Bangsamoro Framework

The recently signed preliminary peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Muslim separatist group the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a welcome development for the Southern Philippines, which has been ensnared in a violent conflict that has claimed more than 120,000 lives over the last 40 years. Already some commentators are suggesting that the Framework Agreement is a model for that could be adopted by other Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand and Burma, who have ongoing security challenges associated with ethnic Muslim insurgencies and separatist movements. The domestic business community and regional neighbours are heralding the agreement as an opportunity for economic development and investment in the regions rich natural resources and agricultural potential. Addressing insecurity and encouraging investment is perceived as an antidote to the endemic poverty in the region. The Framework Agreement is more than a simple ceasefire and disarmament agreement. The agreement spans a broad spectrum of judicial, government, security and financial management issues, and includes specific measures outlining the necessary institutional and governance structures required for the new autonomous region of Bangsamoro. Without detracting from the positive expressions for peace, graduated disarmament, disbandment of private armies and the normalisation of human security, the agreement is very much a road map that has avoided addressing the most contentious sticking points. To a degree, creating a transition process spread out over a number of years to establish key institutions, deliver security and reconcile deep seated opposition and confrontation makes sense for two key reasons. Firstly, the creation of the appearance of peace and security will help Manila attract foreign investment into Mindanao for increased agricultural production, infrastructure development and

extractive industries exploration and production. Confronting the core bones of contention in an environment of entrenched poverty and factional conflict with no economic leverage or incentive may end the peace process before it even gets started. Breaking from the existing regional economic stagnation may, instead, provide President Benigno Aquino IIIs administration with some leverage with which to encourage a new autonomous government to actively manage potential political instability. Secondly, Aquino's broader peace strategy of converging multiple objectivities to stabilise Mindanao had to balance a variety of competing interests. Intrainsurgency factionalism, local clan competition and provincial rivalry made Aquino's convergence strategy ambitious and challenging. The result is that the Framework Agreement defers many of the most contentious elements of securing a new governance framework for Mindanao and rightly hands determination of inclusion in Bangsamoro to local plebiscite. This approach is a product of earlier peace agreement negotiations, such as the 1996 peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front, which were overturned by courts, derailed or left unfulfilled. Reports suggest that both the MILF negotiators and the Aquino administration were mindful of the past failures. A central issue still to be resolved is the extent to which a central Mindanao authority will reduce the administrative authority of the provincial governors of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi or disrupt existing relations between Manila and the archipelagic provinces. In relation to this, the Framework Agreement states: "The privileges already enjoyed by the local government units under existing laws shall not be diminished unless otherwise altered, modified or reformed for good governance." At present these governors, and their provincial government patronage networks, have not been affected by the existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which has had limited political and fiscal influence over local government units. The Framework Agreement

essentially bets both ways: it assuages concerns of a centralised regional authority taking greater administrative control of federal transfers, while at the same time allowing existing laws and privileges to be varied in the name of good governance. At some point, this will need to b e addressed and if provincial interests start to harmonise with competition between insurgent groups there is a potential risk of the peace process being derailed. Equally challenging will be the issues of civilian policing and any transition of MILF members into a local police force. The jurisdiction of Sharia courts may also be problematic, as it may be difficult for Aquino's administration to intervene in judicial processes that are questioning or assessing the limits of Sharia jurisdiction and precedent. There is no guarantee the Philippine judicial system will refrain from such questioning or challenging the precedent and authority of these courts. Above all, the imperatives of incremental transition and change may be problematic considering the importance of Aquinos personal political commitment to a peace process and the reality of political term expiring in 2016. There is always the risk that if a transition period of establishing the institutional and political foundations for Bangsamoro is not completed within Aquinos term a new administration may not follow through with the process. Importantly, these limitations seem to be recognised by both parties: with the Philippines government and MILF representatives emphasising the Framework Agreement is a first step and a roadmap. This measured optimism, underscored by the caution publicly expressed by Aquino, reflects the need to temper expectations and acknowledges particular forces that could easily unravel the plans for peace. Submitted by: Mr. Bernie P. Ibanez Submitted to: Atty. Coronel