A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

May

& Sept. 1982

Volume 10 Numbers 2 & 3

139

Patrick

Coby

The Education Aspects

of

of a

Sophist:

Plato's Protagoras
of

159

Warren R. Brown

Aristotle's Art
of

Acquisition

and

the Conquest

Nature
a

197

Thomas Prufer

Notes for

Reading
versus

of

Augustine,

Confessions, Book X
201

Larry

Peterman

Machiavelli

Dante:
on

Language 223 251 David Lowenthal

J.

and

Politics in the Dialogue

Language

Shakespeare's Caesar's Plan

Economics
or

Harvey

Lomax

Political Philosophy: Which Should

Prevail in Public Policy?

273

Robert Sacks

The Lion

and

the Ass: a

Commentary

on the

Book

of

Genesis (Chapters

25-30)

Discussion
319
353 423
George Anastaplo
Stewart

Notes toward

an

"Apologia

sua"

pro vita

Umphrey

Eros

and

Thumos

David Bolotin

Response to

Umphrey

interpretation
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io

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Interpretation

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The Education

of a

Sophist:

Aspects

of

Plato's Protagoras

Patrick Coby
Kenyon College

I
One
to the

clue

structure god of

of

Plato's Protagoras lies

with

the

figure

of

Prometheus.1

This Titan

dialogue. His

"forethought,"

name means

Greek mythology serves a double purpose in the and he generally is associated with
which conduces

that cautious approach to life

perity.

to self-preservation and pros

For example, the word nooLir\Qr\c, first occurs in the dialogue when Protagoras thanks Socrates for his subtle reminder of the dangers incident to the
practice

sophistry (316c). And the god himself is first identified when Protagoras cites him in the myth as the deity responsible for the gifts of fire and
of

technical wisdom. Prometheus

would suggest
species.

is

credited

in large
with

part

(a

close examination
of

that he

is

given credit

entire)

the preservation

the human

For this

reason

the salvific knowledge which Prometheus imparts to

measurement"

may be likened to the "art of vation of man's life (356d). The art
men

which of

Socrates

calls

the sal
as

measurement, defined pains,

by

Socrates

the weighing

of aggregate amounts of pleasures and

represents

the con

summation of

that Promethean knowledge introduced

by

Protagoras.
cautious
ascertain

The

second purpose of and prudent

Prometheus
of

foresight

weighing

from his symbolizing is more difficult to alternatives

aside

and requires a consideration of

the

myth

in

which

he

occurs.

Protagoras
earth

relates

that

in the

beginning

all mortal races were

of each

fashioned beneath the

them

by

the

gods; that the powers

species were apportioned to

by

the titan

brothers, Prometheus
wish and allowed allotted the

and

Epimetheus;
the human

that Prometheus acceded to his brother's

the

Epimetheus to

execute

distribution;
"naked,

that Epimetheus

mis-

powers,
and

leaving

species

unshod, unbedded, and

unarmed";
wisdom

that Prometheus rushed to Olympus

arts with which

where

he

stole

fire

and

in the
said

to

accommodate

the near-birth human beings.

Later it is
of a

that

by

virtue of these accommodations

human beings "partook

portion"

divine

(322a).2

One implication

design,

was

not

is that the human race, according to essentially different from any other species: there
of the myth

original was no

This paper was first presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the New York State Political Science Association, Syracuse, New York. For a different treatment of the Promethean motif, see Clyde Lee Miller, "The Prometheus 1
.

Story
2.

in Plato's

Protagoras,"

Interpretation, 7 (May 1978),

are

pp. 22-32.

All translations from the Protagoras

the author's.

140

Interpretation
in the divine blueprint. Whatever
could not of powers were appropriate

homo

sapiens

to the

human

frame, they

have included
only.

the power of reason, this

having

by way less than its survival, to the timely intervention of Prometheus. The human being, it would appear, belongs to an anomalous and indeterminant species that
come to man no

theft

Thus

mankind owes

its

specific

humanity,

is

halfway

between the
and

animal and

the divine: he is

mortal and

like the beasts,

but intelligent

like

the gods. For Protagoras this intellectual capacity, or the

human being's Promethean endowment, is mainly confined to the technai of self-preservation. To be part brutish and part divine means to the sophist that
man relies on cleverness

in

place of

instinct

and physique

in the has

struggle

for dif

existence.

But Socrates indicates that

mankind's

intermediate

nature

a rather

ferent meaning for him. He claims at the end of the dialogue that he is a dis ciple of Prometheus. Prometheus symbolizes the promise of knowledge (that is,
of correct

definitions)

which

Socrates,

as a

disciple, ardently

seeks

to attain.

Socrates dreaded
sable

contends and

that the knowledge of good and evil, or of what is to be

dared (called simply courage in the Protagoras), is an indispen pleasurepreliminary to the knowledge of self-preservation and successful
and

seeking (3i3a-3i4b);
not pretend measurement.

because Socrates lacks the former

(314a), he does
as

to possess the

latter, despite its

adumbration of a

by

him

the art of

For Socrates then, the partaking

this sort occasions a

divine

portion means

having

the wisdom necessary to realize the extent of one's ignorance. A Promethean

endowment of

lifelong

investigation into the

question of

virtue; accordingly, the dialogue concludes with

to join him in continued inquiry.

Socrates

beseeching

Protagoras

At

one

other point

in the dialogue Socrates in the

alludes to man's

in-between
the argu

existence.

This

occurs

poem analysis where

Socrates

makes or

ment,

strained

in its

application on

to the poem, that

or

faring

well

ill in life

depends respectively
man's or

knowledge
whether

ignorance. The
can and

point

of contention

throughout the analysis is

knowledge
acquires perpetual

be

a permanent possession of

is something which he Simonides, Socrates concludes that

and

loses in turn.
a

Speaking

for

knowledge is

divine

prerogative

that

temporary knowledge is
a

the most that is vouchsafed man. At his

comes and

best,
other

man possesses

knowledge that
opinion.3

goes,

or what

Socrates in

dialogues

calls right

Right

opinion occupies
wisdom. man who

that epistemological half

way house between ignorance and the understanding of the daemonic desirous
of

In the Symposium it designates

is

aware of

his ignorance

and

the

wisdom of

the gods

(202a,
wise).

202e).4

then say, enjoys a

Promethean

endowment

The daemonic man, we might that leaves him part brutish (that is,

ignorant)
3. 4.

and part

divine (that is,

But, like Socrates, he is Promethean

and the

Meno 97d-e; Euthyphro nb-e, 15b. For an interesting examination of the In-Between
trans, and ed.

Anamnesis,

Gerhart Niemeyer

(University of Notre

daemonic man, see Eric Voegelin. Dame Press, 1978), pp. 103-109.

The Education of a Sophist

in the
sense of

141 in love
of with

being

erotic,
with

a philosopher and

wisdom;
as

rather

than
case

cautious, preoccupied
with

safety
of

fearful

persecution,

is the

Protagoras.

Given this dual function

the erotic,

Prometheus,

to represent both the cautious and

with reference

it is

significant that the

dialogue begins

to the theme

of eros and

then turns rapidly to the theme the lover

of

of caution.

Socrates is introduced

by
of

an anonymous companion as redeem

the beautiful but aging Alcibiades.

persuade and

As if to his

even greater

his reputation, Socrates endeavors to love for the wisdom of Protagoras;

the
wise man more

the companion

he

enjoins

the

com

panion to esteem
soul over

than the handsome youth, or to prefer the

the body.

We

notice

that Socrates commends to the companion the very behavior that

put

the young
returned anxious

Hippocrates

into

action at the

beginning
slave

of

the day. For

having
was

from chasing

after the

body

of

his

Satyrus, Hippocrates

to commence his quest for the wisdom of Protagoras. It seems that

Socrates'

Hippocrates took to heart Hippocrates is

expected.

protreptics on the

beauty
of

of wisdom.

But

not applauded

by

Socrates

and encouraged

further,

as might

be

Rather he is

rebuked

for his

efforts.

The burden

Socrates'

remarks

to Hippocrates urge caution and moderation in place of the erotic hunt. What
explains man

this shift in emphasis

who

from

eroticism

to prudence

is the

character of a

the

from

Hippocrates

would

importune instruction. Protagoras is

more

sophist,

and a sophist of

is

a merchant of

doctrines,

interested in the

profitable sale

his

wares

than in the education and well-being of his students. He is an

educator who

insists that he be dealt his interrogation

with

on

a cash

basis. For this

reason

erotic enthusiasm on

the student's part is singularly out of place.

of

By

the time

Socrates fearful desirous

completes

Hippocrates,

the two of them are more

of

the harm to be suffered

by

association with

Protagoras than they

are

of

the benefits to be gained. Circumspection has effectively quieted

the erotic
excluded

urge.

As

token of the extent to which eroticism is consciously

from

Socrates'

discussion

with

Protagoras,

there

is the delightful
the dead

Callias'

vignette enacted on

doorstep: likened to the

residence portal

realm of

(315b,

315c), the home of Callias is a

wise

men; and in attendance at the

exemplifies

for illustrious but erotically deficient of this new Hades is a eunuch.

Protagoras then
of which are

that cautious Prometheanism the twin objectives

Concerning the second of these objec security for his practice of charging a of Protagoras tives, Socrates never tires chiding fee his money-making inhibits the erotic relationship that need obtain between
and acquisition.

teacher and student.

But

with respect

to the

first objective,
Protagoras

a caveat

is in

order

lest it be
energy.

supposed

that Protagoras is a

man

of modest ambition and most

limited
With

Perhaps

what

inspires

and quickens

is his desire for fame is

reputation, and

he

pursues reputation even at risk to supersedes

his

personal safety.

him the love

of

fame
of

the love of life. Because the love of

decidedly

form

eroticism, it is incorrect to say that Protagoras is simply

142

Interpretation

unerotic.5

Indeed,
of

were

there no erotic component to

and would

Protagoras, Socrates
to
persist with

would

find him

little interest
But
while

have little

cause

the in

Protagoras is admittedly erotic, and while his eroticism is of ultimate importance to Socrates; the direction of this eroticism, that it is aimed at fame, is a more immediate concern, and one which induces Socrates
vestigation.6

to

lay

stress

on

the cautious at the expense of the erotic.

The tone

of

the

Protagoras is

combative:

Socrates,

the

first challenger,

pitted against
reputation

Protag

oras, the doyen

of a

of

the sophistic trade. This contest for the eroticism which Socrates

is

eroticism

sort, but it is
of

not

condones.

Hence the teach

an

ing

the Protagoras is the

omnipotence of enlightened self-interest: of alternatives as

in

formed, dispassionate weighing

conduct one's

the most satisfactory way to

life. intent cryptically of the thesis of the Protagoras is to define sophistry, its
to flesh out the character of
as

The

caveat stated above anticipates and so speaks of

this essay: namely, that the

limitations, Protagoras,

and

the obstacles to its

premier

improvement;

the

sophist,

around such

issues

virtue,

cation, ambition, and the opinions of the multitude; and to

through use of

knowledge, edu move Protagoras,

of

his self-revelatory comments, to

as of

an

understanding

sophistry
philos

(that

is, sophistry
and which

the art of measurement, or the science of pleasure-seeking)

reliance on exact
knowledge,7

which, because ophy,

its

is less hostile to its

own manifest

is

even open

to philosphy

because

of

inade

quacy.8

In

sophist's

word, Socrates attempts to educate Protagoras by utilizing the cautious Prometheanism (this more than his love of fame, though not
a

to the exclusion of his love of

philosopher's erotic

fame9)

as a means of

introducing

him to the

Prometheanism.

This project,

as

by

the advanced

formulated, may seem unrealistic, given the obstacles posed age of Protagoras, his reputation, and the general success of
desires
could

5.
of

Of

course all appetites and

be

considered as species of eroticism.

But the love

fame is sufficiently exalted and plays upon emotions sufficiently distinct as to be classified apart from the desires of a lower order. An example of someone who ascends from a lower to a

couches

desires is Glaucon in the Republic, who begins demanding relishes and comfortable (372c-e) only to sacrifice these for the fame of founding the perfect regime (404d). See Allan Bloom, Interpretive Essay, in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 343-456. As it is, interest in Protagoras is none too pronounced. See 310b; cf. 310a.
higher
order of
Socrates'

7.

Throughout

Protagoras'

myth and

argument, or

what

speech,"

Protagoras is loath to distinguish the

sophistic virtue

in the scholarship is called the "great teaching of virtue from the coercive

methods of citizens.

He leaves the impression that

is habit.
to ends given

8. The See

art of measurement provides scientific means

by

opinion.

For this

reason

it is inadequate.
rates makes a point of

outlined the art of measurement and having christened it sophistry, Soc saying that its practitioners are Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias. The honor is divided among three and diminished accordingly. At the same time the financial rewards of exhorts the public to part with its money, to sophistry are enhanced: pay the sophist's

9.

357e.

Having

Socrates'

fee,

that

its

sons might receive

this indispensable education.

Money,

not

fame, is

to

be the

pri

mary inducement to the

practice of sophistry.

The Education of a Sophist

his
ways.

143

To be sure, Socrates harbors no serious hopes of reforming Protag oras, who is at best an unobliging pupil. The cross-examining of Protagoras
serves rather the

larger

purpose of

elucidating the

nature of

the sophist and

the

pedagogy necessary for his

conversion to philosophy.

II
When
approached

by

Socrates

and

Hippocrates, Protagoras
He
speak

wastes

little

time

in showing himself to be
passed all previous
without

a competitive educator.

explains

that he has sur

sophists

by

his ability to

openly

of

his

profession

incurring

risks

to himself. Protagoras is a better sophist than

not with respect

Homer,

his teaching, Hesiod, Simonides, forth, manner but in the of its transmission. Protagoras candidly admits that he is a such as poetry, to disguise the instruction sophist, and he employs no
and so

to the content

of

"veils,"

that

he

provides.

In short, he boasts
with

of

being
for

the

first

sophist
we

to have com
take this to
mere

bined
an

personal

safety

the reputation
and

wisdom.

Unless

be

incidental accomplishment,
we must

take also

Protagoras'

boast to be
garner

fool

ishness,

suppose

that the sophist's desire to

fame

by

public

pronouncements of

heterodoxy, but of such heterodoxy as would imperil him if once discussed in public, is the intrinsic, ever-present dilemma of a dilemma, however, which Protagoras purports to have resolved. Socrates, we submit, in questioning the teachability of virtue, means to put
sophistry10

this boast of Protagoras to the test.

Socrates

confronts

Protagoras

with

two

objections, each drawn from the behavior of Athenians. As Socrates

sees

it,

Athenians

imply
to

that

virtue

is

unteachable

when,

gathered

suffer anyone
allow

address

them on

matters of

virtue, that

is,

in Assembly, they public policy, but

teachable this subject,

only

experts

to

testify
seem
would

about matters of art.

If be

virtue were a experts on

knowledge, Athenians
and

to reason, there

would

only the
that

experts

then be permitted to speak.

Athens'

observes
unable

exceptional

citizens,

Secondly, Socrates notably Pericles, are generally

teach virtue,

to

pass on

their virtue to their children, despite the pains taken to pro

education possible.

vide them with nor

the best

If

virtuous men cannot

hire

capable

tutors,
not

Socrates concludes that virtue must be unteachable.

voiced

These two sistency that taught, but

tion
assumes

objections

by

Socrates have inherent in them

to the
Protagoras'

an

incon be

is

exactly

relevant

question of whether virtue can reply.

which

is

of crucial importance to

The first

objec
which

that Athenians are equal in

a

judging

affairs

of state

for

reason certain

Athens is

democracy. But the

of

second

objection, in that it recognizes

challenges supports:
of

Athenians to be
and

outstanding virtue,
this

the assumption of

equality
10.

the

political

regime
and

assumption

Pericles, it is

af-

Leo Strauss, Natural Right

History

(Chicago:

University

Chicago Press, 1953),

pp.

116-117-

144

Interpretation
more excellent than
rule.11

firmed, is
entitled

the multitude; thus

respond

Pericles, it is implied, is
first objection, then, is to to him for the expressed
respond

to

For Protagoras to

to the

disappoint those, like Hippocrates,

purpose of

who

have

come

attaining
objection

prominence and

notoriety; and for Protagoras to

to

Athens'

the second

is to

antagonize those who are partisans of

demo

cratic regime.

This dilemma

facing

Protagoras is the heart

to the

Socrates'

of

test, for

it

would

appear

that the two

objections

teachability

of virtue cannot

both be safely refuted. In reply to this challenge

master, Protagoras
argument. provides

and

his
to

"pupils"

in the condescending manner of a first with a myth and then

democrats
(in
and pays

school with

an

The

myth appeals

worried

homage to their

egalitarianism,
reassure

while

the

argument endeavors

a somewhat covert

fashion)

to

the ambitious that sophistry offers them the ticket to

of

success.

The
the

legitimacy

democratic rule, the

myth

affirms,

resides

in the fact that

dispensed equally to all men, in contradistinction to the Promethean distribution of talent in the other arts. That the political unequal, art, or virtue, is possessed differently than all other arts is the moral of Pro
political art was
tagoras'

tale.

It demonstrates

not

that virtue is unteachable, as

Socrates
so

con

tends, but that it is taught

that this virtue, of which

by
all

all and practiced

by

all.

However, it

happens

partake,

amounts

to little more than the citizen's

habit

of rendering obedience to the law. In proving thus that virtue is teachable, Protagoras has plainly disadvan taged himself: if virtue is universal taught by all and practiced by all what

need

has

anyone

for

a sophist?

The teaching

of the myth that the political

art,

or political redoubt

virtue, or virtue, or wisdom

whatever

the name

is every
averred

man's

is simply incompatible with the elitist presuppositions Accordingly, Protagoras in his argument must controvert what he
myth.

of sophistry.

in his His
all

He

must

find

some

grounds or of

on

which

to establish the uniqueness of

sophistry's
procedure

teaching
is to liken

of virtue success

the virtue which sophistry teaches.

given

in virtue, supposedly
art which

equally

by

Zeus to

men, to success in flute playing, an

given set

along

with

the other arts was

of education

unequally

by

Prometheus.

By

way

of

explaining the limits

by

nature and

chance, Protagoras
to repeat their

submits that the sons of virtuous citizens

political successes than are

are no more

likely

fathers'

the sons

of accomplished craftsman
of

likely

to repeat the technical and artistic successes

unlike

their

fathers. The

reason

why virtue,

flute playing,
requires

seems unteach

able

is that the importance

of virtue

to the

city

that it be learned and

gifted.
on

practiced

by

everyone,
of equal
with

including

those who are not

especially

Were
as

flute playing
wide a

importance to the city, it

would

be taught

just

scale,

the same result that only those gifted

by

nature would rise to

the

upper ranks of excellence.

What Protagoras implies is

that virtue and art are

II.

Thucydides

11.65.

The Education of a Sophist

the same except

145

for their
of art

respective manners of

inculcation:

anyone can

be

taught the rudiments

and accomplishment with a good nature. and

just

as anyone can

be taught the himself

rudiments of

virtue;

in

either

depends

on

the conjoining

of a good education

Protagoras

of course offers place

as

the good educator,

pedagogic

therewith establishes that unique

for sophistry in the

myth

process.

We

recall

that

at

the center of

Protagoras'

is the distinction between

the aptitude that all men

some men

selectively
second

possess

commonly possess for arete and the aptitude that for techne. The first, to repeat, originated with

Zeus,

the

with

meaning
speech.

of

the myth,

Prometheus. That distinction, the very purpose and effectively disappears in the discursive portion of the

Protagoras'

secret

teaching,
point,

elitist

techne are one.

The

relevant

however, is
Protagoras'

in its implication, is that arete and that because this teaching is

open endorsement of

concealed, it does

not conflict with

demo
set

cratic egalitarianism.

It thus

serves to

help

extricate

Protagoras from the trap

equivalence

for him
A

by

Socrates.
point should

second

be

underscored:

in teaching the

of

arete and

which

techne, Protagoras puts sophistry on the side of that Socratic doctrine holds that virtue is knowledge. The form which this doctrine takes in the
virtue

Protagoras is that
nical

is the

art of

measurement, that

is,

that virtue

is tech

knowledge,

or that arete

is

techne.

advance the proposition proposition

that virtue

It is noteworthy that the first party to is knowledge is not Socrates, with whom the

is commonly associated, but Protagoras. Socrates returns to it later in the dialogue, we will argue, because of its efficaciousness to sophistry in
general and

to Protagoras in

particular.

Protagoras has intimated that he is knowledgeable in

advanced

a political art more

than the instruction tendered this knowledge

by

the

body

politic. of

But

never

does he

explain what
modest:

is,

and

his description

he "surpasses

others a

Again, Protagoras is being

he
could

little in going forward towards cautious; but he is not being as honest

admit

his teaching is pointedly (328b).

virtue"

as

he

claimed

be. While he does

that

to

being

sophist, he

conceals what

sophistry

is, implying
The
as a

it is but the
concealment successful

completion of an education

in

good citizenship.

extent of

his

becomes

clear once the subject of nature surfaces

factor in the

pursuit of virtue.

Rather than

elaborate on so

phistry's education of returns

the

exceptional of

young, as might be expected, Protagoras

to the habituated virtue

of

the citizen and compares it

favorably
and

to the

lawlessness
coerced

the savage. He suggests

thereby

that the pinnacle of virtue

is

habituation, threatened from below

Socrates who,
unaffected accomplishments of

by

human depravity;
citizens.

he berates
virtue,

"misanthropic"

the

with an eye on some more resplendent

disdains the
portion

ordinary

In this the closing

of

his speech, Protagoras

reiterates

and confirms

the

teaching

of

the

myth

that virtue

is habit.
performed

Protagoras has

admirably, but it

would

be

an exaggeration

to say

146

Interpretation
Socrates'

that he has actually

passed

test. He
with

has

concealed

himself

throughout

behind

"veil"

of civic-mindedness,

character of whether

his

profession.

Based

on

only faint hints given of the real his speech alone, it cannot be determined

Protagoras

possesses a political art which

disclosing,
he does

or whether

his

professed

teaching

of

safety virtue is

considerations prevent a simple

fraud. And if may

possess an
either

art, there is the further ambiguity that its

publication

be hazardous
who

because it legitimizes

government

by

the

wise

(by

the man

knows the

common good and

the means to its attainment) or because

it

replaces virtue with

This

second
when

hood that

self-serving possibility has yet to be discussed, but there is every likeli Protagoras identifies virtue with art, he means by art essentially
the art of rhetoric
courts and
which enables

cleverness.

two things:

first,

its

practitioners

to defend

themselves in the law

such as

Assembly; in
virtue of

litigous, democratic society

even superannuates

Athens,
piety

this art mimics the

courage,
of

it;
the

second, the
pretense of

art of

disguise

by

which students

and

justice, enjoying
Protagoras
when

a reputation

sophistry for virtue along

maintain a clever with

fruits
not

of self-indulgence.

refers

to this seeming virtue, excusing but

recommending it,

he defines

moderation as

lying

about one's a

injustice

(323b). When Protagoras is later forced to

proffer

such

recommendation

(333d), he

takes refuge in an to his

irrelevancy,

and

the

conversation able

breaks down.

Contrary
As
a

boast, Protagoras has

choose

not

been

to combine candor with

safety; he has had to

result, there are

of

between them, and he has chosen to be cautious. ambiguities in his speech. Chief among these are the
virtue and of

relationship
tagoras

knowledge to

the sophist to the multitude.

Socrates'

In

subsequent sections of the

out on each of

dialogue it becomes

concern

to sound Pro

these questions; and on each Protagoras shows himself to

be

of a

divided

mind.

Ill

Following
rebuttal.
as a

Protagoras'

great

speech, Socrates

says

Instead he begins anew, asking Protagoras

or whether virtue

whether

nothing of substance in he regards virtue

parts, like
so

homogeneous whole,
gold;
and

composed of undifferentiated

pieces of

for him is

heterogeneous,

with parts as

many dif

ferent in form

function

as are the organs of perception which make

up the

face. When Protagoras

parative

adopts

the latter

depiction, Socrates launches

Socrates'

on a com

study of the five parts of virtue. There is one unmistakable peculiarity about ensuing argument. His intention generally is to prove, against Protagoras, that virtue is an undif ferentiated
whole whose parts all reduce
man and

to knowledge. To do this he abstracts

from the just

the

just deed

and considers

justice in

and of

itself. He

The Education of a Sophist

reasons that

147
nor
unjust.12

justice

cannot

be

impious,
he

piety
can

his

argument emerges

when

submits that there

But the peculiarity of be no alternative to

piety (or justice, for example) save impiety, its diametrical opposite. Be cause Protagoras agrees to disallow the notion of an impious justice, Soc
rates concludes

that

justice

tion
and

the

more

likely
from

be pious, having precluded by mere asser possibility that justice is nonpious a virtue distinct
must

separate

piety.

middle

ground

of

moral

neutrality

neither

pious nor

impious,

just

nor

unjust,

and so on

which

it

would of course seem

reasonable to

affirm, is herewith

collapsed

into the

opposites of virtue and vice.

Why

does Socrates

adhere to so extreme and

implausible

a position?
Protagoras'

We

think the reason is twofold.

lax definition

of virtue.

First, Socrates is responding to Protagoras defined virtue as obedience

poet

very
to

law

and as

seeming justice. Like the behavior that

the

abidingness of the sound man

Simonides, who in his ode applauds the law(vynqg cxvrjg), Protagoras regards as exemplary
is between
virtue and
means

mode of conduct which

vice,

or

between

rewards and punishments of civil society.

with

Socrates
virtue,

then to confront

Protagoras
escape
Socrates'

a more

exacting definition

of

one which obviates

the

into the

complacent

forbearance
in

of respectable mediocrity.

extreme position reflects

reverse what

has

come

In this way before.

It is

also

anticipates

what

comes

likens the

oneness of virtue

later. Socrates favors the analogy which to the oneness of gold, whose division into parts
the parts of gold differ only
same.

accidental and quantitative:

by

greatness and

smallness and are therefore

essentially the

If this analogy is to hold, the

Protagoras,"

12.

Gregory Vlastos,

in "The

Unity

of the

Virtues in the

25 (1972), 444-52, recommends that the "surface in which moral predicates is and "piety is
pious"

grammar''

of such
are ascribed

Socratic

Review of Metaphysics, statements as "justice

just,''

to universals, be
particular

disregarded
of the
at

and

that the phrases be

read as

universals: a

just

man who

predicating behaves justly is

"

pious and
at once

just behavior to

instances

pious; a pious man who

behaves piously is

once

just. He

reasons thusly: are as

moral predicates

brave-cowardly
matical

impredicable

of a

[for example, just-unjust, pious-impious, logical entity, like a universal, as of a mathe

pious."

figure: to say that justice is pious would be as One might ask though whether say that the number eight or a hexagon is God is not a logical entity and whether it is not reasonable to speak of him as just, holy, moderate, and so forth. If by God Socrates means that perfection of wisdom towards which dae
entity, like
a number or a geometrical absurd as to
monic

human beings only aspire, then to

suppose that

divine
absurd.

wisdom would

be imperfect
articulated

were

it

not also

just,

moderate,

holy,

and so

on, seems

hardly

Protagoras has

that some

men are courageous

cupies the position that

but unjust, Vlastos

nomenal character of virtue man

(329c). Protagoras already oc to, namely that of affirming the phe (with the difference that Socrates would deny the possibility of a just
while others are would

just but

not wise

have Socrates

move

being

unwise

and other such combinations of virtue and vice).

But is

seems

from the

context

is attempting to induce Protagoras to consider justice as a ngayfia n (some thing) and informing its phenomenal occurrences. We think it is fair to say that Vlastos is transcending generally indifferent to the context of the dialogue, inasmuch as he treats the Protagoras as an
that Socrates
accidental conduit

for the doctrine

Thesis,"

of the

cogency

of all

three articulations of this

and

Unity of Virtue; and it is his purpose to establish doctrine, designated by him as (1) "The Unity
Thesis."

the

Thesis,"

(2) "The Similarity

(3) "The Biconditionality

148

Interpretation

parts of virtue must themselves

be

commensurate

quantities, such that

an act of

justice is distinguishable
as

by

size

from

an act of

courage.13

As

strange a proposal

this may seem, Socrates

as the art of

utilizes

it

when

later in the dialogue he defines

as a means of

measurement.14

sophistry
courage equips

Introduced

incorporating

into the unity of virtue, the art of measurement is a faculty which its possessor to make all decisions in life according to available
of pleasure units

amounts so

and

pain.

By

this

model

an

act

of courage

represents

many

of

pleasure,

and an

act of cowardice

so

many

units of pain.

Corollary
but

to this

teaching is

the fact that at every

decision-making juncture,

every alternative choice no matter how approximate merely incorrect and bad. Hence no middle ground between good and evil, or between virtue and vice, exists. Every
one choice emerges as correct and

good,

with

decision
pain;
no

either

succeeds

or

fails

at

maximizing

pleasure

and

minimizing

decision is
of

neutral.

The

purpose

the

above

remarks

is to

show

how

Socrates'

arguments what

attesting to the unity of virtue are conditioned

sophist

by Protagoras, by
He has explicitly

the

has

said

and

by

what

he has left
or

unsaid.

said that virtue

is is

habit; Socrates
knowledge. The
need reason

would

have him say

given
on

say

more

that virtue

previously for caution imposed

to

Protagoras'

explain

reticence
of

was

the

him
overt

by

the

inconsistency
with

the Athenian
elitism.

body
The

politic

its
over

combination

of

egalitarianism offers

covert

debate
oras

the unity

of virtue

now

a second reason

for why

Protag
Pro
such

treats of virtue from the citizen's perspective.

attempt

Socrates'

to
all

identify
things

justice
are

with

piety is
ways and soft

stymied

when

tagoras

objects

that

in

some

alike,

including
wisdom.

seeming Socrates

opposites as white and

undertakes

black,

and

hard

(3 3 id). So

stymied,

to equate the virtues of moderation and the same technique of aligning things

Despite

the fact that

meets

he

uses

by

opposites, he
throughout

here

with

success.

There is this

one

difference, however:
particular act

the argument

(332b-332e) Socrates
act.

moves

from the

to the general

faculty
the

producing the
the
and

Three
with

sets of opposites are

listed,

each

establishing
thoughtless

union of

thing done
and

the

power

by

which

it is done:

as

thoughtlessness

respectively from thoughtfulness, so also, reasons Socrates, things done strongly and weakly from strength and weakness, and things done swiftly and slowly from swiftness and slowness. To all of this Protagoras concurs. Socrates next presents three additional sets of opposites which differ from

(immoderate)

thoughtful

(moderate) doings

emanate

their counterparts

by

virtue of

their

having

dispensed

with examples

known

by

13.

Joseph
14.

See Harry Jaffa, Cropsey (Chicago:

P- 74-

in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss and Rand McNally, 1972), p. m. Rudolph Weingartner, The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

"Aristotle,"

1973),

The Education of a Sophist

experience.

149 contrariety
of

Socrates

submits the
and of

the beautiful

and

the ugly,

of

the good and the evil,

the high

and

the

deep

of

the voice without

including
A

reference to particular occurrences of things

done

beautifully

or of

persons who are

beautiful. Again Protagoras Protagoras

concurs.

moment earlier

is

opposed

that even

just only the unjust and the pious by only the impious. He replied opposites bear certain resemblances to each other, that white and
resisted the unadulterated proposal that the

by

black
the

are not

entirely dissimilar. But brought to the

and

same point

(for example,

beautiful

the ugly)
and

by

way

of concrete examples

(for example, things

and wisdom are

done
sive

thoughtlessly

thoughtfully) Protagoras
sole opposite of

affirms the absolute and exclu

same

contrariety because each is the

we

of abstractions: moderation

(ococpgoovvr])

the

thoughtlessness

{dupgoovvrj)
sense would

What

discover from this Socratic interrogation is the

similar to

in

which

Protagoras is

the multitude

of men

(as

much as

he

like to be differs

their untouchable superior). On the experiential level Protagoras acknowledges

the existence of opposites. He understands that a courageous
person

from

coward,

wise person

from

fool (common

sense experience

for

example,

wise"

"many [329e] was

are courageous

but unjust, and many again are just but not the basis for his saying that virtue is a heterogeneous

It is only on the conceptual level, and then only when concept is divorced from experience, that Protagoras disavows opposites, claiming rather that all things bear resemblance to one another; such a position makes intellec
whole).15

tual

clarity
with

about good and evil quite

impossible.16

Protagoras

seems then out of

joint
moral

himself, for

as

sophist

he

suggests the ultimate

relativity

of all

propositions,17

but

as a man

he

appeals to those experiential certitudes

which

delineate
point

virtue and vice.

Our

is that Protagoras
this

speaks

to disguise
15.

himself

he does

without

glowingly of citizen-virtue not merely doubt but also because there is a

arising from common sense, it is only Socrates: the unity of virtue
In effect, Socrates is returning
argues

If it

seems that

Socrates favors the

granted

heterogeneity

because Protagoras has is

oras to square one: 16.

homogeneity

on terms unacceptable to

part of a nondescript sameness that penetrates all things.

Protag

for example, things done strongly and weakly. Republic 479a. In distinguishing knowledge from opinion, Socrates

that there can

be knowledge only of things that are (that is, the ideas), whereas opinion is of things that become (that is, phenomena between being and nonbeing). He says of the many phenomena that things
beautiful look both beautiful
and

ugly, that things

good

look

good and

bad,

and

that things

holy

look

holy

and unholy.

In

other

words, there is resemblance of opposites among the objects of the "three

fingers"

opinion.

At Republic

524c

(the

conclusion of

passage) Socrates

states

that this

resemblance of opposites can

turning it
with

around

be instrumental in compelling a soul to undertake an investigation, toward the contemplation of being. The discipline which helps to accomplish this

conversion

is

mathematics

(number,
For

calculation, plane and solid

geometry).

But Protagoras,

happy

things as

they

appear and with the

obscurity

of opinion

mathematics

(Protagoras
on

3i8e).

an excellent analysis of

(Protagoras 334a-c), dispenses with the "three passage, see Jacob

fingers"

Klein, A Commentary
pp. 115-17-

Plato's Meno (Chapel Hill:

University

of

North Carolina

Press, 1965),

17.

Cf. Protagoras

334a-c and

Theaetetus i6ic-i62a,

i66c-i67d.

150
side
city.

Interpretation
complete

to him in

harmony

with

the

experience

and

opinions

of

the

Discerning

this

partial

ticulars of experience as a means of teristics of

congruence, Socrates resorts inducing Protagoras to

to

to the

concrete par

accept

the to

charac accept might

difference

and sameness when applied

abstract

ideas

in

other

words,
noted

the possibility of

definition

and

real

knowledge.

It

further be

that Protagoras the citizen is here

more amenable

to philosophy

than Protagoras the sophist. At other points in the dialogue the

and

reverse

is true,

it falls

to Socrates to remind Protagoras that he is a sophist, a wise man

(352b-d). The
mon
argument

being

advanced

is that Protagoras holds basic

views

in

com

with

much-despised

hoi

polloi.

found in the
each tries

subsequent section of at

Evidence supporting this thesis can be the dialogue where sophist and philosopher

his hand

literary

criticism. critic.

Protagoras is the first to play

ode of

He

recites selected passages prove

from

an

Simonides; his
contradicts

general purpose

is to

the

poet

inconsistent. He But

observes

that Simonides believes it difficult for

men

to become good.

himself, Pittacus, a sage of old, for stating that it is difficult to be good. In defense of Simonides, Socrates suggests that the poet intended a difference
Simonides
when

Protagoras charges,

but

few lines later

he

rebukes

between his
(ZpLpLEvai

own

"to become
of

good"

(yeveodai

tiyadog)
his

and

the "to

be

good"

Sodkog)
once

Pittacus;

and

Socrates

supports

proposal

Hesiod's Works

and

Days to the

effect that

becoming

good

by quoting is difficult, but that

being

good,

having
rebuff:

with an
ides],"

imperious

become so, is easy. Protagoras greets this suggestion "Much would be the ignorance of the poet [Simon
. .

Protagoras explains, ".

to
possess

trifling
beings"

virtue,

what

is

most

if in this way he says that it is something difficult of all, as it seems to all human

(34oe).
position

Protagoras'

is that
Socrates'

virtue

must

be difficult
addition

or

else

it is

trifle

{(pavkov). That it is
gested

Protagoras'

position
use of

in

to hoi

polloVs

is sug
good

by

the

fact that it is

the Hesiod quotation violates the plain

sense of easy).

the poem (neither Simonides nor Pittacus holds that

yet not

being

is
ad

And

in light
rather

of

the poem that Protagoras protests this

complains

hominem argument, but

opinion,

he

that it runs afoul of universal

quite seriously.

an opinion which

By
they
arete

Protagoras'

account

he evidently shares and takes all human beings, for whom

reason that

"vulgar"

charactristic predication

(337c), disdain

the vulgar opinion about virtue.

(cbavXog) is a Virtue,
excellence of

say, is

noble and

for the very

it is difficult. The

lies in the

willingness

to suffer, to struggle, to persevere, to withstand the

allurements of pleasure and ease.

Virtue is heroic self-sacrifice, In espousing the

and the

tragic

hero is the
of

paradigm of

human

excellence. an

essential

difficulty
in the

virtue, human beings cling to

old,

aristocratic view crystallized

epic poems of and

Homer. There is
and

said that virtue

is

practiced

for its

own

beauty
lend

splendor,

that virtue

is universally

admired

though it does not

The Education of a Sophist

itself to

-151

calculations of profit and

loss

and though

it does little
play.

or

nothing to

ameliorate
where

the adverse conditions that brought it into

In

tragic world,
virtue of man

the

destruction
hard
and

of

the

individual is

an

ineluctable fact, the

is

always

toilsome,
the
appears

being

in

perpetual conflict with an evil that per

of evil never

sists within and without

soul.

Because the malignancy

virtue retains

abates, great,

because heroic
ance.

evil

itself

desirable,

the

character of a

struggle conducted against

temptation, weakness, fear,

pain, and ignor

If virtue,

conceived

as

heroism,
of

of

courage,

of passionate

something difficult, leads to the glorification of intensity in a word, of the active life and
virtue

motion; nonheroic virtue,

points of

that is easy in its exercise, as maintained

by
is

Hesiod,
in fact

to wisdom, to the contemplative

life,

and

to rest.

Easy

virtue

two sorts, a division which reflects Aristotle's distinction between

moral and

intellectual
or

virtue.

Of the first
whose

sort

is the

virtue of

the just man, the

brave man,
and pleasure.
meled

the temperate man,

disposition towards justice, courage,

and whose actions are graced

moderation

is informed
man

by

prudence,

by

Because this
Achilles'

knows

fairly

well what

by

the doubts and misgivings which

he is doing, he is not tram figure so largely in heroism (for

and an

example,

tortured choice between a glorious death

actions are

inglorious

life);
love

and

because his

intrinsically

pleasurable, he is

not required
self-

to sacrifice himself in pursuit of nobility. Quite the contrary, nobility and

are

for this

man one and

the same. The more he practices virtue the easier

it becomes, until The other sort Contemplation is

rest

finally
of
man's

virtue

is

as natural

to his soul as seeing is to his eyes.

contemplative

easy,

restful virtue

is the

life

of philosophy.

rationality

carried

to its highest perfection; calm and

which

become it. It is the its he

reverse of

heroism

reflects

man's

passionate

nature at
which

most violent pitch.

The hero

seeks

distinction

and

individuality,
his
emo

attains through

tions, through great and truth does little to distinguish him The brief
analysis of

experiencing and displaying the full loves and great hates. The philosopher
since

range of seeks

it is

not

his truth

which

only truth, he seeks.

which

the Hesiod quotation indicates the extent to

Protagoras, in associating himself with the opinion of hoi polloi, betrays his antipathy to the contemplative life. The conflict between difficult virtue and
easy
virtue raises

the

question of whether

the

hero

or

the

philosopher

is the

most excellent

human
virtue.

being

and whether courage or wisdom

particular even

is

the most ex

cellent of

human

On this

issue Protagoras is
professional

a sincere advocate self-interest would

the hero

and of

courage,

though his

have him think otherwise; for if

cause

virtue

is

at all times

difficult,
as

there is little to teach it.

for

anyone

to

purchase virtue

from the
could not

man who purports

Protagoras holds that Simonides

virtue rather

be

so

ignorant

to suppose that

is

easy.

When the time

on

different injunction

for Socrates to play critic, he imposes a Simonides: Socrates contends that the poet was
comes
committed

not so uneducated as

to believe that evil is

willingly (345d-e). In

152
order

Interpretation
ranks of wise

for Socrates to include Simonides in the

men, the poet

or that

must affirm virtue

that all wrongdoing is unwilling, or that vice is

what

ignorance,
and

is knowledge. The difference then between

intelligent Simonides is

Protagoras

Socrates

expect of an
with

a measure of and

Protagoras'

lingering kinship
travel

the multitude and of the

distance

direction he

must

if he is to

distinguish himself as
attempts

a wise man.

In the

poem analysis which

follows, Socrates

to chart this course

of

by

speaking

discreetly

to Protagoras about the

importance

knowledge to

virtue.

IV
Socrates'

rather

fantastic

exegesis of the poem

education.

is

preceded

by

an

equally

fantastic in
which

examination of

Lacedaemonian

The

substance of

this study,

Lacedaemonians (and
of

Cretans)

are credited with

highest
to

achievements and the

in the field
because they
and

philosophy, is the

contribution

of wisdom

power

incompatibility

of wisdom and power with

fame: Lacedaemonians

are powerful

are wise and

because

everyone

to courage and to

training in
fail to

gymnastics. call

erroneously attributes their power This combination of wisdom, power,

Protagoras'

fame

can

hardly

to

mind

boast to have been the

first

sophist

to make safe

(power)

the publicizing

(fame)

of wisdom.

The
(one

Lacedaemonian

example contests

this claim, and

with such explicitness

could also mention

the unmistakable parallel between the traditions of Greek

philosophy,

whose adherents

include the

seven

sages,
as

and

that of Greek so

phistry,
notice

represented

by

the nine

"veiled"

sophists)
will

to put Protagoras on
addressed reveals

that the ensuing analysis, like its prelude,

Socrates'

be

to him per
we

sonally.

poem

analysis,

strange as

it may seem,
to

its logic,

suggest,

when viewed as a private communication

Protagoras,
his

with all re

marks made about

Simonides
of

applicable to the sophist and

profession.18

A detailed study

the Socratic exegesis is not here appropriate. The essay's

limited
1

objective permits

only

brief discussion

of

its

most

salient

feature:

8. The

similarities which

tie Simonides and Protagoras together are numerous enough to jus

a stand-in

tify
men

the contention that the

are sophists

former is

for the latter: (I)

By

Protagoras'

testimony, both
questioning: a

(3i6d). (2) Both

engage

in

a mode of speech that and

is deaf to

Si

monides

is

a poet whose work per se

forbids investigation (347e).

speech),
whose orations are

Protagoras is

rhetorician,

a practitioner of makrologia
and

(lengthy
(335a;

full-sailed

ships

racing

across

the sea (338a).

343c).

(3) Protagoras
assail

and

like resounding vessels (329a) Simonides are both ambitious,

a means of

preferring

reputation

to truth

(4) Both

the giants of the past as

establishing their reputations (3i6d-3l7c and 339d; 343c). (5) Both tolerate a reduced standard of human excellence (32ic-d; 346d); accordingly, both substitute the acquisitiveness and ambition of the moderns for the moderation of the ancients (343b). (6) Both are flatterers (328c; 346b). (7) Both
are

Hipparchus

itinerant teachers (315a; 346a-b 228c). And (9) both teach that

and

virtue

become good, while impossible to be virtue is impossible (340e).

good

Xenophon's Hiero). (8) Both teach for pay (328b; is difficult: Simonides teaches that it is difficult to (339b); Protagoras teaches that the easy possession of

The Education of a Sophist

-153

namely, the observation, repeated some five times

the ode

by Socrates,

that throughout

Simonides is solely concerned to discredit Pittacus and steal from him his reputation for wisdom. By way of substantiating the claim that Simonides is a surrogate for Protagoras, we note in passing that Protagoras is guilty of the very same offense, that he attacks the artistry of Simonides for the purpose of What Socrates then charges against Simonides, and discrediting a rival Protagoras too, is the prostitution of their crafts the subordination of poetry and pedagogy to the cause of personal ambition. The sophist is an ambitious man; this trait is at least as important as his deficient eroticism and his partial orthodoxy. He is competitive, for he sees in his profession the opportunity to grow rich and famous. In fact his competitive
sophist.19

nature and

may

well explain

his

attraction

to heroism.

By

means of

wit, subtlety,

persuasion, the sophist defends himself and

subdues

his

opponents.

Like
re

the

heroes

of epic

poetry, his

principal virtue

is

manliness

except

that

he

places the crude of the mind. unrefined

force

of the martial arts with the

"sophisticated"

employments
even come

For

reason of

this substitution, he may

to

despise

the

simplicity

of courage.

Protagoras plainly

adopts this

attitude,

defining

courage as a subrational

technai taught

is

superseded

by by

nurturing of the soul which is positively outside the sophistry (351b). Protagoras apparently believes that courage other forms of boldness (351a), specifically by the art of
which enables

euboulia,

good

counsel,

its

practitioners to protect

to advance their

interests,

to do

all

the things that courage purports to

themselves, do, but

by

the more effective and more sophisticated means of clever speech. Never

theless, Protagoras, and those whom he tutors, retain a vital element of the heroic model in that their reputations as wise men depend on the vanquishing
of
rivals.20

Socrates'

position, made evident

that this
"heroism"

by

of

sophistry is the
prevents the

chief obstacle sophist

his arbitrary reading of the poem, is between the sophist and

philosophy, that it
art.
and

from taking seriously his own At his best the sophist possesses a knowledge which he teaches for pay, he calls this knowledge virtue. At his best he subscribes in some manner
even virtue

to the Socratic doctrine that

ambitiousness

is knowledge. But Socrates implies that the

of

(cbikoviKia, meaning love

wise,21

victory)

of

the sophist

dissuades

him from

reaching his best. This Socrates does when he accords Simonides the designation but on condition that the poet join other wise men in
ever
19.
moment

No

other explanation exposed

is

possible since

Protagoras

quits command of the conversation the

he has

considered

Simonides contradicting himself judgment that the poem is artistically sound.

Contest,"

and

has

confronted

Socrates

with

his

ill-

20.

See Frederick Nietzsche, "Homer's

to the
Ancients,"

in The Portable Nietzsche,

pp.

ed. of

and

trans.

Walter Kaufmann (New York:

the

Viking Press,

1968),

36-38.

Cf.

pp.

557-59

Twilight of

Idols, "What I Owe

21.

from the

same volume.

In

one of

his

several paraphrases of a

the poem

(3440-3453;

cf.

339c), Socrates deprives

Pittacus

of this same

designation. As

daemonic

philosopher convinced of

his ignorance, Socrates

is

closer

to Simonides who says that it is difficult to become good (that

is,

to possess the in-

154

Interpretation
evil

avowing that
to this

is

never committed willingly.

As

stated

before,

the corollary

proposition is that virtue equals knowledge. The reason why it is dif ficult for Simonides, and for Protagoras, to endorse this proposition (apart from the fact that in proportion as virtue is knowledge, virtue also is easy) is that

involuntary
the greatest

and unintentional
Socrates'

blames Pittacus (in

things"

blameable.22 But Simonides wrongdoing is not liberal paraphrase) for "lying exceedingly about

if

lying
one

is evil, Pittacus
of

culpatory.

about the greatest things, and have lied unwillingly; and unwilling evil is ex Thus Simonides is not entitled to blame Pittacus, and his entire poem
must

(347a). If Pittacus indeed lies

long

censuring

the

sage

is

an unfortunate miscarriage. wise

To

accept

that

evil

the sophist that

is unwilling, he forego the

and

therefore to

be

in

Socrates'

judgment,

requires of conquest.

quest

for fame through intellectual sophistry is

Nothing
The ions

less than

fundamental

reformation of

anticipated. certain opin

sophist

is

untrue

to his art because he

adopts

unwittingly

and attitudes

virtue and

the belief in

from the many, most especially the admiration for heroic its importance to the good life; because he appeals
art

to this belief
and

by

shaping his

into

form

of

because he

rests content with a standard of

intellectualized manliness; excellence drawn from hero

himself from the
pursuit of

ism, namely victory in debate,

knowledge. With these
sequent

and

so excuses

shortcomings of

the

sophist

in mind,
on

Socrates'

sub

discussion

of

the art of measurement takes

the character of a

deliberate

rectification.

In the concluding
save

section of

the

dialogue, Socrates
to one
another"

returns

to the

question of

the unity of virtue. He finds Protagoras now ready to concede that all virtues,

courage,

are

"fairly

near akin

(349d). But

when

Protagoras
takes

Socrates'

repels

ensuing

effort

to

make virtue one

with

throughout, Socrates

the circuitous route of

with

the noble;

(1) (2) contesting

equating the good

the

the pleasant and the pleasant

experience of akrasia

plaining

virtue as correct

reckoning

of pleasure and

pain; and

(incontinence); (3) ex (4) granting to teaching

sophistry, defined
of virtue.

as an art of

measurement, sole responsibility for the

Having

previously declared that

and

virtue

is unteachable, Socrates

now affirms

that virtue can be taught

this assertion, we note, is
of

that it

is taught
pleasure

by

the sophist. The context of

and virtue

hedonism:

is the good,

is the

art

maximizing

pleasure

and

minimizing
with

pain.

Also,

the argument

disputing
good

between knowledge (that

of

right opinion) than

gods).

Pittacus

who says

that it

is difficult to be

is,

to

be

wise

like the

22.

Apology

26a.

The Education of a Sophist

akrasia,
on which of

155
the unity of virtue to the revised

everything

depends, from

definition
the
no

fallacious and plainly so: it relies on sophistry homogeneous soul, one in which passions are rational and have interests aside from the general welfare of the soul; it presumes that the
notion of a

this argument is

soul's

welfare,

made

known

by

the activity

of

supported

by

the passions and appetites, even

parts.23

when

weighing alternatives, is readily the good of the whole is at

articulated

variance with the good of the

The psychology

by

Socrates in

the Republic is profoundly different, in that it recognizes the contribution of discipline to virtue. In the Protagoras Socrates maintains that knowledge is

both the necessary and the sufficient cause of virtue. The extremity of the argu ment can be accounted for, we in light of the person to whom it submit, only

is

addressed.

Protagoras has done his

utmost to obscure the

linkage between

knowledge

and virtue

thus Socrates exaggerates their ties. On the other

of virtue

hand,
of

Protagoras has implied that sophistry is the art this art is all that one needs to prosper in life
makes explicit sophistry's embrace of the

and

that mastery thus

(3i8e-3i9a)24

Socrates

doctrine that

virtue

is knowledge

by

designating
has
in
pression of virtue

sophistry his
own

as the art of measurement.

For the

sake of a sophist who

eschewed

knowledge, partly for safety

true opinion, Socrates
which

considerations and

ignores the
and

role which makes

partly as an ex habit plays

virtue

(something

he

admits

elsewhere)

instead

synonymous with

knowledge.25

23.

For

a similar explanation of the

fallaciousness

Socrates'

of

argument, see

Terry Penner,

"Thought
ed.

and

Gregory
")

in Plato, II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion, Vlastos (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 197 1), 103-08. Penner argues that the
("

Desire in

Plato,"

statement

in the Republic
expresses

at 438a

no one

desires drink, but

good

drink,

nor

food, but

good

food

accurately the Socratic doctrine, found in the Protagoras, a doctrine which Plato explicitly disavows at Republic 437c ("But thirsting itself will never be a desire for anything other than that of which it is naturally a desire for drink alone and, similarly, hungering will be [This quotation and the one above are from the Bloom translation, The Republic of Plato]). Penner's explanation is as follows: "Plato refuses to allow that thirst can be thirst for drink which is thought to be good in that situation. For to grant that would be to grant that
a

desire for

food?"

thirst, like desire to not drink, could be analyzed as a desire for good which has associated with it a calculation of advantage, advocating drinking. Therefore, thirst must be for drink simpliciter. This
stops

Socrates from redescribing

answers
Acrasia,"

such cases of conflict as cases of a single

desire for
(p.

good

wavering between two Vlastos, in "Socrates on

to the question what the good is in this

situation

107).

Phoenix, 23 (1969), 82,

makes a similar of

observation,
polloi

although

he does

in affirming akrasia, he states, "So while there is a contradiction in 'I choose this action, knowing it to be bad on the whole, because I want there is no contradiction in T choose it, knowing it to be bad
not pursue
manner.

it in this

Concerning

the

ridiculousness

hoi

good,'

on the

whole, because I want this particular 24. If virtue is confused with the equipment
claim of

good'

(which I
virtue,

can get

only

by

action)."

choosing this

of

for example, power, wealth, reputation,

then it is indeed the

a

sophistry that

virtue

knowledge
25.

which can procure

the equipment of

is knowledge; for sophistry purports to transmit virtue single-handedly. See Gorgias 452e. it is the
condition

Justice in the Republic is

of

not so much a virtue as

for

all virtue

that

hierarchical structuring
tite

the

soul

reason over passions and appetites.

in conformity with nature which establishes the government of The teaching of the Republic is that reason cannot govern appe
and persuasion, of the

directly, by
and

means of

instruction
spirit.

but

must

employ the
other

coercive powers of a

disciplined

habituated

The teaching

Republic, in

words,

is that

virtue

is

not

156

Interpretation
remarks on virtue to
some of

That Socrates tailors his interpretation

analysis.
supported

Protagoras his

addressee

is

an

by

the more gratuitous

particulars of

the

poem

For example,

we

observe

that the Lacedaemonian

akrasia and

model

bears

notable resemblance

to the discussion of

the art

of measurement. of

Socrates
wisdom

reports

that among the Lacedaemonians wisdom is a source

powerful and

power;

is choiceworthy because it is
Socrates'

for

no other reason.

Like
of

wise, the
the art of

substance of
measurement

refutation of akrasia

is that the knowledge

is too

powerful

to

be

overcome

by

appetite and

desire;

hence

akrasia

is

a ridiculous explanation

for

wrongdoing.

Socrates takes up the

subject of akrasia

in

order

to persuade Protagoras of the

with

utility

something

which

Socrates has dealt

previously,

albeit

of knowledge, fancifully, in his

speech about

Lacedaemonian

customs. power

One drawback to Lacedaemonian

remain

is the

stipulation that

its

source

secret, lest this power be neutralized through imitation. The price Lac edaemonians pay for military prowess then is the reputation for wisdom. Even so, Socrates
seems

to recommend Lacedaemonian esotericism over against the

exotericism practiced

by

Protagoras.26

But

as

the

poem analysis makes

abun-

knowledge (simply), but knowledge (reason/the philosopher) in alliance with habit (spiritedness/the warriors). This is true of everyone, it would seem, because it is true of the human soul: appetites
can

can

only be controlled by the spirited passions (anger, shame, honor), and the spirited passions only be trained by a mixture of force (communism) and fraud (noble lies). However, Socrates does make an exception for the philosopher who fortifies himself against his

appetitive nature not of

by

the

hard-won habits

of restraint

but

by

his

predilection

for the

pleasures

the soul. The philosopher seems not to need spiritedness because his eroticism
overpowers part

for

learning

(485d)
the

desiring
The

every other desire. For him it is conceivable that of his soul is naturally disposed to learning. human beings for
whom virtue

virtue

is knowledge because

number of explains

is knowledge is

restricted even

further

when

Socrates

that the philosophic nature

from the laws

withstand

and opinions of

is singularly prone to corruption. The corruption stems defective regimes. No private education, Socrates confesses, can blame that
pours
potential philosopher

the

flood

of praise and

sundry gatherings of people (429b-c). The men, and his proper rearing requires a perfect
and

forth from assemblies, is a

order such as

courts of rare and

law, theaters, delicate speci

political

Socrates describes in the

Republic but There

with

which nowhere exists

in

practice.
"useless"

are still other philosophic

natures, those

reputed

(49oe),

who

keep

company

philosophy because circumstance (for example, exile, tion (496a-c). Mainly, it seems, their spirited desires are
miring crowds; hence
conspire

or

ill-health) has

prevented their

corrup
ad

not excited

by

the blandishments of
and

they

escape

the fate of those

whose

talents, birth, beauty,

"human,"

fortune he dis
of the
of

to mark them as natural

leaders.
of philosophers

Socrates designates the two kinds

tinguishes them

discussed

above as philosopher

and

from the

"divine"

philosopher

(492c). The divine

assisted

is independent

external supports of politics and accident

because he is

by

a god

(492a). In speaking

his

own

sign

intellectual life, Socrates attributes his loving devotion to philosophy to the (496c); he thereby identifies himself as the one divine philosopher.
virtue, seems true of
perhaps

daemonic-

In summation, the Socratic doctrine that

cause of

alone

(though The

he

will

virtue is knowledge, or that knowledge is the sufficient very few human beings; and it applies with full force to Socrates admit one other into his company, cf. 496c). and at

26.

contrast

between the Lacedaemonians

remain no

Protagoras is far too striking to be

acci

dental. For instance, the Lacedaemonians only their

own

citizens; Protagoras has

home; Protagoras is itinerant. They educate fellow citizens from Abderos with him (315a; cf.

The Education of a Sophist

157
to be

dantly

clear,

a sophist

is

not about

deprived

of

his

reputation.

Thus the
of of

Lacedaemonian

example of wisdom
chance of

fame, has little

measurement,
sophist

producing power, but at the expense to a sophist. Here we note that the art appealing

as

described

by Socrates, by

corrects this

is invited to become the tutor

who are esteemed wise of

of

hoi

polloi

very deficiency; for the (357e). Unlike the Lace

daemonians

a select

few,

the sophist is permitted to

enjoy the good opinion The reason why the

and sold

nearly

all mankind.

art of measurement

indiscriminately27

is that it

contains
euboulia.

may be taken to the marketplace little of the competitiveness of the

art of good expects

Protagoras'

counsel,

or

Socrates
that

reveals that

Hippocrates

from Protagoras the kind

of

instuction

will make

him ellogimos,

notable, in the
others

city. His notoriety clearly presupposes the anonymity of many if Hippocrates is to succeed, others must fail. But the art of measure

ment promises

happiness
station

through skillful

decision-making,
situation

and

this anyone can

do, from any

in

life, using
best

whatever resources are at of

hand. Happiness
pleasure,
mini

then is every man making the

his

(maximizing

mizing pain), rather than one man rising to the top of the heap. The point, however, is less the egalitarianism of the art of measurement than the stress it
gives to

the

acquisition of exact of

knowledge. Socrates

goes so

far

as to

say

that knowledge is the salvation

life.

remarking that Socrates hereby accomplishes for sophistry what only boast of providing. Be redefining sophistry as the art of measurement, and by explaining the urgency of sophistic training for all, Soc rates devises a way to reconcile the dissemination of wisdom with the require
worth

It is

Protagoras

could

ments of personal safety.

It is Socrates, then,

not

Protagoras,

who resolves the

one great

dilemma

of sophistry.

The digression
minate

on akrasia and the effort

to unify virtue under wisdom cul measurement, like the Lac

in the

art of

measurement,
shows signs of

and the art of

edaemonian

model,

being

tagoras. Socrates wishes to impress on

uniquely suited to the needs of Pro Protagoras the importance of knowledge. in life,
art

This

knowledge,
of

which conduces spoken

to salvation

reminds one of that cau

tious Prometheanism

of earlier.

The

of measurement

is

a vulgar

kind

knowledge,
which

concerned

solely

with

the pursuit of pleasure. Still

claim

it is

knowledge

Protagoras

cannot

honestly

to possess, and yet

his

need
made

for it is acute, both as a sophist and as aware of his ignorance and of the urgency
Erotic Prometheanism is
at

a man. of

Hence Protagoras is More importantly, the

its

rectification

through wisdom.
prac-

least

within

his

grasp.

315c).

They

frustrate imitation
honored

by foreigners;

Protagoras

advertises

his

wisdom

admired and

by

wise

men; Protagoras is admired

by

the many

by

Socrates. And they

speak

freely

among themselves, but circumspectly in the dialogue is to

correct

to all. They are by Hippocrates but not among strangers; Protag

oras prefers public gatherings.

27.

One

Socrates'

of

purposes

sophistry

so as to make

it

a suitable

"purchase"

for Hippocrates. Cf. 3130-314^

158

Interpretation
eventually
confront the question of what

tice of scientific pleasure-seeking must

is truly pleasurable,
Prometheanism
of

or the philosopher's question of

the good. Here it is that

erotic

the cautious Prometheanism of the art of measurement gives way to the

this Protagoras clearly does far; preoccupied with saving face, he breaks off the conversation midstream. But the bridge is nonetheless in place for his conversion to philosophy should
philosophy. not come or someone

Socratic

he,

like

him,28

elect

to traverse it.

28.

There is in

attendance a

"someone"

of particular

importance; he is Alcibiades. But

for his
sake

the

extent to which the of the

dialogue is directed to him

and conducted

is

a separate

"aspect"

Protagoras.

Aristotle'

Art of Acquisition

and the

Conquest of Nature

Warren R. Brown

University

of New Hampshire

I. INTRODUCTION

"There

are

only two

sections

in the

whole

Aristotelian

corpus

that permit

systematic consideration

Ethics,

the

other

[of economics], one in Book V of the Nicomachean in Book I of the Politics. In both, the "economic is

analys

only a subsection within an inquiry into other, more essential subject matters. Insufficient attention to the contexts has been responsible for much misconcep

Aristotle is talking This statement, by one of the most thoughtful commentators on Aristotle's economics, provides an indispensable insight for those undertaking an investigation of Aristotle's economics: the
tion of what
about."1

reader must appreciate

the setting in

which

Aristotle's discussion
case of

of economics

intentionally,
that the

not

appears.2

accidentally,

In the

the art

of

acquisition,

perhaps the economic

reader must

art, it is found in Aristotle's Politics. In the

alert to the

same manner

be

of which

fails to
The

survive with the a term

Greek understanding of politics, the meaning term, he also must be alert to the modern
not

concept of
meaning.3

economics,

which, if unqualified, fails to describe Aristotle's

art of acquisition

is

found

within a

discussion

of

economics;

2.

Past and Present, vol. 47, 1970, p. 5. M.I. Finley, "Aristotle and Economic Could this be the reason that J. A. Schumpeter, in his History of Economic Analysis (Oxford
states, "Aristotle's
performance

Analysis,"

U.P., 1959)
more

is

decorous,

pedestrian, slightly mediocre and

than slightly pompous common sense"? p. 57; also cited in Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Dis Trade and Market in the Early Empire, Economics in History and Theory, covers the
Economy,"

Polanyi (Free Press, 1957), p- 57- Compare this that Aristotle's Politics exhibits "sublime common
ed.

with

Henry

sense,"

cited

Jackson's statement, in his Letters, in Aristotle, Politics, ed. and tr.

H. Rackham (Harvard U.P., 1967), vi. Failure to consider the context of Aristotle's economic teachings is certainly behind H. Michell's assertion, in The Economics of Ancient Greece (Cam bridge U.P., 1940), that "they [Greek Philosophers] have nothing to tell us regarding those per our minds p. 34. Michell would go on to plexing [economic] problems that so occupy acquit the philosopher of a conscious unwillingness to condescend to such say "it is difficult to [em vulgar and mundane matters as stood in the way of the development of economic
today,"

theory,"

33. In the same vein note Newman, in The Politics of Aristotle (Arno Press, laments the fact that "[pjolitical economy almost originated with him [Aristotle], and the clearness of his economical vision in some directions is balanced by blindness in Polanyi: "none has ever penetrated deeper p. 138. A rare exception to this line of thinking is Karl
phasis

added], p.
who

1973),

others,"

into the
66.
3.

material organization of man's

life. In effect, he

[Aristotle]

posed, in

all

its breadth, the

Economy,"

question of

the place

occupied

by

the economy

in

society,"

in "Aristotle Discovers the

p.

Note: "There is

no single

English

word

that will translate polis

[p]olitics,
concrete

the abstract
not,"

general characterization
"Aristotle,"

derived from the Greek survives, but polis, the

subject, does

Harry Jaffa,
1963), pp.

History

of Political

Philosophy,

eds.

Strauss

economy'

65ff. Also

see

Finley: '"the

cannot

Cropsey (Rand McNally, be translated into Greek the

and

160

Interpretation
evidence seems to confirm that
we

in

fact,

Aristotle

wrote no work evidence

by

that

name.4

And,
were

as

shall

see, it

would

be perfectly

fitting,
to

aside,

if this

true.
"economics"

Aristotle's
ture.

consideration of

is tied

This

For Aristotle, recognition has

a

man's simple needs are met

by

his understanding of na nature through her provisions.

nature

given rise

to the opinion that Aristotle views

as

simply
whom

benevolent

provider or a
world.

kind

mother who

dutifully

nurtures

those

she

brings into the from Bacon

Frequently
who

this opinion contrasts Aristotle

nature as

with a passage

or

Hobbes,

portray

mean,

secretive

and an object of conquest. assessment are not and

This

paper will argue

that those who make such an

totally

mistaken.

Yet the dissimilarities between Aristotle

must

Bacon

or

Aristotle

and

Hobbes

be in light

of

the

following

problem

which

is

common

to the three: the natural circumstances into which man is

man.

born

are

inadequate for from

The failure to
of

give

sufficient

weight

to this
com

problem

in Aristotle's treatment

the "art of
what

acquisition"

has kept

mentators

distinguishing
And it

between
to

Aristotle

appears

to say and what

he actually
opposed to

says.

causes them

ignore,

to comment superficially upon,

or to remain perplexed about those passages which support an

interpretation

their own.
we shall see man.

Initially
sacrifices children

that

from

If

nature

according to Aristotle nature's provisions require is a mother, she does not choose to relieve her

from labor

and pain.

conquer other children of

nature, that

Secondly, given this fact, man is called upon to is, plants, animals and even other men,
nature, if
the
a modern

in

order to

live. The

conquest of

construct, is
of nature

not a mod

ern creation.

According

to

Aristotle,

conquering
well.

is

required not

only for man to live but for man to live he conquer nature's original conditions
must move maternal

The

nature of man requires

that

as

well

as

nature's provisions.

Man

away from his beginnings which reflect his retarded dependency on nature to conditions in which his labor is diminished while his moral
Yet the fact that
man's moral nature

faculties

are rendered active.

is

occasioned

by

the circumstances in which he seeks the relief of his own estate presents

the major problem.

Man's desire to

relieve

his

estate

has its It

root and support

in

the powerful economic

cumstances which give

desires

associated with

his

youth.

seems the

very

cir

birth to that morality

concept

seem

to prevent its dominance.

ancients p. 22.

did

not

have the

[of economy]
as a

"

"Aristotle

and

Economic

Analysis,"

4.
nomic

Finley

twice refers to the

p.

Oeconomica

"pseudo-Aristotelian"

Analysis,"

5,

n.

8; M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (U.

p.

122; Barker emphatically states, "the Oeconomica is not an Aristotle, ed. and tr. Ernest Barker (Oxford U.P., 1962),

work: "Aristotle and Eco California Press, 1973), p. Aristotelian The Politics of of
treatise,"

29;
the

and

Ross

asserts:

"Of the

Oeconomica, the first book is a treatise based on the first book of Oeconomicus, and probably written by Theophrastus or by some
second generation

Politics

and on

Xenophon's
first
or

other

Peripatetic

of the

[t]he
Aristotle,"

second

book is

a worthless compilation of stories

[t]he third
pp.

book

is

not

by

from W. D. Ross, Aristotle (Methuen Publ., 1923),

15-16.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

What is to be done? A
nings, for
on

and the

Conquest of Nature

161

portrait of nature cannot

that account it fails to be descriptive of

simply describe man's begin nature's highest manifes

of

tation,
then it
and with

man.

If

nature

is to be

understood

in light

human

or moral of

nature,

can no

longer be
are

simple.

hence but

evidence of nature's
rather

Man's morality is evidence complexity. His moral needs

his

his complexity
moral

are not consistent

in

conflict with

bodily

needs.

Consequently,
moral

nature cannot predominate unless

even prior

nature,

as a

creator, possesses

intention
this

to morality. Aristotle recreates

must

man's pre-civil conditions with natural roots which can

in

mind.

Morality

be

shown to

have

be traced to
power of

man's

beginnings. It

must

be invested

with strength

to overcome the

bodily desires. This is why Aristotle ultimately portrays nature as a creator who is assisted rather than conquered by her creation, man. To do less is to free man from the pain of his estate only to enslave him to the desires of that estate.

II. SETTING

Aristotle's discussion roughly the

needs,
and middle of

of the art of acquisition

I.5

is found in his Politics in

much

Book

There is nothing
must

surprising in this

ob

servation since

the acquisition of property is necessary in meeting man's

bodily

the significance of these needs

be

acknowledged when speak

concerned with

ing

of political more

life. Yet, to

large extent, Book I is

the house

hold,

specifically

with

the art of household management

(olxovofiia)
present

What is surprising
exchange.7

and somewhat

puzzling is Aristotle's decision to

the association

the

art of acquisition as a part of

the

household,

which occasions no

puzzling is his procedure from the opening through the within middle of Book I. For although placing his consideration of the first book, he does not open by speaking of the household, of man's bodily

Equally

"economics"

needs,

or of of

the art of

acquisition. which

These concerns,
reflect,

perhaps

strength

the desires

they
and

are not

in

need of

owing to the natural his immediate

assistance.

Rather Aristotle's

attention

is turned to

another manifestation of

nature, namely human nature,

the

problematical conditions associated with

its

appearance.

Aristotle

opens

by

speaking

of

the polis, that comprehensive association

without which the household cannot be

properly

understood.

The

beginning

of

5.

See Finley: "Neither

elevation
"

speculation about
.

the origins of trade nor

doubts

about market ethics

or

economy'

led to the

of

'the
and

to independent status as a subject of discussion

p. 22.
Household."

study 6. Note Barker's misleading title for Book I: "The Book I,

part. considers

from "Aristotle

Economic

Analysis,"

Theory

of

the

the complexity of the

p.

polis of which

the household

is

constituent, if

Aristotle, in distinctive,
"finance."

Barker, Politics, Politics,

P-

1.

7.

This fact is disregarded

by

H. W. C. Davis

who speaks of natural and unnatural

Aristotle's

tr. Benjamin

Jowett,

Introduction

and

Analysis

by

H. W. C. Davis (Oxford

U.P.,

1959).

8-

162

Interpretation
man's chronological

the Politics does not reflect the

beginnings; it does
as

not reflect

economic side of man's existence.

Paradoxical

it

might

sound, Aristotle

begins he

with

the ends of man. His art, in the manner of art, imitates nature,

for

prefaces

his

remarks on

the household

by introducing

the

reader

to the polis

and

to

poreal

Completion is the starting point for growth, at least noncorgrowth, and hence politics and morality are brought to light before re
goodness. man's

claiming

beginnings.
the polis is not followed
association

His

mention of

immediately by
political

the household. He

art, for he turns to the association. In this con man responsible for the political statesman, that ruling text Aristotle mentions for the first time household management. The manager

is led from the

political

to the

of

the

household,

that man responsible for ruling the initial association, to distinguish him from the
statesman.

is

introduced in

Aristotle's point, which is not without importance economically, is that these are very different kinds of rule. For purposes of our investigation, this entails at least a twofold
order
effect.

First,

such a

distinction

prevents

the polis from absorbing the

household;

the

bodily
good

man's

desires may not be exorcised from the Politics. And yet, secondly, political life cannot take its bearing from those needs which precede it life
must

the

be

understood as

something

other

than an extension of mere

life. Aristotle has life

chosen to confront

the powerful origins of man's economic

which explores

by

parts.

opening with the polis in a book In what sense does this rob man's
question

the

household
power?

and

its

economic

life his

of

its

This

ing
of

phrase:

"if

...

leads into Aristotle's reopening we begin at the beginning and

.

of

work with

the

follow

consider

things in the process

man's

their growth

Aristotle in

sets

forth the

reason

why

beginnings

follow his

completion

order of presentation: man's

beginnings

are

identified
pre

with growth.

Only

the polis and the soul are

identified

with rest.

Man's

political
which

beginnings is

commence not with male and

impulse."9

female but

with their

union,

itself results from "natural

a response to

Man's

beginning

arises with needs.

His

movement

the body. Natural desire removes man

from his
a number

beginnings
of

while

giving

rise

to the creation of a

household.

Eventually

households
8.
9.

gives rise to a village.

I252a28.

The

creation of the village

is traced to

Barker, Politics, Barker, Politics,

I252a33; in this

regard also note said.

the single individual

your

what

Aristotle has already

Marx: "Now it is certainly easy to say to You have been begotten by your father and

has
to

produced

mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings a species-act of human beings the human being. You see, therefore, that even physically, man owes his existence

man.

Therefore

you must not enquire:

leads hold

you on

further to

to the circular

only keep sight of the one aspect the infinite progression which 'Who begot the father? Who his grandfather?', etc. You must also movement sensuously perceptible in that progression, by which man repeats
subject."

himself in procreation, thus always remaining the Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of in The German Ideology, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Tucker (Norton, 1972), p. 78. In what sense is man's begetting man or his "circular necessary if man is to repeat himself as other than a sensuous "subject"?
1844," movement"

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

the same source
as

and the

Conquest of Nature
desires. But,

163

the

household

man's procreative

following
with a

the village, simple nature ceases to create. Man's growth culminates

movement

from

prepolitical to

political, from

village to polis.
unassisted

Yet the

polis at

results an end.

from deliberation

not procreation.

Nature's

creativity is

The

polis can no

longer be described

or understood

in terms

of prior growth.

Those

economic motives which created the

household

and village

in attempting
qualitatively

to sustain life cannot comprehend that association

which seeks a

superior, that

is,

supra-economic, life for its

citizens.

Consequently, Aristotle

only momentarily reclaims man's prepolitical life and the desires which are at its root. With the end becoming a beginning, man is politicized. The household and man's economic life remain, but with this difference: Man no longer
simply
meets

his

bodily

needs

but

now must meet

them in a
as

moral way.

With

the advent of the polis, man's earlier life as

transformed. Prepolitical
polis

well

his

subsequent

life is
to the

life becomes
of

subpolitical

life;

man's

life

prior

is

understood

in light

his

completion

following

the

polis.

As

a result

initial
was

nature and

the life which she produces are discredited. Prepolitical life

was not

defective; strictly speaking it

is
no

the life of

man.

For this

reason pre com

political nature prehend or

longer its

man's nature.

It,

unlike moral appears

of

nature, cannot

encompass

creation.

All that

to remain, prior to the

prepolitical

polis, is
man

time

when economic

life is devoid
be

humanity. Yet if

is

all

but forgotten, the

same cannot

said of

his initial

economic activ

ities. Man's labor, like nature's provisions, remains from beginning to end. Although also in need of reassessment, it may be permanently reclaimed, for in the As
absence of

deliberation there is

more than the presence of procreation.

economic subjugation of

we shall

see, Aristotle finds in the

life,

the

sub

jugation

of economic

life

or the presence of

humanity
sets

prior

to its

emergence.

Consideration

of the

household

as a part gives

the parts of the household. Aristotle

of which

initially

way to the consideration of forth three actual parts, each

parent-child.

has

constituent parts: with

master-slave,

husband-wife,

The

first, dealing
ruled

subjugation, is followed
reader

by

two concerned with procreation.

Yet Aristotle tells the

part even

that

each

the procreative
unsubjugated

relationship has a naturally ruling and relationships are informed by subjugation.

which

Seemingly
other
concern

the only

part, one the

Aristotle

separates

from the
Its The term

three, is the fourth is

and

part

of

household,
we shall

the art of acquisition.

not with subjugation

but

with acquisition or accumulation.

itself is ambiguous,
ambiguity

Aristotle,

as

see, merely compounds the

gain. But from using the term to denote two contrary forms of the opening Aristotle speaks of the fourth part as an art, an art which has no constituent parts. Hence there is nothing said of internal articulation. At this point it is apparently free of nature. The knowledge that the art of ac

by

quisition

is potentially

a part of

the household does little to

erase

the

uncer-

164

Interpretation it is
portrayed.

tainty
pear

with which

The

reader

has become

aware that

it may ap

to be something other than it

is;

the part may assume the dimensions of

the

whole.

Following
Aristotle
expectation
will

his

enumeration of

the parts or potential parts of the

relationship.

household,
reader's

moves

to a discussion of the master-slave

of

The

is that discussion
follow.

the

husband-

wife,

parent-child relationships

immediately
and
part of

But Aristotle's discussion

art
of

of

the

slave and

leads to certainly

acquisition;

hence the
the

acquisition,

an

unorthodox

dubious
nation. was

household,

replaces characteristic parts

master-slave

in

order of exami
which

Perhaps this is because the

art of

relationship,

initially
an ex

distinguished from the

of

acquisition,

will

ultimately become clearly reflecting in

order

ample

that art. This is not simply for the reason that the slave may

be

acquired.

Rather,

as the part of the

household
of

most

subjuga

tion, it
object

anticipates the civilization of acquisition

which

the art of acquisition. The slave

is

an

should and must

be

subdued

to be ac
master-

quired. slave

Slavery

reveals

the art's

natural character.

For
to

following
focus
on
conquest.

the

fitness

relationship the art of of its objects objects

acquisition

will

come

the natural

which nature

has fitted for

Aristotle's procedure,
made

which at

first

glance appears so

misdirected, has been

to

mirror

the moral misdirection of man.

He begins

by treating

the

master-slave not

relationship, that

union concerned with self-preservation.

But it is

followed

by

the husband-wife relationship, whose purpose is procreation.

art of

Rather love

by

of self-preservation. of one's

moving to the The

own
are

acquisition, Aristotle

extends

the consideration

expectation of aborted

considering in the face of bodily desires

expansion. anticipated

relationships

extending the

which

ignobly
of

limit that love

while

preservation to give

seeking their own birth to comforts is

The

powerful

tendency

case, the
purpose.

art of acquisition appears to

be

before Locke. In any deflection from Aristotle's stated

long

This deflection is tantamount to

an

admission

by

Aristotle

of

the

natural strength of

bodily

desires

which

he

will condemn as

immoral.

Certainly
seek

his

procedure reminds us of

the creative and

who

deflective
aim at
.

power

resulting from

man's economic passions: means of

"Even those

do
.

[the
are

good

life]

the

obtaining

physical enjoyments and

they

thus led to

occupy

themselves wholly in the making of

money."10

III. BENEVOLENT NATURE

Now limited
nature's

within

this setting, one characterized

by

man's

immoral desire for Aristotle

sets

un

acquisition and the art

by

which

that is effected,

forth

benevolent

order:

10.

Barker, Politics,

l258a3-4.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

and the

Conquest of Nature
nature

165
from the

Property
instant
mals

of

this order is evidently given

by

to

all

living beings,
with

of their

first birth to the days it

when

their growth is finished. There are ani

which, when their offspring is

born, bring forth along

case with so

it food

enough to

support

it

until

can provide

for itself: this is the do

insects

which reproduce which are

themselves
viviparous
of what

by

grubs,

and with animals which

by

eggs.

Animals time,

have food for

called milk.

their

offspring in themselves, for

a certain

of the nature

is

adults.

It is equally evident that we must believe that similar provision is also made for Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and animals to give it to men.
when

Animals,
too, in
other

they
if

are
not

domesticated,
in
all serve

serve

for

use as well as

for food;

wild

animals,
also with

most cases

to

furnish

man not

only

with

food, but

comforts,

such as the provision of

ingly,
made

as nature makes

nothing
sake of

purposeless or
men."

clothing and similar aids to life. Accord in vain, all animals must have been

by

nature

for the

While asserting that this

passage

is

"naive"

a commentator such as

Ernest Barker
readily."12

simply interprets it to mean that the earth "yields her Barker's interpretation may stem from his unproblematic
sentence.

abundance

translation of the final

nature makes

Literally

the passage
or

should
"13

read:

"Accordingly, if
earth."14

nothing incomplete speaks of Aristotle's

much

in

vain

But Barker is

not alone.

H. Michell
there is

view of

the

"kindly fruits of the

Apparently,

doubt regarding the validity of Aristotle's teaching but little doubt regard its meaning. This in itself is somewhat surprising since Aristotle's discus ing sion of nature, even within the First Book, is not without obvious difficulties. Nowhere
natural

are

these difficulties better evidenced than

slavery.15

in his discussion
better
see

of

and of

unnatural

And

nowhere

can

we

the inade
of
art

quacy

Aristotle's depiction

of nature as

it

acquisition and

generally to his

"economics."

specifically to the art Prior to his discussion of the

relates

of acquisition
as

proper, Aristotle asserts that

soul.

men

the

body

differs from the

while

Those

who

naturally differ from each other can only obey reason in others are

appropriately slaves masters. Nature has

even more

those possessing a deliberative

a severe

faculty

are

fit to be

articulated

startling than nature's intention

errs; the bodies
of slaves and

distinction among men, yet what is is its execution. Aristotle admits

often

that

nature

freemen

display

no physical

dif

ferences.16

Nature's

weakness

in this

regard

is

not a

lone

exception.

The

reader

ii. 12.
13.

Barker, Politics, i256b7-25. Ernest Barker, Political Thought of Plato

Emphasis
to
me added.

and

Aristotle (Russell

and

Russell,

1959),

p. 375.

Barker

failure to translate

literally

the final sentence of this passage was

comments

pointed out entire

by

Prof. Richard Zinman

who also made

many helpful

regarding the

text.

14. 15.

This, if

Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece, p. 29. the best, is not the only example. For instance, Aristotle's
mistaken

statement

that women

have been

for

slaves
of

tinct regarding the

appears

female

been sufficiently dis thinly the species, Barker, Politics, l252b5-6; l26oal2-I4. And nature
veils the

possibility that
to their

nature

has

not

indecisive in creating intending them for the sake of

16.

animals with a view man:

own preservation while

concurrently

Barker, Politics,

i254bio-i7; i256b20-25.

Barker, Politics,

l254b32-35.

166
also

Interpretation
slave can give
slave.17

discovers that the

can produce a

birth to the freeman,

and

conversely the

freeman

Nature's distinction

within a species

is

not as

evident as

between

species.

tions within the species

by

Aristotle dramatizes the desirable clarity of distinc stating: "If nature's intention were realized if men

differed from
obvious of

one another

in

bodily

form

as much as

the statues of gods

it is
to the

that we should all agree that the inferior class ought to be the slaves

the

superior."18

Men's differences become

apparent not with reference

but only with reference to the bodies of gods. Man attributes his the gods in order to make obvious distinctions among men. It appears
gods
create

nature
easier

to
to

divine

corporealities

than to recreate incorporeal humanity. Man's god

like

representations of man

do

not make

for

unmistakable

distinctions

as

do his

representations of absence of

the gods. Given this

as a

fact, Aristotle

refers

to the slave, in the

that

designation,
of

man.19

Nature's lack

clarity

cannot

be divorced from her deficient

of unnatural

bounty
slavery.

as evi

denced
slavery

by

the possibility,

indeed inevitability, is
subjugated

Such

entails

the inversion of the relationship between master and slave: one

possessing
not waver

deliberative

faculty

by

another.

Now Aristotle does

in his

condemnation of such a

relationship

as unjust.

But, following
issue. In inclina
re
Helots'

the First

Book,

the injustice of slavery seems not to be the only

of the

criticizing Sparta in the Second Book, Aristotle speaks tion to rebel but makes no mention of their unnatural

subjugation.20

Doubt

garding nature's efficacy in distinguishing her slaves is not simply derived from Aristotle's silence. In the Seventh Book, in setting forth conditions for the well-ordered regime he speaks of the desirability of slaves. But apparently the
slaves would
languages.21

be drawn from Needless to say

various

tribes and probably would speak different

He

goes on to promise a
neither

discussion
tribes

of emancipation as a reward

for

such slaves.

nor emancipation

has

a place

in his

treatment of natural slavery. The obvious

ous answer. of

Surely

there might be
with

inconsistency does not have an obvi difficulty in strictly subjugating, on the basis
lives
without

the soul, those

whom one

occasioning

civil

war.

Yet

maybe the

fault lies

with nature.

Does

nature's niggardliness

demand slaves,

even those who are unnatural slaves?

In pursuing
of

an answer we must return to

Aristotle's

portrait of nature as a provider.

The preceding
nature as

quotation

(at the

beginning
nature

this section), which portrays

benevolent,
nor

contains at

least two

parts.

In both
to

parts nature

is

neither

simply hostile
care,
parental

indifferent. Rather

is

made

imitate

the

household:

care, is its formal characteristic. As

nature's children we are the

17.

Barker, Politics, I255bi-s;

with

also

difficulties

surround

the slave's

deliberative faculty, his

friendship
18.

his

master and the extent

to which he possesses virtue.

19.
20.

21.

Barker, Barker, Barker, Barker,

Politics, Politics, Politics, Politics,

i254b33-39. I254bi6. i269bi-20. i330a26-34.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

recipients of a

and the

Conquest of Nature
aspect of

167
uneasy. mas

legacy

which,

given the

dual

parentage, is

Initially
tering

nature appears as a mother capable of

birth her

and

nurture.22

Far from in

nature we are the grateful children of

generosity.

Only

another

work, in a
nal nature

different context, does Aristotle admit that we are has not abandoned us to our needs. She has created

enslaved.23

Mater

man with needs satisfied.

only to
nature,
and

provide the means and objects unassisted

associated

by

which of care

they

can

be

Here

nature,

speaks

by

way

the

biological is

provisions.

resulting from procreation She has secured the infant's life

young.

through the

adult who

portrayed as

providing for her

we are

Nothing

is

said or

of parents who phaned

abandon

their natural young

or of children

who

may be

due to This

natural accidents.

As infants

creator.
nature

attachment gives

way to

another

simply attached to our which is not maternal, for mother

pro-

generates a

dependency
is

that is not limited to the

child.

As Aristotle

admits, "similar

provision
acted

made

for

adults."24

If
what

nature

has

through the adult in her care for the child, then

who or

has

she acted of

through in her care for the adult? Aristotle moves from the

dependency
lieve,"

the child to the

such

dependency
as
.

of

the adult

with

considerable
must

equivocation, using
or

phrases

"it is equally
"u

evident that we

be

"so that clearly

child

we must suppose not

Nature's

concern

for the

child appears as a

necessary, if

for

man.

The

is

at

best

an uncertain

completely accurate, prelude to her concern father of man for man is not limited Aristotle's
comparison reveals a

to the desires associated

contrast.

with youth.

striking
exist

Nature does

not

simply

provide nourishment

for life: "[p]lants

men."

to

give subsistence to

animals,

and animals

to give it to

While

nature's ques

hierarchy
she

powerfully

reinforces

her

concern

for man, it

also

discloses her
appears

tionable concern for anything less than

man.

Nature's

care

uneven;

simply kind. Even her concern for man does not extend to removing his dependency. The lower provisions of nature are necessarily for the purpose

is

not

of man's subsistence.

Man's
visions.

youth

is

said

to

parallel which

that of a child; nature

meets

has

given each pro

Yet the

manner

in

man, the adult,

these needs
own species

is

altered.

Now his inferior

needs are satisfied neither

by

nor through

his

but from

species.

As

a result mother nature

becomes

dramatically

less

prominent.

22.

Note

passage

from

"pseudo-

Aristotelian"

Oeconomicus:

"[Agriculture] is
quoted

also one of

the

activities ment

according to
p. 122.

nature

in

other respects,

because

by

nature all

things receive their nourish

from their mother,

and so men receive

theirs

from the

earth,"

in Finley, The Ancient

"

Economy,
23.

Note Aristotle's Metaphysics: "in many

ways

human

nature

is

enslaved

Aristotle,

Metaphysics (Harvard
enslaved.

U.P.,

1961),

The

gates of of

freedom

appear

sive examination 41-44-

this point see

is simply for the very few. For a more comprehen Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Rand McNally, 1964), pp.
982b29-32.

Still Aristotle does

not

say that man

to

remain open

24. 25.

Barker, Politics,

I256bi2-i8.

Barker, Politics,

I256bl2-I5.

168

Interpretation
a

She

remains

provider,

yet

provided

to

man.

Consequently,
He
must nonetheless

her provisions, if they are provided for, are not man is interposed between provision and exis

tence.

He is

moved.

nature's

kindness,

labor. This movement, while not redounding to appears natural. His movement appears not to be
care

a response against nature's

speaks reason

limited

but

an act

done

at

her

request.

Nature Nature

through man's labor securing

what

has

not

been

secured

for him. For this

Aristotle does

not

identify

unassisted nature with nature simply.

issues in
appears

and sanctions man's actions.

As

result,

man

is tied to

nature and

totally dependent.
limited
care presents an opening. of

Yet

maternal nature's

In her absence, man,

take in

embodying the
own
behalf.26

paternal

dimension
nature,
in the
same

his parentage,
remaining

must subdue or a
maternal

his

Apparently
parental
Lights."

while

provider, has

26. as the

Note the
"Father

imagery
In the

works of

Bacon. In the Novum Organon God is depicted

speaks of the

of

work

Bacon

mother, or more exactly the

and

"great
give

Mother, divinity and art, God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardness of all Francis Bacon, Bacon's Works, collected and ed. James Spedding, Robert Ellis, and Douglas Heath, Vol. Ill (Longman, 1857), p. 265. Man is the product of God's art who must "recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine Francis Bacon, The Complete Essays of Francis Bacon (Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 263. Bacon goes so
mother of

sciences,"

the

which

is

natural philosophy.

Father

birth to the "spirit

man"

of

depicted

by

Bacon "as the

lamp

of

secrets."

bequest."

far

as to

say that "natural philosophy is

possesses
"will"

after

the word of

God

at once
"

the surest medicine against

p.

superstition, and the most approved nourishment for

mother"

faith God's

Bacon, Essays,
Yet Bacon

233.

This

"great

the

"power"

to make manifest

"will."

also admits that

if

"power"

and reason

should

form

an

"indissoluble
"

bond,"

they traditionally have been disunited.

the sciences has with strange
p.

The

for their had

separation

is that the "great

her due.

mother of

indignity
she could

been degraded to the

not

office of a servant

Bacon, Essays,

222.

In this capacity
except

nurture;

she

not received

Bacon

makes no mention of similar

of natural

injustice

accorded to our

"Father"

insofar

as

the

depreciation
suggest

philosophy

prevented the

bringing

of

light. Yet there

are passages which

mother."

that God, the father, may have received that which justly was due our "true For instance, he states that theology has deflected the "wits and learning of from natural phi losophy (Bacon, Essays, p. 221). Bacon attempts to explain away any conflict by maintaining that
men"

the subjugation of natural philosophy results

most power over men's

from

"superstition"

and

"religion,

the

thing

which

has

minds,

[and] has by
her"

the simpleness and

p.

incautious

zeal of certain persons

"blind"

been drawn to take

not

part against

(Bacon, Essays,

233).

Irrational beliefs

and

zeal,
not address super ascend answer

God,

the

Father,

cast a shadow over natural philosophy.

Yet Bacon's

response

does

a number of significant questions: stition or

to a

Is God only a Father darkness? In shedding her servility can the station of greatness equal, if not superior, to that

of

Light? Is there

a rational

basis for

great mother of natural

accorded the

Father

of

philosophy Lights? The

to some of these questions may

man recover

lie in Bacon's
p.

recreation of

the comment that "man is a god to

bequest"

but from the

that right over

arts"

(Bacon, Essays,
nature which

262).

The

great mother

belongs

to it

in

an eclipse of

divinity. Indeed

Bacon's, call

for

by divine honoring our

may "let the human race but that bequest may result "great exposes the depen
mother"

dency
can at nature

of

God

even as

he

sanctions those activities which constitute natural philosophy. needs the

parental

imagery

we

find that the father

Using

the

mother, for she

can

best only indirectly bestow unencumbered she can relieve man's but perhaps God the father is an encumbering invention. Both
the
moral

directly

grant what the

father

estate.

Not only

mother

inventions, in varying

ways,

engender restraint as

solution to the problematic character of man's

based

upon moderation or abstinence

enshrine

light

and

dispense

with

is an impediment to man's rebirth, a rebirth which should darkness. Far from moral or manly, such darkness is, in Bacon's

birth. A morality

words,

"merely

childish and

effeminate"

(Bacon, Essays,

p. 254).

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

and the

Conquest of Nature
but
never to

169
eclipse.27

articulated maleness as coeval with

humanity

her

own

Man

remains

dependent but,
and

given

Aristotle's
He

presentation of nature's

man must

stir,

these stirrings assume

a posture

toward

hierarchy, dependency; they

reveal

kind

of independence.28

subdues nature's provisions

by

his

own

labor. While Aristotle

nature's

would never allow man's efforts to

be

pitted against
of man's po

scarcity
sprang.

or nature's

impotency,
mind

he

cannot

hide the fact

tency. Man does not remain a child. He matures and can rival the parent
which

from

he

With this in

Aristotle first

removes man
art."

from

nature's

dominating care by portraying his potency as a Initially the characterization of man's early
art seems unproblematic.

"natural

economic

The

arts are endemic

to man.

activity as They involve

might

a natural a

kind

of

knowledge
that man's

which

is

put to work so that man

which

may live. And it

be

expected

first labors,
would

for that purpose,

examination

satisfy be the most

needs

by

provisions

natural of all

expressly intended the arts. Yet upon closer

and such

the

status of man's prepolitical

its designation
stems

as

a natural art are not without art of acquisition

activity as an art difficulty. One is

especially

difficulty
nature.

from the fact that the

immediately

bound to

The ordinary arts have no such close affinity. Aristotle speaks of natural slaves but never of natural artisans. Moreover he speaks of natural slaves only in the
context of the natural art of acquisition.

from

nature

but

as a result of

city law. Second, the designation

of

The

arts of the

exist not

directly
accom possess

of such an art as

natural

defies

our

understanding
received

the ordinary arts. The knowledge

received

panying the arts is

the
wisdom

knowledge,

from those

who

source of

necessary for the practice of the art. But, initially, where is the wisdom? In the case of the art of acquisition does nature impart wisdom

to the

artisans?

Is

nature

the

artisan of artisans?

Aristotle has told

she

us that nature

produces,

yet

this productivity results from gender

provisions appear

is

not an artisan

in the

first instance. Still her

message?

to result from need. Is this nature's

Does

nature

teach man through need? We must remember that man's

subsistence.

initial

needs are not

limited to

Surely

anyone who

describes

nature

as maternal could never adopt this position.

Portraying
man as

nature as an artisan would

have the

consequence of

her

product.

Such

characterizations would redound to the

portraying detriment of

each.

As

a producer nature would

lose its identification but danger

with maternal

benev
pro

olence and care.

visions.

It

would appear as a provider

of meager and and

unruly

Unable to satisfy his

regard see

needs without

toil,

indicting
to

rather

27.
engaged

In this
in
a

Bacon's

accounts of

the myth of Atalanta.

According

Bacon, Atalanta
course on a opponent who

footrace

with

Hippomenes. Atalanta,

by

far the faster

of

the two, left the

number of occasions

in

order

to pursue golden apples rolled across her path

by

her

eventually won the race. In Bacon's recreation of the myth Atalanta represents art and Hippomenes nature. Art is charmed by nature and thus distracted from her goal. As a result Bacon concludes, "art
remains subject

to nature, as the wife

is

subject

to the

husband."

Charles Lemmi, The Classical

a

Deities in Bacon (Johns Hopkins

28.

U.P., 1933),

pp. 104-5.
and

See Joseph Cropsey's

p. 52.

excellent

essay, "Political Life

Natural

Order,"

Journal of

Politics, Feb., 1961,

170

Interpretation
circumstances

than indebted to his maker, man must alter his

by

production.

Alienation
this

ends

in imitation is
more

production

forms the horizon

of man's

life. Given

fact,
is

nature

like

a mother whose creation

is man;

she

labors

on

his behalf. In
reader

response

reminded of which

he gratefully practices the natural art of acquisition. The Aristotle's opening description of the unnatural art of ac
natural

quisition,

is distinguished from the

skill."29

art

by

virtue of

being

"a

certain sort of experience or

Aristotle does

arts on of

this

basis, but
mention

neither experience nor skill

simply distinguish the two is mentioned in his discussion

not

its

natural counterpart. of

In presenting the
of

natural art of acquisition

Aristotle
the art.
the

omits

any He does not discuss the quality

artisan's

the abilities

required

for the

performance

of

the artisan's product or

not

its

reflection of

expertise

since

nature

does

demand that the

natural

artisan
. .

produce
of

only that he
of acquisition

subdue.

In the
and

strict all

sense, "the

form

the art

is always,
cannot

in

cases,

acquisition

from fruits
He only

and

animals."30

Man, like
nature.

nature,
nature

be depicted

as a producer.

appropriates
man.

from

Yet

may have

appropriated nature

the power of art from

Irrespec

tive of

fectly
on

Aristotle's presentation, limited to man's needs.

power of man's art

expertly

creates products which are per

The

in

limiting

and

shaping that
nature's

of nature's

has been lost

and man's
admit

those who take their

bearings from
view

simple

products

bucolic beginnings.

They

Aristotle's

praise of nature's

provisions,

tedly inconsistent
was

with other parts of the while

Politics,

as an endorsement of precivil

life. Hence Ernest Barker, only

natural

that early thought should

excusing Aristotle's natural teleology since "it indulge in such explains,

naivete,"

"it

remains

true that the ideal economic society of Aristotle comes perilously

age'

near

the 'golden

when wild

in the

woods

the noble savage

ran."31

Barker's

quotation

is helpful because it
nor would perhaps

misses

the

mark on so

many

accounts.

First, Ar

istotle did not,

never
economic

he,

speak of an of

"ideal

society."

economic

Society

is
of

mentioned,

because

its

inseparability

from the primacy

life. And surely the

household,

that association where economic life

29. 30. 31. abound:

Barker, Politics, I257a5-I0. Barker, Politics, l258a38-40. Barker, Political Thought of Plato
"the fundamental

and

Aristotle

pp. 376-77.

Similar

statements so

in Barker
a

characteristic of

his theory

of

production, if it may be

called, is

reactionary archaism, which abolishes all the economic machinery of civilization in favor of the barter," self-supporting farm and a modicum of (Politics, p. 375); "His ideal is a state of natural

simplicity in which men raise their crops and breed their cattle, bartering one with another when necessity impels and using money only in foreign (Politics, p. 389); "he [Aristotle]
exchanges,"

seems to commit

the error of

identifying

nature altogether with the primitive and undeveloped

rudiments,
and

oblivious of end.

his

general

teaching,

developed
of the

In this way, he
and

theory

family,
he

to make

supremely natural is the absolutely complete reactionary in economics as was Plato in his his motto, like Plato, 'back to the simple and It
comes to

that the

be

as

primitive'

seems curious that

should

have

adopted a tone so much unlike that of the rest of the

Politics in

discussing
aim

economics,"

(Politics,

p. 376).

Even Newman
of

echoes

Barker in this
and

regard:

"Aristotle's

is, in

the first place, to lead the

Science

Supply

to nature. He

worked out

his

conception of

nature,

or

freed it from

inconsistency

obscurity,"

Aristotle,

had not, however, fully (The Politics of

p.

134).

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

is primary,
with man's

and

the

Conquest of Nature
To

111

would never

be described
"ideal"

"ideal."

as

view activities associated man's

beginnings

as

transforms Aristotle's attempts to limit

desire for

products other than nature's

into

an attempt

to limit man's desire to

of man's

the products of nature.

"golden,"

nings as

Second, to speak, as Barker does, if literally interpreted, is directly contrary

error.

begin

to nature, and, if

figuratively
"state."

understood, is simply in

This

error

is

caused

by

his failure
"age"

to recognize that
a not

Aristotle

never characterizes man's

beginnings

as an

or

Aristotle's

portrait
man.

is intended to in

expose man's

relationship to nature,

to expose natural

Man's beginnings

are

"noble

savage"

existed. and

Only

another context

lost in antiquity because no does Aristotle describe bar

barians

then not in terms of man chronologically understood but as a people

who are subhuman.

When considering Aristotle's emphasis Barker's comments on savagery, it becomes

of artisan
acquisition

on

the objects of art

along

with

apparent that

the questionable status

of the natural art of

is

not reserved

for

nature alone.

In speaking

the presence of artisans

need not require

the presence
a polis
not

of man.

Re
or

membering Aristotle's statement that a man without a god presents the difficulty. The bodily needs do hence
polis could
who

is

either a

beast

await
art.

humanity,
even

and

we

find

subhuman practitioner of

this

natural

Now

in the

the

artisan was not considered a complete man.

Yet,

within civil

life, he
of

engage prior

be found in the company of complete men. This in natural acquisition. They make their
to the availability of moral
speaks of

need not

be true

those the

appearance prior to

polis,

life. In part, it is for this

practitioner of

reason that

Aristotle

the

natural art of

acquisition, not the

natural artisan of acqui

sition; it is for this

reason

that

he deemphasizes the

the natural

art, his skill and expertise. Such skill directs us away from art to the artisan's knowledge. It eventually moves us to man's knowledge and the defective moral
circumstances

in

which

the

natural art of acquisition arises.

Aristotle

presents

nature's wisdom

in lieu
the

of that of the artisan.

not

The depreciation

of the artisan
natural

is in

keeping

with

fact that he is

the

beneficiary

of

the

art of

acquisition.

Nature's dramatic articulation, her provisions,

are not

intended to

life. Her products, like those subsequently generated by the artisans of the city, produce a way of life which cannot be understood economically. For
sustain evidence that this

is the case,

we need

only turn to the

activities which com

prise the natural art of acquisition.

IV. THE NATURAL ART OF ACQUISITION

Aristotle

moves

to a discussion

of

the kinds of acquisition and the ways of

life from

which

they follow. He inexact, "often

selects

the

word chrematistic

to convey

his

meaning of the natural art of

the word,
while

acquisition.

According

to

Newman, among others,

mean[s] money

and

[is]

always suggestive of

172
it."32

Interpretation
art of

The ordinary
the

acquisition, that

art

commonly thought to be natural,

provisions were

reflected

opinion

that nature was mean, that her limited

the
to

cause of man's

impoverishment,
changes all

and that man must conquer nature

in

order

live

well.

Aristotle

this

by

setting

prior

to the emergence of

money.

speaking of the art of acquisition in a His discussion of the natural art of

of a term

acquisition as chrematistics represents

his transformation
into
a

traditionally

associated with

the

unlimited pursuit of wealth

term which

describes the
This transfor

limited
mation

pursuit of provisions

for the
another

satisfaction of man's needs.

nature

is

accompanied

by

is

no

longer

condemned

for her
is
not

meanness

but

commended

for her
is

wisdom

nature's

imposed

moderation

to be overcome but heeded. Amid the conditions of man's birth truth

of moral

is found the
a

life:

acquisition

not without pause of

limit. As

result, the
and

ordinary meaning
natural acquisition

and source of chrematistic ,

unlimited economic

desires from

which

namely money-making it springs, is rendered

the

unnatural.33

Un

begins

as man moves

away from

nature's

limited bounty.

This is why Aristotle does not depict man's original circumstances as either an ill condition or the natural objects which meet his needs as perishable provi
sions.

Man is

not portrayed as goes so

departing

from

nature

in

order

to acquire. On the

contrary, Aristotle
man's

far

as to speak of nature's

"comforts"

in making

beginnings

receptive

to and descriptive of his acquisitive the objects of acquisition

pursuits.34

Aristotle

initially

considers

ferent
man.

provisions of nature cause

different

ways of

by observing that dif life in both animals and

the nature of the

In the

case of

animals, their lives

are ruled

by

food

which sustains or solitary.

them.

Depending

on

their provisions

they may be

either nomadic

There is apparently

no question

that their manner of life is

directly
among

attributable to the satisfaction of

classes of animals

initial

needs.

This is true
omnivorous

not

only among
even

carnivorous,

herbivorous,

but

species within a class.

whether

In the

animal world nature

has been

exact.

Diversity,
life. This
to an elab

among

classes or

species, is solely

attributed

to economic
moves

point assumes major oration of

importance, for Aristotle

while

immediately
lives

the natural acquisitive arts. This transition is effected

by
is

an ambigu

ous statement,

which,

appearing to

unite the

of men with

those true

of of

animals, in fact disassociates them: "What is true

men.
32.

of animals

also

Their

ways of

life differ

considerably."35

Newman, The Politics of Aristotle,

means

p.

187.

primarily
tike was

things, tends to
employed
usual

deliberately
of

imply the notion of by Aristotle in the literal

of
'money-making,'"

money,"

Also, "chremata is a term which, though it Barker, Politics, p. 27; "Chrematissense of

providing for the

necessaries of

life, instead
p. 92.

its

meaning

Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers

the

Economy,"

33.

This is

missed

criticized

Plato for his

by Barker who states, "It is indeed somewhat curious that Aristotle, who forgetting that an association must be composed of dissimilar members, practi
members,
all engaged

cally

makes

own economic association one of similar

and

in the

same pur

suits."

34.
35.

(Barker, The Political Thought of Plato Barker, Politics, l256bl8-22. Barker, Politics, i256a28-32.

Aristotle.)

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

One
might expect that

and the

Conquest of Nature
men are

173 owing to the

the considerable differences in

same cause which produced such

differences in the
whether

animal world.

Yet,

at

this

point, Aristotle does not mention

the distinctions in men's lives result

"truth"

simply from
animals
ways of

subsistence or whether the natural

common

to men and

alike

is simply

contained

in the
a

"differences"

appearance of
of man's ways of
earlier

in

then-

life. Instead,
and

what

follows is

listing

life. With this

of

listing
denced

it becomes
man,

apparent
man

that, despite Aristotle's

of

identification

animals

by

this inclusion
natural arts.

differs sharply from other of both the pastoral art

of

living

beings. This is

evi

the nomads and piracy

among the

He begins his discussion

the nomads

tentatively

and

with qualification.

There

are no such qualifications

in his

listing

of piracy.

In

fact, piracy holds

Given the fact that the among the pirate steals from other men, it becomes clear than man's actions cannot exactly be explained by virtue of providential nature. And clearly Aristotle's natural art of acquisition is an elusive art. For he appears to designate as central those
a central position
arts.36

activities which

do

not acquire nature's

provisions, and he fails to designate

those that

do.
two listings of the arts
pastoral art and of acquisition.

There
rounded

are

In the

first, hunting is
and

sur

nomads'

by
and

farming. Piracy,

fishing
is

the pursuit of

birds

and animals exist as separate species of the genus

hunting. In the second,

a separate

herdsmen

farmers
are, in

are

listed before piracy,

and

which now

genus,
central

followed, in turn, by fishing

positions and some

hunting.

Hunting

and

piracy occupy

sense, a part

of each other even while

they

differ.37

The first way of life which Aristotle describes is that of the pastoral nomad. This life does not accidentally follow from a discussion of the ways of life of
animals.

The

nomads

not

isolated in the

sense reminiscent of

only tend herds but live as a herd, and they are Homer's depiction of the Cyclopes: "There
to sleep,
who shepherds

a monstrous man was wont

his flocks

alone and

afar,

36.

Barker merely

states that

piracy

was a

"tolerated
p.

pursuit

in the

eastern

Mediterranean down

to Aristotle's time, and indeed

arts

among the natural piracy, (The Politics of Aristotle,

of

(Ross, Politics, acquisition, (Aristotle, p.

pp. 128-29).

later,"

20); Ross simply

and

mentions that omits

piracy is
of

242);

Newman

any

mention

37.

Aristotle is
learning"

portrayed

by

Bacon

as a practitioner of the natural art of acquisition.

He is

said

who made to be both a pirate and a hunter. Bacon states that Aristotle was "a fortunate robber,

a prize of

(Bacon, Works, m,
"all
that
"

p. 353).

He is

also a

hunter
"all

who

"killed (p.

all

his

brethren"

nations"

(p. 365); he
but to

conquered

as

his

scholar conquered

352).

Aristotle's
opinion,

success results

from the fact

"I have

he
(p.

never

"nameth

or mentioneth an ancient author or a

confute and reprove

method:

352).

Bacon

cites

divine

aphorism which sheds

light

on

in my father's name, and ye receive me not; if one come in (p. 352). The result was glory "without regard of antiquity will ye him his own name, (p. 352). Yet if Aristotle comes in his own name, he also comes in the.name of or although responsible for man's incep nature and nature involves paternity. For Aristotle, nature, Aristotle's
come
paternity"

while not in the name of the father, is at least tion, intends man's completion. This completion, can be made that it is a recreation of the activities of subjugation. A strong case is it fatherly footnote 26). (see sheds Bacon who paternity

174

Interpretation
but lived
apart with

and mingled not with others

his heart

set on

lawlessness."38

The

nomadic

way

of as

life does from the

not arise or

follow from the

bodily
and

needs of

the

nomads

so

much

needs of

the animals

which

sustain

them. As

Aristotle
man's

puts

it,

nomads

"follow in

[animals']

tracks,"39

life becomes At the

contingent same

for direction

upon those

from

which

consequently he derives

sustenance.

reveals providential
which nature

time, and for the same reason, his life most clearly nature. Nomads make their living with ease from animals
subjugated

has apparently
"indolent."40

to their

needs.

Aristotle describes them

as

moving from continual

yet

Unlike the farmer

order

and

the hunter

they

are

freed

exertion

in

to sustain life. More than any of the other

practitioners of natural arts of acquisition appears

they

possess

leisure. Nature indeed

kind.
nomads'

Given the

favorably
fied
of
with

of

relationship to nature, why has Aristotle not spoken more their life? Of the practitioners of the natural arts of acquisition,
Aristotle has
portrayed

nomads alone accept providence as

her.

They
Yet

are satis

being

her generosity; they appear content, lacking in initial nature's favored children, they remain
their uncivil

nothing.

as a result

childlike adults.

It be

comes clear that

care.

idleness,

their retardedness, stems

from

nature's

gerates

Aristotle does nothing to dispel this impression. By omission he exag it. First, no mention is made that their moving existence for the sake of

pasturage

is

not an

harvest

of

animals.

easy one nature does not quickly or easily replenish the And second, their animals are not naturally created to Aristotle takes
pains

obey the
plight as

call of

the

nomad.

in

order

to portray the nomad's

are

stirred simple

lacking pain. Their life is portrayed as complete. They by the bodily desires, and consequently those desires
of

minimally
the

complete

horizon

their

life.41

It may be

said

that nomads, despite the products of nature upon which

they

live,

conform

to the letter but not the spirit of the natural art of acquisition.

They

practice natural acquisition

insofar

as

they

are

not producers.

But the
results

natural art of acquisition excludes and man's satisfaction with economic

discredits

production

because it

in

life. The

nomad

is

satisfied with economic

life in the
penury.

absence

of such productivity.

He sleepily

practices an art which

His servility is in the presence of merely sustains life. We turn from

pp.

38. 39. 40. 41.

Homer, Odyssey, Vol. 1, ix (Harvard U.P., 1966), Barker, Politics, i256a30-36. Barker, Politics, I256a30~32.
Compare
nomads and members of the

185-90.

Republic. Both

in the healthy city of Plato's city apparently lead lives characterized by peace and ease. Justice, in each case, is portrayed as unproblematic; there is no conflict in these associations since providence has instilled only limited desires in each man and she has provided the objects to satisfy these desires through her bounty. Yet, from the perspective of

providential care of nomads with rule of providence

healthy

nobility,

such care of

is but tyranny, such contentedness but the nomadic way of life and Plato's debunking

erate

desires, is

not available of

in the

absence of

implies the possibility

immorality.

Aristotle's depreciation of the healthy city. Moral life, reflecting mod human freedom. Man's moral choice of necessity
servility.

This

explains

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

the nomad's gratitude to the

and

the

Conquest of Nature

175

farmer's

patience and then to the stealth of the

hunter. But the

pirate.

nomad's servile submission to nature

is best

remedied

by

the

He, like

the

hunter, is

moved to causes

conquest, yet,

unlike

the

hunter, his
provisions

dissatisfaction
granted

or

incompleteness

by nature and meet his needs Farming, the last way of life in the
plants."42

him to turn away from from other men. first listing, is

akin

to the nomadic

existence

in that the farmer lives from domesticated

animals while the nomad

lives from "cultivated

as

in the

case of

nomads, appearance

Nature is apparently kind in both instances. But, can be deceiving. Farming is an idle art
would

only when comparing it with the nomad's wandering. It it a peaceful art, yet this would ignore man's attack on he forces her to his labor. This
yield a product.

be better to

call

mother earth

by

which

The

earth's provisions are man's reward

when

for

would seem

to be denied

litical conditions, for there

reminded of man-farmer. not

are men who exist

moving from prepolitical to po as farmers without farming. One is

Xenophon's Oeconomicus in
Such
a man

which

Socrates

speaks with a gentle

has

not overcome nature's

bear that harshness. Toil is borne

changed.

by

harshness but simply does the slaves not the labor but the

laborer has

majority
Is this

of

men,

as

Given this fact, one wonders why in the first instance a Aristotle tells us, choose to live by agriculture. If the
characterized

nomad's existence unspoken

man's

is

by

such ease

why

are

there so many

farmers?

testimony
unruly

to the arduous existence of nomadic

nature?

life? Does this

con result

indicate

sedentary

Or does it dangerous

confirm
animals?

man's

timidity in
.

of

fronting farming

nature's

and often

In any case, the

is

decisively

limited

product associated with unlimited toil

What

follows is the frequent observation, as M. I. Finley properly notes, that "the Greeks never tired in their praise of the moral excellence of
agriculture."43
.

The

next question which presents

itself is

"Why
art.

was

hunting

not,

with equal

activity?"

frequency, cited as a moral Hunting, along with farming, is

leisure. Yet
quisition. merate

not an

idle

There is

movement

but little

hunting

occupies

a special position art

among the natural arts of ac

which

In the first

listing

it is the only
second natural

for

Aristotle

would enu

separate and

species; in the

listing

three of the five arts

involve
as a

hunting,
part of

following
of war

Aristotle's
which

hierarchy, hunting is included

be naturally
just.44

the art

is

said to

In

opposition

to

42. 43. 44.

Barker, Politics, 1256^5-40. Finley, The Ancient Economy,

Compare Aristotle's The
state

p.

123.

account with

hunting
"to

as presented
yet

in Locke's Second Treatise of Gov

ernment.

of nature requires the

hunter,

enjoy."

demand
tion

war and pain

from

man who wants

is

of no

moral

use.

The life

of the chase

unruly and perishable provisions Given this fact, nature's imposed modera cannot be morally liberating. The conditions of
nature's man's were

nature must

be

conquered

by

art and

the hunter relieved of his burdens. Abundance and ease are

evidence that nature's yoke has been broken.

Yet,

liberating

conquest of nature ends

by

extending the

preeminence

of those

desires

which

her

original concern.

John Locke, Two

Treatises of Government,

ed.

Peter Laslett (Cambridge U.P., i960), #30.

176

Interpretation
presents animals

the domesticated animals of the nomads, Aristotle

that are

unwilling to be tamed. These

wild creations which

are animals

free from
their

art.

They
the

are

avowedly
more

apparently do
more

not resemble

creator.

Hunting,
extent

than

farming
nature

and

far

than the nomad's

need

life,

reveals

to which

initial

is

unkind.

Man's

is

at odds with

the

animal's

disposition. In
tracks"

subjugating the animal, despite its only

so
pastoral animal's

disposition, they might follow in his. That is, the hunter, as distinct from nomad, overcomes not only the animal but, in important respects,
man

"follows in their

the

the

way

of

life.45

At the

same

time that he conquers

nature's provisions

he

also conquers

nature's conditions.
expanded corporeal

beginnings to the
rendered

Man is thereby moved away from his desires of civil life but only after he has life. It is
of no accident

those desires suspect

by taking

that the deprecia

movement of

tion of animal life antedates the enjoyment

meat.46

The

the

hunter is the
and

movement

for

moral
of

independence, away from

soul.47

the

bodily

desires

towards the emergence

need

the human

standing the farmer's

provisions of

for slaves,

can

This is why hunting, notwith never be understood as serving the

own
name.48

the earth. It

must subdue

in its

Yet

man's

spirited-

45.

The distinction between In this

warriors as

they

are presented

in the Politics

and

the Republic

is

that Aristotle never likens the

sence of masters.

warriors

to

dogs (Republic

375ai).

Their

dignity

stems

from the

ab

sense

Aristotle's

warrior seems

to resemble the philosopher

in Plato's
char over

Republic.
acterized

Yet, notwithstanding
as a

the fact that the philosopher

kind

of warrior or even
main surrenders

the highest of

is courageous, he could not be warriors. He is not concerned with

coming.

He in the

to a kind of eros.

Plato, The Republic of Plato,

Bacon's New Atlantis,

tr. and ed.

Allan Bloom (Basic Books, 1968), 375ai. 46. The visitors to Bensalem, the Utopian island
prior

of

to

being

received

by

the

island's inhabitants the

island life
of

visitors must

also enjoy meat. Yet foreswear piracy and hunting.

These
of

activities are

impure
spirit

on an

where the productive arts are unaccompanied

by

problems

licentiousness
opposes

and the

way
of

rests on universal animal

love. Indeed

hunting
a

is

kind

of violation

which

the

Bensalem;

life is taken,

not as

means

to

moral

life, but
and

primarily as a means to the continuation of life (Bacon, Essays, pp. 271, 274, 293, 300). 47. See Plato's Republic where the healthy city is destroyed with man's desire for luxury
comfort.

Yet the feverish city

which

follows

cannot

be

understood

in terms

of economic

desires.

The

arts, although present in the feverish city, are essentially descriptive of the healthy The feverish city is characterized by a noneconomic art. The movement away from the healthy city to the feverish city is a movement from merchants, tradesmen, money and peace to the art of Socrates' account in the Republic and Aristotle's account in hunting and the warrior. Thus, in both the Politics the economic arts are subjugated to the arts akin to war. In the feverish city the war
economic

city.

riors form
that

a separate and superior class

distinct from

economic artisans.

They

are

distinctive in

they

cannot

be

understood as an extension of economics or

city is more advanced than the healthy city. The warrior's what heretofore was a consuming interest. The warriors exemplify not a concern Socrates' extension of life but with the denial of life. The warrior is solution to lem:
man's economic

body. This is why the feverish life is evidence of man's disinterest in

the
with

life

or

the

a natural prob

desires

reflect not

foretell the truth

growth

of all cities which are to

only the first city which he leaves behind but seem to follow. Socrates interrupts man's economic growth. Such

desire for Socrates

rules

is limited, if not denied, as meat is understood in light

not

soon as
of the at

it is

occasioned
of

by

virtue of

the warrior's art: the

of

depreciation

life. Through the image

the warrior

only subjugates life but the desire for life.

the same time

introduces that

element of the soul which

48.
more

Compare

with

Bacon's depiction

lively

expressed, than

by

of the Greek making him the God

deity
of

Pan: "The

effect of

Pan

could not

be

hunters: for every

natural

action, every

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

ness,
once

and the

Conquest of Nature
on

111

aroused, may easily concentrate

something

other than nature's

provisions.

Perhaps this is why

farming
not

is

most

frequently

cited as moral.
order

The

hunter's
are

spiritedness necessitates the earth's

limitation in

to produce as

well as maintain civil

life. This is
must
as

to say that the other arts such as

farming
be

just. But the farmer

of the
hunter.49

take

what nature

intends. The

same cannot

said

He,

opposed to the

fanner, does

not

await nature's
associa

bounty

but is

moved

by

covetousness to

acquire.50

Herein lies hunting's

tion with piracy.

Given its unorthodoxy, piracy is a startling inclusion among the natural arts of acquisition. As an art its product is not derived from nature. It takes from other men, not from plants and animals. And it seeks excessive gain or gain
which goes

beyond that necessary for life. In this sense it anticipates unnatural gain, for both arts reflect longings which are neither characteristic of, nor
capable

of,

being
is

satisfied

by

the conditions which nature

directly

bestows. In

motion and

process,

no other

than a chase: thus

arts and sciences

hunt

out their works

"
.

[em

phasis added]. seek

He continues, "all living creatures either hunt their pleasures; and this in a skilful and sagacious
nature

out their

aliment, pursue their prey, or

manner."

In Bacon's
no

reformulation of

hunting,

becomes the hunted in

a

not

the hunter. In the process

hunting

longer

commands

to serve way but now appears "in a skilful and sagacious those pleasures. Francis Bacon, The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, tr. Peter Shaw, Sec tion II: Of Poetry (London, 1733), p. 62.
man's pleasures moral

manner"

49.

See Montesquieu: "[The

magistrates of the

Greek republics]

would not not

have the

citizens

apply themselves to trade, to agriculture, or to the arts, and yet they would found, therefore, employment for them in gymnic and military exercises
cises

have them idle.

They

Now,

these exer

having

a natural

tendency

to

render people

hardy

and

fierce,

there

was a

ing

them with others that might soften their manners. For this purpose, music, which
popular"

necessity for temper influences the

mind

by

means of

the corporeal organs, was extremely

Laws,

tr. Thomas Nugent

[Hafner, 1966],

p.

39).

cizing Sparta, does not simply praise the life of Aristotle's presentation of the hunter or warrior is

(Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Montesquieu footnotes Aristotle, who, in criti the warrior but praises the moral life of the warrior.
not amusical.

The

warrior or

hunter is tied to

justice,

is tied to nature, which in turn dictates that subjugation is not without limit or independent of need. The natural art of acquisition constitutes part of Aristotle's music for the
which warrior and

ultimately for the

to

man of moral virtue.

50.

According

Bacon,

the highest grade of ambition

is

more wholesome and noble when

it is

less

covetous:

it

will not

be

amis

to distinguish the three kinds and

as

it

were grades of ambition

in

mankind.

The first is

of those who

desire to

extend their own power

in their

native

country;

which

kind is

vulgar and and

degenerate. The

second

is

of

those who labour to extend the power of

its dominion among men. This certainly has more dignity, though not less country covetousness. But if a man endeavour to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe, his ambition (if ambition it can be called) is without doubt
their
"

a more wholesome

thing

and a more noble than the other two

(Bacon, Essays,
covetousness,

p. 263).

Compare this
ticed

passage with

Plato's Republic
and pirates

and

Aristotle's Politics for

where

as prac

by

the warriors,

hunters

is

essential

man's wholeness

and nobility.

Indeed

limited to the community as distinct from the universe, occurs in the setting appropriate for man's moral completion. It is not disinterested labors on behalf of the species but interested labor on behalf of moral man which designates the grades of
"vulgar"

covetousness, that covetousness

ambition and

the nature of subjugation.

178

Interpretation

this sense only piracy, among the natural arts enumerated

genuine art of acquisition.

by Aristotle, is
true?

But

what seems most unusual

is that

nature sanc

tions robbery as a manner of

acquisition.51

In

what sense

is this

Alone,
needs.

the

practitioner of

the

natural art of acquisition cannot meet all man

his

This is

evidenced surrender.

by

robbery, whereby
moves

takes that

which others are

not

willing to

Aristotle

the reader to question the justice of

the

natural arts of acquisition

by

pointing to the robber's art which, if unjust in

men.52

the strict sense, nonetheless exposes man's association with other

although

Piracy,

identified

with

the

prepolitical pirate

arts, is

not

tied to nature's
nature as a

hierarchy.

In this

sense

it is free. The

feels disaffection from

man
needs.53

because he is

dissatisfied
the

with

the life which she has created for

and,

result, explores

in meeting his own As piracy moves man away from maternal nature it points to moral nature. It reflects, by requiring, morality. The pirate's independence serves not only to reveal that dependency which en
possibilities

slaves

the nomad to precivil nature but also to disclose the servile character

which results

from the

civil artisan's enslavement

to

profit.54

Their divergent

set

tings cannot hide the close connection among

precivil

nature, profit
attempt

and slavery.

Piracy is distinguished from

51.

these two

arts neither

in its

to overcome

meanness. of

See Plato's Republic (373a-e) where theft of land is the natural outcome of providence's Economic scarcity means that some must live, to say nothing of live well, at the expense others. The taking of land leads to retaliation and war, yet such war awakens the soul and
about

brings

human,

not providential or

barbarous,

peace.

Robbery
of

replaces providence

in giving

birth to the manly activity

52.

of

the warriors who protect the spoils

the city.
on

See Montesquieu's
which

statement that

"[t]he total

privation of

trade,
yet

the contrary, produces

not at all

robbery,

Aristotle

ranks

in the

number of means of

acquiring;

it is

inconsistent

with certain moral virtues.

Hospitality, for instance, is

among
and

most rare

found in the Aristotle

cifically

most admirable perfection

vagabonds"

nations of

provides no

list

or

instances

of virtues

among

robbers.

in trading countries, while it is (Spirit of the Laws, p. 317). In the Nicomachean Ethics he spe

condemns

"mean"

robbery

as a

"stingy"

vice; it is opposed to liberality. Nonetheless he

"tak[e] the greatest risks to get booty (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Martin Ostwald [Bobbs-Merrill, 1962], ii22a8~9). Also of importance is the particular "moral which Montesquieu cites. To say the least hospitality is a doubtful virtue. There is the question
states that robbers
of whether

virtue"

hospitality

is due

all strangers

and,

more

importantly,
hence is

the question of whether hos

pitality, when extended

aside the

no longer hospitality. Setting extraordinary Socrates, robbery, in the Republic and in the Politics, is for the purpose of securing one's own. Not only its end but its spirit is opposed to hospitality. It is not servile but aristocratic. Compare Plato's and Aristotle's accounts with the hospitable modern Robin

by

robbers,

serves covetousness and

robber,

Hood,
53.
public

whose

nobility is in the

service of

democracy.
providential

In this
the

regard note the character of

(3724/.). He

voices

Glaucon who rejects the his dissatisfaction by characterizing the

city

of

Plato's Re
pigs."

healthy

city

as a

city is a city without pigsthere is no hunter or meat presentwhile figura it is Glaucon who is a pighis desires appear insatiable. tively Yet, unlike the healthy city, the depiction of Glaucon is distinctively human. His longings for completion cannot be

Literally

healthy

"city

of

satisfied even

by

beneficient

providence.
of

54.

When speaking

justice, Montesquieu
"[t]he

confirms the

belong together in opposing trade:

of exact

spirit of trade produces

fact that robbery and in the mind of a man a

moral virtue

certain sense

justice,

opposite,

which

forbid

our always

this for the advantage of

others"

on the one hand, to robbery, and on the other to those adhering rigidly to the rules of private interest, and suffer (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 317).

moral virtues
us

to neglect

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

nature nor pirate

and

the

Conquest of Nature
unsubmissive

179
the

in its desire to satisfy needs, but in its takes what he wants, by

conquest.56

character:55

Yet piracy discloses more than this. The pirate, along with the hunter, in conditions of indolent peace. Man's slumbers are interrupted by the pirate who stings him or endangers what he thinks he wants most. As a
practices war

consequence the pirate creates others

in his

own

him in

conditions

where

there is "no propriety,

image, for they must imitate no dominion, no mine and

thine distinct to

fortify

their
as

bors'

And

The art of war is naturally enlarged, for men are moved holdings or, when that is not enough, to covet their neigh Hobbes in his Leviathan has formally instructed, the competition may also herald movement toward peace, but civil rather If this be true, then piracy, in moving us closer to civil closer to justice. Yet, before we forget, this is at the price

or movement after gain

than

barbaric

peace.

life,

also moves us

of natural

justice

or

justice in
appears

accordance with the

ascending

order of nature's

manifestations.

Piracy

boldly

to deviate from the other arts.

But,

per

haps,

more

boldly,
we

the other natural arts

secretly

conform to

it. This possibility

demands that

That piracy Xenophon recounts that the Spartans taught their

ing"

briefly return to hunting and war as they relate to piracy. and hunting are related was acknowledged prior to Aristotle.
"thieving"

youth

and

"deceiv

"in

order

to make the

boys

more resourceful

in getting

supplies and

better
war

fighting
and

men."58

Although Xenophon's
and

account

is

somewhat

shocking,

is

tied, to nobility,

insofar

as

the

warrior

fights for

a noble purpose an admission

stealing

deceitfulness

are

freed from ignominy. But this is

that piracy

lacks the morality associated with war in civil circumstances. Precisely for this reason piracy is the appropriate prepolitical art. In prepolitical circumstances
we should not attempt

to understand piracy in light of

war

but

war

in light

of

piracy.
war

Nature

attempted to

hide this. She

is

attempted to attach

piracy to
In light

war and

to natural providence. With this

nature's manifestations
open

disclosure, her

claim that man

doubt.59

justly
of

wars

on

to considerable

this

55.

unnatural

In contrast, see Locke's Second Treatise of Government where robbery is presented as an form of acquisition (#19). Generally its boldness or unsubmissive character endangers
appropriates another

life; specifically robbery

order

to secure property, the pirate's boldness

individual's labor, the must be feminized or

natural

title to

property. must

In

made

acceptable; it

be

placed

in the

service

of peace.

Hence the pirate,

following
are

society,

merely fulfills magnified,

prepolitical

desires

these economic that piracy,

he is not, as in Aristotle, used to desires rather than his initial boldness

than the other "natural arts of
moral virtue on

overcome those

desires, To

the extent that

indicative

of

the pirate, it may be said

acquisition,"

more

characterizes

bourgeois

man.

For in

denying
pirate,
56.

habituation to
Perhaps this

the ground that it violates

freedom, in

what sense

does the

although often rendered

petty

and

consideration responds to

man should not

be

allowed to exchange

[t]here

need not

be in

labouring

not easy to see why his labour, just as much as the produce of his vines for hire any such desire for an indefinite amount of coin

timorous, remain intact? Newman's puzzlement: "It is

The Politics of Aristotle, p. 132). 57. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 108. 58. Xenophon, Scripta Minora, 11 (Harvard U.P., 1968), pp. 7-8.
59.

The

following
his

statement

by Bacon,

made with regard

to Aristotle's "books on animals this fact: "he

treatises,"

and other of

has

special significance

in light

of

[Aristotle] had

come

180

Interpretation
Can the inclusion Must
of

certain questions arise:

that

man steals

from

nature?

man rob

piracy among the natural arts reveal from nature or initial nature in the

name of

humanity? What is the

source of

providential nature? pect.

At this

point

morality and justice in the absence of nature's foresight and bounty are both sus

Her improvidence in

one respect

is

substantiated

by

another,

for Aristotle have to

other

concludes

his

listing

of

the natural arts

"eke

out

the shortcomings of one

stating way of life in

by

that some men may

...

by
art,

adding
puts

some

way."60

Aristotle's artisan,
mind of

who

engages

more than one

the

reader

in

Marx's famous
communist

passage

from The German Ideology:

in

society

each can

become

accomplished makes

production and

thus

nobody has an exclusive sphere of activity but in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general it possible for me to do one thing today and another
where

tomorrow,

to

hunt in

the morning,
as

fish in the afternoon,

a mind, without ever

rear cattle

in the evening

criticize after shepherd or

dinner, just

I have

becoming hunter, fisherman,

critic.61

For Aristotle,

nature's weakness rather than

her

strength causes

the artisan to

leave
her
art,

one art

for

another.

Nature is
artisan

uneven not

only in her
their

bounty

but

also

in

articulation of man.

Each

is

not

equally

capable of

and

consequently

some

artisans,

by

virtue of

inabilities,

practicing every are forced

to practice more than one. For tence

are man's

last,

rather

than

Aristotle, different manners of gaining subsis his best, recourse since there is nothing hu

manizing in multiplying activities which are all intended only to meet the needs of the body. Marx's passage, on the other hand, is striking because the
arts are presented as

independent

of needs.

Of those

activities cited

by Marx,

only one,
the

unrelated and

to subsistence, appears

with reference

to the demands of
without neces
of

body,

it follows the

satisfaction of a need.

Subjugation

sity

appears

to be the essence of man's existence. The absence

necessity is.

accompanied

by

the disappearance of nobility. For

Marx,

man

is

initially

and

ultimately is

a producer.

Given this

fact,

Marx has

no need of

the pirate.

to his

conclusion

before; he did
and

not consult

experience,

as

he

should

have done, in

order

to the

framing
he then like

of

his decisions
in

axioms; but
and
"

resorts

to experience,
a procession

having first determined the question according to his will, bending her into conformity with his placets leads her about
[Emphasis added] (Bacon, Essays, art of acquisition, Aristotle
p.

a captive

206).

When

such a

statement

is

considered

in light

of

the natural

appears as a

deceptive

master who captures and on

then recreates experience

forcing
Yet

her to

yield

images

of morality.

Bacon,

the other

hand,

appears to

liberate

experience.

such

liberation, if free from

albeit

traditional

morality, is

not

free from

recreation.

And Bacon's recreation,

opinion

in the

name of

enlightenment,

is

not without

deception: "As for antiquity, the

and

touching it

which men entertain

is

quite a

negligent
accounted

one,

scarcely

consonant with the word

and

itself. For the

old age of

the world is to be

the true antiquity;

the ancients
was

this is the attribute of our own times, not of that earlier age of the
and which,

world
of

in

which

lived;

though in respect
p. 225).

of us

it

was

the elder, yet

in

respect

the world

it

the

younger"

(Bacon, Essays,
p.

60. Barker, Politics, l256b5-io. 61. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader

124.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

Marx may dispense
with

and

the

Conquest of Nature
unconcerned with

-181

the

pirate since

he is

demonstrating

the limitations of economic life.

As

we

limitation
nomad

by distinguishing
In his

economic

have seen, Aristotle demonstrated that life from moral life, by distinguishing the
points

from the hunter. Yet this distinction

and pirate. enumeration of

to another

that between

hunter

the

natural arts of acquisition

Aristotle

first

hunting; but in his second listing piracy piracy is given an independent status, separate from hunting, yet central to the other arts. Hunting appears to resemble piracy yet in the final analysis is distin
subsumes under

the art

of

guished

from it. As

can

be

seen

from the

natural art of
of

acquisition, this may

the hunter cannot be

be

explained

by
a

the fact that although the nobility

understood

economically, it cannot be understood free

of nature's provisions.

Moral life is

dependent life in that it

cannot

ignore the

body

and

its demands.

Aristotle has powerfully made the case that such dependence Man may control those desires which seek to control him. Yet to be morally independent is not to be independent simply. Independence, which is not limited
need not enslave.

to morality, carries us beyond

of acquisition
nature.

beginnings,

the household and the natural art

It

moves

in short, it carries us to a domain that appears independent of beyond the world of morality to a theoretical world, beyond
which resembles

the world of the hunter to a world

radical

that of the pirate. In a

way, Aristotle

seems

to foreshadow the highest distinctions of human

within an economic

life,

not

from its heights, but from between the

horizon.
philosophy is too
well

The

connection

worlds

of

piracy

and

drawn to be easily dismissed: The traced to morality; his activity cannot be

a

pirate reflects a understood

nobility

which cannot

be

by

provider; he lives

outside while

being
his

dependent

upon

returning to nature as the city; he is said to

endanger

the very arts upon

which

preservation

relies; and

his fellow

citi

become his enemies. zens, given the nature of his enterprise, may quickly well drawn is the relationship of the hunter's art to that of the pirate.

Equally
Of

all the arts upon which the pirate relies,

reflecting his life. Both conquer but with of the hunter testifies to the importance
provisions.

only one, hunting, comes close to this important difference: The conquest
of nature even while

he

conquers

her

The pirate,

on

the other

hand,
she

depreciates

nature on

by disregarding
In its

the

demanding, dependent life

the
pirate's
attention

which

has imposed

most men.

place

is drawn to the
stated

possessions of

other men, to con

siderations of one's own.

Simply
off

the pirate

conquers other

men, a con
unlike

quest which entails of

living

of their labor. This is why his

movement.

life,
of

that
not

the

hunter, is
him

not

one of continual

preclude

leisure. To
not

understand

this aspect of

His way the pirate's life The

life does

we would

have
to be

to

compare

to the hunter, but to the

nomad.

pirate appears
engages

a peculiar combination of the

without

hunter

and

the

nomad.

Yet he

in

conquest

the hunter's war and, at the same

nomad's peace.
approaches

time, surrenders to other than the in life, appearing independent of nature's demands, divine life. It ultimately cannot be understood within the polis,
The
pirate's
acquisition.

the household or the natural art of

182

Interpretation
concludes

Aristotle

his discussion is

by

of acquisition. objects

Such

an art

part of

affirming the natural status of the art household management, for it acquires
to the
association prior
of

"necessary
household,

for life

and useful

the polis or the

household."62

The polis,

which

had been introduced

to an investigation
and

of

the

now reappears when

discussing

acquisition even

the

bodily
acqui

needs, but only

sition as a
text.63

as an afterthought or an exception. art would cause

Not

designating
polis needs

"natural"

Aristotle to discuss the

although

in this
and

con

Its

return

also

reminds

us

that,

the

bodily

the

objects which meet

those needs are more fitted to the

household,

the household

ultimately

serves and

is informed

by

the polis. Perhaps owing to the precarious

relationship between nature's articulations and war, the household must, in the final instance, be seen as a subpolitical rather than a prepolitical association.
It

follows,

states

Aristotle,
He

that the objects of the natural art of acquisition

ends as

constitute

"true

wealth."64

been

abstracted

from its

accustomed surroundings

he began. Wealth, like acquisition, has in order to redefine it. The

objects that

wealthy
section

man must

take his

bearing from

do

not

bestow

wealth as

ordinarily

understood.

on

The thread running through "true and this entire limitation.65 the natural art of acquisition is Whether it is the is
credited

wealth"

bounty
labor,
needs.

which

to

mother nature or

the product of an all-consuming

man's economic

activity is

portrayed as

naturally limited to his initial

civil civil

This does

not mean

that man must return to a primitive life. We are

referred
life.66

back to
in

nature

to appreciate her

Man's

nature

requires

benevolence only after attaining that he move beyond his beginnings to

money,
not nature's

life,
does

yet

such circumstances

objects, is the

medium of

exchange.

Money

conveys no

limitation. It lends itself to

In the

accumulation since

it

not remind us

of our needs.

presence of civil
compel us

life the

political-

moral art must not

only

remind us of

but

towards moderation. This

requires an authoritative or natural standard which governs man's

beginnings in

light

of

his

end.

One

could

say

mother nature

has

given

way to moral nature

62. Barker, Politics, i256b29-30. 63. Note that Socrates, in Plato's Republic, joins
unnatural arts of acquisition as

what

for Aristotle
we

would

be the

natural and as well

in the "true

city."

In this city

find farmers

and

herdsmen

house-builders,

weavers, cobblers,

and

surprisingly, merchants, tradesmen

and w_age-eamers

for wealth,
money. simplicity. a complex

(39d-37ie). These later artisans, who Aristotle classifies as unnatural given their unlimited desire are portrayed in the healthy city as possessing limited desire even in the presence of
This distortion
serves to

clarify the fact that the

with

artisan and

the true city are borne of similar

Aristotle

would

take issue

this account. This polis, the true or

healthy

city

must

be

city; it must be understood not

I256b3i.
am unaware

economically but
any text

morally.

64. Barker, Politics, 65. Note Finley: "I

of

which suggests

that continued growth in this

and

[economic]
literature

sphere of

human behavior

was either possible or

desirable,

the

whole

tenor of the

"Aristotle and Economic p. 20. 66. See Finley: "Greeks and Romans never tired in their praise of the moral excellence of agriculture, and simultaneously in their insistence that civilization required the city. They were not (The Ancient Economy p. 123). being self-contradictory
argues against such a
"
.

notion,"

Analysis,"

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

except

and the

Conquest of Nature

183

nature was

ing

The creation of mother if Aristotle was to dispute while quietly affirm necessary prudently passage of Solon's which he recreates prior to his investigation of un
mother nature originates with moral nature.

that

natural acquisition:

"There is

no

bound to

wealth stands

fixed for

men."67

V. UNNATURAL ART OF ACQUISITION

Aristotle
natural

justly
view

moves to the unnatural art of acquisition only after considering the form. Now he is willing to admit that this second kind of acquisition is the art of acquisition. Justice here refers not to the worthiness of the art of characterization:

but to the fitness

this unnatural

art

is

responsible

for the
art

that there is no

limit to

wealth.

This

justly

designated

unnatural

is

distinguished from its

of experience or
natural art of

counterpart

by

the fact that it results from a "certain sort

reader

From the opening Aristotle tells the acquisition is not wholly an unnatural art.

skill."

that the un

Aristotle begins his discussion

that the product may that

by

examining the

art's product.

He

observes

have

more

than one use, one appropriate to the product,

was

is,

the purpose for

exchanged

which

it

created, and one not, that

is,

a product

which

is

for

other products.

He

seeks to

clarify his
example

point

by

raising

the example of

shoes.

It becomes

apparent

from this

that,

when speak

ing

of

the

unnatural art of

acquisition,

nature no removed

longer from
of

supplies

the product.

Man,

a product of

nature, makes products

nature

or, more exactly,

pro

transforms

products supplied

by

nature.

Imitation

nature, the original

ducer,

not subjugation of nature's

product, is the
own name

beginning

point of unnatural

acquisition.

Man's artisanship in his

since

implies dissatisfaction. Spe

insufficient. He
at

cifically,

man produces such

nature's

original grant was

tempts to remedy
which nature

deficiency by
provisions; he

had only bestowed

nature's

sparingly.

producing But in the

sight of

or

granting to himself that

process

he loses

sight of needs.

the purpose of

loses
Also

his limited

bodily by

Hence

man as a producer

is

suspect.

suspect

is peace, that

condition

in

which the arts flourish and within which the needs administered to

the arts

are secured.

As

presented

by
to

Aristotle the

problem of

the product's use results

from

ex

change,

and exchange accompanies man's production.

prior
exchange.

No

mention

is

made of

production

It

appears

that man's labor does not produce things in excess.

everything that
this
not

he

needs even while

approves of

he

produces some

Given It

fact,

Aristotle

exchanging

one product
suffices

for another,

an action now

strictly reflecting the

product's

purpose, if it

for

subsistence.68

67. Barker, Politics,

I256b34.

68. Finley's citing of David Hume is especially important in this light: "T do not remember a ascribed to the establishment of a passage in any ancient author, where the growth of a city is The commerce, which is said to flourish, is chiefly the exchange of those commanufacture.

184
appears

Interpretation
that
man

determines the
needs.

use of a product and also

the

extent

to which

nature meets product

with

his

Exchange

presents the

possibility that man's use of a

may be for
nature's

reasons other than

his

needs.

Use

and need are

disjoined
of man's

the appearance of man's productivity. There

provisions.69

was no

discussion

misusing

The

question

becomes, "Why

couldn't nature's

productivity

give

rise to

exchange?"

Indeed Aristotle

speaks of

bartering

one of

nature's simple products

in the

next

justly heralding

the possibility of

unlimited

few lines. Nevertheless, exchange, while gain, can never be understood as

the culmination of natural acquisition.

This may be seen from the fact that piracy neither serves nor is directed by bartering. The barterer may, like the pirate, meet his needs from other men. Yet the
peaceful nomad.

life

of

the

setting in which exchange occurs more closely reflects the The difference between barterer and nomad is that the former

lacks the latter's

gratitude for nature's care. The barterer is no longer simply innocent. He cautiously attempts to make gains in exchanging with other men. Unlike the pirate's boldness and the hunter's depreciation of life, barterers suc cumb

to mutual economic use in the service of security and ease. Unlike the

nomad

they

extend

the

power of economic

life.

Aristotle's chronology opens by eliminating the household from discussion. This is made possible by considering production only as it relates to exchange. Since exchange only occurs among households within a village, the initial

household is
should

reserved

for

natural acquisition

in the

strict sense.

Nonetheless, it
which

be

remembered

that the

household is

present given

the location in

exchange

is

not

is discussed in the First Book. Aristotle only concedes that exchange He omits mention of the contrary to nature when precipitated by
need.70

initial household

at the same

time that he raises evidence to

demonstrate that

be contrary to nature. His evidence is that of barbarism. Barbaric tribes, which he omitted in discussing natural acquisition by concen
exchange need not

trating

on art rather

than artisans, exemplify a remote natural

are

limitation
in

upon

corporeal

desires.

They

only

made a reflection of nature

an unnatural

modities,
p.

different soils and climates were "Aristotle and Economic in Finley, The Ancient Economy, pp. 21-22. 22; 69. This subtlety seems to be lost on Ross: "What is more surprising is that he
suited,"

for

which

Analysis,"

also cited

[Aristotle]
....

regards the whole acquisition of wealth

by trade

other than

barter

as unnatural and even

wrong

But he does

not notice that the pursuit of wealth

are

for its
has

own sake not

may

arise even at this earliest

stage, where goods

accumulated and exchange

begun,

and

profiteering is

possible

(Ross, Aristotle, p. 243). 70. See Polanyi, who states that Aristotle used xajinXixij to designate commercial trading. This term is derivative, according to Polanyi, from xajrnXog which is "synonymous with trickster, He goes on, "[c]ommercial trade was of course, not huckstering; nor was it retail fraud,
cheat."

trading;

and whatever

it was, it deserved to be
.

called some

form

or variant of emporia which was

the regular name

of maritime

for seafaring trade trade, he fell back on

When Aristotle in the

referred

specifically

to the various kinds

not

emporia

usual sense.

Why, then, did he

do

so

in

the main theoretical analysis of the subject

tion?"

but

use

instead

word of pejorative connota

"Aristotle Discovers the

Economy,"

p. 92.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

setting;
nature's

and

the

Conquest of Nature
to
man's

185

imposed

moderation
can no

is

set prior

liberation. Yet, due

to exchange, the

barbarian

longer play the

child of nature.

His limited
want of

use of products results not

from the

wisdom of providence

but from

capacity.

He

awaits unnatural acquisition.

not primarily seen as a introduction of money.

Exchange is
a

means of

associating
to

men

step to the

According

Aristotle,

men

but simply as find diffi

culty in exchanging unwieldy products so they consent to substitute a useful commodity which is easily portable. At first, exchange is practiced in a natural way even after the introduction of money. Hence, money is not a product of
the unnatural art of acquisition. That art concentrates upon

its

accumulation

only

after

it has been
of

introduced,
Rousseau,
is
not

and even

nique. unlike

Reminiscent

man's

then, not without time and tech debasement may spring from art; but,

in the first instance debased. In any case, sev eral consequences follow. First, money is not condemned. It does not neces desire.71 sarily serve unlimited Any moral judgment regarding money de

Rosseau,

man's art

pends

upon

its use,

and

money disapprobation
virtuous

without regard must

thus, condemnation is reserved for those who use its to moral purpose. Secondly, freeing money from moral
seen

be

in light

of

Aristotle's

praise of civil

life

and espe

cially for this reason,

civil

life. Moral
external

virtue

is impossible
must

without external equipment.

Yet,

equipment

be

circumscribed

by

necessity; the
attribute

condition must not supplant

the essence of man. Aristotle takes care to

life to something other than the introduction of money, for he is that barbaric life is not limited to precivil conditions.

aware

Emerging from
opinions,
tification

the fact that

man makes excessive gains

neither of which

Aristotle

offers

in his

own

from money are two name. The first is a jus

is merely

for the
the

unnatural art of

acquisition; the second purports that money is

worthless and useless

for the

purposes of

life. The first

opinion

a re

statement of
man

unnatural art

there is

no

limit to wealth,

and

consequently

obscure of may be solely concerned with accumulating money. The more reaction to as a arose Aristotle tells opinion second the two is the us, which, natural mention of a the first. This view, in contrast to Aristotle's, omits any

art of acquisition.

Instead it

condemns

the object of corrupt acquisition, money.

although surrounded

Those making the

was unable either

argument point

to Midas who,

by

gold,

to eat or drink. the first opinion,

can never

Clearly Aristotle, however adamantly opposing

completely
endorse

natural, those

limited
only

By failing holding this opinion have abandoned money to the service of un acquisition. They have no moral grounds for its condemnation. Their
the
second. recourse

to designate a form

of acquisition as

moral

is to

censure

the object

which

it

seeks

to

appropriate.

They
71. sions and

do

so

in the

name of convention.

Money

is

not

derived from
are apt

nature

but

Note Locke's
them"

statement

that "as different degrees of

industry

to give men posses

continue

in different proportions, so this invention of money (Second Treatise of Government, #48). enlarge

gave them the

opportunity to

186

Interpretation
product of consent.

is the

Aristotle

cannot support this opinion,

for it fails to
consent.

recognize

the extent to which, in this

not

instance,
even

nature gives

rise to in

Money is

simply

conventional.

Not

Aristotle

attributes

the introduc

tion of money to either

an art or artisan. nature and

This
and

second position,
with

drawing

firm distinction between

nounces more our attention

money

than money. If extended to

siding its conclusion, this

to

initial nature,
opinion

re

directs

to precivil life as the only

recreate

alternative

moral corruption.

Aristotle takes the time to

this mean?

the fable of Midas. What possibly could

ing

wealth

At first glance, the purpose in citing the fable is evident. In desir Midas had forgotten those basic needs which wealth, in the form of
Midas'

money, cannot

meet.

error was

he forgot

man's nature or man's

dependence

that, in attempting to conquer nature, on nature. Yet, in one sense, the

cite

example speaks against

us of

those

who

initially

it. For Midas,

while

the importance of our basic needs, also reminds us, through the
of

reminding desire for

insufficiency fulfill his desires, even at

gold,
the

of

those needs in satisfying man. Man's attempts to

the cost of preservation, disclose the

intensity
Midas'

of

his

longings for

completion.

And,

as

Midas clearly reveals,

such

desires for

com

pleteness need not entail moral edification.

Man,

as reflected

by

folly,

may longings for

minate

seek completeness either

through unlimited acquisition or through romantic

a premoral condition.

Man's desire for

completeness must not cul

Midas'

in

either madness or

barbarism. Dionysius the

god who granted

wish, knew something

Dionysius'

wisdom
Midas'

this, for he thought the avaricious request unwise. lay in producing moderation by assenting to the letter
of

of

wish.

He instructed Midas
completion

Midas learned? That is

no

way of unmitigated folly. But what has entails destruction. Following this lesson there

by

indication that Midas

that

would attempt completion other

than

by

means of

the

body, only
reason

he

would no

longer do

so to

the extent he had in the past. than follow

For this

moderation, in the
at completion.

Politics,

must precede rather

man's attempts

Education has the

advantage of

Midas'

ugliness of

desire its

Midas'

without

folly

is

called of

by

right

name;

experiencing way of pleasure is identified with nobility. Not the

a moral

portraying the life. As a result

denial

life but the failure to lead

of

life is folly. Yet

a

short of the
expanded

destruction

life,

what

can

deter

man

from life

life reflecting his

initial desires? Aristotle discredits

and shame

mere

by

crediting

noble praise.

Honor

form the

contours of a
who are not
Midas'

fair life.

veyed

by

or upon

those

Nevertheless, honor may be con honorable. Consequently Aristotle replaces

habituation
to nature.
nature.

the unedifying letter of Neither the second opinion

wants

wish with a spirited nor

Midas

understands

incorporeal

Midas
sought

merely by to distinguish himself from his

his touch to

recreate a product of nature.

But he has
nature

countrymen

by reproducing
see

in

order to origin of

live in

unequaled splendor.

What Midas fails to

is the democratic

gold's value.

Perhaps this is why Aristotle

makes no mention of the

fact that

Aristotle'

Art of Acquisition

and the

Conquest of Nature
and

187 rescinding
Midas'

Midas
of

was a
wish

king. Midas is is

everyman.

Even the divine granting

the

by

Dionysiusthe god of

fertility

as well

as wealth.

understanding
sparkling
sential

of nature extends

taken the common for the uncommon.

product must

only to what the price will bear. He has mis His exaggerated appreciation of nature's

be understood not only or primarily in terms of nature's if similarly common, necessary, provisions, but in light of the uncommon es

beauty
and

of man's

soul.72

Aristotle
sham,

praises a

the second opinion, that

convention,"

is, "currency is

regarded

as

entirely

in that it

attempts to make a

distinction be

tween natural wealth and the art of acquisition as popularly understood. He uses that distinction to support his own: the natural art of acquisition is dif

ferent from the

unnatural

art

and

is

concerned with the management of the

household. The
the household.
sition

second opinion was silent

regarding Aristotle's distinction

or

Also, he
art.

again reminds the reader that the natural art of acqui

even

is

limited

Yet

this point differs from the one

he

attributes

currency is worthless. The fable of Midas only proved that currency is limited. Aristotle is concerned with limiting the acquisition of currency and, as we have seen, by no means on the basis of initial needs.
to those maintaining that

The
sense

unnatural art of acquisition resembles

is

said

by

Aristotle to be

unlimited.

In this

it

the other arts. All arts attempt to secure their end to the
all except

greatest possible

extent,

the natural art of acquisition,

status as an art? money.

which

is limited.

If this is true, then how can it maintain its acquisition is limited only with regard to

The

natural art of of

But the

accumulation

money is not its purpose. It cannot be understood apart from the art which it serves. That art, household management, possesses an end different in kind from unlimited acquisition. It nonetheless seeks its purpose, a moral purpose, in
an unlimited way.

Hence the

natural art of

acquisition, in sharing the

an unlimited

pur

pose of

household management, similarly possesses limited end which demands limited wealth.
The problem,
which

end,

an un

Aristotle observes, is that

engaged

although wealth

has
of

limit,
and

everyone seems

in acquiring an unlimited amount actively He first suggests that the reason for this is the involvement of
the same objects. But this
answer

money.73

natural

unnatural acquisition with

is inadequate

since

it does

not account

for the direction in

toward

which men are moved.

Why

does han
the

dling

money

move men

its

accumulation?

Aristotle then

admits that

genuine cause of unlimited acquisition and the attraction of

money is the desire

72.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, H79b32-34,

II8I-23.

See Chester Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 800-500B.C. (Ox ford U.P., 1977), p- 47: "the Greeks searched for [wealth] with that intensity which they dis
73.
played on other aspects of

too easily the Platonic and Aristotelian disdain for

(chrematistike)."

life. This desire demands stress, for many or for the

'profit'

modem studies accept

far

sordid aspects of

making-

money

188

Interpretation
reveals

for life. Hence he

natural
desire.74

that unnatural, like natural,

acquisition

arises

from

Man naturally desires more than nature This is true despite the fact that Aristotle had identified
acquisition.

initially

provides.75

"comfort"

with natural

He

was well aware of man's

disposition toward life

the fact that

forgetting

the

pain

associated with

birth

by

enhancing
no

civil

with physical pleasure. man

The fre

quency

of

this occurrence is explained the enjoyment

by

can relieve

his is

own estate and

less,

albeit

later,

than the

initial

need

naturally felt. It is in speaking

that which

of

the

unnatural art of

acquisition, of its attempt to satisfy

is deepest in

man and of

the natural desires

life.76

from

which

it originates,
though that

that Aristotle introduces morality or the good the good

No

mention was made of

life in his discussion

The

of

the

natural art of acquisition even

art served morality.

practitioner of natural acquisition was untouched

by

longings for
sibilities. governed

completion since

he only

possessed a
was

dim

awareness of man's pos

The ceiling

of

his

aspirations such

by
or

enforced

limitation. As

naturally premoral; his art was it could be of service to unenforced

As
we

limitation
point

limitation in

circumstances of abundance.

have seen, this

is

missed

by

readers who misunderstand

Aristotle's

account of acquisition

by focusing
extended

on the

products,

not the

limitation. These

commentators assumed

that Aristotle's praise for nature's benevolence and the to the horizon of man's life established
attention

natural art of acquisition

by
of

his initial

needs.

They

paid

insufficient
But

to the political

implications
life

Aristotle's

prepolitical art.

ordered

following the creation of the polis, by the requirements of the good

good

the art of household management

or

is

the life at which politics aims.

The

sions of

from reading the Ethics, does not deny large posses currency, only unlimited ones. The moral use of great amounts of cur-

life,

as one sees

74.

In this

regard note

"There
of

are some crimes which are

property will be a hunger. But want is not the only gives them, and just to get rid
the simple necessities of
commit crime to cure a

Aristotle's critique, in Book II, of Phaleas of Chalcedon. Specifically: due to lack of necessities; and here, Phaleas thinks, equality remedy, and will serve to prevent men from stealing simply through cold or
cause of crimes. of an unsatisfied

Men

also commit them

desire. Vexed

by

simply for the pleasure it desire which goes beyond

life, they will turn criminals to cure their vexation. Men may not only desire they already feel: they may start some desire just in order to enjoy the sort of pleasure which is unaccompanied by (Barker, Politics, I267a3-I7). 75. This point is missed by Polanyi: "Human needs be they of the household or of the city, are not boundless; nor is there a [Emphasis added] "Aristotle Dis scarcity of subsistence in covers the p. 80. He seems to assume that since Aristotle did not admit of scarcity none existed. He fails to recognize that the unnatural art of acquisition is a confirmation of nature's
pain" nature"

Economy,"

scarcity.

76.

Note Newman: "He

[Aristotle] scarcely
love
of

seems to admit that the

love

of

mary
as a

an

instinct

money is

as pri

of

human

nature as the

pleasure; he sometimes resolves the former into the

latter"

"primary
to

(The Politics of Aristotle, p. 200); yet what would result from identifying the love of money instinct of human nature"? Newman seems unaware of the moral purpose of the
.
.

natural order

art of acquisition.

The love

of

money is

not presented as an

instinct

of

human

nature

in

demonstrate its

unnatural character.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

rency discloses great Man's immorality
man

and

the

Conquest of Nature
which

189 it
stems.77

virtuous

disinterest in the desires from

subvert

causes

him to

cannot
of

attain

sufficient amount of attempts to

form
serve

acquisition, then he
purpose.

According to Aristotle, if money by practicing the unnatural gain his end by making the other arts
the arts. the other arts already serve
rewarded

this

The

question

becomes, "Don't

this purpose

for producing their momentarily Aristotle would say no. Each artisan appears solely concerned with his product. Aristotle reduces the good of the artisan to the good artisan. As a
as artisans are
product?"

insofar

consequence

he

left the

artisan

any mention of how the arts are related. His account has true to his art but strangely unable to sustain himself.
omits of natural acquisition was

While the horizon

artisan of

limited to

bodily

needs, the

the city now appears divorced from subsistence. In the city only one

art,

an unnatural

art, is

said to aim at money.

taken with

fashioning
has
his His

their products.

citified artisan
corporeality. while

removed

All the other arts are primarily In removing himself from nature, the himself from that side of his life concerned with

bodily
left

needs were

his

concern

only

when nature supplied

limiting
is

provisions.

the to

artisan

not

unattended.

With the passing of the natural art of acquisition Aristotle now speaks of the arts with reference
natural point acquisition
with

morality.

Morality

supercedes

the appearance
that

of

noneconomic possibilities.

At this

Aristotle

reminds us

both the

arts

and moral qualities of moral qualities

may in terms

succumb
of

to the desires for pleasure. He does not speak

the arts,

for he

presents

courage

rather than not art

soldiering.

The damage done

by

hedonism

should not

be depreciated;

but

moral virtue

is destroyed

when an appropriate

disregard for life is forgotten

in favor

of

the

pleasures of

life.
example,

Courage, Aristotle's first

thought, in the
pleasures name of

inherently
resist

assumes nature.

a posture which

is

nobility, to

brute

It

rejects

the base

arising from civil conditions without which it cannot exist. Robbed of its morality courage is an ability for hire which may be used to destroy that which it previously sustained. The corruption of the arts and of man's moral
capacities are not explained other arts

by

the absence of

unnatural

acquisition as an art

but only by its presence. This unnatural art possesses separate from an entry into the artisan's life by virtue of the fact that all products must be reduced to money, the common medium which serves man's needs. To the ex
arts'

tent that the

incidental

concern with

they

serve

the

master art
considered

the art

of money-making.

money becomes their central concern, This is the reason that

Aristotle first
compensation.

the purpose of the arts independent of the artisan's

to prevent the unnatural art of acquisition from sup
worth of

He

sought

planting mother nature in designating the If Midas wasn't kingly, his art appeared to
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

the other

arts.

be, for it

ordered

his life and,

77.

H22a34ff.

190
without

Interpretation
divine rectification,
other arts would

have denied his life. In

It is

a similar manner

the

unnatural art of acquisition appears supreme.

capable of

destroying

or sub

merging the
seen

into the desire for

money.

They

differ, for

as we

have
than

the strength of the

unnatural art of acquisition requires wisdom other

wisdom.

Dionysius'; it requires human lives, appears only to do what

the basis of his
when man's man's

The

unnatural

art, in ordering

men's

the natural art did before it. Both order life on

natural art ordered

bodily
was

desires. Yet the

man's

bodily

life

life

limited to the body. The

unnatural art of acquisition orders

life

when

this is no longer true. This is why one art of acquisition can

be

natural and another unnatural

despite the facts that both

control man's men.

life
now

and

that in each case the artisans are not

in the first instance

which are

But

accompanying the unnatural art are greater needs

as we
must

different in kind

have seen, the now be ordered by

equivalent,
an

good

life is
is

not one of

monetary degree. Man's life

or complexity.

an art aware of man's not

maturity
such

Clearly
to

the natural art

of acquisition

suited

to

a task.

We
not

need

find
with

its

civil

art

which

is

natural

even

if it is
with

coeval

man's
even

chronological

birth

and

which

is

concerned can

natural

subjugation

though

it

aims at peace.

Perhaps this

best be

accomplished

by

making

a new

beginning.

VI. THE LEGISLATIVE ART

We

can

best

make

that

beginning by

returning to Aristotle's detachment

of

the arts from that side of man's life concerned with subsistence. At that time

he limited
artisan was
was

a consideration of the artisan

to his product. The excellence of the

or

dependent

upon

the goodness

badness

of

the finished product but

put.

independent

of the use

to which the product

not extend

was

ultimately

Hence the

excellence of the artisan

did

to man unless we assume that man

artisan must also consume.

is

solely

a producer.

But,

as we

have seen, the

in the

He
the

must use

the products

of other artisans as well as

his

own.

Man's

use of

product moves

beyond

reason

service of production.

It involves knowl
want of such

edge with which

the artisan appeared unconcerned.

of

Initially, for
arts

knowledge,
need.

the

"wisdom"

the

body

informed the
longer

use was a response to

But

with abundance

liberate,
is

not

required

Now man must de regarding use, but the good use of the artisan's product. Morality in the absence of the artisan's limited awareness. It emerges with
wisdom no

this

suffices.

possibilities created
man

limited to, bodily needs. As a consequence is forced to choose, and his choice is tied to his way of life. Use reflects life within the horizon of morality both are informed by goodness. The good
not man

by, but

is the

man

who

leads

morally
produced

useful

presented as a product.
art

He is

by

human

life. As such, he may now be wisdom and the legislative

producers and production.

the only art whose product

discredits both

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

The legislative
of

and the

Conquest of Nature

191

art

the art of acquisition.

is the only art that can apprehend the natural character Its acumen stems from understanding the effects

which result

if

man's art

is

seen as

conquering
nature,

nature.

It

prevents these effects

by denying

that man,

a manifestation of

conquers all other natural man

ifestations. This
power would

would

be

no

better than the

subjugation
nature's

conquest of nature
each case.

by

art,

since

be the title for

that
man

in

Rather the legislative

art acknowledges

is

festation
only

who can

rightly

conquer and order

of

highest manifestation; he is the mani in the name of nature, for he is the

Man
mirrors nature

part which reflects

the whole

nature.78

in that he is

at

war with

himself. The

conflict present

in

nature's

articulations,

man and ani

mal, is
war

soul and body. The natural life morally yields to the civil, yet no less natural, war to overcome the body and its desires. Here man must fight to subdue, not nature's provisions, but nature's raging passions; here he fights not to live but present

a recreation of

the conflict

in man,

to overcome animal

to live well. If man is nature's

highest articulation,

then the war

in

which man

is

a part

is inferior to the depiction

life.
of

lative

art's

among the parts of man. Consequently, the legis economic life is a battle meant to serve the greater
war

victory hunter and the

war reveals

of moral

Only

moral

life

explains

the

fierce independence

of

the

slavish

disposition

of

the petty artisan; only nobility explains why

man prior

to the polis, and why peaceful pursuit of gain fails to

reflect and

humanity

even within civil

life. The

natural

conquering he

of animal

life

the conquering of man's animal passions are pitted against the

docility
himself.
The

which man occasions

by

surrendering to the

gifts which

presents to

This

surrender

is the

conclusion of a quiet civil war

in

which

the lower parts

part.79

of man's soul attempt to profit

78.

ignobly
by

at the expense of a

higher

Compare

with

the

following

statement

Engels: "The

seizure of the means of production

of

by

society

eliminates

commodity

production and with

it the domination

the product over the

The anarchy within social production is replaced by consciously planned organization. The struggle for individual existence comes to an end. It is only at this point that man finally
producer.

separates

in

a certain sense

from the
ones.

animal

kingdom

and

that he passes

from
and

animal conditions of

existence to

really human

The

conditions of existence and control of

environing

hitherto

dominating
its

humanity

now pass under the

dominion

humanity,
and

which now

for the first time

master of

becomes the
own social

real conscious master of

nature, because and in so far as it becomes

organization"

(Frederick
to

Press,
dom."

1975],

p.

97).

According

Engels, Socialism: Utopian Engels, man must finally be

Scientific [Foreign Language from the "animal His

At the

separated

king
the

The

producer must

be liberated from

dominating

product and nature alike. a commodity. economic

subjugation

results

producer's solved earlier

in oppression, for it dehumanizes man making of him domination of nature does not portend unlimited
the problem of
use.

same time

desires,

since

history
heralds

has
an

Man desires

no more

than he needs. The end of

history

beginning. Man's domination

of nature,
of man

resembles nature's earliest

domination For these life.

his transformation from commodity to human being, his economic contentedness occurs in the absence
the natural art of acquisition, for Aristotle "the
moral meaning.

of

desires to the

contrary.

reasons

producer,"

product

dominating

the

ceases

to have

It

administered

to man's lack

of contentedness with economic

by by

79. The affinity between productivity and peace is from a much different perspective affirmed Bacon: "Wherefore, as in religion we are warned to show our faith by works, so in philosophy

the same

rule

the system should be

judged

of

by

its fruits,

and pronounced

frivolous if it be

192

Interpretation
for survival, but, for
survival

natural art of acquisition reminds us of man's war nature of

given

the

human

life, it

also reminds us that

his

war

is

not

his

most

perilous war.
much like the natural art of acquisition, is no ordinary from the legislative art, determines the fate of the other issues Law, arts. They are permitted or prevented from appearing in the city by political rule. The legislator deliberates regarding those arts which are essential for

The legislative art,

which

art.

human life. In turn, the meaning of human life cannot be determined apart from the nature of man. Law permits and forbids in the name of nature. Hence nature
governs the
was said

legislator. Yet

nature cannot

to govern the acquisitive art.

completion upon

nings.

transformation, by Aristotle facilitates man's shedding but

a

simply govern the legislative art as it One reason is that man can only attain discarding and forgetting his natural begin
of

his

youth.

He does this

not

by

plished

ignoring by
no

by

reclaiming

man's

deep

past;

man's

transformation is accom

transformation of

his history. Those

youthful activities which seek

to fulfill limited
are

when

needs are ennobled and consequently, while remaining limited, longer essentially descriptive of man's youth. Second, nature, even understood in terms of man's completion, cannot simply govern the legis

lative art,

it only passes upon the arts. It remains for law to permit those arts necessary for moral life. The necessity of law reveals the impotency of nature. Without assistance from law the passions of the body reign unbridled;
since

in the beasts.
In

presence of

lawless

nature man

wars, not

with

the gods, but with the

another

sense, the legislative

art resembles

the ordinary arts. Of the two

natural sible cern

arts, only the

polis or

legislative
and

art

is

concerned with production.

It is

respon

for the is
with

that association

which completes man's growth.

Its

con

nobility

hence its designation Aristotle the

as

the supreme

or

manly

art.

Its

practitioner,

according to

greatest of

"benefactors,"80

provides
pre

for human
cedes

nature

in the

presence of mere nature.

No

comparable

legacy

his work; his art neither can be attributed to nor characterized by bodily needs. Hence maternal nature cannot instruct the legislator. Man's ultimate
production can

only be

attributed

to

man.

As

result,

man

is

no

longer

a crea

tion

requiring

servile care.

He is he

now

the proud moral product of a new, if

final,

natural association
nature

the polis. But

imitate the
In its

from

which

withdraws.

in producing, man, of necessity, must Within a civil setting the legisla

tive art gives birth and

destroys.
the unnatural art of acquisition and the
art's creations are

moral war with

desires
its

which

it shields, the legislative

barren,
more

its

weapons.

It,

unlike

powerful

especially

contention"

pute and
a philosophic

if, in place of fruits of grape and olive, it bear thorns and briars of dis (Bacon, Essays, pp. 216-17). Aristotle's contentiousness must be replaced by
and

tolerance,
not

to productive,

"barren,"

his conquering hunter or warrior much succumb, in the first instance, "lovers of (Bacon, Works, in, p. 435).
quiet"

80. Barker, Politics,

i253a32-33.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

opponent,
can

and the

Conquest of Nature

193
understood,

dignify. Its

creations possess the advantage of

being

in the first

instance,

apart

creating for those

power of which

which

from their birth. And, despite it has not created, the legislative

the limitation

in

art possesses the

imagination. It

can

dignify

that which

does

not exist or recreate that

has
no

does. Yet this imaginative power is neither unbounded nor arbitrary it logos. This is why the legislative art, unlike maternal nature, relies on other art to justify its products. And this is why the products of the leg
a
art can

islative

never

be

understood

"constructs."

as of

To describe Aristotle's
of

teaching in this way

assumes
nature.

robs

that

teaching
in the

its logos,

its

reasonability. unauthorized evidence of

It

that moral principles are constructed

principle presented

by

man

but

by
de

Any

name of nature

becomes

ception.

And

deception,

given nature's

disinterest, is
order.

unjustifiable

for it

can no us

longer be
unadorned

part of a natural

edifying

Such

an

approach returns

to

nature, to birth and creation but

considered man's completion.

distortion

of

nature,
of

a still

having significantly The result, from the perspective of nobility, is a birth. Man's moral life dies even while he survives.
without

first

With the demise

a

his

moral

end, his

survival cannot even

be described

as

beginning.

VII. CONCLUSION

The theoretical
mary.

section on

the art of acquisition is concluded with a

and ends with usury.

sum

It begins

with natural

birth

Some hint

of

the con

nection

between the two is

means

supplied

by

the Greek term for usury,

'parent'

xoxog,
princi

which
pal."81

offspring, and, in this case, "child of the literally Aristotle's point is simple money cannot breed. One

commentator

has

charged that

Aristotle is

"merely
has

playing

with

words,"82

for money

can

Aristotle's misunderstanding breed, itself. from the term Aristotle's mistaken claim of usury to difficulties springing that money is barren, his play upon the identification of currency and birth, Both of these assessments fail to ask, blinds him to its beneficial
while another commentator attributed
effects.83
principal?"

"Who is the far

not removed

parent of

Despite its

conventional gives

status, usury is

not

from

man's

birth. Like nature, it

life to the body. It breeds

only money but desire into men who are taken with the conventional ver sion of their initial life. In reproducing money from money, usury appears as
81. Barker, Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle p. 386. 82. Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece, p. 32. 83. Barker, Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 386;
,

also note

Ross: "Here

again a

justifiable
rendered

moral prejudice against

by

lenders

of capitalism

iniquitous usury blinds him [Aristotle] to the economic services (Ross, Aristotle, p. 243); Barker: "It is easy to show that
"

Aristotle has

interest"

not understood

the

theory

of

386); Michell: "The

argument

that money

is

dead thing
p. 30).

(Political Thought of Plato and does not breed

and

Aristotle,
be

p.

must

rejected

(The Economics of Ancient Greece,

194

Interpretation
live
with

the fulfillment of nature's providential promise. It allows some men to

ease not a

in

circumstances

of abundance.

But the offspring

remove

of

usury is

slavish,

warlike, disposition. The debtor's servile obligation to the usurer and the

usurer's servile obligation

creates
nature.

any likelihood of nobility. Usury a child of man by paralleling in civil life his dependence on maternal In an important sense art not only imitates but supersedes nature. Pro
to interest

creation

is

attributed

to art

the usurer breeds interest from

money.

breeds

without

thought of need or limitation. Natural parentage

exists

But money and care have

been forgotten. No Midas

absence

to

remind man

of

his foolishness. In their

most unnatural

usury

cannot

be

naturalized.

It

remains

the

form

of

acquisition.

Given Aristotle's
passage

account of natural and unnatural

acquisition, the

following

from The Economics of Ancient Greece, referred to as "the currently Economics,"84 is distinguished from many standard work in English on Greek
texts only

other

by

the concise clarity

with which

it

misses

the point:

Their [the Greek philosophers'] thought

there was an
absolute separation of

was

entirely dominated
of right and

by

ethical

ideas;

the

from that

of economic advantage and

wrong in human conduct disadvantage. It might, at first sight, be thought

ideas

that in this the

Greek

philosopher was superior

to the

modern economist who

is,

apparently, too prone to overlook the ethical

a materialism such would stricted

in favor
no place.

of the practical, and to preach

in

which spiritual values

have

Reflection

will reveal

that

be far from the

reality.

The Greek
which

philosopher's outlook was too con

for him to
8S

appreciate the

fact,

the modern economist

has grasped,

that

economic advantage or

disadvantage is, in the last analysis,

conditioned

by
from

ethical values.

Aristotle is found wanting in this respect: he views the human perspective "dominated by ethical which consequently
ideas"

condition

causes a separa

tion of the moral from the economic sphere.

look"

The

result

is

"constricted

out

which

fails to

"appreciate"

the fact that economic advantage and disad

"conditioned"

vantage are

by

morality.

What Michell, the

author of

the above
what

passage, and others fail to understand is that Aristotle did

claim

precisely

they

he did
the

not

do. It is Aristotle

who refuses

to present economics indepen

dent

of

household,

an association which cannot

be

understood apart

from its

moral

purpose; and it is the

Aristotle,

not

"modern
economic

economists,"

who, through the

art of

hunter, infuses nobility into

goes

life. domination
reveals a

Where Michell
"separation
man's ness.

wrong is in

failing

to see that

only"

in light
us

of unification.

This perspective, far from constricting

natural completeness or whole

horizon, directs
This is
not

to maximum clarity

to

deny

that nature, which is the

basis for clarity, is

con

trary. It clearly is complex and

apparently inconsistent. Man may

appear as

84. Finley, The Ancient Economy, p. 26. 85. Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece,

p. 34.

Aristotle's Art of Acquisition

other

and

the Conquest of Nature

with
moral

195
which

than man. The answer for

Aristotle lies
obfuscation

edification

preempts procreation and

demands

in the

service of subjugation:

money
same

cannot naturally breed, for it can only be unnaturally bred. But, at the time, obfuscation, however moral, encounters those passions which seek

base clarity
ever-present

by

their persistence. Their continual presence and

intensity

are an

truth.

They

are opposed

by

a moral

truth,

not as persistent

but
and

equally enduring,

with which

Aristotle
of

concludes

his

consideration of

usury

his theoretical
originating

section on

the art

acquisition;

he

reminds us

that those desires take our

with our

birth

outlive

their surroundings, and if

we are at an

we

bearing

by

such

desires, however

natural,

early

unnatural end.

Notes for

Reading

of

Augustine,

Confessions, Book X
Thomas Prufer
The Catholic

University

of America

omni secreto

interior,

omni

honore

sublimior1

Aristotle's
of of

exclusion of action
"god,"

from the

most

its

excellence called possibility:

leaves

a space

primary sense of being, because for unsupported action, the space

human

being
for

able

to be one way or the other and

being

within

the power of the agent to originate

the other.

by determining
and

to

be
we

In this

space

choice

novelty,

what

way have decided

one

and not
and

begun

be undone, remaining perpetually unalterable. For Augustine this space is taken up into a new sense of the divine: God does the unexpected and the unrepeatable; he is artificer and governor, crafts
can never man and

shepherd, lawgiver
promises and

and

caretaker,

king

agreements; he

forgives,
("the

praises and

ishes; he is
passion
and

generous and

avenging,

merciful work

choice,

construction

judge; he is partner to blames, rewards and pun and just; he speaks in terms of of his hands") and convention
and

("the

covenant with

his

people"). not a return

How is it that this is

vention of
what

to a mythology (stories of arbitrary inter

the divine in human affairs: "give what you command and command
will")2

you

and

politics and

("be

our

glory")3

of wisdom?

The Socratic

accommodation to

piety

law is

repeated with a

difference.

Does divine self-sufficiency exclude making and ruling? Is God either nig gardly and a recluse or diffusive and a busybody? Can he create, command, for the lesser and even for the lowly without suffering and provide for others from the
neediness of what

he benefits
to

and

without

himself needing bene

ficiaries? Can there be freedom to

power

choose without
what

to

make

without subordination
self-sufficiency?

indeterminacy overcome and is made, both being one with

of mind a

eternal and

necessary Augustine is paradigmatic for the theological form

philosophical

in

contrast to
of

the Greek
mind

form. Here is
who

hiding

and

revealing

human
in

in

the creator

God,

is free

of all creatures and who

lets
is

creatures
given

be because he

freely

wills

them to be.
knowledge,4

The
and

being

of creatures and

noncreaturely freedom
I
.

and

human freedom

knowledge

Confessions ix I I
. .

2.

Confessions x.29.40(twice); 31.45; 35.56; 37.60.

3. 4.

Confessions

x.36.59.
civitate

Confessions xm.38.53; De Trinitate xv. 13.22; De

34.350.

Dei xi.io, xxi.8; De Genesi

ad

litteram vi 15.26-16.27, PL

198

Interpretation
noncreaturely free letting be of creatures out of nothing. although false, is meaningful for a sense of the being
which

are ordered toward this

"God is

is,"

all

there

of creatures within

the context of creation,

chosen

is free

and out of

nothing,

that

is,

creatures

are

by

God

as

the alternative to there

being

only

God. The
not

plenitude of goodness would not of

be diminished,
to
which

and goodness would

be impugned for lack has denied.

generosity, if

creatures were not.

Thus the

goodness
although

of creatures not

a presupposition comes

in

relation

it is questionable,

Questioning

to rest in a freedom
were

which could choose other

than what it does

choose.5

If God

to

choose

that creatures not be (because

that creatures are is

native could

freely

chosen, that

is,

chosen

in fact

although

the alter

be chosen, that
"being"

creatures not

would mean to-fact), then all that hand, for creatures to be is for them to be,

be is possible, although contrarywould be God alone. On the other

without remainder or

reserve,

chosen

by

and manifest

to another.

There is no longer any privacy: man is because he is manifest to another. But this publicity to God is as hidden as God himself, unless God's eloquence manifests him as our public and as the friend who confirms us in our knowledge
of ourselves and of one another.

Outside this
vainglory

context public virtue or

excelling

in the
or

eyes of others tends toward

or pride of

life,

and private science

knowing
of

for its

own sake are a

The Confessions form it

tends toward empty curiosity or lust of the eyes. dialogue between one man and God; they have the

shows

rhetoric

solitary prayer overheard, not of speech with others about being as itself through city and cosmos. The Psalms are the origin of the of the Confessions, a rhetoric whose form is caritas: mutua redamatio "Thus the Lord

cum quadam mutua communicatione etfamiliari conversation

spoke with

tibi}

Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend,"7 garriebam Mind is achieved through first listening and then speaking to God, not
speech

through

in the

world with others. as

God is

spoken to with words

first
in

spoken to us

(prayer

quotation of
and

common with us

(Christ, human What is best in the world is

and

Scripture) divine, Mediator).

and
abyss,9

in the Word

spoken

mind as and to

first hidden to itself

a

and of

to

others

then given to

itself

others

through

manifestation

its

manifestness
of

to God. Man is

the

freely

freely confessing abyss in the image and likeness hidden God. The Greek shining forth and manifestness revealing
1.8.2.1.

5.

Scotus, Ordinato
responsione

(Vatican
et

ed.

iv. 324-326).
art.

Cajetan, In

quaestionem xix primae

partis, in

ad

quintum

quartum

tertii (Leonine ed.

iv.236;

see

Vatican

ed.

Banes, In quaestionem xix primae partis, art. 3, Tertio, Quarto; Ad tertium, Ad quartum; art. 10, Secundo, Tertio; Ad secundum, Ad tertium (Madrid- Valencia 1934) 414, 438, 441-442. John of St. Thomas, In quaestionem xix primae partis, 24.2.35, 24.4. liter, and Scotus,
vi.26*-30*).

24.7.16

(Solesmes

ed. in

76, 92-93, 132-133).

6. Aquinas, Summa 7. Exodus 33. 8. Confessions

9.

theologiae 1-11.65.5.

IX 1. 1

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics vi.7.ii4ia34-ii4ib2; Psalm

41.8

Vulgate.

Reading

of Augustine,

Confessions, Book
manifestness to the

199
who

to others has

become hidden in his free

hidden God,

through

free
one

revelation of

creative

knowledge

reveals us to ourselves and to

gloria.10

another; Deus

conscientiae testis maxima est

No longer Aristotle's
"the hermitage
of

"that
the

which appears
heart."12

to all, that we call

being,"11

but

rather

hidden

We turn away from the speaking and the listening, the seeing and the being seen of citizenship and become strangers to each other in the hidden thoughts
of of

the

heart, being
rhetorician

witnessed

by

the eyes

of

the Lord and

moved

in imitation
Ambrose:
searched
silent."14

the Word to

a new rhetoric: public witness or confessio

before

others.13

The

Augustine

goes to

Milan
over

and sees the preacher

"when he read, he drew his For

eyes

along

the pages, and his

heart

the sense (cor intellectum rimabatur), but his voice and tongue were

Aristotle,
although

mind

cosmos,

this speaking

finds itself in speaking is implicated in a

with

others

about

city

and

silence

beyond

public virtue
can search

and ordered motion.

But in the theological form

of

mind,15

the heart

the sense while the voice is silent because it is God speaking the sense of things.

who manifests

Confessio, speaking
of

out

from

silence and

from hiddenness in imitation

philosophical sense of

the

freely

the silence and

revealing Word, hiddenness of the eternal

overrides the and

manifesting forth Greek necessary

addressed

by

showing "give
more

as

paradigmatic, indeed
and

divine,

the free action of speaking for

the ears of others

with

manifesting for the

us

eyes of others.

God is
and as

will"

what you command and command what you

the

Other

who,

intimate to

than we are to ourselves, confirms the availability

of mind

to itself and to

others.

The impotence
and

itself exhaustively from from dissipation to recollection opens it, seeking itself
of mind

to

bring

latency
seeks

to patency unity,

as manifest

to the one clarity of its creative exemplar.

Solitary

mind

to

manifest

itself to itself

by

itself.16

But

what mind

is, is hidden in
world of

the hidden God. There

man

is he

a cleavage can show as

between
himself
who
be.17

phenomenal

and

noumenal, between

in

so

far

as

and

be

seen

in the

by

others and

by

himself

and

man

abyss,

is

as

being

known

God,

man

who

is

whatever

God

knows him to

Solitary
in the
of

mind,

manifested

to itself

and

to

others as

freely

willed and

willing

sight of

another,

remains as a residue after

the truncation and destruction

the

theology
De
civitate

which was

the condition of the genesis of this

form

of mind.

IO. 11.

Dei

xiv 28.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics x.2,

psalmos

I72b36-

1173*1.

12. Enarrationes in
13.

41.13,

55. 9,

100.12,

134.16.

Sermo 47.14.23, PL

38.311-312.

Confessions

x.2. 2. x.6.9.

14.
15.

Confessions vi.3.3,

Cf. Regula S. Benedicti

v. 3,

48.5.12.

Aquinas, De
De Trinitate
Robert

potentia

Dei

In librum

sententiarum

1. 38. 1. 5.

id.
17.
phie

x.8.11.

Grosseteste, De

veritate, ed.

Ludwig Maur,

Beitrage

zur

Geschichte der Philoso

des Mittelalters,

ix 1912.142.

200

Interpretation
still

Mind,

possess

remembering gratuitous participation in gratuitous creating, tries to itself as enjoying the privilege of an Archimedean point exploited for

mastery (the image is in Descartes's Second Meditation): mind offers itself the possibility of making itself in the world with others out of the solitude
of

its

worldless

freedom. Just
would

as recollection of
not

to

bring

to be what

otherwise

be

and what

divine gratuity (the freedom could be otherwise)

so recollection of

is

exploited

in

order

to free freedom from the necessary,

of unimitated

divine exemplarity (the inexhaustible excess ploited in order to look down on being in the
The
world we

imitability) is

ex

world with others as material

malleable.18

did

not make

becomes nothing but

world with others

for work;
public

we return
whom we

from

solitude to

being

in the

to make a

to

display
Deo

the solitude we left behind.

uti:

Descartes hints that the

model no

longer has for

primacy.

Once imi

tators of the model, we now arrogate to ourselves the primacy of the model.

The

presuppositions of providence

(being

cared

by God)

and miracle

(being
tech

malleable

nology.

in God's hands) are transformed into the Pride in mastery replaces both admiration of
neither creates

presuppositions of

excellence and gratitude

toward

generosity.

But God
and

himself

nor needs creatures.

Uprooted from

eternal

necessary
and

self-sufficient
over and

natures

power

enjoying goodness, both freedom from natures, which could be otherwise, and the glory
mind

befitting
out

generosity

benevolence toward those

fictions.19

who would

be nothing

with

them,

are monstrous

18. 19.

Jeremiah

18.1-17.
v

Studia Scholastico-Scotistica

(Rome, 1972)

359-370.

Machiavelli
Language

versus

Dante:
on

and

Politics in the Dialogue

Language

Larry Peterman

University

of

California, Davis

Political Scientists
philosophers,
who

are

less fortunate than

of

academic able to

linguists

and

language

discuss language in iso luxury being For us, however, these subjects are inseparable. "Wherever the relevance of speech is at as Hannah Arendt puts it, "matters become definition."1 political by It is understandable, then, that recent developments in
lation from
politics.
stake,"

enjoy the

linguistics
political whether posture.

and

language philosophy have

radical view

given

rise to
of

sizable,

and

increasing,

literature, ranging from

Chomsky's

appraisals of syntax

Wittgenstein to questioning is related to his radical political

This literature is very diverse but a common proposition unites it.2 If language and politics are bound together, then determinations of what draws
together
and us

us

divides

us
and

linguistically
divides

are

what

draws

together

us politically.

simultaneously determinations of From the perspective of poli

language is
also

tics, debate
the

over the character and constituents of

debate

over

character and constituents of communal we shall examine

life.
on

With this in mind,

a

Machiavelli's Dialogue

Language,

tract of particular interest to political scientists inasmuch as it demonstrates

the connections between political and linguistic arguments and between changes

in

political

and

linguistic

positions.3

Essentially,

we

argue

that the Dialogue

represents the ments.

That is,

linguistic corollary to Machiavelli's more familiar political argu at least on the surface, it reverses earlier views of language in a
the reversal of earlier
moral-political views

manner aligned with

in Machiavelli's
a presumption

thematic political

works.

Our argument, in this sense,

arises

in

The Human Condition (Chicago, 1959), p. 4. H. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley, Cal., 1972); N. Chomsky, Language and Responsibility, trans. J. Viertel (New York, 1972); P. Robinson, New York Times Book Review,
i.
2.

Feb. 25, 1979. See, for recent explorations of the tie between language Politics, Language, and Thought (Chicago, 1977), pp. I39ff.
3.

and politics,

D. Laitin,

The full title

of

the Dialogue is Discorso

dialogo intorno

alia nostra

lingua, hereafter
scritti

cited as
ed.

Dial. Our text is included in Niccolo Machiavelli, // teatro e tutti gli F. Gaeta (Milan, 1965). The best available translation of the Dial, is in The
trans.

letterari,
Works

Literary

~of

J. R. Hale (Oxford, 1961). For our purposes, we need not recount the various scholarly debates about the Dial., most of which concern its probable date and whether it is properly attributable to Machiavelli. For details on these matters, see A. E. Quaglio,

Machiavelli,

"Machiavelli,"

Martelli, Una
ment that with

giarda

in the Enciclopedia Dantesca, ed. U. Bosco (Rome, 1971), hi, 754-7, and M. fiorentina (Rome, 1978). What follows here contrasts with Quaglio's judg
political thinker and written the

Machiavelli distinguishes between Dante the

arguments

Dante the poet,

and

and

Martelli's

is

at odds with most

Machiavelli Machiavellian views.

that

could not

have

Dialogue,

that the tract

202
that
of

Interpretation
whose

Machiavelli,

heritage included demonstrations

of the

interrelatedness

language

and politics and whose works

display

a consistent appreciation of

the political force of

cessors'

language,

understood

that he could not change

his

prede

moral-political universe without

well.4

changing their linguistic universe as

what

At the risk

of

oversimplification, then, we hold that the Dialogue has a

place

among the linguistic battalions

ancients and

in
If

became known

as

the

battle

between the

the

moderns.

we are right

in this, it follows that

stakes

the Dialogue opens

recent

the way to understanding the linguistic discussions.

political

in

more

From the outset, the Dialogue operates at both linguistic and political levels. Machiavelli's express purpose in the tract is to settle the controversy, then
current and orators

in Florence, over "whether the language is Florentine, Tuscan, or it to

in
an attack upon written

written

by

our

Florentine

poets

Italian."

To this end, he devotes the Machiavelli takes to

greater part of

Dante's claim, in the Vulgar Eloquence,

which

to have

"curial

language,"

mean

"common Italian

language,"

and

its literal linguistic

and

figurative

core

consists

of a

debate between Machiavelli

Dante to

the

two on the

character

of the
and

Divine Comedy.

argues that

the

poem

is

"wholly

Florentine"

subsequently forces
provides others

"confess"

the point.

Thus he

resolves

or,

at

least,

"with be

matter

for

fiercer

dispute"

the linguistic question that troubles his

of

countrymen. considered results

Henceforth,
Florentine.5

the

language

Florence's

poets

and orators

is to

That Machiavelli

even entertains

this question, how

equivalent
will

ever,

from

a prior political of

concern.

In the Dialogue's
says

to

the epistles

dedicatory
offers

his

political

works, he

that he

take the

opportunity it
will

to "honor his country

{patria).'"

By

refuting Dante he
too presumptuous
audience

"defend"

simultaneously
who seek

Florence
of

and

"attack,

.those

persons

to

rob

her

her

honor."

The Dialogue's

is to
to his

understand that country's

Dante's linguistic
one of

claim constituted a conscious challenge ways

integrity,

but many

in

which

he

criticized and

defamed he

her. In this
wrote

particular

case, he

sought

to

"dishonor"

Florence
"repute"

by denying

in her language and, thereby, denying her the writings gave her. From the Dialogue's perspective, Dante is
cide,"

he thought his
a political

"parri
an

that

is,
his

someone

"who
and

shows

himself
the

by

thought

or

deed to be

country"

enemy

of

loses

greater obligation

than to his

country."6

is that it depicts
who are

a confrontation

man is under no Our first impression of the Dialogue between a patriot and a political renegade sight of

fact that "a

differentiated according to their

not

opinions about the

force

of political

obligations.

This is
4.
5.

to suggest that the

earlier

Dialogue,

as

some critics would

have it,

The

most pp. pp.

famous

statement,

of

course, is that

of

Aristotle, Politics

i253aio.

Dial.

183, 188, 189, 198.

183, 187.

6. Dial.

Machiavelli
is little failed
defend

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

profession
at

on

Language
or an

203
attempt

more than

"petulant"

of patriotism

by

politician to
himself.7

improve his fortunes

explicit
restrict

the cost

of someone who cannot not

Machiavelli's
his

patriotism

in the Dialogue does

necessitate

that he

arguments to the narrow

quite

bounds

of

Florentine

partisanship is imperfect

or sectarianism. and

Indeed, he is

that a person who turns upon

willing to admit that Florence his country, like Dante, may

have legitimate

What he will not admit is that such imperfections behavior like Dante's. Machiavelli can, without rancor, accept the Comedy's "clumsy, crude, and passages because Dante's Florentine language calls for "this sort of but he cannot accept what
grievances. or grievances excuse
obscene"

thing"

Dante explicitly of his Florentine

"said"

about

Florence. What Dante

words,
was

"did"

as

a consequence

heritage, in
as an as

other

"done

well"

even

if it

reflected

poorly and his

upon

him

artist, but he

should not

have

spoken about

native

language
in

he did. Rather, he

ought to

have he

realized that

his country his

freedom to
the same

speak

general was circumscribed

by

what

owed

Florence in

manner

that his freedom

reminder

as an artist was circumscibed a person owes

nature"

Thus,
tence"

the Dialogue's
and

that

his country his

by her language. "very exis

"every

good that

fortune

and

bring

parallels and subsumes

of words used nowhere
nature.8

its

reminder

that Dante had to use "an infinite number

Florence"

else

but in

because

art cannot

wholly

repudiate

The Dia

logue, in
famous

this sense, adopts the same secular

hierarchy
see

implicit in Machiavelli's
soul.

assertion

that he loves his country more than his

of

Dante

errs

linguistically
preceded all outweighs
way"

because his

his

prior

failure to
the same

the ties to his country that

as a
.

his

other secular

ties.

By

all

other achievements.

token, his failure That he was "excellent

judgment"

Florentine
.

and a man of

"genius, learning,
man."

and

does

not offset and

in every the fact

that when he spoke about Florence he lost his

and

"gravity, learning,
was

judgment"

became "another

Where Florence

concerned, in short, Dante

lost his
which

sense of perspective and priorities.

virtually define political excellence gravity which denotes political respectability

which political action
realism.9

Not only that, he lost the qualities in the Prince and the Discourses: the
and

success, the
which

learning

upon

is predicated,

and

the judgment

is

part of political

7.
n. 2

F. Salsano, "Machiavelli
27-29.
pp. pp.

dell'

censore

'exul

immeritus'

Dante

Alighieri,"

L'Alighieri, x,

(1969),
Dial.

8. Dial.
9.

183,

193-4-

Discorsi, Epistle

Dedicatory (1. 3), xiv (1.48), xv (1.49), xix (1.58); (1.229(1.132), liii (1.208), liv (1.209), " Proemio numbers (11.315)The 30), i (1. 231), m.xxxiv (1. 418-9); Istorie Florentine, Proemio (11.5), vi.xxix in parentheses refer to Tutti le opere di Niccold Machiavelli, eds. F. Flora and C. Cordie, 2
187-8.

// Principe, Epistle
I. xiii

Dedicatory (1.87-8),

vols

(Milan,

1949-1950), to which all Machiavelli citations other than to the Dial, will refer.
will

Hereafter the Prince

and

be

cited as

Pr.,

the Discourses as

Disc,

the Florentine Histories as

exile

FH.,
of

the Art of War

as

AW.

According

to

Machiavelli, before his

Dante

was

man

prudence"

good "counsel and

(FH. ll.xviii[ll.8i]).

204

Interpretation
position as a writer

Dante's

and, as such, a public figure

compounded

these

failures. A
speaks

writer

is

called upon

to be especially careful about the

at all

because

what

he says, if he is

successful,

will

of

way he necessity be
seems

the object of

public scrutiny. and

According

to the

Dialogue, however, Dante

in
political

to have ignored this

consequently

suffered

terms.

Indeed,
could

Machiavelli

suggests

that instead of slandering, criticizing,

and

condemning

Florence have

"diversely
a

and

in different
speak

modes"

throughout
without

his poem, Dante

chosen

safer

way to

tells us that even after

compromising his viewpoint. He he might have remained Dante became "another

man,"

in Florence

or

have been have

chased out as a

he judged her. Subsequent to

words, Dante
could

becoming

had he judged everything as disaffected with his birthplace, in other

at

"fool"

continued

to have lived there or,

not such a
fool"

worst, would

have had to
the

endure

being

treated as a fool

bad

political

fate if had he it in

Discourses'

comments upon

"playing

the
affairs

are to

be believed

extended

his

criticism of

her to human
large.10

in

general or submerged would

a criticism of the world at a more successful writer

In short, Dante

had he been less

outspoken on
with

have been politically the subject of Florence.

Thus,

the Dialogue contrasts his behavior

that of Florence's other great

literary

figures. Boccaccio is
citation

said

to have

admitted

to writing in the vernacular

on what

Machiavelli's
avelli calls

is

ambiguous at

best

and, therefore, is

Machi

"our

side."

Petrarch is In

said

to have been silent on the subject and,

therefore, "stands
Machiavelli

neutral."11

contrast

to

Boccaccio, Petrarch,

and, presumably,

himself,
he

then, the Dante of the Dialogue

the way

is exceedingly impolitic

in both

what

wrote and

he

wrote.

Unfortunately,
and

the Dialogue offers little thematic treatment of the political

which separate

literary

differences

its

adversaries.

It

does, however, include

passages which confer

a number of passages

that point to these

differences,

a sense of the

background for its linguistic debate.

events

Machiavelli draws between

in the

Among these is a comparison Comedy and Dante's linguistic posi

language, Machiavelli
says, is
mouth of greatest

tion. Dante's claim to use a common Italian

"no

more to or

be believed than that he found Brutus in the

citizens

Lucifer,
doubts

Paradise."

among the thieves, or his Cacciaguida in Here Machiavelli fastens doubts about what the Comedy records to
Dante
says

five Florentine

about what

in the Vulgar Eloquence. Suspicions

suspicions about

about

the

Comedy
it
on

precede or

accompany his

Dante's linguistic

claim.

Given

that Machiavelli is usually unstinting in his admiration for the

Comedy

and uses

many

occasions to

own

advantage,

we are

these particular

incidents

are so unbelievable and what

led, therefore, they may reveal

to ask why
about

10.

Dial.

pp.

187-8; Disc, ill

ii, heading
will

and

text (1.332-3). Cf. Inferno iv.51;

Rhetoric I4i5b30. Citations to Dante

1921). 11.

be to Le

opere

di Dante,

eds.

M. Barbi

et al.

Aristotle, (Florence,
el

Dial.

p.

186.
p.

Cf. Decameron iv.ii, in La letteratura Italiana,

193.

eds.

E.

Blanchi

al.

(Milan,

i960), vm,

Machiavelli
his
objections to

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

views.12

on

Language

205
to

Dante's linguistic

Unless Machiavelli
or

means

convey
to his

that the whole of the there

Comedy

is fantastic

his

examples are

fortuitous, is

something about these intentions in the Dialogue!

That Machiavelli
and

passages which

is instructive

with regard

considers the

Comedy's

portrayal of

Brutus

unbelievable

implicitly

rejects

it is
.

no surprise given

Brutus in the Discourses Like

that Dante reserves
tyrannicide and a

other

his overtly sympathetic treatment of commentators, he seems to find it puzzling

his harshest
of

punishment

defender

freedom.13

bound to
Brutus

object

to the apparent

for a man usually regarded as a Beyond this, however, he would also be rationale for the Comedy's procedure in the
towards the killer of Caesar.

section and

to Dante's

open antagonism

The first
with

way of thinking refuted in the Prince, the second contrasts the behavior the Discourses advises for men who live in republics and
represents a regimes

principalities, the
world.

which, according to

Machiavelli, divide

the political

facet

of

To begin, Dante's punishment of Brutus is at least on the surface a the familiar medieval argument that the Roman empire and, by exten
were

sion, its leaders

treatments
mission

divinely inspired.

Brutus

and

Cassius

merit

their severe

that demanded the full

because they willfully opposed Rome's providential mission, a development of the Roman eagle, the Paradiso

describes. Again, identifying the punishment of the betrayers of Caesar with placed by Dante in Lucifer's other mouth is that of the betrayer of Christ
a

token of the

doctrines, especially
the

true

for Christian Aristotelians, that the in

secular world shares with obedience

heavenly
as

world of

being

subject

to grace and that

owes

to temporal rulers partakes

the obedience

one

to

extra-

temporal

authorities. represents

To

put

it

simply

as

possible, Dante's
to

portrait of affairs.

Brutus

Brutus'

initially

typically

medieval

approach

secular

treatment signifies the

subordination of

the

regimes and authorities of

this world

to ends which may not wholly be of their own making and

which may not in this life. Thus, Dante's Brutus represents a way of thinking that Machiavelli puts aside in the Prince, when he tells us hence forth to base our actions on how men live rather than how they ought to live.

ultimately be

realizable

In calling Dante's secular and divine

portrayal of

Brutus unbelievable, he
that

calls

in

question the
other

hierarchy

which supports

portrayal.

On the be

hand,

his

objection

to Dante's open
towards
placed

condemnation of

Brutus

would

more practical.

Dante's

ferocity

Caesar himself, description of how Roman

cause

Caesar's enemy and his corresponding tolerance for among the heroes in Limbo, recalls the
Discourses' "celebrated"

writers

during

the

empire
Discourses'

Brutus be

it

was unsafe
reverses

to criticize Caesar. From the

perspective, the

Comedy
12.

the

kind

of

literary

caution

typical of perceptive writers under

Dial.

pp.

187-8.

For Machiavelli's Disc.

admiration

for Dante, see, e.g., Quaglio, "Machi

i.xxxvii

avelli."

13.

Cf. Inferno

xxxm. 37-69;

m.vi.

(1.339),

(1.177). But

see

Martelli, Una

giarda, pp- 43-4-

206

Interpretation

the empire.
reverses

More important, given Dante's own political situation, it- also the behavior Machiavelli advises, in the same place, for those who
in
republic."

"live in
use of and

private

a
ancient

Men

of republics who ought

"read

history"

and make

the "records of

deeds"

to emulate
at

opponents of

Caesarism
the

attend

to the "highest

scorn"

directed

its

advocates

and

"most
there

praise"

excessive

directed
sets

at

its

opponents.

Dante's

portrayal of

Brutus,

fore, simultaneously
past and

him

apart

from

perceptive and cautious

inhabitants,
means

present,

of

both

principalities and republics.

In

one

sense, this

that Dante resembles Machiavelli

himself,

who

departs from "all

writers"

in the

Discourses

on

the subject of the constancy of the people. But whereas Machi

avelli corrects other writers of everyone about of

by demonstrating that the people's failings are true including princes, thereby following his own advice in the Dialogue
"everything,"

Dante focuses his criticism extending particular criticisms to Brutus in a manner virtually designed to inflame the republicans among whom
lived.14

he

The

integrity

of

his

argument might

immediate

political consequences were not.

We

are

have been admirable, but its reminded, in this context,

Dante
would

that before the century of the

Comedy

was out

be

attacked

by

Florentine humanists precisely because of his enmity for the man "who Caesar and plucked from jaws the liberty of the Roman
robbers'

slew

people."15

The Dialogue's

second
of

example,

Dante's

encounter

with

the

Florentine
of

thieves in circle eight

avellian objections.
episode

Hell,

calls

forth

similar combination

Machi

Dante's thieves

are unremarkable

in themselves but their

ishment"

is noteworthy for "the marvelously weird, uncouth, and uncanny pun Dante imposes upon them and because they move Dante to deliver

"one

of

[his] bitterest invectives

punishment

against

his

city."

native

In the first

instance,
The
merge

Machiavelli's departure from Dante in theoretical terms is

thieves'

again revealed.

takes the form

of metamorphosis.

They

into

one another and change

into serpents, transformations

whose

variously final meanings

may be disputable but which are consistent insofar as they point to the vari here," as one commentator puts it, ability of human potential. "For Dante "metamorphosis is a token of the ranges latent within man, excited by the passions and unpredictable (but also reversible) in their And to the degree that the transformation into serpents the vilest of beasts in the
...
stages."

medieval

nature, the

bestiary represents a loss of identity and Comedy reproduces Aristotle's argument

Like

stripping away
to

of

human

that vicious men are worse

than the lowest

as
such.16

of animals whereas virtuous men are superior

any

animal

Aristotle, Dante

teaches that what

distinguishes
l.x

man as man and

14.

Disc.

11.

Cf. Inferno iv.123, xxxm; Paradiso VI. 74; Disc. Proemio (1.227); Dante, Convivio iv.v.12.

(1. 122-23), Iviii (1.217).

ed. and

See

15.
and

Leonardo Bruni, Dialogues, in The Three Crowns of Florence,

trans. D. Thompson

A. F. Nagel (New
16.

York,

1972),

p. 35.

Inferno XXV.94-151, xxvi.1-3; The Divine Comedy, trans. C. Langdon (Cambridge, lv-lvi; B. Stambler, Dante's Inferno (New York, 1962), p. 67; W. W. Vernon, Readings on the Inferno of Dante (London, 1894), 11, 338-40; Aristotle, Politics I253a32.
1918), i,

Machiavelli
man as

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

him
above

on

Language

207
beastli

political raises

the beasts

and

does

not partake of

ness. of

Machiavelli,
in this
and

of

course,

exchanges this

idea for

the Prince's

famous image

the unchanging

element

beast-man, Chiron. And, instead of emphasizing the human dichotomous figure, he urges us to bring forward the beastly
and

(la

bestia)
the
men

learn to imitate the lion

"sad"

the fox. For Dante's Aristotelian

we now

view of

manifold possibilities of
"wicked"

human existence,
and

have the doctrine

that
of

are of

or

(tristi)

the allied idea that the best way

this contrast
and
view

life is that

the

intelligent

predator.17

Admittedly,
Machiavelli

hardly reaches
alone

the

depths

of

the

imagery

employed

in the

Comedy

the

Prince, let

exhausts

the question of how Dante

and

human potential, but

it

serves to

clarify the theoretical divide between Dante and Machiavelli. At

"savaging"

a more practical

the
of

level, on the other hand, the thieves episode again indicates imprudence, for Machiavelli, of Dante's writing. Dante's open
which concludes measure of

Florence in the invective description

the

episode error

is

"deeds"

one of the

forbidden in the Dialogue. A

own of

Dante's

here is the Dialogue's

to the Comedy's

Florence. Just before he

extolls

calls our attention

unbelievable

events, Machiavelli
reverses

his homeland in

a manner

that,

with

remarkable

precision,

Dante's

outraged

invective. In

itself,

this praise

is puzzling some critics seize upon it to deny the Dialogue's authenticity in that it does not readily conform to Florence's historical situation at the
time nor to
other

Machiavellian descriptions
a

of

her. Irr juxtaposition to

over

an

invective in

which

is

direct

result of

Dante's distress

Florentine immorality,
to Florentine

however, it
"greatness"

serves as a counterpoint

to the poet's impolitic writing and a lesson

refers
land"

what patriotic

and says
itself"

writing demands. Where Dante sardonically that "her wings beat over sea and

and
"glory"

her "name
that makes
couples

expands

throughout
all

Hell, Machiavelli
the
provinces of

refers

to the

Florence "celebrated in

the

Where Dante

his

"shame"

for Florence's thieving

claims were

citizens with

her failure to rise to "great

honor,"

Machiavelli

that Dante would have to admit

reborn and see

his

own

"guilt

or

die

again"

he to be

how Florence In

"prospers."

Where
of

Dante

predicts
. . .

calamitous

future for Florence, Machiavelli

condition.

speaks

her

tranquil"

"present

happy

and

contrast

to Dante's

moral

criticism of

Florence, then,
expected

the Dialogue presents an example of the kind of

writing to be
are
contrast

in

a context

in

which moral challenges

to

one's

country
that the

insupportable.18

Beyond this, it is

within

the range of
points

speculation

between the two descriptions

of

Florence

to

a still more practical

lesson. If it is true that Machiavelli had

well-being
when

reservations about

Florence's

political

he

wrote

the Dialogue

and the evidence

critique of

in this direction is
a respectful

compelling
of

then calling

attention

to Dante's
a

her is

way

indicating day, Machiavelli may convey

17. 18.

his doubts. That is, repeating

the

lesson that

was old

in

Socrates'

problematic character of

his

praise of

Florence

Pr.

xviii

(1.55)- Cf. Politics

p.

i338a9ff-

Cf. Dial.

187; Inferno

xxvi.1-3.

208

Interpretation
us

by directing
version of

to critical

words

that come

from the

mouth of another.

In any

event, the thieves

episode as a whole potential and to

draws

our attention

to Dante's antique

human

how

one ought and ought not to write about

one's country.

The last
with

of

Machiavelli's
spans

examples

is the

most ambiguous.

Cacciaguida

four

cantos and

includes
it

such

Dante's meeting varied material that it

is difficult to fasten
Machiavelli. At the

upon specific parts of

which would

end of

the meeting,

however,
of

there

especially antagonize is an exchange that is

of

directly
exile

related

to the Dialogue's indictment

Dante. Aware
worries

his imminent
will

from Florence

his "dearest because he

will

place"

Dante

that he

lose "other
bitter

places"

of

his

"verses."

He knows that for

poem will

most of

similarly his

"repeat"

contemporaries what
herbs."

in his

likely
a

"have the taste

timid

of

Yet he
with

also

knows that "if I'm to truth

who will call

friend, I

fear lest I lose life

ancient."

those

this time

then, between his knowledge of the immediate political verses and his dedication to the truth and to future audiences. At this point, Cacciaguida comes forward. He, too, realizes that Dante's words will feel
"harsh"

Dante is torn, consequences of his

to the men around him but argues that their

initial impact
"offense"

will

be

offset

by

the future

"nourishment"

they
of

will

impart. The

that results

from the "first

taste"

Dante's

"voice"

will will

be transcended

by

long-range
small

benefits,
honor."

such

that Dante's
and

Together, Dante

eventually bring Cacciaguida answer the Dialogue's

arguments

him "no
charge

that the

Comedy

was unpatriotic and

impolitic.

They

are aware of

the delicate

political

position of writers

but refuse to qualify their arguments because of this. Cac in lauds Dante for his frankness inasmuch as an "argument that ciaguida, fact, is not will fail to relieve the "mind of a person who is to hear
clear"

[Dante]."

This

section

of the
of

Comedy

might

be

called

Dante's

apology.19

Rather than
to
accept

accept

the tenets

Machiavellian

instrumentalism,
what

Dante

would seem

the Aristotelian

dichotomy
is best

between

moment and what

everywhere and

is judged practically best at any given always, and foregoes immediate poli

tical advantage for the sake of obligations which extend

beyond Florence. To
odds.20

borrow from

an

Aristotelian

passage of which
when

faithful to truth before his friends

The Cacciaguida
the "other
section of

Dante is fond, he chooses to be the truth and his friends are at

the

writers"

from

whom

Dante is

unrealistic

insofar

as

Comedy, in this sense, identifies Dante with Machiavelli departs in the Prince. Like them, he points to a way of life which unmistakably

contrasts with

things as

they

are.

In sum, the Dialogue's "unbelievable" examples from the Comedy provide illustrations of the differences that form the background for its debate upon language. As proponents of different views of speech, Dante and

Machiavelli,

will

Paradiso xvn. 100-142. Cf. Paradiso xxxm. 70-72, where Dante prays that his lingua be sufficiently powerful to move la futura gente. 20. Convivio m.xiv.8, iv.viii. 15; Monorchia m.i.3. Cf. Convivio iv.vi.9, 15.
19.

Machiavelli
in turn,

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

on

Language

209
way of Dante. The

represent a classical-medieval approach to the world and a new

on

thinking. Perhaps the final word

their

division is

provided

last thing we hear from his mouth in the Dialogue is a quotation, from Luigi Pulci's Morgante, whose central point is that "one who begins is not
of
merit."21

by

In the Dialogue
and new

deserving

for founders
ciate

elsewhere, we would argue, Machiavelli stands ways, and he is sufficiently fair to allow Dante to enun

as

his

reservations about such a stance.

We

now return

to our

initial

issues that

precede their

cially in their political arguments? The tone for the Dialogue as a whole, in this respect, is set early. Machiavelli proposes that we decide the question of the language of Florence's best
writers

concern. If Dante and Machiavelli divide over linguistic differences, how do these differences, espe manifestations, bear upon the Dialogue's linguistic

by comparing
where

their writings to the

languages
we

of

different

"parts"

of

Italy.

By

seeing

trie resemblance is greatest,

at all

language they used and, asks that we "distinguish

to "avoid

the same
Italy"

time, from its

can

rank

may determine what the different dialects. Thus, he

"cities,"
"provinces"

"towns,"

and

confusion"

provinces will receive most attention places

we see

in

order that

by

studying these separate among them. The initial Italy's linguistic

seen with

the "great

differences"

in

speech

stage of

its

Machiavelli's argument, therefore, political divisions. Linguistic

"frontiers"
authority"

correlates are

to be

through the medium of political

as

duces Dante

the "alleged

frontiers. Conversely, Machiavelli intro for the position that Italy is a single frontier is determined

comprehensive

linguistic

"province"

whose

by

use

of

the affirmative particle,

si.

As

evidence of

Dante's view, Machiavelli

quotes

Inferno

33:
shame of

Woe Pisa,

the peoples

(genti)
the
si.22

Of the fair land (bei paese)

where sounds

The Dialogue's first linguistic confrontation, therefore, presents opposing descriptions of Italy; Machiavelli's grouping of separable linguistic-political
units and

Dante's

"peoples"

association of

whose

"fair

land"

subsumes

lesser

political entities guage of

Florence's

like Pisa. This effectively transforms the question of the lan writers into another, greater question. Is Italy, after Machi

avelli, to be or,
after

considered a collection of

Dante,

as an association of political

linguistically autonomous linguistically homogeneous

Here,
recall

political

parts,

peoples which

supersedes

Machiavelli's
p.

divisions?
we

21.

Dial.

192.

See Morgante

xxiv. 1-2.

the

advice

of

L.

Blasucci

letterarie [Milan, 1964], p. xii) and H. Baron ("Machiavelli on the Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 23 [1961], 452) that we Eve of the ought to attend to the intention of both characters in the Dial.'s internal dialogue. In other words, we ought to approach its formal debate section in the same spirit that we approach a
(Niccolo Machiavelli
opere
Discourse,"

Platonic dialogue.
22.

Dial.

pp.

184-5; Inferno xxxm. 79-80.

210

Interpretation
reopens an old

With this, the Dialogue

world

discussion. Recognition that the

eOvea

is divided among peoples or nations in the Latin translations had long since
political orders.

in Greek,

gentes or nationes

prompted questions about what

dis

tinguishes peoples, their relationships to one another, and their

bearing

upon

Answers to

such questions

differed

elation of a chosen people

but the tie between

peoples and
were

especially after the rev languages was

seen

so

far

as

am

aware

conceded

by

all.

Languages

to attach to

less permanently than their natural or divinely inspired characteristics, e.g., ferocity or softness, but more permanently than their laws. Languages held a position, as it were, between the simply natural or divine and the
peoples

simply

conventional.

By

the same

token, they

pointed

to something in peoples

that preceded constitutional or legal arrangements and,

of peoples

hence,

to the

priority

to the regimes
a

which gave

them political form.

shared a polis

Using Aristotle's

formulation,
stood

people,
or

signified

by

to

its laws
of

its

constitution as
"peoples"

language among other things, stands to its politeia. Dante's

"peoples"

identification

in speech, therefore, may be placed in the context of two classically oriented ideas. First, Italian are homogeneous insofar as they possess a language sufficiently common Dante
unified

Italian

accepts the existence of

separate

dialects

within

the general vernacular

peoples.

framework

to

them

fundamentally
is
a

from

"foreign"

Indeed, if Dante's lin

reference"

"frontier"

guistic

genuine

then,
for in

to borrow from St.

barrier to Italians understanding non-Italians, to Thomas, Italians are "barbarians with

exhibits

non-Italians.

Second, Italy

the potential, a homogeneous set of peoples,

a generalized constitutional order.

In

combination with assertion

things Dante says

other

places, Inferno 33
constituted a

recalls

Aristotle's

that the Greek peoples

(e0vea)
peoples

Hellenic

people

(e0vog)

that

might

have

"all"

ruled

other

had it been
words,

able to realize

its

in

other

are reminiscent of

Dante's Italians, Aristotle's Hellenes insofar as they are the

constitutional
potential.23

matter

for

which a regime of classical

dimensions

could

be fashioned.

Thus,

the Vulgar Eloquence identifies Latins according to a

single regime
"court"

language
might

peculiar to no

(civitas) in Italy
would

and speaks of

how they

join together in

that

be

"home"

to the entire Italian

realm.24

This,

of

course,
mind

tells us very

little

about

the specific character of the order Dante had in

for Italy. After

six centuries of

the one side, there

is

reason

vexing question. On to doubt that Dante intended for Italy's peoples

criticism, that
remains a

On peoples, see, e.g., Politics I327b20ff.; Alfarabi, The Political Regime and The Attain Happiness, and Maimonides, Statement on Political Science, both in Medieval Poli tical Philosophy, eds. R. Lerner and M. Mahdi (Toronto, 1963), pp. 32, 73, 189; Thomas
23.
ment

of

Aquinas, In Libros Politicorum Espositio

1951).

i.i. 29, vil.v. 11 politics

and

19-21,

ed.

R. Spiazzi (Turin
also

and

Rome,
work,
un

For the Thomistic link between

language,

see

i.i. 23.

For Hellenistic

political

potential, see Politics I327b34. On the polis-politeia

'Monarchia',"

dichotomy
e

relative

to

Dante's

L. Minio-Paluello, "Tre note alia dated), 11, 511-22. See Monarchia n.vi.8ff.
see 24.

in Medioevo

Rinascimento (Florence,

De Vulgari Eloquentia

1. xvi. 3-4, xviii. 3,

hereafter

cited as

VE.

Machiavelli
to

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

on

Language

211 Good

join together in

an extended version of an made

Aristotelian
such

good regime.

regimes, as Aristotle
that an order of the
as

clear,

suffer size

limitations

that it

is improbable
as well

dimensions indicated in the Vulgar Eloquence

could meet

Dante's

other works

Aristotelian

standards of political excel

regime

lence. Aristotle may speak, for example, of the potential for a pan-Hellenic but he also speaks of how Babylon, whose walls enclosed a

"nation,"

is

not a place

to be

emulated.25

On the

other

side, there is

equal reason to

doubt

that Dante looked

upon

forward to

a mystical union of

the Italian peoples, patterned this sort would have

the idea of the mystical

body

of

Christ. A

union of

as much

denied the

practical necessities that

follow from

political

heterogeneity,

in

Aristotelian sense, as Babylon denied the homogeneity necessary for a good regime. It is difficult, therefore, to be certain about the kind of politics Dante foresaw for Italy. Despite this, however, we may say that Machiavelli
an

directs

us

to that aspect of Dantean thought whereby

Italy

would

come

to

represent more

than a collection of autonomous and independent communities.

objection a

Machiavelli's

to Dante's argument for

a common

Italian vulgate, Italian

poli

in this sense, includes

tical potential.

tacit challenge to Dante's

as

position upon

Machiavelli,

Dante,

recognizes that a people who share a

a set of

language
order.

something anterior to The Discourses, for instance, tells

represent

laws

or

specific

ruling
to the

us

that the church found it easier

and

to replace Roman
accomplish

laws than the Roman language

over

that

its

inability
admit

the latter left its victory

Rome incomplete. To
would call which

existence of a common mission

Italian language, consequently,

an
association

for

an ad

that there existed

of

Italians to
would

the Prince's

victorious

ruler, "new

laws,"

and

"new
of

orders"

have to

defer.26

If Dante

is correct, in short, the reordering

total. On the
and
other

Italy

advised

in the Prince
separate

could not

be

hand, by separating Italy into

that

linguistic

areas

explicitly
who

denying
acquires

it

contains a

Dantean

"court"

Machiavelli lessens
we

the obstacles to such a

a prince

reordering.

In the Prince, for example,

"same
province

learn that
as

language"

a state of the

and same

his

own must take care

. .

"if he

wishes

to hold on to them

[not to]

alter

taxes."

their laws customs,

[Or]
institutions"

If he
are

acquires a state

in

a province where

"language,

and

disordered (disforme), however, he is free to

do

it follows, will be best anything to hold it. A potential prince, own order in heterogeneous initiate his and able to exercise his ruling skills situations. Roman rulers, for example, demonstrated their political excellence
almost

in disordered
opposite of geneous

provinces whereas

Louis XII failed in

Italy

because he did "the

things he

ought

to have done
us

in

order

to hold a state

in

hetero

province."27

This leads
new

back to the Dialogue. Its

order, led

argument clears the ruler and put

way for the Prince's

25. 26. 27.

Italian

political

by

forceful

Politics I276a28. Disc. 11. v (1.246-7); Pr. (1.83). Dial. p. 194; Pr. m (1.7-11). Cf. Pr. vi

(1.17-9),

vii

(1.20-1).

212 into

Interpretation

effect

by

extraordinary procedures,
political

by

and, thereby, presuming the disorder

most advantageous

effectively separating Italian dialects to able founders.

clearer
still when

The Dialogue's delivers his

standards

bearing

becomes

Machiavelli

own

"most

true"

account of

language.

answers a question

whereby the Comedy will be shown he himself raises about how Italians,
can understand one another. more of

Here, he introduces the to be written in Florentine and

given their

language
he says,

differences,

"Common Italian

speech,"

would contain

the

common

than of

any local language, it

out of

which sets

the stage for his subsequent demonstration that the Comedy's

number of common

"overwhelming"

Florentine

words

and expressions moves

the realm of a

language. He

also

understand one another.

words

easily disposes of the question of how Italians When men of "different provinces converse they take
and

from

another"

one

these

"borrowed"

words

facilitate

conversation

across

linguistic frontiers. Languages

as

are accessible

to other than native speakers

and

insofar

they

consist

of native

and

foreign

elements

are

not

totally
words

unfamiliar

to those not born to them. The mixing of native and

foreign

cannot go on
"finer"

as

indefinitely, however. Languages they become more copious, but in time the
"bastardization"

"enrich"

themselves and

become
time it
a

admixture of new words

leads them into

takes for this

and

"loss
a

identity."

of

The length
comes

of

to happen varies.

If

"new

population a or single

to

live in

province,"

cumstances,
appears

for example, it can occur it takes longer. Whether

during
rapid

lifetime. In

other cir

slow,
the

however,
invention

the process
of grammar

to be irresistible. Unlike

Dante, for

whom

provides a record of

gives us a
which

language impervious to linguistic fluctuation, Machiavelli linguistic world that is no more constant than human affairs generally,
at
all.

is to say that it is not very constant lost language is by means of the "good

The only way to

regain

writers"

who used

it,

which means

that we regain a
rather

language

as

it

existed at the moment of a particular writer

life.28

than as it existed throughout its

The Dialogue's A

account of

language,
are exists

accordingly, culminates in two points.

First,
words. and or

common and

local languages language in

a

differentiated despite their sharing of when the greater part of its "words its province, the greater part of its
within

"provincial"

usages"

are

not

used

dialect

whereas

dialect

"one's

language"

own

exists when

words are not

found in

another provincial

dialect. Second,

languages

unstable, continually changing mixtures of native and foreign elements, with the foreign changing sufficiently to be accommodated by the
are
native

but

not enough

to allow the native to retain their

Together,
from Dante.

these arguments clarify

By differentiating
separations,
or of

identity indefinitely. Machiavelli's expressly political departure between dialects as he does, Machiavelli brings
varying

about permanent

albeit of

degrees, between

men of

dif

ferent locales

different dialects

within

the same

locale. Even if Tuscans,

28.

Dial.

pp.

184, 188-9; VE. i.ix.n.

Machiavelli
for

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

on

Language

-213

instance, shared many words in common and there existed a kind of Tuscan lingua franca, they would remain members of separate communities with regard to their "own For Dante, in turn, this would mean that
languages."

they
give

are

also

significantly divided in
shared speech

political

sense.

Following Aristotle, friendship

and virtue.

he holds that
life to Where there is

is

coeval

with

the sharing of those things that

a genuine political not shared

association, for example,

sharing in the goods or ends that distinguish a political association, for example, from an alliance, where a common purpose like military strength does not presume a common good like
speech, there
no virtue.

is

As Dante

puts

it in the Banquet, "one's

would

own

speech

[is]

conjoined

with one's

reborn

parents, fellow citizens, and in a city after its language changes

people."

people"

in

a manner such

that to be

be like

finding

it "occupied

by

foreign

This does

not mean

that Dante demands that all potential

Italian community speak in precisely the same manner. Indeed, the Vulgar Eloquence has it that the purest form of the vernacular is found
members of an

The vernacular does, however, provide a only among ground for Italian dialects. It is the basis of an Italian linguistic

"geniuses."

common
"genus,"

bearing
bears to "all the

the same relation to the various Italian dialects as

various shades of white. still says

what

is simply
of

white

Thus, despite

the

infrequency

the perfect

vernacular, Dante
cities of

that it identifies an Italian people and ties together

common

Machiavelli's dialects, on the other hand, have no such thread. Save for sharing certain words, they are essentially inde
cities

Italy."29

pendent of one another.

between Italian
order

disappears and,

If Machiavelli is correct, it follows, the Dantean tie with it, the possibility of the Italian

Dante

envisages.

In these terms, the Dialogue does more than merely deny the homogeneous peoples of Inferno 33. Its argument also transforms the Dantean political world,

in the

sense

that it creates
alliances

the conditions for only two kinds of political

of

associations,
common replaces of

or

confederations

independent
where

communities

where

goods

are

unnecessary

or

principalities

forceful

leadership

the

need

for

communal agreement. produces a

Italy, in

other

words,

Machiavelli's linguistic restructuring situation in which, upon Dante's standards,

any Italian
of

political order would either

be

superficial or purchased at

the cost
con-

freedom.30

Thus,

whereas

Machiavelli is apparently

comfortable about

Ethics Il7lb32; Politics I253a14, l28ob38; Convivio I. xii. 5, m.xi.14; VE. i.ix.l, xvi, In the immediate sequel to Convivio I. xii. 5, Dante speaks of the tie between lingua and la consuetudine de la gente. There is considerable debate about the relative status of the vernacular and Latin for Dante, but the vernacular is certainly one of the principal things which
29. il.i. 8-9.

ties Dante's community together.

pp.

See,

e.g., C.

Grayson, Cinque
see

saggi su

Dante (Bologna, 1972),

Machiavelli,"

1-31. 30.

On how Machiavelli

changes

Dante in this regard, See

also

F.

Ercole, "Dante

Quaderni di
1926).

Politico,
note

n.2

(1922),

5-54.

idem, La Politico di Machiavelli

emphasize

(Rome,
prede

Like

other

Italian

writers of

his time, Ercole tends to

"Dante,"

Machiavelli's
to

new nazione

without

sufficient

of

the degree to which this notion

is

antithetical

Machiavelli's

cessors,

especially Aristotle.

See,

e.g.,

13-14.

214

Interpretation

guistic

a fully fledged country although it encompasses different lin he indicates that from Dante's perspective the French situation groups, is more problematic. For the Dialogue's Dante, what a France of different

sidering France

languages is, his

and what of

it is called,

are

two different

matters.31

But

perhaps

the

best illustration

how Machiavelli integrates his

new

linguistic

position with

political arguments

is the Dialogue's analogy between the

the role

role of

Roman

legions in Rome's

consular armies and

of native expressions

in the

Florentine language. In both situations, we are confronted by alliances, in the one case of Romans and what the Art of War calls their friends and con

federates, in
soldiers and

the other
officers

of

Florentine

usages

and

foreign

words.

As Roman

ruled

their allies in the

consular

armies,

so

Florentine

usages command
and

foreign

expressions

in Machiavelli's
provided gave

native

tongue.
. .

Military

linguistic
of

excellence are akin.

Romans

the "nerve

order and

discipline"

the consular armies and

thereby

them "the name, authority,

and

dignity

of

Rome"; Florentine
and

presses

foreign

words

into its "own

service,"

"subdues

[them],"

"makes them

itself."

seem part of

This ability to
of

order

disparate
perhaps

parts

is in Machiavelli's

context a mark as well of political

excellence,

the mark of political excellence.

point

The final lines

the

Discourses,
who earned

for example,
political

to the meritorious service of Quintus

Fabius,

the title Maximus

by incorporating

"new

peoples"

into Rome

without serious

repercussions. are similar.

excellence
nature

For Machiavelli, linguistic, military, All involve the ability to join things
such

and which

political are

by

dissimilar.32

Where

is
as

critical.

He

castigates of

ability is wanting, concomitantly, Machiavelli the papal court for being a place where "there are
as

many

modes

speaking
or

there are nations

rule"

and

no

and

where

nothing "good

praiseworthy"

happens. It demonstrates that "where

must

customs are perverse then

given the

language too

be

perverted,"

an

incidence

of

famous

literary
and

works

like Dante's

produced

intriguing rule during

the example

periods of political
of

dissolution

unrest.33

In any event,

however,

the contemporary papal court reinforces the tie between language and politics

and

is further

evidence that

Machiavelli's world,

linguistically

and

politically,

demands the ability to impose rule upon elements in common, at least upon Dantean standards.
Machiavelli's
31. 32.

which otherwise

have little

account of

language, then,
see

recapitulates
"Dante,"

his

political argument

Dial.
Dial.

p.

185.

Cf. Pr.

in

(1.7). But,
vi

Ercole,

38.

pp.

193-4; AW.
over the

Critical disagreement Dial,

and the

AW. has tended

equivalence

0-571)- See, too, Pr. xxvi (1.83); Disc, ui.xlix (1.444). differing descriptions of the makeup of the consular army in the to distract critics from an analysis of why and how Machiavelli
foreign
example, the Dial, states that Florentine Roman troops to foreign troops, Machiavelli Where 11,000 Romans commanded 20,000 foreign troops,
words as

develops the
words

in the Dial.
to

Although, for

bear the

same relation

reverses the numerical proportions.

20

legions

of

Florentine

words and usages command a

more

lesser

number of

foreign

words.

In this

sense, the Florentine language appears to be

faithful to

the

description

of

the consular

army in the AW. than in the Dial. 33- Dial. pp. 194-5-

Machiavelli
insofar
as

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

on

Language

-215

it

emphasizes

change and

lacking
of

the necessity for direction in a world dominated by homogeneous standards. For Machiavelli, linguistic alter

ation

is

part of

the same process whereby cities welcome "new

arts"

and of on

because

the dangers in the process

on

exemplified

learning and new by the perversion

of

the papal court, the other

there

the one
need

hand,

and the

"bastardization"

language,

is

for strong
and rulers

measures.

Thus, linguistically
calls upon calls upon

extraordinary ruling politically, Machiavelli calls for refoundings.

to emulate the founders of antiquity,
writers

leadership

and

As the Prince
so the

Italian

Dialogue

contemporary

to emulate the great Florentine

writers original guistic

Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio

barbarism in
contrast
which

who

led

other

Italian

writers out of

"the

them."

their native tongues

steeped

Another lin

suggests

what

Machiavelli in this

respect.

fundamentally at issue between Dante and According to the Vulgar Eloquence, a mark of the
"polish"

is

vernacular's excellence of

is its

or completeness.

That is, the final form

the

vernacular provides

the goal

for

well-intentioned writers.

According

to

the

Dialogue, however, Florentine is better than the language of any other Italian city because it was ready before them to lend itself to verse forms imported from Provence. Whereas the final version of Dante's vernacular
demonstrates its perfection, what Machiavelli's language was at its beginnings makes it the best of languages. The same difference may be said to divide
their formulations
affairs.34

of political

One
the

more matter
political

in the Dialogue
raised above.

merits attention

inasmuch

as

it touches

upon

issues

the first and last terms of

of

Although the Dialogue systematically treats Was the language the question it formally sets out

Florence's

greatest writers
middle

Florentine, Tuscan,
vernacular

or

Italian?

it fails to do the
Florentine"

same and us on

for the

term. We learn that the

Comedy

is

"wholly

that Dante's

alleged

Italian

is

imaginary

but Machiavelli leaves

in the dark
this point

about what

Dante's language
means

might owe

to Tuscany. His silence

is bedeviling. If it but in Florence

that we are to consider Tuscan and

says that

Florentine synonomous,
nowhere else

we wonder

why he

Dante
all

used words

found

and that

Florence, "of
verse we
wonder

Tuscany,"

was espe means

cially well suited to receive that Tuscan and Florentine are different, discriminate between them
with

Provencal

forms. Conversely, if it

why the Dialogue does not anything resembling precision. Why, for instance, does Machiavelli distinguish Tuscan from other provincial dialects and then direct us to search out writings that are "simply Florentine, Lombard, ask Dante to consider or from some other province"? Again, why does he
language"

the

dignity
Dial.

of

his "country's both to Florentine

and to

(la lingua patria)

Tuscan
without

thereafter refer
34.
pp.

immediately indicating whether

and

188, 197-8; VE. XVII.

innovation and change, especially in a political I326b20; Convivio 1.X.3; Paradiso xvi.43-5, 67.

Dante, like Aristotle, questions the general value of context. Cf., e.g., Politics I268b33, I275a5,

216

Interpretation
to

patria applies

Tuscany, Florence,
Tuscan
readers.

or

both?35

The Dialogue's lack

of

clarity
creates

about

possible

component of

Dante's language, therefore,

us writers

difficulties for its degree to

which

First,

Machiavelli leaves

the language

of

Florentine
us

wondering about the is to be identified with

about
whether

Tuscan, if
linguistic

at

all.

Secondly, he leaves
his

confused

Dante's

claim entailed

being

unfaithful

to

Tuscany

as well as

to Florence.

This situation, in turn,

ambiguous posture

reopens an old respect

controversy

about
of

Machiavelli.

By its

with

to the

relationship

Tuscan, Florentine,

Tuscany,
what

and

Florence,

the Dialogue becomes entangled in the question of

when

Machiavelli intends

he

speaks of patria. over what

Rather than
patria, we

founder, like many others, choose a less hazardous

other writings with regard

Machiavelli

means

by

option.36

If the Dialogue is

as opaque as

Machiavelli's
contrast

to patria,

by

way

of

it

we

may

at

least

Machiavelli's in

approach

to the issue with that of one of his most notable

predecessors.

Moreover,
relation

the Dialogue also offers the opportunity to consider

this contrast

to the

linguistic

contrast

between the two. A

passage

in the formal debate

concerns.
Florentine"

portion of the says

Dialogue

provides us an

opening to both
and

Here, Machiavelli

that Dante admits

to

using "Tuscan
cites

whether

in the Comedy and, therefore, that it is he left Florentine in the poem. In support

"needless"

to argue over
of

this, he

Inferno

23

and 10:

Do

you not

say

of one you

heard speaking in the Inferno

Tuscan
when
speech?'

'And

one who understood the

And,

again, in Farinata's mouth,

speech makes manifest

he is speaking to

you

'Your

That To

you are

born

of the noble

country (nobil

patria

natio)

which

was perhaps too

harsh.'

According

to

Machiavelli, then, Dante's

of

reference

to Tuscan and

Farinata's
written

identification

Dante's

patria with

his

speech prove that

the

Comedy is

in Florentine. We
and

move

from Dante's

alleged admission

that he used Tuscan

it is written in Florentine dispute between the two. Machiavelli bearing not only ignores the possibility that Dante has something other than Florentine in mind when he speaks of Tuscan, he also seems to consider it self-evident that Farinata means Florentine when he speaks of the speech of Dante's home
poem

Florentine in the
no

to the conclusion that

upon

as

if Tuscan has

the

land. For Machiavelli's purposes, Florence is simultaneously Dante's patria,

35. 36.

Dial.

pp.

186, 192, "//

195-6.

On the

problem of

Machiavelli's
lo
point

political

20ff.; J. H.

Hexter,
accept

stato,"

principe and

terminology, see, e.g., Ercole, La politico, pp. Studies in the Renaissance, iv (1957), 113-138.
114) that Machiavelli confuses
us

We tend to
of

Hextern's

("//

principe,"

in his

use

because their meaning otism, see L. Strauss, Thoughts

terms

shifts
on

from

place

to place. On the matter of

pp.

Machiavelli's

patri

Machiavelli (Seattle, Wash., 1969),

80-81,

and passim.

Machiavelli
his birthplace,

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

source of of

on

Language

-217

and the

learn that
good

the

importance

his language. Thus, shortly thereafter, we Dante's language from his having the
"derived"

fortune to have been born in

Florence.37

From this perspective, the Dialogue conforms to a position that Machiavelli develops more fully in his political works. According to his version of history,
Italian
political

affairs

had

once

centered
conquer

around

its

provinces

and peoples. people

The Romans, for example, had to

Tuscany

and

its free

before
control

they
its
has

could subjugate

conquered provinces. changed.

Italy and they founded cities in Italy in order to By Machiavelli's own time, however, this situation
"name."

Now
exists

provinces

in particular,
the
cause of

only in

have generally lost their strength and Tuscany, The Romans would appear to be largely

this alteration, especially with respect to Tuscany. In conquering "wiped the things which made it influential, including its own it, they language (la sua lingua patria) Indeed, according to the Discourses, there is no The Dialogue's rather off-handed "civil in Tuscany worth
out"

life"

mentioning.38

treatment of
understood

Tuscany

and

its

emphasis upon

Florence, in
as peoples.

this sense, may be

to reflect

what of

Machiavelli describes
provinces and

the historical failure

even

disappearance

Italian

In the Dialogue

as

elsewhere

in

particular

in his works, Machiavelli calls upon Italians generally and Florentines to recognize the force of their immediate patriae and, in turn,
that once

to forget

obligations

bound them to their

provinces.

By

the same

token, he

also calls upon

them to recognize that patriotic demands are unqual

associated with province

ified

by

the things that

had, in former times, been

and

and people.

The
a

contrast

between Dante

Machiavelli here

can

be

seen

by

way

of

further inspection

of the passages
occurs when

from the Inferno that Machiavelli turns

upon

Dante. The first

eighth

Dante meets, among the hypocrites in the had once held high office in Florence. who circle, two Bolognese friars
account

Machiavelli's

of

this meeting, we

discover, is
hears the

not

true to the Comedy's text. It

is

not

Dante

friars'

who

strictly speaking Tuscan speech

to

but the

reverse.

The friars
way
of

react

to the language
as a

they hear Dante speaking

Tosco."

Virgil and,

by

it, identify him

Tuscan. Upon the basis

of what

address him as "O Only later, they hear, for example, they formally and raised "born was that he reveal Dante does in response to their request, Dante as know friars the Thus, in the great villa upon the beautiful
Arno."

Tuscan

prior

to

knowing

him

as a

Florentine. The

same order of recognition

cites.

also emerges
amounts

in the

context of

the Farinata passage that Machiavelli

short
speech

This
when

to the

second

half

of a

which

Farinata delivers

Dante

comes upon

him in the
speech

circle of

the heretics. For our purposes,

however,

the first half

37.

of the

is equally instructive. Like the friars, Farinata

.

Dial.
FH.
vi

pp.

192,

197-

38.

i.xiii

(II. 26-7),
xxi

il.i

(11.59); Disc

i.lv

(1.2 13),

11.11

(1.234-5).

iv

(1.242-3).

(1.248),

(I.248),

(1.292-3). See AW. I (1.472-3)-

218

Interpretation
Dante
as a

addresses

Tuscan

"O

ulars of salutes

Dante's background. That

as a

him

Tuscan,

and

before he learns any of the partic Farinata hears Dante speaking to Virgil, is, only then inquires about things in this case,
Florentine.39

Tosco"

ancestors

which place

Dante

as a

Contrary

to Machiavilli's argu

ment, the events of Inferno 23 and 10 point to Dante's

being

recognized

by

others, according to the way he speaks, as a Tuscan before he is revealed

to

be

Florentine. From Dante's

own

perspective, his language links him to

Tuscany, his Florentine birth and other ties notwithstanding. This position is consistent with Dante's general view of his relationship to his province and
city. a
Florence.40

As he

puts
of

it in the Vulgar Eloquence, he is

"native"

of

"citizen"

the

latter,

categories which also

bind

men not of

former, Tuscany and

the

Unlike
are

Machiavelli, then, Dante

of

will not

disregard those

of

his He

origins which

independent

that

his immediate city, or, if you will, Italy's provinces and its peoples have become
once

patria.

acknowledges

corrupt relative

to what

they
his

were, but he

refuses

to take the Machiavellian step and obliterate

obligations

to things that go beyond patria. An example of his difference

regard

from Machiavelli in this

whom

is their

respective treatment of

they both regard as an instigator of Whereas, for Dante, Mosca is "the evil seed of the Tuscan
avelli, he is the
source of

Mosca Lamberti, Guelph-Ghibelline factionalism.

people,"

for Machi

"the first division

Florence"

of

and the person who

"divided the

city."

whole

Moreover,

when

Machiavelli

places

Guelphism
and says

and

Ghibellinism in "the
seed of

broader context, he bypasses

Tuscany
that

the Guelph and Ghibelline

quarrel

tempers"

entirely "tore

that
was

apart"

Italy
IV.41

planted

in the

between Pope Alexander II

we

and

Henry
a

Without

further

belaboring

the point,

may say that Dante

retains

sense of

his

province and people

that is lost in Machiavelli.

Dante,

to return to our earlier

of

argument, recognizes his Tuscan ties in a way reminiscent

appreciation of

the classical

the

differing
puts
man

kinds

of obligations which command one

in the

secular sphere.

As he
a

he is bound
the customs,

as

it in the Vulgar Eloquence, to be virtuous; he is bound language

of

building
as a and

upon

Aristotle,
as a

Tuscan to follow

manners,

and

his people;

he is bound his

Florentine to be
39. 40.

law-abiding.42

By
to

obscuring Dante's
xvi. 137.
a

own view of

relation-

Inferno
VE.
and

xxm. 76-99; x. 22-46.

See Purgatorio

i.vi.3.

Here, Dante

refers

Tuscany

as

region

(regio)

and

Florence

(urbs)

then

immediately

compares

Latins to

other nationes

and gentes.

as a city See Monarchia 11.

vi.8ff.; Inferno xxiv. 123-6; xxvn. 20-27; Purgatorio xi.58; xiv. 103, 124; Paradiso XXH.112-17.

An illustration kindred he is

action is that when his is in Caina among traitors to Tuscan (Inferno xxxn.66), whereas when he is in Antenora among traitors to party and country he is called a Florentine (Inferno xxxm. 11- 13). 41. Inferno xxvm.108; FH. i.xv (11. 28-9), 11. iii (11.63-4). See H. Mansfield, Jr., "Party and
of

Dante's distinction in

called a

in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, M. Fleisher (New York, 1972), pp. 252-3. Mansfield goes beyond our argument to suggest that, for Machiavelli, the changed position of a people with regard to politics involves its al
ed.

Sect in Machiavelli's Florentine

Histories,"

legiance to
42.

a pope

before any

other secular

leader (p.

245).

VE. 1. xvi. 3.

Machiavelli
ship to
works.

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

the

on

Language

-219

Tuscany
the

and

diminishing

force

of

Tuscan, it follows,

the Dialogue
other

reinforces

overpowering
to

sense of patria which pervades

Machiavelli's

This is

not

say that the

nor

world

Dante describes is

fully

amenable

to

Aristotle's categories,
evidence

that Machiavelli denies their importance. There is

view of polis and politeia,

that Dante saw that the antique

from

which

his

view of province and and

city

derives,

was

in large degree lost to his

it.43

contem

poraries

that there were barriers to reestablishing

situation of

Similarly,

there is

evidence

that Machiavelli appreciates the

his

contemporaries

in

terms of the old view.

and

But this does

not

deny
and

the divide between the Dantean

sees

Machiavellian

positions.

As Machiavelli
are

province and people

left intact

Germany

the

it, the only old-fashioned Germans, and their example

be dupli

is

useless

in

other places

because it depends

upon things that cannot

cated

elsewhere, for example, isolation. Thus, he will reconstruct provinces in thoroughly modern fashion, removing their influence on politics and patria
same manner that the

in the
The

Dialogue

removes

their influence on language.

modern province

any
a

province subsequent
of

to the overrunning of imperial

use

Rome

is, in

effect,

product

invasion. That is, to

rather
life."

Machiavelli's

words, it results from

ages"

"occupation"

than the development "through the

of a people and their

"mode

of

As such, it becomes A
people

an extension

of an empire and

is externally
of

controlled.

in their

province are no are

now

longer the

seedbed

the political order, as for Dante.

They
will

but

a potential source of conquest

selves.44

for

others

stronger, in some sense, than them

So too, in the Dialogue's terms, their language Machiavelli says Florentine subdues its foreign words. Pehaps the final
and
word on all

be

subdued

as

this

is found in

parallel passages

in the Prince
salutes

Discourses. In the

exhortatio which ends

the

former, Machiavelli

"lifeless"

his
of

new prince as a man who will restore

Italy

and

stop the devastation

and to

its
43.

provinces:

that

is,

"put

an

end

to the sack of

Lombardy,

the

Here

one might

old-fashioned

usefully compare the three occurrences of identification of his parents as Lombards whose
Farinata's
of ambiguous
patria

patria
patria

in the Comedy. Virgil's

was

Mantua (Inferno
ref

1.67-9)
erence

contrasts with

statement

(Inferno x.22-7)
reference

and

Peter Damian's

to the location

Dante's
raised

without

any

to his province (Paradiso xxi.

106-11). edition of

The difficulties

by

Dante's
vols.
patria

patria

are

indicated

by

G. A. Scartazzini in his
on

the Enciclopedia

Dantesca, 3

(Milan,
with

1905).

Without remarking
stato,
or
regione

any

possible
patria

conflict, he identifies Peter Damian's

of

a paese,

and
same

the

Virgil

and

Farinata

with a provincia, edition of

citta, or

luogo

where one

is born. The

prevails a populo

in the Bosco
or, as

the

Enciclopedia,

which

identifies

patria as a terra

dichotomy inhabited by

in Farinata's speech,
to the

a citta where one

is bom.
provinces"

44.

Rome, according
"Dante,"

Disc,

turned "kingdoms

into

(11. iv [i.244]). See AW.

129-30; in Machiavelli, see Hexter, "// vi (1.594). On the way of the change Machiavelli betokens is perhaps that of description best 35. The Ercole, ancient kings who, only calling themselves Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, Rousseau: ". rather than masters of the the Macedonians, seem to have considered themselves leaders of men
such changes occur
country.

principe

Today's kings

more

cleverly

call

themselves Kings of
inhabitants"

France, Spain, England,

etc.

Bv

thus

holding land, they

are quite sure

to hold its

(On the Social Contract i.ix,

trans. J. R. Masters [New

York,

1978], p. 57).

220

Interpretation
from the Kingdom
to model

tribute exacted

he directs the
redeemed

prince

Naples, and from himself upon Moses, Cyrus,

of

Tuscany."

To this end,

and

Theseus, "who

provinces"

their

and whose success enslaved

...

depended

upon
.

their

finding

"the

people of

Israel

the Persians oppressed

new

and

the

Athenians

dispersed."

The
of

success of

Italy's

redeemer,

the

disarray
The
a new

Italy

and

the destruction of

therefore, is predicated upon its independent provinces and it. He

will

peoples.

prince will not reconstruct

Italy

so much as recreate of

forge

community,

a new patria,

independent

the communities once

powerful

in Italy. But how, in himself? An

a question

that must occur to any reader of

the

Prince, is
a
chapter

this transformation to be

effected

and,

once

effected, how

will

the prince maintain

answer of sorts a

is found in the Discourses.

or

In

entitled

"A New Prince, in

New,"

City

Province That He Has

Taken, Must Make Everything

we

find that the

such

prince succeeds

precisely

by destroying
he is
urged

that upon
move

which

Dante

sets

store.

Among

other

things,

"to

inhabitants from
province

another"

one place
. . .

to

and, "in sum,

to leave nothing in to him. He

[his]

intact
of

should emulate

Philip
prince

unbeholden nothing in Macedon, "of whom a writer says that

and
sheep."45

it"

he

moved men

from

province to province as shepherds move new and conquers and

We have

come

full

circle.

The

holds

by

provinces and

peoples,

their independent

languages,

to a point where,
we
new

reducing Dante's from

will

Dante's perspective, they virtually disappear. The Dialogue, speaks of the speed with which a language changes when a
moves

recall,

population
upon what

into

province.46

The

new

prince,

one might

say, improves

the church

did to Rome

the provinces

remaking the languages as well as the laws in he takes. It is a lesson in Machiavellian boldness that the Dia

by

logue

chastises
advises

Dante for his ineffectual

the new
prince

criticism of steps
not

Florence

while

the Dis

courses

to take

that would culminate

in the

destruction
upon

of

Dante's Tuscany. But this is It

the only

lesson

about

Machiavelli
as other

which

the Dialogue touches.

not

also

teaches that in

linguistic

matters, Machiavelli does

play for

small stakes.

This
our

concludes our political

introduction

to the

Dialogue, but it hardly

the details of

exhausts

topic.

Indeed,
To

we

have scarcely touched

upon

Machiavelli's

arguments.

comprehend

fully

what constitutes a

avelli, for example,

merits

we would

have to

examine

strong language for Machi his comments on the relative

such

of serious and comic

writing. which
1

However, beyond
demands
("Dante,"

another
45.

level

of the

Dialogue

consideration.

things, there is Dante is famous

Pr. xxvi; Disc,

i.xxvi.

Cf. AW.

(1.475-6). Ercole
which

14) argues that Machiavelli

says

considers provincia

synonomous with nazione,

may be true but

nothing

about

how

Machiavelli
46.
popoli

perverts i.v

the old sense

of province and nation.

See FH.
and

(11. 15-16)

where nuove
after

lingue
and

are said

to have developed among the

provinces were
and

nuovi

the rovine
new

(ruins) left
languages

Italy

other
of

Roman

overrun

by

the
the

barbarians. Such
natives

"mixtures"

were

the old

Roman

the lingua

patria of

that resulted in "new order(s) of

speaking."

Machiavelli
for

versus

Dante: The Dialogue

on

Language
quest

221

having

spoken of politics as a

a stance

to which

his discussion

of

way station in the language is not

such much

opposed.

for higher things, Machiavelli is

equally famous for dismissing concern for The divide between these positions is as
Dialogue
as

things and
more

being

"realistic."

the context of the

a systematic

the matters considered above. To do it

justice,

in

vestigation of

the formal debate

at

the heart

of

the Dialogue

would

be

necessary.

Shakespeare's Caesar's Plan

David Lowenthal
Boston College

Only
of

one of

Shakespeare's thirty-seven

plays

deals

with an

historical figure

Coriolanus, Antony, Cleopatra, Henry V were of lesser Macbeth, Lear, Hamlet would have been lost in historical obscurity but for Shakespeare himself. With Julius Caesar, however, Shakespeare chose
greatness;
a man of almost

the first rank.

unrivalled glory.

Why

Caesar
was

and no other?

Why

four

of of

ten tragedies

about ancient

Rome? What

Shakespeare's understanding

Caesar

and

Rome?
such a

Designed in

way

as

to mirror the complexity of their subjects,

elicit a

Shakespeare's

plays were all

bound to

variety

of

interpretations
with

and

judgments. Parts

stand out and

speeches elusive.

impress, but,
To this

as

the universe

itself,

the overall meaning remains

common state

Julius Caesar it
provokes. plebs

adds a complication

deriving
its

from the

partisan political passions conflict

Even Coriolanus is
and patricians

not

match

in this respect, for the

between

is less

profound than

the conflict between one great man and

the mixed republican rule of the few and the many that he overthrows. Because the
of

rise

of

Caesar

signified the ruin of the old republic and

the establishment

the empire, those

living

in

ages

or societies

capable of

appreciating the

difference between the

two regimes tend to side with one or the other, thus

clash

mirroring the bitter and violent supporters in Rome. In Caesar

assassination,
and

that originally took place between their

see a prodigious

republicans

tyrant

deserving

in the

defeat. To his
perhaps

own

mighty heroes even as they go down to partisans, however, Caesar looms up as a great king
conspirators
all whose

the greatest of

prominent

abilities

alone

could

preserve

justice,

order, peace,

civilization

in

a period of republican as

decay,

and whose

assassination was therefore as

foolish

it

was unjust and

base.

It is mystifying to

observe

that Shakespeare

seems

to encourage both view

assassination

points, allowing Caesar's

supporters

to locate the

tragedy in his

early in Act III, and his republican opponents to locate it in the suicides of Cassius and Brutus at the end of Act V. But is it not strange that a play
named after

Caesar

should

begin

on

the

last

day

of

his life

and

devote

most

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Howard White, from whom I first heard about Shakespeare. It tries to make Allan Bloom's brilliant interpretation of Shakespeare's Caesar (in Shakespeare's Politics) more consistent by denying that Caesar, imprudently and in derogation of his
own

greatness, sought to become

king

of

singular

in its
A

end and even more

in its

choice of means,

Rome. On the contrary, Caesar's true ambition, is perfectly in keeping with the greatness

Bloom

attributes

to him.

My
as

thanks to a group of friends who originally

discussed this

paper

with me.

similar conclusion can

be found in Michael Piatt's Rome

to learn
recently.

and

Romans

According

to

Shakespeare,

pp.

193-213,

was pleased

224
of

Interpretation
to events

its

pages

following

with

the

final

memorable sympathies

his death? Does this disproportion, coupled depiction of republican heroism, indicate where

Shakespeare's

ultimately lay?

These difficulties
tell whether
or

are compounded

by

one

more

central, for it is hard to

just

what

Shakespeare felt any admiration or sympathy for Caesar at all, he meant by the portrait he presented. We get to know Caesar
part of

in the first

the play through

an

intricately

woven

series

of

direct

appearances and reactions

by

others.

The direct

appearances occur at and after

the games

of

and,

finally,

Lupercal (i.ii), in Caesar's home early the next morning (n.ii), on his way to and at the senate house (m.i). Indirect impressions or

reactions come

sayer, the lengthiest in

portrait

from commoners, tribunes, conspirators, a sophist and a sooth speeches by Cassius, Casca and Brutus. The resulting
incomprehensible. Caesar
vainglorious and
seems

is

well-nigh

imperious,

superstitious,
gives

overconfident,
orders refuses
Decius'

inconstant,

above all

imprudent. He

like
to

an oriental

potentate, credulously
and

accepts old religious

of

ceremonies, to

heed Calpurnia's

his

own

apprehensions

danger, bows

flattery, boasts of his own unique and superlative constancy to the senate, and is easily murdered. His talking of himself in the third person as Caesar seems ridiculous. His claim to be fearless and more terrible than
subtle

danger like

itself,

together with his

likening
at

himself to the height

of

northern

star,

sounds

extravagant

bombast. And here,

after

the

his career,

we watch

him

blunder, allowing a handful of conspirators to accomplish what whole armies, native as well as foreign, could not. No greatness here, but there is another, less obtrusive side to the man with
commit
which

blunder

many
open

of these traits are and

over

completely

at variance.

He himself

alludes

to

his

great

conquests,

won

in

battle

the play opens with his return from a victory just the sons of Pompey. He already commands like a
and

king
Mark
ators.

rather

than a republican official,

and

is

obeyed

as

one.

Not only do
of

Antony
Even

the people love

worst

him, but

also

Brutus,

the best

the

conspir

Cassius, his

enemy, testifies to his colossal authority,

and

Caesar,
then,
there
serious

in turn,

understands

the danger represented

by Cassius
be

perfectly.

How,

can a man so

defects

all

many suddenly be led to his downfall? Had these defects been along, would they not have prevented his astonishing succession of
and

great,

so

successful,

so astute

afflicted with so

military defects
example,

and political

victories?

Or

was

it the

successes
wish

that engendered the

to depict still another
that

especially the
perhaps the

vainglory?
of

Did Shakespeare
the

loftiest,
the

makes great men challenge

gods and come

Only

the

latter

alternative seems

insolent pride, crashing down? plausible, but the facts of the play
the rash and

hubris,

will

it. Far from recently evincing a rash imprudence, Caesar has, after all, just returned from successfully ending the last open resistance to his hege
not allow

mony
shows

within

Rome. And his capacity for swift and ruthless self-protection itself to be very much alive in his reaction to the tribunes, instantly,

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

225

covertly
manifest

and

somewhat

silence."

Besides, it
downfall

can

and

ambiguously (though ominously) "putting them to hardly be said that Caesar's fate in the play is one of of the play defeat, for the second and larger
"half"

demonstrates Caesar
and

without question

that his spirit, triumphs

or

its

embodiment

in Octavius in life. have his

on

Antony, completely
the

over

the republican conspirators.

at

Caesar, hubris or no, Finally, we must face

of errors
assuaged rather

seems to prosper

in death
could

least

as much as

fact that Caesar

could

easily have

avoided the rush

in his last days. He

have

protected

himself,

and

he

could

than provoked the

fears

and suspicions of

his

ambitious

intent.

Or

are we

to believe that the great

and

Caesar,

the most astute

of

politician of

time, had swiftly

what was

unaccountably taken leave

his

political

senses

to prove the last full

day

of

his life?

I
Let
us examine commands as

Caesar left

Shakespeare's mystifying portrait further. In his first words and cure Antony to touch Calpurnia in this "holy
chase" say,"

her sterility,
out.

"our

elders confirms

commanding further that "no

the view, expressed
late,"

cerem

be

This apparently
political

afterward

by Cassius,
could

that Caesar "is grown superstitious of

of

(ii.i.195). But this Roman innovators

"elders"

great violator

Roman

traditions, this

greatest of

hardly

have been impressed

power

by

the sanctity of the

Cassius'

to himself.
a

Nor, contrary
course
of

to
superstition

resembling
perhaps soothsayer

regular

in gathering supreme claim, does he show anything now. On the contrary, though
warnings of

unfortunately for
and

him, he dismisses

the

both

an unknown

his

own

augurers, and seems utterly unreceptive to the dire

omens

Calpurnia

cites

to

keep

the plainly
of

superstitious

him from attending the senate. Moreover, unlike Casca, Caesar reacts to the stormy eve of the Ides
gods

March

without

mentioning the
most constant

and their

punishments, and even his

last
star

speech about and

the

things

in the

universe cites

only the
an

northern

himself

without

the gods.

This distinction

receives

astonishing

Caesar's sharp warning "Hence! wilt thou lift up actually refers to the prospect of his own rising from his chair in the Senate, and not to the gods as such. Such
confirmation almost

immediately

afterward, where

Olympus?"

evidence

inclines

one

to

conclude

that

Caesar, far from being

at all.

superstitious,

might not

have believed in the Roman deities

On this supposition, Caesar's opening expression of pious traditionalism before the assembled multitude must be viewed as nothing more than politic
dissembling. Caesar knows full
those who openly
respect

well

that the people cling to tradition and love

as yet unknown

it. For

reasons

to us, he may, in

fact,

have recently taken to such public displays of

thus accounting

before,

for

Cassius'

observation.

piety much more than But if Caesar understands

226
this
their

Interpretation
of

attachment

the

people

to

tradition, how
all

could

he fail to

anticipate

devotion to the his

most

hallowed
and

of all political

traditions in
might

Rome

that

of opposition accept

to the Tarquins

kings?

They

accept

they did

king-like supremacy, but not the name risk the suspicion and odium Antony's offering him a crown
own several

"king."

Then why not once but

times was
people

likely

to

engender?

The
rejects

it. It

offer should

away the crown that is, when he but far more dangerous, that Antony's equally predictable, intensify the fear and anger of the remaining band of pro-republican
cheer
when

Caesar

puts

was

senators.

So
of

great

people

but

the aristocrats as

Caesar erred, it appears, not only in his estimate of the well. Yet the immediate aftermath of Lupercal
rebuffed over the

nullifies this

interpretation. Caesar has just been

crown,
to

and

is described
spoken

(by Brutus)

as

leaving

the scene angrily. His

first

words

Antony,
in

privately, therefore

sound strange

indeed, for they have

"dangerous"

no anger

them and seem oddly removed from the event that has just transpired.

Observing
to per

Cassius in the crowd, Caesar tells Antony he is after Antony's demurral, sifies to "very
dangerous"

a and

term he inten

in

conclusion need

haps the finest thumbnail

more than this

character sketch

in

literary

history. We

nothing
could

assessment of

Cassius,

so true

to what we have just learned

to know how

from his
attain an

conversation with

Brutus

about

Caesar,
and

Caesar

the unrivalled supremacy Cassius acknowledges and envies. Caesar has

extraordinary comprehension of men ments about Cassius show how little that

situations,

and

his

present com

unique and

dilemma thereby becomes

a man of such acumen

more obvious a

capacity has declined. But our more pressing, for how could
committed
such a

have just
must
Cassius'

moment ago

blunder

regarding the crown? There his sudden comment on

of

be

some connection

between that

event and
aware

danger to him.
against

Obviously, Caesar is

the possibility

of a

aroused

by

Antony's

action. on the

conspiracy And how

one man

him

marvelous
who

conspiracy probably further that Caesar's attention should

and

focus unremittingly

has already begun to foment

rather

organize such a conspiracy!

Cassius is very dangerous, Caesar insists, but "I be feared than what I fear; for always I am
but Caesar does

tell thee what

is to

Caesar."

Cassius is to be feared,

not fear him. Why so? Is Caesar unconcerned about living is he incapable, perhaps, of dying? Or does Caesar at once act in such a way that he need not feel fear? As to the former alternative, Caesar is perfectly

aware of

his

own mortality.

Not only does he have

other men:

certain physical afflictions

(epilepsy,
death

some

deafness), but he later

to

acknowledges

in

famous

speech that

will come

him

as

to

The
It

Cowards die many times before their deaths; valiant never taste of death but once. Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
seems to me most strange that men should

fear,

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan
a

227

Seeing
Will

that

death,
it

necessary end,

come when

will come.

This

passage efforts

seems

to express a curious

fatalism

about

death, but does it

a restraint not

forbid
true of

to stay
past

healthy
avoid

or

keep

from
mean

being
that

killed

hardly
what careful

Caesar's

life? Or does it
a view

men

should

fear

they
this

cannot

ultimately

perfectly

compatible with

taking

precautions to protect oneself

to the greatest extent possible? The valient,

take

by

interpretation,

need

not

unnecessary risks,

or

allow

themselves to

become the helpless

victims of others.

What has Caesar done

forming
guard?

against

about the conspiracy he knows Cassius might be him? Has he taken those simple precautions kings and tyrants

have taken in Has he

all

ages,

even

in less

worrisome

times? Does he have a

and other malcontents?

set spies on the trail of at

Cassius

body Surely

a conspiracy about which lius Lena) come to learn,

least two

perfect strangers

(Artemidorus

and Popi-

and organized

by
a

this very

Cassius, slinking

through

the night

with a

troop
of

of

accomplices,

would not

have

presented a major prob

silence"

lem to those forces

Caesar that had, in

tribunes merely for removing scarves

twinkling, "put to from Caesar's statues. We do

the two
not

know

why Caesar fails to take such steps, but it is impossible to believe he did not think of them. For he had given much thought to his death, and had
taken other steps
with

it in

mind.

He

had, for

example,

made

an

elaborate

will,

and named

Octavius Caesar his

summoned

son and

heir. Moreover,

and most pecu

liarly, he had already

Octavius back to Rome, thus accounting for the coincidence by which Octavius arrives outside Rome the very day of his funeral. Here Shakespeare deviates significantly from the account in Plutarch
13)*, where Octavius hears of Caesar's death only after it occurs and he is abroad, returning sometime later. By having Caesar himself summon Octavius, Shakespeare intimates that Caesar his Caesar, not Plutarch's had

(p.

1 1

while

some purpose

he have had
Or is there

some premonition or some other

in wanting his heir on hand around the Ides of March. Could foreknowledge of his own imminent murder?

bearing

that this solicitation,

invented but

unexplained

by Shakespeare,

had for Caesar's future?

II
To find
our

way through difficulties

deepening

on all

sides,

we must retreat

to a vantage point that will permit us to appreciate Caesar's situation as

saw

he

it. First

and

foremost,

we must realize that

the

one-man rule

he has, for

time, been engaged in establishing is not a harsh rule, not a simple tyranny, but something like what Aristotle calls a royal tyranny. How far he
some
*

Modern

Library Giant

228 has

Interpretation
along this path Shakespeare does not tell direct mention of Caesar's earlier political
us

come

in

detail, just
We
never

as

he

omits all as we

career.

learn,

do from Plutarch (p. 881), that Caesar has been made "dictator for an extension of the limited emergency nature of dictatorship rendering the republic essentially inoperative during his lifetime and at his pleasure.
life"

Instead, Shakespeare
work

makes sure we

fully

realize that

somehow,

within a

frame

still

republican

(for example,

with

tribunes and a senate),

Caesar has

managed

to gain supreme power. And he that this

engaged
must could not

leaves it

to our own
or

intelligence
have

to

realize

must
such

have

in

a series of

have happened accidentally, illegal and immoral acts,

legally. Caesar
sought

must

have defeated many rivals and opponents in the course of power, achieving it (as he has just defeated the sons of Pompey), and must have given considerable thought not only to the strategy that would make his quest
successful

but

even more

to the ultimate object of that quest. the basis of his power, and it

Clearly, Caesar has

is
with

made the common people

them that the play begins and in a way starts anew after Antony's
oration for Caesar. The people enjoy Caesar's benefactions, in his triumphs, glory in his command, and dote on his sub Caesar's enemies, the main defenders of the republic, come from the

Caesaristic funeral
exult and share
servience. senatorial against

class,

and

against

them he has had to use force

also

most

recently

Pompey's

sons.

He is

capable, in

an

instant,

tribunes, themselves supporters of the republican order. harsh. Some of his former enemies, pardoned, still sit in the senate, and even the "very Cassius is left perfectly free. This is why Caesar's rule
dangerous"

silencing the two But he has not been

of

could appear

(if

one

did

not

look too hard,

thus
speak the

and

forgot much)
virtuous

not severe and

tyrannical but mild and

just,

accounting for the

truth of
than

Brutus'

admission, in soliloquy, that: "To

when

Caesar, I have

not

amazing known

his

affections sway'd more

his

reason."

Why
his

Brutus

should

have lost

sight of

Caesar's
and

earlier usurpations of

(of

which

recent triumph over

fellow Romans

his treatment

the tribunes are

lingering
without

examples),

or of

the monarchical power already in his possession

the title

"king,"

we

do

not yet

know. But

we must assume

that the

willingly vest Caesar with quasi-monarchical authority, that it yielded only what it had to under the pressure of some kind of necessity, either from him or from circumstances. Just as the senate coming directly now seems willing to grant him a crown abroad, it may previously have
republic not

did

bestowed

increasing

levels

of

authority

Nevertheless,
on

clearly seeming more king-like than tyrannical, and hence on securing for himself first, the love of the people, and then the attachment of as many senators as possible consistent with their presenting no direct threat to his king-like
authority
that
of

this great usurper

seems

simply to avert his seizing more. intent on not being seen as one,

is,

with

their willingness to surrender the old republican pre

rogatives

the senate

itself. But if this has been

and

remains

(as in his

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan
what motivates poor

229 it? Does Caesar love the

claims
a

will) Caesar's policy,

common

people,

cry

at

the plight of the

as

Antony

in his

oration?

Is he

Roman And

patriot,
what

devoted to the

common good?

Is he

gentlemanly lover
hear Caesar
private

of virtue?

is his

ultimate object?

It may

not

be entirely

accidental
or

that

we never

refer

to virtue,
and

Rome,
a

the common good, justice

the people

in his

discourse,

in

some cases not even publicly.

Of course, he

speaks

like

a monarch rather us

than
our-

tyrant, refusing to self shall be last

Artemidorus'

read and

message

because "What touches

opens

serv'd,"

he inquires,

as

he

the senate (his senate,

redress?"

he says), "What is now amiss that Caesar and his senate must But Caesar seems to have little genuine respect for the senate, as his imperious
words

to Decius

beautifully

indicate: "Have I in
truth?"

conquest stretch 'd mine arm

so

far, To be

afeard

to tell greybeards the

the greybeards, of course,

is there any clear sign of genuine love for the people, being despite his slavishly prostrating himself before them at Lupercal and lavishly providing for them in his will, and despite Antony's eulogy citing the foreign
the senators. Nor
monies

he brought into the "general

coffers"

and

the tears he wept "when the

cried."

poor
care so much

Evidently
for the

Caesar did
to

not put so much

in the

general coffers

or

poor as

deny

himself those

enormous sums

permitting
ambition

his testamentary largesse to the people, and thus serving that very Antony was at such pains to deny in him. Much dissimulation interest is
person and masks

the

fact that Caesar's

main

perhaps

his

sole

himself,

although

the qualities

his way of talking lays claim to fairly he

swim and write

about
shout

himself in the third

it

out.

From Cassius

we

learn that Caesar dared him to

the raging Tiber with

him,

and

that

he bade the Romans to "mark him

was,

his

speeches

in their

books"

He
and on

then,
to

highly
be

competitive,

sought

to do unusually difficult things,

prides

wanted

remembered

long

after

his death. He clearly

its

himself

his

vast

conquests,

and even master of

more, we may presume, on

in making himself
peare even goes so

Rome

as well as of

having succeeded farflung empire. Shakes

though most unobtru
and see

far

as

to demonstrate before

our eyes

Caesar's perfectly remarkable capacity for ruling men, sively his demeanor from one audience to another. At Lupercal we

for altering him first as

lordly

emperor, the next

scene afterwards

self-abasing slave of the people. In one he is the gentlemanly equal of fellow aristocrats, welcoming
moment as

them into his home that morning,

and

in the

next

not

king
side

again

but the
the

godlike

man, like

unto the northern

only the emperor or star. Where else in

side

literature

are

manners

befitting

such

different

regimes manifested

by

in

so short a space?
must

to suit style enjoy this unrivalled and almost uncanny ability what remains? Rome's fact king, If, as to occasion. But if he is already in Cassius himself admits, he is now become a god, bearing the palm alone, and

Caesar

".

doth bestride the

narrow

world

like

Colossus,"

can

he have further

230

Interpretation
The
analysis given

ambition?

tained in Shakespeare's play Caesar

was

by Plutarch, begin, is this:

and

at a place where

the events con

born to do

great

things,

had

a passion after

honour,

and the

many
to

noble exploits and go as

he had done did

of

not now serve as an

were

inducement to him to

sit still

reap the fruit

and raised

his

past

labours, but
It
was

incentives

and encouragements

on,

in him ideas

of still greater

actions, and a des-re of new glory,

a sort of emulous struggle with

if the

present were all spent.

with

in fact

him

self, as it had been

another, how he might outdo his past actions

planned

by

his future.

Plutarch

goes on

to say that Caesar

to add to his glory at this point

an assortment of geographical

through a new campaign against the

Parthians,

improvements,
. .

and a new

calendar, but

that
of

which

brought

upon

him the
the

most apparent and mortal

hatred

was

his

desire
with

being king;

which gave

common people

the

first

occasion to quarrel

him,

and proved the most specious pretense to those who

had been his

secret

enemies all along.

most

In Shakespeare's play only the last of these ambitions shows itself, and directly in the crown-offering scene recounted by Casca. Why Antony
to Caesar at the Feast of Lupercal
we are not

offers a crown or coronet

told.

Neither before

nor after that scene

do he

and

Caesar discuss the matter,

of

and

it is

highly
it is

improbable that direction

Antony
We

the

Antony
so

"When Caesar says, 'Do

an

this,'

performed"

would

undertake
are

important

action

without

Caesar's

explicit aside

or consent.
and

told

reluctantly,
scene

from the

by Brutus looking angry or

(confirmed
sad.

by by Casca)

Casca that Caesar

that

put

the crown

Caesar

came

away

He

seems to

have

wanted

the crown very

badly by the

a conclusion

that spurs Brutus to join the conspiracy, and is also drawn

senate as a whole.

Does Shakespeare's (not That he

wants people

Plutarch's) Caesar really

doubt
come

wish

to

become king? he
gain

to think so seems obvious. But the

what would

there

by? With the

with

crown would no

opportunity

to

dispense further

republican

forms,
of

to a natural heir or,

with

lacking
and

Caesar's love
as

convey his authority either that, to one of his own choosing. But a man distinction would also see certain disadvantages. King
and perhaps

the right to

ship,

traditionally

ordinarily
many

understood

in Rome,
and

could

never com

pletely free itself from in which it was held

renown
would

association with the

over

Tarquins his

centuries.

hence from the obloquy Moreover, it could hardly bring

own

to Caesar as a novel system of

of a

creation,

since

its

revival

be that
would
and

finally,
people,

very depend

old system on

devised

by

others.

This
of of

revived

monarchy,
and

his receiving the

retain

consent

the this

senate

the

would, therefore, always

viewpoint of a man of

something

dependence.
the very the
of

From the

the highest ambition

to the

of one of

few who, according to Abraham

and the

Lincoln, belonged

"family

lion

eagle"

tribe of the

these were

important defects, but how

could

they

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan
provides

231
answer:

be
to

avoided?
which

History

the

Caesar

must

found

a new

regime

he

would give

his

name

the rule of the

Caesars

instead. The only

and

change

Shakespeare
plan,

makes

is to

attribute to
seems

Caesar's intention,

to a com

prehensive

what

historically

to have come about without such a though it will challenge

cannot assure

plan, even if

him to
of

by a kind of necessity. Unfortunately display of fortitude without parallel Caesar

without

the success

this plan

submitting to,

and

indeed in

some

own not

assassination,

martyrdom and

deification.

Only

degree arranging, his on this improbable but inconsistencies

several
events. after

impossible
which we

assumption can we explain

the paradoxes and

into

have

otherwise

fallen.

subtle changes

Shakespeare
can

makes we

in this way can we explain in Plutarch's account of the same

Only

And only in this way

make rather

sense

of

the play

being

named

Caesar,
import

and

of

the necessary,
of

than accidental, triumph of his spirit,

embodied

in the forces lesson

of

Octavius

and

Antony,

that constitutes the primary

and

the second and larger part of the play.

Ill

Fortunately,
evidence.

this

conclusion can

be

shown

to rest

on more

than circumstantial

The

scene

that

most

fully

reveals

the working of Caesar's mind

(ii. ii)

shows

him first
with

alone

and then

in

extended and

discussion

his only

one

in the play
most of

Calpurnia, Decius Brutus

Just
as

them

conspirators.

in the

finally a group of senators, immediately preceding scene Brutus

had been

shown

is first

shown

walking in his orchard amid stormy exhalations, so here Caesar awake, in his nightgown, inside his house, amid thunder and
was

lightning. Brutus

up,

so

Caesar kept him from sleeping, but

the storm
with awaken words

he said, because thinking of the plot against we do not know why Caesar is up. Did
roused

him? Was he
reports

by

Calpurnia'

the

he

("Help! Ho! they

murder

crying out in her sleep Caesar!")? Did he go to

s

sleep Caesar is determined to

with

at all?

We do

not

know.
go

to the senate house that morning but meets

from Calpurnia. In arguing against his going, Calpurnia does not tell her says nothing about any dream of hers, and he, on his part, from "one report cites a She sleep. her in out what he heard her cry Caesar all "beyond things of "most horrid sights seen by the
strong
opposition
use."

within

watch"

is

unmoved:

not

only is any
unusual

"end"

gods"

purposed

by

the

"mighty

inevitable,
for the

says

he, but
in

these

sights

these

"predictions"are

as much

world

general

as

for Caesar. To this

"

retort

Calpurnia objects, in turn,

because

by

means

of

comets

the heavens blaze forth the

not

death

of

princes,"

not

of

beggars

point

Caesar does

try

to deny. He asserts, the mighty

of

mention of instead, that death will come when it will come (no braggadocio But the gods here), and the valiant do not fear it.

his first

232
response

Interpretation
to

back

and vanish when

Calpurnia (the things that threaten him have only looked they see his face) is not repeated: Caesar now

on

his

seems

willing to

acknowledge that the death of this particular prince, meaning him in fact come today but still should not be feared. self, may At this juncture Caesar's continued insistence on going to the senate house
another
. .

receives
"

setback, for the

servant

he

sent

to the augurers reports that

omens support

they
against a

would not

have

you stir

forth today": the

Calpurnia

heart)

not go

refuses to budge, giving the bad omen (a beast lacking interpretation: he would be such a beast a coward if he did contrary forth. To support this view he returns to braggadocio in another form,

him. But Caesar

a

claiming that Caesar is more dangerous than danger itself, and so he forth. At this the frustrated Calpurnia can only lament that his "...

shall go
wisdom

is

consumed
with

in

confidence,"

and

her last

resort

is to

replace not

her

original com

mand

plea.

On bended knee her

she

begs Caesar
the

to go,

and

he

at

once relents.

Apparently,
is
against

what argument and

not accomplish

accomplished

by

lowly

authority pleading her

consents

of

the priests could

as

"humor,"

Caesar

calls

it. Much
will

his

reiterated

will, he

to

stay home: Marc

had
assured

Antony

tell the senate

he is

not well.

But Decius Brutus

conspirators

arrives

first

the

same

Decius

who

the

he

could

again

to the Capitol.

Cassius,
and

successfully flatter Caesar and assure his going you recall, had been fearful the lately supersitious

Caesar

might

be deterred from going

and

by "apparent

prodigies, the
augurers."

unaccustom'd

terror of this night,

not one of

the persuasion of the

are all present

As it turns out,

these

they

succeeds with

Cassius wrong
succumb to

about

his

having

grown superstitious.

Calpurnia'

s plea and

is thus,

by

Caesar, thus proving Nevertheless, Caesar does means Cassius did not foresee,
could

to remain at home.

With Decius
plished would

on

the scene before

Antony, Caesar
was

easily have

accom

his
tell

altered resolve.

All he had to do
was not

tell Decius (as he said he

Antony)

that

he

feeling

well and ask

him to convey that

not

message

to the senate. But Caesar takes an entirely unexpected tack: tell the

senate, he instructs

Decius,

that Caesar

will not come

down

cannot,

or

dare

not

tutes a
vene:

(which he explicitly denies), but will not. This, of course, consti clear affront to both the senate and Decius, causing Calpurnia to inter he is
sick."

her thought in no other way than this because Caesar had just insisted, a moment before, that "Cannot is in short, that he was not sick, contrary to what he was going to tell Antony.

"Say

She

could put

false"

To the
great

poor woman's open suggestion

that Decius

lie, Caesar

now reacts with

indignation:
send a

Shall Caesar Have I in To be

lie?

conquest stretch 'd mine arm so

far,

afeared

to tell greybeards the truth?

Decius,

go tell them

Caesar

will not come.

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

233

out

Of course, Caesar does not admitand Calpurnia is in no position to point presence in that it was Caesar himself who had first said he
Decius'

would
now

have

Antony
will

tell the senate he was not

of course a

well

itself

lie. And

what

he

tells Decius is

lie

too

for it is

not

his

will

but Calpurnia's
ques

pleading that
assertion of
soul

keep

him from the

would

senate

that day.

Moreover, it is

tionable whether

Caesar

really have
will

permitted

Decius to

bring

such an

arbitrary

and

tyrannical
and

to the senate.
to the

Minutes later he is the

who

of gentlemanliness

friendliness
at

senators
of

come

as

his

escort

to the
senate

Capitol. And

even

the very

height

his imperious

pride

house, where he treats not only the senators but all other men inferior in constancy, he asserts not his sheer will but his refusal grossly to be sway'd by fawning and flattery rather than reasons: "Know, Caesar doth
as not

in the

wrong,

nor without cause will

he be

satisfied."

Before

dispatching Decius,
the auguries,
assertion
.

Caesar

could

have found

some not

way

of

blaming
But

his

absence on

or perhaps on will

Calpurnia's

feeling

well.

by
ask

this

false
In

of mere me

further: ".
so."

let

he had practically compelled Decius to know some cause lest I be laugh'd at when I tell
seems to soften: though

them

response

Caesar his in

to satisfy the senate, out of love for

Decius,

and

for his

his willing it is enough private knowledge

only, Caesar
makes

will confide

real reason

Decius his

partner

lying

for staying home. In this way Caesar to the senate and keeping from it truth that
But the
real truth

somehow cannot

be

aired publicly.

is

not what
with

Caesar tells
and

Decius: he does

not repeat the gist of

his

conversation

Calpurnia,

how Calpurnia
an

managed

to persuade him to stay home. Instead he concocts

saw his statue spouting Romans many happy coming to bathe their hands in it, and, taking this dream as an evil omen, she had begged Caesar on her knee to remain home. Now the most notable (and least noted) feature

amazing and ingenious lie, greater than any before. This night, he tells Decius, Calpurnia dreamt she
a

blood from

hundred places,

with

of

this account is that Caesar has just invented it out

not

of almost whole cloth.

Calpurnia had indeed begged Caesar, but herself had

mentioned no such

because

of this as

dream. Calpurnia
remarks

dream,

though she

had,

he

in

solilo

in her sleep about his being murdered. Her argument with Caesar quy, had been based not on dreams but on publicly observed prodigies and the
cried out

generally
than to

accepted

significance

of comets.

She

seems

to

have known better

whatever she

try

to persuade Caesar with stories of personal

dreams,
before

remembered of

her

own

that

morning.

She may

even

have

observed as

how

con

temptuously he had dismissed

"dreamer."

the soothsayer the

day

nothing but
or

The fictitious dream Caesar describes does

not

directly

involve him,

his
of

being

murdered,

how the

conspirators

but his statue, and it turns later bathed their arms in his blood. But its tone is
out

to be an amazing prediction

hardly

optimistic,

and

its immediate import is to demonstrate,

with

perfect

234

Interpretation
conscious even

clarity, how

bility

perhaps

Caesar was, that morning and that night, of the possi the likelihood of a conspiracy against his life. In

responding, Decius fundamentally had two alternatives, each of which would tell Caesar something about both Decius and the situation Caesar was to face that day. An innocent Decius
might well
would

be inclined to
a

acknowledge as

how Calpurnia
with

be frightened

by

such

dream, baseless

it

was

Caesar

widely loved. Perhaps the peculiar happenings of the night brought it on, but in any case he could certainly understand Caesar's desire to keep his wife
so

from worrying, and absence that day.

This is the

would

be

happy

to tell the

senate of

Caesar's intended

response

Decius failed to
and

make.

Instead, he

gives

highly

optimistic, wildly
supposed

improbable,
as

extremely

flattering
go

interpretation to the

dream. Just

Caesar had
was

earlier given an

improbable interpretation
to the senate-house,
going.

to

an evil omen

because he

determined to
set on

here

Decius "great

gives another

because he too is

Caesar's
blood"

So

when

Decius
which

interprets Caesar's
men"

statute as

come
eager

supplying "reviving to collect for relics, Caesar

the dream

to "great

Rome"

voices no

objection.

On the

contrary,

to reverse his promise to

Calpurnia,

duress, he
confirmed
promise

"well-expounded."

proclaims

made unwillingly under And Caesar must have been

in his

suspicions

by

Decius'

of a

crown

from the

senate

only abroad), the

other the prospect of

adding two further points: one, the (he says nothing about it being worn senate mockery. In short, Decius seems

exceedingly
of

anxious

to get Caesar to go, and

eager
again

this anxiety, is
one

as

the

sure

he had

Caesar, recognizing the import kill, the other to be killed; successfully flattered, the other knowing he had
to go
the one to

seduced

the flatterer into revealing his

secret; the

one

intent his

with

small

band

of colleagues on of

freeing
and

the republic, the other

on

facing
glory.

greatest

deed,

"unshak'd

motion,"

bent

his

own

immortal

Now many otherwise inexplicable details in the play, including changes from Plutarch made by Shakespeare, become comprehensible. Caesar, having just defeated the last
the possibility
remains. of

his
the

open

opposition on the
of

battlefield, knows
such

that

indeed,

likelihood
is
most

secret, conspiratorial
to

opposition

He

even

knows

who

likely
his

foment

a conspiracy.

He has decided that the

a new sort of

culmination of and

ambition requires the

founding
perhaps

of

monarchy,

that this goal the

is best
of

attained

(and

only
will

attained) through
permit

a martyrdom at

hands

traitorous aristocrats that

he has already initiated to be regarded as the product of a superhuman being or god. He returns from the battle with Pompey's sons on a holiday, the feast of Lupercal a detail not stipulated in Plutarch
the political system
and

apparently forgotten
of

even

very opening The people will therefore be

the play

for

by the tribunes, who censure the artisans at the being out on a working day rather than a holiday.
available
with

both for his triumphal

return and

for is

the crown-offering Caesar arranges

Antony,

the

main object of which

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

235

to
of

stimulate and accelerate

the conspiracy Caesar believes to be forming.

Caesar,

course,

must

be

made

to look innocent and unsuspecting, hence no the discussion of guards reported

sect.

body
be

guards

and no spies

not even

by

Plutarch
will

and others
protected

(for example,

Suetonius,
to

86),

with

Caesar saying he

by

the love of the people instead of asserting the extreme fearlessness

assert

Shakespeare has him

sayer

and Calpurnia. This is why the sooth for warning Caesar about the Ides of March, and why Caesar refuses even to try to read Artemidorus's urgent warning whereas in Plutarch he tries very hard but unsuccessfully to read it (p. 892).

Antony

is

not asked

his

reasons

For Caesar,
nature with

we

of

the weather,

may presume, did not sleep the eve of the Ides, and the wild with its preternatural manifestations, fitted perfectly him his
most anxious

his

plans and made what

for the

plot

to come off that day.

senate

This is

accounts

for his insistence

promise

on

going to the
even as

house,

and

his

finding way Decius that the Ides

a

out of
was
much

to Calpurnia

he discovered from
to himself

indeed the day.

to
prepare were a

Caesar had done in the third person,

bombastic

for this

occasion.

His

reference

as

if he

being

apart

from himself personally, his

when

language,

more

like that

of a god

than a man, even

speaking

to Antony privately, his letters to Octavius, summoning him back from abroad directly so that he appears in time for Caesar's funeral, his will were all essential parts of this plan. And this plan is what forms the bridge between
"halves"

the first

and second of

of the

play, and

makes

not

only necessary but

intended the victory

and

ultimately
over

even

chose

Antony

the conspirators, Caesar's forces (his "spirit") the heir Caesar himself the victory of Octavius Caesar presaged in this play and brought to pass in the next.
over

Caesar is

most courteous

to the group that

all

assembled

the morning of the

members

Ides to

escort

him to the

senate

but

one

(Publius) being

of the

conspiracy.

Some among them, like Metellus Cimber and Caius Ligarius, Caesar. Brutus is there, though Caesar obviously had little reason to love treats him with remarks how unusual it is for him to stir so early and hardly
angel."

the

special affection one would expect

for "Caesar's
though
will

But

Cassius,

as

Caesar may have

mended
him."

noted,

did

not

appear,

it
all

was

he

who

had

recom

to the

conspirators

that ".

.we

of us

be there to fetch be
on

Evidently
deeda men

Cassius

spoke

to

make sure the others would all

hand

for the

somewhat

dangerous

idea,

considering Caesar's capacity to

judge

but decided
me

against

his

own

presence,

knowing,
while

as

he did, that

hard."

"Caesar doth bear

Observing
Brutus,
cisely
must when

this

particular

group
would

of men,

Caesar,

have had his

or
where

suspicions

confirmed,

but he

could not

wondering about know pre

they

strike.

It is interesting, in observing his

conforms

conduct at the senate that morning,

how little it
that he was
give

to the

expectations

one might

form

on the
senate's

assumption

burning

to become king. In

mentioning the

intention to

him

a crown,

Decius had carefully

236

Interpretation
heard from Casca that it
place, save here in
was

avoided the qualification earlier

".

.by

sea and

land, in every
any
acts

Italy."

only to be worn But on that fatal

day
in

neither

he

nor

senator mentions

it. Even

more

striking is the fact

the senate

that Caesar
order

hardly
reacts

like

a man who wants

to avoid
are

displeasing
not

to assure himself of the crown to Metellus Cimber's

they

about

to bestow.

On the
as

contrary, he

kneeling

before him

gently

one would surmise

visitors at

and

with of

from the friendly cordiality with which he had greeted the his home just before (and especially Metellus) but most indignantly, words completely disproportionate to natural request in
Metellus'

behalf
of

his brother. Since

with

we

cannot

assume

himself

the crown was

little provocation, we must hardly burning. He seems, indeed, to have

so

Caesar actually lost control conclude that his interest in

expressed

himself

in language

so

pletely invented action and leave

we must

highflown, by Shakespeare)
a

monarchical

and even godlike

(in

speech com

as

to goad the conspiracy into

with

immediate

memory
view of

most

in

keeping

the idea of

his divinity. And

it first

admit, in

the deed then absorbing

of

him,
as

that the comparison

as

to the

northern

star, "unshak'd

motion,"

is

not

exaggerated

appears.

in

On seeing Brutus join the entreaties for Cimber's banished brother and close with the rest, Caesar exclaims: "What, Brutus!", and then, at Cinna's approach: "Hence! wilt thou lift To Decius, his "Doth not up
Olympus?"

Brutus bootless
than

kneel?"

means

that no one would be more

after

likely

to move him
and

Brutus,

and

is
tu

followed,
as

the blows of
Caesar!"

by

the

famous "f
sect.

Brute\ Then
much

fall,

Casca, Brutus This "And you,

others,

Brutus"

(see
men

Suetonius,
might enter

82) is

as

to say: "I can see how these other

this vile conspiracy, but how could you whom I

loved

and

trusted

Thus, in his last breath, Caesar draws attention to the benefactions he had heaped on Brutus that is, to his own king-like magnanimity, his own
so goodness

much?"

in

contrast to the
of all.

base deception
Caesar

of

the conspirators and to leave

Brutus'

basest betrayal
complete.

The

memorial

wanted

is

now

almost

Unlike Plutarch's

tackers, like an animal at at all. And the finishing touch

Caesar, who struggles mightily against his at bay (p. 893), Shakespeare's Caesar will not struggle
in his last words, entirely invented acknowledges only that he will "fall", not die,
comes

by

Shakespeare. For Caesar prefiguring the rise

of

thus
play.

his

all-victorious spirit

in the

second

half

of

the

IV
If Caesar has
surrendered

his life in

order

to attain

lasting

influence

and

glory after his death as the divine founder of the Roman Empire, Shakespeare leaves little doubt, by the end of the play, that his plan is well on its way

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

237

to succeeding.

leases "Caesar's spirit, ranging for

voice,"

At Caesar's funeral, Antony's entirely Caesaristic oration re with a mon crying havoc ".
revenge,"

arch's sides goes

which not over

only

expels

Brutus
at

and

Cassius from Rome but

the young man

pre

their
as

defeat

and

suicide

Philippi. What is more, Shakespeare

of

so

far

to suggest the coming preeminence

and

bearing
when

Caesar's name,
Octavius first mediately

hence the
the

beginning
he

of

the rule of the

Caesars. Even

comes to sight

is, despite his

youth and

inexperience, im

made one of at a

be his heir. And

man

triumvirate, simply because Caesar chose him to certain point Antony himself begins calling the young

Caesar instead
and

inferiority
sion

of Octavius (v.i. 16, 24), thus tacitly acknowledging his own presaging his own defeat. Finally, to consummate this impres it is Octavius Caesar rather than Antony who speaks the last lines of the

play, commanding, without contradiction from

Antony,

that

Brutus'

bones

shall

lie in his tent. In

and unexplained

all

these respects Shakespeare seems to suggest some unstated

inevitability leading
the

Octavius

as

Augustus,

first

of

the

from Caesar's death to the solitary long line of Caesars.

rule of

Could Caesar have foreseen his

own posthumous triumph and planned

for

it? Or, if the conspirators had only avoided a series of blunders (most of them due to Brutus), could the republic have been saved for good? If Cicero had been enlisted, if
forbidden to followed
speak at
Cassius'

Antony

Caesar's funeral,

cautious

had been killed along with Caesar, or at least or if Brutus and Cassius had only and won at Philippi instead of Antony and policy
repressed

Octavius,

could

the mighty force of Caesarism have been

indefinitely?
that

Certainly
struck

the conspirators themselves

had

proceeded on

the

assumption

all the republic needed

for its
of

healthy

restoration was

Caesar's death. One is

any deeper reflection on Rome's decay and of any comprehensive plan for its reformation. This is particularly remarkable in nothing, in soliloquy, where he admits to finding nothing wrong

by

the absence

Brutus'

long

fact,

short of admirable

in Caesar's

past

and present

conduct, and nothing

preoccupied with the awry in the condition of the republic as it stands. Solely future threat of kingly power, would anyone hearing him realize that Caesar was already a king in fact if not in name, and the republic already dead? Over some time forces must have been at work in the republic to con

centrate almost
with

power

in the hands
and

of one

man,

and

in

imperceptibly

leave the impression

return

of

way as to inevitability. The play

such

occur

opens

Caesar's triumphant
great generals

from

a war with

Pompey's

sons

a reminder

that

(Pompey, Sulla, Marius) had long been contesting for sway

contention

in

republican

Rome. From this

unlimited

Caesar has
celebrate

emerged

victorious, with
over power

powers

almost rather
move

even

daring

to

triumph

fellow
again

Romans
seems
rule

than foreign peoples. And

after

Caesar's death,
to one man,

to

practically

inevitably from the triumvirate disappearing from sight.

makes

with

republican

Shakespeare

it

clear

that the

republic

has lost its inner vitality in

238

Interpretation
Over
time the people have slowly changed in Caesar's rule, have utterly no desire they glory or war, and no longer regard themselves as needing
a

other ways as well.

long

period of

from
to the

citizens

to subjects:

participate

in

politics

protection of elected

tribunes.

So far has this

upon

decay

in

popular republican

spirit

proceeded, that

immediately

Caesar's death the

people want

nothing

more than seems

to make Brutus Caesar.

Even the senate,

after

Pompey's
"his"

defeat,

senate. completely subordinate to Caesar, who publicly calls it But behind everything is the vast empire, fostering enormous concentrations of
wealth and

power, particularly in the hands

now stronger than the republic

play, but
more

of

his

enormous

of conquering generals who were itself. Of Caesar's army we learn little in this wealth his own will speaks conspicuously. Even

openly do his three

to

successors

display

not

only

rampant

avarice

but

an eagerness

murder or sacrifice men of

prominence,

including

close rela

tives, for
are
of efforts

their own ambitious ends.

and

Once the
and

proscriptions of

the triumvirate

completed, to the

the forces

of

Brutus

keep

the republic alive.

Cassius defeated, we hear no more Even Brutus and Cassius have nothing

to say

in their dying breath, and the only mention of repub in the succeeding play, Antony and Cleopatra (11.vi.15ff.), comes from Sextus Pompey a man quite willing to become the sole master of the world if only the triumvirs could be murdered by hands other than his
of republic

lican

sentiments

own.

If the facts in Rome,

rule and

of

both

plays

show

that one-man rule was all but

inevitable

if Caesar

stands

out as

by

far the best

and

of

those seeking such

successors'

(compare, for
one realizes

example, his

mildness

proscriptions), then the conspiracy

once

against

civility with his him is hard to justify. Harder

still and

the conspirators were themselves motivated

by

envy

ambition at

least

as much as

by

republican

virtue,

and

that

they

played

directly

into Caesar's hands

the martyrdom

by

giving him the

one

thing he
imperial
even

could not give order.

himself

necessary to
to
suggest

founding

a new

This is

not

that good men,

republic

in times strongly
attempt to

favoring
the

despotism,
But
once person

should

desert the

rather than

prolong its life.

and when case

the situation has

degenerated

as

far

as

it had here,

for actually holding is not compelling. In fact, one can scarcely believe that the conspirators themselves, had they known beforehand of the long train of evils
monarchical power

has Caesar's qualities, the

assassination

their action would engender

own and

the senatorial proscriptions, the the struggle

defeat
and

of their

forces,

the rule of the

triumvirs,

between
rule

Octavius'

Antony
would

Octavius,
persisted

final

reassertion of martyred

Caesar's

have

in their

effort

to kill

Caesar.

They

assumed

they

would

succeed,

not

fail,

in

restoring the republic, and

prospect.

justified their

recourse to

violence

solely
play.

by

this

Only
Cato's

two alternatives to

conspiracy

receive

any

attention

in the

One

suicide after a

life

of open opposition

to Caesar in the senate and on

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

239

the battlefieldoccurred
Brutus'

mentioning the suicide

the

before the play begins and is referred to only through itself. The other is that of Cicero, perhaps

highest ranking member of the senate. He is clearly in the opposition to Caesar, though Brutus and Cassius differ about his aptness for the con spiracy. There is some whether question, however, Cicero
would

have joined if asked,

as

he

was not.

Tolerated in

and

pursuing

philosophical studies at the same time

the report of his

(Shakespeare's) by Caesar, (signified in the play by

the senate

equanimity in a suggests by his

crown

speaking Greek), Cicero tries to preserve his humor and losing cause. Unable to frustrate Caesar's ambition, he at least
absence

from the

senate the

that

he

will not

directly

cooperate

in

of personal

consequences.

In short, this
presumes the

day Caesar was to be given a furthering that ambition, regardless policy frequently at variance with
of

that of

Plutarch's Cicero
precipitates

doom

the republic. As

Caesar's death
From the in Rome
was

Cicero's,

since the

triumvirs,

lacking

it turns out, Caesar's for

bearance, have him

picture

murdered.

Shakespeare paints, the

cause of republican government

actually doomed, this fact than Caesar himself.

and

and no one would

be

more

likely

to appreciate

Only

one question remained

whether a solid

enduring replacement for the republic could be devised and constructing its elements became Caesar's greatest ambition. He must have concluded that
a new

form

of

monarchy,

anchored

in both

popular passion and popular

piety

and attached

to the name

Caesar,

would prove superior to

restoring the republic. be followed by Antony's stirring oration and an immediate reversal for the conspirators. He could not know Brutus and Cas sius would lose at Philippi: they might have won. But he could and did know
course,
all efforts at

including,

of

every alternative, Thus, Caesar could

not

know that his death

would

that the

period of republican revival after

his death

would

be short-lived,

and

that a struggle between the republican and

immediately,

would of

necessity,

at some

Caesaristic forces, ensuing almost point, lead to the victory of those

proclaiming his name and his precedent. His secret collusion with the conspiracy against him was therefore more than a wild and risky venture: its outcome
could

be foreseen
should

and

depended

on.

Caesar willingly surrender his life at the very height of his political power, and for an end his very action would prevent him from en joying? After defeating the sons of Pompey in the field, why not easily fend off

Why

Cassius'

in Caesar's mind, new Plutarch's view that he was glory from greater constantly seeking recalling and greater deeds. Caesar was not one for quietly enjoying past accomplish
with all put ourselves ments.

conspiracy and enjoy unchallenged its pomp and adulation? We must

monarchical rule

for

some

years,

Moreover,
says

there was

already

some sign of

his

physical power

flagging. in the

Brutus

Caesar has the

sickness,"

"falling

but there is

no evidence

play that he has always had it. A second infirmity, this one invented by Shake speare, is a loss of hearing in one ear that must have occurred recently, since

240

Interpretation
pains

Caesar takes is ill,

on or

to instruct

Antony
of

to speak to his

other side.

Not that he

in generally

failing

health:

this there is no sign, and no expectation

the part of

Calpurnia, Decius

or anyone else.
more

Still,

Caesar may have

sensed

the onset of physical disabilities much

than the average man, and worried

powers as soon as

particularly about retaining his extraordinary mental on. He would want then to culminate his ambition as

the years went

himself

of opportunities

that might otherwise

never

he could, availing return, and hence using

the conspiracy

for his

own purposes.

V
Despite the intrinsic superiority, upon reflection, of the case for Caesar, at least against assassinating him, the net surface impression left by the

or

play heavily favors the conspirators. In the last half of the play, after Caesar has left the scene, attention focuses mainly on Brutus and Cassius, who are shown becoming in some ways even more admirable and attractive than before,
and whose suicides at

the end constitute memorable refusals to bow to vic

torious tyrants.

on only as a shadowy and enigmatic By however and those spirit, victorious, supporting his cause seem clearly inferior not only to him but to the republicans whose destruction they seek and achieve.

contrast, Caesar lingers

Even in the

earlier

Acts, Shakespeare had been

careful to

keep

Caesar's

most

direct sight, and to mix in enough seeming arrogance and quite ordinary defects to make him somewhat repellent or at best perplexing, but certainly not simply or mainly admirable. And from the
obvious accomplishments out of
outset

the

perspective of

with

which

pathetic, is that
rather

the conspirators
and

than

Caesar, Antony

familiar, Cassius, Casca, Brutus Calpurnia. On the other hand, it

that of
pains all

the audience is made

and

sym

and

Portia
also

must

be

admitted that

Shakespeare has taken

morally

repulsive

by

withholding

almost

keep Caesar from appearing references, indirect as well as

to
as

direct,
and

to the wickedness

by

which

the real

Caesar,
and

depicted

by

Plutarch
to the

others, actually sought

ever-increasing

sole

power

that

is,

corruption on

he induced in the

body

politic and the various wounds

he inflicted

it in

an active effort

to reduce the republic's

capacity for

self-government.

Indeed,
virtuous
Brutus'

compared to

Plutarch, Shakespeare has

so

removed all the

blackness

and

almost all

the dark shadows,

that his Caesar

hardly

evokes, even in the

Brutus, anything like the detestation Plutarch's Caesar evoked in father-in-law, Cato. Why did Shakespeare decide on arranging this
effect, mixing
of a

peculiar with a

muting

Caesar's
and

favoring of the republican conspirators against Caesar evil? Why did he choose to keep Caesar's immor
almost

alities, illegalities
played present

injustices

completely
sides with

out

of sight

if he

also
not

down his

greatness and

generally

his

opponents?

Why

the republican case, the case against

Caesar, full

strength?

Shakespeare'

Caesar'

Plan

241

This for his

would not

own ends.

His

be the only time Shakespeare has seen fit to alter Plutarch Coriolanus, for example, gives voice much more fully is
more extreme

than Plutarch's to aristocratic and antidemocratic views, and

in avoiding
pressure and

public

honors, refusing
Lepidus'

to show his wounds, and resisting the

of

those urging him to conciliate the aroused plebeians. In

participation

Antony

Cleopatra he invents
expands

Pompey, greatly
deaths for two
tion of Caesar
carriage of

the role

of

in the peace-making with Eros (Antony's armorer), introduces a

and

number of remarks

adumbrating Christianity,
and

invents apparently
as vast as

unnatural

of

the characters (Enobarbus and Iras). But nowhere does the

difference between Plutarch

Shakespeare become

in the

presenta

himself,

with

Caesar's

career.

Shakespeare omitting the whole ugly under This could not be from incapacity or repugnancy,

for, as Richard III attests, Shakespeare is perfectly capable of describing the villainies of a usurper when he wishes to. Of course these two usurpers differed
markedly.

Greater

by far,
and

Caesar had
of

broader

and

deeper ambition,

keen

sense of

the dangers

of command unsullied

vindictive,
a godlike

whereas

tyranny, any perverse taste for evil. Richard was mean, cruel, Caesar's love of the greatest honor and his desire to be

defects

and a natural astuteness and power

by

founder

seemed some

to

engender a certain

high-mindedness in him. Such

a man might

doubtlessly
would

not

from outsmarting Decius and would exult in exercising the self-control his final plan required, but he take pleasure in having his own brother drowned in a butt of

derive

little

enjoyment

malmsey.

Caesar
peare power or

might not

leaves it to the

have been cruel, but he was hardly good either. Shakes reader to imagine the means by which Caesar came to
the
moral consequences of own

initially,
not

and also

may

be

moral

to permit one's

it may immoral assassination, it is certainly his

plan.

For

while

to

plan a series of events

mately to to be monsters. Shakespeare

a settled

necessitating prolonged despotism of Caesars who not

concealing, or

civil

war, and

leading

ulti out

infrequently

would

turn

By

leaving
and

to

inference,

this side of

Caesar,

makes

him less

repellent

tempts us into a greater openness

to the mystery of his than his

critic. other

power and

charm, acting as

his hidden

partisan rather

On the
evils of

hand, it

can

justly be

claimed

that Shakespeare
clear signs of

ignores the
countless

the

republic

to an equal

degree, omitting
with which could

the

moral,
makes

political and social

disorders

it had

long

been
the

afflicted. scene at

He
any

it

almost seem as
republic's

if Caesar

have

appeared on

point

in the

long

historyas

if

changes no

in the spirit,
on

structure and

operation

of republican

institutions have

bearing

the Caesaristic pos the matter, and why the republic to

sibility.

Certainly

this

is how the

conspirators considered

they
the

thought that

simply removing Caesar

unlike

would

restore

full

health. Thus Shakespeare,

republic

Plutarch,

tries to give the impression that

and

is

not

subject

to internal illness

decay

or, from the

other

242

Interpretation
or not

side, that its allowing

allowing
or

man

like Caesar to dominate it is

mainly
must

function

of

its will,

the

will of

its

leading

members, rather than

seems

of political conditions generally.

The republic, Shakespeare

to suggest,

think this

way if it is to

prevent usurpers

from making its

supposed

decay
some
ex

their greatest public excuse.

Much to

our

confusion, Shakespeare apparently favors the

others.

republic

in

ways, Caesar in
plained.

Let

us

step back

and see

if

all

features

can

be

Certainly

the overall tone of the play

is republican, from

beginning

to end, giving the impression that republics are superior to

monarchies.

But it is

also

true that republics can grow

of some

sick

tyrannies, or even beyond republican

remedy,

and

that despotic rule

sort own

necessities
and which

that must, for the

republic's

may then become inevitable good, be kept hidden from it,

lead Shakespeare to
available

omit

If Caesar is the best

any direct description of republican decay. despot at a time of inevitable despotism, this
order

teaching
to

must

be

conveyed

covertly in

to avoid giving encouragement

Caesaristic movements, assaults on their freedom.

Yet this
minimal case

and

to protect republics against rash and

unnecessary
way the play

for Caesar

hardly

exhausts or explains the

treats him. For what does Caesar signify? In the play as well as

historically,
a

Caesar

can

that can

lay lay claim,

claim to as

being

the greatest hero of

pagan

antiquity, in

Rome

well, to

being

the greatest society of antiquity. The

Roman Republic had link between

natural

always encouraged

its

leading

men

to enter

into

emulous

competition with each other

for the

public good.

But

as the empire

grew, the
the

ambition and patriotism

dissolved, for
and

the

first time

leaving

love

of one's own

power, influence
the public

artificial constraints of virtue and

glory free from the apparently good. Here then was a great arena

for ambition, and as Shakespeare portrays it for a man who could be modi fied (by the poet-philosopher's magic) to embody the highest of all political
talents. This man might therefore warrant

being

called

not

only the

greatest
man

Roman,
as such

or

the greatest hero or pagan antiquity, but the greatest political

ambition

and, if

the greatest man as such.

is the very hallmark of humanity perhaps even He might even bear comparison with Christ himself

(see the

attention

to wounds in m.ii and v.i), seeking his own martyrdom not

for the love

glory
and

of others

but

of

himself,

duration have

never

establishing a wordly kingdom whose been exceeded in the West, and in the confines
and

of whose universal peace would arise another martyr with another purpose and another

kingdom.
we can

Now

begin to

appreciate the complexities

an overall

designed the
peare under

play.

Within

facing Shakespeare as he framework strongly republican, Shakes

Caesar,
who

cautiously
the

reveals a

confusing

and somewhat repellent

only

how he could come to rule the world scrutiny and what he intends in his last days. To stimulate a sympathetic interest in this man, Shakespeare is willing to conceal his infractions of law and morality,
most careful

shows

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

243 grip the

mind and entrance

and

to allow

his

awesome ambition to
what

the

soul.

At its core, this is

play,
either
else.

Caesar's

"spirit"

means
well

in the

second

half

of

the

and

Shakespeare himself (as

as the readers

he has seduced)

must

bow down to this

great god or

discover its

subordination to

something

VI
There
as must

be

some relation

the perfection of political or

between Shakespeare's understanding of Caesar honor-seeking man and the fact that the play
to certain philosophies of classical
a

pays an unusual and even unique attention antiquity.

By

his

own

admission, Cassius is
name

follower
a

of

Epicurus,

and

the

bookish Brutus (without, the only

character of some

being

used)

historical

renown

as a

Stoic. Moreover, Cicero, the philosopher, is clearly linked Greek

at

to philosophy,

first, by Casca's
with appearance of

report that

he

spoke

Lupecal,
of

second,

by

the way
one

he takes issue

Casca's
the

superstitous

interpretation happens

the storm
that

in his

direct
made

play.

Now it

also

historically

Cicero had
to the

it his life-work to

bring

Greek philosophy

and

philosophizing

Romans, devoting his most comprehensive moral work, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, to what he took to be the three main alternatives Epicureanism, Stoicism, and the philosophy of Aristotle (not essentially dif ferent from Plato's) to which he himself was closest. Shakespeare does some
thing
similar

in the play, showing

what

by

the

words and

deeds

of

Brutus

and

Cassius
were

only particularly defective. Before examining the details, let

in these
philosophies should appear

not

their philosophies expected but

us explain

wherein

they

why the

serious

interest

In Coriolanus, dominant

at

the

beginning
is held

of the

explicitly in this play alone. Roman republic, life was

and

guided

by

and unchallenged moral

could

custom,

in

accordance with

this custom
and most or phi

Cominius

say, "It
"
. .

that valour

is the

chiefest

virtue

dignifies the haver

(n.ii.88). Here there

were no philosophers

losophies, time, however,

philosophy,

and no essential
after

differences in appraising life's

growth

goals.

By

Caesar's Greek
mani

the vast

of the empire and the spread of

significant

differences

within

the ruling class

had become

fest. Plutarch's life

of

Cato the Censor describes how the Roman

of

conquest of

Greek philosophy at Rome during the diplo B.C.). matic visit of Carneades the Academic and Diogenes the Stoic (155 Despite initial resistance led by Cato himself to protect the Roman way of life against this subversive and divisive influence, the Greek schools made Greece led to the introduction

headway

in Rome,

so that a

century later Cicero

could combine
orator with

of the republic's

leading

statesman and

its

leading

being one being the fore

most philosophical

writer of

his day.
taken seriously

These

philosophies

were

by

the

men

who

followed them.

244

Interpretation
presented,
and

They
man pain

were

understood,

as

a substitute summum

relying solely

on reason to

determine the
contended

for piety and custom, bonum or the good for

by

nature.

The Epicureans

that pleasure was the only good and

the only evil, the Stoics that virtue was the sole good, and the Aris

totelians that virtue was the chief but not the only good, and vice the chief

but

not

the only evil. To place these views in artful but unobtrusive

reactions

juxta

position, Shakespeare arranges for five different

on

to the storm

occurring
with and

the eve of the Ides of March. First comes the superstitious

traditional view that the gods
prodigies.
"
.

Casca,

his

in their

anger

made and

the

storm,

his

credulous

belief in

These interpretations
may
construe
themselves."

reports

Cicero then interest in

"
. .

rejects,

insisting

that

men

things after their fashion clean

shows no remark

from the

purpose of

the things

But Cicero

arguing with or instructing Casca disturbed sky is not to walk

to

further,
views

and

his parting
the

that

this

in"

the storm as a

natural evil

be

avoided

if

possible.

Not

so to

Cassius,

third,

who

obviously berates Casca

for his

superstition and attributes

the storm not to the gods but to the

defects

or qualities of

the matter found on earth, which, he

implies, is in
his bosom

the skies

and everywhere.

Cassius

stalks about

in the

storm

baring

and

daring

the thunder and

lightning

to strike him. Here then is the materialist Epicurean

not so great

whose philosophical who must

capacity is

that he trusts reason alone and

therefore prove that Zeus does

who combine

not exist with

by

his failure to
comes

destroy
Brutus

those, like Cassius,

with a perfect

insolence
so

impiety. Next

display
air."

of

Stoic apathy,

that he can stand in his orchard reading a

completely the master of his fear letter by the light of "exhalations

night

whizzing in the
sounds much

The last to judge the

superstitious

like the

Calpurnia, who Casca) is Caesar himself. Inside his house,

(apart from

viewing the thunder and lightning outside, his comment is brief: "Nor heaven nor earth have been at peace This is neither superstition, nor Epi
tonight."

curean not

bravado,

nor

Stoic rigor.
or

Surprisingly, Caesar

sounds most

like Cicero
unusual

fearing

any gods,
not as

storm, though

seeing anything but a severe if somewhat plainly taking his guidance from nature.
this comparison,

By including Caesar in
need to add sidered

Shakespeare

seems to

indicate the

the way of life he represents to the alternative philosophies con

not

by

Cicero. This does

that the alternative

of personal

imply that Caesar was a philosopher, but only ambition, followed to its greatest heights, is
the others, and that it naturally do. In the play the case for ambition or
the subject of my
more

of sufficient seriousness shows

to

be

weighed with

itself

most

fully

when

they

honor is

presented almost

immediately, "Well, honour is

In that speech, Cassius appeals to Brutus' love of honor much than to his love of the honorable or the virtuous, and displays his own
of

story."

Caesar's honor

as well.

As

we

learn from Cicero if

not

envy from the originals,

of
associ-

however, neither Epicureanism nor Stoicism allow for this ambitious love honor, the former rejecting the artificiality of honor and the anxieties

Shakespeare'

Caesar'

Plan

245

ated with

the political life as such, the latter making virtue completely inde

pendent of

honors

and all other rewards.

to

underestimate

a vital element of

But according to the play, they seem human nature, and the one most closely
to
Brutus'

linked to bition
Brutus

politics.

For

Cassius'

appeal

love

of

honor

to his am

proves at once

only too true. In

takes

joining

over and makes

the conspiracy devised by Cassius, himself its head, despite his persistent
which

intellectual

inferiority

to Cassius. In short, both share the love of honor

passion and

is Caesar's dominant
that

therefore considerably strengthen the claim

nature.

he

embodies

the perfection of human

Why
ety.

these

four

alternatives and no others? custom

Prior to their emergence, human

the duties required

life is dominated Once

by

directed

at

inculcating
replaced

by

soci

custom

breaks down

and

is

by

recourse

to reason and

nature, the alternatives are set

by

the elements readily thought to inhere in

natural allure
of pleasure

human

nature.

Now for the first time the

can

be

fully

attended

to,

and

the selfish interests

of

the

body

made

the
of

prime

starting-

point.

But

by

necessity this view

leads to
and of

depreciation both
To this

politics,

which

depends
mental

on ambition and
enjoyment

honor,

morality,

which now view

becomes instru Stoicism is the

cal

to the

of selfish

pleasures.

polar

opposite,

insisting

that

duty

and virtue are

irreducible to hedonistic
man,
which requires

culation and

that

they have their

the passions
seems

root and

in the

nature of

the

rule of reason over

devotion to the right for its

own sake.
preserved

While Stoicism
ancestral

to revive the sense of

as

duty

so

long

by

external

custom, its viewing the wise man influences also estranges him from
and even

completely independent political life, which loses

of

of all
some

of

its importance

its

necessity.

The love

honor,
be

as

ordinarily
vantage

understood,

must not motivate

the wise man, and

and

he

must

capable of perfect

happiness

regardless

of

his

own

his

city's

fortunes. From this

point, Stoicism shares the

need

with

Epicureanism

a certain apolitical character

hence

a third philosophy that regards the citizen as essential to the Cicero man. This, claims, is the distinguishing characteristic of the Peri Unlike the Epicureans, patetics, and of Plato and the older Academy as well.

for

to make pleasure-pain the primary principle, but unlike the Stoics on man's natural place in the polis, and do not try to establish insist they for the wise man so radical an independence from politics and from the ordinary goods as honor goods and evils of human life. In allowing for such external

they

refuse

and wealth,

they

come closer

to the real

aspirations of political

men while at
moral

the same time containing them within the limits set

by

the

virtues.

And

having

tied mankind to a political

base, they
3).

can

also allow

for

a con

templative
still

life, involving
hold
and

the

fullest

use of

reason, that admittedly was

higher

another

on proud

honor (Ethics iv,

The Stoics
and
moral.

the Peripatetics both

view

consider man

essentially rational,

social

This

is

challenged

not

only

by

the Epicureans but

by

the

position

Caesar represents, according to

which ambition or

the love of honor

246

Interpretation
feature in
of

is the
of

distinguishing
and engaged

man, and the

key
for

to his happiness. This way

than private or cosmo

life implies that

man

is essentially political,
an endless competition an

rather

politan,

superior

distinction,
in

power

and glory. and

Morality here is

instrument

of ambition rather than good

itself,

it may have to be violated if ambition so demands. Judged by his own standard, of course, Caesar seems easily to run away with the prize in the play. No one was as great a conqueror, no one could keep him from subduing
the
republic and all rivals empire

internally,

no one could

keep

his

spirit

from domi

nating the Before

for

centuries victim

to come.

Pompey,

Cato, Pompey's sons,

Cicero,

Brutus, Cassius
discover his

all

fall

to his irresistible

power.

determining
attitude

whether

Shakespeare

accepts

toward the three philosophies

Caesar's standard, let us formally described as such

Cassius'

by

Cicero. The

ones

he

directly

examines

are

the

polar opposites

Epicureanism
took both

Brutus'

and and

Stoicism. Now it is clear, first

of

all, that Shakespeare than phi

Cassius

Brutus to be disciples

of philosophers rather

losophers themselves. Neither has

Cassius
who

a philosophical

mind, and so it is that the the storm has already lost

that

dares Zeus to
Philippi
and and

strike

him dead

during

his

atheism

stition shared

by by

begun to believe in
Calpurnia. In

omens

is, in
Brutus,

the super
who

Casca

a similar

manner,

first

blames Cato for taking his own life rather than allowing himself to become Caesar's captive, is immediately brought to reconsider by Cassius7 picturing his

being

led in triumph through the Cassius

might

streets

of

Rome. These facts

guided

suggest ancestral

that both Brutus and

custom

have been better

by

an

they

would not

have to

pretend

issued from the

evidence of

human

reason and nature.

In general, it can be views both Epicureanism

sented

shown and

that the standpoint

of

from

which

Shakespeare
as pre

Stoicism is that
crucial

Plato
of

and

Aristotle,

by

Cicero in De Finibus. The for the Cassius found in love

defect

Epicureanism is that it
ambition, for the
sense of

cannot account

natural attractiveness and strength of and

devotion to
and

others

friendship,

and

for the

the just

the

noble.

commits suicide after

Titinius (whom

with exaggeration

he

refers

to as his best

friend) is

captured on a mission

for him: "O,

coward

that I am, to live so

best friend ta'en before my He long in other words, reproving himself for a moral vice and for inadequacy dies, as a friend neither intelligible by any hedonistic interpretation.
to see my
selves

face!"

If (Bloom tells us) Epicureanism makes men think too poorly of them by its failure to comprehend certain higher elements of life, Stoicism
men

makes

think too well themselves.

and what

Brutus

cannot recognize the ambition

in himself,

he

says

in

criticism of

Cicero

"he

will

never

follow

anything that other men begin" at least in part applies to

himself, judging

by

the way

he

immediately

takes

over

dominates Cassius to the very end. he conceives of himself as the perfectly

conspiracy begun by Cassius and Brutus is puffed up with his own virtue:
the
wise
man

depicted in Stoic

litera-

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan
underestimates

247

ture.
men

the power of the passions not only in other but in himself, and also gives too little credit to them as such. This is why he presents a stiff and weak oration at Caesar's funeral, in contrast to the passionate and mercenary appeals employed by Antony. This is also why

He therefore

he fakes Stoic apathy at the news of Portia's death (which he had already heard and lamented), and why at first he thinks it absolutely wrong to commit suicide: the wise man, according to Stoic doctrine, is happy in all circum
stances,

including

If Shakespeare
of

ignominious captivity (Bloom, pp. 1038".). criticizes the Epicureans and Stoics from the
much as

vantage point

the

Peripatetics,
must shift

Cicero had done in his

own chief

writing,
one

our

attention

to Cicero in the play. As we have seen,

his

direct

appearance, amid the storm, confirms the conclusion

just drawn: in
the

contrast to

god-defying
the

Cassius,

the

Epicurean,
who

and apathetic

Brutus,

Stoic, he displays
to

common sense of

the Peripatetics. As

for the indirect

how those have

references

him,

the first comes from

Brutus,
such

reports

leaving

the games at

Lupercal looked: Caesar angry, the

rest

chidden, Calpurnia pale, Cicero

as
we

looking

"with

such

ferret
in

and

being

crossed

conference

fiery eyes by some

seen

him in the Capitol,

senators."

But this

hardly

squares with whether

the impression conveyed

by Casca,

who, in response to

Cassius'

asking

Cicero
and

said

anything
who

at

the crown-offering scene, answers that he spoke

Greek,

that those

understood

him "smil'd

at one

another and

shook their

heads."

angry man: it suggests a joke made at Caesar's expense, something ironical, but implying that not much can be done to keep limits on Caesar's power. It also gives some sense of the state of far from desperate, but where criticism has to be veiled. affairs under Caesar This does
perhaps

not suggest an

Far from desperate

also

is the tone

of

Cicero's

chance

(shortly

afterward

in the text) that evening,

where

meeting with Casca his inquiries about Caesar

seem quiet and

ordinary enough. After recruiting Brutus for the conspiracy, Cassius

us"

claims that
out.

Cicero "will
others

stand

special attention to Cicero's age, judgment and gravity. with Only Brutus disagrees, contending that Cicero would not join them would and he easily carries the day. This not follow something begun by others remark here as well as characterize dislike for Cicero which seems to at Lupercal does not follow Plutarch's account in his lives of Cicero and Brutus,
Brutus'

very strong Metellus drawing

with

and

should

be

sounded

Three

agree,

where spoken

Cicero becomes
Brutus'

an main

adulator

of

Caesar toward the end,

and where

where

he is
not

of

as

confidant,
was

the

reason

given

for

including
1065-65,

him in the conspiracy

1 1 92).

his

generally-conceded

timorousness

(pp.

altered Plutarch in such a way better. The play leaves little doubt Cicero as to make Brutus look to believe that Cicero opposed Caesar's increasing authority, but he seems

Shakespeare

seems

to have

worse and

little

can

be done is

about

of action

attributed

to him. All

it. At any rate, no remark proposing we do learn is that Cicero,

some course

having

asked

248
Casca

Interpretation
about

Caesar's
not go

plan

for the

next

day,

and

learning he

will

go

to the
neither

Capitol, does

there himself.

On the contrary, he is
nor

present

among those him at the Capitol that fatal day. We do not know why. Perhaps he had learned of the senate's intention to give Caesar a crown, perhaps of the con
who attend

Caesar

at

his house

among those who are with

spiracy.

In any case, he is

not mentioned again until

the shocking news of

his death, along with that of many reaches Brutus and Cassius in the field (iv. iii. 171).
There
can

other senators proscribed

by

the triumvirate,

be little doubt that the conspiracy would have fared better with Cicero in it, and would have made fewer mistakes afterward. But apart from the confidence expressed by Cassius, there is no evidence Cicero would have
joined if asked, and some evidence he would not have. He seems to Caesar as an inevitable evil whose play-acting before the people is a
object of
cised

regard proper exer

derision, but
the

whose

power,
or

vast and unchallengeable,

has been

with

kind

of tolerance

highmindedness that

allows

a critic not

like

Cicero to
politically,
writing.

retain we

a prominent place

in the

senate.

When Cicero is

busy

philosophical may presume, he is occupied with philosophy and He may well have been permitted to die a natural death under Caesar;

he is

almost

immediately

destroyed

by

Caesar's

successors

after

the

assassi

nation.

clusion and

While Shakespeare treats Cicero sparingly, he presses us toward the con that the ultimate conflict of philosophies in the play in between Cicero

Caesar,

or

in

view of

Cicero's

own admission
on

between Plato
would

and

Aris

totle, on the one hand, and Caesar, rivals to pit against each other than

the other.

Who in fact

be better

the greatest philosophers of antiquity and

the greatest political man of antiquity, the

former resting human happiness ambition? Does the latter on play supply evidence allowing mainly on virtue, the a decision to be made between the two? The question is not whether anyone
could

have beaten Caesar

own

whether

even

younger

Cicero

endowed

with

Caesar's

talents could

have beaten Caesar in those

circumstances.

Using

victory as a but the true

For Caesar

criterion view

is already making the crucial concession to Caesar's view, may not be physically, militarily or politically the strongest.
with

also

had

him the times

the forces that over a

and

long

period

had

enfeebled the republican spirit and

institutions in Rome is that deeds

the evidence from

out of this

the play is that no human power could

have brought health

great
of

decay.

The

essence of

Caesar's

position

of

conquest, usurpation,

domination
constitute the

over extensive

areas, all kinds

men,

and vast periods of time

height

of

human

achievement and the chief good.

prides

With

other men

weak,
speech

fearful,

changeable, Caesar

himself

most on more

his

constancy:

his

linking

himself

and

the northern star seems

than a panegyric

for

the

occasion. will

lute

But his constancy shows itself in a fixed ultimate aim and a reso rather than in the means he employs or the appearances he presents
which

judged

by

he

would

be

one of the most changeable and

least

constant of

Shakespeare'

Caesar's Plan

249

men.

This is because

ambition makes

whom

he

seems most

him peculiarly dependent on those from independent. His influence is influence over them and
Nor
can

hence determined
all

by

their nature.

he

escape the

inevitable fate

of

human things, which at some point must dissolve and leave no trace of individuals or their influence. The metaphysical tendency of ambition is to
enthrown contention or war as

the

ruling
at

principle of the

universe, thus

com

pelling

even

the

visible

universe, in

which

the northern star

a

(and, among

men,

Caesar) holds its

constant

place, to be

best

temporary

and perhaps

harmony
in the

rather

than

an assured cosmos.

For allowing
than war the

a permanent

illusory harmony
of man

universe would make peace rather

dominating by

principle,

and would give added support and strength and

to those social

harmonies

those internal harmonies

of

the soul that are guided

a peaceful rather

than a contentious power.

Caesar's in the

position underrates

the internal nature of philosophy, understood as

the search for the eternal causes of things (even while presuming its disbelief
ancestral names.

gods),

and underrates
which

too the glory attaching to

seem

philosophy's

greatest

Philosophy,

may first
reality,

merely to consist in the

corre what

contention of spond

opposing sects,

entails

the rational search for truths that

to the subtle

complications of

by

necessity yielding to
manner of

it

tries to know rather than subduing it. the Epicureans and the
confidence

Certainly, by his
goes a

criticizing

Stoics, Shakespeare
reason,

in

philosophical

including
own

way toward engendering its capacity to face the kind

poet,
more

long

of challenge posed

by

Caesar. In his

life

as a philosophical

over, he already indicates his conclusion that philosphy and its influence are superior to ambition and its influence. Nor need we believe that Shakespeare
and

his Cicero

are

less

constant than

Caesar. In
mind

way they

are more

so,

since

the knowledge

they

pursue

links the

to the eternal,
and

lifting

it

above

the

flux of things, uniting it in the universe the last

and

with other

minds,

proving (as Plato showed) that

and order rather than to war

word

belongs to

peace

disorder.
also permits of

Caesar

his

ambition

to dehumanize him
and others

a point

illustrated

not

only by the kind

some of

the

contrasts

between him
shown

in the play, but

to

by

interest in

men

generally

by

Shakespeare the

poet-philosopher
personal and

as compared to

Caesar. In the play,

much attention

is

given

political relationships

involving love, trust, loyalty

and affection

for example,

of

Brutus to Portia
own

and

to their

friends

and

Lucius, Cassius to Brutus, both Brutus and Cassius to the republic. Despite the selfish elements and other
of

complications

inherent in many
self-interest

these, they
the

also contain elements of which alone

no

that

cannot

be

reduced

to

and

on

preservation

the fullness of
no

human strictly
neither

nature

depends. But
and

a man

like Caesar lives

secrets

he has
one.

friends, Brutus,
attrac-

speaking,

shares

his deepest
can

with

In the play,
and

Antony

nor

Calpurnia

be

considered would

Caesar's friends,

angel,"

"Caesar's

according to Antony,

hardly

have any intrinsic

250
tion

Interpretation
exceeds
even

for him. Caesar's isolation in

some ways no

that

of not

the poet-philosopher

himself beings he does

less

secretive
enjoys

for he is

tied to other human

by

bonds

of affection.

He

seeing through and outdoing them:

so

not

find their

good good

for him.
affections,

As he is
that

lacking

in these

social

is Caesar

lacking in justice
the

is,

in fairness

and concern

for the

common good.

Thus, in

interest

of his ambition, he can begin by subverting the republic and end by contem plating coolly the necessity of a prolonged period of civil war leading to the ultimate victory of Caesarism. Hence also the impossibility of applying to

Caesar the

words

Antony

perhaps

uncandidly

applies

to Brutus at the end,

proclaiming him the only

He only, in
a general

conspirator motivated

by

justice:

honest thought
all, made one of them.

And So

common good to
was

His life

gentle,

and the elements

might stand

mix'd

in him that Nature

all the world,

up

And say to

"This

man!"

was a

For
talk

we must remember with

Antony's

mood

directly

after

the assassination and his

Brutus:
me, thou

O,

pardon

bleeding

piece of

earth,

That I Thou That

am meek and gentle with these

butchers!

art the ruins of the noblest man ever

lived in the tide

of times.

Woe to the hand that

shed this

costly blood!

This is
not

Antony calling Caesar

"the

man,"

noblest

not

Shakespeare,

who not

did

separate

political

nobility from justice and human affection, and did distinction and glory higher than philosophy. Caesar had
abilities

think

great and

perhaps

unmatched

command and

distortion
play
with

of

a penetrating intelligence, a remarkable selfbut flexibility they served ambition only, with a consequent his nature. This is why Caesar is most closely associated in the

Antony

and

Octavius
all

rather

than Cicero and

regime

Brutus,

and

why,

ultimately, he

could

sacrifice

for

that would exalt the divine

authority
own

of

the Caesars and permit, along

not

with an occasional

imitation

of

his

highmindedness,
the

only

calculated

infractions
rule

but

some of

most corrupt and

barbarous

morality like his the world has ever seen.

of

own

Economics

or

Political Philosophy:

Which Should Prevail in Public Policy?

J. Harvey Lomax
Memphis State

University

Besides the

excellences or

defects that

belong
upon

to the law and judicature of a country

practical ends, much also

as a system of arrangements
even

for attaining direct

view,
place on the

depends,

in

an economical point of a

the moral influences of the law.

Enough has been

trial

said

in

former

degree in

which

both the indus

on their

and all other combined operations of mankind

depend for efficiency

being
to

able to

which we

rely on one another for probity and fidelity to engagements; from see how greatly even the economical prosperity of a country is liable

be

affected

by

anything in its institutions

by

which either

integrity

and trust

worthiness, or the contrary qualities, are

encouraged.

The law

everywhere

ostensibly

honesty and the faith of contracts; but if it affords facilities for evading those obligations, by trick and chicanery, or by the unscrupulous use of riches in instituting unjust or resisting just litigation; if there are ways and means by which persons may attain the ends of roguery, under the apparent sanction of
favours
at

least pecuniary

the

law;

to that extent the law is

demoralizing,
protects

even

in

regard

to pecuniary integrity.

And
the

such cases

are, unfortunately, frequent

under

the English system.

or

If,

again,
their

law, by
the

a misplaced
or

indulgence,
dismisses
the
social

idleness

prodigality

against

natural on

consequences,

crime with

inadequate penalties, the effect, both

unfavourable.

prudential and on

virtues,

is

When the

law, by
and

its

own

dispensations

and

injunctions,

establishes

injustice between individual

individual, as all laws do which recognise any form of slavery; as the laws of all countries do, though not all in the same degree, in respect to the family relations; and as the laws of many countries do, though in still more unequal degrees, as
between
more rich and

poor; the

effect on subjects

the

moral sentiments of

the

people

is

still and

disastrous. But these

introduce

considerations so much

larger

deeper than those

pass

of political economy, that

wholly

unnoticed

things

superior

I only advert to them in order not to in importance to those in which I treat.

v. viii.

John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy,

It is

evident

that the

polis

is

not an association of place and of not

acting

unjustly to one

another and

for

the sake of

trade; but these things

are there neces

were

sarily if indeed
there, surely, holds
and clans

there will

be

a polis,

but

not even

if

all of

these things

would

there then

be

a polis;

but

a polis

is

an association of

house

for

living

well and

for the

sake of a complete and self-sufficient

Paper

presented at

the

Spring 1979

convention of

the Southwestern Political Science Associa

would

tion. Although the reader should

keep

in

mind

that this

be

a much

different

article

if

written

today (both
survive.

the United

States

and

the

author

have

aged

in the interim), the

graduate assistant

central

questions

Thanks

are

due to Ruth Whipple for her kind

help

as

my

in

1978-

1979.

252
life.
ought

Interpretation
.

And this be
set

sort of

thing is

the

work of

friendship.

Therefore it

to

down that the

political association

is for the

sake of noble actions.

Aristotle, Politics
Our
political

i28ob29-i28ia4.

question

is

whether

the science of economics

and

ought which

to prevail over
we shall

support

philosophy in public policy, is an unqualified "no,

not mean

the answer

try

to

never."1

By

the science of economics we em

phatically do
obvious

the study of the allocation of scarce resources. It

is

that human beings have

and

noneconomic resources as well as economic

resources,

ordinary

men

can

know that the

economic realm

is concerned,

distinguish between the two because they at least primarily, with the accu
money.

mulation of material

possessions,

including

The

science of

economics,

then, is the

science of the accumulation of material

possessions.2

Apart from

i. Those wishing to Political Science and

pursue

this

question

should read

Economics"

in Political

Philosophy

and the

Joseph Cropsey, "On the Relation of Issues of Politics (Chicago: The

Liberalism,"

Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 32-43; Cropsey, "Capitalist ibid., pp. 5375; Cropsey, "The Invisible Hand: Moral and Political ibid., pp. 207-217; Cropsey, Polity and Economy: An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith (The Hague:

University

of

Considerations,"

Martinus Nijhoff, 1957); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II, An Essay the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government; Locke, Several Papers

Concerning Relating to

Money, Interest, and Trade; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments; John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy; Aristotle, Politics; Xenophon, Oeconomicus; Leo Strauss, Xenophon's Socratic Dis course: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy: Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948); John Maynard Keynes, The Means to Prosperity (London: Macmillan, 1933); Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (London: Hogarth Press, 1927); Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Monex (London: Macmillan, 1936); Keynes, A Treatise on Money (London: Macmillan, 1930); Friedrich A. Hayek,
The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: The
to

University

Reaction (Chicago:

Quadrangle,

1963);
and

of Chicago Press, 1944); Herman Finer, Road Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement

of the Liberal Principles of Justice

Political

Economy

(Chicago: The

University

of

Chicago

Press, 1973); Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1948); Frank H. Knight, The Economic Organization (New York: Harper and Row, 1951); Knight, The Ethics of Competition (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942); Schumpeter, Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, ed. by Richard V. Clemence (Cambridge, Mass.: AddisonWesley, 195 1); Harry Kalven, Jr., and Walter Blum, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953); and Herbert J. Storing, "American Statesmanship: Old and in Statesmanship and Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), especially pp. 41-44. Of lesser interest are P. T. Bauer, Dissent on Development (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Gunner Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven: Yale University Press, i960); Andrew Schonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Theodore J. Lowi, "Towards a Politics of Economics: The State of Permanent in Liberalism
New,'

Receivership,"

Modern Polity: Essays in Contemporary Political Theory, ed. by Michael J. Gargas McGrath (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1978). One could of course add Marx's Capital. A critique of so-called cost-benefit analysis by George H. Peters is of some interest: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Public Expenditure (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966; see 3rd ed., 1973). 2. Some devotees of Aristotle might find fault with our definition. to
and

the

the concern of economics is "more about

According

human beings than

about the possession of soulless

Aristotle, beings;

Economics

or

Political Philosophy?
own

-253

knowledge for its

sake, the obvious goal

of economics

is to

assist men

to accumulate material possessions, and the obvious

correspond

human

passions which
and

to this goal are

(i)

the desire for self-preservation

(2)

an

extension of practical

that
of

desire,

greed.

If the

economist

is

successful at

his

obvious
on

goal

increasing
are

material

wealth,

as

economist

his judgment

how to
on

allocate the material wealth allocations

he

generates

is limited to

pronouncements

which

likely

to yield greater or lesser material wealth in

the

future. Of
and

course the economist

may

also

have

opinions about

distributive

justice,

these very opinions may ultimately animate his work as an econ but the wisdom or foolishness of his opinions about justice depends omist,

entirely

upon

his mastery
philosophy

of political philosophy. we mean

By

political

the philosophic study of men in

striving to order their common

and

lives.3

community Apart from knowledge for its own sake, is to

assist men to

the obvious goal of political philosophy

live

well

the human
and

passions which correspond

to this goal are

(1)

the

together, desire for

justice

(2)

the obverse of that

desire,

spiritedness.

It

appears

that in its aspirations

political

philosophy is both

nobler and more

guar-

comprehensive

than the science of economics, but high aspirations are no

and more about

and more about means

the virtue of those than about the virtue the free than the
art of
slaves.'

of

possession, which we call wealth;

21
.

Politics

i.xiii.

I259bi8

The Greek

word

otxovou,ixr|

rule

is

making laws (vou,oi) for the home (olxog), and thus includes the master's over his servants or slaves, his wife, and his children; ostensibly, at least, moneymaking part of the art of making laws for the home only to the extent that. moneymaking is necessary

literally

the

to the rule of slaves, wife,

accumulation

and children.

Nevertheless, in Politics
else.

l more pages are

devoted to the

of

property than to anything

It

seems

that the

toward simple preservation of

life,

whereas

the political order

politics
with

life; just as the family is primarily erotic, whereas Aristotle, then, economics is emphatically concerned
over politics. certain
mere

is primarily directed is primarily directed toward good is primarily thumotic. Following

family

material

possessions, and cannot rule

When

economics

in the

modem sense attempts on

to dictate public policy, it is almost

exaggerate

to

confuse politics with

the home. Economists

and economists on

the right

the

importance

of

preservation

in politics,

the left

exaggerate

the importance of eros in

politics, nobly but

now or

imprudently

assuming that

governors and governed alike can and

should,

either

eventually, treat their fellow

citizens as

kin.

Only
man

rightist

economists are

true economists,

and

thus

they

will

bear the brunt

the

of our critique.

See
if

n. 34.

Notwithstanding
man's natural

foregoing
above all

observations,

is truly

political

animal

by

nature,

home is

the political order.

By

this reasoning, economics, or the art

political art would

of making laws for the home (that is, the political order), and the just as philosophizing about economics and political philosophy

be identical,
man's

are

indistinguishable if

true home is iht

3. and

polis.

Cf.

n.

3.
political science as

Professor

Cropsey

has defined

the science of "the relation of governors

principle

citizens,

expressed

in law,
not

and comprehending, of

in

if

not

men."

of all the p.

See "On the Relation

we

Political Science

Economics,"

and

in practice, all the deeds in Political Philosophy,

to

35.

Although

do

depart from his definition in the main, for it

"law"

be

comprehensive

requires that one stretch and that one take

the meaning of the English

word

to include extralegal conventions

alike."

"citizens"

to mean "all of the governed, both citizens and noncitizens

Professor

Cropsey
to

also offers an unexceptionable

definition

of classical political philosophy:

political

"For
as

twenty
its

centuries

there was

but

one

social

science, namely,

philosophy, and

it had

purpose

understand

the nature of those who are to rule and of those who are to be ruled,

and the nature or constitution of political

society in the light

of

that

p. 37.

254
antee of

Interpretation
practical

achievements.

The

reflection

that political

philosophy is

capable of and

yielding
gain,

no achievable goals sometimes

for

politics

higher than In

self-preservation

material

leads to the in

conclusion policy.

that economics ought

social

to prevail over political philosophy

"costs-benefits"

public of

science the

school
more

is

a recent

offspring

that

reflection.4

The

immensely
eco

interesting

great-grandstepfather of

the

"costs-benefits"

scholars, how

ever, is John

Locke,

the

original subordinator of political

philosophy to
of on

nomics, and it is

to Locke's writings that we must

eventually turn.
know

We

shall

first

present the strongest arguments we

behalf

of

the

priority
are

of economics.

Then

we shall attempt

to indicate why those arguments

must prevail.

unpersuasive, why to the contrary politics

I.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PRIORITY OF ECONOMICS:

PRACTICAL

[F]ew disciplines
the economists.
4.
5
.

make more claims of

their ability to

evaluate

policy than

By

"cost-benefits"

the

school,

we

mean

those

social

scientists

who

argue

that public

officials

ought

to prepare ledgers of quantified debits and credits on which to

critical requirement cited at

base their policy

decisions. Quantification is the

and
and

here,

and
n.

it

puts a premium on economic costs

benefits. See the Peters book benefits love

of public policies

the end of

1.

Granting fully
to

that economic costs

wonder

deserve the
to

serious consideration of public

officials, one can

whether anyone such as

truly

wishes

live

under rulers so obtuse as

ignore

all nonquantifiable goods

and

beauty

and self-respect and school

nobility
that

and even
never

happiness itself. If

some members
nonquan

of

the

"costs-benefits"

would complain

they

dreamed

of

eliminating

tifiable costs and benefits from public policy

deliberations, they thereby

is
good and what

relinquish

their claim to

novelty and renounce their membership in have known for thousands of years to ask
actions. ant

discernible school, for

of

men of multifarious persuasions

what

is bad

about alternative political

and of

We

are reminded of

Aesop's Fable

"The Mountain in

Labor"

the story of the

Interpretation"

which, while

floating

down

a river, shouts
on

"raise the

drawbridges!"

Frank H. Knight's

attack

Herbert Spencer in "Ethics

28-29, is relevant here:

and

the

Economic

in The Ethics of Competition, It is

pp.

interesting

to ndte that

"quantity

life"

of

cannot

be

given an objective

a measurable

quantity, to say nothing of its ethical character. Life is a that in

highly

meaning as heterogeneous

complex whose elements resist reduction

compare

to any common denominator in physical terms. How

a

the quantity of life represented

of

by

hog

with of

human being?

They

are

dif

ferent kinds
more

things. To common sense, a

handful

fleas

"life"

would contain more

than a
represents

town meeting or the Royal

"value."

Society, but Mr. Spencer

would

hardly
bear

contend

that it

There is

no mechanical measure of values which will

examination.

We

note

crude sense.

in passing that Professor Knight himself relies on common position, notwithstanding Knight's perverse and misguided Is
not the central error of the and
"costs-benefits"

sense to undermine

Spencer's
common

characterization

of

school

the attempt to make a science of

public

policymaking

thereby

to leave common sense behind? Perhaps we should at least

be

reminded of

the emperor's

new clothes.

5.

Donald W. Jackson
and a

Theory
115. and of

For

and Ralph B. Maughan, An Introduction to Political Analysis: The Practice of Allocation (Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978), p. fittingly brief discussion of the "discount rate of costs-benefits analysis
formula"

its

"nonobjective"

status, see also

pp.

115-117.

Economics
Economists
to grief

or

Political Philosophy?
argue

255
often

of

the right

because the

science of economics and

vigorously that public policies is not given a free hand

administrators

bring

us

over economic

matters. under

Instead, both legislators

politics

formulate

public

policy
or of

the dominion

of special-interest groups or of political

"ideologies"

both. When

thus

intervenes,
and

the economy is
governmental

sure

to suffer. The

litany

of complaints of

is

long

one,

includes

borrowing

and expansion

the money-supply to provide the

controls
on prices
of gas

funds for the

and

government's stimulation of

demand,
and

oil,

general wage-price

controls,

ra

tioning, price-supports, legal

even on

restrictions on
of

imports

(including protective tariffs)

of nonmonopolistic of

exports,

subsidies

exports,

prohibitions

corporate

mergers,

minimum-wage

laws, devaluations

purpose of

establishing trade-surplusses, unemployment payments, and governmental action as "employer of the last of these political interventions into what should be strictly
goes

currency for the benefits and

the
resort."

"welfare"

The

result

economic matters,

the argument, is severe dislocation of the market both

domestically

and

internationally.

Only

let

economics prevail over politics

in

economic

matters,

however,
The
that

and our common of

lives

will prosper. powerful

economists are

the right make a

case, and it is no wonder

ascending within their discipline. Meanwhile, the Keynesian Keynes saw as "is orthodoxy showing clear signs of sclerosis, even the central economic defect in the free market its tendency to go into slumps

they

senility."6

because

of

deficiencies in

aggregate

demand. The

core of

Keynesian economics,
action, principally

therefore, is
in the

stimulation of aggregate

demand

by

government

governmental spending.

For the

most

part, Keynesian economics has prevailed

on the

policies of

the United
as

States,
of

federal level

last few decades. But

economics
tionary"

rightist

economists

any rate, for the gleefully point out, Keynesian

at "stagfla-

is simply incapable
which

morass over

explaining or of dealing with the the application of Keynesian doctrines has produced

the

or

rather

last decade. Government spending to stimulate demand is useless, harmful, unless supply is simultaneously stimulated. But in fact,
spending

the

result of tremendous government

(along

with multifarious mazes

of new regulations and restrictions upon

than to

stimulate supply.

Every

student a

commerce) has been to inhibit rather of Adam Smith knows that increased
prices.

demand

plus restricted

supply is
to

formula for higher Adam Smith's

The

school of

economics which

is

beginning

supplant

the Keynesians is the

"supply-side"

school,

so named

because it

revives

emphasis on not
,

demand

but

productivity. actual

into

"It is only an increase in productivity which converts latent demand by bringing commodities (old and new) to market at prices
growth."7

people can

afford, that generates

'New'

economic

Economics?,"

6.
22,

Irving Kristol,
Ibid. For
of the

"Toward

The Wall Street Journal,

May
the

9, 1977,

p.

c. 3.

7.

evidence

that in politics Keynesianism

of

is

on

the wane,

see

Report
restrain

Joint Economic Committee

Congress. "The way out, the

to
encourage

committee

1979 Annual says, is to

and

demand

by

paring

government expenditures and

supply

by

reducing tax

256
The

Interpretation

following
before

arguments are

impassioned for the

and

partisan, but

they deserve

hearing
High

we speak

for

ourselves. purpose of

governmental

spending
not always

demand, is usually if
be financed in

accompanied

by

stimulating aggregate deficit. The deficit can

the money supply.
who

one of two

ways,

borrowing

or expansion of

Borrowing
is
critical

takes money out of the hands of private investors

would otherwise

and

this

be

likely
his

to

invest in

private enterprise or private

lending
since

institutions. Keynes

wrote

major

treatises at a time when private

savings often

did

he

wrote

investment, but times have changed his The General Theory. Today, governmental borrowing simply
not

translate into capital

diverts money away from its most efficient economic uses. As a result it becomes more difficult to finance the expansion of existing businesses and
to
establish new ones.

Deficit-generated

expansion of the relative

money supply has weakening of the incentives for

even more pernicious effects:

ineluctable inflation,
tax
worker

currency internationally, capital investments and for

unemployment.

unlegislated

increases,

reduced

productivity,

and

eventual

increases in
when

In the

long

run, the

pattern

just described is inescapable

ever the expansion of

the money supply exceeds the increase in production;

but in the
their

short

run, decisions

by

large

numbers

of

individuals to increase

checking accounts may restrain inflation in spite of excessive increases in the money supply. Germany, for example, has persistently followed this latter pattern. But Germany is, of course, a very unusual country in that
Comparative
studies

respect. an

by

the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis show

prices

extremely high

correlation

between

to

be

expected

because

of

the

money supply United Kingdom, and, depend As

no on the

and actual consumer prices of

in

course, the United

Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the States.8 Even Walter W. Heller,

grants

the great enemy of the "supply-side

school,"

that "prices are bound to

quantity

of

money in the

long

run."9

measured

by

results,
than

governmental controls

on gas

and oil prices

are

less

preposterous

deficit-financed

stimulus of aggregate
a

demand. The deposits

of

United States, for example, is to this

natural

day

country
and

with sizable

gas

and

oil, to say nothing

of

coal;

yet

at

time when these

fuels

are more and more thought to

have tremendous

economic and strategic

value, governmental

price controls continue

to restrict the exploitation of these

regulatory burdens, while ideas that investment is

will

following

a moderate

inflationary,
report

that saving

monetary policy. Gone altogether are the Keynesian is a drag on the economy, and that spending level
of tax rates.
.

lead to

economic growth regardless of the

According

to committee

chairman

emerging consensus in the committee and in the country that the federal government needs to put its financial house in order and that the major challenges today and for the foreseeable future are on the Paul supply side of the The Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1979, p. 20, c. 3. Craig Roberts, "Political 8. See Allan H. Meltzer, "Money, Growth and The Wall Street
an
economy.'"

Bentson, 'this

illustrates

Economy,"

Inflation,"

Journal, May

17,

1978,
9.
p.

p.

22,

c. 4.
of
Inflation,"

Walter W. Heller, "The Realities

c. 4.

The Wall Street Journal,

January

19, 1979,

10,

Economics

or

Political Philosophy?
an

257
multitiered system of price not

deposits. Thanks to
controls over

outrageously complicated,
of

natural

gas, American producers

are

natural gas resources

make

in the Gulf

Mexico,

resources which

building pipelines to by comparison

fact,
natural

the Alaskan reserves seem like a

drop

in the bucket. In

gas

exploration

has decreased

since

the complication of the controls.

Pre

dictably,
have
at not

governmental promises of complete

deregulation

by

the mid 1980s

been stimulating, for producers have not been eager to sell merchandise bargain prices today when sellers may be richly rewarded years hence.
the

Among
from been
a

bizarre

results of controls on natural gas prices

at exorbitant costs a

have been

purchases

hostile country like Algeria

disposed toward us,
clear

by comparison to domestic
have
to purchase Mexican gas

prices; and the antagonism of

well

Mexico,

country

which otherwise might

when arrangements

at prices
ment of

exceeding the Energy. It is

controlled

domestic

price were abrogated

run

by

the Depart

that in the
will

long

both

economic and foreignas a result.

policy
under

costs

to the United States

"entitlements"

be unduly high foreign

Likewise,

the so-called

program of governmental regulation of oil producers paid a premium

prices, domestic

producers are penalized and not obvious

for their
political

oil.

Is it

that if the free market were

left

unimpeded

by

intervention,
now

the energy situation of the

United States have had

would

be far

better than it

is? Similarly,

wage-price controls economists of

all of

the detri
much

mental consequences predicted

by

the right. It is of course

easier to control wages than to control prices, and to the considerable extent

that

wages

remain

frozen

while

prices must

continue

to escalate,

the economic

standard of

living

of wage-earners also

decline. Certain it

is, though,
us

that
were

price-controls will

have their
prices

effects.

The shoemakers, let

say,

about
on

to increase their

in

order

to sustain an acceptable rate of return

their

investments, before
to
of

the price controls were imposed. For a while

will perhaps continue

make

shoes,

even as profits and

dwindle

and

they disappear,

in the hope

raising
sell

prices

again of

soon

thereby recouping
premium.

their losses.

Before too long, however,

and the
rate will
rest will

most

them will simply cease to make shoes,

an

them only

for

illegal

The black-market
rate without

be far higher than

would

have been the free-market

everyone else sometimes
sometimes

controls.

As

usual

the

rich can

manage, but

is

pinched.

Even
"new"

if

most of

the shoemakers rernain

in business,

introducing

sustaining losses in everyone is familiar of elimination controls, the anticipation of forthcoming controls. Wage and removal of the follows with the explosion of prices which

lines

of shoes and

raising their prices in effect,

price controls thus exacerbate are

those fluctuations of the free

market which

they

intended to

minimize or eliminate.

Rationing, it is
according to
to pay the

argued,

is

foolish

effort

to distribute economic products

need or merit rather

than according to willingness and

of

current market price.

Economists

the right

often contend

capacity that it

is impossible to
declaim

establish workable standards of either need or against

merit, and
almost

they

loudly

the dangers

of

tyranny

which

inhere in

every

258 instance
are

Interpretation
of governmental control of economic
distribution.10

For the

moment we

economic

interested only in the strictly economic argument, that rationing dislocations. The aftermath of the so-called Arab oil embargo illustration. Although the Arabs
sold more oil after

causes

serves

as a useful

the embargo

than

they had been selling before,

intervened to
regulate although

the nervous Nellies of the Federal

within

Energy
United

Agency

the distribution of oil supplies

of oil was available

the

States. Consequently,
shortages of oil were
without

plenty experienced in some

altogether, severe

areas of

the United States. It goes

saying that

leaving

the market unimpeded would

have

resulted

in

more rational allocation of oil supplies. or

The tendency

of

rationing is to be

produce

to exaggerate shortages

and

to raise prices.
another example

Many
ports

economists of the right consider price supports to

of unwarranted political

do

serve

meddling in economic matters. Although price sup to insulate farmers and dairymen from the vicissitudes of over-

productive

years,

they

also

bar

consumers

from

access

to the advantages of

overproductive years.
capital

Lower food

prices

can

leave

more

funds

available

for

investment,

provided that

low food

prices result

from the

operation of

the market rather than from governmental

fiat.

Wealthy farmers

excepted, the

materially rich hardly notice higher food and dairy costs, but everyone else feels the pain whether he knows his political malefactor or not. Today at least,
the
pain

is

altogether

unnecessary, because through two

contracting"

new arrangements of

the market, "forward

considerable

and
without

the

futures market, farmers

subsidies."

can

gain

security any Protective tariffs fatuously restrict

which are

governmental
our access

to the cheaper

foreign

versions

of products

goods produced are

less efficiently here at home. Paying more for inefficiently, we have less to invest in our industries which
made

far

more

efficient

than the

protected

industries. But if

other

countries

subsidize

their exports,

bully
us

their goods,

they

allow

to

for them; for increase our

who

by lowering
own

the costs to us of
as

efficiency left in

their efficiency. If every

and

American

buys

a small car chooses a are a position

they decrease Toyota,

to invest

American Motors
efficient

goes

bankrupt, Americans
minicomputer

in

highly

American

industries. If

the Japanese govern

Toyotas for export, for Americans the result is the same as, better than, receiving foreign-aid payments from the Japanese govern ment. Protective tariffs only prevent domestic consumers from receiving the subsidies of foreign governments. All legal restrictions on imports, such as
ment subsidizes or rather

antidumping laws and for the same reasons. Consequences

are no

"trigger-price"

regulations, have the

of governmental

same

bad

results

supervision of exports
prohibition of the

less

ridiculous.
oil

case

in

point

is the Congressional
was not made

export of

Alaskan

to Japan. That

decision

for

environmental

io. ii.

This

Market,"

notion seems to be at the core of Friedrich Hayek's thought (see note i). Julie Salamon, "Brokers Hit the Road to Induce Farmers to Sell Crops Using the Futures The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1979, p. 40. c. 1.

Economics

or

Political Philosophy?
to Japan

259
a

reasons, because

with exports

banned,
and

tanker terminal and

tank-

field in

southern

California
Beach

are

needed,

once

built those

will

increase
national

air pollution at

Long

markedly.

The decision

was not made

for

security reasons, because the

sea route

from Alaska to

southern

California is if
we

highly
sold

vulnerable,
oil

whereas

the Mexican oil

which we would purchase

Alaskan

to Japan could be safely transported from the Yucatan to

the United States. The only argument remaining is an economic argument: the

American economy needs oil, and therefore Americans shall not be permitted to sell American oil abroad. But that is irredeemable drivel it
"argument"

would

be

much cheaper

to export Alaskan

oil

to Japan with one hand while

restric

purchasing it from Mexico with the other. The silliness of the current tions on Alaskan oil exports is characteristic of the whole genre. Governmental
class

prohibitions of nonmonopolistic corporate mergers are another

of

political

follies. If

capitalism

merits

two cheers,

the Clayton Act

probably deserves one of them for prohibiting mergers which reduce competi tion between businesses; but mergers between conglomerates often do not lessen
competition

in any line of commerce, and are consequently permissible under the Clayton Act. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the current chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, is currently rallying support for a huge extension
of

the Clayton Act to

prohibit

most

or perhaps

all

conglomerate

mergers.
absentee-

Senator

landlords,

Kennedy hopes through this to keep businesses more

the Clayton

legislation to limit
connected

the number of

to communities, and to
as a result of

restrict

excessive concentrations of political power.

anticompetitiveness,

would protect careless corporate

swallowed

departing from criterion for prohibitions, the Kennedy bill managers from therapeutic threats of being
But
would

by

giants.

Efficient

companies

be

prohibited

from taking
suffer,

charge

of their weaker

brethren. It is

clear

that the economy

would

but it is far from clear that there would be any benefits. Outside of the coteries of the Americans for Democratic Action, it is widely
known that
minimum-wage

laws

eliminate

jobs for

semiskilled and unskilled

laborers. There is
nesses.

chilling Predictably, young blacks pay the

effect upon

investment in

certain

types of busi
of

severest penalties

in terms

lost

jobs,

and

in the

long

run

the economy

will suffer

for lack

in business
It is

affairs as much as politics will suffer

of their early training from their disenchantment.

a rare season
national

indeed that

goes

by

without

there occurring the

devalua

tion of a the

currency

somewhere on

the

globe.

Governments devalue for

purpose

of raising the price of their imports and

exports

lowering

the price of their

exports.

If devaluation succeeds,

should explode and

imports

should

shrivel, yielding a

tidy

trade surplus

for the

devaluing

nation.

sizable

of empirical evidence

suggests,

however,

that devaluation

is

much more

body likely
ulti

to

bring

inflation than

a trade surplus.

Even if the

empirical evidence

is

mately inconclusive,
an
unstable currency.

certain

it is that businessmen generally

prefer a stable

to

260

Interpretation
"welfare"

payments reduce Laws providing for unemployment benefits and incentives to work and hence lower national productivity. As Professor Martin

Anderson has
who attempt

pointed

out, the highest tax

rates

in the land

are

borne

by

those

to get off welfare.

Similarly,

governmental action as

the "employer

of

the last

resort"

produces economic
workers

inefficiencies. In

most

cases, to put

it

cautiously,

in

such arrangements will not contribute and those who

anything to the

annual national

product;

do

produce material goods will

be less

prolific as employees of eyes of owners of under

the government than

or of

they

would

be

under

the

watchful

businesses

the appointed agents of the owners, and

the stimulus of the promise of salary

increases to depends

reward

increases in

productivity.

In sum, the
of economics
poison.

material

wealth

of

the

nation

upon

the

hegemony

over economic

matters.

In the

world of

commerce, politics is

So

runs

the argument

which we wish

to challenge.

II. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PRIORITY OF ECONOMICS: THEORETICAL

The

protection of

these

faculties [of acquiring property] is the first

object of io

government.

Publius, The Federalist, Number

one

much

deeper justification than the

over economic

just

offered

for the

hegemony
father
of

of

economics

matters, draws
regime.

upon

the political thought of the

founders

of the

American

What James

Madison,

the

the

Constitution,
of

in Federalist Number io, he suggested on the floor the Convention before the most distinguished political leaders his country
says above with

had. In bolder terms, Gouverneur Morris agreed were generally said to be of more value, than
matter,"

Madison: "Life
An

and

liberty

property.

accurate view of

the

exclaimed

Morris,
that

would nevertheless prove

property had

was

the

main object of

Society. The
so

savage

state was more

favorable to

liberty

than the

Civilized;

and

was only property which could only be secured by the restraints of regular Government. These ideas might appear to some new, but they were nevertheless just. renounced

It

was preferred

by

all men who

not acquired a taste

sufficiently for property; it

to life.

for the

sake of

John Rutledge
5, 1787,
and

Pierce Butler promptly endorsed there is no evidence, from the record,

and

Morris'

speech
of

of

July

dissent

on

that day.

On

July

object

13 James Wilson disagreed "that property was the soul or the primary of Governt. and Society. The cultivation and improvement of the human
the most noble
object."12

mind was
12.

But the striking thing

about

Wilson's

remarks

The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), Vol. 1, pp. 533, 534, 542, 605. For a very intelligent and knowledgeable

Economics
is how have to

or

Political Philosophy?

261
one else gives

anomalous

they

are at the
of

Convention. No

any

support

to this position on the

floor

the

Convention,

and

if

one's conclusions should

rest on the evidence of

the Debates alone,

understood

that the protection of

cipal purpose of recall

property rights was government. Of course

have to say generally to be the prin

one would

we are not so

restricted,

and so we

that the most widely revered political

was

in 1787
to

the Declaration of

document among American leaders Independence. The purpose of government is

and

secure

the rights to

life, liberty,

the pursuit to be

the "right to the pursuit of

was

happiness"

seems

happiness. As stated, lacking in content. Content

of

given, one can argue, prospectively

by

Madison

on

the floor of the Con

vention and

Treatise As
as

which

in Federalist 10, and retrospectively by John Locke in the Second the Declaration of Independence echoes.
understands the

we

have seen, Madison

right to the

pursuit of

happiness

being
on

On the
and

one

roughly or exactly synonymous with the right to accumulate property. hand that right will best be enhanced by democratic republicanism,
In Madison's
rule
view

the other hand democratic

prosperity.

urgently democratic government had

meant rule

republicanism

requires
always

material

been bad rich.

government, because
were

by

the majority
rule and

by

the poor, and the poor

over the

invariably by

incompetent to

disposed to tyrannize

It should not be surprising that the

condition

poor should

try

to improve their material

seizing the possessions of the rich for themselves, but it would be surprising if their efforts led to anything but social misery. In the known scheme of Federalist No. 10, Madison designs to suppress the class distinction which previously has afflicted all democracies. Taking his cues
well-

from Adam Smith, Madison large

that
natural
acquisitiveness

notices

that a large republic

tremendous

will

provide

for

market-area which will support a

division

of

labor. Provided

as the engine
national

for

increasing
provided

is unrestrained, the division of labor will serve tremendously and for a very long time the annual
that a natural system of
will no

product,

liberty is

maintained.

In

these

circumstances

workers

longer think
groups

of themselves
which

as poor men
over

but

rather

as

members

of various

interest

cross

the

line

between rich
of

and poor and which cross over one another.

shift

Because the

coalitions enough

interest

groups

frequently,

no

majority

can

coalesce

long

to

sustain a

tyranny

over a minority.

And

of course

the very

process of

forming

coalitions tends

to

keep

majorities moderate. qualities of

For the first time

rule

moderation and

even competence can

be

democratic
scheme

provided

that the econ

omy

continues

to

expand.

Madison's

has

contains a successful, but his formulation of it workers will begin to think for falters long, very prosperity members of the poor not as members of interest groups, but as

be tremendously warning: if ever material sharp

proven

to

of themselves class who can

and should discussion

of

take property away from the rich

through the
and

democratic franchise.
Government."'

Wilson,

see

Ralph A. Rossum, "James Wilson

pp.

the 'Pyramid of

The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. 6 (Fall, 1976),

113-142.

262

Interpretation
as we

So far

know,

there

is

no

evidence

that Madison ever supposed that

Smith's "invisible
perity
most
within

hand"

would cease

to provide for

increasing
regime set should

material pros

the next millennium,

barring

the follies of politicians. For the

part,

economics should reign over politics

in the

by

the United

States Constitution; if not, and if economic prosperity stitution itself should be expected to fall.
The Constitution dation
of and

wither, the Con

the Declaration of Independence rest upon the

foun

contract

John Locke's contract theory of government. Locke elaborates his theory in his famous Second Treatise, which is intended both to
great and

demonstrate that "the

wealths,
their
and
Property,"

chief

end

putting themselves

under

Mens uniting into Common Government, is the Preservation of

.

of

property comprehending here lives, liberties, and estates; and to indicate those governmental institutions which best secure that Pro
end.13

tection of property is the one,

arrangements are

true,
and

natural

standard

by

which

all

political

to be

judged,

falling

short of which need not

be rightly
estates

overthrown. over

As stated, this teaching

provided

any regime may indicate the primacy

chapter on

of economics

politics,

that governmental protection of men's

is for the

sake of

in Locke's Second Treatise,

and

insuring their not liberty

liberty. But in the

but "the

property
receive

life"

conveniencies of

heavy emphasis, materially wealthy Devonshire is extolled over America, where liberty is richly abundant. Locke is so far from setting limits on man's natural acquisitiveness for the sake of higher political liberties, that he asserts
property simply "to for "any advantage of Unlimited acquisition is justified not only shield to fend off infinite threats to a man's preservation, but also as a
with uncharacteristic given us
life."14

boldness that God has

enjoy,"

as a

deep

well

from

greatest

which every happiness

desiring

element

in

a man

is

welcome

to

drink. "The
pleasures."

consists,"

says

Locke in An

Essay Concerning Human

the greatest

Understanding, "in

having

those things
good or

which produce

And, "that
pain."15

which

is properly

There is
as all

no

hierarchy
and

of pleasures and no
all

bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or hierarchy of desires, except

upon

insofar

pleasures

desires depend
below!"16

the satisfaction of the

desire for

preservation. no

Once the
no

most primordial requirement of nature

has its
is

been met, "there is

above,

How does Locke know the

citizens?

chief purpose of government

is to

preserve

He knows

by having thoroughly investigated

interrupts
government.

the state of nature,

which

precedes and sometimes

The

original state of nature

13.

Extent,
14. 15.

and

Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning End of Civil Government, sees. 124, 123, 199-243. Ibid., sees. 25-51, especially 31, 37.
Quoted in Leo Strauss, Natural Right
and

the

True Original,

History

(Chicago: The

Press,
16.

University

of

Chicago

1953),

p. 249.

Nietzsche,

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in, "The Seven Seals," 7, in The Portable trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 343.

Economics

or

Political Philosophy?
almost

263
worthless until

plenteous, but that plenty is

man's gifts

totally

it is transformed

by

labor. Because be

of

the problem of spoilage, nature's nearly worthless

cannot

converted

into

abundant

riches

until

the widespread use of

money

allows men

to amass possessions in proportion to the extent and

of

ingen

uity
nor

of their

labor. Neither the development

property in freedom

the sense of estate

the replacement of barter

by

monetary

exchange requires civil

within

society, but

since

the state of nature is a state of perfect

the

bounds

of

the law of nature, material possessions are at the mercy of strong men who

do

not

know

or

rightly

their
are

Interests,
apt

as well as allow of

apply the law of nature. And ignorant for want of study it

as a

men of

"being biassed by
of

[the law

nature],

not

to

Law
put of

binding

to them in the application of

it to their
nature

particular

Cases."17

To

has
of

no

force in the
as

state

it mildly, for the most part the law of nature, for there is neither an accepted
nor a powerful executor of man

judge

that

law

it

applies

to particular cases

that law.

In these
and

circumstances
of nature

every
men

fears

the

depredations

of

his

neighbor,
state of

the state

tends to become indistinguishable from the

consent

war.18

Not for

long

will

to suffer such miserable con

their property,

ditions; instead, for

tract to

the sake of the

preservation of

they

con

form
as

civil

society
as

and therewith to

be

governed

by

the rules of the

end.

community

long

the community shall serve its original

Thus that
reigns

political order

is best

which

best

preserves men materially.

Economics

in the best We

regime.

now rest

the case for

economics and

turn to our own position.

III.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PRIORITY OF POLITICS:

THEORETICAL

The
the

pain which removes pain

is labor.

Locke identifies the

. . .

rational

life

with

life dominated
efforts

by
is

the pain which relieves pain.

The starting

point of

human from

is

misery:

The

state of nature

is

a state of wretchedness.

The way away Just like

toward happiness
nature:

a movement

The

negation of

away from the state of nature, a nature is the way toward happiness.
there

movement
. .

the primary pain

itself,

the

pain which relieves pain

"ceaseth only in

death."

Since

there are therefore

no pure pleasures,

is

no

necessary tension between

on

civil

society

as the

life,

on the other:

coercive society mighty Leviathan or Hedonism becomes utilitarianism

the one

hand,

and the good

or political

hedonism. The "in the

quest

painful relief of pain culminates not so much

in the

greatest pleasures as

having
for j0y.

those things

which produce

the greatest

Life is the joyless

and

Leo Strauss, Natural Right

History,

pp.

250-51

Locke's teaching
nor
unchallenged.

on the origin of civil government

speaks

is

neither self-evident

Nietzsche, for example,

sees.

contemptuously

of

contract-

17.
18.

Locke, Second Treatise, Ibid.,

sees.

4, 43, 37-5,

124-

19, 21,

125-127.

264

Interpretation
sentimental.

theories as

According
"some

to

Nietzsche,
established

the oldest political order was

a monstrous and oppressive

and nomad people

tyranny,
for

by

the
of

conquest of a

formless

by

pack of

blond beasts
nomads.19

prey,

a conqueror and

master race which organized

war and with

the ability to organize unhesi

tatingly lays its

posterous of rational

upon"

terrible claws

the

Nietzsche

considers

it

pre

to suppose that the

first

governments

devolved from

collective acts

deliberation.
he
who

He
and

who can command,

is

"master,"

by

nature

he

who

is

violent

in

act

bearing
they

what come

has he to do like fate,

work

with contracts!

One does

not reckon with such

natures;
as

without reason,

consideration, or pretext;

they

appear even

lightning

appears, too

to

be hated. Their

terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms.
unconscious artists

"different"

They

are the most

involuntary,

there are.

Nietzsche's

account of

the

origin of politics men

strikes

us as

much

more

likely

than Locke's. Even assuming that

so

in the

state of nature might man comes

become

deliberate

as

Locke

seems to

imagine,
can

when each

to fear the

aggression of

his neighbor, how

except

two men (let alone a whole community)

metaphorical sense

ever establish a contract

can

in the

in

which contracts

be

said to

be implicit in
are

relations of

brute force between

men

men?

Moreover,
will

what

grounds

there for assuming that

in the

state

of nature

develop
even

their faculties of reason sufficiently to devise communal contracts,

could
negotiate with

if they

their

fellows? If

few

succeeded

in

so

developing
would

their reasoning abilities, why should we suppose that the others

listen?20

Considering by

that

Locke himself drops hints here

that
men under

and there that

his

contract
were

theory is but
subjugated

a construction and

the

first

govern

ments

force
out of

of arms

to

tyrants,

we

are

encouraged

to

asseverate that sible.

contracting

the precivil state

of nature

is simply impos

Even if it
will

should

be true that the

original root of civil

of

society is the tyrannical

would

to dominion within the

breast

the ruler, that truth alone

ought to

tell

nothing about the standard by As Locke himself puts it, "at best
us
should of

which civil an

what has been, to what right be, has no great force."21 Aristotle rightly observes that although the city comes into being for the sake of mere life, it continues in being for

society Argument from

be

measured.

the sake of good

life,

that

is,

whether achieved or

frustrated,

good of

life is the
precivil

true

end of politics.

The

effort to understand politics

in terms

its

origins of

has been

compared to the effort to understand the

which

family
and

the sexual attraction

originally

propelled

male

solely in terms female in the

19.

trans, and
20.
21.

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, II, aph. 17, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 522. Cf. Plato, Republic 327CIO-12.

Locke, Second Treatise,

sec.

103.

Economics
direction
more of

or

Political Philosophy?

265
society,
mature

marriage.22

Marriages, like
is that

civil

into

higher

and

complicated set of goals than those manifest

which comes to mind of

in their job

origins.

Another

illustration
ders his
off

the

high-school

graduate who wan

upon

to college in the hope of

a year or

securing

a respectable

receiving his

degree. After
studies
as

two

at

the

University,

the student may come to see

aspirations

the

his fellow
so that

injustices he may right them. He wishes to learn about justice for the sake of imposing it upon the world, doubtless more successfully and grandly than ever
can about civil
man

man.

gateway to fulfilling his highest He wishes, perhaps, to learn all he

for

benefiting

has done before. And

yet

by

the time in

cap

and gown

he

reaches

for

his

parchment yet again

of

scroll, and the time for

joining

the battle has come, his ardor

still

may

thought

have been redirected, perhaps to something books unfathomed pains him; books unread,
advance

higher. How the

How
not can
yet

still more.

he hope to
wise?

the cause

of

justice
is

when

he knows that he is

In

addition our

young

scholar

not

insensible

to the pleasures of the

life

of

the mind. And so he continues to move in the direction of

Socrates,
must

that human

being

in terms

of whom all

universities

and

all

men, too,

ultimately be measured. A political order in which

prehensive respect advocated which

economics

by Locke,
for

has priority over politics in the com is unacceptable because a human life

is

consumed

by

concern

preservation

is

not

good

human life.
and

Even Adam Smith, the father both

of of

of the modern science of economics

capitalism,

recoiled at

the vision of "a tremendous industrial mob, deprived

nearly every

admirable

human

quality."23

As

therapeutic measure, Smith

publicly financed elementary schools and the liferation of religious sects; he thus acknowledged that
advocated

legally
good

encouraged pro

that

men

are

ugly,

without a

healthy

development

of

life is impossible, intellectual and moral

virtues.

Even granting that

shadows

commercial

men can evince

"frugality,

economy,

moderation, labor, prudence, tranquility,

are

order, and

rule,"24

these characteristics

but

of the

virtues

discussed

by

Aristotle in his Nicomachean impels them to be immoderate

Ethics. The hedonism

on

of commerce minded men

with

the side of
of

excess

respect

to

the side

deficiency
man

with respect

to
a

bodily bodily exercise.

likely

pleasures, and

immoderate

on

The

so-called

"moder

ation"

of the
moderation.

of commerce

is

dessicated

version of

the true virtue of

The

man

of commerce
good

is

to be just not out of a genuine

pay."

concern not

for the

common even

but because "crime does

"generously"

not

He

will

be truly liberal
accumulate

if he

gives
rather

to charity,
than

because he

prefers others.

to

possessions

for himself
and p. 72.

disperse them to

Economics,"

22. 23.

Cropsey, "Political Science

"'Capitalist'

p. 42.

Liberalism,"

24.

Cropsey, Montesquieu, The Spirit of

Way,"

the

Laws, v, 6. See Martin Diamond, "Ethics

and

Politics:

The American
versity Press
of

in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (Charlottesville: Uni

1977),
pp. 39-72-

Virginia,

266

Interpretation

The truly liberal man prefers exactly the opposite. The man of commerce is by definition concerned with a multitude of petty things; when business is

bad, he is
naught

upset.

The

magnanimous man contemns such pettiness and cares grandest

for

but the very

may
pass

things. If piety is a virtue, perhaps the man of

one

commerce can possess a camel

it, but

does have to
of a needle.

wonder with

what

difficulty
man of

through the eye

Least

of all

is the
The

commerce courageous and wise,

of

for he is far from

a noble type.

example

Socrates is
and

"reason

incomprehensible to Smithian man, who believes that him "against fear and philosophy will in vain attempt to
almost
defend"

anxiety, the

great

tormentors

of

the human breast.

"2S

Above all, Smithian

of

man

is horrified
and

by

the thought of

death.26

Under the influence

over

Hobbes, Locke, they

engage

Smith,

men allow the

pursuit of

fear

of

fear to take

their lives as

in the joyless
The
the

joy.27

most serious

defect in Smith

and

in Smithian

man

is

failure to

respect

dignity
a

and

the powers of philosophy. This defect sometimes leads Smith

into

vulgarity which is extraordinary for a man of his intelligence. For ex ample, in explaining the meaning of value, he distinguishes between "value in and "value in observing that these two genera of value
use" exchange,"

exhaust

the class.

Although

water can useful

be

used to purchase
of

almost

nothing,
thirst. A to pur

its

value

is

great

because it is
says

diamond,
Smith

which

Smith

for the quenching has "scarce any value in

goods.28

bodily

use,"

will suffice

chase a great says

quantity in these two

case

of other material

Now,

although much of what

own

examples

is

quite

evident, Smith's

illustration
of

in the latter
value.

exposes

the misleading character of

value

Smith's definition

For

diamond has
its

totally

apart

may command beautiful. Likewise, although Smith says that the

world"

all

the

goods which

owner

from its utility and on the market for it:

value of

leaving
a

aside

diamond is
wealth of

"all the

the
sessors which

is "precisely to purchase for Socrates

equal

to the quantity of labor which it can enable pos

certain

command,"29

it is that the
in

wealth of

intelligence

Socrates

possessed was

by

no means equal

value to the

labor
said

which

could purchase.

Even in

commonsense

quantity of terms, it has to be

that Smith perverts the meaning of value and of wealth.

of respect

Again,

out of

his

lack

for philosophy, Smith insists that

one's own passions provide

the only standard

by

which to

judge the

reaction of another to a
are

painting,

poem,

or a

joke. In fact,

random and

blobs
skill

his

painting primarily by the painter's understanding of nature in conveying (and in some cases disguising) that understanding.
on a canvas

great masterpieces of

distinguished from

25.

Adam Smith, The

Theory
Cf.

of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis:

Section 1, Chapter 1, 26. Ibid.

27. 28.

Liberty Fund,

1969), Part I,

p. 52.

p. 53.

Strauss, Natural Right,

pp. 250-51.
and

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature The Modern Library, 1937), 1, iv, p. 28.
29.

Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York:

Ibid., 1,

v, pp. 30-31.

Economics

or

Political Philosophy?
a rational

267
which

That is to say, there is

standard,

does

not

depend
same

upon the

idiosyncrasies
poems and

of

the viewer,

by

which to

judge

paintings.

The

is true

of of

of

jokes. It is Smith's
which

supposition

that

reason

is incapable

arriving

at such standards

inevitably

causes regimes

occasionally causes him, and which almost based on his principles, to sink into the gutter.

who articulates the fundamental misunderstanding which is here. of part the Universe is operating "[Ejvery Body; and that which is not is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which Body, is no part of it is Hobbes, Locke, and Smith refuse to admit any transcendent rational standards because they know that matter in motion ex hausts the world. We know that body is, because we experience it with our
nothing."

It is Hobbes

body, to be bodily means to take up space, length, width, and depth. The corporealist takes as confirmation of this understanding of being, the fact that it is impossible to imagine a world which is not a world of length, width, and depth. But corporealism is open to several objections. Length, width, and depth are re lations; do they not therefore require a relator to do the relating? Or as Kant
senses. of

it

seems.

As for the meaning That which is, has

put what

is

perhaps the same

question,
a part of

are not space and

time built into the

human

mind rather

than
with

being

the world as it is in itself? A second

objection of

has to do
us

the truth or untruth of corporealism. Corporealism is

corporealist claims to

interest to
But if

only if the

know the truth

about

the

world. space.

corporealism

is true, everything

which

is,

can

be located in
not

Where then is the

space which truth occupies?

Since truth is

itself

corporeal,
can

by

corporealist

doctrine there is

no truth.

A third

objection which
corporealism

be

raised against corporealism

is that in equalizing everything,

utter

is ignoble. In particular,

without an eternal return

the corporealist damns every

thing but
of

the atoms themselves to

obliteration.

Finally,
think. In
all

corporealism
consideration of

cannot give an adequate account of

how

a mere

body can
of

these objections to the most fundamental prop

to the priority
repair.

economics over

politics, the case

for

economics collapses

beyond

IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PRIORITY OF POLITICS:

PRACTICAL

It is

a mistake

to believe that it

is

King

Louis-Philippe

who reigns

[A]bove the Constitution is the holy, venerable, solid, amiable, gracious, beautiful, Balzac, Cousin Betty noble, young, all-powerful five-franc piece! The
morals of a commercial nation are not
general morals are prodigal.

completely those

of merchants.

The

mer

is thrifty; lic morals are dissolute.

chant

The

merchant maintains

his morals;

pub

Montesquieu,

"Effect
of

of

Commerce

Government"

on

[T]here is

a very dangerous phase in the life When the taste for physical pleasures has

democratic

peoples.
either
educa-

grown more

rapidly than

268

Interpretation
free institutions,
the time comes when
men are carried

tion or experience of
and

lose

control of

themselves at the

sight of

the

new good

things

they

are

snatch.

tween private

Intent only on getting rich, they do not notice the close connection fortunes and general prosperity. There is no need to drag their
citizens of this

away ready to be
rights

away from
a tiresome

type; they themselves voluntarily let go. They find it inconvenience to exercise political rights which distract them from indus
think

try.

Such folk
a

they

are

following
and

the

doctrine

of

self-interest, but

they
neglect

have

very
at

crude

idea thereof,

the

better to

guard their

interests, they
power,

the chief of

them, that is, to

remain their own masters

an able and ambitious man once gets

If,
the

this critical moment,

open

he finds

way

for

usurpations of

every

sort.

Tocqueville, Democracy in America

Prudent
sight of political extent

leaders,

we

both

grant and

insist,

would as such never

lose

the

to which their regimes require economic support.

material

In the

United States in particular,

bulwark

against the onslaughts of

prosperity does a fearsome class

seem to

be

an

indispensable
pro

struggle.

Accordingly,

tracted expansion of the money supply well beyond the rate of the annual national product,
circumstances: economists mine a nation's material

increase in nearly
all

for example,

should

be

avoided under

right,

left,

and center agree

that such policies

under

wage-price controls

or

Other concessions, such as resistance to to increases in the minimum wage, would have to be
well-being. cannot afford to plunge our

made

to rightist economists in order to maintain the economic props to our

system of political
commercial goose never

liberty. We

daggers into the

that lays our golden eggs. And governmental officials should

say what Harold Denton, the director in charge of regulating nuclear re for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, recently remarked upon shutting down five large nuclear power plants in the United States: "Denton said the
actors commission of

is

not allowed

to consider the economic and social repercussions

actions."30

its safety regulations and Were those who set public policy to deliberate primarily as economists, however, the most crucial political goods might be neglected. "The crux in
practice

is

what

kind
will

of

decision

results

from

one view or

the other. Grant

that the general

cost

make of

(which the fact

what about

bad decisions if he utterly ignores questions of limited resources makes it extremely difficult to do),

but

the economist?

What kind

of

decision is the

economist

likely
and

to make? Is he not

likely

to be easily shifted from a

so?

"utility'

that is costly
utilities

to one that is
costs

[financially] less

Is he

not

likely
not?

to

prefer not

that are measurable over those that are

I do

claim

that the

economists

necessarily

make such errors

in

practical

reasoning

any

more than

30.
c.

"Five Reactors To Be
are

Halted,"

1.

We

inclined to

agree with

the

decision to

Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 14, 1979, p. 38, close the reactors pending investigation.

Economics
it
can

or

Political Philosophy?

269
or

be

claimed

that the general is

irresponsible

indifferent to
the

cost/benefits

but that is the

To the

tendency."31

strict

economist, the

rational principles of

free

market are uni

versally

valid. moral as a

Thus the
and

economist tends to abstract

from the

particular tra
of a

ditions,
and

religious

opinions,

and other circumstances are

people,

insofar

these are noticed,

they
which

likely

to be treated as

irritating
and

hindrances to

truly

rational order.

But it is precisely the

particular character

and circumstances of

his

people

in

the prudent political leader lives

breathes. Prudence

exactly in recognizing that for this people at this time in these circumstances, the economic price ought to be paid for, say, the
consists

subsidizing a certain export product; in fact, the decision may require

circumstances of other peoples as well.

government's

or

supporting the

price of a certain

an assessment of

the characters and

The
not,

gravest

flaw in the

prospect of rule

by

the economist is that he does

conditions and ends
of

qua

economist,

reflect

seriously

on

the

good

government.

Is

not

the final cause of government the happiness of the people,

and virtue are preconditions?

for

which

happiness both freedom

The

pristine

economist will understand that

freedom is the

precondition to self-gratification.

But he may
even

deny that freedom and virtue are ineluctably interdependent, and he may deny that virtue exists outside of the realm of superstition. Economists But is it to imagine that congratulate themselves on being liberty is as secure to the most crassly self-indulgent people as to a people
"realistic." "realistic"

which

evinces

old-fashioned

political

virtues?

And is

not on

John Stuart Mill

a certain system

correct to assert of morality?

that

economic

prosperity itself depends

(This is
can

not

the

occasion

to rise to a full-fledged defense of virtue, but one

begin
be

is

also

by increasingly
altogether

noticing that the corporeal analogue of virtue, i.e. physical merely nonarbitrarily defined as the
challenged as a subjective notion. condition of

health,
health
which

But

can

the

bodily body in

(i)

all the parts are capable of

pain

(3)

performing their natural functions (2) without into the foreseeable future; and in which (4) there is a sense of physical Without
a

well-being.
jective,"

doubt,

the second and

"accidental"

fourth

elements are

in

part

"sub
pecu

that

is,

dependent

on

physiological-psychological

liarities. Moreover, there

are greater and

lesser degrees
"objective"

of physical element

health; few,
and
not

if any, of us are simply healthy. But the often decisive: rarely is most men's poison
model

is weighty
Is this

another man's meat.

the

to begin

with

in reflecting

on psychic

health?)
to disparage the notion
in

The tendency
31.

of authentic

(right-wing)

economists

Herbert J.

Storing, "American Statesmanship: Old

ed.
published as

New,"

and

"Statesmanship

and

Bureaucracy,"

mimeograph,

Robert A. Goldwin (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise

Institute,
(after

1977), pp. 43-44:

revision) under

Bureaucrats,

Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads?

some

the same editorship and

by

the same press in 1980, p. 109.

270

Interpretation
a

of trans-subjective virtue
praise

tendency

which

ill harmonizes

with

their songs of

for

successful entrepreneurs

does

not enhance

their political

judgment.

Proposals to discontinue state-licensing

requirements

for

airline

pilots, mor

ticians, medical doctors, attorneys, dentists, plumbers, and cosmeticians never lose their luster among Milton Friedman's devotees, but they are blind to the many objective standards by which practitioners of these arts can and should be judged: these
ernmental stomach

are not matters of mere preference.

Citizens

are entitled

to gov

protection

to ensure that their physicians know how to

distinguish
to remove

from

gallbladder and

have the

good sense and good will not

the

only the latter needs to be exscinded. Such examples of how libertarian governments must concern themselves with virtue relatively could be multiplied a
when even
thousandfold.32

former

Unquestionably
cies, among them

there are many economically

some

inefficient

governmental agen

licensing

agencies.

But it is politically important to

of

escape the appearance of

callousness, to say nothing

avoiding

callousness

itself. Even if the Social

a

Security Administration,

for example, is

basically

very expensive and inefficient transferrer of income from middle class to poor, it is generally perceived as doing some good and adds some legitimacy to the regime. Similarly, even if opening the public coffers wide to support state
school systems reduces our economic

prosperity,

prudence counsels

that we not
voucher

jettison the

public schools or

jeopardize them

with a radical

Friedmanite

leave them only the dregs of The weaker the public schools, the more dubious is the political order which sponsors them. Professor Friedman's claim that the absolute quality of public education would
system which would
society.33

improve

under

his

scheme

is

not

made

plausible

by

his

assertion

that any

32. To strengthen the sense of community and promote virtue, governments will generally find it necessary to impose certain restrictions on business. Again, the extent and type of ap propriate restrictions will depend upon the traditions, current opinions, and other circumstances of a given people. In the United States today, strong public-spirited arguments can be made for main

taining
tion.

and

unpublished

strengthening our Sunday-closing laws. See Robert L. Stone's highly informative, which includes practical recommendations for legisla treatise, "Scrooge's Day
Off,"

A self-consciously impractical but nevertheless extremely thoughtful and theoretically strong argument for Congressional abolition of television (again for the sake of virtue) in the United States

is

and the Mass Media: A Practical Man's Harry M. Clor, ed., The Mass Media and Modern Democracy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), pp. 181-232. More practical proposals for economically inefficient but politically desirable policies include the following: legislation providing for unemployment compensation, medical insurance and old-age insurance; pure food and drug acts; collective bargaining legislation; compulsory public education; governmental subsidies of the sciences and of the humanities and fine arts; preservation of national, state, and local parks and monuments; anti-child-labor laws; enforced pollution-control; made

in George Anastaplo's "Self-Government

Guide,"

in

and

federal disaster

relief.

The

foregoing

measures

have been instituted

them would

States, but any economically inspired

policies

efforts to scuttle

be

imperfectly in the United highly impolitic. These

help

us

both to be
and

and

to appear to be more humane.

to

33.

Milton

Rose Friedman, Free

pp.

Choose: A Personal Statement (New York: Harcourt,

against voucher
Amendment."

158-170, especially p. 170. Cf. the reservations systems expressed in George Anastaplo, "The Religious Clauses of the First Memphis State Law Review 2, pp. 151-230.

Brace, Jovanovich, 1980),

11

Economics
transfer to a
products on which

or

Political Philosophy?
model

211
worst

free-market

tends to produce a better product. The

their customers and

the

free

market maim

bankrupt their

investors,
of

is exactly why the free

who aim

market must

be

regulated

by

government.
remark

Those

to speak for virtue should not

forget the
art

the

Shakespearean character, "Dost thou think, because thou

shall

virtuous, there

be

ale?"

no more cakes and

Comic self-mockery

and philosophic resigna

tion are rarely in surplus, and without them the virtuous do threaten our

liberty
for

in the
lives34

worst way. offer new

But those

who wish to make cakes and ale central to our

lamps for old,

imploring

us

to trade the wisdom of the ages

flealike

hop

and a starless gaze.

34.

Doubtless many
to
possessions

economists will protest our

that

they

are

far from advocating that

science
of

we make

cake and ales central material

lives. To define
a straw

economics as the

the accumulation of
are
welfare-

is to

construct

man,

they

would

contend, for there

economists, public-policy economists, Marxist economists, and so on. Thus the appropriate defi nition of economics is indeed, they would conclude, the science of the allocation of scarce
resources.

We

answer

that

men

have many

scarce

resources

which

are

example, the legal

right
rather

to marry or leisure time on

weekends.

essentially noneconomic, for For most men the decision to

marry this woman between watching

than that one is not essentially an economic

decision,

nor

is the

choice

a televised

play

and

reading

a novel

ordinarily

an economist's choice as such. will not

The

standard

definition

of economics

is

absurd on

the

face. Moreover, it

do to define

economics as whatever economists engage

in. A

number of plumbers

but that does

not make

plumbing inclusive

of architecture.

may dabble in architecture, In the crucial respect, politics is to

economics as architecture

is to

plumbing.

The Lion A

and the

Ass: (Chapters 25-30)

Commentary on the Book of Genesis

Robert Sacks
St. John's College, Annapolis
and

Santa Fe

CHAPTER XXV

I.

THEN AGAIN ABRAHAM TOOK A

WIFE,

AND HER NAME WAS KETURAH

2.

AND SHE BARE HIM ZIMRAN AND JOKSHAN AND MEDAN AND MIDIAN AND

ISHBAK AND SHUAH

3. AND JOKSHAN BEGAT SHEBA AND DEDAN AND THE SONS OF DEDAN WERE ASSHURIM AND LETUSHIM AND LEUMMIM

4.

AND THE SONS OF MIDIAN EPHAH AND EPHER AND HANOCH AND ABIDAL AND ELDAAH ALL THESE WERE THE CHILDREN OF KETURAH.

Abraham's life
surprise.

after

the marriage of his son,

as

Isaac, may
at the

at

first

come as a of

He

was

described
was

Stricken With Age

beginning

Chapter

Twenty-four. Ishmael 17:25),

and

thirteen years old at the time of Isaac's

birth (Gen.
Abraham

Isaac is

now

forty

(Gen.

25:20).

Fifty-three
child

years after

was considered

to be

much

too old to have a these

he

remarried and

had

no
of

less than

seven sons.

The

names of

men would make an

impressive list

descendants for any apart from his divine calling Abraham is nites, and Asshurim and the Sabaeans are
patriarch other

than the founder of the New Way.

still an

Wholly
Dedaas

impressive figure. The in the Bible

often mentioned

being

great and wealthy nations, but the full significance of Abraham's new life will be discussed in the commentary to Gen. 35:28 (See Jer. 6:20, 25:23, 49:8; Is.

21:13; Ezek. 27:15-23; Job.

1:15).

Though Abraham's
pressive

other

life,

the one

not

in its

own

right, it is by
of the

no means

devoted to the New Way, is im completely disconnected from his have discussed Israel's
most

life

as the

founder

New Way. While

we

connec

tion with the Queen of Sheba (See commentary to Gen. 20:4) the

interest

his descendants is Midian. A passing caravan of Midianites found Joseph in the pit where his brothers had placed him and sold him into Egypt by the hands of the Ishmaelites. The Midianites were thus aware of a certain inner

ing

of

weakness within the people, and

the

various ways

in

which

this awareness af

fected her The

relations with

Isreal

make

up

an

intricate

story.

next

Midianite

whom we shall meet

is

a man of

foreigner Israel will probably be the most influential

meet.

many names who will He is first called

by

the

name of

Reuel (Ex. 2:18),

which as we shall see practice of

later, is
a man

not

his

own

name,

but

the name of

his father. The is

calling

by

his father's

name or even

his

grandfather's

not uncommon

in the Bible

and should

be

of

274
no great places called

Interpretation

difficulty
which

at this point.
called

It is however
the same

crucial

that to

we

keep

track of the

in

he is
names

by

name and

try

understand

why he is

different
was

in

other places.
welcomed

Reuel

the Midian priest who

Moses

after

his

escape
was

from

Egypt

where

he had killed
well when

an

Egyptian taskmaster. One

who was which

day

Moses

sitting

by

Midianite

the shepherdess

to become

his

wife

hap

pened along.

With the

same

princely

dignity

Abraham

showed

to the

in watering her flock, and she re turned home. Up till this point the story was much like the story of Jacob and his bride, but Reuel was a very different man from Laban. The Midian priest
three strangers, he
assisted

the

shepherdess

was wife.

friendly

man

who

offered

Moses

a place of rest and

his daughter

as

When God
went

commanded

Moses to

return

to Egypt and

free his

people

he

to his

father-in-law,
4:18).

now called

Jethro,

to ask permission to

leave. Jethro
said

made no
peace

demands for full

Moses'

payment as

Laban had done but merely

Go in

(Ex.

After
at

the camp

with

first battle, in which he defeated the Amelekites, Jethro arrived his daughter Zipporah and two sons, who had pre
Moses'

sumably been living with their meeting between Jethro and his
understood

grandfather son-in-law

during

Moses'

the New

for

having
Jethro

delivered

Way Israel,

in many ways in its highest form. He rejoices

and

shows and

stay in Egypt. The that Jethro has

Blesses the Lord

the evening is completed

by

and a

feast in the love

spent

and good

fellowship

envisaged

by

sharing a sacrifice the Jubilee Year.

through the camp
was

the night, and in the morning as he

walked

he

Moses'

noticed a crowd of people gathered around

tent and

troubled (Ex.

18:13).
could
was

Jethro

was

the

first

man

to see that even with the

help

of

God Moses The job

could

not

continue

leading

the people

by judging

individual

cases.

too immense for one man, and there

was no guarantee

that

he

be

replaced after

his death. The

whole notion of a

law for Israel

a

was

due to the be
ad

insight

of

Jethro,

who advised men of

Moses to

ask

God for

law

which could

ministered even see

by

lesser

commentary to Gen.

15:9).

Moses himself (Ex. 18:23, ar>d After this advice, which was critical for estab
stature than
Moses'

lishing

the means to the New

Way, Jethro,

with

good

graces,

returned

to his own country (Ex. 18:27).

Moses'

father-in-law

will next appear under

the name of

Hobab,

the son of
met

Reuel the Midianite (Num.

10:29).

This is

our

fourth

meeting.

We first

him It

briefly

was

Reuel in Ex. Chap. 2, when Moses met and married his daughter. Jethro who sent him off to Egypt in Chapter Four, and again Jethro
as

the camp fourteen chapters later. The story of Hobab begins very much like the meeting between Moses and Jethro at that camp, but the rest of the story will be quite different. All of
who arrived at

this confusion

with regard

to

his

name

tends to

put some

distance between the

The Lion

and the

Ass

275 but the early

chapters taken together assure us that

two meetings at the camp,

Hobab the In the Reuel

son of

Reuel is Jethro.

account of the second

was a

meeting at the camp, we are reminded that Midianite. That fact had been left out of the first account. Things
when

go about
return with

the same, but

Hobab

again asks

for

permission to

leave

and

his people, the request is denied on the grounds that he is familiar the layout of the camp. Whatever it is that Moses fears it is not his
to
men are still

father-in-law himself. The two

throw

close,

and
of

Jethro is invited to
the
new

his lot in
io).

with

the people and share the

chapters

blessings

land (Num.

Chap.

Twelve

Israel, in

the battle east of

later, after the Amorites had been defeated by the Jordan, the Midianites and the Moabites became

suspicious that

Israel

would not

keep

her

promise of peace and sent

for the
that the

prophet, Balaam. Moab decided to attack, but it is

by

no means clear

Midianites actually took part in the battle. Now Balaam was from Mesopotamia and
22:1-5).

was a

Prophet

of

the Lord (Num.

Where he

came

from is

anybody's

guess, but Mesopotamia had only

been
to

mentioned once

before. In Gen.

24:10

it

was used

to

describe the country

Abram took Sarai be that Abram

which

Abraham's
Lot

servant went when

he

returned

to Abraham's homeland in
when

order

to get a wife for Isaac. Back in Gen.

out of

12:5,

his

wife and

Haran,

the text added that he took with him the souls

that

he had

got

in Haran. The

most reasonable assumption would

had

converted a number of people

to the New

Way

while

in Haran.

Apparently

not all

those

people accompanied

him

on a

descendant

of one of those men.

He is

his journey, and Balaam may be a man piously devoted to the Lord but
sent a message

seems never to

have heard

of

the people of Israel.

Balak,
him to

who was

then reigning in

Moab,

to Balaam asking

come and place a curse on and

this mass of people who had suddenly come

spite of their words of peace.
which

into the land

regards will.

looked

so

menacing in

Balak
own
of

Balaam

as a man with

strange powers

he

can

use

at

his

Balaam

was sympathetic not

to Balak's cause, but apparently the tradition

of

the Lord has

degenerated in the hands

that

Balaam to

such an extent.

Ba

laam's
the

answer was

will of

be willing to curse this people if such was God. Balaam then went to the Lord in order to ask Him whether he

he

would

should

join Balak,
Balaam

and the

Lord

answered

Thou

shalt not go

with

them; thou

shalt not curse the people:

for they

are

blessed (Num.
time.

22:12).

But Balak in

sisted that same as

go

to the Lord a

second

His

answer

to Balak was the

men were

before: he

would

do nothing but
while

the will of

God. Balak's

asked to spend the

what

night

Balaam

returned

to the Lord in

order

to see

he

should

do. This time the Lord told Balaam to accompany the

other

men

but

to say nothing that God

was
was

than what the Lord

and sent an angel while

would

tell him. The text then says

angry

to block Balaam's way. Now Balaam

could not see

riding an ass, and

Balaam

the angel, the ass could

276

Interpretation
Balaam beat the
ass and tried

and turned aside.

to turn it back onto the path.

Their way
and was

went through a vineyard alongside of a

wall,

and

the next time the

ass saw the angel she turned and

beaten

again.

Finally

bumped into the wall, crushing Balaam's foot, the ass, not knowing where to go, fell down.
ass spoke to

Then

a miracle

happened. The
replied

Balaam asking him why he had

beaten her. Balaam

and

that he had beaten her because she had mocked

ass asked

him,

he threatened to kill her. Then the friend

who

Balaam why he

could not

trust a

had

served

him for

so

many

years.

only Balaam repented,

reminded

It

was

after and

hearing

these words that Balaam could see the angel.

the angel commanded him to continue on his

command

journey
was

but

him

of

God's

to say

or

do nothing but
speak

what

he

told.

At Balak's insistence Balaam

the Lord told Balaam to
would put return

made several sacrifices to the

Lord.

Finally
he
Balak

to Balak but to

only the

words which

in his

mouth.

There
curse

ensue a number of episodes

in

which

tries to convince Balaam to

these people who threaten his

land,

and each

time Balaam blesses the people with perhaps the most beautiful

blessings in
repeated

the book. The blessings may have come from the

Lord, but Balaam's

insistence that he

could

do nothing but
as

what

the Lord told him must have come

from himself.
After his final

blessing Balaam,
and

Abram had done

returned to

after

his discussion
and

with

God concerning Sodom from the field. Five

means.

Gomorrah,

his place,
conquer

Balak

retired

chapters

later the Moabites then tried to

of

Israel

by

another

The daughters

Moab

were sent and

down to

seduce the sons of

Israel

into serving the God of Baalpeor, named Kozbi, the daughter of Zur,
literal
sense.

among

them was a

Midianite

woman
more

who seduced one of

the Israelites in a

Shortly before
which will

Balaam had appeared, Aaron died

under strange circumstances

formally

be discussed in the commentary to Gen. 49:5, and his duties were taken over by his son, Eleazar. For reasons which will also become
Eleazar
all

clear at that time

but

retired

from his duties

as

High Priest

after

the death of his father. His son,

quickly despatched Kozbi and zeal he and his descendants were

episode

Phinehas, however was a true son of Levi and her lover with his javelin, and in reward for his
granted

the everlasting priesthood. After this

Moses
the

and

Eleazar
of

calm

the people

by taking
and

census,
and

and the

book

takes

up Zelophehad

story

the men from

Reuben

Gad

the daughters of

which was retold

In Chapter Thirty-one

of

in the commentary to Gen. the Book of Numbers, God

15:9.
announces to

Moses
their

that it is time for Israel to take

seduction.

its

vengeance

on

the

Midianites for
At first

During

the war Balaam was

appears to

killed (Num. Midianite

31:8).

glance the

death

of

Balaam

be

quite

unjust, but later in the

the
women

chapter we are

told that it was

he

who

convinced

to seduce Israel
Thirty-

(Num.

31:16).

While this

accusation might

justify

the actions in Chapter

The Lion
one

and the

Ass

277
see a

it

would

be difficult to
appeared to see

its

proper

relation

to the earlier story,

in

which

Balaam
order to
and

be

true follower of the Lord.

we must return

In
God

this relation

to the conversation between

Balaam

the

ass.

If God
who

spoke

through the mouth of the ass then

it

was

and not was

the ass

had

served

His friend Balaam those many

towards the
as

years. of the

Balaam

intended to be

an alternative route and

fulfillment

promise.

Like the brothers Moab

Edom

he,

the student of a tradition

going back to
of

Abraham,

was

to

have been

another means

for the spreading

the New Way. He did not trust his old friend because he did not realize

the

of time and of waiting. The only way in which one can under his sending the Midianite women in the light of his earlier trust in God is to assume a deep desire on his part to begin the spread of the promise
stand without more

importance

realizing that the

proper

time

had

not yet come and

that Israel needed

time in which to prepare herself.

announced

When God first

revenge

to Moses that the time had come for Israel to

exact words were:

itself

upon

the

Midianites, His

Avenge the Children

of Israel of the Midianites. Afterwards shalt thou be gathered unto thy people (Num. 31:2). As we have noted before it is somewhat difficult to understand

in

what sense

this

can

be

called

revenge, and it is even

Moses'

more

difficult to

see

why this affair should be related to

again attracted

death. After the battle the

men are

to the

women of

Midia,

and

the text continues as follows:

And Moses

was wroth with the officers

over

of the

hosts,

with the captains over thou

sands, and captains

unto

hundreds,

which came from

the

battle.

15.

And Moses
the

said

them, Have

ye saved all

the women alive? 16.

Behold,

these

caused

Chil

dren of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the Lord in the matter of Peor, and there was a plague among the congregation of
Lord. (Num. 31:14-16)

the

When Moses first

who

met

Jethro it had
a
priest
might

seemed as though

the Midianite people through whom the

had

produced

such

might

be those

people

promise given

to Abraham

be fulfilled. Their
and

closeness

to Israel might

form

bridge between the New

attraction went

Way

the other nations. When Moses saw

that the

the other way, that this very closeness could equally

well seduce

nected

his

own

Israel away from its own path, he understood why God had con death to the battle with the Midianites. When the sons of Israel

left the New

all

Way they

were

doing

nothing

more

than

imitating Moses,

who

in

innocence had been the first to marry a Midianite woman. His anger in Verse Fourteen stems both from his great disappointment and from the knowl
edge that

he

shared

the responsibility

in

way

which

he

could never

have

foreseen.
Throughout the later period,
a narrow thread still connects

Israel

and

Midia.

Jael,

Heber,

whom we had discussed in the commentary to Gen. 20:7, was the wife of a Kenite, one of the children of Hobab (Judg. 4:11). She was the

278

Interpretation

killed Sisera, the captain of Jabin, the presumably a descendant of the other king Jabin, many years before (Josh. Chap. n). Now Hatzor
woman who

King

of

Hatzor. Jabin

was

whom

Joshua had fought

was of some strategic

im

portance since chariots

scholars men of of

it

was

the

first

nation on the eastern side of able

the

Sinai to have
them.

iron, but Joshua

was

to capture and

destroy

Modern

have

often remarked that the not yet acquired

burning

of

the chariots proved that the

Israel had

the art of horsemanship.

account

This may
attitude

or

may

be true but certainly does chariots and horses.

not

not

for the Biblical

toward

In the fourteenth
raoh's

chapter of

Exodus
are

one sees all

nothing but disdain for Pha

horses

and

chariots,

which

Deuteronomy
that

one of the

limitations

placed

drowned in the Red Sea, and in on any potential king in Israel is horses (Deut.
17:16).

he

not

gain

his

strength
was

through the use of

well

This

limitation

on a

king

fairly

kept

until

the reign of

King

Solomon (I

Kings 9:19) though David had already acquired a small cavalry (II Sam. 8:4). The fear of modern armaments and the centralization of power in the hands of
the

king

seem

to

be the last descendant

shreds of

the

original opposition

to

general.

Horses
the

and chariots symbolize the

of

force

of

foreign

power.

kingship in By killing
Midia
the other

Sisera, Jael,
and

Hobab,
form

reaffirmed

the relation between

and

Israel. Though

she could not

bridge between Israel

nations she could at

of

the position of
41:43.

least play a buffer role. For a more complete discussion horses in the development of Israel, see the commentary to

Gen.

5.

AND ABRAHAM GAVE ALL THAT HE HAD UNTO ISAAC.

had already

Verse Five is probably best taken as a reminder to the reader that Abraham given his belongings to Isaac in Chapter Twenty-four.

6.

but unto the sons of the ham gave yet

concubines, which

abraham

had,

abra

gifts,

and sent them away from isaac his

son,

while he

lived, eastward, unto the east country.

7.

and these are the days of the years of abraham's life which he

lived,

an hundred threescore and fifteen years.

8.

then abraham

expired,

and died in a good old

age,

an old man and

full of
9.

years;

and was gathered to his people.

and his sons isaac and ishmael buried him in the cave of

machpelah,

in the field of ephron the son of zohar the hittite, which is before

mamre;
10.

the field which abraham purchased of the sons of heth: there

was abraham

buried,

and sarah his wife.

Some

The early books of the Bible are reticent about the fate of men mention is made of Samuel's ghost in I Sam. 28:13, but

after

death.

even there

The Lion
the
and

and the

Ass

279

force have

of

made no attempt to contact

the passage is to indicate that Saul should have let Samuel sleep him. On the basis of Verse Eight the only

thing
only

one can mean

safely say is that if Abraham was gathered to his people this can that in death he is reunited with his father, Terah. If we are to take

the statement

the land of the

literally it would seem to imply living and that if there is a

the
nonchosen no also present at

that the New

Way

is intended for This

life

after

this life the distinction

explains

between the

chosen and

longer

plays a role.

why Ishmael is
11
.

Abraham's burial.
ABRAHAM, THAT GOD BLESSED

AND IT CAME TO PASS AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS SON

ISAAC;
of

AND ISAAC DWELT BY THE WELL LAHAI-ROI.

associated with

The Well
16:14)
12.
and

Lahai-roi is to be

Ishmael (Gen.

24:62 and

introduces the

next section.

NOW THESE ARE THE GENERATIONS OF

ISHMAEL, ABRAHAM'S SON WHOM

BARE UNTO ABRAHAM.

HAGAR THE

EGYPTIAN, SARAH'S HANDMAID,

13-

AND THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE SONS OF ISHMAEL. BY THEIR NAMES

ACCORDING TO THEIR GENERATIONS: THE FIRSTBORN OF AND 14. 15. l6.

ISHMAEL, NEBAJOTH;

KEDAR,

AND

ADBEEL,

AND MIBSAM. AND MASSA.

AND

MISHMA,
AND

AND

DUMAH,

HADAR,

DUMAH,

AND MASSA.

THESE ARE THE SONS OF AND BY THEIR

ISHMAEL,

AND THESE ARE THEIR

NAMES,

BY THE

TOWNS,

CASTLES;

TWELVE PRINCES ACCORDING TO THEIR

NATIONS. 17.
AND THESE ARE THE YEARS OF THE LIFE OF

ISHMAEL,
DIED;

AN HUNDRED AND
AND WAS GATHERED

THIRTY AND SEVEN YEARS: AND HE EXPIRED AND

UNTO HIS PEOPLE.

We have already tary to Gen. 16:12.

l8.

given an account of

Ishmael's descendants in the

commen

AND THEY DWELT FROM HAVILAH UNTO

SHUR,

THAT IS BEFORE

EGYPT,

AS

THOU GOEST TOWARD ASSYRIA: AND HE DIED IN THE PRESENCE OF ALL HIS
BRETHREN.

We have already discussed Ishmael's relation to the country of Shur in the more complicated commentary to Gen. 20:1. Havilah however presents a
problem

because there

were

two Havilahs. One

was

the second son of

Cush, Ham,

the

Hamite,
In

the other, the twelfth son of

Joktan,

the Semite (Gen. 10:7 and 10:

29).

other words, we are

left in doubt

as to whether

Havilah is

part of

the cursed nation, or not.

mentioned prior

In the commentary to Gen. 9:21 we noted that the incidents to the Flood were all erased and never mentioned
woke

and places again after

Noah

from his drunken

sleep.

There is however

one exception.

In the

280

Interpretation
we

commentary to Gen. 2:10-14

graphical

discussed the

significance

of

Eden's,

geo

position,

which could not men after

have been described

without

place names

known to
Eden

the Flood. In that context

mentioning the land of Havilah

of gold.

was placed near

and was said

to have large deposits

The land

between Shur

and

Havilah

will again appear and

in I Sam. 15:7
special

as the

battleground

for the

great war

between Israel
36:12).

mentary to Gen.
character seem

enemy Amalek (See com Havilah's proximity to Eden and its highly dubious

its very

to

present an

concerning Ishmael,
16:12.

the

ambiguity which would strengthen our remarks blessed wild ass, given in the commentary to Gen.

19.

AND THESE ARE THE GENERATIONS OF

ISAAC,

ABRAHAM'S SON: ABRAHAM

BEGAT ISAAC: 20.

AND ISAAC WAS FORTY YEARS OLD WHEN HE TOOK REBEKAH TO

WIFE,

THE DAUGHTER OF BETHUEL THE SYRIAN OF LABAN THE SYRIAN.

PADAN-ARAM,

THE SISTER TO

In the light
shall see

of what we of

have

seen so

far,

and more

especially in
married at

what we

later

Isaac,

we can understand

forty. In the commentary to Gen. 7:4 we numbers forty and four hundred in the Torah
was connected with a period of gestation.

why he was made a list of As

the age of the

all appearances of

and showed we shall see

that in each case it this is also true of

the

life

of

Isaac. We have already had Isaac is the true test

which

a glimpse of

that character in Chapter

Twenty-four through the

As
we shall see

great role which providence of

began to play in the story. the New Way. Can the New Way live
stature of

through a generation

does

not

have the

its founder, Abraham?

was not

Everything

will

depend but the

on

this test since Abraham's virtue

the virtue

of a private man which could

virtue of a man who was able

to establish a New

Way

lech. It
of

was

last. If Isaac fails, Abraham will have failed to live up to Abime therefore important that the Biblical author present Isaac as a kind
ultimately even as a blind old man. Of real concern is not but the ability of the New Way to maintain itself throughout These assertions will have to be proved by the ensuing chap

sleepy

man and

his

personal virtue

the generations. ters but

they do

give some

indication

as to the significance of

Isaac's

age.

21.

AND ISAAC INTREATED THE LORD FOR HIS

WIFE, BECAUSE HIM,

SHE WAS

BARREN: AND THE LORD WAS INTREATED OF CONCEIVED.

AND REBEKAH HIS WIFE

22.

AND THE CHILDREN STRUGGLED TOGETHER WITHIN HER; AND SHE

SAID,

IF

IT BE

SO,

WHY AM I THUS? AND SHE WENT TO INQUIRE OF THE LORD.

23.

AND THE LORD SAID UNTO

HER, TWO NATIONS

ARE IN THY

WOMB,

AND

TWO MANNER OF PEOPLE SHALL BE SEPARATED FROM THY THE ONE PEOPLE SHALL BE STRONGER THAN THE OTHER

BOWELS;

AND

PEOPLE;

AND THE

ELDER SHALL SERVE THE YOUNGER.

The Lion
Rebekah 's
should not

and

the Ass

281

question

is

highly

cryptic

and

difficult to interpet. While

one

text,

one must

expressed

general about the possibility of a corruption in the equally be open to the possibility that the author may have himself in ways that look a bit strange at first.
question reads we

be dogmatic in

Rebekah 's
same word 1:11b.
where

if

it be so, why
at

am

I thusl The

word so

is the

which

discussed
same

If the

word

has the

length in the commentary to Gen. significance that it had in the early chapter,
some

it implied

a clear and

something like this: "If the direction

definite path, Rebekah's question seems to be which the New Way is to take has already

been given, if Isaac has already been distinguished from Ishmael, why is there no direct and smooth transference from father to son? Why is there struggling
on?"

going God's
sons
ways

Why

are

things not

sol not

answer

is that the division has

an

been

made absolute.

Among

the

of

Abraham

absolutely

clear

distinction

was

made

between the two

and

the ways of the first son Ishmael the son of

son of of

Hagar,
of

the way of

Isaac the

Sarah. Both

children were case

expected,

and each represents a

whom

dif

ferent way

life. In this
The

the children are

twins,

younger was expected.

older

son,

Esau,

will appear as a

kind

of

only the mean be

tween Isaac and Ishmael. The clear

the way of Israel could

not

distinction between the way of Ishmael and be maintained. Esau has appeared in the middle
come

just

as

evening

and

morning

along

with

day

and night.

These mixtures,

while

unplanned,

will

be

of gravest concern.

The unavailability of clear and sharp distinctions is another way of stating the fundamental problem of the book. In general it makes both necessary and
possible

the

compromises or re-evaluations

in the relationship between God

commentary.

and

man which we

have

seen

throughout the whole of this

24.

AND WHEN HER DAYS TO BE DELIVERED WERE

FULFILLED, BEHOLD,

THERE WERE TWINS IN HER WOMB.

25.

AND THE FIRST CAME OUT

RED,

ALL OVER LIKE AN HAIRY

GARMENT; AND

THEY CALLED HIS NAME ESAU.

26.

AND AFTER THAT CAME HIS BROTHER

OUT,

AND HIS HAND TOOK HOLD

OF ESAU'S

HEEL;

AND HIS NAME WAS CALLED JACOB: AND ISAAC WAS THREE

SCORE YEARS OLD WHEN SHE BARE THEM. 27. AND THE BOYS GREW: AND ESAU WAS A CUNNING

HUNTER, A MAN OF

THE

FIELD; AND

JACOB WAS A PLAIN

MAN,

DWELLING IN TENTS.

28.

AND ISAAC LOVED

ESAU,

BECAUSE HE DID EAT OF HIS VENISON: BUT

REBEKAH LOVED JACOB.

Esau's

resemblance

to Ishmael

is, I believe,

obvious, though at this point

side of

it is

not yet

fully

clear

in

what sense

he is like Israel. That

chapters.

his

char

acter will come

to light in the

following

Unlike the

earlier

distinction between Abraham

and

Lot,

the

present distinc-

282
tion

Interpretation
not

is

between those
and

who

live in tents

and

those who

live in houses but

the land.

between the hunters

Rebekah'

those who live in tents at

seems

peace with

love for Jacob

to be less self-interested than Isaac's

love

for Esau, though the full become

visible till

account of

Isaac's

special relation

to Esau will not

the end of the

chapter.

29.

AND JACOB SOD POTTAGE: AND ESAU CAME FROM THE

FIELD,

AND HE WAS

FAINT: 30.
AND ESAU SAID TO JACOB FEED ME I PRAY

THEE,

WITH THAT SAME RED

STUFF; FOR I AM FAINT:

31. 32.
AND JACOB AND ESAU

THEREFORE WAS HIS NAME CALLED EDOM.

SAID,

SELL ME THIS DAY THY BIRTHRIGHT. I'M GONNA DIE: NOW WHAT GOOD IS THIS HERE

SAID, BEHOLD,

BIRTHRIGHT GONNA DO ME? 33.

AND JACOB

SAID,

SWEAR TO ME THIS

DAY;

AND HE SWARE UNTO HIM:

AND HE SOLD HIS BIRTHRIGHT UNTO JACOB. 34. THEN JACOB GAVE ESAU BREAD AND POTTAGE OF LENTILS: AND HE DID EAT

AND

DRINK,

AND ROSE

UP,

AND WENT HIS WAY: AND ESAU HELD HIS

BIRTHRIGHT IN CONTEMPT.

Like
the

a man of

the field Esau's

of

speech and

is

rough.

This

roughness

is

related

to

over-

gentility
nature

city life. Lot

Cain both

sought

independence

by

flee

ing
get.

from

pendence

establishing a place of their own. Esau looks for inde in the opposite sense. He lives in the field and lives by what he can
and sense we can

In this

bring
very

into finer focus his

good at

kinship
life

with and

Ishmael.
come

Unfortunately he
empty-handed.

is

not

leading

such a

has

home

For the

moment

the birthright

willing to sell it for Jacob's lentils and which he ate his meal in Verse Thirty-four forms

looks to him useless, and he is bread. The description of the way in

a wonderful contrast

to the

description
ate, and he

of

Abraham

during
up

the sacrifice of Isaac. Again the words

and went on

and

he

drank

and rose

in four

short

words,

each word

forming
Esau's

his way in Hebrew can all be said sentence by itself. We again have

that starkness of language which typified the

description

of

Abraham's

sacri

fice, but here it is

come unbidden.

used

to show

rough and almost gruff manner.

which

Esau is the morning and Esau is the evening. He is the middle He is the morning which is sometimes as the day
night.

has

and some

times as the

That is why the

world

is

hard

place

in

which to

live.

CHAPTER XXVI

I.

AND THERE WAS A FAMINE IN THE

LAND, BESIDE THE FIRST FAMINE

THAT

WAS IN THE DAYS OF

ABRAHAM,

AND ISAAC WENT UNTO ABIMELECH KING OF

THE PHILISTINES UNTO GERAR.

The Lion

and

the

Ass

283

The opening

words of

the chapter

imply

a conscious attempt to relate

it back
It

to Gen. 12:10. A modern assumption that the

story

of

Isaac's

visit to

Abimelech

is due to
is
argued

a confusion

in the tradition has

both
with

gained

popularity in
words

recent years.

that the

redactor retained

versions of the

lack

of materials

that was in the

Isaac. However, the days of Abraham suggest that the

dealing

story because of the besides the first famine

apparent repetition was

done

deliberately.

2.

AND THE LORD APPEARED UNTO

HIM, AND SAID, GO NOT

DOWN INTO EGYPT:

DWELL IN THE LAND WHICH I SHALL TELL THEE OF:

We

are about

to see

Isaac's

great

journey. Both his father

as
we

and

his

son go on
will visit man.

journeys to Egypt, but Isaac is to go only his father's old friend, Abimelech, whom From
what will

far

as

Gerar. There he
a

know to be

trustworthy

later in the texts, Isaac does not seem to know that Abimelech is an old friend of his father, but thinks the outing is quite an though it doesn't begin with the bold words with which Abraham's adventure,
appear

travels from Haran began.

3.

SOJOURN IN THIS LAND AND I WILL BE WITH

THEE,

AND WILL BLESS

ALL THESE COUN

THEE, FOR UNTO THEE, AND UNTO THY SEED, I WILL GIVE

TRIES,

AND I WILL PERFORM THE OATH WHICH I SWARE UNTO ABRAHAM

THY father:

4.

AND I WILL MAKE THY SEED TO MULTIPLY AS THE STARS OF AND WILL GIVE UNTO THY SEED ALL THESE

HEAVEN,

COUNTRIES; BLESSED;

AND IN THY SEED

SHALL ALL THE NATIONS OF THE EARTH BE

5-

BECAUSE THAT ABRAHAM OBEYED MY

VOICE,

AND KEPT MY

CHARGE,

MY

COMMANDMENTS,

MY

STATUTES,

AND MY LAWS.

6.

AND ISAAC DWELT IN GERAR:

God had made many demands upon Abraham. He was told to leave his father's house, and God had once asked him to sacrifice his only son, and he was told to be perfect. Very little is asked of Isaac. He is placed in the hands
of a noble man and

told to

remain

multiply his seed as the stars in the Abraham included the simile of the
22:17), but God
other
sees no reason

sky.
sand

quietly The
as

on

the land. God

which

promises given

to to

blessing

was

well

to
of

complicate

(see commentary to Gen. Isaac's life by mentioning the

words

half

of

that blessing.

And,

course, God drops the

referring to

Israel's

enemies altogether.
and

In Verses Three
and see that no

Four God in the

makes and

it

clear that

He

will

take care of Isaac

a great

harm befalls him

get

that his seed

will

become

nation,

if Isaac

will

do little to

way.

But in Verse Five He

virtue of

clear that all these gifts stem

from the

it equally Abraham. We shall his father,

makes

284

Interpretation
this

try

to

understand

relationship between fathers

and sons

in the commentary

to Gen. 27:12.

7.

AND THE MEN OF THE PLACE ASKED HIM OF HIS

WIFE;

AND HE

SAID, SHE HE,

IS MY SISTER: FOR HE FEARED TO

SAY, SHE IS

MY

WIFE; LEST,

SAID

THE MEN OF THE PLACE SHOULD KILL ME FOR FAIR TO LOOK UPON.

REBEKAH;

BECAUSE SHE WAS

Abraham's
arranged prior

agreement with

Sarah that

she should claim to

and was

be his

sister was

to their entrance into Egypt

done

with calm

forethought.
his
wife

Since Isaac

is

clear

up his story only after the men asked him that he does not share his father's prudence.
made

about

it

8.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS,

WHEN HE HAD BEEN THERE A LONG

TIME, THAT
AND

ABIMELECH KING OF THE PHILISTINES LOOKED OUT AT A

WINDOW,

SAW, AND, BEHOLD,

ISAAC WAS SPORTING WITH REBEKAH HIS WIFE.

Isaac
some

and

Rebekah had been

living

peaceably

at

the home

of

Abimelech for
know to
as were
well

time. All of this while neither Abimelech nor

his men,

whom we

be thieves, have bothered Rebekah. Now Sarah Rachel

and

was called

beautiful,
which

Joseph. But Rebekah

was

called

good-looking,

may

have
count

meant

healthy-looking
actions of

rather

than beautiful.
men and

This

assumption would ac

for the

Abimelech 's

be

more

in

keeping

with

Isaac's

But since Bath-sheba is also called good-looking the point is moot. In any case this verse demonstrates the difference between Pharaoh and Abimelech. Since Abimelech made no advances toward Rebekah it would seem
needs.

that his

advances

toward Sarah came through

as master of

love

and not through what

he

considered

to

be his right
Pharaoh.
was

the

house,

as seems

to have been true

in the

case of

Isaac's

plan

similar

to that of

Although,

as we

have

mentioned

Abraham, but he was before, divine providence

not

very

clever.

seems to
of

play

much stronger role

in the life

of

Isaac than it had in the life

Abraham,

the

present verse

is

an exception to

that rule. To put it simply, Isaac gets caught.

No

plagues or night-dreams are necessary.

For

our observations on

the way

in

which

he

was

caught, see the commentary to Gen. 21:3.

whole of

During
problem.

the

this chapter we must

From the

point of view of

Chapter

constantly bear in mind the serious Twenty it appeared as though God,

in choosing Abraham above Abimelech to become the founder of the New Way, had made a mistake. In Chapter Twenty-one we were forced to revise that
opinion was

because

of

Abimelech 's

inadequacy

when

the problem of perpetuation

faced. It in
order

will

therefore be necessary to compare

of perpetuation.

Abimelech

with

Abraham's

son

to see the value

The Lion
9-

and the

Ass

285
ISAAC,
AND

AND ABIMELECH CALLED

SAID, BEHOLD, OF

A SURETY SHE IS

THY WIFE: AND HOW SAIDST

THOU, SHE

IS MY SISTER? AND ISAAC SAID UNTO

HIM,

BECAUSE I

SAID, LEST

I DIE FOR HER.

Abimelech'

reaction

to Isaac

is

somewhat

different from his

(Gen.

reaction

to

Abraham

under

the same circumstances. In the earlier case he assumed that

cause

Abraham believed himself to have just

for his

action

20:10-11).

Here he

makes no such supposition.

However it is he

unclear whether

the

change

in Abimelech his
and

was

due to

loss

of naivete which
was

encounter with

Abraham

or whether

he may have suffered through more impressed with Abraham

personal

hence less

likely

to suspect

his intentions. Our

point

taste would lead

us toward

the second

interpretation, but the

SAID,

is

again moot.

10.

AND ABIMELECH

WHAT IS THIS THOU HAS DONE TO US? ONE OF

THE PEOPLE MIGHT LIGHTLY HAVE LAIN WITH THY

SHOULDEST HAVE BROUGHT GUILTINESS UPON US.

WIFE,

AND THOU

Abimelech,
who seems

as was mentioned

to

be

more

in the commentary to Gen. 20:9, is still a king concerned for the welfare of his people than for his
asks: what

personal

safety.

He therefore

is this thou has done

unto

usl

Our

commentary to Verse Seven

seems

to be

strengthened

by

the

fact that Abimelech

have been led his
people

does

not

even

consider

the possibility that

he himself it

might

astray
might

by

Isaac's

actions,

he merely

considers

possible that one of

have been

so tempted.

II.

AND ABIMELECH CHARGED ALL HIS

PEOPLE, SAYING, HE THAT TOUCHETH

THIS MAN OR HIS WIFE SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH.

This

verse

is the

counterpart

of

Gen. 20:7 in
sufficient.

which

God

made

similar

threat, but here Abimelech himself is

12.

THEN ISAAC SOWED IN THAT LAND AND RECEIVED IN THE SAME YEAR AN AND THE LORD BLESSED HIM.

HUNDREDFOLD:

13.

AND THE MAN WAXED BECAME VERY GREAT.

GREAT, AND

WENT

FORWARD, AND GREW UNTIL HE

14.

FOR HE HAD POSSESSION OF

FLOCKS,

AND POSSESSION OF HERDS AND GREAT

STORE OF SERVANTS: AND THE PHILISTINES ENVIED HIM.

These
since the

verses are most remarkable.

No

one of

any

note

has been

farmer be

days

of

Cain

except

for Noah's momentary

have
stood

escapade.

When Jacob
will

decides to

settle

down
33:17).

and tie

himself to the land, the

results

again

disastrous (Gen.
other man,

God do

would not

for

such

but Isaac

can

no wrong.

In his

blundering

behavior from any way he always suc

ceeds and prospers a

hundred-fold.

286
15.

Interpretation

FOR ALL THE WELLS WHICH HIS FATHER'S SERVANTS HAD DIGGED IN THE

DAYS OF ABRAHAM HIS

FATHER,

THE PHILISTINES HAD STOPPED THEM AND

FILLED THEM WITH EARTH l6.

AND ABIMELECH SAID UNTO

ISAAC,

GO FROM

US;

FOR THOU ART MUCH

MIGHTIER THAN WE.

17.

AND ISAAC DEPARTED

THENCE,

AND PITCHED HIS TENT IN THE VALLEY OF

GERAR,
l8.

AND DWELT THERE.

AND ISAAC DIGGED AGAIN THE WELLS OF

WATER,

WHICH THEY HAD DIGGED

IN THE DAYS OF ABRAHAM HIS FATHER: FOR THE PHILISTINES HAD STOPPED THEM AFTER THE DEATH OF ABRAHAM: AND HE CALLED THEIR NAMES AFTER THE NAMES BY WHICH HIS FATHER HAD CALLED THEM. 19.
AND ISAAC'S SERVANTS DIGGED IN THE

VALLEY,

AND FOUND THERE A

WELL OF SPRINGWATER. 20.

AND THE HERDMEN OF GERAR DID STRIVE WITH ISAAC'S

HERDMEN, SAY ESEK;

ING,

THE WATER IS OURS: AND HE CALLED THE NAME OF THE WELL

BECAUSE THEY STROVE WITH HIM.

Redigging his father's wells ham was never shown digging

significance of

was

the great act of Isaac's life.

wells we shall

Since Abra
together the

any

have to

piece

that

act

from

other sources.

In Verse

Twenty

the

herdsmen

of

Gerar
Their lords

justify

their actions on the grounds that all the water

belongs to them. These

men are

statement would appear

and

to be true in a

most radical sense.

Philistines,

throughout the Bible the Philistines have been shown to the watery realm.

be

and masters of

The wells, which form a small in just measure life-giving substance. The
channel the waters of not a
well.

But Israel, too, is in need of water. passageway back to the waters of chaos, provide
goal

of tradition

is to limit

and

chaos, but to

close

them off would mean death.

Isaac is

builder
But he

of

traditions any

more

than he
alive.

is

a man

who

can

sink a new

can

keep

the New

Way

21.

AND THEY DIGGED ANOTHER

WELL,

AND STROVE FOR THAT ALSO: AND HE

CALLED THE NAME OF IT SITNAH. 22.

AND HE REMOVED FROM

THENCE,

AND DIGGED ANOTHER

WELL;

AND FOR AND HE

THAT THEY STROVE NOT: AND HE CALLED THE NAME OF IT

REHOBOTH;

SAID,

FOR NOW THE LORD HATH MADE ROOM FOR

US,

AND WE SHALL BE

FRUITFUL IN THE LAND. 23.

AND HE WENT UP FROM THENCE TO BEER-SHEBA.

In these

verses

Isaac's

one great virtue comes

to the

foreground. He keeps
in

digging them by
sition still

the

wells which

his father had

dug, keeping
called

the channels open. He calls

and spite of all oppo
men are

the same name that

right on

his father had

to

them,

he keeps

digging

and clearing.

Note that Abimelech 's

thieves. He has

no obedient son

carry

on

his

virtues.

The Lion
24.

and the

Ass

287
NIGHT,
AND

AND THE LORD APPEARED UNTO HIM THE SAME

SAID, I

AM
AND

THE GOD OF ABRAHAM THY FATHER: FEAR WILL BLESS

NOT,

FOR I AM WITH

THEE,

THEE,

AND MULTIPLY THY SEED FOR MY SERVANT ABRAHAM'S

SAKE.
25.
AND HE BUILDED AN ALTAR

THERE,

AND CALLED UPON THE NAME OF

THE

LORD,

AND PITCHED HIS TENT THERE: AND THERE ISAAC'S SERVANTS

DIGGED A WELL.

Isaac has

passed

his test

with

flying
the

colors.

We

are

beginning
and

to see the
no wells

force
to

of

Verse Five. If it
clean,
and

were not

for Abraham there

man

would

have been

keep

Isaac is

not quite

to go out

dig

a new well.

But he

will

certainly do for

present purposes.

26.

THEN ABIMELECH WENT TO HIM FROM

GERAR,

AND AHUZZATH ONE

OF HIS 27.

FRIENDS,

AND PHICHOL THE CHIEF CAPTAIN OF HIS ARMY.

AND ISAAC SAID UNTO

THEM,

WHEREFORE COME YE TO

ME, SEEING

YE

HATE
28.

ME,

AND HAVE SENT ME AWAY FROM YOU?

AND THEY

SAID,

WE SAW CERTAINLY THAT THE LORD WAS WITH THEE:

AND WE AND 29.

SAID,

LET THERE BE NOW AN OATH BETWIXT

US,

EVEN BETWIXT US

THEE,

AND LET US MAKE A COVENANT WITH THEE:

THAT THOU WILT DO US NO

HURT,

AS WE HAVE NOT TOUCHED

THEE,

AND

AS WE HAVE DONE UNTO THEE NOTHING BUT

GOOD,

AND HAVE SENT THEE

AWAY IN PEACE: THOU ART NOW THE BLESSED OF THE LORD.

Abimelech

seems to

have

understood

the full power of Isaac's

shows

foolish
means

actions.

In Verse Twenty-nine he
even

that he understands what

not

apparently it
blessed.

to be blessed of the lord

seen

though

he himself is
in the house

so

Somehow he has

that Abraham
was able

succeeded

one crucial point where

he himself failed. Abraham

Abimelech 's

to

establish a

and a

tradition, but

great virtues are

to

die

with

him.

30.

AND HE MADE THEM A

FEAST,

AND THEY DID EAT AND DRINK.

31.

AND THEY ROSE UP BETIMES IN THE

MORNING, AND SWARE ONE TO AN

OTHER: AND ISAAC SENT THEM AWAY AND THEY DEPARTED FROM HIM IN PEACE. 32.
AND IT CAME TO PASS THE SAME

DAY,

THAT ISAAC'S SERVANTS

CAME,
AND SAID

AND TOLD HIM CONCERNING THE WELL WHICH THEY HAD UNTO

DIGGED,

HIM,

WE HAVE FOUND WATER.

Peace is
own way.

now established

between Abimelech

and

Isaac,

and each will go

his

The story
water.

ends as all good stories

do,

with a

happy

ending

Isaac

has found

33.

AND HE CALLED IT SHEBAH: THEREFORE THE NAME OF THE CITY IS BEER

SHEBA UNTO THIS DAY.

288

Interpretation
one great
will

Isaac's Sheba
out of

where

he

deed has been accomplished, and he returns to Beerbe a blind old man when we next see him. As was pointed

in the commentary to Gen. 22:19 Beer-Sheba continually marks the limits the New Way, and the old man's active life has come to an end.
AND ESAU WAS FORTY YEARS OLD WHEN HE TOOK TO WIFE JUDITH THE

34.

DAUGHTER OF BEERI THE

THE HITTITE: 35.

HITTITE,

AND BASHEMATH THE DAUGHTER OF ELON

WHICH WERE A GRIEF OF MIND UNTO ISAAC AND TO REBEKAH.

shall give an account
of

We

Esau's descendants in the commentary to

Chapter Thirty-six.

CHAPTER XXVII

I.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS, THAT WHEN ISAAC WAS OLD,

AND HIS EYES WERE

DIM, SO
UNTO

THAT HE COULD NOT

SEE,

HE CALLED ESAU HIS ELDEST

SON,

AND SAID

HIM,

MY SON: AND HE SAID UNTO

as an old man and

HIM, BEHOLD,

HERE AM I.

Isaac is described
the highest of the
and

has lost
a

what even

in Biblical terms is
to his

senses.

Isaac's blindness is
character since

fitting
will

culmination

life,

it has been

part of

his

the beginning. He has been led

by

his father in the New Way, Rebekah in ways which he

The
went as
conversation

and

in this

chapter

he

be led

by
of

the

wisdom of

will not

fully

understand.

between Abraham

and

Isaac

at the

top

Mount Moriah

follows:
spake unto

And Isaac
am a

Abraham his father,

and

said,

My father;
but

and

he
is

said, Here
the

I, my

son.

And he said, Behold

(Gen. 22:7)

the fire and the wood:

where

lamb for

burnt

offering?

The

conversation

between Isaac

and

Esau is

a strange

parody

on

that

verse

in

which

Isaac

plays

the role of the son and Esau the role of the father. Verse

Eighteen
2. 3.

will contain another

parody
I AM

which we must consider

further.

AND HE

SAID,

BEHOLD

NOW,

OLD,

I KNOW NOT THE DAY OF MY DEATH: THY

NOW THEREFORE THY

TAKE,

I PRAY

THEE,

WEAPONS,

THY QUIVER AND

BOW,

AND GO OUT TO THE

FIELD,

AND TAKE ME SOME

VENISON;

4.

AND MAKE ME SAVOURY MEAT SUCH AS I

LOVE,

AND BRING IT TO

ME,

THAT

I MAY

EAT;

THAT MY SOUL MAY BLESS THEE BEFORE I DIE.

cannot

Verse Two

but

remind one of

the first
old

verse of

Chapter

Twenty-

four, but

the circumstances are

different. The

man,

Abraham,

was

busy

for sending the servant off to fetch making case that activity is replaced by a blessing.
plans

a wife

for Isaac. In the

present

In Verse Four Isaac

reveals

that he is somehow aware

of

his

own position.

The Lion
He
saw

and the

Ass

289
soul will

will eat

the venison, but his

bless Esau. It is

as

if the

old man

that

what was

blessing

his

son was not

he himself but something that lived

through

him.

In the commentary to Gen. 2:5 we discussed two Hebrew words, both of which are translated before. Isaac considers himself about to die though, as we
shall see

in

what

follows, he

will

live

on

for

another

eighty

years.

In Verse
which

Seven Rebekah

will correct

Isaac's

statement

by

using the other word,

this has.

does

not

have the

significance of

immediacy

which

5.

AND REBEKAH HEARD WHEN ISAAC SPAKE TO ESAU HIS SON. AND ESAU

WENT TO THE FIELD TO HUNT FOR VENISON AND TO BRING IT.

6.

AND REBEKAH SPAKE UNTO JACOB HER SON FATHER SPEAK UNTO ESAU THY

SAYING, BEHOLD,

I HEARD THY

BROTHER, SAYING, MEAT,

THAT I MAY

7.

BRING ME

VENISON,

AND MAKE ME SAVOURY

EAT,

AND BLESS THEE BEFORE THE LORD BEFORE MY DEATH.

8.

NOW

THEREFORE,

MY

SON,

OBEY MY VOICE ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH I

COMMAND THEE.

Rebekah in her

masterful plan

is

aware of

God's her

way will now take (Gen. 25:23), but has

charge of the arrangements. a

She

loving

understanding
of

of each

member of

own

family including Esau,

spite

which will emerge as

the present

chapter

develops. In

of, or more precisely because

that love and under

standing,

she realizes

Her

care and

that Esau is not the man to carry on the New Way. love for Isaac lead her to believe that to deceive him would be

better than to

make

him face his

own

failure to

understand

his

sons.

9.

GO NOW TO THE FLOCK, AND FETCH ME FROM THENCE TWO GOOD KIDS OF
THE

SHE-GOATS;

AND I WILL MAKE THEM SAVOURY MEAT FOR THY

FATHER,
10.

SUCH AS HE LOVETH:

AND THOU SHALT BRING IT TO THY

FATHER, THAT HE MAY EAT, AND THAT

HE MAY BLESS THEE BEFORE HIS DEATH.

and

Rebekah has been cooking Isaac's food for many years and knows his likes dislikes perfectly. Who but she could cook such a meal? Out of respect
she chooses

for her husband

kids of

a she-goat which as was explained

ruler.

in the

commentary to Gen. 15:9

are associated with the

II.

AND JACOB SAID TO REBEKAH HIS

MOTHER, BEHOLD, ESAU MY BROTHER

IS A HAIRY
12.
A

MAN,

AND I AM A SMOOTH MAN:

MY FATHER PERADVENTURE WILL FEEL

ME,

AND I SHALL SEEM TO HIM AS

DECEIVER;

AND I SHALL BRING A CURSE UPON

ME,

AND NOT A BLESSING.

Jacob fears that his father

of a constant

will want

to touch him. The

chapter

is built

out

play

on

the senses

which we shall see

develop. One may begin to

290
wonder

Interpretation
at

this point why such a fuss is

question raises

made about

the

blessing

of a

blind

old man. positions centuries.

ment.

This

many difficulties which appear in the most central of the Torah and which have been greatly misunderstood over the The problems first arise in what is known as the Second Command

God's

jealousy

leads Him to fourth

visit

the

iniquity

of the fathers

upon

the

children until the third and

generation

of them that
those who

hate

me and show

kindness

commandments

of

keep my (Ex. 20:5, 6). The context for this statement about the relation fathers to sons is a warning against idolatry. It begins with the words thou
unto the thousandth

(generation) of

love

me and

shalt

have

no

other gods

before Me. God's

vengefulness

in the

sense

here

described is strictly related to the warning concerning other gods. The passage is also repeated in the Book of Deuteronomy, 5:9, practically verbatim.
In the Book
of

Exodus Moses

once asked

God to

allow

him to
of

see

His face.

God
His

said

that

no man could see

showed

His face

and

live. Instead

face, God

Moses His

back,

that

is to say His

effects.

showing Moses The passage

reads as

follows:
and stood with

And the Lord descended in the cloud,

name

him there,
and

and proclaimed

the

the

of Lord God,

the

Lord. And

the

Lord

passed

by

before him,

proclaimed, the

Lord,
sin,

merciful and

gracious,

longsuffering,

and abundant

in

goodness and

truth,

keeping

mercy for thousands,

no means clear

forgiving iniquity
visiting the

and transgression and

and that will

by

the guilty;
s

children'

children,
ation.

and upon the

children, unto

of the fathers upon the the third and to the fourth gener

iniquity

(Ex. 34:5-7)

In Ex. 34:7 God's merely

the
closest must

jealousy

is described

again.

But this time it is

verse

no

longer

a part of a particular commandment.

In this

jealousy

emerges as

that

Moses

will ever come what

to

knowing
mean.

the essence of

God Himself.

We

try

to find out

these words

different context, when God is giving the laws concerning individual men and their individual actions, whether it be stealing or killing or perverting the judgment of the stranger, He says:
In
a

The fathers
put to

shall not

be

put to

death for

the children.

Neither

shall the children

be

death for the fathers: but

each man shall

be

put to

death for his

own sin:

(Deut. 24:16)

practice

This is certainly the law for men (See II Kings 14:6), but how
to

and

this is the law that

that

was

put

into

shall we understand

jealousy

which

is

so essential

God's being?
God had
revealed

Sometime

after

his

essence as

being jealousy
because

in the double

sense of punishment and giants

care, the

people revolted

of their

fear

of the

(See commentary to Gen. 14:4). God at that time was about to destroy the people when Moses reminded Him of His promise, and His jealousy was
used

to save the people.

must

It

first be

noted

that the statement is always in the

plural and never

The Lion
used

and

the

Ass
of an

291

for the detriment

individual

person

because

of

the individual sin of

his
of

own

father. The

passage speaks of a whole generation which suffers

because

the mistakes of the previous generation. It would be hard to live in our

present world without

seeing the truth

of this warning.

The

statement

is directed

not

to the sons but to the

fathers, warning

them that their errors may lead their

or

children

to suffer

either

because they have lost the way

because they find

themselves in circumstances not entirely of their own making. The statement is

indeed
tion
well

close

to the essence of Biblical thought. The claim is that if a

founda

is poorly laid its effect will only last for a few generations but that if laid it will prosper for a thousand. The author surely does not mean that be
no ups and

there will

downs, but

the claim is that this solidity, once estab

lished,
13.

can

be easily

revived.

and his mother said unto

him,

upon me be thy

curse, my

son only

obey my

voice, went,

and go fetch me them. and

14.

and he

fetched,

and brought them to his mother:

and his mother made savoury 15.

meat,

such as his father loved.

and rebekah took goodly raiment of her eldest son

esau, which

were with her in the son:

house,

and put them upon jacob her younger

l6.

and she put the skins of the kids of the goats upon his hands

and upon the smooth of his neck:

17.

and she gave the savoury meat and the

her son jacob. and

bread,

which she had

prepared, into the hand of

18.
and he came unto his

father,

said,

my father: and he

said,

here am

i;

who art

thou,

my son?
uses of the words

How different Verse Eighteen is from the

we
seen

Here

am

I that

as of

have up showing full awareness and readiness to care for another. They were words certainty when God used them at the time of the Flood. After reading
am

till now. In the commentary to Gen. 22:1 we described them

Abraham's reassuring words Here it is to read the words Here am I,

AND JACOB SAID UNTO HIS

addressed

to his

son

Isaac, how

pitiful

who art

thou, my

son?

19.

FATHER,

I AM ESAU THY

FIRSTBORN; I

HAVE

DONE ACCORDING AS THOU BADEST ME:

MY

ARISE,

I PRAY THEE SIT AND EAT OF

VENISON, THAT

THY SOUL MAY BLESS ME.

20.

AND ISAAC SAID UNTO HIS

SON,

HOW IS IT THAT THOU HAS FOUND IT BECAUSE THE LORD THY GOD BROUGHT IT

SO

QUICKLY,

MY SON? AND HE

SAID,

TO ME.

lie. In fact they are more truthful than Abraham's lie to Abimelech. Jacob received the birthright from Esau at the end Jacob's
words are

not a complete

of

the last chapter,

and

for

present purposes

he is the

man most

appropriately

292
known

Interpretation

by

the name
would

thy firstborn,

whereas

Abraham

was not

the man whom

Abimelech
wise

primarily

understand to

be the brother
even

of

Sarah. Through the

intervention

and cooperation of

Rebekah,

Verse

Twenty is

not a

lie

in the deepest

sense.

21.

AND ISAAC SAID UNTO

JACOB, COME NEAR, I

PRAY

THEE, THAT I MAY FEEL

THEE MY 22.

SON,

WHETHER THOU BE MY VERY SON ESAU OR NOT.

AND JACOB WENT NEAR UNTO ISAAC HIS

FATHER;

AND HE FELT

HIM,

AND

SAID,

THE VOICE IS JACOB'S

VOICE,

BUT THE HANDS ARE THE HANDS OF

ESAU.
23. AND HE DISCERNED HIM

NOT,

BECAUSE HIS HANDS WERE

HAIRY, AS HIS

BROTHER ESAU'S HANDS: SO HE BLESSED HIM.

Having
rather than

lost his

sense of of

sight, Isaac chooses to trust his sense

word which

of

touch

his

sense

hearing. The from the

has been translated felt

to the least

generally describes

means to a

grope, and implies confusion (See Deut. 28:29). The text

motion most reliable of our senses

downward

trustworthy:

from sight, to hearing, to touch.

24.
25.

AND HE SAID ART THOU MY VERY SON ESAU? AND HE AND HE

SAID,

I AM.

SAID, BRING IT NEAR

TO ME AND I WILL EAT OF MY SON'S

VENISON, THAT HIM,

MY SOUL MAY BLESS THEE. AND HE BROUGHT IT NEAR TO

AND HE DID EAT: AND HE BROUGHT HIM

WINE,

AND HE DRANK.

Isaac has

eaten

the sheep

believing

it to be the

venison.

He is
to

again

fooled

by

his

senses.

Strangely

enough, the

one sense which seems

no

be operating
hearing.
on

well

is the

one sense

to which Isaac pays

attention, his

sense of

Given his
sense.

position one would of

have

expected

Isaac to rely
with

most

heavily

that

If the story
would

Isaac

concerns

itself mainly

the

continuity
the New

of

tradi

tion one

have

expected

the sense of
and

hearing
is

to be the most important.

But

not all generations

listen,

the question
soul of

whether

Way

can

bury

itself

deeply

enough

into the

the people that it can

live

through

such generations.

On the

use of wine see

the

commentary to Gen.

9:20.

26.

AND HIS FATHER ISAAC SAID UNTO

HIM, COME NEAR NOW,

AND KISS

ME,

MY SON.

27.

AND HE CAME

NEAR,

AND KISSED HIM: AND HE SMELLED THE SMELL OF

HIS

RAIMENT,

AND BLESSED

HIM, AND SAID, SEE, THE SMELL OF

MY SON IS AS

THE SMELL OF A FIELD WHICH THE LORD HATH BLESSED.

Isaac is
and yet

now operating on the lowest of the sensesthe due to the well-laid plans of Abraham, God, and

sense of

smell,

Rebekah, everything

is going perfectly according to

plan.

The Lion
28.

and

the Ass

293
HEAVEN,
AND THE FATNESS OF

THEREFORE GOD GIVE THEE OF THE DEW OF

THE 29.

EARTH,

AND PLENTY OF CORN AND WINE:

LET PEOPLE SERVE

THEE,

AND NATIONS BOW DOWN TO THEE: BE LORD

OVER THY

BRETHREN,

AND LET THY MOTHER'S SONS BOW DOWN TO THEE:

CURSED BE EVERY ONE THAT CURSETH BLESSETH THEE.

THEE, AND BLESSED

BE HE THAT

Isaac's

blessing

is

curious.

There

are

two

sets of words which milk and

in Hebrew

go

together like
which one

bread

and

butter. One

set

is

honey

and the other

set,

blessing
wine on

finds less often, is corn of a farmer rather than the

and wine.

Isaac

chooses to give

Jacob the

blessing

of a

shepherd,

as a result of what

was pointed out

is

often

in the commentary to Gen. 26:12. The example of corn and used as an example of what God may or may not bless depending
of a

the

behaviour

Israel. But there is only

one passage

in

which

it itself is

used

to symbolize

it

was used

by

suade the men

very Syrian emissary at the time of Hezekiah in of Israel to give up the battle and become

blessing,

yet the passage

is

not a

pleasant one since

an attempt subject

to

per

to Syrian

force (II Kings

18:32).

30.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS, AS SOON

AS ISAAC HAD MADE AN END OF BLESSING

JACOB,
31.

AND JACOB WAS YET SCARCE GONE OUT FROM THE PRESENCE OF

ISAAC HIS

FATHER, THAT ESAU HIS

BROTHER CAME IN FROM HIS HUNTING.

AND HE ALSO HAD MADE SAVOURY AND SAID UNTO HIS

MEAT,

AND BROUGHT IT UNTO HIS

FATHER,
SON'S 32.

FATHER,

LET MY FATHER

ARISE,

AND EAT OF HIS

VENISON,

THAT THY SOUL MAY BLESS ME.

AND ISAAC HIS FATHER SAID UNTO

HIM,

WHO ART THOU? AND HE

SAID,

I AM THY 33.

SON, THY

FIRSTBORN ESAU.

AND ISAAC TREMBLED VERY

EXCEEDINGLY,

AND

SAID, WHO? WHERE ME,

AND I HAVE EATEN

IS HE THAT HATH TAKEN

VENISON,

AND BROUGHT IT

OF ALL BEFORE THOU CAMEST, AND HAVE BLESSED HIM? YEA, AND HE
SHALL BE BLESSED. 34.
AND WHEN ESAU HEARD THE WORDS OF HIS

FATHER,

HE CRIED WITH A

GREAT AND EXCEEDING BITTER

CRY,

AND SAID UNTO HIS

FATHER,

BLESS

ME,

EVEN ME

ALSO, O MY

FATHER!

In Verse Thirty-two,
thou? He

as

in Verse Eighteen, the

old

man

says,

who

art

is

confused about which son

is

which.

Verse Thirty-four is difficult to translate because in it. The

root of

of a certain

play

on words

which we
and

the word for crying used in the verse is one of those roots have discussed in the commentary to Gen. 21:3, and so the words he cried sound very much like the word for laughter, and hence like the

his father, Isaac. In Verse Thirty-four the author says: And when Esau heard the words of his father, he cried with a great and exceeding bitter cry, and said unto his father, Bless me, even also me, O my father. At this point in
name of

294

Interpretation
words

the text the

one

crying,

laughter, Isaac,
of the

and

father

all

become jumbled into

word,

and

the full

irony

into light. Esau's

name.

pitiable clumsiness and

ambiguity of Isaac's name comes completely Isaac's blindness are all part of his

35.

AND

HE

SAID,

THY

BROTHER CAME

WITH

SUBTILTY,

AND

HATH TAKEN

AWAY THY BLESSING. 36. AND HE

SAID,

IS NOT HE RIGHTLY NAMED JACOB? FOR HE HATH SUP

PLANTED ME THESE TWO TIMES: HE TOOK AWAY MY

BIRTHRIGHT; AND,

BEHOLD,

NOW HE HATH TAKEN AWAY MY BLESSING. AND HE

SAID, HAST THOU

NOT RESERVED A BLESSING FOR ME?

37.

AND ISAAC ANSWERED AND SAID UNTO

ESAU, BEHOLD,

I HAVE MADE HIM

THY

LORD,

AND ALL HIS BRETHREN HAVE I GIVEN TO HIM FOR

SERVANTS;

AND WITH CORN AND WINE HAVE SUSTAINED HIM: AND WHAT SHALL I DO

NOW UNTO 38.

THEE,

MY SON?

AND ESAU SAID UNTO HIS

FATHER, HAST ALSO, O

THOU BUT ONE

BLESSING,

MY

FATHER? BLESS HIS

ME,

EVEN ME

MY FATHER. AND ESAU LIFTED UP

VOICE,
and

AND WEPT.

Isaac
gives an

Esau

now

have
of

and

have

not understood what

has happened. Esau his

unconscious

interpretation

Jacob's

name

consciously

whereas

explanation of

the name Isaac may have been much

more

insightful. death Sarah

Esau's weeping is not described used twice before in the text, once
and once when

by

the word used for his cry. It has been

when

Abraham

wept at

the

of

Hagar

was

left

with

Ishmael in the desert. As

we shall see when of

we consider the character of

Joseph, weeping is
of

the highest

the passions

from the

point of view of of

the Book

be the highest form

our respect. shall see

that passion

Genesis. While Esau's weeping may not it is certainly close enough to command
uses

In Verse Thirty-eight Esau

next chapter

the

word father

three times. As

we

in the

the constant repetition of this word as he is about

which sets

to weep reveals Esau's devotion to his father

mael.

him

apart

from Ish

Esau's devotion to his father is He is

almost

one

half

of

the paradoxical nature of his

character.

desperately
a

in

need of of

the ties to his own

immediate
requires

father. On the
nothing.

other

hand, he is

man

the

fields

man

who

This

near paradox captures

the sense in which Esau is

like evening
and

(see commentary to Gen. 25:23). Esau was an unplanned and almost

accidental mixture

between Jacob
God had

Ishmael. The
to in
answer

problem

in his

character

is the

problem which

referred

to Rebekah's question in Gen. 25:22. He

tinction which we

have

made

between the New

complicated

Way
the

and

defies the sharp dis the blessed way of

of

Ishmael. The

problem

is further

by

fact that his devotion is to

seeing beyond

his immediate father Isaac, and hence he is Isaac to the principles of his original father,

rather

incapable

Abraham,

which are

fully

seen

by

The Lion
Rebekah
and
of

and

the Ass

295 Jacob. Isaac's

preference
and

implemented

by

his lack
petuate.

full

awareness of that which

of

he

for Esau may be part of only he can carry and per

will

A fuller understanding

this

distinction

have to

wait until

the

next chapter.

39.

AND ISAAC HIS FATHER ANSWERED AND SAID UNTO HIM

BEHOLD,

THY

DWELLING SHALL BE THE FATNESS OF THE FROM

EARTH,

AND OF THE DEW OF HEAVEN

above;

40.

AND BY THY SWORD SHALT THOU

LIVE,

AND SHALT SERVE THY

BROTHER;

AND IT SHALL COME TO PASS WHEN THOU SHALT HAVE THE THOU SHALT BREAK HIS YOKE FROM OFF THY NECK.

DOMINION, THAT

It is difficult to his
neck.

understand

in

what sense

Esau

will

break

the yoke

from off
the

These

words

may

refer

to a

wonderful

day

in the future

when

problems of man caused

by

the mixture of good and bad will be solved. That

which

is to say, it may refer to the fulfillment of the promise holds out to the whole of mankind. On the other hand,
the

the New

Way
free

historically

speaking,

Edomites,
Even to

who

were

the descendants

of

Esau, only
be to

gained their

dom from Israel

16:6).
of

at the time

Israel became

a vassal of
would

the Assyrians (II Kings

assume

consider

this interpretation

that the Book

Genesis

was written after

the fall of Jerusalem.

and

However,

we

have

not yet

established

the author's

tion in

abeyance.

It does,

date, however,

therefore

we shall

have to hold the interpreta

date

of publication, and we shall

necessity for establishing the face the problem in the commentary to Gen.
show the

28:19.

41

AND ESAU HATED JACOB BECAUSE OF THE BLESSING WHEREWITH HIS FA THER BLESSED HIM: AND ESAU SAID IN HIS FOR MY FATHER ARE AT

HEART,

THE DAYS OF MOURNING

HAND;

THEN WILL I SLAY MY BROTHER JACOB.

42.

AND THESE WORDS OF ESAU HER ELDER SON WERE TOLD TO REBEKAH: AND

SHE SENT AND CALLED JACOB HER YOUNGER

SON,

AND SAID UNTO DOTH COMFORT

HIM, HIMSELF,

BEHOLD,

THY BROTHER

ESAU,

AS TOUCHING

THEE,

PURPOSING TO KILL THEE.

43.

NOW THEREFORE MY

SON,

OBEY MY

VOICE; AND ARISE, FLEE THEE THOU

TO LABAN MY BROTHER TO

HARAN;
DAYS,
UNTIL THY BROTHER'S FURY TURN

44.

AND TARRY WITH HIM A FEW

away;
45.
UNTIL THY BROTHER'S ANGER TURN AWAY FROM

THEE, AND HE FORGET

THAT WHICH THOU HAST DONE TO HIM: THEN I WILL

SEND,

AND FETCH THEE

FROM THENCE: WHY SHOULD I BE DEPRIVED ALSO OF YOU BOTH IN ONE DAY?

Esau,
not

as we

know, is

a man of quick passion.

until

His

respect

for his father

will

allow

him to kill Jacob

vinced that one

day

he

will

is dead, but he is utterly kill his brother. Rebekah however shows no

the old
man

con great

296
concern.

Interpretation
She
advises

Jacob to

go

to her brother's for a few days because she

matter and

knows that Esau's passion down. Unlike

the
virtues of

is

temporary

that

he

will

soon calm

Isaac, Rebekah
those
whom she

sees with great

clarity both the

weaknesses and

loves.
when

At the
her two
shows

end of

Verse Forty-five,

it is

a personal matter of

the

death

of

sons and no care no

in her

longer a matter of carrying on Way, Rebekah distinction between Jacob and Esau. She is not primarily
the New
will

worried about

the death of Jacob but fears that she

be deprived

of

both

of

them

on one

day.

46.

AND REBEKAH SAID TO ISAAC I AM WEARY OF MY LIFE BECAUSE OF THE

DAUGHTERS OF HETH: IF JACOB TAKE A WIFE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF

HETH,

SUCH AS THESE WHICH ARE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF THE SHALL MY LIFE DO ME?

LAND,

WHAT GOOD

Rebekah

sees no reason

to cause her husband any worry or pain about what

sons.

has happened between their two

gives

Isaac

totally different

reason

if nothing had happened for sending Jacob away.

She
acts as

and

CHAPTER XXVIII

I.

AND ISAAC CALLED UNTO

JACOB,

AND BLESSED HIM AND CHARGED

HIM,

AND SAID

HIM,

THOU SHALT NOT TAKE A WIFE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF CANAAN.

TO

2.

ARISE, GO FATHER;

PADAN-ARAM, TO THE HOUSE OF

BETHUEL THY MOTHER'S

AND TAKE THEE A WIFE FROM THENCE OF THE DAUGHTERS OF LABAN

THY MOTHER'S BROTHER.

The
search
will

following
for Isaac's

two chapters are obviously intended as a counterpart to the

wife

in Chapters Twenty-four just

as we

and

Twenty-five. In them Jacob

provided with a wife. under no circum of

take himself a
of

wife

had

seen

Isaac

being

In Verse Six
stances was

Chapter Twenty-four Abraham insisted that

return

Isaac to his

to Padan-aram. But in the

beginning

this chapter

Isaac

sends

son to that same almost an

Verse Two is

country in order to find his own wife. inversion of the beginning of Chapter Twelve. Isaac
places
one

is sending Jacob back to all those In the light of Abraham's warning

ous

from

which

God had

sent

Abraham. danger

hardly

knows

which

is the

more

journey,

and which will

take more courage.

3.

AND GOD ALMIGHTY BLESS

THEE,

AND MAKE THEE

FRUITFUL,

AND MUL

TIPLY

THEE,

THAT THOU MAYEST BE A CONGREGATION OF

PEOPLES;

4.

AND GIVE THEE THE BLESSING OF

ABRAHAM, TO THEE,

AND TO THY SEED

WITH

THEE; THAT THOU MAYEST INHERIT

THE LAND WHEREIN THOU ART A

STRANGER,

WHICH GOD GAVE UNTO ABRAHAM.

The Lion

and

the Ass

297

We have discussed the term God almighty in the commentary to Gen. 17:1. In Verse Three Isaac blesses Jacob and says that he shall become a congre
gation

of peoples. The

peats

to Jacob the

which

is

not

blessing is part of Isaac's two-sided virtue/vice. He re blessing which would have been appropriate for himself but completely fitting in the case of Jacob. That error may be related
great nations.

to

his

position as a mere

whom will

beget

repository of tradition. Isaac had two sons, both of It would have been appropriate for Isaac to re
word peoples

ceive a
should

blessing
have
problem

read people

containing the in the

in the plural, but Jacob's

blessing

singular.
use of

The

involving

Isaac's

the plural is rather

difficult because

there are several ways of

against what we

interpreting

it. One alternative,

which would speak

of

that

loosely
On the

have just said, is that Isaac may have envisaged the possibility connected nation of tribes found in the Book of Judges which for Israel hand if the

had been the

parent.

author

by
5.

the

until the necessity of a king became ap blessing was an error on the part of Isaac the may have intended it ironically since Israel was divided into two peoples revolution which occurred after the reign of King Solomon.

original plan
other

and isaac sent away jacob: and he went to padan-aram unto

laban,

son of bethuel the

syrian, the brother of rebekah,

jacob's

and esau's mother.

6.

when esau saw that isaac had blessed to

jacob,

and sent him away and that as he

padan-aram,

to take him a wife from

thence;

blessed him he gave him a

charge,

saying thou shalt not take

a wife of the daughters of

canaan; mother,
and was gone

7-

and that jacob obeyed his father and his

to padan-aram;

8.

and esau seeing that the daughters of canaan pleased not isaac HIS

father; ISHMAEL,
AND TOOK UNTO THE WIVES WHICH HE

9.

THEN WENT ESAU UNTO

HAD MAHALATH THE DAUGHTER OF ISHMAEL ABRAHAM'S

SON,

THE SISTER OF

NEBAJOTH,

TO BE HIS WIFE.
a comparison of

Esau's devotion to his father Isaac is touching, but

Verses

Seven
to his

and

Eight

reveals

that Esau's great

since

devotion to his father does

more

not extend

mother.

However

Rebekah is

in

contact with what

is

most

important in Abraham, the indication is that Esau's respect for his father fails to include that which is most important in him. While something of that nature
mean that the test through which may be said of Isaac himself it would only New Way, while it is strong forever. The continue cannot put been has Isaac from time to time, and renewed be must enough to lie dormant for a while,

Esau

seems

to be incapable of that

renewal

precisely because

of

his strong

devotion to his immediate father. We

there

shall

have to

see what other alternative

is in the

next chapters.

298
10. II.

Interpretation
BEER-SHEBA,
AND WENT TOWARD HARAN.

AND JACOB WENT OUT FROM

AND HE LIGHTED UPON THE PLACE, AND TARRIED THERE ALL

NIGHT, BE
PLACE, AND

CAUSE THE SUN WAS PUT THEM FOR HIS

SET;

AND HE TOOK OF THE STONES OF THE

PILLOWS,

AND LAY DOWN IN THAT PLACE TO SLEEP.

Jacob has set out on the long and fearful journey which appropriately began from the city of Beer-sheba. In the commentary to Gen. 22:19 Beer-sheba turned out to be the border par excellence. Jacob, in leaving from Beer-sheba,
enters

that

endless world of

the

outside. met

Verse Eleven
the

literally
world

begins He be

up

with the place.

It is

peculiar were

that

definite

article should

used with

the word

place as

if there

only

one place

in the is

in

which

the

following

chapter could

have

occurred.

This

feeling

underlined

by

the

fact that the

words the place

or that place

are used no six

less than three times in this

whole.

one sentence alone and will appear

creates a suspense which will

By using the definite article the author broken in Verse Nineteen. be only Jacob's dream begins after sunset just as Abraham's dream in Chapter
times in the chapter as a

Fifteen had. It

would be wise to recall precisely what that dream taught Abra ham. From it Abraham learned that the Promised Land was not an uninhabited

paradise
which

waiting for his arrival. He learned that it was his descendants would not even see until they had

inhabited country endured four hundred

an

years of

slavery in Egypt and forty years of arduous travel through the wild barren country of Sinai. He also realized that many wars would be fought in its establishment. These are the things that Abraham learned after the sun
and
went

down.
not

Jacob does The

lay

his head

directly

on the ground at

but

places

it

on a rock.

significance of the rock will

be discussed

length in the commentary to

Verse Eighteen.

12.

AND HE

DREAMED,

AND BEHOLD A LADDER SET UP ON THE

EARTH,

AND

THE TOP OF IT REACHING TOWARD HEAVEN. AND BEHOLD THE ANGELS OF GOD ASCENDING AND DESCENDING ON IT.

While
now

on

his journey, Jacob had

dream in
Professor

which

he

saw

angels.

Until
the

God Himself He

was never more connected with

heaven than he
of

was with

earth.

created each and was called

or perhaps

both.

Many

times in the

past,

heaven,

it

would

tion as the
sent

home

of the chaotic

be better to say the sky, has had the connota waters and hence the place from which God
the fire which fell on

the waters of the

angels on

Flood

and

Sodom
with

and

Gomorrah.

The

the other hand have often been

and 22:15).

identified
of

heaven (See Gen.

will

21:17, 22:11,

But Verse Thirteen

the present chapter

with

be the

first
It

verse to associate
would

God Himself unambiguously

heaven.
is. First it
be

be

wise at

this point to consider the appearances of angels in the

must

text in an attempt to get some glimpse of what an angel

The Lion
said

and the

Ass
an

299

that we may be
uses

doing

injustice

to the text

by

using the

word angel.

The

Hebrew

the normal e very-day word for a messenger.

In

general angels appear of as

to ordinary human beings

mally think
once

being

the highest the

whom one does not nor leaders in Israel. The list includes Hagar,

Lot, Balaam, Gideon,

before had
munication with

and

wife of

Manoah,

the

father

of

Samson.

Only
com

an angel appeared

to a major character.
of an

Abraham's last

God

was

through the medium

of

angel, but

as we saw at

that time it

indicated the

beginning

the

final

stage of

Abraham's life.
the

The

next

time an angel of the Lord will meet a major character, aside from a

fleeting
Lord

glance

will appear

in Gen. 32:2, will be in Exodus 3:2 in which to Moses from the burning bush. From that God directly.
Moses'

an angel of point on

Moses

will speak with

encounter with the angel will

be

a coun

Abraham's. To Moses, the angel is an introduction the separation implied in the scene with Abraham.
terpart to

which

balances
the New

Only

one other angel plays revolt of the

a major role

in the development
was a

of

Way. After the

Golden Calf there

tween God and the people which we

have discussed

at some

necessary length (See

separation

be

com

mentary to Gen. 20:7 et en passant). When God made his decision to Himself from the people, He sent His angel to lead the way.
2.

keep

And I

will send an angel and

before thee;

and

will

drive

out the

Canaanite,
3.

the

Amorite,

the

Hittite,

and the

Perizzite,

the

Hivite,

and

the

Jebusite:

Unto

land flowing heard

with milk and

honey; for I

will not go

art a stiffnecked people;

lest I

consume thee

in the

up in the midst of thee; for thou way. 4. And when the people

these evil tidings,

they

mourned: and no man

did put

on

him his

ornaments.

(Ex. 33:2, 3, 4)

13.

AND, BEHOLD,

THE LORD STOOD ABOVE

IT,

AND

SAID,

I AM THE LORD

GOD OF ABRAHAM THY

FATHER,

AND THE GOD OF ISAAC: THE LAND WHEREON

THOU LIEST TO THEE WILL I GIVE IT, AND TO THY SEED:

God is lies

pictured as

on the ground.

standing at the very top of a high ladder while Jacob God and man have never been so separated in the book
constantly

before,
between

and yet messengers man and

keep

the two in contact. The distance

God

which we see at

this point will

have
with

a radical effect on

the remainder of Genesis. In the past God spoke this point on he will almost
reflect rather
never

freely

many

men.

From
speak

speak,

and

the few words he does

than relieve this silence. The

appears

man with whom manifestation of

Jacob

shall wrestle

in Chapter Thirty-two

to be some

God,

but there

are

only three instances in which God In Gen. 35:1 there will be a short his dream. But, blessing He had
the
separation

will speak

in his

own voice

to Jacob again.

when
given

telling Jacob to return to the place of Jacob returns, God will do nothing more than repeat the before. In Chapter Forty-six, Verse Two, God will make
verse one verse

clear

in

by

sending Jacob down into

Egypt,

where

300

Interpretation
direct
communication

there will be no
years.

between God

and man

for four hundred

14.

AND THY SEED SHALL BE AS THE DUST OF THE

EARTH, AND THOU SHALT

SPREAD ABROAD TO THE

WEST,

AND TO THE EAST, AND TO THE

NORTH,

AND TO THE SOUTH: AND IN THEE AND IN THY SEED SHALL ALL THE FAMILIES

OF THE EARTH BE BLESSED.

15.

AND, BEHOLD,

I AM WITH THEE. AND WILL KEEP THEE IN ALL PLACES

WHITHER THOU

GOEST,

AND WILL BRING THEE AGAIN INTO THIS

LAND; FOR

WILL NOT LEAVE THEE UNTIL I HAVE DONE THAT WHICH I HAVE SPOKEN

TO THEE OF.

Jacob

receives

did

not receive.

Gen.

26:4).
which

only the other half of the blessing, the half which his father He is blessed as the dust of the earth (See commentary to This indicates that he will be forced to face many of the difficulties

from

his father

was protected. man could

Jacob is
at the

lying

on

the ground sprawled out, as low as

lie. God is

very top

of a

high ladder

which

has its foundation

on the earth and as

the text says reaches in a

heavenly

direction. The

angels seem

to be a promise

that in spite of this great distance there will always be some connection between

God

Verse
will

Jacob, or Israel. This is the sense in which we Fifteen, in which God promised that he would be keep Jacob, and that he will not leave Jacob.
and

ought to understand
with

Jacob,

that he

l6.

AND JACOB AWAKED OUT OF HIS

SLEEP,

AND HE

SAID,

SURELY THE LORD

IS IN THIS

PLACE;

AND I KNEW IT NOT.

In this

context we can well understand

and yet not at

first be

perceived

by

why it is that God may be present human beings. This is the first time in the

Bible that any man has ever made such a remark, and perhaps this is Jacob's great test in the sense that Isaac's stay with Abimelech was his test. In Isaac and Jacob we can see two very different men, both of whom play a role after
the

death
is

of

the

founder; Isaac,
aware of

through whom the tradition can pass, and

Jacob,

who

keenly

the presence of things that no longer appear on the

surface.

17.

AND HE WAS

AFRAID,

AND

SAID,

HOW DREADFUL IS THIS PLACE. THIS

IS NONE OTHER BUT THE HOUSE OF

GOD,

AND THIS IS THE GATE OF HEAVEN.

The fear

which

Jacob felt

at that moment was a new not

feeling
from

never

felt before in the

case

by
of

mankind.

It

Man

or of

(Gen. 19:30),
the

laws

of

in the face of evil men is it simply the fear of God in the sense of one who obeys decency (Gen. 20:11). The fear which Jacob felt was the sudden
of a coward nor

certainly Sarah. Nor was it the fear

was

the fear which arises

guilt as

realization of

his

place within a vast universe and the great

distance between

The Lion
him
the
will

and the

Ass
a

301

and

the

highest. Such
bush
and also

burning one day

should

feeling will again be felt by by the people at the foot of

Moses

at

the sight of

Mount Sinai. Moses

overcome

that gap, but the people will have to have that gap the priests, and the kings.
sense need

closed

for them

by

the

Prophets,
in
now

It

now

be

clear

what

heaven

and

why Jacob is

in

God has taken up residence in the of a gate. I believe that in the next
meaning
of of gate.

verse we shall get a clearer

indication
upon

as to the

However it

is

not yet clear

why Jacob insists

the location

the the

place.

l8.

AND JACOB ROSE UP EARLY IN THE

MORNING,

AND TOOK THE STONE THAT

HE HAD PUT FOR HIS

PILLOWS,

AND SET IT UP FOR A

PILLAR,

AND POURED OIL

UPON THE TOP OF IT.

Jacob's

reaction

to what

he has

seen

is

curious.

He

anoints

the stone

which

he had
erence

used as a pillow.

The

stone on which
wrote

he

rests or

to the stone on

which

Moses

the

laws

his head may be a ref it may be a reference to

word which

the general

translated to pour
used when when

solidity is

of
not

tradition, but
anointed

one

thing is
first

clear; the

is

the normal word used for anointed. Nonetheless to be the

priest

it is

Aaron

was

(Ex. 29:7),
10:1).

and

again
reac

Saul

was anointed as the seems to

arisen

first

King

of

Israel (I Sam.
grasped

Jacob's

tion to

his dream
which

imply

that he

fully

the

significance of

the

distance

had

between

man and

God. He

sees that not all of

his

descendants
will acquire

will

have the
a

courage to and a

both

Priest

face this gap King. When Jacob

and that returns to

eventually Israel
the
place of

his

dream in

chapter

Thirty-five the fact that Israel

will one

day

be in

need of a

king
are
gate

be explicitly stated. The Prophets, the priests, and the kings the people Jacob had in mind in the previous verse when he spoke
will

these
of

The

of Heaven.
AND HE CALLED THE NAME OF THAT PLACE BETH-EL: BUT THE NAME OF

19.

THAT CITY WAS CALLED LUZ AT THE FIRST.

The tension is

now

broken. The

place

turns out to

be Beth-el. The

difficulty
had

is

to account for the great importance of that place for the author. Abraham

once made a sacrifice there and

had

even

lived there for

time, but he built

captured the city, but the many altars and lived in many places. Joshua once battle itself is not even mentioned. Deborah was there for a while, but it is hard to see in what sense that could be of such grave importance.

In

order

to

answer our present

difficulty,
From the

we shall

be forced to face
since

a prob

lem

directly

which

has been
in

looming

over our

heads

Chapter Twelve but

the connection

which we

had thought to
cities

avoid.

moment we noticed

between the

which

Abraham built his

of

altars and

the scenes of

Joshua's

battles, it became
out

clear

that the Book

Genesis

could not

be

understood with

knowledge

of

the later books. The present author does not regard

himself

as

302

Interpretation in
all

a philologist and cannot authorship.

honesty

raise

the problem

concensus among those wise partly because of the traditional claim for its divine authorship through Moses it would not only be foolish to face the problem of the date of authorship but at best it could only distract us from our true goals. Nonetheless we shall be forced to face the problem in some form or another.

Nor is there any

reason and

concerning the date of men for him to accept.

Partly

for that

If the

author presupposes

knowledge

of

later

events we must

determine date in

which

later

events

the author had in mind. Although we have limited our

discussion
order

to events mentioned to exclude

in the Bible

we must

determine the

author's

later

events.

The
Book
what

difficulty

of

is that the city of Beth-el rises to prominence only in the Kings. Thus we are forced to consider that book and to decide at
in the Book
of

point

Kings there is
at

an

occurrence

at

Beth-el

which

would

justify

its
of

great

importance

this point in the Book of the

reign of

Genesis.

The Book
passages give
and south.

Kings begins

with

Solomon. These
of

introductory
of the

the immediate cause for the division

chapters of

the country into north

The final

the last book describe the

destruction

state. and

The large
old

central section
which

is held together
retold

by

the story of the man of

God

the

prophet,

was

in the Digression
the
of

Twenty. Jeroboam's

altar

is

used as

the

symbol of

following Chapter disunity which existed in

of the

Israel

story it formed a thread holding them together. No concerning the of God, less than nineteen times throughout both Books of Kings there is a reference to
man

during

most of

its life. It
and

was

the

focus

both halves

the

sin

of Jeroboam. Even concerning the

greatest

of

the kings the ends of

not from

their lives are always summed up

by

the

words

He departed
sin.

the sin of

Jeroboam,

the son of Nabat, who made

not

Israel to

Only
able to

in her last days,

reunify the country and

long before the Babylonians attacked, destroy the symbol of its disunity,

was

Josiah

the altar at

Beth-el.

If this is the
rethink

moment which

the author has in mind we shall be forced to

in

a most radical sense much of what

has been

said.

The distant fears

that we imagined the author to

Gen. 14.3

could not

have had concerning the rise of Babylon in have been as distant as we had supposed. That in itself is

The grave problem is to understand how the world could be blessed through Israel if Israel had already fallen. At this point the evidence looks pretty slim, but nevertheless it does open up a possibility which we shall
of no consequence.

have to bear in
If
we are

mind

from

now on.

to read the Promise in the light

or

soon to

fall

the whole of

of the probability that the state is had already fallen into the hands of Babylon we must reinterpret the author's intent. The success of the New Way must rest in its

ability to withstand the years spent in captivity under foreign domination in Babylon. If this was the immediate cause, as opposed to the ultimate cause of the book, it would certainly shed light on the story of Joseph and the time

The Lion
spent

and

the Ass

303
we

in Egypt,
of

as well as

the great insistence that

and

have

seen

throughout the

book

on the number

forty
it

its

relation

to gestation.

The Book
another sense

Genesis
which

was

intended

as a

book for

all

in

was

intended for those

who

times, but if there was lived after the time of

Josiah then the

of

period spent

in Egypt

and the redemption under the

leadership
to

go

Moses may have been intended into Babylon.

as a paradigm

for those

who were about

20.

AND JACOB VOWED A

VOW, SAYING, IF GOD

WILL BE WITH

ME,

AND

WILL KEEP ME IN THIS WAY THAT I

AND RAIMENT TO PUT 21.

GO,

AND WILL GIVE ME BREAD TO

EAT,

ON,

SO THAT I COME AGAIN TO MY FATHER'S HOUSE IN PEACE; THEN SHALL

THE LORD BE MY GOD.

Unfortunately
cally

there have been times when these two verses have been radi

misunderstood.

They

have been taken to

imply

that Jacob proposed a

deal

according to which he would serve the Lord for material gain. As we shall see in the following paragraph, however, Jacob solemnly pledges himself to live in
a certain way.

Within the

context of the chapter as a whole

Jacob has just discovered that

his life

be very different from the life of his father. He was off to Haran, and on the way had a dream in which he learned that his relationship to God would no longer be precisely the same as the relationship between God and his
will

fathers. God indeed. He

more

will

be

more

distant. Jacob's

"conditions"

turn out to
as

be very little

seems

to be saying that so

long

he has clothing
survival,
then
and

and

bread,

no

than the

meanest man requires

for

simple

that

if he is in
continue

any way
the New

enabled

to

return

to the Promised

Land,

his

oath

is to

Way

of

his fathers.
A

22.

AND THIS

STONE, WHICH I HAVE SET FOR

PILLAR, SHALL BE GOD'S

HOUSE: AND OF ALL THAT THOU SHALT GIVE ME I WILL SURELY GIVE THE TENTH UNTO THEE.

Jacob's
section of

oath

includes his

willingness

to

accept

the

duty

of

being

tithed. This
realized

his

oath

is

a reference

back to Verse Eighteen,

where

he first

be necessary within the constitution man and God. If God is no between of the people, relationship sense with each of his literal longer to speak personally and in the most descendants then both a political and an ecclesiastical order would become
the
magnitude of

the change which would

given the new

necessary.

by

In the commentary to Gen. 15:19 we described the necessity for an ecclesi astical hierarchy in terms of the need to fill up the gap between man and God a priestly class. Tithes are generally understood to be the return which the
Children
of

Israel

give

to the

Levites

as recompense

for their labors in the

Tab-

304
ernacle. subsist
upon

Interpretation
The Levites themselves solely
class. were

to have

had

no

land

given

them but to

on

these tithes.

Presumably, by

making the Levites dependent

corruption within

the people in this way, the Lord thought to avoid

the

Levite

Tithing is
with

usually

connected with

the yearly sacrifice and more

meal when all of

the joys surrounding the communal

comradeship.

particularly Israel is to renew its according to They are to be

will receive

feeling

of unity and law the fruits which

It is

also

interesting
that the

to note that

are taken

for tithes

are not to

be inspected.

taken at

random

from the harvest

of good and sense the

as a whole so crops
were

Levite, too,

the same

mixture

bad

that are enjoyed

to

by

the other men

recompense

(Lev.

27:33).

In this

tithes

be

no more than

just

for

what they would have gained had they worked along with their brothers. In expressing his willingness to give tithes, Jacob is in fact expressing for himself and his children the willingness to accept the burden which such an ecclesiastical

hierarchy

would entail.

Jacob's

oath

then consists of two parts; one which touches

only himself,
spirits,
even

the other, part of the New

Way

which on

he is
this

dants. For himself he best to

swears to

take

helping long journey

to build for his descen

in

good

though he shall be forced to fend for himself in a strange

return

land,

and

to do his

to the home of his fathers. the stone

with oil and

But, by anointing
cepts will

pledging the tithes, he tacitly sedentary

and political

ac

these necessary burdens

upon

which a more

way

of

life

impose

his descendants.

CHAPTER XXIX
I. THEN JACOB WENT ON HIS PEOPLE OF THE EAST.

JOURNEY,

AND CAME INTO THE LAND OF THE

The Hebrew

literally

reads

Jacob

picked picked

English

we would

plication

of

probably say Jacob that same jauntiness of

off

up his feet and went. In modern up his heels since there is the im

Young
and

Jacob is

to the

to conjure

up many and his breed as well as the

Lot

character which the English expresses. land of the people of the east. This land is intended various images in our mind. It was the home of Cain
site of

the Tower of Babel. It was the direction

in

which

chose to go when
of

he left Abraham to live in

that

Sodom,

and

it

was

also the

home

Abraham's

sons

he had
of

with

his

wife

Keturah.

Finally
Israel

the men of that place will join the

forces

Balak in their

attack against

(Num.

23:7).

Its

specific geographic

ambiguous character.

It is

at

location may not be as important as its the same time both a wild place and a place close

to Eden.
2.
AND HE

LOOKED,

AND BEHOLD A WELL IN THE

FIELD, AND, LO,

THERE THEY

WERE THREE FLOCKS OF SHEEP LYING BY

IT; FOR OUT OF THAT WELL

The Lion

and

the

Ass

305

WATERED THE FLOCKS: AND A GREAT STONE WAS UPON THE WELLS MOUTH.

3.

AND THITHER WERE ALL THE FLOCKS GATHERED: AND THEY ROLLED THE STONE FROM THE WELL'S

MOUTH,

AND WATERED THE SHEEP. AND PUT THE

STONE AGAIN UPON THE WELL'S MOUTH IN ITS PLACE.

Jacob's

experiences came

begin

much as

those of Abraham's servant

in Chapter

Twenty-four. He

to the well and

found

a number of shepherds with their

flocks
mouth.

gathered

around

it, but
we are

this time there

is

great

stone

In Verse Three

told that it

has become
told

the custom of the men

well's mouth and

covering its in feed

that city to gather their

made ment

in

order to roll

the stone

from the

flocks together. However

in
order

we are not water

whether

this

arrangement was of

to protect their

from foreigners rights.

or

because

disagree

among themselves concerning

water

4.

AND JACOB SAID UNTO

THEM, MY BRETHREN,

WHENCE BE YE? AND THEY

SAID, OF HARAN ARE WE.

5. AND HE SAID UNTO

THEM, KNOW YE LABAN THE SON OF NAHOR?

AND THEY

SAID,

WE KNOW HIM.

6.

AND HE SAID UNTO

THEM,

IS HE WELL? AND THEY

SAID,

HE IS WELL:

AND, BEHOLD,

RACHEL HIS DAUGHTER COMETH WITH THE SHEEP.

At this

point

in the text

we can see

the

great

difference between the

present

chapter and Chapter Twenty-four. Abraham's servant, trusting to the angel, gave Rebekah bracelets and earrings even before he knew who she was. Jacob,

on

the other

hand,

makes

definite

before

meeting them. But more

exception of

inquiry importantly

about

his

family

and their

status

he

searches

them out.

With the

one word statements.

notion

last reply, the shepherds answer Jacob in simple, Their lack of friendliness would seem to reinforce the
their

that their

arrangement

internal
7.

peace as well as

concerning the heavy stone was intended to to protect them from the outside.
DAY,
NEITHER IS IT TIME THAT THE YE THE

keep

AND HE

SAID, LO, IT

IS YET HIGH

CATTLE SHOULD BE GATHERED AND FEED THEM.

TOGETHER; WATER

SHEEP,

AND GO

Jacob tries to

arrange

the

most

favorable

circumstances

for his meeting the

of a

young lady by making Under the circumstances Don Juan himself

plan.

sure that the other shepherds are well out of the way.
could

hardly

have thought

better

8.

AND THEY

SAID,

WE CANNOT, UNTIL ALL THE FLOCKS BE GATHERED TO

GETHER,

AND TILL THEY ROLL THE STONE FROM THE WELL'S

MOUTH;

THEN WE

WATER THE SHEEP.

9.

AND WHILE HE YET SPAKE WITH SHEEP: FOR SHE KEPT THEM.

THEM,

RACHEL CAME WITH HER FATHER'S

306

Interpretation
the

Unfortunately
vents

young lover's

plan

has failed. The

business

lady

the men are not yet out of the way. There seems to be some

has arrived, law which

and
pre

the

shepherds

from going

about their

and which will

force Jacob

to take another tack.

10.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS, WHEN JACOB SAW BROTHER,

RACHEL THE DAUGHTER OF

LABAN HIS MOTHER'S

AND THE SHEEP OF LABAN HIS MOTHER'S AND ROLLED THE STONE FROM THE

BROTHER,
WELL'S

THAT JACOB WENT

NEAR,

MOUTH,

AND WATERED THE FLOCK OF LABAN HIS MOTHER'S BROTHER.

Jacob's

new plan

is

even more splendid

than the last. He

of

will win

the young

lady by ing by.

provide

rolling away the stone himself in spite

the shepherds who are stand

and

His gallantry does not care about the laws, him with the necessary strength.
RACHEL,
AND LIFTED UP HIS

his heroic inclinations

II.

AND JACOB KISSED

VOICE,

AND WEPT.

12.

AND JACOB TOLD RACHEL THAT HE WAS HER FATHER'S

BROTHER, AND

THAT HE WAS REBEKAH'S SON: AND SHE RAN AND TOLD HER FATHER.

Jacob
of

was moved

by

what will

turn out to

be the highest

passion

in the Book

Genesis,
Jacob

the tears of

wasted no

time in

happiness (see commentary to Gen. 45:1). long introductions after his duties were finished. his heroic
character.

Verse Eleven is the

even

clear proof of

Poor Rachel doesn't

know

who

the

romantic.

this gallant young man is, but perhaps she, too, has a taste for Jacob however is not a simple romantic. In Verse Ten he clearly the young

looked both

at

lady

and at

the size of the flock. The

on words.

combination of word

beauty
lated

and wealth

is

emphasized

by

as used

in Verse Eleven is
in Verse Ten.

almost

a certain play identical to the

The

for kiss

word which

has been trans

watered

After the meeting Rachel runs home to tell her father what has happened. Whether her running proves that she has the virtues of Abraham and Rebekah
or whether

it is to be

understood

in

another

way

we shall

only be

able to tell

when we get

to know her better (see commentary to Gen. 24:15).

WHEN LABAN HEARD THE TIDINGS OF JACOB HIS

13.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS,

SISTER'S SON THAT HE RAN TO MEET

HIM,

AND EMBRACED

HIM,

AND KISSED

HIM,

AND BROUGHT HIM TO HIS HOUSE. AND HE TOLD LABAN ALL THESE

THINGS. 14a. AND LABAN SAID TO

seems

HIM, SURELY

THOU ART MY BONE AND MY FLESH.

Laban too

to greet Jacob in a
a mere

friendly

manner.

His friendliness is

normally taken to

be

show, but

as we shall see are

ters, his character is by no means simple. There sidered in forming a judgment of his character.

in the following chap many facets to be con

The Lion
I4b.

and

the Ass

307

AND HE ABODE WITH HIM THE SPACE OF A MONTH.

time

Jacob has already stayed in Haran a full month, a good deal longer than the his mother had appointed. Several factors may have played a role in
extend

Jacob's decision to
mother

the visit. He may

have lacked the trust

which

his

had in the fundamental

decency

of

his brother, Esau,

and then

too,

there was the young

lady

in Padan-aram.

15.

AND LABAN SAID UNTO

JACOB, BECAUSE THOU

ART MY

BROTHER, ME,
WHAT SHALL

SHOULDEST THOU THEREFORE SERVE ME FOR NOUGHT? TELL THY WAGES BE? l6.

AND LABAN HAD TWO DAUGHTERS: THE NAME OF THE ELDER WAS

LEAH,

AND THE NAME OF THE YOUNGER WAS RACHEL. 17. LEAH WAS TENDER EYED: BUT RACHEL WAS BEAUTIFUL AND WELL FA

VOURED. l8. AND JACOB LOVED

RACHEL;

AND

SAID,

I WILL SERVE THEE SEVEN YEARS

FOR RACHEL THY YOUNGER DAUGHTER.

19.
AND LABAN

SAID,

IT IS BETTER THAT I GIVE HER TO

THEE,

THAN THAT

I SHOULD GIVE HER TO ANOTHER MAN: ABIDE WITH ME. 20. AND JACOB SERVED SEVEN YEARS FOR

RACHEL;

AND THEY SEEMED UNTO

HIM BUT A FEW

DAYS,

FOR THE LOVE HE HAD TO HER.

Laban, for
sires

one reason or

another, seems to be

pleased with

Jacob

and

de
set

him to stay for an extended period of time. His either the wages can be understood in several ways
a calculation offer
more

offer as a

to

allow

Jacob to

friendly

gesture or as would point

based

on the assumption all

that,

given

Jacob's character, he

than Laban in

decency

could

have demanded. At this he

Laban's Jacob

character remains obscure. wishes

to contract

for the
and

younger younger

daughter, Rachel,
daughter
of a

whom

loves. She is very beautiful

those
seven years we see

the

the same gentility and

joviality
is

which

wealthy became

man.

deeply During

apparent

in Verse Ten.
Regardless
of

his long-range

thoughts Jacob

somewhat

of a romantic.

While he knows from

and customs more and might well seem to share of

his dream that one

Biblical

day

he

will settle

down to take laws

youth

seriously, he has decided to play the madcap in his

called a version of

be

Prince Hal. While he does held himself

than

not

the

more complete view of

Genesis,

one might more

have been

by beauty justifiably wonder whether that author attracted by the softness of Leah's eyes

the author of the Book

might not

by

Rachel's

beauty. Needless to say Jacob thinks nothing of asking for the hand of the One cannot younger daughter even though her older sister is not yet married. forget that he himself had an older brother who never received his birthright.

Then, too,

when

he

rolled

the great

stone

from the

mouth of

the

well

he tacitly

308
assumed

Interpretation
that the distinction between

right

and

wrong

was

more

a matter of

good spirits

than of law.

21.

AND JACOB SAID UNTO

LABAN, GIVE

ME MY

WIFE, FOR MY DAYS ARE

FULFILLED, THAT I MAY GO IN UNTO HER.

Verse Twenty-one is difficult to interpret. There

are

two possibilities. It may

be

argued

that Jacob's demands indicate that Laban had been remiss and al
of service to

lowed the time

Eleven it
years

drag

on.

However,
seven

given

Jacob's

actions

in Verse

seems more

later to the day.

likely During

that Verse Twenty-one takes place precisely seven the years, Jacob seemed light-hearted
the moment

enough, as is clear from Verse

ments are of great

Twenty, but

had

arrived and mo

importance to

men with such souls.

22.

AND LABAN GATHERED TOGETHER ALL THE MEN OF THE

PLACE,

AND MADE

A FEAST. 23. AND IT CAME TO PASS IN THE EVENING THAT HE TOOK LEAH HIS

DAUGHTER,

AND BROUGHT HER TO

HIM;

AND HE WENT IN UNTO HER.

Jacob's
the
word

error

becomes
quite

somewhat more

intelligible
provide

when one remembers

that

for feast

literally

means

to

liquid be

he

was not

fully

capable of not

making distinctions
noble, may

at

may imply that the time. Laban's actions,

and

while

they may

be

considered

not

fully

reprehensible.

He

may have
years of

entered

into the

original agreement on

the assumption that his elder

daughter, Leah,

would

have found herself

seem

an appropriate mate

during

the seven

service, though he does

to have taken a coward's way out.

24.

AND LABAN GAVE UNTO HIS DAUGHTER LEAH ZILPAH HIS MAID FOR AN

HANDMAID.

25.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS,

THAT IN THE

MORNING,

BEHOLD IT WAS LEAH:

AND HE SAID TO

LABAN,

WHAT IS THIS THOU HAST DONE UNTO ME? DID NOT I

SERVE WITH THEE FOR RACHEL? WHEREFORE THEN HAST THOU BEGUILED ME?

26.

AND LABAN

SAID, IT MUST

NOT BE SO DONE IN OUR COUNTRY TO GIVE

THE YOUNGER BEFORE THE FIRSTBORN.

While Jacob's
appears as

anger

is certainly

intelligible, Laban,
way.

aside

from his deceit,

to have acted in a generous

his

gifts

in Verses Twenty-four

and

His greeting in Verse Thirteen as well Twenty-nine leave little to be desired,

no more than

and

his deceit in Verse Twenty-three is

the inverse of Jacob's

own actions

ceit appears

in the preceding chapter. In fact according to the law Laban's de to be somewhat less onerous.

27.

FULFILL HER

WEEK,

AND WE WILL GIVE THEE THIS ALSO FOR THE SERVICE

WHICH THOU SHALT SERVE WITH ME YET SEVEN OTHER YEARS.

The Lion
28.

and

the Ass

309

AND JACOB DID

SO,

AND FULFILLED HER WEEK: AND HE GAVE HIM RACHEL

HIS DAUGHTER TO WIFE ALSO.

29.
AND LABAN GAVE TO RACHEL HIS

DAUGHTER,

BILHAH HIS HANDMAID TO

BE HER MAID. 30. AND HE WENT IN ALSO UNTO

RACHEL,

AND HE LOVED ALSO RACHEL MORE

THAN 31.

LEAH,

AND SERVED WITH HIM YET SEVEN OTHER YEARS.

AND WHEN THE LORD SAW THAT LEAH WAS

HATED,

HE OPENED HER

WOMB: BUT RACHEL WAS BARREN.

God's
buried

preference

for Leah

will

be

manifested

in the fact that be buried

she will

be

with

Jacob in Machpelah though Rachel

will

by herself

near

Bethlehem.

32.

AND LEAH

CONCEIVED,

AND BARE A

SON,

AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME

REUBEN: FOR SHE

SAID, SURELY

THE LORD HATH LOOKED UPON MY

AFFLICTION; NOW THEREFORE MY HUSBAND WILL LOVE ME.

33. AND SHE CONCEIVED

AGAIN, AND BARE A SON; AND SAID, BECAUSE

THE

LORD HATH HEARD THAT I WAS

HATED,

HE HATH THEREFORE GIVEN ME THIS

SON also: AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME SIMEON.

34.
AND SHE CONCEIVED

AGAIN,

AND BARE A

SON;

AND

SAID,

NOW THIS TIME

WILL MY HUSBAND BE JOINED UNTO ME BECAUSE I HAVE BORN HIM THREE sons: therefore was his NAME CALLED LEVI. 35.
AND SHE CONCEIVED

AGAIN,

AND BARE A SON: AND SHE

SAID,

NOW WILL AND LEFT

I PRAISE THE LORD: THEREFORE SHE CALLED HIS NAME

JUDAH;

BEARING.

descendants according to their tribes will be found in the commentary to Chapter Forty-nine. The point which will interest us most is the names themselves, but since
sons and their

The commentary on these passages will be brief. A fuller account of the

as well as most of the

following

chapter

they

reflect

more

on

the character of the mother who gave the name rather

we shall
wives.

than on the child

himself,

discuss the

names

in the

next chapter where

we will see more of

Jacob's

CHAPTER XXX

I.

AND WHEN RACHEL SAW THAT SHE BARE JACOB NO ENVIED HER

CHILDREN,

RACHEL ELSE I DIE.

SISTER;

AND SAID UNTO

JACOB, GIVE

ME

CHILDREN, OR

2.

AND JACOB'S ANGER WAS KINDLED AGAINST RACHEL: AND HE AM I IN GOD'S

SAID,

STEAD, WHO HATH

WITHHELD FROM THEE THE FRUIT OF

THE WOMB?

her husband's love, Rachel feels jealousy and even hatred towards her sister, Leah. The end of Chapter Twenty-nine made it obvious that In
spite of

having

310
Leah's

Interpretation
patience

has

not won

her the love

of

her husband,

and yet

Rachel Am I

was

envious.

But

we shall see more of

that as the chapter continues.

The

words which are

translated am I in God's stead

literally

read

under

God. The Hebrew

word

for Under
to
stand

allows

for two

possible

interpretations. It
in

often means to replace or

in the

place

of, but
not

it

can also mean under

the political sense of

being
he

under a ruler. since the

It is
at

unlikely that

both interpre
to

tations

are

intended. Ever
and

dream
in that

Beth-el, Jacob has been left

for
some

his

own

devices,

will remain

situation

time.

In
the

either case

words used

is something ironical about Jacob's sharp answer because to express his anger are often used as a description of God. In
there
uses

Verse Two the text

the

wonderful metaphor

his

nose

burnt,

which might other

better be translated he
about

was

fuming

than his

anger was

kindled. The
where

irony
least

the

passage will emerge at

the end of the chapter

Jacob,

at

in the

case of

sheep,

goats and

rams, proves to be quite capable of

ensuring

conception.

3.

AND SHE

SAID,

BEHOLD MY MAID

BILHAH, GO

IN UNTO

HER;

AND SHE SHALL

BEAR UPON MY 4.

KNEES,

THAT I MAY ALSO HAVE CHILDREN BY HER.

AND SHE GAVE HIM BILHAH HER HANDMAID TO WIFE: AND JACOB WENT IN

UNTO HER. 5. AND BILHAH AND RACHEL

CONCEIVED, SAID,

AND BARE JACOB A SON.

6.

GOD HATH JUDGED

ME,

AND HATH ALSO HEARD MY

VOICE,
7.

AND HATH GIVEN ME A SON: THEREFORE CALLED SHE HIS NAME DAN.

AND BILHAH RACHEL'S MAID CONCEIVED SON.

AGAIN,

AND BARE JACOB A SECOND

8.

AND RACHEL

SAID,

WITH GREAT WRESTLINGS HAVE I WRESTLED WITH MY

SISTER,
9.

AND I HAVE PREVAILED: AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME NAPHTALI.

WHEN LEAH SAW THAT SHE HAD LEFT

BEARING,

SHE TOOK ZILPAH HER

MAID,

AND GAVE HER JACOB TO WIFE.

hates her for some time, always opening up the possibiity that one day her husband will care for her. The name she gave her first son, Reuben, means, See (I have given you) a son. The second son was named Simeon. Apparently in reference
who

Leah,

has been

living

with a man who

sees

the birth

of a son as

to God she

has

named

him

there is one who

hears. Her third

son she named son

Levi from the

she named

verb which which

is translated in the text be joined. Her fourth

shall praise

Judah,
a

the author derived from the words /

the

Lord. Rachel is victory

over

different

woman.

She

sees the

birth

of

her

children as a personal
and

her

older sister.

She her

names them
wrestle.

Dan, meaning judgment,

Naphtali, coming from

pable of

the word to
which

Rachel's

jealousy

renders

her inca

sharing the joys

sister

felt in

spite of

her loneliness.

The Lion
10. II. 12.

and

the Ass

-311

AND ZILPAH LEAH'S MAID BARE JACOB A SON. AND LEAH

SAID,

A TROOP COMETH: AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME GAD.

AND ZILPAH LEAH'S MAID BARE JACOB A SECOND SON. AND LEAH

13.

SAID,

HAPPY AM

I,

FOR THE DAUGHTERS WILL CALL ME BLESSED:

AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME ASHER.

Leah

seems

to be as pleased

with

Zilpah's

sons as she was with

her

own.

She

names them

Gad

troop,

and

Asher,

which means

blessed.

14.

AND REUBEN WENT IN THE DAYS OF WHEAT

HARVEST,

AND FOUND

MANDRAKES IN THE

FIELD,

AND BROUGHT THEM UNTO HIS MOTHER LEAH. I PRAY

THEN RACHEL SAID TO

LEAH, GIVE ME,

THEE,

OF THY SON'S

MANDRAKES.
15. AND SHE SAID UNTO

HER,

IS IT A SMALL MATTER THAT THOU HAST TAKEN

MY HUSBAND? AND WOULDEST THOU TAKE AWAY MY SON'S MANDRAKES ALSO? AND RACHEL

SAID, THEREFORE

HE SHALL LIE WITH THEE TO NIGHT

FOR THY SON'S MANDRAKES.

l6.

AND JACOB CAME OUT OF THE FIELD IN THE EVENING AND LEAH WENT

OUT TO MEET

HIM,

AND

SAID, THOU

MUST COME IN UNTO

ME; FOR SURELY

HAVE HIRED THEE WITH MY SON'S MANDRAKES. AND HE LAY WITH HER THAT NIGHT.

Words
chapter.

and

their usages
of

will

play
words

The first

these rare

very significant role in the is mandrake. It comes from

present
a word

meaning beloved and in that sense is similar to the English word loveapple. Although the root can also mean uncle, and is used twice in that sense in I

Samuel,

the word as related to

love

will never appear

in any fruit

of

the books

from Genesis

through the Books of Kings.

presented

Leah's son, Reuben, has

her

with a magical

with a magical

sounding
husband had

name.

Its

magical powers of

those powers which

seems

to be precisely ensuring Jacob denied having in Verse Two. Leah's love for her
conception seem

to

outweigh children

her desire for the (Gen.

30:9).

mandrake even

though she, too,

ceased to

bear

17.

AND GOD HEARKENED UNTO

LEAH, AND SHE CONCEIVED, AND BARE JACOB

THE FIFTH SON.

l8.

AND LEAH

SAID,

GOD HATH GIVEN ME MY

HIRE,

BECAUSE 1 HAVE GIVEN

MY MAIDEN TO MY HUSBAND: AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME ISSACHAR.

19.

AND LEAH CONCEIVED AGAIN, AND BARE JACOB THE SIXTH SON. AND LEAH

20.

SAID,

GOD HATH ENDUED ME WITH A GOOD

DOWRY; NOW

WILL MY HUSBAND DWELL WITH

ME,

BECAUSE I HAVE BORN HIM SIX

SONS;

AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME ZEBULUN.

21.

AND AFTERWARDS SHE BARE A

DAUGHTER, AND CALLED HER NAME DINAH.

312

Interpretation
mandrake appears

The is

to

have been
and

useless.

Leah bears three

nothing.

more children

two sons and a daughter

son

Rachel

still

has

The

name of

the

fifth

kind

of portmanteau made

from the
word

words man and

hire. The

name of

the sixth son

with

is derived from the

which appears

is translated he

shall

dwell

me.

Her daughter's name, Dinah,

to have the same root as

Rachel's first son, Dan, but Leah does

the
name.

not seem to make much of a

fuss

over

22.

AND GOD REMEMBERED RACHEL AND GOD HEARKENED TO HER AND

OPENED HER WOMB. 23.

AND SHE

CONCEIVED,

AND BARE A

SON;

AND

SAID,

GOD HATH TAKEN AWAY

MY REPROACH.

24.

AND SHE CALLED HIS NAME

JOSEPH;

AND

SAID, THE LORD SHALL ADD TO

ME ANOTHER SON.

Rachel

finally

has

son

of

her

own.

She

gave

him the
of

name

Joseph,
the
she

meaning he

shall add.

Poor Rachel

still sees the

birth

her

son as part of

battle
makes

with

her sister,

and rather than rejoice

in the

simple

fact

of

birth

it

clear

that this victory

she will

is

still

insufficient
given

and

longs for but only

another son.

In Chapter Thirty-five her

own

finally

be

that son

at

the cost of

life.

25.

AND IT CAME TO

PASS,

WHEN RACHEL HAD BORN

JOSEPH,

THAT JACOB

SAID UNTO

LABAN,

SEND ME

AWAY, THAT I MAY GO UNTO MY OWN PLACE,

AND TO MY COUNTRY.

26.

GIVE ME MY WIVES AND MY

CHILDREN, FOR

WHOM I HAVE SERVED

THEE,

AND LET ME GO: FOR THOU KNOWEST MY SERVICE WHICH I HAVE DONE THEE. 27.
AND LABAN SAID UNTO

HIM,

I PRAY

THEE,

IF I HAVE FOUND FAVOR IN

THINE

EYES,

TARRY: FOR I HAVE LEARNED BY DIVINATION THAT THE LORD

HATH BLEST ME FOR THY SAKE.

28. 29.

AND HE

SAID,

APPOINT ME THY

WAGES,

AND I WILL GIVE IT.

AND HE SAID UNTO

HIM,

THOU KNOWEST HOW I HAVE SERVED

THEE,

AND

HOW THY CATTLE WAS WITH ME. 30. FOR IT WAS LITTLE WHICH THOU HADST BEFORE I

CAME,

AND IT IS NOW

INCREASED UNTO A

MULTITUDE;

AND THE LORD HATH BLESSED THEE SINCE MY

COMING: AND NOW WHEN SHALL I PROVIDE FOR MINE OWN HOUSE ALSO?

The discussion between Jacob

and

Laban is

somewhat

formal. The

long

form

of

the first person which is used in polite speech often occurs, as does
which can

be roughly translated please. Laban has discovered that his household prospered while Jacob was with him and wishes Jacob to remain.
the particle

Jacob

on

the other hand knows that it is time for

own

him

to return in order to

build his
ultimate

house. Laban's prosperity

of

appears to

be

a scrambled

form

of the

blessing

the

book,

through you all mankind will

be blessed, but the

The Lion

and

the Ass

-313

time for such a

must start

blessing

has obviously
part of

not yet

arrived,

and

Jacob

sees that

he

in

a small way.

In Verse Twenty-seven
character

the reason for the lack of clarity in Laban's

becomes

clear.

He is

a magician and

has learned

about

God's

special

love for Jacob through the

magical art of

divination.
related

The

root

of

the

word

which shall

story
pent,
while

of

play an the Garden

for divination, Nachash, is important role for us. One of the

of

to other words

words was used

in the

Eden

where

it

appears as the word which means ser

word

and

the other word

is the Hebrew
will present

for brass. Later

as a

on

in the text,
shall see

in Egypt, Joseph first

himself

diviner,

and

we

more of

the problem at that time.

act of magic
serpent

Moses'

turn his staff into a

in Egypt, the great land of the magicians, was to (Ex. 4:3 and 7:9-12). While in Egypt Moses and
magical abilities
which

Aaron both demonstrated

magic of

great

could

outdo

all

the

Egypt

even

though the practice of

magic was

strictly forbidden
and

once

the Jews were safely out of the hands of Pharaoh (Lev. 19:26).

We

shall soon meet

Pharaoh's
of

magicians

(Gen. 41:8, 20, 24),

they

will

appear again

in the Book

Exodus. In

each case

they

are true magicians who

are able

to do most

wonderful

things. The author of the Bible does not

deny

that there are men who

can accomplish

by

their

knowledge deeds
do

which go well

beyond the
The

normal course of

events, but in
and

no case

such men prosper.

charms

of such

men

the need that others

have to hold them in

in

veneration

is

well understood

by

the Bible. The laws

which prohibit magic

Israel

are given

in the Book
promise

of

Deuteronomy.

followed
natural

by

God's

to send a
magician

However, they are immediately prophet to replace Moses, as if the

is
one of

desire to

venerate

the

the human needs

which

is

better

satisfied

by

a prophet.
you

There

shall not

be found among

any

one that maketh

his

son or

his daughter
or an

to pass through the

fire,
For

or

that useth

divination,

or an observer

of times,

enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a

or a necromancer
.

consulter with

familiar spirits,

or a wizard,

all that

do

these things are an abomination unto the

Lord:

because of these abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee. Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God. For these nations, which thou shalt possess, hearkened unto observers of times, and unto diviners: but as for thee,
and

the

Lord thy God hath

not suffered thee so to

do. The Lord thy God

will raise

up

unto thee a prophet from the midst

ye shall

of thee, of thy brethren, like

unto me; unto

him

hearken: (Deut. 18:10-15)

Moses may have hoped to put down his magical rod for the last time when he crossed the Sea of Reeds, but things were not to be so. The Children of Israel made their first attempt to enter the land from the southeast. By now we know that that After that
campaign

failed because the his

men could not yet

face the

giants.

campaign

there were a series of revolutions under Aaron and Miriam

and

and then under

Korah

allies.

After the first revolt,

at the

time of the

314

Interpretation
remorse and was

giants, the people, in

shame, tried to

conquer

the land.

But,

as

Moses had
(Num.

warned

them, it

too

late,

and

they failed

at the

battle

of

Hormah

14:44).
of revolutions that took place

The string

following

the battle of Hormah led

to the death of Aaron in to Gen. 49:5. It was

at

describe in the commentary that time that Israel first came into contact with the
a manner which we shall

Canaanites
second also

who of

inhabited the Promised Land.

King

Arad

attacked

Israel in the
was

battle

Hormah, in

which

Israel

was victorious.

But that victory

the swan song of the southern campaign.

Moses,

realizing that the people

the Ammonites and

were still not yet able

to face the giants, led them up to the River Arnon to

which

begin the

northern

campaign,

led to the

wars against

the story of Balaam.

When Moses decided to

and

give

up the

southern campaign the people

serpents.

revolted,
plague

God

punished

them

by

sending

fiery

As

antidote and

for the

Moses
pole.

was

told to make a
who

fiery

serpent out of

brass
Moses
of

to hoist it up on a

Those

had been bitten

the
serpent of

by

one of the so

Lord's

serpents could
was

be

cured

by looking

up

at

brass. And

forced to

pick

up

the serpent that he

had thought to leave in the land God's way

of

Egypt.

This story

reflects

curing Israel

which we

have

seen

from time
itself

to time. It is a substitution of the artful for the harmful. The

medicine

unfortunately, but necessarily,

was

kindred to the disease. The

the

fiery

serpent of

brass

was never mentioned again until

Second Book

of

Kings,

where we are

told that the Children of Israel

root nachash.
was

For

all

kept it, giving it the name Nechustan from the these hundreds of years they burned incense to it until it
Hezekiah (II Kings
18:4).
not part of the

finally

destroyed
magic
when

by King
is
the

In general,
there are times

leaders

of

New Way. However, as we have seen, the New Way, such as Moses, Aaron, and
of

in the

present

case,

Jacob, find
these

themselves in foreign lands and in the hands

men prove able

magicians.

In

such cases

to

match

the foreign

magicians.

31.

AND HE

SAID,

WHAT SHALL I GIVE THEE: AND JACOB

SAID, THOU

SHALT

NOT GIVE ME ANYTHING: IF THOU WILT DO THIS THING FOR ME. I WILL AGAIN
FEED AND KEEP THY FLOCK.

32.

I WILL PASS THROUGH ALL THY FLOCK TO DAY REMOVING FROM THENCE

ALL THE SPECKLED AND SPOTTED CATTLE AND ALL THE BROWN CATTLE

AMONG THE

SHEEP,

AND THE SPOTTED AND SPECKLED AMONG THE GOATS:

AND OF SUCH SHALL BE MY HIRE.

33.

SO SHALL MY RIGHTEOUSNESS ANSWER FOR ME IN TIME TO

COME,

WHEN

IT SHALL COME FOR MY HIRE BEFORE THY FACE: EVERY ONE THAT IS NOT SPECKLED AND SPOTTED AMONG THE

GOATS,

AND BROWN AMONG THE

SHEEP,

THAT SHALL BE COUNTED STOLEN WITH ME.

34.

AND LABAN

SAID, BEHOLD,

I WOULD IT MIGHT BE ACCORDING TO THY

WORD.

The Lion
35.

and the

Ass

-315

AND HE REMOVED THAT DAY THE HE-GOATS THAT WERE RINGSTRAKED AND

SPOTTED,

AND ALL THE SHE-GOATS THAT WERE SPECKLED AND SPOTTED

AND EVERY ONE THAT HAD SOME WHITE ON

IT,

AND ALL THE BROWN

AMONG THE
36.

SHEEP,

AND GAVE THEM INTO THE HAND OF HIS SONS.

AND HE SET THREE DAYS JOURNEY BETWIXT HIMSELF AND JACOB: AND

JACOB FED THE REST OF LABAN'S FLOCKS.

37. AND JACOB TOOK HIM RODS OF GREEN

POPLAR,

AND OF THE HAZEL AND

AND MADE THE WHITE

CHESNUT TREE; AND PILLED WHITE STRAKES IN

APPEAR WHICH WAS IN THE RODS.

THEM,

38.

AND HE SET THE RODS WHICH HE HAD PILLED BEFORE THE FLOCKS IN THE

GUTTERS IN THE WATERING TROUGHS WHEN THE FLOCKS CAME TO

THAT THEY SHOULD CONCEIVE WHEN THEY CAME TO DRINK.

DRINK,

39.

AND THE FLOCKS CONCEIVED BEFORE THE

RODS,

AND BROUGHT FORTH

CATTLE

RINGSTRAKED, SPECKLED

AND SPOTTED.

In Verse Thirty-One Jacob insists that he desires only thing he requires is the temporary use of his own herd. By outdoing Laban's magic Jacob dence from Laban
the meantime
and

pay for his service. The Laban's cattle in order to produce

no
will

both

prove

his indepen

be in
to

better

position

to

meet

his brother, Esau. In

he

promises

do

all of this while not

shirking his

duty

towards

his host.
The Jacob
precise

terms of the agreement are not at all clear. It appears as though

agrees to accept

most cattle are either

only black

strange

looking

cattle,

which are

or white and

have

straight

rarely born, since hair. One gathers from

Verses Thirty-three
cattle

and

Thirty-four that the

and that
all

arrangement such cattle

to be born in the future

will remain

only to affect presently in Laban's

was makes

flock

the property

of

Laban. In Verse Thirty-two Jacob

the

prospect of

cattle out of the

speckled

his amassing any flock at all even dimmer by taking the flock in the beginning, which will mean that the brown and line of white sheep, contrary sheep will have to come from the pure
off-breed

to the

natural order of passages which strangest

birth.

The

describe how Jacob find

was able of

to

accomplish

his
be

task are

some of the simple over

in the Torah. The Book

one

Genesis is

written

language. Seldom does

average

a word which would not

at

in very home

the

dining-room table,
and

Thirty-two to Forty-two,
shall meet a

suddenly in Chapter Thirty, Verses Chapter Thirty-one, Verses Eight to Twelve we

and yet
connected with a

wholly

new

vocabulary

very

strange activity.

been trying to es By this time the reader is aware that our commentary has twelve books tablish a unity in the Bible from Genesis through Kings. These
taken together are what I pompously
mean

by

the

word

dodecateuch.

relevant pas for speckled, for instance, a whole and never again sages but will appear only once more in the Bible as of those in the dodecateuch (Song 1:11). The following chart presents a list

The

word

appears seven

times in the

316
words

Interpretation
which

are

completely foreign in the

sense

that the Hebrew

language

contains

no other word
number of

give will give

the
give

coming from the same root. The second column will times it appears in the present passage; the third column
within

any

reference

the

dodecateuch;

and the

fourth

column

will

a complete

list

of references

to Biblical books not included within the

dodecateuch:
Word
SPECKLED
SPOTTED

Chaps.

30-31

Dodecateuch

Other Books

1 5
4
I

Song
Josh. 9:5

of

Songs
16:16

1:1 1

Ezekiel

BROWN
HE-GOAT

Gen. 32:15

Proverbs

30:31

Chron.
POPLAR HAZEL

17:11

I
i

Hosea 4:13

PILL
GUTTER CONCEIVE

3
2

Ex.

2:16

Song

of

Songs

7:6

3
2

GRIZZLE

Psalms 51:7 Zachariah 6:3 Zachariah 6:6

RINGSTRAKED*

6
i

STRAKES*

STRONGER*

i
*

WATERING-TROUGH

Gen.

24:20

*The

roots of

these four words are morphologically identical to roots commonly

found in the

Bible, but in
connection.

each case the

meaning is

so

vastly different that there is probably

no etymological

The total

number of appearances

is

as

follows:
Number of
appearances

Number of
appearances

Number of
appearances

in
Number of
words

present

in the

in

rest

of

passage

Dodecateuch

Bible
10

15

39
of the passage

The language
reminds us of

is intended to
Jacob is
act

reflect

its

magical character and within

the

fact that

when

not

wholly

the land of the

New

Way

he is

sometimes

forced to

in

a manner appropriate

to those

other

lands.

40.

AND JACOB DID SEPARATE THE

LAMBS, AND SET THE FACES OF THE FLOCKS LABAN;

TOWARDS THE

RINGSTRAKES,

AND ALL THE BROWN IN THE FLOCK OF

AND HE PUT HIS OWN FLOCKS BY LABAN'S CATTLE. 41.

AND IT CAME TO

THEMSELVES,

AND PUT THEM NOT UNTO

PASS,

WHENSOEVER THE STRONGER CATTLE DID

CON-

The Lion

and the

Ass

-317

CEIVE, THAT JACOB

LAID THE RODS BEFORE THE EYES OF THE CATTLE IN THE

GUTTERS,
42.

THAT THEY MIGHT CONCEIVE AMONG THE RODS.

BUT WHEN THE CATTLE WERE

FEEBLE,

HE PUT THEM NOT IN: SO THE

FEEBLER WERE LABAN'S AND THE STRONGER JACOB'S.

Ironically
accomplish

enough

Jacob, by

the use of his magic staff, has been able to

could perform

for the

in the

case of

very nearly the same act he denied he Rachel in the beginning of the chapter.
goats

43.

AND THE MAN INCREASED AND

EXCEEDINGLY,
AND

AND HAD MUCH CATTLE. AND

AND ASSES.

MAIDSERVANTS,

MENSERVANTS,

CAMELS,

As Jacob is
strange

about to

leave this land

of wonders

he

appears to

have

sold

his

breed

of cattle or

to have exchanged them for a kind of property

more

befitting

the New Way.

Discussion
Notes toward "Apologia
sua"

an

pro vita

George Anastaplo
The

University

of

Chicago, Rosary College,

and

Loyola

University

What is

called

is just the
in
mind

name [of the correspondence theory of truth] of truth. It is common sense surely. What I have about, say, Mr. Anastaplo is true only if it corresponds to what Mr.

by

this

highfalutin

commonsense view

Anastaplo is,

does,

and so on.

Leo Strauss, Seminar

Aristotle'

on

Ethics (1963), 11,

26

PROLOGUE

We have been taught

circumstances an

by

Professor Strauss that it is

of

reasonable

in

some

to assume that the commission

boy"

"such blunders

as would shame

intelligent high
a

school

is intentional, that they

point

to a purpose

(or

offer.

meaning) beyond (or beneath) that which the offending author seems to And we have been taught by the Socrates of Plato's Apology that such
are sometimes clues to a

blunders

riddle, to

testing, if

not even a

kind

of

playfulness, especially if their

source

is

a comic poet. critique of

my Constitutionalist in the May 1980 issue of this journal. To be sure, many kind things are said (and not without some plausibility) about the book, but they are balanced by so

Blunders

abound

in Glen E. Thurow's

many
who

unkind

things (some of them of an outlandish character) that the reader

know my book must find it difficult to decide what is to be taken seriously. I trust that the passages quoted by Professor Thurow from does
not

the book

suffice

to

put on notice attentive readers of

his

critique who

do

not

happen to see this reply, arousing in them at least the suspicion that anyone who said the things quoted from the book simply could not have taken the dubious positions attributed to him by Mr. Thurow. Certainly, it is remarkable how the tone
of the

Thurow

critique changes after

its opening

paragraph which

includes these

observations:

The Constitutionalist has been well received since its publication in 1971. It has been widely recognized as presenting the best existing defense of the opinion that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech from any
limitation
approach

by
free

law

of

Congress.

Yet this

view

is

presented with such care

to

speech as a problem rather

and reflection rather

than

partisan

dogma that it has led to questioning Few books have received as defensiveness.
than a

320

Interpretation
reviews as

many thoughtful the book.

this one

a credit not

only to the

reviewers

but to

It is
ment

obvious

that Mr.

Thurow,

of

the

University
which

of

Dallas Politics Depart

con

(where I have

conducted annual seminars since

1967), has devoted

am grateful.

siderable are

time and effort to his review, for

understood?

How, then,

his blunders to be

Perhaps the

most generous

interpretation

is to conclude that Mr. Thurow jests, that he is (if only to put us all to the test) being somewhat comic, even as he repeatedly inveighs against my play fulness. Perhaps, indeed, he is thereby counselling us about the care needed in reading not only the greatest books but even reviews written by intelligent
men about

ordinary books. Perhaps, also, he can be

understood

to

have

wanted

to spur me to assess
and where

the race I
am

have

run

thus

far,

to consider

where

I have been

going as well as how I am regarded and why. For this opportunity, too, I should be grateful. It is a particularly propitious time for such an appraisal, since I do seem to be moving from a post in a college political science department to
I
one

in

esteem more

highly

university law school. Furthermore, I know of no readers than I do those who read Interpretation regularly and

so

the forum for this exercise in autobiography is also propitious.

I
That the Constitutionalist is, in many respects, an ordinary book should not not to say that it is not extraordinary in certain respects. the paper on which it is printed is remarkably good for these times; Thus,
so

be denied. This is is the binding, also, it is

devoted to

as

may be

seen

in how nicely the book lies flat

with

when opened.

Thus,
pages

a rather
notes.

big book,

an

extraordinary

proportion of

its

(I have been informed

required

by

the

Recording
cassettes

for the Blind

hours

service that of the

fifty-seven hours
are

in their

for the Consti

eight

tutionalist, thirteen hours

devoted to the text

of

the

book,

hours to the notes.) It should be said as well on the book's behalf that it may turn out to be one of the few contemporary attempts at constitutional interpretation to survive our time. That is, the Constitution itself is looked at, I believe with a certain
to the appendices, and thirty-six

rigor;

the book is not dependent on the vagaries of United States Supreme Court interpretations, however much it may take account of them. I will not attempt to summarize what Mr. Thurow wrote about the Consti
section in Interpretation. That become evident, insofar as it is relevant here, in what I now choose to respond to. (All my page references in parentheses are to Mr. Thurow's should critique of the

tutionalist upon

inaugurating

the

"Discussion"

Constitutionalist.) Nor do

attempt to catalogue all

the

ques

tionable things Mr. Thurow says, but only enough to confirm the

perceptive

Discussion
reader

321 be many things in the Thurow On the other hand, those who
review

in the

suspicion that there must

that need not

challenged

be taken my

at

face

value.

are not com

by

response should

be

sympathetic toward

Mr. Thurow's

plaints

and so each will get what argument

he deserves.
summed

The
up

in the text

of

the Constitutionalist itself has been

by

me at

the outset of that book in these terms:

prohibits

The First Amendment to the Constitution

Congress, in its law-making

reason

capacity, from cutting down in any way or for any

of the press.
common

freedom

of speech and

The

extent of this

freedom is to be
but

measured not

merely

by

the

law treatises
the First

and cases available on

December 15,

1791

the date of the

ratification of practice of

Amendment

also

by

the people of the United

States

who

the general understanding and insisted upon, had written for them,

and ratified

(through their State

legislatures)
events

the

First Amendment. An important

seen

indication
ration of

of the extent of this

and

freedom is to be

in the teachings

of the

Decla

Independence

in the

leading

up to the Revolution.
absolute we see

Although the
restraint upon

prohibition

in the First Amendment is

here

the absolute

Congress that is unqualified, among restraints that are qualified prohibition does not relate to all forms of expression but only to terms, "freedom
citizens.
press"

that which the

of

speech,

or of

the
with

were

then taken to
and concerns of

encompass,

political

speech, speech

having

to

do

the

duties

self-governing
primarily
the
or

Thus, for example, this Rather,

constitutional provision

is

not

directly
has

concerned with what we now call artistic expression or with

problems of obscenity.

the First Amendment acknowledges that the to

sovereign citizen

the right

freely

discuss

the public

business,
to

a privilege

theretofore

claimed

only for

members of

legislative bodies.
may be
with respect

Absolute does
not

as the constitutional prohibition

Congress, it
Congres

touch

directly
this

the great

State

power

to affect

freedom

of speech and of

the press. In

fact, 1

shall

argue, one

condition negation

for

effective negation of

sional power over

subject

(which

is important for

the political

freedom has the

of

the American people) is that the States should

retain some power

to

regulate political expression.

It

seems

to me,

however,

that the

General Government
a

duty to police or restrain the power of the dictated by such commands in the Constitution of
that the "United

States in this respect,

duty

States

shall guarantee

1787 to every State in this Union

as that which provides a

Republican

Form

of

Government
of all

Another way

putting

this

is to say that the majority

opinions

of

the Supreme Court both in Scales v. United States and in Cohen

are rather childish: ment

v.

California

is

all about.

they display little understanding of what the First Amend But, considering their author, it is not surprising.

II
Readers book
of

Interpretation

are entitled

to one straightforward review of

my

by

scholar

they

can

rely

upon.

reproduce

here, therefore,

the first

322

Interpretation
the

review of

Constitutionalist (which
of

appeared

in

Dallas

newspaper

It is

by

Laurence Berns,

as a college classmate at

the

St. John's College, whom I first came University of Chicago in 1947. Mr. Berns
review,
presented

in 197 1). to know

should

be familiar to

readers of

this journal since he has published three articles

in

Interpretation. His
provided with

newspaper

here in its

unedited

form, is

his

permission:
eight-hundred-and-forty-page

This

fascinating

First is the text,

of the

detailed

legal, historical

book is really three books, and more. and, above all, dialectical analysis

First Amendment with special attention to the reasoning of the Founding Fathers. Their reasoning is shown to be more subtle than many recent critics have been able to appreciate. George Anastaplo concludes that the prohibition on the

Congress,
speech absolute.
are

and

hence

on the

"general

government,"

against was

(political speech, not, for example, obscenity) The

privileges and extended

abridging freedom of rightfully intended to be

respective

immunities

of

legislators in their in their

legislatures

by

analogy

to the people as a whole

capacities as

self-governing

citizens. no remedy against the abuse of this freedom? Must not, or should legislatures not, by rules of relevance and decorum abridge that kind of speech which would defeat the possibility of arriving at any reasonable legislation? Anastaplo

But is there

faces

the problem,
a

but in

He invokes
at

kind

of patriotic

way different from what is suggested by the last question. piety in arguing that Americans have always been
restricting, the limits of
the

their

best

when extending, and at their worse when

abuse.

toleration for that

should

But the states, he argues,

rare circumstances

by

Constitution are,

and

be, left free, in those

In fact, the

speech.

prohibition on against

calling for it, to abridge political the Congress is likely to "lose some of its effect
well."

if directed in its fullness

'do

the states as

"[PJressure in

upon

Congress to
cannot

something'

becomes very

great

if trouble

spots

particular states

be

taken care of

in those

states."

This discussion is developed in

of

conjunction with

a general argument
("states'

for the importance

danger"

the relative

rights")
and

and with a critique and analysis of the

autonomy of state governments Fourteenth Amendment

addition to the

the "clear

and present

test.

However, in

limits imposed

by

traditional standards of to supervise

Anastaplo,
in the
subject to of

due process, the Congress is empowered, according to and restrain the states in the exercise of their power. And
Invasion,"

most extreme

emergencies, in "Cases of Rebellion

can abridge

or

the

President,
writ

later correction,
corpus.

freedom

of speech

by suspending

the

habeas

Beyond the legal analysis, the First Amendment is for

protection

seen as a

democratic

right

against, and for popular influence on

or control

of, government and

as an aristocratic right which

will."

"provides
of

the popular the

Protection

for minority opinion, even against the thoughtful dissenter serves primarily to advance
protection people with popular government

interest

of the community.

"A

[like the

govern

ment of the

United

[as there The

are

States], where there are no recognized spokesmen in Great Britain], needs to rely upon an aristocratic
"book"

of merit

right."

second

is the appendices, especially the

notes.

appendix of close to one

case.

hundred

pages on the record of

"book"

the author's own remarkable bar admission

The third

is the

As the

author explores the question of what

Discussion
kind

323
in the
people

of character

free institutions
depth The
that

and self-government presuppose,

the reader

is led into depth invitation to

after

is,

the reader who

is

able

to accept

the author's
and

explore.

range of

like

carefully in those notes must be seen a little university, a second University

of

penetratingly to be believed: this part of the book is

of

topics dealt

with

Chicago (the

author's alma mater).

any important political event neglected in Anastaplo's notes; but far

Scarcely

the

last

forty

years, it seems, has been

wealth of

more

important is the

discriminating
has

references, comment and often

detailed

analysis of the

anthropological, sociological,

psychological and above all poetic and philosophic writings that the author

found

useful

for his
of

explorations

into the

nature of

American institutions, into

the meaning

the

Serious
and

students of

American way of life, the nature of man, the nature of nature. American institutions, of political life, and of what transcends
life have here
the law
a guide to where

is the

ground of political
posed

to go as

they face
man are

the
not

dilemma

by

the realization that the good

of will

citizen and

the good

simply identical. Students fascinating their field of study

be pleasantly

surprised to

learn how

can

be.

judging roughly from the frequency of references, to have from Shakespeare, from his fellow Illinoisan Abraham Lincoln, and from Plato. This book is a major attempt to discover and articulate the harmony,
author

The

seems,

learned

most

or at

least the compatibility, that

exists

between

principles of

the American polity

and the principles of classical

("Greek")

philosophy.

Mr. Berns (who

paragraphs

was then at

Cambridge University)
a version of

prepared also

the

following

to

be inserted into

this

review submitted

to an English

journal:
Lord Bryce
wrote of

the British polity that "though the constitution has

of the nation are still
aristocratic."

become

democratic,
seem to

the

habits

to

is still true, and many more still impressively true, I believe, to American eyes. At it is true, it is precisely because it is not true, or as true, for the United Anastaplo argues, any rate, United States freedom of speech (and its inevitable attendant that in the States,
doubt it is
whether

that

Although many Britons seem to deplore the extent

which

still

abuses) has been buttressed

government.

by
is

rigid constitutional protections against the general

where aristocratic

To

put

it bluntly,
are absent

habits

prevail

legal

and govern

mental control over speech

apt

to

be

more

salutary, less
of a

oppressive and

less

needed;

where

they

(and there is something

more prudent not

manly
the

spirit of

inde

pendence

in the population) it is
keen

to

entrust

general govern

ment with such powers.

Anastaplo is

student of

British

affairs and

institutions

and the

book

contains a good number of

on similarities and

interesting

arguments and observations

like these based

differences between British

and

American

conditions and pro

cedures.

Mr. Berns provides, I suggest,

much

a sufficient review

for those

readers without

time to devote to

appraisals of

the Constitutionalist. Other reviews are

cited of

Prudence"

in the opening notes of my "American Constitutionalism and the Virtue and in the first note to my Human Being and Citizen.

324

Interpretation

III
We
what must now

turn to Mr. Thurow's criticisms. Foremost among them

about

is

he has to say
own

the notes of the Constitutionalist. Those notes were

of

ignored in my
review,

summary
with

the argument

of

the book. Mr.

Berns, in his
upset

spoke of them

considerable

respect. of

But Mr. Thurow is

book,"

by

them:

he

condemns the
deformity"

"disturbing
(p.
188).

form

the

likening

it to "some
of

gross recall

physical

The "unnatural
and a

proportio

the book

"a dwarf

with

small

body

big

head,"

"little dwarf his

review

[with]
in

his

head"

outsized

(pp.

188-189).

He

opens and closes

with

dignant

protests against

my

notes.

How seriously

are such criticisms

to be taken? (We can

relied

disregard, if only
as well

for the moment, the dubious anatomy evidently

upon

as

the

tendency
Thurow
a

to convert the
refers

"customary"

or

conventional

to the notes, some two dozen times, as

as

into the natural.) Mr. (and only

"footnotes"

half dozen times

opinions, it
notes

"notes"). Had
work around

they indeed been footnotes, they

or

would

have been difficult to

court

deal

with

(although law

reviews

and

might

be

noticed

longer
are at

than political

in passing, routinely have recourse to scientists may be accustomed to). But my

and

much

notes advise

the back of the book

of

properly

so.

Furthermore, I repeatedly
they have
read

readers

my things
not

not

to read the notes until

through the

text.

will

trouble to give that advice on this occasion.

(As for Mr.

Thurow's
said

anatomy:

if my

notes should

indeed be

"footnotes,"

could

it

not

be

that my book rests on "a solid

foundation"

if

not

even

on

"an

ample one

understanding"?
wishes

Certainly, its head

speak of

should

not

be

"big"

called

unless

politely my "arrogance.") thereby Not only does Mr. Thurow insist upon mislabeling my notes, he also mis counts them. What is one to make of a blunder that more than triples the
to
number of notes
about

the notes if

from 787 to 2,787 (p. 188)? Would he have felt differently he had recognized how few there truly were? (He does
devoted to them [p.
to make a
189].

have the

correct number of pages wanted

Or is it that he

did know better but merely

the reader's
of

to work, with or without the

help

of

joke? But, in order for the joke Isaac Bickerstaff, did he not presuppose

familiarity

with

the notes

(including

my observation,

at the center

the Constitutionalist s notes, "What's a millennium among friends?")? Was his joke good enough to risk misleading those readers who do not know the

book? Let

us

hope

so.

Mr. Thurow
of

suggests

that the abundance of notes may be due to the

subject of us

subject

the book:

"[W]hy
mean

does the
to

free
the

speech require such

of

footnotes? revealing

Does Anastaplo
all

demonstrate to
and print?

fruits

free

speech

by

he has been free to hear

showing its

Or does he

mean

to satirize free speech

by

excesses?"

there are publications of mine

(p. 189) But this, alas, is too pat an analysis: for known to Mr. Thurow, published both before

Discussion
and

325
not

after

the

Constitutionalist but
This

on

freedom

of

speech,

which

have
must

similar abundance of notes.

means

that some other explanation

unconventional
use

be
of

found, if
notes.

explanation

is needed, for the

that the

I do

make

Mr. Thurow
out

also suggests

Constitutionalist is

"inconceivable"

with

its

notes of

(p.

201).

Yet he
without
with

can advocate not

having

them: that

is, he

can

conceive

the book
at

them. And he recognizes that most reviewers

as

do

not

deal

length

the notes
which

if they did

not

exist,

for those

reviewers'

immediate purposes,
in its

again suggests that

they

conceived of

the book without them.

the massive notes
of which

Besides,

the text
of

did

once stand alone

that

is,

without

University

my publisher accepted the have been reprinted without notes (such

the American Government
obvious,

Chicago dissertation form, Constitutionalist. And parts

as

on the of the

basis
book

the chapter on

States'

rights, in

reader published

by

the Kendall/Hunt Press). It is

then, that the

without

text can stand alone and can

be

read through

I believe

with profit

the notes.
exist

for the Constitutionalist is providential, so to speak. The opportunity presented itself, during the half dozen years between the accep tance of the original manuscript and its final publication, for development of
That the
notes

do

the notes in their amplitude. To have put the material now

found in the

notes

into the text itself

some.

would

have

made

the argument of the book quite cumber

would

In that condition, I doubt that the book

it has, into a number of bibliographies on freedom of Amendment. The question Mr. Thurow never considers is in the
notes are
worth

have found its way, as speech and the First

whether could

the materials

having

at

all, assuming that

they

be had only looks find

in the form in

which

they

are now available.

Mr. Thurow does

concede

that "not

only

will

everyone

who

something fascinating and instructive among these notes, but throughout there is a high and serious tone and the author makes clear that he has carefully nurtured his little dwarf so that his outsized head would not be filled with
a

jumble

of

disconnected memories, but

[with]

highly
(p.

organized collection

of serious reflections on

important theoretical

issues"

189).

Why

not, in

this imperfect world, settle for that?

of

No, he

must speak of

the notes (and

hence

the book
read

as

whole) in
with

to
of

footnotes
(p.

He finds it "irritating disparaging text because of their tendency to interrupt a train

rather

terms.

argument"

201).

Well, then, don't

will not

read

them with the text,

suggest

and

enjoy footnotes are

them. But

enjoy himself: "One is tempted to say that thought divorced from the natural movements of speech. They he

may shock, inform, instruct, amuse, enlighten, but they do not sufficiently in the structured movement of speech necessary to move a human body and soul from uneducated to educated. Anastaplo's footnotes, like his
participate

book
this

as a whole,

lack

body"

a proper

(p.

202).

It is

with

this remonstrance
ends

temptation

to which he

succumbs

that Mr.

Thurow

his

review.

326

Interpretation
what

Precisely

the last

sentence not

means, or how a human

body

can

be

either

educated or

uneducated, I do

notes shocks anyone.

know. Even so, I doubt that anything in my But if the notes do "inform, instruct, amuse,
to ask, why
not

enlighten"

then, I

again

presume

settle and

for

that?

After all, how many

things

contemporary books here by my critic? Mr. Thurow

eyes

instructive"

offer the

"fascinating

discovered
their
what

reports

that

reviewers

have ignored the notes,

book"

"avert[ing]
we

from the

disturbing

form

of

this

(p.

188).

Here

have

lawyers

call a question of

fact: how have may be

see

reviewers regarded

the notes?

Any
found

thing but
of

silent embarrassment of

seen

in

most of

them. A

few

are critical

them,

course, preferring to

in the text

some of the material

express an

in the

notes.

But

several reviewers of the

notes.

Constitutionalist

informed

appreciation of

my

Emeritus

of

the

University

Thus, the late Malcolm P. Sharp, Professor of Law of Chicago, could conclude an article ("Crosskey,
on

Anastaplo

and

Meiklejohn

the United States

and

Constitution") in

this way:

Mr. Meiklejohn's, Mr. Anastaplo's only

stand the tests of practical

Mr. Crosskey's

constitutional opinions not

utility; When slight adjustments are made among

appeal characteristic of music

them,

their

Constitution has the immediate intuitive

or poetry.

In the Notes tutionalist, the

which can

which are

in

effect the third volume

in Mr. Anastaplo's Consti

comments and

author engages

in brilliant

and

delightful

explorations,
which are

be

read with the main text or with the aid of the on their own account.

Index, but

best

read at

leisure

Here, for
the

example,

fairly

early in the

Notes,

the

Constitution is

compared with

famous cup of tea which brought to life in Proust's mind the beloved and beautiful Combray with its people, its fields and its buildings. And at the very end of the Notes, Mr. Anastaplo reverts to his early love for and skill in mathe
matics,
with a passage which confirmation

as

understand

it

has

received

(for its

mathe

matics)
of a

by

qualified specialists.

It is in

part

beyond the

comprehension

layman. But it is

also

aware of the part played

and modern philosophy.

part intelligible to any student of philosophy who is Pythagorean thinking in the history of both Greek Here the extraordinary mathematical relations among

in

by

the elements are taken as signs of a

deep

if inscrutable

reason

in the

nature of

things,

including
about

the nature of

law.

What

those reviewers who did

ignore

the notes? Perhaps represen

tative of them
passage

is the

reviewer who me:

has

authorized me to quote the

following

from

letter to

regret

that my

review of

The Constitutionalist in the American Political Science

Review

could not

have

addressed your arguments with greater placed a stringent word

depth

and

fullness.
which

Unfortunately,
made

the

journal
me

limitation

on

my review,

it impossible for
of

to do more than to sketch the outline of your argument

in the basic text

the book and to

indicate the difficulties I found in it. While First Amendment, I

should

1 found it impossible to

accept your position on the

Discussion

327
able to express

have liked to have been

my

admiration of the erudition reflected of the notes.

particularly in the endlessly

fascinating

digression

This is
formity"

hardly
(p.
1

the attitude of one

"turn[ing] from
have

some

gross

physical

de

88).
a number of readers reported
me

The fact is that

themselves that

delighted
replaced

by

the

notes.

One thoughtful

college teacher
as

informed
reading.

they had

Gibbon (temporarily, I trust) has urged lawyers and other

the notes, after text.

his bedside

More than

one reviewer

students of constitutional

having

grasped

the systematic
of

law to browse among argument I have made in the

which

reviewer

in Modern Age

the volume

includes, among
Prudence"

other

things, my "American Constitutionalism and the Virtue Thurow's instructive article on the Gettysburg Address,
much

of

and

Mr.

observes of notes

very

like those in the Constitutionalist:

of

many long footnotes, Anastaplo suggests that "the notes provided be necessary for a first reading of [his] article. In fact, most readers This is bad advice. With the leave the notes completely should probably possible exception of his own essay, no part of the book is better written or more In his first

here may

not

alone."

interesting
Do
not

than Mr. Anastaplo's

notes

notes.

my

in the Constitutionalist
education

and and

elsewhere

offer,
their

however teachers,

episodically,

guides

to the
not

that

lawyers

judges,

and

very
men

much need?

Do

they,

at the

least,

"practical"

remind narrow-minded

that "there is a

world elsewhere"?

IV
Mr. Thurow's crowning jest may be his all men should try to be
suggestion

that I presume to teach

philosophic

"that

(p.

199).

He surely

means

for

his readers to see this as a

jest,

since

for support) to a passage (at the indicates just the opposite:

This atory
as

(evidently immediately beginning of the Constitutionalist) which

cites
on the as

he

them

inquiry is,
effort.

as

its

subtitle

[Notes

First Amendment] suggests,

perhaps

an explor

The Constitutionalist seriously

may

be true

of anyone who

takes

political

things

is occasionally
can

obliged

to

beg

the question, to

proceed

if there

were more what

certainty

and precision

than there

can

be

about such matters.

If he knows

he is doing, he
which

serve

his fellow

citizens

by fashioning

story."

salutary lawyer's brief

tells "a

likely

"salutary"

(An advocacy

of the

in the concluding words of to the place for me of philosophy in the life

purpose

may be seen throughout my book, including its text.) Mr. Thurow's distortion, with respect
of a community, of
must

have has

(just

as

does the distortion, in

other

note

13

his review,

which

me

saying something

than what I have about Lincoln's

Gettysburg

Address).

328

Interpretation
effort to provide

Of course, philosophy is to be drawn on, in the

or

lawyers

the teachers of lawyers

a grander view of things.

One is

reminded of such

things in the notes to the Constitutionalist. Mr.

more of

Thurow, in advocating
have been have had
put me

that

the

materials

hidden among the

notes should would

into the be
more

text (on the surface of the

philosophical

book,

so to

speak),

for

everyone!

Surely

he jests. he
seems to suggest that

Surely
and

Mr. Thurow jests

as well when

I do

not

concern myself

sufficiently with the moral character of the American people, that I believe that an absolute freedom of speech will solve all our problems
190).

(p.

Indeed,

I may be remembered, if I
as

am remembered at all

among

political

scientists,
abolition of

the first among them to

publish a systematic argument

for the
vision

broadcast television in this country

the
character of us.

an abolition of tele
and

for the

good of

the American people

for the health

of political abolition

discourse among

presumed

to call this argument

for total

"A Practical Man's

Guide."

V
Then
(at least
we are asked
with respect

by

Mr. Thurow to believe that

matters) to

choice

is to be
I92f.
,

preferred

to

political

deliberation (pp. Fathers

196,

199).

This means, among other things, that the Americans to have deliberated. Freedom

Founding
of speech

are to

be the last

is distinguished

by

him

from "reliance
ment"

upon

the capacity of

men

to

deliberately

choose good govern

(pp.

195-196).
of the

But is

not good government

that which our "freedom

press,"

of speech

[and]

properly understood,
the establishment

also aims at

but

a choice not

of good government

(including

of

justice)

continuously,

just

once?

sake. upon

Mr. Thurow talks (e.g., p. 196) as if I praise deliberation only for its own But he can do this only by remaining silent about various limits I suggest freedom
of

speech,

not

the least of

which are

the

emergency

restrictions

provided

in the Constitution in
order

upon

liberty

generally.

(Comic poets, too, depend

position seem unpolitical
life"

on selective silence

to secure their effects.)

silence

One
and
as

effect of

Mr. Thurow's

is to

make

my

irresponsible. Thus, he can speak of "underestimating] both the difficulty

But
a number of people who

me as and

"denigrating
dignity"

political

and

the

of

that "moderation

which subordinates one's own claims to

those of the
work

Constitution"

(pp. 199,

200).

know my
on

do

consider

it devoted to in that

an effort

to

bring

prudence to

bear

the study of legal and constitutional,

of the place of prudence

as well as political, matters.

Indicative both

work and of sensible men's response

Speech"

to it are my "Occasions of Freedom of

and

the generous acknowledgments of my

influence in the
and

excellent

University
useful

of

Dallas Press translation

of

Machiavelli's Prince,
on

in

a most

Northern Illinois

University

Press commentary

Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Discussion
Of course, the in
preference to

329
simplest response to

Mr. Thurow's

emphasis upon

choice,

deliberation, is
such

to say (as is shown in various Platonic dia

logues)
truly
dom

that unless one understands the alternatives before one, one cannot
and

choose

understanding depends,
American citizens,
us?

to some extent, on serious to choose

well

deliberation. Are
of speech not

not we, as at work

more apt

if free

is

among

Will, if

willfulness, seems the

key

to Mr. Thurow's preference here.

In this, perhaps, he is very

much a modern.

VI
Related to the
appetite emphasis on choice

in Mr. Thurow's

critique

is his

hearty

for

combat

(p.

199).
made so much of

Why is
What

combativeness

by

this mild-mannered scholar?

opinion about the world

is implied

by

this appetite? To what extent

is

combativeness seen as essential

to patriotism?

must

say that I find

unless one

combativeness tiresome.

I have

seen

far too

much of

it for my taste
"serious"

at academic gatherings:

it is in

all

too often assumed that one

with when

is

not
colleagues.

is

on

the

attack

dealing

the work of one's

Not that I have failed to be

sometimes

combative

I have had to be.

But I have
even when

found

myself

tiresome also in assuming such postures,

I felt

obliged

to do so.

Certainly, I do

not

want

to encourage

attacking and defending. A little understanding, as well as gentleness and magnanimity, now and then, might not hurt. Certainly, firmness does not require one to be
callous,
meanspirited or

anyone

to believe that patriotism depends only on

fighting,

on

vindictive, however salutary it

can

be to

display

one's

teeth and claws occasionally to

keep

presumptuous wolves at as well as

bay.

generally my easily-exaggerated career of resistance to tyranny at home and abroad, have helped prompt a committee based in Chicago to nominate me repeatedly
and

gather

that

such sentiments as

these,

my

publications

for

Nobel Peace Prize. This

students of mine

committee

former

in the

University

is evidently made up primarily of of Chicago adult education program. from

(Fewer than
all over

one

hundred

complete

nominations are submitted each year

the world.) I

nominators

both

of

peremptorily informed several years ago by my their intention annually to go through the elaborate Nobel
was

Peace Prize

procedures and of

their determination not to

be dissuaded
was

by

any

thing I might say or do. My favorite law-school teacher man for this committee of generous Chaerephons.
I
myself suspect

the first spokes

that the most useful public

as a
member

service

could

provide

at

this time

would

be

of

the Supreme Court. I know of no one

"liberal"

else with the useful

credentials

I do happen to have

who could

be

depended

upon

to

servative"

restorations.

develop the arguments Especially needed

necessary for various critical "con on the Court today is an articulate

330

Interpretation
in the capacity and differences between good
common

but

relaxed confidence act upon

duty
and add

of

the community to
such confidence

discern
as was

and to

bad,

once reflected

in the

law. Need I

that it is safe to predict that

my appointment to the Court is not destined to be? (I am reminded of what I told the character and fitness committee back in 1951, that the Illinois bar
needed

me
of

far

more

than I needed the Illinois bar.

am

also

reminded,

of

course,

the outlandish proposal that the useful critic of the community should

be

maintained at public expense

in the Prytaneum.)

Be

all

this as it may (and may not

be!), fearfulness,
great us or a

as well as

ambition,

may lie
risks

at the root of a contentious approach. us.

Not that there

are not genuine

facing
all

But fearfulness (or too

often either

mortality)

too

paralyzes

arouses

sensitivity with respect to in us a desire for a

of

strong leader (and

disinclination to deliberate). (Awareness

my

own mor

tality
many

was

years

vividly brought home to me in our B-29 one night over Kwajalein ago, where I [as navigator] and our pilot took turns trying to get killed. It
proved a

our air crew

liberating

experience,
of

and not

I have

sometimes

felt that the

almost

four decades

life

since then

only because have been

something of a "bonus.") The combination, as in Mr. Thurow's argument,

choice

of a

(1)

an

emphasis

on

(with

depreciation

of

deliberation)

and

(2)

glorification

of com

bativeness (or assertiveness, if

as the modern

not even

aggressiveness)

points to existentialism

way

out.

VII
But it is
rather not an avowed

existentialism that

Mr. Thurow

relies

upon

but

(since he is

a political
power.

scientist, however

much of a modern

be)
not

upon

Presidential

Mr. Thurow's
much of

expertise

(Here I temporarily step outside in the Presidency follow naturally for

he may his review.) Does

anyone who
not

makes

the combination of choice and combativeness?

May

this

perhaps unrepublican emphasis reveal a covert existentialism?

The

President, it

would

seem, is preeminently
things. All a

a man of action:

he defends
to do
cannot

us; he executes the

laws; he does

legislature

ever seems

is talk: it may be too deliberative for Mr. Thurow's taste; it evidently be taken seriously.
Publius (pp.
and

the Federalist seem to him to be in need of defense from

me

191-200).

He is

not altogether should

wrong here,

although

I do rely

upon

the

Federalist

a good

deal. (I

note,

however,
of

that the explicit reference to

the Federalist

in the opening

paragraph

the

Constitutionalist

was

out

of

deference to my publisher's insistence, as was the extensive use of my bar admission case in an appendix. If I had had my way, there would have been little or nothing about that case in the Constitutionalist, just as it has never been discussed in any class I have been responsible for since I began

teaching

Discussion
more

-331

than a

review with

quarter-century ago. Mr. Thurow makes than I am inclined to do in this setting. But
I do
go comment upon

more of

the case in his

since

it has been dealt

by him,
must

it here

and

there in this response. But the

reader

useful place

for my systematic considerations of that case. A to begin is in my June 18, 1979 National Law Journal article.
elsewhere
are

Also

useful

the

following
law

remarks, recently

made

to me

by

perhaps

the

in this country today, who wrote, "As you leading I am probably know, something of a fan of Justice Harlan, especially his First Amendment work in the late 1960s. But I have always considered his
constitutional scholar

treatment of your claims as one of the low points

in its roughshod, in
most of

cavalier

handling

of your

in his career, especially arguments, and I have so stated

my classes over the years, whenever the bar admission issue arose.") The Federalist is important, for Mr. Thurow, partly because Publius does not really deliberate (p. 192): everything Publius says is designed to elicit a
certain response

ratification of

the Constitution

by

the community. Does not

Mr. Thurow, in glorifying Publius as he does, inadvertently point up the limitations of reliance upon the Federalist by anyone who is trying to under
stand what

the Constitution itself does

proper

provide?

may have been whatever Madison, Hamilton and Jay did in the Federalist, was it not immediately and primarily something said for the occasion? Thus, for example, if the Constitutional Convention had hap However
pened, in its closing

days,

to adopt a bill of

rights

which, I dare say, it

use

would

have done if it had

critics

anticipated the considerable

that would
can

be

made

by
as

during

the ratification campaign of

its

absence

it be doubted that
as

Publius

would

have

explained

and

justified its

presence

just

cogently

he (and his

apologists

in imitation

of

him)

accounted

for its

absence?

VIII
Mr. Thurow's instincts
makes much of are

consistent, however
even as

mistaken

they may be: he

of speech. can refer

the

Presidency,
of prototype

he disparages freedom

For

the

legislature is the locus

freedom

of speech.

to the parliamentary

for freedom

of speech

This is why I (p. 193). (A

back

nice con

this may be found in the Tennessee Constitution of 1796: the people "shall in all cases, except treason, felony or a breach of the peace,

firmation

of

be

privileged

from

arrest

during

their attendance at elections, and in going to

Does not this echo the privilege of legislators, such returning from Constitution of the United States for members of Con the provided in as that gress, who are protected "from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session
and
of their respective

them."

Houses,
critical

and

Of course, the legislature

tion is obviously
good and

also

in going to and returning from the same"?) acts, in that it enacts laws. But delibera
But deliberation
about
what?

to its activities.
achieved

The

how it is to be

in the

circumstances

facing

the legislature.

332

Interpretation
there

Certainly,

is limited

merit

to their worth)

which someone

in vigorously executing laws (without has happened to make.

said about

regard

Something
legislative, deliberation,
government

more

should

be

the people in their sovereign, or

after

capacity.
must

It is that

people

who, preferably
overall

due

and adequate

lay

down the form (or

as

whole

(State

and

that
as

is,

the people is the supreme

land) which the Federal) must implement. In this sense, legislature, with its various governments
of the

law

its

executive.

IX
Mr. Thurow's instinct is certainly correct in noticing the importance for me the relation between freedom of speech and the right of revolution. Perhaps
the
combativeness

of

get

after

my bar
on a

admission

out of my system here (or, at least, whatever is left litigation). Consider the question I put in Athens in who

1969,
plotted

the

overthrow of

nationally broadcast press conference, to the Colonel the Greek government two years before:

had

We have been told many times that the April 21st revolution was made by Army officers who sincerely believed that they had to intervene when they did in order to rescue Greece from its deteriorating situation. My question addresses itself to
the central
problem of

the

legitimacy

of

the

present regime and of

its

continuation

in

power.

What do you, ligent

and sincere

as

Prime Minister

and as

Minister

of

Defense,

advise

those intel
your regime
was

Army

officers who should now

honestly
is
again

believe that

has been disastrous for Greece in

and who agree with

Mr. Karamanlis [who

then

Paris]

that

immediate intervention

rescue

Greece from its

by Army dangerously deteriorating situation?

the

necessary in

order to

Conscientious army officers who studied the published transcript of this press conference, I have been told, found my question even more interesting
and

worthy

responded to

to return

study because of the evasive manner in which the Prime Minister it. Be that as it may, I was never permitted by the Colonels to Greece after that visit. (Even so, I can be considered fortunate,
of

since a couple of not sure

would

my fellow foreign correspondents in Athens that summer were leave Greece alive. They kindly took precautions on my behalf.)
the section

It is

appropriate that

dealing

with

the relation between the right to Mr. Thurow's critique

of revolution and

freedom

of speech should

be

central

the Constitutionalist. To be reminded of the right of revolution, properly understood, is to invoke the role of nature and hence of natural right in
of our political

life. It

at

least

reminds

us

who

(or,

rather, what)

sovereign,

and of the standards

to be looked to. But I

have

never

is ultimately discussed
exercise

the right of revolution without noticing prudential

limitations

upon

its

limitations

which also remind us of nature and

its

prescriptions.

Consider, for

Discussion

333
on

example, the essay

volume.

Thoreau

and

Socrates in my Human
of

Being

and

Citizen

Freedom
revolution

of

speech, then, is
193).

kind

domesticated
ends

version of the

right

of

(pp. 191,

It looks to the

by

which

deliberation is

guided

and

revolution

the right of be found in may my Orgain Lecture at the University of Texas Law School (in April 1981). In the course of that lecture, "The Trials of Witches and the Tribulations of I put the question of "how a decent,
useful comment on
Witch-hunters,"

toward which action

is to be directed. A

intelligent

and educated man could and should

have

responded

in the

fifteenth,

sixteenth or seventeenth

century to

have been desperate little they

could

men

do,

once

recognizing that "there must the clergy) who knew there was (especially among a witch hunt began in their My response,
witch
locality."

hunts,"

which recognized also

that it was very

dangerous to be identified publicly

observations:

with

anyone accused of

witchcraft, included these

No

doubt, behind-the-scene

efforts were made on

behalf

of

some,

with

influence
could

and wealth

being

brought to bear

on receptive witnesses and

judges, if they

be

gotten to

witch

in time. But probably the best course of action was to head off a hunt before it could start in one's locality. Sensible people would have had

to unite at the earliest symptom of the

some a

disease,

to catch

it

early.

Of course,

with was

diseases, it may be

sensible

to let them burn themselves out

but that

risky

course to pursue when a witch

hunt threatened
of

at

that time.

(One does

need

prudence, to distinguish one kind

affliction, or one set of circumstances,

from another.)

Perhaps,

also, in such circumstances, decent

men should

have been
well

prepared to

use extralegal means.

Perhaps, indeed,

some communities

fared

precisely
of

because discreet leaders knew

how
and

what measures to
would

take,

whom

to get rid of and

in

such a

way that there

been done. The

occur

measures that are appropriate

be (to this day) no record in such circumstances

unduly

it

having
surely
"right
of conven

would

to

truly

sensible

men, especially to

men not

constrained

by

tional spiritual

considerations.

piecemeal

invocation,

so to speak, of the

revolution"

may be

called

for in

such

desperate times.

am reminded session of

by

these observations of a comment

seminar on

by

Mr.

Strauss, in

the

opening

his 1963

Xenophon:
unfortunately he didn't have the practical read in a renaissance writer that Xenophon meaning that he defended the position, its enemies.

Someone told

me once a

long
it

time ago that he had

circle,

wisdom to make a note of was the

watch-dog

of

the

Socratic

the tradition one could almost say, against

(I draw

here,

as

in the epigraph,
of

upon

the transcripts prepared of Mr. Strauss's

courses at the
would not

University

Chicago.)

myself

have

long

believed that Socrates

executed, had the re
B.C.
expressed

have been indicted, let

alone convicted and

markably

resourceful and vigorous

Xenophon been in Athens in 399

of revolution

Reservations

by

Mr. Strauss

about right

talk,

as

334

Interpretation
session

in the fourteenth
should also

of

his

i960

seminar

on

the Problem of

Socrates,

be

noticed

here:

The
The
and

argument

[in the

Crito]

of the

Laws

with a capital

suffers

from

generality.

problem of obedience to the

laws

cannot

is why Plato wrote the dialogue as is sound teaching. People should really be law-abiding, by all means. There are cases where it is not possible to be law-abiding, but don't teach people that [which]
that

be simply decided. On the other hand, he did, as a crude rule of thumb it

is true [only] in
extremists

extreme

cases, because that has a bad effect. That that's

not good

makes

them

themselves

and

for any

society.

But there

are extreme

cases.

I think any

one of you can

find

examples

I hope fictitious

examples

where

he

would not

him
stated

has

not

I don't know if some of you know obey the law. Mr. Anastaplo been admitted to the bar here because he stated this principle. He

it, I

think very soberly;

it is,

of

course, an undeniable

principle.

But it is in the

also a principle which

first

grade of

I say it? elementary school, because it is how

should

which one shouldn't teach

also a

disconcerting

point.

X
Of course, there
and remedies should are

risks to any
my

extensive exercise of

freedom
wrong.

of

speech,

be

available when

things threaten to go

Mr. Thurow
the abuses

disparages
of

as unrealistic

reliance upon

the States to deal

with

free

speech

(pp.

196-198).

But for

much

more

than a century after the ratification of the

Constitu

tion, the States were relied upon for many things, not just for policing the abuses of freedom of speech. (It is evident that Publius, too, relies on the

States.) Certainly, my

argument on

behalf

of

the States should be taken more

see

seriously than Mr. Thurow seems

tion through to success; and

inclined to do. The States did

to deal with

the Revolu

they

were, at least in part, responsible for the

most serious

Constitution itself.
of

They

remain competent

abuses

freedom

of speech
we

to this

day

the abuses (which do tend to be local in

with.

character) that

States

should

may want the law to deal prove inadequate in their duty in

notices
which

Then,

of

course, if the
are

a particular

situation, there

the emergency provisions in the

Constitution for
have
questioned

genuine national crises.

Mr. Thurow

that I

the

dangers thus far in the

on

twentieth century

have

evoked

federal limitations

freedom

of speech.

He is

to concede that I may have been correct to play down, as I have for several decades now, these supposed dangers. But he adds, "This estimate
seems

overly reassuring in the light of recent (p. 198). What does Mr. Thurow suggest, that Russian aggression and tyranny in Afghanistan mean that we should restrict freedom of speech in this country? The tendency to lump together legitimate foreign-policy (or national-defense)
a

very

happy

one, if

not

events"

concerns with problems created of

by domestic dissent
may
want over

keeping

whatever control we

points up the advisability harmful talk in the hands of

Discussion
the

335
than in the

States,

rather

hands

of

those charged with (and

moved

by)

overpowering international concerns (p. 200). Let us hope that the final pay ment on the folly of Dennis v. United States was our ill-conceived involve
ment

in the Indochinese

War,

not

nuclear

war

stumbled

into

by

fearful

gamblers or

by
of

thoughtless

"defenders."

Very
with

few

the problems
we suppress

sensibly if
of

cussion

them.

Still,
at

we do face are going to be made easier to deal full (including, unfortunately, irresponsible) dis to say (as I do) that much, if not most or all, of the
our

suppression of political

dissent in home
and

time

has been silly, if

not

not even

harmful

to American

interests

abroad, is

to

deny

that the conscientious

public servant must

"philosophic")
then, I

can

regarded

is rarely, if ever, be led (or misled) to believe necessary for its security. But, the response to the Watergate as silly also in its
take account of what the public (which
"threat"

excessiveness, as may

be

seen

in the essay

on

impeachment in my Human

Being
XI

and

Citizen.

The

question about

the status of the

States in

our constitutional system and equality.

be be

related

to that

of

the tension

between

liberty

may The States tend

to stand for differences (even if only in the form

said

of prejudices).

They

can also
moves

to

stand

for liberty. A

national

government,

on the other
and

hand,

more

toward equality, toward sameness, toward

.

leveling
with

subduing large
provides reliance no on

numbers

Mr. Thurow, Federalist

although

he is

quite

familiar

the

book,

citations

to support his

suppositions not

about

Publius's

equality
some of obliged

arguments

(p.

200).

Indeed, does
read

the Federalist take

for

granted

my reservations about a (in his circumstances) to

reliance on

equality, however Lincoln was

of

the

intentions

the

Founding
mean

Fathers

(p.

203)?

endorse
"liberty"

(What contemporary conservatives mean is, for me, far from clear. Far clearer is

by
what

the

"equality"

they

they

by

the

they

condemn:

revolutionaries

with

guns

and

"the

designing
and

few,"

to say nothing of "ambitious

intellectuals,"

come

to view [pp. 195, 196, 201].)

In any event,

we

should

be

reminded

of what

both

liberty

finally

aim at: each

is directed

by

an opinion about the

highest

good.

equality Whether

equality or liberty should be stressed, I have argued on various occasions, which means, among other things, that some may depend on circumstances and both beyond equality must be kept in view as sovereign. liberty thing be reminded, especially in these most egalitarian times, of Tocqueville's observation that "there is only one effective remedy against the
We
should also

evils which
reminded

equality may cause, and that is political as well both of Chief Justice Marshall's
v.

liberty."

We

should

be

display

of

deference in Publius's

McCulloch

Maryland to "the

liberty"

great principles of

and of

336

Interpretation
generation well

warning, a

earlier,

"Liberty may be

endangered

by

the abuses of than the

liberty,

as

as

by

the abuses of power, and the former

rather

latter is apparently most to be apprehended by the United Is it merely my temperament which inclines me to the
more well

States."

opinion

that

liberty,

than equality,
as

is something which may be desired for its own sake as for the good things it makes possible? Does not liberty point to
includes
an awareness of and

excellence?

And

excellence

dedication to

one's

duties.

Thus, I
Union first

observed on

December 15, 1975, in the

the Illinois Division
of

course of

presentation

to me

by

the American
of

acknowledging the Civil Liberties

of

its Second Annual had been

given

Harry

Kalven Freedom

Expression Award (the

award

to Professor Sharp):

The salutary

questions

I have for community

you are these:

at

What is the is

moral

character,
that
most

both

of citizens and of the

right of a

large,

which

presupposed

by

important

presupposed

self-governing people, freedom of speech? That is, what is in the responsible use of that freedom of speech for which the A.C.L.U.
parties should

has
and

so

by

gallantly labored for decades? What may properly be done, by private the community itself, to foster and preserve whatever moral character

be thought
It is

by

reasonable men to

be

required

for

common

decency

and

for thoughtful

citizenship? one

thing

to

teach,

as

does the First Amendment in

discourse is

keeping

Congress in
It is

check, that it is eminently prudent in our circumstances to allow contending argu

ments

full

scope so

long

as political

being
due

conducted

among

us.

quite another

thing

to assume (as all too many

intellectuals

assume

today)

that we

as a people are not entitled to

we

do (consistent
and as

with

process of

law)

to

do

what

can, both as human

beings

citizens, to save

each other and

hence the
well-

community from corrupting influences being of our fellow men. That mistakes
spirited endeavours

and to promote the virtue and the

will

be

made

in the

course of such

public-

is inevitable

but that is in itself

no ground

duty

we

naturally have to

make reasonable and repeated efforts on

for shirking the behalf of a

civilized community.

XII
I do
not
recall

saying

anywhere

in the Constitutionalist that "the First

Constitution"

Amendment is the
passage cited

centerpiece of the

(p.

191).

I do say, in the
the
press

here

by

Mr.

Thurow,

that

freedom
to

of speech and of

is "both

literally Truly

central"

that amendment

spiritually is "a declaration of our

and

the

First Amendment,
as a

and

that

political

faith

united, self-governing
of which

people."

central,
and

however,

are

those goals in the service

as a

the

First
and

Amendment,
for the

indeed the Constitution

whole,

are

to be

used

sake of which even our cherished constitutional

liberties may be

temporarily
good and

set aside

the twin (not altogether compatible) goals of the common

the

fully

developed human being.

Discussion

337

Of course, liberty,
discussion in the text
abolitionist-petitions

including
of

freedom

of

speech,
of

can go

too far.

My

extended and

the

Constitutionalist
should

John is

Quincy

Adams

the

have to

contend with wherever

controversy freedom dangerous

suffice to
of speech

suggest the permitted.

abuses we

do

But, I
Instead,
of

repeat, the

most

abuses we

face

cannot

be legislated

against

effectively.

(This is

where education comes

in,

to which I will return, shortly.) the crippling delusions

we

get such things as the

and present

Schenck

case and which

the

facile "clear

danger"

formula

has

appealed so much

to

intellectuals, liberals
Besides, equality

and conservatives alike. not

too can be abused. It does have its purpose

the pro

motion of adequate

discussion

with a view

to sensible choices, but as a

handy
for

test with respect to the

justice

of

the community.

But is

not

a passion

equality (unless properly discussed) apt to be used today to deny standards, hierarchical relations and hence nature, even as it legitimates envy, jealousy
and a

lack

of generosity?

That
should

liberty
be

and the right of revolution need also to

obvious

could conclude

from everything I have published my "Human Nature and the First

with

on

be discussed properly this subject. Thus, I

article

Amendment"

in the

University
we

of Pittsburgh Law Review

are called

these cautions:

Prudential judgments

for in the

exercise of the considerable

freedom that

depend

upon and enjoy.

upon a general opinion

But to rely upon prudence is to rely, by and large, about the fitness of things which a self-confident community Self-confidence
as and the moral tone of a

must encourage and sustain. can

be undermined, however, when,

is

true

today, there is

a good

community deal of

corrupting stuff around. (Indeed, that moral tone is already considerably affected, for the worse, when it becomes fashionable to argue either that there is no such

thing

as corruption or that the

community has
deal
of

no

legitimate
can

concern with

it.)
as

All this aside, the

also true around

good sense of the

community

be inundated when, but time-consuming)

to

is

today, there especially

is

a great

when we are with

deluded into
effort

(non-corrupting believing (contrary

than our

rubbish

what nature

teaches) that
in
earlier

we can,

far less

betters

were obliged to exert

times, understand what is going on and A lot is to be said for thinking for ourselves

what needs and

to

be done.

this the

First Amendment,

properly understood, helps us do. But thinking for ourselves is virtually impossible if we don't think if, that is, we do not do what needs to be done to discipline
ourselves to think.

This means, among

other

things,

that self-restraint

is

essential

if

we are

to have effective

self-government.

[W]hat Western intellectuals

to

are

doing,
is

or are

permitting
more

relatively few

do,

to the

sensibilities of

the community

likely
must

to provoke a to

natural rebellion aggres

by

people whose

instincts tell them that there

not even spiritual

be

life than the

sive

hedonism, if
way
of

anarchy, into
and the

which we are

falling. Unless

we once again stand

for civilization,
we

discipline

and prudence associated with nature

a civilized

life,
to

in the West
even

can expect

(human

being

what

it is) to be

subjected

barbaric,

elements which

blatantly deny

the

tyrannical, efforts to purge ourselves of those deep-rooted moral claims of the community.

338

Interpretation
cavalier attitudes which our corrupters even presume to call principles

Our
about and

the

governing

opinions of the

the

character of our

leaders be

will

community mean that the become such that we can

of a

passions of our people

anticipate political and and of an

social repression public

(through the

use

both

harsh

criminal

law

intolerant

opinion)

which will ever

much more painful and sustained than

anything

Americans have

known.

XIII

Playfulness, it
partisan

can

be said, helps
can also

position.

It

help

puzzling complexity
whole

and ambiguity.

from making too much of any one understand how things are, in their One is moved thereby to wonder what the

keep

one

ability to know the whole is like. (as well as protect) oneself through playfulness. Certainly, enjoy Furthermore, playfulness (which is the manifestation of a certain liberty) can

is like

or, at

least,

what one's

one should

promote

(It

should

discipline in reading (or in writing), thereby deepening one's thought. be noted in passing, however, that Mr. Thurow does not have the
puzzle quite right

horse-race
other

[pp.

190-191].
of

He his

overinterprets
general

this,

as

he does
my

things in my

book, partly because

one understands
out"

misconception of

position. when

One knows
"figures

that "Roman

'constitutional'"

puzzle

one are

they

why it and its solution found. Despite what Mr. Thurow says,
cleverness
see

appear

in the
the

notes

where

however,

riders'

horse

manship or One can

is

not

decisive.)

in the Constitutionalist things found (that is, also hidden from view) in fuller development in far greater writers. Thus, my book is in some ways an experiment, for it demonstrates to the perceptive that a certain kind
of

writing is

possible even

in

our

day. (An

author

does have to be
out"

ever vigilant various

with publishers and editors who want numberings of

to "straighten things

for him:

chapters,

sections

and

notes, if not of paragraphs and even

one may check to see whether a in its integrity. The Rabbinic tradition,

words,
text is

can provide

test patterns

by

which

likely

to

have been
respect

published

especially

with

to transmission of the
nice so

Bible, is instructive here.)

yet

In
the

any event, there are some rather Constitutionalist and, if I may say
other writings as well

things

to be

discovered in
who

(and if I do not,
some

will?), in my

things

which

readers

should

someday enjoy be
posited

bringing

to view.
as

But then,

I have

indicated,

certain

playfulness

must

for for?

Mr. Thurow himself. For how

else are

his

shortcomings to

be

accounted

Thus,
under

to give

still

another

(after conceding Bill

with of

an

(albeit minor) example: Mr. Thurow, in note 11 argument I had made about the freedom of speech implied
reports

the original

Constitution),
not placed at are

that I do not account

for why

the

Rights "was
text."

its

Herbert J.

Amendment]."

beginning of the Constitution or integrated by him "to an excellent discussion [by Storing] of this question as understood by the authors of the [First It so happens, however, that the Storing article ("The ConstiWe
then refered

the

Discussion
tution and the
as

339
of

Bill

Rights") does

not

really

provide the explanation sought

to the placement of the Bill of Rights. In

useful

discussion
where

of

the episode

fact, Mr. Storing's characteristically concludes rather lamely, "Sherman had his
debate."

way [as to

the amendments would

report of

fully

emerge

from the

the

be placed], for reasons that do not I believe I have indicated as much

invocation
Herbert

in the Constitutionalist
me, inasmuch

and elsewhere.

Yet there is something

against always

fitting

in this
of of

equivocal

of

Storing

as

various career

Mr. Storing's
my bar

ambitious

disciples have
of

disapproved

constitutional

of my interpretation

admission of

case,

my

mode of

and political

analysis,

my

casualness with respect

to ever so many things

they

take ever so seriously

(including
what

Cold War fan

tasies). Mr. Thurow seems to

be in that

convention-minded

dition

which ages

young

men prematurely. on

(Is this

tradition, a tra comes from wanting

to be "one of the
as someone who

boys"?) I,
grew amiss

the other

"never

up"

and yet

Still, it

might not

be

to record

be plausibly dismissed here I am, going on sixty! here the observation by one sensitive

hand,

can

scholar of considerable

talent: he recalls that the one exception to the dog-eat-

dog

attitude

the intense competition

science at

the

University
over.

of

Chicago

among graduate students in political during his time there was among those
gatherings Of professional

students who were members of

the informal seminars in political philosophy

that I presided

We did
the

make

little in those

ambition and much of add that ment

leisurely

reading together of good

ever

books. (Need I
depart

these

seminars were

"unofficial"? Neither the

political science

nor

the law school of the university has

services.

displayed the

slightest

story for another occasion: it begins with buckle under in 1950 to the demand that I give up my resistance refusal to my the demand made by the to the impositions of the bar admission authorities

interest in my

But that is

then dean of the law

and

school who went on

to become president of the

thereafter

Attorney
an

General

of

the United States.

of

And

so

university I have been

confined ever since, so

far

as the

University
program.

to

teaching in

adult

education

Chicago has been concerned, Fortunately for my intellectual

development,
so sound a

no part of

the university has had

old-fashioned

during

the past

quarter-century
adult education

dedication to

liberal

education as

its

division. And

Rosary
thodox

College

fortunately for my during this period

opinions

professional

development,
tolerant
of

the president of

was much more

man"

political

than "that

at

the

University
career.

apparently unor of Chicago who

somewhat com

had

come

to take
yet

such an

insatiable interest in my

bative but
time

being,

salutary summing up of the Attorney General, at least for the may be found in my National Law Journal article.)

XIV
I have
us
several

times
of

referred

to the need to respect the limits confronting

(to say nothing

the

even more severe

limits confronting the Russians).

340

Interpretation
one

Education helps
of all

become

aware of
points

limits

the limits of most people and

whether

institutions
or

even as

it

to the unlimited,

the

divine

or

the

ideas
and

the cosmos. Education

one's

should also

help

one

to know oneself
as
well as

better,

hence

own

limits

and one's

possibilities,

what

is truly

worth choosing.

Political philosophy is available in some form to a few, philosophy to even fewer. For the community it is useful that a few be shaped by political philos ophy (not necessarily by philosophy itself, the influence of which on political

life

should probably remain indirect if it is not to be destructive) There has always been a gap, of course, between the level
.

of

discourse
our

in the

public

forums

of countries and

that

in their inner

councils.

But in

regime, there has usually been

correspondence

between these two levels:

perhaps even

the higher the one, the higher the other; one reflects, is

keyed

to, the other. Thus, what is said in the public forums is apt to affect what is thought in the inner councils, especially since some of the best people among us have access only to public forums. Thus, also, what is said in the
public

forums
councils

can

give

one

reliable

indication

of what

is thought in the

inner

and

this provides the community an opportunity to assess,

question

and

correct

the opinions that are

should

likely
a

to be acted upon

by
is

those

in

authority.

If there

be too

great

gap between the

public

forums

and

the inner councils, our people cannot

name

grasp

or countenance what

being

done in their
It
should

and

demagoguery

is

more

likely

to be effective.
councils

not

be

assumed

that discourse that in the

in the inner
public

today is

necessarily

more thoughtful than

more self-interested or more expediency-minded

forums: it may merely be and hence more calculating.

Principles may be more evident in the speeches of some in the public forums, if only because the many generally tend to be respectful of the established morality of the community. Furthermore, since some modern thinkers have lifted the restraints of traditional morality from the tough and ambitious few,

it may be necessary in
and

modern

times to widen

both the freedom Of

"liberated"

speech are

the education made available to the many if the

watched and controlled.

few

to

be properly

comment

in my "Pentagon

Papers"

article anticipates this point:

It is the

success of

Machiavellianism (with its

persuasion of
which

bright

men that

they
the

should not

be

concerned about conventional

morality)

helps legitimate in

modern constitutional elevation of

freedom

of speech and of the press

public

life. For it is freedom

of speech

which never enjoys

had to have in

ancient

(that is,
(with

pre-Machiavellian) times the status it

today
for

which can

help

the public
all

become its

as

informed

as

it is

capable of

becoming. It is freedom
possible

of speech

risks and

banalities)

which makes

it

the

deepest

moral sense of

the

community,

the conduct of
obliges

however crudely it may be expressed at times, to make itself felt in foreign affairs. It is also freedom of speech which permits and even citizens in private life to speak on public affairs, those private citizens who

Discussion
are as
who

341
and

informed

intelligent (and
office.

sometimes even as

experienced)

as

the men

happen to be in high

Thus, it is freedom
us to

of speech and public opinion an age

which

help

make

it

possible

for

live humane lives in

in

which even so

the

most respectable

among the

sophisticated and ambitious

have been
"a
good

taken

by

Machiavelli

as to permit

themselves to do terrible things

at

with

conscience."

cation

For the decent community (as distinguished from

notes

least for the

educated

citizenry

liberal

edu

political
and

philosophy) is
elsewhere)
program"

possible and

desirable.
that,

My
not

(in the Constitutionalist

provide guidance to

to philosophy simply.
read good yet

My

"educational

(for

which

instruction in
published

how to begin to
and

books is vital) may be

American

seen

in

what

I have

in

what

I hope

to publish:
studies principles and

The Constitutionalist

institutions

and

moves,

especially in its notes, to the underpinnings of our way of life and of our ability to understand (or at least to deal sensibly with) that way of life. Human Being and Citizen addresses itself to enduring questions as reflected in various

issues

of

the day. So does "Human Nature and the First

a small

Amendment"

(which

is, in

effect,

My forthcoming
of natural

Artist

right

as

my long Thinker considers, among other things, the question reflected in the work of various English-language artists.
as
of several more of

book,
as

is true

articles).

My

publications

on

affairs, culminating
edition of the

perhaps

Quebec separatism, on Israel and on modern Greek in my article on modem Greece in the current
constitute a separate volume of work.

Encyclopedia Britannica,
and articles

So do the briefs

I have

prepared since

Illinois bar
Black's

admission

controversy. which

(My

1950 with respect to my American Political Science Review

critic ended the

opinion

letter from

in

your case was

I have already quoted, "I believe Justice the finest and most eloquent of his

career."

This assessment, which I have heard from many others, suggests that there may indeed be something about that case worth thinking about. Thus, Willmoore

Kendall generously identified

'apology'

me

in the Review
a place

as

"the

author of perhaps

the

only
oratory."

of our

time that demands

[He, in

association with

in any anthology of American Leo Paul S. de Alvarez, was the founder,

at

the

University

of

Dallas,

of what must

be

one of the

finest

political science

departments in

this country

My

publication plans

today.]) (D.V.) include

collection

a collection of commentaries on con of

stitutional

documents;
peace;

of analyses

famous trials;

series

of

addresses on political questions of our

of war and
as

another collection of

time, with special emphasis on problems discussions of the kind found in Artist
most careful

Thinker, but

not

limited to English-language artists; the

yet made of

trans

lation into English John Gormly;

our
of

Plato's Meno
edition

(working

from the draft left

a collection

by
of

contract

for this
and

has been signed);

examinations of classical

biblical texts

(returning thereby
much of

to the roots of
upon a

way

life);

and a series of
which

inquiries into the divine (based

recog

nition of that question

is fundamental to

philosophy

as well

342
as

Interpretation
the question quid
sit

to

theology

deus). Much

of

the

work

for

most of

these

projected volumes

consulting the philosophy actually

much

entries

has already been done, as should be evident to anyone under my name in the useful bibliography in political
J.

prepared

by

Harvey

Lomax. Whether

all of

these volumes are

should not matter

collected me.

and published

in my lifetime, however,
one

to

In

much of what one

does,

unfortunately,

is today pretty
contact

much

working
authors against

alone.

There

is, for
I

in this

country. as

variety I have long thought it

of

reasons, relatively little

useful

among

(partly
own

as a precaution and

sophistry),
Prudence,"

explain

in my "American Constitutionalism
upon

the Virtue of the

to make extensive references to my

work as

well as to

work of others.

(The influence

my

work of

Hugo L.

Black, Laurence

Berns, William W. Crosskey, Harry Kalven, Jr., Alexander Meiklejohn, Harry V. Jaffa, Malcolm P. Sharp, Richard M. Weaver and Leo Strauss should be
evident

to anyone familiar the care I

with

that work.) I have not written the things I

"lost"

have,

with

have,

only to have them

in diverse journals

and

for this reason, too, I cite myself freely, however immodest it may seem. I do conceive of my widely scattered publications, including such things
as

my

introductory

lectures

on

Confucian

and on

Hindu thought,
to work
199).

as all parts

of one corpus with a consistent argument

from

a general point of view.

Thus,
even

I believe Mr. Thurow is

to

mistaken

to consider

me

from "an

exception

government"

(that

is,

the First

Amendment)
(at least

(p.

It is apparent,

in the Constitutionalist, that I

and constitutional

work

with respect
of

to American political
193).
as mani

matters) from the Declaration

Independence (p.

Thomas G. West had this to say about my "educational fested in my Human Being and Citizen:
Human
politics

program"

Being

and

Citizen

should prove

helpful to those
speaks

who wish

to understand

in its broadest in the light

context.

Anastaplo

in the precise,

vigorous

language

characteristic of events

the great tradition

of

of political

discourse. He

examines

contemporary

the

abiding

arguments of political philosophy,

simultaneously

addressing himself to those arguments in the light of current political questions. His writing is free from jargon, and he discusses points of view opposed to his
own with
of a

sympathy and clarity, In our time liberal education that enables a man to

we

have nearly

abandoned the
when

idea

speak and act

sensibly
of

facing
men

the

whole range of questions with which

human beings

must concern

themselves;

Anastaplo's book helps

such as

us to recall that the universal and

.

interests

thoughtful

Aristotle, Cicero, Hegel,

in
our

Churchill

remain our

only

access to the

completeness we seek
.

lives.

The

peculiar excellence of

Human

Being

and

Citizen is that the

questions

it

raises can

be

considered within the terms of

Anastaplo's

own arguments.

Even

where politics seems too and of

depreciated
back

by

philosophy's authority, the thoughtfulness

a

balance

of the presentation shine

through. This is

fine

example of the
and

kind

writing

needed

to

bring

a conception of education

in letters

citizenship

Discussion
that

343
under

has nearly dissolved

seller."

the corrosive effects of academic

skepticism and

the

decline
a

of serious political

"best

discourse. It is unlikely that Anastaplo's book will become His standards of human and political virtue are probably too high

to

satisfy the debased tastes of an age of mass communication. The book, however, may be a godsend for anyone whose mind and soul are capable of genuine growth.
observations

These
review ment).

by
It

may be found toward the beginning and at the end of a Mr. West (who is also in the University of Dallas Politics Depart
to be characteristic of the
younger members

seems

of that

gifted

department to

make a good

deal

of

the political as against the philosophical,

as against

of war as against
generous

peace,

and of

equality
and us

liberty. Mr. West, in his

several thoughtful

critique of

Human

Being

Citizen, has
and

things

to say about the

suspect

differences between

in

such a

way

as

to

make me

he may not be altogether wrong. I hope to be able to use in future publications, form which I can perhaps justly claim to have
that
exercise

whenever

appropriate, that

"perfected,"

the dialectical note.

That

is, in certain critical respects, imitative of the most satisfying (however immoderate) conversation among friends. (The influence here of Diogenes Laertius, the Talmud, Pierre Bayle, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, I hope, Plato should be evident.) Thus, one of Mr. Thurow's
apparent association

in

free

Harvard teachers "developed the

could

art of

my Human Being the footnote with the fervor and

observe,
of

and

Citizen,

that I

had

elaboration of a

Gothic

architect."

Thus,
upon

also, the editors of the Memphis State

University Law Review,

publishing my long memorandum on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, took (at my request) the step, perhaps unprecedented for a law
of

journal,
"used

more

placing the notes after the text; they for elaboration than for
who

explain

that my notes are

all

documentation."

However

this may

be,

time is on the side of those

take

offense

at

my notes,

since such

notes

do require, for their proper fashioning, considerable energy, a disciplined imagination and a good memory, all of which (whatever my original supply)
can

be

expected

to diminish

with age.

In any event, my notes are to my work as digressions are to Tristram Shandy: take them out, Laurence Sterne's narrator suggests, and one removes the sun

light from the book. Or, to

recall

Walter Shandy's observation, "Learned men,

It should upon long noses for brother Toby, don't write be recollected as well that it is indicated in Plato's Phaedrus and elsewhere that one's writings (and especially the notes one has "the practical

nothing.

dialogues

wisdo

to make?) can serve to remind some, perhaps even oneself

in

one's old

age,

life be usefully of things worth thinking about. Furthermore, guided by the right kind of writing (which includes constitutional documents
cannot political

and commentaries

upon

them)? This hope

should

is

consistent

with

the recognition

that the
not

most

important things

not,

perhaps

cannot, be written, certainly

for the

general public.

344

Interpretation

XV
Mr. Thurow
with concludes

this comment:

his section, "The Federalist and the "Anastaplo understands the fundamental
revealed

Constitutionalist,"

character of

the

United States to be
choice of revealed

Constitution"

the

in its dedication to deliberation; Publius, in its (p. 193). But, to repeat, is not that character truly
nor

neither

in dedication to deliberation
rather

in

choice of

any

particular

constitution

but

in the

set of standards and

in the

attendant

institutions
alter

which permit a

discussion

of and an

informed

choice

among contending

natives at various

times? (Mr. Thurow evidently overlooked, in the article

he

drew

upon

in his

note

11, Mr. Storing's

endorsement of

"the

value of a serious

and thoughtful

deliberative
of

process"

in the First
our

Congress.)
circumstances,
upon genuine

One

consequence

my emphasis, in

deliberation is that I
conservatives

am considered suspect

by

diverse

partisans.

(of

whom

Mr. Thurow is merely the

latest)

Thus, young dread the risks that

they

my reading
to

of

the First Amendment exposes a defenseless country to:

that "one need only consider who revolutionaries are

can even warn us

likely

one grows older

(p. 195). (We may wonder what one will do as is unduly fearful in one's youth.) On the other hand, an old liberal such as Thomas I. Emerson (of the Yale Law School) effectively discouraged the University of Chicago Press from
our

be in

circumstances"

if

one

publishing the Constitutionalist in

some

1964.

(The Press, I have been told, had had

par

strong

recommendations

that the book be accepted.) He seemed

ticularly

concerned

that my reading of the First

Amendment

would open

the

way to repression, particularly by the States. (Thus, his concerns were just the opposite of Mr. Thurow's!) His criticisms of my manuscript include the fol

lowing:
The
author seems

to think that the problems of

free

speech and the

First Amend
prohibition regulate

ment are confined

to situations the

where

the government undertakes

attempts

direct

of speech.
speech and

He
the

confines

discussion to

by

the government "to

or sedition

press,"

referring mainly to censorship

the problem of

laws. There is

no

consideration of and pervasive author never

than

indirect infringements, which are far more numerous the direct prohibitions. It is surprising, for instance, that the
might

discusses how the First Amendment

which

The
and

parts

deal

with

the contributions of

apply State's

to

his

own case.

rights to

free

speech

the restraint of

States in that

area seem to me

tions that suppression of speech

in distant less

states

particularly weak. The proposi does not affect more balanced

with

communities, that the

States

are

likely

to

interfere

free

speech

because

international affairs, that States have limited resources for repression of speech, that the States have the power to regulate speech because they have responsibility for education, that the States are less impersonal, etc., are

they

are not concerned with

mere speculations

(wrong

in my opinion)

not supported

by

any

serious

data.

Professor Emerson

concluded

his

assessment

in this fashion:

Discussion
I
seem to

345
worked myself

have

up to

to separate opinion from workmanship.

frenzy over this. And I still find it hard My general feeling is, however, that the
are

levels

of

standards of an

thinking, treatment of materials, and craftsmanship here important university press.

below the

It is

rather

pedestrian

engaging to see Mr. Emerson so worked up, considering how his writing on the First Amendment usually is (with his forced marches
a

through the cases).

Even so,

assessment of

the

refreshing contrast to the sort of thing found in the Emerson Constitutionalist is provided by C. Herman Pritchett who
published review of the

included in his

book these

comments:

This huge book is primarily a treatise on the first amendment, with notes. As such it is probably the most original, extended, learned, dogmatic, tightly-structured,
eloquent, unorthodox,
and altogether

heroic essay in
was one of

constitutional

explanation,

interpretation, William W Crosskey,

and plain and

who

fancy incidentally

assertion since the

two volume blockbuster of

professors at the

Anastaplo's

University

of

Chicago Law School.

even goes on

Professor Pritchett kind Pulitzer

to suggest that the publisher (which was also,

to use the Emerson phrase, "an

Prize"

of

costs,"

important university press") "deserves some for having, "in this period of astronomical printing "indulged the author in a considerable spate of autobiographical appen
(he later

dices"

and

indicates) in
adds

"an incredible

mass of 390

fine-print
have

pages spent

of

notes, some 300,000 words,

years."

on which at

the author

is

reported to

four

(Mr. Pritchett

this point, "In these notes the positions

taken in the text are supported, elaborated on, or

illustrated

by

staggering

array

of sources ancient

to modern, sacred to profane, serious to popular, and that he did not have
room

by

the

author's own observations should

for in the text.")

make
of

Still, it

be

recorded on

Mr. Emerson's behalf that he did

at

the

following
1964

concession

assessment

in supplying me recently, (which I had not seen before):

only
as a

my request,

copy

his

I know that

you will read the enclosed

a matter of

strong

statement of

intellectual

differences. As
"political"

my vigorously today. For example, your argument for limitation of the First Amendment to speech has far more support today than I would have thought back

fact, I probably

would not state

position so

in

1964.

(It

should also

be

recorded

that if Mr. Emerson

had

not

discouraged the Uni

versity of Chicago Press from publishing the Constitutionalist when he did, its appendices and its massive notes would not exist and so his veto proved
a

blessing, just
I believe it
doctrinaire

as was perhaps reasonable and

my

exclusion

from the

practice of

law.)
do have
work

for

me

to recognize that I am neither conventional

other

nor

this means, among

things, that my
"frenzy"

readers

to think for themselves, however

themselves up to
upon

much of a

they occasionally

confronting that

painful prospect.

346

Interpretation

XVI
To say that
one

is

considered

suspect

by

diverse It

partisans

is

not

to say,

however,
indicative

that one cannot ever win their

of

respect.

would

be

useful

here,

as

how I

approach

the issues

of our

day,

to draw

upon

the response
special

made on

the

occasion

(October 12, 1979)

to ideals in both

when

was presented a

award

("for
of

commitment

word

and

deed") by
who

the Chicago

Council

Lawyers,

liberal bar

association.

I had been introduced

remarks with which

on that occasion

by

lawyer

quoted

certain

Mr. Pritchett began his

1972 review of the

Constitutionalist:

On April 24, 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of five to four, affirmed the action of the Illinois Supreme Court which, by a vote of four to three, had
of the
upheld

the decision

of

the Committee

on

Character

and

Fitness

Illinois bar which,

was unfit

by

a vote of eleven to

six, had decided that George

Anastaplo only

for

admission

to the Illinois

bar. This he

was not

Anastaplo's

such experience with power structures.

In

i960

was expelled

from Soviet

Russia for protesting harassment of another American, and in 1970 from the Greece of the Colonels. As W. C. Fields might have said, any man who is kicked out of

Russia, Greece

and

the Illinois

bar

can't

be

all

bad.

My

response opened with

was excluded

these

words:

Since I

Union in

i960 and

untouched

by

from the Illinois bar originally in 1950, from the Soviet from Greece in 1970, I look forward with a curiosity not concern as to what 1980 will bring. Thus, I may especially need

your support next year.

not to be taken, I hasten to add, as a covert announcement of my the United States Senate, to say nothing of even higher office. Nor for candidacy is any disavowal here of candidacy to suggest, I should also hasten to add, that I consider myself unqualified for such public service but I have noticed that it

This is

takes a while, indeed even

high
a

opinion of myself

that

decades, for influential I have, and a political

people

to

arrive at

the same
marches

career

necessarily

to

faster drummer than that.

talk
on

My

that

occasion

(entitled, "One's Character Is One's Fate?")

concluded

in this fashion:
means

Your award, if it

anything, testifies that I am

to

being

commended now

for

having
other

been fortunate

enough

have

seen a quarter

Americans trained in the law

could see about

century ago what only a few the Declaration of Independence

that

and

its right

to revolution, and about related

issues

of

desperate

period

in

the

life

of our country.

My

appreciation

for
of

your award

should take the

form

continuing to
what all as a

my appreciation, if it is to mean anything comment in the years ahead upon what I

consider questionable

in

too many of our token of

fellow-citizens believe

about the

issues

of the

day. Permit me,

reputation as a constitutional scholar as

future performance, to draw upon my I indicate reservations about three opinions

Discussion
that the

347
lawyers
and

"better"

am

limited to
first

permit me to

judges among us hold these days. The few minutes do little more than to voice bare conclusions: is that
school we now

of

dissenting opinion mandatory busing of public

My

face here in Chicago, in the

prospect

children,

a tiresome ritual which promises

to

do little in this city for education and the invaluable neighborhood school, for racial justice, or for ordinary people's faith in the Constitution, bureaucrats and
federal judges. It
would make

far

more

sense,

and

hence be

far better

use of the

passions and resources which

forced

busing

in the form

of an urban equivalent of

something (if only the Civilian Conservation Corps) about the

will

waste, to do

scandalous unemployment patient

rate, especially among the young, in the remarkably

Negro
second

community.

My

dissenting
us are

opinion

is that the virtually

correct
of a

unlimited access

to abortion

now available

in this country is

an unconscionable state of affairs.

The Roman
to
what we

Catholics among
now

substantially

in their

deep

opposition

have,

even though

they (because

law) have long been

serious

misled

by

misunderstanding of the dictates of natural their leaders with respect to birth control. Particularly

here is the

unwarranted

Supreme Court,

which

reading of the Constitution by the United States has left local governments paralyzed in any attempt to deal
with our

compassionately but

firmly

dreadful

abortion epidemic

(which

represents,

among

other

things,

a callous exploitation of women and an endorsement of mindless

gratification).

My
is to

third

dissenting

opinion

is

rooted

in the argument,
purpose of

which

I have

made again

and again

in my
that

publications, that the

primary

the

First Amendment
people, the
political
danger"

protect our right and come

duty
us

to discuss

fully,

as a sovereign

questions

before

from time to time. (The "clear

support

and present

test

is, in

these matters,

questions always open

simply without for discussion is

in

the

Constitution.) Among
a

the

that of

what

the community should

do to

train

itself

and
no

its

citizens

for

self-government and

for

decent life together.

and

Certainly, community is obliged, in the name allow itself to be corrupted by the demented, the
less
or

of

liberty

self-expression, to

vulgar, the selfish, the thought

the doctrinaire.
of

Each

the three

dissenting
which

opinions

I have just better

shared with you requires an equipped

extended argument

lenged to do so, than

of you.
needed

am

many I. I hope that that

the
matters
public

of you are

to

develop, if

chal

which

I have

said

does

challenge some

Serious thinking

about

among making these remarks, to express proper award and for your dedication to justice and the
most appropriate appreciation anyone

men and women

in

I have touched upon today is sorely life. In any event, I have intended, by appreciation both for your generous
common good.

After all, is

not the

tinuing
law? I

to

remind people such as you

in my circumstances can exhibit that of con from time to time of the ethical, political
depend
to
as students of

and constitutional principles upon which we all so much can

the

only hope

that

I have indeed earned,

and continue

deserve,

your

recognition as a colleague of sorts whose

my

public

capacity

over

the

past quarter

primary concern in what I have said in century has been for the moral fitness, security
of

the informed sensibility, and the enduring

a vulnerable world must

that troubled
not

nation

to

which

look for

prudent

leadership

if it is

to

perish.

348

Interpretation
event, is how it seems to
me

This, in any
that
what

that issues of the

day

should

be

spoken of when

liberals

are

dealt

with.

(It

should

be instructive to

record

here

I did say in this talk

proved so

challenging that the

editor of

the bar
even

association's

journal twice
set

reneged on

his undertaking to

publish

my talk,

though

it had been

in type

by

his people.)

XVII
How issues
with

of

the

day
what

should

be

spoken of when conservatives at

are

dealt

is

suggested

1980)

about a

by leading

I had to say

conservative

Rosary College (on December 4, polemicist, Harry V. Jaffa.

occasion scientist

that he

I began my introduction of Professor Jaffa on that is, to my mind, "the most instructive political
today."

by observing

writing in this

(This introduction and the long conversation which followed country have been recently published in the Claremont Review of Books.) My intro duction included the following remarks:
A little
that
more should

be

said

by

me about

we might want

to talk about on this occasion.

Mr. Jaffa now, if only to suggest matters A few differences between us,
speak

of which

was reminded when

I heard him

yesterday

at

Loyola

University,
myself to

could usefully be indicated. Mr. Jaffa not only makes far

more of

exercising than I do

I limit for

walking of less than five floors

whenever possible and

to the avoidance of elevators

also

ascents or

descents

but he

is

a much more vigorous moralist

than I am,

both in regulating his own conduct and in judging the conduct that I allow more than he does for good-intentioned errors, for
part of

of others.

I believe
on the

inefficiency
can

people,

and

for

circumstances which account

for,

sometimes even

justify,

what seem

from the

outside

to

be

moral aberrations.

Compassion

be

almost as

important
relations,

as moral
whether

indignation in these matters, particularly with respect to domestic the subjects be abortion, divorce or homosexuality. Perhaps also he does
of

make more

than

the

importance
tone of the

if only

out of respect
of

for the

sensi not

bilities

of others and

for the

moral

community
foreign

discretion, if
We do

even of good-natured

hypocrisy.
relations. share

We differ

as well with respect to the conduct of

an abhorrence of part

tyranny,

whether of

the Right

or of

the Left.

But

we sometimes

company

on assessments of

how

constitutional government and

American

republicanism can

best be defended have been,

that our

abroad.

Thus, he
it was, in differ

was much more

hopeful than in intention

was much or

could ever

be

that our
might

involvement in the Vietnam War (however

and that

noble

that

involvement Indochinese

some respects) could

he

more

hopeful than I

was

Vietnam involvement

do the American
what

the

people some good. pose

Today

we

as to

precisely

kind

of

threat the
and war

Russians

to

us.

see them as much more vulnerable

(both politically

militarily) than does he;

"scenarios"

and

consider all too

many

calculations about nuclear

to

depend

too much on game theories and not enough on political

judgment. I believe, for example, that the Russian leaders are much more con strained by domestic public opinion (by a pacific, even though patriotic, public

Discussion
opinion)
and

349

by

other

factors than many

of us recognize.

They

have suffered,

at

home
and

and

abroad,

a considerable setback

we, do not suffer an even greater

in Afghanistan; we can only hope that they, setback by a Russian invasion of Poland. But

whatever

happens in Poland, it is
part

now evident that the cause of

freedom is bound

to be in better shape in Eastern Europe than it has been since the Second World

War

in

because
and this

of what

Polish

workers

things really stand there. The

have to pay, Perhaps

at

only may depend, in part, on their prudence and on the heart of the differences between Mr. Jaffa and me
as

question

have done in showing the world how may be what price the Polish people will
ours.
whether the

differences be
with respect

to the status of exercise or as to assessments

with

of

the

Russians

is

to how much one should be concerned

of what

the preservation of one's

life. An immoderate cherishing

happens to be

one's own can

lead, it

seems

to me, to psychic paralysis or to undue combativeness: either can undermine that

relaxed competence which makes

healthy

statesmanship
"equality."

more

likely.

Certainly, Mr.
touch

Jaffa
what

responds much more

than

I do to the
as against

apocalyptic as against the comic and some

less

than

I do to

"liberty"

Obviously,
and of

we

here

on

questions about the nature of

human existence, heart

of our

of

virtue,

happiness.
that we

On the
were

other

hand,

at the

deep

affinities

besides the fact is

decent life

both fortunate

enough to share a great teacher

in Leo Strauss
is known

our

minority

belief that fundamental to

munity is

sensible political science and to a

as a com

a general respect

for

natural right and what

as natural

law. This

things, that discrimination based on arbitrary racial categories cannot be defended, especially by a people dedicated to the self-evident truth that "all It also means that the family as an institution should be men are created
means, among other
equal."

supported.

Thus to

challenge

one's

fellow

citizens

whether

they be

"liberals"

or
can

"conservatives"

seems

to me the

duty
be

and privilege of

the citizen. One

see, in the two talks I have just drawn upon,

upon

anticipations of

themes touched

in

what

I have

suggested would suffice

an appropriate response to
refute

Mr. Thurow.
contention
politics"

"Dallas"

Such talks
that I

should

as

well

to

the curious

do

not

concern

myself

sufficiently

with

"the

dignity

of

(pp.

196,

198-199).

EPILOGUE
the American regime, flawed though it may
might not expect

praise

be,
face

when

it is

appropriate

to do so. One

this, if

one took at

value

Mr. Thurow's

my determination to defend the Constitution. But that defense has been abundantly displayed both in word and in deed, beginning during
reservations about

the Second World War.

Praise my

of the

American
quoted

regime

may be seen, for example, in

on

various of
as well

writings

I have

from

this occasion.

It may be

seen

throughout the

Constitutionalist,
worthy
of

which even concludes with

an extended pa

triotic

speech

the Fourth of July.

(I

refer

here to the text,

since

350

Interpretation
for
a much more

the book's notes, which are

limited

set of

readers,

conclude

[as Mr.

Sharp indicated]
discoveries

with certain

discoveries I have

made

in

mathematics

and physics which

I have extended,
can

not altogether

playfully, to political rela

tions. These

be

connected with what

I say in my Leo Strauss

eulogy

about

something I

call

the

"ultron.")
following:
hope"

Thus,

the closing words of the text of the Constitutionalist are the

republicanism remains not

American
noblest

only "the

world's

best

but

also the

testimony
man

that

men

the ability of

to use

have today of his reason properly to

men should

their faith in
secure

one another

in,

that

is,

for himself
that

and

his posterity

the good things of this

experiment not
republicans

life. Timid

be

reassured

our republican

only has worked, but has worked much better than eighteenth-century had a right to hope for: it may well be the best which our political
will admit.

circumstances, nature, and traditional opinions

The salutary
free."

republican of our

opinions should

day, however subject to continual re-examination his be, is entitled to conclude, "We must not be afraid to be

to be

We have to be counseled, in the words of Justice Black, not to be "afraid In our day and time, respectable intellectuals do not have to be
free."

counseled not

to be afraid to be equal (except

when

"affirmative

action,"

which

can sometimes which

be both

useful and

just,

seems to threaten them).

It is freedom

frightens them, not equality. On the other hand, their thoughtless dedica tion to a doctrinaire equality can make them indignant, especially when they
encounter
of

talented

men who

insist

on

going their
he

own way.

One is

reminded

the

hostility

provoked

among

ambitious
as

politicians
"arrogantly"

by

the Socrates both

through the

of

Aristophanes
However

and

of

Xenophon, be, it

walked

marketplace. all

this may

should not

be

assumed that

I take issue

with

all of
with

Mr. Thurow's
some of them

criticisms.

"in

principle"

On the contrary, I can imagine myself agreeing but I do have difficulty seeing how most
particular."

of them

apply to me or to my book "in But then, I have suggested, Mr. Thurow

misapprehensions.

must

be

aware of what

he is

doing
about

in his his
his

To

conclude otherwise would preconceptions and

be to leave doubts

care

in reading,

about

his

standards, if

not even about

good will and sense of

Still,
"gentle

clouds remain
rain

fair play to say nothing about his sense of humor. which I, for one, cannot altogether dispel. Perhaps some is
necessary.

from

heaven"

BIBLIOGRAPHY
i.

Alfange, Dean, Jr., Review

of

The Constitutionalist (Item 2[iii]), 68 American

of

Political Science Review 774 (1974). 2. Anastaplo, George, (i) "The Declaration Law Journal
390

(1965); (ii) "Swan Song

of an

9 St. Louis Eagle: America in

Independence,"

University-

Greece,"

50 South-

Discussion
west

351
116

20,

by

1970] Item 2
on

Review 105 (1970) (reprinted, in part, in and in 117 Congressional Record

28130

[viii], Essays I, XI
the

and

XIII)

(see

also

Congressional Record 16359 [May [July 29, 1971]) (supplemented Item 10); (iii) The Constitutionalist:

Notes
(with

First Amendment (Dallas: Southern Methodist

and

corrections and reviews

by

"Human Nature

University Press, 197 1) listed in Items 2[viii], 2[ix] and 2[xiii]) (supplemented Amendment," the First 40 University of Pittsburgh Law Review
of

661 [1979], and by "The Religion Clauses State University Law Review 151 [1981]); (iv) in
118

the First

Amendment,"

11

Memphis (reprinted

"Preliminary

Reflections

on

the Pentagon

Papers, 64 University of Chicago Magazine, Jan./Feb.,

Congressional Record
24990

March/ April,

1972

Mass Media: A Practical Man's

Modern

Guide,"

[June 24, 1972]); (v) "Self-Government and the in Harry M. Clor, ed., The Mass Media and

Democracy

(Chicago: Rand

(vi) "The Occasions of Freedom of (vii) "On Leo Strauss: A Yahrzeit

Winter 1974 (to be
on

reprinted

part, in Item 14); 5 Political Science Reviewer 383 (1975); Remembrance," 67 University of Chicago Magazine, in Item 2 [xiii]); (viii) Human Being and Citizen: Essays
Speech,"

McNally, 1974) (reprinted, in

Virtue, Freedom and the Common Good (Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press / Ohio Uni versity Press, 1975) (with corrections and reviews listed in Item 2[xiii]) (see, also, Item 9); (ix) "American Constitutionalism and the Virtue of Prudence: Philadelphia, in Item 8 (1976); (x) "One's Character Is One's Paris, Washington, Fate?", 125 Congressional Record E6162 (December 15, 1979); (xi) "Abraham Lincoln's
Gettysburg,"

Emancipation

Proclamation,"

in America (Durham: Carolina Academic

"An Introduction

(reprinted in The Claremont Review of Books, Decem versity of ber 1 981; to be reprinted in Item 2 [xiii]) (supplemented by Item 2 [viii], Essay V, by Item 2[ix], Note 64, and by Book Review, 23 Modern Age 314 [Summer 1979]);

Harry Dallas, Spring 1981

of

in Ronald K. L. Collins, ed., Constitutional Government Press, 1980) (reviewed in Item 24[iii]); (xii) V. The Newsletter, Politics Department, The Uni
Jaffa,"

(xiii) The Artist

/ Ohio Carol
3.

as

University Press,
which appeared

Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce (Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press 1982) (including a chapter on Charles Dickens's A Christmas

in 7 Interpretation

52

[1978]).
xxvi-

Anastaplo, In re George, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (Counsel pro se), 405 U.S. xxvii (1972); 50 Southern California Law Review 351 (1977); 9 Southwestern University Law Review 977 (1977); National Law Journal, June 18, 1979, p. 21; Item 2(iii), Appendix F; Item 2(viii), Essay IX; Item 2(x), Chicago Magazine, Dec. 1982. 4. Aristophanes, The Clouds. 5. Arnhart, Larry, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 198 1). 6. Berns, Laurence, (i) "Two Old Conservatives Discuss the Anastaplo 54 Cornell Law Review 920 (1969); (ii) Review of The Constitutionalist (Item 2 [iii]), Dallas Morning News, Nov. 28, 1971 p. 6H; (iii) "Gratitude, Nature and Piety in 3 Interpretation 27 (1972); (iv) "Political Philosophy and the Right of King Interpretation 5 309 (1976); (v) "Francis Bacon and the Conquest of
"Rhetoric"

Case,"

Lear,"

Rebellion,"

Nature,"

7 //jferpretation
7.

1(1978).
of

Bordelon, J. Michael, Review

Abraham Lincoln, the

Gettysburg

Address

and

American Constitutionalism (Item American Constitutionalism

8), Modern Age, Fall

1976, p. 442.
and also

8. de Alvarez, Leo Paul S., ed., Abraham Lincoln, the Gettysburg Address (Irving, Texas: University of Dallas Press, 1976) (see
11).

Item
9.

Kendall, Willmoore, Book Review, 61 American Political Science Review 783

(1967)-

352
io.

Interpretation

and

Lomax, J. Harvey, ed., A Contemporary Bibliography in Political Philosophy (1976) (4215 Glenaire Drive, Dallas, Texas 95229). 11. Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by Leo Paul S. de Alvarez (Irving, Texas: University of Dallas Press, 1980). 12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (18 19). 13. Plato, (i) Apology of Socrates, translated by Thomas G. West (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1979); (ii) Phaedrus. 14. Pollingue, Mary L., ed., Readings in American Government, 2nd Edition (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1978) (including reprints, without notes, of parts of The Constitutionalist (Item 2 [iii]) and of "Self-Government and the Mass
in Other Areas
Media"

(Item

2[v]).
of

C. Herman Pritchett, Review Law Review 1476 (1972).

15.

The Constitutionalist (Item 2[iii]), 60 California

16. 17.

Publius, The Federalist. Sasseen, Robert F., "Freedom

Scales
v.

as

an

End

Politics,"

of

Interpretation 105

(197018.

United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Cohen

v.

California, 403 U.S.

v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 20. Sharp, Malcolm P., "Crosskey, Anastaplo and Meiklejohn on the United States 20 University of Chicago Law School Record, Spring 1973, p. 3 (see
Constitution,"

15 (I97U19. Schenck

121

Congressional Record
21.

40241

[December 12,

1975]).

Sterne, Laurence, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman. in M. Judd 22. Storing, Herbert J., "The Constitution and the Bill of Harmon, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1978) (reprinted in Ralph A. Rossum and Gary L. McDowell, eds., The American Founding [Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1981]). 23. Strauss, Leo (i) "On a Forgotten Kind of in What is Political Phi losophy? (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959); (ii) Seminar on the Origins of Political Science: The Problem of Socrates (University of Chicago, i960; transcript); (iii) Seminar on Aristotle's Ethics (University of Chicago, 1963; transcript); (iv) Seminar on Xeno phon (University of Chicago, 1963; transcript); (v) Socrates and Aristophanes (New York: Basic Books, 1966). 24. Thurow, Glen E. (i) Abraham Lincoln and American Political Religion (Albany: State University of New York, 1976) (supplemented by "The Gettysburg Address and the Declaration of in Item 8); (ii) "The Defense of Liberty: Anastaplo's The Constitutionalist, 8 Interpretation 188 (1980); (iii) Review of Constitutional Gov
Rights,"
Writing,"

Independence,"

"

ernment

25.
western

West, Thomas G., Review

in America (Item 2[xi]), 34 Review of Metaphysics 374 (1980). of Human Being and Citizen (Item 2[viii]), 9 South University Law Review 278 (1977) (see also Item I3[i]) (supplemented by

"Cicero's
26.

Teaching

on

Natural

Law,"

St. John's Review, Summer 1981,

.

p. 74).

Xenophon, Memorabilia [of Socrates]

Eros

and

Thumos

Stewart Umphrey

shall review

David Bolotin's
published

published

interpretation
of

of

Plato's Lysis,
of
work of

and

Thomas G. West's

interpretation
both in

Plato's

Apology
First,

Socrates.1

What justifies

examination of

one essay?

the

Leo

Strauss plainly informs that of both authors. In the course of their interpretations each author refers to Strauss more often than to any other modern philosopher.
Each
supposes

that a Platonic dialogue is to be to the to

action as well

regarded

as

an

independent
the dialogue to what is

whole.

Each

attends

as to the argument of absent as

well

in question,

and also
or

what

is conspicuously
present

as

conspicuously The shared

readers

inconspicuously
of

therein.

presence

the late Leo Strauss should not,

however, blind
works.

to

important hermeneutical differences between these two

should a not

Furthermore, it Each is about

distract

attention

from
each

more

obvious

kinship.

dialogue

by Plato,

and

in

dialogue the

philosopher

Socrates is plainly at work in some way. The Lysis, on the one hand, is about another day in the life of Socrates. He is made to present himself as an itinerant,
marginal man who once

dallied in

a new palaestra

because

his

acquaintance

was

in love
the

and needed the skill of

young man of Socrates in seduction.

a

Socrates readily

granted

requested

favor: he

engaged

the

beloved,

boy

approaching adolescence, in an exemplary conversation at once playful and unsettling. As a consequence the boy, whose acquaintance Socrates was then
only beginning to make, friend in a similar manner; The
asked

Socrates to

punish

his

playmate

and closest

and with this

on

Apology

of Socrates,
stand

request, too, Socrates readily complied. the other hand, is a political dialogue. There

Socrates is his fellow

which

made to
citizens.

in

lawcourt
not

and

give

an

account

of

himself to

In his defense he

he has
says

gained

notoriety, he also

only describes the way of life for exhibits it; at any rate, he does just
refuting, rebuking, and

what

he

he has been

doing

for

years

trying

to

persuade the men of

Athens to become

more

virtuous, less lazy. Yet despite

his

statesmanlike

activity, or because of

it,

the majority

charged and condemns presented

him to death. In
contexts.

these

judges him guilty as two dialogues, then, Plato has

one and

Socrates in diverse in both, his in the

Though apparently
one situation are thus

the same

philosopher

appearance

in the

his

appearance

other.

We

readers

certainly differs from induced to raise anew the

New
of

I.

Translation (Ithaca

David Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis, and London: Cornell U. P., 1979). Thomas G. West, Plato's
with

with a

Apology

Socrates: An Interpretation,

a new

Translation (Ithaca
or

and

London: Cornell U. P.,

unless otherwise noted.

1979).

In Part I II

references

are

to Bolotin's

book,

to Plato's

Lysis,

In Part

references are

to West's

book,

or

to Plato's

Apology,

unless otherwise noted.

354

Interpretation
What is
Socrates'

old question:
most of all

pragma!

It is this

particular question

which

brings together,

as

it were, the two interpretations

under review.

Accordingly, it may

serve as an alternative to the title of this essay.

I
i.

Most

of us

would

agree

that

friendship
friendship,
old as examined

Some
wants

of us would also agree that our

is very important for our lives. understanding of it is inadequate. Bolotin

apparently;
as and

to discover the truth about

assistance

to this end he

has

sought of

friendship"

from writings, is posed. He has

well

new,

wherein

"the

question

Plato's Lysis in particular, for it

theme"

(9-10). "devoted in its entirety to this In this reading Bolotin has found a problem. The immediate question is whether there can be a friendship in which each befriends the other wholly
stands out as a work apart
such

We may like to believe that it is possible, and that is the highest kind of friendship. Throughout most of the Lysis, however, from
self-interest.
argues while an

Socrates
is that for the
to be

impossible,

friendship must be based on utility. The problem, therefore, friendship (independent of wants and needs) seems imperfect one (admittedly dependent on need) "fails to account
that
perfect
friendship"

whole phenomenon of

(10-12,

208).

How is this

problem

The Lysis itself indicates the way, Bolotin finds. It is true that there are friends "in the fullest sense of the only if each befriends the other from a desire to attain some good for himself. According to Socrates,
resolved?
word"

desire for
or

good

arises

its

recognized

only when something bad is evidently present. Evil, presence, is then a cause of friendship. But there are friends only

in the fullest
other

sense

if, in

addition,

each

desires to be together

with

the

not

owing to some natural kinship. This desire, according to for one's own good; it is not at all due to the presence

Socrates, is
of evil. causes

Of
or

friendship
conditions.

in the fullest sense, then, there Each is necessary. Together they

no such
nor

are

two

independent

are sufficient

(180-1). It

directly
is
is

follows that
needs

friendship
good. while

is

possible

between two beings

human beings

each of whom

nothing;

is it

possible

between
It does
no

two
not

each of whom

otherwise

self-sufficiently
may

follow

that perfect

friendship

impossible, however; for

other,
each

two such
other a

nevertheless

like the

beings have any need of each as another of his own kind; and

they

may therefore come to be

makes

friends in

sense, presumably because

they

can

together meet one of the two aforementioned requirements

(193-4).
to an imme

This summary

Bolotin's interpretation is

seem vulnerable

diate

objection.

Understanding friendship
about

not

the same as understanding

Plato's

own

teaching

it,

even

evidently
organon.

seeks the

former,

and

if his teaching happens to be true. Bolotin seems to regard the dialogue itself as a mere
of

It is therefore

quite

unlikely that his interpretation

it

will

be both

Discussion
thorough and
are more

355
misunderstanding.

free from

Hermeneuticians, strictly

speaking,

disinterested.
objection one might

Against this
procedure

try

to defend the propriety of Bolotin's

by

appealing to the principle that makers,

to users,

including

authors,

should

be in

subordinate

including

readers. as

Bolotin himself

suggests

safer

defense. The
question

goal of the

interpreter,
or of what which one

such, is knowledge
author

of what the text

means,"

"really
the way in

its

thought."

"really

The question,
case

then,
of a

concerns

is to
way

attain this

knowledge. In the

Platonic

dialogue,

one reads

in

appropriate to
one

of all

the guidance available

subject matter and

within

the

dialogue,

it only if, by means tries "to learn the truth

to arguments made

about the

it

discusses."

Bolotin here

appeals

by

Leo Strauss
a

Jacob Klein,

and adds some excellent remarks of confirmation

and

his

own

(12-3). It is
one

strong defense;
Socrates

is in the interpretation. On the

throughout.

hand, Bolotin is interrogative

at what

reflective

Certainly
reduced

his

wondering

says or means

has

not reduced

him to dumbfounded

awe, nor has his

complacent proceeds suspects

long

and close acquaintance with the

dialogue

him to

acceptance of

the assumptions

it harbors. On the

other

hand, he

Only

patiently and synoptically from beginning to end. One almost never he is attributing something to the dialogue that is not there. occasionally do I suspect that he fails to notice something important.
that
suspicions

(These few

shall state and of

consider.)
proceed?

How is the interpreter

Bolotin's interpretation to
quite such

Though

one

should, I believe, read his book in a way read Plato's, I shall not try to represent any

like that in

which

he has

is
on

not an

interpretation, in
major claims.

the full sense

of

reading here. What follows the word, but a series of remarks

exhibit a unlike

Bolotin's

These remarks, like his book,

grace.2

desire to his book,

discover, in
and

a similar

way, the truth about friendship.

and

Quite

Plato's, they may lack balance

2.

Each Platonic dialogue

presupposes a

diairesis owing to The Lysis,

or

which

it is

decidedly
matter

more about some

a

things than about others. From things it leaves or puts aside,

said

dialogue is
discusses,"

sometimes

to abstract.

"the

subject

it

Clearly occurred during

there
constraints were permitted what

is negatively determined by several such abstractions. is an abstraction from the political. What Socrates
a

narrates normal

(legal) holiday,

when

there

was

relaxation

of

and, consequently, a little disorder: to commingle; the supervisory

and an old man

youths of

different

age-groups some

slaves were

free to become
of

drunk

and neglectful;

openly fond
In those

youths,

Socrates,
the word
and

was able
'polis'

to have the
used

conversations

he

relates.

conversations words

was

only

once,

with

disdain (205C2); the

'nomos'

2.

For

what

follows I have
and

received considerable assistance not

also

from Seth Benardete

Drew Wilkinson, I have

with

whom

only from Bolotin's book but I have read the Lysis, and from

Deborah Achtenberg,

with whom

conversed about

the good.

356

Interpretation
not

'arete',
or

at

all.

Furthermore, in
real.

Socrates'

arguments

it is

as

if the city
seem to

state

were

scarcely
those

In his first

exchanges

with

Lysis both

assume that political accept

necessity

can wither away:

ignorant

multitudes will

gladly
accor

the
with

rule of

who prove

wise;

and

these

few, acting freely in

dance

their own wisdom, will

In later but
not

exchanges with

do nothing that incurs their Menexenus, Socrates mentions our need for
and other such arts.

subjects

enmity. medicine

the locus

of

this

As

goods we seek under pressure

of evils

he there

mentions

health

and wisdom

but

not

justice; he

speaks of

wisdom and

ignorance, but
from

not of right opinion.

As Bolotin notes, there is in

the dialogue no explicit reference to pistis (67).

This
about

abstraction

political

things

friendship.3

For

whereas

justice (at
and

is appropriate, if indeed the Lysis is which the law aims) is universal and

impartial, friendships
friends
end of and

are

"private
or

exclusive"

(9, 69,

74).

Helping
and

one's

doing

what

is just

legal

are

frequently
society

at

odds:

consider

the

the

Lysis, for example,

and also

the

Euthyphro, Crito,
needs

the Republic.

Therefore,

while

every

political

to promote

especially friend

the various societies of

ship among its members, every political society must also be ready to suppress friends in its midst (cf. 126). Men, or rather human
are

beings,
147,

in the Lysis
cf.

regarded not as political

but

as

"social

animals"

(133,
concerns natural

180,

9).

The dialogue's

relative

freedom from
of

political

permits the

recovery, or at any rate the appearance,

its

participants'

sociality friendship. In its

and

individuality;
from

and

situation of this

kind is

a proper

home

of

abstraction

political

constraint

Plato's Lysis is

quite

like his

Symposium, but

unlike

was of course present.

it is only marginally about eros. Eros Hippothales eventually confessed his love for a beauti
the Symposium

ful boy; Socrates

confessed

his

eccentric

disposition toward

acquisition erotic

of

friends. In his
is for the

conversations with
part not

Lysis

and

Menexenus, however,
when

love

most

mentioned.

In particular,

suggestions

about the philon

Socrates

holds, first,

examining his own that one needs or desires

the good, not that one

own,

not

the good or

loves (kqa) it; second, he holds that one loves one's the beautiful. This difference Bolotin rightly emphasizes
that the conception of eros
not
Diotiman.4

(184,
loves

220-3).

He

moreover argues

here

presupposed erotic

is Aristophanic (183).
mentioned eros

Certainly

it is

And,

though like the

zenship,
either
3.
ask

Socrates in the Republic it is potentially at odds with citi for one's own natural kind must be mutual and thus cannot be

by

tyrannical or
also

philosophic.5

It is Cf.

appropriate

given

the

interlocutors'

extreme

youth.

But

of course

one

should

why, in this
4.

dialogue, Socrates is
20idff.

made

to converse

with

interlocutors

who are so young.

Symp

At Lys 20732-3 Socrates

reintroduces the

seems to
almost

distinguish the beautiful from the

seems

good; and at 2i6c6

he

beautiful,
of

gratuitously, then

to forget it.

It

can

therefore

hardly

escape the reader's notice that the object of eros, as

commonly conceived,

is

being
5.

ignored. Do

we

have here

an

instance

Plato's

generosity?

Cf.

Rep

490b2, 573e6.

Discussion
This
philia

357

partial abstraction

from

erotic

things seems appropriate; for eros and this is the

are

distinguishable. A

sign of and

fact that
has

we would

speak of a philia

between Lysis

Menexenus but
philia

not of an eros an

correctly between

Lysis

and

Hippothales. Another is the fact that

whereas eros

opposite, namely
one could

enmity (exQQOt),
use
sexual

does

not.

Yet

another

is the fact that

without

the word 'philia', but no longer the word

interest. So, if
we

we suppose

speaking,

should expect such

'eros', suggesting a is about friendship, properly distinctions to be observed therein. Indeed

that the Lysis

its
of

subject matter

is

other than

that of the

Symposium,

as

it is

other than that

the Republic. It lies between them.

Likewise,
at

the dialogue

Socrates here
of Socrates, It took place

narrates took place neither within nor well

neither

the city, as does the

Apology
wall.

beyond it,

as

does the Phaedrus, but

the city

in

the marketplace or courtroom, nor within the

yet another palaestra.

privacy
own

of someone's
was

house, but in
was,

And, for Socrates,

from
within

the dialogue

initially

compelled neither

from
free.

without nor

by

his

desire. Thus it Socrates

initially,
a

quite

There is

third,

related abstraction.

In his

search

for the

philon

admits evil-induced
natural

desire for

what

desire for

what

is

one's

is good, or both beautiful and good, and own. He does not expressly admit any natural

desire for the beautiful. It may be present in Hippothales, for instance, but it is not considered as a basis for philia. Thus, presumably, lovers of wisdom and friends
of the

forms (of

whatever

sort)

are not such

because

wisdom and admit

the

forms are for them naturally attractive. Nor does Socrates expressly natural desire for the good. It may be present in the
search

any

interlocutors'

common

help
and

explain

for happiness, but it too is not considered as a basis for philia. This may why Socrates speaks of the compelling presence of some ignorance,
not of the

for example, but why he

enticing
the

absence

(or presence)
of

characterizes

philon

in terms
not

of any knowledge; loving (qpiAelv), needing

of

(6elo0ai)

and

desiring (^Jti0up,etv),
admit

but

in terms

wanting

(|3oiJ^eo0ai).6

Nor does he expressly love present, in

Lysis'

any

natural

of

listening

and

desire for the truth. It too may be in pleasure at love of

Socrates'

Lysis'

the basis for any kind explain This may help why there is in including The Lysis the dialogue no explicit reference to abstracts, then, from our natural orientation to the true and the beautiful and the good. This is
wisdom

(2o6cio,

2i3d7); but it is

not considered as

of philia,

even philosophia.

wonder.7

tantamount to an abstraction

from

our

daemonic

nature.

That
which

Socrates'

friendship or friendly feeling inquiry depends. It is

,

has

no

such

basis is

a supposition of

on

a plausible

hypothesis,
.

course, but
conversation
not

with

6. Cf. Hipparchus 227d, 232a8-bl I Meno 78a-b, Grg 467C5-di Lysis the word |3otjXo^cci is used only once, and then only in the
(2i3d6).

After the first

narrative

frame,

in

what

is

narrated

7.

58d5, Phdo

Bolotin, pp. 70, 79, 80; and Plato, Rep 475e4, 485C4-8, 487c, 499CI-2, 50ld2, Phlb 66e3, 68a7, Tin 155CI3.

358 it does it too

his

Interpretation
remain

unstated, unexamined,

unconfirmed. not

Much

more

doubtful, I

think, is his hypothesis that human beings do

remains

naturally love the good. Yet latent throughout. Since, moreover, it is a needed premise in
would vanish were all evils remains

argument

that the good

removed, the sound

ness or unsoundness of

that argument
either

to be seen. And since

Socrates'

Bolotin,
is

too, fails to incomplete.

To repeat,

articulate

hypothesis, his
our

account of

inquiry

abstraction

from

daemonic
or

nature

does

not seem

inappropriate.
toward
our

For it
own of

allows attention

to the mortal

human kindness

we show

kind; and such fondness, when reciprocated, seems to be of the essence friendship, whereas the intrinsic transcendence we show toward the intrin sically good or divine does not. In the Lysis, however, Socrates attends less

to

friendly feeling
in
a

based

on

kinship

than to desire for the good

based

on the

presence of evil.

How is this
on

appropriate?

Why

should the

bad figure

so prom

friendship? More surprising still is the pervasive inently emphasis on self-interestedness. No one, Socrates seems to suppose, ever desires the good for another as But what, then, is one to make of the
such.8

dialogue

proverbial

common? so evident standpoint

Is it

according to which the things of friends are shared in salutary falsehood? And what is one to make of the generosity in friendships? Is it really illusory? Egoism is not the most promising
wisdom

from
as

which

to

try saving
phantom

the phenomenon

of

friendship

unless

classifying it The problem in

deceptive

is to

count as

an

act

of preservation.

appears

speech to reduce

in Plato's Republic (4i2d2ff.), where Socrates endeavors both household and city (or its middle class) to an extended
the ground that one cares most of all about that
which

circle of one

friends,

on

loves (cpdel) to oneself. It also did

and one appears

loves

most of all

that which seems advantageous

where of

in the Nicomachean Ethics,

and

Aristotle tried his

own subtle

to account for such things as courage

friendship

in terms but to

egoism,

and cf.

not

obviously

succeed:

to say that the

friend is
state

another self

(n66a3i,
egoism

Ii70b7) is

not to resolve the problem

it. Hobbesian

does

not offer even the promise of a resolution

(cf. 9).

How, then, does Socrates fare in

ship is
possible?

the Lysis! Can he consistently affirm both

latter.9

that our need for friends is self-interested and that our entry into true friend

Perhaps he does
philon

not affirm the

of

to apprehend the
oneself.

in terms
and to

loving

or

befriending
of

Yet surely he attempts what is good for

To this attempt, disposed

nor

Bolotin's interpretation

it, I

now turn.

3.

On

having

of

their paternal wisdom

sometimes philein

Socrates divines that it is

the

neither good

bad

which

("loves")

the good.

In

other

8. Bolotin's
9. 2i6e2

explication of this theme 21 iff.

is

excellent.

See especially Also

207C10

pp.

78, 100-02, 124-31,

134, 145, 160, 163, 169-70,

Cf. Bolotin's

note on

his translation

of 223157.

(XivETm)

with

220ai-b3:

Discussion

359
nor

words, the neither good

good

bad

sometimes

becomes

philon

("friend")

of

the

(2i6d-2i7a). Socrates then

elaborates this

divination and, if Bolotin is

one needs

right, refutes it.

In
to

order

to

avoid

keep

in

mind

the

becoming unduly confused by this passage, following. The philon, according to Socrates, is

the neither
good.

bad. It is something which loves (cptkniv). What it loves is the The good, then, is something loved (cpiA.oijp,evov). Now one expects subsequent examination to be about the philoun. In fact, however, he
good nor
attention

Socrates'

shifts

away from it to the philoumenon, which he begins calling 'philon ('dear'?).10 But this proposed philon is not and cannot be the same as the philon
nor

originally proposed, since by hypothesis the good and the neither good are heterogeneous (2i6d6), and since the one is loved without loving
other

bad

and the exam

loves
of

without

being
an

loved."

It appears, therefore, that if

an attempt

Socrates'

ination

his divination is indeed involves We

ignoratio

to refute
not

it,

then

his

putative

refutation

elenchi.

Bolotin does

draw this

unexpected

conclusion.

must endeavor to see why.

Socrates
good nor

elaborates

his

proposal

in two

steps.

First he

considers the neither

he maintains, when and when the bad is present to it in a (2i7a-2i8c). In what way? On way only Bolotin's interpretation, the distinction Socrates makes here between appearing and being is to be understood in terms of awareness. The neither good nor

bad,

that

is,

the philoun. It

becomes

philon,

bad
to

needs and of such

loves the
serious

good when and as

only

when

it

recognizes

the presence

it

evils

sickness,

ignorance,
is

and

death (148). Bolotin

180).

occasionally
the text no
not

suggests

that this

recognition

reflective

(e.g.,
and

There is in

explicit reference

to calculation,
'reflection'

however,
he
means as

in fact Bolotin does

other than

say

or

strictly

imply

that

by

here anything
such.12

simple awareness of the presence of

something bad
which

Socrates considers, secondly, that

that

the

neither good

nor

bad loves,
sake of and that us

is,

the
we

philoumenon.

The

real philon,

he maintains, is that for the

which alone.

(allegedly) love all the other Medicine, health, and so forth are

things we
mere

(allegedly) love,

"phantoms"

distracting

from is the

what we

ontic status of these phantoms?

really hold dear (2i8d-2 2ob). What is this philon! And Bolotin begins to answer the first
"friend"

what

question

by by

tentatively identifying
One may
10.
'friend'

the real

with more

the ultimate good

(i6iff.,

216).

venture

to

identify
notes

it

specifically

with eudaimonia,

sought

This

change

Bolotin
or

for

'philos'

'philon

in passing (165). In his translation he has consistently The justification for so doing is supplied in nn. 26, 35 (pp.
'dear'

used
55-

7).

as well as 'friend'. In his commentary, however, he used II. As Bolotin notes (163), Socrates now ignores the reciprocity which,

we

suppose, belongs

to friendship.
12.
good.

Bolotin

uses the word

'reflection'

when

distinguishing
I252a28 and

love

of one's own

from love The

of the

Probably
to

he has in

mind

Aristotle, Pol
also

Plato, Symp

207b7.

absence of

any
to

reference

calculation see

may

help

explain

the absence, already noted, of

much reference

want

((3otjXe08cu):

Bolotin,

p. 91

and ps-Plato,

Z)e/4i3c8-9.

360

Interpretation
it.13

all who need not use

Socrates, however,
"good'

makes no such

identity

statement.

He does

the
the

word

in this

part of

the argument, and he seems to prefer

leaving
22oa4).

first

question

unanswered and unasked

(2i9b5-22ob5, especially
one of these phantoms

His

answer to the second question

philon

is

clear.

Every

is, he
he

says,

in

name

appears says

more

generous

that the real

is philon in reality (xqj ovti). Bolotin departure from the language of the text, friend is alone friend in the sense (169-70);
only;
none

when,

in

"fullest"

for to
and

speak thus

is to

suggest that other

such allowance:

things
there

can

be friends in
reference

some

sense,

Socrates
or

makes

no

is

no

to degrees of
also empha

being

sizes the

truth, and harshness

no appeal
of

to

pros

hen homonymy. Yet Bolotin

Socrates'

little Lysis
based
no on a

will never

One consequence, he notes, is that be loved. The pleasure he took in his dream-rule was
proposal.

deception (162-3,
can

T70).

He

moreover notes

the consequence that

of us could

be truly a friend (169-70). If so, then most living thing hardly be more deluded in what we hold to be dear, and why.
In his interpretation
step. of

the subsequent argument Bolotin will take one more

will

The

real

friend, he

conclude, is

oneself as

an

independent

being
Soc
yet

free

of evils

(175-6). This further

conclusion

is

not

expressly drawn

by

rates, who nowhere in the dialogue even

mentions self-love

(cpdcama);
explain

it does
he

accord with the

drift

of

his argument,

and

it may

help
of

why

refrains

from

identifying

the

philon with

the good. It
of

is,

course, incom
the good;

patible with
as

Bolotin's tentative identification

even

the

philon with

for,
is
a

he notes, it implies that But it is

also

the ultimate good is a mere phantom

with

(171,

176).

inconsistent

his

statement

that no

living thing

friend; for it implies that, on the contrary, no unliving thing is philon. And, finally, it is inconsistent with my statement that what is loved differs from what
loves; for it implies
an

that philoumenon and philoun are one and the same, and
otherwise

inquirer

who

holds

to some phantom (cf.

164-5).

is probably overlooking himelf in his attention Thus Bolotin's more radical identification of

the dear one with oneself is not

here, too,

appearances elaborated

Having
Bolotin,
I

obviously derivable from Plato's Lysis. But may be deceiving. his proposal in these two steps Socrates, according to

refutes

it. His

"primary

refutation"

occurs at

22ob6-e6; the "refutation

remainder of this section
shall examine

as presented

to

Menexenus,"

at 22oe6-22id6.

In the

shall consider

Bolotin's

account of the

former. In particular, I

what

he

says

regarding these three claims:

removed;
of

(i)

that the good would cease to

be

were evils

(ii)
his

that the good is loved

by

us not

for its

own sake

but for the That the

sake

an

enemy; and

(iii)
were

that
.

Socrates'

argument

here does

constitute a refutation of

original proposal

good would cease to

Socrates'

be

the bad removed is the conclusion

of an argument.

naturally

constituted

reasoning involves the following steps: The good is (jtecpuxe: ds) by us on account of the bad; therefore, if
also

13.

Cf. 220b3

with

Meno 88C2-3;

Symp

20461-20534.

Discussion

361

the bad were removed, the good would not be constituted

would not exist.

by

us; therefore it
that we love

To repeat, Socrates

relies on

the tacit

premise

the good only if compelled to love

it

by

the presence of the bad.

Conse

quently, his reasoning is sound only if this hypothesis is true. Let us now suppose that it is true. Let us also suppose that we alone can bring forth the

good,

and

that we can be free of evils. There remains the question of whether

Socrates'

conclusion

is true. Is the good,

as

such,

so

dependent

on us?

Observe
absence

that ours
of

is

an ontological question: we we would

do

not now ask

whether, in the

the

bad,

be

aware of

the

good.14

Socrates'

present answer to

this question is plausible in the case of goods

usually called instrumental. Consider a certain inanimate substance. Apparently it is itself, per se, neither good nor bad. It is good or bad an antidote, say,
or a poison

relative

to the needs of beings like us. Thus its goodness, if it

an accidental attribute of

is good,
oiiaiac,. so too

appears

to be

the substance, a mere JtafJog

Just
a

as a

thing is dear because

good

someone

loves it,

and not

conversely,

is

thing instrumentally
for.
'
. .

because it is
case, '.
.

useful to someone to some

good'

end,
.

and not conversely.

In every

such

.is

is

elliptical

for

is

good

According
The
question
not

to Bolotin (171 -6), Socrates now maintains that the same is true

of the ultimate good.

In this case, too,

the

we

may

ask

"What is it

for?"

good

is

reasonable since

ultimate good

is itself

relative

to some

thing
good

to another good, of course,

good

but to the

being

whose perfection

it

is. The

ultimate

(cf.

193).

it were, that for which it is the ultimate Suppose that virtue is our ultimate good: surely it is the virtue
needs,
as
eudaimonia:

proper

to us, not to horses or soils. Or suppose that it is the happiness

of man qua man?

is it

conceding On this account, then, the ultimate good needs those beings who, like us, need it. Other goods are for the sake of it; it is In other words, the for the sake of what is, per se, neither bad nor
as much

not then

Even Aristotle

verged on

(EN

H77b24-28).

good.15

"higher"

"admirable"

and more

is for the

sake of the

lower

and

less

admirable

Furthermore, if it is reasonable to ask what the 100, 133, 143, ultimate good is good for, then it is also reasonable to ask why we love the ultimate good (cf. 161). The answer, Bolotin says, is that one loves it just
(cf.
145).

because it is
good

good

for

oneself given one's evil circumstances.

Thus love You

of the

is

rooted

finally

in

self-love.

The friend is

not another self.

yourself

are your sole true

friend.
Socrates'

question

the adequacy of
considers

argument as

Bolotin interprets it.

(158,
225).

First,
In this

14.

Cf. Heraclitus Bui. Bolotin Lysis

with

the cognitional question as well

connection compare

Rep

334c iff.

15.

Like Aristotle (for

ways: when
when

example,

de An 4l5b2-3), Bolotin
which

uses

the expression 'for the

sake of

in two

mentioning instrumental goods,

each of which

is for the

sake of some other

good; and

mentioning the final good,

is

somehow

relative not

to another good but

to an intermediate or underlying entity. Thus he only seems to be in disagreement with Plato's itself" Glaucon on this point. For Glaucon admits that a good which is good "for the sake of
alone

is

"in''

nevertheless

or otherwise proper to

something

(Rep

357b, 358b, 366e;

cf. 367b).

362 if the

Interpretation
good

is

so

dependent
itself
per

on

the
an

neither good

nor

bad (together

with

the

bad),
that

then

it is

not

se,

independent being. Yet Socrates

suggests

it is

(22OC4-5

with 2i6d5-6).

Furthermore,

this causal account entails

that the bad is not likewise dependent: Socrates cannot consistently affirm that

it is naturally
account of

constituted

by

us, on account of the good, since he maintains the bad were already the bad is
no present.

that the good would not the nature

exist unless

Yet

a similar

and existence of which not

less

plausible.

Thirdly,
is

this

line

of

reasoning,

ends

in

discovery

that our ultimate good

(perhaps) happiness, is
in

discovery

of

the

good.

evidently the only line of reasoning which ends Consider Plato's Republic VI- VII, where Socrates knowledge
of

proposes

that through dialectics one can attain

the absolute or

unconditioned

(rivTjJtoOexov),
virtue

that

is,

the good. That ultimate good cannot

be

thing; in no sense of the word could any it need us; in no way could it be generated. Now account there may be incorrect, a beautiful or degrading myth; but certainly it is not shown to happiness
or

or

other such

Socrates'

be incorrect here in the Lysis.

ultimate good

Furthermore,

even

if

we

do

affirm

that the

is in reality for us, we need not admit that it would vanish when we ceased needing it. Suppose that the ultimate good is the activity called 'happiness', and that we have come to be happy. Then we no longer need
that
activity.

for (relative to) us, But I

regards

But that activity exists, of course; and apparently it is still even if it is not also useful for us. Socrates seems to

good

agree

that the good cannot be reduced to the useful

also question

(2iod2,

cf.

100).

the adequacy of Bolotin's interpretation. Socrates now

the

good

as

drug

(cpaopiaxov: 22od3) for the bad. A

not now

drug

is

an

instrumental
good; he is

good. not

Therefore Socrates is

speaking
or

of the

ultimate

"higher"

referring to anything plainly

"admirable"

more

than such beings as we ourselves are.

If, however,
gives

the

good

mental, for the taken to be

sake of what

is it? Bolotin

the answer: the end

were we

is merely instru is now

"free
of serious

evils"

"ourselves", or ourselves as we would be (176). Thus, when illness somehow becomes

love
as good whatever will remove

present to the

body,

we

constitute and

that

illness,

whatever will

assist restoration of the

body

to its original state. The original state of the

body

is

not

itself
was

good at all.

Socrates indicates this be

good

which

earlier admitted to

wisdom

or philosophy.

In general, the

longer mentioning health, (2i8e6); and he no longer mentions line of reasoning presented here not

by

no

only differs from that leading to discovery of the absolute good, it differs from that leading to discovery of the ultimate good for us. It too begins instrumental goods, namely those things but it bypasses any
proper

also with

ultimate good and

hold to be dear, to be ends, instead, in discovery

we

our of

friends;
Our

the state

to us as
state

intermediate, independent beings. It is

an

our natural

state.

natural virtue

is

ultimate

end, but it is

not

but

freedom, from

the good as well as

good; it is not happiness or from the bad. And, on this

conceives the end to
which

account, it is the

real philon.

Bolotin properly

Discussion
Socrates'

363 reasoning leads, but he

to the
misconceives

present

the

reasoning

which

leads to it. We
come

now

immediately
reads:

most

perplexing

passage

in the Lysis.

In Bolotin's translation it

Therefore,
for
but

that

friend to us, into

which all

the others [were seen

we asserted

that those things

were

friends for the

sake of another

to] terminate friend has

no resemblance to them.
what

of this.

is really For it has

For they have been called friends for the sake of a friend, friend comes to light as being of a nature entirely the opposite

appeared

plainly to be

friend to

us

for the

sake of an enemy.

(22od8-e4).

Of the

expression

^x^Qofj

evexa various

interpretations have been

proposed. used

According
Plato to

to von Arnim it expresses a deliberate logical the

view

blunder,
of

by

ridicule

that the good is loved for the sake

anything

other

than itself. As Bolotin shows,

however, this proposal rests on a misinterpretation of the dialogue in its entirety (173-4, 21 iff.). It may nevertheless express a logical blunder. For instance, Socrates may now take his ambiguous question at
220b4-5 to dear thing,
same. unable suggest

that the really dear

to speak as
similar

thing is dear for

nondear and

the sake of a not

were

and choose a

if the

the hateful

the
am

He
to

made explain

slip at 2i3b8-ci (cf. this slip if it is deliberate, and quite

very
put aside

118).
unable

But
to

since
show

that

it

is

not

deliberate, I
to
'dia'

this proposal, too.

here means on. account of, the very thing in preceding exchanges. This is possible. As Bolotin notes, however, Shorey's interpretation goes against the usage Socrates has just estab lished and, furthermore, it requires that he not mean entirely the opposite

'heneka'

According meant by

Shorey

opposite'

when

he

says

'entirely

the

(174).

Bolotin's

own proposal of

is

made

in two

steps.

First he

argues that

the

real

friend is oneself as free is, I add, oneself properly speaking; it is the very thing one really loves (174-5). Then he argues that, loosely since one is speaking, one also hates oneself regards oneself as an enemy
the bad. This

presently in

bad

condition

(otherwise

one

would

not

love the good),

and

since one regards one's present condition as

hateful (175-6). This is

no

proposal

is

'self-love'

baffling
the
express

in that the

precise

meaning

of
or

less
of

problematic than

'self-mastery'

meaning sui. It may also seem unintelligible, on the ground that one's real friend cannot be one's enemy (cf. 2i3b2-3). But my own major objection is that Bolotin fails to show how one is in fact an enemy to oneself. Pre
causa

precise

of

'for the

sake

itself if taken to

good only if we are not sumably we are in a bad condition and desire the clear and present danger, but yet bad (2i7a-2i8c). The bad then constitutes a It is about us, but it has not yet corrupted us, at all, in either body or
soul.16

16.

Are

we

then worse than

with

before,
not

without

being

bad? Comparatives,
passage.

so

frequent in

Socrates'

first

conversation

Lysis,

are

used

in the

present

If Bolotin is right, the only

364

Interpretation

not of us. statement

Any
that

such circumstance we regard as an

enemy, of course; but the speaking,

in

hating

it

we

hate ourselves,
proposal

loosely

is strictly

speaking false. One might remedy Bolotin's be

oneself as

by taking
first,

the enemy in question to

corruptible, and

by

arguing,

that one's capacity to

be bad

is is
I

not

really distinct from

of all

one's

capacity to be good, and secondly, that one

most

this very capacity.

one that

pretation,

however,
I

His book strongly suggests another inter involves less departure from the text. The proposal Bolotin's
more

shall now make

regard as

than mine, though I should not

like

either one of us
Socrates'

to be blamed if

it

proves

incorrect.

By
philon:

present

line

of

reasoning
meets

one

finally

comes

upon

the real

it is

oneself.

One

so?

The

real philon,

more

state, the

status quo ante

How enemy oneself in one's own is natural precisely defined, to which one would return if the bad were removed,

finally

an

as well:

it is

oneself.

if

one were

liberated from
a state
of

all

lets

and

hindrances,

psychic as well as somatic. you are

Negatively, it
you.

liberty
state

conceived as unrestraint: conceived as

free to be
you and

Positively, it is
to retrieve
proper

of self-love
are.

self-satisfaction:

rest content with yourself as you

endeavors or

Every

one of us

by

nature

loves

be the

real

philon,

to be oneself

in

actuality.

It is

a natural
not

end,

to each. This telos is certainly not

and

bad; but it is certainly

ultimate good

good,

either.

It is lower
with

less

admirable than

the

for

us. not

When
appear

compared

that telos,

it

appears phaulon

("inferior"). It does
we are

inferior

as a matter of

course, however. On the contrary,

ultimate good

naturally

disposed to but

mistake

it for the
good

(96-7). From the

standpoint of

self-satisfaction, the
alien

itself

seems too

high. It

seems not proper

(oikeion)

(allotrion), scarcely less so than the bad. From the standpoint of our higher end, on the other hand, self-satisfaction comes to light as foolish pride
or vanity.

Our inalienable fondness for the

to light
as a

natural

status quo of

ante,

right or

wrong,

comes what

hindrance to

our pursuit

the good. It reveals

our positive unwill real philon

itself in

Hume

called our natural

indolence,
best

and

in

ingness to
an

move

restlessly toward

being

possible.

The

is thus

bad. There may be none more insidious. Consider, for example, our soul. The ultimate good for it is wisdom, cording to Socrates; the bad is stupidity. When ignorance is present to enemy
without

being

ac our

soul,
cf.

without our yet

being
state

stupid, shift,

we are compelled

to philosophize

(2i8a-c,

152-159).

Let

us now

with

Socrates,

to regarding the psychic good

as a

drug. To

what

can

it

finally bring

us?

What is the

natural end of

There are, I guess, three candidates: knowledge, right or true a kind of barrenness. Of these, the first is too like ultimate opinion, and wisdom, the third too like utter ignorance, to be likely candidates. That we
the soul per se? has been altered,
not

thing

that

so

far, is

our

awareness.

This

awareness

is psychic, I guess,

yet

the soul

is

thereby

made

any better

or worse.

Discussion
are

365

to elect the second is confirmed to be intermediate between

by

Plato's Symposium,
and

where

this state

is

said

knowledge

stupidity (202a,
us

cf.

20365),

and confirmed acterized

by

the

Meno,

where

the innate condition of our soul is char

in terms

of true

opinion, the truth for

(86bi). Now many

are

threatened
are

by

numerous psychic evils.

We

recognize that not all our

beliefs

to be

trusted,

that some of them may for all we know be false. We suffer

and small.

mental

cramps, great

Suppose that

we were

therapeutically

released

from

all

these evils, and purged of all those untruths so that we can

would rest

deeply
Then,

ingrained in
presumably,

our souls our soul

hardly

come

to recognize them as
natural

such.

content, for in its

attitude there

would

be only
would

the simple certainty characteristic of right opinion, of true trust.

There

be

inconsistent beliefs, no perplexity, no wondering, no questions asked. True trust is not stupidity; it is not bad. It is not knowledge or wisdom,
no either.

But

we are nonetheless

fond

of

it,

naturally; and this fondness

(philia)

is, from the standpoint of philosophy, a grave impediment. For philosophers, then, it is an enemy scarcely less hateful than any untruth latent in their
souls.

Is this
the

proposed

interpretation

correct?

It does

imply

that the presence of

contradicts

bad is

good when not overwhelming.

nor

This is odd, perhaps, but it

should

neither

itself

the text. Is it

not also

true? We

to those who
slumber and so-called

by

their nagging questions

and objections rouse us

be grateful, of course, from dogmatic

we

spur us on of

in inquiry. We may thank God that

scarcity,
political

live in the

Age

Zeus,

when natural

society,

and

becoming

toward death

grateful, of
we

supply a rich diet of troubles. It is difficult to be properly course, because the presence of all these bad things is something

naturally try to avoid. The proposal in question

also

implies that liberation from the bad is

not

but it is not obviously unqualifiedly good. This implication, too, may seem odd, denied by Plato: consider, for instance, what Socrates says about Theages in
the Republic (496b6).

Admittedly

it

supplies a

the

goodness of

Socratic

cathartics.

It

also

little-used basis for questioning present puts into question

Socrates'

conception of constitute

the

good as antidote rather objections.

than end. But these

do not, I think,

insuperable
the

Third,

proposal

in

question

implies that

nature

is

not

basically

good.

For,

again, our
and

natural end

is

one of perfect

freedom

and

self-satisfaction, not

happiness; being naturally fond of this end subverts our good. Yet one of the major differences between attempts to become perfectly Ancients and Moderns seems to be that the former regard nature as basically good whereas the latter do not. This objection, too, can be met. Were it
virtue and our
appropriate where

to

do

so

here, I

would

begin

with

Aristotle's Metaphysics i.ii,

he

admits

that we are

by

nature enslaved

in many ways,
question

and with

his

Nicomachean Ethics 11. viii,

where

he

admits a natural

propensity to

unrestraint.

It

might

also

be

objected

that the proposal in

suggests

an

anti-

366 Platonic

Interpretation
conception

of

the Ideas. For on this account it is in reaction to the

philon.

bad that

we pursue go

the good rather than the

other way?

Do

we not

then tend to

overreact, to

too far the

Do

we

not

then postulate the

just

itself, for example, and endeavor to in our indignation at all the injustice
ends are mere
would

assimilate
about us?

ourselves

(and others) to it
unnatural

But these putative,

projects, ideals. The illusion that

they

are

independent beings
we were

drop
are

away when,

by

means of what objection

is really good,
would

finally

liberated from the bad. To this Ideas

not

ideals;

indeed be
and

a cause of

reply by admitting that by admitting that our desire to be free of evils may such entia ficta, and of the illusion that they are real;

then

by

that there are no

arguing that from such admissions it does not in the least follow Ideas, but only that such ideals are easily mistaken for them.
question

Fifth,
only if
not

the proposal in

presupposes

that

we

can

be free

of

evils,

that we can become entirely at ease with ourselves. This could be so,
we were ourselves

however,
we are

independent beings be directed

(xa0'

atjxa ovxa).
presupposition
against

But

and

cannot

be

autonomous.

Therefore the

is false. This interpre be

the unstated
we

objection

is

strong.

It

should not

the proposed
of

tation, however, but

hypotheses
on

against

the text interpreted. For it is another

present

Socrates'

which

reasoning

proceeds
end

that

can

perfectly free; it) is an ideal

and

it

can

be

argued

that this

natural philon

(as I have
a

called

in

other

words, that the true

argues

is in reality

beautiful

illusion. Throughout his book Bolotin independence is fostered

188).

that the illusion of comfortable

by family
since

and

friends (e.g., 79, 84, 97, 103, 133,

"composite"

He

also

argues

that

we

are

necessarily

that

is,

embodied and mortal

as we exist

(158,

192).

to the

body,

to us, so

body Why not long as we

the

must present evils

to the soul, to us, so

long

say, rather, that the

exist?

soul must present evils

It

would

be better, however, to begin

examining this very acceptance of an enmity between body and soul that ceases only in death. Might not this picture be produced in our reaction to the bad? Are
not our soul and our

bodies,

so

conceived,

yet more entia

an

ficta! But there from

our

is

deeper

question.

In the Lysis, I said, there is

that the

abstraction

daemonic
naturally

nature.
viewed

It
as

now appears

daemonic,
comes

as well as without.

the

divine, is

we do something fall in love, and into perplexity, and that both are ailments or diseases. This abstraction is appropriate to the things themselves, however, only if our mortal or human nature is separable in thought, at least, alien.

It

from

Indeed

ordinarily say that

we

from the daemonic. Is it?

Having
return to

reviewed

Bolotin's interpretation

of

the argument at 22ob6-e6 I

Socrates'

his

claim

that it constitutes a refutation of

own proposal

regarding the philon. Is this claim true? At first it appears false. For the true philon has come to light as ourselves apart from serious evils; in other words,

it is the
Yet he

neither good nor

bad

itself,

the very

thing Socrates originally

proposed.

also proposed

that it is philon of the good, and this proposition has

Discussion
now

367 The
neither good nor

been

refuted. on

The good,
are

the other
our

hand,

is

another

bad is in reality philon of itself alone. deceptive phantom, and we ourselves

own

braggarts in
be

holding
that,

that we

love it for its

sake.

Thus Bolotin's

claim appears

true.
noted even when

It

should

he

"would"

says we

(or

"might")

continue

loving
it is

ourselves

apart

neither good nor

bad is

always philon. claim

from the bad (176), Bolotin suggests that the This suggestion may be correct. Certainly

compatible with on

his

depend

self-love,

self-love

that, whereas love of the good and self-hatred depends on neither. But what is this self-love?

Bolotin probably regards it as a desire: he usually speaks of loving (philein) in terms of pursuing something one wants (e.g., 119, 133, 181, 197). When
evils are present and recognized as

such, then

we

long

to be

free

of

them, to
ourselves
would

become
as not
we

what we are.

Since the

object of the

desire thus
a case once

expressed

is

are,

one

appropriately
with

regards

it

as

of self-love. we

But

it

disappear, along
show

our

self-contempt,

became free? Bolotin

regard

fails to love in

that it

would not.

Perhaps

one

should,

instead,

the

self-

question

as self-satisfaction.
Socrates'

Surely

it

would remain after removal of

the bad: consider

a

statement at

218C4-5.17

But

self-satisfaction

is

not

desire; it is found together with rest rather than motion, being coming to be. In sum, Bolotin's suggestion that the neither good
always philon remains

rather nor

than

bad is

in

need of elaboration and

defense. Furthermore, it is
who

independent
that the

of

the

proposal

originally

made

by Socrates,
philon.
Socrates'

then said only

neither good nor

bad

sometimes

becomes

It may also be noted that, on my account, is less a refutation of his own proposal than

argument at 22ob6-e6
a

way

between the
of

philon

and

the good.
oneself qua
end.

His

present
of

showing the disparity reasoning ends in discovery

of

the

real philon.

It is

free
not

the

bad,
The

and good

independence is
whatever

a natural

It is

good. and

nothing is now

else.

Such

said to

be

helps

one achieve

independence,

nothing

else.

It is, therefore,
un-

strictly

subordinate to that end.

our ultimate good

Anything

superordinate

to that end goes

mentioned;

has been

eclipsed.

(In the

course of that other

reasoning
the
philon

which

leads to

to be overlooked.)

has
of not

come to

light

as

discovery By means of this being really other than the

this

of our ultimate

good, one should expect

philon

argument, then, the

good.

To

most

of us

most

the time,

however,
other

diairesis

seems

inappropriate,
want

since

the

philon

is

apparently
made

than the good. There

is disagreement. Perhaps Socrates

to make

has

a mistake.

But

we should

probably

further inquiries

before asserting that he has, particularly those of us who are still quite perplexed about the good itself. Yet it seems to me, and evidently to Bolotin as well,
that the error
error or
more

serious

error

consists
each of us

in
so

identifying
readily

the two.

This in the

is

widespread and

deep

because

acquiesces

17.

Bolotin's translation

of

these lines

is correct, LSJ's

mistaken

(s.v. CtyaTV(\x6c

in. 2).

368

Interpretation
what

belief that

is dear to him is good, because

each regards

his

own

inde

something higher and more admirable than it is: mankind is wont to boast. It may also be that each of us by nature wants an impossible dream.
pendence as

For

who would

not, like

Socrates,
absurd

admit

that he wants a good friend (cpikov

now

6iYo:06v:

2iie3).

But this is

if,

as

Socrates himself
together.

argues, the real

philon and

the real

agathon cannot come

4.

Nowhere in the Lysis does Socrates define

the dialogue is 'About

friendship
and

(philia). Nowhere

therein does he expressly pose the question of what

subtitle of

it is. Yet the traditional

this determination of
of

Friendship',
of

its but

theme Bolotin accepts. He does

so not

because it is traditional,

course,

because he believes that flection

Socrates'

"emerges"

an

understanding

friendship
about

through re the philon

"suggestions"

on

two embedded

first,

that

the intermediate becomes philon of the good owing to the presence of the

bad

(2i6ciff.),
222d8).

and

second, that

one's own

is philon

of one's own

by

nature (22id6-

Bolotin's
mentioned.

reflection on

these two suggestions

has

yielded

the account

already if there is
Socrates'

There is

(i)

evil-induced

friendship in the fullest sense, he says, if and only desire for the good and (ii) an immediate desire to be
kindred
(180- 1).

together with one's own

This hybrid

account

shares

with

suggestions some
nation

important features. Above all, it too is

the
of philein. philia

an expla

(aitiologia). It

"phenomenon"

exhibits an attempt to understand

in

question

in terms

of a source of
as well.

motion,

in terms

But there

are

important differences
to
which

By

noting

some of

these I shall indicate the

extent of

Bolotin's

own account of

friendship

is

logically

independent

its dialogical background.

The first
component of
as

Bolotin's

account seems

to be a reiteration of Soc
no mention of
on

rates'

divination

first
the

elaborated good

by

him. There is
said

self-love,
omission

even can

though love

of

has been

to depend

it. This

be justified, perhaps,
while

by appealing

to the

distinction between
no

aition and

sunaition:

it is true that there

the

would

be

desire for the

good without

either self-love or

directly
account.

effects such

(recognized) desire, therefore it

not

presence of alone

evil, it is the latter alone which is to be mentioned in the present

medicine and so

But

what

justifies

disregarding
"of the

the

implication that

forth

are

mere

phantoms,

On further
which

examination of

(181) but of the philon itself? his divination Socrates articulates certain strictures

good"

desire is
cannot

Bolotin has observed, but now relaxes. One result is that the good we no longer said to be deceptive. Another is that the sole true philon

be

friend in the fullest desirous

of

sense of the

word,

since

it is

not

in itself

either good or

the good.

The

second component of

Bolotin's
It is

account seems to

be

a specification of

Socrates'

alternative suggestion.

other

than

Socrates'

own, however. For

Socrates

elaborates

it

by

proposing that what one lacks one has

lost,

and

by

reintroducing

eros and

soul, this time together

(222ai-3). Bolotin does

not.

Discussion

369
that the kindred things
and are social

Instead, he
one
not. not

proposes

animals, fellow human

with

beings in particular,
another;
and

that the object of their desire is to be together

association.18

he

stresses the pleasures of such evident that

Socrates does
but does

Thus it becomes
entail, Bolotin's

his

alternative suggestion allows,

own specification of

it. his
alternative suggestions.

Finally, Socrates
are

refutes or abandons each of

They text, but do not even seem to constitute an account. Yet clearly his treatment of each leaves something to be desired; and when in his summary review of the ruins he fails to mention both love of the good and reciprocal love (22263-5), readers are tempted to try leading them together
the
and

juxtaposed in

making them

one whole.

Bolotin has taken the bait. Let

us examine the

result.

Friendship
important
good

so conceived

two components are alike

ways.

is admittedly composite, a Though its in that both are desires, each differs from the other in
the one is the good, or
appropriation of

"hybrid."

The

object of

the

to oneself; and its subject is a separate, needy individual alive to his

neediness.

This desire is evil-induced, unreciprocated,

serious.

The

object of

the other desire is another proper to oneself, or

being

together with another

such;

and

its

subject
without

is

a social

animal of some

reciprocated,

serious

concern.

Putting

kind. This desire is innate, these two together is a little

like adding apples and oranges, and Bolotin admits that there is a difficulty. He indicates it by saying that the connection between these different loves is only accidental (181). Why is this a difficulty? It is such for Bolotin, I infer, beings do
this

because he, like Socrates, has refused to consider friendships between human apart from oenophilia, philosophy, and so on. In other words, he has refused to separate those loves which aim at reciprocity from those which
not

(cf.

119).

And

yet

his

own

account

fails to

show

the

impropriety
when

of

separation.

One

can

indicate the

difficulty

more

precisely, I think,
two

by

saying that Bolotin puts one and one together one; for his conjunctive account plainly fails to
friendship"

and gets save

he

wants

"the

whole phenomenon

of

(cf. 12,

208).
one of whom

Consider two men,

of whom

is wealthy

and sick.

is needy and skilled in medicine, the other The doctor befriends the sick man for his wealth,
skill.

the sick man befriends the doctor for his

other to

In addition,

each

finds the
"friends

his liking, apart from his in the fullest sense of the is

useful

own needs. since

These two
are

men are now

word,"

both

properly Janus-faced.

Again,
of

while each and

(agathon)

and congenial

(oikeion)
qua

to the other, the utility

paleness

congeniality

of each

are, like the proverbial musicality and

related.

Socrates, only accidentally needy is indifferent to who or what the sick man is; he befriends him solely qua wealthy. The doctor qua
The doctor
18.

is rarely
verb

Pp. 180, 189, 222 (cf. 133, 134, 147); 183, 188, 194, 218 (cf. 80, 93, 94). Pleasure mentioned in the Lysis; pain, not at all. The noun cruvowia occurs once (223b3); the

cruveivai, not at all.

370

Interpretation human being,

on

congenial

the

other

hand, is indifferent

to the sick man's

being wealthy; he befriends him solely qua congenial human being. Further more, to the extent their friendship is without illusions, to this extent each is disposed not only to be with the other but also to take advantage of him,
and

to

abandon

him

when someone more

helpful
sick

comes

along

for the doctor,

good, since

a wealthier or more generous

admits

patient; for the

man, a better doctor. Bolotin

that love

of

the congenial very

of

likely

attenuates

love

of the

it fosters illusions

is here
very

a euphemism subverts

sufficiency in a group (188). But 'attenuates', I submit, for 'subverts'; and I would add that love of the good
of

likely

love

the congenial, in that it fosters illusions of dog-

eat-dog individualism. If this is so, however, then it is insufficient to say that the two desires producing an exemplary friendship are only accidentally con joined: they are principles no less at variance with one another than are tyranny
and

democracy. Clear-headed friends in the fullest

to
each other

sense of

the

word will

be,

and will appear

to

be,

two-faced. In the absence of

any illusion,

or sacred

bond,
of

One way and desire for the

friendship is bound to formulating the difficulty is

their
oikeion cannot

disintegrate (cf. 82).

to say that desire for the agathon

their proper objects. But are

become friends owing to the disparity between they so disparate? Socrates seems to answer in

the affirmative. As Bolotin observes,

however, his
191),

argument

depends Lysis

on some are thus need not

thing expressly
induced to
raise

supposed

(222d8;

cf.

and readers of the argues

the

question anew.

Bolotin himself
case of a

that

they

be he

so

disparate (191-4). Consider the

one who

self-sufficiently
able

good

man,

that

is,

by

his

present share of good

is

to acquire other goods

needs.

In the first place, he loves his

good
and useful

own share of
condition

good, his excellence,

satisfied.

since

it is

to him.

Thus

(i) is

In the

second

place, he

and

his

excellence

the good would not be were

being

in

order

to be

useful or

naturally befit each other. What is more, it good for nothing; it is "in of a needy (193). It may then be said that the man's
'need'
good"

need of the good

for him is

reciprocated.

Thus

condition

(ii) is

satisfied.

This

being remarkably Platonic: it makes plausible the extra ordinary claim that man's best friend is virtue (phronesis). On the other hand, like other philosophic arguments it is more apomantic than apodictic. I shall
argument strikes me as

here

confine

myself

to noting why it fails to associate the agathon and the

oikeion

in the

needed way.

The

good man and

his

own proper share of good one of

cannot a

be friends in the fullest

animal,
not

sense of

the word

because friend
a

them is

not

social

alive,

not

the sort of
a philosopher

thing
is
a

that loves.

Earlier Bolotin

granted

that the sense in which

sense

of wisdom of

(by loving

it)

differs from the

in

which put

wisdom

is

friend
in

the philosopher

(by being

dear to him). Then he

the word

'friend'

quotation marks

in order, I suppose, to
the good

make clear

that he was using

it in

two quite different

which and

ways, one of them extraordinary (118). Now he grants that the sense in

is

needed

differs from the

sense

in

which

it

needs

to be needed,

Discussion
he
puts

371
'need'

the word

in

quotation marks.

His

honesty
in the

throughout

is

note

worthy, but I

fail to

see

that the shift from an equivocation on

constitutes an advance
argument.

'friend'

to

'need'

an equivocation on

There

are other ways of

trying

to remove the

difficulty

in

question.

shall

briefly

consider

three.

First,
account

one might assert that

is the love

essential

only one of the two desires mentioned in Bolotin's factor in genuine friendships. Which one? Let us make
on

up

friendship
on

based solely
of

love

of

the oikeion,

and

friendship
(cf.

based

solely
would

of

the agathon, then compare. An exemplary case of the former

be that between two

case of

Bolotin's self-sufficiently kindness. In the former

on

good men

194-5).
and

An exemplary
rich

the latter would be that between my poor

doctor

patient,

minus all natural

case neither could

believe

that theirs

is

friendship
not

based

utility; so let
of

us suppose

that in the latter

either of

case, too, there is

even

an

illusion

congeniality.

Is

these

friendships exemplary as a friendship? Most, I guess, would be prepared to assert that the former may be, and that the latter certainly is not. Bolotin himself says that the former would be "among the purest, if not deepest, of (195). The latter, on the other hand, seems neither pure nor
'friendships'"

deep. Here
resemblance not given

'friend'

each

treats the
philos

other

only

as
,

means.

Each bears less

to a

than to a philetes

(thief)
they

and need

to

holding

in

common the things

greedy men as such are (xa xQiIM-ccxa). Bolotin

might agree.

He would, however,

deny

that the

difficulty
human

is thus

overcome.

The basis

of

his denial, I infer,

only if they
are

would

be that two
a

people are

friends in the
(181). If this

fullest

sense

friends "in
seems

fully

way"

inference is correct, then Bolotin

confuses the
as

vulnerable

to the objection that

no mere confusion

he

fully

philon and

the

fully

human. But this is intimate

if,

it appears, there is
and

a profound and

connection

between

friendship
good

properly speaking
viduals are not

humanity broadly

speaking.

Self-sufficiently

indi

fully human. Perhaps they cannot be human properly speaking. But if not, if they are gods, can they be exemplary friends? Perhaps it is because he looks to the fully human that Bolotin now speaks of friendship
in the fullest
130)."

sense

and

not,

with

Socrates,

of

true

friendship (2i4d8,

cf.

Second,

one

might

agree

that both desires are coproducers of

friendship

in the fullest sense, but deny that either is to be mentioned in an account of what it is. Bolotin's mistake here is one that many today make. It is, very roughly, to suppose that if X, Y, and Z are necessary and sufficient conditions
of

E then E itself is XYZ. Plato did

not

make

this mistake. In the

Meno,
a

for example, he had Socrates define (visual) beings always follows color (75b). Barring
19.

shape as

that which alone of the

counterexample

one

seeming
between

Since

what

men

need, and what is naturally akin to them, are to a considerable extent

determined
and what

by

their

being

human beings,

perhaps

the

disparity

what

is

agathon

for

each

is

oikeion

to each

is

not so great: consider

the Stoic notion of olxEiwoig.

372

Interpretation
criterial

uniformly colored universe infinite in extent this true. But it is not an essential definition, not an

definition

appears

account of what

shape

is.

Nor, surely, does it entail any such definition: no one would conclude that shape is color. Bolotin's mistake here is akin to another he almost makes,
one who

that I call the

fallacy
loved

of

decomposition. It is

"strange,"

he says, if those
the

both love

and are

loved become friends

without

while

those who love without

no sense of word

being loved,
(114).
sider two
what

or are

loving,
no

are

friends in

Strange,

perhaps;

wonderful,

doubt; but true,

apparently.

Con

individuals. Each is one, together they are two. They are together neither is alone (cf. Hp Ma 300-303). More to the point, consider a community (koinonia). Together,
psychosomatic and each

political

is

citizen, a participant in

that community: apart, none is. I venture to

of

say

that much the same

is true it
not

any

being: this

soul

would what

not

be

what

it is

were

embodied,

this

body

would not

be

it is

were

it

without

the soul.

Presumably
said of not
both"

this is why

Aristotle,

when
these"

only that it is "out of ( fipxpotv). Bolotin himself is

used

speaking of any such composite being, (x xcuxcov) but also that it is "out
stresses more of a

the

frequency
and a

with which

the

dual

number

in Plato's Lysis. Still

to the point, consider

man
woman

Diotima's
a

saying that the

an

communion

(sunousia)
In general,
exist

is

tokos,

offspring

(Symp

206C5-6).

when

things come together there may

something which did not the natures of its causes or its

occur
sodium and chlorine.

before,

the nature of which

202d-205e).

is

other than
not

elements of a

(cf. Tht

Salt is

just

The

beauty

very beauty in a certain way (cf. Phdo iood). Full friendship, too, may be a whole gen erated, as Bolotin says, when and only when certain antagonistic causes co
colors,
even though this
operate a

painting is irreducible to its shapes and would not exist were it not bodied forth

kosmos
of

from both
How
culty?

essentially from them together (cf Tim)

differing

either

of

its

causes

alone,

and

would

Bolotin

regard this second proposed

way

He does say that

he

seems not

to correlate but to

friendship identify
222).
whole.

in the fullest

sense

these aspects

of removing the diffi has two "aspects", and with desire for the good

and

friendship
else that

desire for the kindred (180, is either beautiful or a

Thus he must, it seems, deny that full But since his book contains very little

bears

on

this question, I shall refrain from

that

trying

to answer it.

Third,
ship, but
other.

one might agree

both desires

are

factors
to

essential to

full friend

deny

that

they

are either antagonistic or one

relationship As Bolotin has observed, love of

has observed,
self-love

Their

essential

may

bring
is

accidentally light in the

in

related to each

the good

rooted

following way. self-love. As Umphrey

And,
of

again, the real

is ultimately the self-satisfaction of the real philon. philon is you yourself alone (ov xaxd oauxov). An

excellent general account of oneself qua

being

is

supplied

in the is

central

Books

Aristotle's Metaphysics. On this account, substance (ousia). Of ousiai themselves there

each

of us

an

independent
each

are no universals

in re;

is

Discussion
private, an idios

373
ousia.2"

No

ousia

has

transcendent end; the telos for

each

is nothing beyond its

oneself

own

proper, intrinsic form.

Accordingly

one

may

picture

thus:

Now there

are other a

Aristotelian texts

wherein

it is taught that
well.21

we

for example, have

entirely
closed

higher,
a

transcendent

end as

Accordingly
a

human beings, one is not

off, like

circle, but partially open, like

cave, thus:

But this teaching

not

contradicts the aforementioned

hypothesis that for the

our nature

is

daemonic, however, still other Aristotelian

and social.

is therefore to be
texts

put

aside

moment.
we are

There are,
man

wherein

it is taught that

In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example, it is

coupler,
syndyadic.22

said

that

essentially is by

nature a

Accordingly

we

may

picture ourselves thus:

No human

being

qua

living

itself involves
usage

being is simply idios, on this account, since for us living together, ousia involves sunousia. It is not contrary
own

to Greek

to call oneself one's

oikeion

or ownmost not

(oikeios,
corrupt)

oikeiotatos)

On this account, then, the

is in reality
To
alter

confined not

to oneself (to
one of

gether with some of one's properties).

(if

Seth

Benardete's technical expressions, there is

20. 21
.

even at

the level of

ousia an

oikei-

Metaph I038bl0, I044b3,

i69bl6

I07lal4.
x 7-8.
pp.

For example, de An 4i5a29~b3, EN

Il62al7; cf. 1

22.

19,

and

Bolotin,

61

183.

374
ontic

Interpretation
If
our

spread.

very

individual (idios) and my relative to you (oikeios) axe equiprimordial. The oikeiontic spread is such that neither of its terms is reducible to the other,
and moreover such

being being

involves

being together,

then my

being

an

that neither of its terms is prior in

being
as

to the other.

From this

account

it

seems

to follow that the friend

real

is,

Aristotle said,
other of

another self

(alios

autos).

More precisely, the

friend is the

two

mutually This argument

the

appropriate

human beings, heteros oikeios. may help illuminate the philon, but it does little to It
suffices

remove

Aristotle's ousiology together with his transcendental teleology is notoriously difficult, and there is no reason to hope that putting it together with his political accounts of man as a social animal will prove any less difficult. Furthermore, the shift away from
question.

difficulty in

to note that putting

self-love to

self-satisfaction, then to

oneself per not

se, belies

an

ignoratio
real

elenchi.

The task

at

hand is to

comprehend

the togetherness of the

oikeion

but the togetherness

acquire

of our

the goods we need. The

desiring foregoing

to be with our

kin

and our no

desiring

to

account offers

explanation of

what we

fully

ordinarily call selfishness. It abstracts from the crucial fact that, in human friendship without illusions, each part is disposed to dwell disposed to
go after what

together with the other and, in addition,

own private

is in his

interest,

to look after Number One.

I have

considered

four

ways of

trying

to remove the

difficulty
of

encountered

by

Bolotin in his

attempt not.

to understand

friendship. Three

them proved

inadequate. One did

but in any

event

it

serves

It too may prove inadequate on further reflection, to draw attention to Bolotin's hypothesis that this
friendship"

difficulty
correct?

pertains

to "the very nature of

(201)

to the way

in

which

he has

attempted

to understand it.

merely Is this hypothesis

and

not

We

must make a new

beginning.

5.

Consider

some

exemplary

cases of

friendship. About these

cases

there are

facts

so obvious

that one expects any account of

friendship

to acknowledge
give a
similar

them, or else to ignore them only after much argument. I shall now brief descriptive account of several such facts. (Observe how different a
account of eros would

be.)
between two.

(i) It is
Toward

friendship
they

They

constitute a

pair,
other

a private society.

Some things lie inside the

outsiders

circle of their

friendship,

things

outside

it.

share an attitude of nonacceptance or rejection: three

is

a crowd.

(ii) From
It is
as

without, these two

relation or

friends
is. It is

appear

inseparable, mutually
that

dependent.

if the

bond between them

as

is,

their

very

friendship
whole.

determined

who or what each

if they

were

the halves of a

From within,
to the other.

however, they
than

appear to

be

individuals, definitely

two. Each

re

gards each as other

himself. Neither feels

decidedly

inferior

or superior

Discussion

375
restraints.

(iii) There is freedom from

protect each other against

On the

one

hand, friends

are

political,
other

familial,
be: there

and other external pressures.

are no commands given.

ready to On

the other

hand,

each

lets the

Conse

quently, the circle of their

his

friendship is a haven in which each may kick off let down his hair, drop his guard and let off steam, let go his cares, forget his obligations. Together they laugh, relax, and are comfortable. (iv) There is mutual understanding and trust. Each friend confides in the
shoes and

other; there are no secrets, except those

parent

they

share.

Indeed

each appears trans

to the other; consequently, there is little felt need to discover the other's

thoughts, or to disclose one's own, through queries and declarations: the Prob lem of Other Minds does not arise here. Furthermore, each accepts the other as he is, and recognizes his intrinsic worth, notwithstanding those little idio
syncrasies and

faults he displays

within

the circle of their

friendship. Conse
promises or

quently, each is confident in the other.

other reassurances are needed.

No contracts, pledges,
asked.23

There is
not

are no questions a refuge

(v) The
sities,

circle of of

friendship

only

from

various
a

besetting
in

neces

a place

rest; it is

also a center of
alive.24

activity,

space

which

both

friends may with confidence be really Together each may be himself, do his own thing (pragma). There is freedom for me to be me and you to be
you.

An exemplary (vi) The coming

of

friendship and being

is

an

ideal democracy. friends is, in their view, not for the goal-directed. It is play, or like

together of

anything play in this respect. They are fond of each other, of course, but their fondness is not a desire. As friends they experience no great need to look at each other, to talk with each other, or even to be always with each This is com
other.25

sake

else.

Their activity is

not

patible with grieve

the fact that

they usually

are

together,

and with the

a

fact that

we

the loss of our friends. There may in reality be

deep-seated

need or

desire for
may be
entered
of

friendship

whereof

friends themselves

are quite unaware:

delusion have

the essence of friendship.

cases
of

(vii) Exemplary
into
one

friendship

are

not

uncommon; most of us

or

two.

Yet they

seem

to

occur

by

chance.

One doubts,

therefore,

whether

ing

or

popular.

winning of And while ordinary

any acquisitive or productive skill for the mak friends: Dale Carnegie's manual may be as useless as it was
there can be
Socrates'

saying that he
as well as

wants

to acquire

friends is

not at

odds with

usage

(Greek

does little

seem at odds with ridiculous.

the way friendships come into

with

English), his will being,

Lysis

to acquire them
and

therefore a

Perhaps he has become friends

and

Menexenus

by

the end of the dialogue (cf. 223b6-7); but if so, it has happened despite his

intention, behind his back.

23.

Friends

are not

disposed to
(cf.

reflect on their

friendship. In the Lysis it is friendless Socrates

wanting the
to exist: Rhet I382ai5.

who raises the questions

Bolotin, 66-7).
of not other

24. Aristotle characterizes enmity in terms Cf. Bolotin, 117 and Plato, Symp 2i6ci. 25. Cf. 2o6e5-207bi, 20435, et passim.

376

Interpretation

Now according to Bolotin, and others, the Lysis is about friendship. If this determination of its theme is correct, then one can reasonably expect to find
that the dialogue
suggests either

the

foregoing

account or else a refutation of one can

it.

But if this
whether

expectation

proves

the Lysis is

about

reasonably wonder friendship. With these conditionals in mind, let us

incorrect,

then

reconsider

the passage from 212a to 222d.

proceeds

Socrates here
Menexenus'
'philein'

in two

ways

(6601) In

the first he takes advantage of

experience
were prior

in ordinary Greek
and

usage.

By

'philos'

to

adjectival and substantival

speaking as if the verb he effects in speech

,

separation

of

friend from friend

and

introduces the

notion

of

unloving,

unliving "friends";
'philein'

by

stressing the active and passive voices of the verb

to follow. The second way has two
the poets; in the second
parts.

he

anticipates the causal accounts

proceeds

stages.

In the first he his

in

accordance with

he he

proceeds more on

own.

The first

stage as

has two likes

In the first he

and

Lysis
and

examine

the conception of
examine parts.

friends

or as

good; in the

second

Menexenus

the conception of

friends

as opposites.

The

second

stage also

has two

In the first he

and the two

boys

examine the

concep The

tion of the
examine

friend

as neither good nor

of

bad; in

the second he and both boys

the

conception

the

friend

as

somehow

naturally

one's own.

second

way

of

(2i4a6)

to phusis
without

proceeding involves, characteristically, a movement from theos (22ie6), from divine making without natural desire to natural divine
production.

desiring
the

Socrates
the

strips

away,

as

it were, the divine,

philon

beautiful,
is

the good, and

somehow

finally

bad, leaving
to it.

only the real

together

with what

naturally

oikeion

Immediately
a

there are two questions.

First, Socrates

confesses

that he

wants

friend (2iie3); he accounts those happy who are able to get one (2i2ai); and he tries to gain the requisite know-how, or power, through discovery of the cause (cf. 22id3). But he also seems to confess ignorance of what it is to
be
a

friend (223b7-8),

and

this is ridiculous since it

follows that he, like

Plato's Meno, seeks to understand the generation of something he-knows-notwhat. The question is, why does he proceed in a way so uncharacteristic of him? Secondly, Socrates eventually discloses the home of friendship, I believe, but he
chical,
also seems and

to assume that the relation

between friends

can

be hierar
unargued

that one can be compelled to befriend another; and these

assumptions are out of place

in

an account of

friendship. The
be brief.

question

is, why
poses

is his

present

discourse

so

inappropriate

to

friendship

itself? Since Bolotin

neither

question, my present treatment

Socrates'

of each must

As first elaborated,

divination

amounts to a nascent physics of

friendship,

or philo-geny.

pair of contraries

is supposed,

and also an under

lying thing capable of becoming either. This underlying thing (the neither good nor bad) is then said to go after one contrary (the good) when and only when
the other contrary teleological: there

impels it to do is
no reference

so.

Clearly

the account

to mind or reason. And

is mechanistic, non explanaclearly it is

Discussion
tory,

311
there are at most allusions to a question of the form
own

nondefinitional:
?'

'What is

In short, Socrates here reverts from his

regression so

'second

sailing'

to the

first. How is this

to be

justified?
Socrates'

One

might

try doing

by

remarking

erotic

disposition toward the

acquisition of

friends. This

ever,
of

not

to

justify
a

cosmogeny is

would serve only to explain the regression, how it. One might, instead, argue as follows: giving an account being.2* relaxation from giving an account of Likewise, trying

to give an account of how one

becomes
his

trying
the
and

to give an account of what it

is to be

inquiry
be

to go on a

holiday;

and

friendly or dear is a relaxation from friendly or dear. Socrates allows so doing befits both the subject matter
This argument, while acceptable, deeper reasons, or of a deeper

the dramatic setting (cf. 222C2,

supplemented

e5-6).

should

by

consideration of three

reason articulable vate.

in three

ways.

First,

the philon appears to be

without yet

Socrates knows
e2).

Hippothales'

beloved

irreducibly pri knowing who the boy is

(204C2,
as

such, is

not

This is plausible, I suggest, only if one supposes that the beloved, the boy but his beauty or form (cf. 20465, Phdo 73d8 with
Menexenus'

Phdrs

25IC6).

close question

friend,

on

the

other

hand, is
since

the

boy

himself

and not

his looks. The

'What is the

philon!'

thus appears no

less

misleading than the question 'What is erroneous belief that there is universality
manifold

individuality?'

it

encourages the

where

there is

none.

Second,
prevails

the

of phila

appears

to be

irreducibly
or

diverse. Otherness

(cf.

2iid-e).

The

question

'What is the

philon!'

thus appears no less misleading

since
which all

than the question 'What is

science?'

the question 'What is

pleasur

it

encourages

the erroneous belief that there is some one feature

and

only

phila

have in common,

or else a

separate,

monoeidetic

being

(auto

to philon) whereof all and to

deeply rooted So^aoxov); it is like

that

be

only phila partake. Thirdly, the philon appears in human nature, to lie wholly within the opinable (xo
the very
ground on which

one

stands.

Little wonder,
understand as

then,
place

it

proves as elusive as

the sophist, and as difficult to

itself.27

The locus

of

friendship

is

what

is first for

us

by

nature.

presocratic inquiry about In this way one can begin to justify Observation of certain friendship! friendship. But is it really an inquiry about commissions and omissions makes one wonder. For example, the stress on philein suggests

Socrates'

that the

thing in
to

question

is less

friendship
object.

than

fondness,

since
what

the latter more than the

former is

said

to take an
the word

Indeed this is

'philia'

Socrates eventually
22ob3).

seems

mean

by

(especially
is

21904,
trans

Accordingly
since

recommend

'About
subtitle. on

Friendliness'

as an alternative

lation

of

the dialogue's traditional

This

minor revision

not adequate,

however,

Socrates is
not a

also

insists
a

friendly feeling
26. 27.

desire but

regarding philein as epithumein, and pathos; fondness does not take an object in

Tim

59C7.

Cf.
.

Rep

477b-479e with 432d7-e3.

Lysis

2l6dl with

Sph 23ia8, C4, 235C2,

239C6-7.

Tim

47e3ff

378

Interpretation

the way that desire does.

Therefore,

Socrates'

while

present silence about reason

is

quite

appropriate, the
greatest

importance he
The

gives to

desire

seems quite out of place.

This is the
spiritedness

commission.

greatest omission
"aspect"

is his

silence

about argu
thu-

(xd 0up,oeiSeg), that

is,

that

or

form

of soul which
two.28

is

ably

neither

desire

nor reason

but intermediate between the basis

of

For to

moeides

is,

I submit, the

principal

friendship. This hypothesis is

nothing novel: Plato had Socrates suggest it in the Republic, and Aristotle pro posed it in his Politics vn.vii. I shall now mention some reasons for believing

it to be true.

(i) Spiritedness
eros, it has

can

listen

and so

no natural end

beyond itself,

be informed, given a cause; but, unlike and in this sense it is blind. It is not

therefore without any natural end,

strive

to

attain or maintain our

hindrances.29

however, for it is as spirited beings that we integrity and independence, our freedom from
would-be

lets
are

and

(ii) We

ourselves, as individuals or
sign of

individuals,
which

most of all

spirited

beings. One

this is the zeal

with

we

endeavor

to be ourselves always, and to take at any

one's need

be

recognized as such. our pride.

Another is the
real philon

deeply
to

personal offense we

thumoeides.
and

Of is

course

injury to believing that

nothing,

The
can an

is

one

is

or on

be

an

entity,
whose

separate

'this', in

of

may

rest

illusion

inalienable dignant

cause

amour-propre.

(iii) Spiritedness is
at
spirited pursuit of

reactionary.

It is

as spirited

beings that

we

become in Of
our

the obvious injustice about us, and seek revenge, to

get even.

the good, at any rate, a mechanistic explanation

is

appro

priate.

Of

course

the

good

that spiritedness pursues may

be

an

ideal it has
than the

projected,30

just

as

its

finding

the

malum

to be

decidedly

more evident

bonum may be a fundamental mistake. (iv) Spiritedness is expansive. Our hearts

and the affectionate of

go out to others of our own results

kind,

regard, good will,

or

sympathy that

is

of the essence

friendship. Of

course

this thumoeidetic spread may be the cause of

decep
another

tion: it may seem to me not that my

friend is very
nature.31

much

like me,

such, but that he is

another

I, my

second

(v) As
are
mutual

together

near and dear to one another only when they Cohabitation (sun-etheia) eventually produces habituation (sunetheia) and intimate acquaintance (sunetheia). Long and a

rule, people become

for

some

time.

close

acquaintance, or understanding
a gnosis rather

(sungnome), is

affective rather than ra

cen-

tional,
28. 29.

than an episteme. The sunethes, or gnorimon, is

435eiff.

Rep
Cf.
11.

44ie6,

603b6~7

with

6o6d; Tim
Strauss'

7oa2-d6;

Aristotle, EN H02b3l,
Man,''

H49a25-bi8.

Rep

375ail-b2;
30.

Aristotle, Pol
S.

I327b25, I328a6~7.

Benardete, "Leo

The

City

and

Political Science Reviewer 8

(1978):
31.

Cf.
p.

Rep

Inquiries,

462a-465d, 6osd4 with 6o6d, and 58ld7-8 with S. Benardete, Herodotean 86. Aristotle, Pol I327b40-4l (6 jiolwv: cf. I262b22).

Discussion

379
which one

trally

that whereof one rests assured, that in

puts

trust.

And the

original

trust, as of habit or character (ethos), is One loves or is wont (philei) to do whatever one is willing (ethelei) to (vi) 33 do; and one is willing to do whatever is in accordance with one's will (thumos).
of
spiritedness.32

locus

(vii) Friendship
edness

is the basis

most of all

enmity, sympathy and antipathy, are opposites. Spirit both. As Aristotle remarked, it is with our friends that we become angry. The locus of trust proves
and

of

unstable.34

(viii) Spiritedness fumes

when

it is

frustrated,
such,

festly

present

to it.

Were it free
not

of all

is, when evils are mani however, then it would be at

that

ease, for its ownmost state is

satisfaction.

animosity
explained

or ambition

but unblushing

self-

The

real

philon, more precisely, is one's

own acquiescentia animi.

In proposing that

friendship

be

am not suggesting that philia has nothing to

associated

primarily in terms of spiritedness I do with desire. Surely the Greeks

and eros

philotes, at
wish

any rate,
the soul

with

eros;

is,

or

involves,
a

desire.

Nor do I
thymotic.
not as

hereby
To

to suggest that

sort out

any into powers,

psychic phenomenon can or

forms, may be
am

be wholly mistake. Is it

spirited,

willful

beings that is far from

we are partial to clean cuts? that we take

ourselves

to be separate from

ourselves?

What I

planation of

friendship

adequate

if

spiritedness

suggesting is this: An ex is not mentioned in

seems, but he does
not

the

explanans.

Socrates tries to

explain

friendship, it

spiritedness.35

mention

Consequently,

we should wonder whether

trying

to

explain

it. We

should also reconsider

the propriety of the

he is really dialogue's

traditional subtitle.

The Lysis is Bolotin

seems

after all

about

friendship, I believe,

though not

to suppose, but in a way he clearly

shows.

in the way For throughout the

dialogue Socrates is indeed exposing the limits of philia, and of the human, in which it occurs by deflating the high rank customarily im natural
'cave'

puted to

the

possession

of

friends; by disclosing
to light the

the stupidities that

friendly
purest of

our

feeling breeds; by bringing friendships; and by helping us see that what we most need and desire insistence on the impor cannot be supplied by family and friends. tance of such desire in a fully human life is not part of a suggested account of
self-interestedness
Socrates'

latent in the

what
32.

it is to be
Cf., for

friend in the fullest

'friend'

sense of
and

the

word

Instead, it
429b-

example,

Aristotle, Metaph 99533

Plato. Crito 4327-8, Rep 37562-4,

430c, 5l8d9-e2, 522a. This fact

about the generation of

friendship
ix.

is

largely

ignored

not

only

in the Lysis but

33.

also

in Aristotle's

long

account with

in En is

vm

Cf.

Rep

375an, 439C2, 43708

439e; also Laches 19065,

what

193C2, Laws 697d8. The

scriptural

basis

of

Augustine's doctrine

of will

Paul

wrote about

6eXeiv in Romans (esp.

7:15.

19 snd 9:18). 34. Cf. Aristotle, Pol l328ai-5, 10-16;

times
of

and supra, n. 27.

which

Observe that memory is

mentioned

mentioned

eight not

in the Lysis,
its its

snd

thst the passages in

the

it is

serve

to remind one

only
35.

apparent connection with untrust worthiness.

identity
pp.

of an

individusl (or inquiry,

("spirit

or

conversation)

but

also of

He

alludes

to

it

at

207c;

cf.

Bolotin,

80, 82, 88

of

"spirit

of

in

dependence").

380

Interpretation
it were, from
which

marks the standpoint, as ship.

he

offers

his

critique of

friend
as a
out

This

critique occurs

in

dialogue

wherein

Socrates

presents

himself

kind
of

of elenctic

daemon,

someone who

is himself

almost always

in motion,

place,

and who

draws

and prods others

to be

in

motion as

well, through
an oppor

dialegesthai (cf. 203a-b,

223a2).

Once,

quite

tunity

to

do his thing

with

little Lysis. He

by directly
own

chance, he had
attempted

to

liberate the
good

boy
at

from the fond

and

foolish belief that his

things are

generally

enough

an attempt that
of certain

least,
Is

necessarily involved established orders. Socrates

dissolution

(A.t)aig), in
consists.

speech

dialectical
what an

pragma.

In this the

action of

privately Plato's Lysis chiefly

might regard

now

makes public

that

Socrates did justifiable? Some fox

who slipped

the Lysis as a
and
wreaked

story

about

old

monium when might

the authorities

in among the chickens momentarily dropped their

pande

guard.

These

people

be ready to accuse him of having corrupted Lysis, in particular, by loosening his attachments to family and friends. Bolotin refers to this accusa tion,
as

he

must

(especially 66,

98, 123-4, 186-7,

against

T98)one

shows

how

we can

defend Socrates

it. On the

What is more, he hand, Lysis seems

too good a

boy,

too obedient to parental authority to be seriously

disturbed

by

the suggestive and oath-provoking questions

Socrates then

posed

(65, 84, 86,

Lysis
can

90); 1,

and

his

friendship
On the

with

Menexenus

was about

to come apart anyway (80that

106-7).

other

hand, it is

evident on reflection

do

he wants, according to Socrates, only if he knows what he is doing (86, 91, 94, cf. 116); and Socrates is arguably making the young beauty more worthy of being loved by Hippothales and others (84, 86). These defenses are
whatever

admirable even if not entirely successful. I add two more indicated by Socrates himself later in the dialogue. According to one, what he says constitutes an antidote

to

very

great

evil

which

almost

always

comes says

to us

with

age,

namely
poison,

stupidity. an

According
himself,
to

to the other,

what

he

constitutes

little

intoxicant for

our natural

complacency; for it produces in his inter

locutors,
dis-ease

as well as

a certain
a

dizziness (216C5,

cf.

222C2),

and this

very In either way he is their benefactor, is he not, even if such xoivf) oxeijnc; is communal dynamite? Why did Socrates do what he did? What was his motive? It is a common
their notice,

compels them

love

great good which might otherwise escape

namely

wisdom.

place

that Plato's Socrates

is

highly

erotic, and that he professes to be knowl

regarding erotic things. The Lysis is one of several dialogues in which he appears to be both: it confirms the reader's opinion of Socrates as someone
edgeable

very clever, energetic, and at home with homelessness. Yet the presentation here is manifoldly peculiar. In the first place, his erotics and his eros seem mutually independent. His erotic skill in diagnosis, at least, is by divine allot
ment

and not

by

nature

(204c iff.);
of the
neutral

and

his

exercise of

it is

not

in the least
as a

erotic.

In the
the

earlier parts

dialogue,
technician

therefore, Socrates
that

appears

model of

disinterested,

is,

as an

intermediate being

Discussion
(cf.
21934).

-381

His

erotic

desire,
or

on

the other

hand, has

possessed

him from

child

hood; it is

by

manifestations

due to the abiding presence of some evil; and its nature, are not in the least technical. In the later parts of the dialogue,

therefore, Socrates appears as a model of the wanton, incompetent hunter (cf. 2o6a-b). The question is, why did Plato represent Socrates in this way in this
dialogue? Bolotin does
not give

the answer.
as

Furthermore,
only is it
and

Socrates'

eros,
to

he discloses it

here, is itself

peculiar.

Not

strange

to speak of

be erotically disposed toward the acquisition of friends, friendship almost as if it were a hobby among hobbies; it is love has
Socrates'

also wonderful

that this

no apparent connection with all

other
philan-

loves. For he is
thropos,

an avowed philosophos, philomathes, philologos, and

as well as philetairos
and philophily? questions nature.

One

general question

is, how

related are phi

losophy
Such
erotic

draw

attention all

to a

further

peculiarity.

Socrates is

highly

by

Above

in his

attempt

to

replace

he leaves behind the security of inarticulate trust, opinions with knowledge about the most important
unasked,

things. For

him,

almost no question goes

That he
that he

should wants

be friendless is therefore
at all?
are.

not surprising.

friends
as

Consider

philosophic

nothing is certain. But is it not surprising conversation. Its aim is to

almost unless

discern things
communion

they

It

cannot take

place,

however,
behind the A

there

is

some

between the

participants.

In time, through frequent conversations,

produced

particip

such communion takes root.

There is

backs,

naturally, a

long
is

and close mutual acquaintance.

likely

concomitant of such

acquaintance

undue

agreement, a

coherence of views rather participants are wont

than conformity

of either

to things as

they

are.

The

to forget that the

truth

is

more

to be honored

even

than

friendship.37

They

cease

being

philoso

phers, or

would-be

philosophers, as

they become
account.

good

friends.
to show why,
of accordance

The
after

foregoing is,
Socrates'

I think,
of

likely

But it

also serves

all,

love

(io). In this
with one.

connection

friends may be "second only to his love Bolotin proposes a two-fold account, in
friendship. In the first place, two
as well as see

wisdo

his hybrid

account of and

better than

In intellection

argument,

in deed,
an alert

we

humans
can

can

be

more

resourceful

together than apart.

attempt

In particular,
out

follower

be

of use

to

Socrates in his
this helps

to figure

how things are,

or what

he means;
cf.

and

explain

his fondness for

second

conversation with philosophers

the young

(162,

216C4-

5,

2i8e2-3).

In the

place,

naturally

regard

their own

kind

with

affection;

and their affection extends even

to those who, though not yet

Socrates'

good, show
ness

promise of

becoming

good.

This, too, helps

explain

fond

for the young (195)Phdrs 230d3 (cf.

36.

Rep

Euthyph t,&] (cf. 376C2, 48503), 23665, Tht 14636, 16137, 169CI,

ps-Plato, >e/4i2eu-i3).
37.

Cf.

Rep

595C2-3, and

Aristotle, EN

io96ai6.

parallel:

Augustine, Christian Doctrines

1 22, 33-

382

Interpretation
account of philosophic as

This double
enough,

however, for,

sociability is plausible. It does not go far Bolotin notes, Socrates wants to get a cpiAov fayaOov
ambiguous.

(211C3). The
who

expression

is

Does he

want a good and good?

friend,
In
order

or a

friend

is

good?

Or does he

want a
an

thing both dear

to resolve
of

this issue one

must complete

inquiry
what

about

the goodness and

dearness
nature,

things on which Socrates usually

relies without question

his

own

and

especially his ability in inquiry; jectures and divinations, and the

cannot

little he himself knows; his many con suspicions which occur to him (cf. 218C5-6);

the guiding logos (cf. 21733); the

truth,

or at

have;

the daemonic sign

which comes

to

any rate the beautiful, which he him on occasion. This inquiry

not

I may
place.

not now even attempt.

Yet three

small suggestions will

be

out of

First, I have
the
appears absurd. nature

argued that

in Plato's Lysis Socrates

seems

to conclude that

good and one's own cannot

coincide; therefore his wanting a philon agathon absurd,

It does

not appear so
on

however, if

one admits that our

is daemonic, for

this alternative hypothesis one can argue that a to the good is

a
possible.38

partial appropriation of one's own

Second, Plato's Socrates is notoriously

for example, wherein he makes it plain or else held back (or holds back) something from

dissembler. Consider the Lysis, that he either lied to everyone present

each.

suggest

that, for

Socrates, ironic, so
appear

a good

friend

would

be

someone with whom

he

could cease

being
he

guarded; someone

with whom

he

could relax and

disclose just how

would

resourceful

knowingly help him to know what is in question. Next best would be those who gladly help him, and themselves, to that end. This I take to be similar to Bolotin's own suggestion. It is confirmed by Xenophon's Memora
and would

and impoverished he really is. Then, and only then, both really alive and verging on death. Third, a good friend for Socrates might be someone who could

gladly

bilia

i.vi.14:

...

I myself,
so

Antiphon, just

as anyone else takes pleasure

in

a good

horse

or

dog

or

bird,

I take

even more pleasure

in

good

friends;

teach and

introduce them to
to virtue.

others

from

whom

if I have anything good I I think they will get some benefit

and

with respect and and

And the treasures

open

which the wise men of old wrote

in books
if

left behind, these books I if

we should see

up

and examine

in

common with
we

my friends,
we

should

anything good become dear to each other.

we pick

it

out.

And

hold it

a great gain

II
1.

Bolotin's

unstated

aim, I have said, is to discover the truth about friendship.

West's
38.

stated aim

is to

bring

forth the logos, the

of

reasoned

thought that

animates tries

I distinguish this

attempt

from that

the

tyrant,

who

by

'Copernican

revolution'

to appropriate the good to

himself.

Discussion
and unifies no attempt

-383

Plato's

Apology

of Socrates (io). It

need not

follow that he

makes

to discover the truth about city and man, of course, and in fact his
reflections on

digressive
tions on

this theme are no less prominent than Bolotin's

a notable

reflec

what

it is to be friends. There is

difference in emphasis,

however, and in attitude as well. Whereas Bolotin regards the Lysis mainly as a good book, a useful verbal aid in one's investigation of the human things,
West
regards

the

Apology

of Socrates mainly

as a splendid

animal,

a complex
greater subject

whole

to be viewed in both
of

solemnity

its complexity and its unity (cf. 9, 18). The his interpretation is not due to the greater seriousness of its
differences in
and

matter alone.

There
plex.

are also

manner of exposition.

occasionally for example, and "public "arrogant (75, 78, 79). Furthermore, while he appears to distinguish himself from scholars (10, 18, 73), West's scholarly apparatus is much more elaborate. Occasionally his
dissembles,"

Modifiers abound,

the results seem pleonastic

laws,"
hybris"

West's is relatively com "ironi

cally

interpretation literature to
vis

will

befuddle those he
refers.

which

not already acquainted with the non-Platonic For example, when commenting on Socrates vis-a

"artisans"

the

struction of

(22C9-e5) he asserts that, whether it be the planning and con houses, the understanding of mathematics, or the command of an
their exact but partial knowledge with a comprehensive
good

army,

they identify
the

vision of with

for

man

(11

1-2).
,

But Socrates is speaking

not
with mathematicians

of encounters
or generals.

handicraftsmen (kheiro-tekhnai)

Why, then, does West

essays

mention them?

The

answer

is

obvious else

if

one

has

read

by

Strauss

and

Bloom (which he cites),

not

or

Plato's Theaetetus,

Sophist

and

Statesman (which he does

cite); but otherwise their

being

men

tioned here will probably

seem out of place.

The

intricacy
are

of

West's

exposition

is

not

due to the subtlety of its Now these complexities in

reader encounters

subject matter alone. manner of exposition

defensible. When he
will

dissembles"

careful

the phrase there

pelled

to

wonder whether

Perhaps there

can

be

a private

"ironically dissembling law (cf. Symp i84d4), and even

is
a nonironic

be

com

(Meletus'

at 24e8?).

a servile

hubris

(Bacon's? Socrates'?). And

mathematicians are

when

he

encounters

the startling suggestion that

handicraftsmen he

will

stop

and ask

how this

can

be;

per

haps he
West's

will

style

find it necessary to make a detour through other excellent essays. is no less deliberate than Bolotin's, I suppose. But it does make

his essay relatively difficult to follow. There are further reasons for this difficulty, (i) Occasionally West arrives at a remote conclusion in a single bound. For example, he concludes that Aristoph
anes

is the

sole or major

initiator him

of the

ugly

rumor about

Socrates from the

i8d

fact have

that Socrates refers to

no

at 19c

and perhaps also at

alleged

(84,

128-30).

There is

discussion

of when

Chaerephon's

journey

to Delphi could
works

occurred.39

And he
least three

concludes that
arguments

Socrates found the

poets'

to be

39. on an

There

are at

for

an earlier

established reputation:

see

Burnet,

p. 79.

Consider, too,

date, (i) Aristophanes would have relied the fact that the jurors hsve hesrd

384 beautiful

Interpretation
and

wise,

and

the poets themselves to

be wise, from the fact that he

says xai xaXXa at

is

a sham

22C5 (109, 113). And he seems to conclude that sophistry image of the legislative art from these premises alone: the sophists
their students,
since

cannot

rule

they

are

at

the mercy of the

authorities

in is

whichever

city they

currently reside; the question of who ought to educate

equivalent

to the question of who ought to rule; the legislative art includes the
wherever

authority to rule;
are

not actually rule, occasions for its exercise fail to see how these sentences constitute an any rate, argument, (ii) Occasionally West makes one proposition out of two, by a light ning sunagoge. For example, he asserts that Socrates examined himself after

it does

limited (103). I,

at

each encounter with a

seemingly

wise man

(117). His
and not

evidence what

for this
said at

must

include something said at 28e5ff., however, only 22c, or 22e; for while it may be true (but strange) that
quires

is

2id,

self-examination re

comparing
Another

oneself with

others,

not

every

such comparison need

be

self-

examination, ment.

(iii) Occasionally West

example

shifts

ground

in the

course of an

argu one

is his using

a prepositional phrase

in

more

than

way when arguing that, as i8a-e reveals Socrates from the perspective of po litical men, and I9c-d from the perspective of a poet, so I9d-20C reveals him from the
to
add
perspective of sophists

(112,

118;

cf.

181,

210).

(iv) His

readiness

modifiers

notwithstanding,

example, he asserts first that Socrates is

West occasionally delays doing so. For boastful, and only later that Socrates
that

"expects his listeners to think he is

forth"

shine

(105,

cf.

he lets his "true superiority 149, 155, 161, 170-1, 180, 220). Socrates is a superior
a

boasting,"

truth-teller
appears

mistaken

for

boaster

by

some of
what

his inferiors: this is

what

West

to mean, but it is not always

he

says.

am

ready to

grant

that these subtleties, too, are defensible. The

disparity

between philosophy and authoritative opinion may become better understood if one considers it first from the standpoint of such opinion. The suggestiveness
of

Socratic

or

Platonic

speech

may be

more

of a

hermeneutical

vigor

that sometimes outstrips

effectively communicated by means logical rigor. And, obviously,

am not averse

to hazardous inferences as such. The

rhetorical and

difficulty
it. One

to which I now

refer

is due less to the he

Socrates

speculative

character of

West's

own

argument
what

than to the alacrity with which he makes

says of
at

could

say

of

him

his trial: he declares the truth

without

producing
re-

conviction.

Do I then

comprehend

West's interpretation sufficiently to

(l8d5)
together with the

venture this

of this reputation
years of age.

from

childhood

fact that
refuge

no

juror

can

be

under

thirty
His

(ii) Plato's Prm

suggests thst

Socrstes took

in logoi

3t

sn

early

age.

Prt

suggests that

Socrates turned to the human

and political things prior

to the outbreak of the

Peloponnesisn War. (iii) From historical considerations it appears likely that Chaerephon would have visited the oracle either in the 430s or about 421. H. W. Parke argues for the former date:
A

History

the

strength of

of the Delphic Oracle 412-13. I. Ferguson has argued for the latter, and Parke's argument: Eranos (1964), pp. 70-73. But see I. Beckman's
argument:

questioned critique of

Ferguson's

The Religious Dimension of

Socrates'

Thought,

p.

106.

Discussion
view?

385

It

mistaken reader

to me that I do; and my fear that I may nonetheless be quite in this case, too, is once more balanced by my expectation that the will judge for himself in any case.
seems

2.

Plato's

Apology
apologia.

of Socrates has three parts,

of which the

first

and

longest is

Socrates'

The bulk
to

of

West's interpretation is
sets of

about this

defense.

Socrates first
against

claims

have two
24b,

accusers,

and

then defends himself

now

both (i8a-i9a;

19a-

24b-28a).

His defense is

complete,

we

suppose, but our supposition proves incorrect.

At any rate, the anticipated peroration to the jury does not occur until 34b-35d. A long, meandering di gression intervenes. Among West's outstanding exegetical achievements is his

having

brought to light the

on

structure and

function

of

this
a

passage.

It is to be
of

divided into two parts, Socrates

as public man

his

account.

The first is

four-fold disclosure

(28b3-29b9,
is
a

D9-30CI, c2-3ia7, a7-c3); its

against

counterpart

is the

passage wherein

he defends himself

the old charge of sophistry

of

(i9d-20c). The

second part
,

four-fold disclosure

Socrates

as a private

man (3ic4~33ai ai-c4, C4-8, c8-34b5); its counterpart is the passage wherein (20C-23C). In both he explains the origin of his "conversational parts

philosophy

and

in the defense

as a whole

Socrates addresses, turn

and turn

about,

the two formal

charges against

him;
in

there are altogether eight direct or oblique

corruption charge.

treatments of the

impiety

charge, seven treatments of the

passage
question

On

West's account, then, the

ordered continuation of
defense.40

is

no

digression

at all

but

well-

Socrates'

defense. Indeed it is "the

core"

vital

of

his

Socrates does
since

not

hereby

he
of

"opposition"

makes

the
not

ethos"

Athens

the majority of his innocence, of course, between his way of life and "the traditional less but still more apparent. This opposition is the prin
persuade stresses

cipal theme of

West's interpretation. He
Two
results
are

it throughout,
noteworthy.

and moreover

tries to interpret it.

especially

First, beginning
argues

from the fact that the hind

Socrates'

most obvious accusers are

two poets,

he

that

be

conflict with

Athenian
as

political men political

lies the

old quarrel

between
to the

philosophy Athenian demos,

poets

and poetry. so

For

Athenian

leaders

are subservient

too

is the demos
example).

subservient

to certain "powerful and

poets"

seminal"

(Homer, for

Socrates

and those

"good

are at
other

odds over the question of what

the good for

rule.41

man and citizen

is. In

words,

Second, West finds that the opposi they disagree regarding who should actual political life is revealed in and conversational tion between philosophy incoherence. and the contrast between integrity
Socrates' Meletus' Meletus'

incoherence,
otic,

a theme announced

in

Socrates'

is

revealed

in his proving

unable

calling him both good and patri to articulate what he believes without

40.

See

esp. pp.

149-50, 199-200, 234; 173-4. Also Burnet's coram., pp. 100, 107.

41.

Pp. 10-11,

85,

96-103, 113-6, 118-24.

386

Interpretation
Socrates'

contradiction.42

integrity,

a theme announced at the outset of

the

dia

logue, is
and closed

revealed

in the fact that his in the fact that his

West
also

inquiry

is essentially conversational,
to everyone
Socrates'

therefore public, and

speeches are at once open

to

Everyman.43

finds, however,

that
practaice

"'practically'"

"'theoretically'"

and

incomplete. In

way of life is it is limited by

"the
art of

his

not

limited

being able to persuade the men of Athens to accept by his not knowing what virtue is. In short, Socrates
He disagrees
Socrates'

it. In theory it is
wants

education."

with

the founders

of

Athens, fundamentally,
holes. This is

without

being
many
would

competent to take their

place.44

West judges
others

defense to be full

of

not surprising:

have
the

made

the same

presentation of

evidence.

judgment, though rarely with so detailed a Is Socrates then incoherent, like Meletus? West
so. a

deny
also

that he

is,

and

rightly

He

judges

Socrates'

defense to be

failure. This

will surprise readers

he certainly fails to persuade the Athenian majority of his innocence, Socrates does accomplish what he intended. But West himself seems to be of two minds about this, for he also speaks of "deliberate
who suppose

that,

while

Socrates'

decision"

to die

(223,

cf.

208, 213),

and asserts

that the death he has chosen

cf.

befits the

perfect albeit

either contradicts

limited life he has lived (231, himself or, more likely, takes

224).

Here West

Socrates'

apology to be in one
Socrates'

way deficient, in another way sufficient. It is unlikely, however, that Socrates chooses death before receiving the guilty-verdict. But what is inten
tion? To gain or retain what

is good,

of course

(cf.

I9a3).

But what, in

par

ticular, does he prefer in these particular and changing circumstances? At the outset he says that he will tell the whole truth. It is unlikely that he does so,
45odunlikely that he ought to do so (cf. Rep 33ic-d, 382c-d, 451a). One expects him to try to avoid doing any injustice, to prefer suffering to doing it (cf. 28b, 32d, 39a-b, et passim). One also expects him to try

however,

and

departing

as

little

as

possible

from the

greatest good

for

human being,
and

by

making within this day, too, speeches about 38a). In any event, it is likely that Socrates
as participants

virtue and

the other things (cf. the

regards

himself,

jurors,

in

not one

but two trials

or contests

like

An actor must play a given beyond and he may not be able to it; thing this part in a somewhat novel and therefore
an actor.

(cf. 39a-b, and 225). He is role; yet he naturally aims at some

achieve

that end without playing

unexpected way.

(Do

not

the fine
not

artists we most admire take great want

liberties

with what

they play?) Now, I do

am

to suggest that Socrates defends himself

badly, for I

to

affirm

that he does so unjustly. But one can

wrong and still maintain that he both loses and quer. And the Athenian majority likewise wins one, loses

hardly deny that he does anything wins by not stooping to con

prepared
one.

Which

side

fails

in the
42. 43.
44.

more

important trial?
context.

24b5 and pp. 142, 147. Cf. Grg 48236-03 snd Pp. 94-5, 191-2, 196, 220-1. Pp. 73-4, 77, 78, 166, 231-2; 11, 180, 218.

Discussion
West
now

387
a third

makes

judgment

about

Socrates. It
of Socrates

astonished me,

and even

regard

it

as a grave error.

The

remainder of this section will

most

be

about

it.

In their
assume against

commentaries on the

Apology

contemporary
I thought

scholars

that

Socrates

was

right, Athens wrong. This is West's "chief

complaint

them

(10,

cf.

71-2).

Surely

it is

justifiable,
neither

or so

at

for I took it to be directed

Athens wrong,
even

against their

assuming that

Socrates

was

first; right,

though this belief is

not

dently

salutary. and

It is

evidently salutary because,

self-evidently true nor evi as West notes, it reinforces

the vain

capable of

hermeneutically disabling opinion that we moderns are more judging the ancients than the ancients themselves (76). And, I add,
not

its truth is

sufficiently

evident to anyone

ignorant

of what

justice is,
or

and

in

this respect

most scholars seem no

less ignorant than Socrates

proved

than

Socrates'

interlocutors.

My

own

assumption

erroneous,

however, for it

soon

became

clear

that West's complaint is

directed
In

rather against our

falsely

assum

ing

Socrates to be right, Athens

as charged.

wrong.

fact, he

maintains, Socrates was,

entitled

or is, guilty Socrates.

His book may

fairly

be

A Kategoria of

That this is West's judgment becomes many

passages

evident

from

consideration of the
ground of

in

which

he

asserts

it. Some instances: "The true

young"

the

present charge

is his

corruption of the

(128). "The

Socrates'

core of
-of

injustice is his disbelief in the

consists of
.

city's gods. His true corruption the young in teaching them to doubt that those gods exist. The indictment the later accusers is correct, but it is correct for reasons that only the
explain"

earlier charge
Socrates'

can

(129-30). "There is
as

a clear connection

between

serious

joking
is

and

his impiety, just

because it

there was a connection between

young"

his

care

for

wisdom and

his

corruption of the questions those

(148).

"Socrates'

philo
laws"

sophic conversation
Socrates'

unjust

[Athenian]

(205).

"arrogance"

is

"impious"

(211). These

statements are made without

qualification:

it is not that Socrates merely seems unjust; in West's judgment he is guilty as charged. Unlike Bolotin, he makes almost no attempt to find Socrates blameless. At only one point does he pause to consider an objection; it is minor,
and

dismissed in "the
conflict

few

sentences

he

concede that

between Socrates
conceded on

and

(130). At only one point does Athens exists more in prin

ciple

than in practice"; it is
corrupted

the ground that Athens

has already

been

by

philosophers and others was

(209-12).
traces to our En
can

The judgment that Socrates

(or

is) innocent West

lightenment heritage, and in particular to the faith that reason dissemination become "the highest authority for the conduct of
rates'

by

its

own

life"

(10). Is this

etiology judgment
scholars

correct?

Observe that West's judgment

of

Socrates is

right

only if Soc

of himself is wrong (17C2-3, 3735-6). Do not believe him innocent less because the Englightenment

most classical

remains effec

tive behind their

backs,

as

is

so

plainly

vindication

it were, than because Plato's Apology of Socrates of Socrates, because the Laws in Plato's Crito

admit that

the Athenian people did

him

an

injustice (54c 1),

and

because those

388
very

Interpretation
much,
when

people soon admitted as

they

tried to

make

things right

by

wronging his prosecutors as well? The opinion that Socrates was right, Athens wrong, is ancient as well as modern. Plato seems to have shared it. But if he did, then West's judgment of Socrates is right only if Plato's is wrong. Furthermore, his interpretation of Plato's Apology of Socrates is correct only if
the dialogue is not, as it appears, a
vindication of

Socrates.

Why does West believe, contrary to well established opinion, that Socrates is guilty as charged? Surely it is not from any desire to be original, iconoclastic, disestablishmentarian or naughty. Nor is it from any hatred of philosophy:
West
seems to count
condemn

does he
will

himself among the friends of philosophers. Why, then, someone dear to him? Well, of course, a friend of Socrates
wrong.45

be strongly disposed to condemn his own friends, for their own good, whenever they have done anything But this, too, is not quite the motive sought; for West recognizes that the Socrates of Plato's dialogues is "disem
a

bodied,"

fictional character, why he

to

and

thus beyond remedial punishment (cf. 232).

No,

the

reason

condemns or

Socrates

appears quite philosophic:

and

it is the

conclusion of an

argument,

arguments,

therefore to be accepted.

And,

having decided

scarcely have withheld this conclusion, together with supporting arguments, without fail ing to exercise the arete proper to an exegete. One can say of his book what Hobbes
I
said of

publish an

interpretation

of the

dialogue, he

could

Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise: it disseminates the

examine these arguments.

truth with
shall

bold

candor.

presently

This

examination will constitute

West, my defense of Socrates. Before undertaking this defense, however, I wish to draw attention to an implication which phi losophers might do well not to overlook (cf. 91). West's arguments derive
the core of my
refutation of

mainly from consideration of the opposition between Socratic inquiry and Athenian tradition. This opposition, as West describes it, will obtain between

any
any

such

inquiry

and

any

such

(nonutopian)

political

tradition, between any Socratic philosopher and community in which he lives. West is such a philos in
a could

opher, obviously; he has

even gone public

only

on pain of manifest

inconsistency

way that Socrates did not; and he deny that he lives in a non

utopian political community.

the same charge that representatives of the Athenian regime

Therefore he is vulnerable, in principle, to much brought against Socrates is

Socrates. His

explicit condemnation of

implicitly

a condemnation of

himself. Therefore my explicit defense of Socrates is implicitly a defense of West against himself. Furthermore, while Socrates is not now mortal, West is. For this reason I take his implicit self-condemnation to be the more serious,
and

my implicit cross-examination of it to be the Socrates' In order to reason well about guilt

more or

urgently

needed.

to make and

keep

in

mind several

innocence, it is necessary distinctions. (West does not expressly do so.)

45.

Grg

48os6-b2 and

West,

pp.

197-8

Discussion

389
unjust without

(i) One
even

can, it seems, be

do

an

injustice

without

being

unjust.

doing any injustice; and one can Some distinction is ordinarily made

between the

question whether one

question whether one

ordinarily
and on.

made

has done something unjust, or just, and the is unjust, or just. It is a specification of the distinction between what one has done and what one is, between pragma

(ii) One
acts and

noble or splendid.

without doing anything Some distinction is ordinarily made between supererogatory dutiful or law-abiding acts. It is a specification of the distinction

can, it seems, do something just or lawful

ordinarily made between kala and dikaia or nomima. (iii) One can, it seems, distinguish between doing something just and re fraining from doing anything unjust. For example, when Socrates went home
rather

than take part in the tyrannical seizure of

Leon, he

refrained

from

doing

anything unjust; but he did not then do anything very noble; and he did not, West intimates, do anything just (191). In other words, as someone can be not

ugly without being beautiful, not unmanly without being manly, and abstain from stupidity without attaining wisdom, so too can someone be not unjust without being just, and do no injustice without doing a just thing. Recall
Socrates'

distinction in the Lysis between the

good and

the

neither good nor

bad.

(iv) One
benefit

can, it seems, do something just

without

benefiting

anyone,

and

someone without
without

injustice
made

doing anything just; and one benefiting anyone; and so forth. Some
and

can refrain

from

doing

between beneficial

just

actions.

It is

a specification of

distinction is ordinarily the distinction

one and

ordinarily made between ophelima and dikaia or nomima. Accordingly, can be harmful, or not beneficial, without contravening any law: plagues
gadflies are not unjust.

pleasant

One can, it seems, do something both just and unpleasant, or both and unjust. Some such distinction is ordinarily acknowledged, and Socrates properly draws attention to it in his peroration to the jury. If a juror

(v)

keeps this distinction in mind, he will solely on the ground that he has been a

not

judge

someone

guilty

of

injustice

pest.

(vi)
and

regime
made

ordinarily
what

can, it seems, act contrary to its laws. Some distinction is between legal and illegal rulings, between what the law says
wills.

the regime
and

This distinction is

preserved

by

the

Stranger in

Plato's Statesman, is there relatively

by

Aristotle in his

democratic society,

of

course, just as

It is relatively obscure in a the distinction between rulers and ruled

Athens did
acknowledge some such

Politics.*6

obscure.47

The

people of

distinction, however. They customarily distinguished laws (nomoi) from decrees

46. 47.

Sts

300C2 and context, snd

Pol

I282biff.
nstionsl nightmare

"My

fellow Americsns,

our

long

is

over.

Our Constitution
rule."

works.

Our

great republic

is

a government of

laws,

not of men.

Here the

people

(President Gerald

R. Ford's Inaugural Address,

as recorded

by

N. Y. Times, 9 Aug. 1974)

390

Interpretation
,

(psephismata)
the law.
course of

and at about the time of of

Socrates'

trial

they
that

were concerned

to

prevent abuses

they Socrates, then, properly draws attention

his defense (for example, 32b4~5). can, it seems, do something legally

the latter. Sometimes

admitted

they had violated to this distinction in the

or conventionally just without just. Some philosophers, and their vulgar exponents, doing anything naturally do make a distinction between what is by convention (nomoi) and what is by

(vii) One

nature
well as

(phusei). Of these,

some also maintain

that there is justice

by

nature as

justice is

by
are

nature

by decidedly

convention.

And

superior and

these, to justice by convention. Two

of most

if

not all maintain

that

justice

such philosophers

(Plato's) Socrates

both naturally just and in accordance with nature (kata phusin) (kata nomon) is as well as
'practical'

West. West plainly believes that something can be illegal (paranomon), that the disparity between action
and action

in

accordance
not.

with

law

'theoretical'

Socrates does
at

While

all

these

distinctions

are

relevant

to the case

Observe, in the first place, ordinarily made by the men of Athens. It is, therefore, not immediately properly applicable to the case at hand, and indeed Socrates refrains from
take care not to misapply them.

hand, one should that (vii) was not

and ad

mitting it. (This silent deed co-constitutes the principal omission in the of Socrates. It is of a piece with his leaving unwinged the question
virtue or

Apology
of what

justice is.)
that

My introducing (vii)
not

is

nonetheless

appropriate,

however,

for West expressly

appeals

to it in his interpretation.

Observe, too, (i)-(vi) are Distinction (iii) usually appears

the

ordinarily
the just

made with almost

clarity
and

and precision.

quite

nebulous,

nonexistent, owing to

tendency

of citizens to
of

identify

with

the

legal,

pervasive

negativity

law. Distinctions (iv)

and

(v)

are not always

owing to the kept in

mind, because

people are wont to

identify

the

unjust with whatever

they do

not

like,
even

with whatever arouses

their

indignation,

and

because

people are wont to

identify help
the

the injurious

with

the harmful and the

harmful
and

with

the painful. Yet

well

these

distinctions
recall

are

ordinarily intelligible,
neither said nor
with

Socrates does

to

jury

them.48

Observe, finally,
it is

that I

have

implied that any

of

these dis

tinctions is made correctly, in accordance

always to one's own advantage to

the things themselves. Perhaps

elsewhere

has Socrates
to
all

maintain.

be just, and do no injustice, as Plato But if so, then (iv) is to be rejected. And
the ground that there
should prove

perhaps
nature.

(vii) is
Even if

be rejected,
seven

on

is

no

justice

by

distinctions

incorrect, however, they

was

would nevertheless

be

relevant to the case at

hand: Zeus

important for
were much

48.

In his Greek Popular legal

Morality

K. J. Dover

argues that

Athenian jurors
the city
as

less

concerned with

it (156-9, 181, 293, 309-10). But he concedes that 3 juror was considered dikaios only if he had regsrd for the lsw (183), snd tfrat he did acknowledge some distinction between legality and public utility (288-9). Consider ApS 34b~35b with 28d-e and 30d-e.
of

niceties and evidence than with

the good

they

saw

Discussion
the Greeks even

391

if he does
if it

not

exist; the perfectly just polity is important

for

all of us even

cannot exist.

to discern what the issue is. It is whether Socrates has done (or is doing) anything paranomon, whether his dialogical pragma is (or was) contrary to Attic law. It is not, except secondarily, whether he is odd,
are now a position

We

in

garrulous,
whether

busybody;
a pain

whether

he has been

or

will

be

great

benefactor;
politic

he is

in the

neck and or

3iai).

It is

not whether

he is

every has been unjust

other part of the

body

(cf.

by

the standard of
shown that
of

nature.49

Accordingly, my
anything ceed in truth

question

for West is this: Has he

world can a not

Socrates did
suc

paranomon!

But how in the

kategoria
the

Socrates

if, like West's, it does

deal

with

fact that the Athenian

majority decided, upon further reflection, that it had made a mistake (224)? How can it succeed if, like West's, it does not discuss the fact that, according to Anytus, a judicial trial of Socrates was inappropriate (29CI-2)? Above all,

how

can

it

succeed

if, like West's, it

judges
their own

contains almost no
suppose

discussion
that

of

Attic

law? I
prior

grant

that

Socrates'

inquiry
and

into
us

what

cannot;
cut?

for

this

inquiry

plausibly they laws say (cf. 24e2). We, on the other hand, is notoriously difficult. Has West found a short
Socrates'

could

needed no

He

seems

to assume that he can discover

guilt a priori. seems

In

other

words, he seems daemonic in just the way that Anytus Plato's Menol

daemonic in

Surely
One

West

would object.

He has three

objections at concerns

his disposal, I infer.

concerns

concerns

the

identity

of

Socrates. Another

the general opposition the dis

meet

between Socratic philosophy and tinction between political justice

each objection

political society.

The third

and natural

or

human justice. I

shall

in turn,

and

thus complete my

apologia.
'historical'

First,

one should

distinguish between the

not

Socrates

and

Plato's decades

Socrates. It is the former,

the
not

before Plato. It is the latter,

latter, being the former, "who has truly

who came of

into

several
made

history."

Likewise,

one should of

distinguish between the trial

the former and Plato's

"portrayal"

latter,
it is

not

Apology of Socrates. West's book is about the the former (9). In my cross-examination, however, I supposed that
the trial in the the former.

about

Consequently, my
objection called

refutation meets

is beside the

point.

There is less to this

remains:

than

first

the intellect. For the question

paranomon!

Has the

'Socrates'

person

done anything

This

question can

reasonably be

answered

Either the
not. aim

nomoi

in

question are

only by appeal to some nomos or nomoi. identical with certain Attic laws or they are

If they are, then much historical research is necessary even though the is to ascertain whether Plato's Socrates is guilty, not whether Socrates himThat Socrates himself takes this to be the issue is
an

49.

clear

from

what

he

says

in his defense.

He
the

supposes

identification
observe

of

the just

with

the legal (cf.

West,

189).

He

puts emphasis on

doing

of

injustice:

how

frequently

the words prattein and adikein occur.

He

admits

that spesking is or csn be a praxis (40b5).

392

Interpretation
If they are not identical, one must nonetheless find out what One will find that out, presumably, by reading the Apology of
with other about

self was guilty.

they

say.

Socrates (together, perhaps, described

or established).

dialogues in

which

Plato's Athens is

Yet

fictional things

as such we can tell

only

what we are

told;

and the

Apology

no more

tells us what the

laws in

question

say than it tells us all the prior, unwritten kategoriai, bathed for the occasion. Consequently, the necessary
pletable.

or whether

Socrates has

research appears incom-

And

even

if completable, it is
to

not undertaken

by

West in his book.

of

Consequently, he has failed

Socrates. And
even

justify

therein

his

condemnation

Plato's

if he had succeeded, it would has or will be likewise been, being is, But West has at his disposal a second objection,
culpable.50

not

follow that any human line

of

a stronger

defense. I
guilt with

have heaped
out recourse

scorn on

his

assumption

that one can discover

Socrates'

to painstaking historical research. But expressions of

are
not

indignation,
West's These

however vigorous,
condemnation of
arguments are not

even reasonable on

facsimiles

of arguments.

Socrates,

the other

hand, does

rest on arguments.

based solely

upon consideration of

the nature of

Socratic in

quiry and the nature of political society; yet they are sufficiently general that they do not depend, in turn, upon completion of much historical research. Con
sequently, my
spirited
refutation would

fail, in truth,

even

if it

were worked out

in less

fashion.
examine these arguments.

It is time to

Six

are

explicit,

a seventh

implicit.

(i) Socrates tells the truth but refuses to speak beautifully. Because he does not speak beautifully, he fails to persuade the jurymen to reach a just judgment. Therefore, by refusing to speak beautifully, he causes injustice; he is, it seems, not entirely just, (ii) The earlier charge is based not on his post-Delphic activ ities, as he alleges, but on his pre-Delphic activities. A comical! v exaggerated
but essentially
Aristophanes'

correct representation of the pre-Delphic

Socrates is

given

in

Clouds.

According
young

to

it, he did

not

believe in

the gods of the

city,

and

he

corrupted the
Socrates'

by teaching

them to doubt the existence of

those gods,

(iii)

speeches would not corrupt

program adopted

only if they

constituted a

politically feasible educational tion is not met. Therefore his

by

the Athenians. This condi

admits that

speeches corrupt, other

(iv) Socrates

he

does the

people's

business. In

words, he does not mind his own. Justice

unjust.

is minding

one's own

business. Therefore he is

Furthermore,

Socrates'

meddlesomeness consists

in

conversational
question

inquiry

about virtue etc.

But

such

inquiry invariably
etc. unjust

brings into
unjust,

the

generally

accepted views about virtue

Therefore it is
to shrink

ical

action.

justice, then it is Socrates admittedly abstained from polit Therefore he did injustice, if indeed it is unjust not to promote
from
political action.

(v) If it is

unjust not to promote

50.

Most

commentators on

ApS do
(cf.

not maintain a strict separation

between

"portrayal"

and

portrayed, and
st the outset

West is

no exception

89-90, 177,
incidentsl

231).

He rightly insists

upon the

distinction,

(9), in

order to set sside some

questions.

Discussion
justice,
the

393
Socrates'

(vi) In

account, the

god

to whose aid

he has

come

is

replaced nature.

daimonion. The daimonion is really eros, or by Socrates, then, has indeed introduced a new daemon,
city's

Socrates'

erotic or

god, to

replace the

gods, namely himself. Therefore he is impious. And he has

corrupted all

those youths who now come to the aid of their new god,

himself.51

(vii) Socrates
authoritative rupts

admits

to

having

readily

and

openly
of

conversed with youths

about virtue and so

forth. But, again,

the

such conversation
ethos

invariably
and of

overturns

opinions,

traditional

the

city,

thus

cor and

the young and two of his

impressionable. Consider the

(192).

careers

Alcibiades

Critias,
gence.

"associates"

Socrates, like Gorgias, is guilty

one accepts two and

of negli

But
that

argument

(i)

will seem

Socrates

can somehow

strong only if defend himself

hypotheses

first,
can

nakcbc,,52

second, that he
obviously,

do

so without

breaking

the law. Both

hypotheses
would

are

doubtful,

and yet

West defends

neither.

Furthermore,

it be just for Socrates to

will seem

speak

strong only if xctXcog if indeed he is guilty as charged? Argument (ii) Socrates is identical to Plato's one accepts the hypothesis that
Aristophanes'

Socrates (if

not

to Socrates himself). This

hypothesis, too, is doubtful. West

that the
pre-Delphic

tries to defend it

by

reference

to the autobiography in Plato's Phaedo 96-100.

Yet from this

versed with need not

passage one cannot conclude

Socrates

con

youths, or anyone else, about the gods, or anything else: logos

conclude
would-be

be dialogos. And, contrary to popular opinion, one cannot that he was an atheist, or agnostic, from the admission that he was a
phusiologos.

Argument

(iii)

will seem

strong only if
and

one agrees with

West that life. This

Socrates demand

must

be

able

to convert the people of Athens to

his way

of

appears

excessive,

however,

West

nowhere shows

that

it is

not.

Furthermore, Socrates could satisfy this demand only by subverting Athenian tradition. Does it not follow that his speeches fail to corrupt only if they
corrupt?

Argument

(iv)

will seem

strong only if
paranomia,

one accepts

two hypotheses
Socrates'

first,

that

polupragmosune entails

and

secondly, that

con
appears

versations

did

subvert

the traditional Athenian way. The

one
considers either

first hypothesis

false, however,

when

the way Athens was or the way

Plato's Athens is. It

also appears

false

when one considers

the

authoritative

hearsay
there
others.

to

which

West here appeals, namely Plato's Republic. For Socrates

that

makes

it

clear

justice,
it
clear

as

he defines

it, is

compatible with

supervising
it.53

He

also makes

that justice may

not

be

as

he has defined

And the
phon's)
51.
ad

second

hypothesis

appears

false

when one examines seems

Plato's (or Xeno

works with care.

For Socrates there

173-183)

to be a

steadfast proponent

Pp.

79-80 and

(comm.
154.

ad

snd 149. 128-30

ad 3ia-c).

(comm.

ad 23C-24b). sd

172, 175 (comm.

198-

290-300)

98,

179-80

(comm.

183 (comm.

3ic-33a) and 191.

with 195-6
52.

(comm. 3d 33c-34b).
use of

For this

the sdverb see,

for exsmple, Demosthenes

lvii 2.

53.

Cf.

Rep

43238-9, 435d3-5> 44ie4"5> 502ei-2, 504bi-2, 5i8d9-io.

394

Interpretation
Athenian
nomos.

of obedience to the not as

One

can agree with

West that Socrates is

he usually seems, in this respect, and nonetheless maintain that it is diffi cult, if not impossible, to subvert that whose preservation one constantly seems to undertake. I shall presently revert to this theme. It suffices now to remark
that West
worse.

nowhere shows

that Socrates in
and

fact broke
seems

law

by

Argument (v) is
attend.

incomplete,

West
a

to shrink
exegesis

making someone from completing

to which I shall

it. So do I. Argument (vi) depends presently does

gods
not

on

suspect

For now, let it be

account,
and

assumed

that the daimonion

does

replace

the god, in

Socrates'

that the daimonion is

a new

reducible

to eros.

It

follow that Socrates has introduced

acknowledged

by

the

city.

Let it

moreover

deity: Eros is among the be assumed that the eros in

question

is
as

Socrates'

nature.

It does
can

not

follow that Socrates has introduced

himself

new

deity:

nature partakes of some can even grant

consistently affirm that the philosopher by divine lot and deny that he is himself a deity. One
one

that Socrates is a
as such:

deity

without

having

to grant that

he has

introduced himself

this

god

Finally,
has
made

argument anyone

(vii)

will seem

may love to hide. strong only if one believes that Socrates

of the
city.

worse

from the in

standpoint

Has he? Consider

Apollodorus,
crackpot now

one of

the charmed inner circle. Is he any more a softie or a

than before

falling

with

Socrates? Or

consider

Crito,

another

Is he any less law-abiding for having conversed with Socrates in the Crito! Was he any less disposed to give Socrates a proper burial after having
associate.

heard the

conversation about soul narrated

in the Phaedo! Or

consider

Alci

biades,

only marginally an associate. Is he corrupted by argument, in the Alcibiades Major, according to which he ought not to do political things until he knows what he is doing? Was he corrupted by
even

though

he

was

Socrates'

Socrates'

the

making him feel ashamed in the presence of another human being for first time in his life?54 It is true that Xenophon's Alcibiades once engaged
guardian,

Pericles, his
reasonable

in

dubious

conversation

about

the

law,

and

it is

to suppose that Alcibiades was then

as

imitating
not.55

Socrates (cf. ApS

Boys
will

23C2-5).

But,

Pericles remarked, he too

was eristic as a youth.

be boys,
most
with

When they grow up they happen to imitate Socrates or like Alcibiades and turn to other things, in accordance will, Callicles,
whether

Athens'

traditional ethos.

West, I
means of

conclude, has failed to

justify

his

condemnation of

Socrates

by
his

these seven arguments. Readers might suspect that,

by taking

complex argument apart

logos

weaker.

from its interpretative setting, I have made This suspicion would be just; but it would, I trust, be
reluctant to accept

a stronger

prove un

founded.
Readers
54.

might also

my

refutation

because West's

argu-

Symp
Mem

2l6bl-2. 1 2.40-46.

55.

See

slso

Plato, Phlb

I4d4-e4.

Isocrates
(Panath

recommended eristic

for

youths

on the ground thst

it keeps them

out of serious mischief

26).

Discussion
ments continue
correct.

395
to have a certain plausibility. This reluctance,
pragma

For

Socrates'

ing

to

do;

some

too, would be is politically questionable. He has some explain Athenians have understandably sought to put him on trial, to
But
suspicion

compel

him to

give an account. own

is

one

West, I

suggest, takes his

logos to be

stronger than

thing, conviction another. it is because he takes

shall now

certain partial

truths to be less partial than

they

are.

draw

attention

to these misconceptions, in order to complete my response to the second and

strongest

line

of

defense

at

his disposal.

First, West
publicity
refusal

misconceives

Socratic

irony by
attentive,

overestimating

the openness or

of

Socratic
A

philosophy.

Socrates does

frequently
will

converse about right

and wrong.

listener, if he is
the law is

quite

to

disobey

not

based, finally,
what

on

eventually realize that his the law's very authority.

god'

West, for
and

example, notices that

Socrates
he

calls

'obedience to the
to the

would, under certain circumstances, be that

incompatible
would

with obedience

law,

he leaves little doubt

the laws

as to which

then obey (cf. 29c-d). But

West leaps from this insight to the

and attacks
of

proposition that

Socrates

defiantly
and

challenges goes

Athens (164, 167, 172, 205, 209),

here he

wildly

astray.

upholds

For Socrates plainly upholds those laws, sometimes even defiantly them, in speech as well as in deed. West has turned Socrates insideconfused

out.
with

More precisely, he has here

the

his

private

thing, namely dialectic,

which

various public exhibitions of

that thing, namely the dialogues in together constitute his

should take

he has taken

active

part

and

which

(public)

pragma.

It is understandable, therefore, that West politically

the
subversive.

But Strauss's

counterfactual

Socratic philosophy to be statement is more faithful to

whole phenomenon: were not

wrote, if it

Socratic philosophy would act as political dynamite, he diluted.56 As exhibited in the Platonic Corpus, however,

Socratic philosophy is always diluted. Accordingly one wonders whether it must appear thus. Is such dilution, or irony, essential to dialectic itself? However
this may
Socrates'

be, Plato's Socrates

atopia.

comes

to light as a

moral man.

I
a

agree with

West,

and some

Athenian citizens, that in this fine I

also agree that

surface there

is

problem, namely
surfaces

this

aporia

is inseparable from the

in

which

it is: the

connection should

between dialectic (xo

preserved.

6iaXeYO0ai)

and

dialogue

(xo

6iaA.eyeo0ai)
own

be

But West, in his This is

attempt

to disclose
mistaken
Socrates'

Socrates'

activity

more

completely, has at this point

inadvertently
because

it for the

public praxis

in

which

it

occurs.

a mistake

just his pragma, properly speaking, philosophizing, in which it is: the distinction surface than a problem is the very any more between dialectic and dialogue should be preserved. And when one preserves it strictly speaking,

is

not

in

accordance with what occurs

in Plato's dialogues, then the society is

not

disparity

between
ques-

Socratic philosophy

and political

nearly

so

obvious,

or so

56.

Natural Right

and

History,

p.

153.

West (167)

shifts without comment

from

a conditional

to sn

unconditional

statement.

396 tionable,
and

Interpretation
as

it is in West's

account.

Then the
'theory'

"opposition"

between Socrates
'practice'

Athens is readily taken to exist in is right about this, for the wrong He
also
seems

rather

than in

West
in"

reason.57

to

misconceive

what

it

is,

ordinarily,

to

"believe

(vop,iL,eiv)
of such

the civic gods,

belief. Civic
certain

religion consists

less in
cares

holding
than in

overestimating the cognitive or doxastic character less in observation than in observance, for example, that Zeus exists and things to be the case

by

performance

of certain practices

(vou.i^6p,eva)

making and keeping oaths. In other words, ordinary religious a disposition to behave in certain prescribed ways in certain
tions.58

for example, belief is primarily

prescribed situa

Plato's Socrates,
prescribed

as well as

Xenophon's, has behaved in the

to this considerable extent, at
of

prescribed

ways

in the

situations,

and

least, he is
that he

pious

by
so

civic standards.

There

is,

course, a

lingering

suspicion

has

done

from reflection, thoughtfully, and not ordinarily, from habit. One may, therefore, be ready to assert that he has prayed and sacrificed for form's sake
alone.

But the

extent to which religious practice

is for form's

sake should not of the extent to will

be

underestimated.59

And if

one

does not, if

one

is

mindful

belief is ordinarily a matter of performance, then one probably be less ready to find Socrates guilty of civic impiety. West's account of the disparity between Socratic logoi and civic religion
which

religious

will

appear even weaker when one reflects also on the

Greeks

and their gods.

In

first place, there was no Scripture, and no strict orthodoxy. It is unlikely that a man would have been deemed impious just because he doubted that Zeus
the
castrated

his father,

or concluded

that Zeus might assume the

form

of an ass

too.

It is

also

unlikely that a man would

have been deemed impious because he took deemed

impious.60

the Homeric account of the netherworld to be

Aristophanes'

and

Frogs,

were not

false. The Eleusinian Mysteries, And it could hardly have

charged

57.
violate also

Cf.

p.

209.

It is hazsrdous to follow West in concluding that, when Socrates refers to his attempts to turn others towsrd csre for virtue, he is referring to conventions in which he ssked what virtue is
3 possible

lsw

It is illegitimate to hold that Socrates is guilty as under possible circumstsnces. In practice it is

because he

would

practice thst counts.

and suggested encourages understood.

that it is

knowledge (cf.
pursue virtue

166-174).

Plsto's Socrates,

as well as

Xenophon's,

often

interlocutors to

however understood, that is, to

Euthyph 3b3, ApS 18C3,

pursue virtue as

ordinsrily
charged

See, for

exsmple, ApS 34b-35d.

and

58.

Cf.
with

Symp 17633

Bumet,

comm. ad

24c!

Some have

reducing orthodoxy to orothoprsxy (see esp. Beckmsn, op. cit., 55-59). Perhsps he did. I do not. I do suggest that, ordinarily, the very distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy cannot be made so strictly as some believe. I suggest, moreover, thst the prescriptions to which I
refer sre

Burnet

mostly if

day
with

life

and

find,

at

not entirely conventional. Wittgenstein was not the first to investigate every its heart, conventions: consider Plato's C3ve snalogy. One should not suppose, of ordinary religious belief or practice is It is in the deep thst nomos snd pathos meet. st odds

however,
59.

that the

thoroughgoing conventionality
religious experience.

the profundity of

The

verb

&(poaioi)a8cu

mesnt not

something for form's sake. In 60. See slso the evidence

163-5.

which

only to purify oneself from pollution but slso to do way does Socrates use the word 3t Phdo 6oe2, 6is8?
op.

cited

by Dover,

cit., pp.

129-31, 266-7. Compsre

West,

pp.

Discussion
escaped

397
notice

the

Greeks'

that

Achilles'

famous judgment
and

about a

the afterlife
who ad

was mediated

by Odysseus,
and

a notorious

liar;

by

the

Muse,

deity

mittedly

can

according to one many falsehoods

presumably does tell verisimilar lies; and by Homer, who tradition was blinded for telling a whopper. That bards tell
was proverbial
wisdom.61

Accordingly, it is not unlikely that Greeks would have and poets as regarded even the many less than absolutely reliable authorities. The foremost such poet, Homer, went so far as to say that the gods are said to reside on Olympus, which is virtually
"good"

" 'inventive' "

an authoritative
gods as

instruction to

regard

the most

authoritative

things said about the

things said

(A.ey6u.eva).62

Is philosophy

so out of place

in

doctrinal

climate so

shifting

and unsettling?
while

it may be true, that the gods of Athens were bound up with distinction to care for virtue, this statement is In the
second

place,

as

West

says

(203, 206,
in

223),

care

for

one's own
whole

contra

neither

the

truth nor

its
for

greater part.

For these

gods

were

bound up

with

justice, too,

and

from the
care
'music'

standpoint of political

justice
gods,

are

sometimes

any rate, care for one's own and incompatible. Furthermore, the Olympians are
society,
at not

they

are

beautiful (if
own,

terriby just);
private

and there

remote

from

one's

as

such, than the beautiful as such.

encounter with

may be nothing more It is fitting,

a poet

therefore, that Plato had

which

Socrates'

be

one

at

the theme

was

Eros, held by
The

the poet to be both very

of

beautiful

and an

Ideas according to Plato is not dis exemplary being, Homer.63 To someone mindful of this like to similar to the pantheon according of Plato's Socrates ness, and its importance, the disparity between the logoi
a god. and the songs of

'cosmos'

his

old

friend,
this

the chief inventor of the Greek gods,

will not

appear so great or so questionable as

it does

on

West's

account.64

West

also misconceives

disparity by

overestimating the degree to

which

Athens is (or was)

philosophers

rooted

in the

ancestral.

According

to

classical

political

the polis

is

most of all

the politeia, not the

patris.

The former,

we

its body. Indeed every city is embodied, but may say, is its soul; the latter, the its soul is prior: as Aristotle remarked, we all seek the good rather than describes how Socrates is at odds ancestral. West notes this (21 1), yet when he
with

Athens it is the

body

that

he

emphasizes.

This is

surprising.

It

moreover

appears wise at

society

In the first place, every odds with itself, (i) Each exhibits dianoia as But of craftsmen as well as a land of the free.

less than

correct.

political

community is like
thumos;
each

well as

is

craftsmen are

innovators,

of course,

if

invention only because the mother of

is

ever

present; and their

political com

innovations munity

are

bound to destabilize
to the
spirit

established ways,

(ii) Every
of the

attends

as well

as to the

letter

law. But laws

as

61. Hesiod,

Thg

27-28;

62. Odyssey 63. I owe this

64.

vi 42.

Compare

Plsto, Phdrs 24334; Aristotle, Metaph West, p. 229.

want

983a3.

point

to Seth Benardete. (He may

to disown

it.)

Rep

595b9

and

Herodotus

11 53.2.

398

Interpretation
bound to fall

short of their intention, and obviously so, since riddled with loopholes. In general, a commu defeasible and obviously they political like is Socrates, it aims at the precise itself, whether nity only if, specified as a perfectly fair ruling, for example, or as lots perfectly equal in established are are
magnitude.

In

other

words, any

given political

community is
so,

open as well as

closed; it is essentially like of doxa would be radically

would moreover

a cave. at odds

Were this
with

Socrates'

not

investigations

be utterly in vain. In the second place, Athens appears to have been very open to the whole. (i) Like Athena she was justly famous for sophia, for manifold craftiness. (ii) She rightly regarded herself as restless, not wholly embedded in a particular
place. not

city in which he resides. But neither is obviously the case.

the

They

As Fustel de Coulanges remarked, exemplary by the oldest standards he

things
associated with

Athens'

attachment could

to the sacred was

Greeks'

establish, for here the

veneration of

the prytaneum was

especially weak, here

prominent.65

their

looking

who wants

Socrates, away toward beautiful things was especially discern much to gain what is good and things kata phusin, very
in
a place where

does

not appear quite so out of place

Hermes the

boundary-

marker

is identified
reader

with

Hermes the thief.

The

Socrates
poetry,

and

may believe that I, too, have misdescribed the disparity between Athens, by playing down the old quarrel between philosophy and underestimating both the
review what

and

by

lingering
said.

power of

the sacred and the

order

subversive power of classical political philosophy. we should

Have I? In
now

to find out,

have to

has been West's

It

mention

two more ways

in

which

account

however, to is questionable. First, he

suffices,
Greek saying totio: 8UE15. domestic. To an ancient
Socrates'

65. The Ancient

City
be

ill. 6-7.

Elsewhere (11. 9) Fustel

'You
are

quotes the

To him it

seems to

a vestige of meant

the time when religion was strictly

selfish!'

Greek,

on the other

hand, it

West too

appeals

to The Ancient
culmination

City, but he
his

uses

it to

secure the
and

thesis that

first
there

counterproposal

is the

of

attack on civic piety,

the thesis that Athens has

puzzling.

already been corrupted by philosophers and others (209-12). I find this is in the opening chapters of The Ancient City sn sbstrsction from Homer's
religion, in order to isolste
political
a

First,

contribution to

Greek

much more sncient

religion whose

locus

was a multitude of pre

households. There is, however,

"revolutions"

no subsequent reintroduction of

the Homeric contribution,

contributions which msy have been kingships into democracies. Thus Fustel's account remains quite incomplete, and in a way such that it is doubtfully sn adequate guide to religion in Periclean Athens. Secondly, the old religion which Fustel associates with the prytaneum is decidedly nondemocratic. Therefore, one cannot use his account of it to criticize Socrates without implicitly criticizing the Athenian regime as well. But then one is no longer assuming

admittedly substantisl, made during the four

snd no consideration of

sny further

that transformed

the perspective of the city

itself, according
account

to West's own sccount.

a critique of most

Furthermore,
one

3 critique

of

Socrates based

on

Fustel's

is

implicitly
an

Homer. But then

established the

is

no

longer

maintaining that Homer is the "good Thirdly, what West (citing Fustel) calls
of the

poet"

who

of all

gods

of

Athens.

"egregious

symptom of the philosophic transformation

city

and

its
an

gods"

(212), Fustel himself

account of the and

regarded as an

important step forward. The Ancient

spirit, of the progressive
and
uni-

City

is plainly

Hegelian

development

of man's

versalization of religious

beliefs

institutions (see

esp.

Introduction

first

chapter of each

Book).

Discussion
seems are

399

philosophy and political society conflict if they incommensurable (for example, 164). This is not obviously true, yet West says little to show that it is. According to some philosophers, it is false.
Spinoza Aristotle clearly affirm the incommensurability and deny the con flict. Yet, to my surprise, West does not discuss these outstanding counter
and
claims:

to suppose that Socratic

his book

contains no reference to

Spinoza,

and

only

one reference to

Aristotle's Politics.

Second,

and

finally, West
This

supposes that

philosophy has been politically

enough, "for
of

and

historically
must

effective.
of

seems

reasonable

while

'philosophy

wishing to be flection, however, West's supposition Socrates

elenctic
more

beware

edifying,'

it is

appears

On re necessity misleading. It is true that Plato's

edifying."66

does occasionally dumbfound. His nature, particularly his is awesome but only in private; in public he can do little ability,
can and
even

than raise an occasional clamor. And

in

private

he has little

profound

effect.

He

proves unable to persuade

secondary questions; or to persuade himself and the role Critias and others have

Meno to distinguish between primary and Charmides to distinguish strictly between

created

for him;

or to persuade

persuade

Alcibiades to distinguish strictly between the good Crito to distinguish between himself and

and popular

renown;

or

to

body. It is

also true that

Plato has been remarkably influential. Indeed, it is owing to his published work that we are prepared to understand the Periclean Age in terms of the

Socratic Turn, less

with

and

tempted to

identify

the greatest

kinesis in the

ancient world

the Peloponnesian War than

Socrates'

with man

inquiry. One should, how

who wrote

ever, distinguish between Plato the poet, the

dialogues

and

instituted

school,
rather

and

Plato the

philosopher or

dialectician. It is, I suggest, history. In

other

the former the divine

than the latter who

composer

has

made

words, it is
than the

Plato, daemonic Plato, mere

or
process.

and publisher of

beautiful

logoi,

rather

thinker.

The

so-called

Philosophizing history of philosophy,

(xo auXoooqieiv) is
on

an

activity

the other

hand, is (the
that

account

of)

a succession

of positions or suppositions.

One

complaint against

philosophers, many contemporary to distinguish sufficiently between philosophy

scholars and

including West, is
and

they fail
his
as

its tentative

conclusions or

starting points, and between the activity itself and

torical
manifestations.

its

various political or

The

assumption

that

they

are to

be

conflated

an

sumption

traceable, I dare say, to the Enlightenment His activity

this
no

does it.

Socrates'

make

activity
ever,

appear subversive.

longer

appears so

influential, how

when one articulates remember

assumption and questions

Readers may
tion of

that I have been cross-examining West's condemna

arguments

Socrates,

and, in particular, the

arguments

by

which

he tries to

justify
why

it. I found these

wanting, and

have discerned

several reasons

they

might nevertheless

appear

satisfactory to West and others.

My

counter-

66. L. Strauss, Thoughts

on

Machiavelli.

p. 299.

400

Interpretation
But West has
a

charge remains undefeated. shall now examine

third objection at
and

his disposal. I
my
present

this remaining line of

defense,

thus

complete

apology of Socrates (and of West). Throughout my refutation I have

supposed

is guilty becomes

of

impiety

and corruption.

But his judgment is

that, in West's judgment, Socrates not so simple. This in

which

evident

from

consideration of

the many passages

he

asserts

it. Some instances:

point of view of awe and reverence.

"Socrates'

Meletus"

very care for virtue corrupts the young from the (143). "From the city's perspective, piety requires

Men

are expected to playful

the gods.
proper
doubt"

But

Socrates'

look up to the splendor banter appears to deprive the

seems
Socrates'

and power of gods

of

their

dignity"

(148). "At this juncture Socrates

perspective of political
impious"

(150). "From the

unjust and
"

life,

guilty beyond any philosophy is

city's view of

therefore

(180). Socrates "undermines the

human

excellence

traditional gods) and

city's

(201). Socrates "was guilty of impiety (toward the corruption of the young (from the point of view of the
Socrates'

laws

(225). In West's judgment, then, for

injustice is

relative

to the city. This important qualification I have so far ignored.

so

My having

done

is

ground

doubting
while

the strength of my refutation.

I doubt it. For,

cation, it is
that
also

it is true that I did

not remark

this

important
West

qualifi

true that the

leading

question

has been

whether

shows

Socrates,
shown

or

his pragma, is

unjust

from the

standpoint of the city.

show

And I

have

successfully, I think

that West

fails to

it.

Consequently,
its
relevance.

this objection serves not to weaken my refutation

but to

confirm

There is
tion.

an additional reason

why West

might not want

to make this objec

It is

not a serious

error, perhaps, to
whether

in

answer

to the question

hubris

or wit.

But surely

one

mean one thing but say two things Socrates is boastful, whether he displays ought not to say that Socrates is unjust, period,

when one means

tional or conventional standards.

would

only that Socrates appears unjust if judged by certain tradi Should this in fact be what West means, he be vulnerable to the charge of having an interpretation that is very

obscure

just

where

it

ought

to be most clear.

West's

distinguishing
the human
trial.67

and
or

opposing two
natural goes

perspectives

the political or cus

proximate

tomary,
Socrates'

and

beyond the

horizon

of

It deserves

consideration

nevertheless, if only because his

with

account

here

seems
or

to be in substantial accord

Plato's teaching. Within

this account
tinction there

teaching I discern
what

three basic propositions:

(i) There is

dis

just
was

by convention; (ii) by convention or law alone; and (iii) the by nature is superior to the just by law alone. Proposition (i), I repeat, acknowledged by philosophers, not by the Greek in the street. And, when
nature and what

between

is

by

is

custom or

is justice

by

nature, and not

67. He finds
distinguishes

support

for this

move

3t

ApS

20b4-5.

On his interpretation, Socrates there

snd opposes

two kinds of virtue, thst of a human

not

being

and that of a citizen

(for

example, 101, 103).

But this interpretation is

entirely faithful to the text interpreted.

Discussion

401

examining proposition (ii), one should avoid confusing the distinction between legal and natural with the distinction between legal and illegal a confusion
often made
sider

by

nonphilosophers once

they do

acknowledge proposition

(i):

con

Callicles, for example, and other vulgar hedonists. And, again, whereas West clearly denies that actions are naturally just only if conven Socrates does not. just, tionally
Proposition (ii) admits of a stronger to the stronger, justice by convention just if,
entails

Plato's

and a weaker alone

interpretation.
name

According
is

is justice in
So

only; one

and

only if,

one

is just

by

nature.

interpreted,

proposition

(ii)

possibility that Socrates is simply just even though, as West main tains, he seems unjust from the perspective of the city. Lest this possibility seem incredible, I adduce three analogies. First, suppose the men of Athens
the

in this dream every dreamer has a counterpart So, for example, corresponding to widely Socrates there is, in the dream, a certain individual let us call it which many mistake for Socrates himself. Now, the pragma of Socratesd is
all

'see'

the same

dream,

and

mistaken

for the dreamer himself.

'Socratesd'

patently illegal. He has persuading him to regard

ruined
with

the character

of

Alcibiadesd, for instance, by

ultimate authority of the law. Has Socrates then done anything unjust? If the dreaming Athenians were goaded into wakefulness they would probably disbelieve it, for they would then realize

impious disdain the

that it was
man plays

all

just

dream,

that

Socratesd
some

is

not

Socrates. Secondly, It
would not

suppose a
unreason

the part of

Antigone in

Sophocles'

play.

be

able

to

conclude

that Antigone

does

injustice,

and to

believe that this

to become

man

performs nant at

her

unjust

deed. But it

would

be

quite unreasonable

indig
a

him

on

the ground that he himself has thus done some injustice. that

Thirdly,
cave,

suppose

and so on.

being an Athenian is like being bound, unwittingly, in Among the observed shadows there is a certain Socrates
whose observed pragma prisoners

ScoxQaxng
pragma

xig (19C3)
unjust?

to information these then

have

received

is evidently unjust according behind their backs. Is

Socrates'

No. It may be simply interpretation

just,

or

as

just

as

any human

affair can

be.
to the
weaker

According
both
of

of proposition

two ways, or in either way alone. So

Socrates'

(ii), one can be just in interpreted, it entails the possi

bility

that

stance,
anyone
with

by nature. For in he may have made someone worse as a human being without making worse as a citizen. Indeed this will seem likely to one who agrees
pragma

is just

by

convention, unjust

West that

some

naturally just

actions are

illegal,
always.

and agrees with me

that

Socrates
tion

exhorts also

interlocutors to obey the law

the possibility that
and

So interpreted,

proposi

Socrates'

(ii)

entails

pragma

is both

unjust

by
that

convention,
so

as

West maintains,

just

by

nature.

If

one

believes that this is

assert

in fact,

and accepts proposition

(iii),

then one will

be ready to
one also

Socrates'

pragma

is

rather

just than

unjust.

And if

believes that

Socratic

and civic activities are antithetical

in practice,

then one will

probably

402

Interpretation
assert that

be ready to

Socrates has

elected the albeit

lesser

of

two evils; for

and

if

one

must choose between being being conventionally unjust, conventionally just albeit naturally unjust, then Socrates has made the better choice, many Athenians the worse.

naturally just

Does West believe that Socrates, I

am unable

or

Socratic philosophy, is just

Socrates'

by

nature?

to tell. On the one

hand, he
his life

speaks of as a

true superiority,
225).

and of

the transpolitical

worth of

human

being (105,

These

and other passages suggest that

by

one standard and not

just

by

he, like Hegel, judges Socrates to be unjust another, higher standard. On the other hand, he

does

being
and

say that the philosopher's transcendent worth consists in, or involves, just. Furthermore, he conveys without dissent the Socratic hypothesis

that virtue thus

is knowledge,
appears

stresses the

fact that Socrates lacks

such

knowledge,
just (cf.

committed

to the judgment that this

or

Socrates is
or not

not

179-80 with
account

164-5).

But

whether

is his judgement his pragma, is

fails to

show that

Socrates,

unjust

certainly his in any way. It

that, while he appears to accept propositions (i)-(iii), West nowhere argues for them. Yet not everything natural is obviously superior to its nonnatural counterpart: consider, for example, ApS 22c 1 and context.
suffices now to remark

And

maybe there

is

no

justice

by

nature: consider

the

teaching

of

Democritus,

for example,
nature and

Antiphon the Sophist. Finally, the very distinction between convention is problematic, as becomes evident when one considers,
or of

for example, this question: Is the distinction between what is what is by convention itself by nature or by convention?
3.

by

nature and

condemnation of what

Socrates has done

justice

can

succeed

sufficiently judged. I have

requirement. ceed

clear the standard of

argued

relative to which this pragma

only if it makes is to be
not meet

that West's condemnation of

a condemnation of what

Socrates does

this

Furthermore,

Socrates has done

can suc

assumed that

only if it makes clear what this pragma is. For the most part, I have West's condemnation of Socrates does meet this requirement. My
admissible, I think. It is
to defend Socrates but to understand him. And we

inadmissible, however, if one's aim do, after all, want to understand him, to know what his is. in the first For, place, it is won thing derful and difficult to categorize. And, in the second place, while Socrates himself does well to insist, sometimes, that one cannot know what sort some thing is if one does not at all know what the thing is, I have proceeded as if
assumption was

is

not

this were not so; I rushed on to consider whether his

thing is

unjust,

or po

litically
quently,

subversive,
while

without

having first

stopped even to ask what

"practical'

it is. Conse

my apology

of

Socrates does
in

meet all

requirements, I

think, it does
Socrates'

'theoretical'

not meet all

requirements.
order.

It is

now

time to go

back,

to proceed more slowly, simply, and

"activity"

is

above

all

philosophy.

Specifically, it is

"conversa-

Discussion
tional

403
In
Socrates'

philosophy."

other

words,

own

thing is dialogical

as well as

strictly dialectical. And, in his case, things done (jipaxBevxa) are most of all things said (A.ex0evxa); action is principally argument. It appears, therefore, that
we can arrive at some practice by examining almost understanding of Platonic dialogue. In most of Plato's Socratic logoi, however, Socrates any shows what he does without talking about it. There are only two dialogues in
which
Socrates'

one of

is explicitly posed; and in only is it posed and answered by Socrates them, Apology of Socrates, himself.68 This is a reason for our beginning with it. A reason for not beginning
the
with

the question 'What is

Socrates'

thing?'

it

comes

to

light

when one

observes,

with

West,

that

it is only marginally
speak ad

dialogue,

that Socrates is here compelled to speak, and needs must

captum vulgi.

quate account of

It is unlikely that himself when

a philosopher will give a

philosophically

ade

at work under circumstances so alien to phi

losophy. Socrates probably declares no more of his own thing than is needed for his apology, and he probably declares that much in a dissembling manner.
we may risk beginning with the Apology, I suppose, if we take distinguish (as much as one should) thing as it is per se from

Yet

care

to

Socrates'

Socrates'

thing

as

it is

relative

to

present

political

affairs,

and

if

we

guard

against
section

being
I

deceived

by

ironic

semblances. examine

West himself has done

this strand of

so.

In this

shall explicate and

briefly

his interpretation.
of Socrates is
quite

On this interpretation, like

a

as

understand

it,

the

Apology

mystery

rite wherein

Socrates himself
count.

finally

stands self-revealed. place at 2ic-24b and

There
28b-

are even three

stages,
at

by

my

The first takes

31c; the second,

stage, Socrates
god

3ic-34b; the third,

at 34b-35d and 35e-38b.

In the first
the

represents

(presumably

uncalculating Apollo). Thus, in Odyssean fashion, he has gone

himself

as a selfless and

servant of

about

in

specting those who suppose they know what they do not know. And thus, in Achillean fashion, he has taken a stand in Athens, where he contemns much
care

for

one's own and encourages much care

for

virtue.

His

pious

devotion to

the god,

festing

such

then, is also a noble devotion to the city; and by steadfastly mani devotion in practice, in rebukes and exhortations, he selflessly
the real good of his fellow men. Now this initial
such
representation

promotes

is
as

ironic. As
such

it is

mere

appearance.

But it is

also problematic;

and

it is

a partial revelation, or

initiation. On the

one

hand,

Socrates'

uncon

ditional

obedience

to the

god

began

as an attempt to prove
not

he lies. And the

identity

of

this god,

whom

Socrates does

identify by
Socrates'

name, becomes sus

pect as the

defense
men

proceeds.

On the

other

hand,
that he

authority to

educate

his fellow
the that

is

undermined

by

his

own admission

is

unwise and

lacks

art which
Socrates'

sophists profess to have. Thus it is already plain, as West says, public work is better taken as a satyr-drama than as a serious

68. 20C5,

cf.

Symp

217C6.

Compare Cn'ro

53d!

404

Interpretation
statesmanship,
gadfly.69

exercise of

and that

he himself is less like the heroic Achilles

than

like

puny
stage, Socrates begins to
makes
remove work

In the

second

this

mythicopolitical

veil. usual

On the

one

hand, he
It is
at

it

plain

that

his

is

not public

in the

sense of

the word; it is open to all, but not political (except this

point that

incidentally,

as a

jTaoeoyov).

he

alludes

to the

pleasures of philosophizing:

his divine
attractive. of

mission and civic

duty

prove

happily

in

accord with what

he finds

On the

the

god

and so on. of

the public authority hand, Socrates tacitly with the private authority of the daimonion, together with dreams, But the daimonion, West argues, is itself a mythical representation
other
Socrates'

"replaces"

eros,

or

of a new

erotic

nature or

in its

mantic who

capacity.

Thus Socrates

comes

to light as
at

deity,

demigod,
refers not

has introduced himself into

Athens. It is
also

this point that

he

to the fact that it occurs

whenever

he is

about

only to the apotreptic voice but to do something that would

to the daimonion proves

bring danger to himself: his unconditional subservience happily in accord with his own prudential
In the final stage, Socrates lets
mythical and altruistic veils.

considerations.70

us see
one

him

as

he really
now

is,

apart

from

all

On the

hand, he is

frankly

a philosophic

human but

being

who, as actually philosophic, examplifies the greatest good for a

such

human being. As
a

he is

not

demigod, in

the usual sense of the word,

beings."

"true human

tivity must best ('daemonic') inclination,

at this point
god

among "imperfect human Clearly his ac be justified through investigation of human nature, including its
and not

being"

by

appeal to

any

superhuman authority:

he

no

longer

mentions

the daimonion at all, and mentions the

other
on

only once, in
someone

order to

dismiss it. On the

whatever appears

hand, Socrates is
own reflection

now

frankly
good

who

prefers

his

to be
at

for him,

and rejects whatever appears

to him to

be bad for him: it is his

this point that

he begins referring openly to On West's interpretation, then, Socrates

ignorance"

eudaimonia.11

finally

reveals that

own

"pe

culiar"

own

thing is doing philosophy (xo qxXoooqjeiv). its starting point is his "knowledge of together with his own love of wisdom. This
West identifies
with with

wisdom

phronesis, and

with

virtue;

and

this virtue he

is, knowledge of the virtue of human and both what it is and how to bring it about. Socrates admits citizen, being that he has not attained this knowledge. West maintains that he cannot attain
art of

identifies

"the

education", that

it, owing

to the limits of what he is.

and wisdom.

Consequently, his activity is

on-the-way.
sense

always

in

between ignorance

tentative, questioning. Socratic philosophy is also its

69. Esp.
220-3. 70. 71. 72. pp.

It is essentially There is an important

telos or
"peak."72

As

such

it

remains

in

which

the arche of

106, 141-2, 148, 153, 161-3, 170-2, 176-7, 187, 192, 195-6, 202-3, 2I8,

Esp. Esp.
Esp.

pp. pp. pp.

153, 175-7, 181, 183-96, 198-9, 202, 217.

187, 194-6, 202, 210, 213-7,

10-11,

223.

83, 102,

119, 142, 159-60, 171, 180, 218, 231.

Discussion
As

405
practice is itself tentative, ques its inherent questionability in two ways. First, from his own knowledge of ignorance, it appears that Socrates

so revealed and

interpreted,

Socrates'

tionable.

West know

actualizes

the perspective of

does

not

whether

philosophizing is
greatest

good
we

for

human being. He has

"discovered"

that it

"show"

or teach that

may say, but he is unable to it is. Therefore his ultimate proposal, too, is rather playful

is the

good,

than serious, and should

be

regarded as such

fast
aim

exemplar of

the life in philosophy.

wisdom

Socrates himself, this Secondly, from the perspective

by

stead
of of

his

namely, the attainment of

it

appears that

Socrates'

way

life

is, for him, not only deficient but necessarily so. He must remain radically Odyssean, wandering (or falling) between goal and starting point, wisdom and ignorance, virtue and one's own, mind (or soul) and body (or city). He must
go without either

human

or

divine

sophrosune.

Notice that this

Socrates'

Socrates'

critique of of

practice

is

made

in

accordance with

own

revelation

that practice. It is internal

rather

than external,

philosophical rather

than political. This is not to say that it is without political

of

import: both
point of

as

knowledge way
of

ignorance
not

Socrates'

life is

and, if West is right, the

admissions,

goal of

for wisdom, the starting with established ways; in accord simply of statesmanship. his way life is From these
and as eros

however,

no

condemnation of

true that West weaves them so

critique seems

tightly

together that

Socrates necessarily follows. It is his properly philosophical

political

to be only part of his narrowly

critique; but

they

can

and should

be carefully distinguished. I believe that the best thing in West's book is the
I have just
now gathered

Socrates'

critical account of account appears "to

practice which solve offers

from it. For this

and the solution it a problem namely, what Socratic philosophy is appears, on further reflection, to be problematic. It is, then, like a

Socratic logos, has

so

doubly
prima

useful.

The problem,

facie, is

Socrates'

that

account of

himself in the

Apology

give

many loose ends as to be incoherent. The god and the daimonion might incompatible signs; piety and philosophy, civic duty and individual good,
Socrates'

dogmatic pronouncements seem out obviously consonant; unwisdom. In short, his account of knowledge keeping with his admitted
are not

of

of

himself is West's

not one
solution

but

many.

It is

unsound

(Sph

23233).

is mainly

a reductio:

logos

supersedes

muthos,

irony. It is

a solution

favored

by

several other

commentators, notably

truth-telling Bloom,
There
are

Sallis,
many
would

and

Strauss. It is

moreover

solidly

grounded

in the dialogue itself.

tell the truth.
of

Socrates does tell

reliable

the truth when

he

says that

he

will

signs on the

way to it.
set out to

(i) His investigation

and the

the oracle was

initially

'automatic',
resulted

a piece of

independent research;

have

had he

investigate, instead,

very same pragma his reputation for

73.

Esp.

pp.

11, 142, 160, 165, 168-73, 180, 212, 218, 231-2.

406
wisdom

Interpretation
among

men. (ii) His exegesis is idiosyncratic. From a declarative state derives, for himself, a categorical imperative. The harmony between his duty and his desire appears preestablished by himself, (iii) He examined the poets in order to learn, too. (iv) He preferred human to technical wisdom on the ground that it profited him to remain as he was. (v) He swears by

ment

he

Hera

soon

reveal

That Socrates does finally before representing himself as a real himself in the second speech is confirmed in the third, where he appears
man.74

'god'

'daimonion'

willing to
plain

use

and go on

interchangeably,
even

and where

he

makes

it

that

he intends to

philosophizing

though his service to Athens

is finished in his

view.75

Furthermore, West's
dialogues. There is the

solution accords

with what we

find in

other

Platonic

characteristic shift
Socrates'

from

god to

nature, and from piety

to philosophy. The nature of

nature proves

to be a formidable eros.

His distinctive thing is philosophy or to dialegesthai. It is most of all what he does. It most of all defines who or what he is.76 Here, as elsewhere, Socrates
proves more utilitarian than

deontologist,
appears

and more prudentialistic than altru

istic. Here,

as

elsewhere, he

ready to

exploit

the communicative
critique of

less than fair in dialogical exchange, too situation for his own good.
not wide of

Finally, West's
love
of wisdom. and

Socrates is

the mark. It does appear

that his attachment to Athens cannot be grounded solely in his care for virtue or

And it does
wittingly

appear

that this philosopher, as such, is essentially to learn that he was both

on-the-way,

so.

We

are not surprised

great-souled and

melancholic.77

But West's

solution

is

also

problematic, for two

"mythical"

reasons. of

First, he has

too

quickly interpreted some of the as he preconceives it. Secondly, he has

ances
shall

parts
moved

in light

the whole

"logos"

too quickly from the appear

encourages

to the reality in question. The first not,

mistake

the second.

however,

review

them in this

order.

Instead, I
then

shall go

from West's
the relevant

solution

back to the text,

almost eclipsed

indicating

first the
and

need to reconsider

differences
The

in his account,

indicating
from the
a

the

difficulty

of

recollecting this variety in a refined account.

need to reconsider

differences becomes
the question

evident

following

three
or a

observations.

First,

about
or

whether

Socrates is

deontologist

utilitarian, duty-bound

understandably two en Which is right? West adopts one of them, but he does not show that the other is untenable. In particular, he fails to show that while Socrates the deontologist is ironic, Socrates the utilitarian is not. Could
trenched camps of opinion.

happiness-bound,

there are

it

not
74.

be the

other

way

around?

Or

perhaps

both

are

ironic;

perhaps neither.

It is

22b5, 22e5, 24e9 and 28ff. 75. 4034-bi (cf. Phdrs 242e2); 39d8-9. Apollo
76.

was

held to be the inventor

of mantike.

i69bs-c3 (cf. I89e6-I90a2); Crito 53c6-di, Prt 36104-5, Grg 45204-5, Prm I30d9, Phd 6oe-6ia, 67b I, 97bff., 115C7 (cf. Phlb 59C7 and context), Aristotle(?) MM I078bl7-l8.
77.

See, for

example, HpMa 304CI-4 (cf.

Rep

53IC5), Tht

Cf. Tht

l43dl-6.

Aristotle, APost 97b4

and

ps-Arist., Probl 953a27.

Discussion
important to
self

407

remember silence

that,

unlike

ironic. His

may be

part of

Nietzsche, Plato's Socrates never calls him his irony, of course, just as Nietzsche's
be
elaborated.78

outspokenness was part of

his; but
of

this remains to

Secondly,
speaks

when

Socrates
but
not

supplements
care or

his

refutation of the old accusation

or

he
of

of

wisdom,

benefaction
exhortation,
with

virtue; he

speaks

'indictment'

examination and

but

not of

counsel and persuasion. speaks of

care-

When,
taking, but
of

on

the other

hand, he has finished

not of

Meletus he
of

and so

forth, but

wisdom79; he speaks

persuasion, and so on,

not of

being

made an exemplar of

human

worthlessness.
Socrates'

Right in the

surface

text, then, it is plain that the first stage of two parts. In the earlier part he represents himself not
the

self-revelation

has

as a protector or therapist

but

as

the

puppet of a

terrible,
be

unnamed god.

There he

suggests that the mani

fest difference between Promethean

political

and pre-Promethean man

is

unreal.

Every

society

must

pretentious

or

stupid,

since

none

can

be

without

political men or artisans.

And every
a capital

political

that death is a great evil,

pends on an evaluation of

punishment;
which

society rests on the supposition but this supposition itself de

human life
appeal

in the later

part

does Socrates

may be quite mistken. (Only once to his human wisdom: the subject is our
not

mortality; his not

believing

that death is bad is tantamount to

neither

believing

that life for us is good.) Socrates

examined

life is
there

worth

living

for

strictly implies that the human being. In the earlier part, as in the
says
nor

Euthyphro,
sents gests that care

is

no mention of psuche.
god as

In the later part, however, he

pro-

repre

himself it

and

the

philanthropic, even
all

Athenian.80

Here he sug
to share the

makes

practically
or

the difference

in the
He

world whether or not we even

for

our

soul,

for

virtue

and phronesis.

seems

tendency
a great

of a political

community to think

big,

to

answer as well as

ask, to be

sophist.81

but

also

Here, for the first time, he mentions not only self-examination philosophizing. It appears, then, that Socrates gives two diverse ac
his divine
mission.

counts of

So far

as

can

tell, this difference is ignored in

(Phdo

West's interpretation.

Thirdly,
Hellenic

the god to protreptic;

whom

Socrates is

consecrated

and

its

oracle occurred to

Socrates once,
which

85b5) is indirectly, when

pan-

he

was at

least thirty
are

years old.

The daimonion

Socrates heeds is

private

and apotreptic

always; its

signs

have

occurred

to

Socrates, directly, from

child

hood. The two

apparently different. Are they nevertheless identical, in the the inventor of medicine? way that Apollo the bringer of plagues is Apollo reason to judge that they are. He offers here offers little Socrates but Perhaps;
Socrates'

78.
pelled

West takes he deserves.

second speech

to be

frank,

on

the ground thst he is no longer com

to defend himself (210).

But surely he is do

compelled

to

mske

counterpropossl,

to tell

the

people whst

79.

The

words 3t 29d8 snd 3532

not mesn what

they

meant at 20d8-9.

80. Cf. 3ia7 81. Cf. 33b2

and

Euthyph

3d7.

with

Meno

70c 1.

408
even

Interpretation
reason

less

to

so-called political wisdom

judge that the former is really the latter, in the way that is stupidity. Finally, he offers no reason to judge
reducible

that the
'eros'

daimonion is in turn its

cognates are

to eros:

as

West himself observes,

and

conspicuously missing from the

Socrates'

Apology

of Socrates
the ques

(186). (This

omission

is

of a piece with

leaving

unwinged

tion of what justice or virtue

is.)

And if

one

does introduce this

great

daemon

and into the dialogue, then one confronts the the god to whom Socrates is enslaved. Is the Apollinian really the Erotic? Perhaps; but West offers very little reason to judge that it is. Consequently,
apparent

difference between it

his judgment that it is

tion.82

remains

divination in

need of exegesis

and

verifica

Now

by

reference
,

to eros,

that which binds the all together with

go a

itself

(Symp
in
returns

202e6-7)

one can

probably
a

long

way toward resolving the problem

question.

But again, it is
account

missing link, imported

by

West. When

one

themselves, what does one find? In the first stage, especially, Socrates represents himself as a wandering antilogikos. Then he represents himself as a public defender, who
operates
at

from his

to the

dialogue,

to the phenomena

the margins of the

presents

stage, especially, he

city in which he resides. And in the third himself as bold without moderation, that is, as

utterly mad (208, cf. Sts 3iod8). Are these various appearances to be unified in the way that West proposes? This is no longer clear. Should we. like Soc
rates, modestly
refrain

surely it
what

will prove more

from offering any synopsis? This is not yet clear. But difficult to collect the data in question than West's
That this is
about

account of them

suggests.

so

he

and

Socrates say
work,

Socrates'

and negative

and about
Socrates'

the greatest
of

indicate by comparing human wisdom, about his positive good for a human being.
shall now

West

speaks of
nothing.

knowledge

ignorance,

and of
so.83

his

knowing

that

he knows
that
mere

Nowhere does Plato's Socrates do

not wise at all.

he knows he is

(true) belief.
of

It

is, then,

as
as

Here he says only This is knowledge, presumably, not West says, an achievement. (The perfective
But West
through
goes
on

aspect

otivoiSa
achieved

suggests

much.)
wisdom

to maintain that

Socrates
(i6if. ).

his human
no

post-Delphic
Socrates'

interrogations

and

for this there is

textual support.
of

wisdom, so called,

is nothing

more than

his knowledge
of the

his

own unwisdom.

That he is, in this

is bssed
and on

82. West's identificstion

pretstion of s psssage

daimonion

Socrates'

with
with passages

erotic nature

his

inter-

in the Theages together

in the Symposium

the Cratylus.

His interpretstion
that what

of the first passsge is incomplete, since it lesves unjustified the tacit premise Socrates there discloses about his erotic science is sbout his erotic nsture ss well. 83. Cf. pp. 11, 102, 107, 115, 119, 130, 164, 184, 213, 218 (it should be noted that on some occasions he puts the expression in quotstion msrks). In Rep 354b9-ci. T know

nothing'

is plainly elliptical. Compare Cicero, Academia 1 4,16. It is true that, at 29a6, Socrates shifts from talk of wisdom to talk of knowledge; but one conclude that he there uses the words and as
'wisdom'

2231

and

again

at

should

hesitate to

'knowledge'

synonyms, if only becsuse

'I know thst I know

nothing'

is true only if it is fslsc.

Discussion
respect,
wiser

409
than other human beings is not something

he

claims

to know.
reveals as

(His using uxog, eoixa, pioi Soxei, oiopm, much.) More generally, there is here no sure
or self-knowledge ,

and xtv&irve'uoj sign that

here

his human 'wisdom',

else sought

involves knowledge

of the good or an

anything

by

him in his
of

post-Delphic career.

He is indeed

exemplar,

an excellent enforcer

the Delphic injunction 'Know thyself!', just because he knows that he is

unwise
capable

(cf.

Grg
made

525C2); but it

seems

that he is not,

on

this account, useful or

no sign of

in any

other way.

Pace West (118L, 153, 184L), there is

his

having

any

cognitive progress

beyond

or within

human 'wisdom'. It
vertigo.

seems rather

to be a state of rest or paralysis, or perhaps of restless

admits as
much

Socrates

almost

in the Symposium,

where

he tells Agathon
he implies

that his own

paltry

wisdom

is

as

disputable

as a

dream,

and where

that

ing

Eros, too, notwithstanding his great resourcefulness, never makes any last advance toward wisdom or happiness (17563-4, 203e). Socrates might be
capable,
of what

otherwise useful or

on this

account, if his knowledge of

unwisdom

involved knowledge
know that he is

the problems are. Perhaps it does: surely he cannot

comprehending what it is to be wise (cf. Meno 98b 1 -5). Observe, however, that it will be difficult to make the desired in ference without going way beyond the given text. Finally, Socrates might be
unwise without
otherwise useful or capable

because he knows
at 29b6-7.
little,"

other

things. He does
at

claim

to

know that something is bad, knew nothing, to exaggerate

teme;
and

He does say,

22di, "I knew that I

some epis

thus suggesting that he has

in

other

I, for one, am eager to identify it in accordance with certain passages dialogues (cf. Thg I28b3~4 and Symp I77d8; Grg 47436-7 and Tht
Phdrs 25737
connect

i6ib3;

also

and

Tht I50b6,

21OC4).

Observe, however,
sophia

that it

will

be difficult to

this

episteme with

his human

(or eidesis)

without

going way beyond the given text. At the very least, one should have to con (2ib4). cede that love matters are "neither great nor Socrates here suggests that knowing one is unwise is equivalent to not
small"

'wisdom'

supposing one knows whatever one does not know. Thus human is suppositionless. But if so, then it provides insufficient purchase for any inquiry. Yet Socrates inquires like his
practice and crazy.

This

disparity

between the
than
no

scope of maintains

the

limits

of

his

'wisdom'

is

greater even

West
sure

(for example, in this

exhibit

119).

And,

pace

West (179), there is here

erotetics or exetastics

sign

that

Socrates has dialectics

way.84

that

is,

no

sign

that

he is

sophron

On the contrary, his

appears

to be an

alogon pragma.

He

can

it,
to

perhaps,

be

secured

in this way,

and no

Socrates, then,
nostics without

question

can making many logoi; but no final account For final account of this way can be his undertakes is to dare. He openly pseudo-diag

by

given.85

knowing
snd

the

thing in
Top

question, and

he openly

undertakes

his

84. Cf. Crat 85. Cf.

pp.

398d7-ei

Aristotle,

ioib4; Chrm i67sff.

Grg

46536,

Symp

202a6 with

204al-7, and J.
1265*1 1.

Klein, Commentary

on

Plato's

"Meno,'

168-172.

Also

20c6 with

Aristotle, Pol

410

Interpretation

pseudo-demiurgics without ness

knowing
moreover

what

the end in

question

is: there is

mad

in his

methodos.

It is he

hazardous,
b is bad
or

in deed
a and

as well as

in

speech.

For example,
a

whenever

must choose whether

between

b,

and

he knows that

is bad,

and

does

not

know

good, then he

prefers

b (29b).
a.

This

seems reasonable

enough; but

of course

b may be

worse

than

And,

in fact, Socrates
partly
course
on

prefers

the ground

obeying the god to obeying the people of Athens, that it is bad, he knows, to disobey one's better; but of

the god, so-called may not be

better; he is

not

better, for

all

Socrates

knows. In the Phaedo (6oe-6ib) he

the

dream in There

which,
refrains
are

Apology he
good.
without

admits that he may have misinterpreted he supposed, he was ordered to philosophize, and in the from saying that he knows his mission to be
'divine'

things to which that

knowing

they

are

he looks, things he follows, things he heeds, reliable. The god or daimonion, for example,
unenigmatic
accordingly.86

comes and

from without; it gives a sign, or a voice, never an Socrates, having interpreted it as best he can, behaves

logos; Here,

to say, lies the religious dimension of his thinking. At any rate, inspired (entheos), like some poets. His is clearly other than his 'wisdom', since it involves obedience and trust. Therefore, to the extent he is guided by it, to this extent he operates mindlessly (even if cor

venture seems

he

'inspiration'

rectly).

His

work

belies

kind

of audacity.

Such audacity is
some

not utter

madness,

however,

since

it

remains

enlightened, to

extent,

by

human 'wisdom'.

Socrates knows he is

in the things he investigates. Pace West (167, virtue etc. He does not 174, 175, 178, 191), he does not pretend to declare his convictions without declaring that they are convictions. In short,
not wise
"teach"

he

never

forgets his ignorance (cf.

the difference between

than West

makes

1733 with Grg 472b5-6). Thus, while his philosophizing and his human is greater it seem, the pretentiousness of practice is less than
'wisdom' Socrates'

West's. On the
an not

one

hand, he is

convinced other

injustice (37b2-3). On the

(he says) that he has done no one hand, he knows (I infer) that he does
the former

know

what

justice is. The latter Socrates

a remains

should moderate

by destabilizing
This is but
to resolve:
aporia!

it, I
one

suppose;

yet

appearance

of

problem

outwardly resolute which I, for one, am

else,

and serene. unable

By

virtue of what

does Socrates,

or anyone

keep

his head in

In his

second speech of a

lower limits

is

daily
not

Socrates makes a suggestion regarding the upper and properly human life. The greatest good for a human being life in to dialegesthai, he suggests, and an unexamined way of
worth

life is
On the
not a

living
there

for is

human being. Is this

to

not

modest proposal?

Ours is bodily life fit for cattle, as Aristotle rhetorically declared. For us, at any rate, self-ignorance is not bliss. On the other hand, there is no identification of our
no appeal or oceanic pleasure.

one

hand,

4034 West infers thst Socrates has an srt of divination (187). A more thst he hss 3 nontechnicsl mantic dunamis: cf. Phdo 84e4 and Sph 21935-6, 22109, Phlb 58d4.
of plausible

86. On the bssis

inference, I think, is

Discussion
own at

-411

greatest good

with

wisdom

or

with

the life

of mind:

in this dialogue,
or

any be

rate, the word

vofjg does
apparent

not

appear outside

colloquial

idiomatic

expressions. well what

For

all

its

reasonableness,
who, like
212).

made or accepted

by

anyone

however, this proposal cannot Socrates, does not even know

Perhaps this is why Socrates him self modestly refrains from making it in any straightforward way. It is clear from his actions, however, that he does make some such supposition, and
clear

the greatest human good

is (180,

from his
with

speeches that
a

it is for him only

appears not agree

a supposition.

Thus,

once

more,

agree

West that

discrepancy by
other

between

Socrates'

pragma and

his

self-knowledge.

But I do
overcome

(or

disagree)
his

with

his thesis that the

220).

discrepancy
more, I

can

be

human beings (cf. 218,

Further
proposal

wonder whether one should agree with

suggestion that

the

is self-defeating since, if all were to take part in daily philosophic conversation, some conditions for its possibility would not be met (169). It
in
question

is true that

to

dialegesthai is distinguishable from to politeuesthai; true that

philosophy is parasitic on properly political and economic matters; and one need not be Kantian to doubt that the greatest human good can be such that

few may share in it only if most may not. But what does Socrates now mean by 'human being'? This is unclear even though the Apology of Socrates is
a

tween

arguably about the human things. Does he have in mind some distinction be human beings ordinarily speaking and human being strictly suggestion about the human good to be So far, I have found
speaking.87

Socrates'

somewhat

less

problematic

than

it

seems

in West's

account. while

But I

also take

it to be

much more

problematic, for two reasons.

First,

West throughout

of plausibly holds that Socratic philosophy aims at possession of "the art Socratic that sometimes he also says, no less plausibly, philosophy
education,"

beings"

aims at attainment

to "the truth
aims,
not

of

the
even

(173; but

see also

166, 168L,
unattainable

86). These
apart

are

two

one,

if the

political

art

is

from

some

comprehension

of all

nature.

Furthermore,

these aims are

cannot both know the whole and ultimately irreconcilable if, as I suspect, one be whole. If indeed one cannot, then Socratic philosophy must be at variance with about

itself,

it is essentially a sort of philo-psuchia, or attempt to bring the common good for us ('our soul'), and also an eros for the truth,
since
Socrates'

or philo-sophia

the

greatest

strictly speaking. Secondly, according to good is both an end and a means to some ulterior
other

suggestion end

(whatever

it may be). In
and

words, it is both
one

energeia

and

kinesis,

at once complete

incomplete. Consequently,
so

can

maintain

this

proximate

human
end.

end

only

long
pp.

as one remains on the 187, 223,

et passim.

way toward that

least four

supra-human

And
not

87. Cf.

There
no

are at

relevant

facts

which

West does

discuss in this

connection,

be

philosophers

(i) Socrates is (cf. 29d-30s). (ii) He is

proselytizer.

He hss

not exhorted

his fellow

men

to

silent about

the question whether all of us are

naturally

fit to

philosophize,

(iii) He

ssserts thst no

humsn

being

knows

whether

de3th is

not the greatest

srgument at 27b

of all goods and 27d

for

mankind

(2937-8). (iv) His

disregarding

opaque contexts

in the

is

acceptable

only if human beings

are quite rational.

412
a

Interpretation

human

being
of

is thus

on

the way,

supra-human present rates

end

is

attainable

in

other

I think, only if he supposes that the words, only if he regards his own
Now it is doubtful that Plato's Soc But if he does not,
must not

way

life

as a means thereto.

always

shares

in

so

high

hope.

his

philosophizing
48id4)?

then

degenerate

into

mere

philo-philosophizing

(Cf.

Grg
self-

Furthermore, such high hope is out of place relative to knowledge; and it may be false as well, in which case it is also
the
all so philosopher's

Socrates'

at odds with

any falsehood in the soul. Is it not the case, for we know, that philosophy, or the greatest human good, is sustainable only long as the philosopher himself remains deceived in his belief that the
of

hatred

end

he has life

achieved not

is

means

to the end
a

he

still

seeks?

But if so,
without

what which

good
our

is it? Is it

then

like

friendship

beautiful illusion

would appear unlivable?

4.

According
Plato's
being."

to West

(10) "the
"lead,

stake"

questions as the

at

in the

conflict

between

the philosopher and his city

of

Apology

shows, to other major themes

writings."

of

Of the ten themes he then mentions, one is "the nature How does the Apology show that philosophico-political questions
not

lead to this theme? It does

obviously do so in any way, and West's inter pretation does not obviously show that it does: direct references to being are herein almost as rare as in the dialogue itself (cf. 89, 123, 173, 217). This
abstraction seems

appropriate,

of

course,

and

might

have forgotten the

being-

theme altogether had West not thus drawn my attention to it and aroused my
curiosity.

Being is
are

said

in

more

than one way in the

Apology

of Socrates. At any

rate, more than one meaning first

the following,
seems or
as

falls into the

or

reader's mind.

Among

them

merely
exist

those gods

(i) Being existence, as distinguished from what reality is held to be real. For example, Socrates may not hold to whom Athens holds to exist. And he has encountered more
he thought,
seems wise

than one political man who,

but is

not.

And he believes

that he is in reality too equitable to do some things and remain alive,

(ii)

Being
your

something is. Socrates has someone ask: What, Socrates, is thing? And he makes a double proposal regarding what it is to be dead.
as
what

(iii) Being
are

as

being

good

and

not
of

worthless,

nonentity.

Socrates

remarks

the possibility that a few men

Athens

seem

to

be something

when

they

nothing,

and

the possibility that his sons will suppose

they

are

something

when

they

are nothing,

(iv) Being

as

being being
is,

alive.

Socrates

suggests that

being

dead is

such as

to be

nothing.88

Observe, first,
of

that in most cases

is provisionally

regarded

in terms held to

nonbeing, or

of what peradventure

or of what seems

to be. For example,

of gods

the question

whether

any

divinity

exists

is framed in terms
36CI.

88. 26e3ff.; 2ic6ff., 2931-6; I7d4, 2od8, 23C5,

36d). 40C6.

20C4-d3. 40C5. 35b5,

4ie7 (cf.23S7,

Discussion
exist

-413

by

particular

city.

Since ovxa, is the

and

especially

paradigmatic

ovxa,
point

first
of

come

to mind as vo[Ai^6p,eva, it is correct to say that the

or metaphysics

starting

first philosophy Plato's Phaedo

of either or

same as the

philosophy. of

Observe,

second, that
not

Socrates'

pragma and

starting point of political death the twin theme

do

appear to

be

ovxa at

all; there is
as

doubtfully
is
a

an

idea

both. Observe, third, that

suggests

being
that
a

kind

or sort

theme

throughout.

For example, Socrates

to a human
with

daily

philosophizing is the
And
when

greatest good proper

being
his

(not to

god,

or a citizen).

this suggestion
greatest good
good

is

coupled

earlier admission

for mankind, then Socrates

appears

death may be the to distinguish between the

that
Socrates'

for

human

being

and

the good of

being

human.

outwardly to those who voted for West's interpretation Here

to
Socrates'

The

most

metaphysical passage a

in the

Apology is

address
with

fine

rather than

death (39eiff.). To it, together

of

it, I
is

now

turn.

praxis

not to apo-logize mytho-logize

(ajtoXoyeloGai);
warns

nor

is it

literally

divine; instead, it is to

(&iapu0oXxryf|O'cu:

39e5).

What is it

to mythologize?

According

to

West, Socrates hereby

myth

listeners that the

following mythology is edifying but "probably old myths surrounding death, it is itself only a
the

untrue"

that while superior to

(226-31).

According

to

Phaedo,

mythological arguments are offered not

to

instruct but to
often
,

persuade.

They

involve

likely

inferences to
are

likely

conclusions;
. . .

they employ like

'

nesses;

typically they
argument

put

in the form 'if

then

In sum,

mythological

the messy way of

is openly speculative. It expresses, I venture to say, investigation dispalyed by Socrates throughout most of the
dialogues.89

Phaedo,

That he should expressly set out on this fitting. In the first place, he is now addressing is the here in Apology way is no longer duty-bound. He can relax, friends (40ai). The dialogue, so called,
and most other

and

digress

about

the

cause of

something

wonderful

(4oa3, b6). In

the second

place,

most of

these friends no doubt pity him. Some are probably angry and
as
not

afraid, too;
good men

for,
will

Socrates has just

end
with

now

proclaimed, the popular

also
will

killing

of

him;
no

and, as he

proclaimed

gratuitously

and erroneously,

I think

there are others who

punitive work when

he himself is
the

longer

around

vigorously carry on his to restrain them (39c8-d3).

For

such

listeners,
remove confidence

following

confabulation

is

a consolatio philosophi

de

signed

to

their pity and

building
It is last

fear, not by provoking these passions but by in the thought that death is good for good men at least.
(parakeleusis: 2f)ds,
36d5).

another encouragement public work.

It

could

be

Socrates'

Here, too, Socrates

must

seems to suppose that all men are

mortal,

or

that each

die

sooner or

later (cf. 29a-b, 35a,

38c).

The

question

is

whether

death

is

an

evil, as popularly

believed,

or

something

good.

The

center-piece of this

89. For

exsmple,

6ie2, 64b9, 6634,

7ob6-7, 77C5-ei with

64b9, 84C6-7,

97b7ff.

414

Interpretation
is
an argument

confabulation

for the

unpopular answer:

(i)

Either death is like

dreamless sleep for all time or else it is like a journey from one place to another, where the dead abide, (ii) If death is the former, then it is good for the dead, (iii) If death is the latter, then it is good for the dead, (iv) There
a

fore death is
West
and all

good

for the dead.

remain unconvinced.

First,
is

an argument of

this

sort

is

acceptable

only if
is

relevant

options

are

considered. also

Proposition

too small a mess of hypotheses. It

annihilation.

possible,

(i), however, offers for all I know, that dying

annihilated?

Is it

good

for

anyone

to

have been

Good for

whom?

We

can avoid undue paradox

here

by

for

us

to cease

living
makes

as

soon as possible.

saying that it is perhaps good Is this hypothesis true? Whatever

seems

its truth value, as he himself

incomplete.

annihilation remains a plain

possibility that Socrates

to

ignore,

(4OC6).

Consequently,

the

argument

is plainly he

Secondly, he draws
stresses

attention one

to

another weakness of

the argument when

e4).

that

death is like is good,

and quite

thing

or

another

(4odi,

It is

possible

that,

while a

b is like a, b is

not good.

Suppose, for instance,

that philosophizing

like dying, and that it is the greatest good for a human being. It does not follow that dying is good. It may then be bad, since one can philosophize only in this life, perhaps, only so long as one is a human is

being, and one ceases being human when Thirdly, proposition (ii) is questionable
incompatible
and with with

one
on

dies.
ground

the

that
with

dreamless sleep is
self-examination,

actually

knowing
virtue,

that one
and so a

is unwise, forth.

Athens'

dozing;
they

Socrates'

any reasoning is not. For tyrants, longer

share

about

wont

is to

continue

sound

can no

in any

sound

waking
are
no

or

sleep may be desirable since dreaming life; for philosophers

at

it is plainly Sleep is the

want

undesirable
opiate

until

they

longer able,

any

rate

(230).

of the

busy. People

so

troubled seem to themselves to

cf.

They
him,
thing
But

nothing more than release from their troubles (pragmata: wish for return to a prenatal state, when the foetus is

4KI4-5).
without

still

aisthesis,
at

like

a plant.

Socrates,

an avowed

too

any rate, suspended animation high: he does not regard man

the

idiotes, harbors no such wish. For is clearly too low, and it is like some
as a plant whose roots are
wishes

in

heaven.90

what of

Great King? When he really

for

undisturbed

sleep, is

this what he really wants? I think not. For the pleasure one experiences in
this regard can
soporific since
ex

only be

retrospective or prospective.

To

one

having

undergone

death nothing appears to last only a single night; nothing at all appears, hypothesi such death is forever. Consequently, were his wish ful
could

filled,

and

he then speak,

our

former
do

political

man

would

deny

that

this is what he wanted. He might even say, extravagantly, that he would prefer

being
90.

tyrant

on

earth:

most

people

not

think

well
3nd

when

troubles are
778"

Cf. Tim

9032-bi with 7734.

Also Aristotle, Pol I334b24

EN U76b35-6, GA

28-779*3.

Discussion
present.

-415

Under

pressure of circumstances we are wont

to exclaim T just

want

sleep!'

to

go

to

In

most

cases, the

wish

so expressed

is

not

only infantile
what

but erroneous, and the pleasure attending it Socrates now proposes is unacceptable.

spurious.

But if so, then

said'

are true. (iii) is acceptable only if 'the things They are true, West holds, only if the individual soul can exist apart from the body. It very likely cannot, however, and Socrates very likely doubts that it can (230). I agree with the conclusion of West's diagnosis; but I am also struck by the fact that, in his explication of the second hypothesis about death,

Finally,

proposition

Socrates is deathless

silent about

the soul. He moreover says that the

on

by dying
were

we

become
thought

(4ic6).

But, traditionally,
eis we
allon

deathless
Socrates'

ones present

not

besouled. Are the dead then soulless,

then this
eis are alio metabole

hypothesis? If so,
a metabasis

topon

(40C7-9) is simultaneously
individuals
we are.

genos.

Yet

remain

the

Being

and

nonbeing

the same and not the same. Do we then remain corporeal? Perhaps not.
could
we not

For

become

mere

phantasms?

But

where

then would we be?

"There"

(xei: 40C6, 4ia3,

not

b5,

C2, 4, 5). The

within

place

the god Hades need

stand

be located

the

eventually identified with koinos kosmos, however, or

Aristophanes'

in any

other of

spatial relation

to it. Consider

Frogs. The
of what

presentation

it

occurs

here in the theater. But

"There"

where

does

most

it

seems

to represent occur?
nor

(xel:
earth

cf.

19C3).

But that

place

is

not our

in the theater, koine

patris,9'

literally

within

the

(I

presume).

Likewise Hades,

in reality
or

we

is presumably neither above nor beneath the ground on which walk. Could the occupants of Hades then have any intelligence

any

other power?

They do

ex

hypothesi. Let

us

grant

Socrates

so

much

and

ask:

Would

residence

there be good? For many, it is too

like

exile

to

appear so.

For those

who condemned

Socrates to death,
it
will appear

or who would eternal

have

done
once of

so under similar circumstances,

to be

damnation

they
will

realize that there, waiting presents

Socrates himself? As he forever be

Socrates'

for them, is an immortal gadfly. What it here in his confabulation, his existence it is here. Ex hypothesi, then, he is

there
an

much

the same as

individual uniquely the same everywhere, like an idea. This is, I conjecture, 0e6v).92 Were this efjxrjv (not xaxa dreams the (3ios the life of
xax'

wish

fulfilled,

would

it be

what

he he

wanted?

Perhaps

not:

most people

do

not

think well when troubles are absent. But Socrates may be exceptional in this

respect, too.

Furthermore,

while

would

then

be free

of all

duties to

god and

country and family, he might nevertheless incur troubles endemic to Platonic dialogues these daydreams in which Socrates almost always has an easy time
91. 92.

Plutarch

II,

113c.

Cf. 2234, 23b5. This is confirmed by his silence about any punishment in the place of Hades. It is to be qualified, perhaps, in the light of his saying that he will be with individuals there without ssying thst he will see snyone or anything; for this omission suggests that he is, even
now, abstracting

from

eros.

416
of

Interpretation

it, but not without encountering some resistance on the part of his inter locutors owing to their various characters, their stupidity, and so on. Socrates appends to his general argument a gnome. He puts it in a way
which casts without

doubt

on the soundness of ought

that argument (41C9).

true. It

You, he

asserts

argument,

to think this

gnome

is therefore

unclear

that

Socrates himself thinks it true (compare

he has
now.

30c8-di).
own

another reason
reason

for

hoping
in two
always

that

his

In any case, West notes, imminent death is good for him

sign of

This

comes

versions,

(i) The
I

the god did not to do or say

oppose me

today; it has

opposed me when

was about

anything (40a-c).

incorrectly; therefore what has happened to me today may be good (ii) It is clear to me that being dead and freed of troubles was better
me,"

for me; that this is so has been confirmed by the sign's not occurring to me Socrates says. Thus today (4id). The first version is "a great proof for
he
presents

himself

as

one

who

trusts that "the

god"

has been, is,

and will
Socrates'

continue to admission

be

reliable.
whether

The

second version

that

he is his

departing

is closely followed by for something better is unclear to him is

uncertain as well as certain

(42a3~5). Thus he here

presents

himself

as one who

about the goodness of reaffirms

imminent demise. As West remarks, Socrates his knowledge of ignorance about the afterlife, and very likely
own

never

forgot it (229,

231).

His

stated

reasons

for

being

hopeful fall less

within

the confabulation.

But

if,

as

it

Socrates'

now

appears,

own reasons are no with a couple of questions:

mythological

than the rest, then

we are

left his

Given his

admitted

ignorance his
own

about

its

goodness or given

badness, why is Socrates

admitted

dreadnought before
about

death? And,

knowledge

of

ignorance

it,

why

is he

rather

hopeful? I

shall speculate

briefly

about the

former

question.

My first
classifies

thought is that

Socrates has the it

courage of
about

his ignorance. More

mis-

precisely, because he knows he is ignorant

the afterlife he never

any thought about

not mistake

he does

may imaginations for precognitions, hypotheses for

entertains proposals about remains

which

occur

to him. Unlike most of us,

realities.

Thus,
from

while

he certainly

death, including his

own,

such entertainment or

play

wittingly
that

mythological.

By

settled

beliefs

about

the afterlife

is, from

man's

most

preserving him deplorable him

own knowledge stupidity (29b2) from mankind's foremost dread.

Socrates'

of unwisdom also preserves

My
we

second

thought is this:
one

Every
there

one of us

has two

ends

(xehn)

to

which

look. On the

hand,

good, or the both beautiful and

a somewhat poetic

is death; on the other hand, there is the good. It is as mortals, I suggest (employing

term), that

is in dread (beocf. And it is

oriented toward the good.
erotic. entities

are oriented toward death. As such, each human beings, Socrates suggests, that we are As such, one wants (fkruXexat), one is somehow we as

These two
or

ends are similar

in

some respects.
a

Neither is
property;

an

an

object

among objects; neither is

neither

entity among is some-

Discussion

-All

thing

we ourselves can

have in any literal

or

reasonably

metaphorical sense of

the term.

In
one

other
off'

respects,
a

however,
way.93

these ends are quite dissimilar.

Each

Now Socrates is plainly very wanting, he looks from 'his very erotic; persistently death, and from his own away living (28b7), toward the beautiful-and-good. Thus he is an exemplary human being. He is not an exemplary mortal, since he unhesitatingly prefers the good
own'

'finishes

in

different

to his own

(see, for

example,

Symp

2o6a2).

In

other

words, I suggest, he is

plainly

erotic not thumotic.

For is it

that we fear the unknown, the

not owing to our old friend, xo 0uu.oei5eg, different? that we fear the anticipated disinte
'death'?94

gration,

or

loss

West

often

one's own.

As commonly give the name remarks, Socrates looks down upon all that is involved in love of As mortals we are fallen. But our fallenness may be inseparable
of

self, to

which we

from

our

humanity; for,

as

West

also

remarks, even Socrates is

not

somewhat

distracted

by

his

own.

being
5.

but his

being

For this exemplary human being, too, is an issue.

only

well

political power.

of Socrates represents a chance meeting of philosophy with At this meeting Socrates declares its causes. On the one hand, he has been ordered by a divine sign to bring philosophy down to the level

Plato's

Apology

his fellow men, back to what is first for us. He has made this descent. In particular, he has made trial of the tripartite claim of the city to know; and he has tried to persuade his fellow men to care less for wealth and honor,
of
more

for

virtue or prudence or of elders and

waspishness

patriots

truth, than is their wont. On the other hand, the has been aroused against him in some
some cases under their

cases on

on

the ground that

the

ground

he has humiliated them personally; in that he has enviably enticed their sons out from
on

control; and in some cases

the ground that he

a

done

such

things.

Now,

at

last,

few

leading

is commonly said to have citizens have brought him to from two

trial, in
The
points.

order

to get rid

of

him.
and

conflict

between Socrates
standpoint of

From the

the

philosopher

Athens may be it is
and

viewed

stand
eros

a conflict

between
or

and

thumos, between human

even a

sophistry.95

wisdom

very

great

Because

democracy is
Under
such
appears

pretentious and spirited at

stupidity heart, it
confuse

always resists

philosophizing.

investigation it

appears

to
a

the good with

the ancestral; it

too stable, too slow,

like

(30e4). It
of

moreover
power.96

appears

ridiculous,

since

plump its vanity has

unjust, and

and not

stately
the so,
sre

mare

backing
since
not

any
93.

real

More seriously, it

appears

inalienably
they

In the Phdo Socrates tries to

identify

them. In this way he shows thst

to

be identified.
94. 95. 96.

Cf. Phdo
Cf.

77b-e.

Rep

49238-49436,

Sts
and

303b8-d2.

Cf. Phlb 4838-50b6,

people.

Crito 44c6-dl0,

Grg

466bll-468e5.

It does

not

follow that
there his

Socrates ridicules the

lsughter
seems

In Plato's dialogues he lsughs only twice, gently;

necessity (Phdo

snd

to sttend

recognition of a certain

84d8,

II5C5)-

418 indeed it

Interpretation
can

have

no conception of

the

common good apart

from

collective

selfishness,

no conception of punishment apart

from

revenge: those who con

demn Socrates to death think to harm him (4id8);

and

they

would city.

lose little In
other

sleep

over

the thought that he is

doing

his thing in

another

words,

no political

tween soul and body.

precedence over

community None can

can

acknowledge the

Socratic distinction be

allow our

soul, as Socrates calls

must

it,

to take

the

law.97

Even the best city

demand

what

it

calls courage grounded so

(eupsuchia), for
in
what

the sake of

itself,

while

tacitly conceding
political

that

it is

it

calls cowardice

(philopsuchia). Thus

orthodoxy,

called,
with

must remain

incoherent. Socrates has brought to light

ordered

such

incoherence,

removing it. Now he is called by the Athenians an

out
course.

by
to

Athenian law to
contend with

make another

descent
of

ascent

shadows.98

He does so,

It

occurs

in

public. one make

In

contradistinction to

his

private

conversations,

his apology here is unlikely that he will

speech

for all, rather like a law, or a book. It is himself understood by the people, for between these

two parties there can be no common

investigation,

no common

deliberation.

It is also unlikely Amidst the Athenian majority he is an Athenian that he will be fairly judged, since the people routinely make the weaker logos stronger, and are no more able to tell a just action when they meet one than
stranger.99

children are able unclear that

can.

to tell a nutritious dish

when

they

taste

one.100

Finally, it is

he

should

try

to

help by

the majority do well, and unlikely that he

For

popular prejudice cannot

against

him is

a corruption

not

Perhaps it

be

remedied

the philosopher's

maieutics.

easily remedied. Perhaps it cannot

some
would

be

remedied without

further injury, because it is

anyone persuade not
worth

now

inextricable from
Athens

deeper

and more pervasive presumption without whose support

falter (cf.
amined a sense

I9a3).
of

Could

way it is dead,
most

life is
a

the Athenian majority that its unex living? that it is better off dead? that in

nullity?101

The

Apology

of Socrates is

'dialogue'

in which,

for the
it does
what

part,

one

not remain

party speaks silent. Near the

and the other

party

makes a clamor whenever asks the people to recall

beginning, Socrates

they have heard him say rather than hearsay about what he has said (i9di-7). Near the end, he makes a final request of his accusers, one which they
cannot

From the

hear because they are not even listening (4ie2-42a2). standpoint of the Athenian majority, on the other hand, the
and

conflict

between Athens
correct

Socrates is
very great He is

a conflict

between
years yet

right and

wrong, between

thinking

and

sophistry. unneeded

For
and

this native philosopher has

been pushy in
97. 98.

speech.

meddlesome,

an

inveterate

In the Crito,

as

in the Euthyphro, the

with

word psuche

does

not occur.

Cf. l8d2, 31C6, 40b2; i8d6 looa2-7, and Homer Od xi 207.

99.
100.

Rep

51537, C2,

di, 5l6d2-7,
with

520ci-di, 52IC3, Meno

I7d3; Crito 49d3,

Grg

474a7-bl.

Consider his dialogue

Meletus.

Cf.

Grg

52ld6-522C3.
snd

101.

See Grg, 11.4, n.75,

Grg

492eff.

Discussion

-419

chatterbox, a great debater in private, a tyrant in unmanly pastimes. His the high priest of babble
upset several would

being

leading

citizens
even

by
his

have been simply comical had he not also his unseemly verbal gymnastics, and caused
a self-appointed public examiner would attract

them to

lose face. And

being

have been tolerable had he

youths

not also

managed, somehow, to

Athenian

to his side,

where

he filled

their ears with philosophy and made them

such pollution

disrespectful

of all authority.

Against

there

ought

to

be

law.

And, in fact, there is the decree of Diopeithes, under which anyone like Anaxagoras (that is, any philosopher) may be prosecuted for impiety, regard Amnesty.102 less of the So, after all these years, during which the men of Athens
patiently
allowed

Socrates to odyssey
much

within

their city, wasting his time

and

theirs, may

and

incurring
dose
of

this good-for-nothing wise guy him with interest, since even is to get what's to going coming (ooqiog avfjo) in courtroom dissembles and boasts his he in the customary manner, adding insult to injury by his megalogoria.
get a own medicine.

his

hatred, finally Indeed,

he has been brought to trial. Now he

The

Apology
He

in

a certain way.

of Socrates presents the conflict between Athens and Socrates When writing it Plato chose not to narrate but to recreate
chose

the trial.

also

to to

subtract

some

parts

(the

written

indictment,

the

(Socrates'

kategoria,
the

the time sis),

and

add a part

third speech).

These choices,

I conjecture,

were made

in

accordance with

his

phantastike

shabbiness and

brutality

of the trial are

problem

diminished,

and

For in this way the true dimensions

of the

philosophico-political

are

Apology of Socrates, however,

elaborated example regarded

this problem

brought vividly before us. In the is more shown in practice than dialogues
the

in

an

account,

whereas

in

other

Republic,

for

it is discussed as well. The Apology of Socrates may therefore be as Plato's own proto-philosophical introduction to those works.
may
even constitute an unsurpassable
philosophico-political

Reading it
to

starting
gain

point

in

one's attempt and compre gave

articulate

the

problem, to

precise

hensive understanding
name

of

the indeterminate dyad to

which

Strauss He

the

'City

and

Man.'104

Plato's Socrates, too, herein himself

mere

practices

sort

of phantastike.
courtroom

presents and as a

as a

plain-speaking old-timer,

stranger

to

mores,

servant of an ancestral god. and

Above

all

he

assimilates

himself,
reveals

as much

as

he can, to the young

beautiful Achilles. Thus he

his

great

recognize it. But nobility to those not quite unwilling to Socrates is no simpleton, and no stranger to courtroom
102.

it is

also true that

mores

(cf.

35a4).

Cf. Plutarch, Pericles 32 (also Nicias 23), and ApS 26d with l8d, 19b, 23d. This he expressly consider the esse with which impiety psephisma is not mentioned by West. Nor does Rhet i4i6a29-35). He does, however, chsrges could be brought (see, for exsmple, Aristotle,
Socrates'

mention

the importance

of

sssocistion

with snd

Critias
Lysias

and

Alcibiades. On this

shadow-

charge see also

Aeschines I 173, Hyperbides fr. 55,

23604-7Strauss'

xviii 19, xxv 34L

103.
104.

Cf. Sph

Cf. S. Benardete, "Leo

The

Man,"

City

and

passim.

420
Above

Interpretation
all

he is

no

Achilles. As West notes,

Socrates'

excellence shines without

forth

in

speech

rather than

in deed (if

at

all).

He is

ambition, and well

and

nigh

invulnerable to ridicule. He holds that

no one

does wrong willingly,

refuted

that paying a penalty (Sixr)v

6t66vai)
it

SiSovai)
suffering to

benefits the

patient whenever

particularly being it is right. Consequently, he

a great gain to

(eXeyxov
prefers

doing injustice,

and counts

be

refuted.

For him,

ignorant may be ignominious but showing it is not. Achilles, on the other hand, is an archaic exemplar of the real man. Surely he is motivated by both

being

For him, to refute (kXeyxeiv) naturally means to disgrace. Because Socrates plainly conceals as well as reveals himself, and Athens, the Apology of Socrates invites interpretation. In particular, readers want to
shame and ambition.

find is

out

more

about

the grounds of their conflict. To this end West's book

useful.

He emphasizes, for
and

that is both truthful

instance, the difficulty of making a public speech persuasive, beautiful, poetic. Above all he emphasizes
and

the importance to Socrates of eros

of

nature,

and

the importance to Athens

in the Apology of Socrates. West illuminates the work, then, by going beyond it. And in going beyond it he is guided primarily by Plato's other works, only secondarily by
the
ancestral

and

the

sacred.

Neither is

emphasized

works of

Strauss

and

attention to one somewhat

respect

Fustel de Coulanges, among others. I have already drawn in which the heuristic value of his interpretation is

limited: because he properly begins from the standpoint of the city, but improperly remains inattentive to the question of justice, what it is, he improperly concludes that Socrates has done injustice. I shall now indicate
another respect

in which, I suspect, the heuristic

value of

West's interpretation

is

somewhat

limited.
problem
Socrates'

Is the
question

philosophico-political seems

soluble?

answer

to

this

to be

'No.'

West's answer, hedged

about with qualifications cannot solve

and occasional retractions, seems to

problem

be two-fold: (i) Socrates

the

in

'practice'

or

in 'theory'. For him the

art of education

is unattainable;
pursued

he

needs must remain

sound political

daemonic, (ii) The tension between

can

philosophic goal

and

life

nevertheless

be

sublated.

The

inquiry by
Is (ii)

Socrates is

attainable

by
be

others; it

was attained

by

the

'divine'

Plato.105

true? There seems to

much evidence against

it. Let

us put aside all general

inquiry. Let
sold

us

also put
and

aside the

into slavery,
us consider

the accounts of his

story according to which Plato was once failures in the court at Syracuse.

Let

only his Republic. There it is maintained that the meeting of philosophy (wisdom) with political power is accidental. They concur by some divine chance, or else not at all: fortune cannot be mastered. Furthermore,
should

they

concur, it

would

be

a mere coincidence.

The

wise no more

love
com

to rule than
pelled to

do the

philosophers. a

The true

statesman at work

has been
be

be lord in

'cave', like Hades. And

such government must

guided

105.

Pp. 219-20;

cf.

115, 157, 160, 173, 180. But compare

pp.

11, 183, 189-90.

Discussion

421
not

by

experience, too,
apparent

by

knowledge

or skill

alone.106

West does
not ask

not

discuss
the than a

this

counter-evidence.

In particular, he does

whether more

desired hybrid
What

of wisdom with popular consent can

of

in truth be

coming together had he

remarkable

two independent conditions.

offer

evidence

does West

in

support of

(ii)?

Only

this, I find: Plato

recognized

literary

powers;

unlike

Socrates,

who

merely
most

them,

writing and public speaking; and he did so; his beautiful and truthful opera have been very influential.107 That Plato had awe-inspiring literary ability is beyond dispute. But possession of such ability is not obviously equivalent to possession of the art
of education.
pretation of

was

able

to overcome the

problems

inherent in

The basis

of

West's

largely

tacit argument seems to

be

an

inter

Alas, he does not present it here. Because he does not, I can hardly report it. I am, however, able to say that, on Jacob Klein's interpretation, the Phaedrus does show that Plato was able to overcome the
the Phaedrus.
problems wiser

discussed therein, but it does

Socrates.108

not show

that Plato was therefore any

one

than

Has West
as

Plato to have been West's

on

divine,

emphasis on

reasonably judge it were, without being divine oneself? Plato's literary ability is of a piece with his emphasis
gone

beyond this? Can

"wisdom"

poetry

and poetic

in general,

and with

his

promotion of

epoch-

making poets in particular. It is, I dare say, also of a piece with his taste for manliness and subtle thought, and with his demotion of justice as a dis
cernible
issue.109

Be that draws

as

it may, his

drawing

attention

to Plato's dialogues

as

literary

works

our attention

to another omission in written,

and
and

his
so

own:

He does
Meletus'

not

interpret the fact that Plato's

Lysias'

Apology is
of

like

sworn statement,

Apology
leaves

of Palamedes.
says

(219L), West
rates'

radically fictional the beyond Furthermore, noting ambiguity of its title fiction in Plato's ceuvre. He little about the place of this

Apology

Callias,

Gorgias'

uninterpreted

the fact that this dialogue alone

has

a title

in

which

Soc fol Soc

name

occurs; the

fact that it is

one of

only two dialogues whose titles

the fact that it plainly designate the pragma each represents; lows the Sophist and Statesman, and seems therefore to be a
unwritten

immediately
substitute about

for the

Philosopher;
whose puts

the fact that it

counterpart

is

one of seven

dialogues

rates'

last days,

seems

alone

expressly

Plato in the

audience

be the Sophist; the fact that it (but not among the jurors).
to
West
clsims

106.

Rep

473d3, 484d6,

5l9d-e,

539e5,

592a8-9, 49265-49332.

(124) thst

compulsion

Symp is But Diotima is here speaking of philotimia (208C3), of houtos eros snd not eros in general (cf. 20737 with 20535ff.). She last mentioned philosophia at 205d5, before her turn to praxis (206b2). See Rep 54933-7 snd Phd 82C7.
not required once eros

is

reintroduced, snd

in

support of

this clsim he cites

208cff.

107. 108. 109.

This
Esp.

sketch

gsther on

from

p. 220 snd pp.

pp.

77, 1 15, 124, 157, 177, 180.

poets"

"Meno,"

Commentary
pp.

Plato's
10, 77, 79,

26L

226

and

80,

190,

192.

The "good
consider

are

discussed

on pp.

115L,

121.

His

account of them

is

doubtfully

Platonic:

the p3SS3ges cited p. 115 n.63,

and ssk whether,

according to Plato, the

wise as such can

disagree among themselves.

422

Interpretation
seems not

Finally, it
as

to

me

that the great emphasis West puts on Plato's work

wants

Dichtung,

Historie,
his
one,

balance. Do

we want

to

maintain

that,

while

statements about are neither?

compositions are true or am unprepared to

false,

the compositions themselves

I, for

reject out of

hand the hypothesis

that each
a

member of

the Platonic Corpus

imitates,
as

or otherwise

instantiates,
in geometry

supra-linguistic

alone

logos laid up in heaven that insight or declaration (6r|A.o)Oig)

it

were.

It is

not

seems possible

by

construction or

proposal

(0eoig). And if this hypothesis is true, then the Platonic kosmos involves

those exemplary logoi in their entirety. The logographic necessity organizing

Plato's

own contingent compositions would then of some

be
do
or

subordinate to
we

perhaps a

likeness
suppose come

dianoetic

necessity. not

Second,

have

good reason

to

that Plato's

Apology is

biographical
was

historical? I, for one,

Thucydides'

wel of

the hypothesis that this dialogue

for him

what

history

the Peloponnesian War was for Thucydides: a ofjXcoaic; of the most significant
event

known to its

author.

If true, then the Platonic kosmos its

also

involves that

particular event

together

with all

particular circumstances.

The logographic
perhaps we want

necessity organizing his composition would then be subordinate to even a likeness of historical necessity or chance (Tvyr\). Third, do
to
maintain

that Plato's

writings are

in

no

way

philosophic?

I, for

one, have

already

advanced the

hypothesis that his

6fjXa>aig

of city-and-man. would

this composition

Apology of Socrates is an inchoate If true, then the logographic necessity organizing be subordinate to perhaps even a likeness of some
Of course, if this consequent is true, and if every like an animal like the reader, then the Apology
of

transcendental necessity.

Platonic dialogue is

shaped

is

not

as

such

close

likeness

the

indeterminate dyad it declares. But

as there can

there can be

5rjXcoaic;

without

piu.r|0ic;, just

SfjA-cooig. Perhaps logographic necessity, like meaning, is

in terms
The
of erotic or some other psychic comments are

be uip,r]0ig without to be understood

necessity

as well.
of exegesis and

foregoing

little

more

than signs in need

Yet they serve to indicate, as promised, a second respect in which the usefulness of West's interpretation of the Apology is somewhat limited.
validation.

Incidentally, they
pression

serve

to
,

'Platonic

kosmos'

indicate the propriety of using the linguistic ex I think, and also the defensibility of saying that,
called, this dialogue is the
Crito"

to the Platonic

kosmos

so

portal

(see L.

Strauss,

"On Plato's

Apology

of Socrates

and

ab

initio).

Response
David Bolotin
St. John's College, Santa Fe

For

several

reasons, I am grateful to Stewart

of the
Lysis.'

Umphrey

for his thoughtful

called attention commentary.
correct still

review of

my interpretation

In particular, he has

to some possible obscurities, and to some genuine mistakes

in my

Moreover, his essay

other mistakes

gives me an

opportunity,
am

as

answer

it,

to

in

what

wrote.

happy

to acknowledge these mistakes.

But

as

for the

claim that

regard as

my

most

important
I
still

one

relation

between

self-love and

the

(highest)

good

think

concerning the it was funda his

mentally sound. My response to Umphrey's argument will length his objections to this claim, but I will also discuss
criticisms.

address at greatest some of other

Umphrey
as a

dialogue
we

And

most surprising feature of the Lysis, understood is friendship, its "pervasive emphasis on further agree that the main difficulty for an understanding of friend

and

agree

that the

self-int

about

ship, if not

also

for

friendship itself,

concerns

its

relation

to self-interest. This

difficulty
is

is

a serious

one, especially because

our attachment to

virtue,
our

which

accompanies and supports the willingness to make sacrifices more an attachment to our own

for

friends,
evident

(highest)

good than to theirs

can

(cf. Aristotle,
the

Nicomachean Ethics
unselfishness

Ii68a28-n69b2).
at

How
with

we

reconcile

in

friendship
to this

its highest
or at

the self-interest that Socrates

uncovers as an

ingredient in all,

least the deepest,

friendly

loves?
the

Umphrey's
two.

answer

question

is apparently that
upon which

we cannot reconcile

He

argues

that clarity about our own self-interest

destroys the "sacred

bond,"

"illusion"

or the
sees

(of community),

the truest

friendship
as

must

depend. And he illusions that from

the Lysis primarily as a critique of

friendship, for creating

individuals,
to me,

strengthen our natural

complacency

and

hinder us,

pursuing the high goods we need.

Umphrey

attributes

by

contrast,

the opinion that

friendship
friends'

"in the fullest

sense"

is

possible without

illusions,

namely

when

the

natural

an acknowledged need

for

some

desire simply to be together is combined with further advantage from one another. Against friends for
our own

this view, he

contends

that our attempt to use

"fullest"

advantage,

far from contributing to the

friendship,

undermines

friendship by
we each

leading
after

us to take advantage
One."

of, or to abandon, one another as

"look

Number

There is
i

great

strength

to Umphrey's argument on this point. But

he has

This

review

quotations, unless

All is included in Part One of Umphrey's essay entitled "eros and otherwise noted, will be from this essay. Page references, except for those to
on

thumos."

the

Lysis,

will

be to my book, Plato's Dialogue

Friendship.

424

Interpretation
the purpose of my suggestion about the hybrid

misunderstood

friendship

caused

by

affectionate

desire together
my

with a need

for

one's own good.

For I didn't

present that suggestion as

own

opinion,

or as

Socrates',

about a possible

"friendship
in
need.

sense would

I did intend to say that a friend in the fullest have to be, among other things, someone we could rely on when But Umphrey disregards several qualifications that I added to my

in the fullest

sense."

suggestion,

and

in

particular

the warning that it ignores "the question of

'phantoms'

self-

love,

as

well

as

the deceptiveness

of

what

were

called of

of

the

good"

(181;

cf.

174-175

and

169-170).

But these are,

of

course, decisive

considerations.

Earlier, I had
of one

stated

clearly that love

the good (and even of

the highest good) is at bottom a

the

selfish

desire,

and

that

it ultimately
not

weakens

friendly
in

love

human

being
was

for

another.

chose not to repeat

these

"hybrid"

claims

my had forgotten them, but because I

In truth,

connection

with

account of

friendship,
an

because I
to do
so.

willing to
of

allow some readers

however, my

claim

that love

the good is

ingredient

of

"friend

was intended primarily to indicate that such friend ship in the fullest with itself, and thus impossible (cf. especially 169-170). ship is at odds

sense"

Perhaps I
of

was

many

of our

to be more

have been wholly truthful blunt. For I don't think that the friendship based on natural affection
might not even

too timid in my friendships. Still, it

reluctance

to

further

expose

the illusions

together with utility

as

has to be

so

hollow

or

false,
for
a

even

Umphrey's

main argument portrays

it. Socrates

and some of

among the clear-headed, his friends, for

and their affection

example,
was

were quite useful strong.

to one another

long

time,

rather

And

Umphrey

himself, in fact,
Socrates'

concludes

his discussion

of the

Lysis

ship

with

with an admiring look his friends.

at

pleasant and useful companion

and I agree that love of the good is ultimately inconsistent with deepest hopes from friendship, and that the Lysis brings this truth to light. And we further agree, I believe, that the dialogue's purpose in so doing

Umphrey

our

is its

not

to

find fault
too

with

our

love

of

the good

on the

grounds, perhaps,
of

of

being

selfish

but
our

rather

to expose the limits

as

friendship,

whose

charms tend

to dull

awareness,

for the

good.

Umphrey
and about

and

individuals, differ, however, about

the good.

that our greatest need is the character

of our

love

for the good,

the status of the good itself.

Umphrey
objects to

questions two

key

assertions

that I

made about

First, he

my

claim

that

the good, whatever else

as such

it

would cease

interpretation

Socrates'

of

it is, is essentially also a drug against evils, and that to be if evils were removed. Secondly, he disputes my suggestion that the good is not loved for its own

sake, but for the

arguments about

sake of

something

else.

shall

discuss separately Umphrey's depends for its

these two claims.

According

to

Umphrey,

Socrates'

suggestion that the good

Discussion

425 is
meant to not

existence on the presence of evils

such as medicine or virtue or wealth.

apply only to instrumental goods,

our ultimate

It does

apply to

good, which

might

be

happiness, let

alone to

the absolute, unconditioned good

on the

itself. Umphrey's
speaks of

argument

is apparently based
against

fact that Socrates here

instrumental
good.

the good as a

drug

evils, that

is,

an

But

that very

fact

suggests

a quite are

insofar
against

as

they
or

are

goods,

different interpretation, namely that all goods, like instrumental goods in being useful to us Socrates has
gone

evils

the threat

of evils.

to

great

lengths, in
instrumental
ultimate

this the

part of one

the dialogue that is

thing
in

(2i9b5-22oe6), to distinguish truly dear to us (22ob7-8), from

in
name only.
our

the ultimate good, as

all those

"phantoms"

that are
purpose our

"dear"

By

raising the question of

ourselves.

lives, he has directed

own

thoughts toward an

ultimate

good even

that we can

love for its

sake,

and not

merely for Far from

He has

suggested,

as

Umphrey
absolute

himself
(cf.

notes

elsewhere, that the good we

love is

"per se, independent

good and

being"

220CI-5).

disregarding

our ultimate
strongest

Socrates'

the

good,

argument encourages us

in the

way to think of
good

them,

and of them alone.

depends
of

on the presence of evils

reference

His suggestion, therefore, that the applies especially to them. And it is

because

his

to our ultimate good, and to the good we regard as

Socrates'

absolute, that

suggestion claims

is

so

striking, and so important.

argument

Umphrey
good upon would

further

Socrates'

that
refer

for the dependence

absolute

of

the

evils, if it did

to our ultimate good or to the

several reasons

good,
shall

be inadequate. He
only
says on

offers

for this claim, but I

comment

the two that seem to me the strongest. In the first place,

Umphrey
be
useful

that

happiness, if

we were ever

to attain

it,

would

no

longer

or us.

good

for

necessary as a remedy against evils, although it It seems to me, however, that any attainable happiness
of our
at ultimate

would still

be

would not

be the

whole

good,
such

since

it

would not yet would

have lasted into

indeed
as a

the future.

And

all

events,

happiness

be

useful

remedy against evils, if only lasts. And as for a complete

against

those evils we are

of evils

free from

while

it

abolition

(once

and

for all), this

con

dition
call of of

would

indeed

no

longer be

useful

it

good?

Without the

ever-present

for anything, but why would we even possibility however dimly perceived
to care about our
condition or

further evils, it

wouldn't make sense

to speak

it

as good.

Umphrey

contends, second, that the Republic outlines an alter

of

native approach
Socrates'

to knowledge

the

Good,
upon

or of the

Unconditioned,
the

and

that

argument

in the Lysis is

of no weight against

account suggested

there.

But the Lysis does indeed bear

that suggestion, since

it

compels

us to ask

forcefully, in the Republic being itself, where Socrates indicates that the initial vision of the Good is not yet adequate for knowledge of it. The vision must be supplemented, he says, by of other things, and the last step a reasoned account of the Good as a cause

why we speak of anything, good. This question is also addressed, if less

even

the Unconditioned or the

One,

as

426
of

Interpretation
is to
show

this account

that the Good

must

be

seen

by

anyone who

intends

to act

sensibly in private or in public (Republic 5i7b8-c5; cf. 505dn-ei; 534b8-di). Socrates is implying, I believe, that we cannot meaningfully speak
anything
who

of

as good without some reference to the suffer

lives

of

beings, like
argument

our

selves,

from

evils.

And this is the fact that his

in the

Lysis is intended to
Socrates'

bring

to light. the good is that it is not loved for

else. good

second major assertion about

its I

own

sake, but for the

that the

sake of

argued

being
we

for

whose sake each of us

something (or someone) loves the

not, love

In my book, is

"himself,"

or rather so

"since

cannot,

and should

even ourselves
evils"

long

as our

life is
were

obstructed

by

the presence of

unreservedly it is "himself as he But

would

be if he

free

evils"

of

(176). I

still

think I was correct that each

"loves"

the good,

and

especially the highest good,

for his

own

sake.

have left it at that, without suggesting that suffering beings cannot themselves and without claiming that what each of us really loves is love truly "himself as he would be if he were free of Our self-love isn't necessarily diminished by the presence of (remediable or bearable) evils; in fact, it may I
should
evils."

even

be deepened, just

of evils to them.
selves

love for others may be deepened by the presence it is not likely that what we most want for our Moreover, is complete freedom from evils, especially since such freedom appears
as our and

to be

impossible for us,

attain

incompatible
be

with

life. And

even

if this

were

the

condition we most

wanted, we
would

would still want rooted

it for the
natural

sake of ourselves.

Our

desire to

it

still

in the

love that

each

of us,

necessarily, has for himself. Our well-being is

ourselves

what we most

want, but it is

that we most love.

of

So
down

far, however, my summary

Socrates'

this last argument has given a

what

watered-

version of

claim.

For

he

says

is

not

the good for the sake of some other

enemy"

of an

being, but (220e3~4). In my book, I tried to

for

that we

merely that we love love it "for the sake

explain this remarkable claim

by

proposing that we ourselves,

whose sake we
"enemies"

desire the good,

the good.

are not

only friends, but also (loosely speaking) of our present bad condition helps prompt interpretation
as one
as an

to ourselves, since

hatred

us to seek

Against this
as

Umphrey rightly objects that to hate one's bad condition, isn't thoroughly bad, is not at all to hate oneself or to regard enemy. Accordingly, I failed to show that we ourselves are the
love the
good.

long

oneself

"enemies"

for

whose sake we

And

so

I haven't

explained what

Socrates
.

could mean

by

saying that
a

we

love the

good

for the

sake of an

enemy

Umphrey
view, this

offers

tentative explanation of his own as to what

sake of an about our

Socrates'

suggestion about

love for the

argument as

whole

enemy might mean. Now in Umphrey's love of the good still applies only to
ones.

instrumental goods,
qualification, he

distinct from the highest

with
me

But

apart

from this

agrees

that we love the good for the sake of our

suggestion

selves,

and

he

accepts the

further

in my book that

we

love it for

Discussion

421

the sake of ourselves "as we would be if we were

sees such
good.

free

evils."

of

Umphrey
highest
a condition

freedom from
a

It

is, instead,
in

something freedom from good

evils as

other

than our ultimate or

as well as

from evil,

of unrestraint
mediate

which we are contented with ourselves as

independent, inter
suffer

beings. In Umphrey's view, this

state of comfortable self-satisfaction

we

is the
All

original one that we enjoyed

before

first began to
aims at

from

evils.

our pursuit of

instrumental goods, he argues,

even
our

the recovery of this

original state. still

And it
as

though this state may no longer be attainable,

natural

Umphrey
simply
and

regards

one, the

one

in

which

we

are

most

ourselves.

Umphrey
be,
for
The

uses

the above interpretation of

what

it

means

to

love,
we

to

oneself as

the basis for his tentative suggestion

about

how

ourselves,

whose sake we

love the (instrumental) good,

might also

be

our own enemies.

natural state of not

being

ourselves

proposal,

because it is

is hateful to us, according to this tentative intrinsically bad, but because our fondness for it
good.

hinders

our pursuit of

the highest

Our

satisfaction

in simply

being

(or

hoping

to

be)

ourselves tempts us

to dismiss the

ultimate good as

something
a most

too high for

our concern. our

This

satisfaction with ourselves

is therefore

insidious threat to may be

said

true welfare. And in the light of these

facts,

we ourselves

to

be

our own enemies.

According
Lysis is to
pursuit of

to this suggestion of that self-love,

Umphrey's,
assertion

Socrates'

one of
our

purposes

in the

show

like the love for

the

ultimate good.

This

friends, hinders us in our obviously depends on Umphrey's

highest ones, are ourselves. It depends, in
of
we
"loved"

claim that as a

only the instrumental goods, but not the

against evils
assumption

remedy

and

for the

sake of

other

Socrates'

words, on the

that
of

discussion

has ignored
rates'

our selfless

love

the highest good.

good why But as I argued earlier, Soc

love the

argument about which seems

love

of

the good applies above all to love of that good to that love of the good which we tend to regard
that

the

highest,

and

as

selfless.

Far from

ignoring

love, Socrates is

concerned

above

all

to

show that such

selflessness,

view, the Lysis

is

characterized

in love for the good, is impossible. In Umphrey's by a deliberate disregard of our "natural [that
good"

is, is,

unconditioned

by

the presence of evils] orientation to

the

[that

the highest good] or of "the intrinsic transcendence we show toward the

divine."

intrinsically good or Umphrey to ignore the

transcendence and to

But this is
main

false premise,
which

and

it has

allowed

dialogue's

concern,

is to

examine

that

expose some of

its hidden
of,

roots.

If love

of ourselves

is

at the root

and not

incompatible with,
enemies

our pur

suit of even sense

the highest good, then

proposes.

we cannot

be

to ourselves in the

that

Umphrey

And

so

the question remains as to what

sake of an enemy.

Socrates
hold my

could mean

that we love the good

for the
for

still

earlier opinion

that we pursue the good

our own
now

sake, and that

think

we ourselves

"enemy"

are

the

Socrates has in

mind.

But I

differently

about

the

428

Interpretation
why he
would speak of us as our own enemies.

question of suggest

The

answer

now
self-

presupposes pursuit of

the distinction I have been the

drawing

between

our

interested
evils,
as

truly highest
selfless

good,

which serves us as a a spurious

drug

against

supposedly existing (and as being good) independently of any evils. We are to ourselves, I think, to the extent that we surrender to the latter
two loves. Our

and our

love for

good that we

imagine
enemies
of

these

love for
In this

such a spurious good

in

an attempt

to escape from ourselves, and

sense we

is rooted, though only in part, from the evils that are bound up
Yet despite

with our nature.

may be

called our own enemies.

the hatred

of

being

merely ourselves, our self-deluded love for a spurious good

sake
of ourselves

is

no

less for the

than

is the

clear-headed pursuit
even

of our

true good. Our ineradicable self-concern

is

revealed

in the

comfort we

tend to feel
experience appears

at

the thought of

having

overcome
with

it. And
reflection

apart
on

from that, the

of

this delusive
a

love,

together

that experience,

to be

necessary

precondition

for

our

truest

well-being.

Accordingly,
believe that

it is for the
we

sake of

ourselves, that sake,

is,

"enemy,"

of an

that we

love,

and

for its

own me

a self-subsistent good.

To conclude, let

indicate how the differences between

we

Umphrey
not

and me

regarding the good are reflected in the attitudes of evils. Umphrey's position, to repeat, is that
toward our ultimate good,
a state of

take toward the presence

self-love

does This

direct

us

but

rather toward the mere abolition of evils and to

foolish

self-satisfaction

in the

absence of the good.

view

implies
further

that freedom from evils, if it were possible for us, would remove us still than we
are now

from

our

highest

end.

The

world's

evils,

by

their very

inescapability, help
they
provoke us

raise our sights

from the futile

attempt

to avoid them all;

to

try instead

to transcend them through attainment of our

a posture of gratitude

ultimate good.

Umphrey

directs us, then, to

for the

evils

that afflict us, at least so

long

as

they

are not unbearable. we

And he is

consistent
of

in saying that "We may thank God that

when natural

live in the

so-called

Age

Zeus,

scarcity,

political

society,

and

becoming
seem to

towards death supply

a rich

diet

troubles."

of

For Umphrey,

evils

be

lightened,
make

and even
our

their indefinite continuance

ultimate of

justified, by

the contribution

they

toward

good, toward our participation

in

what

is

good

in itself. But the

account.

status

this higher good remains unexamined in

Umphrey's for

My

own argu

ment,

by

contrast, is that the very goodness of the

apart

highest

good cannot

be

fully
as
no

understood

from its

usefulness

us who suffer called

from

evils.

Just
were

nothing, good,

not even

to

die,

could

be meaningfully
or

bad if there be truly

so

nothing,

not

even

virtue

happiness,
lie in the

could

good

if

it

weren't needed

by

those who are vulnerable to evils. The

not

deepest necessity

for

evils

(cf. Theaetetus I76a5-bi) does

contribution that some of

them may make toward our

highest good, but rather in their being, as evils, inseparable from those natures for which goods as such exist. To be sure, there are many evils, such as taxes, that could not possibly be eliminated

Discussion
without

429
still greater

the introduction of
we

evils,

including

that of

being

deprived

of goods grateful

need.

But to

prefer a

lesser

evil

to a greater one is not to

be

for

evils as such.

Admittedly,

again, there are high goods

we

courage,

for

example

that we could never attain if

"goods"

were,

per

impossibile, free
good

of evils.

But in that case, these

would no

longer be

for us,

and

we would

have

no reason

to regret their absence. It is ultimately misguided,

therefore, to try to be grateful for evils as such, just as it is to try to live in complete freedom from them. Instead, we would do better to acquire, if
we

can, enough true goods to balance or outweigh them.

Let

me again thank

Mr.

Umphrey

for his
as

these remarks will

be

as

helpful to him

review of my book. I hope that his have been to me.

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