GP Content Notes Terrorism

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02/3
After the September 11 attacks, the US was fully justi-
ned in waging war to punish those responsible and to
prevent future attacks. The Taliban government was not
a passive host of bin Laden but was closely associated
with him ideologically. By sheltering him and his terror-
ist network and by refusing to give him up, the Taliban
became his accomplices in terrorism and deserved to be
overthrown.
The invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at capturing bin
Laden and overthrowing the Taliban, which harbored
him. It was not a war against the Afghan people. The
Afghan people, especially women and ethnic and reli-
gious minorities, suffered greatly under Taliban rule.
Their lives have improved since the invasion.
Invasion was the only way to capture bin Laden and
destroy his terrorist organization. Without the com-
mitment of land forces the global coalition formed by
the US could not have hoped to achieve its objectives.
In addition, because the Taliban regime was so isolated
before September 2001, no meaningful diplomatic sanc-
tions could have been applied in an attempt to achieve
these aims peacefully.
Invasion was the only way to prevent terrorists using
Afghanistan as a base in the future. The Taliban provided
a supportive base for a range of terrorist groups seeking
to overthrow regimes in Central Asia, China, and Kash-
mir, as well as for the global terrorist campaign of Al
Qaeda. The stability of the whole Central Asian region
depended on the installation in Afghanistan of a new
government dedicated to peaceful coexistence with its
neighbors. This could only have been achieved through
an invasion.
#/.3
Even though bin Laden masterminded the September 11
atrocities, this was no reason for the invasion of Afghani-
stan. Given the fragmentary nature of government, the
Taliban was probably incapable of seizing him even had
it wished to do so.
Even if the Taliban was judged to be equally guilty with
bin Laden, the Afghan people were not. Yet they are the
ones who have suffered through the invasion and the
ongoing power struggles among the local warlords.
Invading Afghanistan did not lead to bin Laden's capture
despite an extensive on-the-ground search and bombing
campaign.
An invasion using conventional military tactics will
never be effective against a diffuse, highly secretive inter-
national network such as Al Qaeda. As we have seen, the
organization may have been driven out of Afghanistan
but continues its activities from bases elsewhere. To have
made the whole population of Afghanistan suffer in the
vain hope of damaging such an elusive organization was
and is unacceptable.
Debatabaserevised.indd 26 6/10/2004 10:50:32 AM
GP Content Notes Terrorism
\
Swift and decisive action against Afghanistan was neces-
sary as a deterrent to other regimes thinking of support-
ing terrorism. If it is clear that allowing attacks on other
countries will result in massive retaliation and the swift
overthrow of the sponsoring regime, then the world will
have become a safer place and some good will have come
out of the tragedy of September 11.
Ill-considered action against Afghanistan has made the
US more widely feared and hated. The invasion has
increased sympathy for bin Laden, especially in Islamic
countries. This in itself seriously increases the risk of
future terrorist attacks, but it also threatens moderate
and pro-Western Islamic nations.
3AMPLE-OTIONS
This House supports the invasion of Afghanistan.
This House celebrates the toppling of the Taliban.
This House would overthrow regimes that support terrorism.
7EB,INKS
Across the Great Divide." <http://newyorker.com/FROM_THE_ARCHIVE/ARCHIVES/?010924fr_archive05>
An article from the New Yorker magazine (May 2000) providing background on the Taliban.
The Taliban: Afghan's Fundamentalist Leaders." <http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/background/taliban.html>
Canadian Broadcasting Company article on the Taliban, including a partial list of what was banned under its regime.
Time.com Primer: Understanding the Taliban and Afghanistan." <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175372,00.
html>
Article providing background on the Taliban, the problems bin Laden posed for it, and the politics of the area.
United States Department of Defense. <http://www.defenselink.mil>
Provides up-to-date news on the military aspects of the campaign against terrorism, including the invasion of Afghanistan.
US Invasion of Afghanistan. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._invasion_of_Afghanistan>
A history of the invasion.
&URTHER2EADING
Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.
Penguin, 2004.
Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars. Stylus, 2000.
Gohari, M. J. The Taliban: Ascent to Power. Oxford University Press Print on Demand, 2001.
Goodson, Larry. Afghanistan`s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press,
2001.
Margolis, Eric. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet. Routledge, 2001.
Marsden, Peter. The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan. Zed Books, 2002.

02/3 #/.3
Debatabaserevised.indd 27 6/10/2004 10:50:32 AM
GP Content Notes Terrorism
The arguments for:
1. Fueled by $100 million per year raked off
from the opium trade, the Taliban have
carried out some 30 percent more attacks
than in 2007, and they have become
active in the environs of Kabul. Boosting
troop numbers can help blunt this Taliban
of f ensi ve and enabl e Amer i can,
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), and Afghan government forces to
r egai n t he i ni t i at i ve. Hel i copt er s,
surveillance drones, military police, and
other specialized troops are sorely
needed, American commanders say.
2. The Afghan army and police are too weak
to handle the situation, while NATO
partners are reluctant to boost their
commitments. So sending more U.S.
troops looks like the only option.
3. Instability in Pakistan and the need to
combat al Qaeda make it essential to
maintain a strong U.S. presence in the
region.
Arguments against:
1. The United States and the world are going
through the biggest financial crisis in 75 years, and we do not yet know how it will play out. Signs of an
impending recession are everywhere. Prudence dictates that we refrain from making new investments of
troops, equipment, and money until the uncertainty passes.
2. Every foreign soldier who enters Afghanistan provides one more incentive for Afghans to join the
insurgency against the foreigners. The Afghans have a track record of driving out foreign occupiers. The
presence of American and allied troops combating a religion-based insurgency (of course, also a narco-
insurgency) in a Muslim country is a standing provocation to many Muslims worldwide, so fighting this war
loses good will and gives young Muslims a reason to join anti-American groups.
3. The real threat to the United States is al Qaeda, not the Taliban; and al Qaeda is in Pakistan, not
Afghanistan. So we are fighting against the wrong enemy and in the wrong country. We need to pressure
the Pakistanis to root out al Qaeda.
4. Plenty of Afghans hate the Taliban. We could withdraw and let the two sides fight it out, perhaps lending
air support to the anti-Taliban forces. In 2001 the Northern Alliance, with the assistance of the U.S. Air
Force, swiftly defeated the Taliban, who were much more dominant than they are now. Of course, this
option accepts the possibility of the resurgence of warlords and the decline of liberal democracy in
Afghanistan, though other outcomes could emerge.
So there are arguments on both sides. Even as one recognizes the power of the arguments against
escalation, one must grant the validity of American generals desire to obtain the troops needed to fight
the war as it is presently conceived.
The future surely holds surprises. Perhaps the current efforts by the Saudis and others to broker a
settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban will work. Perhaps the global financial crisis will
lead to a sharp drop-off in demand for opium, thereby cutting the Talibans revenue and forcing them to
curtail operations. Or the Government of Afghanistan, riddled with corruption, may implode, leaving the U.S.
and its allies defending the non-Taliban parts of the country as they waver between warlordism and chaos.
So uncertainty about the future of Afghanistans political system runs parallel to uncertainty about the global
financial crisis and its economic consequences. On balance, and in such circumstances, it seems wise to
GP Content Notes Terrorism
refrain from escalation, at a minimum until we know better what to expect.
Afghanistan is on the other side of the world from the United States, and its culture and history may destine it
to a very different fate than we might wish. The arguments for freezing plans to escalate in reality appear to
constitute a telling case for withdrawal.
GP Content Notes Terrorism