1|Page

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: REVIEW NOTES

By Prof. Alexis F. Medina

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN GENERAL

Quasi-legislative v. Quasi-judicial powers Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. xxx Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. (Smart Communications v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.

151908, August 12, 2003)

Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitumon their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.

(Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

2|Page

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power in general Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. (Smart Communications v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070,

October 19, 2005)

With [the power of subordinate legislation], administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. (Eastern

Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies. xxx The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the

3|Page legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. (Echegaray v. Secretary of

Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998)

The need for delegation of legislative powers Treason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." (Eastern

Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated, or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestats delegata non delegari potest This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Congress however may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law for the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate- and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. (Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 199)

4|Page Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegateand (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. (Echegaray v. Secretary

of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998)

[L]egislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. xxx There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. x x x This rule however admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. x x x However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinableto which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009) In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing

5|Page the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. "The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." xxx It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. x x x The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. x x x "x x x In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." The legislature then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, G.R. No. L-

45685, 16 November 16, 1937)

What cannot be delegated: determination of what offense is punishable

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977)

When are standards sufficient for delegation to be valid? The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR "public

6|Page convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine

Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Limitations on quasi-legislative power The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; 2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; 3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;

February 12, 2009)

4. It must be reasonable. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220,

The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. (Dagan v.

Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. (Smart Communications v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules

7|Page and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. xxx [I]t is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. (Department of

Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005)

Administrative rules must be reasonable

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. (Lupangco v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, 29 April 1988, 160 SCRA 484)

A rule or regulation need not be expressly stated or provided in the statue being implemented Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. (Holy Spirit Homeowners

Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006)

Fundamental is the precept in administrative law that the rule-making power delegated to an administrative agency is limited and defined by the statute conferring the power. For this reason, valid objections to the exercise of this power lie where it conflicts with the authority granted by the legislature. xxx

8|Page Indeed, when an administrative agency enters into the exercise of the specific power of implementing a statute, it is bound by what is provided for in the same legislative enactment inasmuch as its rule-making power is a delegated legislative power which may not be used either to abridge the authority given by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge the power beyond the scope intended. The power may not be validly extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for its just and reasonable execution. In other words, the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law, inasmuch as the power is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Therefore, such rules and regulations must not be inconsistent with the provisions of existing laws, particularly the statute being administered and implemented by the agency concerned, that is to say, the statute to which the issuance relates. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It must be stressed that the DOH issued the rules and regulations implementing the provisions of R.A. 7305 pursuant to the authority expressly delegated by Congress. Hence, the DOH, as the delegate administrative agency, cannot contravene the law from which its rulemaking authority has emanated. As the clich goes, the spring cannot rise higher than its source. In this regard, Fisher observes: xxx Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. Agency rulemaking must rest on authority granted directly or indirectly by Congress. Moreover, although an administrative agency is authorized to exercise its discretion in the exercise of its power of subordinate legislation, nevertheless, no similar authority exists to validate an arbitrary or capricious enactment of rules and regulations. Rules which have the effect of extending or conflicting with the authority-granting statute do not represent a valid exercise of rule-making power but constitute an attempt by the agency to legislate. In such a situation, it is said that the issuance becomes void not only for being ultra vires but also for being unreasonable. The law therefore prevails over the administrative issuance. (Entitlement

to Hazard Pay, A.M. No. 03-9-02-SC, 27 November 2008)

Rules must be published to be effective

Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which

9|Page shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

2008)

(Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December

We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in this Courts Resolution in Taada v. Tuvera: We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which shall begin fifteen (15) days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on Audit, De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, and Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit. In Taada vs. Tuvera , the Court held, as follows:

10 | P a g e "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties." Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. (National

Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761, 04 December 2007)

Rules must be filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987. In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. (Securities and Exchange

Commission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December 2008)

11 | P a g e

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA

Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December 2008)

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as follows:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Sec. 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in this rule. Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

2007)

(National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761, 04 December

A rule that prescribes a penalty for violation should be published before it becomes effective Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. xxx

12 | P a g e In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof. (People v. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954) Circulars to enforce law vs. Circulars to interpret law: Which must be published to be effective?
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 x x x. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. (Victorias
1

Milling v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. L-16704, March 17, 1962)

The fact that the rule is addressed only to a specific group of persons does not obviate the need for publication to be effective The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the

13 | P a g e administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented. Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions. (Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of

Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, 04 April 2001)

Instruction from a superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of the latters duties need not be published In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders

were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench. (Philsa International Placement and

Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, 04 April 2001)

In Nacus defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that there was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ. At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly falls within theadministrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Taada v. Hon. Tuvera:

14 | P a g e Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

(Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187752, 23 November 2010)

Rate-fixing is a legislative or quasi-legislative function A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SECs assessment amounting toP1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its corporate term. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23

December 2008)

In the exercise of rate-fixing power, the rate imposed must be reasonable and just The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the ratefixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable. (Holy

Spirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006)

Rate fixing as an exercise of quasi-legislative power vs. as an exercise of quasi-judcial power In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:

15 | P a g e Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rateswhen such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to crossexamine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public

16 | P a g e considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. (Phiippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, 18 December

1989)

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009) Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association, G.R. No.

111953 December 12, 1997)

Regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the valdity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Smart Communications v. National Telecommunications

Commission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)

17 | P a g e

QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORY POWER

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power in general Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. (Holy Spirit Homeowners

Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006)

Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. United Residents of Dominican Hills v. COSLAP, G.R. No. 135945, 07 March 2001 The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,[8]described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.]

18 | P a g e

The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province ofMaguindanao and the nontransmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said province. Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. (Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 03 December 2009,

G.R. No. 179830)

Quasi-judicial agencies are not courts However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.[25] The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (United Residents of Dominican Hills v. COSLAP, G.R. No.

135945, 07 March 2001)

Jurisdiction of administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions is determined by law Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated. xxx

19 | P a g e In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. xxx That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice. (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB0 v.Lubrica, G.R. No.

159145, 29 April 2005)

Commission on Human Rights has the power to investigate, but not adjudicate As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to

20 | P a g e find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775. (Carino v. Commission on Human Rights,

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 204 SCRA 483)

Requirements of Due process in administrative proceedings In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced." The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend

21 | P a g e ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. (Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 08 June 2005) In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. (Acuzar v. Joroloan, G.R. No. 177878, 07 April 2010) Due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial-type hearing Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioners plaint that he did not fully appreciate the nature of the charges against him because the ATO even without an ostensible complainant against him failed to state or announce that petitioner was being charged with falsification, is incorrect. The subpoena issued to him clearly stated that petitioner should appear before the panel investigating his alleged falsification of the AEB examination results. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780,

27 December 2007)

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough opportunity to present his side

22 | P a g e and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated. (Acuzar v. Joroloan, G.R. No. 177878, 07 April 2010)

in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied [P]etitioners assail the credibility of Ligans statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan. It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the nonpresentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that the contention was unavailing, stating that In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. (Nacu v. Civil Service

Commission, G.R. No. 187752, 23 November 2010)

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. (Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01

July 2003)

The absence of a complainant also did not affect the regularity of the investigation. As opposed to a regular trial court, an administrative agency, vested with quasi-judicial functions, may investigate an irregularity on its own initiative. Particularly in the instant case, the overriding considerations of public safety warranted the investigation of the falsification of the subject ATO-AEB certification, which allowed petitioner to undergo training despite his lack of qualifications. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, 27 December 2007)

23 | P a g e Administrative due process does not guarantee right to cross-examination of witness [P]etitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein. We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation. (Montemayor v.

Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01 July 2003)

Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries

24 | P a g e are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal. (Remolona

v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, 02 August 2001)

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissa. (Carbonnel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, 07

September 2010)

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. (Nestle Phils. v. Uniwide Sales Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 10 October 2010)

25 | P a g e

[T]he principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court. (Acuzar v. Jorolan, G.R. No. 177878,

07 April 2010)

Basic is the rule which has been consistently held by this Court in a long line of cases that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded by him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. That this is the prevailing rule is aptly explained thus: The underlying principle of the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts --- for reason of law, comity, and convenience --- will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. (Union

Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131729, 19 May 1998)

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. (Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development

Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, G.R. No. 170599, 22 September 2010)

26 | P a g e Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: Exceptions in general

Pure questions of law exception

[T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; moot; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388,

January 18, 2011)

[T]he principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is

27 | P a g e disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. (Paat v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997)

Pure questions of law: Exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the Contract of Agreement entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. In Lacap, this Court said: ... It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

(Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011)

It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is when the issues raised are purely legal. However, the Court is not persuaded by respondent's contention that the special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA involved only purely legal questions and did not raise factual issues. A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that factual matters were raised. (Public Hearing

Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, G.R. No. 170599, 22 September 2010)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only when the assailed act was in the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function, not quasi-legislative or rulemaking power In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was

28 | P a g e performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. (Smart Communications v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only when the assailed act is in the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. (Smart Communications v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. (Nestle Phils. v. Uniwide Sales Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 10 October 2010)

29 | P a g e

In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. (Fabia v. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 132684. September

11, 2002)

In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. (Smart Communications

v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)

Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the administrative body of special competence. (BF Homes, Inc. v. Manila Electric

Company, G.R. No. 171624, December 6, 2010)

30 | P a g e

Res judicata applies in administrative proceedings Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows: a) The former judgment or order must be final;

b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties. xxx This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court: Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. x x x. There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case. The parties, although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have been the same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject fishpond area. The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the rights to the subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actions associated and related to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and the petition now before us. With regard to the identity of the causes of action, this Court, in Mendiola v. Court of Appeals[ held that:

31 | P a g e The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. x x x. The similarity between the two causes of action cannot be impugned. The facts and evidence which supported Catalinas petition for revival of Hipolitos fishpond sales application in O.P. Case No. 4732 are the same facts and evidence now before us; hence, the difference of actions in the two cases is of no moment. In O.P. Case No. 4732, the action was to revive Hipolitos fishpond sales application, which, when granted, gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area, eventually leading to their ownership over the same. The action in Civil Case No. 97-15, the case that was elevated to become this petition, is for the nullification of the respondents respective titles to the subject fishpond area on the ground that the respondents have no right thereto. If we allow the nullification of these titles on the ground presented by the petitioners, then we would also be nullifying the decision in O.P. Case No. 4732, because it is the decision in that case which gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area. Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating over the same subject fishpond area. More importantly, the same contentions and evidence as advanced by the petitioners in this case were already used to support their arguments in the previous cause of action. The petitioners argue that res judicata cannot apply to this case because O.P. Case No. 4732 is an administrative case. While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, we have also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies. As this Court held in Fortich v. Corona[: The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasijudicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. (Emphasis ours.)

(Derla v. Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011)

Evidence required in administrative proceedings On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It

32 | P a g e means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. (Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01 July 2003) Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. (Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

187752, 23 November 2010)

Review of administrative adjudication: Findings of facts of administrative agencies entitled to great respect, and even finality by the courts The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received. The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction. (Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473,

02 August 2001)

In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the

33 | P a g e administrative agency concerned. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,

December 2007)

G.R. No. 166780, 27

Factual findings made by quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies when supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even finality by the appellate courts. This is because administrative agencies possess specialized knowledge and expertise in their respective fields. As such, their findings of fact are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. (Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.

No. 189479, April 12, 2011)

Factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. (Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. v.

Albayda Jr., G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010)