A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

January 1985

Volume 13 Number 1

David Bolotin

Socrates'

Critique

of

Hedonism:

Reading
Speech in

of

the Philebus
of

15

Arlene W. Saxonhouse

The Net

Hephaestus:

Aristophanes'

Plato's Symposium
An Interpretation (Part
of

33

Mario

Lewis, Jr.

Plato's Euthyphro

I, Section

4, to end)
"Introduction"

67

Donald J. Maletz

An Introduction to Hegel's
to the

Philosophy

of Right

91

Joseph J. Carpino

On Laughter

Discussion
103
Angelo M. Codevilla
113

De Gaulle
on

as a

Political Thinker:
on

Morrisey's Reflections
to

De Gaulle

Will

Morrisey

Reply

Codevilla

Book Review
119 Nino Langiulli

Philosophy and the by Richard Rorty

Mirror of Nature

interpretation
Volume 13

JL

number 1

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Socrates'

Critique
of

of

Hedonism:

Reading
St. John's

the Philebus

David Bolotin
College, Santa Fe

Callicles'

argument, in the
of

Gorgias,

that it

is

right

by

nature

for the

stronger

to take advantage

the

weaker relies

largely on

his

claim that

the finest and best

life is to be cording to

capable of

Callicles,
instead

continually satisfying one's greatest possible desires. Ac nature herself proclaims the truth of his position. If most
what

people praise

they

call moderation and

justice,

and condemn their

opposites , this

is merely because they

are ashamed at their own

can.

inability

to sat

desires, and afraid of the power of those who isfy with Callicles, Socrates leads him to accept the following
their
sition: that men are

In his discussion his

po

restatements of

happy if they enjoy themselves,

with
Callicles'

with whatever

kind

of

enjoy
re

ment,

and

that the pleasant is identical

refutes

the good.

Socrates
marks

hedonism

with a

two-fold argument.

First, he

that the pleasant and

and cease still

together,
not

as

in the

its opposite, the painful, are experienced together case of drinking, which is pleasant only while one
of

feels the
at

pain of

thirst. But this is not the character

the good

and

its

oppo

site,

least

according to his
view

gether nor gotten rid of at

Callicles, for the same time. So

whom

they

are neither present to

shown

Callicles'

hedonism is
a condition relies on

to be

inconsistent

with

that the good, or

happiness, is

from

Socrates'

evils.

second argument against

hedonism

Callicles'

entirely free be
whom

lief that those

men

to

whom

the good is

present are good

(as those to

beauty
as

is

present are

beautiful). Now Callicles

understands

by

good men

those

who are wise and

brave. But he is forced to

admit that

fools

and

cowards,

as well
or

the

wise

and

brave, enjoy
makes men

pleasure.

So if

pleasure were

the good,

that

whose

presence

good, then bad

or worthless men as

would also

be

good, at least

while

they

are

enjoying pleasure, just

the good are.

Though Callicles is
which suggests

not

that no

really convinced by the first half of this argument, pleasure is good, he is compelled by the second half to

admit

that only some pleasures, the worthy ones, are good, while others are bad.
argument

But this been

does

not refute

hedonism,

since

Callicles tums^out

not

to have

a whole-hearted

hedonist in the first

also

place.

As the discussion

with

Socrates

makes

clear, Callicles

has the

conviction

that human excellence is noble and

good

in itself,

quite apart

from its

usefulness as a means to pleasure.

Moreover,
cer

he had

earlier expressed vehement pleasures.

disgust

at

Socrates for
accepts,

even

mentioning
to be

tain sexual

And

when

he

nonetheless

as a restatement of

his

thesis, the claim that all

I
wish

pleasures are

good, he is admittedly
work on

trying

consis-

to thank the Earhart Foundation for its support of my

the Philebus.

Interpretation
rather

tent,

than to state his truest thoughts.

a

Accordingly,
had
always

the outcome of the ar

gument
views.

is merely

bringing

to

light

of what

been

Callicles'

deeper

The Gorgias leaves

us wondering,

then,

whether

Socrates

can give an ade

quate response to the claims of a genuine

hedonist. This

question

is obviously

an

important one, especially

even

since

Socrates

seems to

think that

most people

believe,

if they

won't often

the greatest pleasure

and

say so, that the good is pleasure, and the greatest good (cf. Republic 505b5-6; Gorgias 492di-3; Philebus 66e2-3

be reasonable, for a man who seeks the best way of life, simply to disregard what he considers to be most people's opinion about it. Now this consideration offers the best perspective from which to approach Soc
would

67b3). It

hardly

rates'

confrontation with act as a spokesman other

Philebus. For Philebus is frank

cause of pleasure.

or shameless enough

to

for the

hedonists in

having
said

Moreover, he differs from nearly all thought through the implications of his position. He is
praise of pleasure
even

undeterred, for example, from his

pleasures are

by

the knowledge that some

Callicles'

usually
vice,

to be low or

disgusting. And
In

whereas never speaks

hedonsim

coexists

uneasily

with an attachment

to virtue, Philebus
other

of virtue and

or of good and

bad

men.

words, he is sophisticated

enough to

deny

sophisticated
refusal evils

that there is anything intrinsically good other than pleasure. This detachment from what men call virtue would also help explain his

to speak about

happiness,
It is

or about a perfect good

that is separate from all

of

(contrast

I ido-7).

plausible that

he'd be

as

distrustful itself.

the promised
seems

reward

for

being
or

good as

he is

of goodness or virtue

Instead, he

to

believe that
with

we can

have

no greater good
painful

than the
sexual

pain,

satisfying

wants

wants

incomplete pleasure, mixed in particular (2767-9;

seems to

54e4-55au and

4733-09;

i2b7-9).

Philebus'

hedonism, then,
and

differ
so

from that

of

Callicles
so

by

its

uncommon

briety. And

Socrates'

arguments against

consistency by Callicles don't appear to be

its disenchanted

adequate

to refute him.

Yet Socrates evidently believes that Philebus is vulnerable to a similar refuta tion, despite the fact that Philebus, unlike Callicles, never admits to the defeat of

his

unqualified

hedonism. For Socrates

attributes to
and at

him

also the absurd

belief

that those enjoying pleasure

virtuous men

they

alone,

those times alone

are good or

(55b5-ci),
are.

and

that the more pleasure

they

are

then enjoying, the

better

men

they

In

other

words, despite

Philebus'

apparent rejection of all

concern with mean

virtue, Socrates interprets his

claim

that pleasure is

(the)
is

good to
practice

that pleasure itself

is,
of

or

is the necessary is that the

and sufficient sign

of, the

of virtue.
means.

Now

Philebus,

course,

would never

have

agreed that this

what

he

is nothing more than pleasure, not that pleasure is nothing less than what men call virtue. But he may neverthe less have admitted to this latter view implicitly, at the very beginning of the dia logue. For there he agreed to the statement that pleasure is (the) good for all liv
means good

What he thinks he

ing

beings. Now to

speak of

something

as good

for

being

means, among other

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:

Reading
or at

of the Philebus

3
that is
such

things,

that it is sufficient to meet its needs,

least

part of a whole good

sufficient to meet
a good were not

its

needs

(20CI4-6;

22b4).

For if our fundamental less

need

for

met, anything that

gave us

would strike us more

in its

deficiency

than in

admits no other good sufficient good sufficient

its strength, and we wouldn't call it good. Since Philebus besides pleasure, he must mean that pleasure alone is a
all

for

living

beings. But is pleasure,

or

the available pleasure,

and

to

meet

the

needs of all

living beings, including even the incurably

painfully diseased? To be sure, there might well be some pleasure, if only the pleasure of hope, that is available to everyone who seeks it, no matter what the
circumstances.

But

on what grounds can

Philebus

claim

that even the emptiest of

pleasures,

and when accompanied

by

the greatest pains, are

for

us?

By

far the

most plausible explanation

is that

(sufficiently) good he believes, as Socrates later

interprets him to believe, that pleasure is the goal that everyone ought to pursue (6oa7~9; cf. Republic 519C2-4). He believes, in other words, that to seek plea
sure,
and not good

to despair in its pursuit, is a kind of duty. Now

a

since

it is

presum

ably

for

being

to live as it ought to

live,

and since pleasant

hopes

are

always

intertwined

with those pursuits

that we regard as
all

duties,
would good

belief that

everyone ought
Philebus'

to pursue pleasure, in

circumstances,

account

for

claim that

the available pleasure is (a sufficient) that everyone

ought

for

everyone.

Moreover, if Philebus does believe

might well

to pursue pleasure, he

have to

make

the further claim that Socrates also attributed to

him,

namely that the more pleasure one is enjoying, the better or more virtuous one is. For to pursue what one ought to pursue is to be good. And the good man in the

fullest nestly then,

or

sense will or

be the

one who pursues what

he

ought

to,

either

the

most ear

skillfully, or else the most successfully. Now

neither earnestness nor

even skill

in

a pursuit can guarantee great success.

Philebus

must either

allow,

that the success or

failure

of the

best

man

depends,

more or

less,

on chance

the gods, or else think of the best man as the one who pursues pleasure the
Philebus'

most successfully.

belief in
most

"ought"

an

leads him to insist that the best be happiest in fact, that is, The only way, then, for
those who
which

men,

who as such

deserve the

happiness,

will

most successful

in their

pursuit of

pleasure;

and yet

he is too disenchanted to be

least consciously, in divine help for the him to avoid this dilemma would be not only to

lieve,

at

good.

regard good men as we

succeed

in their dutiful

pursuit of pleasure

success, as

have seen,

is

guaranteed

to some extent

but

even to

define the best

men as

those who are

succeeding the most. Socrates seems to be right, in other words, in attributing to con him this bizarre notion of human goodness. The implications of
Philebus'

tention that pleasure

is (the)

good

for

all

living

beings

are

this extreme.

There

are other

signs,

apart

more concerned with virtue

than

from the universality of his claim, that Philebus is he knows. For one thing, he tells Socrates that
of

he

will continue

to believe in the superiority of the life

pleasure,

no matter

what

happens in the discussion (I2a7). Now Philebus

could

have

no reasonable

grounds

for claiming to know

what

his future beliefs

will

be

unless

he knew the

Interpretation
he is
too sophisticated to

truth of the beliefs themselves. And yet

delude himself
will

that his hedonism is based

remain a

on

knowledge. His assurance, therefore, that he

on a will to remain one.

hedonist

must

be based instead

In

other

words,

Philebus is unreservedly loyal to the cause of pleasure. Yet isn't unreserved loy alty, even to Pleasure, inconsistent with the doctrine that the good is merely plea
sure and that all pleasures are good?
Philebus'

stubborn

loyalty

to the

cause of pleasure cannot

be

accounted

for,

at

least
the

not

fully, by
in

the

assumption

that

he

regards

hedonism

as

being

conducive

to

most pleasant

life. Indeed, he

never claims

that to be a hedonist is

more

pleasant

all circumstances were

for instance, in

old age

than not to be. And if

hedonism itself
consistent

to appear as an obstacle to the greatest pleasure, wouldn't a

hedonist

at

least hope that his beliefs

anticipate

Philebus'

could change?

failure,

then,
ment

or

his refusal, to
of

to the virtue

loyalty,

any change in his beliefs is a sign of an attach which deepens and is a part of his very attachment
views seems

to pleasure.
Philebus'

candor, moreover, in stating his disreputable

to go

be

yond what a consistent and politic

hedonist

would allow

himself (cf. Gorgias

492di-3

with

cussion, at

Protagoras 35ic2-d7; Republic 538CI). In the course of this dis any rate, he suffers considerable pain for having been so outspoken in
of pleasure.

his advocacy
and powerful
near silence.

For

one

argument,

which

thing, Socrates attacks his doctrine with a long he is unable to answer and which he listens to in

What may be even more painful, he sees his own closest follower, turn against him and join eagerly in ridiculing both him and his be Protarchus, liefs (54d4-55c3; cf. 49dn-e5, 23a2-b4, and 46a5-bi). Indeed, the whole
Philebus'

circle

of

followers

if

we

can

trust

Protarchus'

claim

to

be their

spokesman

sure

join Socrates in severely rebuking those who praise the life of plea (i2b4-6; 15C4-9; 67b8-9). Now if Philebus had been less outspoken about
could

his beliefs, he
too
much

have

protected

himself from this

at

contempt.

Or if that

was

to

foresee, it is

clear

that he could

least have

mitigated

the contempt
makes no

by
his

pretending to be
companions.

convinced

by

Socrates'

arguments.

But Philebus

compromise with

candor,

not even

for the

pleasure of

being

respectable

among for his

Perhaps he despises hypocrites. But

kind
of

at all

events, his outspoken

to suffer

candor

betrays

a concern with a

virtue,

and a willingness

beliefs,
In

that are

inconsistent

with

his

own

doctrine.
than he supposes, Philebus is
of

addition

to

being
his

more concerned with virtue

also more serious about

what

the divine. He betrays the hidden depth

his

piety, or

Socrates

calls

exaltation of

Pleasure
pleasure

as a goddess

his goddess, not so much in speaking about for this he does playfully but in his serious claim that

be

about

is completely good (27e7-28b2). For this claim, which he imagines to human pleasures, is more deeply, in fact, about the divine. What Phil

ebus says

is that

pleasure would not

both in
belief

number and
Philebus'

be completely good if it were not unlimited, in degree. Now this somewhat peculiar remark points to a

on

part that

pleasure-seeking

would

lead,

not

to complete fulfill-

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:

Reading

of the Philebus

ment, but rather to satiety and

boredom if there

were not always a more

intense

pleasure,
ness,

or a

while

different pleasure, to look forward to. But this two-fold unlimitedit may be a blessing of sorts for Philebus, is still not evidence that
good.

pleasure

is completely

To the contrary, it
good.

means
or

that we

can never

possibly
com

have

enough of pleasure so as not to want

more,

in

other words

that attainable

pleasure

is

at

best

an

incomplete

In claiming, therefore, that it is

that are merely

pletely good, Philebus cannot be speaking merely

ence.

about the pleasures we experi

He

must also

be

including

"pleasures"

those

imaginable,
an un

but
real

never enjoyed

by

anyone.

goddess,

a goddess

The Pleasure that is completely good is thus in whom Philebus does in fact believe.

Philebus'

whom

he

"knows"

unwitting belief that pleasure is virtue, and his belief in a goddess to be unreal, are clear enough evidence that his position is un
a

reasonable.

Yet it doesn't follow from this that

even

really

sober

hedonism
to

would

be

false. And

if it

were

impossible for any human be tempted to judge

pleasure,
rather

being

believe

whole

heartedly
and

that the good is simply the pleasant, someone

a one could

might still suspect

that

the belief is true. Such

Philebus'

inconsistencies,
akin to surface

his own, from the ableness. And

perspective of conceit that

than from that of reason

Philebus'

to enjoy

oneself

the

divine, may considerably

give

enhance the natural

is to be good, and pleasures, just as his

beliefs

him license to

pursue

them all.

Even from the

so well.

perspective of

pleasure,

however, Philebus doesn't really fare

oneself

For his deepest, hidden, belief is

pain

good, but likewise that to be in

merely that to enjoy is to be bad (55b5-ci). He

not

is to be

must therefore

feel

ashamed

versation with

loyalty being in
ists,

goddess for the suffering that he endures during this con Socrates. Not only does he put up with a painful discussion out of to his convictions, but these very convictions lead him to be ashamed of

before his

pain,

and so

his

pain must

be

compounded.
pain

And

who can sometimes

feel

relief

from their

by

ordinary moral interpreting it as a punish

unlike

ment, and
solation.

resolving to be better in the future, Philebus cannot enjoy this con For in his case, to resolve to be better would mean to resolve io feel

by

better;

and

that resolve, as experiment

will

show, doesn't

work

very

well.

Phil

ebus1

state of

soul, then,
painful

during

this dialogue and on

be unusually longing for a

"knows"

(cf.

27c 1-2).

And the
explain

pain

occasions, must many that he feels, together with his

other

complete

good, helps

his

attempt to escape
a

himself

by

ex

alting his goddess, whom he dreams that she doesn't exist.

Socrates'

of as

perfect

good

even

though he

argument against

hedonsim, however, is

not

merely to

reveal

the in

consistencies

in

Philebus'

position and the pains

that it adds to his life. He also

argues,

against a still more sober

hedonsim,
To
show
whether

that pleasure isn't the

only good,
offered, a
mem

and that not all pleasures are good.

Philebus'

that pleasure isn't the only good, he

would

asks

follower Protarchus

he

choose, if it

were

life full
ory,

of

the greatest pleasures, but without

replies

intelligence,

understanding,

and

the like. Protarchus

that everyone would prefer to this a

life that

Interpretation
both
pleasure and

combined
sure

understanding,

and so

Socrates

concludes

that

plea

is

not

the same as the good (cf. also 55bi-5).

One

could

object,

however,

to this argument that it rests on the

supposition

that a life

could

have the

greatest pleasures and still

be

without

intelligence

and

the like. But this is surely

impossible, since the pleasures of the moment are much increased by intelligence, especially by the intelligence to anticipate future pleasure. Accordingly, a hedonist might come to admit that intelligence is also
good, but he
would see

the greatest possible

pleasure.

it merely as a means toward, or else And even though pleasure

ultimate

as an

ingredient of,
not,
on

would

this

view, be the only good, it would still be the only that was good in itself (cf. Protagoras 35id7-e3).
Socrates'

good, the only good

case

for the

goodness of intelligence

is

strengthened

if

we consider

this further point,

whatever else
chosen

which

he

also mentions

in his discussion

with

Protarchus:

the good

might

by

thinking being, by
is
good

be, it is necessarily something thinking being (like ourselves)

sought after and

that is aware of a

need good

for for

what

(20d7-n). And

no presumed good could

be sufficiently
we need.

us without our awareness of

being

in

possession of

the good

For in the
"good"

absence of such awareness without

of true

opinion, if

not

knowledge We

the
would

slip away having for something else, and thus the so-called good would not have sufficiently met our needs. Even the most sober hedonist, for example, depends for his contentment upon the thought that pleasure is good. This thought is im
would appreciated as good. still

been

be

looking

portant

to

him,

not

to

be

satisfied with them.

because it increases his pleasures, but because it allows him And thus even if pleasure were otherwise the only ulti
of

mate

good, the awareness

this truth would be

further good, distinct from

than a

pleasure

itself.
the argument I

Still,
good,

have just
might

sketched

is

no more

formal

refutation of

hedonism. A hedonist
when

this conviction

reply that his conviction about pleasure being the is good, is good because it reduces the pain of empty

fears

and of

amount of

his

dashed hopes for something more; it thus increases if not the pleasure at least the predominance of pleasure over pain in his
argue, then, that understanding or true opinion is good only this predominance of pleasure. And most importantly,

life. He

could still

because it

contributes to

the above argument doesn't challenge, in any serious way, Philebus' conviction that the best way of life is to pursue pleasure, to pursue only pleasure, and to pur
sue pleasure

from any available source. Socrates does, however, spend much

of

the

tive way of life to that of mere pleasure-seeking,

rejection of

dialogue in outlining an alterna a way of life that requires the

Philebus,

whose mind

many kinds of pleasure. He discusses this better way of life, not with is already made up and who for the most part refuses even
Socrates'

to speak, but again with

his follower, Protarchus. Indeed, only obvious in the dialogue is that he wins Protarchus over to this alternative doctrine victory about the best way of life. Socrates persuades Protarchus, in the first place, that a

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:
and

Reading
on

of the Philebus

life combining pleasure best one. Subsequently,

ments

wisdom,

rather

than that of pleasure alone,

is the

by

elaborating

the proper combination of the ele to agree that

in this

mixed

life, Socrates leads Protarchus

only

certain

pleasures

those unmixed with pain and those that accompany health and vir

tue

are compatible with

it. And he leads him further to

admit

that intelligence

or wisdom

is

good

is better than pleasure, in the sense of being more nearly akin to what about this best life. What the dialogue seems to accomplish, then, is to
Philebus'

save

Protarchus from

hedonism

by

providing him

with a clear alterna

tive and with a goal to aim for in his own life.

There is something unsettling, however, about this apparent conclusion to the dialogue. For although Socrates and Protarchus speak of the best life primarily as
a

that

life for human beings (62a2; cf. 62b3; b8; C3; 6334; 66e4~5), the mixed life they outline together is quite impossible, at least for us humans. Not only
adequate

does it include ishable simply isn't

knowledge

of

"justice

itself",
of all

and of all

the other imper

beings, but it

also

includes knowledge
could
Socrates'

the arts and crafts. Now it

and

true that a

human

only underlined, an ingredient of the best life (64a7-b5). How "too

How
'good'

and not

being resolved, by
regarded

know

so much

this

difficulty
"truth"

is
as

last-minute

addition of

to be

true,"

be

can

the impossible be good

can such a life, which is clearly seriously as something good or best for us? (see 23a6-bi; cf. Protagoras 358b6-ci)?

At the very
good,

beginning

of

the

dialogue, Socrates indicated that the

or choiceworthy, cf. 22b4-6).

(1 ib7-c2;
or

in

accordance with

only for those for whom it is possible And yet this important consideration of what is possible, a being's nature, is treated slightingly, if at all, in the
55a7).

is truly to share in it
good

course of the

discussion (cf. 33a8-9;

It is

never even

suggested, for

exam

ple, that the dialogue is sketching

best life for human beings, or approximates this pattern (contrast Republic

for the best life, and that the truly the best possible life, is the one that most nearly
a pattern

472a8-473b3).

Now the

manifest

impossibility
lous
about about

of

its

conclusion

lends to the

whole

dialogue the
of

playful or ridicu
we must wonder

character of wishful
Socrates'

thinking. And

in the light

this

fact,

interlocutor, Protarchus. If he really believed what Socrates says the best human life, wouldn't he want to know how, and whether, it was
for him to lead that life himself (cf. Republic 450C6-9; 458ai-b8) ? And gives no indication that he cares about the question of possibility
42d9-n).

possible yet

Protarchus

(contrast
neglect

Why

doesn't he? Whatever

else

it

means

for Protarchus to be
not of

this

key

question,

it surely is

means

that

Socrates'

success, in winning him

at

over

to his

own

doctrine, is

not so significant as unconcerned

it

appeared to or at

first.
con

Is it

possible

that Protarchus

with,

least

seriously

Socrates'

cerned with,

inquiry

about

the best life? On the face

Protarchus'

it,

this seems

hard to believe. So urgent, in fact, is and to determine what kind of life he

threatens not to

desire to

settle

this question,

should

pursue, that he

half-play fully

let Socrates

go

home

until

he has

provided a sufficient answer

(i9C4-20a5;

23b2-4; 5od6-e2; 67bro-i3). And

even at

the end of the discus-

8
sion,

Interpretation
which

he follows patiently, despite its

more.

abrupt and

still wants goes

to hear

Yet there he's

are signs

that

Protarchus'

confusing transitions, he eagerness to listen

together with a lack of genuine openness to the inquiry.

while still

Early

in the dia
con

logue, for example,

ceal

defending hedonism,

Protarchus tries to

his better knowledge that

pleasures can

be dissimilar

or opposed to one an

other, because Socrates has

admission would compel

teasingly frightened him into believing

some pleasures are

that this
opposed

him to say that

bad,

that

is,

to the good ones. As a result of this attempt at concealment, Socrates has to chide

him for the foolishness

the

of

trying

to defend his thesis so dishonestly. And later in

abandoned

dialogue,
his

after

Protarchus has

hedonism, he
on

remains

unwilling to

expose

own

beliefs to the

Socrates'

power of

argument.

Thus, Protarchus

shows great reluctance

on some

to take an independent stand

ones

ridiculously easy likes to say what others say, especially if they are reputed to be wise (28c6-29a2; 36e9-io; 4ia2-4; 43ai-6; 67b8-9). And if this proves impossible to do, he be
comes uncomfortable.

hard questions, and even (28b6-io; 44CI-4; 48di-7; and 63ai-7). He

For example, he
of unchangeable

responds to

Socrates'

question whether used

the truest knowlege is

praise

being by
one

saying that Gorgias

appear

to

instead the

art of

persuasion,

and that

he, Protarchus, doesn't

occasion, he does

want

to op
ar

pose either of

the two

men

(58ai-b3). On
of

to be

guing for a genuine conviction sures. But when Socrates calls

his own, namely that there are no false plea attention to his unusual eagerness in defense of
claim

pleasure, he retreats at once behind the

that he's merely repeating

sometimes claims

what

he's heard (37ei2-38a5). It's true that Protarchus

to be argu

he really believes. Yet he unwittingly betrays, again and again, how little of himself he is actually giving to the discussion. He agrees, for example, that he must stand behind his claim that there is a cosmic intelligence, and face

ing

for

what

the risk of

being

refuted

by

some clever man who

denies it. But

when

Socrates,
and

instead
quite

of

attempting the
arguments

expected

refutation,

surprises us with

additional,

intellect, Protarchus shows no concern that the question has been sidestepped (28d5~3oe8). Or, to take another example, Protarchus agrees, late in the dialogue, to the suggestion that pleasure
support of a cosmic

dubious,

in

is

longing

although he repeatedly speaks of it elsewhere as a good be without ever necessarily to the best life remarking on the contradiction (cf. 54C9-55ai2). Despite intense desire to hear what Socrates has to
not a good at all
Protarchus'

say, especially in answer to the question about the best

confirmed

life,

our suspicion

is

that

he holds the

question

itself is

at arm's

sistence upon a
cern

satisfactory

answer tonight might not

length. Indeed, his very in have alerted us that his con

so genuine as

to learn the truth about the question

cf. 34di-8).

nearly

he

pretends

(uc9-di; i4b5-8;
Yet how is it best

possible

for Protarchus to
of

care so

little

about this search

for the least if

is

life,

and

for knowledge

the good? His unconcern is surprising, at

much of

Socrates is

right

that everyone wants to possess as

the good

of what

really good,

and not

merely

reputed to

be

good

as

he

can

(20d7-io;

cf. Repub-

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:

Reading

of the Philebus

lie

505d5-io).
of

Socrates has argued, moreover,

Now
Protarchus'

and argued

persuasively, that

knowledge
knowledge

the good is the most important knowledge there

is (Republic
for this

504d2-505b3).

lukewarmness toward the

assumption

search

could perhaps

be

explained on the

that he secretly be

lieves he already possesses it. But this suggestion, though too simple, for apart from the question of why Protarchus

not

would conceal

entirely wrong, is his be

Socrates'

lief,

the suggestion

fails to his

account

for his intense desire to hear

hidden
conviction

opin

ions. Even the strong

cency. ment

assumption

that

Protarchus'

can't explain

strange combination of
and

Moreover, he is amazingly flexible,

curiosity he doesn't betray any

with

is only moderately inner compla

real attach

to any particular notion of the good. Rather than simply claiming to know the good, Protarchus relies, I

believe,

on

the

following

unspoken convictions: no

first,

there are probably no true answers,

and almost

surely

knowable ones, to fundamental questions,

secondly, the
refusal

about the

good;

and

virtue of moderation consists

awareness of

this situation, and a consequent

to

including that largely in an commit oneself inwardly

refusal

to any one position (cf. I9bi-20a5; 45d7-e2). As for

Protarchus'

openly

to acknowledge these convictions, there are several reasons for

snobbishness.

it, including

But the
of

the harsh light

as

truth of

he is, of all his own

most important reason is his fear of exposing his beliefs to Socratic cross-questioning (cf. 22e6-23a2). Being distrustful, claims to truth, he can hardly have a genuine confidence in the convictions.

But they

provide

him,

even

so,

with what

he

some

how

accepts as a sufficient response to the question of the

only superficially involved in the discussion with Protarchus, then, is adrift to some extent deliberately

best life, Socrates.

and thus

he is

adrift regarding life's important questions, and he even prides himself on this fact. He is, more over, a hypocrite. Once one has seen through his facade of earnestness, it is hard

to take him seriously. And so the

prominent a part

question

arises

in

the

Platonic dialogue

about the

of why he should play so best life. For Socrates surely

doesn't succeed, despite appearances, in educating Protarchus, any more than earlier teachers had done. father Callias, by the way,
Protarchus'

Protarchus'

may

well

be the

same

Callias

whom

Socrates

speaks of elsewhere as

having
cf. expose

spent more

than anyone else

in Athens for the

education of

his

sons

(i9b5;

Apology

of Socrates

2oa4-b9).

What Socrates accomplishes, rather, is to

Protarchus'

true character,
show

which

cealed, and then to

we

the

inadequacy

Protarchus thinks he has successfully con of his posture toward life. And though

may be tempted to dismiss Protarchus out of hand, as not even serious criticism, Plato must have thought it of some importance to
grounds

deserving
show

the

for rejecting his attitude. For Protarchus might conceivably be correct in his suspicion that there is no true answer to the question of the good life; human life
could

be

a meaningless accident.

And if this is

even

possibly true, it isn't

so

Protarchus'

easy to say things, to

what's

wrong

with

attitude.

It

allows

him, among

other

avoid

the painful doubts that tend to plague those who take some

10

Interpretation
stand about the

definite

good,

as well as

the

heartaches
protects

that threaten anyone with

pains of what

serious commitments. could edge

At the

same

time, it

him from the

be the futile
34CI4-9).

attempt

to replace one's opinions about the

are

good with

knowl
pain, in

(cf.

Since there

difficulties,
pursuit of

and

difficulties that

bring

all opinions

that are held about the good, and since even Socrates has often been
resourceless"

left "alone
tion to

and

in his

knowledge (i6b4-7),

the tempta

try

to evade the

question

is

not

know

Protarchus'

whether

attitude of

The
chus'

most obvious perspective

and it may become necessary to easy-going indifference is untenable. from which to see the inadequacy of Protar

surprising,

approach
most.

to life is that of moderation, the virtue

that

on which

he

prides

himself

To the

extent own

failure

by

his

he really cares about this virtue, he must be judged a standards. That this is so is not because he accepts the dia
the best human

logue's
he isn't
means

ridiculous and extreme conclusion about

serious about

that

conclusion

himself. But moderation,

life; after all, to Protarchus,

and not even

primarily

self-knowledge as

the sober refusal to claim to possess wisdom,

along with the self-awareness, to hope for answers, regarding

he

sees

it,

not

to commit

himself,

such

fundamental

questions as

that about the good

(i9bi-2oa5;

48c6-49a6).

In the dialogue's
and

rather

lengthy
not

analysis of

comedy,

Protarchus repeatedly agrees that folly, wise, is an evil, an evil that stems from

especially the foolish conceit to be

self-

knowledge. He apparently thinks that

and of good

hateful, lack of Socrates is criticizing the folly of Philebus,

a

ridiculous, if

those many

others who make cf. 54*14-5531 1).

dogmatic
But
what

claims about the

best life

and the
own re

(48a8-50aio;

he doesn't

see

is that his

fusal to
not

make such a claim presupposes

the belief that it is good, and sensible,

Protarchus'

to do so. To state this criticism

differently,

claim
what

to possess the

virtue of moderation

implies the belief that he knows

or even a single

that virtue
claim

is;

and yet at

to claim to know what virtue,

virtue, is is to

to

know,

least in part,
chus evade posture

what

is truly

good.

No

more

than any other

human

being can Protar

the necessity of making some serious claim about the good. And his

is

all the more ridiculous conceal

success, to

for his failed attempt, which he regards as a his inner indifference to the questioning of the dialogue. himself
on

Protarchus,
is
an

who prides

his

self-knowledge and who

insists that

folly

evil,

orients

his

otherwise aimless

life in terms

of a

foolish

self-delusion.

His way
self puts

of

living, then, is

unacceptable when

judged

by

a standard that

he him

forward.

however, even if it doesn't take for granted that moderation is does assume that it is decisively important to Protarchus. But what truly virtue, if Protarchus isn't serious even about this? What if he doesn't really care whether
a

This criticism,

his belief in his

own moderation

is

a coherent or

true one? If he were shown the

inconsistency in claiming that it is virtuous or good to make no serious claims about the good and if he were willing to speak his mind he might reply as follows: he surely doesn't know that his noncommittal attitude is good, and it
may
well not

be; but it doesn't really

matter

anyway

whether

it is

or not.

If this

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:

Reading

of the Philebus

11

were make

his reply, his indifference to the truth of his belief in moderation would its inconsistency irrelevant to him. Now we might be tempted all the more
and

to despise Protarchus for such shallowness. But if his underlying suspicion, that

nothing is truly good, were correct, how could anything indifference to moderation, and to the truth of his bad? Someone
might still object

"belief"

in it

in particular, his be criticized as

that it is base of Protarchus to be so easy-going can be possibility that there is no good. But such called bad only if there is a good and bad. If there isn't, difference from others would mean merely that he's less troubled by painful thoughts. It is
about the awful
"baseness" Protarchus'

least conceivable, then, that cially if fortune is kind to him

at

Protarchus'

aimless

life is

no worse, and

espe

less difficult than those

within

of others.

There is
quite wants

ample

evidence,

however,
and

the dialogue that Protarchus is

troubled

by

painful

thoughts,

that he is haunted

by

the difficulties he

to sweep

under

the rug. His half-playful threats

of

violence, when he

senses that

feeling

of

Socrates is teasing, and not taking him seriously, betray a painful contempt for himself and for his phoniness (I5d8-i6a6; I9b2-e5).
admitted reluctance to state an opinion of others share

Moreover, his
knows that half-buried
to hear

it,

suggests a conscious

dread

of

his own, unless he being left alone with his

see also

uncertainties

(compare 58a7-b3

with

59bio-ci;

1433-6;

28b6-c5; 48d4-7; 67b8-9). It is

ger
what

largely
about

as a result of

this dread that he is so ea

Socrates thinks

the good. But since this desire is merely a

can never

substitute

for the desire to learn

what

is good, it

real

Thus, the dialogue is as frustrating and he is unable to let it end, even though Socrates had itch, scratching offered to resume it the next morning (50d6-ei; 67^0-13).
satisfaction.

lead him any closer to for Protarchus as the

of an

The

evidence so

far

might suggest

now and

then,

as everyone

merely that Protarchus is uncomfortable is. But in fact he is unusually depressed. His underly

ing
the

depression becomes

evident when

Socrates

asks

him

about

the pleasure

or

pain

involved in the is

following
the

situation: someone suffers

from

hunger, thirst,

or

like; he

remembers

pleasant

things that could put an end to

Protarchus'

his pain; but

which

his he

emptiness

not yet

stresses with an

being unusually firm response, oath by Zeus, is that there is then a double pain, from longing
in the
soul
.

filled.

bodily

emptiness and

from

Socrates has to

remind

him that

one can

also

hope for

and thus rejoice again.

or, better, that one can hope for it consciously in the memory of those pleasures that one hopes to enjoy What Protarchus imagines as his despair about the good makes him tend
replenishment

to be
acute

oblivious

to the

pleasures of

hope,

and that sad condition must

be especially
will

during

this conversation,

from

which

he only

pretends

to hope that he

learn (35e2-36c2;
The dialogue

cf. 48ai-2 and 34bn).

Protarchus'

offers a still clearer sign of

depression,

and of

its

deepest source, in his wavering judgment about a hypothetical life without plea sure and without pain. Early in the dialogue, Protarchus says that a life con

taining

wisdom

and

intelligence, but entirely free

of

both

pleasure and

pain,

12

Interpretation
be in
worth

would not

choosing, and that everyone would

prefer

to this a life that

analyzed and

combined

intellect
so

with pleasure.

But later,

after pleasure

has been

the

falsity

many

pleasures
with

reasonable

to choose a life

has been exposed, he claims that it's pleasure and pain in preference to the
soon contradicts

highly

un

thoughtful
again and

life that

contains neither. as

Now it's true that he

himself

reaffirms,

if it

were an obvious

ness with pleasure.

And it is

always

truth, that the best life combines thoughtful hard to know how much he means the things
he is led to denigrate the kind
without pleasure and

he
of

says

(cf.

also 4434-8). as

But the

ease with which a so-called

life

we

know,

being
a

inferior to

life

pain,

betrays

a soul thst

is

oppressed

by suffering (2id9-2236;

5461-5531

1;

6od3-e7;

less unhappy youth, even if he weren't in earnest about the conversation, would have probably seen through the absurdly wishful think outline of the best human life (cf. also 62CI-4). ing in
cf. 3335-C4).

Indeed,

Socrates'

Something
thing
must

Protarchus'

spoils a

satisfaction with the

could

life

we

live,

and

this some

be

buried dream that there

not 3cknowledge

Though he does

life wholly free of evils. this dre3m consciously, and thus does not en

be

joy it, it
dream
as

colors all

his

experience nonetheless.

And the immediate

ground of

this

must

be his belief in virtue, (cf.

39e4~40b5).

which alone could promise a

life

without evils

its

reward

In

other

words, Protarchus does care

more

than

he knows
also

about virtue or

moderation; his belief in its goodness,

3s

snd therefore

in his own, is deeper than whst he imagines Now no one could hsve much confidence in such
goodness of not pesce of mind

his despair

3bout

the good.

belief,

3 serious

belief in the
not give

msking

serious claims about the good.

concern

It surely does

to Protsrchus. But the

for

virtue

the concern thst under

awskens

lies his bondsge to this

source of continusl
tarchus'

belief,

and

to the buried hopes that it

is

view of

life is

dissstisfsction for him. The dislogue shows, then, that Pro an unenviable one, both becsuse of its inconsistency snd
the criticism of Protsrchus thst the

becsuse
The

of

the suffering th3t it entsils.

exposure snd

dislogue

sccomplishes

compel us and

to hesitste sbout its spparent conclusion that wisdom,

are more

intelligence,
is

the

like

choiceworthy than any pleasure. That conclusion, which

directed chiefly to Protarchus, might not be seriously meant. And we are thus left wondering whether Socrates knows a better way of life than the unqualified pur
suit of pleasure.

Unfortunately, I

cannot even

try

to resolve this question

here,

but I

will state what

I take to be the decisive hope. Socrates

consideration: this

is,

I believe, the

question of the value of

rejects unqualified

hedonism because he
perhaps surpris

thinks that there are worthless pleasures,

by

which

he means,

ingly, nothing
pleasures that
as an evil

other than

false

ones

(4oe9-4ia6;

cf.

32b9-d6).

Now the false

Socrates has chiefly in mind are the pleasures of false hope, such man's pleasant hopes for his most distant future. But since we tend to
the magnitude
of

exaggerate
must and

future

pleasures and

also, perhaps,

because

all

hope

imagine the future

as

if it

hence worthlessness,

even

already present, Socrates sees some falsity, in those pleasant hopes that turn out to have been
were

Socrates'

Critique of Hedonism:

Reading

of the Philebus

13

well-founded

(4ia7~42C4; compare 39C4-7 and 4oa9-c2 with 5ibiff.). Now Socrates isn't recommending, of course, the impossible and miserable task of trying to live a life without any hope (cf. 39e4-6 and Phaedo 9iai-b7). But
what
mand

distinguishes him from

that the
"goods"

simple

hedonists,

and

from

most

others, is his de
to which the
and

other

highest good, or that sufficient pleasure in his life could become truly good, must be free
that reason alone, of all mere
Socrates'

in

relation of

falsity,

in

dependent, for
If there is
there was

hopes,
so

or at

least the deepest

ones.

such a pleasure

and

experience

led him to believe that

as

it is the

philosopher'

pleasure, for

long

he

remains capable of

enjoying it, in

thinking.

Thought
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The Net

of

Hephaestus:
Speech in Plato's Symposium

Aristophanes'

Arlene W. Saxonhouse

University

of Michigan

of

Socrates especially praises that the city be one, a unity he says to be the work (egyov) love (rfjg cpikiag) just as in the speeches about love (egcorixolg Xoyoig) we
know that Aristophanes
says how on account of their strong love (did. xo ocpodga lovers cpikelv) (igcbvtcov) are eager to grow together and become one instead of two. In such a case it is necessary that both or one be destroyed, but in a city it is neces sary that love (xf\v cpikiav) become watery on account of the community and one will

least

"mine"

of all

say

whether

it be

a son

for

father

or a

father for

a son.
(I262b9-I7)'

Aristotle, Politics, Book II

Socrates'

mistake, sccording to
tween

Aristotle, is
"Yes,

thst

he fails to distinguish be
Lovers
offered
are

lovers

and cities.

For us, the distinction is

obvious.
it,"

two people

devoted to

each

other, ready to say,

we want

if

the net of He
encompasses

phaestus which would

bind them together for

"water

an eternity.

The city
else,

many between her

people and
lovers.2

its

down"

expanse must

the

intensity

of the passion
make

felt
or

Love is the desire to

obliterate

appropriate someone

him

your

own, to

the distinctions between you.

The city

as we

know it

evokes no such

intensity, no such specificity. We may feel fond of "the city"; we even become, as Pericles urges his Athenians to do, Ugaorai of the city in may our defense of it or pride in it, but we cannot visualize a unity with and appropri
ation of

the city in the way that

we can visualize such a with

ality is

not part of our

relationship

the

city.

unity with a lover. Sexu However, for the Socrates and

It is the
passion overcome our

the Aristophanes of Plato the passion

creation of one out of more than equacies and

is the

same.

one, the desire to

for unity, the individual inad

others.

incompletion through
not

a union with another or

with

many

While

sexuality may

be

a part of

relationship

the city, it arises from the same

source: our needfulness of others.

Greek philosophy developed among the

pre-Socratics

from

a concern with

the

relationship between the one and the many, the eternal and the changing. The the rela problem of politics (and the problem of lovers) is precisely the same
tion of the one and the many

how individual

units

(people, families,

villages,

The author gratefully acknowledges financial support for work on this paper from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the Uni versity
I
.

of Michigan. The terms egcog and cpiXia appear interchangeable here. According to Dover (1980; p. 50, 20) they are not distinct in the classical period. 2. Aristotle is not so concerned with the watering down of love as he is with the consequences

n.

of

that watering

down,

that

is, impiety.

16
states)

Interpretation
can

unified whole.

be transformed through the casting on E pluribus unum is not a meaningless

question,
whether we are

of some unseen net phrase.

into

It

reveals

the funda

mental political

talking

about

ism,

monarchy,

or the ancient polis.

Aristophanes'

contemporary federal speech in Plato's Symposium

suggests

why

we must engage

in that

tions suggest why the solution which

and

for unity, while Aristotle's reserva Aristophanes seems to offer for his lovers
quest

Socrates for his city is unsatisfactory for both. The intensity of the desire for unity that both Aristophanes and Socrates appear to encourage is self-destructive
in its
ers. abstraction

from

bodily

limits

that which

defines

our separation

from

oth
net

Aristotle in his turn

encourages moderation and the wise rejection of

the

when

offered, for he refuses to separate

body

and soul or to suggest

that complete

unity without death is possible. But why does Plato give to both Socrates

describing
unity?

describing
eration

lovers the

same

drive,

the eros for

the city and Aristophanes While Aristotle in his mod

is clearly correct to espy the differences between lovers and cities, for Plato the differences seem to be less significant than the similarity. Both reveal
the needfulness of the human species, the
sufficient.

inability

of

the individual to be

self-

One's
a

eros

is

an acknowledgment of

that

inadequacy;
in

at

the

same

time, it is

desire for

one's

true

form,

one's eldog, a condition

which

there is

no needfulness.

Thomas Hobbes,
tion of our true

an

early

spokesman

for the

modern

period,

rejected

the

no

form

or eldog.

There is

no summum

bonum,

no finis ultimus,

(he

tells us in
nor cities

Leviathan)

such as the philosophers of old

described. Neither lovers

help

us

to

attain our not

eidog, since for Hobbes that eldog does not exist.

pain which

Our sociability comes which Aristophanes

from the

drives

us

to seek our eidog, a pain

and

the Diotima of Socrates

equate with

love, but from

characters as

the pain of conflict. Associations of lovers or cities

suage

for the Platonic distance from

with

the

pain we

feel in

our recognition of our

wholeness.

an unattainable
whole

perfection

an

individual like is
atoms

Moderns begin

individual for

ness,

with men

in

void,

where others stand as

impediments to

our

happy

enjoyment of

the goods around us. The

natural condition

us of the

modern period

one of a-sociability.

Aristotle

and

Plato's Socrates

and

Aristo

phanes would all agree

that sociability, one's natural

drive toward

union with an

other, is necessary for human completion, thst socisbility is

to's characters and Aristotle
net

nstural. and

Where Pla

disagree

would

is to be cast, not on the source of our The story of the net of Hephaestus is told in the
entertain

be how widely desire for it.

how tightly the

Odyssey by

the singer Demo

docus to

Odysseus,
Ares

a guest
and

the secret

love

affair of

Alcinoos. It is the story of Aphrodite, the wife of Hephaestus. Alerted to

palace of
a net

in the

this affair Hephaestus goes to his smithy and hammers out webs,
which not even one of

"thin like

spider

the blessed gods could

of

see,"

which

he hangs
"so

over

the bed to catch the two lovers in their act

of them could stir a

love.

They

are trapped

neither

limb

up,"

or get

unable

to escape their pleasure or their

The Net of Hephaestus

shame.

17
not the

All the gods, though

goddesses,

come

to observe and laugh

un

controllably.
whether

All

laugh,

that

is,

except

Hermes

who when asked

by

Apollo

as to

bed

by

he "caught tight in these strong fastenings would be willing to sleep in the side of Aphrodite the responds that he only wishes it could
golden,"

be he

with

"thrice the

number of endless
on"

fastenings

and even with all the gods even shame cannot

or

and goddesses

looking

(v 11.266-366). For him

limit

the desire for unity

wards

with

the beautiful. Our partiality

incompletion leads to

this

desire for

union with others and more not

beautiful

as

Aphrodite is in body, if
the permanence
of

in

character.

specifically others who are The net of Hephaestus desire to be

would ensure

that union, the

cessation of our

complete and

bound

with

beauty. We

would all want

it

or would we?

The lame Hephaestus

says to

understands more
gods:

than swift Hermes. For Hephaestus

will not go on

Zeus

and

the other

"I think they

lying

thus even

for

little,/

much

though

they
for

are

in love, I think they

will

have

then my fastenings
suages

them."

and

my

snare will contain

for sleep, but Sexual intercourse as

no wish/

the

longing

completion which
passes with

haunts those

who are

partial, but only

so

momentarily: modern

the pleasure

the act itself.

our

Sexuality
our

ignored

by

on vividly but it is one sign of that characteristic human and its transi others, only partiality tory resolution is not a final answer. As the tragic playwrights of the ancient

liberal theorists

announces

incompletion,

dependence

stage show complete

us, seldom if ever can

we

find thst

union which will mske us with

whole,
own

in unity with beauty. The vision of a human telos carries tragic knowledge that it can never be achieved by mortals limited
aries of

it its

by

the bound

their bodies.

Sexuality
thereby

illustrates sharply the

inadequacy
vividly

of a union

de

pendent on

bodies. It is

of course the comic poet who most shows us

portrays us as

bodily

creatures and

the limits of our endeavors.

Aristophanes has
and

made us

laugh

often.

He has

shown us

fantastical images

feats

on the

Attic stage, images

on

into birds, sailing to heaven

their
poetry.

be transformed they from Hades to defend dung beetles, returning

of men as could never

Along

with

these

fantastic images, he

shows us ourselves, as we

would not we

like to

see ourselves.

By focusing
he

on our

bodies he

revesls

how ugly

really We become functions

tesque

are at the same time that as we watch an

evokes our

laughter

at our own ugliness. aware of our

Aristophanic comedy vividly

on our physical and

bodily
gro

which

transform our amazing potential on the comic stage

into

expressions of our

dependence

bodies, bent

and crooked

bodies, bodies in

need of

being

filled

in

need of

being

purged, bodies need

ing

to be

scratched or soothed.

Aristophanes in the Symposium is transformed into

characters, one who

one of

his

own comic

is

stuffed and then emptied.

But Plato does

not

Aristophanes into

buffoon in the dialogue. He turns

Aristophanes'

Aristophanes'

only turn comedy into

tragedy

and thus turns

question of

speech

into the

work of an

The final

the

dialogue,

whether one person can write

ugly tragedian. both tragedy

18
and

Interpretation
answered

comedy, is

in the

affirmative

by

the portrayal

within

the dialogue

of

Aristophanes. The tragic

poet on

the Attic stage shows to the Athenians their

makes mortals

mortality, their distance from the divine. But in the process, he

beautiful

as

they

struggle against

the net of

necessity

that surrounds them. The

power which we

piety

of

the tragedian is evident in his respect

for, that divine

cannot conquer.

Aristophanes

under

the control of the Platonic

literary
is

art

is

transformed into a tragedian who evokes fear and pity with his praise of

love; he
The
the de
ac

does this

not with

beauty, though, but through

even

the

depiction
images

of what

ugly.

tale he tells here is a grotesque one filled

corum

with absurd

which offend of

the other speakers had shown

in their descriptions

indecorous

tions. Unlike his

brother dramatists, Aristophanes here does

plays

not uplift us with

the

beauty

of our

necessary tragedy. Plato

without

the ultimate trick on

Aristophanes:

he leaves him
and yet makes

the

beauty

and gentleness of the prize

portrayal of

winning

Agathon,
says that

his

speech a

tragic

the human condition. Eryxima

speech:

chus, the

doctor,

the

technician, sweetly

reacts
or

to

Aristophanes'

he

Aristophanes has

spoken

cutely (r)decog,

19364).

The

unpoetic

doctor

fails to from

recognize

the

tragedy
can

that Plato's Aristophanes intends and that

Aristotle

understands when our

he describes the Aristophanic lovers. The

only be
at

passion which arises

incompletion

satisfied

by

our

death.
the dialogue to admit to his

Aristophanes
But his true

appears

briefly

the

beginning
as

of

excesses of the night

before, his drowning,

"Aristodemus he

he

phrases

it, in drink (I76b4).

the first two

entrance comes at the point at which said

he is to
was

speak after

of several elegant orations:

it

tophanes speak, but there chanced

(rvxdv)

to come upon him to

necessary (deiv) that Aris a certain hiccough

speak"

from

some

fullness
of

or other cause and

was not able

(185C5-7). The
reflect on

hiccoughs

Aristophanes have in the

caused

many

a commentator

to

the

significance of the change

need

order of

the speeches. For our purposes, we

Aristophanes'

merely note on one level that they are a sign of his body. Most of the others at Agathon's house are similarly bodies
topic
of a

bondage to

controlled

by

their

bondage

which

has

allowed them this

are not

evening to
of

discourse

on the

love. Like Cephalus, they

avenues of

true

lovers

speech;

they

turn to

logos because the

bodily

satisfaction

have been

closed to them

by

earlier excesses and the current weakness of their

bodies.
progression of

However,
and

the

hiccoughs

also change the

orderly

the speeches
and a

introduce the theme

of xvxn.

Chance

appears to place

Eryximachus

Aristophanes in direct
pair

counterpoint with each other.

visions of and

Their

speeches

become

politics

offering opposing humanity, reality in the world. Eryximachus talks about order, the xoouog (i87d5), the
the place of
and

zexvn and

beauty

harmony
And
yet

of that order.

Occasionally

that order must be reasserted

through the efforts of the

condition.

doctor's craft, but order is for Eryximachus the natural the hiccoughs of Aristophanes had come by chance, dis
which

rupting the order of the speeches

had been

agreed

to

in

an

orderly

vote of

The Net of Hephaestus

the

19
need to

dinner

party.

The hiccoughs
and

be treated

mony, the
as

tickling

the

sneezing to
the
and a

which

by creating yet more dishar Aristophanes must subject himself

Eryximachus
sugar and
with

the doctor

discourses

on

harmony

of the universe. nature

his

vision of a natural

harmony

benevolent

is the

coating for the

about and about the

harsh reality that Aristophanes has to teach

the

us about

love

ourselves,

inadequacy

of medicine as practiced

by

doctors
about

of the

body,

tyranny

of nature.

While Eryximachus talks

order, Aristophanes reveals

shows
never

human suffering (ndd-og). It is the comic poet who doctor (i89di; I9id2; I93d5) as Eryximachus could

love to be indeed
do.

Eryximachus,
as

who envisioned nature as made politics

inherently harmonious,

ignored

polit

ical life. Indeed, he

tor's art assures
other and are
us

irrelevant. Politics
of

as the resolution of

conflict,

the choice of actions, as the protection that that

order exists

the city can be ignored for the doc

by

nature.

Opposites

complement each nature and

drawn

by

nature

into
life

harmonious

Aristophanes'

whole. not

il

lustrates

none of

this harmony. His own

political

body

is

harmonious

the nature

he describes demands
which arises

as a means to work against the chaotic world and the

disharmony within our beginning of his speech Eryximachus suggests that he will complete the speech offered by Pausanias, whose own speech was not sufficiently completed (otx Ixavcbg cxnexEksoe, i85d7-i86ai). Eryximachus initially has a vision of the world in which comple
our selves which the

from

individual incompletion
cannot always

doctor

easily heal. At the

tion

is possible; it is necesssry
conclusion of
order

thst

(i86ai). At the
completion.

his

speech

he try to put sn end (xekog) to the speech Eryximachus no longer pretends to

The

is

placed

in

question

he has posited, the possible comprehension of the whole as he suggests now that Aristophanes fill in (dtvankngcooai)
out

what

he, Eryximachus, has left

His
as

(i88e3). Aristophanes
men

abhors a
eager

vacuum; any
to fill up the

emptiness offends.

comedies

holes in their bodies. But

makes more apparent

parody he fills up the holes in

and

(and women)

Eryximachus'

speech, he

the incompletion of the human form and thus the

impossi
reflec

bility
tions

of ever
assume.

achieving the
Aristophanes'

harmony
the

filling

in

Eryximachus'

which

destruction

of

this vision will set the scene for So

which

crates'

more elaborate account of

harmony

eventually

arises

from

and

transcends the

bodily disharmony
begin to look
at

Aristophanes

describes.3

Let

us now

the

actual speech of

Aristophanes. The task

which of

Aristophanes

sets

for himself is to discover the

good

power

(dvvauig, 189C5, d4)

love; he specifically does not talk of and earthly love as the two previous
had
given

love

speakers

bad love, of heavenly love had. All three previous speakers

and

to love a

moral

value,

seen

it

within

the context of virtue and vice.

comedies

Aristophanes
3.
who

eschews such an approach.

Throughout his

he had

sug-

Edelstein

(1945)

makes a valiant effort

to

resurrect

Eryximachus before

generations of readers

have

scoffed at this pompous

doctor. The

argument

from the

perspective of

dramatic

role

is

persuasive

but it falls

short when considered

in

conjunction with what

exactly Eryximachus

says.

20
gested

Interpretation
the
problem of which we

cording to
pretend conflict

establishing a standard capable of objective verification might be able to measure what is good and bad. He does

ac
not

to discover one

here

either.

Rather, his

concern

in this

speech

is

with

the

between

men and

vinity and the alien Aristophanes begins

gods, love's role in making hostile forces that tyrannize men.

men powerful against

di

by describing

love

as most

friendly

to mankind,

tpikav-

&gcojx6xaxog (iSgcS-di). In Greek thought Prometheus

thropist. The
role
metheus'

was

the famous philan

story of Prometheus is told twice in Hesiod's poems; in both, Pro is to heighten the conflict between men and gods. As he helps men,
gods'

he does nothing to assuage the hostility towards them. Prometheus in his love for mankind had given them the fire he stole. He thereby gave them the
power

to survive on their own, to learn to tame the

natural

forces

of the gods and

to become civilized rather than bestial creatures. Thus both Prometheus and
Aristophanes'

Eros

show their

philanthropy
mentions at

hostile divinity. Aristophanes

should
gods.

by helping men in opposition to the the beginning of his speech that love

have the sacrifices, the temples, the altars which men reserve for the He is replacing the Olympisn divinities with s truly philsnthropic force
towards the easing of
pain rather

which works

than

its

exacerbation.

The inver

sion
of

is

captured

by

the notion that

we are

to

be

"initiated"

into

love's

power.4

The

phrase recalls
praise of

the mystery

religions.

understanding Both Pausanias and

an

Eryximachus in their

love found the

good

love in the

heavenly love,
the gods of

rather than the popular

love.

They

looked towards the Olympians

the city
wards

for their

model of

their orderly noble

with all

the popular religious

forces

homosexual relations, not to their passionate human frenzy. Aris

to the noble and orderly. It the
Olympians'

tophanes rejects the Olympian

visions.

The love he describes is passionate; it

does is
a

not

justify

itself through

reason or with appeals

power,

a primal

force

which

does

not

depend

on

approval.

He intends to
about

educate

others,

make them
men are

teachers ready to proselytize to others

the

power of

love. All

to learn that
prophet.5

love, like Prometheus, is

its philanthropy Aris to female seers, but to the he turns to the

cpikav&gcoTCog

and that

Aristophanes is his
power of

In

order

to

describe the

love

and explain

tophanes turns not to psychology, not to armies nor

fantastical images image

of

which are

the

mark of

his trade.
or could

Specifically

the human

being

as

he

once was

inings
nature.

of an

Aristophanes. Aristophanes
past was

offers us a

have been only in the imag picture of a changing human

what

The

different from the

nature

present and the present

from the future. Human

is

not static.

In the past, in

may be different I shall call Time

the

A,

there were

according to

Aristophanes'

mythology three

sexes

double

4.
5.
claim

Bury (1909;
that

p.

56) translates
pp.

Elcrrjyrjaaa&ai
on

(i89d3 )

as

"initiate

into."

Cf. Rosen (1968;

Aristophanes'

144-45)

speech

is filled
(p.

Prometheus. However, I disagree profoundly with Rosen's for the Olympians and that his "philwith
"philotheism"

otheism

is the

same as

his

patriotism"

121).

The Net of Hephaestus

male, the double
male and

21
the
hermaphrodite.6

female,

and

Now there

are

only two, the

the

female. Who knows how many there will be in the future? This portrait of the changing human form raises important questions about
the

status of

nature, the cpvoig,

to

of

the human being. If human nature

is changing,
described

where are we gested one of

existed

find

our standard of

the good human form? The problem is sug

"androgyne"

by Aristophanes
the three sexes is

himself. The term

which once
7

by

nature as a natural perfection

simply a term of reproach now (i 8962-5). What once human form has been destroyed. Perhaps a new has
yet

form

of

human between

to arise. When the Sophists introduced the

and

conflict

nature and

convention, cpvoig

vouog, cpvoig

was seen as unlike

permanent, the

standard

by

which we could evaluate good and

bad;

the

variable world of

vouoi, it offered

a measure which might

be true in Persia

and

in

Greece. With his myth, Aristophanes raises standard to be what once was by nature or

questions about that measure. what

Is the

is

now

form

understood

by

what we see around us

today
look
mired

and

by nature? Is the human beauty defined by the

for
an understand

perfection of that

form Are
we

or can

we,

must we

elsewhere

ing

of perfection?

left

by

Aristophanes

in

a world of relativity?

It is

at this point

that eros enters into

Aristophanes'

analysis, for it is eros that

tells us what our true nature

is,

that drives us towards our ancient perfection. The

contemporary human form is not the true form, not the real xekog according to Aristophanes, because it is a form characterized by a sense of loss, of pain, of
what

Aristophanes it
alerts us

chooses to call
what we

cause

to

love. Love is worthy of being honored be halves and shows us whst we csn really are beings
st a

strive to

be
and

wholes

instesd

of psrtisl

distance from

our

true selves.

Pausanias
to their

Eryximachus had tried to

separate good and

own prejudices.

Pausanias had tried to justify

bad loves according his vision of the good love

with an appeal

to virtue, but as his own reporting of the varied customs through

virtue

out

Greece suggests,

is

not

had found his

Aristophanes'

vision of good own

easily identified within the city. Eryximachus an order that had been belied by love in order

loves

and

hiccoughs. Aristophanes turns away from these good and bad instead finds in love the drive to become sgsin whst we once were. The is
rejected snd sncient nature

evslustive stsndards of the two previous speskers

becomes

again

the

standard. recover

We know that it is the true, final form because love

forces

us to

seek, to

it. The drive

or

longing (noftog)
and

that

love is

comes

from the

pain

(jiaftog)

of our present

state,

it is

pain

that uncovers truth

(19135-6). 8

Why
egcog

then

for Aristophanes is

our ancient

form

our xekog?

It is

form

without
absence

(pain) because it is
p.

self-complete.

Its

spherical shape

indicates the

"double-male"

6. As Neumann (1966;
since

421)

notes there are problems with

which

the

original

beings

were not own

double,

using the phrase implies divisibility, but unified unities.

a portrayal of

Aristophanes'

7.

Cf.

Thesmophoriazusae for

Agathon

as such a shameful

androgyne.

8. Consider the frequent

references

to pain and truth in

Alcibiades'

speech.

22
of a

Interpretation
or an end.

beginning

It

requires

interdependence among the spherical for the sake of procreation. The absence
humsn. Their
strive, that
perfection mskes them

nothing bodies.

more to

be

complete.9

There is
other,
rather

no

They

do

not need each

even

of need makes them

divine

than
can

the models towsrds

which

humans

is,

the gods we have now are inferior representations of

perfection.

The
cal

ancient spherical

beings,

our

ancestors,

are our

true

gods.

There is

no politi

life among these ancient beings. There are no families. Both lies (and lovers) indicate the absence of perfection. Both reveal
creatures who cannot survive or procreate on

cities and

fami fami
not

men as needful

their own. Political life and

spherical creatures

lies feel.

arise

from

a sense of

partiality, something these

do

The

sense of completion and wholeness gives to

wondrous strength and

these ancient creatures, in ad

and proud
looks.10

dition to their What

and are

speed, terrible thoughts

against

these great thoughts? Rebellion

the

gods.

In their

completion

fullness they no longer need the gods as the mortals of later time, those to whom Aristophanes spesks, shsll. Wholeness opens the door for impiety be
csuse

it

rsises

the question of our need

for the divinities. When

men sre

psrtisl,

piety Pride
and

re-enters ss s confirmstion of our comes

inadequacy
not

and

dependence
a sense of

on others.

from the
pride

arrogance of

completion,

from

inadequacy
the

it is this

that leads the ancient beings to contemplate the gods because

an attack on

gods.

have.

They They rise up because

not attack

do

they desire to have

what

the gods

their completion engenders the rebellion against the

arrogance."

Aristophanes Ephialtes
two
and

compares

immortals to the
where we

actions of

Otus. The story is told in the

that that

Odyssey

learn that these

were giants even as children and

they

"made threats/ against the immor

the turmoil of battle with all its

tal gods on

Olympus,

they

would carry/

(xi. 312-14) [Lattimore trans.]. However, we csn many sorrows against not ignore a different story told about these two in the Iliad. There we learn of

them"

Dione, comforting Aphrodite

Dione
remarks on

who

has been injured

by

the mortal Diomedes.

the pains that the gods on Olympus must suffer

from

mortals:

"Ares had to

endure

it

when

him in bonds that

chained
perished"

were

strong Ephialtes too strong for him/

rescued at

and and

Otus/

sons of

Aloeus,
of

chained

three months and ten he

lay

in the brazen had he

not

cauldron;/ and now might

Ares, insatiable

fighting

have

been

the last moment

by

Hermes (v. 375-91)

story?

[Lattimore trans.]. What

and
9.
and

portrait of the gods

is

painted

in this

The three

ten months that Ares remained chained is a period without conflict among
Cf. Nussbaum (1979;
p. 139 and p. 171, n. 13) for her discussion of and Aristotle's conceptions of divinity. relationship to Bury (1909; p. 58) translates ra (fgovijpiaxa ^icyaka (I90b6) as
Xenophanes'

the spherical creatures

their
10.

"high-minded"

or

"proud

looks."

1 1

We

cannot

here ignore the

question of

achieves prepares

him to

revolt against

the Olympian

Socratic piety the completion which Socrates gods. Consider how Socrates is called arrogant
Alcibiades'

(hubristic) in
and

this dialogue

(I75e2;

2i5b7; 219C5), how impervious he is to

affections,

how in this dialogue he

claims to

know (I77d6~7).

The Net of Hephaestus

Ares'

23
The
gods

mortals.

release unleashes again the pains and sufferings of war.

do

not

story

of

only give gifts to mortals; they are the cause of much hardship (as the Prometheus shows as well). Had the assault of Otus and Ephialtes been

successful,

they

would

have

accomplished great things.

Had the

assault of

the

high-minded
plished great

spherical

things, for example, (jia.'&ogl no-Qog) for

mortals.12

beings been successful, they too would have eternal happiness and the absence

accom of pain

The
met

spherical counsel

humans

of

Time A
on

were not successful counter

in their

revolt.

The

gods
con

in

to

discourse

how to

the attsck. The gods

here, in

trast to the sphericsl rebels, sppear

pend on men must

human,

with political

institutions.

They

de

to give them honors and to send them

against

sacrifices.

The human

gods

defend themselves
Their

the divine
on others

politicized.

dependency
The

To do this they must become leads to the development of political

mortals.

life. Had they killed them all

same

not needed off.

men,

they simply

could

have disregarded

men and

challenge put

before them is to

keep

men alive at
gods'

the

time that men are

made

their servants. The solution to the

dilemma is
It

arrived at mskes

by

Zeus

who

in

most

human

humsns

wesker st

the ssme

ungodly fsshion devises time that it makes them more

and
and

s plsn which

numerous.13

is

a plan which
similar

forces

men

into families

into

political

life,

that

is,

makes

them
what

to the gods

shall call

ruling over them. The first step in this process leading to Time B is the famous splitting of the round human beings in humans
as partial and
all

half. Zeus is to longer hsve lack

make

incomplete is
now

as

he is.

They

can no

proud

thoughts since

the attention

focused

on what

they

their partner, their other

from

one many and While they were spherical, these beings were associated with the heavenly bodies, the double men with the sun, the hermaphrodites with the moon, the dou

half. From unity they have become divided in multiplicity there is weakness.

ble

women with split

the earth.

They

were

luminous in their divine

origins.14

Upon

being
like

by

the fearful

objects such as one might

Olympians they are transformed into lowly objects find on the dinner table of s poor pessant. They are
or

an

egg
art

split

by

hair,

they

are

like flat fish

and when

Apollo

applies

his

healing
move

they

are compared to a sow's

bladder. As

a result of their

slicing,

they
one

from the

heavenly
a

realm

to the mundane world of

food. Apollo is the humans

who refashions

these new human shapes and works much like a shoemaker with

last. He leaves

few

wrinkles around puts

the navel to remind

of the

"an

suffering,"

cient

as

Aristophanes
what we

it. But the language is have felt

since

not precise.

The

suffering is present,
We

feel

now and

the slicing. What is

12.
13.

should also consider p.

here the tale

the

of rebellion

Aristophanes tells in The Birds.

Bury (1909;

59)

suggests

irony of Zeus
that the

the omniscient

"cudgel(ing) his brains

over

the

business!"

14.
of

Neuman (1966;
these divinities

p.

422)

suggests

heavenly

bodies indicate the barbarian

proclivities we must

these spherical

beings, descendants
in
contrast

of

divinities

worshipped

by

non-Greeks.

However,

consider

to what

they become.

24
ancient

Interpretation
and now

lost

is

a sense of completion and wholeness.

The heads
reminded

of

the split beings are turned around so that men are to be constantly the sight of these ugly wrinkles of what
gods

by

they had been

and of the power of the

to

destroy
of

that human

perfection. of

The tale
the warring

Aristophanes is the tale

the conflict between

gods.

men and gods

speech niggardly Aristophanes urges us to be pious, but he himself is not pious. He mocks and be littles the gods at the same time that he invokes a piety based on fear. The hu

which must go on with

the

Throughout the

viewing their cut forms from terror and not from love
mans
phanes'

accept as

the rule of

Zeus, but

the

order

then comes

Eryximachus

pictures

nose and price which often about order

his is

consequent not pleasant

sneezing created to pay (18933-4). Zeus

He is
and a tyrant

it. The tickling of Aristo order. Order is bought at a

with

his

plan

brings

by destroying

an ancient unity.

his

own

self-interest, the honors he desires

for controlling the sacrifices he craves. Our na

others

vels and the wrinkles around them serve the same

function

as men

hanged in the
remind us of
simple na

city

square or

heads

on stakes at

the outskirts

of

the city do.

They

the power of the tyrant to

vel which enters

human It

destroy those who history at the same

and

threaten his position.

Our

time as eros reveals our dependence

on

divine

authority.

reminds us of our

as our present

inadequacy
the

former glory and high thoughts, as well dependence on others, humans as well as gods.

Eros is As

our response to the

of rebellion against

often

tyranny of Zeus. Our honor for love is our only form tyranny of the gods left to us. happens, however, the tyrannical exercise of power misfires. The
Zeus
creates

suffering

which

in his

subjects

is too

great.

The

screws are

being
can

twisted too tightly. The people cannot respond to a tyrant so violent; all
acknowledge

they

is their
snd

Zeus'

pain.

aims are thwarted as men spend their time

fsil to

give

him his

desired honors
other

sscrifices;

they

instesd searching for their

half,

the wholeness

they

once

had. Instead
now

of

having

twice as many ser

so

vants, as he had

initially

anticipated, Zeus

has

none.

Humans
own

busy

pursu

ing

their mates not only

and rest.

ignore the
race

for food

The human

they ignore their in Time B is dying off.

gods,
sexual procreation.

bodies'

demands

Again Zeus devises

which

a Lcnxavr):

The xc'c&og

and jto#oc

had

controlled

the half-beings in their search for their mate up to this point

had been

asexual.

The

longing

for unity
met

with another mate

had had nothing to do

with

genital contact.

When they had

their

or one that

they hoped

might

be
all

their mate
need other

they

would stand with

their arms around one another,

ignoring

for food, clothing and shelter. The pain of separation had overriden all pains. Procreation in Time B had been accomplished from the earth not
each

from

other, that

is,

not

sexually, but
there

by

autochthony.

We

can question whether

was procreation

in Time A. The spherical be but

no reference

ings

are

described

as exyovov of

the

heavenly bodies,

is

made to
of

birth among these

creatures.

The

absence of generation

is

an

indication

their
dis-

original perfection.

Seth Benardete (1963) in his

article on

Plato's Statesman

The Net of Hephaestus

cusses with regard

25
obvious absence of eros and sexual repro ruled

to that

dialogue the

duction in the
prived of

golden age when

Cronos

the

universe.

"The human herd de

any desire beyond itself necessarily leads to men of the golden age who apparently have neither philosophy nor the use of their sexual organs. As they spring up already perfect and then live their lives backwards, they lack on all lev
'potentiality.'

els

They
the

are

born

are"

what

they

(p.

199).

Benardete's

comments

are relevant
cerned with
of

for understanding

Aristophanes'

speech as well.

Benardete is

con

form,

the eidog which precludes eros, just as the

spherical shape

Aristophanes'

original creatures

had

precluded eros.

Both

represent comple

tion and the absence of potentiality,

one

being

other and more complete than what

currently is. In

such

circumstances,

procreation

is

not

only impossible, but

which men are now

unnecessary.15

Aristophanes'

ancient nature

is that human eldog towards

forced to direct themselves

these humsns attempting to

after

they

are split

by

the gods.

However,

st

first,

re-assert

their sncient eldog destroy themselves. Eros

these

in Time B, when there is no sexuslity and only longing, leads to death. It is to the humans that Aristotle refers in his discussion of unity from diversity individuals for
that
whom

the

discovery

of the appropriate mate

is

of such

importance
unity.

they destroy
a

themselves and each other

of and shelter

their

diversity

in their

It

is

kills them; the unity which they only clothing despite their transforms them into beings who no longer show achieve, diversity, any potential. They are whatever they might be. At such a point they need no
not

lack

that

others;

they become
politicsl

asocial and apolitical.

In Aristotle's

model

they become

ei

ther gods or beasts.

The

is the

reslm

inhsbited

by those who remsin in s stste

to
attain

of potential

ity
in

that
our

is,

who are still

dependent

on others

their telos. When the split towards which we

forms occurs, the

driven

ancient nature remains a standard

strive snd sre

not

by

the force of eros.

Our
our

ancient nature shows what we are

and

but

what we might

be. It incorporates

potentiality

it is just

our poten

tiality

that moves us into the world of politics. Again Benardete helps to explain:
are without
. .

"Arithmetic handles beings that

spherical men of our ancient

having

become [for example, the

natures]

become. It deals
mans

with

beings that have

eros"

but statesmanship handles beings that (p. 201). When Zeus splits his hu
them into the world of
rather
po

in half he takes away their

and social of rather

perfection and casts

litical
metic

interdependence,

the realm of

statesmanship

than arith

antiquity

than modernity.
created

Zeus

who

had

inadvertently

eros,

is

no

longer threatened

by rebellious

humans; in Time B he is threatened by their death. By giving them sexuality in what we shall call Time C he gives life back to them. Eros is thus transformed
from
a source of

death to

one of

by

placing the genitals in front and "through these

See Neuman's discussion (1965)
of

life. Zeus introduces sexuality among humans he made generation through

15.

Diotima's

speech and

the

nature of reproduction

there.

26

Interpretation
$r\keij"

the msle in the femsle (dia xov aggevog ev xco

(191C3-4). Now the

penetration

unity is no longer the clssping which leads to the creation of only

takes
consequence. place.

of srms around

the other but includes

a new

individual. Generation, though, is

achieved when

not

the

There is
of

now

the satiety that is

unified

copulation

Instead

striving to be
used

always, unity

can

be

achieved and

then relaxed.

The term

to express this

(191C6)
satisfied,

the same fullness that caused

men are able and want
of

Aristophanes'

satiety is fullness, jiknouovr] hiccoughs (185C6). Once last forever.

men can

to turn to other activities. Hephaestus well

understood

that the

love-making
ceases at

Ares

and

Aphrodite

could not

The desire for unity

the

moment

that

fullness is

achieved. gods

Thus

live,

can

turn to other activities

can

indeed honor the

and offer

them

sacrifices.

Eros
when

during

Time B turns

us

During Time
race

sexuality is introduced at B there can be no art,

governed

away from daily chores and thus kills us. Only Time C are we able to take care of ourselves.
no

philosophy, no

is

exclusively

by

the eros

for

one's ancient

family, no city; the human form, one's true na

ture. At Time C we are released from the unrelenting power of eros to build other
realms of satisfaction.

Satiety

allows us

spite our partiality. our

Eros draws
potential

sexuality

and

the

for activity which enables us to survive de back to our original natures, but it is precisely for sexual satisfaction that prevents us from be
soothing
our pain as

coming
ment,
gods.
which

what we once were.

By
of

the result of sexual

fulfill

by

making We become ignorant Aristophanes

us

disregard

our

telos,

we are able which

to become the servants of the

us and

the chains

the gods have put over

of our pain

reveals

to us. The

soothing

through sexuality

makes us eager servants.

The

sexual eros that arises

trayed

by

Aristophanes

as a trick of

the gods to

during Time C is thus por keep the human race alive. It

does

from the pity which Zeus felt for the human species. Zeus does not have pity in mind; he has self-interest. What Aristophanes offers is not a praise of eros such as Phaedrus had requested.
not come as

Aristophanes had

at

first

suggested

Instead he

uses

temples and

his story of love to damn the gods. His plea to honor love with sacrifices is part of his arrogant rebellion against the Olympians.
spends a as partial

Aristophanes
tence in Time

fair

portion of
.

his

speech

describing
was

our current exis

beings If

our original

form

that of the hermaphro

dite,

we

turn for

sexual satisfaction

to members of the opposite sex; the result

is

child and

in

some cases the

family. The

family becomes
Nevertheless,

the expression

of

the

search

for

one's original

unity transformed into

a complex of when

individuals inter

Aristophanes him in Time C, he makes them adul terers. He ignores the family. Is this because eros is not part of the family once it has been created; that is, the family serves as a whole which brings men back to
acting to preserve their
self
mutual existence.

describes the life

of the original androgynes

their original unity, but does not need eros to remain together.
serves

Custom

now pre

that unity and replaces eros as the means to meld two or more

into

one.

The

other unions

Aristophanes describes, those

which come

from the

original

The Net of Hephaestus

double dition.
men and

27

double

women are not sanctioned

by

custom or preserved

by tra

They rely Aristophanes talks They

will

on our

drive to

regain our original

form.
men.

at greatest

length

about

the double

These

are the ones

who receive

the greatest praise:

they
each

are

the

bravest,

the

most

(I92a2).

find satiety in

other, but satiety in this

case

manly by nature does not lead

to natural offspring.
of politics and cerned with of

They

thus turn themselves to other tasks

polis.

namely, the tasks

the creation of the civilized world of the

which says

They
and

are uncon part

the public opinion

that

they

must

marry

become

community which produces children. The family unity draws men away from the polis, from the public life in which they might demonstrate their cour
age and their manliness.
and

the

Offspring

do

not

divert their

attention

from
born

great

deeds

thus

Aristophanes claims, "upon

into
jrokixixa"

becoming

mature, these sorts

also

of males

alone go

xa

(i92a6-7). Political life is thus

which

of our sexu

ality, but the

vidual after

homosexuality
attracted

does

not make

lasting
case

demands
in the

on

the indi the

the moment of satiety, as

would

be the

structure of

family. Men
and

to political life "love young boys and do

opposition at

not

love

marriage

childrearing"

(i92bi). In

to Aristotle's later
whom

formulations,

the

family
worthy

is

not

necessarily natural,

least for those

Aristophanes

considers

of praise.

Why

does Aristophanes have this is

not

view of

the

family? For him

procreation or

reproduction

the aim of

eros.

Genesis is

was no part of

the life we once

requires no

led; if

there was any

participation.

birth, it

was autochthonous and

autochthony If
nature

female

Heterosexual
of our

genesis

a response

to and evidence of our subordi

nation

to the gods,

contemporary

weakness.

is

what

existed

in Time

A,

then marriage cannot

be based

on nature.

The

males

is old, what in Ari

Mar

stophanes'

riage

story are forced (c\vayxat,ovxai, I92b2) to marry by thus becomes sanctified by the gods as a means of keeping
powerful
.

custom.
men

from be

coming too
gods

The

family

prevents men

again, from

finding

once again power

from uniting and threatening the and arrogance in unity such as their

ancestors

had

experienced.

The city is based on the exclusion of the female. Procreation in the family is based on the union of opposites whereas the double males, who are political, de light in those
who are similar

[xd duoiov (ig2a^)

similarity,

and to

political realm

is the

arena of

where one

ovyyeveg (19205)]. The is free through interaction

men who are

with those who are similar. one

Freedom is to live among

the same as
concept of

who share similar values and on

have

similar potential.

The Greek

ikev&egla is dependent
confines of

the

family

life among those who are similar. To live within the is to live among differences and therefore not to be free,
than nature.
Socrates'

but bound

by

custom rather

Aristotle in the Politics

similarity: we cannot

criticizes

city

as

he

argues against

too much

There

must

only city be diversity. On the other hand, in Book III

the unity which comes

have

comprised

of

doctors
of

or

only

of carpenters.

the

Politics, Aristotle
must

emphasizes

from

similarity between citizens; they

28
all

Interpretation
able

be

to engage in reasoned

discourse. Again Aristotle

nor can

returns

to the

men.

There

cannot

be too

much

diversity

there be too
of eros and

much similarity.

The

city is

Aristophanes'

a midpoint.
nature appears

description

the drive back to the

originally destructive of the city. But with the intro duction of sexuality the city can arise and become the arena for those who are similar in their masculinity, but not self-destructive in the monomaniacal search
original

for

union.

Aristotle may indeed be criticizing the lovers

part of
,

of

Time B but

not of

Time C.

Whereas in the first between Time B focus

and

his

speech

Time C towards the

we shall see

Aristophanes had distinguished clearly end of his speech he begins to conflate

the two. This happens as

on

the

body

and

because he slyly moves from an exclusive its drives to the psyche. He no longer distinguishes be
The

tween the three original sexes. He talks about all and describes the chance meet

ing
ual.

of those

"made"

for

each other.

encounter with our true mate occurs

by

chance as we all go

running

around the world

searching for that

elusive

individ

ing

in

The meeting is not predetermined and we may spend our whole lives search one vain. The naturally orderly universe which Eryximachus envisions
Aristophanes'

disturbed occasionally by the bad sort of love does not exist in model. For him, the world is as chaotic as the hiccoughs which interrupted the
order of

this most orderly symposium. If and

one

when one

does

finally

chance on

is wondrously struck by the olxeioxng (192CI), the sense that mate, the other is one's own, belongs to one. One is moved by the feeling that this is
one's someone who
unified so as sense.

is kindred. This is the

person made

for me,

with whom

can

be

to end all pain, all the seemingly ceaseless searching, all the chaos I
not propose random promiscuous

Aristophanes does
to the

joinings

of

bodies

as

the

resolution

search

for the

other.

There is

one

body,
we

one specific other to

whom we can attach

ourselves.16

This

no specific qualities of goodness or

body which badness, beauty or

other

may

chance on

has

ugliness, brown
not

or red

hair
the

which evoke our sense of awe upon

discovery. We do

desire

union with

other

because he

or she

is beautiful

just because there is

attempt

a certain own

kindred it is the

sense.

The

values of

Pausanias in his
Love is
not

to

justify

his
of

homosexual

longings

are avoided.

for Aristophanes the love logos

or

beauty

love

of ourselves.

It is based

not on

reason, but simple passion. Eros for

Aristophanes is thus
In his description
those
we of

neither orderly, nor necessarily directed towards the good. Apollo's surgery he has shown us how ugly are the bodies of desire covered with full of holes wrinkles, paunchy, of

quite unlike

the perfection

the spherical shapes and

hardly the

image

of

beauty

itself. Yet

we overlook all

that is ugly and grotesque and see only

something kin

dred in

our mate.

At this

point the

bodies

round

bodies,

cut

bodies, sewn-up bodies, ugly

on a specific other with reference

16.

Nussbaum (1979) describes the importance

Alcibiades'

of this

focus

to

the significance of

speech.

The Net of Hephaestus

bodies
yield

29 has
no shape and
with

to that which
can

is incapable

of

being cut

or

sewn,

namely the soul. We

Aristophanes
under

love those
control

Plato's in the

wrinkled, paunchy bodies because begins to abstract from the body. The pain
thus no longer satisfied

is

no

longer

sensed

body

and

by

physical, sex

ual

union.

Those is

made

for

each

other

desire to live
192C2-3).17

out their

lives together

(diaxekovvxeg
now

uex'

c\kkr\kcov not

did. fiiov

This

love, Aristophanes

tells us,

192C5).

simply sexual coupling (r) xcov ticpgodioicov ovvovoia Now that the soul has been introduced, sexuality which had freed men

to pursue other tasks

movement

is

no

longer

an

adequate release

from

pain.

With this

from the

body

to the soul, the needs which are

felt become ineffable.

Men

cannot express what elneiv

they desire:
are able

odd'

av elneiv exoiev what

(192C2)

and

ov

bvvaxai

(i92di). We

to articulate

the

body

needs when we

talk about sexual union,

sexual

but

now with reference or

to the soul simple descriptions of

are quite

couplings, be

they homosexual

heterosexual,
a

inadequate. The

human for

being

split as a

body,

now also

has

double

soul.

The

soul of one

longs
the

a permanent union with the soul of no

the other, a permanent union

allows
Zeus'

which

body

longer

the cessation the body's

because its sexuality from permanent longing.

needs

for momentary satisfaction and gift of sexuality has placated only

the soul.

longing, but it has ignored

point whole

the

pain of

It is does

at

this

that Aristophanes turns to the

image

Hephaestus'

of

net.

He

not

tell the

story

of

the adulterous lovers

not

caught against

their will

by

the shrewd Hephaestus. He does

goddesses'

gods'

tell of the

uproarious

Hermes'

shame or

he has Hephaestus
upon each other.

offer

his

net

desire to be eternally bound with lovers once they have to

Aristophanes'

laughter, of the beauty. Rather,

chanced and say:
so as not

He is to
to

appear

before them

with

the tools of

his trade
other,

Are
to

you eager

for this,
together

become

as much as possible

joined

with each

leave

one another neither night nor

day. If you

are eager

for this, I

and weld you one so you

long

as you

die,

there

(ovLicpvorjoai) so that being two you will live; as one you will live in common with one another and when again in Hades, having died, you will be one in common instead of two.

willing to fuse become one and be

am

But think if
upon

you

long

for (igdxe) this

and

if it is

sufficient

for

you should you chance

it (I92d3-e5). offer, Aristophanes asserts,

would

Hephaestus'

be

rejected

by

no one.

Hephaes
to

tus offers the lovers the opportunity for revenge

give

on

the gods, for

he

proposes

to

mortals

dence

on their as

the opportunity to bodies. Bodies having

of

make

light

of

their mortality, of their

split cannot

depen
perma

once

been

be joined

Time B discovered, without death and the separation nently, bodies then implies. Hephaestus turns not to the body but to which death for their
the humans the soul
of
with

his

net as

he talks

about a

life together
of the

after

death

a continuation as

human
17.

identity

after

death. The mortality

body
out

becomes irrelevant
diareXsa),
thus

Pausanias death

expresses

the same thought

(i8id) but leaves

at

the

ignoring

the

issue

of

which

Aristophanes introduces

this point in his speech.

30
the

Interpretation

joining of the lovers ignores the limits which the bodies create. Aristotle was right. Unity of bodies alone is impossible alone without death, while unity of souls is possible only after death. By preserving the unity of body and soul, he
allows

for the city,

earlier

which

ultimately fails to satisfy

speech

even

the double

men

of

Aristophanes.

Whereas
of

in

Aristophanes'

bodies had

mingled under
relevant.

the control

love,

now

that the souls are mingling death ceases to be

with whom

Unlike the
who

dead Achilles
would wish

Odysseus

speaks

in Book XI

of the

Odyssey,

the life even of a serf to a lotless man, the dead bound

by

He

phaestus'

net
achieved

do

not wish

life but

are satisfied with

the

wholeness which possession of

Aristophanes'

death. In death they have their bodies had denied them. Aris If love is
so

totle in his reference to

speech understands this.

strong for another, if the two indeed become one and self-complete, life itself ceases to be important. Human life is characterized specifically by potential. The net of Hephaestus as Aristophanes presents it offers an escape from that potential

by destroying
value of

the meaning
on

of

mortality for

humans.18

The city depends

on

the to

life,

the

acceptance of

the mortality

of one's

body

and the need

deal

with

that mortality. The obverse view of those who can

ignore their bodies

is that

neither net of

the city

nor

death

matter.

The

comedies of
cannot

can only be offered to us in the speech or Aristophanes. Hephaestus does not stand before us; the souls of two

Hephaestus, though,

be bound together
life

by the

tools

of a smithy.

The

search

for

our ancient na

ture the

when we were whole mortsl

(okoi, I92ei)

must

be

carried on within

the reslm

of

of our

bodies. And Aristotle's

predictions

hold: the

complete

melding of those bodies would mesn desth. We knowledgment that the net even if available
our

must struggle with

the tragic ac
us overcome

could never

help

partiality Aristophanes from Aristophanes

power over us

without

destroying
his

us.

It is in this way that Plato transforms

a plea

a comic artist to a

tragedian.

ends

speech with

for

piety.

The

gods retain their

precisely because the net of Hephaestus is unavailable, because we cannot insure our own completion and immortality by making death irrele vant. Because of an earlier injustice (xr)v cxdixiav, 19332) we were dispersed

(dicoxio&nuev, I93a2) by the god. The term is the opposite of the famous ovvoixiouogby which Theseus, in Attic legend, brought together the villages of
Attica to found the city of Athens. Aristophanes anachronistically compares the first splitting of the human race to the dispersal of the Arcadians.
gods'

Spartans'

The Arcadians had been disloyal to the Spartans, as in effect had the ings been to the Olympian gods. The Lacedaemonians exercised
18.

spherical

be

and demon-

Rosen (1968;

he takes the bad

"bad."

advice of

attainment of one's

suggests that because man is inarticulate concerning what he desires, Hephaestus. This advice, however, is only bad if one values life above the eidog. Certainly, the life of Socrates suggests that such advice is not unambig p.

153)

uously

The Net of Hephaestus

strated sented.
which

31

their power

by destroying the unity which the city of the Arcadians repre By dispersing them and destroying that unity, they obliterated any power
result of

that city might have had. Weakness came to the Arcadians as the
one another.

their

isolation from

The

punishment which

the gods imposed on

men paralleled

the punishment the Lacedaemonians imposed on the Arcadians

was

and

the purpose
can

the same

the

destruction

of unity. of

We

further

analogize and see

in the drive

the Arcadians to become a

city again the same drive, eros, that motivates men to seek their mates by nature. Not to live in the city is the consequence of a hostile power intent on preserving simi its own stature of dominance. The city in this analogy is the natural unit lar to our original nature. Not to be part of the city is to create pain and longing,
jiaftog
power

and

Jioftog, such as experienced

by

the divided beings

of

Time B

The

to create such pain

in

others

is divine.

Piety
able us

towards the gods who rule over us, according to

our natural

Aristophanes,

will en

to find

unity, just as subordination on the part of the Arcadi

allow

ans might

lead the Spartans to

the re-creation of their city.

Piety is

form be

of political

subjection, as Aristophanes portrays it. Should

are not

we not

be pious, he

warns, "if we
split and

gods,"

orderly (xoouioi) towards the become like figures on a bas relief, a oxrjkn,

we such as

may

once again

those which adorn

the graves of the dead (19334-6). In other words, the next split may mean our

death
Limited
mit

and without as we are

the net of Hephaestus around us that death has meaning. the union of bodies rather than souls, we are forced to sub

by

to the
us

power of

the gods. If we had that wondrous net, the power of the gods

to

keep

from

our wholeness would

be

no

threat. Without

it,

we are subjects of

the gods and

must give

them our sacrifices and honors. One way of showing

suggests

them this honor Aristophanes

eral

is

(rjyeucbv

xai oxgaxnyog,

I93b2).

by honoring love By honoring love

our

leader

and gen

we acknowledge

the

power of

the gods, we admit the pain we feel as the result of our actions against
accept

them and
release

the

fact that is

while sexual

satiety may have

admit

allowed us a certain

from that pain,

never will

the gods give to men surcease

from the
and

pain

in

their souls. Aristophanes

of

finally

forced to We

the domination

the gods as

well as

human

weakness.

cannot

fly

to heaven on

dung

supremacy beetles

nor return

from Hades to defend

our poetry.

The tragic

stage reveals our

limits. is

The task
cerned

of politics
with

is to unify many into

Aristophanes'

one.

parable
yet as

con

only

the making

of one out of two.

And

he

plays with

the

idea,
to

he

inadvertently

illuminates the

problem of politics.

What does it
our

mean

be
the

united with another or others?

How is

this reflected

by

understanding unity

of

relationship between
the finis
provide
ultimus

body

and soul?

What happens to the

not give

concept of

when

is

rejected?

Plato does

to Aristophanes the chance to

privileges
allow

the

final

answers

for

these questions.

Such

he

gives to none of
ab-

his

characters

not even

to Socrates. But he

does

Aristophanes in his

32

Interpretation
buffoon-like fashion
us

surd and

to give us the

image

of

the

net of

Hephaestus

and

thus

force

to consider whether
or

we would accept or reject

it if offered,

whether

we should

desire
or

fear unity,

whether eros

drives

us towards completion and

our unattainable

thus

death,

towards the constant but human search for

telos.

REFERENCES
Statesman,"

Benardete, Seth.
107:193-226.

1973.

"Eidos

and

Diaeresis in Plato's

Philologus,

Bury, R. G. 1909. The Symposium of Plato. Cambridge: Heffer. Dover, K. J. 1980. Greek Homosexuality. New York: Vintage Books, Random
House.

Edelstein, Ludwig.

1945.

"The Role

of

Eryximachus in Plato's
76:85-103.
Love,"

Symposium,"

Transactions of the American Philological Association,

Neumann, Harry. 1965. "On Diotima's Concept Philology, 86:33-59.

.

of

American Journal of

1966.

"On the

Comedy
1979.

of

Plato's

Aristophanes,"

American Journal of Philology,

87:420-26.

Nussbaum, Martha.
Symposium,"

"The

Speech

of

Alcibiades:

Reading

of

Plato's

Philosophy
1968.

and

Literature,

3:131-72.

Rosen, Stanley.

Plato's Symposium. New Haven: Yale

University

Press.

An Interpretation

of

Plato's Euthyphro

Marlo Lewis, Jr.

Claremont College

IV. Second Definition: What is Dear to the Gods is

Holy (6eio-9e9)
gods

Euthyphron
xoig

now offers

his

second

definition: What is dear to the

and what

(to
unholy.

fieoig ngoocpikeg, 6eio)

seems to one

is

holy,
with

is

not

dear to them is

Socrates
very know
teach

be delighted

this answer, and he suggests that it is the

he

was

whether

looking for. However, Socrates goes on to say, he does not yet the answer is true. But surely, he continues, Euthyphron will
course,"

him why it is true. "Of first examine what the statement they
The
god-beloved god-hated

replies the prophet.

means.

Socrates

suggests that

He then

advances

two propositions. the the

({rsocpikeg, qaf) thing and human being are holy, whereas (d-eouioeg, 7a8) thing and human being are unholy. Moreover,
these statements
as suitable

holy

and

the unholy are not the same but most opposite to each other.

Euthy

phron accepts

formulation

of

his

views.

What does Socrates

accomplish

by
a

First, he improves the definition from

contraries with contradictories.

reformulating Euthyphron's definition? logical standpoint. The prophet confused is dear to the
gods

If

what

is holy,

what

is

not

dear to them

be unholy; it may merely be not holy. In its original ver Euthyphron's answer reflected his hostility to the many; for most men are sion, presumably not dear to the gods. Second, Socrates enlarges the scope of the in
need not

Nearly all religionists suppose that what is loved or hated by the gods must holy or unholy. Equally common is the assumption that holy actions cannot also be unholy. This view would be correct if things are holy or unholy because in one of two distinct they By examining that view, Soc rates will be able to test indirectly whether there is a paradigmatic of holi ness. Finally, by making explicit Euthyphron's belief that human beings as well
quiry.

be

"participate"

"forms."

"idea"

as actions or

things can be dear to the gods, Socrates points to

another

facet

of

the

prophet's psychological makeup.

by

We have already seen that Euthyphron is a lover of justice; it should be clear now that he is also a lover of the gods. In general, men cannot help imitating

what

they ardently

admire.1

Euthyphron is

a case

in

point.

He

admires

the gods
and reli

too

much

merely to obey them.

Soaring

admiration,

zealous

devotion,
love.2

gious enthusiasm are all manifestations of

egcog

or passionate

"Egcog

is

born

is

imperfection, insufficiency, or neediness. Since it desire for something needed and lacking, it is essentially outward looking. It
of an awareness of one's

Plato, Republic
Plato, Phaedrus

377e-378b; 500c-d.
244b-e.

2.

34

Interpretation
attention of the self on produce

fixes the

things other than

of

self.

In

moments of peak

inten

sity, it may

those states

the soul called

ecstatic.

When egcog is
puts

moved

by

a sense of

imperfection,

it is

also upward

looking. The lover

things and

persons on pedestals;
holds"

he idealizes. It is in

a state of

ecstasy that the

prophet

"be

the highest or divine things.

poet,"

"Egcog frequently
baseness,
cide and
whose

plays

the

"lying

lending

the color of nobility to

Zeus'

morality to immorality. Euthyphron sees only justice in

much as a romantic

parri

usurpation,

charms

are commonplace or worse. so

lover may adore as And as egcog beings

a goddess a woman can

find

perfection

where none er's

exists,

too

can

it invent

perfect

which exist

only in the lov

imagination.

"Egcog is

god-forming

power.

The lover

seeks

to lose his separate

identity
unless

in

union with

the beloved. Simi

larly,
lover
great

the

mystic attempts

to transcend the beloved

selfhood

in

oneness with god. return.

But the
need not.

cannot

be

united with

he is loved in
when

If his

is
In

enough, he may convince himself he is loved

self-deception

in fact he is

Euthyphron's case, the

is unavoidable,

as

there are no gods at

hand to disillusion him.

But let
claims to us assume and

Euthyphron is every inch the

assumed

prophet and wise man

wisdom.

he

be,

let it further be

that the gods love

Still,

since

his

divine gift, he cannot legitimately take credit for it. Strictly speaking, it is not his at all. Euthyphron thus has no virtue of his own that could make him dear to the gods. Or would they love him for the knowledge they gave to him? We are reminded of Machiavelli's quip that Moses is to be esteemed for
wisdom

is

that Grace which made him worthy of so great a

of

preceptor.3

The

equivocal status

the prophet's virtue

is

rooted

in

a more general problem:

the dubiousness of

rational self-esteem

in

a world ruled

by

beneficent from the

gods. gods

Later in the dialogue

Socrates
do.

will

say that all good things come simply true,

men could not

(i5ai-2). If this
pride

pious

platitude were

reasonably take

in anything they his

Socrates

now undertakes

to break

down Euthyphron's
in the

resolve to prosecute will

father. Throughout the

prophet present

remainder of the

dialogue, Socrates
in the

try

to make the

feel that he
section, he

cannot

justify

his

action

eyes of gods and men.

In the

exposes a massive contradiction

prophet's view of the

holy,
the

and,

at the same

time,

suggests that

gods.

divine

support.

In short, he attempts to make Socrates' An outline of argument follows:

the

his lawsuit may be hateful to some of Euthyphron doubtful of his wisdom and

(i) Euthyphron defined

god-hated.

holy

as

the god-beloved, and the unholy as the

He

also said the gods

disagree,
or

quarrel,

and make war upon each

other

(7b2-4). (2) He further

supposes that the gods quarrel and

fight because

they hold conflicting

3.

views of

justice

morality (7b5-dio). (3) Since in his

The Prince

ch.

6.
522c, 6o2d.

4.

Plato, Republic

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

opinion

35

the gods

love

what

they believe

moral and

hate

what

they believe im
others

moral, he

must admit

that what is dear to some gods may

be hateful to

(7ei-8a6).

(4)

It thus

appears that the same

things may be both

holy

and

unholy,

contrary to what Euthyphron said earlier. Therefore, even if his lawsuit is dear to Zeus, it may be hateful to Cronos, Uranos, and Hera deities who suffered at the hands of their offspring and possibly to other gods as well (8a7-d6). Before turning to Euthyphron's response,
rates'

we must consider each

step

of

Soc

argument more closely.

Socrates

refrains

phron's position.

If

what

from pointing out a mischievous consequence of Euthy is hateful to the gods is unholy, and they feel enmity
gods

and

hatred for

each

other, it follows that the

affirms that the gods

themselves

are unholy.

2.

When Euthyphron
asks

disagree
causes

with one another and

fight,

Socrates
explains

him

what

kind

of

disagreement

enmity

and anger.

He then

that if the two of them were to

disagree

about the

number, size, or
and

weight of certain

objects,

they

would not on gives

that account become enemies

angry

at each other.

And the reason, he

Euthyphron to understand, is that

of

they

could

easily

resolve their

dispute

by

means

counting, measuring,

or

weighing the

objects

in

question.

Socrates does

not mention that

those skills, es

pecially counting, are the foundation of all artful procedure or rational knowhow.4 He implies that knowledge is the ground of genuine concord, whereas ig
norance

is

productive

of

contention

and

strife.

It

might

be

objected

that

enlightenment sometimes of

fosters enmity

interest. Against this

Socrates

objection one

by revealing previously hidden conflicts could argue that insofar as men seek truth,
asked.

their interests are

identical.5

now returns

to the question he just

and anger?

A disagreement

about mat

ters of

what

kind

causes

swer, Socrates
and good and

offers

enmity one of his own: "The just

goes on

Since Euthyphron has

and

no

the unjust and

noble and

ready an base

bad."

He

to

suggest

that men become enemies only when

they disagree
concerning flicts

about

those

matters or are unable

to reach an adequate judgment

them. To this Euthyphron strongly assents. He naively assumes that

all conflicts arise

from differences regarding

to
"values."6

"values,"

whereas

in fact

most con

presuppose agreement as

The importance

of

getting rich is

principle on which
naivete

the bank

president and

the bank robber concur. Euthyphron's

which removes

mundane competition

is traceable to his other-worldly ambition, for scarce goods.

statement quoted

him from the

"just"

In the
and

above, Socrates uses the definite article before

"noble,"

"unjust,"

but

not

before

"base,"

"good,"

"bad."

or
on

The

effect

is to

"morality,"

create a composite
while

the one

hand,

"immorality,"

and

on the

other,

and

giving due emphasis to the primacy of justice as an element of the former, of injustice as an ingredient of the latter. This mode of expression nicely

5.

Plato,

Republic

350a. 11. 6. 17-21.

6. Xenophon, Memorabilia

36
reflects so

Interpretation
Euthyphron's he does
not moral consciousness.

Even

as

he

confuses

piety

with

jus

tice, Socrates

clearly distinguish

the

just from

either

the

noble or

the good.

other,"

the gods, too, disagree about moral matters, as suming they disagree at all. "For presumably they wouldn't quarrel with each he remarks, "unless they differed about those Euthyphron em
asks next whether
things."

phatically agrees, no doubt because he feels it would be unworthy of the gods to fight over anything less exalted than the principles of justice or morality. Now if the gods knew what justice is, they could not disagree about it, for
truth is
one. was

The

agreement of all

knowers, in
examples

virtue of the

identity

of

the things

known,
vine,

the point of

Socrates'

concerning the
that the
of

arts of

counting,

measuring,

and weighing.

Does Socrates

imply

Olympians, if truly di
any
action or

could assign an exact numerical value speculate

to the justice

human

being? We may
regard
man

that the

inability

to achieve mathematical

to the

just,

the noble, and the good is a

defining

limitation

of

certainty in merely hu be

intelligence.7

Knowledge, in
otherwise.8

the strict sense, is the apprehension of that

we

which cannot

When

it

scientifically.

know why something must be so, we may be said to know From this it follows that only things which are invariable can be

objects of scientific

knowledge.

Following Socrates,
"ideas"

let

us call

the objects of ra

tional

inquiry

"ideas."

Now if the

are prior to the

gods,

they

preclude

dis

agreement of the
can

"ideas."

among the gods, who can be But if the gods make the

presumed perfect
"ideas,"

in their

apprehension nor

they

are

bound to disagree,

they find a nonarbitrary basis for resolving their differences. For with no in dependent or pre-existing standards to guide their making, the gods must act in ignorance. Each deity will define good and evil according to its likes and dis

likes, loves

hates. Because they create out of blind desire, the gods will clash; they will fight. The belief in warring gods thus presupposes the priority of the gods to the The questioning of that priority by the philosophers is the
and
"ideas."

deepest
3.

cause of the quarrel response

between poetry
next

and

philosophy.9

In

to

Socrates'

question, Euthyphron affirms that

each god

loves
said

what

he

considers moral and

hates

what

he

considers

immoral. Earlier he

that Cronos unjustly devoured his sons (6ai). Did Cronos act from a sincere, if misguided, devotion to justice? So convinced is Euthyphron of his own right eousness, and so desirous is he of being loved by the gods, that he transforms them into lovers of

justice. However draw the

what

much

they disagree, they

all

fight for

the

right.
4.

Socrates

proceeds to

consequences of the statements

Euthyphron

has

accepted.

If the

gods

love

they believe just

and

hate

what

they believe

unjust, but some consider just what others consider unjust, then the same things
7.

Consider Plato, Republic 587dio-e3, in light

of 546a i-d3.

8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics H39bl7-24. 9. Plato, Republic 597b3-d5. This part of my interpretation borrows from ture on the Euthyphro by Leo Strauss.

an unpublished

lec

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

are

37
to Euthyphron's
complains

dear

and

hateful to the

gods.

Thus, according

definition,

the

same

things are

holy
his

and unholy. question.

Socrates therefore
not ask to

that Euthyphron

has

not answered

For he did But

be told

what same

thing hap
god-

pens

to be both
as

holy

and unholy.

what

hated,
and

it

seems.

In fact, it

would not

may also be be surprising, Socrates says in conclu

god-beloved and

is

sion, if Euthyphron's

suit were

dear to Zeus but hateful to Cronos

and

Uranos,

pleasing to Hephaestus but hateful to Hera; agree about it, the same will hold for them. Socrates has
He has dear to
accomplished

if any

of

the other gods dis

both

more and

less than

one might at

first

suppose.

not refuted the common view that what on

is dear to the

gods

is holy. How
what

ever, he has shown,

one god

the basis of traditional Homeric theology, that

holy"

is

godmay be hateful to another, and hence that there is nothing beloved in itself. This means "the is a unity only in name, or that there are as many of holiness as there are gods who differ in their loves and hates.
"forms"

The

unholy "are not the lation to the same god. For that "by

holy

and the

same

but

opposite"

most

(7a8-9) only in
(6dio-i
i

re
not

which"

holy

things are

holy

) is

an

eidog but divine

love,

which

is

always the

love

of a particular

deity,

whose

affections

may be contradictory to those

of other

deities. An intelligible
In short, the

arche of

type or common character of all

holy

things does

"idea"

not exist.

holiness is

altogether a piece of problem

fiction.
practical rather

The immediate
theoretical. If one

Socrates has brought to light is

a certain action would

than

believes

be dear to Zeus but hateful to

one

Hera,

which

deity

should one

try

to

please?

Should

god or coalition of

gods,

or

the

most

just

god or

gratify the most powerful coalition? Tradition is of no help

mentioned

in answering these questions. At the conclusion of his argument, Socrates

Hephaestus. He thereby ther parents, children, or both. The deities

Uranos, Cronos,
Olympians
are ei

Zeus, Hera,

and

reminds us of

that the

the

poetic

tradition are within the

old.

realm of genesis.

New

gods

may

arise who supplant

the

The

capriciousness

of

the gods is proverbial,

and win

the impermanence of their attachments

posed

in every

attempt

to

divine favor through

men

sacrifice and

is presup prayer. It would

therefore seem impossible for to the

ancestral

to know that the ancestral ways remain dear

gods,

or

that the ancestral gods are the present gods. The tradi
about

tional mode of
agree as over

inquiring

divine things is

prophecy.

But if

prophets

dis

to

whether

the commandment to honor one's parents takes precedence

the commandment to avenge

injustice, how

should

the dispute

be

re

solved?10

Again,

it becomes necessary to think for

could

oneself and

to pursue

wis

dom

as

best

one can.

Euthyphron denies his lawsuit

the
gods

do

not

disagree about, he
penalty.

assures

be hateful to any of the gods. One thing Socrates, is that someone who kills
expression

unjustly
10.

must

pay the
of

The Greek

for

penal

"pay

the

On the possibility

disagreement among

religious authorities, consider

Plato, Laws 871c.

38

Interpretation

(didovai

dlxrjv) literally

means

"render

what

is

due"

or side

"give

justice.""

In

effect, Euthyphron
avenge

argues that

the gods must be on his

because it is just to
and

injustice; he

assumes that

his lawsuit is

indubitably
prove

unmistakably

just. Socrates
more
cause.

will now

try

to make him recognize that the

not

situation

is

a good

deal his

complicated, and that he does

know how to

the justice of

Earlier

we saw

that Euthyphron's view of conflict among the gods reflects a

naive view of conflict

among

men.

He

now contends

that none of the gods

denies

injustice based
ever

should

be

punished.

on a confusion about
men

Socrates apparently suspects that this opinion too is human things, for he asks whether Euthyphron has

heard

argue that someone who

kills unjustly
elsewhere:

or

does anything

else

unjustly
manner

should not

pay the

penalty.

Euthyphron

responds

that

they

never cease

disputing

these things both in the courts and

"Since they
avoid

commit all

of unjust

deeds, they do
as

penalty."

and

say everything to
persons accused of

the

Euthyphron
themselves

answers

if he thought

by denying
men

that crime should

be

punished.

In

wrongdoing defend fact, it is because he

has

never

heard

dispute the

imagine the
son

gods

disputing

legitimacy of punishing criminals that he cannot it. However, he has heard people say it is unholy for a
murder

to prosecute

his father for

(4ei). And do

not

these persons argue

in

effect

that

someone who

prophets of whom

kills unjustly must not pay the penalty? Like some other history or legend tell us Euthyphron views mankind as mired
,

in sin; he is
where and

a misanthrope

(cf.

3d7).

Ironically,

the sinfulness

loathes is that unreasoning

continues to question

preference

for

one's own which

he detects every forms no

human be

small part of piety.

Socrates ings. He

Euthyphron

about the

behavior

of

wonders whether

they

nonetheless claim

they

ought not to

this. Socrates then observes

confessing it, pay the penalty. Euthyphron strongly denies that men do not say everything, since they
"quite"

confess to wrongdoing, and while

do

not

dare

argue

that if

the penalty; rather, this

they really are guilty of wrongdoing, they must not pay they they have done nothing wrong. Euthyphron thinks
claim concludes

is true. Socrates then

should and

that men do not dispute whether wrongdoing be punished, though they may dispute who the wrongdoer is, what he did, when. Again Euthyphron agrees. Three times Socrates has led him to affirm
all men acknowledge

that

the

fundamentals

of criminal

justice. He is attempting
that the many

to make Euthyphron less

are enemies of

fanatic

by disabusing

him

of the notion

justice.
the subject of gods. He wonders whether

Socrates
the facts on
what

returns to

they

too

dispute
For

which guilt and

innocence depend, "if indeed they

say,
and accuse each other of god or

quarrel about

is just

and

unjust,
no

as you

wrongdoing."

surely, he continues,

injustice

should not

human being, dares to say that he who does the penalty. Euthyphron thinks this is true, "at least in pay
one,

1 1

Plato, Gorgias

476a8-l0.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

main."

39 justification.

the
nal

He is

not

totally

convinced,

and with some

declares

by

his

actions

that he does not regard the rules of justice as

aware of

Every crimi binding

upon

himself. Euthyphron is

this, but he does

not

tween what men say

own public speech criminal on

publicly and what they silently is dictated by inaudible inner voices). For his
contempt a man
would

think12

clearly distinguish be (perhaps because his

obvious reasons a

the

witness stand will not express

should a god

be

so constrained?

Glaucon thought

for justice. But why who could make himself be

as a god

invisible
mans.13

and so commit crimes with

impunity

among hu

To judge from the horror

stories which

Euthyphron

accepts as gospel
of who shall

truth, the Olympians

guard

offer no safe and sure solution

to the problem

the guardians.
on

Elaborating
of crime and

the point he just made, Socrates now submits that in

questions

punishment, the

disputants,
is just

whether gods or

men, "if indeed

gods

have

disputes,"

argue about the particulars of

the situation, since it is these

which

determine
upon

whether a given action

or unjust.

Euthyphron concurs,

where

Socrates issues

an abrupt challenge.

He demands to know

what proof

Eu

thyphron

has that every god believes a man dies unjustly who, while serving as a field hand, becomes a murderer, is bound by the master of the person he killed, and then perishes from his bonds before the man who bound him could learn from the Interpreters is
right
what ought

to be

done;

and

that on behalf of such a fellow it

(dgficbg, 9a8) for

on,"

a son to prosecute and

denounce his father for if

murder.

"Come

Socrates

exhorts

him, "try

to show me at all clearly that all the gods

and

absolutely believe this action is right (dgftcdg, 9b2); quately, I shall never stop singing your praises for

you show me ade

wisdom."

Socrates has

challenged

Euthyphron to

prove that

his lawsuit is

"right,"

that

is,

right

in the circumstances,
makes

and could not appear otherwise to

the

gods.

If

Euthyphron

the

attempt and

fails, Socrates
will

could

probably

convince

him

he has
the
of

no chance of

winning in
on

court and should therefore abandon

his lawsuit. If
sameness

prophet

succeeds,
and

the

other

hand, he
will

have demonstrated the

shown

reason, human
right without

divine. He
of

thus have

that men can know what

is

the

help

divine

revelation.

Socrates

would never

stop praising
the proof

him for

wisdom.
Socrates'

Euthyphron declines to
quite go

accept

challenge.

He

could exhibit

clearly if he wanted to, he claims, but the Socrates replies, "you think I'm duller than the into just now. "I show them that [your father's deeds] are unjust will you judges, since obviously
whole
things."

business is too involved to

and that all the gods ers

hate

such perhaps

Euthyphron does

not

deny

that

he

consid

Socrates unintelligent; but

he holds this
Euthyphron

opinion

partly because Soc

yet raises questions
would

rates

has

suggested

it. If Socrates is duller than the judges, justice

which cannot

concerning the

gods and

answer,

it

not

12.
13.

On this distinction,

cf.

Xenophon, Memorabilia

1.1.19.

Plato, Republic

36ob3~c2.

40

Interpretation
for the he
not prophet to stay out of court? And if he takes Socrates for a lose interest in the conversation and leave of his own accord? sight of

be

advisable
will

dullard,
Socrates he

never

loses

his dual

practical

intention.
indeed"

Euthyphron
says.

asserts

he

will persuade

the

Socrates

assures

him they

will

judges, "if listen, "if

adds

indeed"

they listen to what they think he speaks

came

well.

"But

speaking,"

while you were

myself."

he

slyly, "a thought

to me and I

reckoned with

Even if he

could

be

sure that all the gods consider

the la
about
while

borer's death unjust, Socrates explains, he would not know anything more what is holy and unholy. The death might very well be god-hated; but a
ago

it

came

to light that the

holy
to be

and

unholy

cannot

be defined

on

that basis. For

what

is

god-hated appeared seems

god-beloved as well.
gods'

Socrates

to suggest that the

of what

opinions and passions are

irrelevant

to the determination
next section.

is

holy

a view

he

will

The thought behind

Socrates'

"thought"

introduce explicitly in the appears to be something deed

must

like the following. Euthyphron

the gods and therefore
unholy.

supposes that

any
right

unjust

be hateful to
always

He

would

be

if: (i) the

holy

is

just,

(2)
of

the gods know

what

justice is,
point.

and

(3) they love justice

if Euthyphron it unjust, he

and

hate injustice. But

all three of these assumptions

have been
Thus
even

rendered questionable

by

the

argument

the dialogue to this

could prove that all

would

the

gods

hate his father's deed

and consider

not

have taught

Socrates anything further about the holy. Having failed to make Euthyphron recognize that he

cannot

convincingly de hate the laborer's

fend the justice definition. He

death
and

of

his

lawsuit,

Socrates

resumes

his

criticism of the prophet's

grants

for the

sake of argument that all the gods

believe it to be
love is holy, definition in

unjust.

He then

proposes an amended

definition: What
love
and oth

all the gods ers

and what all

hate is unholy, but

other things

what some

hate is
The

neither or

both.
seems

new

to

imply that,

being equal,
able to

an action
strength

in
in

creases

in holiness
also

with

the number of gods who

love it. There is

numbers, but

size and weight. arrayed on precise

Must Euthyphron be different

sides of a of what

count,

mea

sure,

and weigh the gods

dispute in

order

to
.

make good

his

claim to

have

knowledge

is

holy

7b5-c8)?

Or

would

it be

sufficient

for him to know the

all

will of

unholy (cf Zeus (cf. 5e6)?

and

Homer's Zeus
cord

once

declared that if

the other divinities held fast to a golden

let down from Olympus, and pulled until their strength was spent, they could not drag him from the sky to the ground; yet he, whenever so minded,
could

Socrates
gested.

haul them up along with the earth and the asks if Euthyphron wants to define the The
prophet responds with a

sea.14

holy

in the

manner

just sug

bored

not?'

'Why

him the discussion has become purely tween his own well-being and clarity about the
14.

'academic'

(xi yag xcokvei; 9d6). To He sees no connection be

that
most concerns

subject

him.

Homer, Iliad 8.5-27.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

41

When he nonchalantly grants that the amended definition is correct, Socrates gently calls him to account. Should they examine this definition also, to see
whether

it is

well-stated?

Or

should

they let it

pass and accept offhand so

both their
someone must

own statements and

those

of

others, agreeing that something is

if

merely
another

says

it is? Or

must one

inquire into

what

the

speaker says?

"One

in

quire,"

the prophet concedes. But it is one

thing

to disparage

to question inner voices no one else

can

what the many say, hear. When the Delphic oracle

proclaimed

him the

wisest of

all, Socrates

undertook

to refute the

god.15

We
the to

may therefore surmise that if the entire host of Olympus told him that gods love is holy, Socrates would put to them the same question he
ask

what all

proceeds

Euthyphron: Is the

holy

loved

by

the gods because

it is holy,

or

is it

holy

be

cause

they love it?

V. Is the

Holy Loved by

the

Gods because it is Holy,

or

is it Holy because it is

Loved? (ioai-ub5) If something is

that

holy

because the

gods

holy

things will

never

become unholy, for the may be in

love it, their unanimity is no guarantee gods may hate tomorrow what

they love
what

today. This problem is different

one situation unjust
action

from the
another.

one posed

is just in
In

For if the

by the fact that holy varies with

the affections of the gods, the same

uation. practical

may be

terms, this means that the

which men can orient

holy or unholy in the same sit holy cannot serve as a standard

might seem prudent
opposition

(nagddeiyLia, 6e5) by
stances; it is
ous man to

themselves in changing circum

not a principle of right action.

In fact it

for

a pi
and

pray

that

his very piety does

we

not set

him in
that

to

himself

other pious men.

"form"

of

holiness, If,
on

ous cere
an

life

will clash

At any rate, may there is always the possibility that the requirements of a pi with those "of consistency, of a consistent and thoroughly sin
conclude

if the

gods can alter the

life."1

the other
of

immutable

"idea"

hand, something is holy because it holiness, it would still be holy though every
But if

"participates"

in

god

hated

it

indeed,

even

if

no gods exist.

by

practicing piety

one

does

not neces

sarily do changing but at the

There

what

the
of

gods command or

desire, why worship

them at all? An un

"idea"

holiness insures that the

holy and the unholy are not the

of

same,

price of appear

turning piety into nonsense. to be two alternatives: the arbitrariness

gods as guides

the

holy,

and

the

dispensability
15. I.

of the

to the

practice of

piety.2

One

might wish

for

Plato, Apology

2lbl0-c2.
and

Leo Strauss, Natural Right

History

(Chicago:

The

original context of

the quotation

is

an argument

University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 75The faith in ques defending "the thesis of
faith."

tion, however, is biblical. There is

religion.

no reason

to doubt that Strauss accepted Plato's criticism of pagan

2. p. 160.

Seth Benardete, "A

Sophocles'

Reading

of

Antigone: Part

I,"

Interpretation 4

(Spring

1975).

42

Interpretation
love
what

gods who

is

intrinsically just,
it is bestowed

noble,
upon.

or good

(cf. 7e6-7),

and whose

holy holy without being

makes

love

whatever

But if

such gods

exist, one can

order

be

pious,

and pious without

being

holy. For in

to be

god-

beloved it
The

suffices to

be

just,

noble,

or good.
asked

more general

form

of

the question Socrates has

Euthyphron is

something is true simply because the gods think it is. What the gods cre knowledge in ate they presumably can destroy. Thus if they make the the strict sense is impossible, even as an unattainable goal of human aspiration;
whether
"ideas,"

for

without eternal things

there

can

be

no eternal

truths.

According

to

Leibniz,
love
of

the belief that something is good merely because God

wills

it debases

all

His glory; "for why praise Him for what He has done if He would be The belief may be irrefutable, equally praiseworthy in doing the however. Every attempt to disprove it must rely on principles of demonstration

God

and

contrary?"3

that an all-powerful creator could render

inapplicable to himself. In
as

Greek

con

text, this
city.4

problem

part of civic

is strictly theoretical, orthodoxy; hence it does

complains

the

notion of an omnipotent god

is

no

not

impair Socrates's

case against

the

Euthyphron
namely,
cause

that

he does

Socrates'

not

understand

question,

whether

the

holy

is loved

by

the gods because it is

holy,

or

is

holy

be

it is loved. To have

make sense of

his perplexity,
the approval

we must recall of

that he

hopes,
might

by prosecuting his
as well
or obeys

own

father,

to

win

father Zeus. Socrates

obeys

asked a small child whether

he is

good

because he

his

parents

them because he is good.

says

Socrates

he

will

try

to express himself more clearly. He does nothing of

the sort. What follows is a

analysis of propositions
.

highly abstract, needlessly complicated exercise in the Socrates commits, or leads Euthyphron to commit, a se
most remarkable

ries

being that because the holy and the plan diametrically opposed. in the remainder of this section is to make Euthyphron dizzy with self-doubt, too uncertain about the holy to defy his family in court, and too demor
of

nonsequiturs, the

god-beloved are not the same

they

must

be

Socrates'

alized

to continue the conversation. While

administering
will seek

this chasetisement,

Socrates
He

by

means of

the same

faulty arguments,
Euthyphron

the truth and reveal it.

starts

by

asking

whether

understands the

difference between

something carried and carrying, led and leading, seen and seeing. Euthyphron thinks he does, though in all probability, he does not. The difference is not one of
cause and

effect,

of agent and

thus appears

Nor is it one seeing is the cause of a thing's being patient, unless in seeing we act upon the thing The difference to be purely grammatical: in each case Socrates contrasts active and
unless
seen.5

seen.6

3. 4.

Discourse
An
266d).

on

Metaphysics

ch. a

1.

omnipotent creator as

theoretical possibility is

discussed

briefly

in Plato's Sophist

(265b-d,
5.

Cf. Republic 507d-509a.

I56d-e.

6. Cf. Theaetetus I53d-I54a,

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

passive participles of

43

the same

verb.

far from

evident.

The first

pair of

The reasoning behind his choice of verbs is participles indicate a physical, the second a
at all.

moral, and the third a perceptual relation; but this subtlety is surely not intended

for Euthyphron's benefit, if it is intended Socrates

asks next whether there

something loving. "How could there not however, one is both loving (cpikovv)

is something loved and, different from it, Euthyphron responds. In self-love,

be?"

and

loved (cpikovuevov). Self-love is

of

blinding

to the extent that it conceals and transfigures itself. Euthyphron's belief

a

in his exemplary holiness is

delusion born
another's

that passion. The self that loves

experience of

him, he imagines, is
self-induced.
whom no one acts.

not

only

but divine. His

divinity

is

He is the

unconscious cause of an

imaginary

effect,

a patient upon

ciple of each pair

Perhaps this is why Socrates now replaces the active parti with an inflected passive of the same verb, thereby masking Euthyphron's
assent

the agent or grammatical subject.

Socrates

obtains

to the

following

propositions.

Some

thing is
cause

(cpegouevov) because it is carried (cpegexai), led (dyouevov) be it is led (dyerai), seen (dgouevov) because it is seen (dgdxai). These
carried

statements seem meaningless passive

but

are

has

an sctive sense.

If his

sim were

merely trivial. In each case the inflected to instruct Euthyphron, rather thsn to
carried

befuddle

someone carries

him, Socrates would hsve said outright: Something is it, led because someone leads it, seen because
C7).

because it

someone sees

(cf. ioa2, brackets

sense

Socrates
will

elaborates

on

the propositions Euthyphron has

what

accepted.

(Here
non

be

used

to distinguish the sense of

Socrates
seen

says
seen

from the [does

.

Euthyphron

hears.7) Not because something is

seen

is it

one see

it];

on

the contrary, it is

because it is

seen

[because

one sees

it]

Nor because
one

it is led is it led [does

one

lead it], rather, it is led because it is led [because

csrried

leads it]. Agsin, not is csrried becsuse it is

whether

becsuse it is
csrried

is it

csrried

[does

[because

one

carries

csrry it], rather, it it]. Socrates then asks

one

his meaning is not entirely clear. Before Euthyphron can reply, Socrates says he means the following: Not because something is becoming does it be come, rather, it is becoming because it becomes; nor because it is being affected

is it affected, rather, it is
curs,
not nonsense.

being

affected

because it is

affected.

Euthyphron
nonsense

con are

realizing that these statements not Socrates began

only

sound
and

like

but

by

contrasting

passive

active participles of

the

same verb sives

(ioa5-n); he
an active

then
sense

contrasted passive participles with

inflected

pas

having

(iobi-n);
both

and

he

concludes

yiyvouevov with
jxaoxov with

ylyvexai,

which are neither active. nor passive passive

by contrasting in meaning, and

ndoxexai,

which are

in meaning (ioci-4).

"is"

7.

This

remark requires clarification.

In Greek, the
differ in

passive participle plus

(e.g.

<pepo>evdv

ion)
do

and the

inflected

passive of

the third

person singular

(e.g. qiEQerai)

are

phonetically distinct

and

not sound alike.

However, they

need not

meaning.

44

Interpretation
asks next whether

Socrates fected
ing.8

the loved
says

thing is

either

becoming
mistaken

or

being
as

af

by

something.

"Of

course,"

Euthyphron. He is

if,

Socra

tes sometimes argues, the most

loveable things

are ungenerated and

He is also mistaken if divine love is essentially similar belief that something is holy because the gods love it implies that divine love affects its objects. Human love has no such power. The lover's passion affects
the

unchang to human love. The

lover,

not

the

beloved; love

and

the

lover,

not

love

and the

beloved,

are re

lated it is

as agent and patient. submits another proposition

Socrates
a

for Euthyphron's

approval:

Not because

loved thing is it loved by those who love it, rather, it is a loved thing be cause it is loved. Euthyphron strongly assents, and goes on to affirm, in response to further questioning by Socrates, that the holy is loved by the gods because it is

holy, it is
seems to

not

holy because
gotten

it is loved. The

"understands"

prophet now

the ques

tion with which the present segment of the conversation

began,
is

and

Socrates It

have

the answer he

wanted.

But the

answer

a mere assertion.

is

not

the conclusion the argument demands.

From the

statements

Euthyphron

has

accepted so

far, only

this much

can

be deduced: Not because the

holy

is

thing is it loved by the gods, rather, it is a god-beloved thing be cause they love it. This trivial proposition is the only legitimate inference that can be drawn from long and tedious argument. By no means has he
god-beloved
Socrates'

proven that

divine love is
reasons

a response to

holiness

rather

than its cause. As

for
the

Euthyphron's Socrates

thought that the gods cannot

next observes

for accepting this view, he is probably flattered help loving him because he is holy.
that since the
could

by
a

holy

is loved

by

the

gods

it is

loved

thing
then

and god-beloved.

"How

it

be?"

not

the prophet responds.

Socrates

infers that the

explains

holy

and the god-beloved must

be different from

each other.

And he

to his startled interlocutor that, according to the statements

they

have

agreed

upon, the

loved,
he

whereas

is loved because it is holy, it is not holy because it is the god-beloved thing is not loved because it is god-beloved,

holy

rather, it is god-beloved because it is loved. Euthyphron accepts this as true. If

fully
At

Socrates'

understood

reasoning,
shown

however, he

would

dismiss it

as

irrele

vant.

most

Socrates has

that the

holy

and god-beloved

differ in defini

tion; they might nonetheless be numerically, and so for all practical purposes, the same. It may be the case, in other words, that all holy things and only holy things
are
god-beloved.9

Socrates

puts

Euthyphron through

one

last

exercise

in false logic. Suppose the

were

holy

and god-beloved were

the same,

he

says.

Then, if the holy

loved

be-

9.

8. Plato, Republic 479a-48oa; Symposium 2ioa-2i ic; Phaedrus 247c-e. Of the commentators who recognize this point, only Geach considers it
argument, and he is far from

a serious objection

to

Socrates'

understanding

the matter in its full gravity. In their preoccupa

tion with the problem of

not occur

definition,
neither

these scholars

to them that if the things called

holy

are also

nal quest

for

wisdom

is

necessary

nor

about the problem of the right life. It does dear to the gods, then philosophy as the ratio possible. See P. T. Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro: An

forget

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

cause

45
god-beloved

it is

holy,
be

the god-beloved would

be loved because it is
to iod8).

(con

trary

to ioe8). And
would

if the

god-beloved were god-beloved

because it is loved, the "But

now you see

holy

holy

because it is loved

(contrary
are

that

the two are

exactly opposed, that

a complete non

they

other."

This is

sequitur.10

in every way different from each If the gods love the holy because it is

holy (iod8), and if the holy and the god-beloved are not the same (ioe2-i ia3), then the holy must be god-beloved even if it is not the god-beloved. As Socrates goes on to say, the holy and the god-beloved differ in this: the one is loved be
cause

it is

of a sort

to

be loved,

whereas the other

is

of a sort

to be loved because

it is loved. The
given premises. of

conclusion that

they

are opposites

is

false inference from the

to

Yet

as a

theological proposition it

happens

be

true.

The task

finding

its

proper premises

has been left to the in praying

and

reader.11

Orthodox piety
phron assumes

largely

consists

the gods themselves do

not sacrifice and

sacrificing to the gods. Since pray, they cannot be pious. Now Euthy
who

that the gods love the man

imitates them
In
other

or who

does

as

they
god-

do. If he is correct, the gods do not love gods is god-beloved but unholy. Or, if

piety.

words, imitation of the

one

insists that true holiness is

least
not

beloved, piety in the

conventional or too position.
Socrates'

usual sense

is unholy

or at

holy. Euthyphron is too

lazy

(cf. i2a4-5) to grasp these

radical consequences of

his

an

inference
as well.

ion

thesis, that the holy is not dear to the gods, proves to be from Euthyphronean heterodoxy, but from common opin only "Divine is a meaningless phrase unless it refers to something
paradoxical not
love"

analogous to
our own.

human

love, for

we cannot

imagine

passions

If divine love is

similar

to human

love,

we

may

sssume

utterly different from it resembles the

Analysis
ioa-l

Commentary,"

and

Monist

50

(July

1966), pp.

376-77; S. Marc

Cohen, "Euthyphro

Journal of the History of Philosophy 1 2 (1971), pp. 9-10; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, I: Plato on Man and Society (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 210; Thomas D. Paxon, "Plato's Euthyphro 10a to Phronesis 17 (1972), p. 184; and Richard
lib,"

lb,"

Sharvey,
120.
10.
ment

"Euthyphro

gd

I lb:

Analysis

and

Definition in Plato

Others,"

and

Nous 6

(May

1972),

p.

Commentators
and

who assume proper

that Socrates intends to present a

logically

compelling

argu

respond to exclusively on the logic of this section his non sequitur in one of three ways. Cohen and Rose say nothing about it. Anderson, Brown, and Paxson interpret it in light of the following sentence ("the two are not the same"). Allen, Geach, and

hence that it is

to concentrate

Hall

mistranslate

it

as

"the

opposite

is the

case."

Thus do these

commentators

ignore,
pp.

eviscerate,

or

conceal the most radical statement

1

in the dialogue. See S. Marc Cohen, "Euthyphro

10-11,"

ioa-llb,"

pp.

3; Lynn E.

Rose, "A Note

on

the

Euthyphro.
Euthyphro,"

Phronesis

10

(1965),

149-50; Albert

Review of Metaphysics 22 (March 1969), pp Anderson, "Socratic Reasoning in the The Philosophical Quarterly 14 476-77; John H. Brown, "The Logic of the Euthyphro p. 183; R. E No. 54 (January 1964), p. 3, n. 5; Thomas D. Paxson, "Plato's Euthyphro ioato
ioa-nb," lib,"

and the Earlier Theory of Forms (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p Allen, Plato's pp. 376-77; John C. Hall 42; P. T. Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro: An Analysis and The Philosophical Quarterly 18, No. 70 (January 1968), p. 3. "Plato: Euthyphro loai-l
Commentary,"
ibio,"

'Euthyphro'

1 1
on the

My

interpretation in the

next

two paragraphs owes

much

to Leo

Strauss'

unpublished

lecture

Euthyphro.

46

Interpretation
love
more thsn

wise msn's said to

thst of the unwise, if only because the

wise man

is

be dear to the

gods.12

Now it is
of

characteristic of the wise man

to be

fonder

of persons who are

like him than

to do. In

those

who are unlike

him; he naturally

tends to be fonder
must always
"virtue"

of persons capable of what

be told

guiding themselves than of those who fact, he would not love someone whose chief
above all else a could not

is

obedience.

But orthodoxy is

follows

that the gods,

mere

being

supremely wise,

morality of love piety.

obedience.

It

vanity led Euthyphron to affirm that the gods love the holy because it is holy. He confuses piety with justice, and it is not generally sup posed that something is just or unjust simply because it is loved or hated by the
gods.

More than

Common
unlike

opinion

recognizes,

although

unclearly, that the basic

rules of

justice,

the particular details

of religious

observances, do not depend

for

their validity on the desires or preferences of divine beings.

Euthyphron tacitly believes that what makes anything holy and therefore dear to the gods is justice. Since he has failed to articulate this view, Socrates now
chides
an

him for

not

stating the

"accidental

property"

(ovoia, i ia7) (naftog, na8) of the holy,

not

"essence"

of the

holy. He

mentioned

namely, the
"being"

fact that it is
I ibl).

loved

by

all

the gods; but he has not yet uncovered its

you,"

(6'v,

"So if

it is dear to from the

or

Socrates continues, "do

tell what the

beginning
is the

holy is,

and never mind

hide it from me, but once more if it is loved by the gods

on

however it is
what

affected

for
the

we shall not

disagree

that

but tell

me zeal

ously

holy

unholy."

and

With these

words

Socrates

steers the

dis

cussion

back toward the

us

problem

of

the relation between justice and piety,

of

preparing

for the

explicit

treatment

that subject

following

the

"interlude,"

which now ensues.

VI. Interlude

(nb6e4)
cannot express what

Euthyphron is baffled. He
since

every

statement

unwilling to logical
rigor.

they propose always moves around them somehow, where stay they put it. What perplexes him perhaps as much
The
mystic seeks a

he thinks, he tells Socrates, and is

as

the

specific results of the exercise to which

he has just been subjected, is its seeming direct intuition of the highest things, a compre
upon nor completes a process of rea means

hensive insight (vovg) that neither depends soning (Adyoc)1. Euthyphron, whose name

"instant

mind,"

is
a

not used

to

thinking
cursive

things

through;
step.

yet

Socrates has

made

him follow
complains

long
at

and

tortuous
the dis

argument

step

by

The

motion of which

he

is,

bottom,

activity

of reason.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics H79a23-39; Hesiod, Works and Days 293-97. Unlike the philosopher, whose best insights presuppose a long and methodical training of the dianoetic faculty (Plato, Republic 510C-511C 52id ff.; Sophist 2l8dl-2l9a3). near the end of
12. 1.

Only

the

to

dialogue, after having examined through discourse a number of related Xoyoi, does Socrates his vovg (i4ds); and what he intuits is the nature of his conversational philosophy.

refer

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

47

to be a species of self-movement, as does life itself. In or der to distinguish truth from error, the mind must be free of external compulsion; it must be able to move itself along correct paths of inference. In classical meta

Reasoning appears

physics, the
soul.

common ground of
of

life

and of

thought as

forms

of self-movement of

is

The spontaneity

the growth
all seem

plants, the motility

animals,

and

the
not

power of rational

discourse
ipvxr),

to

testify

to the existence of
and

something

reducible to the mechanism of moved

matter,

this

"something"

ancient phi serve as

put
a

losophers

called

"soul."2

Now in

order

for Euthyphron to be

mouthpiece of the gods, pension.

his

mind's power of self-movement must

in

sus

Accordingly, Socrates playfully hints

myth of
Daedalus'

that Euthyphron is soulless. Al

luding

to the

statues,
says:

which were so

lifelike they

moved of

their own accord,

works of

Socrates

my

forefather3

"Your statements, Euthyphron, are like the Daedalus; and if I had been talking and had set them have laughed in
speeches
at me, saying that on account of my kin (ra v xoig koyoig egya, 11C3) run away But since the suppositions are yours, some

down,
ship

perhaps you would

with

him, my

works

and refuse other even are

to stay where they are put. joke is needed; for they are not willing to to you Euthyphron's statements
yourself."

stand still are

for you,

as

it

seems

lifeless

copies of

living

speech.

This

would

like moving statues if they be the case if they were not his
through
what

"work"

own

but that

of another.

And if

a god speaks

him, how does he

the ventriloquist is

differ from

a statue

that talks? The god is to the prophet

to the dummy.

In Euthyphron's opinion,
around and not

Socrates'

joke

was

quite apt:

ments], but
would

you.

/ am not the one who put staying in place I think you're the Daedalus, since as far as depends
still."

"For this moving it into [those state

on me

they

have

stood
more

Euthyphron in

effect accuses

Socrates

of

putting

words

in his mouth; he is

right than he knows. Was it

place?

not

Socrates

who compared

himself to Daedalus in the first

cusation quist's

He has
mouth.

put

in Euthyphron's

mouth the ac

that he has

put words

in his

One is

reminded of

the ventrilo
mind.

dummy
acts

who complained

that he

was not allowed

to speak his own

Socrates

in loco deorum.

that he may have become much cleverer in the art than for the Daedalus; Cunning Worker only made his own works move, whereas he, it seems, makes those of outsiders move as well. Socrates adds that the most ex

Socrates

conjectures

quisite

feature

of

his

art

is that he is fast
and

wise against

his

will.

"For I

would rather wisdom of

have my
2.

speeches stand

be fixed

immovably

than acquire the

Cf. Plato, Laws 895b-c; Phaedrus 245c5~e8; Sophist 24934-7; Phaedo 105C7-CL4; Aristotle,
427al8-23.

On the Soul
3.

It

was
a

to have

customary in Athens for sons to inherit the trades of their fathers, and for each trade divine or semidivine patron. father, Sophroniscus, is thought to have been a
Socrates'

stonemason,

and

Daedalus

was

the patron of all who worked in stone. This may

"forefather"

be

one reason

why Socrates
mind as well.

calls

Daedalus his

(Burnet). But Socrates

seems to

By

claiming descent from Daedalus, he

implicitly

claims

have something else in descent from Zeus (cf. Plato,

Alcibiades I 12 la).

48

Interpretation
and the wealth of

Daedalus

Tantalus to

boot."

What Socrates be

means

here

by

an

immovable

koyog

is

discourse that final

can neither

refuted nor

improved

upon

because it is the true

product or work

and

account of the matter under examination.

It is the

ward a

(egyov) of a completed inquiry. We cannot advance one step to final account, however, unless the matter of the inquiry is determinate or
other

fixed. In

words, the pursuit of

wisdom presupposes an

immovable

object of

cognition as well as a
"forms"

mind.4

moving
will, our

It follows from this that if the

at

gods can al

ter the

of things at as a

koyoi may

to

rather

runaway know the unmoving of man than know how to produce, after the fashion of Daedalus, a mobile image of man. Still less does he wish for the
"form"

us

statue to

its

nominal

owner.5

any moment become as useless Socrates suggests he would

wealth of phron. ment

Tantalus,
mythical

which

in the

present context means the

poverty

of

Euthy

The

Tantalus

was condemned

by

the gods to

for

to his chin, while savory

betraying their secrets to men. He was made fruit hung just over his head.
"riches"

everlasting punish to stand forever in water up

Each time he tried to
predicament eat or

drink, his
vealing. what

moved out of

reach.6

Euthyphron's
mysteries

differs in that for

re

the riches beyond his reach are the very

Tantalus

was punished

The

prophet cannot express what

he thinks because he does

not

know

he believes he knows.
enough of

"But
me, I

this

[banter],"

says set

Socrates,

who

then

implies, again,
holy."

that to

Euthyphron
shall

needs a

Daedalus to

him in

motion:

"Since

you seem spoiled

be

zealous

for you,

so that you

may teach me about the

Ex

horting

Euthyphron

not

to grow weary,

Socrates turns justice

directly

to the underlying

problem of the

dialogue

the relation between

and piety.

PART TWO; THE

GODS, JUSTICE,

AND THE TEXNH OF PIETY

VII. Is

Everything Holy Just? (Iie4~i2e4) by

asking
whether all

Socrates begins

the

holy
asks:

tably,
all the

answers

in the

affirmative.

Socrates then

is just. Euthyphron, predic Is all the just also holy, or is

it holy,
and some of

holy just,

and not all the

just holy, but

some of

it

something else? Euthyphron is unable to follow this line might have expected as much. Since he tacitly identifies the

of questioning.

We

holy
is

with

the

just, it
up

is

as though

he has been

asked whether some part of justice

not

just. Socrates

suggests

sarcastically that Euthyphron

ought to

be

able

to follow or

keep

4. 5.

Plato, Sophist

294D-C.

Cf. Plato, Meno

yjd-e.
1 1. 583-93.

6. Homer,

Odyssey

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

49 him in
youth1

(enoa&ai,
in
wisdom.

I2a3), inasmuch

as the prophet surpasses

no

less than

He thereupon

concludes that

Euthyphron has indeed been

spoiled

by
or

his
to

wealth of wisdom.

And, alluding

to the Tantalus myth,

he

urges

the prophet

"stretch"

himself, insisting

that the question is

offers

really

not

hard to fathom. In

der to

make

its meaning clear, he

two examples

which

illustrate in

a rough wider even.

way the relation of a whole to a part. Euthyphron readily grasps that fear is in extent than reverence, just as number is more inclusive than odd or

Socrates then justice but is

contends

that, in

like manner, the

the

holy

is

not co-extensive with

rather a part of

it. When Euthyphron

agrees

to this also, Socrates

bids him to tell

phron's

what sort of part we must

holy

might

answer,

first

Socrates'

examine

be. Before considering Euthy examples in some detail.

to a verse of poetry,
you shall not which

In the first example, Socrates takes

reads: where

exception

Zeus the

lover,2

who engendered all

these things,
points out

revile; for

fear is, there

also

is

reverence.

Socrates

that we are often afraid

who

without

feeling

reverence or shame

(aldcog,

I2b4).

People

disesse
other and

snd other evils of

thst kind do not revere

ashamed at

fear poverty snd those fesrful things. On the

hsnd,
a

anyone who

is

having

fears

bad

reputation.

Thus the

poet

done something disgraceful dreads has it backwards. He should have said,

"Where

shame

is,

there also is

fear."

There
I.

are a number of points main

to be made in connection with this passage.

criticism

The

target of

Socrates'

is

not

the

particular

verse, or its

au

thor, but the poetic tradition as such. This is indicated by two facts. First, Soc (Stasinus);3 rates does not mention the poet's name second, he plays on the root
of

the verb

Jioieiv.

"I say the

poem."

opposite of

the poet who poetized this

a

What

the poet says

or means

is that Zeus is it

heavenly
asserts

father

and a god of
of

love.

Socrates
nature.

rejects

this

view, as

implicitly

the

insufficiency

the divine

He quietly accuses the poets (and the city fathers) of ascribing their own imperfection to the gods. It is because they lack immortality that men seek it
through the progeny of their minds and the children of their
loins.4

It is

question

able, therefore, that immortal

create.

gods should

feel the
as

need either often

to create or to pro

Indeed, if

the

gods are perfect

beings,

in

a state of wantless

self-sufficiency. an

they exist always desirable, they desire Lacking nothing

said,
nonerotic.5

is

nothing.

Divine love is

oxymoron, for the true gods are

If the

holy

is that

which

is god-beloved, the
(younger)

holy
at

"is

not."

I.

The

word

vecjregog

I2a4

recalls

the

word

vewregov

(newer thing)

in

Euthyphron's opening question, and thus indicates 2. The best authenticated manuscripts read
"worker"

a new

beginning

in the dialogue.
of

"lover"

(oTeg^avza) here, instead

Burnet
notice

Burnet's his

"doer"

or

(eg^avxa),
to
and

a conjecture without manuscript authority.

contends that

emenda

tion is

needed

make the passage

intelligible. He fails to

the thematic connection

between
of

Zeus
3. 4. 5.

as

lover
and

the

holy

as the god-beloved.

John Bumet, ed., Plato's Euthyphro,

Apology

Socrates,

Crito (Oxford: Clarendon

note on [2a7.

Press,

1924).

See Burnet's

Plato, Laws 72ib-c; Symposium

209c-d.

Plato, Symposium 202b2-ei;

cf.

Lysis

21531-03.

50
2.

Interpretation
Stasinus'

dictum,

that reverence always

accompanies

fear, is

not so mis

taken as
which

Socrates

pretends.

For it is

not

fear in

general

but the fear

of

Zeus to
of a

the poet refers.

god-fearing man. 3. Socrates virtually defines

word

Piety, Socrates intimates, is the reverence or shame The holy is an (na&og), not a being (cf. na8).
"affect"

shame as

fear

of a

bad

reputation.6

The Greek ill

repute

for

reputation

(do^a, I2ci)

"opinion."

also means
opined

man of

is

someone who

is

opined

to do what is

to

be bad. Socrates has

bad

reputa

tion partly

because, by questioning the

which

city's

dominant opinions, he threatens the

to philosophize, one must be

basis

on which reputations are

given.7

In

order

shameless

is

not

to say that

a philosopher

does

not

fear the harmful

con

sequences of a

bad

reputation.
with

4.

By linking piety
pious man

shame, Socrates hints

at the social

Since the is

fears

bad

reputation with

the gods, he

will

utility be

of religion. reluctant

to

break the laws

secure.
.

even when

the temptation is great and

his

reputation

among

men

5 The from the

conventional status of

the shameful and hence of the

holy

is inferable

"natural"

pneumonia

glecting a his native

character of such evils as poverty and disease. The badness of is clearly much less a matter of opinion than the badness of ne sacred burial rite Yet it is man's fear of natural terrors, combined with ignorance of their causes, which disposes him to ascribe his good or ill of

fortune to the interventions

gods,
man worships

invisible

superhuman
own

the personification of his

revere

In worshipping fears. There is then much

after all.

beings.8

truth in the poet's

dictum. Men his

poverty

and

disease

Socrates is
a part

presents

second example as an elaboration of

of

the first. Reverence

(uogiov, I2c6)

correct

to say that where

fear, he says, as the odd is of number. Hence it is not number is, there also is the odd; but it is correct to say
is
number.

that where the odd

Socrates'

is,

there also

Euthyphron is

now able

to follow

argument,

and

he

affirms

that justice is more extensive than, and in that if the

cludes, the holy. Socrates

says next

holy

is it is

a part

(uegog, I2d5)
be. Two

of jus

tice, they try may be inferred from his

should
of number.

to

find

out what sort of part

might

possibilities

examples.

First,

the

holy

a part of justice as

the odd is

its opposite; for the even is a coequal part of number, and is the of the odd. contrary Thus, if one part of justice is holy, the other part must be which means that not all unholy
the

In this case, the

holy

divides the

realm of justice with

holy

is just. We have already

seen

why this is
second revere

so.

Piety

tends to obscure the

difference between
part of
power might

loyalty

and

justice. The
fear. We

justice

as reverence

is

of

to hurt us but refrain from

thus be

doing

so

possibility is that the holy is a those who we believe have the because of their goodness. Reverence
most

described

as

the kind of

fear

properly felt toward

gods.

Is

pi-

6. Cf. Plato, Laws 646e-647b.

7.

Plato, Apology

2ibio-e3;
ch.

cf.

Meno

93bio-94a5.

8. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan

1 1 end;

Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise Preface.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

ety,

51
of

then,

kind

of justice

to the gods? The remainder

the

dialogue is chiefly

concerned with this question.

Socrates
asked

now

introduces

third example. He says that if Euthyphron had

is even, he would have replied, "that which is not isosceles."9 but When Euthyphron indicates his approval of this an scalene, swer, Socrates advises him to explain in the same way what part of justice is holy. It is difficult to see how he can. Either and are names
what part of number
"scalene" "isosceles"

him

of

triangles,
it

or

they

are odd and even

by

other names.

Socrates'

answer makes no sense at all.

If the

If the former is the case, is circular or latter,

the answer

worse, as
phron

amounts to this: the even

is that

which

is

not odd

but

even.

Euthy

piety as opposition to impiety or injustice (5d8-e5); he later defended his lawsuit on the grounds that it is just to punish injustice (8b7-9). Be defining the even in terms of its contrary, Socrates mimics

first

characterized

Euthy

phron's

failure to
at

give an account of justice.

By

not

he hint
the

Euthyphron's failure to
will

ask what a god

asking is? In the

what number next

on

is, does

three sections of

dialogue, Socrates
He

investigate the

nature of

divinity

the basis of an ac

count of justice.

is impossible, and hence This is why he now says that if Euthyphron instructs him adequately, they can tell Meletus to stop doing injustice and bring no more in dictments for impiety. It is unjust to prosecute a man for a crime no one can
will prove that

injustice

to the gods

that

impiety

"is

not."

commit.

VIII.

Piety

as an

Art of Ruling (^e^-ijdj)

Injustice to the
might

gods

is

possible

only if

we

have

obligations to

them that we

shirk, only if men and gods are partners or shar common good. ers in a The city understands itself to be the lesser member of a human-divine partnership; citizens regard their duties to each other as deriving
and such obligations exist

from,
ular

and subordinate

to,

their

duties to the

gods.

Two kinds

of

justice in

partic

deserve to be

called

bonds

of community: political

the relations between ruler and ruled, and commercial the transactions
conclusion
of

justice, justice, which

have

which governs

regulates

those who trade. Reflection on this simple

ways

fact leads to the

obligations

that there are only three

in

which we might

to the gods: as their rulers, as their subordinates,

or as parties

to an exchange

in

which

they

also participate.

Socrates tacitly
and

considers

I3ai-d4, the
out

second at

I3d5-i4ci,

the third at

first possibility at i4C2-i5aio. If it should turn

the
an uncommittable with

that we have no obligations to the gods, then

and what

impiety is

crime,

is

more

important,
on

the gods

have nothing to do
next

us, since

justice is strictly a human affair. One further general comment is in

9.

this and the

two sections of the dialogue

order

here. While examining the

definition, "a
number

popular conception of

piety

as

justice to the
in Plato's Laws

The

correct

divisible into two

parts,"

equal

occurs

(895e).

52

Interpretation
will also

piety is an first part of art. He is led to make this bizarre assumption by his discovery, in the the dialogue, that we cannot rely upon vouog to determine what our pious duties
gods, Socrates
test an hypothesis
of

his own,

namely, that

are.

One

sacred

law may

command actions

that

another

forbids;

and

the recog

may hold say nothing conflicting views of how we should act. In order, then, for piety to be a cause of right action, it must itself provide the knowledge required to guide the pious
nized authorities on

divinity

to

of the gods themselves

man.
arts.1

Now the only be

available models of assumes

independent,
more

practical

knowledge

are

the

Accordingly, Socrates
a

that

if piety is

a genuine

virtue, it must

also

an art or resemble an art.

To be

specific, it

must

be beneficial
prod

(I3b7-d6), have
uct
steps

definite

subject matter

(i3d9-i4aio), have
The

teachable

(I3a4-b5), principles (I4b8-C2),

will adopt

aim at a

determinate

and realize

its

product

in

that can be explained and

new standpoint

justified in terms

of those principles

(I4d9-e5,

I5a7~8).2

Socrates

is indicated
of

"technical"

use of

language,

and

by

his introduction
words refer of

the words

by his frequent doioxtjg (holi

(pious)
refer

ness) soul,
and

and evoefieia and

(piety). While these

a

to a quality or disposition of

hence conceivably to
the

type

cognition, the words evoefteg

doiov (holy)

key

terms of the discussion

up

to now

or in conformity to not analogy between technical proficiency and a commonly accepted virtue. Among other things, his intention is to point up the absence of knowledge from the behavior and states of character generally recog

acts performed at
unusual

the behest of law

assume an

typically law. It is, of course,

to

for Socrates to

nized as virtuous.

To

return to

the conversation, Euthyphron

opinion,
gods.

now undertakes

to explain what the

part of care

justice is holy. In his

of

he says, it is the

part which concerns

(ftegajxeia, nej)

the

The remaining

part of

justice, he

adds, has to

do

with

the care of human beings. Socrates replies that although these statements

appesr quite

he does
of gods with

not yet

fine to him, he is still in need of one know what Euthyphron means by

smsll piece of
"care."

informstion; for
if the
care

He

wonders

is anything like the care we bestow on other things. He then observes, Euthyphron's approval, that not everyone knows how to care for horses
the

or

dogs, only

horseman

or

the

huntsman. Socrates

goes on

to suggest that

horsemanship

(Inmxrj) is the
(xvveg);

care of

the care of dogs

and

horses ('ijutoi); huntsmanship (xvvi]yexixr\) herdsmanship (fionkaxixr)) the care of cattle

next

(fidec). Euthyphron agrees,

and

he affirms, in his

reply, that

holiness

and pi

ety

are

the care

of gods.

Judging however, by

the obvious etymological link be

subject

tween each of the aforementioned skills and the animal species care, holiness is nothing more than the care of
i

to its
of

holy

things. If there

is

"care

Allan Bloom, "Interpretive I

was

Essay,"

in The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968),

p. 321.

2.

led to

recognize

this pattern of argument

Socrates'

"technical

virtue,"

conception of

by Terrence Irwin's Plato's Moral Theory: The Early

82-6,
90-7.

astute observations on
and

Middle Dialogues

(Oxford: Clarendon

Press,

1977),

pp.

71-7,

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

gods,"

53
an art as unheard of

the

it

would

be the

work of

fteoxixyj,

in Greek

as

"godsmanship"

is in English.

Socrates for its

benefited

asks next whether

every kind
with

of care provides some good and

benefit
are

recipient. and

He then suggests,

Euthyphron assenting, that horses

improved
and

herdsmanship,
pose of care oath.

by horsemanship, dogs by huntsmanship, cattle by everything else by its appropriate type of care. Or is the pur
with an

to harm its recipient, he inquires? Euthyphron denies this

ask

Socrates is thus led to

gods and

if holiness,

since

it is the

care of gods,
this,"

is

also a

benefit to the

improves them. "And

would you accept

he

contin

ues, "that whenever you do something

holy,

you make one of the gods

better?"

Euthyphron

swears
word

The Greek
marily
means

by Zeus that he does not. {reganeia, which Socrates

This is
one
reason

uses

in the

"care,"

sense of

pri

"service."

whether

piety

consists

in serving the

gods and

why he subsequently inquires whether religious services are dear

to them. For present purposes, the

most

ical

treatment"

"therapy."

or, simply,

revealing translation of the term is "med All men are in need of therapy, if only be
soul.3

cause no man pursuit of

is perfectly wise. We may infer from this that if philosophy is the wisdom, it must also be the care of the Certainly the Platonic
and

Socrates
types of

exhibits an

ignorance,
Socrates'

uncanny grasp of the vsriety of souls, their characteristic the ways in which these can be mitigated or rendered less
of

harmful. higher

knowledge any

rj>vxt)

enables

him to

practice

justice
to

on

plane than can

what

public man.

Through

conversation

he

gives

each

in

terlocutor

is

proper or

fitting

for him. justice is the therapy of human Euthyphron, how a skilled therapist goes
as unaware of

Socrates

not

only
us,

accepts

the proposition that

of

beings; he
about

shows work.

by his handling
of

his

Euthyphron,

course, is

his illness

as

he is

of

Socrates'

attempt

to treat him. In this respect

know that
the true

by

executing

Socrates, it
Athens

will

he is like the city, which does not kill the Athenian who best comprehends
that a simply rational solution to the

standards of political
quarrel

health.4

Socrates'

with

reveals

paramount political problem, the

problem of who should

rule, is

humanly

unat

tainable. The reign of perfect justice requires a ruler

ruled exceeds that

whose

by

which a medical expert surpasses a

superiority to the layman. For, to say

nothing

of

the greater

difficulty
does
not

in

knowing

the health of the soul than that of the the doctor to persuade the sick to
can al

body,

the

medical art

in itself

enable

nonexperts that they obey his "orders"; nor is his expertise so evident to problem political The a him from distinguish ways may then be
quack.5

said to supe Soc-

arise

from the fact that any

no

human

ruler

is

as

manifestly

and

transcendently

rior to the ruled as

normal adult

human

being is

to

his

dog

or

horse.6

3. 4.

Cf. Apology 29d8-e2, 3oa8-b2; Republic 5l8d-e, 527d-e, Cf. Plato, Gorgias 52 le.

586c

5.

P\alo, Gorgias

4646. 275c.

6. Cf. Plato, Statesman

54

Interpretation

rates mentioned
of rule over of rule over

horsemanship
subjects.7 groups.8

and

willing large

He

mentioned

huntsmanship because these skills are models herdsmanship because it is a model

of

The demands

justice

point

to the transcendence of
shepherd.9

This means, in the willing obedience of mankind to a divine for the if men do justice to the gods traditional that them, however, by caring human herders and metaphor needs to be inverted: men are gods to the gods
politics

trainers of divine brutes.

Socrates denies any intention of imputing to Euthyphron the opinion that piety benefits the gods and makes them better. Indeed, he says, it was precisely be cause he did not think Euthyphron believed such a thing that he raised the whole
"care."

question about

the meaning

of

Euthyphron

accepts this

explanation;
or

we

should not.

The

care of gods

is

absurd

because it is impossible to benefit

are

im
to

prove a perfect

being. But the Olympians

war upon each

far from
of

perfect.

According

Euthyphron, they
disagree
rocity,
about
would

other, are capable

and

committing injustice,

and

the noble, the

not

just,

the good. In view of their power and

promote the same sort of

fe

it

be in

our

interest to

improvement in

them that

an animal

trainer fosters in the beasts under

and

his

care?

Piety, it

would

seem, is the
counterpart

art of

taming

controlling the gods

for

our

benefit. Its

modern

is the

conquest and

domestication

of nature

by

means of scientific

technology.

The beliefs if

crucial

difficulty

to
or

which

Socrates

alludes

is

not peculiar

to the religious

of

the Athenians

the Greeks. Theists of almost every description con

ceive of
we

God

or the gods as providential

beings,
that

who are more

worship them correctly than if we worship them

particular

likely to benefit us incorrectly or not at all. It

undertakes

is the belief in
this section.

divine

providence

Socrates

to refute in

In ior

order

to benefit us, the gods must act.

animals or

Action,

unlike the

instinctive behav

of

herding

the trained obedience of dogs and

as a motive.

horses,

requires a pursues

conscious purpose or an end which

end,

Unless the
seeks

actor

is

deceived, he
his
goal

has

not yet

been attained; he

to make a potential good actual.

accomplishes

Other things

being equal, he is happier when he

so.

than when

he fails to do

blessedly happy, as is com monly said, they cannot have unrealized ends; whatever the divine good is, their enjoyment of it must be perpetual and at each moment complete. The gods,
gods are perfect and

Now if the

therefore, can have no motive to To deny this is to imply that the

act.10

gods are not perfect and

Consequently, they would not benefit us. happy, and hence that
gods are not

they

can

be improved.
not a virtue

Obviously, piety is

if the
argues

have just seen, Socrates

7.

implicitly

that

they

are

benefactors. And, as we not. But he goes further.

Cf. Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.1.2.

27ld-e.

8. Cf. Plato, Statesman 26ld-e, 9. Cf. Plato, Laws 7130-7143.

10.

Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

H78b7-24.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

55

He intimates that if piety does move the gods to act, it is a vice. Each time some one acts, his condition changes. This is so even if we abstract from the alteration in

bodily

and mental

states that

invariably

accompanies

human

action."

The

very particularity
particular means one must

of action

the fact that it always

involves the

application of

to particular ends
either not

implies that before

or

initiating

any action,

have been
is

acting

gods'

condition
without

one of

blessedness

or

something else. If therefore the perfection, it follows that they cannot act

doing

changing for the worse. Thus to the extent that prayer and sacrifice in duce the gods to benefit us, piety is a kind of care that harms its recipients, and
may be defined as injustice to the gods. In order to maintain that the gods would be
neither

harmed

nor

improved

by

caring for us,

ours.

one must postulate a radical

dissimilarity
But

between their

ways and

Specifically, it is necessary
undertaken

to argue that only human

action affects

the

actor

or

is

for the

sake of an absent good.

a new

difficulty

srises.

Not

cease to have any intelligible meaning when applied only does the word to gods, but so, presumably, does or any other word that names an attribute of human beings. Put somewhat differently, all divine "at
"thought,"
"life," "will,"
tributes"

"sction"

become
again

unfathomable and nameless.

us with

Once
logical

the dialogue seems to confront

two alternatives. Either the

structure of or

human

action

is

a suitable

divinity,
ond

it is

not suitable.

If the first

alternative

starting point for speculation about is true, then we must deny di

of sacrifice and prayer.

vine providence and concede

the uselessness

If the

sec

is true,
that

we

have
"are,"

no right
much

even

they

seem, then, that

reason

either

to make any positive predication of the gods, not It would less that they demand to be injustice to the or there is no good is not gods, impiety
worshiped.12

for

believing it

to be so.

IX.

Piety

as an

Art of Serving (I3d4~l4c4)

"care."

Socrates liness does

continues

to

question

Euthyphron

about the

meaning

of

If ho

not

benefit

or

improve the gods,

kind

what sort of care can

it be?

Euthy
in

phron responds

that it is the very

sort slaves render

to their masters. Socrates

terprets this to mean that

holiness is

of skilled service

to

gods

(vnngexixr)

xig

fteoig,

I3d7),

and

Euthyphron

concurs.

Socrates then

points out that the

by doctors assist in producing a specific work, namely, services used by shipwrights or housebuilders aid in skilled the just as health, Socrates asks him what producing boats or houses. When Euthyphron agrees,
skilled services used
know,"

work

the

skilled service

to

gods

helps to

produce.

"It's

obvious

that

you

"anthropological"

II.

For
The

an

argument against

the possibility of divine governance, see

Plato,

Republic
12.

38od-38ld.
"negative"

classic statement of a

theology is Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Per

plexed 1.50-60.

56

Interpretation
you claim what

he continues, "since
beautifully."

that of all mankind you know the divine things

true,"

most

thereupon exhorts

I say is him in the name of Zeus to

"And

Euthyphron

responds.

Socrates

explain what that

resplendent work

(ndyxakov egyov) (vnngexaig).

is

which

the

gods

produce

by
The

using
gods of

us

as

servants

reply is embarrassingly things. Perhaps he is confused by the The

prophet's

vague:

make

many fine
remarks.

"technical"

flavor
the

Socrates'

For Euthyphron does have

gods'

definite

point of view on

subject.

He believes the

an

is justice, snd thst they sccomplish it by ruling us. Socrates plays on ambiguity in the word Imngexixr), which signifies both an art of serving and a
work

subordinate art.

The former meaning is the

are

one

Euthyphron has in
and

mind.

In his

opinion the

many

properly the
emphasizes

must render.

Socrates

slaves, piety is the homage they the latter meaning when he contrasts piety

gods'

with such architectonic or master arts as medicine and

housebuilding. Are

we

then to understand that the gods,

men as subordinates

in

order to accomplish

justice,

would use pious

(vixngexaig,

13d i)?
and csre aims st

Justice is
cipients

kind

of care

(I2e6),

the good snd

we

benefit

of

its

re

(1304). A

prodigious number of

the

benefits

enjoy

sre provided

by

doctors,
brutish,
used,

shipwrights,

housebuilders,

and

the like.

Indeed,

without

the services of

these and

other craftsmen

human life

would almost

and short.

However, it is equally
practice of arts. so.

obvious

certainly be poor, nasty, that justice does not result au

their products are often mis

tomatically from the

and

The

arts and

unavoidably

For there is
art

no art which can make a man expert

with a partial

in the
good

proper uses of expertise.

Each

deals

good,

not the

human

as

such;

and each takes

for

granted the worth of

its

own product.

The

goodness of

health, for

example, is

not a

finding

of

the

medical

art, but its

presupposition.

Partly for this reason, the doctor as doctor is not qualified to dictate how much health care should be provided, to whom, and with what portion of the commu
nity's resources.

Yet

neither can

laymen

make

this determination
utilized

with

like technical
ment of

accuracy.

In

order

to insure that the arts are

anything for the better

mankind, the master craftsmen must themselves be directed

the true

by

someone

who understands mands a

hierarchy
of

of

human ends,

and

who, in addition,

com

detailed knowledge
of

the contingencies of time and place. This su

preme

director

the arts could only be a god. If the gods rule us, Socrates sug

gests,

they

would

do

so

by

ordering the

arts

in the

manner

best

suited

to promote

our well-being.

They

would

therefore use master craftsmen as their subordi

nates,

not pious men.

Precisely

if the

gods

rule, piety contributes nothing to that

ndyxakov egyov which

is justice.
con a

But do the

gods rule?

ceit of the philosophic

vine ruler would

Obviously, a divinely-managed economy is a pure imagination. Of greater significance is the fact that
the goods and services whose

di

he

secures

which

just distribution among his human subjects. Thus he would not partake of the benefits he confers. But if gods and men do not share in a common good, do

have

no need of

they

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

not make not our

57 Either the be
gods are

up

a community. or

This

suggests two possibilities. our

rulers,

they

work

for

benefit

with no advantage to themselves. could render called

Now

someone

who

works

slave.1

If the

gods establish

exclusively for another's good justice among us, it is they who

a
of

the kind

care that slaves give

to their masters.

When Socrates
question.

asked

him to

identify

gods'

the

work, Euthyphron dodged the

now

The gods, he said,

a more

him down to
accomplish

many fine things. Socrates definite answer. He points out that generals
make

tries to pin
also

and

farmers

and

many fine results. Nonetheless, it would not be hard to state the sum substance (to xecpdkaiov, I4a2) of their respective works: generals produce
gods'

victory in war, farmers produce food from the earth. Euthyphron has to agree. business But when Socrates asks him to state the sum and substance of the

(Hgyaoia, i4aio), he
matters

again evades

the question. The task of understanding such

precisely is very great, the prophet replies, and therefore he will simply (dnkcog, I4b2) say this: If someone knows how to do and say what is acceptable

(xexagiouiva, I4b2)

to the gods

by

holy,

and

this

preserves

both

private

praying and sacrificing, he does what is households and the common possessions of

cities; but the

opposite of what

is

acceptable answer

is impious,
not

and

this overturns and

condescend

destroys

everything.

Euthyphron's

is

only evasive, it is

ing. His former Indeed he

citizens
ous

respect

considers
which

Socrates inferior to the

now sees

for Socrates has been entirely replaced by contempt. many. For it is the piety of ordinary

in

he

fit to instruct him. The dialogue has taken

toward Socrates has
come to resemble
well advised

a curi

Socrates'

turn. Euthyphron's attitude

attitude

toward him. Each thinks the other would

be

to

return

to

orthodoxy.
"simple"

Socrates

responds

to the

prophet's could

explanation

by

not simple enough.

Euthyphron

have

answered much

suggesting it was more briefly had he

to teach. For
gods'

been willing, Socrates contends, but he is obviously

when

not zealous

he

was on

the verge of revealing the

spoken

sum and substance of

the

work,

he held back. If only he had would already have learned from

markable statement.
holy?"

without

reserve, Socrates continues, "I

holiness."

you

sufficiently

about

This is

a re

It implies that

satisfactory

answer

to the question "What

is

the

is to be found in

the preceding

exchange. much

The

most skillful general cannot

might rob

foresee,

less

provide

against, every

contingency that
sure that

him be

of victory.

Nor

can

the most skillful

or

farmer in
But

his

crops will not

ruined

by

bad weather, pestilence,

concern

blight. Man
art

invents

arts and practices

them out of a

for his
his Yet he

own well-being.
undertakings

cannot secure

the

conditions on which

the

success of

depends; it
He there Their

cannot eliminate
outcome of

the role of chance in his to be

affairs.

cares

too much about the

his

endeavors

fully

reconciled

to the power of chance.

fore

turns to gods

in the hope that they may

grant

him security

and success.

i.

Cf. Plato, Republic 343CI-6,

344b4-8.

58
"work"

Interpretation
is the mastery of fortune. Piety is the time-honored desire to control the
uncontrollable.2

and universal expres

sion of man's

In

order

to do their the

work

well, the gods

are

must

be

sovereign over

the things and

processes of

ticipate nor

thing

of

chance.3

radically free beings, man can neither an confine what they do; he is their plaything and so, in effect, a play unless his religious His hope of salvation is unreasonable
world.

Yet if they

observances exert a men are

kind
When

of compulsion upon

the

gods.4

Piety

presupposes

that

too

weak

to control chance

but strong

enough

to

control

the beings who

seek

can control chance.

citizens sacrifice and

pray,

they unconsciously

to

be the lords

or employers of

the

gods.

Again, it

seems, it is the

gods who render

the sort of care that slaves give to their masters.

X.

Piety

as an

Art of Bartering (i4c^-i^aio)

After chiding Euthyphron for his unwillingness to teach, Socrates remarks that the lover must follow the beloved wherever he leads We may expect that he
.

is
no

about

to make himself

as obnoxious as an unwanted suitor who will not an

take

for

an answer.

Pursuing
wonders

implication

of

Euthyphron's last

statement

(cf.

I4b3~5), Socrates

if holiness is

a certain

of sacrifice and prayer. rifice consists

Euthyphron
gifts

affirms that

it is. Socrates then

knowledge (t-jriorrjfiri, 1405) asks if sac holiness is "a

re

in giving

to the gods, and prayer in making requests of them.

When the
knowledge
sponse
missed

prophet assents of

to this also,

Socrates

concludes that

is

sarcastic:

giving and asking in regard to "You have caught my meaning

meaning, namely, that if the

gods"

(iodi). Euthyphron's
beautifully."

quite

But he has

Socrates'

most we can

know

about gods

is

how to

give answers and ask questions retorts:

in

regard

to

them, piety is
your

philosophy.1

Socrates then

"I

am one who

longs, my friend, for

you

wisdom, and I

apply my joinder the Greek

shall

mind

to

it,

so that

nothing

say

will

fall to the in

ground."

In this

re we

words

cpikog

and ootpia occur almost

succession.
section of

As

see, the

nature of

philosophy
of

appears more

plainly in this

the dia

logue than in any other. Returning to his point

departure, Socrates inquires

whether

the

service

(vjtngeoia, I4d6) to the gods consists in asking them and giving to them. Eu thyphron answers in the affirmative. Socrates then suggests that the right

way
and

(dgftcds, Hd9)
need

of

asking the

gods

is to

ask

for things

we need

from them,
of

conversely, that the right way of

giving to the gods is to give them things

an artful

they
he

from

us.

"For it

wouldn't

be

way

(xexvtxdv, I4e3)

giving,"

Cf Xenophon Memorabilia
.

i i 6- 1 o
.
.

Cf. Plato, Laws 644d-e. 4. Cf. Plato, Republic 362c, 3640-3653; Nietzsche, The Gay Science 2.84. 1 Cf. section vi, n. I For a provocative if overzealous interpretation of Gershon W. Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety: An Essay Toward the Solution of an
3.
.

Socrates'

meaning,

see

Enigma,"

Phronesis 3

(1958).

pp.

116-19.

An Interpretation of
explains, "to
opinion

Plato'

Euthyphro

59
need."

This is Euthyphron's something he doesn't too. Socrates thereupon concludes that holiness is a kind of bartering art
give someone
...

(ujiogixr)
other.

tic;

xexvx\, I4e6)

by

which men and gods

trade with each

call

Euthyphron's
art

patience is

nearly

at an end.

He tells Socrates to

it

bar

tering
to be

if he likes.
protests

Socrates
true.

that he is
to

not pleased

by

the new

definition

unless

it happens

And he

seems

tain any
since we

benefit from

our gifts.

have his doubts, for he What they give is

wonders whether evident

the gods ob

to everyone, he says,

have nothing good that does not come from them. But what benefit do they derive from the things we give to them? "Or have we so much the better of them in this bartering, that while we get all good things from them, they get scarcely believe his ears. He demands to know whether Soc rates really thinks the gods benefit from our gifts. This is not the first time he be came indignant at the suggestion that piety benefits the gods (cf. 13C6-10). Yet if
can

nothing from Euthyphron

us?"

piety

satisfies
would

a need of the

gods,

as

for instance

a need

to be honored and that the gods need

obeyed,

it

not

be

benefit to them? Let

us then assume

nothing from us and therefore gain nothing from our devotions. If they nonethe less demand to be worshipped in return for the good fortune they bestow, they
act about as

sensibly

as someone who trades gold

for dross. Piety,

one might

say,

swindling the gods. To avoid this consequence, one must deny that gods and men are in any way linked by contractual obligations or commercial ties. Specifically, one must reject the notion of a convenant in which divine pro

is the

art of

tection

is the

promised reward

for

obedience on

the part of a chosen people. Ear

lier

we saw

that gods

and men are not connected

by political

relations of rule and

subordination.

We

are

therefore entitled to conclude that gods and men

a common good.

do

not

make

up

that piety

is

community and do not share in not justice to the gods, nor is impiety
came closest

It follows from this

them.2

a crime against
after

Socrates

to mentioning philosophy

suggesting that the

right

way to

give or

to ask is to do

so according to need, and before

interpreting

the

most sacred of all relationships nomic arrangement

that between a

people and

its

gods

as an eco

founded

on

human

self-interest and

divine

gullibility.

What

emerges more

foundly

utilitarian

clearly in bent of

this than

in any

other section of

the dialogue is the pro

Socrates'

thought. In this connection we may recall

matings

his

proposal

in the Republic that incestuous

natures.3

be deemed

sacred

Socrates'

duce offspring in the sense of the beneficial

with good

standard of right action

if they pro is the good human

or useful

(cbcpekia, I3b8;
their

i4eio).

He

evaluates all serve

institutions

and moral norms

from the

standpoint of

capacity to

2.

Thus Frederick Rosen is only half right

not

when

he

claims

that Plato's
divine."

intention is to

show

that

"justice,
Plato's
3.

[traditional]

piety, connects the human and the

See his

"Piety

and

Justice,

Euthyphro"

Philosophy 43

(April 1968),

p.

109.

Plato, Republic 458e-459bio, 46iei-3, 464c.

60
needs.4

Interpretation

However,

unlike

the

utilitarian

thinkers of

classic modernity,

Socrates

recognizes a

hierarchy

of needs which

is

neither subjective nor

determined

by

the

strongest passions of most men most of with violent

ing

without

the time, or of any man when threatened death. Man's highest need, according to Socrates, is to become a be This is of course a need we can never satisfy, and for the
needs.5

same reason upon

that

we cannot

apy only the gods enjoy completely and continuously that solely for its own sake and never as a means to another
Let
us pause

himself

and

his

sensible

become simply wise. The wisest man practices ther friends as much and as long as he can. For
good which
end. might

is desirable be.

for

a moment to speculate on what

the divine good

the

That the divine

good

is

contemplation

is

suggested

by

following
A

considera

tions. Our concept of perfection contains two elements that are not simply or

wholly
we

compatible.

First,

there

is the
soley

notion of self-sufficiency.

perfect

being,
on

tend to assume,
external

must exist

by

virtue of

its

own

nature,

depending
.

nothing

to itself. The second element is the idea of happiness

We tend

to imagine that a perfect

being

would

enjoy the highest degree But desire

originates

of

felicity. Now

happiness,
all

at

least in the

common

understanding, is

a state or condition

in

which

desires

are

harmoniously
all

satisfied.

in

felt need,

priva

or lack, whereas a deficiency, and so from

tion,

self-sufficient

being

is

by

definition

exempt

from every

desire.

ceived

in terms

of the satisfaction

Consequently, as long as happiness is con of desire, the happiness of a self-sufficient be

of a corpse or a stone

ing

cannot

be distinguished from that

there are some pleasures

(cf. Gorgias

492a).

However,

such as

those arising from certain smells,

sights and sounds

of contemplation

that are not founded

upon a

(ftecogia) belong in
Since the
reserved

this category,

preceding desire. The as do some of the

pleasures pleasures

of

learning,

such as

the pleasure that comes from an unexpected insight (cf.

pleasures of

Philebus
seem to

5ib-52a).

the senses, like the senses themselves,

members of

have been

by

nature

for

the snimal

kingdom,

whose preservstion

depends

ss much upon

the power of perception ss upon the

promptings of psssion snd the sible able

only for is that

an

intelligent

being
It

cspscity for locomotion; snd since lesrning is pos whose knowledge is incomplete, it is reason
which a self-sufficient

to suppose that the sole pleasure of

of contemplation.

being

could

be

ca

pable

was of course

Aristotle's

view

that

God,

even

though self-sufficient, is supremely pleasure, the

pleasure
of

happy, because He

enjoys one continuous

contemplation

(Nicomachean Ethics ii54b24-29,

to say whether or
not

n78b33-36).

To
gods else

return

to the

dialogue, Socrates declines

Instead he

he thinks the

benefit from
do
you

our gifts.

wonders what

those gifts might be. "What

think,"

Euthyphron replies, "but honor

and

honorable
said

gifts and

as

said before gratitude

(xdgis,

isaio)."

What he actually

is that

one must

4. 5.

Cf. Plato, Lysis 2lod; Statesman 296e-297a. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.6. 10.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

worship the
tude.
gods

61
"gratifying"

I4b2) to them.

(xexagiouevov, However, worship is readily intelligible as an expression of grati Gratitude is what we owe to our benefactors, and the gods are thought to be
manner

in the

"acceptable"

or

the

greatest

benefactors.

Gratitude,
in

moreover, is intended to be
expect to receive

xexagiouevov

in

both

senses of that word.

A benefactor does
value

from his benefi

grati

ciaries

anything He
also

comparable

to the good he does

for them. Their

tude

is

acceptable

return.

he knows it is the best thing they can give him in him, finds it gratifying, as it assures him they are not unworthy of his
to
since

efforts.

According

to

Euthyphron,
point

our gifts to the gods are

honor, honorable
honor them

gifts,

and gratitude.

The

he

wants

to make, but does not clearly express, is

that we

show our gratitude

to the gods
-

by honoring

them,

and we

chiefly through sacrifice and prayer. Man naturally feels benevolence

ward whatever

and gratitude or
or

he believes benefits him for

evil.

enmity and resentment to does him harm. He wants to return

good

for

good and evil

So

deeply

principle, that he

sometimes attempts to
object.

ingrained in him is this retaliatory repay the pleasure or pain he receives

or
or

from dote

an

inanimate
on a

fondly
A

He may kick the door on which he stubbed his toe, possession which has become a special source of enjoyment

pride.
of

moment's reflection

his
ill.6

gratitude or resentment

informs him, however, that the only proper object is a moral agent that deliberately intends his good

Most persons, at one time or another, come to believe they have much to be grateful for. And when this happens, it is usually with an awareness that their
or

greatest

blessings

cannot all

be

attributed

to a human

agency.

The belief in

gods

enables man

to gratify his deepest need to give thanks. The gods are a

gratitude as well as of

personifi

cation of

his

his fears.

By

subtly calling
countless

attention

to this

fact,
sume

Plato

concedes

that piety
would

is

nobler

than the argument of the dialogue thus

far has

suggested.

It

be

a gross

injustice to

devout

persons

to as

that behind every

act of

worship there

lies

an unconscious

desire to domes

ticate, enslave,
XI.

or swindle

the gods.

Ending

of the Dialogue {I5bi-i6ad)

remark about gratitude enables

Euthyphron's

Socrates to

suggest

that the

holy
re

is gratifying to the gods sponds that he thinks the

him to
react

but

neither

beneficial

nor

dear to them. Euthyphron

holy
He

in this

way.

is the dearest thing of all. We might have expected never doubted that holiness is god-beloved (cf.

na4-b8);
or

besides, if the holy is gratifying to the gods, it must also be dear pleasing (cpikov, I5b2) to them. Socrates goes on to infer that Euthyphron
and

now wants

to define the
says.

holy

as that which

is dear to the
predictable.

gods.

"Most

certa

the prophet

Here

again

his

reaction

is

He

never understood

the

difference

between saying that the

holy

is

god-beloved and

defining

it

as the

god-

6. Cf. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 2.3.1-7

62

Interpretation
iodi2-i

beloved (cf.
"accident"

ia9), any

more

than

he

understood

the distinction

between

"essence"

and

(cf.

na6-9).

Twice in the

present exchange

Socrates
Accord

has

predetermined

Euthyphron's answer; he has

Daedalus'

put words art.

in his

mouth.

ingly

he

now returns wonders

to the

subject of can

Socrates

how Euthyphron
appear not

be

surprised, when

he

gives such an

swers, if his speeches

to stand

fast but

walk about.

And how

can

Euthyphron

accuse

him

of

being

the Daedalus who makes them walk, when

he is

himself
round

much more artful

than Daedalus? For

he has

made

the argument go
come

in

a circle.
place

Or does Euthyphron it
started

not perceive that their

discussion has

back to the
and

from?

Surely

he

remembers

that a while ago the

holy
not now

the god-beloved appeared to them not the same but different.

Or does he he is

remember?

Euthyphron
what

replies

that he does. Then does he

gods

not realize

asserting that
equivalent

is dear (cpikov), 15C5) to the

the

to

defining
the

holy

as

the

god-beloved

is holy, and is this not (tieocpikeSi 15C6)? "Of

has
not

course,"

says

prophet. a path

Socrates,

we

observe,

Euthyphron down

that ends in

outright

only steered self-contradiction; he has pre his ability to

tended to doubt both the soundness of Euthyphron's memory and

grasp
either

the obvious. He then offers

him

a choice of

confessing to one of two errors:

they blundered earlier in agreeing that the holy and god-beloved are different, or, if they made no mistake then, they must be using the wrong hypoth
esis now.

"So it

seems,"

Euthyphron

says

with

thereupon exhorts him to start the

could

inquiry hardly say anything better calculated to hasten the prophet's departure. Vowing that he will not be cowardly and give up the search before learning what the holy is, Socrates implores Euthyphron not to scorn him, and to make
all over again

weary indifference. Socrates from the beginning. He

every effort to tell the truth. "For you know [the any human being does, and like Proteus, you
tell."

truth],"

says
are not to

Socrates,

"if indeed

be

released until you

This

remark

ious to leave. It is

is undoubtedly supposed to make Euthyphron even more anx of interest to us for at least two other reasons. First, Socrates
suggests that one would
and

implies that true piety is humanly unknowable. For he have to be as wise as Proteus to know what the holy is,
ary Old Man
logue."

Proteus,
an men

the legend

of the

Sea,

was a god.

The Euthyphro is indeed

to the

"aporetic dia

Piety
of

is

correct

behavior

with regard

divine,

but

lack

genuine

knowledge
intention
of

the true god or gods.

alludes to a

Second, Socrates
his
capture of

Homeric tale
of

which provides a clue

to Plato's

as an author.

In the fourth book

the

Odyssey Menelaos
until

tells the story to

speak.

Proteus.1

He held fast to the Old Man

without the

he

agreed

This

was no mean

feat,

as

the sea god could change his

form

at will.

In fact,
and

Menelaos

would

have failed

help

of a

goddess, Eidothea. He

his

companions

had been

marooned

by

windless seas on the

isle

of

Pharos,

barren

place where sooner or

later they

would

die

of starvation.

Menelaos

suspected that

1.

Homer, Odyssey

4.348-480.

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

a god was responsible
offended nor

63

how to

for their plight, but he knew neither which deity they had appease him. Proteus could easily answer these questions,
retain

but he

shunned

the presence of men, speaking to them only if he could

his

liberty
Zeus

in

no other way. was

When Menelaos
punished

captured

him,

the Old Man

revealed

that the

hero

being

and

the other

failing to render complete hecatombs to immortals, but that by offering the proper sacrifices he would
home. Euthyphron
eluding him. He himself to Menelaos. The comparison has a certain
as a

for

be

granted a safe passage

Socrates

characterizes

Proteus bent

on

thereby implicitly
plausibility.

compares

Like Menelaos he
would

on

the

island, Socrates is in danger

sacrifices.2

of

losing
of

his life.
accusers

And

perhaps

be less

vulnerable

to the slings and arrows

his

if he had been
crucial

more attentive to

points.

Menelaos

death. And Menelaos

Socrates'

But the analogy breaks down at home safely; Socrates will be condemned to punishment will be inflicted by the city, not by the gods.
the
sailed stand at opposite poles of the moral universe.

and

Socrates

The

one

epitomizes a visceral attachment

to one's own; the other, a

would not

reflective

love

of wis

dom. Socrates, Paris had

mer's

we

may be sure,

have

advocated war against

Troy if
Ho
suf

abducted

Xanthippe,

even

had

she

been the

comeliest of women.
of

poetry, through its beautiful and compelling images

of

the deeds and

ferings

the

heroes,

encourages a

way

of

life devoted to the At the

same

care of one's own

body,

property, reputation,

family,
in

and city.

mentally, it provides no ground for a way of

time, and more funda life devoted to the pursuit of wis

reach of

dom. For it
and change. world came

presents a world
Proteus'

which

nothing is beyond the

becoming

mutability

reflects

the chaos out of which the Homeric

criticizes so

into being; it typifies that quality of the Greek gods which Socrates Republic* Socrates must have been amused, there severely in the
with

fore,

that Menelaos overcame Proteus

goddess."4

the aid of

Eidothea,

whose name

Athens executed Socrates, but he triumphed in death. means "form Through Plato's poetry, he became the hero of the philosphic tradition. And that tradition, which Plato's poetry was so instrumental in founding, itself became a element of Western Civilization. Plato could not have secured Soc

founding

rates'

victory
things, the
tion

over

the Homeric heroes if he had

not

become

a poet of new
of

divine

"forms."

By

a strange coincidence, a

fitting

image

this transvalua

of values was provided now purports

by
not

Homer himself. why Euthyphron must know the truth about know clearly what is holy and unholy, he would
of a mere of

Socrates

to

explain

the holy. If Euthyphron did

never

have

undertaken, on

behalf

hireling,

to prosecute his aged father

for

murder.

On the contrary, fear

327a with

the

gods would

have kept him from taking

2.

Compare Republic
once

prays 3loud

only thus, according to the teaching

3.

st

Platonic Socrates 33 ldo-7; also consider Phaedo 1 1 837-8. The Phaedrus 279D-C, in a private conversation. His prayer is for wisdom and
of

the

dialogue, for divinity.

to me

Plato, Republic
The meaning
of

3&od 1-38 1 es.

"Eidothea"

4.

was pointed out

by

Edward Erler.

64

Interpretation
do it
correctly,"

the risk that he "might not

and

he

would

have been

ashamed

be

fore human beings. It is evident, therefore, that he thinks he knows clearly is holy and what is not.

what

Having made ing his lawsuit

prosecute

final

attempt to

frighten

and shame

Euthyphron into
might

abandon correct to

while

hinting

that in some circumstances it

be

one's

speak and no
Socrates,"

longer

father (cf. 4an-b2, 9ai-9) Socrates urges the conceal what he considers the holy to be. "Some
Euthyphron then
alleges

prophet other

to

time,

is the be
on

reply.

he is in

hurry to go

somewhere

and must

his

way.

And

with

surprised and chagrined.

He

rebukes

that, he departs. Socrates pretends to be Euthyphron for casting him down from a
what

mighty
and

hope,

namely, that he

could

learn from him

is

thereby

rid

himself

Meletus'

of

indictment. Socrates thus

holy and what is not, indirectly accuses

Euthyphron
pares
down"

allowing him to be killed. In keeping with this, he tacitly com himself to the field hand, whom Euthyphron's father supposedly "cast
of

(xaxafiakcbv,

4c8, 1565) into

ditch. Of course, Socrates is in

suggesting that Euthyphron is

tion may

guilty

of negligent

not seriously homicide. But this fanciful no a triple

help

us

to see that the dialogue has

culminated

failure. Not

only do Socrates and Euthyphron fail to discover true piety, but each fails to benefit the other. Euthyphron does not save Socrates from the city, nor does Socrates
save

Euthyphron from himself.

to profess disappointment
not at

Socrates Socrates

continues

the prophet's

departure.
not

By
in
to

this time Euthyphron may

says

be

able

to hear

him; he is surely

listening.
wise

he had hoped to
no

show

Meletus that Euthyphron

made

him

divine things, that he

longer

speaks

loosely

or makes

innovations in
a

regard

them,

and above all

that he

would

live the

rest of

his life in

better

way.

With

these words the dialogue ends.

one should

live

reminds us

closing allusion to the problem of how that, in the decisive respect, the dialogue has been en
shown that

Socrates'

tirely

successful.

The Euthyphro has

vouog does

not

deserve the
virtue.

unqualified respect of the wisest

men, and that orthodox piety is not a

It

has therefore

established

the necessity for raising and exploring the question of

the right life. And that question is the central and unifying theme of Socratic
philosophy.

CONCLUSION

It

was observed

in the Introduction that

without

we cannot

take an intelligent interest

in the Euthyphro
seemed

Socrates'

prejudging

quarrel with

Athens,

and this

legitimacy of our study. We found it neces and to assume that we could sary to treat Athens as representative of "the understand what is important about Athenian without ever having practiced piety it. In so doing we covertly denied the chosenness of its any ancient people
city,"

to cast grave doubts upon the

claim

to possess

a sacred

tradition whose significance cannot properly be

appre-

An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro

ciated

65
that the good

from the

outside.

In short,

we assumed

is

not

identical
to

with

the ancestral, the very point Socrates is obliged to prove.

Having
whether

completed our analysis of the

problem

dialogue,

we must now

try

determine
be.

the

just

summarized

is

as serious as

it

initially

appeared to

Two

considerations suggest

that

it is

not.

First,
of

the phenomena
as a guide

from

which we

inferred the

fallibility

and

delusiveness

vouog

to action are neither peculiar to Athens nor trivial for

being

common.

and and

On the contrary, they are fundamental features of civil life, Athenian non-Athenian alike. It will be useful to recall the most important of these, the key points that were made in connection with them, (i) The belief that
is
a sacral union.

the

family

This belief,

which

is

intimately
supports other

connected with no

tions of communal guilt and the

heritability

of

sin,

both Euthyphron's

lawsuit

and

his kinsmen's

opposition

to it. For among

although a son

is impious if he

prosecutes

able

to

free himself from

rules

pollution unless

things, it implies that his manslaying father, he may not be he prosecutes. (2) The belief that the
or sanctioned

elementary
account of of

of justice have been legislated

the tension between
a tension

by

the gods.

On

this

belief,

loyalty

to one's own and the demands

impartial justice
the form of a

intrinsic to

political

life

as such

tends to as

sume

contradiction

between the

commandments of

divine law,

or

of a conflict

between justice

and piety.

(3) The multiplicity of religious

authori

ties.

In

addition

to the officially appointed expounders of sacred custom (for ex

ample, the

King

Archon

and

the

Interpreters), every city has its

and others
who claim occasion some

share of oracle

chanters, inspired poets, soothsayers, gods. This state of affairs is bound to

gious

to speak

for the
reli

disputes concerning

duty

that cannot be
although our

resolved on

the basis of authority. the dialogue involved a tacit

Second,
ging
of

initial

concern with refutation of

beg

Socrates'

the question,

the view that piety is justice to the

gods makes use of no

illicit hypotheses: his

proved.

grounds of proof

do

not presuppose

the truth
compels

of what

is to be

One

and

the same mode of argument enables or

served

him to

deny by

that the

gods rule

us, are

by

us,

or make covenants

with us. In each case the denial follows

logically

from

premises

expressly

or

im

plicitly

accepted

most religious persons everywhere.

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University of

An Introduction to Hegel's
to the

"Introduction"

Philosophy
of Oklahoma

of Right

Donald J. Maletz

University

Hegel's
state at plicates

the

Philosophy of Right is in many ways the great book about the modern beginning of its period of self-confidence. This work defends and ex
it
also

the modern state;

will

teaches an

thought which
ern state.

be

adequate

to the

admittedly new kind foundations and the problems

of political of

the

mod

As

a modern work

in

political

haps

obscured rather

than

illuminated

by

thought, however, its intention is per the fact that it was published with two
with no comment on

separate

title pages, placed on consecutive sheets

except that
an older

their rela

tionship
Right

implied form
of

by

the sequence. The first of the titles appears to

look back to
and

of political

philosophy; it

calls

the

Science
second

the State

[Staatswissenschaft]
as well as

in

Hegel's study "Natural On the other

Outline."

hand, for the

drops the
"state,"

title there is "Outlines of the

"natural"

Philosophy of Right";

this page
of the

mention of

right,

the reference to a

"science"

but it does it

give us

"philosophy."1

Characteristically, Hegel
and the

calls atten

tion to the dual or the divided ("natural

replaces
with

right"

"science

of

the state") and

the single or the unified

("philosophy

of right").

The task

sug-

This
the

article

is the first

of

two on Hegel's

Philosophy
Hegel

of Right (cited

as

PR). Both

are

devoted to
it

difficult

"Introduction"

to this

book, in

which

presents the

basis for his

analysis of right

self and of the consequences which

the criticism of natural

theses of the

right which

flow from it, such as the state. In the present study, the theme is informs Hegel's work from the beginning and then the first three
mode of

"Introduction."

These theses describe the

as

thought which Hegel

follows,

espe

cially in his doctrine

of

'will'

of

the basis

of right.

The

second of

these articles is a reading of

4-29

the

PR,

where

the

idea

of will

is

presented

in

a comprehensive manner.

All too

often neglected,

this section of the PR is in fact the basis for Hegel's the sources
give a
of

both

political

thought and of the

state

novel understanding of the meaning of right and itself. To the extent possible, I have attempted to strengths and weaknesses of

thought

reading of the will become

argument as

it

unfolds,

clearer

if

we

learn to

spell

supposing that the him out.

Hegel's

Note

on editions and citations:

the critical edition edited

1818-31, 4
tion
of

vols.

For the text of the Philosophy of Right (cited as PR), I have used K.-H. Ilting: G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber Rechtsphilosophie, (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann, 1973-74). The second volume is a critical edi

by

the text

of

the

Philosophy

of Right

published

in

1820.

I have consulted, for the translations

into English, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); however, in some cases I have altered Knox's version in order to achieve a more literal render ing, and the translation from Uting's volumes is my own in cases where Ilting supplies material by
Hegel that
1
.

was not used

by

Knox.
"Grundrisse"

"Grundlinien."

The two titles

'outline.'

use

the words, respectively,

'outline'

and
'elements'

I have translated
'elements'

both

as

Knox (p. v)

uses

for the former,

of

for the latter, but

is

plainly

a word chosen to point out the

"Grundlinien."

difference

the terms, not because it is required

gives the

by

the mean

ing

of

Cf. PR 1, 66,
juris."

where

Hegel

title of his enterprise as "jus naturae et

civitatis,

i.e.,

philosophia

68
gested meant

Interpretation

by the titles, albeit enigmatically, is that of understanding by a new unity and why and how it is to be sought; and this
enter

what could question

be

is the

most

direct way, in fact, to

to the hint
given

into the themes

of the
of

book. In
the

we will attempt

examine some of

the chief premises

what follows, Philosophy of Right

by following

by

the titles and the

"Introduction"

full

elucidation of

that

hint in the

opening theses of the theoretical Hegel's argument throughout the

give a

to the book.

Philosophy

of Right is that it is

possible to

coherent, philosophic, and systematic account of

as well as the

right and of

the state.

The

beginning

concluding theses

of

the entire work report a new

or notorious proposition
of course

unity

of reason and

worldly life, there is the famous

the
rational and

about the

actuality

of

the rationality of the actual, and

Hegel's

entire approach

is

one which claims to

find the inner logic

rational.
"Introduction."

at work even

in

material that seems on

the surface to be anything but

The basis for

pre

this audacious project is argued above all in the

pares

Here Hegel
will,

the

groundwork

by

presenting

thesis about

freedom

and

which will

then be the basis

for

a new

understanding

of right and all

that flows from

it

in

dividual rights, morality, ethics, civil society, and the state. The premise for this account of the free will and its implications is a critique of the notion of natural
right.

Hegel

abandons

the derivation of right

more

from

nature

in favor

of the principle

that right comes from reason,

ingly, he
ward

also abandons
natural as a

the

view

that life

particularly from the free will; correspond in accordance with the right moves to

the

goal,

and

thus his

torical,

rather

than natural. The

inquiry concludes by viewing right as his Philosophy of Right ends with a sketch of "world
freedom,
a

history"

as a manifestation of rational

"second
which we are

which we con

struct; this, according to

plore the

Hegel, is

the

insight to

led

when we ex

difficulties

of natural right without

taking

them as an excuse

for giving

up the cause of reason. Hegel's

argument

is

landmark

of the period when the natural

right ideas

ly
the

ing

at the

early foundation

of modern

liberal

democracy,

not to mention at

basis

of classical

thought,

are replaced

by

a philosophic

doctrine claiming to be
merely positive,
the
of

independent
non-

of nature or

naturalness,

while also more than a

or antiphilosophic science.

That transition is

an essential element of

greatest

self-understanding dilemmas. The first

of modern political

thought and also the source

many

of

its

of

Hegel's titles

mentions

the theme of "natural

right"

and

thus builds

on a

long-established tradition stretching back to the beginnings of political phi losophy in classical thought. Yet it also draws attention to a distinction between
"natural
schaft"],
right"

["Naturrecht"]
a

and

the "science of the

state"

["Staatswissen-

distinction introduced especially in modern thought by those who would separate ethics from politics, what men ought to be and do from what they in fact are and do.2 As we look further into the Philosophy of Right, we find that
2.

See the

introductory

remarks

by Eduard Gans to Volume

ed.

G. W. F. Hegel, Sdmtliche Werke,

Hermann Glockner.

20 vols.

VII (i.e., The Philosophy of Right) of (Stuttgart: Fr. Fromann, 1928),

Hegel's
Hegel

"Introduction"

to the
"science"

Philosophy

of

Right

69
science"

claims to offer a

"philosophic
tive

science,"

["Wissenschaft"] but a "speculative dependent ultimately on knowing the "nature

1).

or of specula orienta about

knowledge,"

as

taught in his Science of Logic (PR n, 58;

The

tion he offers proves to

natural

be

a new

one, based

on a critique of received

ideas

right; but it is
of ethics.

not an adoption of

that "science of the

state"

which rejects

knowledge

It is

kind

of science that claims to preserve the concern of of what

natural right

thought

for knowledge
right"

is right
of

or

just in itself
"state"

while also

proposing to elucidate concurrently the real world gel offers a "philosophic (we find once the
sophic

the

(PR iv,

75).

He

phrase

"natural

right or philo

right")

which will explain

how the

actual state and the right as accessible

to thought are

inextricably

bound

together.3

Hegel's thought concerning politics was, from the first, occupied with the idea of natural right, for he saw that the concern for natural right was the mode

by
cal

which was expressed as opposed to a

the quest for a

rational

understanding

of

law law

and poli
or

tics,

simple,

pragmatic acquaintance with positive natural right refers also

histori

examples."

Yet the term

to the source of standards of

right,

to the source in nature; natural right is thought to refer to the right as re

as

ceived,

coming from nature,

as

distinguished from the conventional,

what

pp. 2-4.

By

"science

state"

of

the

is

meant

the

suggests, the study

"politics,"

of

the moving,

study of positive law (PR in, 75), and also, as Gans changing life of the state, as distinguished from the
the science of the state goes

study

of

its form. The distinction between

'abstract'

natural right and

back,

accord

ing

to

Gans,

to the

political

philosophy

of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;

clear see

it is

not of

found in antiquity, which rather treated these as parts of a whole, he argues. For Hegel's views on the division of modern culture into irreconcilable dichotomies,
Hegel's
3.

discussion

Phenomenology of Spirit
one of

(New York: Harper &

Row,

1975),

pp. 19-21

Werner Marx, See also PR iv, 75. PR

1;
or

Or

its

variants, such as

"die

philosophische

Rechts

wissens

"das

Recht,"

philosophische

also

PR 1.

239-240:

3 Remark (here is the phrase 'natural right or philosophic right'). See "The name natural right is merely traditional, not wholly correct; for by PR
'nature'

is

meant

1)

essence or concept, or 2) unconscious nature

right'

(the

actual meaning).

The

actual name:

'philosophic doctrine

of

[philosophische

Rechtslehre]."

Cf. the

suggestion of

Leo Strauss that

Natural Right here
a com

in Epicurean
and

thought there

is

a replacement of natural right

by

the "nature of
note 44.

right."

History

(Chicago:

University of Chicago Press,

with which
.

1953),

p.

in,

would note

ment of

Judith Shklar,

agree:

"One

should perhaps read

the

Philosophy

of Right

as a

de

fense
of

philosophy Raymond Plant's Hegel, American Political Science Review, vol. lxviii (December 1974), p. 1745. While the philosophic and the political in Hegel, by his own teaching, cannot be abstracted one from another, the clear priority and the leading theme of the PR is the renewal of political philosophy
and

of political

rather

than of the institutions of the post-Napoleonic

state."

Review

the
4.

consequent study of the modern See G. W. F. Hegel, Uber die pp. 437~537-

state on

the basis of that renewed study.

wissenschaftlichen

Behandlungsarten des

Naturrechts, in

Sdmtliche Werke, I,
phia:
position on natural

Published in English
see

as

Natural Law. trans. T. M. Knox (Philadel

University of Pennsylvania

Press. 1975);
zu

right, I am indebted to two articles

especially p. 55. For my understanding of Hegel's by Manfred Riedel: "Natur und Freiheit in He
2 vols.

Rcchtsphilosophie,"

gels

in Materialien
and

Hegels Rechtsphilosophie,
Naturrechts,"

(Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp,

1975),

11,

pp.

109-127;

"Hegels

Kritik des
Right."

Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969),

ture and Freedom

pp. 42-79-

in Riedel, Studien zu Hegels The former essay is translated as "Na

and

in Hegel's

Philosophy

of

in Hegel's Political Philosophy, Problems

Perspectives,

ed.

Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge

History,"

University Press,

1971),

pp.

136-150.

Cf.

also

Steven B. Smith, "Hegel's

pp.

Discovery

of

The Review of Politics,

vol.

45,

no. 2

(April 1983),

163-166.

70
men

Interpretation
agree on

have happened to
of

derstanding
nature

right

was once

among themselves. The quest for a rational un inseparable from the quest to know what was by

right

and

therefore more authoritative than any human conventions.

But

Hegel

perceives a new well-known

difficulty

in

In his

"Preface"

to the

linking Philosophy

right to

nature.

of Right, he describes the

mod

ern crisis of natural

right, a crisis already emerging

independently

of

Hegel's in

fluence. He

argues

that is is too widely believed at this time that "freedom of

spirit
what

thought, and of the deed in hostility to,

self-evidently
ture,"

generally, evinces itself only in

is publicly

recognized"

a problem when we observe

divergence from, in (PR n, 61). This tendency is that in regard to knowledge of "na
is to be
viewed as

it is

now

widely
it."

acknowledged must

that nature

"inherently
this actual
within

rational"

"knowledge"

so that
reason present nature

"investigate

and

grasp in

concepts

in

Knowledge

essence"

seeks the

"law

and

immanent

(PR n, 61-62). Yet this view,

influenced
"ethical
springs
within

by

modern

science,

cannot

becoming help but

the common possession of those

cause us

to wonder whether the

world,"

"state,"

the

is "not

allowed to

from the fact that it is

that

reason which

element and which maintains

enjoy the good fortune which has achieved power and mastery itself and has its home (PR 11,
there"

62). Could the by-product

the

of modern scientific rationalism

be

an exemption of

practical concerns of men rational

(so

different, it

would

seem, from lawful nature)

from

order, thus opening the way to a

antinomian modes of

modernism

in

practical affairs us

that

encourages

antirational,

thought?

We find before

in the

modern spirit an apparent

whose

dualism

of

lawful

nature and a

freedom

now

tends to be interpreted as

seemingly free man, independence from rational and

unguided

universal

standards, a license for innovation in ideas and practices

standards.5

by

intelligible

practical realm.

To reply to the dilemma, Hegel proposes to seek the intelligible core of the We must then understand why it is not possible to approach this
standpoint of natural

issue from the

right, especially since Hegel understands the

question with which natural right

thought began to

be

portant one.

We

move nature

easily toward
right,

notions of natural

wholly necessary and im right, toward a desire to

grasp

what

is

by

when we

find

ourselves confronted with a conflict

rights, duties or relationships, or even with conflicting opinions con ing cerning what is right. Arising in the case where there is not simplicity but com
set of

plexity and conflict, the question of natural right seeks to reduce the multifarious demands of practical life to their essentials, supposing that the essential is what is natural; it seeks to ascertain which of many laws, rights and duties are fundamen

tal, natural as opposed to arbitrary and conventional (PR iv, 75-6; 1, What is conventional in origin seems lacking in final authority; it is the
the contradictions that provoke the questioning.
5.

239-40). source of

That

which we

have

freely

in-

Cf. Judith Shklar, Freedom

pp.

and

Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge

University

Press.

1976),

3, 12-13; Charles
pp.

Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge

University-

Press,

1979),

154 ff.; PR 111. 95ff.

Hegel's
vented,
or

"Introduction"

to the
under

Philosophy

of

Right

71
to

invented it
appears

the press of circumstances,

appears

have its limita

tions,
more

and

to us that we can see beyond those limitations to something

relative.

authoritative, less

Yet the traditional law is

now

answer

to this question in terms of to a fatal ambiguity

natural

right

or natural

subject, for

Hegel,

connected with

the very word

nature.

The

question of natural right

has

sought

both that
a

right which proceeds answer

from

nature and also

that which

is

right

simply,

definitive

to the ques

tion of what
posed

is

things.

constituted at

However, nature means now two quite different and op On the one hand, it is 'natural the way we find ourselves the beginning, the primary or original material of our existence be
right.
being,'

fore

alteration

we also

by any man-made processes or conventions. mean by the nature of a thing its essence or concept,
what

On the
what

other

hand,
from

it

means

the point of view of reason. The rational essence of a

thing may be, Hegel

which

remarks, something other than

example what right

it is

'naturally,'

for

he

gives the

is

right as
and of

precisely it

of man and right. appears

What is
man,
76).

right

by

nature might mean either

to

original

man

in

a state of nature, or what

is

in

itself (PR I, 239-40; iv,

this ambiguity

The
with

character of

should

be

compared

to a

difficulty

connected

the

concept of

law. "There is

a world of

laws,

which we call nature

in

gen
natu

eral."

The laws

of nature

properly speaking
"absolute,"

are those

laws discoverable
"are what

by

ral science.
valid as since

These laws

are of

that

is, they

they

are and are

they

are"; to "know the law

are correct and

nature, we must

learn to know nature,

which can

its laws

it is only

our notion of

them

be

false."

"The
and
all"

measure of these not assist

laws is

outside of

us;

knowing

them adds nothing to them

does

their operation; our

6

knowledge

of them can

expand, that is
na

(PR m,

91-93).

Next to this

account of an

impersonal, inhumanly fixed

is
the locus of striving,

ture,

we put then

the human world,

which alone

inten
of

(PR m, and another way The similarity is only preliminary. "We learn to know the laws [human laws] That is, the citizen and the jurist become acquainted with the just as they and to an extent at first accept them just as given. Yet eventu laws of the
92).
exist."

tions, disagreement right is in one way similar

and purposive change.

"The knowledge [of the world]

not"

land,

ally the differences among

many duties "not
so
charged

laws,

or

the

question as

to what is essential among the

to us, make

it

plain that these

laws

are

"not

absolu

they
but
rather

are changeable, which

does

not mean

that

they

are

ultimately

relative

absolute"

as those of nature.
man"

We

observe

that the "laws of right are pos

ited, they come from iting, the result of human

(PR in, 92-93; iv,

action and

77)-

What

comes

from this

pos

choice, can

be

criticized or

evaluated, also
being."

freely

accepted;
95:

it is not, in any case, simply

a given,

not

"natural
hat."

Cf. Kant, "die Natur, die die GesetzmiiGigkeit doch zu ihren Grundlage Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Kritik der reinen Vernunft a 216, B 263. But cf. also s Phenom A. V. Miller, Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), p. 186; English translation by

6. Cf. PR 111,

Hegel'

enology

Oxford of Spirit (Oxford:

University Press,

1977),

245.

72

Interpretation
when we

Further,

know the human

an

source of the

law,

and

know it

as

in

contrast

to the laws of nature, then

"inner

voice"

compels us either

to assent or to ob
itself"

ject. "In the

(PR in,
93).

case of the

laws

of right

[Rechtsgesetze]
it
should

the spirit arouses

In

knowing
is

the fallible source,

enforced

it becomes impossible to

resist

the

question whether what

realm

is

as

that

it

makes

the question of what ought to

be; it is the mark of the human be irresistible, in a way that the

to subordinate ourselves to
which we submit

natural realm cannot.

Even do

when we are compelled

the powerful, we
a powerful ruler nore

cannot

so

in the
our

same

way in

to nature. For

may intimidate

actions, but he

cannot compel

the mind to

ig
for

the

question of

the Tightness of the rules.

Thus,

the concept of nature will

not

remain always

in the background in

matters of

right; it is

the standard

right, but it is a model of precisely

questionable

what politics

necessity; it is that

against which

is not, namely knowable but un the political world appears in its

expression.

true character, as that realm where freedom

finds

When

we

become

attentive

to the character of the laws of right, then we turn

proof

into

ourselves.

"In nature, the highest

not valid

right, the to his

thing is

because it is, but

each

is simply that a law is; in the laws of demands that it should conform
the rationale which led to the issue

criterion"

(PR in,

93).

Yet this

consequence

threatens to

destroy

of natural right

tial when one

in the first place, namely the quest for what is necessary or essen is in a position to recognize the pluralism of laws and duties. To
is in
oneself

suggest that the criterion

is to

move

the sphere of

right into the

If the

area

where subjective opinion and arbitrariness seem man

to have their

play.

spirit of

is the

ground of

right,

then this might eliminate any possibility that one

could

find the

essential and authoritative.

Yet

might one attempt

to answer this

objection what are

by
the

considering

what

it is in

man's

"natural

being"

that

is essential,

upon which

absolutely necessary drives or impulses? Might there be some basis one could find in man's natural constitution an analogue to the ne One
would

cessity

of nature?

then ask about the natural

basis from

which

human

choices spring.

Such is the

'naturalistic'

form

of natural right

teaching,
being"

a view

point that attempts to

begin

with man's and

sires, inclinations
of

and passions

his de unchanging "natural to reason from them to what is right in and

itself. This
(PR iv,

approach

begins

not so much with nature

rather with

itself,

taken as a whole

and contrasted with

man"

the human realm, but

"our

the "nature of

character of

More promising because it directs our attention to the specific the human, it is nevertheless not suitable unless it finds the specif
77). must abandon

ically
mal

human. To do so, it
argues as

the naturalism that attends only to

ani

drives, Hegel holds.

are physical

Hegel There
"is
a

drives, for
us,

follows concerning the natural human drives ["Triebe"]. example, for food and drink. To have such needs
within our

necessity

within

nature, is

itself."

our nature and

One

might then

argue that the right would mean

mutual

basis: that

everyone should
not

acknowledging satisfying these needs on a live (the self-preservation of all) might seem

the

essential

thing. Yet this is

finally

satisfactory, because "the

needs of

the

Hegel's
physical

"Introduction"

to the
are not the

Philosophy

of

Right

73

life The

but

at the same time must example

only needs, there are others which indeed be counted as belonging to spiritual
sociability.

belong
life"

to life

(PR iv,

77-78).

here is the drive toward

both

Society,
too

understood

as the sexual and marital

relationship

and as civil so

ciety, cannot be accounted for

in terms

of physical needs.

First,

animal

drives

are

limited to

account

for

complicated ethical relations

like marriage,

and

the at

tempt to make them

do

so would outrage

"our

feelings."

ethical

Further,

physical

needs cannot account

for the multifarious,

the priority

many-sided phenomena of civil soci

ety

and state.

The

concept of

of physical needs

is too "indefinite,

ab
and

stract"

(PR iv,
as

78).

Hegel

understands the ethical relationships of

family

civil

society

the givens

which are

to be explained and therefore as facts

to refer

which

stand against
and essential. as

the attempt

of naturalism

is

our

They are not, however, bodily constitution; they are

developed,

primary naturally given, simply irrevocable facts, givens, which it is now important to ex according to the terms
of a

only to the

physical as

plain, but which have

nonmaterial stitution.

which unfolded

necessity and have taken us beyond our original merely The concept of the natural as a precondition of human life in the
not rich enough

natural con
sense

of mere

life is

to account for the

on

element of

right, as seen in so

cial relationships as

they have developed

a term

the small or the large scale.

But the

strongest objection
freedom,"

to reductionistic naturalism comes as we consider

the "drive toward

Hegel

employs

here

informally

although

it

refers to a phenomenon that cannot character of the

be

understood

demand for freedom, let

not

us return

drive. To grasp the finally to the drive with which we be

as a

gan, namely, the drive to

preserve oneself

through acquisition of the necessities

for

survival.

That this drive is

concern

'absolute'

is

evident once we consider can range

the ca

pacity to
age or can

limit

for

self-preservation.

Limits

from

modest

forms

of self-limitation

in

pursuit of the goods that sustain

life to

all

the forms of cour

need

self-sacrificing devotion to country, idea or contradict, resist or repudiate other drives. It is

friend.7

The

for freedom
"contradic
which

responsible

for

tion"

in the

'nature'

of

man,

a contradiction

that is "not to be

found in that
the human

we

have

nature"

named

(PR iv,

79).

This

contradiction gives

world a

quite

different

ground than

"natural

being"

and

is that

which constitutes

the basis

of right and of ethics,

serving
this
"
. .

as

both making the problems of right and the basis from which we respond to the problems
ultimately
renders

ethics appear and

as problems.

It is

point which nature

the term "natural

right"

so equivocal, since
unjust."8

is

not

free

and therefore

is

neither

just

nor

Nature is "not

7.

Cf. PR

324-28.
cf.

8. PR S 49 Remark; PR i, 158;
"exeundum
connections esse e statu

PR 1, 240,

where

Hegel links this

Hobbes'

view with

that of

naturae."

Cf. further PR Hobbes

and

11,

between the thought

Kojeve,"

of

Hegel,

see

187 Remark, Patrick Riley, "Introduction to the Read

333.

For

an attempt to sever

St. Martin's Press, 1980). Contrast Riedel, Studien zu Hegel's of Political Theory (New York: Rechtsphilosophie, pp. 66-67. Cf. also Patrick Riley. Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge:
tiers

ing

of

Alexander

pp.

269-271, in Michael Freeman and

David Robertson, eds., The Fron

Harvard

University Press,

1982),

pp. 180-182.

74

Interpretation
another,"

opposed

to
cf.

whereas

"freedom

polemi

appears at once as

(PR iv,
to

79; m, 95;

1, 231-234,

238-239).

In

and of

itself,

mere recognition of the

impulse to freedom is For

we need

not sufficient

grasp the character of the problem

of

of right.

to know what the place

freedom is in the human

an emptiness or

constitution.

being,

indeterminacy
source of

Is freedom merely a lacuna in natural that lowers us from the level of the lawful
and unhappiness?

ness of nature?

Is it the

human uncertainty
unlike

Is it that

which permits us

to deviate from nature, to

even

our eventual cost?

Could freedom be
therefore be re

treated as
garded

'in'

nature,
of

if somehow for

its lawfulness,
'back'

and

in terms
Hegel

its

potential

being

directed

to nature, to a

kind

of

harmony
But
as

with nature? makes

clear, these
to

gropings

do

not

do justice to the fact that

nature"

"freedom does

not want

be

valid

in

a mixture with goal of

but "insists

on

be

ing

the higher

principle."

"The highest

freedom itself is simply

be

unification with

nature, but
goal of

not as a conflation or

in the form

of nature

as

fact;

rather

the
are

the unification of

freedom

and nature must

so conceived
freedom"

that

both

built upwards, both are transfigured The natural being of a man must be
to the

by

freedom toward

(PR iv, 80).

grasped and transfigured

in

a manner con

impulse toward manifesting, bringing to realization, the freedom forming of man itself. Nature is then subordinated; freedom aims at "being itself by itself,
not

having
equal

form

to

form through something else, but freedom must be this, to make its (PR iv, 80). If freedom is eventually to arrive at a goal, that
itself"

goal must

be from

within

itself,

not

something

external.

Freedom is the basis right. it to be

our

of

the moral thrust

inherent in the

original

question

of natural

Thinking
which

through that question after recognition of freedom will enable

approached

in

a more adequate us

way,

one

recognizing that
being."

element

in

makeup

forces

to step beyond "natural

we

With this step,

which and

move

entirely away from

all concepts of natural

right

take nature to be the source of laws of right or even a model of

harmony
by

unity which mankind should seek to imitate as best it can. Nature lies before the Hegelian concept of freedom like a passive field which is to be cultivated
the self-activating

dynamism

of

the

free

will.

Lacking

significant

internal

con

flicts,
which

nature

is

unconscious and
on

ahistorical,

while

freedom,

on the other
a

hand, is

self-generating activity bent

the natural remains the to

constructing its own higher reality, of course included (and in which it silently

reality in

contributes

defining

limits

of

the possible) but subordinate to rational

freedom's di

recting monarchism. Nature is law, whereas the spirit of man cannot be said to be law but is a positer of law, also the critic of law, also the quest for the highest law. Natural law is simply there. Law in the ethically relevant sense is inter with the psychology of the human spirit; it is taken to be the potential master of nature, as if it can take the natural up into itself without any distortion of its sovereign autonomy.
twined

Hegel thus discards the term 'state

nature,'

of

for the state, the

end product of

Hegel's
human

"Introduction"

to the

Philosophy

of

Right
but

75
the striving

social

development, is emphatically
from
a

not natural

a result of

which elevates us

out of our primitive naturalness

toward an ethical condi the free

will

tion which
of

is ultimately

'second
will

nature'

produced

by

for the

sake

itself. From examining our 'natural ["Naturzustand"] man in his naturalness, we learn to see that primitive, unculti vated, original which it is the function of rational freedom to overcome and
,

the wholeness of the free

condition

transfigure. to the

Rational freedom
of

creates a

"second

nature"

( 4),

which

is

adequate

"concept"

man; rational

freedom is based
precisely in

on the proposition that

human
of

"natural
man

being"

must sense of

be

overcome

order

to realize the

'nature'

in the

his

essence

(PR 1, 239-40; iv,

76).'

These

reflections constitute

the basis

from

which

Hegel begins to

construct

the

foundations
of

of the Philosophy of Right. The task of the book is the positive one attempting to explore and form the concept of freedom and will in a new way. Hegel does not hesitate to remind the reader that our first impression about free

dom may be that it means license for arbitrariness or subjectivity in opinion and action (PR m, 94-95; n, 58, 66-67). It may seem to many that the modern state, precisely because moving toward emancipation from nature, is a state of freedom in the sense solely of liberation from what was viewed as the authority of natural law. The emphasis on freedom may thus seem to open as many new problems as

it

solves.

the

Further, recalling the argument of Hegel's kind of theorizing which rejects the discipline both
if Hegel's
own approach

"Preface,"

with

its

attack on

of

law

and

reason, we

might wonder

is

subject

to the same complaint. Yet this

quest

is

not

finally

the case, for the

Philosophy

of Right is the

for

an order that

applies

to the free will, above all for that

order which

is

self-imposed

by

the gen

uinely free will on itself; it is in fact devoted to showing longs to freedom properly understood. It is the attempt to find

that such an
and

ordering be
or

specify this

der that how

an

gives the

Philosophy

of Right its

systematic goal.

Hegel

will

try

to show
and ulti which

for worldly realization in public life mately in "world history"; he seeks to find in freedom an end or goal inner freedom
reaches out
9.

is

For

lucid discussion
also

of this critique of naturalism, see

Taylor, Hegel

and

Modern

Society,

pp. 74-77.

Cf.

Hegel's

statement of

this view in PR

show clearly enough that the priority of freedom over argument by for the Hobbesian views but was based on the apparent discovery of a flaw in Rousseau. See Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality, Part I. Cf. the re mark of Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 270-272, that Rousseau's arguments are based on
Hobbes'
"necessary"

187 Remark. However, Taylor does not the natural drives was not merely a substitute

drawing

a
of

conclusion

from

Hobbes'

premises, but one not drawn

by Hobbes himself.
see

For

the priority

Rousseau (and his importance

on

also

for Kant's doctrine

of

freedom),

Lewis White

Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Cf. also Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: i960), pp. 179-180, Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 45ff. Cassirer's opinion is that in Rousseau's thought there is a tran view in which: "The self is not a datum of sense scending of the psychology based on sensations to a data. It is an original activity, and the only of sense mere product understood as the be never and can not its receptivity, is the evidence of such activity available to man. And this spontaneity of the self,

Beck, A Commentary

199-200.

Divine"

mark of the

(pp.

46-47)-

Cf. Hegel's Remark to PR

7.

76
deeper

Interpretation
and more powerful than the commitment to argued can

liberation in

and of

itself.

How this is

be

seen

if

we now

turn to the formal opening theses of the

Philosophy
tion the
of of

'nature'

the

of Right. Here one can hope to gain an insight into Hegel's exposi (that is, the concept) of the will the doctrine developed in

"Introduction"

the

work

and

constituting the systematic foundation for the remainder into his grasp of the central practical problem facing that new
and

civilization which sees pated

itself

as responsible

in freedom to itself because

"free"

emanci

from tutelage to
we

nature.
"will,"

Before

hear
we

about the what

which will

is

( 4), in

the

Philosophy
the

of

Right, before

learn

the

is

or what

freedom is,

we encounter

fol

lowing thesis,
right

which

is

the

initial formal
object

proposition of

the book. "The philo

sophic science of right

has for its

the idea of right, that

is,
of

the concept of

together

with

its

realization"

1).

This thesis is the first

three

which at

tempt to specify the theoretical criteria brought to the new study

markable

of right.

It is

re

for its jointure

necessarily

of

the

realization with

the concept, the

co-equal status

(though

not

without

sequence)

of

the

concern with what can

be

real

ized
what

with

the concept itself. The philosophic science of right asks not just for
what

is thought but for

is

actualized or

realized;
which

and

just this

point

distin

guishes

it from

a nonphilosophic

science, in

the

abstraction of pure con

cepts assumes a
a certain

false independence. Hegel's

not

Philosophy
how

of Right

aspires

to teach

'realism,'

least

by discovering

concept and actualization are of

joined,
This

or

how the

gulf

between the underlying themes

which

the traditional 'natural

state'

right'

and
will

the purely pragmatic, empirical 'science

a realism

of

the

is

overcome.

be

in

the

'concept'

leads

and shapes the event and

is

ul

timately inseparable from it. Hegel's opening thesis is designed to introduce

of

an exposition of

the

character

this distinctive philosophic realism.

Philosophy, he
distinct

says, is

a critic of those

abstractions which are

merely

clear and

and which

therefore obscure the

what

intelligible form
what

concepts through which we should

interpret

is because they
with

is. Philosophic

science cannot
an

be identified merely
a critic of

the

genera

tion of concepts,
shows

for it is, in

important sense,

'mere'

concepts,

or

it

that a theoretical or than

an

abstract concept

has to be

considered as more of a

question
which

the

mind

itself.10 There are incomplete or one-sided concepts to entity in may at first be led. Indeed, these may even be essential in human

development, for
mind or spirit

the first steps of freedom are the

what

discovery

of

the power of the

to withdraw from

is given, to 'abstract human

from'

every
5).

possible

content or situation

(be it the

natural world or

needs and at

desires), in
be

short,

the ability to refuse, to criticize what it happens to

find

hand (PR
must

But the in
them-

first,
the

negative
of

step, the

generation of the abstract

concept,

examined

light

the question concerning what is the concept.

Abstractions

by
pp.

10.

Cf. the discussion

of conceptual

necessity in Taylor, Hegel

and

Modern Society,

29-37,

49-

Hegel's
selves are of

"Introduction"

to the

Philosophy
is

of

Right

77

defects. Hegel's

philosophic science

concerned to

develop a critique

the multiplicity of

the liberated mind

what

theories, those theories which will inevitably emerge when attempts its first steps away from thoughtless acquiescence to
holds that the
essential goal of

is

given.

Now this

science

is to grasp the

core of what

is

substantial and essential

in the play

"ephemeral existence, external

contin

gency, opinions, unsubstantial appearance,

falsity, illusion
applied to

forth"

and so

Remark).

Further,

this same concern

must

be

thought

itself,

as a cure

for the theoretical productivity that multiplies abstractions but has no cure for deciding among them. Yet Hegel would be misunderstood if interpreted to mean
that we are to measure thought

in

some

purely

external

way

against

the practical,
our

historical

world around us.

For his

proposition

is

not

that we are to concern

selves with

the concept and also with whatever has been realized. On the con

trary, the thesis is that we must know the concept and its realization. The concept of right is that which "has and, further, which "gives this actuality to Remark)." It is a concept which is practical, having the force of a ( i
actuality"

itself"

project,
ceivable

as

if the freedom

of mind without which even

the issue

of right

is incon

is something necessarily transforming

realm of a

experience.
which

cept, is to be found in the

thinking

thought and practice, or whose truth is manifest and

arable

The truth, the con is simultaneously both effective because it is insep

from action; far from

mere

idealism,

the genuine concept

is that

which

is

capable of

becoming

practical,
as

therefore

intelligible

has already shown itself as practical idea, that is both as having been thought and as
or right

and

is

having

been

realized.

The law is that the

itself and the

real world of right

realized

grasp themselves through thought tionality through thought alone and hence
and so

and give

effectively themselves the form of ra

not through

feeling,

conscience, the

heart,
alizes
which

forth (PR n, 65-66). n This is

a realism which turns
an effect and

realism

or this concern

for

what re

itself

to

history,
stages

understood as a process

in
in

thought has this effect

in

which

the

through which
1

it

proceeds

"shapes"

having
mate

constitute

the various
of concept and

Remark) by

which

the ulti

goal, the complementarity

"Preface"

actuality,

mind and

history, is
of

brought into being.

In the
to the

Philosophy

aims of this procedure which will shed some

of Right, Hegel gives an account light on an aspect of what is

the

meant

by

'the

concept'

taught, he explains, it is
ephemeral

giving reality to itself. When it is demanded that a science be understood that what will be offered is not something but something that we already know in a way, but concerning which
systematic, orderly, coherent, 'scien

we also perceive that we require a more

tific'

arrangement of what

is already in

our mind.

Not

having

that scientific
on

clar-

11.

Cf. the implications

brief Phenomenology,

of

Rousseau's treatment

'ideas,'

of

the

Discourse

An illuminating
Hegel'

account of

the premises of Hegel's use of the term

'concept'

Inequality, Part I. is given in Marx,

pp. xix-xxi.

12.

Cf. PR

21

Remark,

105-106, 152, 187

Remark,

343.

78

Interpretation

ity means to know something defectively; the teacher must take what is known haphazardly and then show the wholeness of it, unify it into a coherent view. He must make the "closed circle of a visible. Everything depends on bring out of on the incoherence, ing unity "assembly and arrangement of the essential (PR n, 57). But factors in a content which has long been familiar and
science" accepted"

this is

of course a

two-edged

notion.

For it

offers on

the one
and

hand

an apparent

deference to that "content

the other hand

which

has

long

been familiar

accepte

and yet on
source and

implies that the familiar

known

content

is

not

known truly, its

'familiar'

goal are somehow not

deeply
what

enough and therefore must

essential

be fundamen inhabit

tally
is

misunderstood.

Precisely
time

is

in the

world we

not as yet

known. Further,
a

we are now

in

some ways more of

distant from that fetters

knowledge. For in
against

of a

"shameful

decay"

philosophy, there is a turn

rationalism, whose to
allow

rules

have been

cast

off, "as if

they

were mere

in

order

the
58).

heart,

the

imagination

and casual of new

pleased"

ing
the

The deceptive novelty but the "same old (PR 11, 59),

(PRn,

intuition to say what they radical ideas serves up noth

threatens to disappear is

cabbage"

while what

"science"

which enables us

to

grasp

the essential and

distinguish it from its

more or

less

accidental periphery.

Hegel

replies

to this situation
about

with

the following:
old as

After all, the truth

and

right, ethics and the state is as

its

public recognition

formulation in the
more

public

law, in

the morality of

What

does this truth

require

since the

everyday life and in religion. thinking spirit is not content to possess in thought
as well

it in this ready fashion? It

requires to

be

grasped

(PR 11, 60).

what

In

answer

to certain

modern

theories, Hegel

points to

tradition, to

has be

come after

publicly recognized, to history; it is a thesis sure to puzzle or offend. Yet perceiving the surface deference to the existing law, custom and belief, one must perceive the irony. The thinking spirit is in fact not cowed by tradition, the merely traditional
content"

possesses as such no

to possess

authority at all for it, because it is "not the truth in the form of tradition, that is, in this defective be
grasped

form. It just

seeks what can

in thought. It in

asks the nontraditional question:

law, in everyday morality, in religion? It "publicly looks for that element in the traditional which can be appropriated in thought, be
what

is

recognized"

cause

it is

at some given

level

implicitly

rational and

can, through the

proper

activity

of

thought, be
presented

the form of thought. This is as much as to say that the activity

here

by

Hegel is

one which

is

a critique of that part of tradition which

(and

there will always

be

such a part

[PR iv, 101])

is merely external,
remain

shaped at

by
the

arbitrary and transient causes. "Thinking does not given"; "on the contrary, thought which is free starts
upon claims to

out

stationary from itself and there

truth"

know itself

as united

in its innermost

being

with

the

(PR II,

60).
Hegel
provides an
with

illustration. "The

unsophisticated

heart takes the

simple

line

of

adhering

trustful conviction to what is publicly accepted as true and

Hegel s
then

"Introduction"

to the
upon this

Philosophy
Hegel's

of

Right
its

79
set position

building
he

firm foundation its

conduct and

in

life"

(PR n, 60).
that

("Unsophisticated"

is, in

language,
is

'unbefangen,'

a word

elsewhere uses to

modify 'nature':
"polemical"

'Nature'

"unbefangen,"

posed

to something

else,"

not

the simple

by

unity between citizen and thought, in a movement which demands to know the basis
given content must

[PR iv, 79; cf. country is a beginning

cannot and ought not of what

"not op 185 Remark]). But which is broken apart

be

resisted.

Critical
and

thought

has been
and

accepted as

familiar

true; the
nal

in, form, with the end, then, of a reunification, fulness, between the aware citizen and the laws
appropriated
rational.

be

thus transmuted

into,
of

ratio

on a

higher level

thought

and customs made

explicitly

The

common sense world of also

ordinary

experience

is far from

sufficient

in itself

but it is
must

something to

which

thought

must return.

What is first in
given

our minds and

be

subjected

to criticism; it is to be dissolved in its merely

quality

then reconstituted on the

basis

of

thought. For thought, it is significant that there

world, a world of permeating tradition. That world contains is true but only when reinterpreted. We must learn to see its truth not in terms of what is first for common sense, nor in terms of what is simply given; the

is

a common sense

what

key

is

rather to

find that

element
which

in it

which

is the

expression

of

free

will

actualizing itself, against such. But the affirmation

Thoughtful freedom
there
must

then the peripheral phenomena can be seen as

cannot

of

freedom

take place merely in

abstraction.

returns

to the world of common sense, recognizing that

common sense

be

a world of

the inherited and traditional. That

source of our

world, to

for far

all of

its muddle, is the

thought and
as

finally

the

world

in

which

preliminary education, the results of thought can be

a stimulus

realized

inso

possible.13

In stating this picture, Hegel

which with

attacks

vigorously those
of modern thought

modern

tendencies

repudiate, explicitly
practical world. critique of what

or

implicitly,
kind

the possibility of regaining

harmony

the

A is

certain

tends to pursue an

unending

cable version of a reformed

be effectively established, of every practi constitution. This liberation from the practical world
or could

takes the form

either of a glorification of a primitive, prepolitical and presocial

freedom,

or an absolute
at all

insistence

on

the primacy of individual rights over the the autonomous subjective

community
ternative.14

times,

or a moralism which makes

conscience a universal censor never

to be satisfied

by

any genuinely

realizable al

In adopting this view,

mere

however, it
it
errs

makes

two related errors

it

errs

in pursuing
the
world at

abstractions, and

in

failing

to perceive the rationality in

hand. It unnecessarily

radicalizes

the divorce between the practical

13.

69-72. Cf. PR
14.

Cf. Hegel, Phdnomenologie des Geistes. pp. 28-31; Hegel's Phenomenology, 216. 146-147, 316-318. See also Knox's note 68 to Consider PR 11, 58-59. 63-68; Hegel treats this theme throughout the
"Preface"

31-33,

cf.

258

Remark,
pp.

on

the

work of von

Haller,

and

141

Remark. Cf.

also

Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy,

164-166, 176ft., 184-185.

80

Interpretation
first-hand
unreflective experience and

consciousness of

the thoughtful critique of

that experience which emerged to break the original harmony. It

practical which

divorces the

from the

world of

thought, the

citizen

it fails to

recognize as problematic and

from the thinker, to a degree necessarily incomplete. It is a doc

earth.

trine

of

liberation that

can

find

no road

back to has

It threatens to

rekindle

the

latent tension between the

men of modern arisen

state and

thought,

leading

to a repudiation

by

practical

the

notion

that rational thought

while

an essential role

to play

within

the

state, even

that modern state is in

fact built

on principles

that have

from the

modern rationalist critique of premodern

Yet the

suppression of

thought will in itself provide no

and tries to

society (PR ii, 66-67). solution; thought is an in

eluctable and

necessity for "man thinks

life"

the basis of

ethical

(PR 11, 61). And he does

state as

find in thinking both his freedom so while being in "the

it
exists

state":

"those

who

live their lives in the

here

and now and

find

satisfaction more

there for their knowledge

or

and volition

(and

of

these there are many,

position of

in fact than think

"
.

know it, because ultimately this is the

of a modern thought

everyone)

(PR 11, 62).

This is, then, the dilemma

problem. as

for

which reason

has become

he

sees

It is theoretical, insisting on the importance of each pursuing the truth it. But it is also disposed to yield to a critique of rationalism, on the discipline
a
of reason

grounds that the

is

fetter to the spontaneity

of the

heart

or

intuition. It is in
"consciously"

way

not theoretical

enough, not able to see the theoretical in

the practical and the

practical

find

satisfaction

in the theoretical. The possibility that one might in the state ought not be erased by the emergence
complicated,
and

of critical

thought; it is
What is

made more

transformed into a

goal

to

be

achieved rather than a spontaneous needed

sociability.

is

a restoration of

actuality received in the form of natural insight into the basis for this con

scious,

knowing

the age, then the theoretical

not

membership in the state. If this is now the practical question of formulation of it follows: the study of right has to do but
with

just

with the concept

which

its

realization.

With its realization, that

springs

is,

with of

that realization

it

creates

for itself,

which

from the force

thought's self-liberation from uncritical adherence to the traditional. We

ask

must

to

what

the freedom

of

thought returns after it

discovers its independence? To

the necessary conse
problem of

what practical result

does it lead? Or is

a practical result

quence of

the free mind? Hegel means that we must learn to see the
man and

the

relationship between

the state, thought and politics, in terms of that

single

project

(ultimately

viduals and

societies)

collectively human and historical, transcending by which free thought emerged in rebellion
world

indi

against the

given world and

then reconstituted the

according to its

own criteria.

Hegel's opening thesis thus study

of right as one which

establishes the

orientation of the philosophic

necessarily

pursues the connections

between is
at

the ra
vis

tional and the practical, between thought and

history. Perhaps

what

first

ible in this away from

argument

is Hegel's

critical view of modern rationalism.

It tears itself
"theories"

comprehension of real practice,

generating dissent

and

Hegel's

"Introduction"

to the

Philosophy

of

Right

81

aimlessly and groundlessly. Hegel soberly defends the achieved world of politics and law against what he considers a revival of sophistry (PR n, 67). But Hegel's
proposition contains another

element,

as

he develops it.

Taking

this

linkage

of

thought to

history
is

with

the utmost seriousness, Hegel is also preparing to argue

as all practice of

that all thought

inherently practical, just

no ultimate

theoretical; that there is

losophy
tempt to

is its

own

time grasped in
state as

autonomy (PR 11, 72); that his study

thought"

thought

is ultimately rational or from history, for "phi

will at attempt

grasp the

something

intrinsically

rational, rejecting any

to speak philosophically about what the state ought to

in

and of

history,

not

beyond it. This

an urge

more radical

be (ibid.); that the is embrace of the historical de

who need

"idea"

rives

not so much
earth as

from

to reply to the intellectuals

to

come

down to
or

from

a systematic

questioning
groundwork

of

every attempt,

philosophical

theological,

to articulate a division between the mundane and a higher world.

argument

Hegel's opening
ourselves
rational must

lays the
We

the entire book. If we to

what

concern ourselves with what can

for the concluding argument of be realized, we then limit

of

is

realizable.

adopt

the limits
of

the practical world as the

rational mind

limits;

worldliness

becomes the home

reason, but the

'idea,'

learn worldliness,
and reformed

must recover the mundane world on the

basis

of

having
to be a
an

instructed

it. The

aim

is to live

within

the
of

understood

mundane world

in

which

there has been a

lowering

"the
and

spirit's
idea,"

heaven to

earthly here
tion of the
law,"

and

now, to a

common worldliness of

fact

plus an eleva

mundane

world, which is to be built up toward the

"rationality

of right

and

losing

its

"barbarity

and unrighteous

(of course, only to the

stated as the
"history"

extent possible within a mundane world). proposition of the

which

Philosophy
reveal which

philosophy is to
movement

concluding of Right ( 360; cf. PR 11, 73), is the claims and, ultimately, inhabit. Hegel's
"history"

This goal,

to be the

mutual permeation

by by
its

the worlds of thought and fact are

in the

process of

'idea,'

the
thought.

by

an endeavor of

the human spirit to think

freely

and

to act on

The linkage

of thought and spheres at

history

proposed

because the two

first

glance appear

Hegel is necessarily difficult to be opposed. Thought is free,

by

Hegel has told us, and,

ratified

we might

think,

seeks no other

authority than
on

what can

be

by

thought alone.
with

In the

world of

historical practice,

the other

hand,

we must

deal

the limitations of a

specific

time and place, with the

authority

of a particular state and

its laws,

with

that which

is

not

timeless but which shares

historical.'

the

apparent transience of

things commonly
the quest

called

'merely

Hegel has

argued

that we must

replace

for

natural right with

'idea.'

the notion of the

vio
age-

unification of concept and realization

in the

late the
old

apparent

issue

of the relation

autonomy between

of

both thought

and

Does the proposed unity history? This question, the

politics and

philosophy,

the

remainder of

the

introductory

theses preceding

his

account of

is the theme guiding the will itself.

a part of
philoso-

We

read that

the "science of right

[Rechtswissenschaft] is

82

Interpretation
(PR
2).

phy"

It is

"part,"

but only
with a

a part.

the

limitation

shown

every in the fact that it begins

with

which

part suffers

from

not

Being only a part, it therefore has being the whole. Its partness is
a

given, that there is

free will,

and

hence

concern

right, a

concern

developing

from

more

primordial

factors but
right.15

eventuating in the possibility of an intellectual proposition about the That there is and must be a concept of right is not in itself a theme of Hegel's
philosophic science of and

right,

which

is

rather concerned with what

that concept

is

how it develops (PR 1, 241; iv,

99-100).

Moreover,

Hegel

would also seem

to

imply

that the concept of right emerges

both

as a problem and a

force only
of philoso

with

the emergence of philosophy proper. The philosophic science of right re

mains

dependent

on

this

prior

development; it is

tutelary discipline
is
not

phy,

not autonomous

It is, rather,

caught

is

not a matter of

dependency simply up in the cause of philosophy itself, and its eventual outcome indifference as far as the significance of philosophy is con
an external one.
of

in itself. But its

cerned.

To

show

ginning
result,

point

why this is the case, let us consider more closely the matter ["Anfangspunkt"] for this science. That first emergence

the

be

of

the is
a

sue of right presupposes a prior

a

development

of

philosophy

simply.

It is then

consequence,

of

the emergence of philosophy. But it is a result not

merely in an accidental way, but as a culmination; the emergence of a concept of right is the "result and the of what has preceded it, and it even constitutes a
truth"

"proof"

of

it (PR

2).
a

The

emergence of a concept of right

is

philosophy's own
'idea'

project
'mere'

for reaching

self-

actualization, that is for

part of

becoming

and not

abstract concept. science of right

with a means

As

the

"result"

of philosophy,

the philosophic

belongs to the

project

by

which philosophic reflection emerged what

for

discriminating

between

is true

and what

is false in

com

mon

notions, thus promoting their

a certain

reformulation

(PR iv,

100).

There is
end and which

the

circularity to this argument, as Hegel here indicates. The beginning are linked, for the only adequate beginning point is that
produce and

is necessarily actualizing itself to visible as both point of commencement

whole process as a whole.

the end;

but it only becomes

final

goal when one can view the

Thus, if
first

we

look

at the argument of the

Philosophy

of

Right in its entirety,

we see

an

initially

dogmatic
another

assertion

that thought

leads to its

own realization

which

is also, in

form,

the concluding ar

gument of the

book, namely
The
mind and

the explicit doctrine of

history

as the realization of

thought

341-360).

argument offers the

"closed

science

circle of a also the

(PR
and

11,

47).

At the end,

history are joined;

what

but this is

beginning,

one can

then recognize it for

it is only

after

having

seen and understood the

view is given only within the philosophic science of right. But it is not an item of faith, philosophy proper it is a doctrine receiving adequate explanation and proof. PR I, 241; 11, 88, 112. See Hegel's Encyclopedia, 3rd edition (1830, 234-235, 440-444, 465-482, 483-552, for the placement of right into a of philosophy.

15.

This

for

within

"system"

Hegel's
end.16

"Introduction"

to the

Philosophy
book is

of

Right

83
this

The

entire subject matter of the cause

historical thesis is the final

a

driving the

thesis, in Hegel's account, which cannot conventional way followed by the common sciences; it is, rather, presented and then described in all of its manifestations, after which it has acquired determinate
and concrete
result.

thesis; the study through to its realization. It is be deduced or demonstrated in the

shot through with

character,

and

the initial proposition comes to seem realized as a

Hegel's
of

statement on the

right, or his attempt to the

problem of

relationship of philosophy to his philosophic science define that relationship, is given its particular urgency
with which

by

the

"sciences,"

his Remark to

is

concerned.

The

those modes of

is already revealing; he is independence from philosophy and a central can therefore go off in directions of standard, which, lacking unifying For this is the characteristic own based on unreconcilable premises. their diverse,
use of

the

"sciences"

plural

concerned with

knowledge

which

claim

sciences"

of

the

"formal,
on

nonphilosophic
"definitions,"

method of

the the further

manner.

(PR

Remark): it
the
science

builds

can then

is the validity of formally necessary chosen because it the initial definition? If it is arbitrarily chosen, or, more likely, implicitly accords with common notions, then the entire structure lacks justifica
a

primary be deduced in

from

which

elements of what

But

tion.

Hegel's

principal example

is the "positive law

law."

science of pressing.

In this

problem of a proper
concern

beginning point is particularly

is
enforced as

On the
avoid

field, the one hand, its

clarifying first actual laws are the cases where in those contradictory and principles, especially principle. On the other confused and cannot be brought together under a single
to elucidate what
compels

it to

hand, its
achieve

claim

to the status of knowledge requires an attempt to unify the dispa

rate aspects of

law into

coherence.

Yet

as a nonphilosophic science,
"etymology"

it

can

only

this

cases."

particular

by deriving By either

its defintion from

or

"by

abstracting from

method, the ultimate test of validity

common opinion expects,

definition

correspond

to what

is only that the because it lacks any way

source of all experience

of turning away from instances and inquiry into the right.

of positive right

to the

The

procedure of

this

positive science

is

contrasted with

that of a philosophic
or the

"concept"

science,

which acknowledges

the primary authority of the

inner

conceptualizing activity by method is something different from

which

the

mind moves

itself toward its fruition. This abstracting

following
in its

common notions or

from this
which

or that example chosen

not

haphazardly. It is
world

is

bound to the existing

given

conceptualizing activity form; it necessarily objects

mundane world and

to

what

is

confused, contradictory
256,
on

and erroneous

in the

in

state,"

16.

Cf. Hegel's Remark to

appears

the "philosophic proof of the concept of the

where

the state

both

as the

result and

the beginning. Cf. also

257, 279

Remark,

301

Remark,

302

Remark.

84

Interpretation
notions, and it claims the
right

mundane of

to prescribe and correct;

it is

an

activity

the mind which

is

'in'

history
is
not

and which

in history, but

which

the product
what

necessarily attends to realizing itself of history in the sense that it accepts

prevails.

unquestioningly the authority of

sophic sciences.

immediately

Further,

the philo

'historical'

sophic science of right would also raise a

objection to

the nonphilo

According

to the principle

jected, it is
thority
stracts

apparent

that what is justifiable

by which the merely abstract was re by the criteria of thought must also be
history,
it
ab

that which eventuates in a result. A philosophic science appeals against the au

of

the positive and the historical to another understanding of

namely to

history

seen as the realization of thought.

It

would claim that

from it

positive

law

and that which

immediately
thought

exists

to the conceptual ac
world and

tivity by
return to

which we

both

emancipate ourselves
with

from the existing

then

under

the aegis of thought,

or

experience. ences of

The definitions
are

first

principles offered

leading by the

rather

than

following

purely

positive sci

law

in
it

a sense

ahistorical, for

they

are not related

to the sources of

the

critical

thought

by

which we

have

not

only followed
the

positive

law but

also

rebelled against

and reformed

it.

cept

Thus, the philosophic science of right has as its basis (namely, of a "freedom which gives itself
basis
of

discovery
as

of the con

existence,"

Hegel

puts

it). On

the

its

meditation on

this inner

spring

of

both theoretical

and practical ac

tivity, it then
to this
i oo).
meaning.

returns to common opinion and

looks for that

notion

corresponding contradictory defect. The

concept
"Right"

and,

further, for the

ordinary

word

designating that notion ("right") (PR iv,

is
a term of confused and

in

our

experience

No merely

positive science will

definitively

overcome this

philosophic science of right

is that

which alone can achieve

the

reformulation of

this term in accordance with the standards of thought.

gel's thesis about realization.

What is the relationship of this philosophic right to the state and its laws? He law follows from the principle of the concept shaping its own In the
sphere of

the laws

we can

find the results, the expression,

of

thought. This view cannot mean that the rationality of the

sual observation or unmixed with

laws is

manifest

to ca

the

arbitrary

and conventional.

Precisely

be

cause

the

rational core

is hidden for

by

the surface variety, the

problem at

hand is

two-fold: there is a
to come to terms

need

a critique of that abstract

with

the

modern state and

theorizing which is unable its laws; and there is a need for a

mode of philosophic science which can expound

authoritatively the rational core of law, by teaching how to discriminate between the core and what is inessential. It should therefore not be surprising that Hegel's first thesis about law in the (PR Philosophy of Right is introduced as follows: "the right is positive
. .

law there is its source, which is the reasoning law will; properly speaking is right, or the free will, become positive. The law is a manifestation of the activity and development of the will; it is, in principle,
3).
of positive

At the basis

the manifestation of the right, which must eventuate in positive

law. The

prob

lem in understanding the law

arises

from the

problem of

penetrating

to the point

Hegel's
where

"Introduction"

to the
will

Philosophy
would

of

Right

85
that this
means a

this source

be

visible.

It

be false to
a view

suggest

mindless acceptance of

the

laws

of the

day. It is

which,

on

the contrary, is

an

implicit

criticism of

the

laws,

though not

of positive

law

as such.

It is

a criti

cism
not

because it becomes

evident

in Hegel's its

presentation

that positive law does

know
not

how,

on

its own, to

make

rational core visible. except

The laws
to

of the

day

do

know how to defend their

legitimacy

by

appeal

authority.

From

within positive positive

law, there is no clarity about the ultimate meaning or source of law. Therefore, Hegel's remarks on law are occupied with a critique of the strictly legal mind. It is only the philosophic view which knows the authorita tive case to be made for positive law. Thus Hegel's treatment of positive law,
and of

the

science of positive

law

(literally

"right": "die

positive Rechtswissen-

schaft"),

is based entirely on asking a question about positive law from within the philosophic approach. From within it, we inquire what is to be found when the takes a look at the state as it philosophic approach, concerned with 'the
right,'

first

comes

to

light,

as a positer of specific rights and obligations.

of positive

Now the questioning

guided

law

by

the

philosophic approach must

be

by

two premises, which

follow from the thesis

of

The first is

recog

nition of ular

the necessity of positive law itself (though not necessarily of any partic
or

law

institution

at

this stage). Thought eventuates in real consequences

and ethics.

for

the

practical

world, in

laws, institutions,

Secondly,

the philosophic

approach

holds that the totality

achieve

of positive

sion of the attempt of the mind as will

law is revealing, that it is the expres to give reality to its reflections on the
life.17

right, to

their embodiment into concrete ways of

positive

While in the

or

der der

of common experience, the particular of reflection the particular must

law

comes

first, in

the or

be

seen as

the

product of

that

which precedes

it,

the

thinking activity
when we

of

the

will.
"is"

But

hold that the right

we must also

positive, and

is

thus

in

some sense at the

core of the

laws,
fit the

then account for the

3.

non-self-evident

this fact. This is

ular.

the theme of

The laws

seem at

first

glance to

quality of be only partic

They

particular needs and situations of

distinct
The

peoples.

They

arise

from

practical men

responding to

concrete situations.

right

inheres in them

principles can belong to particular cases (PR only in the way in which general that the right is positive and therefore is in some learn 3). While we must at first

way

at

hand in the

traditions and

laws

under which we

live,

we must also see that

a portion of the

law is chiefly
pretend

a response to

local

exigency.

We

must recognize

the borders
cannot,

of the

philosophic view.

It

can penetrate

to the

essence of

the

law; it
the

however,

to legislate nor

necessity

of the realization of thought.

a

every But it does not lay

justify

particular. claim

It

grasps

to the ability

it

self to specify every detail. There is practical considerations, guided

relatively

autonomous sphere within which

by

general philosophic principles

in the overall,

dominate.
'expressivism,'

17.

Cf. Taylor's discussion

of

Hegel

and

Modern

Society,

ch. I.

86

Interpretation
observations are not

These
edge of

designed

as a criticism of the philosophic

limitation.18

knowl

right; they do, however,

expose a

"philosophy."

by being only one of the parts of from below by the necessary particulars of positive law, for the details of law and custom belong in a sphere that is the province of the more calculating methods of
a

in

sense,

It is limited from above, It is further limited

"understanding"

the

rather

than

of philosophical reflection proper. which

The

actual

laws necessarily apply to factors

character of a ment and

fall into three

categories:

(i)

the national

people,

including

the influence of its stage of historical

develop
the inev
the

the

specific natural

(climatic,
particular

geographical, etc.) situation;

(2)

itable fact that the

right,

in expressing itself in definite

to than

laws,

will require

plication of general rules

circumstances, a process which in

philosophic

ap itself
the

requires practical and calculative skills rather

reflection;

(3)

need that somewhere there be an authority which can make the

final decision,

that

is, have

the

last

word and

then act. Philosophic reflection

is the thoughtful

response

to the needs and circumstances which will constitute the specific situa

tion of all peoples; and

of each of

it knows that

all peoples will exist

in

situations

partaking

these three elements

of specificity.

But it

cannot presume

to legislate

on each and

every matter. It will not issue a book of laws (perhaps alluding to Plato). Not exactly indifferent to the details of legislation, it rather regards them "liberally."19 To attempt to legislate would be to show a failure to recognize the limits
of philosophic

reflection,

failure to

recognize

that reflection's embodi

ment and externalization will

be

mediated

through the existing world

in its

multi

fariousness. This limitation

on the scope of

the philosophy of
particular

right

then establishes room

for

study devoted explicitly to the

has
a

laws

act circumstances of a specific country's situation.

itive law
ophy.

legitimate

claim to a certain
of

apply to the ex the study of pos This study limited independence from philos
and rules that so

But the

positive

study

law may

go

far

as

to assert categorical

independence be that

of philosophic review and critique.

philosophic contribution
which

to the understanding of is concretely enforced. Claiming total autonomy in this fashion, it may then participate in or reflect a tendency which Hegel seems to regard as ever more powerful in certain strands of modern thought, a tendency to hold that there
are

deny the possibility of a law, holding that law can only

It may

fundamental facts
which

of

consciousness,
as

of

feeling, or, in

this case, of positive

law
and

simply

must

be taken

arbitrary

premises of

society
and

and thought

for

which no critique on

the grounds of reason is possible. This

an autonomous science of

view

leads to

maxim, the principle guiding

of rational

law

asserting the
rele

inability
vant

thought to elucidate the basis of what is right in a way

to the actual world. The principle, quoted from Roman jurisprudence:

See PR For this 3 Remark;
use of
Gesetzbuch"

18.
19. vide a

cf.

PR II,
see

71. and 270

"liberal,"

PR 11, 71,
of positive

"positives

[book

law],

"that

Remark (11, 715). Philosophy is, such a book as a real state

cannot pro

(PR

11, 94)-

Hegel's

"Introduction"

to the
civili
2

Philosophy

of

Right

87

"omnis definitio in jure

dangerous) (PR
cause

n,

84;

the

laws

are not
and

(in the civil law, every definition is Remark). Definition is treacherous, it is asserted, be based on rational principle nor intelligibly ordered. The

periculosa"

telling example,
law
was not able

the one in the context of which this maxim emerged: Roman

to provide a

definition
a

"man,"

of

for its

practices

(slavery, fam
idea
of

ily

and

property relations)

could not

be brought into conformity

with an

man and

therefore the attempt at

more visible

only make the injustices Remark). Definition might thus be dangerous both theoretically
would

definition

and practically.

The
exist

science of positive
a critic

by becoming

law may then try to defend itself and the laws as they of rationalist criticism of the law. It recommend may

that

definition be

regarded as

impossible,

on

the grounds that man, law and soci

appear

ety begin from

certain premises which

simply

but

which are not amenable

to rational criticism or revision.

Ultimately,

this view would then become a

thesis about the absolute priority of fact to

theory,

the

historical reality to
to

thought, the
restate the ural right not

empirical conditions to philosophic reflection.

urges

To reply to this possibility, Hegel

the

following considerations. First,

which

fundamental thesis is
but

of that

kind

of

questioning for
matter

the entire nat

tradition stands:
enforced

when we seek what

to examine the

law,

we

desire to know

only

what

is justifiable. No

custom right

is accepted, it

cannot

be

argued

in itself; the thoughtful

mind refuses

how widely a law or simply from that acceptance that it is to be contented merely with the given,
of

for law

what counts or

is to discover the necessity institution flows from the concept of

we need

the matter, to discover

whether a

right.

Second,

to

ask about

the character of positive law in a

deeper

way.

What exactly is that which is posited, posited law? The answer to this question, the thesis of
one:

by

some

free choice, in

positive

3, is only apparently

an

"The

right

timate origin

is positive"; further on, "the right must become of positive law as a whole is that free activity of thought
(the will), altering
our perceptions and

positive."

empty The ul

which

has
the

practical consequences

demands

of

particulars of a given situation by ordering and accordance with criteria that are justifiable to the mind. them in among choosing The polemically positive legal mind errs on the side of the facts, for it has no ten practical

order, responding to the

able account of the origin

both

of

law

and of criticism of

the law.

ent of

Thirdly, while no course of reflection can escape beginning from what is pres to hand, and therefore from the contingent and relative, the positive science
which

law itself remains bound to that

(and to
all of what prevails other

happens to is

prevail

in

a specific

time and

place
of

in that time

and place).

The

philosophic science

right, on the

hand, begins from

what

relative

but

emancipates

itself

from it

and comes

back to it from

a new point of view.

It

commences with a cer

tain question (which of the numerous obligations to

which

am subject

is really does
not

essential?)

and these questions are

practical

in

some measure presented through the me

philosophic approach

dium

of

the

issues

of the

day. Yet the

88

Interpretation

leave these

beginning points untouched. It takes the common notions which we directly from naive experience and poses its central question of them. It pursues its course by attempting to separate out from them what is essential and
imbibe
to

distinguish it

as such

from

what

is merely

relative.

Indeed, it is

the approach
mix

which alone permits

the

discovery

that the common notions are a

disorderly

ture of the
which

temporary

and

the essential, the transient and the substantial, that

value"20

has merely "historical and that which is justifiable in and of it self; it is hardly anything other, initially, than the emergence of the possibility of this distinction. It therefore emancipates us from uncritical subjection to the
common notions and

is

not

in any

sense

dominated

by them; it is their critic,

must

their

assayer, though

not a critic of

the

proposition

that there

be

common no

tions,
what

positive

law,
It

established

institutions
on

and so

forth.

The

positive science of

law,

the

is

enforced.

cannot arrive at

hand, is bound to limit its thought to independent criteria for ordering what is en
other and accidental. and

forced into the

significant and the

merely transient

Therefore, it
accidental, as
pe

finally

presents

everything that the law commands as transient

circumstances prevail.

bound to

particular circumstances and therefore

limited in its validity to the autonomy from

riod when

exactly those

When the purely

positive science of

law

claims

philosophic or

theoretical questions,

it in

effect consigns philosophic questions to

the

realm of

the impractical. But this then also defines the practical realm as one
reason
of

unaffected an

by

because

controlled

by

other

forces The law

.

then

becomes

instrument This

purely

contingent response

to contingent and

fluctuating

circumstances.

approach relativizes serve the

worse

the law. It may do so

critical

with conservative of

intentions,
But the

to pre
cure

laws from the

distinctions

philosophy.21

is

than the

disease. For this relativizing in fact

shows

that every aspect of law

is bound totally to the circumstances; this would mean that when circumstances change, the validity of the law changes. Hegel chooses, not by accident, an ex
ample

having

to do with religion.

One may defend the

monasteries

by

emphasiz

ing

their usefulnes in

helping

to begin the cultivation of unsettled areas or in pre

serving and passing on learning in barbaric times. But this historical defense also implies that the justification for monasteries disappears when conditions change.
If the function
of

the monasteries

providing education is now accomplished by other means, then have outlived their usefulness and have no present justification.

law by rejecting the significance of rational thought is then to law to the purely disintegrating effect of historical change in all of its superficial variety. The paradoxical result of this supposedly conservative view
relativize the open

To

is then to undermine,
20.

not

to stabilize, laws and

institutions.
value"

PR ii, ioo-ioi;

nature."

tory
cal.

is therefore 3 Remark: that which has only "historical Hegel's historicism is one in which it is still possible to depreciate the

of

"a transi histori

'merely'

21.

Strauss, Natural Right

PP-

and

History,

The German Enlightenment

1975).
180-189.

and the

pp. 13-15, 314-317, 318-319. And Peter Hanns Reill, Rise of Historicism (Berkeley: University of California Press,

Hegel's
The law
one

"Introduction"

to the

Philosophy
it has

of

Right

89

philosophic approach

to law is one

which assigns

that positive science of

dependent

role.

In its

own sphere

a certain validity.

The laws are, in

aspect, a necessary the

adaptation of the general to the

particular;

they

must par
was

reflect

particular and specific

imperatives

of their time and place. guided

But the

ticular

law

exists within a

larger horizon. It is

by

an

intention. It
"legislation"

Montesquieu

who paved

the way to seeing "the true historical view, the

genu

standpoint."

inely
"its

philosophical
determinations"

For Montesquieu

considered

and

particular

as parts of one

totality comprising
laws

the character of

a nation and an age. of a

The "true

meaning"

of the

and the other characteristics

people, as

ing
it

unity, its

own

stands and

their justification, is revealed in the light of that underly implicit unity (PR 3 Remark). The unity is the idea for which which is accessible only to those who bring the questions of the
well as
people.22

philosophic

historian to the study of that Thus Hegel's treatment of law leads to

a reformulation of what we are

'nature'

to

un

derstand
that

by

the meaning of history. Just as

has been
usage

altered as a

term,

so

it

now

is intellectualized
of

and refers

in Hegel's

to the concept of a

'history'

thing,

so

the meaning

is similarly
which

redefined.

The merely historical is

and which remains

the "in der Zeit

time" erscheinende,"

that

"appears in

purely temporary. (PR On

an

3 Remark;
plane we
and

11, 94; this realm is the

entirely different
with

find the

philosophic

"purely historical.") history, that which is

process
of

linked

the rational

therefore belongs to that enduring

thought's

self-

actualization.

Hegel

intransigently

opposes attempts to make the or

"purely
schools

into the highest standard, as do the positive of jurisprudence. His opposition is not based, however, on
altogether.

historical"

historical
to

objections

the historical

Rather, it is
end, and

a prelude to an affirmative
posited

teaching
is its

about

history
history.

which can elucidate what

it is that is
which

in history,

what

source

and eventual

meaning

or

finally

seeks to

join philosophy

and

historical"

It is the

element of

the

"purely

which

is the

source of

difficulties for

Hegel. The Philosophy of Right offers a remarkable schooling in the method by which we learn to rise above the purely historical, in order to ascend to that his

tory

which

is

of philosophical

interest because
of

a part of philosophy's own

self-

realization.
structure of

This intellectualization

history

dissolves

and

reformulates

the

in a manner de ordinary experience, natural or primary experience, which ordinary through recognition of the force signed to rationalizing activity Hegel denies itself. Thus beyond point to unreflective experience is compelled
the autonomy
critique,
concerns of that experience which

has

not

been

subjected

to the rationalist

which

is totally

absorbed

in the

particularities of

time and place, and he

himself

not so much with

educating it but

with

subordinating it to

'idea-ological'

higher,
22.

more

politics, as

it

were.

Ct

also

On Montesquieu's importance for Hegel, the comments on Montesquieu's idea of

see

"spirit"

Shklar, Freedom and Independence in Thomas Pangle,

pp. 43-44-

pp. I42flf. s

Montesquieu'

Philoso

phy of Liberalism (Chicago:

University

of

Chicago Press, 1973),

184. 194-195-

90

Interpretation
of

Now this depreciation

contemplative
view

the purely historical

quotidian and

is

not

the same as the age-old

distance from the

the particular. For this

Hegelian

is

teaching

which criticizes

the merely historical not

in

the name of that

which

is

ahistorical

but in the
the

name of a

higher history. The

ples examined above are

preface

to Hegel's doctrine of

introductory princi history as the actuali

the
"Introduction"

zation of

the

free,

rational will.

He

argues

in the

remainder of

( 4-33) that the will unfolds toward the actualization of a state embodying the full demands of free men. But the unfolding of the will must proceed in and
through the concrete circumstances of the existing world:

it is

mediated

through

the confused,
governed

disorderly

procedures of

the world at

hand,

which are

taken up and

by

reason and

by

no means eliminated.

Despite Hegel's thesis concerning the inevitability of this actualization, he cannot avoid drawing attention to a distinction between the rational as embodied
or actualized and the rational
rational with would call

in its

purity.

Actualization

means a

coupling

of

the

that

which partakes of

the

particular and

the

transitory;

while

he

this

union

the

'idea,'

an

overcoming
tinged

of

the merely abstract, it

is im

possible to

ignore the fact that it is Yet that ("nicht

also

with

the qualities of compromise.

The
of

actualization of

the rational means

which

its is

adaptation to the needs and

limitations

the

mundane world. not perfect

empirical

("auf

empirischen

Boden, im

Dasein") is

vollkommen"

[PR iv,

isting

world, the rational meets

with

that

which

In adapting to the ex is "ephemeral existence, external

101]).

contingency, opinion, insubstantial appearance, untruth,

illusion,

etc."

(PR

1
of

Remark),

the

realm of

circumstances, conditions, the unpredictable variety

life. If Hegel
elevation of

would argue

the mundane world,

for the necessity of this linkage, and the consequent he cannot avoid noting that it remains less than
concerning the
unification seems to

a perfect

harmony. His

proposition

be in

many

ways

the core of the modern state's high claim: that the rational can govern
reason can merge

the real, that

what was
earth.23

into history,

and thus that

it

can make one out of

formerly two, thought and practice, spirit and world, heaven and But the imperfections encountered and even perhaps intensified by this
to be the source of the
modern state's self-doubt.

project seem

23.

Cf. Hegel, Encyclopedia,

3rd edition
of

(1830),

552

Remark,

where

he

contrasts

his

view on

the possibility of this unity with that

Plato.

On Laughter
Joseph J. Carpino

Infants laugh for the

rors of existence

same reason adults

do: their

nature permits

it

and

the ter

demand it.
up into the
air and catch

Throw
tice
after

baby

him

a couple of

times and you

will no

the

more, tune if

when you

first fright, peals of laughter, uncontrollable giggling and asking for he realizes that he's not going to fall. (Of course he will change his
even

let him hit the floor

once; but then

we're

involved in

education

and not real

having fun.) The initial terror is instinctive, the primal fear of arbo animals, and the happy expectation is quickly learned, but the neural sur
the laughter is repeated each time
precariousness of unless the game goes on and

just

prise remains and

too

long

the

fundamental
.

his

position

is

reappropriated

by

the baby's nervous system

and

he begins to

cry.
man.

Risibility,
meant awareness.

as

the ancients noted, is a property of

of

By

this

they

must

have

that laughter occurs in function

the discursive character of human

Thinking
We learn

takes time. Not much

of

the

all-at-once or stripe.

timeless apprehension
and we

time, in many cases, but never is it angels or of disembodied intellects of foresee. Pure intelli
so so

any

forget,
we are

we remember and we

gence ought not

do that and,

the tradition to
speak.

runs.

They

might even

or told, angels don't; they simply know learn, coming to know as they come to be,

But they
events.

are never

surprised, and surprise

is

essential

to laughter.
"set"

To be

surprised requires a

set of neural expectations,

"disverification"

which

is then

falsified

by

When the

is

sudden and pleasant a relaxa of neural on

tion supervenes, laughter

breaks out,

and a

kind

joy

splashes are

through

the

organism.

(Sudden
attacks

and w/i-pleasant are

surprises,
pleasant

the other
slow

hand,

the stuff

of which

heart

made!) A

but

surprise, a

"dawning

grin," awareness,"

if it's private,

can

bring

about a

"secret

same as

laughing, however

much

both may

require a

but smiling is not the body and Cheshire cats to

the contrary

notwithstanding.

Laughter
to be.

comes when what

Tickling

is

friendly

happens is suddenly not as bad as we expected it poking, comedy is failed tragedy. Wisecracks and

even as expressions of respect. The ribbing are insults uttered with affection and halflisteners and even the object of the ribbing suddenly realize (what they expected all along; we do not kid a stranger) that the hurt did not happen, that an

essential component of sion

is

released

insult, the intention to wound, is missing, and their ten in laughter, chuckles from the bystanders (ribbing is seldom done
from the ribbee,
and a straight

in private),
maintain

perhaps a smile

face

on the

ribber, to

the illusion.
awareness comes

Human

in pieces,

and the new pieces

have to be fitted
well-known

onto

the old in terms of

some

kind

of precedent expectation.

(The

Ahahl

92

Interpretation
effect a new

Erlebnis is in
nected

bits to become parts

of a

framework suddenly permitting previously uncon whole, and although a tension is relieved it is not
of

the tension of

fear.)

This habit

anticipation, life

being

what

it is,

soon

be

comes a matter of

completely

unawares.

steeling ourselves for what is to come so that we are not taken But if it all turns out well, if the roof at last does not cave

in, then we are relieved and the nervous system relaxes; and if the relief is sud den, the relaxation is spasmodic. And those spasms may well constitute the ratio
nal

pleasure, laughter. (There are other spasmodic pleasures, to be sure, but

there

pleasure
uted

is nothing rational or even specifically human about them. If there be no in it for them, the congress of hippopotami, for example, must be attrib
of

to a truly awesome sense Temporality, then, as the

part of

duty

towards their species.)

of

"structure"

human awareness,

and

fragility

as an

abiding
ately
the

struction must

its content, be foreseen,

are

both

essential to

laughter. This Two things

means that
would

de

or seen as a possibility.

immedi

cancel such an awareness: when

the terrible event actually

happens (when
absolute

baby

hits the floor),

of

and when we

know it

cannot

happen. If the

im

possibility tragedy is foreseen, or when it has become a reality, laughter is and their impossible. Thus the veneration of professional comics for
the
"timing"

concern

for

precise

wording; the possibility

words as

and

the unreality of

tragedy

must

both be

given and

hidden in the

they

come out of

his mouth; to "tele

graph"

the resolution

by

careless

wording, or to give us time to deduce

it,

would

be to kill the laugh.

Comedy, it is
and

often

said, requires a tragic

vision and a

deep

moral

concern,

if this is

so

it

explains what

is

also often

said, that comedians are hard to live

clown never stops

with.

Clowns

must also

be difficult, because the true

"crash"

"clown

around,"

ing
are a

and

that can be very annoying at times. But professional comedians

at

little different: they

home,

we

hear,

and

that must be awful.

entertainers, they are paid to please merely because, people. The bitterness of comedians may have a deeper spring. If laughter entails seeing, suddenly, that things are not as bad as they had
and not

But it

fits,

with all

threatened to
awareness

be,

then the

than most of us

ability to make people laugh must have of how bad things might be and
the

require a

deeper

of our utter

help
vi

lessness,
sion and

our absolute

fragility, in

face
.

of that awfulness.

Thus the tragic

"content"

the

moral concern of

comedy

Humor

requires not so much an articulated comprehension of

the

of

the moral as
mor

it does

a clear eye on the moral

is

a perception of the contrast

between

what

dimension. The primary form of hu has happened (as bad) and what
way that the resulting
within
realization system.
tension"

might

have happened (as less for

even

worse!) in

such a of

permits a more or

spasmodic

"release

the nervous

So

much

received generalities. what

what ought

But the really primal contrast and the ultimate tension is between to be. The really funny makes a moral point. When
we see

is

and

that

what people

have done is

not

really wicked, that they have

On Laughter
acted

93
through

foolishly

or

ignorance (or through

"ought"

a small

vice, like vanity),

and

thus

have

not compromised

the moral order as such, then we can

laugh, because
noth

things are still all right; the

is

still

intact.
to be

If "the

order"

moral

were
would

to fall apart, if the ought were to dissolve into

no ultimate

ingness,
about.

then we

have

contrast,

no

thing finally
to be in

relieved

Even the
to be
of

"physical"

oughts, like "we

as

pain,"

ought not

and

"we

humiliated,"

ought not

basic

as

they

are

among fears,

are subclasses and

of which

derivatives

the absolutely primary order, namely the moral, in terms

rational animals must operate.

The

most

nostrum. of

fearful thing, then, is a compromising of the moral order, to repeat a Certain kinds of behavior, most specifically wickedness, put the reality
question.

that order into

(The Holocaust itself

occasioned more atheism than all the

blandishments
before
us

of comfortable assimilation put manifests

suddenly

as not wicked

together.) But when the behavior but merely foolish, then we can is
not

laugh, because all is still as it should be. Pomposity, for example, apes arrogance,
pompousness

and arrogance

funny. But is inher laugh

is

grounded
enough

in

a weakness

(stupidity, if nothing
jokes
and

else)

and

ently

not

strong

to be

wicked and

thus to challenge the moral order. And

so we are

safe, and,

within

the ideal context of

comedy,

can

when confronted

by

it. Of

course real

pomposity is

occasion

for pity,

as with all

the

lesser immoralities.
are theoretical positions which

There
such

theoretically deny
in laughter
as

the moral order as

and

relativisms

in

general and moral relativism

particular

if these
as

positions were taken make

indignation

meaningless.

seriously they But the

would make

impossible

they

viscera

do

not allow us

to take relativism

seriously.

We fear

possibilities and we

that extent
system.

skepticism and nihilism can

become angry over states of affairs, so to never be appropriated by the nervous

of order as

Ultimately,
of

of

course,

we

fear the disappearance

the

such,

and some

the most

cerebral of jokes manifest

precariousness of our

hold

over chaos.
one-for-

Puns, for example, bespeak the

one correlation

fragility
is the

of univocal

understanding, the

between
put

sound and

meaning

on which

logical thought depends.

and

Laughter,
constitute the

to

it in

a word,

extra of

human reason,

it may

well

specifically human pleasure. for example, may be viewed as the Music,

the
right-ness of

pleasure of a temporal

intelligence,

remembering and anticipating the

members of a

tonal sequence and

its

neural appropriation of

the sequence.

rejoicing in This capacity is proba

bly innate to intelligent animals, varying with their intelligence and perfectable through training. But music is never about anything, it does not compare or con
trast
possible states of

affairs;

for that,

reason

is required,

and

usually

words.

Music

can

be

sad or

gay

or even

majestic, but never tragic or

funny

or wrong.

And very

music can quite

lonely

properly be enjoyed alone, where laughing by oneself is a business indeed. Thus the social character of laughter which, though

94
not

Interpretation
essential to it, is in keeping with the social character of human existence in its derivation, up 'til now or at

absolutely
social

least

"natural"

the

condition.

The

negative counterpart to

laughter

pression of sorrow
special case. usual neural

suddenly realized. Like hysterical laughter at the dreadful, they are an inversion of the reaction and have a law of their own.) Sorrow also has a temporal
awareness

have to be tears, weeping, the ex (There can be joyful tears, but they are a
would

least for us, so far as this loss is concerned. Ordinary pain is present, now, and if its end can be foreseen it can be borne. Sorrow is another thing, and though the higher animals

dimension,

the

that things

will never

be better

at

can pine at

the

loss

of a

beloved

master

(or

even at

the death of another animal)

a worded organism.

weeping is specifically wordless, when "words Animals don't burst into tears at a sudden
wrong,
and angels can't

fail"

awareness so

that things

have

gone

weep

at all.

They

may,

to speak, "gnash their

teeth"

in

kind

of anger and

remorse, but that is very figurative language

with no

"angelological"

import; laugher and tears imply an anthropology. Laughter, however, is pleasant, and the dynamics of it befit the human condi tion. In addition to a body, to do the laughing, laughter requires intelligence (to
permutate

the possibilities) and an awareness of our

fragility
laugh.

(to have something

to laugh about). But it also requires something else, which we shall call the "the
oretical

mode"; a consciousness
we mean

sunk

in

praxis cannot

By
can

intelligence

here the

speed with which words and other symbols

be

logically
the

rearranged,

and comedians and schoolteachers

have

long

been
con

aware of scious

correlation

between intelligence
to

and a sense of

humor. No
of

human

being

is

so unintelligent as

be absolutely incapable
others and

laughter, joke,
al

but

some

"get the

point"

more

quickly than
sense of

this not always only in to the

terms of the

knowledge (in the

almost

"information") necessary
are some

though that is a consideration.

seem to
other

And there

be

totally lacking in

a sense of as

very intelligent people who humor; but this may be due to

factors,

temperamental

impediments

it

were.

Related to

intelligence, laugh,

and often confused with

tion,
ever

acquaintance with the material.

However intelligent

it, is knowledge, informa one may be, and how

presupposes a
well
"travel"

willing to
thorough

fairly
puns

real chuckling over puns in Aristophanes immersion in ancient Greek. Comedy doesn't

in

space or

time, mainly because the things we fear are not all universal; and when and wordplays have to be laboriously worked out with the aid of a lexicon
surprise

there can be no

in the

nervous system.

The

mind concedes

the

joke, but
too much

the stomach muscles do not quake beneath the

lungs. knowledge if there's

line

Ignorance
of

can preclude a prior

laughter but

so

too can

it. Be it only
who

knowledge

of the punch

or a generalized and some

times stuffy polymathy or even a real omniscience, laughter is not possible for

already know "how it comes the perennial jokes of children, or a benign

those

out."

Perhaps

friendly

effort,

as with
we

smile so as not to alienate

before

On Laughter
go

95
"topper,"

into

our own

but

no real

laughs

are possible when you

know too

much.

no

Sometimes the things feared, the tragedy avoided in the comedy, are simply longer a matter of major concern. Consider the role, in Terence, of rediscov
of parents and of release

ery just

from slavery,
them.

at

the end;

or more

recently, the fears

quaint as

and anxieties of as

"situation up

comedies,"

which with

quickly become fears it

reality
are so

quickly

catches

Slapstick, however, precisely because its

calls

"gnoseological"

requirements are so minimal and the

into play

primitive, is

much more universal.

Slapstick,
"awareness
fall
or

perhaps

because

of

of our

fragility"

moment

its simplicity, manifests most clearly the in the dynamics of laughter. That we can
and

slapstick and

be knocked down, that we can be humiliated for all to see, even children. As we get
become
more are

destroyed, is

given

in

older

the crude indignities

of circus clowns
and

less

funny

(the bones

distant, and as pratfalls become more dangerous getting brittle) we turn for our amusement to more

cerebral

essential perception is there, already, in slapstick. Contradictions in terms, paradoxes, and absurdities are nothing less than the monstrosities and horrors of thought, and the mind cannot confront them without
and

fragilities. But the

discomfort, frustration,
vive

in fact

kind

of panic. and

Sanity

cannot

for

long

sur

in

a context of real and radical

of

disorder,

homonyms hint

at a possible

failure
pends.

the

conjunction

But

when after

between meaning and sound on which our thinking de further inquiry, or under a more general classification, the
and

contradiction
not

is

seen

to be only contrast

the absurdity only a paradox (still

the best state of affairs but better than

falling
or

flat

on your

face!),

then the

mind

is

once again at ease and can proceed such a resolution

be

at rest.

Now if

is sudden,

sometimes

having
as

been built into the very

and

terms of the tension, as

with puns and

wordplays, and if the threat to reason as

suddenly evaporates, the rational organism can relax possible, however wry and begrudging it may be.
Logic itself
of course

suddenly

laughter is

is

never

threatened,

and

in the

more cerebral explora

tions of the human mind there is little laughter

solve contradictions and paradoxes

even

though

they

confront and re
mathematicians

daily. However intelligent

may be (and
our own system

most of

them are), the things

upon our nervous systems, and

simply do not impinge their demonstrational failures do not remind us of

they

talk about

fragility

which

but only of the finitude of our thought processes. In a symbol depends on univocity, where sound is only a place-holder for
can

meaning, there

be

terminological checking, counterchecking, and even a

and

kind

of checkmating,

but little fear

few

real puns.

Hippasus
At the

was put to death for revealing the mysteries of

long is it since incommensurability!)

(How
ten
not about

other extreme, when the matter

no

is too real, the

at a

sensibilities still too

der,

there is also

joking. There thing,

can

be laughter

wake, but

every

thing.

Fragility

is

a poised

a possibility, not an

event;

and when

the roof

96 has

Interpretation

caved

in,

when

the worst has

happened,

we cannot

laugh

about

it. Survival Provi

itself keeps

some possibilities
this,"

open,

and with

the passage of time "we may one

sit and wait.

day

laugh

about

but for

now we can at

only

The
are

ways of

dence

provide some ground

for hope

any point, but they

earth. excludes

little

cause

for

laughter Real

as

the box

is

being

lowered in the

indestructibility,
was right about

on the other

hand,
it

laughter. In this

regard

Epicurus
pleased

the gods. "Immortal

more:

nature"

takes no offence and is not

cannot

by

To

speak

anything we do, but even of "the laughter of the

a projection onto

cannot

laugh because it is clearly

at

die.

gods"

at our weaknesses

an anthropo

morphism,

the gods (who may or may not care for us, in

of

fact),
in

of one of the crudest others.

a

forms

human laughter, laughter

or at

the

misfortunes of

Laughing at the contortions of puppets

"anguish"

the the

of characters
context

"theoretical."

comedy is conceivable, because they But really to laugh at the

as

are not real and

is eminently

misfortunes of others
world.

is

so monstrous an

inhumanity
Of

to

approach genuine of our

mystery, in this
can

course

"awareness

fragility"

be

veiled.

Wine

will

do it

almost

every time, but wine can bring its cients.) And besides, the
solves

own

hilarity. (That

also was noticed

by

the an

"indestructibility"

that drunkenness offers soon

of glass and a

dis
the

into its

own peculiar opposite: the

head

brain like

mud

morning after clearly signify the lack of even Epicurean immortality. can be appropriated in such a way as to give the illusion Sometimes an
"idea"

transcendence; one can lose sight of one's own particularity in the vision of a cause and be so caught up in its seriousness as to forget, or more properly, to de
of

spise, one's own fragility. "We are as nothing in the light of the

Movement."

And nothings, of course, are indestructible. There is no laughter in crusades. The main practical impediment to laughter, however, is not seriousness but
praxis

itself,
of

the

doing

of

something, and this not in terms of the objective im

portance of what

function
mary
as

is going on (consider the ribaldries of medical students) but in the level of involvement of the nervous system. Laughter is the pri
theoria,
even

mode of

before grammar,
the

and

it

requires not so much

leisure

distance,

or

the capacity of a neural consciousness to separate

example

itself from its

or

own contents.

Consider for humor

nasty; but

humorlessness
rhetoric.

of politicians
can

rather,

the

very lers if they And

work

careful

of

political

Politicians
make of

handle heck
and

are

when

they're

funny they

the speaker

his

proposals an object

to be looked at, and no politician can tolerate that.

sometimes work

itself

can make

laughter impossible.
not

that allows

for

around,"

no

"fooling

because

of the

Drudgery means intensity of concen

in brain surgery (we hope!), but because the labor involved precludes any relaxation of the viscera (as in a laundry). Let's finish the job and then we'll laugh.
tration required, as

There is

one

case,
and

however, in

which

"awareness

fragility"

of our

is

quite

properly hidden

laughter impossible because the future is essentially known

On Laughter
to the neurones.
where

97
oneself

As it is impossible to tickle

because

we

know exactly

finger is going to go so too is it impossible to tell oneself a joke. People laugh at their own jokes, and can even chuckle as they repeat them
the poking to themselves, but to
surprise oneself

by

one's own turn of phrase can evoke

laughter only in and in terms of the company of others. (It is also, by the way, impossible to be tickled by one's own children when they are small. How could
one

by such short and lovable, essentially helpless little But in the case of self-tickling, foreknowledge and a contextual here, creatures?) indestructibility go hand in hand to make surprise impossible. In this regard, our
be
afraid of pokings

inability
So

to tickle ourselves, we are as divine as any Epicurean

god.
"theoretical"

much

for the

practical

impediments. There are, however,

ob

jections to

laughter,

"anthropologies"

them seriously, would make

mologies"

which, if ever the viscera were to take laughter humanly impossible. And there are "cos

which would make sane

laughter metaphysically impossible laughter

so

by reduc

ing

all

laughter to
we

a cosmic aberration. characterized

The way
("sudden"

have

far,

as a mixed event where the

a

rational-theoretical means a
would

and

the neural-bodily meet in

not no

little time,

time

at

all,

and surprise

radically temporal arena is never absolute),

"dualistic"

less traditionally (you should pardon the expression) understanding of human nature, with mind and body interwoven in experience precisely because neither is a mere function
seem,
on the

face

of

it,

to call

for

a more or

of

the other. This idea

of a

"composite
and

nature"

to man
our own

was subject

to ques
even

tion almost from its first appearance,

mention such a

in

time it is in bad taste

to

thing in

enlightened circles.

But

anthropological

dualism doesn't

it may be for the understanding ("two is the number away, refractory of analysis, never of being"), it is the only anthropology that provides any lever age in explaining the phenomena of laughter.
go and as as
"Platonistic"

Of

course a

Cartesian

or

dualism is

no

help

at all.

mind

to

which a

body

has been
at

affixed at some one or even at several points

has

no more

cause

for laughter

tickling

than we have for smiling in a car

wash.

Even if
"get"

Cartesian
still

consciousness could

he

understood

in

a nonmechanical

way it
might

would
a

be too

other

pun or even

body a wisecrack, deducing

to

its

to feel any danger to the point,

it. And

while

it

it

would

be too

spent

in the

analysis

itself to laugh. There Plato

on the other

are no chuckles

in Descartes.

hand is

not without

humor,

although

here,
an

as we move

men Socrates, closely away from the not entered and its to be into, observed, tality for which conviviality is something participants graded, as it were, on their rationality. Not a bad exam, it must be for future rulers of imprisoned souls, but only bodiless men could adminis
person of

we approach more

Olympian

said,

ter it

without some arrogance.

"unmitigated"

Entitative

or must regard

dualisms, in

other

words, don't explain laughter

"also"

because they

the

body

as an appendage to

the soul, as

an

to be

98

Interpretation
first
available

sloughed off at the

opportunity (at death

or

in

science).

Monistic

materialisms would seem

to take the

body

more

seriously

and thus perhaps to ac

count more

readily for the

of whatever

pleasures of risibility.
would

Pleasure
might

sort, the Epicureans

insist, is bodily. Or,

as we

say,

pleasures of the mind are neural through and through.

Intelligence is dis

neural,

tickling is

neural,

and animals respond

to tickling. And any supposed

tinction between physical and verbal

tickling

or

between intelligence

and ration

ality simply mistakes quantity for quality, since the human being's capacity to laugh at jokes is a function merely of the greater complexity of our neural appa ratus and not of any essential differentia. Or so the argument would run.
The trouble

is,

animals

don't laugh.

They

react to

tickling
of

and some of

the

complex"

"neurally

more

species even engage

no

in

kind
no

horseplay

(not horses,

of course).

But there is

laughter,

no

giggling,

guffaws,

no characteristi

cally human release in a specific and otherwise useless sound. Materialism is burdened, in our time, with a concept which lute
minimum of

caused an abso

trouble for

Epicurus,

the notion of

tribution which a biological process makes to the survival of a species.

evolutionary utility, the con The uni

versality of laughter in human beings, preceding even speech, is an index of the level at which it would have to have offered a competitive advantage; but there is
no

way in

which

the capacity to laugh could give one

more

over another.

hunt

and never a

They might well be during the battle.

the

fun to

group of primates an edge be with, but that comes after the

might

At most, laughter

be

an

evolutionary
abilities, like

side-effect,

by-product, like

the chin or the Adam's apple, indeed an extrusion

of

following

upon

development

other,

biologically

more useful

speech or rationality.

But setting aside evolutionary considerations, if thinking is to be viewed as only a kind of calculating, the activity of a specialized group of "command
atoms"

in their regulating

of all the other activities of our grosser

parts, then

most

of what we

think and think about could

subtlest of syllogisms and

ment of music and

perhaps,

so

conceivably be accounted for, even the far as pleasures are concerned, the enjoy

design. There

are after all

olfactory

pleasures and

tactile plea

sures.

Why

shouldn't

there also be visual and aural pleasures, sounds and sights

communis"

which, when ordered through some sort of "sensus

occasion the enjoyment of music and

(intelligence)

can

design,
Thus

where a sequence of sounds or a

display

of color constitutes the object?

pleasures of

intelligence;
name

why

not

then a "rational

pleasure,"

reason

being, for

materialism, the

for "great

intelligence"?
But laughter In laughter the
could not goes
mind

beyond the

powers of a

rationality

reducible to calculation.

flips over, it

tricks the nervous system,

something

which

it is

do if it

were the same as

that nervous system.

("Epiphenomenon"

just
ness
and

a roundabout

way of saying "the same as"; it gives the appearance but it denominates no real difference.) This kind of language,

of other

"flipping,"

"tricking,"

like "theoretical

modality,"

is admittedly

quite

figurative,

per-

On Laughter
haps
are

99

even vague, but it is not for that, invalid. Laughter should not be there if we but animals, however intelligent, or if thought were merely neural activity. At the other extreme, among the classical anthropologies, Stoicism offers a philosophical understanding of human nature which is dualistic but not
unmiti-

gatedly

so.

gritting of mere Cartesian

a

body is taken seriously enough to require a certain theoretical the teeth, if nothing else. Here the union of body and soul is not a
The
systematic

isomorphy, but
("restored"

the real in-formation of a

manifold

by

structure,

logos,

which otherwise would

have
as

no place

to

be

and

which,

when

finally
able

released

from the

body

they

say), becomes indistinguish

from

intelligibility

as such.

In

such an

anthropology the

body

is

essential

to

man, but

pleasure and pain are

ther good nor

and

only bad in themselves. The

(to

the condition of particular existence and nei

real

cusing"

"dispersion"

speak again

polarity for Stoicism is between "fo in metaphor), and the preference of

.

pleasure over pain

becomes

a matter

for laughter in
dren

such a

man, no

essentially of indifference There is no cause delight in the body, no sorrow even at death. Chil
there is for the Stoic himself a certain
stern satis

are allowed to

laugh,

and

faction in the
most

exercise of

his

will

(the "focusing"), but "rational

pleasur

is here
are

clearly

a contradiction

in terms. The Stoic knows that tears ignorance

and
and

and

laughter

the

pointless side-effects of

lack

of self-control.
and

The

universe

is

serious; it has nothing to fear

pleasure

knows

no

remorse,

there can be no pain or

which is what, if anything, a proper Stoic does. in reason-ing objections to laughter inherent in the Thus in broad outline the basic extremes of philosophical understandings of human nature. Epicureanism
"theoretical"

permits

it but

cannot explain

it (how

"trick"

could neural events

themselves?);
not permit

Stoicism Of

can explain

it (as

a weakness

based in ignorance) but does

philosophy have
stayed

it.

course not even philosophers take

that seriously, and there was

doubtless laughter in the Garden ably

a smile or two even on the
man."

or no one would

for long,

and prob plucked

Porch, if only in memory

Diogenes'

of

chicken, "Plato's

"anthropologically"

All that
possible

would

be

required

is

theory
a

of man which accounts

for the

for laughter to be theoretically in human speech. Not

"but"

all

jokes have

entailed

"understanding"

of

but they all do presuppose the stepping back and overview is not a logical operation, it is not the work in the adversative. The is in Kant's sense. Rather, to stretch things just a bit, the
"but,"

"but"

"but"

Reason"

precisely the

primordial rational

function to

which

the "Ideas of

stand as

specifications.

The

"but"

gives a total picture, and when that total picture

is

sud

denly
breaks

not as out.

bad

as

it

promised

to be and the diaphragm picks

it up, laughter

thought and
reason.

Whatever understanding of human being explains that interplay of in time makes laughter possible and grounds its pleasure in the

body

Sane laughter is
rationality
of

another matter.

Grounded though it may be in reasoning, the

laughter, its

accord with what

is,

would

have to be in function

of

100

Interpretation
nature.

something beyond human

"cosmology."

For this

we must move

from anthropology to

Looked
sense of

at

humor in
no

If there is

the central organizing theme of laughter of a is hope, "danger's as Thucydides puts it. hope there can be no laughter. It's as simple as that. And the prob
comforter,"

"structurally,"

general

lem

now

becomes the "ontological

of

status"

of

hope.
of

On the level

the individual human

being,

course, hope

can

be blotted

out

by

"appearances"

(the Stoic term for just

about

everything that can

happen to

people).

hope

And it may be the case that in a given course of events there is no or at least no rational hope. The limb is lost, the beloved is dead; there is
about

nothing to laugh
particular

in that

regard.

But these

are

individual circumstances,
being"

contexts,

and not what

man of

for the

presence not

in

issue here, namely, the "ground in the "species called hope.

at
phenomenon"

is

Hope is
effort at

planning, though despair

its

roots.

Hope is

not

desire
at

or

effectively cut off any wishing (although "wishful

can a

projective

thinking"

is

kind

of

foolish hoping). Taken

less bleak, that

its barest, hope is

kind

of confidence that

things need not necessarily go completely wrong or, a little more positively though
no

we shall survive

somehow.

There is

no

laughter in

the hold as the ship is going down.

In addition, therefore, to
sume somehow upon our pect

an awareness of our our

fragility, laughter

must also pre

indestructibility,
tragic.
of

survival,

and must somehow ex

that the end is

sciousness

essentially in others, the perdurance

may be to
years.

not

The

continued existence of

human

con

the species, is something of that sort, a

will

kind

of survival to

look forward to: "There

simple resignation

be

on."

others

to carry

And

as

close as this

it has

served as

hope for

men and na

tions through the

ond

In

our own

time, unfortunately,
question.

an awareness of

the Sec

Thermodynamics along with consciousness have put it somewhat in

of

Law

other productions of modern scientific

Pollyannaism, "survival
only a block to The
to make
absolute
"metaphysical"

species"

of

the

was never the

But in any case, for all its basis of belly laughs but
must

despair. issue here

"What

question at

being be for laughter

"cosmological" hope?"

sense?"

is

perhaps more

conveniently formulated in

terms: "What kind of cosmology would permit a rational animal to

again

Here

the ultimate alternatives are few and far between.

a philosophical

Hope is not, generally speaking,

term.

Philosophers know

or

they don't know, and their they don't know. Socrates

hopes (for his
tions
about
personal of
belief,"

"specialty,"

if

we

may

put

was

a philosopher and were

it that way, is knowing that hopeful, but his particular he says, in tales
and tradi careful

survival)

grounded,

as

"worthy
hope

and not

in

what

he knew.

Philosophy

is very

and

its

classical extremes

pretty

well cover

the range of

possibilities.

example, with its affirmation of the objective reality of Reason intelin the universe, seems to offer a basis for a kind of hope, via the eternity of

Stoicism, for

On Laughter

101

ligibility, for a perdurance of the rationality of man. But there's nothing personal about it, no ground for any hope. The Logos is not any one of us, it
"subjective"

is

not even

itself

a someone.

Human

reason

has

kind

of

transcendance

over

time;
that

and the universe

we can

be

sure.

its cycles, will never be annihilated of itself, But the human individual is never anything more than a
through all
of rationality.

fleeting
verse,

mortal

instantiation
than

Hope, for

such a

thing in

such a uni

can

be

no more

just

another case of

shortsightedness,

useful perhaps

for the
at all.
touch"

accomplishment of certain

And

laughter, in
is

such a

limited goals, but with no cosmic significance context, is essentially insane, ontologically "out of

with what

real.

How does hope

accord with expected

Atomism,

then? Its treatment here is even more

brutal (as

might

be

from

sightless

Giants). Epicureans, like the intelli

to

gent animals

they

are, can hope from

day

day

and even

laugh

at

times (al

though there's no

accounting for it), but in the end there is nothing. When Epi curus says, to allay our fears of death, that "whatever is without sentiency is he must be taken at his word and understood to mean that to be is nothing to
us,"

in function

of sensation.

This is the

solipsistic
all

Berkeleian

worm

sleeping in the

heart

of all radical materialisms.

For

its

"realism,"

vaunted

a consistent mate

rialism must regard

"the

world"

as no more than a and when we

projection,

a construct, of

in

dividual consciousness;
pose

die, "the

universe"

ceases to

be. To sup

anything else would entail an inference beyond the evidence of our senses (which are at once the ground and limit of all that we can know). In such a cos
mology there
can

be

no

hope

at

all, and laughter

becomes,

at

best,

one of

the

"natural but
At

necessary"

not

pleasures, like sex and

other vulgar amusements.

Thus the fundamental

est. neither extreme

cosmological alternatives offered

by

reason at

its

pur

be

mean"

no

"salutory
all

And laughter, for

modality.

provided for hope. (There can is any "ontological in these matters but only compromise, a watering down.) its momentary release, is essentially insane, an unhealthy
wine,"

status"

Like "a little

it

might aid

digestion

but

you can't

live

on

it.

Laughter is insane in

such a view

because the human condition,

seen

from the

is necessarily tragic: nothing laughter itself the joke, a mad refusal to is of And the good can come of it. reality then face the horror of contingent rationality. And of course, if "it's all a

inside, is itself

absurd.

Mortal

self-consciousness

joke,"

nothing,"

nothing is funny. "A tale told by appraisal of the human condition

hand,"

an

idiot

signifying

is

after all an

uttered

by

a man

facing

Hell.
hand,"

"But
another are

on

the

other which

as

the Rabbis say, "but on the

all

other

there is

possibility

is

wrong, so

far

as

"philosophical

cosm

concerned, but
total-picture-

which might

be

useful even so.

to us

wise, namely,
of

what could

In any case, it's all that's left be called the Biblical tradition. (what
philosopher would a

The cosmology

Scripture is

not philosophical

ever propose a creation ex nihilo or even more

impossible,

resurrection),

and

102

Interpretation
"members,"

it's
not

cosmology (because its be included in any larger category and

not even a

Creator

"and"

creation,

can

cannot even

be

connected

by

a proper

and), but it does suggest an "ontological

status"

for hope.

The very

fact,
to

of

course, that Scripture

provides grounds

for individual human

skeptical
a cosmo

hope,

grounds pressed
reject

down

consciousness

it

out

spilling over, is itself enough for a of hand, regarding it as the very model of
and

logical anthropomorphism,
rejection, indeed

blatant

projection of overblown

type of metaphysical arrogance, and the ultimate

a mere shrugging-off

human desire, in philosophical naivete. Such

easier when we

a a

in

most

cases, is

disregard

the parts Macbeth could not

all of

forget, however much he tried. But quite apart from difficulty here, without even mentioning the total absence, in of Scripture, anything which could, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be
that, there is
"comic
a
relief."

called

In

spite of all the

hope that "the Biblical its

"cosmology."

tradition"

seems

to

offer most of attempt

us, there is a kind of technical problem

which must

be faced in

any

to base the sanity of

we

laughter

on

have said, is denied the gods of Epicurus by virtue of their im mortality, their essential indestructibility: they can have no experience of fragil ity. How much more must a Creator God, with all His Omniscience and Omnip

Laughter,

otence and a

just

plain all-round on-top-of-it-ness

smile,

much

less

of

be necessarily incapable even of laughter? And if the nature of the "first defines all
thing"

lesser things (that's

what

Measures

do; they define

"ground
of

other things even when

they

don't

make

them),

then

how

being"

could a

Who is constitutionally

incapable

laughter anything more than, at most, property of human beings on the way to God and never of the saved at rest "in the bosom of Abraham"? (A less appealing metaphor, by the way, for union with God, can scarcely be imagined.) And be sides, as a group, Old Testament prophets are among the least amusing the
of

being

surprised make of our

an aspect of our condition

in via,

world

has

ever seen

and

St. Paul is

no

barrel

of

laughs

either.

There is

problem

here. Hope, yes; but laughter: forget it.

And yet, and yet, when all is said and done, it's not impossible. When once the lion has lain down with the lamb, and after all the tears were wiped away, why

may

we not

expect,

within

that sure and certain

hope,

that when it
will

finally

sinks

in

that everything's all right, the novelty of

somber

happiness

bring forth,

in

all the

surety
after

of

Justice in the end,

a peal of

joy

and an ocean of

laughter that
Abra

need never cease?

For

all, that same eternal

Creator,

that same
as

unblinking God,
middle
name.*

of

ham,

and of

Isaac,

and of

Jacob, has laughter

His

*Or just

about!

Cf. Genesis 18:12-14,

and 21:3,6.

(And Exodus 3:15

of c

Discussion
De Gaulle
On
as a

Political Thinker
on

Morrisey 's

Reflections

De Gaulle

Angelo M. Codevilla
Select Committee
on

Intelligence, United States Senate

Reflections
risey.

on

De Gaulle: Political

Founding
of

in Modernity.

By

Will Mor

(Washington, D.C.: University Press

America,

1983. 210

pp.)

Charles de Gaulle, arguably more than any other political leader in this cen tury, wrote in order to explain the basis of politics. Even before he became a
statesman, he
was a

serious,
such

systematic student of statecraft.

He

never stopped
on
*

thinking
Gaulle

of

himself in

terms. Yet until Will

Morrisey 's Reflections

he
understood

De

no

book

sought to understand

de Gaulle

as

himself.

The book is aptly titled because it consists of distinct reflections. If overarch ing connections between the reflections exist, the author has hidden them too
well.

Hence,
on

the book fails to give a coherent account

of what

de Gaulle teaches
mixes
and

about political

founding

in

modernity.

The

author so

thoroughly

his

own oth

insight
ers,

this

matter with

the insights of de

Gaulle, Machiavelli,

many

and with observations on such

wonders whether

the reader

diverse matters, that the result is the cause is chance or intention.

parts.

a puzzle and

The book is divided into five

one of

Each

consists of one chapter

explaining

de Gaulle's

major

writings, and of another that uses the text as a point of

departure for
made

a substantive

discussion

of a

topic suggested
one and

by

it. This format is

to order

what a text says mous

for interpretation, since it allows from what one believes it means

of

to separate elucidation of

from substantive,
an amorphous

autono

discussion
well.

the text's subject. The

first

of the

five

parts succeeds reason

ably

But,
a

as

the book goes on, it dissolves into

of

flow

of

quotes

from

variety

sources, followed

by

what appears

to be hermeneutics

for its

own sake.

general

In 1983 the Institut Charles de Gaulle de Gaulle (Paris, Editions Cujas), the
such as

published papers

Approches de la
a symposium

philosophie politique

du
pa

from

held in April

1980.

The

pers
of

bear titles

"The

notion of

the universe

in the thought

of

Charles de

Gaulle,"

"The

sources

Gaullist thought:

popular nationlism and non-conformism

in the

nineteen-t

"The demo

Gaullism,"

authority,

cratic on a

dimension

of

"The Gaullist

conception of

the state's
closely.

etc.

The

essays are

high level

of abstraction.

They

do

not analyze

de Gaulle's texts

de Gaulle's thought from

own year.

a wide

fundamental

views on politics.

variety of viewpoints, they do not succeed Will Morrisey s Reflections on De Gaulle

'

Though they approach in elucidating de Gaulle's

was also published

that

104

Interpretation
also marred

The book is is
a

by

gratuitous, inconsequential

remarks:

Montesquieu
writer on

"much

greater

French

writer."

Stanley

Hoffman is the best

de

Gaulle. "Enough. It is only an aside Quoting de Gaulle that political leader ship draws from the people what they have "of faith, and hope, and latent devo
tion,"

the

author

ing

habit

of

inserts in brackets "What, no dividing texts into chapters, sections,

the
center of

charity?"

or

Then there is the annoy pages, so as to locate a

particular point at

criteria,
tent

almost

any

place

something is in the middle

a

or other.

Of course,
The

depending on

the

of something.

author seems con

that,

having

so

located

point, he has

established

its importance. This

smacks of medieval numerology.

Moreover,

the book is sprinkled with little fac

for example, the revolution in Russia in February, 19 17, was not the Soviet revolution. The editing leaves much to be desired, Nevertheless, be cause Morrisey is obviously perceptive, the book is worth reading.
tual errors

The first

part

is

on

La Discorde

chez

I'ennemi (1924),
of

a product of

Captain de

Gaulle's analysis,

while a prisoner of
of

war,
as

why

Germany

lost the Great War.

requires ex

Morrisey's description
planation.

La Discorde

"a

leadership"

manual of

In the Great War,

leadership

was not

lacking

on either side.

Quite the

Like every other astute observer of that carnage, de Gaulle was stunned how easily millions were led to make enormous sacrifices. The question that haunted de Gaulle was more concrete: Given such superb material and human re
contrary. at

sources, why did the German leaders lose? As the title suggests, the
solved

question re

itself into:

Why

so much

discord among the German leaders? The answer,

in

nutshell, is that in
to their jobs.

stuck

Germany neither the political nor the military authorities Any large enterprise depends for its success on a proper divi
refused and

sion of

labor. Kaiser Wilhelm for Admiral Tirpiz

to act like a chief executive out of exces

sive regard
von

the military expertise he represented. General

Kluck, for his

part, refused to follow the orders

out of excessive esteem notes

view

for his

own position as

his superior, von Moltke, field commander. De Gaulle

of

that Nietzsche's notion of the that acts

and
of will alone endow

Overman,
the

and

the consequent existentialist

world with

meaning,

was widespread

in

Germany
the

legitimized

a generation's sacrifice of morals and good measure on

altar of success.

tive than the imperative for

No principle, not even love of country, was more authorita selffulfillment. Morrisey agrees with de Gaulle that
of success a

"the German worship

and

does

succeed."

not

In the end,

as

both de Gaulle

Morrisey observe, society based on no principle but unbridled competitive striving not only risks failure, but is likely to disintegrate in the face of it.
Captain de Gaulle
that that is out
of makes no obvious political suggestions measured avoidance

here.

Morrisey

says

"a

young Captain had

the necessity of to proportion, "la

said quite a

for overstepping one's But the lot. True, he had sounded the orthodox theme of

place."

proper subordination: one man one

Mesure,"

job. But his

repeated appeals

in the

realm of

fellow

prisoners of war

decrying
the

the waste

high policy, and his lectures to his of life on the battlefield, were obvi
was

ous, pointed

references to

fact that something

grievously wrong

with

the

Discussion
conduct of
men and

105

the war on all sides. The proportion

between

what

leaders

asked of

the goods these leaders sought seemed to

men

be lacking. Though
In the

at

the bot

tom of

society

still gave

their allegiance and their

charge were

behaving

in

ways

destructive

of allegiance.

lives easily, those in lectures, Captain

might restore

de Gaulle

searched

the realm of military tactics for

something that

proportionality to the French Army's efforts. In La Discorde he searched the

realm of

high politics for the reasons why proportionality ceased to exist, at least in Germany. But in 1924 this brilliant young man was not yet ready to pass on his own beloved country the severe judgment he would later pass: for some rea
son, the
people

in

charge are not

up to their task.

The

subject of

the second part is The Edge of the

Sword,

a series of
.

lectures to
starts with

the Ecole Superieure de Guerre Major de Gaulle delivered in 1 927 the premise that political leaders in
as well
part general

It

and

by

implication those in France

are

in the

process of

because they somehow naturally plays in them. Morrisey is wrong to say that The Edge "contains not a 'philosophy of (Fortunately the terms are in tary
'philosophy'

renouncing their responsibilities. They do so in don't understand them, or at least the role that force
a mili
quota
life'."

tion marks.) In
cipal point

fact,

the book is about the requirements for

what anyone might

political

life. Its

prin

force
to

are

is that, regardless of indispensable. If decent

people no

wish, both authority and longer want to do what is necessary

will pass

run successful political

enterprises, the initiative

to

others.

The

ob

jective

conditions of

success.

Indeed,
out

men

modernity do not make impossible political and military are more disposed than ever to accept discipline. Yet mere

assertion of rank or position

is

no

longer

sufficient can

to

keep

men

together. De

Gaulle lays
embody

the

paths which wise

leaders

follow to

success.

They

must

objectives able

to

command a

following. But he
Intelligence

makes clear that

knowl hu

edge of the man action.

way The

alone will not suffice. will

cannot pierce

the

veil of

to live

cannot

be defined. However, its

presence or absence

is

unmistakable.

The best description

of this undefinable element

is Henri

Berg-

son's concept of elan vital.

Morrisey 's
ited to
erence

treatment of

Bergson,

outside of paraphrases of and

de Gaulle, is lim

an obscure comparison to

Heraclitus

to an identification with the pref

for

offensive

the

philosopher whose

military books

operations.

always

But it is simply wrong to treat this way held the place of honor on de Gaulle's

Bergson had nothing to say about military operations. Rather, he taught that words can at best describe, but cannot define, living things: "before philoso
shelves.
live."

phizing, one

must

Perhaps the

most

interesting feature
drawn

of

any

organism

is

how it

manages

to

make

its living. As Charles de Gaulle

attention was

grew

older,

and

the
pri

twentieth century unfolded, his

more and more

to the

mordial problem of political survival.

Indeed it

seemed

that the nations of Eu

rope were
surviving.

losing
Hence

their grasp on the

much of

moral wherewithal written work

for
an

hanging
is
so

together and
of this

de Gaulle's

is

investigation

Bergsonian theme. What does it take for

a people

to do

what

natural, that

is,

106

Interpretation

to live? But

Morrisey

misses

what

is surely the

distinguishing feature

of

de

Gaulle's

political

thought:

its

concentration on

the simple,

primordial problem of

keeping

the polity alive for action in history. The fourth part deals with France and Her Army. This is
account of

not a

book

of mili

tary history. Rather it is an military effort that has made

disembodied any
given

how France has drawn from herself the

possible

her life.

Nothing
reflects

could

be further from the

all, it is the think

history

of campaigns.

The army

the spirit of the Patrie at

time more

finally

than any other institution

because,
how

after

result of concrete choices about what about

is worthwhile,

about what a people serious a

themselves and others around them. It also shows

about surviving.

How

are

the

forces

and

their officers recruited?

To

whom

society is do

they
How book

answer?

By

what criteria are commanders whole arrangement

judged? What

moves

it to fight?

adequate

is the

to the

circumstances of

the day? If ever a

what a colorful

was written as an

illustration
shows

of the elan vital this

is it. And

illustration it is! De Gaulle knights

mies of who represented

the

reader

the courageous
of

but

undisciplined
ar

feudal France. He tells

ancien

the scientific, professional

Louvois

and

the

revolution

led

by

officers who

tence

alone was enough

regime, and of the young conscript troops of the knew that, for the first time in their lives, compe for personal success. Throughout, he touches the actual

sources of

human

effort and sacrifice.

How

abstract, scarcely relevant commentary,

sion:

disappointing then to read Morrisey 's characterized by the following conclu

Thucydides
"polity"

and

Montesquieu

finally
that

advocate their versions of what

a regime

Aristotle

calls

or mixed regime

is,

in

which

democratic,

monarchic,
regimes

aristocratic,

and oligarchic elements combine

in

a concordia

discors. Such

eventually unbalanced, corrupted, as surely as any pure democracy or oligarchy nonetheless sustain themselves longer and (Aristotle would add) serve humanitas better than
others.

Charles de Gaulle plainly thought that in the 1930s his country equipped to draw from itself an effort proportional to the Nazi menace. In the fifth part,
quest

was

not

Morrisey
and

says that the

War Memoirs "chronicle the Gaullist

for the

France,"

grandeur of

that France's defeat "corrupted the French

leadership"

military
continue

that,

while

fighting

with

the

war until

the enemy's

defeat."

But he is

his division, he "decided to wrong. A constant theme of

of

the books and articles

de Gaulle
of

published prior

to 1940 is the corruption

France's leadership. Another

with

his

constant

themes is his own identification

France, which, he supposed, wanted to live, as opposed to France's estab lishment, which did not care whether it lived or not. Let us now look at some
length
at the

judgment
and at

of corruption

that de

Gaulle

pronounces on

France's

es

tablishment,

the antidote that he chronicles in the War Memoirs.

By
men

the

mid-

1930s

it

was clear

to de Gaulle that

Germany

was

in the hands
to

of

who, however

base,

wanted

victory

so much that

they

were able

see

Discussion
clearly how to
were

107
achieve

it. The German

armed

forces

were

being

rebuilt

to

achieve as much as

technology

would allow.

However, France's
victory but
upon

armed

forces imper

being

shaped not

by

the requirements for

by bureaucratic
to

atives

irrelevant

to it.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle took it for

a mechanized corps of 100,000

himself

draw up

a plan

men, which could blunt any German armored

metier).

thrust

(published

as

Vers I'armee de

He

also

took it upon himself to sell

the plan to the country. He made numerous connections with politicians of the

Left
and

and

Right,

and saw of

his

plan

introduced
plan

as a

bill in Parliament. The

Army

the

Ministry

Defense fought the

in typical fashion. Marshal Petain France's defensive

was

wrote

that the new

technology did

not change the value of

preparations.

General Weygand

said

that though the

new

technology

impor

already had it: "Nothing is to be done, all already Finally the Minister of War, General Morin, solemnly declared to Parliament that the government is responsible for war plans, and that it deemed this plan foolish. In tant, the

Army

exists."

order

to agree

with

Lieutenant Colonel de Gaulle

against such

illustrious military
decision.
far
to

men, the Members of Parliament would have had to have enough intellectual
self-confidence

to look

at

the problem themselves

and make

their own

That
the

would

have
of

required

trusting
men.

the product of mental speculation more than

testimony

bemedaled

It

would also

have
kind

required

putting

aside

more profitable and

immediately
by

pressing
a

political

tasks to do hard
of people

work and

"nobodies"

possibly dined with.

take the side of

against the

they regularly

They

renounced,

large

majority.

After Leon Blum became

paragon of

chief of

the Popular Front government in 1936, this

intellectual

honesty

called

Colonel de Gaulle to his

office

for

long
he
the

conversation.

De Gaulle's ideas

on mechanized warfare

had

made

sense,

and

wanted

to argue them out

and

personally.

Besides, Hitler had just

do
something.

remilitarized

Rhineland,
a while,

there was a general eagerness to that there would be a

After

listening

for in

Blum

said

lot

more

money for tanks

of

and planes

the next budget. De Gaulle replied that he

were

was aware of

the plans, but that these

the wrong kinds of tanks

and the

wrong kinds
countered

planes, and that the plans

for using them

were mindless.
province of such

Blum

that matters of equipment and

strategy were the How could he judge for the

the military leaders and the

Ministry

of

Defense.

Blum's attention, de Gaulle

nation's might years

details? Just before the telephone rang again and took reminded him that the Government was responsible
of

defense. Regardless

how

much or

how little technical

exper

tise that

Four

involve, the Government had to do its job. later, after the invasion of France was well
occurred which

under

way

and

the

newly-frocked

Brigadier de Gaulle had been taken into Paul Reynaud's cabinet,

several

incidents

further illustrate the

In the few

military's and pause

the political

days'

system's renunciation of responsibility.

before the final

Paris, General Weygand, who had taken over as Military Commander in Chief, was desperately searching for expedients that might save the situation. De
drive
on

108

Interpretation

Gaulle told him that the remaining French tanks, planes, and a few infantry divi sions should be pulled out of the line and constituted into two makeshift strike forces for
a pincer attack on the expected

German thrust toward Paris. If that

failed,

there should

be

mass movement of

forces to North Africa. General

worse ones

Wey
mat

gand rejected

the ideas not for the sake of better ones (or

was

for that

ter) but simply because he

framework in
stronger
which

incapable

he had

operated so

of stepping long. The love

outside the

intellectual
proving

of routine was

than the love of victory,

honor,

and

freedom.

De Gaulle
commander agreed that

immediately
had

suggested

who

stopped

Weygand

should

keep a military for victory made no sense. Reynaud be replaced. But, three days before the Government
looking
burning
in the courtyards, Reynaud Weygand's friends. The
pressure of

to Paul Reynaud that to

had to leave Paris, even as documents were said he could not bear up under the political
French
elites'

attachment

to one another proved stronger than their attachment to

political existence.

into

On the very day that the government left Paris, Weygand, uninvited, burst a meeting between Reynaud and de Gaulle, and demanded that the Govern De Gaulle
objected.

have anything to Weygand asked angrily. Significantly, the reply came from de Gaulle, the most junior man in the Government, rather than from the Premier: "The Government
ment seek an armistice.

"Do

propo

you

does

not make

suggestions, but

rather gives orders.

It

them."

will give

Of course

if the Government had had the intellectual

orders, it
would not not

and moral self-confidence commander

to give such

have

suffered a

military

like Weygand. But

Weygand,
de Gaulle

de Gaulle,

prevailed

because,

though he had neither ideas nor an the Establishment

and

official position

in the Government, he
of

was a member of

was not.

Thus the final days

that

the Third Republic were its most typical

in the

sense

they
of

reports

it had become. De Gaulle, like many others, that the Government had an air of unreality about it. Ministers and Mem
most

truly

revealed what

bers

Parliament

met and argued as

usual, bureaucrats and representatives of

interest

groups sought

favors,
of

about the scene. ament

Yet

none of

jockeyed for position, journalists swarmed this could rescue the French people from its predic
people

because
above

none

it

was

intended to. Each

part of

the nation's hier

archy

all, the

senior officers of

the Armed Forces

own particular ends without

any thought,

hope,

or

ing

measured

the consequences of submission

was pursuing its faith in victory, without hav to the Nazis. Most leaders felt

somewhat responsible objectives without

for

what was

happening. But how

could

they

change their

accusing their own ways? The Premier, Paul Reynaud, and the President, Albert Lebrun, could have put in command of the Armed Forces men who wanted to win, but to do so they would have had to override the.
opposition of
chiefs'

fully

many high

personages who were more attached to the present

were concerned with the outcome of

high

status than

they

the

war.

Rey

naud

resigned, and the

high-ranking

personages of the regime

quickly

surren-

Discussion

109
could continue

dered to the Germans in the hope that they before. The French
Parliament had
supplies.
overrun.

to live pretty much as

people were

thoroughly

confused and

downcast.

They

and their

given the

They

Government everything it had asked by way of military had been told their country was impregnable. Now it had been
who

Their leaders
explanation

had

made possible

the disaster

offered neither a

satisfying Vichy Government's line

for

what was

any hope for the future. The that the French people had neglected their Armed
nor

had happened

Forces
have to

and

had

committed various moral

faults. The French

the

people would now of their own

work

diligently
who

for their

new masters under

discipline

military leaders, The bonds of faith

various parts of a

had led them to defeat. Of

course none of

this rang true.

the

and

hope

which

tie a people to its leaders ,

capable of concerted

which articulate

polity

and make

it

action, had simply

van

ished. France had

ceased

to exist as an entity capable of collective action because

its leaders had

for anything which might compel allegiance. On June 18, 1940, Charles de Gaulle was a junior Minister in a cabinet that had just resigned in favor of Petain. When he flew to London in Churchill's
ceased to stand

plane,

with 100,000

francs
be
one

of secret

funds

given

to him

by

Paul Reynaud, he

hoped
than

that

he

would

he,
to

who would want

to continue the

among many French leaders, war. When he

an act of

most more prominent

spoke on the

BBC,
same.

though he knew
a

he

was

committing
names than

rebellion, he thought he was raising

flag

which

bigger

his

would rally.

Churchill thought the

Indeed de Gaulle
asked

immediately
the

contacted

the governors of the French colonies, to put himself at their orders.

them to

continue

fight,

and even offered even

In his
of

second speech

from London he

flattered General Nogues, Governor

North Africa,
was

by

All

to no avail.

citing him in the same breath as the founders of the Empire. Nogues remained faithful to Petain, while the few governors

who

rallied, notably Indochina's General

to

Catroux,

were so

were unable

bring

their

colonial establishments with

them.

uninspiring that they Only later would

was

de Gaulle himself be
alone,
and

able to so.

rally French Equatorial Africa. De Gaulle

on the

distraught to be

But de Gaulle's decision to take

pend on calculations of the
odds.

job that

others

had

shunned

did

not

de

The job, the

governance of not

France,

was

there,

undone,

demanding

to be done. The leader

title or the

reputation.

He is the

one who

necessarily the one with the actually does the job of leading the

is

from London, from the very first, were variations country. Most of his abandoned France, left her at the on a single theme: France's government had her not just of freedom but, more important, of hope.
speeches
Nazis'

mercy,

depriving

But France
can

must not

die. There is in that

good

hope

of victory.

If France struggles, it itself that it is

do

more than share

victory.

Above

all

it

can affirm to no one else

alive.

to

He, de Gaulle, is speaking for France because do so. He is speaking on behalf of honor, good
third speech, right after

is in

a position

sense, and the interest of

France. His

Petain

signed

the

Armistice, is

perhaps the

110
most

Interpretation
will

typical: "This evening, I

what

simply say, because

revulsion arises

somebod

s got to

say it
good

(emphasis mine),
Frenchmen."

shame,
said

what

in the hearts

of

France, he
are

".

knows, feels,

that she deserves much

better
au

than the servitude accepted

by

the Bordeaux

Government."

Then he told his

dience that there

in the

world

"a thousand immense material and moral

liberty."

forces

which perhaps one

day

will arise
ideal,"

to crush the enemies of

Meanwhile,
French soldiers,
which, togther

there must
wherever with

be, he

said

"an

"a

hope."

He then

promised

they

might

be,

that together
restore

they

would

build

the

army

France's allies, "will he

liberty

to the

world

and

greatness

to the

Fatherland."

Again

and again

referred

to himself as someone
of

doing a job

which

has to be

done, doing it only because in fact he was doing it. worthy though The people in Vichy, they had titles, were not doing the job implied by those titles. On June 26, answering a nationwide speech by Petain, he said,
and that

he

was

"Some

days later: "Well,

A few This evening that voice will be had the duty of wielding France's sword have On October 25, 1940: "Free French let if fall, broken, I've picked up the He had men! For the moment France is us. The honor of France is in our
voice

has to

answer you.

since

those

who

hilt."

hands."

wanted to live, it would rally to those who represented immense turmoil, only those men count who know how to France's great think, to want, to act, according to the terrible rhythm of to see the whole world sink because chiefs anxious "[are] they them military no

doubt that if France

present

life: "In the

events."

selves

have

"

sunk

(August

22).

De Gaulle knew

and argued

that,

by

agreeing
resigned

to subordinate itself to

Nazism,
and

a whole

its

right

to lead France. A

new one

Establishment had effectively would have to arise. In fact, "new

and

men"

did

arise.

Colonels Larminat
and

Leclerc

Felix Eboue took behalf

of

over

the French

Congo, Cameroon,
A
not

Chad respectively
their authority.

on

Free France. France

as well.

revolution was

occurring throughout

metropolitan cast

He had

deprived the

elites of war

it. Throughout the

continued not
.

it away by not exercising the British Establishment, eventually joined by Churchill,

more

They had

to

reproach

de Gaulle because
Perhaps if he

illustrious French

personages

had

joined the

movement.

were

less rigid,

alliances could

be

made.

De Gaulle

freely

acknowledged

that his style was rigid and could be charac

terized as extreme.

But, he
such

pointed out

to his radio audiences

as well as

to the

British Prime

Minister,
of

authority

as

he had

unwavering

public espousal of the cause of

came exclusively from his total, France. If he were seen to be com

of allies or

promising any

France's interests,
people who

either

in favor

in favor
with

of

"get

along"

ting
bubble
or

with would

had
not

compromised

themselves
of who

Vichy, his
were

burst. People did

follow him because

his friends

because

of the

favors he
own

could give.
what

represented, in his

person,

Rather, they followed him because he they wanted for their country. The moment

he

compromised

his

moral

was

propounding, he

would

authority or the integrity of the view of France that he be literally nothing. Indeed, de Gaulle was openly

Discussion
scornful of

-111

the suggestion that his movement was worth less for

being unadorned
his French
and

by big
British

names.

Recalling

the wars of the

Revolution, he
Alas,
lose

reminded

audiences that

"France
with

would always rather win

Soubise."

its

wars with

General

Hoche than lose them

Marshal de

the various French elites

with people of

had

proved

beyond

doubt that they

preferred to

their own

kind than to

win with new men and new

ideas.
moral and

Why had
intellectual
How How

the French elites renounced their tasks? There were both

reasons.

of men with no

Above all, perhaps, the regime had fostered the prominence faith except in their wallets and no law except their own interests.
the problem
which

could such men comprehend could

Nazi

Germany
side"

posed?

pect of

they lead a fight for liberty if they did not love it? What military leaders "whose sword does not burn at their
and other areas

could one ex
when

Paris,

Strasbourg,
gone at

are enslaved?
not place

Intellectually

France's leaders had

astray because
see that
was

"they

did

themselves squarely before the problem

sophistication."

hand,

victory."

the problem of

They

thought themselves too sophisticated, and

failed to

"directness is the

greatest

By his

own

standard,

de Gaulle

certainly sophisticated. The War Memoirs are an excellent

primer on

the basics

of political

life. In

August 1944, Dwight Eisenhower and Franklin Roosevelt, not to mention Pe tain, Weygand and Laval, learned firsthand what political founding in modernity
could mean when new regime was

Charles de Gaulle
baptized

walked

down the Champs-Elysees

of most adult regime

and a

literally
is

by

the

joyful tears

Frenchmen.

Yet
was so

and this

our second main point abandoned

the first

de Gaulle founded

flawed its founder

pushed

it,

while

the second, the Fifth

our

Republic,

ul

timately
ings

him

aside.

More

significant

for

purposes, de

Gaulle's

writ

are not are

they

nearly so enlightening about the essential details of political life as about the fundamentals. The Memoir es d! espoir, which cover the period
1958 and

between
and the of

1969

and

deal

with

de Gaulle's stewardship is
an

of

French society

French

State,
works.

are not of

the same substantive or

are not

de Gaulle's
We

Why they

literary quality as the rest important question, about which we

concentrated

learn little in Morrisey's book.

can

tual and
of

only suggest some his political energies

answers.

De Gaulle

both his intellec

on the restoration, maintenance and

much of

the State. It
a

is

an

exaggeration, but not

of

one, to

reduce

strengthening his patriotism

to

kind

of

worship

the State. He

literally
as a

subordinated

that one,

and understood other political good

in terms

of

every political good to it. Hence de Gaulle

dealt

with

the Algerian

war

primarily
to

threat, to the

cohesion of the

State,

even though

doing

so

involved cutting
to giving

off a part of the

body

politic,

and accept

ing

defeat he had

vowed not

accept.

Hence also,
the label

inevitably, he
a

translated

his strong
process

commitment

each citizen a stake

in France into

laborious

liberalism."

that can best

be described
to
note

by

"interest-group
more

Morrisey
thinking

is

quite

correct

that nothing

is

foreign to de Gaulle's
the Fifth Republic

liberalism.""

than

"interest-group

Yet

observers of

112-

Interpretation
admit

that

(including de Gaulle and Malraux in Les Chenes qu'on abat) invariably its day-to-day business consists of nothing else. De Gaulle concentrates on founding rather than on maintaining regimes Morrisey
has
served political

in

our

times. But the truths and errors he writes on both subjects are all worth pon

dering. bright

theory
of

well

man who wrote

carefully, is worthy

by showing that de Gaulle, being read attentively.

Reflections

on

De Gaulle:

Reply

to

Codevilla

Will Morrisey

The initial
called

criticisms concern style.

The

account of

de Gaulle's
are

founding

is

incoherent because the insights

of various

writers a

too
of

thoroughly

mixed, yielding "an amorphous flow of quotes

from
own

variety

sources, fol

lowed

by

what appears

to be

hermeneutics for its

sake."

In fact the book's

ture.

structure and argument consist of

juxtaposition,

not mix

The tenth chapter, for example, begins with a brief survey of five kinds of political foundings as described by several writers, most of them philosophers.
next section contains an account of one

The

kind

of

founding,

what

is

called

the

"ancient"

founding;
of and a

the account given presents a

a

number of

Plutarch's insights.

The bulk United

and

the chapter contains accounts of

States)
a

"late

modern"

final

section of the chapter

founding (that of the founding (that of the Soviet Union). The fifth briefly summarizes de Gaulle's first attempt to
the previous chapter. Be
there should be no

"modern"

found
cause

regime,

an attempt

thoroughly discussed in

the book's subtitle is Political

Founding

in

Modernity

question as to the relevance of each section to the chapter as a whole

(titled "Po

litical Foundings: Reflections

book. It is true that the
the
reflections"

on

reader will

Memoires de guerre") and to the rest of the not find the "overarching connections between
"hidden"
"hide"

about those con explicitly stated. But there is nothing nections. Readers accustomed to studying writers who really do things will find Reflections on De Gaulle quite simple and direct.

There

are two other stylistic criticisms.

of which said

First, "The book is

four

marred

by

gratu

itous, inconsequential (i) "Montesquieu is

remarks,"

examples are given.

writer.'"

to be a 'much greater French

The

offend

ing

passage

may be found
chez

on page

3, in the third

paragraph of the

first chapter,

"La Discorde
.

I'ennemi (1924)":
causes

discretion

the young

French

officer

to

analyze

failures

of

German lead France

ership; two

centuries

before,

a much greater

French

writer commented on

by

imagining
rate

Persian

society.

Fiction

gave

Montesquieu

flexibility,

the chance to elabo

than a

recent history, allows himself no more many parallels. De Gaulle, using history, few hints. Nonetheless, because he whets them on history, those hints have points

sharp

for

those who

pride

themselves on realism.

The military, for

example.

Montesquieu's superiority to de Gaulle is

ery.

not announced as

if it

were a

discov

The intent
and

should

be clear; the
while

author

introduces

a comparison

between de "two
soci on

Gaulle

Montesquieu

insisting

on a contrast.

If the

sentence read,

centuries

before, Montesquieu
reader could

commented on

France

by imagining
put of

Persian

the

believe that the

author

intends to
a

de Gaulle's book

the same level with

The Persian Letters. This is

kind

belief well

prevented at

114-

Interpretation

the outset of
er's

any book. It is not gratuitous to do so. At the same time, the read attention is drawn to the Frenchness de Gaulle and Montesquieu share.
'Germany'

'France'

particularly
major
quential.

as compared and contrasted to

will

be

theme of the chapter and the book. The passage

is therefore

highly

conse

(2) "Stanley Hoffman is

may be found
1956,
1959)":

the best

writer on

de

Gaulle."

The offending
writes

passage

on page 113,

in the

ninth

chapter, "Memoires de

guerre

(1954,
is

"The best de Gaulle scholar,

Stanley Hoffmann,
and

that 'ulti
guerre

mately, the

great political

leader is

educator,"

an
"

that Memoires

de

rulership.'

'essentially
It is

treatise

on

neither gratuitous nor

inconsequential to

refer

the

reader

to a good scholar

who writes on the subject at hand, and to say that he is the best scholar who writes on that subject. The paragraphs that follow contain a description and as sessment of

Hoffmann's interpretation
that the
reviewer

of

de Gaulle's book. In this connection,

one should note and

fails to distinguish between "the best de Gaulle

Gaulle."

scholar"

"the best

writer on cannot

de

Malraux, for
as a

one, is far superior to

scholar.

Hoffmann, but Malraux

be described

de Gaulle

(3)

"'Enough. It is only

aside.'"

an

The

reviewer quotes

again,

out of

context
(1932)."

a remark made on page

29, in the third chapter, "Le fil de I'epee

to the story of Socrates

De Gaulle

refers

'in

passing'

telling

Nicho-

machides

that the popular assembly's choice of a

and

leader

was unimportant

be in

cause a

dishonest

incapable

citizen would

be

no

different than
Three

a skillful and

conscientious

leader (Xenophon: Memorabilia,

De Gaulle
are of

m.iv).

paragraphs

Reflections

on

devoted to the

consideration of

de Gaulle's

evi

dently

deliberate distortion

Xenophon's
an

story.

The
a

paragraph

following

those

paragraphs

begins,

"Enough. It is only

aside, if

one."

fascinating
line
of

This lets
re
nor

the reader adjust to the continuation of the chapter's main

sumed even or

argument,

immediately. Neither de Gaulle's aside,

nor

the interpretation of

it,

the offending transitional passage, can be

seriously

regarded as gratuitous

inconsequential

by

a thoughtful reader.

(4) "Quoting de Gaulle that political leadership draws from the people what the author inserts in brackets, they have of 'faith, and hope, and latent Some reviewers have no sense of humor. De Gaulle did. 'What, no Moreover, a statesman's relationship to certain Christian virtues can be quite
devotion'
charity?'

"

consequential.

The third

criticism of style concerns or pages so as

chapters, sections,

"the annoying habit of dividing texts into to locate a particular point at the center of
that

other."

something
most

or

The

reviewer contends

"depending

on

the criteria, al

any

place

is the

"divide"

middle of

something"; to

a text this
of medieval

way in

an at

tempt to "establish [a point's]

importance"

"smacks

num

One

should

note,

however,
parts that

that the author of the commentaries has not divided

the texts

into any

de Gaulle himself did

not establish.

The
or

central pas

sage of each chapter and section was

determined, intentionally

not,

by

de

Discussion

-115

Gaulle. That "almost any place is the middle of is as true as it is triv ial because the reviewer overlooks the fact that de Gaulle himself determines the
something"

"things"

relevant numerology? care.

by dividing his own book into parts

and after
not

as

he judges best. Medieval

written

Writers before

the Middle Ages have

"habit."

books

with

To know that is
remind
writer.

to succumb to a mere

As for de Gaulle, I
much greater

should

the

reviewer

that I recognize Montesquieu as a

French
to

This does

not mean that

de Gaulle is

an artless one. can

On the degree

which

de Gaulle is artful,
notes with

the reader of

his books
wishes.

judge for himself,

comparing

my

commentaries

if he

The

reviewer next

turns to the substance of the

tions of La Discorde chez

book, criticizing the interpreta Le Fil de I'epee, La France et son armee, I'ennemi, briefly, Memoires
the
d'

Memoires de
cism reflects

guerre

and, very

espoir.

In

each case

the criti

impatient,

superficial reading.

On La Discorde book
as

chez

I'ennemi,

reviewer questions

the description of the

history (quoting much as a history as a manual of Quite so, was not lacking on either
side."

it in full) "a

of the war

[World War

I]

meant not so

leadership"

(p. 3). He

observes that
prudent

but moderate,

"leadership leadership was;

de Gaulle

clarifies

this,

and

his intention,

by

writing that
in its
modest

This study

will attain

its purpose, if it

contributes,

measure, to

bringing

our

ous models

military leaders of tomorrow, according to the examples of their victori in the recent war, to molding their esprit and their character after the rules

of classical order.

It is in them that they

will

imbibe that

sense of

equilibrium, of what
and

is possible,

of measure

[la mesure], which, alone,

render

durable

fruitful

the

works of energy.

The

rules of classical order contrast with the vulgarized

vulgarized

Nietzscheism

of

the Ger

mans and the clear

Bergsonism

of

the French. For the commentary makes

it

that

de Gaulle's

account of

the German discord has implications for French

leadership
clear

present, past, and future. The commentary

paragraph quoted above

begins to

make

this

in the

concerning Montesquieu.

On Le Fil de I'epee,
contains a

the

reviewer claims

"philosophy"

military
requirements

and not a

is wrong to think that the book "In fact the book "philosophy of
that it
life." life"

is

about

the

for

life."

political

Obviously,
of

"philosophy,"

not

the
on

same as a philosophy, or a
"philosophy"

"philosophy of political life. Further,

a

is

writ

does not preclude writing on the requirements for military de political life. Le Fil de I'epee is primarily a book on military leadership; Gaulle distinguishes military leadership from political rulership in the final chap

ing

ter. The

author of

the commentary explicitly discusses the ethical and political

account of

implications

of

de Gaulle's

military

leadership

central concerns of

Gaulle's book. any serious reader of de Gaullist the In regard to understanding

"Morrisey's treatment
of

of

rulership, the reviewer claims that

Bergson,

outside of paraphrases of

de Gaulle, is limited

116
to an
ence

Interpretation
to Heraclitus and to an identification
with

obscure comparison

the prefer

for

operations."

offensive

military
and

This is false. The book's

No

appendix con

sists of
cisms

approximately

one thousand words on

Bergson, Bertrand Russell's

aspect. one claims although

criti

of

Bergson,
says

de Gaulle's Bergsonian

that

Bergson

trusts that no

one anything directly concerning military operations, one denies that Bergson's writings were in vogue among French
and

military
War."

leaders,

among the French generally,

that

at

the time of the "Great

The

reviewer claims

because

of

this

alleged neglect of

Bergson, "Mor
political

risey

misses what

is surely the
in
history."

distinguishing

feature

of

de Gaulle's

thought:

its
for

concentration on action

the simple, primordial problem of

keeping

the pol the re

ity

alive

In this, the

reviewer's

de Gaulle
most

reflects

viewer's version of

Bergson,

who

believes that "perhaps the

ture of

any

organism

is how it

manages to make a

living."

interesting fea Leaving aside the

one must ob

question of whether or not this serve that

survival

formulation does justice to Bergson, himself

not

"primordial"

de Gaulle
with

concerns

only

with

the

problem of

but

the purpose for

surviving: grandeur.

If de Gaulle

concerned

himself mostly with the primordial, he would hardly deserve any thoroughgoing attention. De Gaulle insists that survival alone is not enough, even as he spurns
utopianism.

That

simultaneous
"leaders"

insistence
of

and

spurning distinguishes him from

the various historicist

this century.

On La France
stract, scarcely
"reflection"

et son

armee, the reviewer

is disappointed

by
the

"Morrisey's
"colorful"

ab

relevant almost

which contrasts with

text.

But

reflected,

not so much

necessarily emphasizes the outlines of the phenomenon its colors; it abstracts from concrete particulars. As for the
passage quoted

relevance of these

reflections, the

by

the

reviewer refers

to both

survival and a purpose

for

survival

both

quite relevant to an account of

French

military history. The reviewer's

moires

most extensive criticism concerns

the interpretation of Me

de

guerre.

In the fifth
quest

part

Morrisey
while

says

that the War Memoirs "chronicle the Gaullist that France's defeat "corrupted the French military

for the

France,"

grandeur of

leadership"

and
war until

that,

fighting
But

the enemy's

defeat."

his division, he "decided to [Morrisey] is wrong.

with

continue

the

The

reviewer claims that of

"the

corruption of

France's
unable

leadership"

is "a

constant

theme"

de Gaulle's

pre-1940 writings.

He is

to provide

a single exam

ple of the alleged corruption of

shows, as Reflections

on

France's military leadership prior to 1940. He De Gaulle shows, that de Gaulle regarded the French

military "Great

leadership

as

mistaken, advocating a too-aggressive strategy

during

the

and a too-passive strategy thereafter. De Gaulle implies that the French military leadership envy men of character and lack the ability to (as the reviewer describes Weygand) step "outside the intellectual framework in which

War"

Discussion

-111

[they] had
made

long."

operated so excellent

But de Gaulle

writes

that Weygand would have

circumstances pushed

an

second-in-command,
place

that political

Weygand beyond his true

Gaulle

shows

that the French military

political

hardly a matter of corruption. In sum, leadership were mediocre, not corrupt.

regards them

de

As for the

leadership, de Gaulle

in

much

the same way.

influences"

They

are more weak

than corrupt. But he does allude to "certain

a probable allusion to

on

Prime Minister Paul Reynaud,

sympathizer.

Reynaud 's mistress,

Nazi

the French political leadership. Reflections

One may therefore say that de Gaulle hints at some corruption of on De Gaulle makes this clear, too.

To
my's

write

that de Gaulle "decided [at

regardless of

Laon]

to continue the war until the ene

refer

defeat,

France's

defeat,"

is simply to

to

de Gaulle's

own

account:

I felt

myself

beginning infinitely
that,
much space until

borne up by a fury without limits. Ah! It's too stupid! The war is badly. It is therefore [!] necessary that it must go on. There is, for
world.

in the

If I live, I

shall

fight,

wherever

must, as

long

as

must,

the

enemy is defeated
1954,
p.

and the national stain washed clean.

All

that I

have

managed
L'

to

do

since then was resolved on that

day. (Memoires de guerre, Vol. I,

Appel, Paris: Plon,

43.)

To

remark this

is,

of

course, not to

imply,

as the reviewer

imagines that Reflec

France"

tions on
ever

De Gaulle

implies,

that de Gaulle's "identification with

argument sustains

was

"in

question."

The book's

by

almost

with

every France all along.

commentator on

clearly de Gaulle, that de Gaulle "identified

d'

the observation made

himself"

On de Gaulle's final book, Memoires

not of

espoir, the reviewer claims that

as

it is

the same

substantive or

literary

quality

the

rest of

de Gaulle's books.

Why
book.

[it

is]

not

is

an

important question,

about which we

leam little in Morrisey's

This is

not surprising,

inasmuch

as

Morrisey

finds Memoires

d'

espoir equal

to

much else de Gaulle wrote, allowing for its incompleteness. The style "excites us less than that of Memoires de Morrisey writes, but he does not suppose
excitement a

necessary

effect of quality.

The

reviewer
d'

suggests

an explanation

for the allegedly inferior quality

of"

of

Memoires

espoir.1

He

claims

that

it is "not

much

an exaggeration

to re

duce de Gaulle's

patriotism

to a kind to that one,

of

worship

of

the State. He

literally

subordinated

every

political good

and understood other political good

in terms

of

it.

1.

For

fuller discussion,

see

Angelo M. Codevilla: "De

Gaulle,"

in Statesmanship: Essays in

Carolina Academic Press, 1981), Honor of Sir Winston S. Churchill, Harry V. Jaffa, ed. (Durham: book on de Gaulle, The Lim Codevilla's written was Codevilla pp. 2 1 3-233 At the time this reply to not appeared. had Charles de Gaulle, The Grandeur: its of Statesmanship of
.

118

Interpretation
reviewer overlooks or minimizes grandeur.

Once again, the

'statist'

Even in his
that "All our

most

speech, the 1946 Bayeux

Manifesto, de Gaulle insists

His

tory is the alternation between the immense sufferings of a dispersed people and the fecund grandeurs of a free nation grouped under the guidance of a strong
state."

The

state's purpose which

is French grandeur; the French

state

is

not

the purpose

of

grandeur,

is, in exclusively human terms,

in
France"

an end not a means.

The

reviewer claims

that this alleged state-worship

led to de Gaulle's "com "a laborious

"

mitment process

to giving

each citizen a stake as

by

the means of

that can best be described

'interest group
nothing is

liberalism.'

Morrisey ing day

than

is

quite correct to note that

liberalism."

more

foreign to de Gaulle's think

"interest-group
Malraux in Les Chines
consisted of

Yet

observers of
)2

the Fifth Republic

(including

de

Gaulle

and

qu'on abat

invariably

admit

that

its day-to

business

nothing

else.

Here the
much of

reviewer confuses

two different things: de

Gaulle's

complaints that

his time

'standard-of-living'

was spent on what

merely economic,
"participation"

issues

and

de Gaulle's hope for

he

called

or, earlier, "the

association of and

technology."

labor,

capital,

and

In economics,

interest-group

liberalism

"participation"

resemble one another sultations nomic

among the major economic groups

in that both involve profit-sharing and con involved in a given enterprise. Eco

"participation,"

the extent

contrary to the reviewer's claim, was not implemented to de Gaulle intended. De Gaulle proposed it as a way to overcome the

defects
a

of interest- group

liberalism, differing from

In both
of

the latter in its maintenance politics, de Gaulle

of

strong anything along the lines

executive authority.

economics and

rejected parlia

the endless negotiation and immobilisme of the

mentary regime. Reflections on De Gaulle failure to found the

this
regime

contains a number of pages on wanted.

de Gaulle's
entirely

partial

he

The final

chapter almost

concerns

theme.

As

acknowledged

at

the

beginning, Montesquieu has important

last
substantive word. a new

things to teach. But Plato's

Socrates
sent

gets the

legal code to a country house bring from the city, a book reviewer can bear words describing new discoveries (if not revelations). Whatever disputes may arise, I can only be grate
Like
a messenger
removed

from God

to

hold far

ful to Angelo Codevilla for his closing benediction. One might wonder Gaulle would think of the characterization, "a bright man who wrote

what

de

caref

One

prefers

Malraux's: "his intelligence followed the level

called

of

his

reflection

(what

Chateaubriand

the

intelligence

of greatness of soul).

2.

It is important to

observe

that Malraux's Les Chenes

et

qu'on abat

was revised and ex

second volume of

panded,

forming
also

part of

La Corde

les

souris

(Paris:

Gallimard,

1976), the

his

'anti-memoir,'

Le Miroir des Limbes. The Will Morrisey: Reflections Press

of

revised version contains an

on

important

new section on

de

Gaulle. See
ton, D.C.:

Malraux: Cultural

Founding

in Modernity,

Washing

University

America,

1984.

Book Review
Nino Langiulli
St. Francis College, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Philosophy
Press,

and

the Mirror
cloth,

of

1979. 401 pp.:

By Richard $33; paper, $8.95.)

Nature.

Rorty. (Princeton

University

When

you offer

him

your answer

in

such

terms, if you
at your

speak of

in

mirrors or

in sculpture, he
to

will

laugh

words,

as

something to be found implying that he can see.

eyesight, and
will

He

will profess to

know nothing
what can

about mirrors or water or even

confine

his

question

be

gathered

from discourse.

Plato, Sophist,
when

240a

Every

realm of nature

is

marvellous: and as at

Heraclitus,
the to

the strangers who

and

came to visit him found him warming himself tated to go in, is reported to have bidden them

furnace in the kitchen be

hesi in that

not

afraid to enter, as even

kitchen, divinities

were present

Aristotle, On

[quoted

by

the Parts of Animals, A5, 645ai7 Martin Heidegger in Letter on Humanism]

I
The ophy
that
principal argument of

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is that

must

philos

as

it has developed in the West

human
to

be

either

diminished

or abandoned so
and a

genuine

conversation might continue.

Philosophy's,
not

fortiori

the philosopher's,
wedded

claim

be

the

cultural

overseer,

the argument goes,

is

to two interrelated

"delusions"

(my

word,
and

the author's), namely, the

notion of

the mind as "the mirror of that

the notion of philosophy as epis

is, temology, is the inquiry into first

manner

the discipline which provides foundations and

"delusion"

justifications

or

principles.

The initial
notion of

is formulated in

a variant

in the

course of

the book as the

second

the essence of man as the

expressed as

knower

of essences.

The

is likewise alternately

the notion of

philosophy as essentially ries, it would seem, a step further, indeed toward the final step, the
"elimination"

concerned with

truth and certainty. The argument car

philosophic

enterprise
tion."

known variously

as the

of metaphysics or

its "destruc

The

recent efforts of such philosophers as

Carnap, Heidegger, Husserl,

of

and

Wittgenstein

come

readily to

mind.

But

so

do those

the neo-scholastics

Gilson and among whom we might mention Cartesian and post-Cartesian accounts of the concept, the argument is consonant. The target of Professor Rorty's book, however, is not just a part of philosophy,
that

Maritain

with whose criticisms of

is,

metaphysics,

but

whatever residue

that was supposed to remain when

metaphysics was eliminated or

destroyed. Nor is it epistemology but philosophy

120

Interpretation

understood as

self,

epistemology (or logic) which is the target, that is, philosophy it it has developed in the West, and as Rorty understands it. The argument resembles Michael Oakeshott's withering criticism in his essay
as of a rootless

Rationalism in Politics derstand

reaches and confront

theoretical

reason as

the

proper mode

to

un

the practical domain of politics. The

"spring"

resemblance even of

to Oakeshott's point about the

that feeds the "placid lake

Rationalism."

This spring is a doctrine about human knowledge. That some such fountain lies heart of Rationalism will not surprise even those who only know its surface; the riority
of

at

the

supe

the unencumbered

intellect

lay

precisely in the fact that it society

could reach

more,

and more

certain, knowledge about

man and

than was otherwise possible;

the superiority of the

alleged

ideology

over

the tradition

lay

in its

greater precision and

its

demonstrability. Nevertheless, it is not, properly speaking, a philosophical of knowledge, and it can be explained with agreeable informality (Rationalism theory in Politics, London, Methuen, 1981 reprint, p. 7).

Oakeshott leaves both theory

application of
modern

and

philosophy

alone.

His

concern

is

with

the mis

theory

to politics and

with a corrupted

form

which

he

maintains

philosophy to be. Rorty, on the other hand, if I have understood him cor rectly, is more profoundly radical. His criticism is of theory itself and it extends

to both Ancient and Medieval philosophy, in

fact,

as

I have already said, to

phi

losophy
thereby
he

itself. He

urges

the reader to view and accept theoretical

or rather of

reasoning

as a and

species of practical

reasoning (phronesis),

technology (techne),

appears to accept a major supposition of

the very

modern philosophers

criticizes

in

other respects. no mawkish genuflection toward the

major and

The book,
ness and
native.

however, is
of

East. The tough

alter

acuity

the arguments, both

a radical and

minor, preclude that

Rather, it is
philosophia

daring
in the

attempt at philosophic end a

liberation from

philosophy's

enchantments

and
est

Catonic

call

for its destruc

a phrase
preten

tion

delenda

so that what

the author,

borrowing

from Oakeshott, sion, might live.

It is
a

speaks of as

"the

mankind,

conversation of

free from

book that deserves

answered.

not

and, if possible,
controversial own

For

only to be read but to be reread, grappled with, not only is its main argument challenging and
subarguments are all worthy in their for the way they cling to the principal assent from the reader. All this is achieved

in

a profound

manner, but its

way

of

attention,

even of admiration

theme while relentlessly

without a

importuning

For, although the author candidly admits as part his training his use of the vocabulary of contemporary analytic philosophers, he draws inspiration for his arguments from a wide range of philosophical writ
of parochialism. of

hint

ers.

He

aims

his

criticisms, moreover, at an

equally

wide range of

writers,

meth

ods,

and

postures,

including

especially

the analytic tradition

from

which

he

stems.

Book Review
The

121

body

of

the book is divided into three parts which are entitled "Our
"Mirroring,"

Glassy

Essence,"

"Philosophy."

and

Within this tripartite structure,

there are eight chapters each with either a clever or

Mind,"

informative heading: "The In "The Idea

of a

vention

of

the

"Persons Without

Minds,"

'Theory

of

Knowledge,'"

Psychology,"

ogy to last chapter

whereas

Hermeneutics,"

the

"Privileged "Epistemology and Empirical "From Epistemol "Epistemology and Philosophy of and "Philosophy Without The introduction and are fairly accessible in style and content to the educated reader other chapters require familiarity and patience with intricate and
Language,"
Mirrors."

Representations,"

sometimes as of

prickly

philosophic argument.

There is

a minimum of

jargon

as well

the stylistic mannerisms

of analytical philosophers.

The two

quotations

which serve as epigrams

for the book

are taken

from Wittgenstein's Vermischte begins reading

and appro

Bemerkungen

and are

priately If the

prophetic when one aim of

appropriately finishes.

cryptic when one

this book is as I have asserted, then it

would seem

that the readers

as

towards whom it
once

is directed, in

view of

its logic

and

its rhetoric, are,

Husserl

described them, those who learn "to know the despair of one If Rorty's argument is misfortune to be in love with
said

who what

has the
I have have

philosophy.

it is

and

if it is sound,

then their despair and their misfortune might

wisdom rather

been

averted

Actually
The

the aim of the book

had they been in love with is not so

author states

than with

philosophy.

much a matter of

have suggested, for the

aim of the

it simply
the

and

as I may introduction. in the clearly

interpretation

book is to

undermine

reader's confidence

in "the

mind"

as some
as some

"knowledge' "philosophical"

thing thing

about which one should about which there ought

have
to

a
"theory"

view,
and which

in
"foundations"

be

has

and

in

"philosophy"

as

it has been

conceived since

Kant (p.

7).

Nor is it

a matter of

should read

"since

Plato,"

interpretation to say that the last two words of the quotation since the object of Rorty's criticism is not just modern

philosophy but the

entire tradition of

Western philosophy

after

the

Sophists,
not

as

an unambiguous statement

found

on page

157

makes clear.

He does

suggest,

however,
has

that the

history

of

philosophy

should not

be

studied.

archaeological

use, inasmuch as

it illustrates,

what

On the contrary it he claims to be the histor he

icist

and relativist nature of

reader

philosophy itself.
cannot nature.

If the

takes the explicit aim of the book seriously,

and the

help

con

cluding that Philosophy

wise takes

Mirror of Nature is

political

in

If he like

seriously

what

the author regards as the function of language which

about as the
such

throughout the
"copes"

book is talked

instrument

by

and with which man an

with

the world, then

a conclusion recurs

like

insistent

refrain.

Take the
It is

following

passage as an example:

so much a part of

"thinking
truth that

to be impressed

with

the special char

acter of mathematical

it is hard to

shake off

the

grip

of

the Platonic Principle.

argument rather

If, however

we think of

"rational

as a matter of

victory in

122

Interpretation known,
we shall

than of relation to an object

look toward

our
we

interlocutors
think
of our

rather

than

to

our

faculties for the

explanation of

the phenomenon. If

certainty

about

the Pythagorean Theorem as our confidence, based

on experience with argu

ments on such we

matters, that nobody

we shall not seek

will

find it

an objection to the premises

from

which

infer it, then

to

explain

by

the

relation of reason

to triangularity.

Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between interaction with nonhuman reality (pp. 156-157).

persons, rather than a matter of

This passage, along

asmuch as

with

others, discloses the

political character of

the
we

book, in
have here
that to

the

subservience of

logic to

rhetoric

is transparent. What

is

an echo of the

Machiavellian teaching that discourse itself is

over minds.

political and

the greatest dominion is rule

On

page 368 we

read,

with respect

Dewey, Heidegger, of the book,

"heroes"

and

Wittgenstein,

the three figures

whom

the author calls the

that
at

They

hammer away
than

the

holistic

point

that words take their meanings

from

other

words rather

by

virtue of

their

representative

character,

and the

cabularies acquire their privileges

from the

men who use

them

rather

corollary that vo than from their

transparency
It
would seem

to the

real.

that, for Rorty, the

and or
"dealing"

various sorts of

ence, philosophy, poetry

religion, not to
with

history, sci speak of ordinary discourse, are the

such as

discourse,

human
voice

"coping"

ways of

in "the

mankind"

conversation of
"doorkeeper"

and

reality (p. 375). Philosophy is but one "symponot, as Oakeshott put it, the

siarch,"

"arbiter"

or

(p.

391 ).
systematic philosophy will be revi Or it may be that the image of the the way of the medieval image of the

It may be that mirror-imagery

talized once again
philosopher which priest.

"mainstream,"

and

by

some

Kant

offered

revolutionary is about to

genius.

go

If that happens,

even as

the philosophers themselves will no

"foundations"

"justifications"

the

notion of

philosophy

providing
juris
about

or

longer take seriously for the rest of

of other

culture, or as adjudicating
plines

quaestiones

the

proper

domains

disci

(p.

394).

Although
about
which

Rorty

does

not

develop

the point,

he does

give the reader a

hint

the intimate

connection

is

at once aristocratic

between philosophy and classical antique virtue, and republican. This connection must be, for Rorty,
the correlative
of of a

the

political side of philosophy's arrogance

hierarchial

or

der in ontology

and

epistemology

which

is the butt

Rorty's

arguments

in the

middle chapters of

the book. Such arrogance would

stance. as

have to be insupportable
readers will

from ited

democratic-egalitarian-pragmatic

Some

someone so

deeply
own

impressed liberal

by

pragmatism,

Rorty is,

can give

worry that only a lim

of

commitment to

education

the pursuit of that

"useless"

kind

thing

done for its

nature

sake which

and which

is unmistakably hierarchical and aristocratic in is in mortal danger. His exhortation, therefore, in the con book
must

cluding

sentence of the

be

regarded as

half-hearted.

Book Review

123
concern should upon a

The only point on which I would insist is that the philosopher's moral be with continuing the conversation of the West, rather than with
place 394)-

insisting

for the traditional

problems of modern

philosophy

within

that conversation (p.

Once

again

must repeat

that Rorty's criticism is not only aimed at modern phi

losophy but
remains

to

philosophy itself. The philosopher might wonder, moreover, what be talked about if he is warned against insisting upon a place for the
at
will

traditional problems of philosophy, and who it

mankind."

be to defend the "conversa

tion of

11(A)
In
order to

better

understand the principal argument of this unusual

book, it is
subargu-

necessary to

examine

its

varied sources of

inspiration
review will

and

the many

ments which support examination or nique

it. The

body

of

this

be devoted to

such an

"deconstruction"

as one current

fashion in

philosophical tech

has it.

In the introduction
pline as one which as soon as one with

reflects"

Rorty says that "philosophers usually think of their disci discusses perennial, eternal problems problems which arise (p. 3). He regards this to be an illusion which is intimate
namely,

two other

illusions,

(1)
"the

that there is such a

mirror of

thing
or

called

"the

mind"

which and

is

nature"

sometimes regarded as

(2)

that knowledge is
the

representation"

"accuracy

of

(p.

13).

"our glassy The conjurors

essence"

of

these illusions

"villains"

of the

book

are philosophers as moments.

such, in their the

oretical moments rather than

in their for

"wise"

They

are the
a

Merlins (or
res

Ziegfields)
cogitans, a

who are responsible

such enchantments as

hypostasized

dualistic innerness
attempt

of mind and outerness of

body,

the coronation of
science,"

epistemology, the

to

set

philosophy
could

on

"the

secure path of

and name

other such twaddle which

follies."

Rorty

hardly

mind

my calling in his
and

"the

philosophy Rorty's heroes,

the later
stages of

on

the other

hand,

are

Dewey, Heidegger
All three, he
though
as

Wittgenstein in

their

philosophical careers.

says, regretted their

earlier efforts as self-deceptive

inasmuch

they
even

tried to cling to the conception

of

philosophy

as the

search

for foundations
of mind
"therapeutic"

they had discarded

5).

sev

enteenth work rather

century

conceptions

and

of

knowledge (p.
than

Their later
"edifying"

"constructive,"

which

Rorty

calls

rather

"systematic"

than
and not

is intended to be

philosophy itself

"common
that traditional
9).

in

all

to supply three, he says, is historicist in

new philosophical

questioning of the very motives for doctrines (pp. 5-6). A

nature an admonition

philosophy's vision of

breaking
what

free from

history

is

delusion (p.

Furthermore, he is inspired (a) by

he takes to be Dewey's

conception of

124

Interpretation
"justification"

knowledge

wherein

is "a
and

social phenomenon
'reality'"

intead

of a transac

tion between the

as

subject'

'knowing
conception of

(p. 9),

(b) by
tool"

what

he
of

regards

Wittgenstein's

language

wherein

it is "a

instead

"a

mir

ror"

as well as a prevention

tions of the possibility of

"domination"

for the temptation to look for "the necessary condi linguistic (p. 9), and (c) by what he un
representation"

derstands to be Heidegger's interpretation

of

of the

history

of or

philosophy

as the

Western thinking

by

"ocular

"mirror-imagery"

(p.

12).

Bolstered

by

their

inspiration, Rorty

performs, in mounting the

of scholarship.

siege of

cas-

tellum philosophicum, an

impressive feat

He

employs with

dex

not only the standard figures of Ancient, Medieval, phy but he moves with ease and authority among the

terity

and

Modern
of

philoso

ranks and

positivists,

pragmatists,

analysts,

phenomenologists,

existentialists

hermeneuticists,
as

treating
varied

with respect

the work of writers, aside

from those already mentioned,

in character as that of Carnap, Sartre, Quine, Gadamer, Sellars, Apel, Davidson, Husserl, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Derrida and Foucault. Some readers will
find the
ecumenical aspect of

his

effort an

interesting

feature

of

the book.

Ecumenism

is, however, primarily

is
supported

a vehicle

for his

principal argument which con

in the first

chapter

by

a challenge

to contemporary philosophy's
the challenge occurs is

cept and problem of mind.

"deconstruction"

The

manner

in

which

by

way
and

"reliving"

of a

or a so as to expose

of

the levels or epochs of the

at each

history
man's

of phi

losophy

the "language

games"

level

or epoch

(p. 34)

to illustrate how the

essence"

"mind"

problem of

the mind and the

itself

"glassy

as

Shakespeare

puts

it in Measure for Measure

games"

"invented."

were

Rorty
from
cal

reconstructs

the "language

from

each

level to

show

how they differ

of traditional

one another and

which are

how they

all contribute

to the effort of

fabricating theoreti

fictions

misleading

expostulations

"on the irrelevance

culture"

philosophy to the rest of

when

(p.

37).

He

gives examples of such problems

he

says:

The

problem of consciousness centers around problem of reason centers around all our

the

brain,

The

the topics of

raw feels, and bodily motions. knowledge, language, and

intelligence
attributions of

"higher

powers."

The

problem of personhood centers around

freedom

and of moral

responsibility (p.

35).

He

gives examples of such concepts when as

he talks

about

"mind

as the

universals"

Plato's contribution,
intellect,"

or

Aristotle's "separable
man"

intellect,"

grasp of Thomas

Aquinas'

"active

Bacon's "mind both the

Descartes'

of

and

res cogitans

(pp. 38-45).

lems
46).

as

Rorty belonging to

regards

concepts

(or

models of

mind)

and

the prob

the

language

game of

their time and therefore optional (p.

to

The way in which the changes of concept and problems take place according Rorty is through revolutionary deconstruction. Yet it is also by virtue of this
that the fictional character of theoretical

method

philosophy is

uncovered.

The

Book Review
case of

125

Descartes is instructive. For

Descartes.

Rorty

is

engaged

in the

same

kind

of effort

he

attributes to

Descartes himself was forever trying to hold

tinctions
with one

on

to standard Platonic and scholastic dis

with

hand

while

deconstructing

them

the other (p. 59).

"unconscious,"

Whereas, however, Descartes's "sleight

does
not seem

hand"

of

was

Rorty's

to be so.

Such

unconscious sleight-of-hand when practiced

by

men of

Descartes's boldness
"Kuhnian"

of

imagination, is an occasion for gratitude rather than censure. No great philosopher has avoided it, and no intellectual revolution could succeed without it. In ter
minology
no revolution can succeed which employs a
none can succeed

vocabulary

commensurable with

the old, and thus

by

employing

arguments which make unequivocal

use of terms shared with the traditional wisdom.

So bad

arguments

for brilliant

hunches
porates

necessarily precede the normalization of a new vocabulary which incor the hunch. Given that new vocabulary, better arguments become possible, al
must

though these will always

note

be found question-begging

by

the revolution's victims (foot

28,

p. 58).

If this is so, the

'problem'

reader will not

know

what

to

make of some of

Rorty's

assertions.

For example, is it fictional or optional to say that "the problem of personhood is but a description of the human condition [such] that it is not a not a
matter

for

'solution'

philosophical

."?

(p.

37).

Is it just

a moment

in the

revo

lution to
(p. 152),
tion of

claim that or

"knowledge
of

[is]

a relation

between

prop

persons and can

knowledge'

"An "account
behavior"

the nature of
or still

be,

at

most, a

descrip
as

human

(p. 182),

"the

application of such

honorifics

'objective'

'cognitive'

and
agreement

is

never more than an expression

of, or the hope

"normal"

for,

or "ab Are they statements of among a distinction that he makes in the seventh chapter? Are they discourse neither, that is, belonging to no special period of history? He seems to state them

inquirers"

(p.

335)?

normal"

as

if they were merely and simply true. While the argument in the first chapter attempts to persuade mythological invention of the mind in philosophical literature,
employs a myth of

the reader of the the argument

in

the second chapter

about

its

own.

It is

kind

of science-fiction

beings

who

lived

on a planet on

the far side of the galaxy

story from Earth.

These beings

are much

like Earthlings (Terrans) in language, life, technology

neurology
and

and philosophy, with the exception that

biochemistry

were

the

first disciplines
Terran first

wherein

technological advances occurred.

Their conversation,
feels,"

consequently, was concerned

of or

in

great part with

the state of their nerves. Instead pains, "raw

and minds,

third

person

utterances about

their talk was

about stimulated

C-fibers

and neurons.

In the

middle of

the twenty-first century, an expedition

from Earth carrying

representatives

from every learned discipline,

camps

including

philosophy, visited the

planet.

The

cultural exchanges went on well except

that the Earth philosophers

who were

divided into two

the toughminded who sought truth and the

126

Interpretation
were puzzled

tenderminded who sought meaning

cept of mind. and

that these beings had no con

Recalling
who

forgotten

school of philosophers

centering in Australia

New Zealand,

in the

previous

alism, the Terran philosophers called

century has revolted against Cartesian du the planet Antipodea and the inhabitants
discussion

Antipodeans. What follows this charming introduction is

which periti of

minutely

argued

the genre the

will recognize as a marvellous synopsis of

the

literature

on

"the

mind"

problem of

by

analytic philosophers since

the publication of

Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949). The temptation to enter into that dis cussion is strong. For it is hard to resist asking such questions as those raised by Kenneth Gallagher in his paper "Rorty's Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustra
tion"

with regard
ence"

to what
and

Rorty

could mean

by

the Antipodeans

having

"sci

of
mean

neurology
as we
"science."

biochemistry. Gallagher insists that

such a science must as

what we

Terrans

by the Antipodeans having

If,
of not

be

settled

by

what we mean
us

by
the

"science"

have it, inasmuch

asks

there

is nothing

else

for

to

mean

by

word

fibers instead
so?

thoughts

Gallagher, the Antipodeans are to speak of nerves or or feelings, must they not be understood by us as doing
as we

Must they fibers? The

which

be acting

would, if we

were

to speak about nerves or

reader will

labor arduously both to follow the turns

of the

discussion
to

terminates in a forthright defense

not altogether

of materialism and physicalism and

resist, if
realize

successfully, the temptation to be drawn into it. He

must

that

by

the end of the

mine) discussion
an effort

is,

on

the

book, this one hand, a parody

"careful"

and of the

"closely

argued"

(quotes

literature,

and on

the other,

to show that the philosophical "problem of

cluster of metaphors

mind"

makes no sense with

mirror of

out

the

deluding

(glassy

essence,
cf. p.

nature, etcetera)

invented in the

seventeenth

century (p. 123;

or as

This invention

of the mind was also the occasion of

373 for the transformation

and p. 379).

of phi

losophy
turn."

into theory
contention

knowledge,
philosophy

Rorty

puts

it, for "the

Hobbes

epistemological

At the

same time

and science
of

begin divorce
and

proceedings.

It is

Rorty's

that the rebellion

Descartes

against medieval
self-

scholasticism contained

led to the

reestablishment of
discipline"

'scholastic'

philosophy as "an autonomous, (p. 136). This occurs by means of Locke's

of mind

making Descartes's
man"

new

concept rather

into the

content

of a

"science
means

of
of

moral

philosophy

than natural philosophy,

and

by

Kant's placing philosophy "on the secure path of a The "epistemological wed philosophy to
turn"

(p. 137).
"problems"

other

(quotes

mine)

which

became
or

paradigms

for

modern

of either of

Ancient

Medieval
the
world

philosophy.
of

philosophy but were uncharacteristic There was, for example, the "problem

world"

the external
"outer"

"problem"

how the
was

"inner"

mind comes

into

con

tact with the

with

(p.

139).

There

Locke's

confusion of explanation

justification (pp. 1396.), Kant's

and

confusion of predication with synthesis

version"

(pp. 1488".),

Kant's influence in creating the "standard

of

the his-

Book Review

127
as

tory
(p.

of modern

philosophy

the struggle

between Rationalism
turn"

and

Empiricism

148).

in attending to the "epistemological on Rorty's part is to illus trate how (a) philosophy became epistemology, that is, how philosophy became expressed at the time, (b) epistemology came to be thought of as the foundational
The
point science where

philosophy holds

court on

the other

disciplines, (c) philosophy be

department
"privileged
turn."

"special"

came professionalized and specialized over a

of

knowl

edge, (d) philosophy became impressed and (e) the "epistemological

tions,"

with

the issue

of

representa

turn"

led to the "linguistic

Here

again

the reader will be perplexed about how

Rorty

himself

understands

such assertions as

"Certainty

is

a matter of conversation

betweens

person

(p.

157);

or

"Rational

certainty"

is to be

thought of as
156).

"victory in

argument rather

known"

than of relation to an object

(p.

11(B)
Although
space
more

honor is

paid

to

Dewey, Heidegger,

and

Wittgenstein,

more

is devoted to Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Kuhn, who do the commando raids around philosophy's castle but are not in on the final assault be
cause of some reservation or other on their part and

because

analytical philoso as episte

phy in

general

turned out to be a "successor

subject"

to philosophy

mology.

Analytical philosophy is principally by thinking ophy

of

one more variant of

Kantian philosophy,
rather

a variant marked

of representation as

linguistic

than mental, and of philos psychology, as the

critique,"

language

rather

than "transcendental
knowledge"

or
.

disci

pline which exhibits still committed

the "foundations

of

to the

construction of a

permanent,

neutral

For Analytic philosophy is framework for inquiry and

thus

for

all of culture

(p. 8).
assault

Nevertheless Rorty's final

raids.

is profoundly indebted to
chapter of

those commando

book"

He

calls

his fourth
his

chapter

the "central

the

(p.

10).

In it

he

acknowledges

reliance on

Wilfrid

Sellars'

"giveness"

attack on

the no

tion that there

is

some

basic datum

or privileged representation of which men are

directly
Sellars
the

aware

in

some prelinguistic and nondiscursive way. myth of

This fiction,

which

calls

"the

the

blocks recognition, according to Rorty,

society"

of

fact that "assertions

the

are

justified

by
(p.
us

or

by

social practice

"rather than

by

inner

representations

they

express

174)-

Knowledge, truth, goodness,

and

and

justice

are a matter of what

notions of

"society lets

say"

do (p.
and

174).

It is

not

that

some transfixed

knowledge,

truth, goodness,

justice Quine

are the

foun

behaviorism,"

dations
says

of what

society

says or

does. "Epistemological
and

a posture, as well as

Rorty,
a

common
"species"

to

Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars

"holistic"

to

himself is

of the

endeavor.

As

such

it "is

not a matter of

128

Interpretation
polemic, but
a

antifoundationalist
prise"

distrust

of the whole epistemological enter

which

(p.

181).

"Epistemological
or even

behaviorism,"

has nothing to do

with

Watson, Skinner,
is the
claim

Ryle,
will

that philosophy

have

no more to offer than common sense

(supple

mented

by biology, history,
not clear that
of what

etc.)

about

knowledge

and truth

(p.

176).

Although it is
of all

things,

Rorty agrees with Sellars that "science is the measure (p. 199), he is that it is; and of what is not that it is
not"

does

concur with

Sellars that

science

is

rational

not
put

because it has any

claim

^foundation,

but because it is

self-correcting

enterprise which can

in jeopardy,
the
reader

though not all at once (p. 180).

At this

point

is

urged

to face down the Medusan stare of relativism

emanating from the

meet

gate of philosophy's castle.

He is

encouraged and

by Rorty

to

the

challenge

in

the

following
truth can

way.

In

Sellars'

Quine's

account of

epistemology
to say that knowledge
our own

day

is

not

"cut

off

from the

world,"

only be judged by the standards of the inquirers of to say that human knowledge is less noble or important, or more than we thought. It is merely to say that nothing counts as
and reference and our

justification

unless

by

to

what we

get outside our

beliefs

languages

so as to

already accept, and that there is no way to find some test other than coherence

(p.

178).

The

argument continues

by

reminding the

reader

that saying that "the True and

the Right

practice,"

are matters of social

"epistemological"

leads,

all

by itself,

to relativism

is

an

booby-trap thinking in terms of reduc turned on or foundations. But the is for tions itself, relativism, says Rorty, trap either of the epistemological or moral kind, does not, as we might suspect,
other example of the of emerge

from disagreements

within a

society, or between societies,

or even

from

the

differing
and

viewpoints of our

tradition had placed

"good,"

masters, but from the fact that the philosophical its transcendental hands on the ordinary words and
"true,"

has

constructed a moat around

the castle, that

is, between

the eternal

and of

the spatio-temporal (pp. 306-307). It

of

is from the invention

and construction

the platonic notion

transcendental or absolute turrets that make "current thought of the

practice"

(the best

moral and scientific

day)

"seem

relativ

(p.

374).

No

one need

be

reminded

that
were

We shall, in short, be

where

the Sophists

before Plato brought his

157).

principle

to

bear

and

invented "philososphical
contribution

thinking"

(p.

Willard Quine's

to Rorty's argument is his attack on necessary

of

truth (p. 10), on the "two dogmas

meaningful utterance to

empiricism

(that is, (1) the

experience,
and

reduction of

immediate

sense

(2)

the separation

be

tween truths
and

which are analytic or grounded

in language

independently

of things
idea,"

truths

"'idea'

which are synthetic or grounded on

things),

and on the

Book Review

129
is

the view that "language

covered

the expression of

'inner'

something
means"

which must

be dis

before

we can

tell what an utterance the final

(p. 193).
must

Quine, according

to

Rorty, has

scruples about not prepared

demolitions that
He

be

carried out. Recal-

citrantly, he is
Empiricism"

to detonate what the argument of "Two Dogmas of

201).
wants to preserve

commits

him to (p.

the belief which,

language"

along
view

with

Sellars, he inherited
wants

that "the world can be

Carnap 'completely
of

through

described'

from the early Wittgenstein, the in an extentional

over Geistes-

(p.

204).

He

to leave standing, accordingly, the privileged status

and

of "truth-

functional"

discourse

the superiority
wish

Naturwissenschaften

wissenschaften.

Nor, finally, does he

which

to abandon the notion that philosophy

is the "discipline

guards

against

'irresponsible

reificati

(p.

208).

Rorty

wonders about

Quine's

reservations.

Why
of

do

the

enable us to cope with

Naturwissenschaften limn reality while the Geisteswissenschaften merely it? What is it that sets them apart, given that we no longer think

any

sort of statement

having

a privileged epistemological status,

race

but

of all state
adjust

ments as ment

working together for the good of the made famous by "Two Dogmas of

in that

process of

holistic

Empiricism?"

Why
both the

should not the unit of

Natur- and

empirical

inquiry
be

be the

whole of culture

(including

the

Geistes

wissenschaften)

rather

than

just the
nor

whole of physical science?

(p.

201).

There
or

should

no

faltering

turning back

no

hankering

for the

old myths

the

old mythmakers.

Quine's
what

strictures against needed

Carnap's

attempt

to

is

to

help
of

us realize

that there

is

no such

divide philosophy from science discipline (p. 208).

are

just

It is just this kind

to enthrone
jects"

reactionary nostalgia,

Rorty

says, that prompts attempts

psychology or philosophy of language as "successor sub to epistemology (p. 11). With respect to the first attempt, the fifth chapter
empirical

of the

book

argues

relentlessly

and

persuasively that

empirical and

psychology

will

fare

no

better in

mology formulated
cal

formulating improperly

and

and unnaturally.

answering properly Quine's

naturally

what episte

proposal

that empiri
which were

psychology study the "relations between

epistemology

evidence

theory

and

once the subject matter of

is

sanguine

(p.

220).

He seems, in
223).

Rorty's opinion, to
effects of
"input"

want

to hold on to

empiricism sans

dogma (p.

The

Quine's

recalcitrance can
"information,"

be

seen

in his

"loose"

use of such

terms as

"evidence,"

"testimony,"

and
. .

in the input

use of peculiar sen

tences such as "the

mation about

nerve endings

are the place of

of unprocessed

infor

the

and

"It

is simply the

stimulations of our

tors that are best looked

upon as

the input to our cognitive

sensory recep (p. 224).

In

response

to

such

talk

Rorty

asks

the appropriate rhetorical question, "Could

cognitive mechanism

input to the psychology discover that the ina, but rather halfway down the optic

is

not at the ret

(p.

245).

Rorty
Fodor

considers

in the fifth

chapter a proposal made and

defended

by Jerry

who argues

130

Interpretation
between
program states of computers and psychological states of states of computers and neurophysiological states of

that the analogies

persons and

between

'hardware'

bodies
'inner

give a new and

interesting
of

sense to the notion that our

knowledge

consists of an

representation'

the

world

(p.

220).

It is the
the

ambiguous notion of representation

character of

backsliding
of

this

proposal.

that, according to Rorty, illustrates Both Quine's and Fodor's proposals

of

reflect,

however,

the more

primordial

illusion
other

the

notion of mirror

knowledge

as

"ac

representation"

curacy

(p.

11).

In

words, the
magic.

imagery

surround

ing

philosophy has

wrought

its

illusionary
to

When
cessor

Rorty

considers

the

attempt

subject"

to philosophy as different from those in favor of

nents

philosophy epistemology, he finds the

empirical

make

of

language the "suc in its favor

arguments

the same. So too is the

result.

psychology but the hope of its propo The hope is that philosophy of language will knowledge (p.
11).

succeed where

traditional epistemology failed. The result is a reversion to the

view of chapter

representation"

"accuracy
Davidson
claims

of

This

stage of

the argu

ment, as found in
and

six, employs, among others, the

archaeological

services of

Donald
the
are

Hilary

Putnam. Some
of

tunneling is

required on questions

of some

philosophers

language that

epistemological

finally being formulated correctly within a general theory of meaning and that they are doing properly what earlier philosophers had done clumsily and improp "Whigerly (p. 263). It is just such claims as these that invite Rorty to call them a term frequently used in the last third of the book.
gish"

This

talk about say that talk about something we don't recognize is we do recognize used to be gratified in something by simply assuming fashion that our misguided ancestors had been talking about whatever our
need to
"Whiggish" "really"

"really"

best-approved contemporary inquirers

267-268).

claimed that

they

were

talking

about

(pp.

Davidson's fact. Davidson

the dualism of
and

efforts

are regarded

by Rorty

as

a continuation of
of meaning "third or of

Quine's

at

tempts to jettison the dualism between questions

addresses

and questions of of

himself to the

dogma"

so-called

empiricism,

conceptual scheme and

sensory content,
to

something to be organized
world

of a priori and a posteriori

organizing system of language and

the

(p.

259).

Such

dualism, according

Davidson, however it be formu

lated,
(p.

severs

the

relationship between truth

concludes that

and

301).

Rorty

denouncing

the

meaning and must, therefore, fail dogmas leads to the renunciation

are
of

of a special
and

territory for a theory of meaning so that we traditional territory of the grammarian whose ways
to
explain

left

with

the

modest

describing

sentences

help

how

sentences are used

(p. 261).
English"

The

point of

problems

constructing a "truth theory of to be put in a formal mode of speech,

but simply to
use of certain

is

not

to enable philosophical

nor to explain the

words and the world, a social practice

lay

out

perspicuously

the

relation

relationship between between parts of

use of other sen

(the

sentences)

and other parts

(the

tences) (p.

262).

Book Review

131
that Davidson's
"holistic"

Rorty believes
to

account of

meaning

preempts the

quixotic attempts of

philosophers, especially those

of neoempiricists and realists.

look for

ostensive

definitions,

of

"objective"

which are related

to a single

"observation"

constructing language

theories of reference
common to all alternative
invariance."

theories,
For

and of

support relies

Rorty

clinging to what Paul Feyerabend calls "meaning on this issue of whether or not there are any permanent meanings, not only upon Feyerabend but also upon Thomas Kuhn's concept of
(pp. 270-275).
says

"normal

science"

If it is so, in especially
are used as

Rorty,
of

that as

a result of a

discovery

in

some

domain

of

in

quiry, that "change

meaning"

or

"shift in conceptual
and

scheme"

signifies a
of

"shift

beliefs"

central

(Aristotle's

Newton's discussions

"motion"

examples), then there is nothing for the philosopher to do (such as "analyze meanings") over and above what the historian does in showing the change in conceptual scheme, and it is for an intellectual of the why time to accept it (p. 272).
"rational"

Just

as the second chapter

account of

discussions

of

losophers

after

Ryle,

so

containing the Antipodean myth is an imaginative "the mind-body on the part of analytical phi too Rorty's sixth chapter is a skillful replay of their dis
problem"

"meaning"

cussions of

after

Frege

and

Russell.

Hilary

Putnam's
of

role

in those

discussions

constitutes the

latest

stage

in the development

ence"

out of presented as

the "so-called problem

change"

of conceptual

"the theory of refer (p. 277). Putnam is

indulging
soon

trying

to

make a case

brief sympathy for a for for "hard

a
"realism,"

reconstruction of
facts"

which are

philosophy by independent of

discourse. He
rally this

discovers, however,

that his sympathy is misplaced. Natu

discovery

serves well the cause of

dephilosophization.
there

Putnam's
cal

recantation comes what

down to saying that

philosophy

is

no

discipline do
the

transcendental

could not

way to make some empiri do that is, say something

about

scheme of representations we are wish

the content we

to

represent. we need

employing which will make clear its tie to But if there is no such way, then we can fall in with

Davidson's
295)-

claim

that

to

drop

the scheme-content

distinction

altogether

(p.

It

also comes

tionships"

down to saying that "the attempt to get a set of nonintentional rela (relationships that are independent of discourse) is in vain because simply further
theory"

"those

relationships are

parts of the

of

the current world

(p.

298).
"realism"

The
well.

argument

which

Rorty

aims at

is

addressed

to skepticism as

For the

pseudoquestions as

to whether or not an external world exists or to know the "real

of
causes"

again whether or not we ever get

of

things presuppose

a world somehow outside of or

independent

discourse

which we must explain

in

order

to

explain

(p.

309).
criticism of analytical

Rorty
tween

completes

his

"referring"

about"

and

"talking

on one

philosophy with a discussion be hand and the translatability of lan

guages on

the

other.

132
We

Interpretation
Sherlock Holmes but is
about"

cannot refer to

we can

talk about

him,

and

giston.

sophical art.

"Talking "Talking

"reference"

a common-sensical ranges over

notion;

similarly for phlo is a term of philo

fictions

as well as realities and

is

useless

for

realist purposes

(p. 289;

cf. pp.

300-301, footnote
reader

34).

On the issue
one offered

of

translation, the

is faced

with an argument similar

to the

"relativism"

"skepticism."

understanding
world

concerning a language involves two processes,

and

If

someone

believes that
words

linking

individual

to the

through ostension, and then

building

the core through usage, then

will

he

will

up meaning be held hostage by the belief that

in their

with other words around others

have "cut

up"

the world

differently

original acts of ostension and

thus

given

different

meanings to the
will of

individual
be infected

words

in the be

"core"

of their
our

language. The way

of

rest of

their language
"core"

thus

by

this

divergence from
no

giving

meaning to the
cate

English,

and so there will

way for

us to communi

no common points of

reference, no possibility

of

translation (p. 304).

What into

we

have here is

another.

a defense of the possibility of translation of one language The belief that translation is not possible depends upon the trapped points of reference
account of

beliefs that basic

common.

lie

outside of

discourse

and

that these

are not

"holistic"

discourse,

suggests

Rorty,

would avoid such

traps.

H(C)
The last two
chapters

(VII

and

VIII)

of the

book

are to

be

construed as a

final

assault on philosophic of

imperalism. In them,
"normal"

Rorty

employs a generalized version

science. pretense and

Kuhn's distinction between

"revolutionary"

and

He

pro

poses that

philosophy

should abandon

its

"epistemological"

become

hermeneutics,
be filled

not as a

"successor

subject"

to epistemology, but as

an expression of
not

hope that the

cultural space

left

by

the

demise
the

that our culture should

become
315).

one

in

which

of epistemology will demand for constraint

and confrontation

is

no

longer felt (p.

The demand for

mand

constraint and confrontation

is

understood

by Rorty
quest

as the

de

for

a common ground

for

a set of rules

that will make possible rational

agreement when agreement

there

is disagreement. This
It is

"epistemological"

for

rational

is

"commensurability,"

called
chapters.

a term a term which suspects

which

appears

frequently

in

these last two

describes

one

facet

of philosophic

de

lusion (p.

316 passim).

Rorty

that epistemological philosophers and

order to avoid the

their successors

believe in commensurability in

toward "the war of everyone against

confuse

everyone"

(p. 317).

slippery slope According to him they

two types of philosopher. The first is the "informed

dilettante,

the

poly-

pragmatic

Socratic

intermediary

between

discourses"

various

(p. 317). Through

Book Review
such

133 "disagreements
are compromised or transcended
not mention

an

intermediary
the

in the
about

conversation."

course of

Rorty
"conversation"

does

anything,

however,

how the
about

compromises are made or on what grounds can continue

warranted

transcendence is possible or that truth is "what society

how the
say"

if it is
if it is

so

lets

us

(or

assertability)

and

so that the

difference between

the views of Galileo and Bellarmine is that Galileo won the argument (p. 331).

The

second type of philosopher

one's common ground.

everybody
ultimate

else

is

doing
(p.

who knows every He is the "Platonic philosopher-king who knows what whether they know it or not, because he knows about the

is the "cultural

overseer"

context"

317).

Although there
and

will

be

readers who will

carp

at

differentiating

Socratic types

ception of

Platonic types in this way, the issue is a trans-scholarly one. Rorty's con the Platonic philosopher-king does not reach Karl Popper's level of
of

misunderstanding
"polypragmatic,"

the text of the

Republic, but it does invite unnecessary

peripheral criticism.
or

Frankly
just
plain

am more annoyed
"pragmatic,"

by

Rorty's

use of

the words
echoes of such

as words of praise.
"pragmatic"

I hear

those

sententious

journalists
was an

who also use was a

as an

honorific in

sentences as

"Mao

ideologue but Chou

or

"Pragmatic"

has

"ideological"

"fanatic"

"principled,"

opposites

other

than

such

as

or

"restrained."

The

persistent use of nor edifying.

the term in this way throughout the book

is

neither

illuminating

About philosophers, be they

sense of

king

or

citizen, pontificating (in the primal Latin ground, one should

bridge-building)
and

about common

hardly

complain.

For

by

interest

mon ground exists.

training, they come to care about whether or not some com They also become aware that those who do not care about the but solely
about the preservation of

existence of common ground ground must

their private

employ publicly the

complaint?
understand

rhetoric of care

for the

common ground.

Why

then Rorty's

Nor
matic

can

the

antagonism related

to that between the

namely, that

"polyprag
uni-

Socrates"

and

the "Platonic

between

versitas and societas.

Here

again

he borrows
a

some terms of

Oakeshott's. But

Rorty's

pax

hermeneutica

calls

for

denunciation
united

of universitas
mutual

in favor

of

societas.

He defines

universitas as

"a group

by

interests in
through
much

achiev

end"

ing

a common

and the societas as

united

"persons
than

whose paths

life have
less

fallen together,
common

by

civility

rather

by

a common

goal,

by

(p.

318).

Rorty

again

adapts

Oakeshott's

criticism of mis

guided thought about practical matters

for his

criticism of theoria

itself. One is
could

forced to it

ask why,

if hermeneutics is

routine conversation

(pp. 315-319),

not get around

to issues such as that of the common ground or of the nature of

things?

If

modern

epistemology

and

its

successors

have been broken-backed,

could not shoulder

does it follow that the

the
continuance of

original sources of old-time

conversation?

ontology

the

Why

must

the possibility of universitas

be

134

Interpretation
to,
and

antagonistic

therefore,

excluded

either the search

for

a common goal or a

from the possibility of the societas? Is common ground divorced from civility?
education unite

Does
not and

not

the effort that goes

rooted as

by

the name of liberal

them? Does

"civility,"

it is in logos, already
arete1.

presuppose the common ground

the

common goal

Yet Rorty's

criticism of universitas and

consistent and multisided.

its unifying discipline, philosophy, is Complementing his radicalized (not merely general
with a recycled version of

ized)

version of

Kuhn's distinction
"edifying"

the distinction be

tween

"systematic"

and

philosophy, he amplifies the relativist and

historicist
ence

character of

his

argument.

Kuhn's

"normal"

"revolutionary"

and

sci

becomes

"normal"

"abnormal"

and

discourse.
problems against the

"Normal"

science

is the

practice of

solving

background

of a con

sensus about what counts as a good explanation of would

new

the

phenomena and about what

it

take

for

problem to

be

"Revolutionary"

solved.

science

is the introduction
Normal
science

of a

"paradigm"

of explanation, and thus a new set of problems.

is

as

close as real

life

comes to the epistemologist's notion of what

it is to be

rational.

Ev

erybody agrees on how to evaluate everything everybody else says. More generally, normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of conventions
about what counts as a relevant what counts as
normal of

contribution,

what counts as

answering

question,

having

a good argument

for

that answer or a good criticism of

it. Ab

discourse is

what

happens

when someone

joins in the discourse

who

is ignorant

these conventions or who sets them aside (p. 320).

This distinction,
upon
"knowledge"

we

learn,
is
what

arises out of

the pragmatic approach to knowledge

produces agree

the suggestion of epistemological

which

behaviorism. Normal discourse

"rational,"

speakers,

who regard each other as

upon

to

be

"true."

ideas

which no what

"studies"

anything from nonsense to new discipline can since there is no discipline which describe, existing is creative or unpredictable (p. 320). Abnormal discourse, more
produces

Abnormal discourse

over, is

studied

by

hermeneutics from
understand

the standpoint of some normal

when

discourse. in

Hermeneutics tries to
order

things at the point

of and

they

are not yet clear

to initiate "an epistemological

of

account"

them. The difference is not like

man,"

that

between the "sciences

and

nature,"

the "sciences of

nor

between
a

fact

value,
of

nor yet

between the theoretical

and the practical occur at

but simply

difference
things are

familiarity. Epistemological
well understood and
"ground"

accounts

the point when

fairly

there is a desire to classify them so as to ex

them.
"Whiggish"

tend, strengthen, teach, dard for granted and as

Whiggishness (p.

and such will

be

Hermeneutics may take some stan but inasmuch as it investigates

can

nonreductively, in the hope of

321).
at

discovering

something new, it

transcend its

Rorty's discussion Enlightenment types)

this point appears to be addressed to those Positivists (or

who

invent

and

then

insist

upon
who

the dogmas

of

the

analytic-synthetic and the science as

fact-value distinctions,
the only authentic

currently

understood as

believe, moreover, in knowledge, and who

scorn-

Book Review

135
as either unscientific or a surrogate

fully

regard

philosophy before Positivism

case,

for

religious superstition.

The
mal

paradigm

however, for
wherein

the

distinction between
controversy.

normal and abnor

discourse is the Gallileo-Bellarmine

language"

Rorty doubts

that a "neu

tral observation

adversaries would offer evidence of their

differing
ries

theories

is

either

helpful

or even possible

in

deciding

between the theo

(p.

324).

He
to

recalls

Kuhn's
an

own

doubt

about the

phy

of science

formulate
and to

"algorithm"

for

such
or

possibility of the philoso decisions (p. 322). What is

algorithm, one
of

possible, to Kuhn
which

Rorty, is

hindsight
on

"Whiggish"

formulates

a conception of

knowledge

the grounds
dispute"

"the vocabulary

or assumptions of

the winning side in

a scientific

(p.

324).

Accordingly

the notion of rationality as opposed to that of superstition

in the Enlightenment

depends
328).

on

Galileo

being

completely

right and

Rorty's argument,
"illogical"

however,

more

Bellarmine completely wrong (p. than suggests that Bellarmine was not
"scope"

"unscientific"

being
there exists

or

theory. The claim that he was

some antecedent

in trying to limit the illogical and unscientific

of

of

the Copernican

rests on whether or not

way

determining

what evidence

there could be

for

statements about

the movements of planets (p. 330) and whether or not we do

science and

know how to distinguish

right

theology "such
(p.
329).

that getting the heavens

is

'scientific"

value and

preserving the Church and the general cultural

value"

structure of criterion of

Europe is

'unscientific'

an

Rorty's

point

is that the

being

scientific which

developed in the later

seventeenth and eigh

teenth centuries was not available

in the early

seventeenth century.

No

conceivable

epistemology, no
was

"discovered"

it before it

have study of the nature of human knowledge, could hammered out. The notion of what it was to be "scien

tific"

was

in the

process of

being

formed

Galileo,
"grid"

so to speak, won the argument,

of relevance and

and we all stand on

which

the

common ground of

the

irrelevance
.

"modern

developed

as a consequence of that

values"

just say that Galileo was creating the notion of "scientific that it was a splendid thing that he did so, and that the question in doing so is out of place (pp. 330-330tional"

victory as he

We

can

went

along,
was

of whether

he

"ra

I believe that Rorty's

suggest

point

is

correct.

Yet it is from

a spirit of agreement
out"

that I

ceptance of
"abnormal"

"hammering if it is and Galileo's theory possible, then it would seem that both discourse itself, as philosophy discourse have a common ground as Rorty would have it. If such of "conversation would have it, or the civilized men, victory is not the issue. common ground exists, then among
that

hermeneutics that made

both the

and the ac

"normal"

The

seventh chapter of

the book

concludes with a

discussion

of two

kinds

of

"subjectivity"

confusion.

The first is that

which exists

and

"objectivity"; the

second

among various notions of between the Romantic notion of man

as constitutor of a phenomenal

as self-crea

tor, the Kantian

Cartesian

notion of man

world, and the

notion of man as

the habitation of a special immaterial

ingredient (p.

136
346).

Interpretation
confusions

These

are, according to

Rorty, bound up

with

the propaganda

about the Natur- and

fusions
and

and

Geisteswissenschaften. The way to see through the con the propaganda, he suggests, is to distinguish between epistemology
the
a contrast

hermeneutics "as The

result will

between

discourse"

normal and abnormal and

(p.

346).

be that epistemology
endeavor will

hermeneutics

will not

be in

com

petition

but

will assist each other so

that the gaps between the subjective and ob

jective

elements of

human

be bridged. There

will

be

no need

to be

lieve that just that

needed

persons should persons

be

more

difficult to

understand than other things.

and

It is

talk

whereas

other

things do not,

that hermeneutics

is

in the

case of

incommensurable discourses (p.

after

347).

The

nature-spirit

controversy lasted controversy. Such phy that

long

there was no point to

it,

as

did the

realism-idealism

duty They were dedicated to a notion of a notion bearing dualistic and romantic im spirit as transcendental constitutor plications, yet a notion not reducible either to Geisteswissenschaft (sociology of
controversies
guard

merely did

for

a notion of philoso

was conceived

in

epistemology.

knowledge)
nature-spirit

or naturwissenschaft

(psychophysiology). The fact

.

which

fed the

controversy is that

sounds are not meanings

The fact that

we can predict a noise without

knowing

what

it

means

is just

the

fact that

the necessary
will

and sufficient microstructural conditions

for the

production of a noise

used

rarely be paralleled by a material equivalence between a statement in the language for describing the microstructure and the statement expressed by the noise. This

is

not

cal

because anything is in principle unpredictable, much less because of an ontologi divide between nature and spirit, but simply because of the difference between a
suitable

language
355)-

for coping

with neurons and one suitable

for coping

with people

(p.

Correspondingly, hermeneutics is
"understanding"

not

"another way

knowing,"

of sciences.

as opposed to predictive explanation as

in the

namely It is rather

another science

way of coping, (p. 356).

chapter of

it

relinquishes

the notion of knowledge to predictive

The last

Philosophy
Mirrors,"

and the

Mirror of Nature, whimsically

the book's crucial

entitled
of

"Philosophy
between
the

Without

proposes

to philosophy's defenders the terms

surrender and survival.

"systematic"

Utilizing

another of

distinctions,

that

"edifying"

and

philosophy,

Rorty

offers to philosophers
"discipline,"

accepting a scaled-down version of the equal members in the conversation of mankind or continuing as participating self-deceptively in their quest for common ground, essences or foundations, thereby facing irrelevance, exclusion from the conversation, and ultimately ex
alternatives of either

tinction.

The first

condition of surrender

is that the

old-time philosophers

lay

down

their hand weapons,

et

i.e.,

the notion shared

an essence

by Platonists, Kantians,

positivists,

al., that human beings have

namely, to discover essences (p.

Book Review
357).
can

137

Once this
set aside.

notion

is

set

aside, then epistemologically-centered philosophy

be

Once
wherein

the

shift

in

perspective

suggested

by

Gadamer's hermeneutics
own

the study of nature and them

history

is

not

done for their

sake, but for

philoso

what we can get out of

is accomplished, then men, especially

phers,

will understand

that getting the facts straight is

"merely

propaedeutic to

finding a new and more interesting way of expressing ourselves, and thus of cop (p. 359). Educationally speaking, rather than ing with the ically or technologically speaking, "the way things are said is more important than the possession of (p. 359). The project of finding new, better, more
world"

epistemolog-

truths"

(p. 360). But speaking is called the desire for edification and the desire for truth are not in conflict, according to that the quest for Rorty, unless one believes the "Platonic-Aristotelian

interesting,

more

fruitful

"edification"

ways of

view"

truth is the only way to be edified, instead

one of

of

believing
(p.

that such a quest is

360).

just

the many
to

ways

in

which we might

be

edified

In

answer

Rorty,

one might complain that

Plato

and

Aristotle did

not view

the pursuit of wisdom merely as the pursuit of truth. The Phaedo and the Nico
machean

Ethics
truth

stand as evidence.

On the

other

hand,

one could argue that

the

pursuit of

in Heidegger's
response
out"

sense

a sense which
of

Rorty
If.

should
as

find

congen

ial is
no

is the human

to the

intelligibility

things.

Rorty

says, there

"breaking
in human

of

place

concerns.

discourse for men, truth then necessarily has a special It is not the private preserve of philosophers. By pro
more attention general.

fession, they simply pay

human discourse
the
pursuit of
what

to that

intimacy

which exists

between

and

truth in

It is difficult to understand, therefore, how

truth"

truth could

be edifying in any way, if "the

"cope."

to be

society

allows us to

say

or a

way to

How

can

merely turns out the liberation re

not

quired

by

the quest for

edification

occur, if

men cannot of

break out,

from dis

course, but from convention,

replacing ate how

scribed

one

"ways"

only means convention with another? (p. 379). It is equally difficult to appreci besides the pursuit of truth could be edifying, when they are de
or

if breaking the "crust

in

such psychological platitudes as

"new

and more

interesting

way[s]

of

expressing portraying Plato

modern

Furthermore, Rorty has little

and

or no reservations

about

Aristotle
when

as the creators of

the

real villain of

his book

the

intellectual

from

one standpoint

their

work could

be described
"escape

as the

reductio ad absurdum of

the intellectual.

Why

indeed

should one

Platonism"

from

(p. 378),

unless

it be false?
are,

Nevertheless,

systematic philosophers

for Rorty,
it
as the paradigm of

those who single out one

man activity digm has been
.

idea,

one set of practices, and see

hu

In the

mainstream of

the Western

philosophical

tradition, this
this

para

knowing
produced

Successive

philosophical revolutions within

main

stream

have been
of

by

philosophers excited

by

new cognitive

feats

e.g.

the

rediscovery

Aristotle, Galilean mechanics, the development

nineteenth

of self-conscious

histo
366).

riography in the

century,

Darwinian biology,

mathematical

logic (p.

138

Interpretation
calls

Whereas he

edifying

philosophers

those
the notion that
man's essence

who resemble each other

in their distrust
writers

of

is to be

knower
we

of essence

These

have kept

alive the suggestion

that,

even when

than

have justified true belief about everything we want to know, we may have no more conformity to the norms of the day. They have kept alive the historicist sense that
"superstition"

this century's
relativist sense that the

was the

last

century's triumph of

reason, as well as the

scientific achieve

latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest

representations of

ment, may not express privileged the

potential

essences, but be just another of

infinity
the

of vocabularies

in

which

the

world can

be described (p.

367).

Rorty

cautions

reader

to be aware that abnormal discourse is dependent upon

normal

discourse

and

that

edifying philosophy is

"intrinsically"

a reaction

to the

"intrinsically"

constructive pretensions of systematic

tempt abnormal discourse without the awareness of to

philosophy (p. 366). To at its abnormality is madness;

shows a

insist

on

hermeneutics

where

epistemology

will

do

lack

of education

(P- 366).

But Rorty's distinction between

systematic and

edifying

philosophers

is

not

the same as that which he makes between normal philosophers and revolutionary
ones.

The latter, he says,

who

are of two

kinds:
normal, professionalized philosophy can
with

those

found

new schools within which

be
a

practiced

who see

the

incommensurability of their new vocabulary

to

the old as

temporary inconvenience,
to

be blamed

on

the shortcomings of their predecessors

of

and

be

overcome

by

the institutionalization
who

their own vocabulary.

On the

other

hand,
ever

there are great philosophers

.
.

be institutionalized

dread the thought that their vocabulary should Great systematic philosophers, like great scientists, build

for
(p.

eternity.

Great edifying

philosophers

destroy

for the

sake of their own generation

369)-

Again

Rorty forces the reader to

or

ask whether or not

edifying

philosophers such as

the later Wittgenstein tions

questions of

the later Heidegger asked perennial or eternal ques

questions such as the
ask

the sort, he tells us, are impossible

or

question of about

language

the

question of

being. The later Wittgenstein did did Plato

and

the

first;

the later Heidegger about both. So

Aristotle. These

points are so obvious that

understand something.

the

reader

begins to

wonder whether

he has failed to

Yet he does

not

feel

compelled to prove to question

Rorty

that ev

ery
are

philosopher

in every
others.

epoch asked

every

in

order

to show that there

of

fundamental

and perennial philosophical questions.

Indeed the asking

even

only

one suggests
which

the

An

appeal

to historical awareness, the very standard

not show

Rorty

says shows

otherwise, does
a

otherwise,

if the histori Whatever

ography is done
we
are

by

Kantian,

Hegelian,
of

Thomist,
be the
To

or a pragmatist.

may think of Plato's

handling

the fundamental questions, those questions

ones which will

the same as the ones which nag us and will

nag future

men provided which

they have leisure

and curiosity.

suggest that the questions

an

Plato

asked are either

irrelevant

or obsolete

betrays

indifference toward

Book Review
what

139
questions are.

the

fundamental

Historical

awareness

ignores

at

its

own

risk

the

fact that the fundamental

the variety and
and

questions perdure
of

throughout historical epochs

whatever

diversity

the answers to them may be. Indeed the va

riety
of
with

diversity

of the answers presuppose

the

the

illusions). It is philosophy

which asks

the

universality of the questions (or fundamental questions along

attempting the answers to them. This distinction between the fundamental

philosophy.

questions and the answers to them

would seem and

to be the presupposition of Rorty's distinction between systematic

edifying

Yet both distinctions

presuppose two prephilosophic

practices"

distinctions, (i)

that between the authority of "social

and

and
what

finding
activity,

things out for oneself on one hand

artificial or conventional on

(2)

that

between

is

natural and

the

other.

From the

standpoint of

human

finding distinguishing
course

things out for oneself in contrast to

what

taking

them on authority as well as

what

is

artificial or conventional

from

is
a

natural

do

not re

quire, both Sellers

and

Rorty

should

be

pleased to

hear,

breakout from dis

some

to a principle beyond discourse (p. 390).

They do require, however,

attention to the principle

bespeaks
us,

being. In

our own time we

of discourse, that is within discourse, and that discourse have the Positivists to thank for teaching

regardless of

their motives, that

being

is

not an attribute or predicate.

It is It

rather presupposed

by

both

subjects and predicates.

It is the

concept

into

which

all concepts are resolved and

deconstructed. It is
to be the

neither a myth nor or

is it

given.

simply turns up and turns

course.

out

foundation

the common ground of

dis

Rorty

rightly

seeks out and

destroys the

modern replacements seems rooted

for it. Yet

very
mod

his
ern

attack on modern

philosophy

and

epistemology
(p.
389).

in

presupposition, namely, the self as creator and chooser, for whom

knowing
by
the

is

"right to

believe"

and an act of creation

His

notion that

edifying dis

course

is

supposed

to be

abnormal so as

"to take

us out of our old selves

beings"

power of strangeness,
seems anomic of rooted

to aid us in

becoming

new

(p. 360), likewise

the
"atomic-

in the priority
The
references

of what

Gerald Galgan has

called

self."

to Sartre's notion of man,

are

in this context,

as creator

his

world and of what

his

values

telling (pp.
between

375-37)-

Yet

is

most objectionable

in

the employment of the

systematic

distinctions between

normal and abnormal

discourse

and

at all to be said. philosophy is that it permits anything logic is subsumed under rhetoric or philosophy under poetry (p. 360). The care ful listener and reader will not know what to take seriously. Such an objection is

philosophy and edifying This is what happens when

avoidable when

poetry, and

science

too, becomes

philosophical.

Ill
While
nial
arguments of

so

many

Philosophy
One
could

and

to me, the

main one

is

not.

The Mirror of Nature are conge agree that the notion of "the

mind"

140

Interpretation
on

from Descartes

is

mistaken.

The

epistemological turn and the

linguistic turn

have been wrong turns. But then so too is the Rortyian turn. He seems to believe that the destruction of philosophy will strengthen the conversation of mankind. I
think not.

In fact there is

enough evidence

that the sciences

which

the Positivists

believed

would replace

versation.

philosophy are constructing a tower of Babel for the con the psycho-babblers, socio-babblers, Indeed the various babblers
are well on of

and politico-babblers speak of

the way toward completing the task,

whom rational

not

to

the apostles
of

feeling

or

those for

discourse, let
that

alone

the conversation

mankind, is

contemptible.

Rorty's
or

suggestion

philoso

phy be turned into cultural anthropology (p. 381) could have a happy ring to it in those circles. Then there
says are

into archaeology (p. 391)

shoes. of

those

who will

be

pleased

to fill the philosopher's

come

Rorty
and

that the dangers to

abnormal

discourse

from the scarcity

food

the secret police (p. 389).

Only

a casual optimism permits one to overlook the

fact that the

elements

tyranny."

and perpetual world state.

already exist to make, as Leo Strauss warned, "a universal There is, for example, the of a homogeneous
"ideal"

There

are

ideologies

with

the capacity to be

immediately popularized

and
ogy.

diffused. There is the possibility of an unlimited and uncontrolled technol The rulers of such a state would have to present themselves as philosopheras

kings who,

only the thoughts of the philosopher-kings. Philosophy fares only slightly better at the hands of those radical pragmatists (which Dewey, James, and Peirce were not) who in the name of utility, neces
such,
could permit
would banish it from those very domains, the universities, it already leads a precarious existence. It strikes me as overly sanguine on Rorty's part to say that the "useful done by philosophers will survive

sity, and progress

where

kibitzing"

because,
the
need

for teachers

who

have

read

the great

dead
as

philosophers

is

quite enough to

in

sure that there will

be philosophy departments

long

as there are universities

(p.

393)-

Anyone

who

is

not

totally

oblivious to what

has happened in Western

universi

ties in the last

twenty

years would

hardly

be

so confident about the survival of

philosophy therein. In many of them it is clinging by its fingernails to hold a place in the curriculum, let alone retain its traditional position at the core of lib
eral studies.

As far

as

the danger

of

mit that where and when

the scarcity of food is concerned, one must frankly ad human beings must struggle merely to stay alive, nei
other

ther

philosophy

nor

any

confrontation with the secret police can

specifically human activity will germinate. But be brought about or hastened by the siren
liberal education,

calls of relativism which negates the privileged character of a

by
on

hedonism

which mocks

excellence,

and

by

a crass pragmatism which

dotes

the "cash

value"

of things.

In this regard, I

am more

impressed
of

by

the

James Bond Stockdale's

reflections

("The Principles

Leadership,"

cogency of The Ameri-

Book Review
can

141
1981;

Educator, Winter
4/16/82) in

"Dignity

and

Honor in

Vietnam,"

Wall Street Jour

nal,

on the question of

the relationship between relativism and torture

than those of
years

Rorty

on

torture and freedom (p. 354).

Stockdale

resided

for

eight

a North- Vietnamese prison

camp, four

of which were spent

in solitary
"culture
(p. 319)

confinement.

Rorty's

preference

for

phronesis over episteme and

for the

notion of

as a conversation rather
presupposes

than

foundations"

as a structure erected upon

that there are models to

be imitated
not

and virtues

to be

appreciated.

Phronesis

and episteme are

conjunctive,

disjunctive,
of

so that a choice

be

tween them need not

be

proposed nor made.

The life

those ordinary, plodding,

decent human beings among

not the opposite of
which excellence

whom and with whom conversation

is

possible

is

the excellent life (the philosophic goal) but "the

as

ground which

from
be

grows,"

Eva Brann has said, "and the

end

for

it [ex

work."

cellence]

goes to

If

Rorty

is

worried about an

infelicitous

coincidence

tween philosophic arrogance and human arrogance, then the very Heidegger
whom

he

admires a

has

a reminder

for him. These

Davos.
in the
creation of

comments were made to

Ernst

Cassirer in
Man is

1929

conversation at

never

infinite

and absolute

that-which-is

itself [des Seienden

selbst], but he is infinite in the sense of the understanding of Being [des Seins]. This infinity of the ontological is by its very nature bound to ontic experience, so that one
must

say just the

opposite:

This

infinity

which

breaks forth in the imagination is

pre

cisely the not have it [i.e.,

most acute argument

ontology].

for finitude.

Ontology

is

an

index

of

finitude. God does

However

ponderous

Heidegger's

prose

may

be, his

point

is

clear.

Human beings
act of search

become

aware of

their nature in the act of philosophizing

in the

ing
way

for the infinite.

of authority.

They may learn of finitude from They may also learn of it from the

religion as well sciences when,

but

by

however,

the sciences are thought

other
round

of as part of philosophy (a very old thought) and not the through Husserl). As far as poetry is concerned, Descartes (pace way the Oakeshott who has taught him so much, from if Rorty must be aware, only that while the voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind is not a version of practical or scientific

activity,

it

must

be

philosophical

(theoria). If,
then

as

Oakeshott
should not

conversabl

said, "the
quarrel

voice of

philosophy is unusually
to
Mankind,"

Rorty

with

"its impulse to study the quality

voice of

and style of each

voice, and to

reflect on

the relationship of one

Voice

of

Poetry

in the Conversation is

Oakeshott, "The Rationalism in Politics, pp.

(Michael

200-201). And "since philosophy

as

Heidegger

said

to

Cassirer,
itself in

"with the

whole of man and

the highest in

man. this

finitude

must show

philosophy in a completely
moreover,

radical

from the study of the history of philosophy is not, as The lesson, of the different standpoints, but rather the unity relativism Rorty believes, the those standpoints. His comroot of philosophic activity in differentiating
and

142

Interpretation
Analytic philosophy should not be primarily with its attempt to be a for epistemology but rather with its being ashamed to be philosophy in of science and technology, and with its professionalization to the point This latter transformation he has He
should

plaint with surrogate

the

court

of trivialization. plored
with

duly

noted and

correctly de

(pp.

391-392).

have added, however, that

Phenomenology
not alone

its progeny has not avoided a similar descent into It may be that the Rortyian turn has a millenialist twist. He is
in his
preference

"scholasticism."

philosophers

for

wisdom

over

philosophy.

among Yet Alexandre

Kojeve

who shared that preference

drew, however,

some

noteworthy inferences

about the end of philosophy.

In
of

point of

fact,

the end of human Time

or

History

that

is,

the

definitive

annihilation

means quite sim Man properly speaking, or of the free and historical Individual sense of the term. Practically, this means the dis the cessation of Action in the full ply appearance of wars and

bloody

revolutions.

And

also

the disappearance of Philosophy;

for

since

Man himself

no

longer

changes

essentially, there the basis

of

change and of

the

(true)

principles which are at

himself. But

all the rest can

makes man

be

preserved

is no longer any reason to his understanding of the world indefinitely: art, love, play, etc.; in
to the

short

everything that
quoted

happy

(Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction

Read

ing

of Hegel,

in Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, New York:

Cambridge,
Although
not

1980,

p. 27).

Rorty

has

not

drawn these inferences, it does

not

follow that they do

as

lie in the

entrails of

his

project.

The remedy, then, is

scribed with regard

not

to level philosophy, but rather

"Being"

Heidegger

pre

to and for

be

with all

its

"poverty,"

its

scars and

Gelassenheit. Let philosophy be! Let it its welts. Its kitchen is warm enough for The
conversation

anyone and

for

everyone who cares about the essential things.

there is not only tinue and to

interesting, it is

serious.

In

order

for the

conversation

to

con

be worthwhile, it Conversation of Mankind.

must

be

or

become

philosphical.

Philosophy

is the

Forthcoming
Ronna Burger Peter

Articles

Socratic Eironeia
Rousseau's Management
of

Emberley Webking

the Passions
Adams'

Robert

Virtue
The

and

Individual Rights in John

"Will"

Defence of

Donald Maletz

Meaning

of

in Hegel's

Philosophy

Right
Vukan Kuic

Foreword to "The Politics

Alain"

of

Yves Simon

"The Politics
translated

Alain"

of

by

John

Dunaway

Walter Nicgorski

Leo Strauss

and

Liberal Education

Reviews by Richard Velkley, Will Morrisey, Larry Arnhardt

Feder-Marcus

and

Maureen

Short Notices by Will Morrisey

and

John Parsons, Jr.

ISSN 0020-9635