A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

May

& Sept. 1987

Volume 15 Numbers 2 &3

157 179

K. L. Yeager David Bolotin

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

and

The Theaetetus Opinion

the

Possibility

of

False

195

James C. Leake

Tacitus'

Teaching and

the

Decline

of

Liberty

at

Rome (Chapters 3 to 7)

309 323

Richard Burrow
Kenneth L. Gras Grasso

Credulity

and

Curiosity

in A Tale of a Tub
and

Pluralism,

the

Public Good

the Problem of

Self-Government in The Federalist 347

367 Chaninah Mascri Will
Will

Morrisey

Robert H. Horwitz, 1923-1987 Review

of

373

Morrisey

The Fate of the

Self by

Stanley

Corngold

interpretation
Volume 15

JL

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2*3

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Interpretation

Contents

K. L. Yeager
David Bolotin

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

and

157
of

The Theaetetus

the

Possibility

False Opinion

179
James C. Leake
Tacitus'

Teaching
and

and

the Decline of

Liberty
a

at

Rome (Chapters 3 to
Richard Burrow Kenneth L. Grasso

7)
in A Tale of Tub

195
309

Credulity
Pluralism,

Curiosity

the Public Good and the Problem of

Self-Government in The Federalist

Chaninah Maschler
Will

323 347 367

On the Wisdom

of

Nathan

Morrisey

Robert H. Horwitz, 1923-1987

Book Review
Will

Morrisey

The Fate of the Self: German Writers French Theory by Stanley Corngold

and

373

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

K. L. Yeager
Boston College

"Indeed

not

only this, O

Simmias,"

said still ought to

Socrates, "but

also the

first

hypotheses,
you go

even

if they

are certain to

you,

be

examined more

clearly; and if

through them sufficiently, as I tent possible to a

not search

think,

you will

follow the

argument to the greatest ex

you will

human

being

to understand; and

if this itself becomes clear,

further."

Phaedo,
relates

107b

The Phaedo is the Platonic dialogue that

Socrates'

the events of the

day

of

death
and

and

the conversation
on

Socrates
Phaedo
vides

his

companions
almost

supposedly took place between that day. The arguments contained in the
which

are

focused

wholly

on the soul.

The first

part of

the

dialogue

pro

three

major arguments of

that the soul must always exist. The second part

own search

supplies a

description

Socrates'

for the

causes of what

exists, is

generated,

and perishes.

In

some

ways, the Phaedo

could

is

the counterpart to another

a second

dialogue,

the

Apology
should

of Socrates; it
given

be

said

to be

apology, or defense. The

arguments

by

Socrates here defense

of

are a response to

his

companion

demands that he

provide a

his

apparent

willingness

to separate himself
second

from
go

them

through death. than the

nian

One

might

reasonably

expect

this

apology to

deeper

first apology which was made publicly to the whole mass of the Athe citizens. When Socrates was called upon to justify his activities before his
citizens

fellow

he defended himself
seriously
care of

by

arguing that he

was

educating them. He
speaks to those

made people think

about

virtue, he said; in essence, he required the

Athenians to take
who

their souls. In the

advice

Phaedo, Socrates
to the Athenian

have already heeded the

he

gave

populace

to pay

at

tention to virtue, to

learning

and

wisdom, to one's soul.

The Phaedo has little in it

stance, of the Republic or

is expressly political in the manner, for in the Laws. It is a strange, esoteric dialogue all about the
which

interaction between
not

body
of

and soul

(and in human beings,

"what is
justice,"

vovq, or mind).

It does

explicitly Still the discussion

ask such questions as

"what is the best

and

regim

the

soul

is

vast

in its implications

indeed it is hard to

imagine that
out

one could give answers

to these

particular political questions with

thoroughly

understanding the causal relationship between

body

and soul and

mind.

Both

political and philosophic

discourse

are

ultimately

concerned with

issues

Pure philosophy is concerned with such matters in a disinterested way; political theory becomes involved in debate about politically causation because it is concerned with justice and therefore with freedom. The
of causation and of order. concept of

freedom,

as we

human beings know it,

presupposes some split

158

Interpretation
and

between something ruling

ruled and controlled

choosing
effected).

(i.e.,

causing)
and

and

something

being
harm,

(i.e., being

Justice

law

make sense as moral

issues only if freedom of choice really exists, the to obey law or not to obey. An innate body-soul lect in human beings)

choice

to harm or not to

(including
for
all cultural

dichotomy is
and

the

precondition

especially the intel our debates about in

dividual responsibility

self-control

versus

determinism.

Justice,

freedom,

and self-determination or societal self-determination, are core concepts

of political

theory. No political debate goes far without mention of such matters. for example, could a society justify either punishing or rewarding its citi How, zens if there is no certainty as to whether freedom of choice belongs to the indi
vidual or not?

Reflection ical

on

the

soul

is the foundation from

Near the

which all

lasting

social and eth states

recommendations must rise.

end of

the

Republic, Socrates

that everything discussed therein would become more clear once the true nature
of the soul

has been
to

more

adequately

examined.

comes closest of the soul.

of

fulfilling

the promise of a comprehensive

Of all the dialogues, the Phaedo inquiry into the nature any
of

For this

reason

the Phaedo has one of the most tragic settings of

the Platonic dialogues. The

inquiry

into the

nature of

the soul takes place at a

great

junction

where

religion, politics, and philosophy

out

(including

the

study

nature)

play In the Phaedo, philosophy

all meet and

their conflicts.
meets

the

ancient

Greek

alliance

between

religion

and politics on common

place at various

ground

and transforms

it. The transformation takes in this

paper that

levels, in

various ways.

will argue

Plato tries

to show

in the Phaedo that the development

of

vovg (the

faculty

of reason and

conscious

decision) is

part of a continuum.
caused

It is

neither a matter of chance mate

rial causation nor

is it

by

some outside

force. An implication is
no

of

Plato's

analysis of soul and mind and natural world and

organizing (i.e., divine) noetic body is that there

the human social and political

sharp division between the

which means

realm

that there is no metaphysical basis for the fact-value dis

philosophical

tinction. For this reason the

nificant political

investigation in the Phaedo is

of

sig

interest.
about causation

Philosophic discourse
of the society's

necessarily trespasses

on

the

territory

ruling nokig and its gods is the dramatic context of the dialogue. However, the conflict is resolved through various measures, including the forging of an alliance be
tween philosophy and the god, Apollo.

gods.

Indeed,

this conflict between philosophy and the

This

alliance with aspect.

the gods smooths the

much more natural

way for the dialogue's

active social

engineering

Being

than a

set of abstract arguments about

the causes of the order of the

whole, the

Phaedo
and

contains

very

powerful myths about

the individual soul's

immortality
have had
a

its judgment

and reward or punishment after on

death. These

myths

profound and

continuing influence
the

litical facets
paper.

of

Phaedo,

this one

Of the many po is discussed in the least detail in the present

society's politics.
myth qua myth until

human

After

all

it is

not possible

to discuss
of

it is

shown to ac

tually be

myth

through an analysis

Plato's

philosophical arguments.

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

159

THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIALOGUE

The Phaedo has

unacceptable, he
whether and

tightly

ordered

composition, despite first

"apology"

appearances

to

the contrary. After Socrates has

made an

which

his

companions

find

undertakes an actual examination soul exists after which

(cf. 70c) into the

three

question of

how the

death. He

offers

major proofs

that the
recol

soul exists after

death,
and

will refer

to as "the nature

argument,"

"the

lection

argument,"

"the
the

section."

noncomposite soul
most

Socrates begins
ment and

with

basic hypothesis

about soul

in the

nature argu rec

then advances

upward

through more and more complex ones in the the noncomposite soul section, in
argument.

ollection argument and

in

parts of

response

to

the

incompleteness in first
to
and

each

preceding

In the center,

forming

link be

tween the
sented

last

parts of

the dialogue are two counter-arguments (pre

by

Socrates'

two primary
proof

interlocutors, Simmias

and

Cebes)

which stand

in

Socrates'

opposition

that the soul

must always exist.

These

counterar

guments address
whether soul

the issue of the causal significance of soul and the question of

is something formed

by body

or whether

instead

body

is formed

by

soul.

In

answer

to the counterarguments Socrates

own search

finally

gives an autobiographical
together"

account of

his

for

causes and

his

new

"mingled

method of part of

inquiry
the

a method which
point

logue. From this

he clearly has used on Socrates makes a complicated

about

already in the first

the dia
some of

retreat

from

earlier conclusions

the soul, and the discourse then

about

culminates

in

an acknowledged myth

(cf. nob)

the individual's

journey
whole

after

death.

Nonetheless,
attempt at
manner.1

taken together the various arguments encompass a very precise

order of

accounting philosophically for the

two
major undercurrents,

the

in

a certain

There

are

two

motivations or

objectives, that

pull

the dialogue in
which

various

directions

and move

it

along. One of these (the current

is

more

visible) is that this dialogue

answers

to the need of most human

beings to believe that they will somehow survive death. This is what his compan a proof that his and their souls ions initially demand of Socrates (cf. 69e-70b)
will exist after

death least

and
on

it is the

requirement

the

myths seek

to satisfy, and

the

arguments at

the surface. From the standpoint of the drama of the

Phaedo,

this

requirement

nature of

the soul.

is the motivating force behind the vast inquiry into the In addition, Socrates carries on a more hidden dialogue with
is
obscured

This underlying

attempt

phic mystical traditions to give the appearance of

exist.

because the dialogue does rely on Pythagorean and Or having proven that the individual soul must always
accept

Unfortunately commentators
they stop

have been too willing to

these elements at their face value;

or

therefore,

at a point where the arguments appear

conclusion

inconsistent

merely

wrong.

They

are

then forced to the logical

that Socrates or Plato or both are mystic and doctrinaire "philos

ophers."

Clarendon Press,
and

See, for instance, Plato's Phaedo, ed. by John Bumet with introduction and notes (Oxford: 191 1), pp. liv-lv, and Plato's Phaedo, trans, by R. Hackforth with introduction pp. 3-6. commentary (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1972),

160

Interpretation
who

his fellow-philosopher, Anaxagoras,

whose views
other

is

not

Socrates brings up
more
with

at crucial points

really present of course, but (cf. 72c; 97b-99d). This is the

argument. of

current, the

The dialogue

purely philosophical strain of the Anaxagoras concerns the causes

the beings
and what

the generation, ex

isting,
which

and

perishing
place

of

is necessary in
asks

order that generation

should continue to occur.

The

philosopher

to

understand

the processes

take

in the whole,

of which we

human beings

part

a part which nonetheless vovg?

has to be

explained.

are merely a small How is it that beings exist since

having
sion.

(Novg, I

will

leave

untranslated

in this paper,
of

it has

such a

range of meanings

mind, the
with

faculty

of

reason,

thought,

of conscious

deci
con

At

98b -99b

scious choice of

vovg is described by Socrates as acting the best.) Discussions in the dialogue's first half vovg in ordering
of

involving
will

eventually
the role of
ear

lead up to the
vovg

question of the role of

the whole

as an original causal principle, cause of generation and

decay. It is the

lier

arguments and counterarguments about soul that allow the

questioning to

reach

this

peak.

Only
seems

because the

earlier arguments

have been

gone through can

this issue be

raised and

the answer

be

attempted. ex

Anaxagoras

to have been the first philosopher to suggest that vovg,

isting independently
principle.2

from

all other

things, is the
to

original and central

ordering
ob

In the

middle of responds

the dialogue (in the course of answering

Cebes'

jections), Socrates
finds it
and

directly
and

Anaxagoras'

thesis and explains why he

untenable on various

freedom

as

coming to

be

levels. Within the Phaedo, Socrates analyzes form advancing from within the beings rather than as from without,
as

something imposed
the

or given

in

Anaxagoras'

existing by itself, originally began

to order and arrange all things.

theory that vovg, Nonetheless,

dialogue

shows

that some principles of the human political order are active in

the natural nonman-made order. There are also

need and

disharmonies between human

the conclusions of philosophy,

which are muted

by

salutary

myths

that

reinterpret our

relationship
rooted

to the divine and to the natural world.

Part

of

the strength of the myths is that

they

are

pearance of

being

in

philosophical proof rather than around

very carefully given the ap in human need. The

relates

dialogue
in

as a whole

is built
from

the question of how vovg

and

to

bodily

form. The (And thus

surface mythic argument suggests that

complete separation each

body, i.e.,
be

vovg philosophy can exist vovg does not depend upon bodily form.
analytic part of a

individual

soul can

immortal.) The seriously

related

the dialogue takes the fact that vovg is

to

bodily
focuses

form
on

as a given

fun

damental datum
vovg comes into

of experience

and therefore

the question of how

free from, a It is almost impossible to

2.

being and how it certain bodily form.

is interconnected with,
Plato's

and yet

in

some aspects

overestimate

philosophical empiricism

in the

tary

and

See Simplicius Phys. Fr. 12, 164,24 and 156,13 or The PreSocratic Philosophers, commen translations by G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1957),

pp. 372-73-

Man
Phaedo

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

161

and

the same time Plato's empiricism is nonreductionist the threadbare empiricism of

modern

his parsimony in making hypotheses concerning causation. Yet at it is very different from
times.

No

perception

is discounted merely
the natural whole.
nature argument even when all
"soul."

because it is invisible to the

of significance

eye.

No fundamental human

experiences are stripped

during

the pursuit of the causes the

minimal

which order

Plato (cum

Socrates)

starts with

hypothesis in the

that there is some always existent

potential

for life in the whole,

potential

reproducing living tional hypotheses are brought in

to the

beings have died

with

off.

This

he

calls

Addi

the

recollection argument

only in

response

incompleteness in

the nature argument; the two

arguments are

inextricably

bound together. In the extremely complex recollection argument, a series of new hypotheses are considered including the hypothesis that the nonliving world
aims, despite
all

appearances,

not at

uniformity, but toward the

beauty

and good

belonging

to life. The recollection

argument projects

experiences of

living,

thinking beings back into the nonliving world. Although at first glance this appears to be an illusory projection of our own will (to suggest that what is
nonliving
aims at

anything

at

all, let alone at some

beauty

and

good), there are

make

philosophical reasons

why it is necessary
analysis avoid

and consistent

for Plato to

the

hypothesis.
Not only does Plato's positing vovg
the opposite,
as a

separate, original

(i.e.,

god-like)

causal

force,

it

also avoids

which

is the

mechanistic

At the opposite extreme, vovg becomes something that pops into be suddenly in a chance way. Bypassing the political and metaphysical prob lems of each of these opposing approaches, Plato hypothesizes that there is a complex of powers (which he calls "soul") always existent in the world. Thus
approach.

ing

vovg, when

it

comes to exist

in

living beings, does

or

not

pop into

existence

in

an

arbitrary, and
come of other

ultimately inexplicable,
powers and

way, but instead vovg is the

within

natural out

innate

aims,

strivings,

the

natural whole.

On the

the hand, utilizing vovg as an independent ultimate cause is also avoided Anaxagoras-type usage of vovg that Plato argues does not mesh with our human

experience of what

vovg is

and redefines

vovg into

nonexistence.

The Phaedo begins

ogy

where

Plato's

Apology

of Socrates leaves

off.

The Apol

after

of Socrates closes with a short description of what the soul may experience death if, as is said, the soul changes from this habitation and goes to another (Cf.

place.

Apology

of Socrates, 40c-4id.) In the Phaedo,

when

Socrates'

to his

companions

they

too

demand

"apology"

an

of

first reply him (63b) is a pi

ous one.

Socrates

asserts

that the soul can exist in separation from the

body after

death. When in this

"know

state those who

have been

pure

purely"

the pure truth (67a-b). This should

philosophers.

during life may come to seem most desirable to all

and

those who are true

Socrates
The

also suggests that the gods

ones who place the soul

in the

prison of

the

body temporarily

may be the he hands him

self over to their care and control.

gods are our caretakers and we

human be Socrates

ings

are

their property (62b). Because of these things the companions of

162

Interpretation be distressed
at

should not

the

prospect of

his imminent departure from them.

This

approach will picture of

be very quickly

abandoned

in the
will

new

inquiry that follows,

to again and

but this
again.

the individual

souls

in Hades

be

returned

Socrates'

tenets are
strikes out rule of

although its apology remains an important point of reference, Socrates the which follow arguments the apology, not proven. In the divine mention of in the opposite direction. He leaves behind any

human

affairs

in the first two

arguments and character.

third section, which is of questionable

only returns to the gods in the Socrates proceeds in the first ar

soul

gument, the

nature

argument, to strip the human

bare. Whereas the

souls

he

had just described in the apology were richly human (cf. for example, 66b-67b, 64a-b), the soul discussed in the first argument is not recognizably human. The one in the second main argument, the recollection argument, is not a
social or political soul.

68a- e or

Only in

the last

argument

is anything that touches

the cause

directly

on our social nature mentioned.

Soul becomes
and

inextricably
nature

linked to the
and

problem of

of generation
.

decay

in the

argument,
said

it

remains so

throughout the dialogue (cf

95d-96a,

io6c-d).

Soul is

to be the entity which must always exist if the

always

regeneration of
makes certain

living

beings is

to be possible. The nature argument

at

hypotheses

about soul

by looking
other

it from the outside,

by

analyz

ing
The

"generations"

or processes recollection

that the

appear never

to cease to take place in nature.

at soul

argument,

on

hand, looks
the

from the inside.

souls, this

From the

perspective of what we

know

of

functioning

of our own

argument suggests that

there

are additional characteristics

that always

belong

to

soul which would explain more

life."

Only

perceptions of

of external

likenesses

and

specifically how it is that the soul "comes into outer phenomena are discussed openly perceptions deficiencies in objects such as sticks and stones. The

existence of

the human soul's inner desires and deficiencies is merely alluded to.
no

Furthermore,
mate objects

distinction is

made

between

our

human type

of souls and

inani

in that they too are said to aim and to fall short. The recollection ar with its concentration upon the soul's perception of the world external to gument,

it, is
own

intermediate step between the nature argument, where none of our activities and functions are directly discussed, and the third argument.
an noncomposite soul section are the soul's

souls'

Only
the

in the

inner

peceptions

detailed

soul's various

desires,

the soul's attempt to

rule

body and itself and to grasp

distinction between ignores

itself

by

itself. As the

recollection argument makes no

animate and

inanimate soul, similarly the division between the various

Soul is
toward
seen

noncomposite soul argument species of animate soul.

aspects of the

to exist at three levels in the three arguments: as a

power oriented

life,

while also

being which is receptive and moves toward greater perception holding within itself the past through recollection, and finally as a be
as a

ing

which perceives exhibits

itself

and

becomes kind

occupied with

remolding itself. At
exerts a

each

step it

freedom

of one

or another and

it

forming

and re

forming

influence. In the last argument, the

noncomposite

soul

section, the

Man
soul's

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

attempt to

163
to

internal

grasp itself by itself,

"collect itself

together,"

and

to

escape the

things

which are

bodily

appear as the

highest freedom.

THE FIRST THREE ARGUMENTS

The Nature Argument There

were numerous

difficulties

with the apology.

It

contained no real proof or that pure.

that the soul can exist in complete separation from the

will exist

body
is

like beings
was

together after

death, i.e.,
people

the pure souls with

what

Neither

there a proof that the gods exist and rule

benevolently. Cebes

states the problem

in the

following

way:

Many

fear that the

soul scatters at

death

and

is

no

where; if it does
and prudence which ment ment

exist collected

together itself

then there is
respond

reason

for hope.
as

follow

to the

difficulty

it

by itself, and if it has some power (Cf. 69e-70b.) The three arguments is set forth by Cebes. The first argu
after

deals in the

abstract with

the power of the soul

death. The

next argu
with

takes up the issue of the prudence of soul. The third is concerned

the soul's collectedness.
now

the

matter of

We turn

to the nature argument

the

first

part of what

Socrates

refers to

as an actual examination

into the things that

"imperfect,"

concern us about

the soul (70c). This

argument perfect

is based
not

upon an analysis of what must or

(or

"maimed"

cf. 7ie).

be necessary if nature is to be As has been mentioned be

of the

fore, it

constitutes a radical

departure from the tenets

apology

section.

Socrates

sets out to prove that the soul always exists

by

proving that the

living
hav

are generated out of

the dead. Although to begin with he recalls the ancient say

ing ing

that the souls exist in

some resemblance

Hades, conjuring up

an

image

of

individual

souls

to the

living

person, ultimately this argument is quite

unsuited to

proving that any individual soul exists after death. Socrates argues that if all generated beings come to be from their

opposites

then the the

living must come to others by going into its

form,

be from the dead. Each

opposite

generated

being

must

repay

otherwise all would come

and would

to have the

same

experience the same

thing

the fact that things have

not come

stop coming to be (72b). From to be in this state Socrates will surmise some

thing
he

about the

makes

necessary structure of things. An underlying assumption which is that the material of generation is limited, able to be used up. "And if become compounded, but
would not separate
together'"

all should

again, quickly it would

happen

as

In the final

Anaxagoras said, 'all things stage of the argument, Socrates

come

(72c).
the liv
should un

contends that even though

ing

things presently

to

be from

other

living

things, if

all the

living

die off, then there

are no means

by

which all would not

again"

be is

spent

up into death

less the
exists

process of

"coming

to life

(avaBtojoxeo^ai,
from
what

cf.

7ie-72a, 72d)

the coming to be of the

living

again

nonliving.

164

Interpretation
if all
should

die off,

which partake of

life,

and when

they had died,

the

dead

would

remain

in that

same

form

and would not come

back to life again, is it

not altogether

alive? For if the living things should necessary that all at last be dead and not even one things here], come to be from the others (seemingly Socrates refers to the other living but the living things should die, do any means exist by which all would not be spent up

into death? (72b-d)

Thus the basis

of

the nature

argument must remain

hypothetical
the

since

it

rests

upon the assumption that at some cease to exist.

hypothetical time
the

all

At

such a time when

generation of

living simultaneously living beings can not take

living,
the the coming to

place through the reproductive processes

belonging

to the

be

again of

the

living

can be explained through

generation of

living from their

opposite, the

nonliving.3

The last

segment of the nature argument contains an

and

tween sleeping and waking and

uses the
said

illustration

of

important analogy be again. Here Socrates into life coming dying the sleeping Endymion (the lover of the moon, who was

to sleep eternally in the hills).

Endymion, Socrates
all came

says,
and

would

be idle talk

and would appear to

be

nowhere

if

to be asleep

there were no awak

ening from sleep (72b-c). In this case, it seems, it

to refer to anything as asleep,
to
waken.

would no

longer

make sense potential

since

sleeping necessarily implies the

that would be only "idle
talk."

Potential

must

imply

actualizability, for if a potential were

never actu

alized

it

would no

longer be

potential

Endym
or

ion then

would

be

"nowhere"

in the
no

sense

that

what

defines him, his sleeping

his

potential

for wakefulness,

longer

exists.

What does this tell asleep

of one
and

us about soul?

How

shall

we compare

falling

soundly from

living
level
I
3.

waking up (changes and dying? In going from the

of

within particular

individuals)

with

the processes

one example to the other we move

being

to another. If the
"nonliving"

living

did

not come to

be from

what
as

is dead
uses

"dead"

use

the terms

and

interchangeably in my discussion
it becomes
shifts

because
"the

Plato

the term ra TeOvemia in his nature argument,

meaning.

nonli

synonymous with
of

in

It becomes indistinguishable because Plato

of processes or generations.

from speaking

individual,

generated

beings to speaking

generations must always exist.

He really only gives arguments why certain types of And the fact that Plato is able to argue convincingly that the processes

or generations always exist means

that it is no longer necessary to suppose the individual souls exist continuity of individual soul after death, then there is no basis upon which to distinguish the dead from the nonliving. What is dead? For something to be (in the way the superficial argument for the immortality of the soul requires) there must be an individual soul-related
after

death. If there is

no

"dead"

continuity

with what

the specific
where should

being
Plato
die

was while

living. The

nonindividuation of

death becomes

especially clear at 72c-d vavai) if all living beings did

not exist.

argues

that all would be "spent

process of return

up into
again

death"

(clg

to

reft-

and

if the

to life

(to

avajiiwoxeothu)

It is

also clear at 77c-d that

Plato is

discussing

life

and

death

as general states and not at

the individual level: All the

other

living

come to

be from the dead for

soul comes

into life from

no place

than death and a state of death (ix ftavctTov

xai xov rtfrvavai).

no element to separate

it

out and

differentiate it from something that

to
use

Unindividuated deadness has is merely nonliving. Of course, it

dead individuals
will ex

is important for Plato to

ist in Hades
even after

continue

the term "the

dead"

throughout the nature argument given

that he wishes to maintain the appearance of

having

proven that the souls of

their deaths.

(Additionally,
it

there is no

handy Greek

equivalent

for "the

nonliving

if Plato had

wished to use

certainly

not ajiiov, and

there is no

&(a>ov.)

Man
and

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

things
all

165
no means

if the

living

die,

there are

by

which all would not

be
the

"spent

up"

into death. This

in its
entirety.

was a statement about what would occur within

whole taken

Socrates hypothesizes
to

that everything can actually at

argument.

some point
whole when

die;

this

hypothesis is necessary
life

his

The

state of the poten

this occurs is like the sound sleep

of an

individual in that the

tial that things will again partake of

must exist

just

as the

potential

for

waking exists in the sleeping individual. The functioning whole is such that living beings can again be generated.
In
what
which

of the

nonliving

natural

way then is soul to be understood given has had anything to say specifically about soul itself,

Socrates'

discussion,
least

none of

at

not about

the

souls we

know

as our own?

The in

arguments seemed what

to aim at proving that the po

arguments

tentiality for life

proven

must exist

is

not alive.

If the

finally

have

in fact that "the

souls of the
without

dead

exist,"

as

Socrates concludes,

what can

be

surmised about soul

seems

themselves? Soul the

finally

going outside the sphere of these arguments to be a potential for wakefulness which exists in
"asleep"

whole even when all

is dead,

or
life"

in the terms
said

of the analogy.

What

exists

before

soul

has "come into

not

can

be

to be

asleep (i.e., to have the

potential sense

actually presently perception, consciousness, knowledge

for life, but

experience

the things of
which we

life,

such as

of self ,

etc.,

experience)

without

speaking idle

nonsense

because the

living

must always come

into

being

again.

Beyond this

potential

nature argument.

for life, no other qualities are ascribed to soul within the Socrates no longer claims the souls exist in Hades. They do not
Potential for life,
or

exist
what

in

some separate place. even

soul,

rests somehow within as not exist

difficult to say that soul "exists had hoped Socrates would prove, for what exists as potential does

is dead. It is

somew

Cebes in the

same

way

as what

is

actual.

The Recollection Argument Not surprisingly, is the

connection

one of those present,

Cebes again, is
soul, this

still not satisfied:

What
to

between this

ungenerated

potential

for life

shown

exist through the

argument

nature argument and our own souls?

Cebes

now

brings up the

for

recollection.

He is

concerned

that it be

shown with

that the soul always

has knowledge ings know

and right

reason, that it has

some

link

the soul we human

be

as our own.

Cebes
the

mentions as proof

that we always have

knowledge
through

and right reason within,

fact they

are able to

be

made conscious

questioning and answering, and therefore they must have been there originally all along. There is a difficulty in this proof (which remains throughout the rest of the
recollection unknown

argument) because before this knowledge becomes conscious it is

us and not a part of our conscious soon

to

being.

Socrates
more

takes over this argument from

of argumentation

Cebes, but he begins

and

at a much process of

basic level

than the

questioning

answering

166

Interpretation
with

human beings. He begins When

we perceive

the innate receptivity

belonging
the

to

living
of

beings.

perceived ollection

in the is

past

anything (Cf. 73c -d). Socrates like

and

we also

"receive in

form"

mind

something

gives various examples wherein rec

role of eros

caused

by

by

unlike

things. The
Socrates'

is merely

al

luded to: It is lovers (ol igaoxai, 73d), in

a

beloved

boy

upon

seeing is

lyre

or cloak which

first example, who recollect belonged to him. When things

have
a

are

unlike,

we seem what

to recollect most readily

recollected.

when we eros

strong
to

emotional

investment in

(However,

is

not supposed

belong

to

the soul according to the apology section, at least not any nonphilosophical,
pure

im

desires.)
recollection argument preserves

Socrates'

the link established in the nature ar

life"

gument
which

between the

soul that exists or

before

"coming into

and the

living souls

have been generated,

have

come

into life. In his

analysis of recollec

tion, Socrates treats inanimate things (sticks, an instance of something dead, but once living, and stones, an instance of something we think of as always and com pletely nonliving) as though they too must aim and strive at something and yet fall short of what they "eagerly (cf. 74d-75b). Thus in this way Socrates
desire"

does

not

divide

us off

from the nonliving things; in the

the aiming and
Socrates'

recollection

argument,

stones

and

sticks

experience

striving

the

intentionality
to show

usually ascribed to the living alone. As and as he finally will suggest (cf. 74e-76d), it
"knowledges"

arguments will attempt makes no sense at

to say these expe

can give no ac

riences or
count of

suddenly
or

come

into

being

birth. We

how

why this should be so.

argument,
after

In the

next stage of the

having
how

described
itself"

what

he

means

by
of

"recollection,"

Socrates

gives an account of

we come to

have knowledge

Our ability to conceive of "the equal appears to be pos sible only because we have certain innate capacities, such as an inborn ability to perceive likeness and, at the same time, or lack (cf. 74a). Eros, or de deficiency
equal

"the

itself."

sire, is the

positive aspect of

the perception

of

lack.

Socrates'

account of

know

includes the sensation of aiming at something, reaching and grasping at something beyond us, in with the other things known and perceived. Socrates says that if someone should see the sensible equals and think that they aim to be

ing

like "the

itself,"

equal

he

must

have known "the

itself"

equal
we must

in

some previous
"prudence"

time, and he then uses this before birth (76c).

In the
itself"

argument

to prove that

have had

middle of

the recollection argument,

Socrates tacitly drops "the

as sticks and

equal seen

as

to aim.

being Nonliving beings

the
should aim at

at which

nonliving things (such

stones) are

they

might appear

really aim at the equal itself, even though to us to become more like as they decompose or disperse. That the
cannot

nonliving

something

other

than complete

likeness is impetus
the

crucial to the

argument as a whole at this point. not assumed as

Thus far in the dialogue's any

external

proof

Socrates has
be
must come

necessary the

existence of

which would

the cause of continual generation and

decay; therefore,

impetus

Man
from
of

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

167

within
new

the

his

"method"

regenerating being itself. Socrates seems to be following the path which is described later in the dialogue at 97b-io6d. He is

moving up through one hypothesis to the next until he reaches one which is sufficient. He seems to be exploring a possible explanation of the continual gene
sis of ple pages

living
such

beings
vovg,

without recourse which served

to some separate outside ordering princi

as

this

function in

Anaxagoras'

analysis perfect

(cf.

159

all would

If the nonliving progressed toward become monoform; but this is something which the
and 160 above). never able

likeness,

nature argument

hypothesizes is

to

happen,

since

if it did

all would cease

to be gener

ated and all would now

have been

tutes the beautiful and the good as

up into death. Socrates quietly substi that which is aimed at (75c-d, 76d-e).
spent

Whereas the

conclusion of the nature argument

is

restated

often, and signifi

cantly amended each time (cf. 7ie, 72a, 72d, 77c), the lacks an official conclusion. Socrates asks if it is true that
are always

recollection argument

if the
and

things

which we

talking

about such as

beauty

and good

exist,

if

we refer all

the

things of the senses toward these, which

and

being

ours we

if we liken the things

we perceive

to this or

by

discover existing before, means of this, then is it so that born in this human form

either our soul or our souls

(plural)
here

exist

before

we are

(cf.

76d-e).

The

suggestion

seems to

reference

toward

beauty

and good and some

be that only if there is always some making of likenesses or representa

ex
"soul"

tion

in

response to this perception of

our

ists before
in the

birth

"soul."

Otherwise the
potential

beauty can we really properly call what being which was referred to as
for life) lacks any
would real

nature argument

(the

likeness to the

souls

which we

know

as our own

during

life. The

arguments of the previous sections

and

the conclusion that the soul always exists

have been "spoken in

complicated question

vain."

Since Simmias
affirmative,
would mean

immediately

Socrates'

answers

in the

all manner of

difficulties

are covered over.

By

first saying that this

our souls

that our soul would exist after death

and then

changing to

(plural), Socrates silently

this

points to a problem. Does the previous existence of

aiming or reference toward beauty and good (a form of knowing which Socrates calls prudence at one point) prove that our own individual souls exist? It to; the

seems not

knowing
is

be

subconscious or

aiming of soul before it comes into life unconscious, like the knowledge in us which Cebes
and
not conscious

seems to spoke of

to begin

with which

before it is brought
reference

answering.

Another indication that this is that Socrates

in questioning and toward beauty and good is not

out

personal or conscious

gives no account of

how

and

why

such

things are forgotten at birth. Such an account is necessary if these things were

consciously known. At the end of the has been back to the

recollection argument when

Simmias

complains that there

no proof that
nature

the individual soul exists after

death, Socrates directs him

argument,

is necessary

the nature argument

our

the singular, not

already shown that the soul (soul in individual souls, in the final amendment at 77c-d) must al-

insisting having

this supplies all the additional proof which

168

Interpretation
if the

ways exist

living

are

to

come

to be again

from the dead. The

in detail how

nature argu

ment standing alone, although concluding that the capacity for

regeneration and

change always exists come to

opposite

in nature, had why to be from

not shown

and

why the

living
that

be,

or even

separations

between things
.

are maintained, given

things

come

opposites

The

recollection

argument,

taking

qualities which

belong

to our own souls,

hypothesizes that these

existent soul of

activities might also

belong

to the ungenerated, always

Soul's directedness toward something be yond it, its sensation of lack, together with its involvement with form (with im in the past) might explain in ages like but not precisely like what it has
the nature argument.
"known"

greater

detail how

soul

is

a source of change even

before it

comes

into life. If one it

does

not go outside of

the circle of the nature and recollection arguments, the

beauty
must which

and good which soul

greater

is

said always to reach toward seems as though and

be the

perceptivity belongs to life. This would be true

knowledge, including
of soul even when

self-knowledge,

it

exists

in the

nonliving state. Socrates gives

various

indications that the

conclusions of

the recollection ar

gument are more tentative than those of the nature

argument, but it has extended

the nature argument and attempted to fill up the incompleteness in that argument

in the only way

souls'

possible

by

considering the

activities of our own

souls, our

powers of reference and representation.

soul

These

powers exist even when

with

is

not yet conscious or self-conscious.

Involvement

form is something
the

which also and

takes place at nonconscious

levels in the

regeneration of own

living
are a

the reproduction of offspring,

not

which are

images too in their

way that
not

like, but

conscious

completely like. The soul's activity even when soul is alive.

apprehension of

form is

solely

According

to the nature argument, the

existence of soul source of

is necessary for the coming to be of the living; as such it is a change, of metamorphosis, in fact. If, as the recollection argument in
soul of the

timates, the

nonliving

world

is

moved and

is

a source of

becoming

through some sensation of

nature argument would

lack
a

or

deficiency,

then our souls and the soul of the

have

kinship to

one another.

With its

analysis of soul's

innate receptivity to form and soul's innate sensation of deficiency, the recollec tion argument has taken us further down a path toward an explanation of genera
tion and
soul of

decay

but it has

also

lead

us

further away from the

pure,

disembodied

the apology.

The Noncomposite Soul Section

The

recollection argument

has brought to light

away from
perfect

new

issues,
of

new questions.

How,

precisely, does

soul aim

homogeneity
Pursuit
(the
soul

toward life and the answer

will

toward greater
require a

knowledge, including
of

self-knowledge?

discussion
with

the

interrelationship
and

between

being

shown to

be

involved

form

and

potential)

body. Directed

by

the requirements of the

Man
ongoing

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

169
of an

investigation,
of soul.

the question takes the form

inquiry
did for

into the

"collect-

edness"

The

nature and recollection arguments

not prove

that our

own souls
Cebes'

exist,

each still

"gathered
Socrates'

together"

after

death (a third
and

requirement

in

initial

objection to

apology,

70a-

b)

all time nor

is there
the

any
soul

proof

that the soul can exist in complete separation from the

now wishes

body,

quite

opposite

in fact. When Simmias

Socrates to

show

in

addition that the

is

not scattered after

death, Socrates

says that

they

require a charm

to

charm

away their
posite and charm

fear

of

death (77c). Thus the last

unable

argument that the soul

is

noncom

therefore

to disperse at death is of

a questionable

character,

being

linked

with myth

(ii4d)

and myths with

the poets, who compose

myths, not arguments

(Adyoi) (61b).
argument, Simmias source,
suggests

At the

end of
put

the

recollection

that the soul, hav

again at

ing

been

together

from

some other

might

simply disband

death. Socrates does

gathered

not proceed

by

arguing that each individual soul remains

argues sets

together

after

death,

that the soul is not composite

a

Simmias intimates he might; instead he and for this reason unlikely to disperse. He
as
previous

up

dichotomy
with

which

is

alien

to the two

arguments, but

which

is
of

compati

ble

the apology

section.

The

world

is divided into two kinds

and visible,

being

invisible,
anoetic,

changeless, noetic, noncomposite,

composite.

Socrates

gives a series of proofs

of

constantly changing, that the soul fits into the cat

soon after

egory

of

the

noncomposite

form

being. However,

he describes the
such a

activities of various

human souls, (cf. 83a).

soul

including Subtly
is

philosophic

souls, in

way that

the human

soul appears

to be a gathered and gathering type of

and not so

being

the philo

sophic soul most of all argument that the

subtly, he

undercuts

his

own

individual

noncomposite and not able

to disperse.

The

complicated and contains ments

making the division between the two separate forms of being is many layers of hypotheses, but the supporting argu themselves are not fleshed out. After positing that ;/ anything happens to
process of

be noncomposite, then that thing, // anything, ought not undergo dispersion (78b-c), Socrates turns, not directly to soul, but to what is apprehended by the soul. The equal itself and the beautiful itself are said to be taken hold of only by
the reasoning of the intellect

(79a);

the role of sense perception

grasped

is

now

denied

(compare 74a-b). These invisible things

changeless and monoform and

by
akin

the soul are said to be to (but not the same as)

the soul

is

said

to

be

them. On the
cloaks,4

other

hand,

the visible, tangible things, such as men, horses or

or

which

changing and rates ignores the likeness between

Socrates
as uses combinations of a

may be called equal never in any way like

beautiful,

are claimed

to be constantly

each other or themselves

(78e-79a). Soc

members of a species

that allows them to be

4.

cloak,

lyre, horses,

and

human beings,

and pictures of these 78e).

things,

illustrations in the images

recollection and noncomposite soul arguments

(73d-74a,

The lyre

and cloak anticipate

of soul

that Simmias and Cebes will later use, but the horses draw our at
with

tention to

another

dialogue,

the

Phaedrus,

its important discussion

of soul.

In the Phaedrus, the

powers, or

desires,

of the composite

human

soul are

likened to two horses

and a charioteer.

170
called

Interpretation
and

the

by the same name man or horse being itself has with itself as it exists
present changeable groups.

he ignores the unity form

of

and

likeness

through time.
changeless

The
visible,

division between the invisible,

being

and

the

form

also passes over whole categories of things which

fit

into both
ble
and

The

actual experience of perception and of are

reasoning is invisi Nonetheless the

changing, so too

passions,

desires, fears, hopes,

turns

etc.

argument about

the two forms of

supplied

tion and all

which

information
the

being by the

into

an attack against sense

percep

senses,

including

presumably
79c).

hearing,

is

one of

senses

that grasps

what

is invisible (cf.

devastating argument against the dichotomy is given by Socrates Immediately after positing the changelessness of soul and the things perceived by soul and right before formally severing the connection between
The
most

himself.

soul's points

reasoning

and sense perception,

might

Socrates

overturns

his

own argument.

He

out, gratuitously it

seem, that the division between the

visible and

changing things and the invisible, changeless things is based in human nature (79b It is the senses themselves, telling us what is visible and what is not,
-c).

body- soul dichotomy the very supply the information that yields the senses now and in the apology section under attack. The validity of the argument (which deprecates sense perception) and the value of sense perception stand or
which

fall together. Contained implied

challenge
much of

within

this delicate Platonic

answer

irony

there is of course an

what

is the

then, how

much

in the

dichotomy is
is

cor

rect, how

it is false? Sense

perception

by

itself is neutral; it is the intel

right or

lect's interpretation
wrong.

of the evidence supplied through the senses that

After the division between

on

body

and soul

has been completed, Socrates apply only

adds

two important

new characteristics.

These

characteristics

when soul

and

body

are

together,
the

not

if they

were

to exist in separation. The soul rules and

its ruling and compre hending capacity, soul is said to be like the divine, since what is divine guides that which is bodily and mortal (cf. 79e-8oa). Soul, alone by itself, is not
master while

is

body

is

ruled and serves.

Because

of

claimed

to be divine, only soul in conjunction with body. How important then is the divine and guiding aspect of

soul?

This is

an

issue

linking
In this
of

the first part of the noncomposite soul argument with the last part. The

second part contains section soul

discussions

of

the

is described

as a

interrelationship between body and soul. being that changes according to the direction
Underneath the
question of whether soul another more section

its loves, desires,

lingers
of soul's

and passions.

is

composite and

sue

changing or noncomposite and changeless the freedom of soul. The noncomposite soul freedom
on a new

basic is

treats the prob

to the political

lem

level,

the level

most

interesting
dealt

theorist. Although the nature

capacities

and recollection arguments

with certain

innate

for

change

belonging

to soul,

neither of

these two major arguments

had anything to say about change in form in the kind of soul that is specifically human. When human beings talk about freedom and virtue they are speaking

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

of change

-171

about the

possibility
able to

that occurs in response to opinion

(do^a,

gSe-

99a) (itself
what

change)

about what

is best,

as opposed to change

initiated

by

is

bodily

in form. The

noncomposite soul section, which opens with an ex

us over

plication of
realm

the body-soul separation, has thus taken

into the

political

of

body
of

one part

human beings. Prior to making the distinction between soul and there is no possibility of discussion ruling, the other obeying
and choice of action.
of

freedom

Likewise,
put

of

course, there is

the

discovery

determinism or,

into

more ancient

possibility of terms, the belief that ev

no

erything happens by necessity, in the form of chance. If the import of the nature and recollection arguments has been accepted, the issue of determinism is more or less moot. The whole thrust of the philosophic
analysis

in the Phaedo has been toward

to have certain capacities

an

understanding It has

of soul as a source of

change and metamorphosis.

In these two

previous major arguments soul always

has

been

shown

or potentials.

been involved
nature argu

with change of

form

at some

level. To quickly recapitulate, in the allowing the emergence

still embedded of

ment soul was analyzed as a power

life,

a potential

that always remains even when all

ing"

is

in

an unconscious or

"sleep
powers
al

state.

In the

recollection argument soul was surmised to

have innate
linked the

of perception of

likeness

and

deficiency,

and

along

with

this a directedness

ways toward some good and

beauty. The

recollection argument

soul of as our

the nature argument

own.

with

the

conscious and

directed type

of soul we

know

At the

conclusion of

the

recollection argument

it

remained to relate the of

powers of

the soul of the

recollection argument

to the

transforming potency
soul

the human soul existing

within a political and philosophical environment.

At

least this further step is necessary if the

examined.

nature of the

human

is to be

fully
-

The

noncomposite

"soulform"

setting forth a "body dichotomy. Now that the body-soul separation has been maneu
soul

section

began

form"

by

vered

into

place

this distinction

being

a most essential one

for

political

dis

course,
ment of

and of course

for philosophy

altogether

the noncomposite soul argu

turns to an analysis of

political and philosophical activity.

The

second

half

the

noncomposite soul section

is

soul's guidance and transformation of

immensely complex in its description of the body and of the soul's attempt to free itself
in the
account

from the body.

At first the
gods

have

a prominent role

(cf.

8od, 81 a, 82b-c)

reminiscent of

the apology section

free"

where

himself has
yet

would set us

from the

body

lovers of learning say that "the god (67a). This is despite the fact no proof

been

given

that the gods exist. Instead the

intervening
The

arguments

have

worked together to eliminate the power of the god(s). gument are

noncomposite soul ar

itself has just linked the

and

gods with what

-80a).

is

bodily

in form insofar

as

they
the

divine

ruling in

nature

(79c
the

However,

as the argument progresses as opposed to

philosophy takes the

god(s), is

place of

gods.

At 84a philosophy,

said to set us

free from the body. The

bringing

in

of

this new god,

phi-

172

Interpretation
with great

seems to way that philosophy practi important be in alliance with the ruling gods. Preservation of this link is whole basis of cally speaking, since philosophy, love of wisdom, becomes the consist in not be morality here. The orderliness and courage of the philosopher (83c- 84a). The phi ing moved by loves and desires other than love of wisdom

losophy, is done

subtlety

and

in

such a

losopher's

virtue

has been
elevated

called

the only genuine sort of

virtue

(69b).

Philosophy 82d-83b, 84a)

specific
somewhat

is

and, like a Greek god, given a

persona of

its

own

(cf. in

as though it existed apart from

same

being
of

love in the

souls of
and

human beings. At the

time the political

realm

is degraded

less

subtle

way than the

downgrading

the role of the gods. With

several sentences

the autonomy of the

political sphere

is dissolved:
into the

Those

who

have

preferred

injustice

and

tyranny

and

rapacity
those

enter

race of

wolves and

hawks
said

and

Of course, is

kites; or where else can we say Cebes, into the ones of such sort.
also own care? certainly.

of such sort go?

Therefore, he
what most

said,

the others are clear, where each would go,

according to

like its

It is clear, he said,

Accordingly
who

the

most

happy

of these and those who go

into the best

place are

those

have

practiced the social and political

virtue, which

they

call moderation and

jus

tice,

having

become

such

from habit [or custom] happy?

to go
again

and care without

philosophy

and

vovgl

How

are these the most

are

Because these
some such as of

likely

into

some such political and tame race, either

bees

or of wasps or of

ants, or even

into

the same

human

race

again,

and moderate men come to

be from

them.

Probably
It is
not

(82a-b).

the practice of customary social virtue that makes us specifically human.

Even

some

insects

practice

these virtues; in essence, there is no difference. This

strange consequence would all soul

follow from the

somewhat

nature and recollection arguments. we can not

If

is

understood

to

be

free,

divide

off one segment of

living ity of
and

soul

from

another and

say it only has freedom,

us

with

the attendant possibil

choice and virtue.

According

to the statement quoted above, philosophy

other

vovg

are what

distinguishes

from the

Philosophy
The
seems
call of

is

a new entrant at this point

in the

living beings. inquiry into the

nature of soul.

nature and recollection arguments are examples of philosophic

inquiry

it

later this type

of

of

inquiry

is

referred

to as "wisdom

(ooq)ia),

which

they
aim

investigation

nature"5

yet

the soul, has not been explored.

philosophy itself qua species of love, an How does it come into being? What is its
importance

sta

tus? How does this most complex love connect with, or flow out of, the more ba
sic

loves in the

soul?

These

questions are of utmost

given the Soso

5. Xocpia when it appears here at 96a is particularly striking since the noun by itself occurs rarely in the Phaedo. In fact I think this is the only place it appears in the dialogue.

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

in its

173
truest
nature

cratic assertion that the soul

pursuit of

innermost,

is inclined toward

knowledge.
crucial

First, it is
the

to note that love of wisdom

and

freedom

last

segment of the noncomposite soul argument.

of escape

closely tied in And freedom is discussed

are

in terms is

from the imprisonment

what

of what

is

"bodyform."

As to the

posi

tive aspect of truth

what

the soul reaches toward

and grasps when

it

escapes

bodily

this is not discussed in any detail. The positive aspect, the goal,
of always existent causes of

is

presented

later in the dialogue. It is knowledge

generation and

decay,

knowledge

which

incidentally
not of

leads to

discovery

of

the

deathlessness
As

of soul

(cf. 95e-iooc), though

earlier, there
are

the individual soul.

was mentioned

two basic presentations of the soul's free

dom from individual

takes on
a

body
soul

here. In the first, the one heaviest in references to the gods, the is highly responsible for its bodily form. Each soul in its next life

form corresponding to its desires and concerns (8od-82c). A picture is drawn of how the world might appear if, at some point, the individual soul its
aims and concerns chose
soul

through the

its

own species

form. In the

second account conscious

soul exercises pain

consciously aiming freedom in is its

is

responsible

for

much

less. What the

response to sense perception and pleasure and

changing and invisible things felt in the soul (cf. 82c, 82e-83e). Freedom from these invisible but body-related perceptions is achieved
wisdom.

through philosophy, the love of

seems

As

presented

by Socrates,
it
when

to come
and

upon

the

soul

suddenly,

taking

possession of

philosophy it is wholly
evi

bound

fastened in the
body."

body

(82d-e). Yet

as

the description is expanded,

dence

accumulates

bound fast in the

showing that the To the extent that philosophy

with

prephilosophic soul

is

not

really

so

"wholly

can speak with

this soul,

exhorting

and

reasoning

it,

to the extent the soul is susceptible to varying

beliefs,
pendent

nurture,

and even

rhetoric, (cf.
a

82d-84b), it
soul

seems

to be already

inde is

from body. There is in

human

hint that the

philosophy begins to

speak to

a soul engaged

a social and political existence.

Philosophy
as

suggests to the asserts

merely

political

that the orderliness

cise of control

being that he is and bravery of "the

free

not as

free

he had thought. It

many"

qualities

in

regard

to pleasure and pain

the soul

are not genuine

already implying exer (83e-84a).

was mentioned

How does love

above,

of wisdom

from the body? As

sense perception and pleasure and pain are

key

elements

in the

soul's es

cape,

or

failure to escape, from body. Both

attacked on grounds of their

sense perception and pleasure and

pain are

sense perception

to deceive seems

deceptiveness. However, the ability of more to be a route through which our percep

tions and opinions

all not and

about pleasure and pain can what causes

be

attacked.

The

greatest evil of
when

is

believing
and

that

the soul great pleasure or pain

is true

it is

it is in this way that the human soul is put into bondage "opinions."6 (Cf. 83c -d.) forced to share the body's
the noncomposite soul argument, the status of
greatest evil a

by

the

body
accord

6. After
with

Xoyoc. becomes

a central

issue. In

this, the

human

being

can suffer

is

changed

to hatred of Xoyoc (89d).

174

Interpretation
asks

Socrates
ing"

if it is true that the things causing "the

untrue.

soul of each
ones

human be

the

greatest pleasure and pain are

mostly the visible What

(83c). Although

Cebes

answers

affirmatively, this seems

causes

human beings the

opinion,

greatest pleasure and pain are things and thought added

that have a large

measure of

belief,

in,

things such as
and

honor,
must

the god(s), power, speeches, hope of

or

salvation, foreknowledge
and so on.

fear

of

death, beauty
be

nobility

of

soul,

justice,

All

such things

seemingly

consigned

to the realm of the de

ceptive and

uncertain, since

they

exist outside of

the

realm of

the "divine and

monoform"

pure,

and

(83c)

except that this category itself

is

quite

dubious (cf. in the

pp. 169-170 above).

Despite

Socrates'

reiteration of

the rigid

body

-soul

dichotomy

non-

composite soul section,

his

analysis

has disclosed
when

a soul which always moves

along

a continuum of

freedom. Even
enslaved

the soul

body
in his

it is

not

absolutely

but

willing

partner.

is originally bound to the The imprisonment is

through the soul's own desire and the soul imprisoned is

imprisonment"

"very

much an assistant

(82e-83a). Indeed, if the

soul were ever

wholly tied to
to

bodily

pleasure and

pain, it is hard to see how philosophy

even when

would get a chance

begin to loosen it from the body. However,

possible to

the soul is free it is im

what

discuss its freedom

esp.

without reference

to its relationship to

is

bodily
a

in form (cf. myth,

conclusion of

114c).
soul

At the high

the noncomposite
of

section, the dialogue has

shown to

reached

point:

Philosophy, love

wisdom, has been

be the love that

freedom from body. But the position that philosophy is precarious, both philosophically and politically. Philosophy ex tends the original realization, primary to all human beings, that sense perception
offers the soul the greatest
now occupies can

be deceptive, to human
much pleasure or

opinions

regarding

whatever should cause

them "ex

ceedingly human

fear or

desire"

grief or

(83b). The

noncomposite soul

section presents a vivid picture of

opinions.

The

analysis

philosophy solidifying doubt in regard to all could be a formula for what is now called relativ
once all a

ism,

which

naturally takes hold

be valued,
even

human

perceptions are shown to

be

sus of

ceptible to questioning.
wisdom can

However,
if
all

basis is

also

delineated

upon which

love

the other loves in the

soul are

dubious.

This foundation has its

truth. Truth must
man

weaknesses.

the greatest possible freedom from the

Philosophy body as the

must

soul

supposedly allows the soul is grasping toward the

In

be

valuable

in itself; truth

be

attainable.

fact,

most

hu

beings

seem

to have a natural need for truth, at some level. Few are able to

something and aim at it once they sense that that objective is in some way false. Truth may be impossible for human beings to attain (cf. 66e, 85c-d, 91b).
value

Truth's

absence creates a vacuum

in the

social and political sphere.

Alterna

tively, truth if attained may be

myths might

detrimental

to that sphere. As a remedy, politic

be

constructed to transform the

truth,
in

myths such as those

found in

the Phaedo (cf. noa-ii4d, 77c

point

61b),

and

other

Platonic dialogues. At this

will attain a

in the Phaedo

a separate noetic realm wherein

the philosopher

Man
divine

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

truth
and will

175 join the

truth
gods

and pure and monoform

has been

posited.

The
as

existence of

this separate realm

of changeless

is

quite problematic

itself,

has been
In the

pointed out already. second

half of the Phaedo,

together.

all

the

diverse

strains of the

first

part

discus issue

sion of soul are pulled of

the nature of the truth grasped to

Everything by philosophy.

is brought into focus

around the

Philosophy's

truth

mitted

involve knowledge
the

of generation and

decay

and the

inquiry

is openly ad becomes

concentrated on

body

-soul

interaction, moving away from

the rigid body-

soul separation of the

apology

and noncomposite soul sections.

PHILOSOPHY'S REALM

For

a short

time again at the center of the

dialogue,
.

the

momentum comes

di

rectly from Simmias and Cebes. They insist on unraveling the Penelope-like fab ric that Socrates has just woven for the soul (cf 84a-b) his nurture of belief in
the monoform, changeless nature
native model of causal
of

the individual

soul.

Each

suggests an alter

interrelationship
body,
Simmias'

between

body
a

and soul.

In

Cebes'

im

age,
and

soul

is the

weaver of

soul's cloak; yet the

individual

soul can weaken produced

die (86e-88b). In
of

image,

soul

is like

harmony
soon

instrument

the

body, necessarily dispersing

as

as

the

(85e-86d). Simmias intimates that the

some

body

and soul might

be

by the body dies produced by

demiurge(s)

(86c). issues. The

nature and recollection argu

Simmias has beings

reopened a number of

ments taken together

had

offered a possible explanation of the generation of

living
the

without recourse

to

any

sort of separate

demiurge. However, the

presenta

tion of the

body

-soul

dichotomy

in the

noncomposite soul section opened

way to
playful

account

Some ruling and invisible demiurge(s) is now available to for the ordering in the whole available not just as a mythic tool or an actual philosophical explanation. Socrates describes but as conjecture,
new answers.
"attack"

this philosophic

against

his

arguments replaced

in

grand

Homeric terms (89b-c, battles

95a-b), for philosophy and truth have of value might be played out.

every

other arena wherein

Socrates
possible and

pauses

to

make clear

that

if

what

Simmias
of

says

is true,

virtue of

is

not

for human beings (cf.

92e-94a).

Aspects

the arguments
of

Simmias
the

Cebes

are then united and transposed

into the language

Anaxagoras,

philosopher who gave

definitive

expression

to the possibilities inherent in the

body-soul division. As

cause of generation and

decay

and origin of

living

be

ings,
cal

Anaxagoras

posited

vovg, which,

he said,
in

existed

originally
things

as a

separate,

all-alike, all-knowing
whole.7

or

determining
to be

force that

produced

the order of the physi

which explains

Later vovg

came

mixed

with some

why these things have life.

7.

Virtue

and choice

become just

as problematic on

Simplicius, Fr.

Simplicius Phys. Fragment 12, 164,24 and 156,13 or Kirk and Raven, pp. 372-73. Also, 17, Phys. 163,20, wherein Anaxagoras denies that qualitative change takes

176

Interpretation
Simmias'

Anaxagoras'

account as on

for

vcwcis all-alike and changeless and

liv

ing

beings differ only

of soul

by having
of

more or

less

of

it.
Socrates'

Anaxagoras'

conception

vovg is

similar
soul

in many
argument

respects

to monoform,

description

in the
exist

noncomposite

soul

as

changeless, able to
course of

in

complete separation

from body. However, in the

his discussion

Anaxagoras'

of

thesis and of how vovg might order the

whole, Socrates

gives an analysis of what we mean

by

vovg (autobiographical
what

section, 97b-99d). Because Anaxagoras did not pay attention to

vovg

is,

he

finally

reduced

it to

physical causation. of

But vovg is

an

individual

deciding
It is
not

force,
simply

conscious

choice

the best

in the

context of a

political, nonunitary
98b-99c).

whole, dependent upon

a

having

a certain

bodily

form (cf.

unitary force. For there to be choice, the soul noncomposite, by itself, apart from any bodily form.

cannot

be monoform,

Philosophizing
(cf. 96a-b,
97b).

too involves choice: The

philosopher gropes

along many

ways

or possible routes of

inquiry,

and

Socrates himself
of

finally

chose a composite

Upon the failure

insignificance,8

first the

minimal

hypothesis that

what

way is

bodily
ond

in form

alone can explain generation and or at

decay

(cf. 96a-97b),

and sec

the

failure,

the other extreme, of vovg alone as an ade

a new route.

quate explanation

(cf. 97b-99d), Socrates took

examine sort of

To him "it
of

seemed
beings"

necessary taking flight into Xoyovg to (99e).9 Aoyot become prominent as a

philosopher can as

in those the truth

the
which

intermediary

means

by

the

Socrates has
what

pointed out

grasp the truth. But this is a specifically human way of knowing in the recollection argument: When a human being
perishing is merely combining and separating of always exis Raven). See also Simpl. Phys. Fr. 14, 157,7, or P- 374 m Kirk and

place

is

called generation and

tent things; (p.

369 in Kirk

and

Raven.

8. There is
This is because

some
what

ambiguity "the

as to whether the whole might not

be

arranged and caused

by

vof'c.

best"

means undergoes a change within the autobiographical section and

would ar

the best is that according to which vovg would arrange things. Socrates first expected vovg
range and establish each

thing

as would

be best for that

the best

particular

thing (97c-d). Next he

for
all

amends

this

to

say that vovg

would arrange
Socrates'

things as is best for each and good

in

common

(98b). The final

statement

after

own choice of

is itself shown to be in
for
together"

regard

to the human whole,

the 7roA(c, and to involve self-sacrifice

is that

when people search

causes

they fail

to think of

"the

good and

necessity

which constrains and

what

holds

(99c). The
particular

qualification that

vovg

should order

things according to

is best for any

thing by itself is tacitly dropped.

seems to

Socrates

says

he

could not

find

out about this sort of cause and

he then

treat the possibility

noth

that the whole might be ordered in this way

by

vof'cas

inconsequential. Perhaps this is because

ing
no

is

added

by

this beyond what the nature argument had already shown to be necessary for the con

tinual generation of new beings. The nature argument assumed the material of generation is

limited;
back its

individual if

good

is

able

to be maintained since each generated

continue.

being eventually
is
not

must give

substance

generation

is to

Novg as

an

ordering

principle

distinguishable from this

good of

necessity

which

impinges

upon each generated

being and

the good which

what

is the

the regenerat

ing

whole.

Thus, vovg
since

would no

longer be differentiated from

is usually

called nature, with its

economic constraints.

ble to philosophy
through
9.

At any rate, knowledge of this separate, unitary, ordering voOgis not accessi it can neither be taught and thus learned nor can it be discovered for oneself
suggests

inquiry

(cf. 99c-d). So Socrates

shall

in the Phaedo; the Timaeus is

case of vof'c.

another matter.

Aoyog I

leave
of

untranslated since, as

in the

the

Greeks
with

allowed

Xoyog to re
can mean

tain such

complexity

meaning

all centered around the

human

facility

language. It

Man

and

Nature in Plato's Phaedo

177

knows, he
Socrates
of

can give an account

(Xoyog)

of what

he knows (76b). He does

themselves images.

not

grasp the truth

directly

but through Xoyoi,

which are

says that to examine the truth of the

beings in Xoyoi is

no more of a

images than is to study this truth in visible activities and their products study (99e- 100a). Both Xoyoi and egya are evidence of the projective nature of iegya)
soul

hypothesized

always
with

to exist in the

nature

and

recollection

arguments.

Soul's involvement logical

scious

images has

a vast range

from the

nonconscious

bio

reproductive

processes, to the retention of to the

self of some

level

of representation

images in memory, to the con "beauty itself by itself and good level
at which

others"

and magnitude and all

the

(100b)
and good

the

vovg

operates. can

These only
and

particular

images

beauty
as a
not

and

the reaching toward these

"eclipsed"

exist

99d-iooa).10

because vovg If it were

"eclipsed"

unitary ordering force is missing or they would not be able to

accomplishment

(cf.

appear

to us

to be

grasped as objects of choice.

In

Xoyog,
to

soul attains

its highest
way

for it

re-presents the whole as

world
ror."

itself in

a conscious

and

it

sees
of

itself for the first time,

in

a mir and

Knowledge

of the natural

whole,

the causal interaction of

with an

body

soul, leads to

self-knowledge:

Socrates began

investigation

of nature

of

(96a) and ended with images, and at its

The

the knowledge of soul

most primal

as projective

force,

maker and user

level

as the

form

of

life (io6d).

Philosophy

catches soul

in its final act,

soul

struggling to
order are

grasp "itself

by

itself."

natural order and

the human

linked in the Phaedo. The freedom

of soul seems movement of

to be a progressive freedom as it is reflected in the progressive

Socrates'

nature, recollection, and

noncomposite soul arguments.

just words,
ovxa, and

or an account or argument, thought or reason.

In the

statement

quoted, the beings (ra

immediately
beings.

above, ra ngayuoTo) of which the truth is sought are the visible and gener

ally

perceptible 10.

Examining
in
to suffer

in Xoyoi the truth in

of

the beings is first likened to

looking

at the

image
must

of

the

eclipsed sun

water or what

some other such

thing (99d-e). Socrates

at

says

he decided he

be

care

ful

not

those who look at the eclipsed sun suffer

soul would

their eyes are ruined.

Likewise

Socrates thought that his

each of
at

be blinded if he looked
sun

the things and tried to

the senses. What then does the

itself and its

eclipse stand

for

as an

grasp them with image? If people look

only the corona, a phenomenon produced by the sun. They are not able to see what is causing this phenomenon. When people try to understand the beings through the senses alone, then, like those who look at the corona and are blinded, their souls are blinded.
eclipsed

the sun when it

is

they

see

They
The

too

are able

sun represent?

to see only the outermost phenomena and not what caused them. What does the Not the Xoyoi or the ioya, since they are likened to images of the eclipse of the sun.
sun seems

eclipse of the

to

represent

the absence of the all-determining, all-alike vovg of

a

Anaxagoras'

theory. The hidden sun, vovg, remains (of

different

nature

than

Anaxagoras')

as

that

which soul always

unknowingly is drawn toward, I. This image But

as

the potential

it

seeks to

fulfill.

1 1

The

soul with the aid of

language imagines itself

as a monadic unit with a changeless per

sonal core

the selfsame

of the self seems to

have

some

truth in it and some falseness.

To
is

gather or collect

is

an essential characteristic of soul,

while

including

the gathering of itself into itself

(67c, 8oe, 83a;

what allows

see also I05d).

the gathering

it to form into

particular generated

ability of soul (which occurs at many levels) beings, it is at the same time what ensures that the
one

boundaries
separation

of each

being
its

will remain open and

its form fluid. When

tries to discover a

soul

in

from

all

attachments

extending

outside

itself,

there seems to

be nothing there.

178 The

Interpretation
suggest

arguments
power.

the soul always exists

having

collecting

and recol

lecting
what

It

preserves at

both

conscious and unconscious

levels the form

of

ward

has been. Beyond this, soul is always reaching in a certain direction, to life, toward intensification of its perceptions and toward consciousness and
self-consciousness.

finally

Soul's

potentials are what make

both the larger

natu

ral whole and

the

smaller

human

social and political sphere evolutionary.

To

be evolutionary is to be both historical and transhistorical holds and incorporates something of the past forms in itself
that it moves beyond these boundaries.

historical in that it
and

transhistorical in

What does this

mean

in the

context of a more

history,
of

or more

the structure

which

precisely perhaps, a fear of has evolved through time) is

The term
to designate
and action.
an opaque

contemporary understanding of history? In modern times history (or

often seen as an unchosen

fixer

both

"historical"

events and values.

is

frequently
show

used

in

Nietz

sche-style manner

historical horizon

with

the power to

limit human thought

The Phaedo helps to

how

history

is both

producer of and a product of

freedom.

limit in

so

far

as

freedom

and structure

History is only naturally a producer of are always found together. The Phaedo

shows soul to

be evolutionary

and transhistorical

by disclosing

soul's permanent

capacity ing beings

and

striving to move beyond the limitations of any given structure. Liv

are

bounded

by

their species

forms

and their specific potentials arise

out of this.

Human beings, in

addition are

bounded

by their special social

arise out of this. are what give

and po

litical forms its

and their greater potentials and

freedoms

The many
the
natural

turns soul takes in

whole

its

search

for

conscious

knowledge

order.

The freedom

of

soul,

being invisible,
to assert that

tends to disappear from

sight; it can only be proven to exist through the methods of philosophy.

Ethically
Phaedo,
ultimate order of soul

speaking

what

does it

mean

soul

is

evolutionary?

The

which on

the surface appears almost apolitical, turns out to be one of the

Platonic
the

political statements.

Politics

and metaphysics are

joined

the

whole

is

shown

to be produced, not originally

by

vovg alone, but

by

reaching in the direction of vovg. (Novg seems to be that which Socrates means is in itself beautiful and good.) In the Phaedo, Plato collapses the political
and natural spheres chasm
rated of

to

reveal a whole

that is value-saturated. There is no gaping

between

natural

history

and mankind's

history. Within this

value-satu

whole, only philosophy (in its first wider signification, including all forms inquiry) is the natural path for human beings to follow. Throughout the dia

logue Socrates insists that philosophy provides the only real foundation for hu man activity, and his arguments attempt to show that this is so. A
modern political theorist might

be tempted to

complain
and

that, like its impos

sible changeless counterpart regimes cent philosophy-centered regime

in Plato's Republic

Laws,

this

magnifi

is

historical

evidence supports the

impossible. Except that in this case Phaedo: Human knowledge advances, always
also quite

wandering along a path that combines some mixture of belief in the controlling god(s) discovered by vovg, and technology, a debased form of philosophy.

The Theaetetus

and

the

Possibility

of

False Opinion

David Bolotin
St. John's College, Santa Fe

The

section of

the

Theaetetus*

that begins
concerned

Theaetetus'

with

suggestion

that
the

true opinion might

be knowledge is Socrates

instead,

almost

entirely,

with

question of false opinion.

what

will

later

Theaetetus'

refute

suggestion about

knowledge is

by

reminding him

of

the difference between an

who

eye-

awareness of the

truth and that of those jurymen

merely believe it. In the

meantime, however, he and Theaetetus engage, unsuccessfully, in repeated at tempts to discover how false opinion is possible. When he finally abandons these

attempts, Socrates

chides them

both for

having

turned aside

from the

search

for

knowledge to investigate something else. And indeed, from view, the search for false opinion had emerged as a diversion from
quiry (200c8-d2; kind
of return

Theaetetus'

point of

that main

in

cf. i87dio-n).
presented

Socrates, however, had initially

done

the

search

for false
do

opinion as a

to the earlier argument,

and an attempt to

well what

had been

inadequately before. Later on he hints more fully why they needed this re turn, by acting quite ashamed at the bizarre statements they would be forced to
agree with unless

it became

clear

how false

opinion can exist (i9oe2- 19135).

He

won't even

tell Theaetetus what these statements are until the danger of their

having
of

to agree to them

is

past.

Yet despite

Socrates'

apparent shame and

his

air

mystery,

which suffice

to blunt
mind.

Theaetetus'

curiosity, it isn't hard to

will

guess
with

what statements

he has in

He fears that they

be forced to agree,

that there is no false opinion, or that every opinion is true for the one holds it. Socrates had already hinted, in fact, that their refutation of this unqualified Protagoreanism had left something to be desired. After completing

Protagoras,
who

it, he
his
that

turned to a

refutation of

the further opinion that nothing

is

stable.

And

yet
and

conclusion

to this further

argument was

that

they

were rid of

Protagoras,

they didn't yet have to agree with him that every man is a measure of all things (i83b7-c4; cf. i79aio-c2). But why should Protagoras have cropped up
again after

this new

argument?

And why, especially,

should

they don't yet have to lier refutation?

There are, in fact, ion

agree with

him,

unless

he

sees some

Socrates say that deficiency in their ear

ar

good reasons

for

Socrates'

dissatisfaction. What he had

that there

gued was that everyone,

including Protagoras,

must agree

is false

opin

and that some men are wiser than others.

But though these

arguments appear

What Socrates claimed, in convincing to Theodorus, they leave room for doubt. in the first place, was that even Protagoras had to agree that there is falsehood
particular, the falsehood of his own doctrine that all
*

opinions are

true

since

The text

of

the Theaetetus

is Burnet's OCT. All

translations are my own.

1 80

Interpretation believe that the doctrine is false, be true. Protagoras

that
might

most people

and

according to the doctrine itself

that all opinions are

their

belief

must

have replied, however, that though it

claim

is true for
true

most people

his doctrine is false, his

remains

true

for

him. And if others were to

deny
And

have
that

accepted

their denial as true for them,

while

this, Protagoras might maintaining as true for himself

even
Theodorus'

it's true for him that

all opinions are true.

manner owes as much

so on.

failure to

defend Protagoras in this lacks

cisive

to his fear of the reproach that

Socrates'

he

seriousness as

it does to his
i69c8-d2;
Socrates'

being

convinced

that

argument

is de

(i68c9-e3
men,
at

and

compare 171C8 with I79b7~9).

argument against

The
some

second part of

Protagoras is his

claim

that

least in

questions

regarding the

future,

are acknowledged

by every
own

Protagoras'

one to art of

be

wiser

than others. Our reliance on the arts,

presupposes

including
believe,
to take

forensic rhetoric,
example, that the

this belief in the superiority of some men's

Socrates'

others'

predictions over
chief

But

even

if

everyone should

beneficial, in
cf.

the sense of the future good, is more than

just

a name

(I77d2-e2; 17835-8;

Republic 505d5~5o6a2), this

would

show,

indeed, how seriously we are concerned about our fates, but not that our belief and our hopes are well-founded. And our reliance on skilled men's predictions,
though it helps confirm our trust that we perceive the same world, and a world
with some

fixity, is

no more well-founded than that original

trust. A Protagorean

might contend that although

mon sense could

he too lives, for the

most says

part, as

if sanity

and com

distinguish true from false, that

Socrates'

nothing

about the truth of

things.

These difficulties in
admission

refutation of

Protagoras

help

to explain his later

next

that the argument against him is

which

still unfinished.

The

argument,

moreover,
old one as

leads to this admission, is not so sharply distinguished from the it first appears. For the hypothesis that all is changing, and that noth
presented as

ing

is stable, though it is

the ground for

Theaetetus'

claim that per

is knowledge, is more than that. For as Socrates shows, this hypothesis is self-destructive; it undermines the possibility of true or meaningful speech. But it
ception

isn't hard to
might come

see that someone

suffering from the belief that

as of unlimited

speech

is

never

true

to contend that any speech is as correct

Protagoras'

ions

are

true (18334-6). The hypothesis the whole that underlies

right

any other, or that all opin flux, in other words, is the

of

view of

denial

false

opinion.

Accord Pro
such

ingly, Socrates is

to treat the

whole argument as another refutation of

tagoras (i83b7-c7). Yet couldn't a Protagorean still object that to dismiss teachings as his on the grounds that
selves ss a

they

speech, is to

beg

the question?

themselves, or destroy them Isn't Socrates presupposing that there is

contradict

arguments have assumed, more or nonself-contradictory truth? All of less explicitly, the soundness of our ordinary belief that both true opinions and false ones exist by nature (cf. 18765-8). Perhaps, however, the self-contradic-

Socrates'

toriness
with

of

denying false

opinion might show rather than

the

inadequacy
of

of our

langusge,
Perhaps
to the

its trust in opposites, seeming

the falseness

Protagoras'

claim.

such

absurdities as

his

are as close as our

langusge

will sllow us

The Theaetetus

and

the

Possibility

of False Opinion

-181

unspeakable or chaotic truth.

Objections like these have kept Socrates from feel

3nd

ing entirely free of Protagoras,

is
possible.

they
truth,

compel

him to

wonder

how fslse

opinion

For if there

were no

or

if

all opinions were

equally true, it

would

hardly
main

make sense to

The
one

difficulty
3nd

both to know

be searching for knowledge. in accounting for false opinion is that it seems to require not know the same thing (cf. Meno 8od5-e5). Socrates

shows that to believe, falsely, that one thing is another is to believe that some thing one knows is either something else one knows or something one doesn't know, or else it is to believe that something one doesn't know is either something

else one

doesn't know

believe
names

without

having

(cf. I47b2~3) knows. Yet Theaetetus had already claimed, much this was impossible, and Socrates goes along
i88a7-c8).

or something one knows. And unless it's possible to in which esse we couldn't even use any knowledge false opinion 3lwsys implies th3t one not know whst one earlier
with

in the dialogue, that

him here (i65b2-6;

Later, however, Socrates

will suggest what one

that one can, in a way,

without

believe

falsely

that what one doesn't know is

knows,

this

being

a case of not

knowing knowing

what one with

knows (i9ia8-bio ). He
or rather with
tablet"

explains

this paradox

by

remembering, the "wax

having

the imprint of a

equating former per

ception stamped on

of

the soul. And it seems possible to believe

falsely
is

that a stranger,

whom one perceives without

knowing him, in

this sense,

an acquaintance whom one although we

knows. We
as

can even mistake one acquaintance

for
of

another,

know them both,

long

as we also perceive one or

both

them. But this account, which requires some present perception as an element of

false opinion, fails to explain how we can make mistakes in pure arithmetic. When we add incorrectly, we seem to suppose that some number we know, or right answer, is some other number that we give, and so we both know and don't know the
the
again presented with this alternative: either there
possible regards also

know,

or

the answer we

same numbers.
no

Theaetetus is
or else

is

false opinion,
instead
of

it is

for

someone not to

know

what

he knows (I96b4-c9). Since Theaetetus

proposes

this as an impossible choice, Socrates

a new account of
some

what sort of where

thing it is
soul,

to know. He

calls

it the "possession
possession

knowledge"

in

one's

and at

he distinguishes this

that knowledge ready

hand. Thus,

when we make mistakes

from actually having in arithmetic, we

know the

right

answer, or the
when we

number we

want, but that knowledge is not at

hand. For instance, know both the

edges are

mistakenly
the

add

five

and seven

to make eleven, we

number eleven and

number

twelve. But although both knowl

in us, like two birds in an aviary, the knowledge we're looking for, namely that of twelve, isn't at hand when we want it, but we capture instead the knowledge of eleven. And by this account, there can be false opinion, even in
pure arithmetic, without our not
possess

knowing
even

what we

know,

since we never

don't

the knowledge

we

possess,

though it's not always available when

we want

it (I99a4-c7).
object,

One

could

however,

that this apparent resolution

hardly

does

more

182
than to

Interpretation
paper over

the

difficulty

with names.

For the failure to

add numbers cor

rectly is surely a kind of ignorance about them. We hold false opinions about Socrates' numbers we know because we somehow also don't know them. And
attempt to restrict
where

the term

"knowing"

knowledge"

to the "possession

of

some

in the

soul

doesn't

alter

this situation.

Indeed, his

earlier restriction of

the

term

"knowing"

to

had been

another

having memory imprint of a former perception (or thought) such verbal artifice. To fail to recognize an acquaintance, for
a
about

example, implies a kind of ignorance

him. It is both to know

or not

and not to
an

know him. And every false opinion, whether instance of not knowing what one knows
.

it involves perception, is

But
result

rather a

than pursue this line

route.

of

criticism, Socrates comes to to their

account of

much

the same
as

by

different

He

objects

false
soul,

opinion and

the

failure to find the knowledge

tion of another knowledge
edge of

sought

for from

within one's

the substitu

something

by claiming that this would make one's very knowl responsible for being ignorant of it. Theaetetus, who is not
knowledge
and

ready to

consider that

ignorance

of

something

might

coexist, tries

to escape this

knowledge,
who are

may be

difficulty by flying

suggesting that birds of for false

opinion.

ignorance,

as well as those of

around, as it were, in the aviary of the soul, and that

the former birds

are responsible

But he then

agrees that those

ignorant, and who make mistakes, believe falsely that their ignorance is knowledge, and so the original dilemma soon shows itself again. To believe that one's ignorance is knowledge is to know, and not to know, both ignorance and knowledge, for even though one knows them both well enough to distinguish
them in general, one fails to distinguish them correctly in this particular
case.

To

believe something falsely, then, and to believe that one's ignorance is knowl edge, is not to know what one knows, and if this should prove to be impossible,
then perhaps

Protagoras

wasn't

mistaken

to

deny

that opinion can

be false

(19832-4;
knows"

i99di-2;

200aii-b5).

"Either there is

no

false opinion,

or

it is

possible

not to

know

what one

opinion

(196C7-8). Our ordinary experience, or apparent experience, of false would appear to rule out the first alternative, and yet the second one

seems self-contradictory.
of

Moreover,

when

Theaetetus complained, in the

yet

course

the argument, that there was no way to choose either alternative,

Socrates
What

even added
won't

to the
both"

difficulty by

replying, "But

I'm

afraid

that the argument

we

allow

(I96c9-d2). Now this

was

a strange response.

would

have

expected or

Socrates to say is that

we must choose at

the argument won't allow us to reject

both alternatives,
always an opinion exists

that

least

one.

For

since a

false

opinion

is

instance
is to

of not grant

knowing

what one some

knows,

to acknowledge that
of not

false

that there are

instances

knowing
to

what one
we re

knows,

which

there wouldn't be if this weren't possible. In other words, if

we must choose

ject the first alternative,

the second.

Similarly,

deny the possi

the existence the

bility of not knowing

of

what one

knows

requires that we

deny

as well

false

opinion.

If

we reject

the second alternative, then

we must choose

The Theaetetus
first. The

and the

Possibility

of False Opinion

183

argument won't allow us to choose neither of them. But why does Socrates suggest, instead, that the argument won't permit both alternatives? In particular, if we admit the second alternative, or the possibility in general of not

knowing

what one

knows, why

should the argument compel us to reject the

first

alternative, or to affirm the existence of

false

opinion?

Why

should

it tell

us not

since it would merely that false opinion hasn't been shown to be impossible belong, if it exists, to a class whose possibility in general has been admitted

but
our

also

that it does exist, and exists

by

kind

of

logical

necessity? opinion

To be sure,
an obvious

ordinary fact, but experience

cessity.

experience suggests that the existence of

can't tell us that this a world

false
a

is

fact, if it is
the only

fact,

emerges

by

any

ne

Couldn't there be
and

in

which

knowing

beings

are able not

they know, without their ever holding false opinions? Couldn't they have partial knowledge, for example, of some sub ject, like mathematics, which they would both know and not know, in a sense,
to
not what and which

know,

indeed do

know,

they

could

learn

more and more

about,

one number

any falsity b3-4)? Socrates apparently believes that such a impossible as the only instance of not knowing what
and without
wonder why. ment

for another,

without their ever mistaking in any of their opinions (144 case is impossible, or at least one

knows,

and we must

But for now, it is less important to

see

the grounds for this

judg

than to see its implications

for the

argument as a whole.

False

opinion will

necessarily exist, according to this stronger suggestion, if it is possible not to know what one knows. Socrates is not, then, treating this possibility merely as a but also as a kind of cause, for it though it is that condition of false opinion
entails that
stand

false

opinion must

necessarily have
a

exist.

And if

someone were and understand

to

under

the possibility of not

knowing

what one

knows,

it

as en

tailing false opinion, he false opinion exists. For

exist,
more

would

by

firmer trust in his very experience that understanding why false opinion must necessarily
exist.

he

would also

know better that it does indeed

claim

And he

would then

be

truly free

Protagoras'

of

that all opinions are true.

Theaetetus, however, didn't

and

notice this

subtlety in to,

Socrates'

response

to

him,

indeed he

could

hardly

have been

expected

at

least

not without

reading
write.

the record of their

conversation

that Socrates will later

help

Eucleides to

And for the time being, Socrates apparently thought it unwise to insist upon this hint. Instead, he then offered his suggestion about knowledge being in us as in an a suggestion, as we have seen, which led back to the difficulty that aviary Theaetetus had already understood, namely, that false opinion cannot exist un trust in his ex less it is possible not to know what one knows. Now
Theaetetus'

perience of vent

him from

false opinion, together with their earlier refutation of Protagoras, pre denying that false opinion exists. On the other hand, his youthful
sense"

concern

for truth

protects

him from the facile "common

that would grant

know, though this seems self-contradictory to belief in false opinion. While he won't deny the his retain order to in him, merely will he say that we can know what we don't neither existence of false opinion,
that we can not know what we

184

Interpretation
or

know,

that false opinion is in any sense

even

possible,
a

without

understanding

how this is true. And Socrates does

not show

Yet this very perplexity may prove more lution, for reasons that I can perhaps make
lemma
myself.

way out of his perplexity. fruitful to him than to be shown its reso

him

clearer after

trying

to resolve the di

Let

me now continue the argument where

Theaetetus has

given

it up,

and

try

to understand how
stand

it is

possible not

to know
allows

what one

knows,

and

then to under

how this possibility

not

only

the existence of false opinion. I will the

dialogue

examines perception

for, but might even make necessary, begin, however, with a certain detour. Since at considerable length, it is helpful, and gives

food for reflection, to take perception as an example of knowledge and ask how we can fail to perceive what we perceive. This procedure might, indeed, appear
objectionable at

first,

Theaetetus'

since

suggestion

that perception

is knowledge
to the

has been
question

refuted.

But

although perception

is

not an adequate response

"What is

knowledge?,"

it

can still

be

a sort of

knowledge

and

thus serve

as an example of

it. Indeed, Socrates himself

while against

gives several

hints that he believes

is thing, arguing knowledge, he surprises us by saying that he too had said that it was (i82e7-i83ai; cf. 152C5-6). It's true that he later contends that there is no
this.
one claim that perception

For

Theaetetus'

knowledge,
hard

or

"touching
involves
soft

of

knowledge", in

perception

(i86dio-eio). But this

of

extreme claim or what

such absurdities as

that

knowledge

the

being of what is

is utterly distinct from the awareness, through the sense of touch, of their hardness or softness, as if their being could simply be separated from their being hard or soft (l86a2-b9). Later, we will consider rea
Socrates'

is

for suggesting such an impossible separation of perception from knowl edge. But for now, it suffices to note that such separateness is unnecessary for his
sons
over-

all conclusion

that the two are not identical. A further hint that Socrates

re

gards perception as a
of

kind is

of

knowledge is

contained

in his is

provisional account
tablet"

knowledge Socrates
know"

as the preservation of memory-imprints account shows

in the "wax
also a

of our

souls. edge.

For this

untenable unless perception

kind
we

of

knowl
and

his

awareness of this

fact

when

he

says

that

"forget

don't

only those perceptions whose imprints are rubbed away, but also those that can't be imprinted in our memory-tablets. For how can we forget what we never knew (I9id9-ei; i88a2-4; cf. Philebus 33d2-34ai)? In other
not

words, to
edge was

know

cannot mean to present asks

have

memory

of our perceptions unless

knowl

already
rather

in the

perceptions

themselves. It is for this reason, I

to say whether we can perceive without himself (19265-7). And this is also why he affirming never repeats, in his later elaboration, the second of the three cases where false opinion had seemed possible, namely the case where one believes that something one is something else one "doesn't know, but (I92c9-di; I93b9-i94b2). He doesn't repeat this case because it doesn't exist, because

think, that Socrates

Theaetetus
so

knowing,

than

"knows"

perceives"

The Theaetetus

and

the

Possibility

of False Opinion

185
awareness of what

there is no perception without

appears ever

knowledge. Perception is the

to our senses; what appears to us must

a

be;

and our awareness of

it, how

confused, is
Socrates'

kind

of

knowledge. It

should no

longer be surprising, then, is knowledge takes

that

refutation of the suggestion that true opinion

granted

for

Therefore,
stand

that there is knowledge only eye-witnesses can have (20ib7-c2). to see how we can not know what we know, it will help if we under

how

we can

fail to

perceive what we perceive.

To

understand this

possibility, it is useful,

by

way

of

contrast, to look

at

the

dialogue's

quasi-Protagorean account of

perception, according

to which not to

perceive what we perceive of

is impossible.

By
of no

this account, a

perception

is

kind

feeling

that

exists

perception exists

only in togetherness only along with it. Each

other.

with

its object, just as the object of a these pairs is utterly particular, and

utterly distinct from every

There is

derlying
from

each perception of

its

object.

perceiving being, other than or un And neither is there any other being, apart way
at one
or

such

pairs, that

might appear one

time,

or

to one
can

act of

percep

tion,

and more or

less

differently

at

another,

to

another.

We

not, then, fail

to perceive what we perceive, since there is nothing

or at least nothing with other than the object as it then exists for the momen any stability, or no being tary us, for us to fail to perceive. In contrast with this view, if we can fail to per

ceive what we

perceive, the

object of such perception must not

other.

then is for us, or that appearance, but also something

about perception
our experience.

be merely what it Now this suggestion

what seems

is in

obvious accord with our possible

experience, or

to be

It is indeed

for

us

to fail to perceive

what we

perceive,

because
spective.

we perceive

the beings

around

us, but only from

some particular per

And however favorable that We

see a

limited
do

awareness.

touch only the outside of a

so

perspective might be, it allows for only a for example, but only its near side, and we building, can fail to perceive what we perceive, we stone. If we

because

each appearance of a

being

is only

a certain aspect of that

being.

This

account of perception suggests

how

we can not

know

what we

know. If

perceiving is knowing, we could know the being that we perceive, insofar as it is its appearance to us, without knowing it exhaustively. Yet perception, though it
may
well

be knowledge, is
or

not all

there

is to knowledge,
what we

which we understand as would

requiring,

issuing in,

true opinions about

know. It

be helpful,

then,

to examine opinion, and in particular true opinion, and

and

try

to explain how

knowledge
And if we be better

ignorance

of

the same

thing

can coexist

in

our opinions about

will

it.

can

do this in the

case of opinion as such, or

true opinion, we

then

prepared

to account for

false

opinion, which was our original concern.

clarify our understanding of perception, since percep from know it experience, never exists in isolation, but already tion, Even in our most elementary perceptions, as in opinion. implies the presence of

Moreover,
as

we will also

we

the

perception of

white,

we are aware of

it

as

something white,

or as a

being

that

appears white

(compare i86dio-i87a9

with i88e5-i89C5).

But it is the

power other

of opinion that gives us awareness of the

being

as a

being,

or as

something

186
than

Interpretation
Perception
and apart

mere white.

from opinion, if there

could

be

such a

thing,
called

would

grasp only white,

it is

even

hard to

see

how

this white could

be

white

(i84di-ei;
to opinion,
what we answer

i86a9-b6;

contrast I52b2-c8 with

Sophist

264bi-3). we can

Let

me turn

then,

and

to the question of

how, in opinion,

fail to

know To

know.
again to contrast the opposing claim that Protagoras. Perhaps Protagoras neglected, or perhaps he re perception

this question, it is helpful

Socrates

attributes to

fused,

to distinguish

from

opinion.

But

at all

events, that

most ex

treme claim about perception,

as a claim about opinion

which we

have already sketched, is

i67a6-b4).

presented also

(15865-6;

i6id3;

According

to this claim,
and

what a sick man eats appears

bitter to him

i.e. he believes that it is bitter

for him it is so, while it appears to be, and is, the opposite to one who is healthy. And not only do both of these men hold true opinions, but neither of them can be
made other

wiser, at least

not about what

he

eats (i66e3- 16731).

Each

of

them, in

words, knows all there is to know about his food, presumably on the grounds that the bitter food exists only for the sick man, who believes it to be bit ter, while the healthy man's pleasant-tasting food exists only for him. On this
view, the same food couldn't
and so neither of 3lso

have the

power to taste
of such a

them can be ignorant

different to the two men, power. Neither of them can be

each of them could

ignorant

of what

he knows. On the
same

other

hand,

be igno

rant sbout wh3t

he knows if the

food is

of such 3 nsture as to
what we

taste

different
the sub

to

different
of at

men.

More generally, if
true opinions
as

we can

fail to know be merely

know,

jects
what

least
show

some

must not

what

they

seem to

be,

or

they

themselves

being, in
is

those opinions, but also other than that.

And this

suggestion about opinion we

also

in

obvious accord with our experience.

For the beings th3t

themselves in

think about have the power, or so we assume, to show

not

various

ways, and

necessarily

all of

them together. The

same

stone, for example, that someone now

might slso show

itself to

another as

knows, or truly believes, to be white being hard, or as being heavy, while still be
our

ing

the same stone. If we can

fail, in
only

opinions, to know

what we

know,

this

is

because those

opinions reveal

certain sspects of their subjects. csn

We understand better why opinion deed why it is unavoidsbly so limited

of our opinions.

be thus

limitedly

if we

exsmine more

revesling closely the

and

in

character

Opinions

are silent statements to

oneself, and

they have

the

same

form

as

the spoken kind. To believe is to

believe something
about the

about some or the predi

thing (cf.
some stone

I89e4-i90a6). Now what

possesses some

is believed

subject,

cate, is that it

feature (or

festures) in

common with other

beings,
3

festure in terms

of which

it belongs to

3 cert3in clsss.

To believe thst

is white, for exsmple, is to believe thst it possesses, slong with other bod ies, the character of whiteness. Our thought of it as white has not distinguished it from those other bodies. And if further opinions can distinguish that subject from the other members of its class, this must be through other predicstes, or in terms
of other

festures that it

possesses.

But that it

possesses certain

features

means,

The Theaetetus
smong
other

and

the

Possibility

of False Opinion
with

187

things,

that it is not

identical

those features.

Accordingly,

there must be more to the subject than can be thought as any predicate. Now to
see

this more clearly, let us consider in particular those primary opinions that

the very being of a subject, ss distinct from its other 3ctions or attributes. To believe about a tree, for example, that it is a tree is to think of it only insofar
state as

it belongs to

a certain class

the class of trees

have

similar characteristic

features. For it to be

a tree

along is to

with other

beings that

possess the character

istics that it
of which

possesses as a member of

that class. Yet the characteristics in terms

it

as a

tree,

it belongs to its class, and which we have in mind when we think about sre no more than important aspects of the particular tree. Even in this
must

case, then, there the

predicate.

be

more

to the subject than is known or thought about it to it than

what

ss

There

must

be

more

think about is so simple or incomposite that it lacks such

ments"

it is. And nothing that we can otherness. Even "ele

what

themselves, if
to

we can

think about them, are their capacity for

they

are

by

their

be

longing
sre

various classes and

being

parts of various wholes

(cf. 203b2-5;
thought to

207d3-2o8a8).

And

so even
are.

they

3re 3lso other thsn whst

they

be,

or

thsn

what

they

other

than any or all of its possible predicstes,

Every including

subject of

opinion, then, is also

those predicates that sre

presupposed

in our very nsmes of the subjects ss the kinds of beings they sre. This limitstion to our opinions is one that Socrates doesn't shrink from ac
asks

knowledging. For he

"Secondly,
ignorant
of

to believe this

Theaetetus, as if in passing, the following [to be] other, and the other this, how is this
with

question:

not much and

unreasonableness, that the soul,

knowledge present, knows nothing

is

everything?"

(i99d2-5). Now the

simpler srgument, within which

can make us

Socrates

sandwiches

this

odd

question, asks instead how knowledge to that

question

ignorant,

and

it is in

response

that Theaetetus posits birds of the soul.

ig

norance, together

with

those of

knowledge, in

There, however,
of some

there

was no question of our

being
in

ignorant

of everything,

but only
and

things.
reveals of

This

more extreme suggestion, which

awareness

Theaetetus

never seems

to notice,

Socrates'

thst

all our

thinking, knowledge

ignorance

the

same

beings

must go together.

it is

about

being, or a kind of it, our thinking must

and

Already in grasping a being enough to know that being, let alone in any further thoughts or predications
this."

suppose

"this [to be] other,

and the other

And

however true this believed to be

supposition

it

must somehow

may be, however much a being may be what it is it is be this, if it is somehow known There is
sn unsvoidsble recslcitrsnce of s recslcitrsnce that

also other, snd to sn extent unknown.

things to their
as

being fully known,

a

is

not so much

"unreason

ableness"

it is

limit to

reason.

Now it is true, however, that

not

what we

know

of the subjects of our opinions

remainder of what we

is

limited to any, in the

or

all,

of

their

predicates.

Yet the
their

do

know,
tion,

case of particular

beings, is only
perception

appearances

to our

percep

at least if we extend the term

to include such awarenesses as that

of the particular oneness of each

being,

as well as our

inner

awareness of our

188
own

Interpretation
feelings. And
even or
since all opinions are

thoughts and

ultimately

opinions about

particular
or

beings
of

if

their immediate

subjects are aspects of

classes

them,

relationships

among them,

or

images

beings, deriving from

those

them that in

we can

treat perception

in this

wider sense as our

beings

which cannot

be

grasped as

their common

only original access to features. Yet we have

already

contended

that sense-perception,
perceives

which must always

be from

some par

ticular perspective,

only limited

aspects of

beings. Moreover, further

sense-perception can never overcome this

body,
neath.

reveals

And

as

only its surface, for inner

at

limitation, if only because a body, as least when it is still, and conceals what is be
or

"perception"

self-awareness, the act of

our

it

suffices or

to note that in

every least in

one of our thoughts and some

feelings,
Yet

thinking

feeling
is
of

is other,

at

sense, than its

object.

primary

awareness

the object,

and we are

only

somewhat aware of

the act, or the

happening, itself. This limita

only be overcome, if at all, by still somewhat mysterious, act of it the of still as object another, regarding awareness. We may indeed come to know the character of these acts as of any others, and be sufficiently aware of them to know that they are somewhat dark to tion, moreover, in
our awareness of that act could

us, but

they

remain somewhat

dark for

all that.

Our

self-

awareness, then, like

our awareness of all other

beings,

can never
of

be

exhaustive.

The

subjects of our
of

opinions are more than we can ever

necessarily Since the

which we

accompanied

by

grasp ignorance.

them,

and our

knowledge

them

is

subjects of true opinion possess certain characteristics as whst

in terms
than

of

know them

they

sre

while also

being

other

we are

aware of them as means

being,

then it is possible not to know what one

knows. And this

that false opinion is also possible, at least in the sense that it need not yet

be

Now to further understand the possibility of false opinion, we should note that the possession of even one characteristic implies the possession of more than one. A being that is a tree, for example, is
ruled out as self-contradictory.

also one and a not a

being. It is

also similar
same as

to other trees
and

and

dissimilar to

whatever

is

tree,

while

being

the

itself

number of

characteristics, in

other words, must

different from everything else. A be present in any subject. Yet

our

very its

awareness of characteristics presupposes that not all of them are com

patible with one another.

with

For

a number

to be odd is

incompatible, for

example,

simultaneously be sitting; and what is at rest cannot be in motion, at least not in the same simultaneously respects. Now with these considerations in mind, let us consider how false opin ion might exist. To do so, we may take, as an example of it, own ex
Socrates'

being

even; someone who is standing cannot

ample, namely that

person

of someone who adds

five

and seven to make eleven.

When

does this, his mistake is not to suppose, as Socrates pretends, that twelve is eleven (i96b4-6). The subject of his false opinion is not twelve, but rather "five and and these numbers are not what merely they are thought to be when we think of them as five and as seven. have more characteristics than They that. And in particular, they have the characteristic, when added together, of beseven,"

The Theaetetus

and

the

Possibility
be ignorant

of False Opinion
characteristic
and

189
with

ing

twelve, just

as

twelve

units

do. Yet this

of

is incompatible

that of being eleven.

We

can

five

seven, then,

even though we

know them, if

we

fail to know that they

are also

twelve. And

we can

be ignorant
to know

of the character of

being

eleven,

even though we

know it

well enough

that eleven units possess

it, if

we

think that the sum of

five

and seven can also

have this
opinion even

character.

It is thus

not

inconceivable that

someone could
we can we

hold the false

that five and seven are eleven. In general,

hold false opinions,

what we mean

though we

know their

subjects and even

though

know

by

their predicates,

because these has

subjects and predicates are multifaceted, and our

with

knowledge

of them csn

thus coexist

ignorance.

progress, now, in showing how false opinion is first showing how it is possible, and even to an ex by tent unavoidable, to fail to know what one knows. And it has then suggested how there might be false or mistaken opinions. But even though the argument has
argument

The

made some

possible.

It has done this

helped to

explain also

the possibility of
us to

false opinion, it has false

opinion must

not

yet

shown,
exist.

as

Socrates has

led

expect, that

necessarily

After

all, it isn't clear that there have to be mistakes, just because there
though

might

be. And

thing is

knowledge may be unavoidably limited, a limited knowledge of some not necessarily false opinion about it, st lesst not evidently. It is still not

clear, then, why the only

knowing

beings

couldn't

be

such

flawless knowers

or

learners that they

course,
while

avoid

there are

Further reflection, then there must be false

all false opinion. Though this couldn't happen, of humans, why couldn't it happen at some other time? however, suggests that if knowledge is necessarily limited, opinion

for there to be true its

opinion.

For

opinion can

be

false, in
as we

sense,

even without

being

mistaken, that
with

is,

even without our

attributing to a
acter, in

being

something incompatible
opinion about

its
that

actual characteristics.

For

have seen, any

or

common with other members of

anything its

states class.

its

subject

has

some char
opinion

Yet however true the

may be, is also other than,

however

much

its

subject also

and so

it is

may be what it is thought to be, that subject not, what has been thought about it. And this is
opinions about

true in particular of the fundamental

what

the

being

of

things,

or about

they

are as

distinct from
not

what attributes

they have. A

particular

tree, to take
charac

our earlier

example, is

merely those aspects of itself that

a tree

belong

to its

ter as a tree.

To think, then, that it is

is to think that
as what

that it is also not, or to think that it is the same this means, in other words, that the true

it is is something it is also other than. And

what

opinion

about

it is

also

false (cf.

i89d4-i90d2; Sophist

262C5-263d5). opinions

Indeed,

all our true opinions about the

common nouns with which

being

of

things,

or

those true

implied in the
also

we name

beings,
an

are not

only true but

be

false. And

even

if this

falsity
it

may be
to

overcome, to

extent, through more careful

cannot
overcome at all

reflection about what without

means

be something, it
such.

first

being

recognized as

False opinion, then, just

an accidental

emerges as a

kind

of

necessity if there is to be truth,

and not

fact.

190

Interpretation
of not

The possibility
cause, and
not
Socrates'

knowing

what one

knows has

now emerged as a

true

has merely a condition, of false demand that it explain why false opinion must exist. It might fulfilled seem, then, that we have transformed the status of false opinion from that of a
opinion, and so the argument

fact, and a precarious doubtful, to that of an intelligible

mere

"fact"

at

that,

one whose

necessity.

very existence is even But this isn't entirely true. For our

argument
opinion

has

assumed exist

from the

beginning knowing

that Protagoras is wrong, or that

false

does

in fact. Trust in this

of not

assumption what one other

is

what compelled us

to ac

knowledge the possibility

them as

knows,
than,

and

thus to suggest

that the subjects of opinion both are, and are

what we are aware of

must exist

being. Accordingly, to use this last suggestion to show that false opinion is to argue in a circle, and it would be ridiculous to suppose that we
with

have dispensed
prise,

the need

for that initial trust. It

should

hardly

come as a sur

however,
is

to discover this weakness of the argument.

presupposed

For the

existence of

false

opinion

by

any argument,
opinion

even an argument that

intends

to

uncover much we

the so-called absurdity of that

presupposition.

No matter, then, how

our

learn

about what

false

is

and

why it exists,

knowledge

can

be completely independent of trust in its existence as a fact. Facts, in gen can never be fully explained, they can never be fully understood as eral, being
never

necessary,
"highest"

by

any

possible

knowledge

of their causes.

Even knowledge

of the

causes must assume

the existence
of

of some mere

facts,

such as

the fact

thst there is false opinion. Instead

all we can

do is to deepen

and

escaping the need for these assumptions, clarify the knowledge that is already present in
or

them,

by

showing that their consequences,

and that

presuppositions,

are

not

self-

contradictory that false opinion

what one

they

even make sense

(cf. Phaedo

ioid3-e3).

We know

exists

because

we understand

that it is possible not to know

knows,

and we understand

that this is possible because we know that

fslse

opinion exists.

This

sccount

nation of

hss been only s very limited, though necessarily limited, expla false opinion. Yet if it has helped at all, and if, as I have suggested,

didn't say

Socrates had something like it in mind, there remains the question of why he so more explicitly himself. Why, after leading Theaetetus into the im
this question, it

passe we've

perplexed.

been discussing, didn't he show him the way out? Now to answer helps to begin by looking more closely at why Theaetetus was so For in fact, his trouble is not simply with the apparent contradiction in

the phrase "not

knowing

knows."

what one

He is

aware that words

have

various
who sees.

senses,

and

he doesn't hesitate to

grant that someone with one eye

with

closed,

sees with the one eye what

he doesn't

the other,

does

not see what

he

His
an

refusal

to allow this possibility, in the case of

knowing,

comes, rather, from

implicit belief that knowledge is so high and pure a thing that only perfect knowledge is really knowledge (cf. i88ai-b2; Phaedrus 247d6-e2). He not only believes, in other words, that there is a perfect or a

knowledge,

complete

The Theaetetus

and

the

Possibility

of False Opinion

-191

knowledge that is free uinely

count as

of all

taint of

ignorance, but also that nothing less can

not

gen

knowledge. To be sure, Theaetetus does

probably
even

know that he thinks

this,
that

and

he

would

deny

that

he's

learning

some

geometry,

which means

he does, if asked. After all, he says that he knows it, but imperfectly

(145C7-9;
calls

cf. I46c7-d2). not

And

yet

it impossible

to know

what one

he betrays his hidden belief not only when he knows, but also when he speaks of the What he
agrees or

difference between true

and

opinion and a reasoned account.

to there,

Socrates'

only partly

at

suggestion, is that to know something,

all of

to

have

an

account of

it,

one must
one never

know

its parts,

or

elements,

and each of

them so

perfectly that

fails to
who

recognize

it,

wherever

it

might appear. of of

Accord
even

ing

to this view, someone

is

ever mistaken about

an

other

contexts, doesn't even have

any imperfect knowledge

these parts,

in

the whole, but

as

true opinion. For example,

can't

if

someone misspells

TAe-o-do-rus
or even

only 7e-o-do-rus, he
no mat

know how to

spell

the name

The-ae-te-tus,

its first syllable,

yet

words, such a one doesn't correctly he happens to spell it. In know how to spell it (207dlo-2o8a5). The only genuine knowledge, for Theaetetus, is perfect knowledge, and it is this view of knowledge thst lesds him ter how

Theaetetus'

to

deny

thst one can

fail to know

what one

knows.

belief in the purity of genuine knowledge helps to explain, more weakness for the Protagorean doctrine. For his belief implies that what his over, something really is, or the thing itself, is completely hidden from us, no matter how
much we

Theaetetus'

learn

about

it,

unless we

know it

perfectly.

Consequently, despite
never quite

his

awareness of

knowing

something
that

about all

kinds

of

things, he is

free from the

Protagoras

painful suspicion

assuages this

pain,

after

he doesn't really know anything at all. Now a fashion, with his claim that there are no be
thoughts or
at

ings,

apart

from

one's own particular at

feelings,

to

fail to know. This

claim even perfect

suggests, in fact,

i52eio).

knowledge, a There is, then,

first hearing, that we can have a kind of knowledge untouched by any ignorance (cf. I5ie6least
a

deep kinship

between

Theaetetus'

lofty

dream

of

knowledge in its purity and Protagorean relativism. And it is this kinship that Socrates plays upon when he leads Theaetetus to the impasse that there is no false
opinion unless one can not account of

know

what one

knows. perplexity now allows us to him the way out. For if even necessary, not to know
and are other

Theaetetus'

This fuller

the source of

understand better why Socrates didn't try to Socrates had simply told him that it is possible, what one

show and

knows because the

subjects of opinion

both are,

than,

what we are aware of them as

being, Theaetetus
perfect

might well

have

agreed

too eas

ily. For this

one thst the gun

new opinion would still coexist

only

real

knowledge is

in him along with the contradictory knowledge. And if Socrates had be

perfect

instead

by

explaining that knowledge

doesn't have to be

knowledge,

in order to be knowledge, Theaetetus would have thought that he already knew that. Even when his own responses in the dialogue have betrayed that he doesn't
know it
well enough

or

that

he doesn't

"really"

know it,

ss

was about

to

192
write

Interpretation
Socrates
couldn't use these words as

proof, since Theaetetus

would still

they were just slips of the tongue. It is practically impossible they themselves unconsciously believe, especially when those beliefs offend both common sense and public opinion. Socrates, like a good mid wife, knows better than to try to force his way out of this difficulty, and he cares
have
supposed

that

to tell others

what

too

much

for Theaetetus to
of

pretend

that

it doesn't

exist.
and

Instead

trying

to tell Theaetetus that he holds the opinion,

"knowledge"

the

false

knowledge, only really knowledge, Socrates leads him to Rather than attack his hidden belief,
opinion, that
perfect

or a where

he

might

he doesn't have, is see this for himself.

encourage

Socrates'

approach

is to

in him

actually acquire, in their present inquiry, the kind of knowledge he believes in (cf. 202di-5). Thus, he suggests that the knowable as
the hope that he
might

pects of the

beings

around us can

be

grasped

in

complete separation suggests

from their Socrates

own as

merely

perceptible

features. And
belief

when

Theaetetus

that the soul grasps

these intelligibles "itself by

encourages this
well

itself,"

independently of any bodily organs,

which

belief

is,

or rather used

to

be, his

body
or

for saying so, even though his by calling him "beautiful, and not is visibly ugly. Socrates wants Theaetetus to hope, then, that his pure soul,
which and of

ugly"

his true self,

or without

things

is beautiful, might knowledge, in particular

admixture of

come to

grasp the knowable

any
on reliance on

essence of

without

the senses at
or

all,

any

bodily

imperfection

the

part of

the knower

the known

(i85d7-i86e8; 189C5-7; cf. 17635-17738). But hope, Socrates also tskes away any safety net by promoting
that

while

feeding

this

Theaetetus'

illusion

only

such

perfect

Theaetetus'

suggestions about what

knowledge is really knowledge st all. For when knowledge is are shown to be faulty, incom
clesr, he trests them as if
who must

plete,

or perhaps

just

insufficiently
children,

wind-eggs,

or stillborn

be completely
nor

rejected.

they were mere Thus, for ex

(a)
reasoned

ample, he

says thst neither

(s)

perception,

(3)

true opinion, nor

as

account together with

wasn't complete
was

(a) knowledge,

true opinion is
or

(a) knowledge,

if something that
with

that could coexist in 3ny wsy

nurture"

ignorance,

simply

not

gestions are
contrast

knowledge. He invites Theaetetus to think that his fruitful sug not even "worthy of (209d4-2iobio; cf. i87b9-c2; but
and consider

By
while

15OC3 and I5ie6). promoting in Theaetetus the hope for a perfect knowledge of knowledge, supporting his belief that only this is reslly knowledge of it, Socrates lesds

201C4-CI4,

him towsrds
this

he doesn't know anything about knowledge at all. Yet feeling, which is a belief in which no one can have much trust (cf. 187C2; Socrates' 210C3), might turn out to be a fruitful one. For earlier arguments have

feeling

thst

already foreclosed the Protagorean escape, or pseudo-escspe, from this perplex ity. And yet the srgument hss 3lso forced Thesetetus to see, if only he will, thst his acknowledged belief in the of not whst one

impossibility

knowing

knows,

which

follows from his

concealed

belief that knowledge

no

equivalent to the

Protagorean absurdity th3t there is

be perfect, is false opinion. If he faces

must

The Theaetetus

and the

Possibility

of False Opinion

193

his situation, then, he might notice that his belief, which he also doesn't believe, that he's completely ignorant about knowledge comes from the same illusion
about come

it

ss

does his

weskness

for

Protsgorss'

denisl

of

fslse

opinion.

He

might

to understsnd for himself how it is possible not to know whst one

nonethe snd

less
to

also

knows,

and

for there to be fslse

opinion.

He

might come

to

know,

know thst he knows, thst it is equally faulty to identify knowledge knowledge ss it is to try to circumscribe it ss being mere opinion. He
to

with perfect might come

know, in

other

words,

snd

to know thst he

knows,

thst

being

is

neither

wholly
neither

than, nor wholly the same as, just its bsck side nor just its front
other might more

we are 3W3re of side.

it

ss

being,

thst it is

And if he knew this

well

enough, he

truly begin
succeed.

to

philosophize. will

There is, however,

no evidence within
com

the dialogue that Thesetetus

pel

be

sble

to go so fsr. Yet Socrates can not

him to

He

can

hardly

do

more

for Theaetetus than

what

he does

here,
and

except, perhaps,

what

he does lster

when

he helps Eucleides to remember,

to record, their conversation (cf. 14331-4).

The Political Science Reviewer

Volume
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1986

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Tacitus'

Teaching
The Thesis of

and

the Decline

of

Liberty

at

Rome

James Chart Leake

to the Department of Political Science, Graduate School, Boston College
submitted

CONTENTS
I (in Vol.

15, No. 1)

Prefsce Introduction

Why
I.
1

Read Tacitus?

Tscitus'

Msnner
Intent

of

Writing
in
a

The Problem
Tacitus'

of

Writing

Tyranny

Which Is Hostile to Virtue

2. 3. 4.

Tacitus'

Rhetoric

Methodology
Assessment
Prefaces
of the

II.

Tscitus'

Roman Republic

1.

Tacitus'

2. The Roman Republic 3. The Republican Alternative

4.
Tacitus'

and

its Limits
of the

Assessment

of the

Doctrine

Mixed Constitution

// (in this

issue)
of

III. The Consolidation

1
.

the Principate:

Tiberius'

Rule

and

his Chsrscter

Tiberius Begins to Rule

Tiberius: Excessive Fear
of

2. The Case for Tiberius: Capable Administration

3. The Case
against
as a

Cause

of

Tyranny

IV

The Scope
1. The Limits
2. Is there
a

snd
of

Limits

Moral, Nstursl
Teaching
Tyrant
of

and

Divine Law

Law:
or

Tacitus'

Moderation

Divine

Natural Basis for Virtue?

under s

V. The Pkce for Virtue

1.
Tacitus'

Teaching: Moderation in the Face

of

Overpowering Depravity

2. Seneca

and

Burrus, Tutors
and the

and

Ministers
of

of

Nero
the Senate

3. Paetus Thrasea

Decline
of

Liberty in

VI.
1
.

Philosophy

and

the

Causes

the Corruption of

Oratory

An Alternative to Political Participation

of

2. The First Speech

Aper: The Case for

Oratory

196

Interpretation
of

3. The First Speech

Maternus: The Case for

of

"Poetry"

4. The Second Speech

Decline
of

Aper

and

Messalla's Response: The New Style

and

the

Oratory
Superiority
of

5. Messalla's Second Speech: The Education

Maternus'

Ancient

Upbringing

and

Thorough

6.

Second Speech: The Political Causes

and

of

the Decline of Eloquence:

Eloquence

Wisdom

VII. Epilogue

Selected

Bibliography

CHAPTER III: THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRINCIPATE

TIBERIUS'

RULE AND HIS CHARACTER

Tiberius Begins

to

Rule
the

We have already
significsnt effect of

commented on

fall

of

the Roman Republic. The most to concentrate ultimste po

and

thst

momentous c3t3strophe wss

liticsl

power

in the hands

of

Caesar,

then of

Augustus,

subsequently

of their

successors.

However, Augustus

was

too well aware that Csessr's

f3te hsd fol

from offending the republicsn sensibilities of the Romans ss from kingdom.1 The his despotic power to designste his regime by the odious n3me of regime he established has been well characterized by Gibbon as "an absolute
lowed
3S much

commo

monarchy disguised successors followed "The

masters of

by

the

forms

of a

The policy he
tenacious

snd

his

was one of artful

duplicity,

enjoined

by

prudence:

the Roman world surrounded their throne with

darkness,
and
army.3

con

cealed

their irresistible strength, snd

humbly

professed

themselves the

sccount-

able ministers of

the senate, whose supreme decrees

they dictated

obeyed."2

In the last
I
.

analysis their power

of

depended

upon

the goodwill of the

"This title

highest

rank

[the tribunician power] Augustus found out,

and nevertheless

so that

he

should not

have to
other

assume the name of

king or dictator,
cf. 1.2.1.

by

some

title should be superior to the

authorities"

(in 56.2),

Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury, 3 vols. (New York: Heritage, 1946), 1:53. Consider also Arnaldo Momigliano, Claudius: The Emperor and his
2.

Achievement,
diction
of the
organization

trans. W. D. Hogarth (Oxford:

Clarendon,

1934),

p. 25:

"It

was the essential contra

Augustan policy to desire to preserve the [the Republic], and at the same time to be

spiritual strength of a certain

form

of national

convinced

that the organization itself ought to

be profoundly 3. "It is evident that in fact the princeps

all practical

modified."

could not maintain

purposes,

at

his

command

but this does

the

not alter

his authority unless the anny was, for the fact that the legal basis of the

new constitution was the conferment upon

princeps of a special commission

by

the Senate
whom an

and im-

People
the

of

Rome. In the

course of

history

it

came about

that the legions or praetorians, to

of course

perator was a

necessity, imposed their

when

will upon

the

Senate (which

implied formal
action

consent
extra-

of

People)

the

succession

was

not

constitutional,
tus

and

clearly

not contemplated

by
et

clearly indicated: but Augustus as part of his Cambridge

such

was

system."

Populusque

Romanus,"

in S. A. Cook
10:161.

al., ed. The

Henry Jones. "SenaAncient History (Cambridge:

Cambridge Univ. Press, 1934),

Tacitus'

Teaching
We have
regime

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

197
of such a of

argued that

Tacitus

recognized the unavoidable

necessity

under

the political circumstances and the moral

degeneracy

those

times.

inferior regime, but the Romans were no longer fit for selfgovernment. We have yet to see how he understood it. To do so requires that we examine rather closely his presentation of its actual functioning. This we intend
was an

It

to

do, beginning
in
a royal or a

with

the Principate

of

Tiberius. It

will

readily be

understood

that

such a government much

depends

upon the character of one of the

the ruler, whether

he be

tyrannical

Caesar.4

This is

key

problems of such a

government.

This

chapter will then consist of a close examination of episodes

from the
We
under

account of

Tacitus

selected to exhibit

his judgment

of the
of

Citizen Tiberius held

will see

power and

the strengths and weaknesses

of

way the First his character.

power

the masterful behavior

Tiberius
years.

who

successfully held
we are

these circumstances for twenty-three

But

interested,

above
of of

all, in the effects of such power on the man's character. What

makes

the study

Tiberius
rather

so

fascinating

is that he is

a more

than ordinarily adept politician

master of

potiri, 1.5.4).
power

ordinary This is the

nature was set
Gyges"

character who somehow

supreme

became

the world (rerum

test of any man's character. With absolute

his

free to

reveal

itself fully. It is
he

almost as

if he

were given

the

"ring
for

of

Glaucon for its

mentioned when

asked

Socrates he

whether

it is

good

you and good

own sake to
what

be just. For
as

all practical acted

under

purposes, it

would

seem, Tiberius could do

he liked
showed

long

as

intelligently.5

We

are

interested in seeing
circumstances to

what

he

himself to be

those circum

stances

which, it may be argued,

most ambitious men se

cretly
4.
der'

aspire.6

Cf. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny,

p. 191 :

"If in

a given situation

'the

republican constitutional or

has completely broken down, and there is no reasonable foreseeable future, the establishment of permanent absolute
therefore it is

prospect of
rule

its

restoration within all the

cannot, as such, be

justly blamed;

fundamentally different from

in
are

to the manner

the establishment of tyranny. Just blame could attach only which that permanent absolute rule that is truly necessary is established and exer tyrannical as well as royal
Tiberius'

cised; as Vogelin emphasizes, there

5.

Caesars."

Perhaps before
it

beginning

to

study
who was

character and

his

art of rule,

it

would

be

useful

to

underline what

meant

to be First Citizen of Rome.

No few

one

has

expressed this more

forcefully

than

Seneca,
ning
of

educator and minister of

Nero,

in

years to

hold

Tiberius'

place.

At the begin

his treatise De dementia, Seneca held up a mirror to his royal pupil: "Have I, of all mortals, pleased the gods and am I chosen, that I should serve on earth in the office of the gods? I am the arbi
ter of
what

life

and

fortune

wishes

death to the tribes; in my hand is placed what lot and civil status each man to be given to each mortal she announces through my mouth; from
for gladness;
no part
which

should

have;

our response

peoples and cities receive causes

prosperous; these so many thousands of swords

what nations are

from

which

to be absolutely destroyed, which it is to be taken, what kings are to become slaves,

anywhere, except with my will and favor is my peace restrains will be drawn at my nod; to be banished, to which liberty is to be given,
whose

heads the
right."

splendour of

kings

should crown, what cities shall

fall

and which arise,

is my

utterance

by

Lucius Seneca, De
1928).

dementia,
spokesman greatest

1.2, Moral

Essays, 3

vols.

Loeb Classical

Library

(London:

Heinemann,
and

6. Socrates hints
had it
said

at

this grim truth in a myth near the end of the Republic. "He said that when the
man who

this the

had drawn the first lot

gluttony, chose

came

forward

immediately chose the

tyranny,

and,

due to his

folly
it
at

quately: and

escaped

notice

that

that life. When he

considered

everything ade eating his own children and other evils were fated to be a part of his leisure, he beat his breast and lamented the choice, not abiding

and

without

having

considered

198

Interpretation
a

We believe that there is

concentrate the

early

portions

particularly significant reason that Tacitus of his study of the Principate on the

chose to
reign

of

Tiberius. It

was

during

this time

(14-37

a.d.) that the institutions

founded

by

Augustus took
pate endured.

on the

form

of abasement

that was to remain as

long

as the

Princi

remaining sary

partisans of republican

Augustus devoted his life to overcoming opposition from the last liberty. This success was the absolutely neces

prerequisite

for

all that was

to come. It

was a

herculean

accomplishment of

ambiguous worth.

Tacitus begins his Annates

with an able summation of

that

lifetime's task:
After Brutus
and

Cassius

were

killed,

there

were no

longer any

armies

owing

alle

giance to the commonwealth when sar

[publica arma],
and

Lepidus

was stripped as

[of his army]

of

Pompey was overthrown in Sicily, and Antony killed, there was no one but Cae
faction. Then [Augustus]
set aside the

[Augustus] left

the leader

the Julian
and

name of

triumvir, claiming to be consul,

[claiming to be]

content with the tribuni-

cian

while

authority for protecting the populace, gradually he began to strengthen himself, he allured the soldiers with gifts, the people with the corn-dole, and all by the
[from the
civil

sweetness of respite

wars]; then
of

[gradually

strengthening himself], he

took to

himself

the

duties

of the

Senate,

the magistrates, and of the

on the

laws,
or

while no

one resisted

him,

since the most

rest of

high-spirited had died

the nobles, the

battle-line

through

proscriptions.

As for the
were

more each one was prone

to servitude the new

the

more

they

lifted

aloft with wealth and

honors;

as

they

profited

from
with

order,

they

preferred what was safe and present to what was old and provinces reject that state of affairs since
of

filled

danger.
[previ

Nor did the

they looked askance

on account of

at the

ous] authority

the

Senate

and people

[the

Republic]

[the

civil wars

arising from] the rivalry of powerful men, the avarice of the magistrates, and the use less protection of the laws which were overthrown by force, ambition, and finally money (1.2).

Such

was

the life-work of Augustus

to overthrow all public armies owing

allegiance to the

Republic,

and conciliate all significant groups of the

the empire to the

new order.

Tacitus details his

means

which

City and included bribery

century
of
all-

and corruption as well as

the sweet enticement

of order after a

consuming civil war. But Tacitus did not elaborate an account of the reign of Augustus. He chose to begin his intensive study with the reign of Tiberius. We suspect that he accorded a peculiar importance to that reign. We believe that that

importance

was

the

Tiberius, especially in
change of emperors
cans.

following. Tacitus thought that it was from the policy of the last years, that the Romans took on the servile charac coming reigns,
ruled

ter that was to remain with them through the

whether good or

regardless of the

bad. Augustus

defeated

republi new
or-

Some

were still political men

even

rivals, certainly hostile to the

by

the spokesman's
rather

forewarning. For he didn't blame himself for

was one of

the evils but chance, demons and

Tacitus,

having lived in an or in his former life, participating in virtue by habit, without philosophy. And it may be said, not the least number of those who were caught in such circumstances came from heaven, be cause they were unpracticed in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom, 6i9b-d, cf.
come

anything

than himself. He

those

who

had

from heaven,

derly

regime

labors."

1. 13.2-3.

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the Decline of Liberty at Rome

199
peculiar

der they

were compelled to accept.

It

Tiberius'

was

the effect of
of

and character
republicans

to complete the transformation

these proud men these

policy from defeated

their po

to mere apolitical subjects. The

character of

men and

tential

danger to the despotism has

we gain a

nowhere

been better described than

by

Gib

bon. From him

The
minds of

hint

Tacitus'

of

intention.
prepared

the Romans were very

differently

for slavery [than the Per

military violence, of their freeborn
was

sians].

Oppressed beneath the

a

weight of their

own corruption and of

they for

long
The

while preserved the sentiments, or at

least the ideas, Tacitus

and

ancestors.

education of
and

Helvidius

and

Thrasea,

of

Pliny,

the same

as that of
most

Cicero. From Grecian philosophy they had imbibed the justest and liberal notions of the dignity of human nature and the origin of civil society. The

Cato

history
ous

of their own

country had taught

whom

them to revere a

free,

a virtuous, and a victori

and

commonwealth; to abhor the

successful crimes of

Caesar

Augustus;

and

in

wardly to despise those tyrants

magistrates and

they

adored with

the most abject

flattery. As had
once

senators,

they

were admitted

into the

great council which

dictated laws to the earth,

and whose

whose name gave still a sanction

to the acts of the monarch,

tyranny.7

authority

was so often prostituted

to the

vilest purposes of

This tradition
obstacle problem

and education of

the

to the smooth working of to

which

potentially the major believe that this is the the Principate. We

leading

Romans

was

Tacitus

addresses

himself in his study in the

of

the reign of Tiberius.

That
reign

reign

is

a crucial turning-point
consolidated

history

of

the Romans. For

during

this

tyranny

itself by
most

a terrible treason law and whatever remained

of the proud self-reliance of the old everyone save

Romans

was assailed and all

men.

but destroyed in

the very few

reason

outstanding

It is for this
acter of

that we have chosen to devote an entire chapter to the char the

necessities at work

Tiberius,

to

understand

biguous

accomplishment of

Caesar

and

in transforming the am Augustus into such a monstrosity. After

Tiberius there
pated, the

remained almost no more politics at

Rome;

all opposition extir

subsequent

history

of

the Empire

remains one of palace

intrigues Rome

and are

occasional seditions of eliminated were

mercenary armies, but the Senate

and people of count.

from the
accept

enumeration of political

factors that
their

Henceforth

men

to

the

decisions

taken

by

master

in

Rome

without

the force to resist them, or the

of

will

to govern themselves.

Already
establish

in the

reign

Tiberius
cities

we see evidence of this acquiescent temperament

relief

in the

embassies

from

shrines quests

begging asking dedicated to the reigning emperor or his ancestor. In the increasing re for temples and the spread of eastern religion we see the beginning of a
misfortune or

in

leave to

temples and

new era when men turned to

in

common

for the

solution

other-worldly hopes rather than to their own efforts of their problems. Tacitus indicates the beginnings of

this development in the the passing

and tribes. and
years.

reign of

Tiberius; it

was

to increase in importance
an end

with

The Roman Republic brought to

alone remained political

the independent cities

Rome nearly
conquered
and

Augustus

Rome, but it
1:63.

remained

in the first century B.C. Caesar for Tiberius to extirpate the last

7.

Gibbon, Decline

Fall,

200

Interpretation

vestiges of spirit of the

dying liberty
Romans.

(vestigia

morientis

libertatis, 1.74.5) from

even

the

We

must

cions of

that, however much the unfortunate fears and suspi Tiberius did to hasten the annihilation of the old Roman character, hasten to
add

Tacitus is far from Caesar

and

holding

Augustus did

not resist

him solely responsible. The Romans who survived his baleful influence with all the spirit of their

ancestors.

This, too, is

a matter of

deep
of

concern

to Tacitus. We have

already

tried to show that the causes

for

which republican

liberty

could not endure were grows must

deeply
die,

rooted

in the defective policy

Caesar
and

the

old

Republic. All that

and there are times when self-government armies of

is simply

not possible. of

If it

were

merely the
crushed the

Augustus

and

the treason law

Tiberius that

Romans,

one could expect that

could

they

would recover under a milder

prince, that their

liberty

be

restored under more

favorable

circumstances.

study the policy of Tiberius, the leading Romans be of their willing instruments of despotism they sought out the First Citizen to accuse of treason, or they prostrated themselves before him in
as we will see when we
"enemies"

But

came

servile adulation.

This

servile temper was

in

some

already

present

before the
and

death

of

his

reign

Augustus; it preceded Tiberius, but he did not put a stop to it, it came to predominate. Hypocrisy, flattery, and malignant
a

during

accusation

became

way of life to the leading Romans. It was not his policy alone that caused this, but his policy helped to foster and fix the corruption of the world's last political class. At times even he seemed to regret it:
Those times
of were so malignant and

degraded

with adulation

that not

the

City whose rank had to be protected by obsequiousnesses [obsequiis],

great part of

only the first men but all the

senators

consulars, a
rose

those who

had been praetors, he left

the

and

many ordinary

in

rivalry

to one another to

deliver loathsome
as often as

and extravagant opinions.

It has

been
to

remembered

that

Tiberius,

Senate-house,

was accustomed

say in this

manner

in Greek words, "Oh men, how

servitud

prone to

Indeed,

even

he

who opposed the public

liberty

was revolted at such abject endurance

from those

who were slaves

(in. 65. 2-3).

We

must

be

alert to the evidence

that the Romans were to some extent them

as much as

selves responsible

for "the

what

they became,

their rulers. At one point,

state"

Tacitus

speaks of

anger of the gods

toward the Roman

(iv.

.2).

Per

haps that best

sums

up the mysterious combination of circumstances that pro

political arena as

duced the tragedy. Before turning to the

scribe

it

remained

then,

we should

briefly

de

the general conditions of the reign of

Tiberius. He

was a capable adminis

carefully husbanded to pay the vast establishment of mer cenary armies on which the peace depended and provide money to help the victims of disasters such as earthquakes. The lavish games and shows to which
were

trator.

Finances

the

Romans had

grown accustomed were restricted

by

the parsimonious and aus to study the

tere First

Citizen. This is to his credit,

as we will see when we come

Tacitus'

Teaching
problem

and

the

Decline of Liberty
it became

at

Rome

201

in the

reign of

Nero,

where were

a serious

difficulty. Militarily, the

and these were

world was

at peace.

There

only three revolts of unpacified provincials

during

the entire reign

in North Africa,
Tiberius'

Gaul,

and

Thrace

crushed more or continued

Tiberius by and Parthia to their own internal policy leaving Germany contentions and occasionally fomenting them. The single war fought against the Germans in the early part of the reign was abandoned by the cautious and suspi
vigilant commanders.
Augustus'

less effectively
of

local

cious

Tiberius,

who, like his successors, feared

.4).

a successful commander more

than he desired expansion (cf. 1.3.6 and 1. 1 1

Tacitus devotes
and

a portion of the

first book to

a sedition

in the but

armies of

Illyria

Germany;
of

the soldiers who

revolted were not citizens grievances

mercenaries and conscripted slaves who shared

but

no political

ambition.8

It is generally true
Such

the period

we

study Cae

(as

opposed

to later periods, as comes to light in the

who was ruling.

Historiae)
was

that the army re

mained sar and

loyal to the Julio-Claudian Augustus. Such it

our
Tiberius'

the

legacy

of

remained as

long

as that

family

held

power.
of

We begin
called after

study

of
death.9

politics with

the first session

the Senate he

Augustus'

There Tacitus,

while

revealing

surface

formalities
begin
and

for

what

they

were,

penetrates the consolidation of power which was then

ning.

Tiberius

appeared to respect the

rule"

Consuls, "as if in
the
edict

the old

Republic,

ir in

resolute

[ambiguus]

to

(1.7.3). But the primacy he

words of

conceded them was

swearing

loyalty

to him. The

by

which

he

called

the Senators

together were "few and very modest in

and apparent
of

sense."

Tacitus

contrasts

his hesitation
command

diffidence in the Senate

with

his alacrity in assuming the

with

the Praetorian Guard and communicating

obtained

the armies, as though

he had

al

ready
all

the Principate. Someone the orders to the army

might reveal

say, this is power politics and it is

the truth and the modest words

hypocrisy

Tiberius was not merely seeking they in the face of possible present and future consolidate it to he was power, seeking legitimacy.10 To receive power at them was rivals. What he needed to forestall
were empty.

But

were

so

empty,

after all?

the request
8. The
would see

of

the

Senate

would give

him that legitimacy.

which offered
prompt and

one exception

is the German army

to make Germanicus emperor if

refusal sufficed

he

that their demands were granted. His

suggestion which

decisive

to

make

them

forget this

they

never mention again

(1.35.3)- The threat that

some member of the years the

ruling house might tempt the armies to ruled, from Tiberius to Nero.
9.

revolt remains a cause of

fear throughout the

dynasty
(1.6),
we as

We do

not consider

the

murder of

Agrippa Postumus primumfacinus

novi principatus

we are convinced

that Tiberius was not responsible, nor does Tacitus

claim

he was, for
whom

take

propius vero as still warned not

depending

on credible erat.

The story hints

to
as what was

at

the guilt of

Livia,

Sallustius

to divulge the

arcana about

imperii,

and seems

show as much what

the Romans of that

day

were capable of edge

believing

my gratitude to an Bolotin. I owe this and

actually done. I am glad to acknowl unpublished paper, "Political Succession in the by Professor David not a few other insights of this essay to his acute analysis. See also Albert
their ruling

family

Annals,"

Pappano,
10.

"Agrippa

Postumus,"

Classical

Philology
See
also

36(1940:43-44.

Bolotin, "Political

Succession."

Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR

(New York: Columbia

that of legitimacy:

University Press,
what right

1965),

p. 2.

"The

central question

in

political succession

is

By

does the

successor

202

Interpretation
sees

Tacitus

that

much rested on

the way Tiberius was

received

by the Senate.

The "chief
adopted

cause"

of

heir,

"in

whose

allies, astonishing
power

his unduly modest hand were so many legions, boundless auxiliaries of the the people, should prefer to have commanding favor
was

behavior

fear lest Germanicus, his

among

[imperium]
could

rather

than to wait

for

it"

(1.7.6).

all

he

to

assure an uneventful succession. other armies

By dissembling, Tiberius Seeming to be chosen by

thought

did
the

Senate,
a more

and

duping the

to

support

him, he

he

would present

Germanicus'

formidable deterrent to

potential ambition

than

he

would

unconfirmed and unsupported.

cause"

Tiberius'

This
power.

fear, then,
It

was

the "chief to

of

seemed urgent

make certain of

his

delay in openly assuming leading rival. But the elicited re

as the

quest of

the Senate

was crucial

to

establish

Tiberius

legitimate heir

of

Augustus
that he

with others as well.

"It

was

his

concession

to

public opinion

[famae],

should seem called and chosen

ambition

by

the

republic rather

than to have crept in

by

the uxorial

[of his

mother

Livia]

and

the

adoption of an old man

[Augustus, his
ion"

(1.7.7). The

word we

have translated "public

opin

can also mean

reputation, but Tiberius

was not

as a man might who was governed

by

moral scruples about

offering the Senate a choice, forcing himself upon

not as a moral man

his

country.

Tiberius

was concerned with

his

"image"

is, but

as an astute politician who saw

cover and

its

value

for

ruling.

sanctify his power, but its

the Principate
reign, and Tiberius was

acquiescence

He was using the Senate to increased that power. The re

worked

publican mask of

was a

commonly formulated lie that had

all

for
of

one

long

doing

he

could to continue as

to

make use was a

it. Tiberius intended to follow Augustus

man and

as

far

he

was

able, but he

lesser
of

his

renown was smaller.

This

made a

difference in the

character

his rule,

regardless of

his

wish.

Tacitus tells
when

us that

Augustus trusted his heir

a successor.

and

did

not

fear

conspiracies

he had designated his he his

This judgment

of

Augustus

reflects

his

own

estimate of

preeminence and

the veneration

in

which

he knew he

was

held

by

others as well as

assessment of

Tiberius. Because he judged that

others

held

him in
1 1
.

awe

could afford

to be aloof

from

fearing

them."

eca, De

Consider his magnanimous treatment of the attempted conspirator, Cinna, as reported in Sen dementia, 1.9: "Cinna, though I found you in the camp of the enemy, not made, but bom. my deadly foe, I saved you, I allowed you to keep the whole of your father's estate. To-day you are so
prosperous, so rich that your conquerors envy you, the conquered. When you sought
gave

holy

office, I

it to you, passing over many whose fathers had fought under me. Though such is the service that What is your purpose in this? Is it that you your I have done you, you have determined to kill me
. . .

self

may become the

prince?

way of your ruling freedman defeated

against
and

except

On my word, the Roman people are hard put to it if nothing stands in the me. You cannot guard your own house; just lately the influence of a mere

you in a private suit; plainly, nothing can be easier for you than to take action Caesar! Tell me, if I alone block your hopes, will Paulus and Fabius Maximus and the Cossi the Servilii and the great line of nobles, who are not representatives of empty names, but add dis
will

tinction to their pedigree

these put up with you?

Cinna,

a second

time I grant you your

life;

the

first time
of

you were an open

enemy,

now a plotter and a parricide.

From this

day

let there be

beginning

between us; let us put to the test which one of us acts in better faith I in granting you your life, or you in owing it to me. He found Cinna most friendly and loyal, and became his sole heir No one plotted against him

friendship
.

further.'

Tacitus'

Teaching

and the

Decline of Liberty
chose

at

Rome

203
in the
trib-

When [Marcus
unician

Agrippa] died [Augustus]

successor should

Tiberius Nero [as

colleague

power] lest his

be in

uncertainty.

Thus he thought the de he trusted in the

(hi. 56. 2).
unassum

praved

hopes

of others could

be repressed. At the
own greatness

same time

ing

character of

Nero

and

in his

[magnitudine]

But from the very his own

beginning the case of Tiberius

For this
reason

is different. He did

not

"trust in

greatness."

he did

not

trust his
hopes"

thy,

and

he did

not

think that the "depraved

heir, however trustwor of others could be easily

repressed.

If this is
potential

so

it is easy to
on

understand

suspicion of

conspiracy day the Romans that there was

the first

of

why he was especially on the lookout for his power. Tacitus therefore reports the
another motive

that induced him to hesi

tate in the Senate. "Afterwards it tion to look into the choices

words and appearances need

was recognized

that he had introduced hesita

chief men.

[voluntates]
crime, he

of

the

into

stored

it

away"

For twisting their (1.7.7). Not only did he

also

the Senate to

repress

Germanicus

and the

armies, he

feared it. His

sim

ulated reveal

hesitation

was an artful strategem to

induce his

secret enemies at

home to

themselves.12

After Tiberius had devoted the first meeting

neral solemnities of

of

the Senate to the

will and

fu

Augustus,

the

entreaties of all were

turned to him to declare

his intent. He
to rule.

was still

feigning

reluctance

in

order

to elicit the

Senate's

request

And he variously discoursed of the greatness of the Empire, and of his want of confidence in himself [sua modestia). [He said] that the mind of the divine Augustus
was alone capable of so great a charge; that
participation

for himself,
experience

having

been

called
was

by

him to

a of

in his cares, he had learned

subject

by

how difficult

the burden

ruling
men,

and

how

to fortune.

Therefore, in
labors (1.
1 1

city

supported

by

so

they

should not cast all upon republic with associated

one; that many

.

would more

easily carry

many illustrious out the du

1)."

ties of the

The

speech

is

magnificent

in its

appeal

to the
of

most admirable sentiments

in its ideal
of

veneration

equal
1 2

Augustus, for the herculean capacity service for the common good; but when we examine its
and

its

republican

purpose we must
prepared

Tacitus

reports

the grim story;

he rarely

moralizes on

it. We too

must

be

to open our

hearts
tain

to an understanding of these terrible

politics.

Ronald Syme thinks

even more

is

required:

"Cer

features in the Tacitean Tiberius, detestable

wrote

on a superficial view, carried praise, not

blame.

Tacitus

for

men of mature and pitiless understanding, as one of

them,

paths of power and

the devious recesses of human

dissimulation?"

nature.

How did

a ruler survive

knowing the slippery for long years save

desirable to

by deep ing

counsels and

Syme, Tacitus,

1:429.

We think it is

possible and

Syme is right in think leam from terrible and tragic things endorsing them or praising them. that it was there is much to leam from the tyrannical arts and nature of Tiberius Caesar. But to say
without

not a

tragedy

or that
more

Tacitus

"praised"

Tiberius

seems

to us

not a

little

misleading.

with Syme that

than an ordinary

humanity

is

at work

in the discussion

of

Still, we agree Tiberius, and certain

our learning all that Tacitus has to teach. over-hasty judgments could present an obstacle to displayed in such a speech as this in mind when he wrote, the qualities have had 13. Tacitus must in "Tiberius understood the art [artem] by which he weighed his words; sometimes [they were] strong

their meaning,

sometimes obscure

[ambiguus] by design

[consulto]"

(xm.3.2).

204
conclude

Interpretation
it is
magnificent perfidy. much

Tiberius had

an ulterior motive

in making this

speech, and, however speech, Tacitus

he

paid

tribute to the artfulness and statecraft of the

was not

taken

in

by

it. Without indignation

or naivete

he judges: (1.11.2).
the

[fidei]"

"In

such an oration

there

was more of

dignity than

of

credibility

The Senate is
reign.14

presented

Tiberius

could

generally already servile, have had his request and gone away.

as

at the outset of

Why
hide
.2).

then did he

continue

to dissemble?

"By

they
were

were more confounded

striving that his meanings in uncertainty and

should

deep

within,

ambiguity

(1.

1 1

The Senators

utterly bewildered. They dared not show that they understood him. They burst into complaints, tears, entreaties. Tiberius continued to delay, did not ac
cept

the charge,
with

and

waited, apparently to draw them out. He seemed to

was a

be

playing When Gallus Asinius

was

them, but it

deadly

game.
Tiberius'

ventured

to take

reluctance

seriously, Tiberius

taken aback, momentarily silenced, then angered. His anger was exacer

bated

by

personal resentment and

fear (1.12.4). This

episode serves

to

introduce
Julio-

the last conversation of Augustus. From this

we see

how seriously the dare to

attempt

Claudians feared
on the

opposition.

There

were still men who

themselves wished to sit

throne of the

Caesars,

and some of them would

was young.

it,

given

the opportunity. The

succession was
man warned

dynasty
whom

To its

venerable

founder the

moment of

the moment of its greatest vulnerability. As he

lay dying,

the old

his heir

he

could not

trust. He knew

Tiberius'

nature and

he

had

sized

up

who was most

dangerous:
reflected upon who, though
while unequal

In

fact, in his last

conversations, Augustus
place,
would

pable to attain the

or who would

Lepidus

was

primary equally be able [to attain it] and desired [it]. He said that Marcus capable, but that he would disdain it [aspernantem]. [He said] Gallus

not, or who,

sufficiently ca [to it], wished [it|,

Asinius eagerly longed for it, but was not up to it. Lucius Arruntius [he said] was not unworthy and if the opportunity were given, that he would dare. There is agreement
about the recorded

former [in the

writers

I have consulted]; for Lepidus

Gnaeus Piso. All

except

were afterwards

Arruntius, certain [of them] have 15 [mox] overthrown on

various charges which

Tiberius instigated (1.

13.2-3).

This is
gained

one of

those

inexhaustible

his

wonderful reputation secrets of

[the innermost
14.

passages from which Tacitus deservedly has for penetrating and revealing the arcana imperii power] How much is revealed of the insecurity and
.

Syme blames Augustus for this

the proscriptions and appointments of unworthy

1:429.

persons

corrupted the once noble assembly.

Syme, Tacitus,

We acknowledge that he

was one

impor

tant

factor.
15.

Certain

critics

have

mistranslated this word as

"soon,'

and then when the men were not over

"afterwards"

can mean as is in Michael Grant, trans., Tacitus. The Annals of Imperial Rome (Baltimore: Penguin, 1956), p. 38; and Alfred Church and William Brodribb, trans., The Complete Works of Tacitus (New York: Modern Library, 1942), p. 13. As is generally the case, higher standards of literacy are maintained by the Oxford translation, The Works of Tacitus 2 vols (London: Bell, 1888), 1:13.
clear at vi.51.1 and vi.51.2.

thrown quickly have charged

Tacitus It is also

with

contradicting himself. Mox

mistranslated

Tacitus'

Teaching
limits
of absolute rule new ruler

and

the Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

205
old!

in this

admonition of the new ruler

by the

We

see

the

perspective which is by necessary for ruling in Rome where the Principate is not yet securely established. He must learn to be suspicious, but Augustus does not teach his heir to be indiscriminate predecessor

initiated

his

into the

in his

mistrust.

Perhaps that

was

the deepest

teaching

to

Tiberius,

whom

he knew

was prone

to mistrust.

How
secret

deep is the knowledge of ambitious minds that enables him to size up the
of

desire

these potential
of

rivals; how
may
well

much experience of men and politics

informs his judgments

son of

their capacities for action and

holding

power!

The les

the experienced

old ruler

have been

misunderstood.

Augustus

Tiberius of only three men, two who might try something, one in whose interest something might be tried. In Tiberius the perspective of suspicion re mains, but it is no longer governed by the experience and judgment of Augustus.
warned

Tacitus

presents

him it

as

indiscriminately
suspected

speak up.

With

reason

he

suspecting all those who ventured to Gallus (1.12.4), he had been warned about his
suspicion

Arruntius, but
Tacitus
sion

was

not crude to extend

further than

necessary?
a mere pas

underlines this: the reasonable counsel of

and

Augustus becomes

in Tiberius. "Even Quintus Haterius [suspicacem

(1.

Mamercus Scaurus

grazed

his

sus

animum]"

picious mind

13.4).
yet

Tacitus judges that Tiberius

angered or

was

in

absolutely
must

danger from these men, remember his passions when we

no

they
to

frightened him. We
the

come

wonder about which

indiscriminate

extensions of the

law

of

treason [lex majestatis] for

he

was responsible.

We

must

keep

the comparison with

not

Augustus in
"not

mind at all

times: Augustus sus

of

pected

Arruntius

because he

unworthy"

was

of

empire, but because

qualities of mind that would

dare."

But Augustus

was

inspire him, "if the opportunity were given, to held in awe and he knew it. In Tiberius, Tacitus dis

cerns a
worth.

tendency

to suppress the latter

discrimination,

"Tiberius felt

no prior anger against

and simply to suspect Arruntius. But he generally mis

marked

trusted
acter

a man who was

rich,

resolute

[promptum],

by

outstanding

char

[artibus],

reputation"

and equal public

(1.13.1). The

core of

this suspicion

is envy based on a secret comparison between the ruler and his victim, and the tragic truth is that such a comparison and such a passion necessarily govern when
small men
rule.16

We have

remarked

the parallel situation in Stalin's succession

to the awesome Lenin. Under

such circumstances

it is impossible for the discrim

non-

ination between potentially dangerous virtue such as that of Arruntius, and dangerous virtue such as that of Lepidus to be made. (Why Lepidus survived
be
a question

will

for Tacitus, which we will take up in Chapter V.) Yet these dangers were merely latent at the outset. Tiberius had yet to discover what he was capa ble of. And we must hasten to add he was capable of good as well as of evil
.

16.

Consider the

words of

the

wise man

to Tigranes when he knew that he would

be killed

by

Tigranes'

father,
not

out of envy:

die, he

addressed me and

for he does
I hold to
all

do this

out

"And yet, O Cyrus, such a gentleman was he that when he was about to said, 'Do not be angry, O Tigranes, with your father because he kills me; of ill-will to you, but out of ignorance. The errors men make by ignorance,

be

Xenophon, Cyropaedia,

in. 1.38.

206
2.

Interpretation

The Case for Tiberius: Capable Administration

The

impartiality
severely
as

of

the historian is

judged,

above

all,

by

his fairness in

pre

senting his
cized as aged

characters.

In

recent years, no presentation of

Tiberius.17

Tacitus has been

criti

that of

the virtues of the

First

Citizen.18

It is thought that Tacitus willfully dispar Some have maintained that he vented his
all

anger and contempt

for Domitian in attributing to Tiberius

that
execrable
tyrant."

the vices that

he

himself
seen of

suffered under

Others,

more

ingeniously, have
Tacitus'

in Hadrian's

complicated

personality the

actual model

for

portrait

Tiberius.20

We do

not see the

Tacitus

appears capable of of

having

necessity of these reached his judgment

the

"explanations,"

for to

us,

about

Tiberius from his

judicious reading

the

sources and

evidence of reasonable contemporaries.

Certainly, experience of politics in his own times will have helped to form that judgment, but we believe one remains truer to the phenomenon in saying that the
judgment
of a

Tacitus is

a power produced
experience.

by

the

interplay
in his

endowments and
us.

his broad

The

education of
with us

his extraordinary Tacitus is unknown to

of
works.

Yet he in

attempted

to share his judgment

Do

we not en

gage

a more profitable enterprise

rather never

than

in idle

and

in trying to learn from what he wrote for us narrow-minded speculations on its source, which we can
to study
Tacitus'

know?
more profitable

We think it is
veracity.

Tiberius before

doubting

his

Many

of

the doubts could have been overcome had their authors fol
principle of

lowed
ius'

an

elementary

interpretation. Where Tacitus

says that

Tiber

subjects gave sinister and suspicious should

interpretations

of

his conduct, this

than as a
a popular

have been investigated

"innuendo."21

as a reflection on the subjects rather

reasons

Tacitean
ruler.

Tiberius, for

we

will

see,

was not

Tacitus

would not

have been true to his

subject

if he had

suppressed this.

It

was one of of

the

facts

of

the reign, and an element in

Tiberius'

policy.

For

reasons

his
17.

character and prestige which was

inferior

to that of Augustus and the

Frank Marsh is
account of

at the

head

of

this school

in the

that, in his

Tiberius, Tacitus laboured

under the

English-speaking world. "Admitting then handicap of a preconceived bias which

constantly led him to give a false colouring to the facts, we need to seek some explanation of this bias. It is probable that he derived it in the first place from the tradition of the aristocratic society in which he lived. The impression which he received in these circles was strengthened and confirmed by his general conception of the history of the empire and his personal experiences. It was inevitable

by
of

that as he
victim of stained

looked back
evil."

upon

the past the recent

tyranny

Domitian

should

darken

all

his

views.

One

tyranny impresses one's imagination more than several years during which the emperor ab from Frank Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius (London: Oxford University Press, 1 931),
Ibid.

pp. 10-11.

18. 19. 20.

.

Ibid.

Syme, Tacitus, 1:217-52. Kurt von Fritz, "Tacitus, Agricola, Domitian, and the Problem of the p. 77. Cf. D. M. Pippidi, Amour de Tibere (Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1965), pp. 36, 40. An important exception to now-prevalent high-handed treatment of Tacitus is M. P. Charlesworth, who gives a
21
Principate,"

balanced
al., ed.,

and respectful

treatment

of

Tacitus'

evidence

The Cambridge Ancient History 10:607-52,

esp.

in his chapter. 652.

"Tiberius,"

in S. A. Cook

et

Tacitus'

Teaching
difficult
situation

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

207

in

which

that placed

him, Tiberius
his

was perceived as severe.

This in turn led him to inordinate fears

vere repression.

of

subjects and

consequently

more se

Tacitus knows this, but he also knows that it is not the whole story. Tiberius did have certain virtues, and Tacitus does not suppress them. The careful reader
will see

them and will realize that the character of Tiberius as understood

of

by
be
Ti

Tacitus is

derstanding
studied.

extraordinary interest. The of the ruler and his political

Tacitus'

discrepancy
"image"

between the

scientific un

then

becomes

a problem to

As instances
cite the

of

acknowledgment of the virtuous side of

passages: contempt

berius

we

m. 18. 1 -2, iv. 31. 2,

his

following liberality and

justice; 11.48, his liberality; for flattery; m.72.2, his magnificence;

1.75, his

his clemency, though admittedly rare; and 11.88. 1, his magnanimity. But these insights are of momentary interest in comparison with the great passage
reign toward the summing up the first nine years of beginning of Book IV. We consider quotation in full justified, for, in his own name, Tacitus gives a magnificent
Tiberius'

testimonial to the accomplishments

of

Tiberius. Here

we

find the
world so

key long

to why,

despite

all

his

other

excesses, Tiberius held the Roman

not fear for

and so quietly.

Where he did Tiberius is

his

own

security he
as the

was a compe

tent, nay

a good ruler.

more enigmatic and the problem

is

more com

plicated than some scholars seem to realize.

Tacitus locates

decisive

turn

ing

point

in

Tiberius'

rule

the death of

Drusus, his

son, in 23 a.d. Until then:

To begin,
ators.

public affairs and the greatest ones of private men were managed chief men were allowed to used to repress

by the

Sen
ad of

The

discourse
used

[disserere]
assign

and those who sank

with a view

into

ulation, he

himself. He

to

honors

to

nobility [spe

ancestors, splendour that it

cies]21

[claritudinem] in
were

war, and

illustrious

civil accomplishments, so

was agreed

that no others

better. Their

own ostentatious mere

display
the

was

left to the
of the

consuls and praetors.

In addition, [to

display]

[potestas]
ple were

lesser

magistrates was exercised.

The laws

were well enforced

authority [bono
peo of

in usu], if the inquisition

the First
sea as care

of treason

[quaestio majestatis]

was excepted.

The

indeed distressed

by

the high price of grain,

but this

was through no

fault

Citizen; nay rather, he opposed the infertility of the lands or the storms of the much as he was able, by great expenditure [impendio] and diligence. He took
aroused

lest the provinces be

without

by new exactions
The lands

and that

they

should endure

the old
and

burdens

the avarice or

cruelty

of the magistrates. of

Whippings
were

of

bodies

confiscations of goods were unknown.

Caesar

few in Italy, his

slaves were

If ever

unassuming [modesta], his household was in the hands of few freedmen. he disputed with private men, he allowed it to be tried in the forum and accord
arrangements

ing

to right [ius]. All these

he

retained, though

manner

[comi via], but harsh [horridus],

and often

indeed, not with a kind terrifying [formidatus], until they

.

were changed

for the

worse

by

the death of Drusus

(iv.6-7. 1).
Tacitus'

With the
count of
22.

one sinister exception of

the inquisition of treason,

own ac

Tiberius'

first

nine years reads

like the
ri-

accolade of a

benevolent despot.

Emile Jacob, ed., OZuvres de

Tacite,

1:284,

8.

208

Interpretation
remains

Ultimate authority
display"

in the hands

of the

First Citizen

(only

the "ostenta
good ends.

tious

was

left to the consuls), but the

enforced,
central authority:

power was used

for

The laws
chosen
ter"

were well

and virtuous men were rewarded with

honors

and

to represent the

"It

was agreed

that

no others were

bet

than those Tiberius chose.

Tacitus'

Yet if we turn from

count of

those

years we of

find

summary of the day-by-day political ac somewhat different emphasis. There, the persecu
scientific

tions

under

the law

treason assume prominence. Modern

interpreters have
undermined

en

the entirely liberty and security of the leading subjects of the Principate. However he may have praised the good administration of other matters, this law was for Tacitus

tirely

misinterpreted

the importance of this

law,

which

the determinant of the character of the

crucial

reign.

Modern

apologists

fail

to see

how

this law

nious attempts

in perverting the politics of the time hence, many inge to show that the law wasn't so bad as Tacitus affirms, that he ex
was

aggerates

its effects, that Tiberius

out to

was

innocent

of

its

excesses.

The

assumption

underlying these attempts is that Tiberius

makes

was simpler and nicer

Tiberius'

than

Tacitus

him

be. Tacitus does

puts them

not suppress

commendable accom

plishments.

He merely
of

in

perspective as of subordinate

importance

to

the overall effect

the reign on the political men. If the

highest

goal of politics

is

to encourage virtue and honor good men, a

law

which

is directed

them especially deserves the severe judgment it has

ruler who allowed and even encouraged character

received

at persecuting from Tacitus. The

nor

it

cannot escape
Tacitus'

censure,

does his
law is

deserve to be

admired.23

Let

us

turn to

assessment of this
Tiberius'

and approach susceptible

to such

it especially in light of the varied impulses.

enigma of

character,

which

3.

The Case Against Tiberius: Excessive Fear

reports various conjectures of

as a

Cause of Tyranny
why he One opin

Tacitus
continued

Tiberius'

contemporaries as to

the same people in

important

offices

for very

long

periods.

ion that
"it

was expressed seems

partially to
better"

Tacitus'

contradict

own statement that

was agreed

that

no others were

than those

Tiberius

chose to rule under

him. "He
virtues,
the

was not accustomed to seek out

yet

he hated

vices:

from the best

men

[sectabatur] distinguished [eminentis] he feared danger for himself, from

(1.80.2). If he chose the best men, one won ders why it is said that he feared them. But on deeper reflection perhaps the sec ond opinion is also true. For Tiberius did not dare to govern without the vague
worst

he feared

dishonor"

public

23.

There is

beautiful discussion
of

by Montesquieu

entitled

"Of the Morals

as

of the

Monarch."

"The
make

morals

[mceurs]

the prince contribute as much to the

liberty
souls

the

laws; he

can, like them,

have subjects; if he loves base souls he will have slaves. Does he wish to know the great art of ruling: let him draw to himself honor and virtue which he calls personal merit Let him not fear in the least those rivals whom one calls the men of merit; he is their equal from the moment that he loves Montesquieu, De T esprit des lois, xui.27.
will
...

beasts

of men and of

beasts

make men.

If he loves free

he

them."

Tacitus'

Teaching
and severe nent men.

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

209

law of treason which seemed to be especially directed at these emi Perhaps Tiberius genuinely cared for good government but also feared that those he promoted to office were secretly hostile to him. He was capable but
his
accomplishments

did

not render

him

so venerable as

Augustus

and

further

more, he did not have ble, despite his competence. The

ened

Augustus'

presence.

People thought him harsh his

subjects must

and terri strength

perceptions of
with

have

his

resolve

to further dispirit them

the perpetual threat of the treason

not

law. The

contradiction we notice then

is in Tiberius. He did
would secure

trust that the de

cent measures

he took to benefit the Romans

measures.

his

power.

Therefore
cyni

he turned to tyrannical
cal opinions of

The

effect of these subjects.

latter is

reflected

in the

Tiberius held

by

his his

How

else could

they

regard

the

originator of such a

law,

whatever

other accomplishments?

Though the Sen

and

ate was

already

corrupted and

debilitated

by

the fortune

of

the Caesars

the

policy

of

Augustus,
itself

this law destroyed the independence that was left.

Tyranny

consolidated

and

liberty

was

to remain only a memory to the Romans as to absolve Tiberius for

long

as

their empire endured.

of scholars

It has been the heartless but ingenious labor

the excesses
cases.
of

this

law.24

He

pardoned

this

man or

But these defences No

overlook

the most

that, he refused to try certain important aspect of the law, its

the law. The pardons
were

effect upon political society. arbitrary. one could

For he did
whether

not remove

know

he

would or would not

be

pardoned or

have his

case

dismissed. The law

was so vague as

to

present a

threat to everyone,

especially those most conspicuous

able that
and

for

virtue and

independence.25
Tiberius'

It is

reason

Tacitus

report

the

opinions of

the Romans on

sinister motives part of

the danger of this law. Those to the

evaluation of

opinions are an

important

history,

and

crucial

the law.
context of otherwise republican sentiments
which

Tacitus introduces the law in the

and a philosophic speech of swear allegiance to

Tiberius', in

he

refuses to

have the Senators

him. "Nevertheless he did

not therefore cause

faith [fidem] in
treason"

his

civic mind

[civilis animi]; for he

restored

[reduxeraf]

the law of

(1.72.2). Tacitus here, it is generally agreed, refers to the Lex Julia of Augustus. The actual terms of this law are lost, but events show that it extended the charge
of treasonable violation of

majesty to

Julius,

verbal abuse and slander of

of members of

his

family.26

include, as well as abuse of the divinity of Citizen, and sometimes even slander Under the Republic the treason law (Perduellio) had
the First

from the

earliest

times

comprehended

magistrates.
24.

Sulla

passed

any deed committed against the City or its the Lex Cornelia which was applicable to such abuses
and

Robert Rogers, Criminal Trials

Criminal Legislation Also Bessie

under

Tiberius (Middletown:

American Philological Association, 1935),

(Manchester: Manchester
25.

passim.

Walker, The Annals of Tacitus

so

University Press,

1950),
1'

p.

88.
that the government

[lese majeste] should be vague, Montesquieu, De esprit des lois, xn.7. degenerates into 26. C. W. Chilton, "The Roman Law of Treason under the Early
"It is
enough

that the crime of treason

despotism."

Principate,"

Journal of Roman

Studies,

450955):73-81-

210
of

Interpretation

leaving his province without permission and the loyalty of troops, illegal detention of making tampering and perhaps a governor's not prisoners, leaving his province on time. But Au application of the law to his family and extension of the charge to include
private

the late Republic as a proconsul's

war,

with

gustus'

speech

so

easy to allege,

and so
was

difficult to disprove

were

fraught

with peril

to the citizens. The penalty

crease of

Senate eagerly extended the legal penalty

sonal position was so
will see

exile, but from the early years of Tiberius, the the punishment to death. Examples of such arbitrary in
are rare

in the

reign of

Augustus, "because his

proceeded

per

strong that

cases of

treason

We
of

how

much

the suspicious

nature of

rarely Tiberius and the

were

with."27

malignant zeal

the accusers combined with the

of

abjectness of punished

the Senate to change that.

even

The

treason, or iniquity treason with threats to the First Citizen himself. Such was
chief and was

the law was not that it

that it

identified
the law

somehow reasonable of

necessary considering that the regime had its vagueness: not only deeds but even idle
effects of

changed.28

The defect

speeches were made punishable. as

The
It

this on society

were

far-reaching,

Montesquieu

explains so well:

was not

that

which

only actions that fell under this law, but words, signs, is said in the outpouring [epanchement] of the heart
cannot

and even

thoughts: for

which conversation

produces
no more

between two friends in

be

regarded

but

as thoughts.

Therefore there
no more

was

liberty

banquets,

no more confidence of

between relations,

loyalty in

slaves; the dissimulation and sadness

where,

the prince

having
as an

communicated

itself every

friendship

was regarded as a

trap, frankness

imprudence,
happiness

virtue as an of earlier

affectation which could recall to the mind of the peoples the

times.29

The

aside of

Tacitus that Tiberius

was

"made

fierce"

to

bring

back the law

by
his

anonymous poems
mother"

attacking his "cruelty, pride,

not a mere

and mind at variance with

(1.72.4) is

"innuendo";

rather

it

serves to emphasize

that
rea

Tiberius

was governed

by private passions
revenge,

in this

crucial

case,

as well as

by

sons of state.

Anger,
law
of

and suspicious excessive

fear

are as much
put

the

causes of the

treason as reasonable caution. As Montesquieu

to the
man."30

it, "the

statesman yielded

continually

Prudence was necessary as a means to get the law of treason accepted as Tiberius desired it. Tiberius, when asked by a praetor if the trials for treason should be restored, replied, "the laws must be (1.72.3). Tacitus reports
enforced"

the two first cases that were brought in the reign

of

Tiberius despite the fact that

Tiberius

they

were

dismissed by Tiberius himself,

p. 76. not

since the charges were absurd.

27. 28.
stain

Ibid.,
"I do

intend to diminish the indignation that

one ought

to feel against those who

one wishes to moderate

wish

to

the glory of their prince in the

least; but I
be

will

indeed say that if

despo

tism,

a simple correctional punishment will

treason,
29.

always terrible even to

innocence."

more fitting on these occasions than an Montesquieu, De V esprit des lois, xii.12.

accusation of

Montesquieu, Considerations
XIV.

sur

les

causes

de la

grandeur

des Romains

et

de leur deca

dence,
30.

Montesquieu, ibid.

Tacitus'

Teaching
a prostitute

and the

Decline of Liberty
have

at

Rome

-211

knew that the law lent itself to

such charges as to

"treasonously"

introduced
of

into the

solemnities of
are

Augustus
of

or to

have

sold

his

statue with some

gardens.

How depraved

the minds

the

men who would avail

themselves

the law to

Senate became in enforcing the law. Perhaps no artfulness was necessary to have the precedents es tablished. But Tacitus assigns the to responsibility to Tiberius and attributes his behavior in doing so. Thus he recounts even the cases which did not is early sue in condemnation or where the accused was guilty, "that it may be known from what beginnings, by how much art of Tiberius the most grave ruin crept in, then was repressed, and at last blazed forth and corrupted all (1.73. 1). The art of Tiberius consists in his occasional attempts to moderate the zeal of the
servile the
"art"
things"

bring

such charges!

We

will soon see

how

accusers under the

while

he

was all

ecrable
means

persecutions.31

attempted to gain the reputation of mercy, the time responsible for giving them the opportunity for their ex Furneaux says that the Roman law had other less vicious
libels.32

law, from which he

to punish treasonable acts and scandalous

would

A truly

merciful

First

Citizen law.

have

used

these

more

discriminating

means and repressed this

The third

case mentioned

by Tacitus,
of

the prosecution of

increases
way to
and

our

understanding
honor

why this law

was such a scourge.

Granius Marcellus, It opened the

unscrupulous opportunists to accuse the

attain with a suspicious

thereby

innocent, especially the great, First Citizen. Ambitious men among

their

the worst of the

Romans honored

made their careers and with

fortunes in this

way.

For
and

they

were often

Senatorial

rank after a successful

prosecution,

the goods of the accused were divided among them. These were the
"accusers"

infamous
class:

(delatores). Hispo Romanus

was

the first of this

despicable

[He] entered a form of life which the miseries of the times and the shamelessness [audaciae] of men made common afterwards. For [though he was] poor, unknown,
and restless,

he

crept

into

the

he

caused

danger to

each most

cruelty of the First Citizen by secret informations; then illustrious man. Having attained influence [potentiam]

erty,

hatred among all men, he gave the example that riches follow from pov feared [follows] from contempts, and he brought ruin upon others and being upon himself (1.74. 1-2). finally
with one and

To

help

absolve
and

upon

decent
.

Tiberius from the responsibility of having unleashed this plague innocent men, it is sometimes said that the Romans needed defonder
of

it"

3 1 "Tiberius (iv. 71. 3).

32.

was

his dissimulation than

of all

his

other

virtues; for such he conceived

"Under Tiberius the Lex Majestatis is limitation to libels

libels
on the prince and

extended not
all

only to libels

written and published

but
re
or

even to spoken words, an extension strictest

involving

the terror of espionage in private

life;

and the

his

family

is disregarded in

practice.

It

should

be

membered that the scandalous

which

Roman law

was not without other means of

'Majestas'

dealing

with either

treasonable acts

and that

the law of

it had been apparently thought Tacitus 1:141.

.

prudent

probably from its more sweeping character, was one to hold in Henry Furneaux, ed. The Annals of
reserve."

212

Interpretation
prosecutor.33

The testimony of men of lower latores because they had no public could appreciate their elo Romans the show that moral standards is brought in to abused. It is quence without considering the merits of the cases in which it was
sometimes said
Tacitus'

that even the noble Trajan allowed

character of

accusers.

But this is to

make

point.

The

the First Citizen

is

all-important.

Perhaps Trajan
unscrupulous

could control them. careerists

The

system was

dangerously
Tiberius

open

to abuse

by

which made

it

all

the more important that the First Citizen act to re

under was a

strain and govern

it. Delation
who

very different thing from de

the notorious spies

lation
and

under

Trajan,
of

began his

reign

by

the

expulsion of

delator es

Domitian.34

We have

chosen

to

examine the

interplay

of politi

cal and private motives of

Tiberius

and

the delatores as

they

are exhibited

in

three of the most

interesting
later

trials, that of Libo

Drusus,

which was one of

the

first

(a.d. (a.d.

1 6), and the 25).

ones of

Gaius Silius (a.d. 24),

and

Cremutius Cordus

The first have trials

pose and

question

that arises in the case of Libo is why Tiberius wanted to

was capable of secret assassinations when

at all.

He

it

suited

his

pur

did

not

man of noble

birth

dare openly to try his enemy (11. 40. 3). Libo Drusus was a young whose vanity was greater than his sense. He was encouraged
"friend,"

to conspire against Tiberius

by

the malice of a deceitful

Firmius Catus. his

crime
of

The foolish
was

youth and

did

not get so

far

as to plot

any action; the

magi

sum of

silly crazy dreams. Tacitus suggests that he

[improvidum]"

consultations

with

soothsayers,

and

interpreters

was a

fool,

not

to

be feared, "without fore

inanibus]"

thought

and
"friend"

"gullible for empty impostures [facilem

of

(11. 27. 2). Libo's

informed Tiberius him

as

Libo's intentions. But Tiberius

even with the

did

not call

Libo

and reprimand

Augustus had done

the

far

more

dangerous

Cinna.35

charge,"

"By

no means

despising

he

allowed

Libo

to continue
more

his plotting, or rather consulting. Perhaps he wanted to see if anyone formidable would join him. (This is the claim scholars favorable to Tiber
that Libo
presented a real
threat.)36

ius

exaggerate

Yet it

seems

doubtful that

33.

5:135;
34.

Merivale, History of the Romans Walker, The Annals, p. 88.

These
are

under the

Empire, 8

vols.

(New York: Appleton, 1865),

the

words of

Pliny

to Trajan: "You turned

as

your attention

to the problem of the ac

cusers and peace was restored to the

forum

it had been to the

army-camps. on

You

cut out the canker

in

our midst; your stern providence ensured that a state

laws'

founded
so
.

laws

should not appear

to perish

through the

abuse

nity

we enjoyed of

looking

nothing was so popular, nothing down at the informers at our feet

and abandoned to the

fitting

for

our times as the opportu

Ships

were
.

hastily
.

produced, and
us

they

were crowded on

board

hazard

of wind and weather

What joy for

to
render

to

watch

the ships scattered as soon as

they left harbor,

and on

the very

water's edge

thanks to

our ruler who

of the sea! rocks

in his unfailing mercy had preferred to entrust vengeance over men on earth to the gods Then indeed we knew how times had changed; the real criminals were nailed to the very which had been the cross of many an innocent man; the islands where senators were exiled were
with

crowded

the informers
and

whose power you

had broken for

'

all

time

Plinius Secundus.

Panegyricus, in Letters
1969), xxxiv, xxxv.
35. 36.

Panegyricus,

2 vols.

Loeb Classical

Library

(London: Heinemann,

See

note 11.
pp.

Rogers, Criminal Trials,

13-14;

Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius,

p. 58.

Tacitus'

Teaching
anyone with matter who

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

-213

any sense would conspire against Tiberius for the sake of a Libo, no his ancestors were nor how closely related he was to the Caesars.

Tiberius

went

further. He honored Libo

with

the praetorship, invited him to his

won

banquets,
der
at

was not estranged or

excited, and hid his anger. We are forced to

the pettiness of Tiberius who ruled the world

but

was curious and mali

was able

cious enough prohibit all

to play cat

and mouse with

this imbecile. "Though he

preferred to

to

[Libo's]
of

speeches and

deeds, [Tiberius]
for the

know

[them]"

(n. 28. 2). It does

not seem reasonable to suppose that

Tiberius

allowed

Libo to

carry behavior
the mere

on

in hopes
of

getting

more evidence

sake of

the trial. For from the

the

Senate,

we see

that

they

were

willing to

convict on

testimony

of

intent to

commit

the crime.

made certain

there were

witnesses

Anyway, the original informer had already before he laid his information before Tiberius.

At this point, however, Tiberius had done nothing worse than to conduct himself in a manner unbefitting a decent ruler. Strictly speaking, of course, he is respon
sible

for the

excesses of

the informers

who

framed Libo.
together to consult about "a
adopted a mask of

A trial
ity. We

was

in

order and

the Senate

was called

matter."

great and terrible

call

In the trial itself Tiberius

impartial

it

a mask

because, by

the nature of the situation, to be accused was

tantamount to
servile was

being

condemned unless said

the First Citizen actively

Tiberius'

intervened,

so

the Senate. It may be

often

to

credit of

that

during

these early

years

he did

intervene to

moderate

the servility
arbitrary.37

the Senate and the zeal of

effect of no one

the

delatores, but his interventions

can

were

The dreadful
could

these

trials on the Senate

be

seen

from the fact that Libo

find

to de

fend him. "All refused,

the same
of
fear"

and

though

they

alleged

different pretexts, it
out

was

from

(11.29. 1). Tne

prosecution

brought

the ridiculous consultations

Libo

with

the fortune-tellers. Tacitus

says

they

were

"stupid

and

empty, if

you

accepted

them more gently,

[worthy]

to be

pitied"

(11. 30. 2).

On Libo's denial that he had Tiberius

permitted

conspired against

the Caesars through magic,

the most serious breach of law. He allowed the slaves of Libo

to be tortured

as witnesses.

Tacitus indicates that this

the

was a tyrannical act over

turning

the

ancient custom which prohibited court where

testimony

of slaves

from

being
The

admitted

in

their

masters were

being

tried on a

capital charge.

modern commentators who

have

so

rudely disparaged
the crime,

Tacitus'

judgment have

not recognized

that

while ancient custom allowed

the use of slaves

in

cases of

conspiracy
witnesses.38

or

incest to inform the

passage

court of allege

they

were never used as

points

The very to the great fear in

See
11.50 where

they

in

support of

their claim from

Cicero

which

the Romans held the

use of slaves as witnesses.

out against

37
whereas

he

permitted

Apuleia Varilla to be tried for speaking

the
remark

Augustus,

in 1.73 he had dismissed the

gods"

similar charges with

curae).

that "the injuries of the gods are

the

concern of

the

(deum iniuriae dis deposition

38.

"Augustus decreed that the

slaves of

those who

should conspire against

him

would

be

sold

to

the

public so

they

could give a

against

their master.

One

ought

to

which

leads to the

discovery

of a great crime.
can not

Thus in

a state where there are

nothing of that slaves, it is natural that

neglect

they

can

be informers, but they

be

witnesses.

Vindex

gave

information

of

the conspiracy

214

Interpretation
gods,
what can

O,

ye

be done

with more animosity?

Our

ancestors

did

not

think

it

right

that slaves
could not

should

be

examined as witnesses against their masters; not

scandalous

because the truth

pressive to the masters than even

be discovered, but because it seemed a death itself.39

thing

to

do,

and more

op

Cicero

goes on

to explain the eminent dangers

of corruption

in this his

sort of pro

ceeding, for it
enemy.

was well

It may
to

only too natural that the be that Augustus, too, "was disposed to
considerations,"40

slave should regard

master as an

subordinate the

law had

on occasion

practical

but this merely

the

proves

that

Tacitus is

right in the
protected

spirit of what

he

says: under

Principate,

old custom which of

the citizens was subverted, and the choice and interest

a

the ruler sub

stituted

for it in

way that

rendered

their situation particularly

insecure.41

After this, Libo committed suicide; later Tiberius swore that he would have asked for his life, though guilty, if he had not hastened to a voluntary death. As suming for the
ate the moment

that we

can

believe him, for he did in why Tiberius

those

other cases allevi

penalties, this raises the

question

allowed who

Libo to be

put on

trial at all.

He

was not above

taking
of worth

revenge on

he thought had hurt

whom

him,

as we see

from his treatment

was

his wife, Julia,

and

her adulterer,

he

ordered

killed. But
put

Libo

taking

seriously?

One possibility is that

of the slaves

Tiberius
gests

Libo through the trial for

more sinister. allowed

revenge.

But the torture

sug
ever

something him. It

In the

absence of real

conspiracies,

Tiberius,
an

suspicious, may have

against

the trial as a deterrent to those

unscrupulous

who might plot

promised an

unmitigated,

investigation

inves

tigation that would be conducted

of justice as to most probable

with such

disregard for the traditional

principles

threaten even

innocent
was

men with persecution

by

their slaves. The

intent

of

this trial

to

disconcert Such
was

and

they try anything

made

to endanger Tiberius.

his tyrannical

frighten the nobility, lest art. It had an inBrutus. It

was

in favor

of

Tarquin; but he
had his

was not witness against the children of

just to

give

lib

erty to him

who

rendered so great a service to

country."

would render that service to

his country; but one did not give it to him so he Montesquieu, De esprit des lois, xu.15. Rogers, who
/'

treats Tacitus so contemptuously, is unaware

39.

of this distinction. Criminal Trials, pp. 16-17. Marcus Cicero, Pro Milone, xxii, in The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, trans. C. Yonge, 4 vols. (London: Bohn, 1852), vol. 3.

40.
41
.

Rogers, Criminal Trials,

The
passage alluded

p. 17.

at Pro Deiolaro 1.3 supports Tacitus even more explicitly: "For though, according to the usage of our ancestors, it is not lawful to examine a slave as a witness against his master, not even by torture in which mode of examination pain might perhaps, elicit the truth from a man even against his will a slave has arisen, who, without any compulsion, accuses him against whom he might not legally say a word even on the The passage cited by Rogers at Pant. orat. 34 speaks of an exception to the law of examining slaves against their masters, it is true. But it is vague and not sufficiently clear that it should be allowed to stand against the distinction.

to

by Rogers

rack."

Therefore, in

the absence of contrary evidence, the

a

teaching

of

Tacitus

should

be left

as vindicated.

Tiberius introduced

tyrannical

usage

them merely to inform the court of an the exception granted even by the ancient law.
and
Rogers'

allowing slaves to be tortured as witnesses. Had he used intended conspiracy, he would have acted within the scope of

by

Admitting

their

testimony

as material was tyrannical

law."

Tacitus is perfectly justified in calling him a "cunning man and discoverer of new attacks on Tacitus similarly dissolve under close scrutiny. See note 42, infra.

All

of

Tacitus'

Teaching
delible
old

and the

Decline of Liberty
Roman society,

at

Rome

-215

and

deleterious

effect on

which was never

to recover

its

independence.
a

As
der."

reward, Libo's

goods were

divided among the

accusers and those who

were of

Senatorial

order were endowed with praetorships

"out

of

the

usual or

This

would not

have been done had Tiberius

would not

opposed

it. But his henchmen

had to be

paid.

The law

have become the

engine of

tyranny it

was

be

coming if the accusers had not been induced by extravagant rewards. This is not the least of the sinister revelations about Tiberius that are brought to light by this
trial.

Furthermore,

various servile

Senators heaped

execrations on

the memory of
names of their

Libo in
lic"

flattery

of

Tiberius. Tacitus details them

and the

illustrious

depraved

authors

"that it
evil

might

be known that this

was an old evil

in the
when

repub

(n. 32. 2). The

thus begun remained, nearly a century

later,

Tacitus

was writing.

This trial

set a

precedent, it is true. But

during

the early

years of

his reign,

Tiberius does
trials are

not seem

to have been certain how much he

needed

to use it. The

occasional. and

The threat remained,

and one cannot overestimate

its

effect

in

dispiriting
not ever

worrying the

decent

citizens who survived.

But Tiberius

often

intervened to limit the

does but

proceedings

that had been begun (n. 50. 2). One those

who

thing he

do, however, is

punish

did injustice in these trials. One

cannot

conclude
was

that though he

saw

the dangerous opportunity for injustice in

the

law, he

necessary.

willing to risk that injustice because he felt the law was useful or In a.d. 21, Clutorius Priscus, in the absence of Tiberius, was put to

death
an

on a treason charge

by

the

Senate,
have

on

the ridiculous ground that he

of reward

wrote

might

obituary poem have thought that this

the accusers,

for Drusus prematurely, in hope

would

if he died. One
and punish
or

occasioned some

inquest

ment of

but

when

he returned, Tiberius tolerated the injustice

most general terms.
complained of

complaisantly
his

reproached

them

in the

The immediate
accustomed

punishment of

Priscus Tiberius

in the Senate

with

ambiguities; while modest,

he he

praised

the

the First

Citizen, however
He
proposed

expressed speaker

piety of those avenging injuries of disapproval of such hasty punish for moderation] but he did
not

ments of words.

praised

Lepidus [the

blame

Agrippa [who

the

death penalty] (111.51.1).

"piety"

of his avengers in so sordid a case as this. Tiberius actually praised the this even in There is no question that early period he would have done away with

law. The appalling degeneration of the atmosphere of political discourse in the Senate during those times can be deduced from the speech of Marcus Lepidus, a decent and moderate man. He wished to have Priscus pardoned but he felt under
such a

the necessity of

heaping

execrations on

him to

accommodate

the

Senate, before
mind and

he

could even

think of proposing a milder

we consider

sentence:

Conscript Fathers, if
the ears of men,
suffice

only that Clutorius Priscus depraved his

neither

the

prison nor

the noose, nor even servile tortures would

to

punish

him (111.50.

1).

216 Lepidus
though

Interpretation
goes on

to distinguish between

what

is empty

and what

is criminal,

and

he clearly feels that no punishment is deserved, he proposes that Priscus be exiled and his estate confiscated, "as if he were sentenced under the Lex
Majestatis"

(in. 50. 4). He

indirectly
the

censures

the

increasingly
is

common

arbitrary

and

illegal

applications of of

the death penalty

in

such cases.

But here

we see

how,
ap

under

the pressure
and

flattery,

most severe punishment even

considered most
eager

propriate,

the majority of the Senate oppose

exile,

to gratify the
with
was

First Citizen
the ultimate

showing their affection in zealously punishing his vengeance. The Senate voted against Lepidus and Priscus

"enemy"

by

"im

for writing a poem. mediately deprived of While one cannot absolve Tiberius of all responsibility der the frightful necessity to flatter
palled at

life"

since

he

put

them

un

by keeping

the

law,

one

is

amazed and

ap
of

the cowardice of men who rejected the milder punishment in

favor

one so severe

for

so slight a

fault. The truest

mark of

the terrible pressures that

iv.20.2).

then existed
save

is the

speech of so noble a man as

Lepidus (cf.

To try to

the foolish

and pitiful

Priscus he

was compelled

to frame his speech

abjectly
of

too. Otherwise he

would no

doubt have been

arraigned next as an

enemy

the

First Citizen for abetting so great a criminal. Things changed after the death of Drusus,

Tiberius'

only
and after

son.

The restraining
of

influence

of a

father's love

and

hope

was

removed,

the baleful influence

of

his friend, Sejanus,

revealing
of
Tiberius'

replaced

it. The first trial

the death

Drusus is very

the worsening

of

the atmosphere. Sejanus had secretly poisoned

heir. The adolescent children of Germanicus, who was then Drusus, also dead, became the recognized heirs (iv. 8.4-5). Sejanus made himself indis fears of these boys, their mother Agrippina encouraging and their In fact, he himself had designs on the state that could only be realized if they were taken out of the way (iv.3. 1). When the boys were
pensable

by

Tiberius'

"supporters."

praised

by

priests, Tiberius became annoyed, that the city

was

and

Sejanus

saw

his

chance.
were

He

complained
who called

distracted
of

as

if in

civil

war, that there

those

themselves the party

would

Agrippina,

and that unless

they

were

op

increase; there was no other remedy for the growing discord they than that one or another of those most forward should be overthrown. For this
posed,
purpose the
was

law

of

treason stood ready at

hand,

Tiberius'

and

distracted heart
the treason

ready for this law for reasons of

the reign of terror.

counsel.
state as a

With the trial

of

Caius Silius the

grew more

use of

deliberate policy
was one of

intense

and resulted

in

Silius

was chosen

because he

the most

illustrious

men to

have been
sons and

associated with

Germanicus,

and might

be

expected to
years

befriend his he had

thereby

threaten Tiberius (and Sejanus). For seven

won

governed

huge
the

armies, had

triumphal honors in

Germany,

and

had

conquered

Sacrovir,

dangerous

rebel of

Gaul. Tacitus

underlines the

fact that

a generalized terror was

would
out-

intended: "The

more

the greatness with which he collapsed, the more fear

others'

be dispersed among the

(iv.18.1). The

reason

that

he,

among the

Tacitus'

Teaching
of

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

-217

"partisans"

standing in his

the

family of Germanicus,

was chosen

is further

specified

contemporaries'

conjectures:

Many believed he had augmented his offense by his own lack of moderation, immoder ately boasting that his soldiery had remained in allegiance, though others sank to sedi tions. [He boasted] that the Empire would not have remained for Tiberius if there had
been
a

desire for

change

in these legions

as well.

Caesar thought his fortune dimin

ished

by

this and unequal to such merits (iv. 18.2-3).

supports and

The

private resentment

intensifies the tyrannical intent. Tacitus

concludes with one of

only

so

much

his stunning aphorisms on human nature: "For benefits are far gladly received when they seem to be able to be repaid; where they This is not so much a revelation exceed, hatred is returned for
gratitude."

about all men as about

was

Tiberius

and men

like him. There

was no

doubt that Silius

guilty of extortion, but that is irrelevant; the whole case was treated under the law of treason, and when Silius committed suicide his money was sought in
excess of what
was

the law allowed even if he had been guilty. Thus the

net of

terror

drawn

tighter.42

During
causes

the last period of Tiberius

character of

(23-37

a.d.) there

were

three distinct

beyond the

Tiberius for
of

which

the law of treason was abused.

who wished

One

was

the depraved ascendancy

Sejanus. Men "the

[scelere]"

honors had
Sejanus

no

access not

to them but through

him,

and

preference

[voluntas]
Such

of

was

to be sought except through crime

(iv.68.2). Tiberius

allowed

Sejanus to foment
always

accusations out of sheer malignancy.

accusations

nearly

led to
after

conviction.
Sejanus'

Then there

were

the

state

trials which were initiated

by
in

Tiberius
31 a.d.
with

ambition was unmasked and all

Tiberius broke his

power

By

these trials he destroyed

minister.

those who were in any way connected

the plotting

Surviving
Of these

victims or relatives of victims of account

and

Sejanus

joined in the hue

42.

Tacitus'

and cry.

in Book V is mostly lost

under

In his

review of

R.

Rogers'

book, Criminal Trials

the
often

Criminal Legislation
Tacitus'

Tiberius,

C. W. Chilton develops

a reasoned protest against

revision of

assessment of

the law of

treason. "In this book Rogers asserts positively and

that the Lex Julia embraced two different

kinds
ties

of treason

high treason
no more viz.

which

he

calls

by

the old name of

Perduellio,
and

and

Majestas,

which

often amounted to
were

than

slander of

the Princeps or
confiscation

his

family

and that

two different penal

memoriae)

prescribed,
exile

death (with

of

property

damnatio

for

Tiberius'

Perduellio,

adminis for Majestas. If Rogers is right, the evil reputation attaching to After a close survey of the tration of this law is unjust and Tacitus was both malicious and penalties laid down by relevant laws he concludes: "There can be no reasonable doubt that the only
ignorant.'

ignis'

the Leges Juliae

de

majestate of

Caesar

and

Augustus

were

'interdictio

acquae et

with or with sentence of

out confiscation of property.

therefore,

which was

This penalty was frequently exacted in

. .
.

legally

the

same

for

all cases.

The

death,
later

Tiberius'

later years,

was an aggravation of

this penalty

arbitrarily imposed by the sovereign court developments and to vindicate the rule of law
the Principate the trend of Roman criminal

Rogers is trying to

combine ancient practice with

where no such rule existed.

From the

establishment of greater arbi

law, especially
defendant
seen under

the law of treason,

is towards

trariness,
ments.

wider

discrimination between
of

one

and another, and crueller and crueller punish

The beginning development is amply

this process can be

Tiberius

and even under

Augustus. The full

clear

in the

jurists."

C. W. Chilton, "The Roman Law

Treason,"

of

Journal of

Roman Studies 45(I955):73. 81.

218 only
with

Interpretation few
speeches survive.
whose

Finally,

there

were

the trials
and

of people connected

Agrippina,
her

influence Tiberius feared

we

hated

as a threat.

Here he

acted to

forestall her plotting, though

have

no evidence

that she intended any

thing. Still

name as granddaughter of

Augustus

and widow of

Germanicus
categories

was great with resemble

the people and the armies. The trials of the

latter two

the trial of

Caius Silius for

Sejanus'

reasons of state. malice

trial of the first category

An exceptionally revealing is that of Cremutius Cordus. From

it

we see

the degeneration of the

political atmosphere

during by

the years

(23-31
the out
of

a.d.)

when

Sejanus

was

in the

ascendant.

The
set:

atrocious character of

the proceeding is indicated

Tacitus
Brutus

at

Cremutius Cordus

was accused on a charge

"new

and

then first

heard

(iv. 34. 1). He had

published

histories in

which

he had

praised

and called

Cassius "the last

sinated

of the

Romans."

Caesar,

adoptive

father

of

As they were the tyrannicides who had assas Augustus and his predecessor in establishing
a charge of

the

new

state, two

clients of

Sejanus brought

treason against
Tiberius'

Cordus.

This fact, that Sejanus

nance

was sponsor of

the charge, and

"lethal"

grim counte

in the Senate
on
Cordus'

were understood

to be

(perniciabili)
of

to the accused.
politics.

Resolved
core of

death, he

made a magnificent

indictment

the new
and

The

speech

is

a comparison

between Tiberius
criticism.

the two former

eloquent speech character

Caesars in their
of

toleration of

direct

and

implied

This

underlines our contention that

in those days

and under that

regime, the

the First Citizen made a great difference. Cordus begins

words are

the words
pertain to praised

by noting that his held to blame, so far innocent is he of any harm in deed. Further, even for which he is charged are not covered under the law, for they do not
the First Citizen or his mother. He is merely charged
with

having

Brutus

blames the

Cassius, law by implication,

and and arbitrary.

who

have been

praised

as well as those who cause

by many in the past. He misapply it. The proceeding

First Citizen
"the
Pompewealth

is tyrannical
who allows

The decisive
existed

is the

character of the
praised

it: though the law

and so

before, Livy
resent

Pompey, Caesar's

great
ian,"

enemy,

little did Augustus

it that he

called

Livy

"nor did this

obstruct their

friendship"

(iv.34.3). Augustus heaped

and or

honors

on others who praised

Brutus

and

Cassius,

so

far

was

he from

malice

fear toward them. "And how

Marcus
oration,

Cicero, in
as

which

did Caesar the Dictator reply to that book of he equaled Cato with heaven, than in an answering
else
judges"

though

before
of

which was

worthy
not

the

dignity

of

(iv.34.4). Caesar thought that the answer, his government, was an answer in reasoned brutality. But
the

discourse,
Augustus
opposed,

pseudo-

legal

or violent

magnanimity

of an

or a

Caesar,

who could admit and respect the virtue of men

politically him

was not shared

by

Tiberius. One
virtue. as

cannot escape the conclusion that

a

Tiberius had become hostile to

self, he feared it in
others.

Perhaps, being
not years.

less

virtuous man point

And,

Cordus does

fail to

out,

some of

those others had been dead for seventy

Cordus

concludes

by

reaffirming his belief that

virtue

is beyond the

power of

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the Decline of Liberty

cannot use

at

Rome

-219

any tyrant to suppress; and, though he nevertheless reminds him that there are

that

word

before Tiberius, he

standards above

his

will

by

which all will man

be judged. The historian

for
virtue and

as as

the recorder of human worth is himself a

striving

his fate is

virtuous active men whose

worthy lives and

of remembrance with reverence as that of the

character

he

records.

"Posterity
Brutus"

weighs out

the worth

[decus]

of

each,

nor will men

be

lacking

if the

condemnation assaults

[me]

who will remember

committed

suicide, and

only Cassius and this draws from Tacitus an outburst

me,
and not

(iv.35.3). He

of scorn

for the

petti

ness of a certain sort of

unworthy

men of

power, both

rulers and ruled:

The Senators decreed that his books

were who

must

be

burned; but they

laugh to

remained

hidden
of

and

[later]

published.
even

For this [reason]

one can

scorn the

stupidity

those

believe that

the memory of the succeeding age can be

extinguished.

For in

stead,

when geniuses are

punished, their authority

same

increases,

nor

have foreign kings,

them

or those who
selves and

have followed the

cruelty,

produced

anything but dishonor to

glory to [their victims] (iv.35.5).

virtue and

Hostility
Tacitus

to

as

record of it laid up in the histories is denounced by The laughter he indulges in is bitter, for the barbarism. tantamount to

the

prerogative of zen of

half-savage foreign
all

potentates

is

now exercised

by

the First

Citi

Rome. Tiberius, for

are

his education,
the

and the

Roman Senate, despite its

the Roman
world.

tradition,

the instruments

of

rebarbarization of
Tiberius'

Tacitus
virtue and

now

turns to a deeper probing of

mind

in its

attitude toward

fame worthily attained by virtue. The glory Tiberius tried to deny Brutus was offered to him on a grander scale. He turned it down. This leads Tacitus to wonder about the First Citizen's attitude toward his own Cassius
and virtue.

Delegates
to Tiberius
spoke

of

Further Spain

asked

the Senate

whether

they

could erect a temple

and

his

mother

a privilege

he had

allowed

to the cities of Asia. He

in condemning honors, and having thought that he ought to respond to those by whose rumor he was charged with (iv.37.1). Tiberius often having stooped to the desire for display strive for the true glory to desire of the spurned flattery. However bereft he was
to forbid

this, "otherwise

resolute

[ambitionem]"

of

being

benevolent prince, he had the

not possess.

decency
is

not

to

claim

false

attestation of

virtues

he did
fear

Moreover,

as

Tacitus remarks, it is

not

difficult to

know
pelled

the difference between praise that

freely
more

given and

that which

is

com

by

or

baseness. But something

interesting
ambition

is

revealed

by

Ti

berius'

speech.

political men

He is really devoid of that higher to create and found a new order that
Tiberius'

that moves

the best

will perpetuate their

memory

after their

death. However
a

respectable

claim

may be, it
create or

reveals a pedes

trian

heart,

heart

not moved

by

its

own

mortality to

grasp something
could not con not

eternal.

Perhaps this is

the deepest

revelation about

why Tiberius
son.

trol himself or limit his

sufficient sense of

evil minister after

he lost his

He did

have

his

own worth when social constraints were

removed; but for

220 him

Interpretation
men,

above all

they

were removed.

His merely

respectable claim

fails to im

pose upon and

himself the high demands

of self-sufficiency.

The

respectable

humility
com

mortality that Tiberius emphasizes should not blind place called upon him for far more. We do not forget here
parisons other.

us to the
Cordus'

fact that his

implicit

between Tiberius
a part of

on

the

one

hand

and

Caesar

and

Augustus

on

the

Tiberius'

Here is

speech of refusal of the

honors:
enough

O Conscript Fathers, I hold

tion of men,
remember.

myself

to be
and

mortal and

I hold it

to

fulfill

the

func

if I fill the first place,

They
am

believe that I

posterity to will attribute enough and more than enough to my memory if they worthy of my ancestors, watchful over your affairs, constant in
call you
witness and

to

wish

dangers,

and not

fearful

of

offending

on

behalf

of

the

republic

(iv.38.1).

Perhaps it is only fair to recognize that Tiberius was decent in not claiming di vine honors he knew he did not deserve. He freely admits that Augustus was
worthy of them (iv.37.3). Tacitus reports the conjectures
nize of

those

who used

this as an occasion to scruti

out of as

the

mind of

the First Citizen.

Some

said

he turned down the honor

others explained

modesty, because he
mark of a

was not confident of as

his worth;
were

it

the

degenerate mind, impressed

they

by

the opportunity the

First

Citizen had for

tue.
Tiberius'

deserving
be

divine honors if he

exerted

himself in the

cause of vir

refusal strive to

to accept such honors

worthy:

was

but the

outward mark of a soul

unwilling to

"By

the contempt of

reputation

the virtues the

were

condemned"

(iv.38.5). These last,

principle

most severe

interpreters

adduce

effect of

the love of high honors on the

hoped."

character of

Augustus. "He

was

better because he is too

great to

Their

the object of aspiration

virtue.

is that nothing not even deification for the men best endowed by nature
of mortals

be
It

with character and

[altissima]."

"Indeed the best

who

[mortalium] desire

the highest

is First Citizens
virtues

have the

greatest opportunities

by

which

the highest honors are attained.

for exercising the arts and (It should be remarked that

these

do

not seem to

be

credulous

men;

they do

not

come gods

mortals"

of

only that they can be honored who desire the highest.)

shown that

as gods

say that virtuous men can be if they act well: it is "the best capacity
whose undoubted

We have

Tiberius his

was a man of some

accomplishments were undermined and cast

into

the shade
worse.

by

his defects,

even

during
Citizen
ruler.

the best

period of

rule.

Later he became

An

adequate explana

tion of this
of

degeneration

requires that one

not

look

at the peculiar position of the

First

Rome. This is

just any

man we are

We have
out

said that there were almost no

it is an absolute analyzing limits to what he could do and this

brought
so

the worst in him. But why the progressive decline?

reveal

gradually

the worst aspects of his character,

and

Why did Tiberius becoming cruel from being

Tacitus judges that it
own worst at

merely suspicious,
was a radical

finally joining
were

lust to his

cruelty?

dependence on

others that preserved

him

first from his

he

impulses. His impulses

bad because

as a small man

was exposed

to envy

Tacitus'

Teaching
and

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
what

221 he wanted, for he like the best

of

fear

of

his betters. As his

relatives were removed

of reputation and

he did

he

was not governed

by the
have

love

glory;

nor was

men,
a

independent
sort

of opinion and self-sufficient

(see Chapter V). Had he been

of

higher

he

could

endured

the awesome solitude

his eminence;

as

it

was, he looked to

others

for

support and

Only
is

when

they

were gone was

he truly

liberated,

secretly feared their personal opinions. and liberation for such a man
a monster as a ruler.

a catastrophe.

Outstanding
his

as a

subordinate, he became

The

periods of

character were also

and reputation as was a

long

as

he

was a private man or

different. [It was] an illustrious [time] in his life in commands under Augustus. [It
virtues

time of] reserve and guile

and

Drusus

Germanicus

survived

for pretending to (vi.51.3).

[he did

not

possess]

as

long as

It is this judgment
the best
Tiberius'

of

Tacitus that has

For how

aroused

the doubts

and

indignation

of even

commentators.43

could the accolade of

to the benevolence of

government

in the

beginning
whole

Book IV be Tiberius

squared with this severe

judgment? Tacitus knew the Tiberius

was

life

of

and when

he judges that

merely pretending to virtues as a ruler, he compares the apparently

with

decent
what
ask

rule

in the Empire

the

law

of treason persecutions which revealed

secret.

Tiberius meditated, envied,

one

and

feared in

The

question one should

if

doubts Tacitus is this:

can a man
"good"

have

virtues who

does

not

have

vir

tue? Does it not cast doubt on the

same

things Tiberius did to know that at the

time he was persecuting good men and

of politics

terrifying

all

but the

wicked?

If the
1),

highest task
how
The

is to

elevate and educate view of a

the best

men

(consider

111.65.

can one give a cause of

favorable

First Citizen
of

who made virtue a crime?

this

was

in the deficiencies

was incapable of restraining itself in a he burst forth into crimes and dishonorable deeds were removed and

his character, which, as we have said, position of radical independence: "Finally

at

once,

after shame and

fear

he followed his
men can ever and

[ingenio]"

own nature

(vi.51). Freedom from

Tiberius'

restraint, acter,

such as

few

know, destroyed
state.

the Emperor

char
republican

and with

it the Senate

the Roman

After Tiberius, the

spirit was never to return.

abject, unwilling to
of

assert

In succeeding reigns, the Senate remained servile and itself for good, unable to resist the worst importunities
must share

the vilest of emperors. For this, Tiberius

and

the responsibility with the

cowardly erate further. We

ous

dependent Romans
recall

whom

he did

not correct

but

allowed reign

to degen

that Tacitus

was moved

to

attribute

the

to the "an
mysteri

ger of the gods toward the

Roman

state."

Perhaps that best

sums

up the

forces
was

at work. a man came

It
an

deeply tragic that such

to rule, especially

since

he had been
to conclude

exemplary leader Marcus Aurelius

Syme, Tacitus,

while still a subordinate.

Yet it

would

be

rash

that absolute
and

power corrupts all men.

prove

The

cases of

Seneca, Trajan, Antoninus,

is
so

the opposite. That of Tiberius

1:653,
n. 3.

fascinating and so

43.

1:420;

Furneaux, The Annals,

222

Interpretation
because it
reveals

significant

how

even a

more-than-ordinary

man

is

corrupted

by

too

great a position.

Rome

never recovered.

CHAPTER IV: THE SCOPE AND LIMITS

OF MORAL, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW
Tacitus'

The Limits of Law:

Teaching
sources of

of Moderation
corruption

We have investigated the have

seen

Rome's

in the

past and we

that there

were

irreversible difficulties
we

deeply
it

imbedded in the imperial

Republic itself.

Subsequently

looked

at

the fate of the old political class of

was reduced

Rome

under

the difficult

circumstances

to

which

by

that

corrup

tion and the victories of

Tiberius'

Caesar

and

Augustus. We explored, in particular, the

effect of

dent

and servile.

policy in further discouraging and rendering these men depen The evil was recognized by some members of that order, and

Tiberius how

was under some pressure

from them to initiate

Now
we wish

a reform.

We have
Tacitus'

seen
pre

old were

the

causes of corruption.

to investigate

sentation of the reasonable

limits

of what could can

be

expected

from

reform. an

The

teaching
with a

of

the limits of

what

possibly

be done

by

legislation is

important

part of the political

teaching

of

deeply corrupt time,

virtue which

as

any thinker. It is especially crucial when he deals does Tacitus. After the discussion of why modera

tion is necessary, we explore

Tacitus'

teaching
and

on

the cosmic or natural supports

for the
eration

is possible,
to the

the implications of his

teaching

about mod

for his

answer

question of man's place

in the

whole of nature.

gence.
men

Sumptuary laws are laws restraining They were employed during the
hoped the
a

expenditure

for luxuries

and self-indul

best days
could

of

the old Republic and some

with

corruption of the

Empire

be dealt

by

their

revival.

There is

cess over

distinction between necessary and unnecessary expenditure. The ex the necessary results from an attempt to gain pleasure or honor and at
and

tention
which

by display,
of

is forbidden

by

such

laws.

They
and

are proper to a regime

is

concerned with the character of

and ostentation

its citizens, for

moderation

is

an

impor

tant part
with

tain

virtue, food, dress, Still, sumptuary laws, like all laws regulating character, demand a cer sacrifice of liberty, and careful watching of the citizens, one by the other.

in

furniture is incompatible

it.

Ancient statesmen,
ous character are

living

in

willing to make these sacrifices,

in the
as

citizens

cities, like the early Roman Republic, were because they thought that a self-sufficient, virtu justified it. Yet, as we will see from Tacitus, there
small

limits to these
withhold

to all good

laws,

and

in

a corrupt people people

it may be

more pru will

self-

dent to
be

them than to subject the

to a regulation which

painful and yet

inefficacious legitimate

on account of
of

deeply

ingrained habits
regards moral we will see

of

indulgence. Such

was

the character

the Empire.

Tacitus

legisla
that his

tion as a good and

object of public

concern, but

Tacitus'

Teaching
deep
concern

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

223

for morality is

moderated

by

an awareness of the

limits

of all

legislation.

We

are

interested in the
For
we are

positive attitude

Tacitus takes toward

moral

laws in

principle.

heirs

of a modern

liberal tradition that is hostile to

such

leg
of

islation. The contemporary left

and right

dispute the

nature and proper

with

limits

freedom, but both

they
reject

are united

in their

opposition

to all interference

it. Thus

the

older orientation of political

or virtuous citizens

by

moral regulation.

policy by the goal of producing noble Yet both contemporary left and right are
commercial

also somehow aware

that

modern

liberal

ideal

political order

by

reason of

the prevalence
or

society falls in liberal society

short of of

the

the mere

"consumer,"

the "spineless

conformist"

the easy-going "mass

man."

The

ab

sence of character unrelated

education,

which

is the

core of moral

regulation, may
we

not

be

to this

deep
Then

problem.

Under these circumstances,

were adduced

do

well

to famil

iarize

ourselves with

the arguments that

in favor

of our

liberal

easy-goingness.

we will attempt to present

the

great premodern

alternative,
and

emphasizing the limitations

application.

which were thought proper

to

moderate

its rigor

One
made

of

the last

modern

investigations

of the principles of

society that

was

in full

awareness of

the fundamental alternatives was Montesquieu's De

i esprit des lois. That

work

is ultimately

defense

of

liberalism, but
whole range of

an argued

defense,
cieties.

which, with

infinite patience, investigates the

human

so

For Montesquieu,
modern

ancient republicanism seems

to pose the most attrac

tive alternative to

liberalism,

and ancient republicanism was

based

on

participatory

virtue.

When he first

makes

the distinction between ancient and

sides with

modern statesmen one even

is led to think he
who

the

ancients.

The Greek
nize

statesmen

[politiques],

lived in the

popular government,
virtue.

did

not

recog
'
.

any

other

force that

could sustain

them than that of

Those
,

of

today only

speak

to us of

manufactures , of commerce , of

finances

of

riches
the

and even of

luxury

Montesquieu

seems

for

moral reasons

to be

repelled

by

commercial emphasis

of the doctrines of modern liberalism. This is apparently corroborated the things he says in Book VII, which is devoted to sumptuary laws.

by

some of

In

proportion as

luxury establishes

itself in

a republic, the spirit turns toward particular

the glory of their nothing but what is necessary, desire only corrupted by luxury has many other desires. Soon soul But a own. their and fatherland, As soon as the Romans were cor it becomes an enemy of the laws that annoy it through a general impulse, all the immense When, became desires their rupted,

interest. Those

who need

world

inclined to

voluptuousness, what

did

become?2

virtue

Here Montesquieu
reasons.

seems

to be a
not

proponent of virtue

for

moral as well as political

However,
equality

this
and

is

the whole

story.

He distinguishes between
is
good

a repub and each

lic,
I

where

hence sumptuary
111.3.

regulation

for society

Montesquieu, De V esprit des lois, Ibid.,

vii. 2.

2.

224
of the

Interpretation
citizens,
and

aristocracy

where

he denies that

concerned control.

is he to

help

the poor. The virtue

luxury is bad for the rich, of humanity here replaces strict

so

self-

Compassion is higher than

constituted

moderation:

Badly

aristocracy has this misfortune, that the

nobles there

and yet

they

must not spend are

them;

from it. Therefore there

who cannot
spend.3

luxury contrary only the very poor who

to the spirit of moderation

cannot receive, and the

have riches, is banned

very
rich

He

comes near to

approving

of courtesans who poor can

force the

nobles

to spend on

luxu

ries, in

the making

of which the

be

employed.

For the

same reason

inequality

of wealth and

humanity

toward the poor

Montesquieu

opposes

sumptuary legislation in We begin to wonder

virtue or so peared

monarchies.4

whether

Montesquieu is

so

favorably

disposed toward

unfavorably disposed toward commerce and even luxury as he ap in the first statement. In fact, his most important teaching is the superior
vehe of

ity

of

the liberal regime of Great Britain. Its commerce puts prosperity within the

reach of

ment

many and it allows civil freedom to all. Montesquieu praises the dynamism of the British character because it contributes to the power
more natural

the

state, but also because it is

to man.

Since
sire

all

the

passions are

to enrich oneself and distinguish

would

free there [in Great Britain], hatred, envy, jealousy, the de oneself would appear in their full extent; and if
be like
a man cut

that were otherwise the state

passions at all caprices and
.

down

by

sickness,

who

has

not

Since

each

individual

who

is

always

independent
often

would
. .

follow his

this nation one could forget the

his fantasies very much, one would change party laws of friendship.5

and often

in

In the

absence of moral

regulation, a greater naturalness is possible, for

man

is

naturally free and virtue is, according to Montesquieu, an artificial imposition which is merely for the good of the Virtue, in the old regimes, was a ne of not the health of the soul: "The ancient Greeks, who were over state, cessity
state.6

come should

by
be

the necessity that the people who lived under popular

elevated to

government
"Singular"

virtue,

made singular

institutions

to

inspire

it."7

here

means unnatural or extreme. natural

Egoism is States
of are

to man, for

men are not

rightly
vii. 3.

established to end the state of war which grows

naturally social, but forced to be so. up in the state

restore a civil

nature, but their goal if

3.

they

understand

themselves rightly is to

Ibid.,

4.

Montesquieu

approves the

beautiful
good

solution

found

to this problem

by

the Greek cities

which

were without

sumptuary laws. "The

Greek There

republics

had

admirable

institutions in

this regard.

The rich
race 5.

men employed

their money on

festivals,

on choruses of

music, on chariots, on horses for the

poverty."

course, and

on onerous magistratures.

riches were as onerous as

Ibid.,

vn.3.

Ibid., 6. Ibid., 7. Ibid.,

xix. 27. xi. 5.

iv. 6.

Tacitus'

Teaching
approximation of were social. security.

and the

Decline of Liberty
which existed

at

Rome

225
men

the independence

in the beginnings before

It is especially important for Montesquieu that governments Most states, however, mistake their end, and instead of limited

provide govern
goal

ment,
which

with

its

protections

for

personal

security,

establish some

fantastic

distorts their

citizens and overregulates them.

Moral

regulation violates

personal

security and privacy. This is the liberal argument against virtue. Virtue health of the soul but mere restraint. Its beauty, however great it may appear, is a deceptive beauty which perverts mankind, who is born for freedom.

is

not the

Sumptuary laws
name of eration

and other moral regulations

limit

man's natural

desires in the

virtue, but that virtue is a delusive ideal created by men's minds. Mod or self-restraint is but one among many choices a man can make, no more
and when

choiceworthy than the rest,

natural

the state intervenes to enforce

it,

man's

freedom
Freedom

and

independence is it

perverted.

Thus Montesquieu, is
enlightened politics.

who accepts

the modern denial of man's natural political character,

virtue. replaces as the goal of

compelled

to

abandon

fully

particularly rich development of the case for and legislation which we have only been able to sketch. He claims sumptuary to understand why it was necessary in the ancient republics and he pays homage
Montesquieu
provides a
against

to its

beauty, but ultimately he denies

advantageous or correct
as

that

moral regulation of

kind is

in

a government which

rightly understands
with

any thoroughgoing itself.

man

But inasmuch
modern ate

there

is

widespread

dissatisfaction

the kind of

that

liberal

commercial regimes

have produced,
such

we think

it is

not

inappropri

to state

briefly

the case in favor of

are

regulation, and then turn to an exam

ple where aware of

its limits

discussed

with uncommon penetration.

We thus become

the fundamental
seems to

alternatives. moderation

Tacitus

hold that

is

good

for

man.

Somehow the life

of

of

virtue chosen

for its

own sake

is happier

and

better than the life

mark of a

bodily

plea

sures and external acquisitions.

Moderation is the
and can

healthy

mind which

is

without

base

or

illusory

diversions

devote itself to the

practice of

the

other virtues

for

their own sakes. That

means virtue

is

more

choiceworthy than

the honors

or riches

the opportunity for making

allure and

that may follow from it. If this is so, it is reasonable to limit an ostentatious display of those external goods which
mind

distort the

from

a moderate

autonomy

and

devotion to

virtue.

Therefore sumptuary laws They forbid one from tempting others to immoderation. But good laws are limited in their power. They work best where the population has good morals and where
are good.

support one's own moderation and

they do

not counteract

deeply
wrote

ingrained inclinations to immoderation. Rome

about, a

was, in the time Tacitus

deeply

corrupted society.

Riches flowed

in from the

conquered world and

habits

display
be too
would

and wasting time

in

debauchery
to

of squandering money on ostentatious had become widely shared. Under such

circumstances, Tacitus is
weak

reluctant

endorse severe moral strictures. measures

They

will

to

combat

those prejudices, and the

as

to make them effective

Augustus'

be

severe and

harmful,

is

clear

from

what

had

occurred with

226
moral

Interpretation
legislation (in. 28. 3). But
more than
Montesquieu,8

Tacitus

regards

this as

a misfortune
moderation.

for those He does

who are no

not

think of

longer self-sufficient, virtuous, and capable of the benefits of luxury and commerce, for he is
mind of corrupt men.

more concerned about

the state of

The
of of

most complete consideration of

regulation comes at
Tiberius'

the corruption of Rome and the question

of

sumptuary the last years

the center

Book III, in the That

year 22 a.d.

one

"decent"

of against

period.

year men were apprehensive

lest there be
things on
who

"severity

luxury,

which

had broken

out

tremendously in
here
whether

all

which were

money is

wasted"

(m.52.1). It is

not clear

those

feared

the same as those

who were culpable and

hence feared

punish se

ment or whether vere measures civic

was

they

were public-spirited and prudent men who

feared that

taken to repress

luxury

would

be

abused and prove

detrimental

to

liberty. There was, in any case, widespread indignation at the luxury, and it feared (by more moderate men?) that this would cause Tiberius to overreact.
was

For he
moral were

himself

of notable

frugality,

and might respond with moral zeal

to

indignation. "The

preparations

for the

belly

and

for

debauchery,

which

discussed publicly [vulgati] in continual speeches, had caused anxiety lest a First Citizen of ancient parsimony would turn his attention [to them] harshly
[durius]."

The

aediles was

brought

a complaint

before the Senate that the

established

sumptuary law

ignored

and

that

prices continued

to rise. The Senate referred

the problem to the First Citizen. He recognized that something was seriously wrong, but his response is very statesmanlike. Perhaps ter caused

he had in

mind

the disas
about the

by

Augustus'

moral program.

His deliberation is mainly

harmful

effect of

the law on an already corrupt city:

.

But Tiberius

had

often pondered with

himself,

whether such extravagant

desires

were capable of

being repressed,
passed would

whether repression would

[not] carry
of

more of ruin

[damni] into
and

the republic, how

dishonorable it demand

was to

try

what could not

be

attained

if [a law were] (111.52.3)-

shame and

infamy

illustrious

men

Luxury

was accepted

stigmatize them would

public acquiescence

among respectable people in high Roman society. To have been revolting, for their vice had had the sanction of
generations. addressed

for

Though there
the Senate in

were old a

laws, they had been

men, the ae
persuaded them

allowed to

lapse. Tiberius

letter:

If before

[referring

this question to the

with me,

Senate]

these zealous
what

[strenui]
have

diles, had held counsel

to

I do

not

know but

would

disregard [ommittere] prevalent ful passions [flagitiis] with which

and mature vices, we are no

lest they

should reveal the shame

longer

able to cope

(m.53.2).
of

He

gives a vivid

description
It is

of the widespread

luxuriousness

Roman life in

those days in a series of rhetorical questions

regulate the problem.
not moral

showing how difficult it would be to indignation but worldliness and moderation

kinds
of corruption.

8. Montesquieu too is
perial

worried about certain

England is

not the same as

im

Rome. Certain

virtues are

necessary to

a commercial society.

Tacitus'

Teaching

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

227

that

here denominate

luxury

a misfortune and attempt

to persuade less experi

what

enced men of

the unwisdom of

trying

to coerce the citizens to leave

they

have

come

to love so well.

For

what should

undertake to prohibit

first

and cut

back to

ancient custom

[moremy1.
weight of promis

The infinite

spaces of

the

villas?

The

number and nations of the slaves?

The

gold and silver

cuous

[plate]? The

miracles of

bronze [statues]

and of paintings?

The

clothing money is transferred to foreign

corruption

of men and women and those or

[vanities]

proper to women
sake of

by

which our

hostile

nations

for the

jewels? (in. 53. 4).

Where
and

is

so

widespread, the

endeavor

to restore the ancient

frugality
politic a

self-sufficiency
to attempt

would require

remaking the

citizens.

Tiberius is too

ruler

this, for it

would require

government and a penetration of private

anny,9

was considered repellent and

assuming extraordinary life that, before the birth of improper even by as cold and

powers

in the

modern tyr

tyrannical a

man as

Tiberius.
one cannot repress the sicknesses of the

But indeed
oped,
and

body,
be

when old and which

long

devel

except with severe and

harsh

measures.

The mind,

is

at once corrupted

corrupting, and is both

sick and

ardent,

cannot

allayed with

lighter

remedies

than the

desires

with which

it burns

(ui.54.1).10

An

adequate reform would as

Tiberius describes them

mind

have to allay the mind and quench its desires. But ardent, like old and long developed diseases. The

is obviously is
meant

"corrupted"

by by
calling the

the easy-going wealthy atmosphere of the Em

pire where

there are

no more enemies

to fear and the

whole world renders tribute.

But

what

mind

"corrupting"? This indicates the depth

go

of

9.

The

careless reader of
at such pains

Rousseau is liable to
overturn.

away
said

with

the very self-righteous indignation

that Tacitus is

to

It

cannot

be

that Rousseau himself took great precau

of

tions to prevent himself

from

being

misunderstood.

Consider the tirade

Fabricius. "Oh Fabricius!

What
seen
more

would your great soul pompous

have thought if, to Rome

saved

your unhappiness, called your

back to

life,

you would

have

the

face

of this

by

arm,

and which your respectable name glorified what

than all her

conquests.

'Gods!

you would

have said,

has become

of

those

roofs of straw

and those rustic succeeded to

hearths

which once virtue and moderation

inhabited? What funereal done?

splendour

has

Roman

simplicity?

What is

this strange

language? What
what

are these effeminate morals? you

What do these statues, paintings, edifices signify? Madmen, of nations, have made yourselves the slaves of frivolous men
and actors that you

have

You,

the masters

whom you watered

have

vanquished?

Is it to

en

blood? The

rich architects, painters, sculptors, player? Romans, hasten to overthrow spoils of Carthage are become the prey of a flute drive out those slaves who subjugate those bum paintings; these amphitheaters; break those marbles;
whose

have

Greece

and

Asia

with your

you, and

funereal

arts corrupt you.

conquer

Let

other

hands glorify
to

themselves

by

vain

talents; the

sole
who

there.'"

talent worthy of Rome

writes these

is to

the

world and

make virtue rule

Yet

Rousseau,

feverish words, denies that he has any

such

immoderate intent: "On the

uselessness of

sumptuary laws to uproot luxury of what there is to say about that.

doctors."

once established, one says that the author

is

not without

knowledge
one ought
or men

Truly

he is

not.

am not unaware was not shared

that

when a man

is dead

not call the

The

moderation of

Rousseau

by his disciple Robespierre,

like him. Lettre

vols.,
10.

Raynal, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, in (Euvres Completes, 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 111:14-15, 33Pleiade Bibliotheque de la
a

L'Abbe

"Corruptus

simul

et

corrupter,

aeger

et

flagrans

animus

haud

levioribus

remediis

restinguendus est quam

libininibus

228

Interpretation
ostentation.

the problem. The mind comes to depend upon luxuries and them over and makes them its own with a
measureless

It takes
more

desire that is far have

natural

difficult
There is

to
no

deal

with

than the desires of the

body,

which

limits.
the

limit to

what

the mind, once aroused, can

desire to demonstrate its he

complains that
of

power or refinement. villas were of and

Tiberius does

not exaggerate when

no

"infinite
mind.

spaces."

There is truly
are

limit to the desires

would

the sick

immoderate

To

attempt a reform

by

laws

simply

not

work,

for

there are already

laws,
the

and

they

ignored. parsimony
once

He touches
So why
was

on

reasons

for

which

flourished:
himself [sibi
were not

frugality

once so strong? we were

Because

each man used to control

moderabatur], because
same temptations we

the citizens

of one

city, and

indeed there

the

[irritamenta]
(ill. 54. 3).

to those who ruled within

Italy.

By

foreign

victories

learned to

consume

foreign [property];

by [victories]

in the

civil

wars, [we

learned

to consume]

our own

The decisive

cause seems to

be the decline

of the
rule. was

Rome that
citizens

accompanied the growth of

Roman It

morality of the old City of That morality was taught the

external condi

by

the

City

and their strict parents.

irreducible to
to a

tions but supported

another.

In that city
while

by frugality
ruled

such conditions as

belonging

city

where all

knew

one

spirit

flourished;
did

this was

and poverty were the necessary because the City

conditions was

in

which public

threatened

by other cit

ies. Even

Rome

only

Italy

there was always a

Italy
one

not provide such

tribute to enrich the rulers.

foreign threat, and Plunder taken from de

feated

enemies and the mentality of civil war where one never knows how long may live led to a habit of squandering. These are deep causes, rooted in his torical change. One might try to turn them around by strict laws, but Tiberius

thinks that

would

be futile

and

too tyrannical. He therefore

unlike some of our

leaves

a moral prob

lem to be
not

solved

by

individuals. But

contemporaries, he does

hesitate to

call

luxury
be

and materialism a problem.

"The

remainder

[i.e. the

moral

problem]

must

cured within the

mind; let

shame change us
rich"

for the bet

ter, let necessity change the poor, let satiety change the ingly, he does not mention education or philosophy. He latter
weak was

(m.54.5). Interest have thought the former too

must

too rare to merit consideration as a political

force,

and the

to counter the corrupt tendencies of the age.

point

At this

own name. more could said.

Tacitus inserts one of those rare investigations he makes in his Perhaps he thinks that we, as moral men, would despair if nothing be done to arrest the growth of immorality than what Tiberius had
to

According

Tacitus,

the

luxury

of the

table grew and was practiced

with

in the century from the Battle of Actium (33 b.c) until Galba became First Citizen (69 a.d.). Then it gradually declined. Tacitus dis
profuse expenditure

this change. First, noble families entertained on a lavish among the plebeians, allies, and subject kings, which brought them reputation and influence. For this was still permitted in the early
of

cusses

four

"causes"

scale to

gain

clients

Tacitus'

Teaching
days
of

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
But
also

229
it became dan

the Empire.

By doing

this

they became

poorer.

gerous

to

be illustrious

and powerful:

slaughter, and magnitude

ers

"After the cruelty [of rulers had ordered] of reputation became [a cause] of destruction, the oth
wiser"

[who survived]

grew

(m.55.3). The severity

of the new

Roman

re

gime was an

tion.

inducement to parsimony and the abandonment of public ostenta Secondly, new men from the Italian colonies and the provinces were
into the Senate frugal
ways

admitted

by

the First Citizens.

They

brought
up.

with

them and re

tained the

in

which

they had been brought

Sabine
way
country.

But

above

all, the new

morality by Vespasian from Reate in the

was

introduced

the ruler
old

who set a good example

the Emperor

He

was

the ancient education this effect Tacitus

[cultu]

and

of

life

[victu]"

himself brought up "in (m.55.4). In reference to

makes a

famous

generalization.

Hence

allegiance toward the

First Citizen
and

and

love

of emulation are more powerful

than punishments

from the laws

fear (111. 55. 4).

an enterprise which

The love

of emulation arouses

the corrupting mind in

is

as

satisfying to it as ostentation through luxury.

Only

way the mind's infinite desires is it possible to stifle it seems reasonable that Tacitus should conclude that
are more powerful than punishments and

by satisfying in some other its depraved longings. Thus

allegiance and emulation prevent

fear,
of

which

merely

the yielding

to, but do
this effect
ancient

not

stifle, the infinite longings

the mind. Someone might ask why

was not experienced

in it

Tiberius'

time, for he

was

"a First Citizen

of

parsimony"

(m.52.1). But
whereas

as we
seems

hated for

other

reasons,

have already seen, Tiberius was widely that Vespasian was popular and people
greater

desired to be like him. The

even

power of

morality is

than is often thought,

in dark times.
concludes with a

Tacitus

in

all

things,

including

fourth possibility that there may be morals, as in the seasons. He encourages his
and

"cycles"

(orbes)
bet

contempora

ries

to strive to be worthy

to

accomplish noble

deeds. "Nor

are all things

ter among

[our]

ancestors,

for

our age

too has

produced

worthy]
contests

of praise and arts

worthy to be imitated
to
cheer

by

posterity.

many [moral examples Truly let these our

remain"

in

noble

things

with our ancestors

(m.55-5)- Tacitus introduces

citizens who might

the idea

of moral cycles perhaps

his fellow

despair if

they
were

thought that the decayed morality of the Principate and its severe regime

fated to

continue

forever. He

deftly

exhorts them

to strive to be worthy of

Tiberius'

their
of

ancestors.

Thus,
He

while

accepting

admonition

to beware the limits

of

regulation, he is far from

citizens.
adduces

being

merely defeatist

or

indifferent to the fate

his

fellow

the encouraging example of

arts of

Vespasian, but he

goes

beyond it. He
als

even

hints that the

decline. He may have thought arts can be carried to a high pitch

may flourish in these later times when mor Seneca or of himself in this connection. The

of refinement

in satisfying the

cravings of van and ar

ity,

which are so extravagant

in

such a time.

Thus the sculpture, painting,

chitecture of the

Principate

are

incomparably

finer than those

of

the Republic.

230

Interpretation
of certain capabilities of the mind
ages.

But the knowledge

may

also

be developed fur
the problem of

ther in a time of corruption than in happier

The

analysis of

tyranny is carried to a far greater degree of refinement in Tacitus than in Plato. One might also say that the possibility of a self-sufficient political virtue is more

fully
in for

developed in the

writings of

Tacitus than in those

of

the

Greeks honors

who

lived

more

fortunate
have

ages

(see

our

Chapter V). For there

courts of

were no

or supports

political virtue

in the depraved
Tacitus'

the Principate.

Now

we

seen

broad
of

awareness of the scope of

human

possibili

ties ranging

from the simplicity his

the citizens of the early Republic to the

infinite
in

longings his

of

the corrupt Principate. There seems to be a kind of

willingness

deep humanity

moderation and

to tolerate corruption that cannot be responsi

of those who are

bly

cured politically.

The dangerous first impulse

themselves

good, but politically naive, is simply to root out evil. Tacitus teaches that this impulse must be resisted. But he never forgets the difference between corruption
and an

health,

and

he has

a greater

variety

of measures to

deal

with corruption

than

ward.

ordinary His statement that "allegiance from the laws

us and

politician.

He

encourages those who care to turn their attentions and

in

love

of emulation

is

more powerful
of

than

fear"

punishments
and

shows a rich

knowledge
is
always

the limits

of

law

thereby instructs

in the

moderation which
of political

necessary for

an ele

vated and prudent

understanding

things.

2.

Is There

Divine

or

Natural Basis for Virtue?

our suspicion that count

We have already indicated

Tacitus

was sensitive

to the

longing
reflected

of moral men that

in the

world.

morality Therefore he

for something, that it be

somehow

encouraged them

by

the thought that the

moral

decline
The

of

Rome

was not

eternal, though Tiberius said it could not be re

this

versed.

more complete expression of

longing

is the belief

of moral men

that there are

just

and

to what their actions

as a

question,

and

according deserve. Classical philosophy was also concerned with this though seeking a natural basis for justice in place of the di
and

benevolent

gods who can punish or reward men

vine, the ancient wise men wondered whether nature supported morality, some

how allowing
raises

better

happier life to those

is

who practiced virtue.

Tacitus

precisely this question in Book VI. It is proper that a thinker so

such as

concerned

about virtue should wonder whether nature virtuous ways

to make the practice of a

which

life desirable. We

will see

this is a question with

of

Tacitus is
understate

al

concerned, though the chastity

not a moral

his

wisdom

leads him to
in

it.

Since he is for him

dogmatist the

question of virtue's place

nature remains

a question.

Yet there

are certain

things that

can

be

said.

Tacitus is led to the question of the ordering of the world by the prevalence of astrology in his time. This in itself is significant as it shows how much the sim plicity (m. 26. 3-4) of the earliest times had been corrupted. Astrology is essen tially decayed piety. The pious man is moral, for he sees the good in obedience

Tacitus'

Teaching
to the divine
gods are
phasis

and

the

Decline of Liberty
important to be
will

at

Rome
He

231
assumes that the

law. For him it is

and

most

good.

just

that his obedience to them

is

on obeying.

Astrology

presupposes

lead to happiness, but the em observations of the heavens that di

gods,11

lute

or

break down

simple moral

belief in the

and

its

orientation

is fun

damentally
what

amoral or corrupt.

is

good and seeks

For the believer in astrology assumes he knows it for himself. He does not seek to know what he should

do to become worthy of happiness, but whether the influences of the stars will grant him that happiness. Astrology is essentially vulgar, for it is indifferent to
virtue and stood as

its devotees

seek

happiness in

vulgar goods.

These

goods are under

coming to men through fate, not through their own Tiberius believed in astrology, and by the "knowledge of the he
was able

effort.12

art of

the Chal

deans"

to prophesy that Galba

was

would one

day
his

come

to the Empire
prophesied

(vi. 20. 2). When he

in

exile at

Rhodes,

the Empire had been

as
master

to

him

with

like

skill

by Thrasyllus;
most

he then took him

in

the art and

kept him among his

to predict

intimate friends. It

was the claim of this art to

be

able

someone's

future from

a computation of the position of the stars at

his

birth (vi. 22. 3). At times the

ported

prophecies were was

here (cf.
written

iv.58).

Thus, it

fulfilled, as in the two cases re inferred, fate governs the affairs of men and

fate is

in the

stars regardless of our actions.

Astrology

constitutes a claim

about the nature of the

cosmos, a

claim which

has

sinister

implications for
here:

virtue.

This is

what

leads Tacitus to

raise

the

cosmological question

But from
tain

hearing these [prophecies]

the
or

and such things

whether

affairs of mortals are moved

by

fate

[as these], my judgment is uncer [/atone] and immutable necessity

[necessitate],
It is to be
to
wonder.

by

chance

[forte]

(vi.22.1).
"heard"

remarked

that Tacitus says he

these things and was induced

practiced

This

seems

to rule out the possibility that he

question

astrology, as

some

have
of

claimed.13

The

he

was

led to is scientific,

an antithesis con

sisting
able.

two

extremes.

This is because astrology

constitutes an extreme claim

human

affairs are ruled

by

immutable necessity,
nature

Tacitus is here

concerned not with

necessity is simply, but with how human

and that

know-

affairs are moved

(volvantur). Are they

controlled as a whole

by

force

extrinsic

to

man and

is that force knowable,

wisest of

or are

they

not governed at all as a whole?

He

ancients"

turns first to "the

restate

the

for

help in clarifying this question. They

outlook of the moral

it in

terms

directly following
mentions

from the

man, but their

answers are

different. He

not only the wise men, but also those who

life."

"strive to
what

excel

in

accordance with original

their

[respective] way

of

This

confirms

is implied in the

turn to

philosophy:

philosophy itself is
question.

way

of

life

which constitutes an answer

1 1
.

to the fundamental

The

answers of
191

the

Kegan Paul, E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London; Routledge & Libo Drusus, who We have already seen in Chap. Ill how Tacitus treated 12 "gullible for empty deans whether the Empire would be his. He called him

1),

p. 5.

consulted the

Chal
inani-

imposture"

(faciiem

bus,

11.27).

Cf. Hist.

1.22. 1:30.

13.

Furneaux, The Annals,

232

Interpretation
to the question what way
of

various wise men

life is in

accordance with

nature,

or what

is the highest good, differed. Those

answers

formed the basis

of various

regimens which were practiced

by

those

convinced

that the answer propounded

by

the founder

of

their sect was the truth.

Indeed
excel

you will

find the

[aemulantur] in
is is
men,

accordance with their

The in

opinion

adopted

[sapientissimos] of the ancients and those who strive to [respective] way of life [sectam] differing. [insitam] by many that neither our beginnings, nor our end, nor
wisest

sum

a matter of care to

the gods; therefore very often there are sad things

who are worse
(vi.22.1).14

among the

good and

joyful

ones

among those

Tacitus does

not elaborate the conclusions

these

men

(probably

the Epicure

ans) drew from their doctrine, but it would seem to be discrediting to political virtue. For if the gods are indifferent and there is no other power to guarantee that
the good should not suffer,

how

can

they be

sure

that

they have

chosen a correct

way

of

life? What Tacitus does

not

say is that the Epicureans did

deny that honor by

and virtue as understood

understood

by by

political men are good.

They

taught that pleasure,

scientifically,

was

the true goal of

life in

a godless universe ruled

chance.

Tacitus indicates

the deference with

which

he introduces this

opinion

that it is an alternative that

must

be taken

seriously.

But

is, by
At
view

not

drawing

out

the consequences

fully, he
IS

also

understating it, that hints that he regards it as

by

pernicious or
greater

unsavory for political society. length, Tacitus reports an opposing

to be that
of

view.

It is

significant

that this

does

not seem

goods constitute a part of

the

founders

of

Stoics, notoriously denied that external happiness. This may mean that Tacitus did not regard Stoicism as among the "wisest of the Yet he leaves out
the
who

ancients.

dom"

Plato's teaching too, although he elsewhere calls him "most excellent in wis (vi.6.2). One must remember that Tacitus is emphatically political in his
even

orientation

toward philosophy. Perhaps he means to regard Plato tradition

which was

and

the

Stoics

as subdivisions of that ancient

favorably

disposed to
in

ward moral virtue

prudence

(reason

(r) fj&txrj cxgezij); this governed by morality),

The
opinionem non apud

same tradition
and regarded

found its

culmination

this as somehow

prefera
view

ble to
14.

mere vulgar pleasure.

view given

in

opposition to the

Epicurean

"Ac

multis

insitam

initia nostri, deteriores

non

finem,

non

denique homines dis curae;

ideo

creberrime

tristia in

bonos, laeta

Lucretius'

minds of

godless account of the origins

a

This summary of divine indifference re of political society in Book V of De rerum natura.

esse."

particularly clear statement of the problem by Montesquieu: "I believe that the sect of Epicurus, which was introduced to Rome near the end of the Republic, contributed very much to spoil the heart and the spirit of the Romans. The Greeks had been infatuated with it before them; ac cordingly they were corrupted earlier. Polybius tells us that in his time, the oaths of a Greek could not be trusted, while a Roman was, so to speak, enchained In addition to the fact that reli by them
.

15.

There is

gion

of men, there was this in particular among the Romans, that they mingled a certain religious sentiment to the love they had for their fa therland. This city, founded under the best auspices, this and their this Romulus, their of

is

always the

best

guarantee thai one can

have

the morals

itol,

king

god,

Cap

eternal as

the city, and the city, eternal as

its founders, had

at one

time made

an

impression

on

the spirit of the

Romans that
et

one would

have
x.

wished

they

would

have

preserved."

Causes de la

gran

deur des Romains

de leur

decadence,

Tacitus'

Teaching
seems closest

and

the

Decline of Liberty
the Ethics.

at

Rome

233

to Aristotle's

teaching in

According

to this other view,

we choose our own

life,

and our

that choice.

Happiness

consists

possibility of happiness follows largely from in nobility of character and includes the prudent

use of external goods.

On the contrary others think that fate indeed [i.e. instead of chance] is in accord things [i.e. things go in accordance with fate], but not from the wandering stars.
True

with

[fate] is in
it,
there

the first principles

naturalium causarum].

[principia] and linkage of natural causes [nexus Nevertheless, they leave us a choice of life. When you have
Nor
are the

chosen

is

a certain order of consequences.

bad

things what the

who

multitude seem

[vulgus]

thinks. [These thinkers maintain] that many

are

happy [beatos]

[miserrimos] many very riches, if the former [the happy ones] endure their severe fortune with constancy [constanter] and the latter [the very miserable] use their prosperity without deliberation [or inconsiderately, inconsulte] (vi.22.2).
to

be harassed

by

misfortunes,

and that

are

miserable

although

they

possess great

The latter human

ance

school agrees with the

former, in

effect

denying

efficacy to the

gods

in

affairs.

However,

such a

denial is only implicit in their tracing

character.

all govern

to

natural causes. affirm

They

remain closer

to the perspective of the pious man

because they
tion

the decisive importance of

of

The

virtue

they

men

by

name

is, however, indicative

the difference

in their

cosmological as

sumption.

a cosmos

Constantia is necessary to bear the severe fortune which is possible in indifferent to individuals. The emphasis is on enduring, or bearing up.
or

The benevolent
virtuous will

just

gods

do

not govern.

There is instead
external affairs.

possibility that the

even such men
constancy.

be harassed

by

misfortunes

in

Still,

may be happy does not seem that

if they have the

character

to

govern

their lives

by
one

Yet it

external goods are altogether

indifferent;

may be harassed

by misfortunes, but to be truly happy one must have external goods and use them the opposite pole from astrology prudently (not inconsulte). This doctrine is at
because it denies that the
multitude

knows

what

is

good.

Whereas those

who

consult astrologers seek riches and

noble character as

honor,

these followers of philosophy

regard a

the highest

good and subordinate external goods

to it. It would

seem that education

in

political virtue

is the

greatest good

according to them.

Tacitus

finally

presents a

third

position which

is the

opinion of most men

in

his time (plurimis). Surprisingly, it is

ogy.

not

Since there

are

many

other evidences

belief in the gods, but belief in astrol in his work that belief in the gods was
was not considered

still widespread we must conclude that astrological

it

incompatible

with

fate,

knowable
cannot

by
be

art.

However [the

idea]

removed

[eximitur] from

most mortals

that

from the first is

prophecy beginning of each [person] that which is to come falsified by the event, through the dishonesty of the prophet who speaks he knows not is corrupted of which our [age] what. Thus [they believe that] the credibility of an art
and the ancient age

is destined; but

at times a

have brought forth shining testimonials (vi.22.3).

One thing
phy.

seems

Some

men

removed by philoso reasonably clear, superstition cannot be converted to the reasoned opinions of the wisest men, be may

234

Interpretation
is
weak when

but

reason

it

comes

to persuading the their

multitude.

Their belief in fate

that are

"cannot be
not

removed."

Tacitus

reports

rationalization of prophecies

fulfilled. It is

not

that things are not predestined

who profess

or even

that what is predes

tined is unknowable, but that those

testimonials"

the art are imperfect.

They point

to

"shining
silent on

of our

time and before. Tacitus reports

never

He is
ment

the ones that were

fulfilled. We do

not

many of these. think for one mo his

notion of

that he therefore believed this rationalization, but it is to have a care for not only
what

part of

history
believe.

the wise

think, but

also what the

many

If we

wish

to know

what

Tacitus thought

about

the virtuous way of life and its

cosmological

support, it

seems advisable

to turn to his explicit account of the their fortunes

choice to
with

lives

of some
with

bad

and good men and compare of

their merit. tyrant.

We

begin

his judgment

the result of

Tiberius'

be

may seem the highest good to those who are aware of the implications that justice or virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake. Such men would prefer to steal or defraud others of worldly goods and power even in cases where the pur
suit of

Tyranny of denying

these goods conflicts

with

justice. But the

ultimate object of choice

for

them is
goods

tyranny because in becoming a tyrant one gains possession of all the and power in the political community. This is thought to lead to complete
In
addition to the means

satisfaction or self-sufficiency.
of

to complete satisfaction
of
single-

bodily lusts,
rule.

the tyrant is thought to achieve the highest honor

gains

handed

Moreover, he
not good

the

impunity
at

from the laws

which

is denied to

pettier criminals. and

Therefore, tyranny is
for its
own

the opposite pole from the just

life,
as

if justice is

sake, but only for the rewards it

brings,
it

one might conclude that

tyranny is
of

the most choiceworthy life

inasmuch

supplies the most complete satisfaction

honor.16

in those
or

other goods:

wealth, power,

The thesis that the life

tyranny

injustice is

preferable to the

just
as

life is

maintained as a thesis

by

no character

in the

writings of

Tacitus

so

far

am aware. we will

However, it is

maintained as a choice

by

innumerable bad

men.

As

show,

such men admired

Tiberius

and

his

successors above all men.

The

the success of the tyrannical career is then of the utmost importance in responding to these longings. If Tiberius was miserable, then one must seek elsewhere in nature for satisfaction. If the tyrannic life is it creates a
evaluation of

miserable,

presumption
must

in favor

of

the virtuous life

a presumption

that, Tacitus thought,

be investigated

as well.

6. This thesis is
362b-

maintained

in its

most extreme and rules

public,

c.

"First he [the

unjust

man]

in

marriage

from

whatever station

he

wants and

revealing form by Glaucon in Plato's Re in the city because he seems to be just. Then he takes gives in marriage to whomever he wants; he contracts

besides benefiting himself in all this, he gains be So then, when he enters contests, both private and pub lic, he wins and gets the better 6f his enemies. In getting the better, he is wealthy and does good to friends and harm to enemies. To the gods he makes sacrifices and sets up votive offerings, adequate and magnificent, and cares for the gods and those human beings he wants to care for far better than the just
wants, and,
cause

and

has

partnerships with whomever

no qualms about

he

he has

doing injustice.

man."

Tacitus'

Teaching
In light

and the

Decline of Liberty
why

at

Rome

235

of these considerations one can see

a candid statement

by

Ti

berius

of whether

he

was

happy

is

of the utmost consequence.

There

was such a

statement,

and we will see

that Tacitus regarded it

as most revealing.

It

provokes

him to his only

against

quotation of
most

Plato,

the ancient wise man who had put the case

wrote a

tyranny

from his had

retreat on

clearly and most comprehensively. Tiberius Capri to prevent the Senate from completing a his
criminal

letter it in
an

prosecution

undertaken of one of

friends,

a notorious

delator. From
secret.

the

troduction to that letter Tacitus was able to unmask

unguarded

Tiberius'

For in
calls

moment, Tiberius spoke from the depths

"remarkable"

of

his heart. Tacitus

its

beginning
what

(insigne):
Conscript Fathers,
i).17

If I know I

what

should write to you, o

or

how I

should write, or
me worse than

should not write at all now,

let the

gods and goddesses

destroy

perceive myself to

be perishing

daily

(vi.6.

This is decisive

proof

for Tacitus that Plato

are

was right when

of

in his Republic

and

Gorgias he taught that tyrants

To
such a

the most wretched

men.18

degree [as to

perish

daily] had
Nor

[the tyrants] themselves in

also turned their own

wisdom of

shameful

deeds into

punishments.

was the most excellent

vain

[man] in
et

[praestantissimus sapientiae]

accustomed to affirm
mangling19

that if the minds

tyrants

[mentes tyrannorum] were laid open, be able to be seen. As the body might be torn to

and stabs

[laniatus

ictus]

would
mind

pieces with whips, so

may the

[animus] [be torn]

tune
of
nor

with

his

solitudes
and

lust, and evil deliberations. Certainly neither his for protected Tiberius, but instead he himself confessed the torments
cruelty,

his breast

his

own punishments

(vi.6.1-2).

The
sense

crimes and shameful

deeds

of tyrants turn evil

into punishments, but

not

in the

that the tyrants become sorry for the

and

toughness

low-minded
sense

selfishness

they have done to others. Their is too great for that. These crimes become
longings
of

punishments
17. 18.

in the
deaeque

that

they

are the result of the unfulfillable

scio."

"Di

me

peius perdant quam perire me cotidie

sentio,

si mind a passage

Republic 578b, Gorgias

greatest

524c

Tacitus may have

opinion of

also

had in

from Cicero,

Plato's

Roman disciple. "In the

the multitude, I do not know what utility is greater

than that of

ruling.

less

to him who

has

On the contrary, when I have begun to recall true reason, I find nothing more use attained it unjustly. For to whom are torments, anxieties, daily and nightly fears,
and

and a

life full

of

intrigues

dangers
what

useful?

'Many

are

hostile

and traitors to a

kingdom, few

well

disposed,'

says

Accius. And to

kingdom? To that
more enemies

which,
you

handed down from Tantalus

and Pe-

lops,
of

was obtained

by right.
be
slave

How many

do

think that

the Roman people

nations to

oppressed

that Roman people

itself,

and compelled a

ruling the
wounds?

to him? What
of use to

stains of conscience when

do

you

who, with an army city not only free, but even think he has in his mind, what

king has,

Whose life
will

could

be

him,

the condition of that life

is

that whoever should

are not

take it away,
are

be held in the

greatest esteem and glory?

But if these things

De officiis,
111.21.

useful,

which

full

of shame and

baseness,

though

nothing is useful which is not noble 19. Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary wrongly tropical sense to laniatus, translating it as "anguish,
the
as minds of tyrants are tormented
more adequate:

they seem [or honest,

to

be

most useful, one ought

to be persuaded that

honestum]."

gives this as the unique case of a

figurative

or

remorse."

This

cannot

be. Tacitus

charges that

by their evil desires,

lacerations."

not

by conscience.

The Oxford translation is,

usual,

"wounds

and

Works of Tacitus,

1:215.

236
an

Interpretation
mind

unhealthy

for

power and satisfaction.

Cruelty, lust,
not

and evil

delibera

tions are the substance of such a mind and

they do
be to

bring

self-sufficiency;

they

only
man.

give

birth to

new needs which are new

tortures. Tacitus
confuse the

does

not

think that

tyrants

have

a conscience,
more open

for that

would

tyrant

with

the moral
which

He is

to the possibility of

thoroughgoing self-seeking

is

so tough as

to be

altogether

heedless

of

the

consequences of

its desires for

others.

But then the

proof

that even such a man

is

wretched carries more

conviction, for

he has tried to liberate himself

denial
of conscience never uses

from morality and failed utterly. This in the decisive case may be connected with the fact that
altogether
"soul"

Tacitus
"mind"

the term

(anima) but

the more cosmologically neutral

(animus) in
the

all contexts of psychology, except where someone speaks

of

di

rectly
would

of

immortality

the

be necessary to
affirm

assume

Does he thereby indicate that for him it the cosmology of Plato's myths and personal im
soul.
never speaks

morality to
explains

that man has a soul? He

meted

in his

own name of

di he

vine punishments

out

to

wicked

men; only of their misery, which

causes.20

Therefore, unlike wholly in terms of natural or nondivine punishments in the afterlife to re Plato, he does not rely on conscience or fear of strain political men from wickedness. This may be more a mark of the difference
in the
societies

to which the two men addressed their teachings than a mark of the
own

difference in their
pose religious

thought about the soul's constitution. than Tacitus?

Could Plato presup

belief

more

Before raising the question of how Tacitus thought nature provided for the happiness of good men, I would like to cast a glance at a passage to which he
turns

immediately
In this

after

his

Tiberius'

revelation of who participated

secret.

The

context

is the

great

number of

illustrious Senators
passage a

in the

Tiberius'

wickednesses of

reign.

brash

and

bad

ence with

Sejanus,

the

powerful and

his apology for seeking influ depraved minister of Tiberius. He spoke to

man gives unmasked and

justify
stroy
were

himself

Sejanus'

after

plots
with

had been

Tiberius began to de

all

those associated
on

him, indiscriminately,
was

regardless of whether

they
de

in

the plot or not. Marcus Terentius the

character of a man who was

not, but in his speech

seek

of

fense,
with of

we see

drawn to
Tacitus'

influence it

and power

the

minion of

Tiberius,
men

regardless of

justice. This is the justice to

clearest revelation
gives

the

motives

that led
of

to seek power in all

work and

insight
the

into the deeds kind

I

many

other men who sacrificed

power or made

of choice whose

folly

he has just
of

revealed.

confess that rejoiced.

I I

was a saw

friend

Sejanus,

and

that I sought to be and that

after

attained

it, I

his father ruling the Praetorian cohorts, after wards undertaking the duties of the city and the army at once. His relatives and associ ates were increased in honors; on the other hand, those to whom he was hostile were
as colleague of

him

harassed
20.

by

fear

and meanness of rank

For it

was not

Sejanus the Volusinian

Three
are

we

There

are

the philosophic
"souls"

only four references to doctrine of the immortality dead in

"soul"

in

Tacitus'

extant works.

in the

context of

of the soul

(xvi. 19, 34; Agr. 46). Once

a character refers

to the

of the

a religious ceremony.

Tacitus'

Teaching
but the

and

the

Decline of Liberty
Claudian
and

at

Rome
which

237
he had
occupied

cultivated,

member of

the

Julian house
your

by

alliance, your son-in-law

Caesar,
have

the colleague of

consulship, undertaking

your and

duties in the

republic.

It is

not our part

to judge him

whom you raise above others of

for

what causes.

The

gods

given you the

see at a

determination

the

highest things;

to us the
near

glory

of obedience

is left. We
whom

distance those things

and

which are

held
whom

[by

you, we see

him]

to

[there are] riches

honors from you, to

[has been given] the

to have
and

greatest power of

helping
of

and

harming

which no one would

deny
one

been Sejanus'. The intentions

seek out whether

the

First Citizen

are

hidden,

and

it is illegal if

dangerous to
would

he is preparing anything

more secretly; nor

did

he

succeed

(vi.8.

1-4).

Here the degree to

gime appears.

which common men are men

dependent

on the character of the re

Such it.

desire

success above all things and

they do
the

what

is

nec

essary to
cess,

attain

They

are corrupted

by

corrupt politics and great power of

opinions, but

they
suc

are such as

to be eminently
and

corruptible. put

The

longing

for

riches,
that

honor is here

crimes
should

were committed

by

starkly, for the man seems oblivious of the Sejanus and in his name. The letter of Tiberius
and admirations of

be

an answer

to the hopes

this
or

opportunist.

But I do base

not think that

Tacitus had

much expectation

that

he

the men like him were

cursed with a

likely to be
soul.

changed
can

Little

reading it. This is what it means to be be done for such a man in a regime like

by

Tiberius'

Under better

government opinion.

his desires his

would

be

repressed

by

good

laws

and more

decent

public

Better

men would own

discovering
Tacitus

be held up for his admiration. He might live without desires. It is worthwhile to cast a glance at him, for his in those
times.

choice was all

too

common

Does this

give us an

indication

of

why

wrote?

Could it have been to

counteract

the effects of a depraved public

opinion on

the impressionable

young?

Now

we can return

to the more important question. What did Tacitus think to

practice virtue?

nature provided would go so

to
as

encourage good men

We have

seen

that he

far

to

hold,

with

Plato,

that

bad men,

above all the

worst, the

ty

rants,

are

naturally

miserable.

But

we still wonder whether nature somehow pro

"Epicurean"

tects the good. We have seen from the

opinion,

which

Tacitus took

seriously, that he did

not think the good were always given their deserts as if

by

benevolent Tacitus
ment

and

just

gods.

We have

chosen

the

case of

Lucius Arruntius,

which

reports near the cosmological passage.

passage and

We think it is

a natural comple as

to the Tiberian

that

in the Arruntius passage,

other cases of good and

bad men, the

cosmological question was a

many guiding theme

in

so

for Tacitus. We have already mentioned Lucius Arruntius. There was some dispute as to whether Augustus had warned Tiberius of him on his deathbed. Some said Au
gustus characterized given that

him

as

"worthy

of

the

Empire,

and

he

would

dare [to take

it]."

Tiberius

suspected

if the opportunity were him as a man who was

Tiberius

repu

"rich,
(1
.

resolute,
1

marked

by

outstanding

character and equal public

However he may have been

remarked

by Augustus

and

as a

po-

238
tential

Interpretation

rival, Tacitus did

Rome. In his
Arruntius'

not share that estimate of

his

character.

He
to

regarded

Arruntius
rant of

as an altogether

higher type than he

a potential conspirator

become ty
refer

own name

speaks of

his

pure or

tissimis artibus,
ence and reign of cessful

vi.7.1).21

His

estimate

is is

corroborated

holy by an

character (sanc-

important

to

attainment of

"the highest honors through his incorrupt life

made

eloquence"

(xi.6.2). This

reference

by

defender

of

justice in the

Claudius. Arruntius
politics.

was a gentleman and

he had been
of

active and suc

in

He

was even appointed

refused

Proconsul

Spain,

though

Tiberius,

for

reasons of

his own,

for ten

years

to allow him to go there and rule.

From the

point of view of

the

question we are victims of

significant of all those

innumerable

Tiberius'

investigating, his fate is the most fear and fury, which are
pure or

detailed in
more
totelian"

an almost endless series

in Book VI. For the

holy Arruntius,

than most men, deserved to be happy. He presents a test case for that "Aris doctrine which, we saw, Tacitus took so seriously. If he could be happy
would

in those dark times, Tacitus

ture there is a
principle

have

good grounds

that

supports moral virtue even as was

for suspecting that in he has shown that

clear

na

na

ture punishes vice. That Tacitus

the

deeply

interested in Arruntius is

from
but

fact

that

he

reports

his

case

in

much

fuller detail than those

evaluation of

of most others.

We hear

Arruntius'

own
occasion

words, his own

work.22

his

whole

life

a rare

important

in

Tacitus'

Arruntius

and

two

with a woman noted against

other worthy men were for her promiscuity and

accused of of

committing adultery complicity in her

"impiety"

the First

Citizen,
up

an all

too common occurrence. It

was

thought that the

charge was

trumped

by Macro,

the vile successor of Sejanus as Prefect of the then ascendant, and

who

Praetorian bored
and

Guard,

whose malevolent power was

har

a notorious

animosity

against

Arruntius (vi.47.3). As Tiberius

was

then ill

dying,

the others encouraged Arruntius to

delay

his death (which the Senate

on suicide
delays."

had ordered), in hopes of surviving Tiberius. Arruntius resolved reasons he gave his friends, who "were persuading hesitation and
He
replied

for

that the same behavior

was not proper

lived

long

enough,

and that

he

repented

[decora] to all. He said that he had [paenitendum] of nothing except that he had
old

endured an

uneasy [troublesome, anxious, anxiam]

a

age, since he

was

hateful to

Sejanus for
(vi.48.1).

long time,

and now

to

Macro,

always to someone of the powerful, not

of shameful crimes

by

his fault [culpa], but because he

was

intolerant

[flagitiorum]

On the basis

of

this, it

would seem

difficult to

maintain

that the good are

"happy,

though harassed
yet

proper,"

hated

by

his life by "the many precisely because he lived virtuously or piously, he was marked and the powerful men who did not do so. Is his language that of religion
governed

by

misfortunes."

Arruntius

paenitendum, culpa,
Arruntius'

decora, flagitia? It
belief
and

seems so.

Surely

he did

not suffer

from

21.

character and

History. See Leo

22.

Strauss, The City

parallel

An important

resemble that of the pious general, Nicias, in Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 208-209. is the untimely death of the noble, but simple, Germanicus, u. 71-72.

Thucydides'

Tacitus'

Teaching
the inward

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

239
in that limited
of

lacerations it
can

of a sick mind's unquenchable said

desires,

and

sense, perhaps

be

that he

was

happy. Yet he himself speaks in dread

of some

his

anx

ious

or

uneasy

old age.
whom

He

was always

threat or

iniquity

from

the powerful
should

by

he

was

finally

brought to
opinion

contemplate suicide.
says

Perhaps it
accept

be in

said

that the

"Aristotelian"

Tacitus

he hesitated to

is too

paradoxical or

"philosophic"; it
from
external

overestimated man's power to control

his

destiny
Tacitus

abstraction

conditions, especially
of

political conditions.

sees

from

a case such as a pure

that

the

holy Arruntius that even

some one of

a pure

man,

or rather an

especially inferior regime. "He

man, is exposed to danger of political

persecution not

in

was always
was

hateful to

the powerful,

by

his

fault, but because he

sense

intolerant

crimes."

of shameful

It

seems

to be only

in the limited dorses

virtue.

that

virtue

is the health

of the mind that nature supports or en

It

could appear that politics of an

inferior type, that is men,

are

men's worst enemies.

Arruntius

speaks of

the best choice for a

man

his fortune soberly, even bleakly. Suicide seems to him like him who cannot tolerate vice, and who wishes to

live

nobly.

Of be

course

during

the

few days
would

until

the

funeral

avoided.

But how

the youth of the

[suprema] of the First Citizen [he] can threatening [master] be avoided? When

Tiberius
ruling, things

after such experience of

affairs,

was overthrown and changed

by

the

force

of

would
and

Gaius Caesar

undertake

better measures, he

[he]

who was

ignorant

of all who

brought up
to

on the worst?

And Macro had been

was worse.

chosen as

his leader,

was chosen
with

overthrow

Sejanus,

since

He had harassed the

a more

republic

death] he fled the things done and those threatened. the manner of a prophet [vatis] he opened his veins (vi.48.2).
Tacitus judges that he "used death
ple.
well."

many in this [his

crimes as well.

[Arruntius said] that he foresaw

bitter

servitude and

Saying

these things in

This is

a pitiful and

terrifying

exam

It is tragic to

see a good man

brought to
conviction

such a pass

by

his inferiors. Yet life is

His

Tacitus
is the

seems to never waver

in his

that the virtuous and political

circumstances.

most

choiceworthy

even under

these dread

work

disheartening sobering and we are moved by Our deepest hopes are somehow disappointed by a case like that of Arruntius. Yet Arruntius is not the noblest of heroes, and his speech is not

deeply

it to

sense of melancholy.

Tacitus'

Tacitus'

last

word on

the subject of good

men

in

a world of

dangerous

politics.

Our

next

chapter will

be

concerned to see whether there

is

nothing the good and wise can

that of

do to
see

ameliorate

the

political situation.

From

cases such as can

Arruntius,

we

that there

are severe

limits to

what

they

do,

but

perhaps all were not as

limited in
tus

their capacity to deal with or within those limits as the pure

Arruntius

who maintained
meant

himself

aloof

from

evil so completely. and

by

calling him

sanctissimus ,

it may

not

This may be what Taci be unqualified praise,

ultimately.23

23.
mained

There is

another case where virtuous

Tacitus
at

remarks

the indifference of the gods to a man who re

overthrow

faithful to the

Soranus

the time of his

by Nero: "Nonetheless,

the same

240 The

Interpretation
Arruntius'

word chosen

by

Tacitus to
pious

mark

the purity of

character re

minds us of will

the opinion of

men, denied

by

the

Epicureans,

that the gods

take care of the

not

virtuous.

Arruntius
evil,

seems to or

this, for he did

good and curean

actively

combat

have thought something like look out for himself. He was simply
good.

evidently denial of this

considered

it

sufficient

to be

Tacitus

presents

the Epi

opinion as a view

worthy

of

being
take

taken seriously.

Yet

many

men

in

Tacitus'

time believed the

gods would
will of

care of

the good men. them as

They deeply
cords

regarded omens as expressive of significant.

the

the gods

and viewed

Tacitus

regards this

belief

as also part of politics and

he

re

the omens accompanying these

omens

great political misdeeds

books.24

faithfully. The
major events

greatest

concentration of

is in the Nero

The

that were

thought to have provoked them were the

murders of

Nero's stepbrother,

and

mother, and the perverted

are all

Agrippina, banquet of Tigellinus, one of

and

Britannicus

Nero's
ted

creatures

(xv. 38-43). These

was

particularly impious deeds

the great fire of
of

commit

by

Nero. This banquet

caused.

followed
these

by

thought it

Tacitus

reports own

beliefs

the

Rome, which many but at one faithfully, many

doubt.

point, he quietly inserts his

thought as well, along with his reason for

matricide:

Consider his
Frequent

account of

the aftermath of Nero's

and vain prodigies occurred.

woman gave

birth to

snake, another in inter

course with and so

her husband

was struck

dead

by

lightning.

the fourteen

regions of

the city

were struck

Suddenly the sun was darkened by lightning from heaven All of which
.

far

came about without

the

care of

the gods that

Nero

continued

his sovereignty

and

his

crimes

for many

years afterwards

(xiv. 12.2).

While it

cannot

be

said

that Tacitus thought the gods look out for the good as
virtuous are not

clearly as the wicked are punished by nature, it may be that the as helpless as the holy but aloof Arruntius. We now turn to
of
of

Tacitus'

investigation

the virtuous

and wise men who

tried actively to participate in the high politics

of our

that depraved age. On the basis

no other power

investigations already
on

we can

say that

apparently they had

tuous
men

to rely

to protect themselves and

other vir

than the power of their own wisdom and political skill.

CHAPTER V: THE PLACE FOR VIRTUE UNDER A TYRANT

Tacitus'

1.

Teaching: Moderation in the Face of Overpowering

Depravity
came

During
to the

the latter part of the reign of Tiberius, and thereafter until Nerva the

Empire,

tyranny

of

the

Caesars

was

in full flood. It is true there

outstanding for

were a

day

bore the

noble example of

Cassius Asclepiodotus,
of all

who was

greatness of

riches

among the Bithynians. He did not desert the shown him when flourishing. He was stripped

declining Soranus,
evil

showing the his fortune and driven into

examples"

same

loyalty

he had
the

exile,

[revealing]

equanimity
24.

[aequalitate]

of

the gods toward good and

(xvi. 33.1).

xm. 17,

24, 58; xiv. 5, 10, 22; xv. 34, 47;

and xvi.13.

Tacitus'

Teaching
ruled,

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

241 Seneca
and

few

years of respite

the

first

years of the reign of

Nero,

when

Burrus

Vespasian's reign, and the brief time of Titus but the Julio-Claudians and the Flavians were and Rome suffered generally tyrants, untold indignities from their cruelty and jealousy for three-quarters of a century.

justly

part of

As

we

learn from

Tacitus,

most public men

then owed their careers to

would

flattery

or

complicity in the
could corrupt all

crimes of

the tyrants. Yet it

be

rash

to think the

Caesars
the
us to

independence
be

and extirpate all virtue.

As

long

as man and

sun

last,

good men will

generated.

With

quiet

grandeur, Tacitus permits

understand and maintained a

treasure the policy and memory of those few splendid

course

men who with

steady

in the face

of

that depravity. We

now

turn,

unqualified willingness

to

learn,

to their careers. For not only are

they shining
learn how

examples of us

the strength of human virtue that encourage us, but Tacitus allows
we

to garner from their policies a lesson in prudence. From them

much

caution,

disguise,
For

even compromise

is

made

necessary
a

by

the strength of

universal

tyranny.

where evil

is

so

strong, it is

not always possible to pursue

the good simply or directly. Through them, Tacitus gives us

moderation:

lesson in

political

hope for too

of

for nothing could be more conducive to failure and despair than to much. It is to prove oneself unworldly to expect the simple triumph

the good.

One learns to

accept the

difficulties
one

and corruptions of

human

nature

as revealed

in these circumstances, but

is

also encouraged not to succumb to

them

by

the example of those who upheld the cause of virtue and civilization so

nobly.

In the

spirit of unrivaled

sobriety Tacitus
reign of

reports the natural

death

of one such

man, who lived through

ous than
a man

Tiberius'

terror. His admiration

is

no

less

obvi

his lack

of

illusions

about

the

precariousness of

the situation of so good

in that terrible time.

Lucius Piso, the high priest, died by fate, [a thing] rare in such a lofty position [claritudine]. [He was] never willingly the author of any servile motion, and as
as

often

necessity (vi. 10.3).

attacked

[ingrueret him,

he]

wisely

moderated

[it

sapienter

moderans]

What
ates

we wish

to

understand more

fully

is how

one

wisely

or

prudently

moder

"attacking"

necessity.

For it is

clear

that Tacitus chose his word carefully.

was a continual attack on

The

need

to serve, mollify, and flatter the tyrants

de

cent men

in high

places.

The

question

is how that necessity

could

be

evaded and

the most effective

with silence

measures

taken to ameliorate the situation.

Tacitus dismisses
with

the contention that Hobbes was later to make that it is better to

tyrant.1

draw from
1.

politics under a
are

We

will

try

to show

in the

next chapter that

"Subjects
are

less

often

undeservedly

condemned under one ruler

than under the people. For

or oppose

kings
them

only

severe against those who either trouble them with

impertinent counsels,

with reproachful words, or control their wills;

which one subject might

have

above another suffer

but they are the cause that that excess of power becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula known to him, namely, courtiers,
and such
who are possessed of

reigning,

no men can

undeservedly

but

such as are

as are remarkable

for

some eminent

charge, and not all neither, but

they only

242

Interpretation
his last word, for he
and placed a

this is not

limit

on

works, the Annates

the Historiae. Tacitus is

his teaching in his most political public-spirited. He knows of the

participation

possibility
regards

of a noble or philosophic retreat

from

in

politics.

But he

these works as an education

in

prudence and patriotism

encourage

for the young do

not need

statesmen of
public arena

his time. Therefore he tries to

to
worse men.

them

not

to abandon the

Philosophers

can

find themselves. in his time

was

They

the

help

of a

Tacitus. If anything, the

problem

that many men too

own

easily despaired
combat

of a political career and withdrew.

He intends in his
of

way to

this tendency.

Furthermore,
required of

one of

the problems
and

the Principate was

that philosophy had become too

much

diffused

debased. Tacitus knew how

was not

hard is the temperament

character of

to philosophize

rigorously. Such

the

the majority

those who practiced that science

philosophy had become dogmatic. Those who wished litical life were all too ready to endorse the principles of some sect and simply profess them in a narrow and sectarian way. For this reason, too, we will see that Tacitus is very reserved in his presentation of the philosophic alternative. He does not wish to contribute to the further vulgarization of a noble alternative. In Chapter VI
we will

in his time. Rather, to withdraw from the po

investigate his

presentation of

the philosophic way of

life. To

do

so we will

have to leave the Annates

and turn to the

less

public

Dialogus de

oratoribus.

In the Annates Tacitus

public-spirited.

chooses

to

remain within

the political

horizon.

There he is

He

explains

tion of an

his teaching on political virtue more fully in outstanding Senator in the time of Tiberius.
.

another characteriza

I find

Lepidus to have been he bent

aside

a serious

[gravem]

and wise

times. For often

ertheless

the cruel adulations of others

moderation with

into

[sapientem] man in a better [course]

.

those

Nev

he

was not

lacking
and

in

[temperament!]

either, since

he flourished
be
un

with constant certain will

authority

influence

Tiberius. Thence I

am compelled to

[dubitare]

whether

the

inclination

of

First Citizens toward

some and their ill-

toward others comes

there is some
void

by fate and the lot of being born, as other things, or whether [room] for our own counsels, and it is permitted to follow a course de of ambition and dangers, between rash obstinacy [abruptam contumaciam] and
[deforme obsequium] (iv.20.2-3).
whether one who uses

servile obedience

It is

a question

for Tacitus his

his influence for

good can gain

that influence

by

own counsel or whether

it is

a matter of mysterious

fate that

he flourishes der Nero,

with

the First Citizen. We will see how difficult it is to determine

un

this when we come to explore the preeminence of Seneca and Paetus Thrasea
which

Tacitus treats in far

more

detail. We

will see

there, especially in

the case of
what

Thrasea,
enjoy. a

that the regime made an

For they that
will

independent

political career impos-

he desires to

are offensive and contumelious are a retired

deservedly punished.
will

Who
out of

soever

therefore in

monarchy
or

lead

life, let him be

what

he

that reigns,
of

he is

danger. For the

ambitious

only suffer; the

the

rest are protected ed.

from the injuries

poten

the more

Thomas Hobbes, De Cive

Citizen,

Sterling

Lamprecht (New York:

Appleton-Century-

Crofts, 1949),

p. 119.

Tacitus'

Teaching
sible.

and

the

Decline of Liberty
on affairs

at

Rome
one

243
relations with

Willy-nilly, having

real

influence

drew

into

the First Citizen. Here it is most important to see that Tacitus is

the possibility that good men of great political competence

at

least

open to

may

pursue a course

"devoid

dangers"

of ambition and
would

and

directed

at

the common good.

This, he
of

suggests,
nacy.

be

a mean

between

servile obedience and abrupt or rash obsti

The

good man would make certain accommodations with the

limitations
of those

the

ruler so as

to gain his confidence, but he

would

be independent

limi

tations and therefore capable of

resisting them to
accepts this

whatever extent

is

possible.

Tacitus is
and

without

illusions. Thus he

little; it is better

than nothing,

base

nothing is all retirement would accomplish by leaving the ruler to his own courses. Tacitus condemns servile obedience, as we have often seen. But
also

here he

implicitly
course

condemns rash
wonders

or abrupt

effective.

The

Tacitus

about

obstinacy as unlikely to be would be an eminently political

course, adapted to the

nature of

the one

in

power and managed

by

a man of con

summate political prudence.

This

was not a course

that could be undertaken

by

just

anyone.

The

obstacles presented

by

the times were especially formidable. Rome was

unresisted

securely in the hands of absolute and cruel men. The Senate, from which
was servile and mies were was

tyrants.

They

were

mostly weak,
resistance,

one might

have

expected some

acquiescent,
and

having grown resigned to

its

powerlessness.

The

ar

ignorant

loyal to the Caesars. The Empire

virtually universal. There was no one refuge. Revolution was unthinkable, for the
the

widely and to turn to for aid, nowhere to flee for

extended corrupt and

frivolous

atmosphere of

City

no

longer

provided

the

moral

basis necessary to the

maintenance of

free

republican

institutions. These Tacitus

are the

dispiriting

conditions that existed

in the His
ages

time of

which

undertook

to investigate the possible

of education

amelioration. men

meditation whose

has been

a powerful

instrument

for

in later

lot

was cast

in dark times. Could it

not

be

timely

reminder

to us, as the

shadows of another universal

tyranny

could appear

to be gathering in the East?

example of what

Prudence is the
would not of

Tacitus'

essence of

teaching.

The best

it

be is the

action of a certain

Lucius Piso (different from the high

of

priest

the same name

whom we

the

actual state of affairs

have already mentioned). The end came early in the reign of Tiberius:
the

his tolerating

Exclaiming loudly
of orators

against

bribery

of

the

forum,

the corrupt courts, and the cruelty that he

would go away and far-off countryside; at the

threatening
and

accusations, Lucius

Piso

asserted

leave the City,

same time

that

he

would

live in

some

hidden

and

he left the Senate. Tiberius

"noble"

was upset

(11.34. i).

"headstrong"

Tacitus
with

calls this man at the

and

(ferox). One
the age, but

can sympathize

his impatience

prevalent corruption of no concrete were

his

speech

did

nothing about it. He proposed impolitic words. In time, they he

was compelled

reform, and Tiberius

never

forgot his

the cause of a

false

charge of treason which

.

to

anticipate

by

voluntary death (iv.21

-2).

He

caused

his

244
own

Interpretation

death

by

his

simple nobility,

devoid

interested in

a more complicated

type of

of worldly decent man

prudence.

Tacitus is

most

one who

is

artful and pru with

dent,

as well as noble and good.

We take up

our account

in Book XIII,
are

the

reign of

Nero. The books devoted to the

reign of

reign of

Caius
to

lost,

and what re

mains

for the

Claudius is too

fragmentary

interpret.

2.

Seneca

and

Burrus, Tutors
roles

and

Ministers of Nero Nero furnish the in the

material

Seneca's

Burrus'

and

in the

court of

for

truly

fascinating

study First Citizen. Seneca

praetorian guard.

of prudent and virtuous men

was

position of counselor of a was

Nero's tutor

and

minister, Burrus

the prefect of the

niece and and and

Both

were appointed

by

Nero's mother,

Agrippina,

last

wife of

the First

dangerous
has been
gan

Claudius'

woman.

Citizen, Claudius (xn.8.2; 42.1). She was an ambitious incestuous marriage to her caused his death,
greatest single mistake

called

"the

by

first century

Roman."2

She be
per and

by

suaded

daughter, Octavia; she then marrying her son, Nero, to Claudius to disinherit his own son, Britannicus, in favor of hers,
she poisoned opens

Claudius'

finally

him, intending
his
account of

to assume power

herself, in

the name of

Nero. Tacitus

two murders she committed unbeknownst

she she

by recounting to, or against the will of, her son. Him could have ruled, and through him, the Empire. But when she laid her plans, had not reckoned on the potent independence of Seneca and Burrus. She
they
were

"Nero's

reign"

in Book XIII

thought

her creatures, for

she

had

promoted them.

Seneca

she recalled

he had unjustly suffered for eight years at the instance of her pre decessor, Messalina. But they acknowledged higher obligations than gratitude to an unscrupulous benefactor. It would not be the first time that a base soul failed
exile

from the

to discern the nature of a

higher

one.

[Seneca
what

and

Burrus]

were the rulers

[teachers,

rectores]

of the

imperial youth,

and

in the sharing of power, they were of the same mind [concordes]. [Each held influence] through a different art, [yet] they were equally powerful, Burrus
rare

is

through

[devotion to] military concerns, in turn

so

and

through strictness of morals, and Seneca

through the precepts of eloquence and noble

each other

friendship

[honesta comitate]

They aided
of the

they

might

the

more

Citizen, by conceding [him]

Seneca is
one of

pleasures

easily restrain the slippery youth were he to despise virtue (xin.2. 1).

First

the greatest moralistic philosophers of all

times.3

His

pre

ferred
2.

method of

teaching is

through precepts which awaken the soul to

p. 38.

virtue

Bolotin, "Political
In his

Succession,"

3.

great edition of

the complete works of

was

Seneca, Justus Lipsius defends him

philosophy.

against

the

charge of

Quintilian that he

too little

diligent in

philosophia parum

diligens,
not

egregius tamen vitiorum

insectator
of

fuit."

Institutio oratorio, x.1.129: "in What Quintilian seems to mean

granted as

is that Seneca did

exhorted

investigate morality

as a problem.

He took it for

simply good,

and

stemming from Socrates. But by the same token, may it not be a strength in a statesman? Here is judgment: "But Quintilian charges that in philosophy he was too little diligent. What is this? Or in what part of philosophy
Lipsius'

to it. This is a defect from the point of view

the tradition

Tacitus'

Teaching
and

and the

Decline of Liberty
to

at

Rome

245

self-sufficiency from the ural desires and common

ter in the pupil.
political

sloth and satisfaction

which

it is lulled

by its

nat

opinion."

But from Tacitus

well.

we

Such teaching presupposes a certain charac learn that his task with Nero called for more Seneca became his tutor
when

talents as

Nero

was young.

he

was eleven and

xiv. 53. 2).

It

was as yet

pursue a path
aspirations.

he became First Citizen in 54 a.d. at seventeen (xn.58.1, cf. uncertain, even doubtful (see xm.2.3) whether he would of virtue. Seneca could not then depend upon appeal to his nobler
was

It

[him]

pleasures were

necessary to retain he to despise

control over

Nero

even

by "conceding
political

virtue."

That Seneca had the

talents

required we can conjecture

from the fact that Agrippina had

chosen

him to be

and not merely to educate him to be a sage. She intended him to important ally in her own struggle for power, something he could not have been were he inexperienced in the ways of court politics. She procured a revoca

Nero's tutor

be

an

tion of
such a

his exile, "that the

master, and that
was

childhood of

Nero

might mature under

the guidance of
of

they

might use

his

counsels

for their hope

Burrus'

ruling"

(xii.8.2). Seneca

indeed wily,
race

and

he

was

long

more

than a match for Nero.

The happiness

of

the human
also

depended
on

on

Seneca

and

maintaining

control, for Agrippina

had designs

the sovereignty, and

her hands

were

already

steeped

in blood. To
and

keep

Rome from had

falling

to

her

was of supreme

im

portance.

"Both [Seneca
of

[ferociam]
tion"

Agrippina,

who

Burrus] burn[ed]
which

a single contest against the

with all

the desires of

wicked

savagery domina

(xm.2.2). Their policy, in

and

her, honor her in public,

deprive her

Nero gladly acquiesced, was to humor of all real influence. She was to Nero a

rival rather than a mother.

should

I think he

speaks?

I do

not

think he meant logic. Was it

are so

natural?

There

are a certain six

books

in that
the

part named

the

Quaestiones; but they

precise, curious, and subtle that

they

challenge or

the very Aristotelian works. Then is it moral philosophy? What trifling [charges]! This holds sovereignty [regnum] among all. But I think that the intent of Quintilian was this, that he did not inquire too deeply or penetrate into the inner part of philosophy. He was content with this external, popular, and so to speak, healing [medicante] type. I confess this; and our own Seneca himself often
conquer claims this claims

to be his meaning

and

his goal,
all

rather

to

pursue what

is

useful

than what

is

subtle.

He

it

and

approve.

Would that
2d ed.

the

philosophers

had done

so!"

Seneca, Opera

omnia quae ex

tant,

ed.

Justus Lipsius,
alone we

(Antwerp: Plantiniana, 1615),

p. x.

4.

Lipsius

speaks of these maxims as

follows: "There

are

him. This

vaunt, and will not grant there is

his

equal

many splendid maxims [sententiae] in in Greek or Latin letters. His equal? He

and what a

has scarcely a neighbor. And these maxims are sharp, shrewd, penetrating, One little book, one letter of his will supply what is sufficient for forming
one gives

is chief,

useful.

himself to be

healed."

Lipsius, Manuductionis

ad

correcting it, if Stoicam philosophiam libri tres L.

life,

or

Annaeo Senecae

aliisque scriptoribus

illustrandis (Paris: Officina

Plantiniana,

1604),

p.

ix. The fol Seneca.

con

lowing
"The

passage

may

also

be helpful in understanding philosophy from the

two
methods of

point of view of

ancients themselves recognized

and

teaching

which corresponded, one

to the

templative philosophy,

the other to the active. When one displays a

doctrine,

when one

fixes the
system,

nature of the supreme good, when one

one and

defines the virtues, in

philosophy.

a word when one establishes a

is

doing

contemplative or universal

dogmatic

But if,

descending from

these high generalities

from these

truths,

one teaches particular

duties, for

example of a

father,

of a

husband,
one

of a master toward

his slaves,

one

is

not

doing

anything but

active or practical morality.

which

The

fur

nishes the general

dogmas,

the

other

the

particular

precepts,

differ according to the

circum-

246
The

Interpretation
success of

this policy depended

on

Nero. For it
exert

was

only

by controlling
ac

him that Seneca

character of claimed

and

Burrus
new

were able

to

their influence. What was the

and

Nero,

this

prince,
upon

whom

fortune

Agrippina had had

by

the soldiers and set

the throne? At the outset he was a child, and

remarked of

willing to be ruled by Seneca. Tacitus tells us that it was the first of the First Citizens of Rome who was in need
other.

that Nero was

the eloquence of an

Seneca

composed
of

Nero's
was a

speeches

for him. This

was not

of

the youth

Nero, it

determined

preference which

merely a matter had shown itself

"Even in his boyhood, Nero had turned his lively mind [vividum animum] toward other [pursuits]: he engraved [silver], he painted, he practiced singing or the racing of horses; and sometimes in composing poems he showed that princi
early: ples of

learning
less

were present

in

him"

(xm.3.3). These hobbies

of

Nero

were all

more or

private pursuits.
and

craftsman.

His tastes
even

The young Nero was a sort of learned amateur nature did not incline him to politics or company. Ora

tory

was

then held in the

highest

indifference to it is indicative
opinions of

of an a

repute in the ruling circles. Nero's indifference to human opinions, especially and a

honorableness. In
and

Roman

ruler, this was ominous. Nero's ad

diction to
moment

horse-racing
made

it

singing the task of Seneca

allowed them

was also considered rather

base. But for the

and

Burrus

easier.

Nero

was

indifferent to

politics so

he pliantly

to rule.

Early in the reign,

his
Burrus'

through Nero's mouth, Seneca proclaimed the principles of

and

regency.

It is to their everlasting
and

credit

that for about eight years,

whole vast

during
of sent

Nero's youth, these

principles were upheld

throughout the

Empire. It is due to Seneca

Tiberius'

reign or

Burrus that the melancholy series the arbitrary murders and banishments of

of treason

trials

Claudius'

are ab
were

from these

years

described in Books XIII

of

and

XIV

It is true there

crimes

in the immediate household

Nero, but

as we will see when we come to

examine
minders

them, they do not dishonor Seneca and Burrus. of the limits of Nero's nature as it developed.

They

serve as grim re

At the

beginning

of

the reign Seneca proclaimed his principles to the Senate

pro

through Nero and to Nero himself through the speech he wrote for him to
nounce on that occasion.

Moreover
pleted, he
the

when

the imitations of sorrow [for the dead and deified

entered the

Claudius]

were com

[Nero]
and

Senate-House.

fathers

the consent of the

Having begun speaking of the authority of soldiers, he called to mind his counsels and examples
itself to reason; the
seduce the
a precept which

stances of men
must seize man

The dogma only

entirely,
moral

addresses

tends to practice
convince and one

strike the

imagination,
of

heart,

clothe all the

forms to

touch

The

philosophy
more than

Seneca is
wished

teaching

of precepts rather than

dogmas. Thus

should not ask of sometimes needs of

him

he

to give. He wished to touch hearts in

instructing

them,

constricting his doctrine, sometimes relaxing this too severe discipline according to the his disciples, and not fearing to be accused of inexactitude provided that he could find ready access to minds and inspire them to Stoic Constant Martha, Les Moralistes sous Empire romain, philosophes et poetes, 6th ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1894), pp. 12-13.
virtue."

I'

Tacitus'

Teaching
in

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

247

of

undertaking to

rule the

Empire in

was not steeped

civil wars or
nor

an outstanding manner. [He said] that his youth domestic quarrels. [He said] that he brought no ha

treds, form
cent

no

injuries,

desire

of revenge

[to

power with

him]. Then he

announced the

Principate to come, especially shunning those things concerning which re indignation [still] was flaming. For he would not constitute himself judge of all
of the

affairs so

that the

influence

of a

few

should proceed with

violence, the accused and the

accusers open

being

closed within one

to

ambition

house. [He said] there should be nothing bribable or in his house, that his household and the republic should be separate.
should

[He further said] the Senate

keep

its

ancient of the

duties, Italy
consuls,

and

the public prov

inces

should take their

laws from the tribunal

they

should give them ar

[the provinces]
mies entrusted

access to the

Senate,

and that

he

would

deliberate concerning the

[to him] (xm.4).

Tacitus'

From

what remains of

account of the reign of

Claudius,

we gather

that Seneca was repudiating the policy of that depraved reign, above all. It

is

that

policy to
tion

which was

Tacitus

refers as

flaming."

[still]

Claudius had

"those things concerning which recent indigna usurped the judicial power from the prae
accused under

tor's court and

from the Senate. Those

the law of treason

previ

of Tiberius, ously had been tried in the Senate. There was, as we saw in the reign at least a legal process permitting them to defend themselves before the sentence,

though the Senate tended

the reign of
case of

inevitably

to convict. The

situation was worse

during

Claudius, if

that can be imagined.

One

can see this

by

reading the

Valerius Asiaticus (xi.1-3). He

was tried

for

treason privately

by

the

First Citizen Claudius, in the presence only of his accusers, and Messalina, beautiful gardens was the real cause wife, whose desire for of the charge. Though Valerius drew tears from Messalina by his defense, she
Claudius'
Valerius'

would not allow enced

him to

escape

her implacable

avarice and she

her

soft

husband to

convict.

Such is the mockery

not

of

cunningly influ justice Seneca had

Nero

repudiate.

And though he does

say it, there

were

to be no treason trials

during

his

ascendancy.

Seneca

next mentions

the

problem of

bribery

and ambition.

He

refers

to the

excesses of pire.

the freedmen of
and

Claudius,
Callistus

who ruled

him,

and through

him,

the Em

among themselves and with Messalina Pallas, Narcissus, Claudius. Their motives seem to have Citizen First the of to determine the policy avarice and petty ambition. Seneca proclaims that in been entirely private freedmen ex-slaves of the First Citizen will not rule Nero's reign the base
vied

the

Empire,

an affront that
more

had been widely

refers

resented

in

Claudius'

time. Like

wise, though
Claudius'

indirectly, he

to the inordinate influence enjoyed the freedmen did

not.

by

wives who governed

him

when

This too is to

stop.

Seneca

offers

to

restore

to the Senate

its

ancient

duties. He

means

that the

be independent to legislate as it sees (xm.5.1). This is the touchstone of good laws subsequently passed by the Senate benevolent monarch under law. Seneca's policy: the First Citizen will rule as a

Senate

will

fit. Tacitus

gives examples of

248
There

Interpretation
will

be

no more tyrannic arbitrariness

were

household. Seneca's intentions

government
were

proceeding from his uncontrolled the highest. He wished to bring back decent
we will see

according to law and

justice to Rome. But

of men

that there

terrific

limits to

what even

the best

in the highest

position could

do

in that

corrupt age.

Seneca
well

because he knew too

much

proclaiming the restoration of the Republic that the Romans were no longer competent for that
was not

freedom. The

armies were still

loyal to the Julio-Claudians,

Republic but
restored

and

they

must

remain

in their hands. The

alternative was not the

civil war.

But

without control of the not

armies, any

liberty

to the Senate was

decisive. We

will

see,

as we

follow the

course of

the reign, that the

ultimately Senate

continued

to take its cue

from the Court,

and as

its

worse elements predominated

when evil men ruled

the

Empire, law,

as

long

as

Seneca

was

in

charge

they

remained

in the background

at the

Senate. But
men

when

Seneca fell from Seneca's

on

power and

Nero

re

stored the terrible treason upper

in the Senate

who rejoiced

in it

gained

the

hand. What
in

good

had been done

during
But

eight-year

ascendancy
For
tone

was undone
who ruled.

a month when

he fell. All depended

the character of the man

Seneca

could not change that.

we get ahead of ourselves.

now suffice

it to say that Seneca

the government

restored significance

to the Senate and set

in the

rest of

which

inclined the Senate to benefit from its

liberty

to govern well as

long

as

it

could.

and Burrus began to be firmly in control, trouble on the borders by an incursion of the Parthians into Armenia, a Roman kingdom. Worry was widespread in governmental circles, but the crisis was put on the way of settlement by the appointment of Corbulo, the outstanding general of the day. "The Senators were happy beyond their accustomed adulation be as was caused
client-

Just

Seneca

cause

['Nero']

set

Domitius Corbulo in

charge of

seemed
not

that a place was cleared for

virtues"

(xm.8.

i).

retaining Armenia, and it Notice that Seneca could

single-handedly extirpate an inveterate Senatorial habit of adulation. There were limits to his power outside the Court as well as in it. We will examine this
problem

further
other

when we come

to study the Senatorial career of Paetus Thrasea.

with

On the
phere

hand,
Nero

the Senate sometimes vied

Seneca to
ruler.

create an atmos

in

which

would

be

proud to

be

an

honorable

When he forbade
recog him highly,

his

colleague

in the consulship to
of

swear allegiance to

him

and seemed to praised

nize

the republican form

youthful

the constitution, the

Senators

"that his
Claudius'

mind,

elevated with

the glory even of insignificant things,

ones"

would continue greater second

(xm.

1 1

i).

He graciously

pardoned an adulterer of

wife,

Messalina, "promising mercy [clementiam] in frequent

made public or

orations which
what noble

Seneca

by

the mouth of the First Citizen to

testify
at

[precepts] he taught,
insensitive

to vaunt

his

genius"

(xn.11.2). Seneca, in
all

least,

was not

to political

honor,

though we will see that he

was will minds at

ing

to sacrifice it for a greater good. But the

big

question

decent

that time was, was

and at

Nero? For Nero

must

someday

come to rule the

that significant moment,

nothing

would restrain

Empire alone, him but his own sense of

Tacitus'

Teaching
honor. How
weak
weakness we

and

the

Decline of Liberty
man and what

at

Rome
could

249

that could be in a
seen

disasters

follow from its

Bur

have already

in the

case of

Tiberius.
to

But for the time

rus
on

being, Nero

was restrained and obedient

Seneca

and

in his
to the

public

life. Perhaps he thought that only in that

or what was almost

manner could

he hold

Empire,
side of

the same turn to

Another

Nero is

revealed

if

we

thing, keep free of his mother. his private life. In public he was
But in
private

modest and and

gentle,

and seemed

to

revere virtue.

Nero

was

indolent

voluptuous, erotic and

luxurious,
as their

and addicted to pleasure. and

Nero's friend
the expense

ships

had

pleasure and of

luxury

object,

they

were made at
would

of

the

influence

Agrippina, his

mother.

She feared he

listen to his

friends He

rather than

to her and her creatures,

with whom she

tried to surround him.

repudiated

his wife, Octavia,

who was noble and

chaste,

"by

some

fate,

or

because
with

what was

forbidden
in

attractive"

was most and

(xm.12.2),
Burrus did
not oppose

and

fell in love

the

freedwoman, Acte. Seneca

out

this, "for it

was

feared lest he break

prohibited."

They
charge seems
was

illustrious women, if this desire were have been reproached for allowing this deviation, but the
crimes against
naive and unaware of endowed with unfaithful

to be politically
of

the

stakes

involved. Nero
to do what he
and

the First Citizen

Rome,

absolute power wife.

wished, not a mere private man,

thought it necessary to

to his

Seneca

Burrus
more

indulge Nero in his lusts that he leave to their it

was good
resist providential care

might

obey them in
of

important

matters and

the

destiny
a

the

world.5

For in the last

of

analysis

that he demanded so little. "The

older

friends
woman

the First Citizen did not

Nero's

new

friendships, for

little

one"

[muliercula] filled up the desires of the First Citizen without any injury of any (xm. 1 2. 2). It could seem that Nero's desires were simple and even petty,
his
apolitical character the
was

and

defect

of a small soul.

Agrippina
woman

the real object of Seneca's

without

demarche,
Nero his

and she

was

not

to lose her hopes of Empire to Acte

was

any

resistance.

The

attention

that

Nero
male

paid

lost to her. She

,

reproached

new

love,

"with fe

intransigence"

(muliebriter)

and with

ill-considered

rage she

inflamed his how

Burrus in

passion and not

lost

what remained of

his

obedience.

Her behavior is

a model of
and

to behave

under such circumstances and chose.

amply justifies Seneca

the policy
5.

they

Her first

course

having failed,
is

Agrippina turned to flattery,

One

of

the few

studies of

Seneca's

politics

between

1776 and 1782.

More than any

modern work

prudence.

It

contains a passionate and reasonable

upon

essay written by Diderot known to me, it breathes the spirit of Tacitean vindication of the career of Seneca from the calum
a curious and excellent

nies

that had been heaped

his memory

by

the simplicity of moralists.

Apropos

of the

introduc
per

tion of

Acte, he

says:

"This

circumstance of

the

life

of

Seneca is

not

the only one where

I have

minister would ceived that whatever part the philosopher, the educator, and the

have taken, he
that

would

not nor

have

escaped

the censure of

malignity.

As for

myself, who

do

not consider myself more

presume

virtuous,

better instructed,
to

nor more circumspect

than Seneca and

and

Burrus. I les

they have done,

courage and the
et

both the
care
sur

one and the other, what was

best to do,

I leave to their detractors the

sur regnes

give

them lessons in

prudence."

Denis Diderot, Essai

d'

de Claude
ce

de Neron

et

les (Euvres Completes (Paris: Club Francais. 1972),

mceurs et
ecrits

les

de Seneque,

pour servir

introduction a la lecture de

philosophe,

in

13342.

250
and

Interpretation
and

"offered her bedchamber

out"

her bosom to hide

There
was

what

first

youth and

highest
in

fortune
her

might seek

(xm.

13.2).

nothing

she would not prostrate

quest she

for

power.

But incest

was not more effective

than reproaches, and at

last der

turned to threats.

She
of

so

frightened Nero that

step-brother

she provoked

him to his first

state

crime, the

mur

his

Britannicus.6

In the

hearing

of

Nero, Agrippina

threat

ened to confess

her

crimes

openly
and

and show of

descendant [of (xm.

14.2).

Claudius]
was

worthy

Britannicus to the army as "the true father" assuming the Empire of his
at

Nero

upset"

"deeply
stop

(turbatus)

by

her

past that she would

at nothing.

That deed
at times

this, for Agrippina had with all its terrible

the

shown conse
of

quences was a real possibility.

"Pondering

ferocity [violentiam]
the deed was
and

his mother, The intrigue

at times

the

Britannicus,"

nature of were not

then

fourteen, Nero determined

until

to poison him. Seneca and Burrus

and

informed

done.

its

accomplishment are

described

brilliantly

dramatically by
the

Tacitus,

even

to the poorly concealed

shock of

Agrippina

who was present at

murder and saw

in it the

precedent

for

matricide.

the estates of his victim among his friends. Sen Burrus may have been among those who were obliged to receive this unwelcome bounty. Let us assume they were. They certainly did not lay down

Afterward, Nero distributed

eca and

their office at this point, though Nero

and

had

now shown

himself

capable of

crime,

they have been reproached. But perhaps they stayed on precisely because Nero was what he was. He was not such as to rule justly if left to his own
also

for this

devices. What he had done to Britannicus he

might

do to

everyone

he suspected,

in the

manner of

the old Tiberius. Was it

eca and

Burrus

remain near

necessary that Sen him to dissuade him from further suspicion and bru
not more than ever

tality?

By

it

was

too late to

receiving his gifts, if they did, they only pretended to accept the crime forestall, but in fact, they held themselves in readiness to pre

Burrus may have been among those who held that the existence of Britannicus, the legitimate heir to the throne, was a factor which could one day lead to civil war. "Many men pardoned [him] hold
vent others

like it. Moreover, Seneca

and

ing

that the quarrels of

could not

brothers

were an ancient

[matter

of

record]

and

that

kingdom

be

shared

[insociable] (xm.17.1).
Nero

It is hard to believe that

they
well

were

among those

who pardoned

nonetheless.

Seneca

and

Burrus

were

of one mind as regards

the

"sharing"

(societate, xm.2.1)

of power.

But they may

a comrade as

a rival.

have known that ordinary mortals like Nero could only regard As Tacitus says, the sharing of power is rare among men.
seems to us

Actually, it

that their decision to remain

was

amply justified banishments

by

the sequel. In Book XIII there are still none of the treason trials that so disfigure
the reign of Tiberius and none of the

arbitrary

murders and

that

Claudius
6. The
7.
a plot
case.

allowed.7

The immediate
Tacitus denotes
were committed

sequel to the murder of

murder of the new

Britannicus is

still the

crimes that

as

"the first

Principate,"

and another that

immediately followed,
There is
one

by Agrippina

(xm.

i).

exception, the banishment

and

(xm.47). Seneca

of Cornelius Sulla, whom Nero wrongly suspected of Burrus may have been unable to overcome deeply held suspicions in this

But in how many

cases were

they

successful?

Tacitus'

Teaching
ordinary
and good counsel on

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

251

administration of justice

in the Empire, and a war prosecuted with vigor the Parthian frontier. Nero's suspicions of his mother,
conspiracy,
are

falsely

charged with

another

Burrus (xm. 19-21). For the time

crime of

being

at

adroitly calmed by Seneca and least they prevented another family

For is it
not of the a series of crises and problems

the same sort. What more can one ask of these men?

nature of politics
which can never

to be

inherently

unreasonable,
all?

be

solved once

for

How

strange that to rule the world

justly

depended

ruling the fears and absurd caprices of such a one as the child Nero! He certainly did not deserve to rule, but considering that he had been recognized, there was no reasonable question of replacing him. Tacitus is very reserved about
on
conspiracy.

Suffice it to say that the

civil war

prudent

Seneca
with

and

Burrus

regarded that as a

grave, not to say unthinkable step, fraught

scribes a

terrible

dangers. Tacitus de
and that

bloody

for the

succession

in his Historiae,

is indeed

what occurred when

Nero died

without an

heir.
the demands of
possessed

The

next

family

crisis was provoked

by

Poppaea, Nero's

sec

ond mistress.
a noble

This imperious woman, "who

everything [noble]

except

mind"

(xm.45.2),

threatened to abandon Nero unless he exterminated

her enemy and rival, his mother. The prize was the Empire. For Agrippina op posed his divorce from his wife, Octavia, and Poppaea aspired to become em
press,
which she could not

do

until

that was accomplished. Poppaea's motive in

suggesting the crime was political ambition. Nero agreed to it. But one might re mark here how unlike the crafty and political Tiberius the young Nero was. Tiberius killed
out of suspicion and a
wanted

desire to

consolidate

power; Nero's

motive

here is primarily erotic he pleasure. At twenty-two (cf. xn.58),

to gratify and
after

keep

Poppaea to
and

serve

his
the

ruling five years,

hardened
of

by

long
sure

tenure of power, he
not even

would allow

nothing to stand

in the way

that plea

his

mother's

life. Yet he had thought

of the crime on

his

own

too, for Agrippina was domineering and insisted on carrying her unscrupulous quest for influence even to the point of attempting to entice Nero to incest, as we have seen. "Nero delayed no longer the long-meditated crime, for his boldness had
with grown

deep

with

the duration of his power, and he burned

more each

day

love for

Poppaea"

(xiv.i.i). Tacitus

repeats

Poppaea's incredible tirade,

and concludes:

No

one

forbade
with

these and such things which

penetrated

[the

mind of

Nero,

enforced as power point

they
of of

were]

the tears

and art of an adulteress,

for
of

all

desired to break the

son would

his mother,

and no one

believed that the hatred

her

harden to the

her death (xiv.

.3).

Here Tacitus

seems

to

imply

a criticism of

Seneca
should

and

Burrus,
what

who

did
a

not

foresee how far Nero

before
stead
she was tried?
enticed

would go.

Perhaps they
could

have found him her

better

mistress than the ambitious

Poppaea. But

they know
and there

nature was

he

To allay suspicion Nero Agrippina to the Bay of Naples boat

prepared

avoided poison and the sword.

In

feted her

and arranged sea.

for her

embarkation on a

to

collapse and

jettison her into the

252

Interpretation
complex and
-6).

The intrigue is
with

Agrippina, however, escaped fascinating (xiv. 3 a slight wound and swam ashore. Only at this point were Seneca and Burrus
plot.

drawn into the learned that his

For Nero

was

terrified to the

point of

despair

when

he

mother was still alive.

She

was now more

dangerous than

ever

and who could

tell

what expedient

her

anger would

inspire?

Then [Nero was] lifeless [exanimis] with fright and swore she would be present at any moment hastening for revenge. Either she would arm the slaves or fire the soldiers or break through to the Senate
wound and and

people, charging

[him]

with

the shipwreck and

against

her
unless

her

murdered

friends. What

refuge was

there

for him

[this],

Burrus

and

Seneca

could

discover something (xiv. 7. 2)?

Accordingly they
whether

were awakened and summoned.

"ignorant"

Tacitus

says

it is

uncertain

they

were as yet

(ignaros). It

seems
,

likely to

me,

considering
not

that surely it is
pose
of

they,

above

all, he

refers

to in xiv. 1

saying that

they did

op

Poppaea's tirades
son would

her

Agrippina for they did not believe "that the hatred harden to the point of her If they knew of the plot be
against
death."

forehand, they
might

were

have been

able to

undoubtedly not consulted, for had they been asked, they dissuade Nero from a crime that would debase him still At this later point,

further (see

xiv. 13.2).

however, Tacitus

suggests, it may

have been too late to dissuade him. When Nero demanded

counsel of

Seneca

and

Burrus,
there was a

long

silence of

both lest they

so

should

dissuade him in vain,

were

believed they had descended perish (xiv. 7. 3).

far,

that unless

Agrippina

because they anticipated, Nero must

or

What

went

through their minds in that

and

long
be

silence?

both Agrippina

Nero were, Nero

seems

would

worsened

They knew that, bad as by the responsibility for

well: as

his

mother's

death. Tacitus in

to suggest something like this as

might son.

the

ignorant

soldiers revered
part

her house, Agrippina her

what

be

able to

incite

some of

them to take her

a civil war against

Did the

peace of the world

hang
What

in the balance? And

sort of ruler would

if there

were a war and murderess make?

Agrippina triumphed?

that

incestuous
were

Nero had

gone too

far

to stop now.
pina was

Unless the deed

completed, the
agreed

risk of war and rule

by Agrip
they
were
quarrel.

too great.

They reluctantly
was

that she must die. But

above all concerned to prevent

Nero from

involving
so

the armies in the

For this, I take it,

the intent of
more

Seneca's

question to

Burrus: "After [the

at

long

silence],

Seneca, hitherto
suspect that

forward,

that he

looked

Burrus

anx

iously,
der be

asked whether the

(xiv. 7. 3). We

soldiery he was signalling to Burrus his

at

ought to

be

ordered to commit the

consent that the mur

re

done, but cautioning him

as

the same time. Burrus understood. He

so as to

sponded,

Seneca intended him to,

dissuade Nero from calling for the

soldiers and

possibly

initiating

civil war.

He

responded that the praetorians were obligated to the entire

,

house

of the

Caesars

and

they were mindful of Germanicus that they would dare nothing dreadful [atrox] against a descendant of his. Let Anicetus complete what he had promised (xiv. 7.4).
since

Tacitus'

Teaching
of

and

the Decline of Liberty at Rome

253 Nero had in the

origi

Anicetus,
nally

the prefect

the

fleet,

was an opportunist with whom

arranged

the treacherous boat. He privately performed the crime without

while

confusion or

resistance,

Seneca

and

Burrus

maintained order

rest of

the Empire. But the

point

deed

was not without repercussions.

It

marked a

turning

in Nero's life

and

in their

ascendancy.

For thereafter he
paid a

was even price.

harder to

control. was

Though there

was no civil

war,

they had

heavy

And Rome

to pay too.

Actually

the servility of the Romans contributed to the problem,

and

for they

received

Nero in ovation,

Tacitus

seems to mark the abomination:

Thus, haughty,
his mother, (xiv.
13.2).

and victor over the public

slavery, he entered the

Capitoline; he
his

gave

thanks and released

such as

himself [so

as

to gratify] all his

desires,

which

reverence

for

it was, had obstructed, though they had been

badly

repressed

Tacitus

remarked a similar phenomenon

in the

old

Tiberius

who grew more

unrestrained when

he lost his

mother

(vi.51.3). It is

as

if,

even

in the

worst of

mortals, there is some inveterate

other restraints are absent. restraint

reverence

that cannot be cast off even when all

was more

Of course Tiberius less

political,

and

his lack

of

included
seen

murder on grounds of suspicion as well as all was political

inordinate lusts.
to leave the
and

We have
It

that Nero

by

nature and satisfied

governance of most political matters was not so much quest

in the

capable

hands

of

Seneca
sought

Burrus.

that this

changed even now as

that Nero to
rule

to politicize

his

for

pleasure.

Seneca

and

Burrus

continued

the Empire

for three

more years after

the death of

Agrippina in 59, but it

was under conditions of

increasing
ders
and years

difficulty.

During

most of

that period there were still no political mur

allowed

the Senate

continued

to

be

its independence. But

on

during

these

Nero's

emancipation showed

itself in his insistence

corrupting

the

Ro

man populace with

lavish

gladiatorial

games, theatrical performances, poetry re

14-

citals,

and

horse-racing
the
nobles

contests

(xiv.

16, 20-21,

47).

Nero himself
and

per

formed,

though tradition branded such exposure with to

share

infamy,

he

enticed or

commanded

in his disgrace.
four-horse
chariot

He had less
He

an

inveterate desire to

race a

in the

race course, and a not

abominable

[foedum]
to be

eagerness

to sing to the lyre in the

was seen

manner of

the

games.

was not able

repressed.

When this

by

Seneca

and

Burrus, they

con

ceded one of the

[desire] lest he
where

should

be

victor

in both. A

place was enclosed

Vatican

he

could race

horses, but the

the

sight was not public.

in the valley Afterwards

even the mob

Roman

people were called and acclaimed

him

with

their praises, since the

way.

is desirous

of pleasure and

happy if

First Citizen inclines that

not

Moreover,

[foedasset] others, are now] dead by [descendants] who could be bought from neediness. Though [they their ancestors. And owed to is fate, I will not record them by name, for I think this
furthermore, [I do
the sake
not name

they thought, but was bring satiety his shame [pudor], though made public, did alleviated if he defiled be would an enticement. He thought his dishonor [dedecus] mount the stage, families to noble of descendants so he induced the
as

them] because

the crime

is his
not

who

has

given

money for
1-

of transgression rather

than encouraging them

to transgress (xiv. 14.

3).

254

Interpretation
master-corrupter, but as
we

Nero

was a

have

seen

in the Tiberius-books, the Ro

already eminently heighten the disease. Good men from fear; the
Donations

mans were

corrupt.8

The

effect of

Nero's

emancipation was

to

were

forced to

accept and squander

Nero's

gifts

voluptuous enjoyed

it:
in

were given which

the good consumed

debauchery from necessity,

nor

the vo

luptuous for
morals

glory.

Thence

crimes and

dishonor increased,

long

since corrupted with more

debauchery than
much

those

did anything surround dregs. Shame [pudor] is

or

hardly

retained with virtuous

training,
among

less

can

of moral

purity be

preserved

contests of vices

chastity or modesty (xiv. 15. 2-3).

anything

The kind
pacity
of

of people
and

Seneca
Their

Burrus

drawn to Nero's Court may easily be imagined. The inca for which they should not be blamed to impart

their taste and noble aspirations to Nero

cations.9

finally

began to have

serious

impli
in the
ambi

grave and austere presence appeared

were not

in itself

a reproach

pleasure-loving Court. There

tion who would

lacking
as

dangerous

men of

ignoble

try

to use their influence on an older

and more audacious

Nero to

destroy
years

the power

of

Seneca

and

Burrus,
In 62

Agrippina

once

had tried. For three

the silent struggle

and

went on.

a.d.

two events signalled the downfall of

Seneca
come.

Burrus
crucial

and

the end of decent politics at Rome

matters was

The

figure in these

Tigellinus,
with

a man of

for many years to inveterate

Tigellinus'

lewdness

and

shamefulness,

thereby friendly
the law
of

Nero. Through

son-in-law, Capito

Cossutianus,

treason was revived (xiv. 48). The

poison

second grave event was

the death of

Burrus, possibly by

(xiv. 51),

and

his

replacement as prefect of

the praetorian guard

by

Tigellinus

and an

ineffectual
behind

though popular simpleton, Faenius Rufus. Tigellinus was the

new power

Nero.
the Julio-Claudians better than any his politics, Caligula by his extravagances. Claudius by his weakness, and Nero by his cruelty were less lethal to the republic in spilling the blood of the most il lustrious families in great waves, than in corrupting those whom they spared. Nero undoubtedly rav ished great men from the state by his murders; but by corruption he peopled it with men without char acter. His predecessors had begun the ruin of morals, he completed it. If one concurs in the truth of
one.

8. Diderot has

analysed this unfortunate effect of the rule of

"I dare to think that Tiberius

by

this reflection, how many princes, though less

ferocious, have
in time; the
13:382.

yet

been

as

culpable, as despicable as
entire nation endures of

he! The
spite the

massacre of

individuals

can

be

repaired

evil

done to the

de

examples, the administration, the precepts, and the edicts of

and of
Julians."

Tituses,

Trajans,

of

Marcus

Aureliuses,
9.

Essai, inOZuvres,

Diderot's

explanation of

applies with equal

of

why Seneca and Burrus did not retire after the force here: "But it was advantageous to remain there for the
no more good

murder of

Agrippina

Seneca, for his friends, for

was

Empire, for the family

assassination of

the number of good citizens. What then ? After the

Agrippina

there

for

a man

to do who was enlightened,

firm, just,

charged with an

immense detail

of affairs, and capable

bring help,
virtues?
all a

to accord grace, to repair

who were of

distance those The

tutor

his authority, his lights, his courage, his benevolence to sorrow, to stop or forestall difficulties, to halt depredations, to

by

inept

and elevate

to posts

men

distinguished for
of

their knowledge and their

boundary

the palace did not circumscribe the district

student out of the minister.
of

the philosopher. He is not at

who

had taken his

hands
the

of

women,

and whom one

kept

out of gratitude;

he is

an educator who

has become

Seneca himself
me,

says:
of

'Providence has

placed me

in this
of

post; I will
presence

keep it despite the

hatred

Poppaea,

intrigues

the

freedmen,
they

the

for Caesar. If they

importunity

my

wish to strangle

it is in the

palace that

me.'"

will strangle

in (Euvres, 13:370-71.

Essai,

Tacitus'

Teaching
Now Seneca had

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

255

long

been

envied

by

those who wanted his place and cared

nothing for his virtue or his competence as a ruler. Such men had always sought to undermine him with Nero. Undoubtedly there were many of them. Tacitus re
counted over

the accusations of one

with

in

his adversary

the

help

of

characteristic

that the punishment

At that time, Seneca triumphed his friends, and with Nero as his ally. It is of his accuser was mild, not vengeful, and lim
xm. 42-43.

ited strictly to what he deserved. But four years later, as we have seen, the situa tion had changed. There was no longer the threat of Agrippina which frightened
Nero
and made

confident.
portance.

him rely on Seneca and Burrus. Nero was older and more Burrus was dead and replaced by a scoundrel in an office of utmost im

self-

At this point, the

charges of those who were ambitious and envious of

Seneca began to carry more weight. Nero gave signs of avoiding their former in timacy (xiv. 53.1). Though the charges were immaterial, they were all addressed
to Nero's vanity. There
ers
was no claim

that Seneca was a bad ruler, for the

an affront
and

accus

knew that
was

such a charge would charged

with

have been
great

to

Nero,

who was worse.

Seneca He

too

wealth

with

tablishment that

rivaled the First Citizen's in

"magnificence"

maintaining an es (magnificentia).

for he arrogating to himself all the glory of eloquence impugned. was speeches. His motive in still had to write Nero's writing poetry "He wrote poems [carmind] more often after Nero had come to love
was charged with

them"

(xiv. 52. 3). He dared to rival the First Citizen. He

was also

deprecated Nero's
Whether Nero
charge,
effect at

pleasures voice:

in

horse-racing
must

and singing.

openly hostile to and It was even charged

was

that he ridiculed his

was

that

have hit home. Seneca

was

doomed.

really

political or

not, he

certainly

vain and

the

following
an

enforced

by

repetition and

implying

contempt, could not

fail to have

last:
there be nothing splendid in the republic which was not believed to him [Seneca]? The childhood of Nero was certainly over, and the

To

what end should

be discovered

by

strength of his youth was at

hand: let him

cast off

his tutor, for he

was educated enough

by

splendid

[amplis]

teachers

in his

ancestors

(xiv. 52. 4). [He

was

then

twenty-five.]
were

These

charges and recriminations were not unknown

to

Seneca, for they

noble"

revealed to

him

by

"those

who

had any

care

for

what was

(honesti

cura).

When Nero began to had

not

avoid

him, Seneca knew his influence

Seneca's

was at an

end, for it

been through

some official post with constitutional guarantees that

power was

he had Nero's

flourished. Nero
awe and

was an absolute ruler and

based

on

trust. Seneca had hitherto

years.

maintained

this adroitly, and it had lasted

for is

fourteen

But
said

at

last

what

Tacitus

said of

Agrippina

when she

fell from
affairs

grace could

be

with no

less truth

of

him.

"Nothing

of

human

so unstable and changeable as the

force"

reputation of power not supported supported

by

its

own

(xm.19.1).10

He had hitherto been

Tigellinus'

by

his

political virtue and

worldly

adroitness alone.

Rather than
10.

serve as

first

victim

or

his

second

if he

was

the one

nixae."

"Nihil

rerum mortalium

tarn instabile ac fluxum est quam fama

potentiae non sua vi

256

Interpretation
Burrus
to
so
no good

who poisoned

purpose, Seneca determined at last to retire

from the
grasp.

power

he had

long

wielded and which

had
and

now slipped

from his

He

sought an

interview

with

the First

Citizen

delivered
other

a curious and

fascinating
gives us an controlled

speech which

Tacitus

reports. arcana

More than any

passage, this one

insight into Seneca's

so

imperii,

the

secret art

by

which

he had

Nero

long. One

secret

is ironic flattery. Seneca

praises and pretends own

to admire and be

infinitely

indebted to Nero. He dissembles his

of

worth; yet

here

and

there he lets slip a hint

the upright code

he himself follows. This

a

Nero may have

awe.

somehow acknowledged and

held in

kind

of

half-conscious
accomplished

The

rhetorical problem

he

solves

in the
a

speech

is to

present

his

fall from favor to Nero

as a request

for

boon. Thus his

enforced retirement will

who

be

protected thereafter

by

Nero's

consciousness

that it is he

bestowed it
Nero

and

that

it depends

on

him. At the

same

time no hint must be allowed to the effect that

this retirement reflects changed

realities of power. stood

Especially
and

since

was

surely Nero's
present
whom

not unaware

that Seneca

for

decency
a

virtue, a reference to
reproach.

change of attitude would

have been
one

dangerous

Seneca

must

his fall
owed

as a request

for

last

great

boon from his beloved

pupil

to

he

all,

and of whom

he had

also

deserved well, through

upon

utter and

devo

tion and service. For though Nero had been dependent

Seneca

Burrus

for

political

guidance, his

self-knowledge was so

rudimentary that he

could rec

ognize no worth that was not

dependent

on

his

own.

Seneca begins his but in his Nero Nero. For fourteen

came to
said of

speech

by reminding Nero of the length of their association,

the

rhetorical presentation all years since

benefit is

said to

have

originated with

Seneca

was

Nero's tutor, for

with

eight years since

the

Empire, he has heaped Seneca

service

honors

and wealth. not

Noth

ing
and

is

Seneca's

to Nero. But even

here, Seneca

Nero, he
he does

permits

himself a

reference to

moderation,
to

without which

only flatters Nero's riches

honors
not

are worthless.

Seneca

was used

tempering flattery

with truth and

begin
at

ject, he hints

desist from stinging Nero. Though he the true case in which he is the superior:
now to
so

appears most ab

You have heaped

should

many honors

and such

riches

on me

lack nothing

except moderation

[moderatio]

that my happiness [felicitate] in it (xiv. 53. 2).

He

adduces the case of two

important

comrades of services.

allowed to retire

in

return

for surpassing
and

Augustus who, he says, were But he is always mindful of

proud

Nero's testiness
compare

when

the worth of another is mentioned. Lest it seem

to

himself with Maecenas

exemplars,

[adapted]

not

to my

Agrippa, he hastens to add: "I employ great (xiv. 53. 3). Seneca, who fortune, but to
yours"

elsewhere claims the power

to

make a

friend immortal through his

point of

philosophic

writings, here carries self-effacement to the

denigrating that very philos

ophy

which was

the core

of

his life:

Tacitus'

Teaching
What
else

and

the Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

257

have I been

able to present to your

so to speak. seem to

nurtured comes youth.

in the shadows,

It is

a great reward

generosity [munifcentia] than my studies if splendour [claritudo]

first beginnings
of your

to them

because I have

have been

present at the

But

you

overwhelmed me with

immense

gratitude and numberless

riches

(xiv. 53.4-5).

It is true that Seneca became

Nero. This has furnished his
accusation against

immensely

enemies

wealthy from the munificence from the time of Suillius (xm.42.4) with

of an

him. He

was an ambitious

hypocrite. He his

praised

Stoic

self-

sufficiency
ness made

and claimed

indifference to
the richest

wealth while

rapacious acquisitive
escaped

him

one of

men

of

his time. What has riches

these
part

simple-minded accusers

is that Seneca's

reception of

was an

integral

his policy in handling Nero. For he knew well the maxim Tacitus expressed in reference to Tiberius: "Benefits are only so far gladly received when they seem to be able to be repaid; where they much exceed, hatred is returned for
of
(iv.18.3)."

gratitude

Whatever he

said

to

Nero, he knew

that it was he who preserved the to Nero's awareness, "hatred

Empire,
would

and should

this become powerfully

present

Seneca's policy, therefore, was to deceive be returned for Nero into thinking that he coveted the honors and riches he gave him. Thus Nero seemed to be the great benefactor, and Seneca knew that we have a tendency to love those
says
who are

gratitude."

indebted to

us.

Seneca

says

this in

his

speech

to

Nero, but he

it

so

quietly that it has

have

escaped

his detractors
immense is it I,

through the ages.

But

you

overwhelmed me with

gratitude and numberless

riches,

so

much

that I

often ponder with

myself,

who was

born

knight

and

in

a provincial

place, who

am numbered with nobles and

the

chief men of

the City? Does my

newness shine

among
nade

the

those

who parade a

content with moderate resources?

Does it in

long [train] of honors? Where is that mind lay out such gardens as I have, and prome
such spaces of estates? comes

through these

suburban villas and

Does it

abound

in

such widespread

[capital

out

at] interest? One defense

to

mind

that

ought

not to struggle against your gifts

(xiv. 53. 5).

unfortunate effect of exposing him to that this envy was harmless implication the him. Thus, ostensibly to disarm the envy of

Seneca
envy. until

admitted

that his fortune had the

not express

Of course, he did
ceased

Nero

to think

he

needed

the

Court, he
it is

offers

to restore
worth

his fortune to Nero. At this

point

he tells Nero the

truth

of

little

to him:
to poverty, but
shall recover

will

not, myself,

reduce myself

by

relinquishing those things

mind

by

whose splendor

am oppressed,

for my

the time

which

is

set aside

for

the care of

gardens or villas

(xiv. 54. 3).

the fact that he
would

Seneca
to

meant

this, but he left

unexpressed

have

continued

postpone

his philosophy to the care of the state if he could have

eo usque

done

so

1 1

"Nam beneficia

laeta sunt, dum

videntur exsolvi posse: ubi multum

antevenere, pro

gratia odium

258

Interpretation
Yet in this
connection one should note

effectively.

that

even

the years in power

were productive

philosophically
wealth.

Seneca

philosophized while still

he

ruled.

Nero

affected

to refuse the offered gift. He was

trying

to

entice

Seneca

by

the promise of more

still

But

even

this is rather for effect than heart-felt.

Nero

feared Seneca

and

the public

opprobrium

ment.

Yet he knew he

must

be rid

of

him,

and

that must accompany his retire he hated him. To his speech "he

added an embrace and

kisses for he

was made

by

nature,

and exercised

to conceal hatred beneath deceitful

was not

flatteries"

(xiv. 56. 3).

by habit, Seneca, however,

in
politics.
was understood

deceived

and

immediately
come.

retired

from

active participation

Though the

new situation could not end

be

recognized

in speech, it

by

both that the

Seneca habits
gave

had

of

thanks, which is the end of every speech with a ruler. But he changed the his former power, he forbade the gathering of well-wishers he avoided being
,

accompanied, he came seldom to the

state or

City

as though

his health

were

in

an unfavorable

he

were

detained

at

home
was

by

the studies of

wisdom

(xiv. 56. 3).

of

This
gime

retirement of of

Seneca

decisive. For the first decision

the new

re

is indicative
exercised.

the character of Tigellinus and the influence that he subse

quently

Tigellinus
alone

grew stronger each

day,
be

and

he thought that the

wicked arts

through which

he

was

influential

would

more

gratifying if he bound

the

First Citizen

by

the

sharing

of crimes

(xiv.57.1).

Accordingly, having found out that Nero most feared two illustrious nobles, Sulla and Plautus, he persuaded Nero to kill them. Nero listened and allowed it. There was no pretense of a trial. As in so many cases that were to follow, it was a
matter of assassins sent

from the Court. From the ascendancy

of

retirement of a

Seneca onward,
series of arbi

the reign of

Nero

under the

Tigellinus is but

long

trary

murders of and

the

illustrious, judicial
and

assassinations of the

innocent, luxurious
take then

banquets,
his

filthy

impious debauches. If anyone is

simple enough to ques

tion the methods and compromises to which

measure of

Nero's capacity for his

power

evil

Seneca had recourse, let him from these abominable acts and

judge. Seneca
eight survived of

for three

years. which

During
ad

this time he composed the

said

books
In

Naturales Quaestiones,
was accused of
commit

Lipsius

rival Aristotle's. He

also wrote years.

his masterpiece, the Epistolae Morales

a.d., he

Lucilium

during

these last

65

himself,
One Though

and was

forced to

complicity in a conspiracy Nero drew on suicide. He died nobly, dictating edifying

speeches until the

cannot

very end. do Seneca justice

unless one recognizes the tremendous obsta

cles with which

he struggled,

and above all the natures of

Nero

and

Agrippina.

appointed tutor

by her,
him

he

never

let unthinking

gratitude get

of justice when she sought

as an accomplice and

tool

for her

crimes.

in the way His re

It is
not

sistance to

her

preserved the world

from tyranny for

several years.

Tacitus'

Teaching
difficult to
understand
sis of a concern

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

259
Nero
on

Seneca's
Stoic

acceptance of the post of tutor of

the ba

for the

common

good,

even after

Nero

revealed that

he

was not

of the character of which

sages are made.

tia, dates from early in the

even godlike pride years

reign.

His treatise to Nero, De demen There he tries to inspire Nero with a noble and

Nero

gave

in sparing and benefiting his subjects. Perhaps in his early promise of decency. Yet Seneca had to struggle with all the cor

rupting influences of flatterers and opportunists to which Nero was exposed at the Court. One cannot fault him for trying his best, but there are limits to the power
of one man

to

influence

another.

If Seneca tried to

make

Nero

as good as possi

ble, it
seen while

was wise

finally
in

to accept Nero's limits. After a time, Seneca must have

was

that the best he could hope for

to preserve the principles of decent rule

he

remained

power and to combat the worst

influences

on

Nero for his

as

long as possible. Why did he not

These

retire when

Nero killed his

step-brother and

mother?

were crimes within

the

family to which Nero was provoked by Agrippina's

untiring quest to rule. Seneca must have thought they would not be repeated and must have seen that they presented no immediate threat that Nero would demand
to rule the entire
such crimes

Empire

by

himself. He did his best to his

post and

prevent

the recurrence

of

by

remaining

at

threats of politics to

which

he

would no

doubt

thereby isolating Nero from the direct respond violently. Agrippina, at

apprised of

least, presented a real danger at death, whatever they might have

the time Seneca and Burrus acquiesced in her

said

had they been

Nero's

plans

be

forehand. But the crime, however abominable in itself, did not present a threat of more widespread degeneration. For the time being the world was spared that by Nero's relatively
alone,
would would nurture
apolitical character. under

The

real threat was

precisely that Nero, left

what

come

the influence of some ambitious opportunist who

his fears

and encourage

him to devastate the Empire. This is

at

Seneca
stood

chose to prevent

by

those who

judge

by remaining by appearances.
was compelled

his

side and

it is this that is
charge that

misunder

Likewise the

Seneca

ruled

out of avarice collapses when exposed to scrutiny.

It is true that Seneca hold

power.

to accept unpleasant things in order to

But before condemning him one should be responsible enough to account look at why he did so. The massive evidence of his writings and of his rule shows that he acted out of benevolence and devotion to the common
Tacitus'

good of

the

entire world

the peace and prosperity of the universal Empire de

accuse so good a man of avarice or

pended on

him. Rather than

matricide,

one should realize that

he

made certain concessions

complicity in that appear base

in

order to
wanted

forestall

worse effects.

Seneca

was virtuous. was not

But he

was also prudent.

He

his justice to be

successful.

He

innocent

or

simple,

and

the

nature of politics often requires that one combat evil under able circumstances. cue

difficult

or unfavor

Those times

were

particularly

corrupt.

The Senate took its

from him. It
do. It is the

was not mark

could

limited in what he really independent. One man was of Seneca's greatness that he did so much so long.

260

Interpretation
and the

3.

Paetus Thrasea
at

Decline of Liberty in the Senate

of

Seneca declared Senate

would

the outset

Nero's reign, through Nero's mouth, that the

be

restored

to its ancient authority (xm.4).

tury

of virtual though disguised subservience to the First

But, after nearly a cen Citizen, a mere inten

independence. The
to accept
offered to

tion was not enough to restore the habits of sovereignty and

Senators for the

most part were no with

longer
the

of

the firm

character requisite

the responsibility that went

restore to them.

to the

family

liberty graciously Nor had they any political power to confront the armies loyal of the Caesars. Was the loss of character an effect of the loss
so regulations were made at the
not

Seneca

of power?

Some decent

beginning

of

the reign

(xiii. 5. 1), but in general, the Senate does

become the focus

of a vigorous po

litical life
even

during

these years. Tacitus seldom reports deliberations as he still

had,

in the early years of Tiberius. When he does, for once, dispute, he calls it a "mere image [or phantom, imago]
(xm.28.1). The

recount a genuine of

the

Republic"

prevalent mood was one of quiet acquiescence

in the

policies

initiated
This

by

the Court. unfortunate, but

not

situation was

utterly
good.

degrading
It

as

long
hold

as

Seneca

held the Senate

reins of government and

initiated the

policies of

the Empire. But the

out against as

was not an

independent influence for demands though it

listened to

could not

unjust or

degrading

would not

initiate them
on

as

long

Seneca

was respected and should

by

Nero. All depended

of some worse

Seneca. Should he

fall,

Nero

come under the

influence

man, nothing prevented the

Senate from returning to the degraded adulations that had characterized it during the earlier reigns of inferior First Citizens Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius. This was
a real

limit

of

Seneca's

power.

Single-handedly
laws

he

could not restore

healthy

po

litical life to Rome. He

servient

could give good

or

judgments to

grateful and sub

subjects, but he
no

could not animate them with virtue.

even

this, for there is

public.

hint that he

for

a moment considered

He surely knew restoring the Re

That

was

impossible

under

the circumstances.

But Seneca

was not the

to the widespread
panied and good

only decent and courageous man who opposed himself degeneration of those times. His work at the Court was accom

to a limited extent

briefly

completed

by

the

influence

then exerted for

eca, is one
with

Thrasea, like Sen extraordinary heros in Tacitus. Like Seneca, his name is also associated Stoic philosophy. Tacitus speaks almost exclusively of his deeds. We won
an
of

in the Senate
the

by

man, Paetus Thrasea.

real

der to

what extent

they

were

influenced

by

his

philosophy.

From his

career we

learn that

even

in the darkest times there is

some room

accompanied
voted to

by

worldliness and political virtue. reveals

for purity of heart, if it is Perhaps the fact that he was de

philosophy sufficiently
Court. But
as

his

character.

We have
ated

spoken of the calm acquiescence of the

Senate in the
Nero

policies

initi

by
to

the

time went on
matters

Seneca

was compelled

to concede some
came to

thing

Nero, especially in

pertaining

to pleasure.

be

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the Decline of Liberty at Rome

261

great promoter of games and

festivals

which

further

corrupted

the

idle Romans.

But it is
what

of

the essence of government, even in a great

Empire,

to be

imitated;

the

ruler

admires, the

subjects

have

tendency

to desire too.

Following

Nero's policy in
tors
allowed

Rome,

the Senate complaisantly

extended

the number of gladia

would not recount so

to Syracuse for her shows. Tacitus says

a matter

he

insignificant
position

had it

not

been

opposed

by Thrasea,

who

thus

provoked

from those
of

whose character on

it

was

to flatter Nero in all things. This

op is the
in

first entry

Thrasea

the great stage

we

of

the Annales. His

a noble and

motives are worth

vestigation,

for from them

learn how

thoughtful

man responded

to the dilemma posed

by the

impotence

and

Thrasea
assailed

opposed

the extension of the games at Syracuse. He

degeneracy of the Senate in that age. was immediately

who saw that there were

by

"his

detractors"

(obtrectatoribus)

important

implications to his intervention. What he

independent

of

the

matter at

tempted to undermine
saw that

and already made him enemies. had hand, They at already him by drawing those implications into the open. They

stood

for

was

well

known,

in his

act was an

intention

of

habituating the

Senate to take

a stand

inde in

pendent of

the Court. He was criticizing the

moral easy-goingness of

the times

a small

matter, but the fact that his

principle could

be

applied

to

greater matters

did

not escape

Nero's

courtiers.

Thrasea

opposed a small matter extend

to

get a safe

hearing
those

for his

virtuous principles. men

Would he then
enemies

them or would

they

at
of

least influence lence.

in

private?

His
to

hoped

by drawing

the implications

principles

immediately,

make

his policy

unsafe and reduce

him to in
so

si

They

dreaded the

restoration of

liberty

to the Senate.

Here,

as

many

have seen, the principles of despotism are maintained not by the despot himself, alone, but by that crowd of followers who hope to flourish by his
other cases we
favor.12

They

complained:

Why did he pursue

Senatorial liberty?

such
.
.

insignificant

matters

if he believed

the republic was

in

need of excel

Was

all else through all the parts of the

Empire equally

lent,

as though not

Nero, but Thrasea held

the

government of

them?

(xui.42.2-3)
recalls

Thrasea does
ate

not seem ambitious to replace

Nero. He merely

the Sen
with

to a

sense of moral replace

desire to He
who

fitness. Yet how easily his Nero. Morality in a decadent age is

enemies charge a

him

the

danger

and a challenge. quake and

dares to

stand

up for it

makes

the easy-going

men of

his time

may be denied them. Thrasea hate him in fear that their influence had taken a bold first step. It might habituate less daring Senators to think inde which could not fail to impress them. It pendently. It was an example of
and pleasures

decency

restoring to the Senate, and thereby the Court of Nero where Seneca of decency. It thus implied independence of to some extent on the sly, behind Nero's back. In the sense, practiced
was a start at

to the public realm, some sense

goodness,

12.

Perhaps it

would

be

more precise n.

to say that the responsibility

was

mutually that

of

the court

iers

and that of the ruler.

Cf.

8.

262

Interpretation attempting to restore a public the completion of Seneca's:

was
who asked

then, that he
policy
was

recognition of

decency, Thrasea 's

To his friends
not

him the

reason

[of his act], Thrasea

that

replied

that it was

in ignorance

of the present

that he consulted the

[dangers] honor of the fathers,

most

he

corrected should

decisions

of this

sort, but

that

it

become

public

[open,

manifestum] that those

their
mind

men would not omit care of

the

greatest affairs who applied

to even the

insignificant (xm.49.4).

Tacitus does

not report whether

Thrasea

won or

lost. From the

most sober point

of view perhaps

that is less important than the fact that

regardless of

virtue once again of

had

spokesman, that

the

wild acts of

the series

tyrants

who

had

ruled

Rome for in

a quarter of a

century, decent
right.13

men could point

to someone again who

public was

maintaining the

One may easily underestimate the dire effects of so long a period of despo tism. Thrasea was attempting something so rudimentary that we, as citizens of liberal democracy, may not even be able to appreciate it. He was trying to restore
a public recognition of the

difference between

virtue and vice

to a world that

had

been

subjected

to

thorough corruption or transvaluation of values

which almost

for

at

least

twenty-five years

during

the only

men who

flourished

or gained

recognition were criminals.

On the basis

of reflections made closer

to

home it

may be affirmed that the overpowering decent citizens and depoliticize them

effect of such a situation

is to discourage
and a

profoundly.14

It

was a

difficult task,

dangerous one, for the man who practiced it made enemies on every side among those who flourished in the established corruption. Tacitus is impressed nonethe
less
with

the courage and goodness

us as well.

of

the man, and it is

not

the least of his con

a power

cerns to

impress

Even in the darkest times there is

Benedetto Croce's
effect

in

moral-

13.

Arnaldo Momigliano's
seems

assessment of

in

Italy during

the period of

Fascism Paetus

to present a modern parallel to the effect of Thrasea. "Croce saw himself as a Thrasea
a

or a

Boethius in
of men,

time of

tyranny
admit

and

barbarism. He

expected the end of

what

Fascism to

come not

from the hands Nazis had done his

but from

mysterious

Providence. Though

the

Fascists

and even more the

compelled

him to

that certain historical periods

represent an authentic regress,

resigned attitude

toward the

world remained

the same. His notion of

history

as the

history

of

lib

erty was essentially fatalistic: it relied on Providence. Thus Croce was not able to indicate a way out of Fascism. If he had been, Mussolini would not have allowed him to speak. But the liberty Croce
spoke about was not selves on the

just

a philosophic notion. of

It

was the

liberty

our

forefathers had

won

for

them
a

battlefields

the Risorgimento. Croce represented

a constant reproach

to

Fascism,

constant reminder of what we

had lost

freedom

and

honesty of thought,
representative

especially in

matters of re re

ligion,
spect

of social questions and of other

foreign policy, tolerance,

government, fair trials,

and

for

nations, and consequently self-respect. He spoke for Italian civilization

his

speech

was the more

the Risorgimento.

moving because he might as easily have become a Fascist. He was the living link with When Nazism came to add its own brutality, his protests became more radical, his
remark that

famous jokes bitter. His imbecile has

not

the

word

Aryan

was

in danger

of

becoming

synonymous with
years agree

its very nature the precise importance of Croce in the !925-39 is very difficult to assess, but anyone who lived in Italy in those years will probably that Croce prevented Fascism from becoming a respectable ideology in the eyes of educated

been forgotten.

By

Italians."

Momigliano, "Reconsidering Benedetto Croce

14.

(1866-

Thrasea's

situation

is that

of

the citizens

in Quarto contributo, p. 108. of East European and Russian Communist tyrannies.

1952),"

Tacitus'

Teaching
will

and the

Decline of Liberty
if
someone

at

Rome

263
it. But
since prob

ity.

Willy-nilly it
we now turn.

be

acknowledged

dares to

exhibit

it is dangerous to do so, the lem

A
single speech of

exhibition must

be

managed adroitly.

To this

Thrasea

could not restore even

than could a single speech of

mouth.

Seneca,

if he did
and

Senatorial liberty, any more proclaim it through Nero's

those who hated them were

Flatterers

and opportunists were

vague

legion,

often repressed

by
in

dominated,
basest
of

and

place

fear. When Nero killed his mother, flattery or fear pre of reproach he was greeted with servile adulations. The
expressions

of acts was made

the occasion for celebration and extravagant

a contest that

devotion to Nero. "In

deserves

wonder

[miro]

the chief men of

the the

City decreeing day of the murder an annual holiday since They decreed a golden statue, and that
one another

rivaled

in

supplications to the gods.

They

made

Agrippina'

"a conspiracy had been s birthday should be

with

reve

accursed.

Tacitus looks

with wonder or

horror

on

this

perversion of

truth and standards. It

on the act of

is then
In

more wonderful

that he does not look

favor

Thrasea,
or

who repudiated
Thrasea'

these proceedings

by publicly

favor it

must

be

said

walking out of the Senate. that he felt the same horror as Tacitus
matricide.

any

good man at
and

the Senatorial sanction for

shares

His

act was one of

passion,

though

he

that passion, Tacitus

acerrime

condemns

the act. Thrasea was a man

of

high

spirit

(cf. xiv.48.3,
of the

increpito),
could

who

passion

for justice

by thinking

of

how it

be

expressed

ordinarily controlled his for the public good.

But the

depravity
of

Senate

on that

day

was

too great. He yielded to anger

and, heedless

the consequences, made a public

display

of

his disapproval. he
was

This

was a public affront which

Nero

could not

fail to resent,
whole cause not

and which

in

a position

to repay in

such a

No

good purpose was served

way by Thrasea's act, for he did

as to

harm the

Thrasea

stood

for.

dissuade Nero from

his
had

course or

less provoking silence he rally wavering Senators to his cause. The practiced would have been more prudent. Tacitus underlines this, formerly
act severely.

for he judges Thrasea's

corrects one of

This is

one of the rare cases where

Tacitus
and

his

characters.

I think it is

a mark of
with

his

affection

for Thrasea

the degree to

which

he identifies himself
means,
not ends.

Thrasea's

cause and career.

The

disagreement is
was so revolted

one of

by

the

proceedings of

Thrasea's defect may have been that he that day that he could not control himself.

Tacitus judges this to be

Thrasea Paetus, he did

fault:
to let
earlier adulations pass with silence or a

who was accustomed

brief assent, departed then from the Senate,

while
not extend a

and produced a cause of

danger to himself,

beginning

of

liberty

to

others

(xiv.

12. 1).

Tacitus is especially severe with him because so We have seen that Tacitus approved of his policy
tiously. But to
repudiate

much rested on of

his

career.

restoring

standards cau

the Senate's

sanction

some men would never

reproach

forget

and never

openly on that day was a thing let Nero forget. For his decency was a
of

to their baseness. It increased the dangers

Thrasea

and other good

264
men

Interpretation
no good end.

like him to

Tacitus is tough. He does

not admire sentimental

ity

or gratuitous martyrdom, and act

he

expects

every

by

the thought of what good

his heroes prudently to govern their could be done for Rome, and thence for
as

themselves.15

The

public

good, insofar

it

could

be

said

to exist,

depended
in the
and

on

such men

living

to set

an example and

lead

and encourage each other

midst

of their sufferings.

Besides,
still were

the Empire was still ruled

particular

by Seneca,
not

Nero's Tacitus

transgressions were
counsels of

limited. These in
order. ever

times were

times in which

despair

Actually,
in
order.

one can wonder whether

thinks counsels of despair are

A very different political situation developed in the years after the murder of Agrippina in 59 a.d. Nero grew bolder, and in time the ambitious scoundrels of the Court grew more importunate for power. Seneca and Burrus declined and

Tigellinus became
signalize and

more and more

favored. As

solidify his

influence,

have already mentioned, to Tigellinus sought to ingratiate himself with

we of

Nero

by during the

restoring the tyrannical law

eight years

treason which had been allowed to

lapse

Seneca
recited

predominated.

certain

was accused of surd case was ous sign yet not so much

having

lewd

verses about

Nero

at a

Antistius, banquet,
was

the praetor,
and the ab
most seri

brought before the Senate

was

as a state crime.

This

the

that the regime the

ruin of

declining. Tacitus
as an occasion of

says that

Tigellinus

sought
who

Antistius

glory for the

Emperor,16

intended to
those
who

pardon

him,

once condemned.

The

significance was unmistakable to

had

penetrated more of the

pense of the good

degradation

deeply. The glory of the Emperor was at the ex Senate, and the law was such as to threaten all
under

men, as one might have seen from its catastrophic employment

Tiberius. The decline

sition to
never of

Seneca threw Thrasea

briefly into the vanguard of decent oppo

in

Nero. If Seneca had

continued

influence,
as

such a case as this would

have been brought before the Senate, but

there to take the
place of
with

someone

it was, it became necessary for the Great Courtier. If Nero could be shown
this

that the Senate would not go along

might

indignity,
would

the position
spared

of

Seneca

be

bolstered, but in any

maintained.

case, the Senate

the

be

effects of similar
might

importunities in

future. At least
or

some
good

degrading semblance of decency

the
would

be

If Nero began to kill

of

banish

men, the Senate

be

spared the

necessity

giving its

sanction.

But Nero had hitherto done

chose

no such

thing. This is important in

15.

determining

why Thrasea

to take the risk of

"Let those

men

leam,

whose custom

it is to

admire what

is

not permitted

[subversive,

illicita],

that there can be great men, even under bad

tion, if industry and vigor are present, can ascend lustrious through an extreme death, ambitious, but to no good of the republic (Agr. 42.4). This is said by Tacitus in the context of an evaluation of the prudence of Agricola, the general who extended the Roman
16.
of rule and

first citizens, and that allegiance and modera to that height of praise where many have grown il

justly

ruled

Britain

during

the

reign of

Domitian,

bad First Citizen.

Imperatori. This is

one of

the rare places in Tacitus (xiv. 48. 2) where that title is used instead

See Chap. II,

First Citizen (Princeps), which was more in accord with the republican fiction of the constitution. n. 1 Is this a further indication of the degeneracy of the regime that it dispensed with
.

even a sham adherence

to the Republic?

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

265

opposing him. Perhaps if he were firmly opposed by the Senate, he would turn from this new course. Thus the fate of the political life of the whole Empire for
years

to come seemed to rest on the shoulders of Thrasea when he rose to speak

on of

that day. He hoped he might preserve decent government and halt the the regime.

decay
much

Actually, Thrasea did

not speak

for the

repeal of

the law

that was too

to attempt at once. He spoke against only the death penalty, which had been de
manded out of complaisance

to Nero and Tigellinus

banishment,17

by the consul-designate.

The

penalty
sure

established

by

the law was

but if the Senate

resisted pres

that

its severity, it might be a signal to Nero to desist from law altogether. What Thrasea sought was very limited, but it was
to extend
of what

the use of
enough

to

intimate to the Court the limits

When
others assented

it

could ask of the

Senate.18

[to the

motion of

the consul-designate that Antistius be

put

to

death

"by

custom,"

ancestral

and not

according to the
most

law] Thrasea Paetus,

with much

honorable [commendation] of Caesar, and that though judged guilty, the accused did

not

bitterly reproaching Antistius, said deserve to suffer just anything, for this

[punishment]
bound

was

to be determined

by

no necessity.

under an outstanding First Citizen and by a Senate [He said] that the hangman and noose were long since abol were established

ished

and

that punishments

by

the

laws, according
judges

to

which

[laws]

punishments might

be

pronounced without

cruelty

of

and stigma of the times

(xiv.48.3-4).

Notice that he
man who

reproached"

"bitterly
law,
and

Antistius. He

was

angry

at the

folly

of

this

had

given occasion
of rule of

to the Court to

reestablish tyranny.

It

was above all

the principle
not

this silly

man.

Tacitus

says that

indirectly good law, that he fought to protect, "the liberty of Thrasea broke the slavery of
exceptions

others"

(xiv. 49. 1)

and that with

few

they

went over

to his

sentiment.

This is, in itself,

and the

a mark of the encouragement that

Seneca's

good government

early initiatives of Thrasea had given to decent men. One need only note how differently the Senate voted on a similar motion by Manius Lepidus during the reign of Tiberius to see that the efforts of these men had not been entirely in
vain.19

But

as we

have said, it

was not

to

be

a permanent

influence.
vacillated

Nero

was

for the time

being

thwarted and, "though he

between

shame and (xiv.49.2), he assented to the milder procured in accordance with the law. Nero was forced to
anger"

sentence shame

Thrasea had
the

by

Senate!
not

Though he begrudged his

change

assent and sent a resentful says

letter,

the

Senate did
course

its

resolution.

Tacitus

that Thrasea

persevered

in his

"by his
to ruin

accustomed

firmness

of mind and

in

order that was

his glory

should not go

[intercideret]."

Tacitus did
n. 42.

not think

it

only

altruistic public

duty

that caused

17.
18.

See Chap. Ill,

Does this

not remind of

the

speech of

Euryptolemus,

who

along

with

Socrates

attempted

to

prevent the tyrannical

Athenian

from picking up

the corpses of

from trying the generals en masse after they those who died at Arginusae? Xenophon, Hellenika,
mob

were prevented

1.7. 14-35.

19. hi. 49-5 1. See also Rene Waltz, Vie de Seneque (Paris: Perrin, 1909), Seneca. only modern study I know of the politics of

p. 383.

This is the

266

Interpretation
act so well.

Thrasea to
tion

Thrasea identified his In

a man of

own

glory

with public-spirited ac

for the

common good.
with

his capacity

and elevation

the private mo

tive is one

the public

motive. not

From this
cannot

we come

to see that even heroes are

recognition of of

insensitive to fame.

They

entirely dispense with conditions limit the openness

virtuous under

their goodness even if the prevalent

that recognition. There were no triumphs of the

of

Tiberius

or

Nero. The tragedy

the

Principate,

of which

Tacitus

is

so well

were

aware, is that in the absence forced to reassure one another in

and complex.

of public recognition of
private.

virtue,

such men

This helps

Tacitus'

make

history

so

rich

He tells

us not

only

what went on

and corrupted

by fear,

but

also recounts the views of

gatherings"

in the Senate, depraved the Roman public men in

circulis, m.54. i) where
common public

private, in "the banquets

and

(in

conviviis et

they

consoled one another

for the loss

of standards

in their

world.

To

some

extent, the

public realm

by

history itself attempts to rectify the old wrongs of the presenting an account of those evil days in which the wrongs
power are recognized as wrongs and

done

by

those in

the

good

deeds that

went

unrecognized are praised as

they deserve.
attempts

But in harshness
virtue

deeper sense, Tacitus

to strengthen good

men

to endure the
maxim

of

the times nobly and alone. His

own

teaching is

austere.

The

that

is its

reward, hard as it is to act upon, is

nevertheless

true. The

hardest
it.20

success and

have always been somewhat contemptuous of the worldly honor that accompany virtue but are not a fitting recompense for Tacitus wishes to harden men to bear up under the harshness of the regime.
of noble men

He

wishes

to

make

them

independent,
be

self-sufficient.

In

such a

world, one

must not

surprised

if one is

called upon

to suppress the

display
openly

of one's

better instincts

cept evil and corruption. and completely.

right while seeming to ac The party of decency is too weak to practice virtue Thus Tacitus even reproaches Paetus Thrasea for walk
and preserve a sense of

ing

out of the

Senate

when

it

praised

Nero's

matricide.

Thrasea unnecessarily

en

dangered the

whole cause.

Better

not to

draw

attention to oneself and practice

virtue with more adroitness and

less

eclat.

I think it is,
than

above

all, in the
of

career of

Seneca

that one sees the poignancy as

was closer

sociated with the

Tacitus'

Thrasea,

and

severity in a better

teaching. For Seneca

to Nero

position

to do real good to the Empire. But the price

concede to

he

paid

for his influence

was

that

he had to

which appeared

disgraceful. He
of

remained

despite the

Nero in petty matters two murders in Nero's

family. He
then and
20.

took great sums

to condone Nero's revolting games and poetry recitals. He money from Nero, for which he did not fail to be censured afterwards. We have explained why this was necessary and how little
seemed
statement
and

Consider Aristotle's

cially

concerned with

honors

dishonors,
since

in the Ethica Nicomachea: "The great souled and he will be moderately pleased by
he is but receiving Yet he will
what

man great

is

espe

honors

offered

by gentlemen [ojiovdaiarv]
be
adequate

honor

would not

for

perfect virtue.

accept

better to

him"

is his own, or less than his own. For it since they do not have anything

give

(i224a6-io).

Tacitus'

Teaching
Seneca
was moved

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
well

267
he has lost his

by

these gifts. In order to govern Rome

reputation

among
this

moral

but impolitic thinkers

price

through the ages.

Was it

some

awareness of

heavy

that led him to proclaim the pure principles he

mouth

taught so often through

mon good of

Nero's

(xm. 1

.2)?

Even for the

sake of the com

the world Seneca did not wish to be despised

by

other good men.

It

is the

mark of

his true
men of

greatness that

he

accepted

to be so despised.
practice of

But if even
virtue under

the caliber of Seneca and Thrasea felt sad in the

those circumstances, we can see why Thrasea's task of restoring a

public recognition of standards was of such

been

cowed

into

letting
be

the Senate stand

importance. If only Nero firm in its devotion to virtue do so, the

could and

have

if only

the Senators could

not

shown that

they

could

practice of virtue would

have been

such a

lonely

enterprise.

Thrasea's intervention in the Senate

other treason prosecution at this
years passed

was not

ineffective. There

was

in fact

an

time, but after Thrasea's courageous rebuff, two before Nero dared to bring the case before the august assembly
storm clouds of

(xv.35). As the
world,
even

Nero's

depravity

were

gathering

over

the Roman

this was an accomplishment.

Thrasea
years of a

continued to
reign.

be

an

important leader in the Senate

recounts at some

during
he

the middle to carry

Nero's

Tacitus

length

a speech

made

decree

forbidding

the provincial subjects

practice

from supplicating honors for their

provided a temptation to

governors

from the Senate. This

oppressions

had

the gover
turn pro

nors

to favor local
them

by

certain powerful subjects, who

in
of

cured

honor

at

home

when

their service was over.

tice

by

decree

was an accomplishment soon after

for the
Seneca

public good which

The ending Tacitus

this prac
credits

to Thrasea (xv.20.2). But

relinquished power

to Nero and

Tigellinus in 62

a.d.

(xiv. 56. 3), Thrasea

arrest.

retired

from

a public

life

whose

decline

he

could

no

longer hope to

Public life became impossible for the

gives us

independent-minded
tance. Nero

opposition.

This

the measure of

Seneca's impor far

more a.d.

murdered other

illustrious

men one

by

one, then grew

bloody in the sequel to a conspiracy which was Among the victims of Nero's vengeance was Thrasea,
volved. even

betrayed to him in
who

65

had

not

been in

We

wish now

to see how Thrasea

continued

to

be influential
so

and

heroic

in death. For Nero determined that he

must

die: "After

many illustrious

men were

butchered,

at

last Nero

conceived

extinguish virtue

herself [virtutem ipsam]

our attention

Tacitus draws
what was

to the

burning passion [concupivit] to (xvi. 21. 1). by killing Thrasea real motives and Nero's between disparity
the
Paetus"

publicly defensible
once as

even

Thrasea twice,

they

were

then, for he gives the list of charges against presented to Nero by Thrasea's enemy, Capito

Cossutianus,
important

and once as

they

were argued

in

open court.

The

private motives so

to Nero are not

repeated

in

public.

Nero

was annoyed

that

Thrasea had
not showed

walked out of the approval

Senate

when

Agrippina

was reviled, that

he had

by

eager attendance at

the games (a crime Nero took to

against

heart),
that

that

he

had

carried a milder sentence

for Antistius

Nero's will,

and

he had

268

Interpretation
himself from the
adulations and

absented

funeral

of

Nero's

second

wife, the mur

deress, Poppaea. Capito Cossutianus, son-in-law of Tigellinus, "did not allow says Tacitus, for he too had been opposed and pros these things to be
forgotten,"

ecuted

by

Thrasea. The

other

charge,

and the

only

one

that

was considered

de

fensible in public, was that Thrasea had now absented himself from public func tions for three years. Silence and retirement were interpreted as sedition by this
malicious proach

company,

who would not even allow virtue

this refuge or this mild

of

re

to their nefarious deeds. Thrasea and a company

his friends

and rela no

tives were all tried at once in a Senate surrounded

choice

by

troops.

The Senate had

but to convict, though Thrasea

was

held dear

by

many.

Nero's tyranny

weighed more

heavily
the

than

ever upon

them that sad

the

day:
which

This

was not

well-known sorrow of

Senate,

to

it

was accustomed

by

frequency dangers; but as they saw the hands and weapons of the soldiers, a new and deeper fear [penetrated the Senators]. At the same time the revered appearance
of
of

Thrasea himself floated before

them (xvi. 29. 1-2).

Before the trial Thrasea deliberated

whether

with

his "close

friends"

(proximos)

he

should attempt

to defend himself in the Senate or await their sentence

that a virtuous man then had

at

home. This is the last

could

and most extreme question

to face: how

he

should make a most

effectively die? It honorable and glorious

most

was a question
end and at

for Thrasea how he

the same time how he

weighed

should most adorn the cause with which

he had identified his life. As he he

owed

his alternatives, he Senate house:

was

insensitive

neither to what

his

own character nor

to the common good. First the argument of those who thought

he

should enter the

They

said that

they

were certain of

would

[only]
some

say nothing but that by the slothful and fearful

which

his constancy [constantia] [They said] that he he would increase his glory. [They said] that
.

should encompass their

last

moments with retirement

[secretum]: let the

people see a man

facing

death, let the Senate hear

.

voices as

from

divinity [numine] beyond human [voices] Nero might even be touched by the wonderful deed itself [ipso miraculo]; if he should rather insist on cmelty, certainly the
memory
those
of a noble end would

be distinguished among posterity from the

(xvi.25.1-2).

cowardice of

who perished

in

silence

From this line

lic Though

of

reasoning

we see again

how

heavily

the destruction of the

pub

recognition of standards reduced to this

in the Principate extremity they

some effect.

weighed on certain

high-spirited

men.

still

Thrasea's
order that
rant.

virtue and

thereby

of virtue simply.

his

virtue all

may have
share a

him to die publicly in Let the tyrant be acclaimed as a ty be impressed

with

long They want

for

a public recognition of

Despite

opposition,

they
kind

continue to
of noble

the one great re

Even after so They simplicity instances to the many contrary they continue to hope that Nero will be touched. Perhaps it was because he understood this hope and simplicity that Thrasea had striven so earnestly to restore a public dimension to virtue. ality
of virtue.
or optimism.

Tacitus'

Teaching
Those friends
of

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

269

who opposed

his

situation.

He

would

be

Thrasea's making a defense pointed out the perils bitterly reviled if he entered the Senate. Some

might even

Even the

good would

stoop to blows under the influence of fear and inveterate malice. be exposed to the degrading necessity of signifying their
Thrasea. It
shame
was a

repudiation of

"vain

hope"

overwhelmed provoke about

by

for his

atrocious crimes

(inrita spe) that Nero would be One should rather fear further to
men are without

his cruelty

against

Thrasea's family. These

illusions

the perilous situation. But

tion to

its

own reward and

overpowering evil. do not demand in for

whom

they did not despair in their counsel of resigna Perhaps stronger than their friends, they find virtue is
addition some public

dimension

of recogni

tion. Or rather the public

can

they

care

is

restricted

to a natural elite who

be indifferent to worldly
company large.
of

success.

For them Thrasea had

long

since

joined the
not

eternal

the

philosophers whose

nobility is recognized, though

by
in

the world at

Still, they
in his

too speak

of glory:
of

Pure

and unstained

honor, he

should seek an end similar to the

glory

those

whose

footsteps

and studies

21 [studiis, discipline], he has led his life (xvi. 26. 3).

It is surely Socrates whose life and death is here referred to. He was the bright exemplar of Thrasea's life and his consolation in death. This is the stunning se
cret of

the Annates. A book that

mentions

philosophy

and philosophers

but rarely quietly

nevertheless pays shows

that it was

homage to their nobility in important decisive for the lives of the heroes. The
Thrasea
or a

moments and

steadfastness and no

bility
which

of

the

careers of a

Seneca

were made possible

by

a pursuit

Tacitus only barely lets us glimpse. He may have thought that philosophy cannot be talked about like political deeds. It can only be practiced. This is the deepest limit he imposed upon himself when writing the Annates.

The decision
was no

against

Thrasea was, Thrasea's

of course, a

foregone

conclusion.

There

longer

anyone of

stature

to

speak

for

a mild sentence or acquit regime

tal,

nor would

it have been fruitful to do so,

There
moved was an

so much
youth

had the

deteriorated

"ardent"

since

Seneca

retired.

(flagrans),
as

the tribune Rusto interpose

speech

ticus

Arulenus,
his

who,

by

desire for

praise

(xvi. 26. 4),

offered

his

veto

to the proceedings, but Thrasea forbade it

quiet

fruitless. From his

one can see

nobility

and consummate prudence:

He had many lic

completed

his life,

and

he

would not was

desert

way

of

life he had his future

practiced

for

so

Arulenus'

years.

magistracy

but beginning,
what

and

was entire.

He

should ponder much within

career

himself beforehand,

way he

would undertake a pub

in

such a

time (xvi. 26. 5).

of moderation, which

He is, above all, a teacher most difficult [lesson] of Hence he

21. peteret

Tacitus

calls elsewhere

"the

wisdom."22

awaited

the

verdict

in his

garden.

It is

remarkable

that he did

not

"Proinde intemeratus, impollutus,

finem."

quorum vestigiis et studiis vitam

duxerit,

eorum gloria

22.

"Quod

est

difficillimum

ex

sapientia,

(Agr.

4).

270 have to

Interpretation
wait alone.

the danger to be with

cause

Despite Nero, a group him in his last hour. his

virtue and

of

illustrious

men and women

braved

They
and

dared to

expose

themselves be

they

admired

held life

preserved at
of

the cost

of

solidarity lost their common

wishers on
Demetrius,23

decent

men

abandoning someone in private was a consolation for their Yet Thrasea held himself

fortune too dear if they must be like Thrasea to suffer alone. This
sadness

in

having
well-

public world.

aloof

from his

this last day. He

whom

attended most

earnestly to the Cynic philosopher, body. Insofar

and

he

engaged

in

a serious conversation about the nature of the

mind and

soul and

the dissociation of spirit or

as

he

was able,

he

imitated Socrates in death, both devoted his last thoughts.

When
one of

by his

constancy

by the

subject

to which he

his intimate friends brought

word of

his condemnation, he dis

those who had attended him, saying they should not endanger them any longer. He dissuaded his noble wife who wanted to die with him: she should live for the sake of their daughter. Finally, he was found nearer joy than
missed all

selves

grief

by

the quaestor, for he had learned that his noble son-in-law Helvidius was

only banished from Italy rather than condemned to die. Withdrawing into his bedroom with only Helvidius and Demetrius, he allowed the veins of his arms to

be cut, and then transpired no doubt intended:

a scene which

has lived through the ages,

as

Tacitus

Afterwards his blood flowed out,

quaestor

and

sprinkling it

upon

the ground, he called the

nearer,

and

said, "Let us pour a libation to

young man, and may the gods avert the omen; when it is advantageous to make the mind firm
35-1)-

Jupiter, the Liberator. Look, however, you are born in such times
constancy"

with examples of

(xvi.

Thus died Thrasea,

encourage

even

in his last

moment mindful
under

that he could instruct

and

decent

men to

bear up nobly

the weight of the

heavy

lot they
of

could not change.

He

assumes that even

the bearer of Nero's tidings may only be

carrying
eca's

out

the tyrant's orders (as was in fact the case with the harbinger
xv.61.3).

Sen

death,

He accordingly
of

exhorts

him to

fortify
off at

his

mind with ex

amples of constancy.

Unfortunately
do
not

the manuscript

the Annates

breaks

this point

and we

have Thrasea's last

or

words

to Demetrius. Also missing, through the in

ages,24

difference
23.

malignity

of

succeeding

are the

last two

years of

Nero's
Chry-

Seneca

compares this man with the greatest sages. "I shall not remind you of

Socrates,

because envy does not stand in the way of praise of the ancients. A little before I mentioned Demetrius, whom it seems to me, the nature of things brought forth in our times, that it might show that he is not able to be corrupted by us nor we by him. He is a man of precise wisdom, though he denies it, of firm constancy in things which he sets before
sippus,
and other great

Zeno,

men, who are greater

himself,
not

of

words, but

with

that true eloquence that teaches the most powerful things, not gracefully or in affected the mind of genius its themes as impulse inspired it. For this reason I do

following

doubt that
24.

providence gave such a man and such a

reproach"

faculty

of

speaking

so our age should not

lack

an example or a

(De

beneficiis,

vu.8).

zeal armed

loss;

certain that in those first times, when our religion began to gain authority with the laws, many against all sorts of Pagan books, by which the learned suffer an exceeding great disorder that I conceive did more prejudice to letters than all the flames of the of

"It is

barbarians;

Tacitus'

Teaching
reign and nates

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

271
An

his

miserable

death. Still, it may be

great

said that the present end of the

is worthy of most important: "You

mind

Tacitus'

theme and
such

not

are

born in

times

when

misleading as to what he thought it is advantageous to make the

firm

constancy."

with examples of

It is
cause

consistently through these for despair, Tacitus does not teach despair
remarkable

that

years when

there

was so much

or succumb to

the evils of the

petty tyrants who rule the world. Instead, these books present a kind of paean to the heroes who are capable of opposing tyranny "with voices beyond human
voices,
as

from

divinity."

some

Their
not

virtue

is

constancy:

bearing up in a danger
and suc

ous, hostile

world.

While he does

teach us to despise worldly honor

cess, Tacitus teaches that

virtue makes a man

independent

of these things and

worthy
cence sal
this

of

admiration, despite the human

opposition

aroused.25

The

mood with

which one

leaves Tacitus

is

so vulnerable

first reading is sadness at a world in which inno and justice so often betrayed. One fears that in the univer
on

Empire there is
Cornelius Tacitus is furnished

no escape and no respite.

a

But

on

reflection, that

sadness

is

express order

all

very good testimony; for though the Emperor Tacitus, his kinsman, had by the libraries in the world with his work, nevertheless one entire copy could
desired to abolish it for only five or six idle clauses that Works of Michael de Montaigne, trans. W. Hazlitt, 4 vols. (Boston:

not escape the curious search of those who

contrary to our Houghton Mifflin, 1887),

were

belief."

2:425.

25.

There is

little

work of

Tacitus

whose

theme

is the

same as

that we have

been
it

investigating
exemplary

in this

chapter.

It is the

biography of Agricola,
of

the father-in-law of Tacitus, who extended the Roman

dominion in the Province

Britain

few

years

later

under

Domitian,
did

and ruled

with

justice. Agricola
to understate his tain

was also a man of consummate moderation, who

own accomplishments and

all

that was

humanly possible

thereby flourish despite

several years after
Tacitus'

the jealousy of Domitian and cer to Rome to celebrate his

leading

courtiers.

The

major

lesson

of

the Agricola is that this moderation makes possible a pub

lic

career even under a tyrant.

Agricola died
(Agr.

he

returned

conquests. ardent and

Some

said

he

was poisoned

43.2).
of virtue.

beautiful

statement of

his

own

love

eulogy for his father-in-law is his most In it we see how integral a part of the com
"If there is any
place

pletion of the work of a virtuous man of

he

considered

his

own work:

for the

shades

the pious,

if,

as

is pleasing to the wise,

great souls are not extinguished with the

rest peacefully, and may you call us, your laments to the contemplation of your virtues, which it is not right [fas] to mourn or lament. womanly Rather let us honor you with admiration, and immortal praises, and if our nature is fit for it, with imi tation [of your life] This is true honor and this is piety of each most near relative. This would I teach your daughter and your wife, to so revere the memory of her father, of her husband, that she ponders

[Agricola,]

body, may you, household from infirm [infirmo] desire and

all

his deeds

and speeches within

herself,

and that

they
of

embrace

the form and

figure

of

his

mind more

than that of his body. [It is not] that I think that images

molded of marble or

bronze
mortal.

should

be forbid
of

den, but
mind

that as the

face

of men, so are the

images

the faces fragile and

The form

the

is

eternal

[forma

mentis aeterna], and though you are not able to

hold

and express

it

through a
of

foreign
of

material and art you are able

to express

it in

your own character.

What

we

have loved

Agricola,
nity
as and

what we

have admired,

remains and will remain

in the
be

minds of men

[animis], in

the eter

ages, in

reports of affairs

[history, fama
and unknown.
me]"

rerum];

for

oblivion

those who

are without

glory

Agricola

will

a survivor as

has buried many of the ancients, he has been described

work provides then the eternal recog (Agr. 46. 1-4)handed down to posterity [by through his power are they fated to nition deserved by the exalted characters who acted so well. Only him virtue is secured the immortality survive. He is the answer to the prayer of the good, for through it deserves. Tacitus gives the palm to the glory that comes to immortal works of the mind in prefer passage: "Triumphal honors ence to that which comes from the deed. Consider the following striking reputation [fama] with posterity, his of part moderate that a but is were decreed to Pomponius,

Tacitus'

among

whom

the glory of

his

poems

[carmina] is

(xu.28.2).

272

Interpretation

transcended their own

by

admiration

for those
who,
even

whose careers were not

fruitless through he

competence and

in death
one need

or

ruin,

remain exemplars of

roic strength and virtue. artifice save ornaments.

Tacitus teaches

to love virtue unadorned

by any

its

own

intrinsic beauty. If

be,

one

learns to do

without the

CHAPTER VI: PHILOSOPHY AND THE CAUSES OF

THE CORRUPTION OF ORATORY

An Alternative to Political Participation

experience and we see

From the
and

the fate of those exemplary political men,

and

Seneca

Thrasea,
for
a

the

risks

limits

of political action

in

time of wide

spread corruption and under a and

depraved

prince. men

time, especially

under

Seneca,

immortal glory, They in the Empire were less exposed to

each won

injustice. Yet both failed to

of

work a

fundamental

and

lasting change
at

in the

system

government,

and what good

reasonable

they did, they bought

the price of compromise

with evil. action

It is thus

to ask whether under such circumstances political

own sake.

is

always noble and

although

choiceworthy for its

Tacitus, too,
he did

must

have wondered,
question.

the Annates give no indication that

raise

this

Perhaps he did
own

not

think it noble to withdraw; yet

he himself did so,

after

his

fashion

and after a

long

and

honorable

public career.

Perhaps he thought it

dangerous to discuss this possibility because others think it ignoble to withdraw. Potential philosophers, philosopher-historians, and poets can best take care of
themselves if their reasoning is not exposed to the
choice and own
view of all men. men

For their
Tacitus'

may

imply

a critique of

the lives and goals of political

thus be even

more radical and

disquieting,

not

only to most men

good-

in any society in
will need which

time, but to

most men at all times

men whose

will

Tacitus

to survive and gain

immortality. A handle
Tacitus'

critique of political action

is dynamite

any prudent We have

writer will

with great care. work

not searched

in vain, however, for the

present

question

is

in fact handled

though

with

the caution proper to it

in his little work, the in this work, few

and

Dialogus de

oratoribus.

Tacitus

though he does not speak, some

cipal speakers seem

young man is of the most important

as a

words of a

of the prin

to have been directed above all to him. We

recounted was a significant event

wonder whether

the

discussion there
the

in his

education.

Because

it treats the
with

question of political participation or political withdrawal and there

question of

the best

most audacious work.

may suggest that the Dialogus is But this theme is treated by such respectable figures
we and

life,

Tacitus'

certainly not by Tacitus himself Dialogus may justly be called

in

such a circumspect

fashion that

the

Tacitus'

most

indirect

or cautious work.

Tacitus'

Teaching
begins

and the

Decline of Liberty
that is not linked

at

Rome

273
critique of

The

work

with a question

with

the radical
posed

politics until

the very end (Dial. 41). That question was

to Tacitus fre
commander1

quently

by

an eminent political

man, the

consul of 102

a.d., army

and provincial conventional no

governor, Fabius lustus

or

a man one would

hardly
The

suspect of un
question gives

longings

the

desire to

withdraw

from

politics.

hint

of a radical critique of

politics, but it does suggest

often asked

a possible critique of
"our"

the Principate.

Fabius Justus has

(Dial

Tacitus why

age

lacks

great

speakers,

when

the genius and glory of so many eminent orators flourished at

1.1).

Rome in widely

earlier centuries

He thereby

remarks a

decline in

what was

regarded as the noblest political art and even the noblest art

simply (Dial.
conversation

6.3,

7.2).

This, if true,

would seem to

be

a significant

blot

on

the Principate! In

stead of

he heard

giving his own when a "mere

chose

response to the

question, Tacitus reports a

youth."

Tacitus
swer

to

Justus'

question.

very carefully the time in which to suggest a comprehensive an His dialogue is set at a moment of political and moral

single-handedly provoked by a certain Curiatus Maternus, who in a corrupt despotism knowingly runs the risk of publicly reciting a tragedy on the theme of Cato, that is, of moral rectitude and resolute virtue. It is "said to have offended
crisis
powerful."

the minds of the

This Maternus

expected and

is

prepared

to accept.

More importantly, "Frequent

affair"

conversations were

held throughout the

as

City

con

cerning
obliged aroused

this

(Dial.

2.1).

In

certain

circles,

the

poet

knew,

one

felt

to take a stand for or

against

his

argument.

One is

reminded of

the furor

by

Solzhenitsyn's Harvard Commencement

address.
on

Perhaps

a more apt

comparison would

be

Berlin

performance of a

drama

Goethe

during by

Hitler's

Reich,
nus'

which

had

repudiated all

the

humanity
while

and

nobility that Goethe stood

was still astounded

for.

On the

day

after

the recitation, two

the

City

Mater

Tacitus'

audacity,
nied

by

their most ardent

in oratory paid Maternus a visit, accompa Tacitus. These two men, Manius Aper and disciple,
masters

Julius Secundus,
and

were respectable

men,

richly

endowed

by

nature with genius

which

highly

successful

in the forensic

and

judicial oratory

was, in the

peaceful reign of wealth.

Vespasian (Dial. 17.3), the

most certain road

to honor and
forum"

Tacitus

calls them

"the

most celebrated geniuses of our

(Dial.

2.1).

At this time in his life,

adored them.

while still a

"mere
of

youth"

(iuvenis admodum, Dial.

seems to share

1.2), he
the

At the

beginning
nobility

the

dialogue, Tacitus
But

conventional view of the

of orators.

even as an admirer of great

orators, it
the

seems

to

be

more their art and power of

speaking that he

admires

than

view of success on which

they

act.

listen assiduously to both [Aper and Secundus], not only in the law-courts, but even at home as well as in public; I zealously attended them with a marvelous de sire for studies and a certain youthful ardor, that I might thoroughly overhear even

used to

According to Syme,
he

"Fabius

occupies a

high

that

perhaps

occupied a post on

Trajan's

staff

He suggests among the marshals of Tacitus," in the Dacian campaign. "The Friend of
rank

Trajan."

Ten Studies in Tacitus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970),

pp.

113,

116.

274

Interpretation
disputations
and

their conversations and

2.1).

the secrets

of

their

private

discourse (Dial.

By

the end

of

the

dialogue, Tacitus
42.2).

will

have found
political

cause to

modify

or

limit this

youthful and unreserved admiration

for

oratory

and even

the political

way

of

life (Dial.

under

the

This, we think, even more than the decline of oratory Roman Principate, is the most comprehensive and deepest theme of the
the disparagement
of political most

Dialogus; (cf.

philosophy, Dial. 41). It is also the that he had learned and was moved,

oratory from the point of view of deeply hidden, for Tacitus indicates saying a word to betray what he important character of the Dia

without

learned. Tacitus is in

a certain sense

the most

logus,
of

and

its

secret

intent is to

present that most significant event

introduction to the true

the question
of what

situation of

human beings
noblest or

and the

first

emergence

in his life, his for him

way

of

life is

best. Accordingly, the dialogue

the
conventional political

conveys of

the most

radical and elaborate critique of

way

life. Yet that

political

life does

not

lack defenders.

2.

The First Speech of Aper:

the

Case for

Oratory

The three find Maternus in his study holding the Cato he had recited the day before. Secundus opens the conversation. It appears that his intent in coming is
to warn Maternus that he has run a grave risk and ought to think of the survival of

his

piece and even of

himself. He
(Agr.

advises

deleting the

frank

passages even

if that
are

means

making the piece worse. As Tacitus puts

it elsewhere, "The times

cruel and

hostile to

virtue"

.4);

thus, in

consideration of their own

safety,

the

friends

of virtue cannot speak out candidly.

Secundus

must

think Maternus is

a sort of simpleton to

have

so

forgotten himself (sui oblitus, Dial. 2.1) in think

was a question

ing
and

only

about

Cato. Perhaps this

for the young Tacitus:

some

are there

ever circumstances when one

reasonably loses

or suppresses the care of oneself

becomes entirely
speaks

consumed

by

the

concern

for

higher

nobler purpose?

To

what extent can prudence

limit

and govern such

devotion? Be that

as

it may,

Secundus

first:
of

Maternus, do

the conversations

the

that you should less love the effronteries

what gave material

ill-willed [malignorum] not frighten you at all, [offensas] of your Catol Or have you removed
that you
might send

to distorted

interpretation,

forth Cato, though

certainly

not

better,

nevertheless more secure?

(Dial. 3.2)

Maternus
the
"ill-

or

his Cato

or

both may be
we see

ruined

by

the "distorted

interpretation"

of

willed."

From
posed

an earlier

passage,

that

Secundus
them

and

Aper

are themselves ex

to attacks from

"many
the

who opine about

ill-will"

with

(maligne, Dial.
(cf. Agr.
1.1).

2.1).

Such is

perhaps

lot

of all successful and eminent men

But they

were orators capable of case

defending
is
more

themselves in the

courts.

Maternus is

only

poet, and anyway his

difficult. Secundus

advises

him that the

Tacitus'

Teaching

and the

Decline of Liberty
revise

at

Rome

275
to

only way to defend himself is to

speak against pretation was

his work, removing

what could seem

"distorted"

the times or the powerful. What

Secundus

calls

inter

probably the

precise point of

the tragedy. Maternus has no inten

tion of revising.

Offering
to

the

book, he

ventures to

say, "You

will read what

what you

Maternus has
heard"

owed

(Dial.

3.3).

In

himself, fact, so far

and you will recognize

just exactly

have

is he from

being terrified by
recitation"2

the opposition that

Maternus has already determined the subject of his out anything, Thyestes will say it in the next

next tragedy:

"If Cato has left

3.3).
question

(Dial.

At this
of

point

Aper intervenes

and

deepens the controversy from the

with

safety to a graver theme. He is not satisfied

and

the criticism made

by

Secun

dus

has

come with a more serious charge against

Maternus. For Maternus

had been
noble ment:

before he took up poetry. Aper accuses him of abandoning for a frivolous pursuit. He makes this charge not without resent oratory "You waste all your time, previously about Medea, now behold, on a Thy
an orator

estes!"

(Dial.

3.4).

These

"fables,"

are

fit for

children.

He is derisive

where was

Secundus
naive.

was

only

compassionate.

But Secundus merely thought Maternus

admits

According

to Aper he

is

perverse.

Maternus disputed this does

remains question

calm, though he

to Aper that
worried

if they had

not often
your

before, "I

would

have been

[perturbarer] by

severity"

(Dial.

4.1).

not choose

Although this controversy between them is old, Matemus to let the charge pass unanswered. For, while Secundus had

merely reminded him that he had enemies, Aper's charge threatens to lose him his friends. One pities a simpleton even for the misfortunes he has brought upon

himself, but
his
dus
error

one

blames

someone who

willfully

persists

in

being

perverse once

has been judge

pointed out

to him.

Maternus
as a

attempts and

to

use

the occasion

for his

advantage of

offering to defend his choice

the
utmost

by proposing Secun life before him. Though he

issue is
at stake

conducts

himself
and

with

urbanity, the most the debate

a noble

serious

here

for Maternus

for Aper

as well:

will concern

nothing less than the

retirement,
as

question of what

is the best life for

human being:

politics or

will es because, oratory or poetry. We say tablish, the ability to speak well is what is most needful for a successful politi cal career (Dial. 6.3). Considering its seriousness, and the commitment or pas sion with which it is defended at least on one side (see Dial. 1 1 1), this is not a politics rather

than oratory,

Aper

question upon which a prudent man would wish to

pronounce public

judgment.

Secundus is certainly
and so

reluctant

to

undertake

the role of judge Maternus has so

casually less cautious than Secundus, for

unexpectedly thrust upon him.

as we will
pronounced.3

Actually,

the

mature

Tacitus is

no

see, he

so contrives matters that the

judgment is
Secundus
2.

never

openly
the two discritique
Maternus'

having been silenced and forced to act as judge between

Roman Republicanism
than that.
give the preference to
was not the theme of

This

should show that

Cato.

is

deeper
3.

and more

unanswerable

Secundus hints that he is inclined to

poetry (Dial.

5.1-2).

276

Interpretation

putants, Aper
where

formally

proffers

his charge,

as

if in

a court.

He loves the

world

he

pursues

He is

concerned

his brilliant career, but he is concerned to justify that career. to show reasonably that what he loves is good, that it deserves to
to

be loved. ble.

According
those

him, oratory is
do
so ought

not

only

most advantageous

but

most no

Hence,

who can

to practice it. It is not merely a matter of

one's private

taste or inclination. It is incomprehensible to him that a sane and

capable man would spurn

his opportunity,

unless

and this

is why Maternus is

being

"charged"

he is morally depraved.
.

I will accuse a judge of this legal controversy [litis] has been found [arguam] Maternus himself alone before all, because, though he was born for manly and oratorical eloquence (by which one is able to acquire and watch over friendships,

Since

gain

partisans, and
which

make oneself

the

master of

provinces) he has

set aside that

study,

than

splendid

nothing in our City can be thought up more fruitful toward profit, or more for acquiring rank, or more noble for the fame of the City, or more illustrious
noted

toward

being

by
is

the entire Empire and all nations (Dial. 5.4).

The

assumption on which

the charge

is based is that it is

good

to seek

all

the

things which oratory

so adept at winning.

How Aper loves, how he

praises and

profit, high rank, the fame

even

of the

City,

one's own

fame in the

whole

Empire

among

all nations!

One

ought

to cultivate oratory if one can, since it is the

or completeness can procure

most certain road

to happiness. Happiness
and

for Aper
oneself.

consists

in
si

wealth, rank,

honor,

everything that one

the

for

For he

lently

drops the

obligation to

City

in his

elaboration.
of

The first

part of

the speech enumerating the benefits

oratory (Dial.

5.5-

8.4) has four

sures, among

sections, devoted first to self-defense, secondly, to the noble plea

which

the chief is

success, meaning political

most

honor, thirdly, influence, but above

makes

to

fame,

and

fourthly
The first

to worldly
the

all,

wealth.

We

will mention

important

points

Aper

in his

praise of oratory. ought to

section

is

based
is

on an axiom:

"All

our counsels and

life"

deeds

be directed toward

what

useful

[utilitatem] for

(Dial.

5.5).

What is

most useful and most neces

guise of

sary is self-defense, for Aper understands civic life as a war carried on under the law and in the courts; whether this is always and everywhere true or just
of the

especially true
zens out of
now a

Empire,
or

we

leave to Maternus. In the decline

of

morals,
citi

some men came

to use the courts to

bring

false

charges against their

fellow

baseness

interest. Aper does

not elaborate

the theme that life is

deadly

competition whose major

instrument is
tend to

courtroom speech,

for this

is

a praise of

oratory, and such a

view would

deprecate it. Aper is trying

useful oratory is for is "himself secure and

to maintain that it is the noblest art.

In his

development, Aper begins by describing how

from their
enemies while the orator
as though with a certain perpetual means at

defending friends
fortified,
who

influence

and power

(Dial.

5.5).

Perhaps Aper

that fear of the speaker's ability keeps his enemies and those

envy him

bay. But before he

self-defense

finishes, Aper

admits

that the

ultimate ad

vantage of

oratory is

in

court.

Tacitus'

Teaching
For
one accused and which you are able to

and

the

Decline of Liberty
is
at once a

at

Rome

277

in danger, defend

eloquence

fortress

and a weapon with

yourself as well as

attack,

whether

in

law-court,

or

in

the

Senate,

or

before the First Citizen (Dial.

a

5.6).

Eloquence is then
man own

necessary

element

in the

equipment of a successful political even

in

a corrupt world where enemies and

mention of

dangers abound,

fellow-citizens. The

"the
to

envious"

suggests that
danger."

among it may be

one's espe

cially In the
sure

one's success which exposes one

second section of

the speech, Aper praises oratory for the noble

plea

that accompanies it. This section enumerates various "noble

which arise

pleasure

(honestas voluptates)
power,

from

possession

of such various

goods as

wealth,

honor,

and

experiencing

one's own genius one's

in

types of speaking,
chief of

both in itself

and

these pleasures

in its ability to hold is honor.

listeners spellbound; but the

For

what

is

sweeter

[dulcius] for
men?

free

and

naturally

superior

[ingenuo]
thronged

mind, and one

with a gather

born for

noble

pleasures, than to see his house always full

and

ing

of

the

most

brilliant

(Dial.

6.2)
well-

Aper is referring to the

Rome for friends, dependents (clients), wishers, flatterers, and those who thought they might need his services, to pay court to a successful orator. What we find most striking in his way of praising is
custom at

that Aper combines the noble and the pleasant as the goals
are

of

life. The best

minds

"born for

pleasures."

noble

Aper

seems

to be a sophisticated
end of

gentleman of

sorts, for

whom pleasure and not virtue

"noble"

is the

life. Yet he is In his list

not a vulgar

hedonist. He
It

speaks of

pleasures rather than of the pleasures of the not a philosopher.

body.

goes without

sures,

learning
are

saying that Aper is or progress in learning do

of other men.

of the noble plea

of

not appear.

The "noble

pleasures"

Aper
and

emphatically

political pleasures.

They

consist above all

in the

praise

dependency

Is there any
aged men

pleasure

from

enormous wealth and great power so great as

to see old and

who are sustained

by

the favor

of

the entire world, and who possess the

not

highest

abundance of all things

what a retinue of

confessing that they do

citizens

have that

which

is best?

Behold,
(Dial.

Roman

accompany his [the orator's]

promenades!

6.3-4)
to Aper
or
enormous wealth and great power are good

According
procure own

insofar

as

they
of

honor

influence

and

thereby

a certain

kind

of pleasure.

Aper loves his

life best, for it

superiority

procures

the

greatest

pleasure, which

is the
the

public

display

one's

over

the

otherwise most eminent men of

City,

nay,

of the

world.

By
4.

understanding the

greatest advantage of

oratory

as a noble
of

pleasure, Aper

obfuscates

its less than

admirable origin the

in the harsh necessity

lot
of the

defense

against
to his
opina-

That Aper's
Dial.

assessment of

endangered

successful political man applies

own case and that of

rentur,"

Secundus precisely

can

be

seen

from the introduction ("Maligne

plerique

2.1).

278 rivals

Interpretation
Does Aper deceive himself with
of a all

and enemies.

his

splendid words about

the "noble

pleasures"

"freeborn

mind"?

He

seems now

to forget what he

had

told us in the

first
legal

section on

the utility of oratory. These splendid promenades of to lose their fortunes or their

the orator are attended

by

men who are afraid

lives

in

a corrupt

action.

The

orator

is delighted

by

their seeming splendor

who possess the

"sustained

by

the favor of the entire world, and

things"

[those]

highest

abundance of all

though

they have

not come

to him in their splendor

as

but because they are needy and exposed. He is delighted admired him when really they are hoping to use him.
Aper is impressed he is
an

if they spontaneously

by

these public testimonials to oratory's eminence

because

does

emphatically say he here distinguish sufficiently between flattery toward a benefactor and admiration. But that would be severe indeed. For who does not like to be loved?
political man. we wished
would not

If

to be severe', we

And it

seems to

Aper that he is loved

by

his following. He is, for the

which we call

most

part,
and

somehow

oblivious

to the element of illusion intrinsic to this

"honor"

pleasure5

therefore takes pleasure in this

self-interest.

flattery
of

or calculation of

Aper

concludes this section with a

lovely

description

the secret

"joys"

(gaudia)

that accompany the

various

kinds

of speeches

long-premeditated,

re

cently written,
persuading

or extemporaneous.

He

recognizes that the pleasure of

which

others

is

not so good as
of

that

is

self-sufficient and

moving or comes from known

the orator's admiration

his

own power.

He

prefers the

"secret

joys"

only 6.5). But Aper

ion. Yet this is The third

to the orator to the ones which even nonspeakers may conjecture (Dial.
can never
what

be entirely self-sufficient, for he is dependent on opin he desires and this is the criterion of pleasures he praises.
peak of

section

is surely the

the speech. There Aper claims that suc

cess as an orator

is

almost transpolitical and approaches genuine self-sufficiency.

The

orator gains

the orator's own

given of

immortal glory, which Aper understands to be due entirely to ability. He denies that this glory is a form of flattery or that it is

benefactor. The glory won by a good orator is the recognition something intrinsically noble, spontaneously accorded by his admiring fel lows and those who are disinterested, if only they are upright and serious. only to
one's

Then [when I
and

plead a case

well] I

seem

to ascend above tribunates, and praetorships,

consulates; then I seem to have what does not arise in another, nor is given will,
nor comes with of

by

[legal]

pared with

the glory

favor. What? The fame and praise of what art can be com orators? Are they not famous, not only in the City among the
the young men
and

political men

[negotiosos] but even among

an upright

the adolescents, at least

those who
selves?

have

innate

character

[recta indoles]

and good

hope

of them

(Dial. 7.2-3)
the speech Aper pays a silent compliment to Tacitus
wish

At the

peak of

by

claiming
most
sig-

that the well-endowed youth who

5.

to emulate the orators are the

is the basis
of

In Dial.

6.2, he

tries to

deny that neediness

in his

the honor. Though aware of a

prob

lem, he

tends to suppress

his

awareness

overall

judgment

of oratory.

Tacitus'

Teaching
nificant witnesses

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

279

to the seriousness of oratory. Here Aper marks, as a special

confirmation of

the orator's right choice of

life,

the approval of those who have

account of

an upright nature or character

(recta indoles).

Tacitus'

his

own

devo

tion to

Aper

and

Secundus

would seem to confirm shared all and

this claim (Dial. 2.1). One

nonetheless

doubts that Tacitus

pursuit of

their reasons.

Whether the
sufficient proved

glory

the admiration of noble political men is ever

a

to

free the

orator and

by

his fellows

completely from their opinions is in

dependence
in his

upon

the standards ap
of

questionable.

The limits

his

self-

sufficiency

are nowhere so much

evidence as

view of what constitutes

success, the theme of the fourth

more sinister orator

section of

the speech. These limitations become

which the

in

a corrupt

defers,

are

society where the opinions of most men, to depraved and fail to restrain his baser appetites.
most certain route to understood
wealth.

Oratory
speech,
erful come cellus

is the is

success

and, above all,

worldly success. In this section of the influence and intimacy with the pow primarily Aper alleges the case of two orators who have be
as

surpassingly influential and wealthy. Through oratory alone Eprius Mar and Vibius Crispus have overcome their abjectly poor origins and risen
world:

high in the
Without
means,

recommendation of

neither

outstanding in

been the

most powerful men

[influential] relatives, without substantial established for many years now, these have character [moribus] of the City, and, while they chose to be, chief men of the
.

forum;
ence

now, as first in the

friendship

of

and undertake all

things,

and are cultivated

Caesar [Vespasian], they bring every by the First Citizen with a certain

action rever

(Dial. 8.3). power,

Along
We

with

they

acquire great wealth:

see their

houses full

of

honors

and ornaments and wealth, who

causes and oratorical

from first

adoles

cence

have devoted themselves to forensic

study (Dial. 8.4).

We

cannot

deny

that to a certain type of

man

the power and wealth so praised

by
his

Aper

are most attractive.

For them, he has

a remark

made

his

case.

But in the

course of

argument

case
ter."

is

he has let slip Aper admits that "Neither [of these men] is outstanding in charac Indeed, the reader may remember Eprius Marcellus to have been in the
closed.
of

that could induce us to wonder whether the

forefront
Aper's

the accusers who

procured

the downfall of Paetus Thrasea (xvi.22).

remark reminds us that

the

most profitable and

the depraved
virtuous

courts of that age was

to

use

"enemies"

by

presenting them as length the

opportunistic

of

discussed So

at some

oratory to the First Citizen. We have already careers of the delators in Chapter III.
these oratorical

likely road to influence in destroy the wealthy or the

powerful

is the

attraction of

the

prizes of

battles to Aper that

conveys

he is willing
6. The

to disregard their
the basis of
which

potential

for

injustice.6

Tacitus

this

sinis-

view on

Aper

acts seems not unlike that stated

Melian dialogue. The implications

of this view

have been

by the Athenians in the beautifully stated by my teacher, Professor

good, is a kind of necessity

Christopher Bruell: "Such [soundly

calculated]

interest,

or the

it can be

280
ter

Interpretation
of

inclination
In the

Aper silently through his division

of the

choice of

Marcellus

as

his

model of

success.

second main

speech, Aper

completes

his

argument

in fa

vor of

the oratorical

life

by denigrating
The

poetry from the

or

point of view of

its

inep

titude for acquiring rank, providing a

or

livelihood,
Aper's

procuring the honor

on

poet pleasure

lasting

honor (Dial.

9.1).

core of

objection

to poetry is that it is the grand scale

useless.

This is why it is

not rewarded orators who

by

success and
others:

on which

they

come

to the
or

benefit

"What

good

is it to

anyone

if your Agamemnon

Jason

eloquently?"

speaks

(Dial. 9.2)

According

to

Aper,

the noble and the good or

tion of the

useful are

united, and

the apparently universal recogni

gerous world.

nobility of oratory is based above all on its profound utility in a dan Those who praise and pay the orators expect to be defended by is
more effective than

them.

Oratory
9.2).

(Dial.
cause asks

Poetry, like
poet],
when

the

other

poetry when it comes to fine arts, appeals to an idle

"obligating"

others

interest,

and

be

it is
a

separated

from

our needs seen

it

cannot once

[for

he has

him

be really engaging: "If someone he goes away and is satisfied as

10.2).

though he had
man would

statue"

seen some picture or need

(Dial.

Presumably
him
Philistine
as

this same

feel the

to honor the orator in an attempt to gain

as a

friend.
allows and

We

must

hasten to
He

add that

Aper may

not

be

such a

he

himself to

appear.

acknowledges that

poetry is
and

a type of

eloquence,
10.4).

he its

thinks all the parts of eloquence are "sacred

cannot
partial

venerable"

(Dial.

Yet

one

but feel that the

main characteristic of what

or

is

sacred and venerable

transcendence of petty

praise of eloquence.

We

are

is lacking in Aper's merely human purposes inclined to believe that he uses these words rather

loosely,
of

since no openness to the grounds of

truly

venerable

beauty
(Dial.

the

order

the cosmos or the

uses

being

of

the gods

is

even

remotely

suggested

in Aper's
to de

discourse. He
For him the

the

word

splendidissimus, "most

brilliant"

6.2),

scribe successful

(i.e. rich

and

influential)

men.

noble or

beautiful is identical

with what

is

useful on a grand scale.

Still, he

would not

be

satisfied with this

debunking
is

explanation.

It is

characteris

tic of Aper to

be

most concerned with what

useful or

necessary

and at

the

same

time to adorn

or

idealize it. He This is

wants

to believe he is devoted to something

higher than
his
ble."

mere utility.

most apparent

from the disproportion between

it is "sacred
and venera

utilitarian praise of

oratory

and

his

conclusion that

adequately prepares or supports this extravagant con clusion. Aper, the realist, believes in an artificial world based on the fundamental illusion that his profession is grander or more noble than he can prove.
A life based squarely
noble which maintains
on an can

Nothing in the

speech

illusion is
called

a precarious

life. The belief

certain gifted

about

the

it

be

into doubt

by

individuals

overridden,

one can make

mistakes, but
are

the dialogue also

indicates,
or

there any

essary desire of Athenian

to

have it

directing our

not without its exacting the consequences of them. Nor, as irremovable barriers standing between the good and our nec desire for the good away from its object. View
"Thucydides'

Imperialism,"

American Political Science Review 68 (March

1974): 16.

Tacitus'

Teaching
who

and the

Decline of Liberty
and

at

Rome

281

have tasted its joys

and

benefits

knowingly reject it.

This is why Aper is

seriously Maternus, for Maternus has indeed turned his on the of back life Aper believes to be best. Aper is sustained in his belief by way the accord of most men. If Maternus fails to return to the oratorical life, he can
so

concerned to refute

expect

that

they

will all

feel threatened
can

and

angered, for Aper's defense

remains

open

to

doubt

and

doubt

reason

for Maternus to be

careful

easily provoke hostility. There is then a sufficient in presenting his case. Of this reason Aper is

perhaps unaware.

But Aper
more careful. retirement on

concludes

his

speech

by

reminding Maternus that he

ought to

be

Aper

suspects

that Maternus may attempt to excuse himself for his

of security and quiet. But if this is Cato? As he says, "You bring upon your more powerful

the ground that he prefers a life

choose to write about

so, why does he ators!] Let it be

age]'

self a more powerful adversary. enough

[Caesar

than the courtroom or

for

us

to uphold private controversies and those of our the question

own goes

(Dial.

10.7-8).

Actually,

is is

not without

force, but Aper

public

too far

in

banishing lofty
The

independent

virtue not

only from
and

discourse
a corrupt and

but from his heart. He identifies

political order. unprofitable

virtue with what

successful even

in

question of virtue

is forbidden

hence dangerous

in the only way Aper is willing to calculate profit. It is not a mark in his favor that he therefore refuses to grant that it is noble. Aper, the political
man, is radically dependent
on

That

such

is

not of

the

lot

of

prevailing opinion. all men but only of men

who chooses

with

his

nature we will see now

from the reply

reasons,

Maternus,

to

reject oratory.

We

turn to his
are

which are of special

importance in Aper

since

they indicate that there

standards of more

limits

to the dependence of the gifted individual on the

which are

society, limits

the

more

interesting
to

as

we

have the

typical case of a man

who

looks

not so much

himself,

the gods,

or nature as

to successful and pow

erful men

for his justification,

disregarding

their depravity.
"Poetry"

3.

The First Speech of Maternus: the Case for

not

Maternus is
ous

only

dramatic poet, he is

also a competent actor: to the seri

charge, gravely

presented

by
of

Aper, he
his

responds

gaily

and with a smile

(Dial.

1 1. 1).

His

speech

in defense

his

retirement

reserved.

Maternus does
and

not present

entire

from oratory is playful. It is also case; he only hints at his deepest

concerns,

he

barely

alludes

to the theme

of

Cato,

the

moral critique of

those

who owe their success and reflection on

influence to

wickedness.

We

understand

this as a
and

Aper. Aper's

speech

tastes. Where Maternus

most

has clearly indicated his preferences argue entirely disagrees, he chooses not to
of

his

and run

the potentially dangerous risk

presses the ground of

Aper's
7.

point of view as

further antagonizing Aper. Instead, he sup their deepest disagreement and presents himself from fool.7 He harmless, unworldly, and even something of a
of a man

Machiavelli treats the dilemma

to take up

like Maternus in his Discorsi. Such Machiavelli,

ought

a man, who

does

not wish

arms and overthrow

his ruler, according to

to

flatter him

with-

282
pretends passed. cannot

Interpretation
to orient himself

by

the golden age, though he knows

it has

long

since
one

To Aper this

must seem

folly, but

perhaps

it

mitigates

his anger, for

patently by At the outset, Maternus indicates that he could have indicted the that, in abstaining from a critique of poetry as elaborate as his praise
someone so
naive.

feel threatened

orators
of

but

oratory,
wonder

Aper has "made

whether,
to make

art"

[him]

mild

by

a certain

(Dial.

n.l).

We then
art"

learning from Aper,

his
experienced

Maternus

will also use a

"certain

whose end

is

own accusers mild.

Maternus has

the

pleasures of oratorical success

but

claims

that

the recitation of tragedies is

episode

what made when

him famous. He

alludes

to a significant

in the

reign of

Nero

he "broke the
to
profane

power"

of

Vatinius

"a dishon

orable power which went so

[studiorum]"

far

as

the sanctuaries of the

[liberal]
of

arts

(Dial.

1 1.2).

It is

not unimportant

that the only political act he

mentions resembles

the

recitation of

his Cato. It

was a successful

defense
The

the

liberal
of

arts against a

depraved Court favorite in

to any explicit

a previous reign.

remainder
of

his

speech comes no closer

explanation or

defense his

his

mo

tives in reciting the Cato. We are left to

whether

wonder what

those motives

were and

they

were wise

in light

of

the

well-defended pursuits of

retirement.

In

response

to Aper's charge, Maternus has indicated that he too can be tough

and combative after a weapon.

his

own

fashion, using poetry

himself
appear.

rather

than forensic oratory as

It

was a

tragedy
gained

that ruined Vatinius! Maternus is not as unworldly as

make

he
He

will

subsequently try to

He is brave,
through

maybe even rash.

admits to

having

"reputation This is

name"

and a

more

than through

oratory.

a partial refutation of

his dramatic poetry Aper's claim that the

for"

fame

and praise of oratory is But Maternus hastens to add that he does

"incomparable"

(Dial.

17.2).

not

"ardently long

(concupisco,

Dial. 12.3) the followers and thronged promenades of the successful orator. Though he does not venture to say it, we suspect that Maternus remains unim pressed with these testimonials because he recognizes that they do not come from
a sense of spontaneous admiration

but

a calculation of self-interest.

he does
who

not need

them. Maternus resembles the great-souled

man of

In any case, Aristotle

is

unimpressed with

honor, "for

even

honor is

not

worthy

of perfect vir

tue."8

remark

Maternus

makes

immorality
tions in his

and

degradation

required

in passing in a subsequent section indicates that the to flourish at Court are important considera
politics:

decision to

retire

from

The middle way is too dangerous and therefore impossible: "It is not enough [for an outstanding man] to say, T do not care for anything, I desire neither honors nor advantages, I merely wish to live For these excuses are heard and not accepted; nor can men quietly and without who have qualities choose to remain thus. For though they truly choose to do so, and without any am bition, because it is not believed of them that they wish to remain, they are not allowed to remain by
out reservation.
conflict!'

others.

It is necessary then to play the

and

madman

like Brutus,

and one plays

the madman very

well

by

praising, saying, seeing,

corsi, 111.2).

doing

things against your mind to be complaisant to the

prince"

(Dis

8.

Aristotle, Eth. Nic.

112439-10.

Tacitus'

Teaching
and

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

283
do they have in Though
. .

For this Crispus

their

Marcellus

to whose examples you call me, what

fortune that is to be desired? That they fear or that they are feared? bound with flattery, that they neither seem sufficiently servile to the rulers
sufficiently free to
us?

nor

(Dial. 13.4)

Maternus is

a man whose conception of also

dignity

will not permit others.

flattery. He is
with and

free

of

the desire to frighten or harm

of the

him to stoop to He can dispense

wealth

these

means

because he is free

desire for the worldly honor,

to be

influence

others

long

for.
also claims no

For the
himself

same

reason, Maternus

free

of

the need to defend

assumes

against

rivals. Since he has

desire to harm others, he

they

will not want

to harm him:

For the

by

security of anyone whomsoever is guarded better by innocence than I do not fear that I shall ever make speeches in the Senate unless in the eloquence;
rank and

cause of another

(Dial.

1 1

.4).

Maternus'

principle makes more sense

case.

in

general

than it does in

his

particular

He

is,

after

all,

nocent"

only if
of

we

under a necessity of defending himself at present and is "in forget the implications of his repudiation of the political life, and such activities as
particular

the

tragedy
called

Cato,

brought down Vatinius. Maternus brand

of political

hopes to be

succeed

by concealing his
only insofar

action,

which can

"innocent"

as

and even ruin men who are enemies of virtue and education. endangered political

it is nonpartisan; for he is willing to ridicule He is therefore more

admit. own

by

their enmity than he is willing to

of

He here deprecates the

boldness. His
attack on not

impact

powerful and right

poetry in order to conceal his base men is impressive, but one wonders
of

whether

Secundus is

in warning him not to publish it. The next section substitutes for a statement
withdraw

the political principles that have

induced Maternus to

from the

oratorical and

life. To throw Aper

"poetical"

off

the

"success"

track and to disguise the

critique of

oratory

implicit in his

with

drawal,

Maternus

gives an exuberant and somewhat

presentation of

between poetry and innocence. He seeks, if even only for a time, to make his interlocutors gentle by removing them from their earnest quest for rank, wealth, and honors. He speaks of the innocence of the men of the
the indissoluble
alliance

golden

age,

and of

the benevolent

gods:

The

use of this profitable and

as you were

blood-thirsty
Aper,

eloquence

is

recent and

born from

wicked

morals, and,

saying,

discovered in
manner

place of a weapon.

But really,

that

happy
of

and

that

orators and crimes,

I may speak in our but abounded in poets

and who

golden

age, was unprovided with

et vatibus], who perpetrated

and prophets

[poetis

sang

deeds

well

done,

did

not

defend

what was

badly

(Dial.

12.2-3).

The

poet-prophets

were close

to the gods "whose

responses

they

were said

to

have brought forth

(Dial.

and at whose

banquets they

were said

to have been

prese

12.4). Now that the times have become wicked,

it is only

by

retreating

284

Interpretation
political world

from the
ness of

that one

can recapture room

the

innocence,
the
still

purity, and sacred

that old poetry. There is

Maternus'

for

veneration of

transcendent, how
not account

ever

understood, in
of

outlook. was

But this

does

for the

kind

poetry that Maternus

to gain

his

proposed alliance

attempt

Could eminently between poetry and the golden age be a partially rhetorical respectability for a pursuit that is not susceptible of being ex
writing,
which was

political.

plained or

defended before is from

men such as

Aper? fundamental illusion. He primarily

the same time wishes to
made

We

recall

that Aper's life is based

useful

upon a

seeks what see

a narrow point of view and at

his life

as noble or somehow splendid and august.

Also, because Aper

no effort to seek what

the opinions
principles of

is truly noble, he was reduced to taking his guidance from of his society. Aper would not like to hear this, so Maternus invokes

innocence and purity without really showing how they apply to life in the Empire. That they do, we know from his Cato and his effort to destroy Vatinius.
Maternus
now

indicates, in

votes

his

retirement.

properly He does this in the

in passing Vergil's most

subdued

manner, to what end he de

context of a praise of

Vergil,

whose

honor is
13. 1
-2).

at

least

as great as that of the greatest political orators quotes of a

Curiously, he

line from Book II

of

(Dial. 12.6; the Georgica.

This line is the life

line
meant

beginning

complete statement of what the poetic

for him. We believe that the

passage

from Vergil that

opens with

this

supplies the explanation of the purpose of poetic retirement that was still

missing and that could not adequately be presented to a man of Aper's preju dices. At this point we remember that the young Tacitus was present at the con
versation.

Perhaps for his

sake

Maternus

ventured

to hint

at

the forbidden pursuit

to

which

he devoted his life.

"sweet"

Vergil invokes the Muses

who are

and

for

whom

he is "struck is

with an

immense
cred

love."

The

pursuit over which the

Muses

preside

venerable or sa

somehow
is'

loftier than the human

to

and

it

seems natural

to love it. That it

is

natural

attested

by

the

joy

it brings:
sweet

Firstly, in truth,
sacred

above all,

may the

[dukes] Muses

accept me,

[Muses]

whose

[objects]

I carry,

struck with an

immense love [ingenti

amore].9

These

sweet

Muses

preside over

philosophy, for
a rational

they

show

the

"causes"10

of

cosmology is the transhuman or di vine pursuit which is, to natural and pleasant. He retires from Vergil, according the pursuits and ambitions of the political life to devote himself to answering the questions to which he is led the love of the truth by his "immense
quest
love"

natural phenomena.

The

for

about the whole of which man

is but

a part.

May they
9. 10.

[the

Muses]

show me

the ways of heaven and the stars and the toils

on

of

the

moon; from

what sources

[unde] shaking [comes]

the

lands, by

what

force [qua vi]

Vergil, Georgica, Ibid., 11.490.

11.475-76.

Tacitus'

Teaching
swell,

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

285

the

high

seas

having burst forth from

suns
nights."

their rocky shores, and subside back into

or what

themselves; why only the winter delay obstructs the late [winter]

hasten to bathe themselves in the ocean,

Vergil
ena.

is, "firstly
appears

all,"

and above
manner

eager

to

know the

causes of natural phenom

are posed

It

from the

in

which

the questions
qua

that he is open

to the possibility that these causes are subhuman:

Lucretius'

vi,

"by
in

what

force"? These
order of

questions remind us of

great

poem,

which attributes

the

the

universe, such as

However,
all
an

no answer

it is, to the is human

chance movements of atoms

an

indifferent

void.

suggested.12

If anything, Vergil any

of

seems to

despair

of

the possibility that the

reason can answer

these questions, and above

ordered

question of greatest moment

to men: is the universe a cosmos

by

benevolent being? Vergil's doubts concerning the power of to find a satisfactory answer to this question compel him to return philosophy from the questions about the heavens to what is first for men. He makes a new
intelligent
and start by adverting to the pleasures afforded by a natural world that does not seem hostile to man as long as he does not spoil his enjoyment of it by an extravagant

desire for
If the

political glory:

cold

blood

about

my heart
me and

obstructs me
streams

may the country please

would

the

flowing

from approaching these parts of nature, in the valleys; without glory I

love the

rivers and

forests."

The ble to
veals

most sensible course of action would

then

be to

remain as close as possi

nature and

live in

accordance with

it. A

closer

look

at this alternative re
must come

that,

if the guidance that

one needs cannot come

from reason, it

from the

gods of

the tradition. Either indifferent

natural necessities or eternal and

These are for Vergil the only two superhuman man-loving sources of direction for human life: nature or the gods. Both of them teach men to overcome the fear of death and avoid an overly high estimation of the political
gods rule nature.

life

and

its

ambitions:

He [would be] happy [felix] who was able to know the causes of things and who trod Acheron! That one underfoot all fears and inexorable fate and the noise of greedy Pan and old Silvathe knew who also gods, country [would be] fortunate [fortunatus]
nus and the

Nymph

sisters.
. .

The fasces Roman

of the people

do

not move

him [the
must

latter]

nor

the purple
ther does

of

kings

nor

politics

[res],

nor

kingdoms that
possessor.14

perish; nei

he grieve, pitying
man would

the poor man, nor

envy the

The happiest
quiet

thus

be the

wise man who can explain all

political

things and

his own concerns about death or immortal ficient knowledge. But Vergil hints at the fact that
and perhaps everyone else.
H.477-82.
cosmique

glory

through all-suf

this may be an impossible task

for him
II.
12. 13.

If so, the

simple

life

of

farmers

who are pious

Ibid.,

Cf. Pierre Boyance, "Le Sens Vergil, Georgica, 11.483-85.

de

Virgile,"

Revue des

etudes

latines

32(l954):235.

14.

Ibid.,

11.490-99.

286

Interpretation
to the country
gods15

is the only alternative worth considering. In the even though he does not argue the point, deprecates Vergil politics, Georgica, would be dangerous. To hold the merely human in ven to do so because possibly
and close

eration,
reason

as

Aper does, is
which a man

an

illusion,
be

and awareness of

this fact

is the
If

supreme

for

"struck

with an

immense

love"

of

the truth would

piety.

disre

gard

the

political

life but
the

might whole

attracted

to a life of

an adequate

philosophic account of

is beyond human reach, the simple cult of the gods appears to be the only way to preserve an honest stance toward the superhu man, which the political man forgets in his consuming preoccupation with his
own advancement or

the

advancement of

human institutions

such as

the

Roman
"neither Vergil

Principate. Like the

wise

man, the

pious man

is indifferent to

riches:

does he grieve, pitying the poor man, nor does he envy the conceives of the life of simple piety, no less than the life of inquiry,
mentally
pleasant

possessor."

as a

funda

life. His

preference

sharing the Epicurean the political life. To

understand

critique

for the country of the love of honor that

seems

to result

from his

characterizes

the city and

this

better,

one would

have to

compare

the Georgica as

whole with

the Aeneis as a
evidence of a
Plato.16

whole.

In

our sketch of

Vergil's deeper concerns,

we

have found

basic

alternative

reminiscent of speaks

Interestingly
the
other

enough,

between philosophy and piety that is Donatus, Vergil's biographer, who

preferred

for the

ancient tradition of all

in this regard, held that Vergil

sects.17

Plato's

philosophy to that

He

also

tells us

that,

after

finishing the
his life to the

Aeneis, Vergil
study of As the

planned

to go to Athens and

devote the

remainder of

philosophy.18

passage

just

quoted

from Vergil
and

makes

clear, there is a higher dimen

open

sion of experience and

inquiry,

Maternus is

to it.

Only

in the light

of

15.
16.

Cf. ibid., 11.473. Perhaps the most thoughtful interpreter

of

of

Plato in

our age

has the

following comment on the

Platonic understanding
mate

the limits of reason: "However much the comprehensive visions which ani

the various societies may

do

not

merely

those visions, the

of the whole. Therefore, they differ, they all are visions of the same differ, but contradict, one another. This very fact forces man to realize that each of taken by itself, is merely an opinion about the whole or an inadequate articulation of

fundamental

awareness of

the

whole and

thus points beyond itself toward an adequate

articula

tion. There is

guaranty that the quest for adequate articulation will ever lead beyond an under standing of the fundamental alternatives or that philosophy will ever legitimately go beyond the stage of discussion or disputation and will ever reach the stage of decision. The unflnishable character of
no

the quest

for

adequate articulation of the whole

does

not entitle

one,

however,

to limit philosophy to

the understanding of a part, however important.

the

whole.

In

particular, such

interpretation

of

For the meaning of a part depends on the meaning of a part as is based on fundamental experiences alone,
is ultimately
not superior to other

without recourse to

hypothetical

assumptions about the whole,

in

frankly based on such hypothetical Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953),
terpretations of that
part which are

assumptions."

Leo Strauss,

pp.

125-26.

soul

especially about the in his books, he himself was nevertheless an Academic: for he placed the thoughts [sententias] of Plato above all Tiberius Claudius Donatus, "Vita P. Virgilii xix, Vergil, Opera,
17.
seems

"Although he

to

have

placed

the opinions

of various philosophers

others."

Maronis,"

ed.

Christopher Heyne (Leipzig: Hahn, 1830;

18.

reprint

ed., Hildesheim:

Georg Olms,

1968).

Ibid.,

xm.

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
love"

287
that leads to it

the concern with nature and the gods and the

could

"immense
or

by paltry merely human. Maternus approaches a self-sufficiency that Aper lacks. In a very subdued manner, Tacitus has recorded perhaps the single most important event of his life: his introduction
seem

the political life praised

Aper

to the taste of a

man of

the
a

highest excellence

and

his

becoming aware of the vast

pale.

horizon
political

of such a

man,

horizon

within which

the pursuits of more conventional

men, however worthy

this

of

admiration, grow somewhat

Scipio"

The
goals

effect of akin

revelation on an exclusive concern with

purely

political

is

to that of the

famous "dream his

of

at

the end of Cicero's De

theme of phi
con

republica, except that

Tacitus

was more cautious work.

in

broaching the

losophy
with

for fear

of

discrediting

As

one sees

from that work, his

replaced

cern with ultimate cosmological questions never

simply educating men to a nobility that encompasses the political while remaining open to its ultimate ground. We do not forget that concern with these questions did not prevent him from writing his
the human questions, or
with
Maternus'

his

concern

Cato. Nor is Vergil's

parent

own

love

of

philosophy

unconnected with
themes.19

the splendor

ap

in his grasp

of vast

human

and political

4.

The Second Speech of Aper and Messalla's Response: the New Style and the Decline of Oratory

Before Secundus drawal from

politics

can pronounce

judgment
"poetry,"

on

the

legitimacy

of

any

with

for the

sake of

Vipstanus Messalla,

a capable

speaker and eminent

commander, breaks in on the

assembled company.

In the

for them to inves ensuing conversation, he introduces a new theme contempt for the type feels orators and ancient the admires tigate. Messalla only least two of at shared taste is His of eloquence that prevails in his own time. by
course of the

the others, Maternus the

mature

and

Secundus. We

recall

that at the outset of the Dialogus

Tacitus had

promised

theme

by recounting this
Tacitus
were

memorable conversation

his friend, Fabius Justus, to investigate this from his youth. Fabius and the
that oratory was

mature
and

both

of

the

opinion

in

a state of

decline,
endure

this decline is

hardly

doubted in the dialogue. Yet Aper,

whom

Messalla be

lieves to

agree with them

secretly (Dial. 24.2), patriotically

unheard and undefended,

refuses

"to

our age to

be

condemned,
16.4).

by

this conspiracy of yours,

[Messalla]"

(Dial.

By

bles

a critique that might not

Tacitus again dissem allowing Aper to speak first, win approval in high quarters or with his contented

and respectable

contemporaries.

The

core of the matter raised

by

Messalla is the

question of whether

the manly
of

such oratory that flourished with more the to superior the Roman Republic was

and vigorous

grand scope artful

in the last century

but

also more confined

ora-

19.

This

can

be

seen above all

what

from the Aeneis,

was

which

is

conceived

essentially

as a theodicee;

"Tell me,

Muse,

the causes,

divinity

insulted,

what

did the

queen of gods resent that she

compelled a man distinguished

such

labors. Is there

such anger

for piety [Aeneas], to suffer so many misfortunes Vergil, Aeneis, 1.8-n. in divine
minds?"

and to undertake

288

Interpretation
the Principate. It

tory

of

that the raising of

be seen, though nothing has yet been said about it, this question implies an adverse reflection on the new regime.
will

For the speakers,

cellence.

at

least initially, in
which

assume that oratorical excellence

is human

ex

regime
modern

it

cannot

flourish is ipso facto defective. Aper takes pursuing the theme of his speech in de the distinction between "the an
are not so of

the side of

oratory,

indirectly
"The

fense
but

of

the

regime.

At first he tries to
age."

obfuscate

cients"

ancients"

and a

"our

own

very remote, for there

are

hundred

and

twenty
reign

years

from the death

Cicero
of

(43

B.C.) to the

sixth

year of

Vespasian's He is

(75

a.d.), the dramatic date

the conversation

(Dial.

17.2-3).

silent on

the change of regime since Cicero's

point

other speakers will

later

out, may be

an

time, which, as the important factor. Instead, he devel

and at

ops a general principle to

times"

the effect that "The forms

18.2).

changed with the

more refined with

(Dial.

He hints

the

the passing of time (Dial. 18.2; cf.

types of speaking are fact that oratory becomes 19. 1). Certainly he claims

to share the taste of the most recent age.

In

several

passages, Aper

characterizes

the change in taste which came about

during

the Empire and

which was

to reach

its full

flowering during the lifetime of

Tacitus (Dial. 20.4-6; 22.4-5). The style that finds favor with Aper's contem poraries is pithy, grave, allied to Augustan poetry, exquisite in its choice of
words, artful in style, this style
was and varied mature

in

construction.

The

greatest

Roman

master of

to be the

Tacitus himself. Though

we cannot

forbear to

add

that the greatest splendor in Tacitus is the

splendor of

human

excellence

(cf.

thies may

Chapter I), this excellence is not unreflected in the style. Wherever his sympa have ultimately lain in the controversy between republican and impe
rial eloquence, Tacitus learned
which please must change with

at

least this from Aper: the forms

of

speaking

changing tastes. To survive the ages artfully

cultivated

it

was neces

sary to

ascend

from the
was

refined and

taste of the Romans. In the

process, Tacitus
to the taste

to create a monument whose scope and content

is

not

bound

or concerns of

any
as

one age.

His

pithiness and

gravity

are eternal,

for

they

are rooted

in

continue

to move us as

deep long

reflection on a

body

of permanent problems which will

human

nature remains. and

The adornments, the

account

vari

ation and

the poetry are beautiful

indeed,
end

they may
only

for his

finding

favor
gives

with some

readers, but in the

they

are

adornments whose charm

way to
return

deeper

pleasure at understanding.

To

to the

Dialogus, Aper downplays

was

the

difference between

ancients

and contemporaries and then praises our suspicion said.

the ornate new style. We have

confessed what

that the young Tacitus

impressed to

some extent
convince.

by

he
ex

But among the interlocutors that day, Aper fails to

genius and spiritedness as well as the

Maternus

tols

his

learning

with which

he has de

fended

their own age

(Dial.

24.

1), but he holds Messalla to his

promise to show
made

the causes of the decline. As far as he is concerned, Aper has not

the

case

that there has been

no

decline. nobody really doubts the superiority

of ancient
elo-

Maternus had

said that

Tacitus'

Teaching
was

and

the Decline of Liberty at Rome

the philosophers in
not

289

quence.

Aper

merely

imitating

argument a part with which

Tacitus'

he disagreed. He does

upholding for the sake of add, but we suspect, that

political prudence

had something to do
casual or

with

his

including
reader.

such a speech

in the

place most

striking to the

potentially hostile
superior

think that ancient republican

prudent men are reluctant

oratory is
so

to

to say

(cf. Dial.

27.3).

may contemporary oratory, but Messalla then takes the su

All

men

periority

of

"the

ancients"

for

granted and as

"conceded

by

all."

He

specifies

that,

as

among the his

Attic

orators

tors of

age are considered eloquent. and

primacy is yielded to Demosthenes, and the ora best after him, so at Rome Cicero is held supreme

among the
and after

Moreover the

leading

orators of

his

age

Calvus, Asinius,
before
own peculiar

Caesar, Caelius,
(Dial.
characteristics and

Brutus

are

generally held to
a certain

excel

those who came

25.3).

Messalla

grants

that each of these has its

but

adds that

"there is
He

similarity

and

kinship of judgment
and

disposition"

(Dial.

"vigor"

25.4).

mentions

(impetum)

"ripe

under

standing"

(maturitatem)

as qualities
older

he

prefers to the mere adornment of comes

the

moderns.

The taste for the

oratory first

to light as a preference for di

rectness,
amine

judgment,
promise

and ardor over embellishment.

modern orators

When Messalla

offers to ex
reminds

the shortcomings of the

individually, Maternus
of

him

of

his

to investigate the causes of decline (Dial. 27.1) and adds, the ancients, avail yourself
even more than
or

"When

you speak of

the

ancient

liberty, from
27.3).

which we
will see

have degenerated
no one

from

eloquenc

(Dial.

We
so

later that
as

dares

is

able

to

avail

himself of the

ancient

liberty

completely
5.

Maternus himself.

Messalla's Second Speech:

the

Superiority
starts

of Ancient

Upbringing

and

Thorough Education
and the other arts or rebarbarization.

Messalla

from

a well-known

their old excellence. The Empire is a

will seek

fact: oratory time of decline

have lost Messalla

to explain the causes of this

moral

decline,

which stem

from

a general relaxa

tion and from the

decay
for

that

characterizes

the Empire:

For

who

does

not

know that both

eloquence and

that old-time glory, not

want of

have fallen away from men, but through the idleness of the youth, the
the other arts

negligence of parents, and the ancient morality?

ignorance

[inscientia]

of

teachers,

and

the

forgetting

of

(Dial. 28.2)

Messalla
quence.

will confine

himself to

discussion

of these causes as

they apply
deal

to

elo

The surviving

portion of

his

speech

has three parts,

the

which

respec

tively

with

the difference between the

the difference
regards

old and

new modes of

bringing

up

young children,
the difference as

as regards

the

education of

the future orator, and

the

practice of
valuable

Messalla's
prevailed

explanation

is

young orators. for the light it sheds

on the tendencies that

in

education and

upbringing

during

the

period we

have been

studying.

From him

we

learn that the

now celebrated problem of

the causes of the

decline

290
of

Interpretation
was

Rome To

already
the

a matter of concern

and we get a glimpse of what explain

causes of

to thoughtful men in the early about its ebbing virtue. felt they the decline of eloquence Messalla begins

Empire,

by

con

Roman upbringing of children with the laxness of trasting children of good families used to be brought up by Empire. The life in the family
the
strictness of

the

old

their mothers, together

with a

highly

respected

female

relative who saw to

it that

they early developed

turn) habit
and what

a sense of shame and respect.

what

Above all, it
or
at study.

was

thought
(hones-

necessary to preserve a distinction between

is

"proper"

"noble"

is

"base"

(turpe),

at

play

no

less than

The

character or

which resulted

from this
master

care was well adapted to the serious and persistent

devotion necessary to for the

man

the noble arts. Messalla holds that

it is indispens
prepares a noble

able to shelter a child and accustom

him to

a certain strictness.

This

him hu

demanding

discipline

one must undertake

in

order to

become

being. For Messalla, gentlemanship is

completed

by

the knowledge of a no

ble

art.

The discipline
of each
with

and

severity [of the ancients]

noble arts

was concerned with this: that the nature

pure, and whole, and turned aside

whole

by

no

depravities
,

should

his

heart the

[artes
right,

honestas]

and whether
of

avidly learn he be inclined to

military matters, or the severe in this alone, he

science of would

or

the study

eloquence,

he

would per

devour it in its entirety

[universum]

(Dial.

28.6).

Nobility

is

possible as

influences. For

only on the basis of sheltering or an early privation of base Messalla believes, the tender young nature can be easily dis

torted or perverted.

ern

This is precisely what is permitted in the more relaxed atmosphere of the mod family Messalla criticizes. The children are not subjected to noble influences.
mothers prefer their own

Their

freedom

and the children are abandoned

to the

care of

ignorant

and superstitious slaves

(cf.fabulas, Dial.

29. 1).

The distinction

between nobility and baseness is not preserved. Instead the child is exposed from the first to the whole array of human and subhuman phenomena. Where morality is
replaced
noble.20

by

lewdness

and cynicism the child

and contempt

does

not

develop

a reverence

for

the
of

Impudence

for

oneself and others result, and

obsessed"

instead
actors,

the noble arts, the mind becomes "occupied

and

with

love

of

gladiators and

horse

races

(Dial.

29.1-4).

Gentlemen disappear

with

the noble

arts and are replaced

by

voluptuaries without

heart.
education proper

In the
orator.

his speech, Messalla turns to the Education in general has been adversely affected
second part of

to an

phere of

the Empire: "Sufficient time is devoted

to reading about the past,
nor

neither to

by learning [classic]
the relaxed

atmos au

thors,
(Dial.

times"

nor

to remarking
replaces

30.1).

Narrow

professional

training

things, or men, or the broad cultivation

of the

liberal
20.

arts which

the older orators considered necessary for adequate

retained with virtuous

speaking.

"Shame is

hardly

training,

much

less

can

chastity

or

modesty

or

any

thing

of moral

purity be

vices"

preserved

among

contest of

(xiv.

15.2).

Tacitus'

Teaching
The
art

and

the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
know

291
what

has declined because

about.

modern orators

simply do

not

they
were

are

talking
studies

They

are as

ignorant

of man and politics as

they

are of nature.

Messalla describes Cicero's

education

in

order to show

how broad

the

Cicero
all

undertook

to cultivate his genius. He mentions seven sciences:

civil

law,

the parts of philosophy,

including dialectics,
from in
great

moral

philosophy,

and

natural

philosophy, geometry, music, and

literature (grammaticae). "That

admi

rable eloquence and

flowed forth
things"

and abounded

learning,

and

many arts,

knowledge

of all

(Dial.
in the

30.5).
moral or political

The human
to be

questions that one examines

considered paramount of

education of an orator:
with

philosophy used "They [the older stu

there

dents

oratory] filled their breasts

those arts in

which

is

argument
and

concerning the good and bad things, the noble and the base, and the just (Dial. 31.1). This study was crucial because the main concerns
unjust"

the

of ora

just (in the law courts) and the noble (in deliberations).21 These are controversial and difficult matters which cannot be treated adequately unless one

tory
has

are the

examined

them

with care.

Messalla holds that knowledge

of the noble and

the just is

possible.

No

one

is

able to speak

human

nature and the

of

copiously and with variation and ornament unless he knows force of the virtues and the depravity of the vices, and has under

standing

those things

[pleasures?]

which are numbered neither

among the

virtues

nor the vices

(Dial.

31.2).

Knowledge

of

human

nature

is

requisite not

only to

knowing

what

is

good
na

the substance of oratory; to ture of the

audience.

persuade

successfully This is

one must also

know the
will

"As the

nature of each

demands, [the orator]

another reason

apply his

hand
of

and govern

his

oration"

(Dial.

31.4).

that the study

philosophy is
the most

crucial

to

oratorical excellence: not

make

careful examination of

human

nature and

only do the philosophers its needs, their modes of

the various types of

presenting their teachings

rhetoric.

are also

exemplary

models of

The best from the

There

orator

learns the types

of rhetoric suited to the

different types

of men

great philosophers who applied them most adeptly:

are some

among

whom a concise and

distilled type

of speaking, which resolves

individual

arguments care

separately, deserves most

faith; among
more; to

these

it is beneficial to
common

have devoted
moral sense

to dialectics. A diffuse and

smooth oration

drawn from

[communibus sensibus] delights

others

persuade

these we will

borrow from the Peripatetics ics

21. will give

for every argument. The Academ be alien combativeness, Plato loftiness, Xenophon charm; it will not even
apt passages prepared

I have followed
which

the

manuscript

reading here

rather than

the

unsupported

conjecture

of

Ursinus,
supplied.

Koestermann

adopts

for the Teubner

text.

According
in

to that conjecture, "the

"laudations,"

profitable"

is

supplied as
unchanged

the object of deliberations and the noble is the object of

deliberations,"

also

The

text, "We discourse in

about the noble

character of

seems

to give a less

amoral sense, and one more

keeping

with

the

Messalla.

292

Interpretation
noble exclamations

to the orator to take certain

use

from Epicurus

and

Metrodorus

and to

these as the case requires (Dial. 31.5-6).

It

should

be

clear

by

now

why it is

reasonable

for

one who wishes

to

become
to

an

orator to devote himself ardently to philosophy. and also

Philosophy

enables one

know

teaches how to

persuade.

If witnesses

are needed,

Messalla brings forth

the two greatest orators

he knows:
most ardent

Demosthenes is
that
whatever

said

to have been Plato's

able to effect

listener. Cicero

claims not

he has been
of

in eloquence, he has accomplished,

colonnades of

due

to the workshops
32-5-6).

the rhetoricians,

but from the

the

Academy

(Dial.

Messalla thinks that the "first disciplined the

education

cause"

and chief

of

the decline of eloquence in

education

the Empire is the abandonment of the old philosophic

genius of a

that nurtured and

Cicero

and

the other great orators of

his

age.

To that

he

opposes

the ridiculous and

narrow concentration on

declamation The

that characterizes the

rhetorical schools of

the Empire. In these schools, boys are

new

taught to

speak without

training
basis is
powers.

stimulates the

really learning imagination but does

about politics and morality. not educate

the mind and heart. Its

boys'

exercises on extravagant subjects

thought to

develop the

inventive

subjects

Messalla contemptuously gives examples of some of the on which boys are made to declaim: how tyrannicides are to be
whether

"incredible"

re

warded,

deflowered
be

virgins ought

to kill or marry their abductors,

which

ceremonies are to most

observed

in times
upon

of

pestilence,

or which arguments are

likely

to deter a mother
section of

intent

incest (Dial.

35.5).

In the third

the speech, Messalla contrasts the introduction of boys

courts and

to the vital life of the

exercises prescribed

law

the forum of the Republic

of

with

the artificial

in the lecture halls

the new rhetoricians. In the old

days,
topics

boys followed the

of real ment.

chief orator of a

the city on his

daily

round of speeches on

importance in
This
section

of

city where Messalla's judicial

we a

speech was crucial to speech

deliberation
lead to

and a

judg

naturally

would

contrast

between the
Republic.

political and

conditions

Unfortunately,

do

not

have the

prevailing in the Empire and the conclusion of his speech, for the
this point.

extant manuscripts

indicate

lacuna

of six pages at

6.

Maternus'

Second Speech:

the

Decline of Eloquence: Eloquence Where the

seems

Political Causes of the and Wisdom

and

manuscripts

resume, Messalla has apparently concluded,

speaking.22

it

boldest

his speech is the amazing speech in all of Tacitus. There is an almost Platonic intransigence to his severely disparaging assessment of actual politics from the
remains of and most
22.

that Maternus is once again

What

See Dial. 42.1,

where

he is identified

as

the speaker in the

preceding speech,

which com

prises chapters 36-41.

Tacitus'

Teaching
standpoint of

and

the Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
of

293
moderation

wisdom,
recall

although

it is tempered

by

kind

Platonic
a

or

humanity. We

that in his first speech he intimated

love

of

philosophy

as part of

the reason for

second

his

retirement

from the

political

life.

In the
cerns eager

speech,

no

doubt
of

the causes of the

decline
,

a reply to Messalla, the argument still con Roman eloquence, a theme Maternus had been

to discuss (Dial. 27. 1

sense

3;

cf. 16.3).

Where the

manuscripts

resume,

we
of

im
the

mediately Dialogus and the

that a great change has taken place. From the

question raised

beginning

by Fabius Justus, it had been assumed that great eloquence is a desirable thing, nay, that excellence in oratory is identical to hu man excellence and hence that is the noblest art (Dial. 1.1; 5.4; 6.3; oratory
28.6).

The first

speech

had

made

it reasonably

clear

that Maternus does not share turn to the

present

this view. The reason

speech.
Maternus'

becomes
is that

even more apparent when we

argument

great

oratory is

stimulated and encouraged

by

po

litical disorder. The

reason

there are no great orators in the Empire is that it is a

time of comparative stability.

man

Oratory
same

Republic. This bold thesis

explanation.
moral

supplements

flourished in the anarchy of the late Ro but does not necessarily contradict
suggests a

Messalla's it
was

At the
of

time, it

limit to it. For Messalla,

of oratory.

the

decadence
also

the Principate that caused the decline

of political order.

For Maternus it is

the restoration

Like Messalla, Maternus

such,
a

denies that

republican

oratory

was pure or noble morals.

and,

as

worthy

standard

by

which

to judge the decline in

He himself will

suggest a more adequate

standard.

At the

point at which we rejoin

his argument, Maternus is making the

the state
of

point that political conditions are crucial to

the art:

Great eloquence, like a flame, is nourished on fuel, and aroused by movements, and in burning grows bright. Such a rationale advanced the eloquence of the ancients in our

City
what

as well.

is

proper

For, although even the [fas] to offer them in

they
seemed

orators of these times

[the

Empire] have

obtained

a peaceful and calm and prosperous common

wealth, nevertheless

to attain more
,

for themselves in that time in

confusion and

of turbu

lence

and

license [the
(Dial.

declining Republic]

when all were

lacking one

moderator

36.1-2).

In those days Rome

citizens were enrolled

stunning
and the

oratory.
of

perpetually on the verge of civil war (see Chapter II), its in hostile factions, and there were many opportunities for Public deliberations concerned objects of the highest moment
was

life

the

City

was ever

in jeopardy. Should be
put the

potent

faction leaders be
of

put

to death or

reconciled?

How

could armies

wrested

from the hands

treacher

ous commanders who were people against one

ready to the Senate called for for

City

to the sword? Mutinies of the

crimes perpetrated

settlement.

Political

by

family

against another cried

revenge.

Great trials

were

continually

neces

sary, for there

were great traitors.

"These things

individually

tore the

City

apart,

but they
rewards

exercised

the eloquence of those times and seemed to

36.4).

accumulate great

for

it"

(Dial.

Honors

and offices were

lavished

on

the

speakers

294

Interpretation
best defend their faction. What
to be
was

who could

come one's rivals came

considered noble and glorious

which

necessary to get ahead or (Dial. 36.8).

over

Maternus
nius,"

agrees

that a certain excellence,

he

calls

"the force

of ge

is indeed

provoked and exercised

by

these conditions: "With the vastness

nor

of

affairs, the force

and glorious

[vis]

of genius unless

increases,
he finds

is

anyone able

to make a bril

liant

cause"

speech

a comparable

(Dial. 37.5).

Maternus illustrates this

made

point

from the

career of

Cicero,

whom

Messalla had
was

into

such a paragon.

For Cicero to become the

midst of a

prince of
crisis.

eloquence, it

indispensable that his country be in the stroying

37-6).
what remained of

terrible
who

His

most

famous
in de

orations are accusations against monstrous

traitors

finally

succeeded

Roman liberty: Catiline, Verres,

and

Antony

(Dial.

Cicero his

was one of

the few orators of his

day

who

tried to use his eloquence for that the art of

country's

good, but Maternus knows

all too well

oratory

usu

ally

was used

for

partisan purposes or most part

the establishment of private

one of

men as

ty

rants.

Oratory
the

is for the

demagoguery. It is it. A

the gravest counts

against

late Roman Republic that it

who wreaked

could not restrain the vicious orators and good

demagogues
such orators:

havoc

on

city, well-ruled, does

not permit

We

are not

speaking
call

about a passionless and quiet

great and

thing

which rejoices

in
of

honesty
license,

and

moderation; rather, that

which

famous

eloquence

is the foster-child

fools

liberty; [it is]

without

the comrade of seditions, the

without

incitement have

of an

ungov-

erned

populace,
that

allegiance,

severity, obstinate,

rash and we

arrogant, a
of

thing

does

not arise

in

well-ordered cities.

For

what orator

heard

among the Spartans

pline and

or the

Cretans? These

cities are said to

have had the

severest

disci

the severest laws (Dial. 40.2-3).

great

According to Maternus,
mocracies such as

oratory

and

demagoguery

flourish especially in de

Athens, Rhodes,

and

the decadent Roman Republic. His own

is for a well-ordered aristocratic republic or even a stable monarchy (Dial. 40.3), but this is merely a passing reference to what is most desirable. The depth of critique of oratory, and thereby of the ordinary poli tics that make use of it, is stunningly apparent in his concluding words. There he
preference
Maternus'

maintains

that all political regimes are

defective

when

judged from the

such a regime

stand never

point of a regime where all

is

ordered

by reason.

Though

has

existed, it

sets

the standard

by

which all

intent

of

this argument is to make his

which

existing hearers moderate oratory does

alerted us to

orders ought to and

be judged. The
with

less frustrated

the order in

they live,

where noble

not

flourish. For

accord

ing

to

Maternus,
His

the glory of

oratory

pales when compared with wisdom that

Maternus'

is

truly

noble.

earlier speech
with

had already

conception of now

the wise man's concern

turn to
Maternus'

the whole and man's proper place in it. Let us

profound critique of politics. more under

No

the Empire than

under

the Republic has

Rome

yet

"been freed
41
.

from faults

or ordained

completely in

prayer"

accordance with

(Dial.

1). Ora-

Tacitus'

Teaching

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome
be

295

tory

remains and

necessary because human beings for

persuasion.

continue to

envious and ambi

tious,
would

to harass and harm one another. If all men were wise and good there

be

no need

"Who

calls upon us to

defend him in is
a political

court un

less he has hurt

made

someone or

been

oppressed?"

Oratory

instrument

necessary by man's abiding cruelty and inhumanity. "If some city could be found in which no one committed wickedness [peccaret] , among the innocent the healthy" orator would be as superfluous as a doctor (Dial. 41 Not among the
.3).

only do men continue to do evil under all regimes, but government continues to be ruled by jealous, selfish, ambitious and unwise men. The following passage is
a critique of the

Principate

as

well, from the

of

almost superhuman perspective of

the rule of the wise take it to be. (It cipate,

who

not an after

identification

the two, as some scholars absurdly

is,

all,

Maternus,
speeches
use

the author of

Cato,

a critique of the

Prin

is speaking:)
is there for

What

need

long

agree with one another?

enced and

the multitude
man?

in the Senate, if the best men quickly were to for many addresses to the people if not the inexperi deliberated about the commonwealth but the wisest [sapientisWhat
need

simus] single

What

seldom and so sparingly?

What

for voluntary accusations if wicked deeds were done so need for hostile and immoderate defenses if the mercy judge the defendants (Dial.
41.4). condition of all poli

of one who understood should

Maternus does
tics

not

have any

expectations

that the imperfect

will change.

His

noble resignation and transcendence of mere

seems

to be the

political result of

his

superior

insight into the

natural and

partisanship irre

versible causes of out anger or

what

disorder in the human

(sine ira between his

realm.23

Like Tacitus he judges "with

wondered

partisanship"

et studio).

We

in his first

speech

the

connection was

philosophic openness

to questions of the
what are

cosmic order and of

his

political stance.

The

supreme question

is

the limits

the rule of

reason or

the good in the

cosmos.

Now

we see more

clearly that

moderation

in

politics results

from

a superior

defective

character of all

regimes,

which must

understanding of the necessarily be ruled by imperfect men. There

is, however,
publication.

limit to

what

Maternus

will put

Cato. He himself here

supplies us with reasons

up with, as one sees from his for doubting the wisdom of that
his interlocutors
more

By his

last

word

Maternus is

concerned
with

to

make

gentle,

less harsh, times have

phe.

and

less frustrated

their

lot

and

the defects
not

of their time.

All

their

defects,

and

the decline of oratory is

the greatest catastro

He has

even shown them that this

decline is

somewhat compensated

for

by a

certain public order:

Oh best born in
were

of men, and eloquent,

earlier centuries or

insofar

as there

is

need

those

whom we

admire,

were

for it, believe me: if you were born in these, or if some god
lack that highest
praise

to suddenly

change your

lives

and

times,

you would not

and
23.

glory in eloquence,
There is
a

nor would

they lack

measure and

moderation; now,

inasmuch

acceptance of human nature as the unchangeable ba study of Studi filologici e storici natura humana Tacitus de "Quid sis for politics. Nicola Barbu, in onore di Vittorio de Falco (Naples: Libreria Scientifica Editrice, 1971), PP- 449~l.
Tacitus'

fascinating

cogitaver

296

Interpretation
fame
own and great

as no one can attain great

tranquility in

the same

himself
(Dial.

of the good of

his

century,

ignoring

the disparagement

time, let each avail [of it] by another

41.5).
Maternus'

Whatever may have been the

ent,
we suspect

effect of

reasoning

on the orators pres

that the young Tacitus was profoundly

exposed

moved

by

his humanity.
poli

For he had been

to a

man

who, though

by

no means

indifferent to

tics,

yet

judged it from the loftiest

the
mature

and most profound perspective.

Maternus
of

shares with

Tacitus the

noble qualities of a

deep

understanding

the

human order, openness to the superhuman, versatility, and acceptance of what cannot be changed, along with a concern to move and educate the few who can be
so educated.

From this perspective,

one wonders whether

the Cato

was not

too much of a risk with too

little hope
was

of

That the

youthful

Tacitus

deeply

improving moved by

matters.

Maternus

we

infer from the

the

following. After concluding his speech, Maternus recalls in differences that separate him from Aper and Messalla:

a playful manner

and embracing Aper, he said, "I will accuse you before the poets, and Messalla "And I will accuse you both before the rhetori [will do so] before the replied [Aper] (Dial. 42.2). cians and school

Rising

antiquarians."

masters,"

Now Tacitus had laughed,

ends
we

the dialogue

with a reminder excludes

that

he

was present:
general

"When they

departed."

He

himself from the

laughter. Does

he thereby indicate that he was lost in thought and admiration of what he had heard from Maternus, clearly the most gifted and impressive man present?
With this study of the Dialogus, thought. It appears to us that in this
us an alternative noble response
Tacitus'

we conclude our

essay

on

political

short non-historical

work, Tacitus has given

under

to the

decline

of

liberty

the Principate.

There is

another

with political

fundamental way of life open to certain gifted and decent men concerns in a time of tyranny. The ways of Seneca and Thrasea are
not

undoubtedly admirable but they are was then less attractive and, though
system,
others could see their

for

all noble men.

Political

participation

we admire

those who tried to ameliorate the

and

way

as

dangerous

less than

Tacitus'

adequate. not com

analysis of

the options and

manifestations of virtue

in the Principate is

plete without some attention petent political man who

to the way of life

retired

represented

by Maternus,

the com

has

from

politics

in

depraved

order to

devote

himself to the study of philosophy. Yet one wonders whether Tacitus

would

have judged Maternus

wise

in

pub

licly denouncing
us good reasons

the ruling tyrant and his creatures. Maternus himself has

given

for

doubting

that much could be done to halt the

corruption of

those in power. He presents actual politics as

regime and seems to accept

inevitably falling
made of

short of the

best

the

necessities

that

the Principate a very de

fective form

of government. gained

Under those

circumstances

did

not the

risk

outweigh

the benefits to be

from antagonizing the

powerful and corrupt?

Some have

Tacitus'

Teaching
suggested

and

the Decline of Liberty at Rome

297

that Maternus was forced to an untimely death and that Tacitus presup

posed common

knowledge
the

of

this on the part of

his

readers.24

However

much

the young Tacitus may have

mature writer was not

admired

Maternus for his

noble

independence,
his
own

to imitate him in this

write

rash critique of of

times. Tacitus knew it was

was

futile to

during

the persecutions

Domitian (Agr. 2-3). He

more

favorable

climate provided

reign of

Trajan. Then Tacitus

by by Nerva's accession to the throne and the long wrote his history of past servitude and tyranny for
patience was rewarded

fortunate in that his

the

the benefit of posterity.

Prior to that time he had been have

active

in

public

life,

no

doubt in the
self

manner of

the Lepidus he so admired (iv.20.2-5). To prepare him

must continued to seek out the

for

such a

career, he

society

of

Aper

and

Secundus, but
Thrasea

there was the difference that in his admiration for Maternus he had
of

discovered the true level

met a most

his

own capacity. man of

The future historian

caliber which

of

Seneca

and

impressive

their

in his

youth.

His

public ca

reer was always marked

by

a certain was

reserve,

that

meeting.

When the time

order

ripe,

may have been inspired by Tacitus abandoned his direct involvement

in

politics

in

to study and to

write

his

marvellous

ability to penetrate the disguises he had learned from life. In the

genius at

and secrets of noble

the

histories, human heart,

dim

so rich so

in their
of what

full

Maternus

we see a

reflection of

the

Tacitus

was

to

reveal

himself to be

on a vaster scale. what makes

This genius,

so adept

plumbing the depths of the human soul, is ing and so inexhaustible.

his histories

so enchant

CHAPTER VII: EPILOGUE

After
gan with

Tacitus'

some

preliminary

considerations on
Tacitus'

method of

writing,

we

be

the opening

statements of and

four

"Roman"

works.

He invoked
and

admiration

for the Roman Republic

the standard

its

principle of

liberty.
all

Tentatively

in hopes
and was

discovering defective, we examined his

of

by

which

he judged

politics, both noble

explicit statements on with

the Republic. We found it

that regime. In

impossible to

identify

Tacitus simply

the

partisans of

fact, he

was critical of
main

Republic. The rialism. The

the policy and arrangements that characterized the Roman defects he found were internal sedition and unlimited impe

unlimited

imperialism
ways.

was

to

destroy

the

conditions

for

republican

self-government

in two

Wealth from the

enabled

provinces undermined

the frugal

and simple patriotism that need

had

the

City

to flourish in the early days. The

for

armies and garrisons stationed abroad

for

long

periods of

time gave

op

portunities

to their

commanders

to

corrupt

the soldiers and lead them back to sub

jugate the City. These

public
24. cember

causes contributed

to the

civil wars

that

consumed

the Re

during

the first century B.C.

of

A. Cameron, "Tacitus and the Death I967):258. Arlene Saxonhouse,

Theors'

Curiatus

Maternus,"

The Classical Review 17 (De

"Tacitus'

Dialogue

on

Oratory: Political

Activity

under a

Ty

rant,"

Political

(February

1975): 59.

298

Interpretation

The corruptibility of the City implies that the once much-admired republican virtue has its limits. It is the result of habit produced by a good constitution and

favorable duced

circumstances.

When these
rarer

decline, it

vanishes.

Tacitus distinguished
which

this political virtue from a

"great

virtue"

(magna virtus),
or natural

is

not pro

by constitution or circumstance but is

inborn

(this

virtue was ex

amined more sake rather

man

closely in Chapter V). The gentleman who loves virtue for its own than for its rewards proved to be the highest type for Tacitus. Such a
those
who practice virtue

is

not as corruptible as

from fear

of

shame, love

of

wealth, or even honor. In a

corrupt regime

base

men

tend to be honored in pub

lic. Thus the true

gentleman must

Virtuous

republics

great virtue.

actively Tacitus identified Crete

seek

be willing to forgo even honor. to foster political virtue as distinguished from

and

Sparta

as virtuous republics and ex

tolled them above the Roman Republic.

and a

They

were characterized praised

by

severe

laws

ban

on unlimited expansion.

Though he
reserved

these cities, his critique of

their political virtue

praise was given

led him to be

in his

praise.

His only

unreserved

to virtuous

individuals,

and even there

he

was well aware

that

their chance to benefit

others was

Roman Republic
about politics.

was our

strictly limited. This partial debunking of the introduction to the characteristic Tacitean sobriety
the highest expectation for individual competence the prevalence
of

He

combined

and rectitude with a resignation to

injustice

and unreason

in

politics, usually and everywhere. Still

one ought not

to overlook the

forest,

even

for the loftiest trees: though Tacitus indicated the

that

ultimate shortcomings of these

republics, he preferred them to the Principate. He was,

sion

however,

under no

illu

they

could

be

restored

in the

corrupt times

in

which

he lived.
of the mixed

Tacitus'

constitution self to

sobriety contrasts with the in Polybius. Again,

somewhat optimistic

doctrine
in

Tacitus'

moderation consisted

directing

him

individual leaders

of character and not

"solution"

allowing himself to be deceived

political problem.

into expecting some permanent Tacitus considered the reign

that
reign and

to the
of

Tiberius

crucial.

He began his Annates

with

investigated it in

considerable

detail. What

seemed most signifi

cant was

that

during

Tiberius'

time,

the

Principate took

on certain

fundamental

elements

it

was to preserve

through succeeding reigns. Tacitus accounted for the

causes of the corruption of the

potism

Romans. He

also explained

became

possible and necessary.

of

The

corruption of

why the military des the Romans was ante

opposi order.

cedent to the

beginning

the Annates. Augustus overcame all military

tion to his rule and conciliated remaining political groups to the new

Under Tiberius the remaining guished by a vague treason law

ate

sparks which

of

dying liberty

were

nearly

all extin

he thought he

needed and which

the Sen

sedulously enforced. Servility and flattery became widespread. Could anything public be done to arrest the degeneration of the Romans? For, in addition to the rise of servility and adulation, and accompanying their loss of
political

power,

was

the growth of

luxury

and

debauchery. This

was not a prob

atmosphere

lem

created

by

the Principate. It was already present in the wealthy

Tacitus'

Teaching
by

and the

Decline of Liberty

at

Rome

299

of

the late imperial Republic.

caused

Augustus had

addressed some of the worst prob

lems

the rise of hedonism

by

means of certain regulations

concerning

marriage and adultery.

These laws

were regarded

by

the prudent as disastrous

and

tyrannical,
and

for,

to enforce

them, Augustus had

encroached upon

encouraged a system of

ing

delation

which

seriously
the

the lives of

leading

spy Romans. him to In

Tiberius properly

resisted

importunities

of

those who called

upon

initiate
an

a more severe program of moral restriction and

sumptuary

regulation.

morality
mind's

important speech, he explained his reasons for doubting that the decline in could be arrested by such means. The core of the argument is that the
cravings, once aroused, cannot be suppressed
measures of enforcement.

by

law. Such law difference

requires

despotic
sires and

Unless the

opportunities are
significant

removed, the de
emerges

temptations will persist. In this section a

ancient

between
or

tyranny

and modern

tyranny

as exemplified
or an

in,

say, Robespierre
of

Lenin. The
of

root of

the difference is moderation,

understanding

the

limits

legislation

and public authority.

At the core of that ancient moderation,

the view that the evils of political dec

shared even

by

tyrant like

Tiberius,

was

in the human mind, transformation than it is thought to be

adence are rooted moral reform

which

is

more resistant

to compulsion or
regarded

by

modern

ideologists. Tiberius

in

a corrupt age as

the task of individuals and was

resigned

to the

fact that it
sponse

will never

be

complete.

This

moderation seemed a reasonable re

to the

problem spelled out

in

our earlier chapter on

the causes of the

de

cline of the

Republic.
not

Tacitus did
Tiberius'

entirely

share

the

grave resignation of

Tiberius. He

corrected

by transcending its premises. He referred to a partial reform intro duced by the First Citizen Vespasian, who became an object of emulation in his frugality. Tacitus pointed to the importance of the example set by the leader of a
view and emu society for establishing its prejudices. He who rules is looked up to there that rather Tacitus or bad. mysteriously, be he good suggested, may lated, be moral cycles that govern the conditions of society. Finally, he encouraged his

contemporaries

to believe that in the harshness

of

their

situation

there are oppor

tunities for them, too, to

nius as general

accomplish noble works.

And he

regarded

his

own ge

partially developed he still shared

of politics.

by

the harsh
view

necessities

he had to

overcome.

But in

Tiberius'

that

moderation

is

a virtue crucial to an un

derstanding
The
virtue.

He did

not expect

too

much.

grave question arose whether there

is any divine
concern with

or natural support

for

Tacitus'

This

question was prompted

by

to encourage

his

con

temporaries not to despair. The

Principate,
section

its

hostility
to the

to virtue, will not

last

eternally.

Tacitus

showed

himself to be

sensitive

longing

of

decent What

men that

morality count,
that the

and

in this

he investigated that
the

question.

is the
the

evidence

gods or nature support

life

of virtue?

Tacitus turned to He distin

men

various answers

given

by

the

major philosophers

of antiquity.

guished as most and the more or

important the Epicurean

view

that the gods are

political

indifferent to

less Aristotelian

view

that

for

men, education in virtue

300 is the

Interpretation
greatest good.

He

also referred

to the belief of the many in astrology,

rather

which provided

the vulgar answer that fate

than

independent

effort

deter
of

mines whether we succeed or not.

Tacitus'

own presentation of

thought could only be discovered from an

of

investigation

his

the fundamental ways

chosen
order

life

and

their results.
as a

First,

was

Tiberius

happy? He had
the best
men

injustice

on

the

widest

scale, for

tyrant he

persecuted-

in

to hold
of

power.

He

confessed

in

an unguarded moment that

regarded

his life

was an

agony

fear,

cruelty,

and

lust. Tacitus

this lack of re

straint as

naturally

leading

to unhappiness, for it is not in accordance with the

virtue.

mind's natural

fulfillment in

It is based

on an erroneous

identification

of

happiness
exercised are

tion."

with the acquisition of worldly qualities of Tacitus said, "Those who in acquiring them. As the very rich may be most miserable if they use their prosperity without delibera Tacitus seemed to hold a version of the classic natural right teaching akin

goods and

is indifferent to the

"Aristotelians"

to the one expounded

suffer than

by

Plato in the Republic

and

and

the Gorgias: it is better to

to do

injustice,
highest

based
and

on a mistaken notion are the

tyranny, the most extreme form of injustice, is that justice does not matter that worldly success
the self-understanding of Manius

honor

goods.
question of

This

raised the

further

Terentius,
the tyran

one of the
nical

innumerable lesser
allied

men who was corrupted

with

by

the fortune

of

Caesars. He

himself

Sejanus,
Sejanus

the diabolical minister of Tiber

committed or

ius,
In

oblivious of the numberless crimes

Sejanus'

instigated. He
of

was

impressed

with

honor
he

and power

to make the fortune

Sejanus'

his followers.
ex

a speech of self-defense

boldly
have

made after

fall, Terentius
choice and

plained of

that he

blindly

followed
gods

success as

determined in the

policy

his

ruler

(Tiberius): "The

given you
left."

the determination of the highest

Such was the craven attitude of a things; to us the glory of obedience is courtier in the new regime. Though bolder than the rest, the temptations and op portunities that corrupted this man bear heavily on the entire political community
of

Rome

during the

Principate. Tacitus

presents this case to show

political order.

how dependent

the characters

of most men are on a

decent

Where that is

lacking
truth

it

can

be

expected that

they

will

degenerate. This dependence is the terrible

ourselves to accept.

Tacitus taught

us we must

harden

There is

no reason

to be
whom

lieve that

men of this sort are

they flatter

and who, as we

any better than the more have seen, confess themselves to be

as opposed

"successful"

tyrants

most miserable.
pious

At this point, it
nical

seemed reasonable

to see what Tacitus thought about a

and straightforward

life

of

justice

to the miserable lives of the tyran

man

types. Lucius Arruntius was a man of piety. He therefore became a

marked

by

the

most vile creatures of

Tiberius. To
was good

seems to ness.

have

got

him into trouble. He

extent, his artlessness but too ostentatious in his good

a certain simple

This leads
of

one to

doubt that Tacitus thought

piety is

enough.

The
way

implication
as

this judgment is that

the,

gods

do

not rule the cosmos

in

such a

to reward or protect their devout worshippers. This raised the

question of

Tacitus'

Teaching
whether

and the

Decline of Liberty
the gods, is
such as

at

Rome

301
virtuous

nature, in the silence

next

of

to allow the

to

be

happy. The

type

investigated
life
of

was one who combined virtuous uprightness

with political adeptness.

Tacitus

explored the

the noble

Seneca,

who

had lived

as

decently

as

was possible

in those brutal times. Seneca

of

wished to

take advantage of his oppor

tunity in hopes
how benefit
choice of

doing

some good

in

circles where

his influence

might some

all

the citizens of the great Empire. Public-spiritedness dictated his

and

life. Through fortune

the

devious intrigues

Nero became First Citizen.

Seneca, in
over

alliance with attempted

of Agrippina, the child Burrus, became Agrippina's

leading
benefit

rival of

for influence

him. He

to use that influence for the

the Empire and did his best to hinder the

evil

devices

of

Agrippina

and

her

malevolent creatures.

Seneca

was not

First

Citizen, but

the First

Citizen's for
eight

apolitical years.

tastes

made

it

possible

for Seneca to

rule

the Roman Empire

During

those years

no accusations were permitted under

the terrible law of

treason.
noble

The Senate

was given

the opportunity (which it did

not always

use)

of

independence. Decent

and competent men were appointed

and

to

govern

the
and

provinces and command

the armies. Law

justice

were upheld

in Rome

triumphed wherever subordinate rulers took their cue

from

what went on

in

Rome.

Seneca's
apparent

accomplishment was remarkable

but far from

complete.

This is

most

from the fact that he did

and restore a

not consider

it

possible to

do away

with

the

Principate

high form

of self-government.

One

or

two good men in

power could set a

decent tone, but they could not do away with the effects of despotism on the morals of political men. The causes of the of a nearly century fall of the Republic could not be undone, rooted as they were in centuries-old
policies and

developments. Thus,

while we admired

Seneca

as a man of

the

highest capacities, we saw that in a corrupt world the possibilities of reform are moderation is always severely limited. Human affairs are so complicated that order to retain his ascen in proper in our expectations of them. Furthermore,

dancy, Seneca was forced to

overlook

the crimes in

which

Nero's deficiencies in

was humanly possible evitably issued. We judged Seneca to have done all that was a masterpiece Nero of circumstances. His under the deplorable handling way knowledge not only of of the statesman's art, insofar as that art encompasses a

the human
which

good

but

also of

the

means of

dealing

with

the human defects

by

that good is

obstructed.

Seneca

was a man of

higher

capacities and greater

success than the pious

plete. at

hero, Arruntius. But

change

one cannot

say his
and

success was com

He

could not

decisively

the
us

regime or

Nero,

Nero

ordered

him

last to

commit suicide.

Tacitus led

to a harder

view of

the world

by

expos

ing the

limits

of success of even so good and capable a man as of

Seneca.
career of

that out necessary condition for the Thrasea. In some ways that career was a fulfillment of standing Senator, Paetus led the Senate in unaccustomed decency during the Thrasea Seneca. the policy of reign. He cautiously opposed Nero in certain corruptions middle years of Nero's

The ascendancy

Seneca

was a

302 he
was

Interpretation
permitting in the Empire. It
was once again seemed to us most

important that

during

those years, someone

For it

was one of

the

greater

publicly championing the cause of virtue. misfortunes of the Principate that during the preced in
public

ing reigns

decent

men

had

no role

life

and virtue and gone

into hiding.

Thrasea courageously became the spokesman for Senatorial independence and the cause of justice. But Thrasea and the Senate were not omnipotent, far from it. When Seneca
relinquished

power, Tigellinus

reintroduced

the treason persecu

tions, and though Thrasea continued to lead Senatorial resistance they were able to hold out only a short time. In the end Nero could not tolerate his independence
and

aloofness,

and

Thrasea does

was given orders

to commit suicide, which he did

with noble constancy.

That this

virtue of endurance should

be

so

important points
We believe in born to do

to the

fact that the

good

not

simply

predominate

in the

universe.

that Tacitus regarded this virtue as primarily a

matter of

character,

a certain

born disdain for base

what

courses which

leads the few

men who are so

is

good even might

in the

absence of

any honor
of

or reward.

One

have left

matters at

this

admiration

for the

noble political men

who practiced virtue

in the harsh days

the Principate. But our awareness that

political action and

Tacitus himself led

wonder what and

life that included both

about

writing led

us

to

he thought

leaving

politics

to pursue a life of thought. Seneca

possibly Thrasea, the great heroes of the Annates, also seem to have com bined political action with philosophy. The question of philosophy is not really
raised

in the Annates. Yet it

was a matter of concern

to Tacitus and he the

dealt

with

it in his Dialogus de oratoribus, which raises the There he introduced the admirable Maternus,
withdrawn

question of a man of

best life.
virtue who

lofty

had

from the

political

life in

order

to practice poetry or study philosophy.

His devotion to

virtue was strengthened

by his

study

of

the causes of the

whole

nature or the gods.

intemperate
was
rash

published an only his time in a tragedy entitled Cato, which widely discussed. There is reason to believe that Tacitus regarded this as a and futile response to the great problem of the Principate, a problem too attack on

Yet Maternus

was not

withdrawn.

He

the base

men of

great

to be overcome

by

poem, however

eloquent.

This led

us

to consider the
politics under career was

rather complicated character of such a

Tacitus,

depraved First Citizen

as

nobly participated in Domitian. We suspect that

who

Tacitus'

based

his heroes, Seneca, Thrasea, and Lepi dus. No more than this could be said, since the reign of Domitian recounted in the Historiae is lost. But Tacitus was not only a noble political man. He made
on

the same principles as those of

widespread and profound observations on

climate

improved

under

Nerva

and

human nature, and when the political Trajan, he began to publish a record of past In
a

servitude and rare

but

resolute constancy.

sense, he seemed to say, the di

an active noble political

chotomy drawn

by

Aper in the Dialogus between

life

incomplete. All the most richly en dowed human beings are powerfully drawn to exercise a combination of both lives: Agricola, Thrasea, Seneca, and Tacitus were great statesmen as well as
or

and a withdrawn meditative one was

false

Tacitus'

Teaching

and

the

Decline of Liberty
base

at

Rome

303
their contem
some

thinkers.

Their

resistance

to the

courses practiced

by

most of

poraries was made possible

by

an

innate

grandeur of mind which

Tacitus

times calls "great

with

virtue"

(magna

virtus).

It is

no accident

that those who are bom

with

this virtue are powerfully attracted to philosophy and concerned

common good.

justice

and

the
of

For Tacitus
cannot

seemed

to regard these as man's noblest ob

jects

devotion. One in

be

true statesman without an abiding love of the

without

truth,

nor can one

love the truth

wishing to

practice

it. The

circum

stances extent

which one practices either

type of virtue remain only to a very limited

us to accept

in

our control.

Tacitus taught

these limitations and to

work

deftly
edge

within

them,

while always and wisdom

remaining
that

critical and

free

through the knowl

that

it is justice

matter above all else.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tacitus'

Works: Texts, Commentaries,

and

and

Translations
Complete Works of Tacitus. New
Biblio-

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di Caligola, Claudio, Nerone. Rendidella Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, classe di scienze morali, storiche e
Osservazioni
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storia

filologiche. Ser. VI, vol. 8, fasc. 5-6 (1932). Quarto Contributo. "L'origine del Tribunato della
Plebe."

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Rostovtzeff, Michael, Storia

economica

sociale

dell'lmpero

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Bollettino dell'lmpero
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his Achievement. Hogarth, W.,

Oxford:

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a note on the persecution of the

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trans., in The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. X, chap. 21. Review of Levi, M., Roma negli studi storici italiani (Turin: L'Erma, Quarto contributo.
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Levi, M., Ottaviano Capoparte: Storia Politica di Roma durante (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1933). Athanaeum, n.s. xm
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Syme, Ronald,

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Clarendon,

Journal of Roman Studies 30 (1940). Review of Sherwin-White, The Roman Journal of Roman Studies 31 (1941). Review of Cochrane, C, Christianity
and

Citizenship

Clarendon,

1939).

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Classical Culture: A Study of

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Journal

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Drexler, Hans, Tacitus, Grundzuge einer politischen Pathologie Diesterweg, 1939); Ciaceri, Emanuele, Tacito (Turin: Unione TipoEditrice Torinese, 1945); Theiler, Willy, "Tacitus und die antike SchicksalsM.:
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alia storia

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di Scipione

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Character
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Early

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Journal

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contributo. studi classici.

Secondo

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Letteratura,
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Syme, Ronald, Tacitus (Oxford: Clarendon,

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con

Introduction to

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Manfredi, M.

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M. (Florence: Sansoni, 1965). Terzo contributo Review of Jones, A., The Later Roman Empire, ford: Blackwell, 1964). Quarto contributo.
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a.d.

284-602, 3

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Review

of

Roman Life, Terzo

2 vols.

Toynbee, A., Hannibal's Legacy: the Hannibalic War's Effects (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Quarto contributo.
degli
studi classici e

on

contributo alia storia

del

mondo antico.

2 vols.

Rome: Edizioni di Storia

Letteratura,

1966.
(18661952)."

"Reconsidering
Quarto
Review

Benedetto Croce

Quarto

contributo. mondo antico.

contributo alia storia

degli

studi classici e

del

Rome:

Edizioni di Storia
of

Letteratura.

ries,

Alfoldi, A., Early Rome and the Latins (Jerome Lectures, 7th Se Michigan Press, 1965). of University Review of Ogilvie, R., A Commentary on Livy, Books 7-5 (Oxford: Claren
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Interpretation
"Polybius between the English
and

the

Turks."

The Seventh J. L. Myres Me

Lecture. Oxford: Holywell, 1975. Classical Philology 36 (1941). Albert. "Agrippa Pappano, Legislation under Tiberius. Middletown: Robert. Criminal Trials and Criminal Rogers,
morial
Postumus."

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American Philological Association, 1935. Dialogue on Oratory: Political

"Tacitus'

Activity

under a

Tyrant."

vols.

Oxford:

Clarendon,

1958.

Ten Studies in Tacitus. Oxford: Clarendon, 1970. The Roman Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon, 1939.

Taine, Hippolyte. Essai sur Tite Live. 4th ed. Paris: Hachette, 1882. Toynbee, Arnold. Hannibal's Italy. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, Von Fritz, Kurt. "Tacitus, Agricola, Domitian, and the Problem of the
sical

1965.

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Clas
1950.

Philology

52

(April

1957).

Walker, Bessie. The Annals of Tacitus. Manchester: Manchester University Press, Waltz, Rene. Vie de Seneque. Paris: Perrin, 1909.
Miscellaneous

Bayle, Pierre. Dictionaire Historique

"Tacite."

et

Critique. Amsterdam: P.

Brunei,

1740.

S.v.

Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. Revised ed. New York: Collier, 1973. in Tucker, Robert, ed., Stalinism, Es Kolakowski, Leszek. "Marxist Roots of says in Historical Interpretation. New York: Norton, 1977. Rush, Myron. Political Succession in the USSR. New York: Columbia University Press,
Stalinism"

1965-

Taine, Hippolyte. Les

ette, 1892.

origines

de la France

contemporaine.

vols. 12th ed.

Paris: Hach

Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de. Memoirs of Raphael, trans. 5 vols. New York: Putnam, Toffanin, Giuseppi. Machiavelli e

the Prince

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1891;

reprint

AMS,

1973.

"HTacitismo."

Padua,

1921.

Credulity

and

Curiosity

in A Tale of a Tub

Richard Burrow
Open University, Great Britain

I
will

wish

to suggest a new
central crux of

interpretation

of

A Tale of a Tub.
where

My
Swift

starting
of

point

be the

"A Digression

Madness,"

on

seems to

for

mulate

the theme of the Tale in the most general terms1. Interpretation

these

two paragraphs tion.

is

problematic

because they
the "common
a

seem

to contain a

double

contradic

In the first,
and

defense
merges

forms"

of

as the rational alternative

to

"Cant

Vision"

into

generally

understood

by Happiness
an

seeming is a

acceptance of the
perpetual of

fact that "what is

well

Possession of being
weak

Deceived,"

and a consequent rejection of

"The Art
neither

publishing Infirmities; Unmasking. the second, the

. . ."In

Employment

and exposing better nor worse than that of

sides"

Sides,

criticism of praise

the exposer of "weak

philosopher who

is

elaborated

on,

while

conversely, there is

for the

"can find

out an

Art to

sodder and patch

ever,

all

this is again
where

How up the Flaws and Imperfections of conclusion contradicted in the to the two surely ironic
who

Nature."

paragraphs,
"soddering"

he

can

"enjoy

the

Fruits

of

this

Art"

noble

(of

and

"patching") is

said

to have

reached

the "sublime

and refined

Point

of

Felicity,
of

called, the Possession of

being

Peaceful State

being

that Swift's own

and

moral realism

Fool among is alluded to in the images

Knaves."2

Deceived; Moreover, many

well

the Serene
critics

feel

of

the "stripped

beau"

the "flayed

woman,"

which

induces them to take the

"curiosity"

attack on

ironically.
"credulity"

These details effectively refute those in these or

"curiosity"

who

find

a straightforward argument
alternative of

for

paragraphs.3

An

possibility

that

Swift's

satire

is purely
to

negative or a mere no

sions,"

which points

final

meaning4

evidence that

Swift has

concealed an

conflicting ten can only be admitted if there is no answer to his riddle in the Tale. I believe

"register

furiously

that there is

a solution which takes

full

account of

the

starkness of
with

Swift's di
the play is

lemma: to

unmask

is

deeply
not

antisocial, but to content oneself

foolish. It is
commends

fudging

the issue to settle

for

a simple compromise such as

curiosity,"5

"Swift
which

but does

idolize intellectual
ed.

for the limits

Press,

i.

A Tale of a Tub (1704),

Nichol Smith & Guthkelch (Oxford: Clarendon

1958),

pp.

I7I-742.

Leavis, "The Irony

Swift"

of

in Swift,

ed.

E. Tuveson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

Swift A of a

1964.)
3.

See for instance, D. Donoghue, Jonathan

andR.

Critical Introduction (Cambridge Univ. Tub:

an

Press, 1971), pp. 7-8, 55-57; PMLA, 66(1951), 441-554. 5.

Elliott, "A Tale

Essay

in Problems

Structure,'

of

R. Adams, Strains of Discord (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958), p. 160. P. Reilly, Jonathan Swift, The Brave Desponder (Manchester Univ. Press, 1982), p. 167.

310
must

Interpretation
set on enquiries could only be established by enquiries which themselves beyond the limits they set. Swift's riddle demands a completely different answer. The biggest clue is the description of the "Life in the common

be

venture sort of

Forms":

his

lives such a life has no "Thought of subduing Multitudes to his Reasons or his Visions; and the more he shapes his Under Power, standing by the Pattern of Human Learning, the less he is inclined to form Parties
a man who
own after

his

particular

Notions; because
Ignorance

that instructs
of

him in his

private

Infirmities,

as well as

in the

stubborn

the

People."

My suggestion is that these lines reveal Swift's subject to be, not simply the desirability of enquiry, but also the desirability of communicating the results of
one's enquiries. courages
Notions"

Swift does
who

the man

dis say that the "Pattern of Human from "shapes his it "particular by forming
not
understanding"

Learning"

potentially in conflict that it disinclines him from "forming

which are

with

the "common
after

Forms,"

but

rather

Parties"

these

"Notions."

Similarly,
to the
at

exposing weak Sides, and publishing dissemination of insights into the depths rather than the
the "Art
of

Infirmities"

seems to refer

process of of

arriving

them in the
publicize

first

place.

To

"unmask"

is

not

to realize the

falsity

the play but to

pher who
of

realization. Swift also distinguishes carefully between the philoso "patches up the Flaws of and the man who "enjoy [s] the Fruits this noble The former is not himself deluded but encourages delusion in

that

Nature"

Art."

others.

gravely back with Information and Discov eries that in the inside they [the Depths] are good for (my italics). This, I would suggest, is in harmony with the as a whole, which culmi
the
then comes
"Digression"

Moreover, the Depth of Things, and

"curious"

philosopher

is

criticized

because he "enters into

nothing"

nates

in

an assault on

the modern rhetoric of enlightenment

"Cartesius
so

reck

oned

to see before he

died,

the Sentiments of all

Philosophers, like
own

many

lesser Stars in his Romantick System, rapt and drawn within his and in a warning which concerns the expression of thought
thought itself: "... it is
a

Vortex"

rather

than the
pass

Fool in

one

Company,

fatal Miscarriage, so ill to order Affairs, as to when in another you might be treated as a

for

Philosopher"

(Tale,

pp. 167-68). suggestion

My

is that those

critics are right who

find
the

an echo of

Swift's

own

moral realism

in the

curious philosopher's

probing

of

depths, but

that his ap

proval of such enquiries

"unmasking."

is perfectly This is because Swift

consistent with
makes a radical

his disapproval

of a general

distinction between

the

few

who
not

"curiosity."

enjoy enquiring into the depths and the many, whose predominant passion is This distinction first comes to light in the account of the man "passes his Life in the
of
Forms."

who

common
philosopher"

His

"Notions"

resemble

the

"discoveries"

the "curious
Infirmities"

in that they

are

both

unpleasant

in

sense
lusion,"

"private

which always

difficult to promulgate, unlike "a strong De "operates from without, as vigorously as from
and such a man and

The difference between

as at

the "curious

philoso

is
of such a

not

inward,

first appears, but

outward:

"the

'Understanding'

man"

has been

Credulity
"shaped to

and

Curiosity

in A Tale

of a

Tub

-311

by the Pattern of Human come "gravely back with

pertinent

Learning,"

which

informs him that it is

unwise of

Informations"

depths. This is
which

because he is
"outside"

also said not

concerning the worthlessness to be in a "State of

preferable

the

Serenity,"

indicates that the

is

In"

"infinitely

to the

for

everyone.

There

are unobtrusive qualifications

in the

argument as

it

progresses: we are

told that "what

of being

well

is generally understood Deceived"; but this may

by

Happiness"

is "a perpetual Possession

"general
un

constitute a criticism of that

popular not

derstanding"

and
evidence

imply

that there is another less

definition. There is because they

are

also

that the persona is repelled

by

the

depths,

inher

Happiness."

ently repulsive, but because he himself pursues "what is generally He is, I would suggest, naturally disposed to be
"curious,"

understood

by
ex

"credulous"

rather

than
periments

like those

who propagate and

"curious"

believe "Cant but

Vision."

and

His

imitate those

of the

philosopher

are not embarked on out

of curiosity.

Rather, they
that

are undertaken as a rather wearisome

task, "in

order when

to

save

the Charges

of all such expensive

Anatomy

for the Time to

Nature."

come,"

he

is already

convinced

such enquiries

"pervert

The

persona

is to be

taken seriously as a spokesman

few,
that

which explains most men are

why disposed to
on

critics

for the majority of men, but not for the find both a seriousness in Swift's demonstration
delusions
and an

"curious"

relish

irony

in his

proof

that

hap

piness must

be based

delusions.
same problem

However,
the
"curious"

this merely seems to raise the

in

different form
as much a

man who cannot communicate

Knaves"

his discoveries is

"Fool

among
argument against strates
sisted.

as

those who are taken in

Delusion."

by every "strong
which and must

The

"unmasking"

ignores the fact

"curious"

the Tale amply demon

that the deluded fanatic

is politically dangerous
"credulous."

be actively

re

However,

the

fact that the

cannot reveal

the truth does not nec

are still

essarily leave them at the mercy Swift calls the "common

"depths"

of the

There

the opinions

Forms,"

which, as we
of

have seen,

are no closer to the

than the "Cant and

Vision"

the

fanatic; but

which at

least

conserve

order, if only because

ous"

they

are widespread and traditional.

even though

It is

open

to the "curi

man sity.

to defend these vigorously

that the true
mentions

he himself recognizes their fal

argument

would suggest when

conclusion of

Swift's

is

provided

by

the persona
and

he

the belief that Brutus

Publick"

"only
175).

personated

the Fool

Madman, for

the Good of the

(Tale,
must

p.

The

difficulty
whom

here is that Swift himself

be

numbered

maskers"

he criticizes, if,
less

as I have argued, the "common

"Cant"

among the "un are here

Forms" "unmask"

revealed complex

to be

no

delusory

than the

of

the fanatic. I believe that the this difficulty. To

form

of the

digression is designed to
of those who

avoid

is to
eral

destroy

the delusions
as

understanding

"a

perpetual

define happiness according to the "gen If a way Possession of being well

Deceived."
"curious,"

could could

be found to be

address

freely

admitted.

only the The obscurity

then the

falsity

of

the

"Forms"

of

the digression allows

Swift to

address

312

Interpretation
the need to defend the
"Forms"

his

remarks on

skepticism about
"curious"

those

readers who will

only to those who are disposed to in the first place, for only these are likely to be puzzle over the problems set by the digression until
Nature"

"Forms"

they penetrate to some of its secrets. Those who "cream off hand, will also stick to the witty surface of the Tale, "leaving Dregs, for Philosophy and Reason to lap
up."

on

the other
and

the

Sower

the

Swift later
to
gain

"curiosity"

acknowledges upon

that
gentle

is the

"Handle"

by

which

he hopes distinc

"a firm Hold

Readers"

[his]

(Tale,

p.

203);

while the

tion between the superficial and the enquiring reader is stressed in the next sec tion of the
Madness"

Tale,
is

where

the persona discusses the effects that the "Digression on

various readers:

likely

to have on

Readers may be divided into three Classes, the Superficial, the Ignorant, and the Learned: And I have with much Felicity fitted my Pen to the Genius and Advantage the of each. The Superficial Reader will be strangely provoked to Laughter.
.

Ignorant Reader (between

former the Distinction is extremely nice) will find himself disposed to Stare; which is an Admirable Remedy for ill Eyes, serves to raise and enliven the Spirits, and wonderfully helps Perspiration. But the Reader
whom and

the

tmly Learned, chiefly for

find
sufficient pp. 184-85).

whose

Benefit I wake,

when others

Matter to employ his Speculations for the

rest of

will here sleep his Life (Tale,

. . .

I believe

we should see

in this

more

than a satire on esotericism.

Swift implies only

a

that his text quite

deliberately
the Tale.

distinguishes between
who

readers and allows

few

a sight of

its depths. Those

aged are

to

understand

They

are not

desire only entertainment inclined to or

"stare"

are not encour

which reader

"perspire,"

the outward signs of a fertile the text. The

"curious"

bafflement,
of

which

leads the
and

"ignorant"

to

puzzle over

dichotomy
the
crux arise and

"ignorant"

"superficial"

corresponds

to that of the

"credulous."

and of

The difficulties
teachings to those

the

"laugh"

who

because Swift is addressing contradictory those who The "common

"stare." "credulous"

Forms"

first

come

to light as the rational alternative to

are to

delusions. Accus
readers

tomed as
are

they

reading the persona's words

Forms"

ironically,
is

"superficial"

unlikely

to see that the attack on

"unmasking"

serious.

They
reason

will

not en

recognize quiries

that belief in the "common

is incompatible

"curious"

with

into the depths. If the

will
Forms"

criticism of the

"cutting,

opening"

is taken

seriously, it the
common

teach a salutary lesson. It is not made evident that the "Life in

of

those who "shape their

a

Understanding by
"unmasking."

the Pattern

of

Human

Learning"

is primarily

refraining from
"unmasking"

Leavis's

puzzled

recognition that the criticism of

"curiousity"

and planned

is

not

simply

ironic (see above) is the reaction Swift The puzzlement may give way to

"learning"

only for his if it is sufficiently intense

as

"curious"

readers.

believe, is
ill
Eyes."

what

Swift

meant

by describing
the
next

As I have

indicated,

staring step is to find in the

"an

admirable

this, I Remedy for

"un-

criticism of

Credulity
municate

and

Curiosity

in A Tale

of a

Tub

-313

masking,"

not an attack on philosophical

the results of those enquiries

enquiry itself, but on those who com indiscriminately. Finally, Swift's advice
certain sur

merely conceal certain depths but actively defend faces, "personating the Fool for the Good of the Public."6

is

that we must not

One
mon

problem remains: must

if the

conclusion of

Swift's

argument

is that the "com

Forms"

even on a

be supported, why does Swift bother to present this argument, submerged level? Why did he not simply put into practice the conclu he had
arrived at without

sions which

vertly admitting their

view

delusory

endangering the "common by co character? Clearly, one answer follows from the
at

Forms"

that the

search

for knowledge brings happiness,

"curiosity"

least to

few: Swift

would wish
sake.

to encourage the

of some of
practical reason

However,
as

there is also a
robust

purely for its own for Swift's discussion of the argu

readers
"curious"

his

ments which

led to his

defence

in the text is

deeply

political as

"Forms"; indeed this his defence of Anglicanism, since it

of

the

level

attempts

to avert the threat

more

posed

to

religion

itself

by

the

"unmasker,"

who

is potentially

dangerous than the

apparent

"credulous"

fanatic.
where

This is
purpose of
who

in the

"Preface,"

the persona affirms that the main

penetrating"

the Tale is to

oppose

the "numerous and

Hobbist wits, (we

can note

"pick Holes in the

surface/depths

weak sides of

Religion

Government"

and

how the

imagery

pervades

the Tale). The strange

thing is

that the

"Grandees"

who oppose

the wits seem

inadvertently

to admit the justice of their

which

criticisms,

when

they interpret the

of

whale as

"Hobs's Leviathan,

tosses and

plays with all

Schemes

Religion

and

Government,

whereof a great

many

are

Rotation"

hollow, and dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to (Tale, pp. 39-40). However, when they come to interpret the tub which
with,"

the

whale "tosses and plays they do not draw the conclusion that it refers criti which is there cally to the established regime, but identify it with the Tale itself,

upon commissioned to
parable

divert the freethinkers from

on a

their destructive work.

The im

thus has an

innocent meaning, but also,

less

noticeable

level,

an

freethinkers'

plication

that Swift is secretly in

agreement with

the

criticisms of

Church
I
runs

and

State. Swift
counters

will argue that

the freethinkers

by

a concealed argument that

throughout the Tale. On this level he

although

admits

the

falsity
on a

of

the "common
of

Forms,"

he

appears
readers.

to demonstrate their validity

level

the text
of

"superficial"

aimed at

Swift's
and

skepticism comes

to light only as a part

his

"unmasking"

opposition

to
good of

public."

the fool for the

the

his advocacy The seriousness

of

the practice of
of

"personating
is
re

his

political purpose

vealed throughout

by the lengths he goes to in order to conceal the Tale's depths.

to
suggest a context

6. There is little

space

for Swift's thought here. One

can

briefly

point

to

Plato's Statesman for

tional beliefs

the same paradoxical

combination of

far-reaching

skepticism

and reluctance

to

criticize

them openly (see especially, 300e-30ia.

regarding tradi See also the Repub

lic

538a-e).

314 The

Interpretation
"Introduction"

opens with an a
Crowd."7

enquiry into the

methods

by

which one can

"be heard in
pher cannot

It is

at once

intimated that the because the

Hearing"

philosopher qua philoso

be

"Foundations"

a powerful rhetorician

of

his

"Basket"

are

"often
a

out of
Crowd"

Sight,
one of a

and ever out of

(Tale,
must

pp.

55-56).

To "be be

heard in
come a and

three "Oratorial
or a writer of

Machines"

be

used: one must

preacher,
of

poet,

"Productions designed for the Pleasure

personas reifications and
Madness,"

Delight

Mortal

Man."

Concealed beneath the

his Modernist

assumptions we
philosopher

namely that the

within

find the teaching of the "Digression on depths to must emerge from the
"curious"

work

the

"credulous"

sphere

if he

wishes

to have

any influence

over the major

ity

of people.

The

retreat

from philosophy is
rhetorical

a movement towards religion or

"entertainment."

The

satire on

Lucretian

theory
in

which

quotation on

the title page

of

the Tale reveals

a passage

follows is obscure, but the the nature of Swift's interest in De

the poet claims to be the first

Rerum Natura: it is taken from

popularizer of

which

Greek
to

philosophy.

In his

egalitarian rhetoric of

enlightenment,

Lucretius

attempts

bring the philosopher's basket down to earth and give equal

"if the Audience be
lost."8

shares of words to all: a

Share,

and

little
.

or
. .

"yet

more refined

nothing is Structure

well compact, every one carries home Contrasted to this, I would suggest, is the
"refinement"

of our

Modern Theatres": the

which allows

is that
to de

they

are constructed on a number of

levels,

"weighty
Colony"

Matter"

scend to

the

"critics"

in the pit,

while

the more entertaining and superficial ele

ments soar

Here,

up to be "greedily Swift introduces the major theme

multileveled

intercepted"

by

"suitable

(Tale,

p.

61).

of

the remainder of the

"Introduction,"

namely, the

text,

which caters

for

all

the different types of reader,

revealing its deepest

The
executioner's
"Poetry"

meanings

only to the

"critics"

among them.
the three
"Machines."

ladder is the

second of

It

represents

"Faction."

and, mysteriously,

Swift tells us, in

one of

the Tale's most

.
.

deliberately enigmatic passages, that it because climbing up by slow Degrees,

they
pp.
can reach within

is "an

adequate symbol of sure to turn

Poetry

many Steps

of

[its orators] off before the Top: And because it is a Preferment at

Tuum"

Fate is

tained

by transferring of Property, and a confounding of Meum and 62-63). By linking poetry both to faction and criminality Swift
to the

(Tale,
recalls the

idea, familiar

Renaissance,
also protects a

that the poet stands outside the common as

sumptions and values of

his society; but

der he implies that it before they

7.

those values in a sense:

Propriety."

by comparing it to the executioner's lad Many are "turned

The distinctive
the

off"

can

"attain

transferring
indicating
Tub,"

of that the

aspect of

po-

"Reason in Madness follows

reveals
crowd."

This is technically a divisio, A Tale of A

subject of pp.

Tale is

rhetoric

H. Kelling,
that what
a

PMLA, 69 (1954),

198-222.

would add

Swift's theme to be the tension between philosophy

attempt to popularize

and the need to

"be heard in
Lucretius"

Greek philosophy see L. Strauss, "Notes Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 92.

8. For

Lucretius'

on

in

Credulity

and

Curiosity

in A Tale

of a

Tub

-315

etry is its ability to select those fitted to question the "common readers to "climb up by slow to its critique of established
Degrees"

Forms"

by forcing
the "In

customs.

That this is Swift's

troduction,"

view

is, I believe,

confirmed

in the final

section of

where
charge of

the persona moves on to exonerate

Grub Street from the

triviality, and to blame its low reputation on the "superficial Vein among many Readers of the present Age, who will by no means be persuaded to inspect beyond the Surface and the Rind of Because "Wisdom is a
Things."
.

Nut,

Tooth, pay the "Grubean Sages have always chosen to con nothing but a vey their Precepts and their Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and which has meant that "transitory Gazers have so dazzled their Eyes, and
which unless you chuse with
Worm,"

Judgement, may

cost you a

and

you with

Fables,"

fill'd their Imaginations

yond

with

the

Lustre"

outward

that

they have

not

looked be

the surface of the text.

The

persona

compleat and
which

laborious Dissertation

upon the prime

hopes to rectify this, and "travel in a Productions of our Society,

of superficial

besides their beautiful Externals for the Gratification

Read

ers, have

darkly

and

deeply
and

couched under
Arts"

Systems The

of all

Sciences

(Tale,

pp.

them, the 66-67). in his

most

finished

and refined

persona'

s project

does

not make sense

own

terms, for if
to the

wisdom

is

dangerous in the way he outlines, what purpose can it concealments of the Grub Street "Sages"? This alerts easy to account convincingly for the Tale's frequent
was

serve to remove the careful

us

fact

that

it is

not

assaults on

occultism, which
pp.

hardly

a serious threat at the time

Swift

was

writing (e.g.

97-99,

126-

29> I55-57 185-87,

Tooth."

285).

As I have demonstrated, the

serious about the

"curiosity"

paragraph

indicates that Swift is secretly a The reference to

dom is
significant

idea that

wisdom

Socrates'

"outward

Lustre"

which
mistaken:

may "cost you concealed his wis

Socrates'

wisdom here because it is only partially "Lustre."9 The real drift of the was hidden, but by his ugliness rather than his satire is precisely opposed to the apparent one: Swift is ridiculing the persona's
"unmasking"

project of sors

rather than

the concealments of his Grub Street predeces to the Ancients in their

and
opposition

(who bear

an

intriguing
strikes

resemblance

to

the "two Junior start up

Societies,"

Gresham

Wills, Tale,
disparate

p.

64).
trivial

The
and

"Introduction"

the

reader at

first

as a

collection of

is ex entertaining satires, but amined closely. Swift's reasoning on this level is as follows: since the majority of people are not philosophically inclined they must be influenced through their
a concealed argument comes

to light

if the

text

religious

belief

and through their

"curious"

love

of entertainment, while

be

reserved

for the

reader, because it

is dangerous
and utilizes

or unlawful

philosophy must in some teachings, if

common

unspecified way.
we can

The Tale itself both illustrates

persona's and
. . .

its

own

believe the

typically
. .

grandiose claim

that

in "the

En

tertainments of Wit

Style

as well as the

more profound and mystical most applauded Orig-

Part,
9.

[he

has]

throughout this

Treatise closely followed the

See Plato's Symposium

215-22.

316
inals"

Interpretation

(Tale,

p.

71).

The implication
to his
a
Sight"

Swift's

irony

is

often closer

real

study is that the literal level of meaning than he indicates. The persona's
of this

concern with
pher's

"being

heard in
out of

Crowd"

is

also

Swift's,
the

which

is why the
that

philoso

basket is "often
argues

in the Tale.
on
grounds

Wotton

that Swift

is

freethinker
and

Anglicanism is
symbolized

implicated in the
a coat
10

satire of

Catholicism
upon

Puritanism,

as

it

too

is

by
p.

(Wotton's "Observations
There is
some evidence

the Tale of a
view

Tub"

(1705), in Tale,
"surface"

322).

for this
"a

coats are

clearly

in

work which at one point represents popular

delusions

as surfaces. as well as
body."

Moreover,
Nastiness"

Swift

alludes p.

to the

role of clothes as

cover

for Lewdness
the naked

(Tale,
ground

78):

Clothes both hide

coat

and protect a

When Jack
pp.
199-

away his

he "proceeded he does

Heathen

Philosopher"

(Tale,

200).

Yet if this is Swift's

aspect of

point

not encourage

his

readers

to notice it. The

Christianity which
is
a

first

comes

to light is its injunction against covetous

ness, ambition and pride,

74).

which

the brothers gradually begin to neglect

(Tale,

p.

delusion it is surely a healthy one. Moreover, Wotton's Christianity account omits the very obvious fact that the Tale first strikes the majority of read ers as a satire on the two principal enemies of Anglicanism. The implications of
If
the comparison of

Christianity to
Church
and

the coats
a

remain

implications, like

the Observ
para

er's comparison of

State to

hollow tub. Like the Observer's defense

Anglicanism

ble, Swift's allegory doubles

lished
"Forms."

as a radical critique and a robust

of estab

Swift's

satirical

defence

of

constitutes

his descent

from the
ace"

philosopher's

basket to the Pulpit

Envy,"

and

the Stage-itinerant. As the "Pref

explains, satire is supremely entertaining precisely because it does not touch personally,
or

readers

"raise their

but flatters them

with a

feeling of supe
the Noncon
render

riority (Tale,

pp. 50-53).

The

attempt

is less to humble the

pride of

formists than to

channel that of

the Anglicans. In this way Swift hopes to

the idea of an established religion

fashionable
simply

once

again.12

However,
torialism"

the

allegory does

not

constitute

the Tale's, surface:

Catholicism.13

"Sar-

parodies materialistic philosophies as well as

On this

level it

represents a society in which the are observed outwardly but no longer believed in. The realization that "Religion is a threatens public
Cloak"

"Forms"

morality.
torialists'

Swift

stresses the

inevitability
. . .

of

the practical consequence

of

the

Sar-

metaphysics

heavily: "These Postulata

The
of

being
of

admitted, it

will

follow
cyni-

in due Course

of

Reasoning

"grandees"

Sartorial society
SP,

are

10. See also M. Dargan, "The Nature Rawson, "The Character of Swift's
11.

Allegory

as

Used

by

Swift,"

13(1916). 155-79; C.
,

Satire"

in Focus

Enlightenment Essays, 3, 41-46. See Sheridan, one of Swift's early biographers, in Swift, The Critical Heritage, Williams (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 227.
12. 13.

way Gulliver's clothes M. Byrd, "Gulliver's Clothes: an Enlightenment

recalls the

One

Swift (London: Sphere, 1 97 1 ) p. 56. disguised his physical resemblance to the Yahoos
on
Motif."

ed.

K.

P. Harth, Swift

and

Anglican Rationalism (Chicago: Univ.

of

Chicago Press, 1961),

p.

84.

Credulity
cal

and

Curiosity
to the

in A Tale

of a

Tub

-317

in their

attitude are no

moral

imperatives
stem

which

they

are supposed

to obey, be

cause

they

longer thought to
Mobile"

vested

by
in

the Primum

by

man.

To be "styled
a certain

Judge"

ultimately from God. "The Stars are in in the most literal sense: justice is invented only it is enough that "certain Ermins and Furs be
pp. 77-79). with
Sartorialists'

Position"

placed

(Tale,

Swift
Gulph"

could not

be

said

to disagree

the

vision of

the "horrid
reli

beneath the

"Superficies"

(Tale,

p. 76).

After all, he himself figures

gion as a cloak.

He reveals, however, that

"grandees"

when

this knowledge begins to perme

opened to

ate through

the

of a

society the door is

scheming knaves,
pretense of
Criticks"

who propagate

"strong

Delusions."

Nevertheless,

the

Sartorialists'

belief is better than

mates.

open

atheism,

as

the "Digression concerning

inti

Here,

the satire seems to be directed at the Modern critic's

concentration

on

the

negative aspects of

the texts he examines, but Swift is attacking something

emphasis.

more aims

threatening
to ".
. .

than a

failure in

The

anti-Herculean

Modern

critic

hunt the Monstrous Faults bred

from his Den
...

within

[texts]: to

drag

out

the

lurking Errors like Cacus

gerous

Or

else to drive

away

a sort of

Dan

Fowl, who have a perverse Inclination to plunder the best Branches of the Tree of Knowledge, like those Stymphalian Birds that eat up the (Tale, p. unpleasant but are not simply 95). Now the actively dangerous, and
Fruit"

"Faults"

Swift's warning,

as

in the "Digression
of them.
who

Madness,"

on

is directed

at

those who

communicate their opponents of of

knowledge

To these
voiced

we can contrast

the traditional

the Modern critic,

no

have

their opinion "with abundance

Hieroglyphick"

Caution, adventuring
and

farther than
who

Mythology
of

and

(Tale,

p.

97),

the "Dangerous
need

Fowl,"

delight in knowledge but

Caution"

keep

it to them

selves.

The

for Swift's

own

"abundance

is

evident when we

consider that the subject of the

tual criticism which

allegory is biblical criticism, and that the new tex Swift satirizes here had been used to deny that a single, au
the Bible
existed.14

thoritative
at which

version of

It is

a measure of

the

greater

depth

the digressions

operate compared
alone admit

to the that

main allegory, as well as of

Swift's secretiveness, that they

tative text

errors

may it

reside

in the

authori

itself,
the

rather

than the interpolations of the

"curious"

critics.
"superficial"

The allegory
readers at

illustrates this

point even as

entertains

expense of

the Catholics and the Calvinists. Thus Jack and Martin

and

(who

represent

the Protestant dissenters

regime

the Anglican church)

keep their crit

his
corruption

icism

of

Peter's

to themselves at

first, but
realize

finally

rebel

openly, after the

rediscovery

of the will

has led them to his

the full extent of

"revolution,"

(Tale,
of

pp.

117-22).

Swift's
that

approval of opposition

Martin's
to

and

his

critique

Errors"

Sartorialism

reveal

"dragging
outward

out

lurking

does
of a will

he simply advocates a passive, fool among knaves). The ways the two brothers use are covert paradigms of the way all private insights into the flaws
not mean that
Tub,"

conformity (the life their knowledge of the

of

the

"com-

14.

J. Levine, "The Design

of

A Tale

of a

ELH, 33 (1966),

pp.

198-217.

318
mon

Interpretation
should and should not

Forms"

be

used.

point

beyond the
the

"credulous"

sphere, the rediscovery of the

of

Since the allegory cannot overtly divine law takes the

Madness."

"curious"

place of

discoveries

the "Digression on
makes

Through the
man

example of

Martin, Swift
.

the

general point

that the wise

actively defends certain salutary beliefs which he knows to be false. We are told that, where Martin ". observed the Embroidery to be workt so close, as
.

not

to be got away without

damaging

the

Cloth,

or where

it

served

to hide or

strengthen

ering
jury"

of

any Flaw in the Body of the Coat, contracted by the perpetual tamp Workmen upon it; he concluded the wisest Course was to let it remain,
no p.

resolving in

(Tale,

Case whatsoever, that the Substance of the Stuff should suffer In 136). In Swift's account the Anglican reformers understand that Christians because they have been brought up to be
central
"unmasking"

most people are

so.

To in

form them suddenly that doctrines they had considered no longer officially recognized would be a disruptive lead to
a more

to their faith are

which might

far-reaching
a part

skepticism.

Martin

accepts

that superstition must

continue to

play

in the Anglican Church.

"Embroidery"
"hide"

My

suggestion

is that there is

an

implicit analogy between Peter's both are surfaces which and

trates Plato's
promote

and the coats

"strengthen."

themselves, since Through Martin, Swift illus

teaching

that

it is

unwise

to reveal the

falsity

of traditions which

honorable

behaviour.15

He

shows also

that this

recognition

does
as

not

lead to

passivity:

the philosopher may institute positive

"credulous"

reforms as

long

he

works within

the

sphere.
Kind"

In the "Digression in the Modern

sected the several

the persona explains that he has "dis

many useful Lectures upon the both and till at last it smelt so strong, I could Parts, contained; containing preserve it no Nevertheless, he is "ready to shew a very compleat Anat
of

Carcass

Humane Nature,

and read

longer."

omy thereof to all curious Gentlemen and ments have shown him "that the Publick Good
and

Others"

(Tale,

p.

123).

His

experi

of

Mankind is

performed

by

two

Ways, Instruction, accordingly throughout his Divine Treatise, [he has] skilfully kneaded up both together with a Layer of (Tale, p. 124). The persona is illogical in the same way as in the
Diversion
....

and

Dulce"

"Introduction,"

where

the recognition that

wisdom

is

nut, "which unless

you chuse with

Worm,"

Judge

ment, may cost you a

vent

Tooth,

and

pay

you with

nothing but
cannot

did

not pre

him from

"displaying by
Dulce,"

Incision"

the secret meanings of

his

more prudent

predecessors.
under a

Here he discovers that discoveries

of

be

communicated except

"Layer

but,

rather

than putting his knowledge into practice,

he

freely

reveals

the

results of
and

experiments,

by

which

he himself is revolted, to
opposition

"all

curious

Gentlemen

others."

The italics indicate Swift's

"nostrum"

to in

discriminate
The

enlightenment.

persona goes on to advertise a miraculous of

by

which
"
.

"an in

finite Number
Republic

Abstracts, Summaries, Compendiums, Extracts

may be

15.

538d-e.

Credulity
immediately
as

and

Curiosity

in A Tale

of a

Tub

-319

absorbed;

and then to

deny

that Homer was "as eminent a Cabbalist

his Disciples

"gross Ignorance
as

since he betrays among other things a in the Common Laws of this Realm, and in the Doctrine as well the Discipline of the Church of (Tale, pp. 126-28). The satire on
would represent
England"
Moderns'

Him,"

the persona's occultism obscures Swift's opposition to the

make

devices to

learning

easily accessible;

while

the esoteric meanings he hopes to

we

find in
his de

Homer
search cays

are so ephemeral and absurd

that it is these that

laugh

at rather than

itself. Between the

superficial

diversion into

which

Modern
a

learning

in Section VII ("I have

sometimes

heard

of an

Iliad in

Nutshell; but it hath

Iliad"

been my Fortune to have

143)
and

much oftener seen a

Nutshell in

an

Tale,

p.

the

"dragging

out of

lurking
texts.
and

Errors,"

there is a compromise, exem

"curious"

plified

by

Homer's

multileveled

The digressions thus discuss

meanings. which

illustrate the

proper

way to convey
with

They

complement
man

the allegory,

which

deals

the

methods

by

the wise

can

benefit the

"credulous"

majority.

Here,

albeit on a

"credulous"

level,

where

the authority of the Bible is taken for granted, Martin's

combination of private skepticism and public support

for Anglicanism

also repre

sents a mean

in this

case

between the

Sartorialists'

unconcerned outward con outward. refers not

formity
of

Aeolists'

and

the

rejection of

everything

Aeolism, like Sartorialism

"Martinism,"

and

Christianity
find in the

but to

a particular view of the use to which

Forms"

simply to the history knowledge of the

"weak
who

sides"

of

the "common

should

be

put.

would agree with critics

freethinkers16

portrayal of

Aeolism

a satire on

Hobbist

without

"superficial"

denying

the importance of the

"forms."

satire on
would argue

Puritanism

by

which

Swift

himself defends the

the Puritans in their
more

that the dangerous

outspokenness of

attempt

to

restore

the true, divine law is analogous to an even

dangerous

effort on

the part of the freethinkers to convey the truth about

Aeolists'
"mysteries."

that law.

In language that

parodies

Hobbes Swift

satirizes the

they believe that wind "ought not to be cov but freely communicated to etously hoarded up, stifled or hid under a Bushel, equal of others and Weight, the Wise Aeolists, Mankind. Upon these Reasons,
Swift
concentrates on

their

rhetoric:

affirm the gift of portrayal of

belching, to be the

noblest

Act

of a

Rational

Creature."

The

the Aeolists lends a

universal significance

to Jack's destructive ef

forts to

restore

his

coat

to

its

original state. need

Here,

all rhetorical theories which

deny
ers

that there is an

occasional

to hide the truth

are satirized.
and

Jack is

Swift's cautionary illustration;

that the
strength of

Nonconformists warning both the

Forms"

freethink

the "common
"Forms"

resides

in their
result

traditional character.

To

reveal the

falsity

of the

is

more

likely

to

in anarchy than
of

radi

cal reform

(Tale,

pp. 150-53)-

Swift
16.

concludes

the

section

by
of

"Frontiers emphasizing that the

Tub,'"

Height

and
pp.

R. Hopkins, "The Personation

Hobbism in Swift's 'A Tale

of a

PQ, 45 (1966),

372-78.

320

Interpretation
other."

Depth, border
enemies

upon each

He has indeed

shown

that materialists are the

of enthusiasts point

but

share with them a common outspokenness.

opposition gods

Swift
as

drives home the

that his

to the Aeolist devil

(materialism) is
"the

deep

as

his

contempt

for their windy

in his hostile

portrayal of

Camel-

ion, sworn Foe to Inspiration, who in Scorn, devoured large Influences of their The nature of Swift's God; without refunding the smallest Blast by
Eructation."

alternative

to both

is indicated

"devil,"

by

the second

".

huge terrible Mon

with
with

ster,
all

called

their

Interest"

Moulinavent, who with four strong Arms, waged eternal Battel Divinities, dextrously turning to avoid their Blows, and repay them (Tale, pp. 158-60). The windmill is an apt symbol for the
most men

"curious"

man, who, realizing that happiness for

is "a
of

perpetual

Possession in
all

of

being
and

Deceived,"

well

and that so

there is

no

"Quality

Mind,

where

Nations

Ages

of the
of

World have

or

Tincture

Enthusiasm"

unanimously agreed, as that of a Fanatick Strain, (Tale, p. 266), decides to utilize the most benign of
"credulity"

the

manifestations

of this

general

rather which

than making a pointless

(Chameleon-like)
most

effort

to remove delusions

universal,

psychological need.

The

same point

spring from a deep, and al is made via the ironic paral

of wise men which pp.

lels Swift draws between the Aeolists

were

and

the secret societies

believed

by

many to have controlled the oracles

(Tale,

155-57).

Through Martin, the Tale's allegory indicates that the

the extremes of disruptive unmasking
knaves"

curious man

may

avoid

(Aeolism)

and

the passivity

of

the "fool

among Propagation

(Sartorialism). The
Religion"

enigmatic

Moulinavent

passage suggests that

the advice to Wotton to turn from "vain

of a new

Philosophy"

and concentrate on

"the

is

advice concludes a
with respect

discussion

of

meant seriously in a way (Tale, p. 169). This how to "distinguish and adapt [one's words],
Times"

to the Differences of Persons and of

"Introduction,"

(p. 168),

which was

initiated in the less

where

the Pulpit was the

with

first

alternative to

the
a

popular philosopher's

basket for those

"curious"

"an Ambition to be heard in

crowd."

actions"

greatest
ing"

The melancholic, if he "shapes his

man can

indeed become the "author

of the

Understanding by
Forms"

the Pattern of Human Learn

171).
Spirit,"

and

In

"pass[es] his Life in the common (Tale, pp. 162, postscript to the Tale, the "Mechanical Operation of the
his
concept of a

Swift As in
to the
and

elaborates on

playing the "Fool for the Good

of mechanism

of

the

Public."

Section VIII, there is satire on Puritanism

again

parody

running beneath
or

and counter

addressed

to the

"credulous"

"superficial"

reader,
of

secrecy is

a major

theme: the persona constantly speaks

divulging"

himself

as an

initiate,

who must

be "excused from

or

is

not

"allowed to

discover"

many of the secrets of the Mechanical Operators (Tale, pp. 270 and 273). This directs our attention to a paradox: his argument is that since the majority will "be born to Heaven
enthusiasm"

upon

in

order

it is necessary to simulate "religious nothing but [an] to be of any benefit to them. However, his careful analysis
would, if taken seriously, the
"credulous"

Ass"

of

the "spiritual

mechanism,"

itself

render

the tech

nique

useless,

since

it depends

on

audience

believing the "enthu-

Credulity
to

and

Curiosity
origin.

in A Tale

of a

Tub
not

321
taken seriously

siasm"

be

of

divine

The fact that it is

is, I

would

suggest, a measure of
pretenses.

Swift's

superior caution rather

than of any scorn for such

It is the

openness of

the

persona's materialism which

is

satirized.

The

"fragment"

culminates

in the

persona's argument of

that religion is a subli

Mysteries"
.

mation of sexual

desire. Orpheus, "one

the Institutors of

which

communicate castrated

exemplify this fact, "was torn in Pieces by Women, because he refused to his Orgyes to them; which others explained, by telling us, he had

tension

himself upon Grief, for the Loss between the institutor of the cult former is
not

of

his

Wife"

(Tale,

p. 285).

There is

and

that the

himself

moved man's

by

its votaries, arising from the fact the passions on which he plays. The
which

principal object of

the

"curious"

desire is knowledge,

distinguishes

him from the majority of men. If he wishes to exert an influence over the "credu he must disguise this distinction. One must marvel at the skill with which
lous"

Swift

avoids

arousing

a similar

animosity in the Tale. Once laid bare, his teach

on

ing

is

exposed

to the charge of paternalism from those who reassess his view that

because they be lieve that the majority are capable of rationally perceiving the importance of vir tuous action for themselves or because their sights are not set on promoting
political

society is best founded

the "common

Forms,"

either

virtue

but

on

ensuring that

all are

free to

pursue

happiness

as

they

conceive

it.

PUBLIUS:
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM
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by

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Pluralism,
and

the

Public Good
of

the

Problem

Self-Government in The Federalist

Kenneth L. Grasso
Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos

INTRODUCTION

In

recent

years, American

public

life has been

vague,

increasingly

afflicted

by

mood of

anxiety,

by

pervasive,

albeit

perception that somewhere

the line

something has gone wrong. In the political arena, this manifested itself in a crisis of public confidence, in a widely held
American
political system no
amiss

perception

along has

feeling

that the

longer

"works."

But

although the suspicion that

something is
gone

is widespread, there is

no agreement as to

precisely

what

has

wrong George F. Will,

and why. one of the nation's most articulate and erudite

journalists,

gives over a

promises

goodly portion of his recent volume, Statecraft As Soulcraft, to what to be a widely read examination of these Will believes very
questions.'

merely survey recent American political and cultural history to ver accuracy of the widely shared intuition that something is seriously amiss. American culture, he believes, is drowning in the sea of an aggressively hedonis

that one need

ify the

tic ethic, subversive of the minimal norms of

public

civility necessary to
an

functioning

order,

not to mention

the higher spiritual aspirations of Western Civiliza

no

tion. Our political life has fared

better. Absent

munity

and conception of

the common good,

our

overarching sense of com polity has splintered into a

The result of this fragmenta narrowly self-seeking "interest tion of the body politic is something approaching political paralysis. Our govern ment has become increasingly incapable of taking decisive, purposive action to
plethora of

groups."

This paper was delivered at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa tion, The Washington Hilton, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1986. I want to acknowledge my debt to Dr. Francis Canavan, S.J., of Fordham University, whose ad vice and encouragement were indispensable in the preparation of this paper. I also wish to express my
gratitude to
of

Dr. Charles Kesler

of

this article; to Mark L. Wilkinson and

Claremont-McKenna College for commenting upon several drafts Cathy Regalado of the Political Science Department of

Southwest Texas State

alone
1.

University
a

for

their work

in typing

several of

its drafts;
work.

and to

Public Re
to say,

search, Syndicated for providing

fellowship

which

greatly facilitated my

Needless
I

bear responsibility for the views expressed. George F. Will, Statecraft As Soulcraft (New York: Simon & Schuster,

1983).

should stress

despite the strong reservations expressed in this paper about certain aspects of its argument, I nevertheless believe this to be an important and, in a number of respects, invaluable work. Will's

here

that

"statecraft"

"soulcraft"

to thesis, namely, the relationship of temporary problems in the failure to appreciate this relationship
main

and

the roots of many of our con

makes this work essential to an

understanding

of the malaise

did

not

issue in

a public

debate life.

of significant proportions

to me entirely sound, and afflicting our public life. That the work is itself a disheartening commentary on the
seems

state of

American

public

324

Interpretation
community,
and

advance the common good of the whole

to the very interests it was intended to direct.

common good now

Indeed,

instead has fallen prey the very idea of such a

has

all

but

vanished

from but

our political

consciousness.2

Thus,

we

have

a government
leading."3

"that is

big

not

strong; fat but

flabby;

capable of giv

ing

but

not

Will's

analysis of

the crisis confronting the American polity is

rather com

monplace; what is striking is the source to which he attributes blame tural and political malaise. In
what

for this

cul

describes

as an act of

half-jokingly but only half-jokingly impiety,"4 "filial Will places the blame squarely upon the
whose

he

Founding Fathers "inadequate, and, in the long run,

shoulders of

the

"defective
to the

philosophic

premises"5

are

dangerous"6

health

of

the

body

politic.

The

cornerstone of
of

Will's

analysis of these

"defective

premises"

philosophic

is

his reading

the famous examination of the

problem of

faction in The Federal

John

ist,

written

by

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,

Publius. Publius, Will argues,
saw

and

Jay

under

the
en

pseudonym of

the goal of political

life in

"negative"

tirely
of of

terms: politics was not conceived in terms of the advancement

the common good,

but simply

of

the avoidance

of

tyranny. To avoid the form

of the

tyranny

peculiar

to democratic regimes
rein

the

tyranny
a

majority

Publius

affords

free

to material self-interest so as to encourage the endless

profusion of verse

narrowly self-seeking interest groups. In society such as the United States no one of these This
profusion of

large

and

extremely di
threat of ma

groups would constitute a

majority.

interest

groups would thus obviate the

jority tyranny by simultaneously

gain,"

of

and

assuring that

no

submerging "dangerous passions in the pursuit one interest group would be able to acquire politi
that in Will's
view

cal power.

It

would

scarcely be

an exaggeration to suggest

Publius in

geniously
ora of

solves the problem of

majority tyranny
groups and of

by

unleashing

a veritable pleth
majorities.

small, self-seeking interest

thereby abolishing

Ac

cording to

Will,

the political
the

teaching

Publius is designed to

preclude

majority
nar-

tyranny by preventing
pable of purposive
2.

formation
in calling

of

strong, cohesive

and stable majorities ca

action;
not alone

instead, by unleashing
attention to this

a profusion of small and

Will is certainly
of

disconcerting phenomenon.
good,

For an
and

exam
conse

ination
quent

contemporary

political science's

loss

of

any

conception of a common

its

inability

to conceptualize political life in terms other than "the politics of

and

interest,"

see

Clark E.

Cochran, "Political Science

'The Public

Interest,'"

As Cochran notes, this inability is a result of a whole ical presuppositions. For an incisive critical analysis beria

Journal of Politics 36 (May 1974), 327-54. series of implicit metaphysical and'epistemolog-

Unger, Knowledge however,

common good

non,

of these presuppositions, see Roberto MangaPolitics (New York: Free Press, 1975). If this eclipse of the idea of a was simply an academic phenomenon, it would be disturbing enough; this phenome is not restricted to academic discourse, but has come to characterize American politi

and

cal culture as a whole.

Cf. Walter Lippmann, Essays in

the

Public

Philosophy

(Boston: Little,

Brown, 1955). 3- Will, pp. 158-59. 4. Ibid., p. 168.

5.

Ibid.,

p. 164. p. 18.

6. Ibid.,

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist

rowly
whose

325

self

exercised

seeking groups, Publius seeks to assure that political power would be only by loose, feeble and everchanging alliances of interest groups
character precludes such action. and

very

Tyranny, in
give

short, is to be

avoided

by

pitting opposite In essence,

rival interests
politics was

against one

another.7

Publius'

intended to
His

free

rein

to material

self-

interest in the belief that

clockwork mechanism

self-interestedness alone
goal was

"is

sufficient to

keep
into

society's

ticking

to utilize

"clever"

institutional
a

devices (e.g.,

checks and

balances)

to manipulate self-interest

"social

equilibrium."

Writes Will:

Madison's
sions; he is
problem

attention

is exclusively

on

controlling

passions with

not concerned with the amelioration or reform of passion. seen

countervailing pas The political

gives, not

is

entirely in terms

of

controlling the

passions that nature

need."

nurturing the kind of character that the polity

might

Publius, like Kant, believes he has devised

is thus utterly irrelevant to An ongoing concern for the
"soulcraft" Publius'

a solution

to the political problem

of

that would work even for a nation of devils. The moral character
solution

the citizenry

to the problem of majority tyranny. the community is no longer im

moral character of

portant:

is

unnecessary.

The
upon

result

is

a crass and

highly

mechanistic conception of politics

resting
of

the unleashing of man's

acquisitive

passions,

and or

shockingly bereft

any

concern

for the

moral

dimensions

of political

life,

mon good

transcending
of

the shifting

alliances of selfish

any conception of a com interests. Indeed, Will ac

cuses

Publius

adhering to "the Cuisinart

justice."

theory of

For Publius

and

the

intellectual tradition he represents, Will contends,

A
good

good

society is remarkably independent of individuals willing the social good. A society is a lumpy stew of individuals and groups, each with its own inherent
motion."

"principle

of

This

stew stirs

itself,
.

and

in the fullness
good.'

of

time,

out comes a

creamy

puree called

'the

interest'

public

The

endless maelstrom of

individuals

pursuing

private goods produces, magically, the public

spoils"

Politics is thus
ues"

reduced

to

"divvying

up the

"the

allocation of val

"value-free"

to

which

ing

coalitions of

whether a nation

genteelly by everchang narrowly self-seeking groups. The question, Will believes, is so conceived and so dedicated can long endure: will not the ab
political science so refers capable of purposive action and a conception of a common selfish machinations of

sence of a good

majority

transcending
all

the

factions

inevitably

lead to

political

paralysis and collapse?

Now if American

this sounds

faintly

familiar it is because this

operate
"pluralist"

conception of

how the

political system was

intended to

is widely
reading

shared.

Far from be

ing

eccentric,

in its

main outlines

Will's

of

The Federalist is

7.

Ibid., Ibid.,

p.

37.

8. Ibid.,
9.

p. 39.
p. 35.

326

Interpretation
Will's
conception of

commonplace.10

the

political system

bequeathed to

us

by

Publius,
of

moreover, bears a striking resemblance to the portrait of

American
school

politics painted

by

the

highly

influential

"pluralist"

or

"interest

group"

Publius."

American politics, many of whose members trace their genealogy back to The principal difference is that whereas the pluralists stand in rap
Publius'

tured admiration of the

clockwork

regularity

of

Will believes the

upon

machine

to be

ill-conceived,

and

does

not

engineering marvel, hesitate to censure it

both

moral and prudential grounds.

Whereas the

pluralists see

approaching wards an inevitable

yet

a perpetual motion

machine, Will sees the machine as

something headed to
not

and catastrophic

breakdown. That

such a

breakdown has

occurred, Will
as

believes, is

not so much a

testimony
the

to the

ingenuity of its in
able to

ventors,
upon
more

it is

a result of a

felicitous

accident:

system

has been

trade

"a

dwindling legacy
eras."12

of cultural capital which was accumulated

in sterner,
not

thoughtful

The

system

bequeathed to

us

by

Publius does

replenish problem.

this capital, and,

indeed,

acts

to erode it. This is our peril and our

By
of

and

large,

I have

no quarrel with

Will's

portrayal of the current workings

of

the American

political

system,

or with

his description
concur with

this situation as a cri the imme

sis of

the first order.

Furthermore, I fully
is the
erosion of

his

assertion that
of which

diate

cause of this crisis

the cultural capital

he

speaks. practice
of

The issue I
that he
so

would raise with

Will is

whether or not the or a

contemporary
of

rightly deplores

is

development

distortion

the

teaching

The

Federalist. It is my
absolved of

contention

that although the Founders

malaise

can not

responsibility for the

ing, by focusing narrowly

on one aspect of

afflicting our body Publius's solution to the

republic,

be completely politic, Will's read

problem of

majority tyranny, namely, the portant dimensions of

diversity

of an extended

obscures

im

Publius'

statecraft;

and that when

these dimensions are

a system

brought into view, the

atic perversion of

practice

that Will deplores can only be seen as

"facts"

Publius'

teaching. Since the

are

upon which

Will bases his

indictment
gin

of

The Federalist

found

largely

in Numbers

io and 51,1 will

be

by briefly

sketching the

main outlines of

their

famous

argument.

PUBLIUS'

REPUBLICAN REMEDY
whose

The Constitution in
of a

defense Publius Publius is

writes

is intended to be the

charter
re-

self-governing

community.

well

aware,

however,

that such

10. The late Martin Diamond was perhaps the interpretation leading exponent of this Publius. See, for example, Martin Diamond, "The in History of Political Philosophy, 2nd edition, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), pp. 631 51. A particularly good recent presentation of this interpretation is found in Edward J. Erler's "The
"pluralist"

of

Federalist"

Problem

of the

Public Good in The

Federalist."

this regard is David E. Epstein's The Political

Chicago Press, 1984). 1 1 See, for example, David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951); and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
.

Polity 13 (Summer 1981), 649-67. Also important in Theory of The Federalist (Chicago: University of

12.

Will,

p. 165.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist historically; as a matter of fact, it read their histories without "feeling sensations of horror and
gimes

327
to

have

not

fared

well

is

"impossible"

disgust"

at

their per

petual vacillation

extremes of anarchy and tyranny."13 Such re have been "as short in their lives, as they have been violent consequently in their (io, 46). Publius concedes that there is much truth in the allega
gimes
deaths"

"between the

tion made

by many

reputable and patriotic citizens that popular governments are

too unstable; that the public good

that measures are too often

is disregarded in the
not

conflicts of rival parties; and

decided,

according to the rules of justice, and the force

of an

rights

of the minor

party; but

by

the superior

interested

and overbear

ing

majority (10,

43).

These dangerous
regimes are

proclivities are symptomatic of a

prone:

disease

to which popular

peculiarly

faction.

By

faction, Publius

means,

a number of

citizens, whether amounting to

are united and actuated

by

some common

a majority or minority of the whole, who impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse

to the right

of other citizens or

to the permanent and aggregate interests of the

community (10,

43).

The

vices

to which

faction

gives

rise in

popular governments are so profound that

unless a

remedy
the

can

be found faction
in

we would

be "obliged to

abandoned

the cause of

that species of government as

indefensible"

(9,

38).

14

Now,

causes of

are

by

no means peculiar to popular government.

sown

The "latent

causes of

faction

are man's
of

in the

man."

nature of

More

specifi

cally, faction has its

ties of men from

origins

fallibility

and the

"diversities in the facul Man's

which

the rights

originate."

property
politics;
and so

fallibility
will

results

in

differing

opinions

in

religion and

long

"as the

connection sub

sists

between

[man's]

reason and

self-love, his opinions and passions

have

reciprocal

influence

other."

on each
. . .

The

upshot of

this is the division of

.

mankind

into

parties

"inflamed

with mutual

vex and oppress each

other, than to

cooperate

and much animosity for their common

more

disposed to
The
most

good."

common cause of
property."

faction, however, is

the "various and

unequal

distribution
of

of

By
"interests":
Those
ests
who

virtue of

this, the community is divided into

variety

distinct

hold,

and those who are without

property have

ever

formed distinct inter

under

in

society.

Those

who are creditors, and those who are

debtors, fall

13.
and

commentary
of

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, with an introduction by Garry Wills (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), No. 9, p. 37. Hereafter all cita
work will

tions

this

be

given

parenthetically in the text

of

the article; the page of reference will

fol fac

low the
14.

number of

the

paper cited.

Publius

writes:

"To

secure the public

good, and private

rights,

against

the danger of

tion,

and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the

form

of popular government,

is

the great

object to which our enquiries are

directed: Let

me add

that it

is the
45).

great

desideratum it has
so

this form

of government can

be

rescued

from the

opprobrium under which

by which alone long labored, and

is to
make

be

mankind"

recommended

to the

esteem and adoption of

(10,
cannot

Thus,

the task at hand

popular government consistent with

justice; if it

be

made consistent with the

demands

of jus

tice, its

adoption as a

form

of government cannot

be

recommended.

328
a

Interpretation
a mercantile

like discrimination. A landed interest,

interest,

a monied
.

interest,
43-44).

with

many lesser

interests,

grow

up

of

necessity in

civilized nations

.(io,

Given factionalism's
to be

roots

in human nature, there is

no reason

to expect

America

immune to

it.15
"activity"

But, if
vary

the seeds of faction are

sown

in human nature, their

of civil

will as

"according
of

to the different circumstances

society."

Inasmuch

the

"regulation"

conflicting interests
"faction"

constitutes

"the

principal

task of modem

Legislation,"

the
operations of

spirit of

Government."

Furthermore, liberty

is necessarily introduced into the "ordinary gives free rein to faction: "lib
an aliment without which

erty is to faction, what air is to A society in which men

pires."

fire,
are

it

instantly

ex

free to

organize and take steps to arrest the

translate

their views
of

into

public

policy

can

do little if anything to

development

factions; hence,
The
problem of

the

peculiar

vulnerability

of popular regimes

to this mortal

disease. faction in
relation ought

to self-government now admits of precise

definition. Although "justice

ular regime
judges."

to hold the

balance between
"judge in his

them,"

the parties to a factional conflict "are and must

no man should

pop be themselves the

own case

in

Despite the fact that

would

be

because

his interest
tegrity,"

certainly bias his

judgement"

and perhaps even

"corrupt his in
time"

in

a popular system men are

can

"judges

and parties at
at

the

same

(10,

44).

How then

the ascendancy of

factions

the expense of "the public good

rights"

and private
with

be

prevented?

How is

self-government to

be

made compatible

justice? This is "the

case of a

great object to which our enquiries

[must

be]

directed."

In the

an efficacious remedy.

minority faction, the principle of majority rule itself provides The true difficulty arises when a faction comprises a ma "when
enables
a

jority
the

of the populace:

ular government public good and

majority is included in a faction, the form of pop it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both
citizens"

the rights of other

(10,

45).

Since the
means must

elimination of

the causes of faction is not a plausible possibility, a

of

be discovered
circumscribed

moreover, is

by

controlling their effects. This choice of means, the fundamental principle of popular government
prevail"

"which

requires

that the sense of the majority should

(22,

106).

Thus,

alternatives which contravene this principle

nity independent

majority"

of

the

must

by establishing "a will in a commu be rejected without further consideration.

basic
principles of popular government

Several

possibilities consistent with the

are rejected as

inadequate to
a sufficient
of

the task at

hand. To begin with, the "parchment barthe state of property,

in

15.

"There is in their

diversity,"

writes

Publius, "in
the

the genius,

man

ners, and habits of the people

position

the different

parts of

union

to occasion

a material

diversity of dis
And
.
.

representatives towards the

different
"

ranks and conditions

a greater or

in

society.

there

are causes as well physical as

moral,

which

may in

different

propensities and
"pluralism"

inclinations

(60,

304).

In

less degree permanently large heterogeneous country

provides a

nourish such as soil

America,

is

an

irremediable fact

of

life. This pluralism, in turn,

fertile

for

the growth

of

factionalism.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self

riers"

-Government

in The Federalist

329

of written

Constitutional rights

alone are
or

Publius

rejects a simple reliance upon

"moral

clearly insufficient. Likewise, religious as a barrier to

motives"

majority tyranny. Such

a proposal smacks of the utopianism which

he

earlier

had

disdainfully dismissed:
wisdom and perfect

"we

...

are yet remote

from the

happy

empire of perfect

virtue"

(6,

26).

If the "impulse

coin

and

neither moral nor religious concerns will alone suffice.

opportunity Nor is a reliance may "not

always
interests"

upon

"enlightened
helm."

statesmen"

alone adequate.

Such

statesmen

be

at

the
mands of

Furthermore,
public

the adjustment of these

cannot take place

"clashing

to the

de

"the

good"

prevail" considerations."

and remote of

"without taking into Such considerations "will rarely

whole"

view

indirect

in the face

the immediate advantages that may accrue to factions from

of another or

"disregarding

the

rights

the good

of

the

(10,

45).
consists

The remedy
resentatives.

which we are

seeking, Publius contends,

in extending

this sphere of the regime and

introducing a scheme of government by elected rep

The

effect of

the latter is to: passing them through the medium of a chosen discern the true interest of their country, best may love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
views,

refine and enlarge

the

public

by

body

of

citizens,

whose wisdom

and whose patriotism and

and partial considerations.

Under

such a regulation

it may

well will

happen that the

pub

lic

voice pronounced

by

the

representatives of

the people,

be

more consonant convened

to the public good, than if it

was pronounced

by

the

people

themselves

for that

purpose

(10,

47).

What

advantages accrue

from extending the

take in a
greater

sphere of

the

community?

Extend the

sphere and you

less

probable

that

majority

of the whole will

variety of parties and interests; you make it have a common motive to invade the

rights of other

citizens; or

if

such a motive exists

it

will

be

more

difficult for

all who

feel it to discover

their own strength, and act

in

unison with each other

(10,

48).

The larger the territory, Publius maintains, the wider the range of interests likely major to be found within it. Since no single interest will be able to command a

ity,

the making
several

of public

policy
one

will require

the formation of a coalition compris

able to get all that it wants. The group compromise. hallmark of such a system will be log-rolling, negotiation, and separate descriptions of Thus, "by comprehending in the society many

ing

groups.

No

will

be

citiz

Publius contends,

we

thereby
majority
of a

render an unjust combination of a

majority
will

of

the whole, very

so

improb

able, if

not

impracticable

[T]he society itself

rights of

be broken into

many parts,

interests

and classes of

citizens, that the

individuals
the

or of the minority, will

be in little danger from interested

the security for the
one case civil rights must

combinations of

majority.

In

free
It

government,

be

the same as

for

religious rights.

consists

in
of

in

the multiplicity of

interests,

and,

in the

other, in the multiplicity

sects

(51,

264).

330

Interpretation
an extended republic

Thus, in
sects
. .

embracing
. . .

"great variety
could seldom
. .

of

interests,
265).

parties and

a coalition of

the majority
and

take
"

place on

any

other

principles

than those of justice

the general good

(51,
it

In the

representative principle and the extended sphere we

makes

possible,

Publius concludes,
to Republican

find "a Republican remedy for the diseases

most

incident

government"

(10,

49).

16

THE DELIBERATE SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY

At first glance, this cursory examination of teaching might seem to bolster Will's case. After all, Publius seems to disavow any reliance upon either
with

Publius'

statesmanship or moral character as a solution to the problem of self-government justice. Far from neutralizing the effects of factions, he appears to reduce policy to
an outgrowth of

public

shifting

icy is

nothing

more

than a

product of an

among factions. If public pol agreement among the various factions as

alliances
seen as

to how the spoils are to be divvied up, how can it be

manent and aggregate

advancing the

per

interests

of

the community? Does Publius mean to suggest

that the public good would emerge "as

if

by

an

invisible

hand"

from this

clash?

Does he not, in
over,
will not

other

words, embrace "the Cuisinart

theory

of

justice"? More

his

"remedy"

have the

effect of

controlled

by

the very

interests it
of

was

producing an impotent government intended to regulate, and thus incapable of

good?
"pluralist"

decisive

action

in behalf

the common

Tempting
reading
To
of

though it might be at this point to acquiesce in Will's

The

Federalist,
most

even

the

foregoing

Publius'

cursory
of

examination of

argument raises mention

insurmountable

obstacles

to the acceptance of this interpretation.

only the

obvious, Will's reading

The Federalist completely

solution

ignores both the centrality of representation to faction and the role accorded the representative in
in Number ship
10.

Publius'

to the

problem of

the previously cited passages

statesman

How

can

the pluralist interpretation's insistence that

and moral character are

irrelevant to
a solution

Publius'

"republican

remedy"

be

recon

ciled with

majority tyranny re quires the existence of a representative assembly consisting "of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and
problem of
Publius'

his insistence that

to the

16.

distinction between democracies The Federalist. I have

and republics

interpretations
text,
cal

of

glossed over this

mond,

by a republic Publius means nothing more than a "Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration
52
a

figures quite centrally in a number of distinction because, on my reading of the representative democracy. Cf. Martin Dia
of the
Framers' Intent."

American Politi

Science Review

cratic and rooted

in

(March 1959), 52-68. Diamond argues that break with the Classical and Christian tradition in favor For
a thoughtful rejoinder

Publius'

statecraft

is both demo

of the tradition of which

Locke

was an exponent.

to Diamond's reading, see Paul

1968).
framers'

Eidelberg, The
contention as

Philosophy

of the American

Constitution, (New York: Free Press,

Although his
statecraft

to the nondemocratic, or even anti-democratic, character of the

is not, in the final

analysis, persuasive,

ing of Publius,

while

simultaneously

Eidelberg brilliantly demonstrates the inadequacies of Diamond's pluralist read enterprise. illuminating the non-Lockean nature of the
founders'

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist

whose patriotism and

33 1

love

of

justice,

will

be least

likely

to sacrifice
can

it to tempo
claim that

rary Publius

and partial

considerations"?

And how, moreover,

Will's

policy to an outgrowth of shifting and everchanging alli ances among factions be reconciled with his insistence that it is the function of this representative assembly to "refine and enlarge the public so as to se
reduces public
views"

cure

"the

public good"?

Surely

this implies that

other

than the product of an agreement

policy is to be something among self-seeking interests regarding

public

the

divvying
If

up

of

the spoils.

we are to arrive at a penetration essential.

upon

satisfactory

alternative to the pluralist

interpretation,

deeper

into

Publius'

solution to since

the

problem of self-government with

Publius'

justice is
so

To begin with,
and

the accent of
what we

discussion falls
call

heavily

faction,
two

the conflict among

today

"interest

groups,"

a word or

is necessary regarding
"community"

the larger context within which

this conflict occurs. The conflict Publius anticipates takes place within the hori
"people"

zon of a
interests."

gate

possessing "permanent constituting a We ought not allow the fact that polity is
Publius'

and aggre

"pluralistic"

to
of

obscure the ren united

ily"

fact that it is
each other

community
the strongest
of

"one
ties"

united

people"; "a band

breth

to

by

bound together factions

by

"chords

affection"

(2, 7); "members of the same fam organized for action in (14, 66)
both the
ultimate programs and

history. This community, to

conflicts of
authority.

whose common good

the

are

strictly subordinate, is the

utilize

locus

of political

To

appreciate

how Publius hopes to

the republic's extended scope to

advance

the

public good of upon

the whole community, we must investigate more

political

carefully its influence

forming a majority that results diversity of particular interests),

expedients

decision-making. The very difficulty in from the republic's extensiveness (and consequent
reinforced and amplified of

by

certain

institutional

precautions

(the famed

"auxiliary
process.

bicameralism,
etc.) acts

staggered elec

tions,

separation of powers, checks and

balances,
effect

so as

to

drastically

does slowing the pace of the decision-making the decisions arrived at? It is a of upon the quality decision-making process have Publius observes that "public measures are rarely investigated
slow the

What

"misfortune,"

with

that spirit of to

moderation which

is

essential

to a just measure of their real ten

good"

dency
The

advance or obstruct

the

public

(37,

176).

He

writes:

oftener a measure

is brought

under

examination, the greater the

diversity
of

in the

situations of those who are to examine which

it,

the

less

must

be the danger

the errors

flow from

want of

due deliberation,

or of those missteps which proceed 373).

from

the

contagion of some common passion or

interest (73,

decision"

Likewise, Publius
branch is "oftener

contends

that "promptitude of
good"

in the legislative
of

an evil than a

because "the differences

"promote deliberation
the

opinion,

and

parties"

jarring
tion"

of

as well as

generally checking "the

act so as to

and circumspec

majority"

excesses of

(70,

358).

Slowing

the

332
pace of

Interpretation

decision-making, Publius
he deems
essential

contends,

will serve

to

engender

the spirit of

moderation

to good government. the importance attributed

We

can now more

fully

appreciate

by

Publius to the

republic's extensiveness and mation of a

majority

around

resulting diversity. The diversity prevents the for a single particular interest and so makes the consid community
possible.

eration of

the

good of

the

whole

Simultaneously, by dras

tically indeed,

slowing the

decision-making

process, the republic's

diversity

allows

for,

encourages, intensive

and prolonged

deliberation

and

discussion

on pub

lic policy initiatives. Not only does the republic's extensiveness militate in favor of a thorough airing of the issues of the day, but by slowing the process lends it
self

to their dispassionate consideration. The

of

delay

it

necessitates

helps

assure

that decisions are not made in the heat

passion; the

public

is

assured an oppor will re

tunity

to "calm

down."17

The

result and

is

a greater

likelihood that issues be decided in

ceive a

"dispassionate

review,"

that

they

will

accordance with

the spirit of

moderation

Publius deems
demands breeze

so essential:

The

republican principle

that the

deliberate

sense of

the community should

govern

the

management of

their affairs; but it does

of

not require an unqualified com

plaisance

to every sudden

passion, or to every transient

impulse

which

the

people

may

receive a

from the

arts of men, who

flatter their prejudices to commonly intend the When

betray
public

their interest. It is
good
. .

just

observation

that the

people

But their

good sense would

despise the

adulator, who should pretend

.

that

they

always reason right about

the

means of

promoting it

occasions

present

themselves in

which of

the

interests

of the people are at variance with their

inclinations, it is the
of

duty

the persons whom

those

interests,

to

withstand

the

they have appointed to be guardians temporary delusion, in order to give them time
(71
,

and

opportunity for

more cool and sedate reflection

363).

18

Publius does
ments crucial

not seek government

by

the will of the people,

but

rather govern

by

"the

cool and

deliberate

community."

sense of

the

The distinction is

one."

The latter is

preferable

because "it is the

reason of the public alone

that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to

be

con-

17.

Cf. Willmoore Kendall

'forces'

and

Tradition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

the republic

George W. Carey, The Basic Symbols of the American Political University Press, 1970), p. 112: "The mere extensiveness of
to heed the very advice that
upon we would

us as a people or nation

friend,
18.

who, in a moment of passion, seems intent

doing something

we are sure

probably give to a he will later live

to regret, namely, cool off, calm

down,

reflect about the situation at

hand before

acting."

19. and its importance cf. John Hallowell, The Moral Eoundations of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Writes Hallowell: "[T]he es sence of tyranny is unrestrained will What is demanded by the democratic form of government is
.

Cf. The Federalist, 63, 320. For a discussion of this distinction

not submission majority. sents a

to the

will of

the majority

but

rather submission to the reasoned of the

judgment

of the
repre

We

are obligated to submit to the superior will,

.
.

decision

majority, the best

not

because the decision

of

numerically
time
of a

but because it
vote

represents

judgment

society

with respect

to

a particular

The majority

does

not precede

the

discussion but

concludes

it; it is the re

cording
tion"

decision

reached through

deliberation

and

is

not conceived

to take the place of delibera

(pp.

120-21).

Pluralism, Public Good & Self

trolled and regulated

-Government

in The Federalist
Publius

333

by

government"

the

(49,

258).

seeks to establish a

democratic

system

in

which public

policy

reflects not

the public will but rather the people, but

the public reason;

reason of

he

seeks government not

by

the

will of

by

the

the people,

by

the

cool and

deliberate

sense of the community.

Implicit in
mands

Publius'

line

of argument

therefore is a distinction between de

emanating from mere desire, from sheer acts of will, and those resulting from reason and deliberation. Factions are dangerous precisely because they
have their judgment
signed

source and

thus are examples of the

in the perverting influence of interest former. All of is

not usurped

and passion upon efforts are mere

the

Publius'

de

to assure that the place of reason

seeks

by

desire

or

self-

interest. He thus

to establish a

barrier to factious
est or passion.

majorities

decision-making process which will act as a by filtering out proposals originating in either inter
in this
process

The

republic's extensive scope plays a crucial role

by

creating tions, that is to say,

tive the
process rather

conditions conducive
which

to the "dispassionate
reasoned

review"

of

issues;
a

condi

favor

decisions emanating from

of passion.

delibera

than decisions made in the heat

character of

Simultaneously,
op

long

and
not

drawn-out

this deliberative

process affords ample

portunity

only for the thorough airing

of all points of

view, but also for the

give-and-take of public

debate,

criticism,

fact-finding,

and the assessment of

of

long-range

effects.

It thus

acts to

bring
of

proposals

before the bar

reason;

and

thus provides a formidable barrier to

permanent proposals and
aggregate

self-interested proposals at odds with

the

interests

the

community.

Factious

proposals

having their origin

will

in the perverting

effects of

interest

and passion upon

the judgment

be

unable to stand the test of this deliberative process. In an

atmosphere characterized position

by

the primacy of reason, the

numbers

become

of

secondary importance to its

reasonableness.

supporting a The dispassion

ate review proposals.

Publius

seeks will act so as to expose the

fallacious

nature of

factious

Hence,
ment

the

republic's

from

being

captured

diversity not only prevents the by partial interests, but, by

on

machinery

of govern

slowing the decision

the
whole

making process, facilitates deliberation community might best be advanced.

how the

common good of

Slowing
serious and

the

decision-making

process,

however, does
how the

not

itself

guarantee

that

dispassionate deliberation

about

good of

the

whole com

munity

might

best be

advanced will

actually take
or not

potential

for

such

deliberation. Whether
views"

It merely creates the this potential for "refining and

place.

enlarging the ine

public

through a deliberative process

is

realized will

depend

upon the member of a representative

agents

the

representative assembly.

One could, for example,

were

imag
of the
much

assembly

whose

members

nothing

more

than bar

gaining
the

for

particular

interests; in
the

such an assembly,

deliberation how

type Publius

wished

to foster is unlikely to take place,

might slow

regardless of

republic's

diversity
points

Paul

Eidelberg

out,

difference between

decision-making process. There is, as deliberating and bargaining; and

334
Publius'

Interpretation
solution

to the problem of self-government

with

justice

required repre

sentatives who would engage

of

in the former than the latter. Hence, the character

process

the representatives is of crucial importance. The deliberative

Publius

envisions sist of

presupposes,
chosen

as we

have seen,

a representative

assembly that will con

"a

body of citizens,

whose wisdom

est of their

country,

and whose patriotism and

may best discern the true inter love of justice, will be least likely

to sacrifice

it to temporary and partial But what assurance is there that the be

men of

consideratio

(io,
members of

46).

the

representative

assembly
seeks republic's

will

this caliber? Won't the very factions

Publius'

whose

designs Publius is that the

to frustrate

dominate the
not

electoral process?

answer

very

diversity

only

slows

the

decision-making

process, but also tends to se

cure the selection as representatives of the type of men

he is seeking,

as well as

assuring them,
required

once

in office,

of

the freedom to exercise independent

judgment

by

this deliberative

process.20

To begin with,
sets

since the representative

a

assembly's character as a

deliberative

body

sharp limits to its numbers, in

a

large

republic

the very size of the districts from which representatives will be to assure, all other things
proportion of
greater

chosen will act a

being

equal,
men

larger "proportion
seeking.

of

fit

characters,"

larger

the type of

Publius is

This, in

turn,
of

will

issue in "a

the legislative districts

will make

At the same time, the size probability of fit it "more difficult for unworthy candidates to

choice."

practise with success the vicious arts

by

carried"

which elections are

too often

(10,

47).

Their size, in

other

words,

will act as a

barrier to both
as

forms

of outright

corruption,
as an

while

simultaneously,

George W.

bribery and other Carey has

that represen

suggested, acting

impediment to the

success of mere
Publius'

demagoguery. As
view

Robert J. Morgan has

tatives
chosen

pointed

out, moreover, it

was

by
be

the

large, heterogeneous districts found

within an extended re

public would chosen

more

likely

to be

independent

of particular

interests than those

by consequently more homogeneous districts. Such large and consequently heterogeneous districts would contain a multiplicity of small inter ests, which would, in turn, cancel each other out. With factionalism thus neutral
smaller and

ized,
can

men of

the character Publius seeks

most

"men

who possess

the

most attractive

merit and

the

diffusive

characters

and established will tend to engage

men of

integrity
to office;

who and

play the roles of impartial arbitrators have the independence to

the republic's

be

elected

once elected will

in the deliberative

process

he

envisions.
cilitate

Hence,

very

extensiveness and

diversity
(10,

will

tend to

fa

"the

election of proper guardians on the public

weal"

47): representa

tives who will be able to stand above

and aggregate
20.

factional

strife and uphold the

"permanent

interests
Publius'

of

the

community."21

Implicit in

desire to

secure the

freedom

of the representative to exercise

independent
of repre

judgment is
sentation.

a rejection of what

Yves Simon

disparagingly

termed "the coach-driver

theory"

Simon's theory of representation invites comparison with Publius' ject. Cf. Yves Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago:
1951),
.

comments on the sub

University of Chicago Press,

"republican
remedy,"

pp.

144-94.
Publius'

21 For insightful discussions of the role of representation in Robert J. Morgan, "Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth

see

Federalist,"

Journal of Politics

Pluralism, Public Good & Self

Thus, Publius believes
the public views
most wisdom
"
. .

-Government

in The Federalist

335

that this representative system will refine and enlarge them through a

by filtering
discern The

group

of men

"who

possess
of

[the]

to

and most virtue to pursue

the common good

society

(57,

289).

"aristocratic"

overtones of this conception of representation

as

are unmistakable.

Publius dismisses

"altogether

visionary"

the idea of the "ac

tual representation of all classes of the people

166).

by

persons of each class

(35,

The

representative

rate microcosm

assembly is not intended to be a demographically accu of society at large: rather it is intended to be an elite excellence, a
Because the
republic's

natural aristocracy.

diversity
are to

will serve to neutralize great

fac

tionalism, the voters

ple

(who, let us not forget, of the United States") can be expected to

to advance their
merit

be "the

body

of the peo

vote not with an eye

towards choos

ing partisans

interests, but
say,

with an eye

towards selecting men of

on the common good.

extraordinary
character.

to engage in an ongoing
one might
were

dialogue
to

A his

representative's

views,

be

of

less importance

than

Now, Publius certainly

some

expected these representatives to

sense, for the

particular

interests

of

their

constituencies.22

be advocates, in Nor, it should

be stressed, is there anything inherently reprehensible in this: "The good of the Publius informs us, "can only be promoted by advancing the good of
whole,"

each of

the

parts or members which compose of

the

whole"

(64,

329).

Indeed,

since

determination
goods, the
process.

the common good itself demands the appreciation of particular these goods is an

articulation of since

indispensible

part of the

deliberative

But

he

expected the members of

the representative assembly to be citizens, he believed that

common

among the

republic's wisest and most public-spirited commitment

they

overarching willingness, in the final analysis, to be

more of

would possess an

to the

good, and thus a to it. His rep

"cut"

subordinate

"partial

interests"

resentatives were to conducive to the

than mere

bargaining

interests

their

constituencies:

seeking to were to be an elite they

agents

deals

of merit

Theory
Press,

37 (November 1974), 852-85; George W. Carey, "Majority Tyranny and the Extended Republic of James Modern Age 20 (Winter 1976), 40-53, esp. 45-50; and Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Madison,"

1969).

Writes Wood: "Although

an

impassioned

and

the new federal government, Madison had the goal of government,

government to
a goal

by

no means abandoned the

factious majority could not be formed in idea that the public good was
new

that should be positively promoted. He did not expect the

federal
Nor did

be

neutralized

into

inactivity by the pressure of numerous conflicting interests.

a consensus of the various groups that made

he

conceive of politics as

simply

culiar advantage of the new expanded national republic

for Madison
'in the

lay

not

up the society. The pe in its inability to find a local

prejudices and to

common

interest for
injustice.'

such

an enlarged

territory, but

rather

substitution of representatives

whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to

schemes of

In the

new

federal

scheme power would

be 'more

likely

to centre in men who

men who would

possess the most attractive merit and the most

diffusive

character

and established

be

able to pursue
and

lence

vigorously what they saw to be the true interest of the country free from the turbu clamors of 'men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs '"(505).
Publius'

22.

Here

again

remarks

invite

comparison with

Simon. See Simon,

pp. 41-57.

"That

particular goods
common

good"

writes Simon, "matters greatly for the be properly defended by particular (p. 41). The defense of particular interests is necessary to the determination of the

persons,"

common good of the whole

community because they

constitute

integral

parts of

this good.

336

Interpretation
deliberate
Publius'

gathered to

on common good.

model of such a

deliberative
actualiza

assembly,
tion

and perhaps the reason was

why he held

such

high hopes for this

Publius'

in practice,
were

the Philadelphia Convention.

a

representatives, in
ar

summary,

to

be less lawyers pleading for

the competing claims
good.23

client, than

judges, impartial
from the

bitrators, weighing
point of

of

"interest

groups"

vantage

the

public refusal

Publius'

"enlightened"

to rely

upon either not mean

religious motives alone

does

that

they

are

statesmanship or moral and irrelevant to the republican

conception of the representative's role makes remedy he proposes. As clear, he does indeed presuppose that enlightened statesmen will usually be at the

Publius'

he is aware, his solution to the problem of faction presupposes a particular type of citizenry. It presupposes a citizenry capable of producing the type of wise or virtuous men he expects to see serve as representatives. It presup helm. And,
as poses a

citizenry willing to forgo utilizing

elections

merely

as an

select clever and zealous

bargaining

agents

for their

particular

opportunity to interests, in order

It presupposes, in
and

to use elections to select the community's wisest and most virtuous men to en
gage

in

an

ongoing deliberative
to

process about

the

public good.

the final analysis, a citizenry

aware of

the distinction between justice

what

injus

tice,

and committed and

put

Kendall himself

George

doing justice. In short, it presupposes W Carey have termed "a virtuous

degree
of

Willmoore
As Publius

people."24

it:

As there

exists a certain

depravity

in

mankind which requires a certain

de

gree of circumspection and mistrust: so there are other qualities

which

in human nature,
government pre

justify

a certain portion of esteem and confidence. existence of

Republican

supposes the

Were the

pictures which

higher degree than any other form. been drawn have some among us faithful like by
these qualities in
a
. .

nesses of the

human character, the inference

self-government

would

be that there is

not sufficient virtue

among

men

for

(55,

284).

A debased populace, in

other words, cannot govern

itself

with

justice;

the enter

prise of self-government requires moral virtue.

23.

Cf. Carey,

pp. 49-50.

Publius believed,

writes

Carey,

that the republic's extensiveness and

plurality of interests acts to secure the presence of "a group of decision makers suffi ciently detached from the immediate interests of any given controversy which would serve more or less as a jury to judge the relative merits of the arguments and proposals advanced by interested and
consequent
parties."

contending 24. Kendall

and

Carey,

p.

112. and

passim.

As Kendall
of the
Publius'

and

Carey observe,
of

from the fact that the

not

republic's extensiveness

facilitates factions

a thorough will

airing

issues

the

day, it does factions is

necessarily

follow that the

to

appeals of

be

rejected.

confidence

that if given the opportunity

a product of two

deliberate the American right

and wrong;

people will recognize and reject the appeals of

prior of

assumptions, namely that: "(a) The American people,

unlike perhaps other people,

have

a sense

they do have in
the community,

other words, a

feeling
of

for justice

and

doing

that which

promotes

the true

interests

of

(b) Off at
vast

the end, if given

sufficient

time to deliberate

and

meditate), the

majority

the American people will opt

of

opportunity (which involves for that which is

"
Publius'

designed
rooted

to promote the permanent and aggregate

interests

confidence that the

deliberative

process

he

seeks will

In short, community issue injustice and advance the common

the
of

good

is

in his favorable

assessment of

the moral character

the

community

within which

this

process

is to

occur.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self

Publius is thus
antees neither
sentative

-Government

in The Federalist
and

337

well aware

that the republic's size

diversity

in itself guar

the election of wise, virtuous and public-spirited men to the repre

assembly nor the establishment of the deliberative process he envisions; it merely serves to facilitate these objectives. In the final analysis, con fidence regarding the realization of these objections rests upon his ultimately fa
Publius'

vorable estimate of

the

virtue and

intelligence

of

the American

people.

By

weak

ening the perverting influence of

virtue and

faction,
fore.

republics'

the

diversity

allows

this

intelligence to

come to the

At this point, the

pretation of

inadequacy

of what we

have termed Will's

"pluralist"

inter

even

Publius becomes readily apparent. Indeed, this reading fails to grasp the fundamental problem to which Publius addresses himself. Rather than
the narrow and
"negative"

taking its bearing from

purely

goal of

the avoidance of

political science takes as its goal a broader, more pos majority tyranny, itive and nobler objective: self-government with justice. Rather than seeking

Publius'

merely to establish a democratic system which can avoid the summum malum of tyranny, Publius seeks to establish a democratic system which can effectively se
cure

justice

and the common good. stresses

Throughout The Federalist Publius repeatedly

of

the energetic character

io af

the government whose establishment he is

seeking.

Indeed, in Number

ter

having

observed

that a multitude

of

diverse

and often

conflicting interests
of

"grow up

of

various and

he notes that the "regulation necessity in civilized interfering interests forms the principle task of modern
proposed

nations,"

these

legislation"

(io,

44).

The

Constitution is

superior

to the Articles

of

Confederation

precisely because it will result in a strong government capable of decisive action in behalf of "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community"; capable in
other

words,

so as

to secure

effectively regulating these "various and interfering Publius does not believe that the public "the public
of
good."

interests"

good

will emerge

"as if

by

an

invisible

hand"

from

negotiations

between the
transcend

various

factions. Rather he ism. His

goal

seeks a

decision-making

process

that

can

factional
of

an energetic government capable of effective action

in behalf

the common good

thus

requires majorities

that will

be he

more

than loose

and

shifting
seek of

coalitions of

self-seeking groups, but which, To

which will avail

on

the

other

hand,

will not a

tyrannical

objectives.

achieve such majorities

puts

his faith in

way
with

making decisions auxiliary

chosen

itself

of

the country's
of

diversity, along

certain

precautions

certain

"inventions

prudenc

so as to se

cure majorities which are the outcome of a

will

deliberate

process whose participants

be "a

body of citizens

whose wisdom

est of

their country,

and whose patriotism and

may best discern the true inter love of justice, will be least likely Publius is
confident

considerations."

to

sacrifice

it to temporary
and

and partial

that

the

majorities which emerge

from

such a

decision-making

process will transcend

factionalism
the

thereby
the

assure a government capable of

whole community.

effectively advancing
self-

common good of

Far from

basing

his teaching

upon the presumed

Publius'

interest,

republican

remedy ultimately

rests on

sufficiency of material his faith in the moral

338

Interpretation
the American
good
people.

character of and of

And far from

Publius'

being

a sufficient condition

in
as

itself for

"pluralism"

government,
of

is

a means to an

end;

Founders'

Eidelberg
et check

observes, the guiding principle

a profusion of

the

pluralism was

divide
would

impera. Given

factions Publius believed that interest

interest,

and thus secure

the capacity of the government to act

was

purposively

for the

common good.

Pluralism
the

thus only half the solution to the problem of

self-government with ened

justice;

other

half of the

solution

had to do

with enlight when

statesmanship
with

and moral character which,

although

insufficient alone,

taken together
a

the

diversity

which

Publius

wished

to encourage, constituted
was

remedy to the

mortal

diseases

of

faction.25

Ironically, it

the republic's
of

very diversity American people to

subservience

which enabled enlightened

come

statesmanship to the fore. Rather than securing the

and

the virtue

the

government's

to the demands of

contains a plethora of opposed ment

factions, the country's pluralism, interests, assures the independence

.

the fact that it

of the govern

from any one interest, and thus its capacity to scending the machinations of factions

advance a public good tran

THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Will's
Publius'

analysis

thus reveals a surprising

insensitivity

to the full

dimensions

of

statecraft.

Yet it is

undeniable that the picture pluralism

Will

paints of

the contem

porary

politics of

American

deed, contemporary American political

Publius'

is uncomfortably close to the truth. In practice might be viewed as consisting of

teaching
stitutes a
whether

minus of

its

moral

dimensions.

Contemporary

practice

thus con

distortion

Publius'

teaching. The question that suggests itself is

not somehow present

the seeds

of

this distortion are

Publius'

in

Publius'

argu

ment.

Could it be that
albeit

teaching itself is in
a political practice
of a

some

tering,

unintentionally,

bereft

way of important

responsible

for fos

aspects of

that teaching? The whole notion

"virtuous

people"

(and the corresponding

pregnant with
which

distinction between both

virtuous and

debased citizenries) is obviously

ontological and political

implications; implications, however,

Indeed, despite its importance
program, the moral character
of

Pub

lius leaves curiously

is
a topic

unexplored.

as the ultimate

conditio sine qua non of

his

whole

the citizenry
mysterious

touched upon only

briefly

in

Publius'

argument.

Equally

is the

nature of the public good which

not avail

Publius did
virtuous

himself either his

he continually invokes. Unfortunately, of the opportunity created by his notion of the enduring
common good

people,

or of

conception of an

transcending

the machinations of
Publius'

factions,

to unfold the theoretical presuppositions of his

or

statecraft.
25.

inability

perhaps, in

view of

his forum

and the practical

Cf. Paul
pp.

Press, 1974),

Eidelberg, A Discourse on Statesmanship (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 179, 214. Here, as in his earlier The Philosophy of the American Constitution,
compelling
rejoinder

Eidelberg

provides a

to the

"pluralist"

reading

of

Publius.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist

nature of

339
raised

his endeavor, his

unwillingness
of

to pursue the theoretical

issues

by

the ethical

dimensions
no means

his

argument

imparts

a certain shallowness

to The

Federalist. And the theoretical lacunae in the

mable, and

Founders'

thought have had inesti

of

by

laudable,

ramifications

for the future development helps

the American polity.

of

Publius'

failure to

articulate the theoretical presuppositions

his teaching both

renders portions of of

his thought

obscure and

explain the

eventual

disappearance

important

aspects of

that

teaching from the American

life for
man

political consciousness.

To begin with, damental

without an explicit account of the good

the

fun

political question

it is difficult to

ascertain what

Publius deems to be

the ultimate goals of the regime he

some of

the

key

terms of

is defending, or even to grasp the meaning of his discourse. Publius, for example, sometimes speaks
contract

in the
ture"

cadences of the
of

social

liberalism

of

Hobbes

and

Locke. He
of na

speaks, for example,

the reasons

which

impelled

men to

leave the "state

(51, 265),
their "natural tion

and the

rights"

in

order

necessity to do

of their so

(2,6). When

divesting themselves of a portion of discussing the dangers of fac

pose to the

he

frequently

adverts

to the dangers

they

rights

of other citizens.

Publius certainly sounds Lockean when he tells us that government is "instituted no less for the protection of property than of the persons of (54,
individuals"

278).

Lockean

resonances are perhaps also of

found in his famous

which
**

assertion

that

"the
nate

protection"

"the faculties
object of

of men

from

the rights of property origi

...

is the first Publius

government"

(10,

44).

Are

we

therefore to con

clude that

was a

thorough-going individualist

who viewed political apolitical men

life
to

as a mere artifice created

by

the

contract of

naturally

in

order

secure conditions

of peace

wherein

they

might

pursue

their subjective
whole

self-

interest,

understood

in

narrowly
this

acquisitive sense?

The

tenor of The

Federalist

militates against

view.
Publius'

Even waiving the

problem of concern

obvious objection that

central

preoccupation, the
a major

faction,
his

or more

broadly,

self-government with

(if

a concern at

all)

of contractarians such as

Hobbes

justice, is not and Locke,

the

fact

remains that

references

to the organizing

concepts of

the social contract tradi central, in other

tion are relatively

few,

and

largely

rhetorical.

They

are not

words, to his
us

argument.

That he

employed this

language

at times ought not give climate of that

pause;
that

after

all, this idiom

was so pervasive

in the intellectual

day

even

Burke, its
realize

principal

self of need

it. To

the gulf

him contemporary critic, that separates Publius from the contractarians, one
sometimes availed with

only

contrast

his thought

that of a genuine representative of that tradi

tion such as
26.

Paine.27

this particular passage is widely cited as proof of the Lockean reading is not the only possible interpretation of this passage, nor is it p. 307. necessarily the most plausible. See Eidelberg, Philosophy, 27. Cf. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973). For an excel

I say

"perhaps"

Publius'

because

although

"Lockeanism,"

lent

exposition of

versy,"

Paine's contractarianism, see Francis Canavan, S.J., "The Burke-Paine Contro The Political Science Reviewer VI (Fall 1976), 389-420.

340

Interpretation
passages abound which attest

Indeed,

to the influence of an older tradition

which asserted

the priority of justice

and

the common good. For example:

Justice is the

end of government.

It is the

end of civil society.

It

will

be

pursued until

it

is obtained, The
aim of

or until

liberty

be lost in

the pursuit

(51,

265).

every

political

Constitution

ought to

be

to obtain

for rulers,

men who possess

[the]

most wisdom

to discern

and most virtue

to pursue the common

good of

society
good, the

(57,

289).

the

public

real welfare of of

the great

body

of

the

people

is the

supreme object
as

to be pursued, and no form

Government

whatever

has any value, than

it may

be fitted for

the attainment of this object

(45,

233).

Unfortunately,
good,"

since
or

Publius

nowhere

explains

exactly
consist

what

"the

common
an

"justice,"

"the

people"

real welfare of

the

in,

no

definitive

swer

is

possible

to the assertion that the meaning of these phrases

"rights"

is

reducible to

the protection of the that such an

of the

individual in the Lockean

sense.

Suffice it to

say The text, for example, is littered

"the
public good and private

interpretation is

not

fully

consistent with

the tenor of the text.

with references

rights,"

as well
of

by factions to as their propensity for "disregarding

to the threat posed

the rights of another or the good

sense on

whole."

the

These

statements

only

make

the condition that the

common good consists

in something
those

more

than

safeguarding individual rights. The burden insist that we read Lockean concepts into

of proof rests with

who would

Publius'

guage and thrust of the argument appear to point

in

teaching, when both the lan direction.28 a different

Publius'

Still,

the

question remains: what

is the

common good of

commercial

republic?

close

reading

of

the text yields the conclusion that it consists in to the individual's that Publius

something
pursuit of

more

than the

maintenance of conditions conducive

his

subjective self-interest.

The fact remains,

the

however,
upon

provides us neither with a clear answer nor with

philosophical

from

which we might

derive

Publius'

one.

whole account of

focus is

anthropology instrumental
new govern

goods; thus,

we obtain a

very detailed
an

the powers of the

ment without ever

obtaining

entirely
context

clear portrait of the ends which these

28.

Of

particular

significance

in this

Madison's thought. Writes Landi: "If

identification
the ends

one attended

rhetoric, it would appear that he shared

of of political

is Alexander Landi's recent study of James exclusively to Madison's use of social contract in the political vision of Hobbes and Locke, whose
with

society
.

its

primitive motivational origins was tied to a rejec

political vision

tion of traditional political

teleology

However, Madison's

in fact transcended the

society oriented solely to security and prosperity, for which reason he also used a more traditional language to describe the ends of political [H]e considered virtue to be an society object of government, both directly and indirectly Madison's understanding of the ends of politi
of a market
. . .
.

image

cal

society

extended

appropriate

to a free

people."

beyond security and prosperity to include justice, virtue, Alexander Landi, "Madison's Political
conclusion as to the
parallels

and

the common good

Theory,"

The Political Science

Publius'

Reviewer VI (Fall 1976). 83-84. Landi's

of

ultimately

noncontractarian character
political

Madison's thought

as a whole

substantially

my

conclusion

regarding

theory.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self

powers are

-Government

in The Federalist
the society

341
these

ultimately intended to

serve.

The

character of

which

powers are meant

to create and sustain is never clearly explicated.

Publius'

partial explanation of
"Notes"

vagueness upon this crucial point might

on

be

found in Madison's
Gouverneur
Life
and
Morris'

the Philadelphia Convention. Madison

records

observation that
said to

liberty

were

generally

be

of more value than property.

An

accurate

view of

the

matter

would, nevertheless,

prove

property

was

the

main object of society.

The

savage state was more

favorable to

liberty than the civilized;

not acquired a taste

life. It

was preferred

by

all men who

had

and sufficiently so to for property; it was re

nounced

for the

sake of

ular government.

property which could be secured only by the restraint of a reg These ideas might appear to some new, but they were nevertheless

just

[P]roperty

then,

was

the

main object of

government.29

James Wilson,
he

however,

responded

that
of government and

could not agree

that property was the sole or primary object

society.
object.30

The

cultivation and

improvement

of the

human

mind

[their]

most noble

It is

interesting

in
on

view of

the

alleged pervasiveness of

the social contract tra

dition's influence

the Founders that Morris expects his attempt to ground po

comfortable self-preservation

litical life in the desire for

associates,
and

to

sound so novel rejects on

to his

disagreement among the Founders may

mate ends of

his fellow delegate from Pennsylvania explicitly explain why Publius is vague
and

it. This
the ulti

government,
on a

the

nature of

the common good. He may have

potentially controversial point in order to avoid ruffling feathers, and thereby narrowing the Constitution's base of support. The most that Lockcan be conceded to the advocates of a Lockean reading of Publius is that

been treading gently

eanism

is

present

in his

writings

along
made

with another older strain of

thought; in my

view, a compelling

case can

be

that the

non-Lockean strain predominates.

Publius'

This is
scure.

not the
we

As

only have noted,

aspect of
Publius'

teaching
solution

that

remains somewhat ob

to the

problem of

faction

presupposes

a virtuous citizenry:
proper"

A citizenry

capable of

both recognizing "wicked

Publius'

and

im

of projects and rejecting them; a citizenry capable of producing the men

character and

ability
citizenry

the natural aristocracy

capable of

required

by

program;

and,

finally

discerning

and

choosing to be governed Writes Publius:

by

these men,
chial

rather

than demagogues willing to

pander popular

passions, and paro

interests. Are the American

that

people such a people?

must own

could not give a negative answer

which

to this

question without

obliterating
the people

every impression
of

I have

received with regard

to the

present genius of

America,

the

spirit which actuates

the state

legislatures,
of

and

the

principles which

1787,"

29.

Convention James Madison, "Debates in the Federal

1842), 2-3 (Mobile: Allston Mygatt,
1094. p. 1034.

in The Papers of James

Madison, vols. 30. Ibid., p.

342
are

Interpretation
with

incorporated

the

political character of

every

class of citizens.

am unable to

conceive

that the people of America in their

present
.

temper,

or under

stances which can

speedily happen,

will choose
.

men who would

any circum be disposed to

pursue a scheme of

tyranny

or

treachery

(55,

282-3).
Publius'

Despite the centrality of the notion of a virtuous people to ment, it receives only a brief mention and its implications

line

of argu

remain undeveloped.

To begin with, beyond asserting that the American people are such a people, Publius nowhere provides us with the criteria that will enable us to distinguish
virtuous

Without
lius'

from debased peoples, must less justifying those criteria. even entering into the complex philosophical issues raised
that there exist objective moral norms discernible
virtuous and more

by

Pub
and and

premise

by

reason,
and

hence that his distinctions between factious majorities, "value

are
preferences,"

debased peoples,

just

it

must

something be stressed that his

assumes a

than mere subjective and

program

arbitrary
cultural

has definite

preconditions.

Concretely, it

citizenry

whose characters
Publius'

have been
the

formed in
formed
wrong,

a cultural

tradition embodying these

norms.

solution to

problem of self-government and

justice

would

be

unworkable with a populace

in

by
or

a cultural tradition
with a

indifferent to the distinction between right

and

operating radically defective conception of the two. It presup in a united in their allegiance to a wholesome moral tradi poses, short, citizenry tion. This, in turn, presupposes limits to the degree of heterogeneity desirable in
Publius'

extended republic.

And this agreement, it

deeper
substantive

must

be emphasized, is In

not

merely
the

procedural: without

agreement,

procedural agreement
realize. view of auspi

alone cannot achieve

the

goals self-government
not

is instituted to

foregoing
that

considerations, it is

surprising that Publius believes it is

cious

we constitute

one united

people,

a people

descended from the

attached
.

same ancestors,

speaking

the same

language, professing
and

the same religion,

to the same principles of government

.

very

similar

in their

manners and customs

.(2,

7).

The American

people can

be

said to

be

one people of

they

share a common a set of

culture,

i.e.,

a common

life is

shared, judgments about the

good

way life for

life.

by virtue of the fact that Underlying this way of

man and

the meaning

of

human into

existence.

To

use

John

Courtney
which

Murray's phrase, these truths

are the

"entelechy,"

the "vital

form,"

transforms an aggregation of individuals

a community organized for action in history, and which gives this commu identity.31 its particular and enduring The American people's status as a vir nity tuous people stems from the deep formative influence this culture and hence

the ethic

which

finds

expression

in it

has

exercised on their collective and

indi

vidual characters.

By

virtue of this shared

a common

culture,

they

possess a shared

concep

tion of right and wrong,

31
p. 21.
.

conscience,

which enables

them to recognize,

John

Courtney Murray, S.J.,

We Hold These Truths (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964),

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist

and assures

343
mainte

that

they

will

reject, the

"wicked"

projects of whose presence

factions. The is
a

nance of

this common cultural tradition

dition

of self-government with

justice
which can

would appear to pose

necessary precon sharp limits to the

raises

extent and

type of

"pluralism"

be

encouraged.

This

the question
which must

of whether or not

there exists a

latent tension between the

of

diversity
and

be

encouraged

to assure the
and

independence

the government from the domina

tion of

factions,
not a

the preservation

of a virtuous

community
of a

thus the ongo

of whether

ing

public commitment

to justice. It raises, in short, the question

Publius'

there
edy.

is

latent tension between the two halves

a

republican rem

There is

limit,

after

all, to the
a

amount of at

diversity
less

community

can con

tain,

while still

remaining
not raise

community

all,

much

a virtuous one.

Publius does dition

might

these questions. Nor does he inquire as to how this tra transmitted. As a

matter of

be

preserved and

fact, immediately
virtuous a

after

reassuring the reader that the American people are indeed a Publius raises the question as to whether they will remain such

people,

people, only to

dismiss it lation.
of
. .

by

commenting:

"what

change of circumstances time and

fuller

popu

may produce,

requires a prophetic spirit

to declare
and

which makes no part

pretensions"

my

(55,

282-83).

How,
It is

as

Kendall

Carey inquire,
polis nor a

are the

virtuous people public

to be kept

virtuous?

obvious that

Publius'

commercial re

is

neither a modern version of

the Platonic/Aristotelian

Protes

tant version of the

medieval respublica Christiana

which, animated

by

visions of

human excellence,
to produce

sought

to inculcate

virtue.

As

a commercial republic

it

aims

neither mystic-philosophers nor gentlemen nor saints.

The

govern

ment whose establishment

est objectives.

Publius is advocating is animated by much more mod The Constitution whose ratification Publius seeks entrusts to the sharply limited
to be
answered

national government a

set of objectives:

The
of

principal purposes

by

the Union

are

these

The

common

defense
con

the members

the

preservation of

the

public peace as well against

internal

vulsions as external attacks

the

regulation of commerce with other nations and

between the
with

states

the

superintendence of our

intercourse,

political and

commercial,

foreign

countries

(23,

112).

But,

as

Publius

reminds

us, the

government

he

champions

national."

partly lives.
of

Publius

fully

expects that the states and localities as the

is "partly federal and levels of

on

government nearest the people would exert the most

direct influence

their

Precisely

what role

however, they
unclear.32

were

character, in the

preservation of public

intended to play in the formation virtue, and how they were to go about

performing this
32.

role remains
the state constitutions at the time
synopsis makes

For the

relevant provisions of

Publius wrote,
at the state

see

Philosophy,

pp. 264-71.

As Eidelberg's
the

apparent, at

least

Eidelberg, level, the for

legitimate

mation of moral character and even

promotion of religious

truth were widely viewed as

might

conceivably constitute the Thus, in view of its centrality to his piece of the puzzle. Even if this is indeed the case, however, missing failure to explicitly address the solution of the problem of self-government with justice,
public concerns.

the role of the states

in

moral education

Publius'

344

Interpretation
seems

Publius diverse

vaguely

aware

that America's decision to be an extended and

commercial republic would not

be

without

implications for the in just

what

national

character.

Yet, he

remains

tions might be

over

the

long run.

surprisingly Despite its he draws

uninterested

these

implica

status as the conditio sine qua non of

self-government with
of

justice, Publius
which

seems unconcerned with either or

the nature

the cultural capital upon

public status

the conditions

of

its

perpetuation.

What if any

he

would accord

to it is unclear. His failure to forth-

rightly confront the cultural preconditions of his political teaching and the politi cal implications of these preconditions may justifiably be viewed as the capital
weakness of

The Federalist.

Indeed,

as

Kendall

and

Carey

note, the "failure to

of

meet this problem

head
. . .

on
"33

has been

perhaps

the greatest

failure

the

American

political experience

CONCLUSION

The
truth.

old

Publius'

saying "out of sight, out of failure to clearly articulate the

which

mind"

contains a good
moral

deal

of political

dimensions

of

the practice he
create
ei

advocates
a situation

has had in

far-reaching consequences.
the

To begin with, it has helped

of

dominant

academic

interpretations ignore

The Federalist

ther minimize these dimensions

of

its

argument or

them altogether.

More is

importantly, the absence of a clearly defined litical life, and hence of the common good
charged with
erosion

notion of the ends of man and po

towards

which

his

government

directing

the community, anticipated and helped precipitate their

political consciousness.

in the American

moral presuppositions of

his

politics,

in

other

words, has

His cursory treatment of the played a role in engen

dering
can

a practice

indifferent to these has

grown

presuppositions.

Today,

the

diversity

of our

extended republic

to the point where morally and

scarcely be

considered one people.

While the institutions

which

spiritually we Publius be

queathed

to us remain,

they

are animated changed.

by

remain, but the

substance

has

The

substance

radically different spirit; the forms has changed because the

presupposed as an essential

common cultural capital whose existence

Publius

in

gredient

in his

program

for

self-government with

justice (and

upon

which, as
not alto

Will

rightly

notes,

we continue

to

trade,

our protestations to and

the contrary to exist

withstanding) has become

gether.

highly

attenuated,

may

soon cease

It is the

erosion of

this capital that constitutes the

immediate

cause of the mal

ady afflicting the American

tant event
of

body

politic.

This

erosion constitutes the most

impor
sit-

contemporary American

political

life; it decisively

separates our

questions raised

by

his

notion of

the "virtuous

people,"

and, in particular, the question of moral

edu

cation, is astonishing. 33. Kendall and Carey,

p. 59.

Pluralism, Public Good & Self-Government in The Federalist

uation

345

from that in

of

the

founders. And it is

undeniable

that this

new situation and

the crisis
profound

which

it has issued
of

necessitate

the development
"pluralism"

of a new and more

theoretization

the problems of

which will center upon

the nature of this capital and the conditions of

its

preservation and renewal.

Nev

ertheless, this new theoretization

must

necessarily begin
statecraft.

by

explicating the often

forgotten

moral

dimensions

of

the

Founders'

(P

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 13, 1987

SCIENCE,
EDITORS: Marsha Hanen
and

MORALITY AND FEMINIST THEORY

Kai Nielsen
Introduction: Toward Integration Bias in Sex Differences Research The Need for More Than Justice Philosophy of Ambivalence: Sandra Harding on 77ie Science Question in Feminism Ascetic Intellectual Opportunities: Reply to Alison Wylie Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender Non-Contractual Society Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labour Ethics, Ideology, and Feminine Virtue Women and Moral Madness Moral Sanity or Who Killed Boy Staunton Rescuing Womanly Virtues: Some Dangers of Moral Reclamation Feminist Ethics and In Vitro Fertilization Surrogate Motherhood Only Connect: The Place of Self-Knowledge in Ethics A Feminist Aspect Therapy of the Self Second Persons Afterword: Feminist Theory Some Twistings and Turnings

Marsha Hanen Alison M. Jaggar Annette C. Baier The Alison Wylie Sandra Harding Marilyn Friedman Virginia Held Sibyl Schwarzenbach John Exdell Kathryn Morgan Steven Burns Barbara Houston Susan Sherwin Christine Overall Sheila Mullett Ann Ferguson Lorraine Code Kai Nielsen

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On the Wisdom
A Lecture
given

of

Nathan

by

Chaninah Maschler
at

St. John's College, Annapolis

November 1985

The Nathan
vid of

whose wisdom

is

our

theme is not the prophet who reminded Da

limits

upon royal

power.1

My

Nathan is

a merchant.

But he has

more

in

common with

his

namesake than a name.

like his predecessor, is remembered special kind of story, a parable for self judgment.
The

My Nathan too lives in Jerusalem and, chiefly for having told a story to a king, a
Saladin,
the

king taught by during

this second Nathan's parable is

Moslem his

ruler

who, at the time of the

there (1 197,

the Third

Crusades, Crusade), roughly

conquered

Jerusalem

and established

court

two thousand years after the bi

ble's

King

David

made

Jerusalem his

stronghold goes

(II Sam.

5).

The story Nathan tells

King

Saladin

like this:

LONG LONG AGO THERE DWELT IN EASTERN LANDS

A MAN WHO OWNED A RING OF PRICELESS WORTH

WHICH HE'D RECEIVED FROM HANDS BELOVED. THE RING'S STONE WAS AN
IT HAD THIS OCCULT

OPAL,

SHINING IN MYRIAD HUES.

VIRTUE,

THAT HE WHO WORE THE

RING,

RELYING ON ITS POWER, BECAME DELIGHTFUL TO BOTH GOD AND MEN.

NO

WONDER, THEN,

THAT THIS MAN FROM THE EAST

WOULD NEVER TAKE THE RING OFF,

THAT HE WANTED IT KEPT IN HIS HOUSEHOLD FOR ALL TIME. HE LEFT THE RING TO THAT ONE OF HIS SONS WHOM HE LOVED BEST,

PROVIDING THAT, IN TURN, THE CHOSEN ONE BEQUEATH THE RING TO HIS FAVORITE
SON.

THUS THE SON DEAREST TO THE FATHER, REGARDLESS OF THE ORDER OF BIRTH,
WAS TO BECOME

RULER, PRINCE, OF THE

ENTIRE HOUSEHOLD

STRICTLY BY VIRTUE OF THE RING.

AT LAST THIS

RING, PASSED DOWN FROM SON TO SON,

DESCENDED TO A FATHER OF THREE SONS ALL THREE OF WHOM WERE EQUALLY OBEDIENT TO THE FATHER.
ALL

THREE, ACCORDINGLY,

HE NEEDS MUST LOVE ALIKE.

BUT, BEING

SOMETIMES ALONE WITH THIS

SON,

THAT

ONE, OR

THE THIRD

THEY'D ALTERNATIVELY SEEM TO BE THE SON WHO MOST DESERVED THE RING. AND SO TO EACH THE FATHER, IN PIOUS
FRAILTY,2

PROMISED IT.

THE HOUSEHOLD LIVED TOGETHER FOR A WHILE.

1. 2.

II Samuel 12; cf. II Chronicles 9:29. fromme Schwachheit, but later spoken
um einen zu

of

in

different tone,

indem

er zwei nicht

drucken

mbgen,

begiinstigen.

348

Interpretation
CAME,
THE FOND FATHER IS IN STRAITS:

BUT WHEN THE TIME FOR DYING TO WOUND TWO OF HIS WHAT'S TO BE DONE?

SONS, WHO

HAVE RELIED UPON HIS

WORD, IS GRIEF TO HIM.

HE SENDS IN SECRET FOR A CRAFTSMAN OF WHOM HE ORDERS TWO MORE RINGS

MADE ON THE PATTERN OF HIS OWN.

HE BIDS THE JEWELER SPARE NEITHER COST NOR TOIL TO MAKE THEM IN ALL POINTS IDENTICAL. THE JEWELER

SUCCEEDS,

AND WHEN HE BRINGS THE RINGS TO

HIM,

THE FATHER HIMSELF CANNOT DETERMINE WHICH RING IS THE ORIGINAL.

RELIEVED, HE JOYFULLY CALLS HIS SONS

EACH IN

TO

HIM,

PRIVATE,

CONFERS ON HIM HIS SPECIAL BLESSING, HIS RING AS WELL, THEN DIES.
NO SOONER IS THE FATHER DEAD THEN ALL THREE SONS APPEAR,

EACH WITH HIS

THEY SEEK THE

RING, AND EACH FACTS;

THEY

WOULD BE THE HOUSEHOLD'S RULER.

QUARREL;

THEY ACCUSE. IN VAIN:

ASCERTAINED3

WHICH WAS THE GENUINE RING COULD NOT BE

"mine."

called

Nathan

man playwright and man

Of curse, he's ours, and he of letters Gotthold Ephraim

not

was given us

by the Ger
I

Lessing

(1729- 1781).

pronounce cause

feelingly only from affection for its bearer, but also be I take pleasure in the historic fact that by chance so fitting a name belongs
the name
chance"

to our author. Or is it wrong to say

"by

since

fried, germanizing
ring-like
I hope that the

the grandfather's baptismal name

his father, Johann Gott Theophilos, bestowed the

name upon

his first-born? rings is

new

parable of the

to some of you so that you will be

able to tell me whether

rightly

the rest

of

the play), the

parable might

imagine that, detached from its setting (I mean, be heard as teaching that tradition, prece
should not
frailty"

dent,
ther,

even

if

riddled with

arbitrariness,

be tampered
making
a

with

the fa

you will

recall, is

chided

for "pious

in

not

choice

among the
than
out

three. Or again, that the story might be heard to teach that it is

perhaps more

important that the

that
the
answer

question

"who

rule?"

should

have

definite

answer

be

rational

and

just.

Such

meanings

may

flash

momentarily when the story is taken by itself. In the play they are not caught because there Nathan adds one brush stroke to the picture of the quarreling brothers:
THEY SEEK THE

FACTS; THEY QUARREL; THEY

ACCUSE. IN VAIN: ALMOST AS INDEMON

WHICH WAS THE GENUINE RING WAS NOT DEMONSTRABLE

STRABLE
AS IS FOR

US, TODAY, THE GENUINE FAITH.

which are

The three faiths meant,

the

together and in their division are

and

made

to

represent

family
der

of

mankind,

Islam, Christianity,

Judaism:
them has

They

stand side

by

side
3.

like biblical brothers contesting

rechte

who amongst

inherited the

bless-

Ring

war nicht erweislich. III. vii,

B. Q. Morgan tr.,

somewhat altered.

On the Wisdom of Nathan

349

ing of Abraham,
the three chief
urged

who

is the bechor (elect).

of

Considering the
what

story's application to

branches

Christianity

in the West,

is

perhaps also

being

is that

strife

ought

to be seen

Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist among Christian brothers against the backdrop of biblical history.
seems to
asked

tion or tions

You may be pleased with the story, though it infinite protest. The Sultan is not. He had

teach infinite

resigna

the merchant

for instruc

in

matters of

religion,
one.

asked

to be told which of the faiths in the Abrahamite

mere subterfuge.
uncouth.

tradition

is the true

To the
of

Sultan, Nathan's fable is

prejudice

In these United States

North America

is

Still, I doubt

that you are unaware that one of the standard opinions about Jews
cob their
not

forebear (cf. Merchant of Venice i.iii.72f ), they are value that splendid Achillean round-outness which hates deception

is that, like Ja devious, tricky, do

worse Les-

than death.
sing's

Certainly
is
one of

this was one of the ruling suppositions about Jews

since the

in

Germany. And

teaching

of

forbearance toward the

the

stranger

in

their midst

Lessing's

purposes

(Kant, in

Anthropology,
is

speaks of

the "unter uns lebenden

Palastinenser,"

The Palestinians Who Dwell Amongst

Us),
play:

this

prevalent opinion about

the Jew as

tricky

coward

addressed

by

the

After

hearing

the Jew's

fable,

the Sultan

irritably

exclaims:

IS THAT SUPPOSED TO BE THE ANSWER TO MY QUESTION?

Nathan

replies:

IT IS SUPPOSED TO BE AN EXCUSE FOR MY NOT DARING

PRECISELY TO DISCRIMINATE AMONG RINGS

WHICH THE FATHER EXPRESSLY ORDERED SO MADE THAT THEY'D BE INDISTINGUISHABLE

(ill. V.65f)

In

soliloquy

immediately

the theatre

audience

preceding the narration of the fable of the rings, had overheard Nathan as he reasoned to the conclusion that

the sultan's sudden desire for instruction cannot

be

what

it

seems:

I'M QUITE CONFUSED. WHAT IS HE AFTER? I CAME

EXPECTING TO BE ASKED FOR DINARS AND HE WANTS TRUTH, THE NAKED TRUTH, AS THOUGH IT WERE READY CASH, LIKE COIN! HAD IT BEEN THE OLD STYLE COIN, WHICH WAS DULY WEIGHED, PERHAPS I COULD OBLIGE. BUT HE IS ASKING FOR MINTED COIN,
SOMEONE'S HEAD TRUTH ISN'T LIKE THAT, SO THAT YOU COULD PUT IT INTO

LIKE MONEY INTO HIS PURSE! WHO IS THE JEW HERE, HE OR I?

WANTS? BUT WAIT, SUPPOSE IN TRUTH TRUTH ISN'T WHAT HE

TRAP IS LOW. I DO ADMIT, TO SUSPECT SALADIN OF USING TRUTH AS A MERE

TOO LOW? WHAT IS TOO LOW FOR ONE SO HIGH? THAT'S it!

Nathan's

wisdom, according to

my exposition,

seems

to consist,

first, in the

abil

ity

unsentimentally to

guess at people's

motives, carefully

taking

account of

350
what

Interpretation
said

is

but

also

looking
Most

behind the
of us

words at more

the

speaker and

his situation;

second,

skill at evasion.

hope for

than this from the wise, espe

cially
about

when

the

merchant's

they bear a prophet's name. And even if there is something attractive intelligence, because it is so exact and adroit, mere pru
stuff of which our

dence isn't the

would rate

heroes

are made.

Ask

yourself

how Socrates

if

you

didn't know that he had drunk the hemlock.

offered as a sort of

Nevertheless, Nathan is being

signed to

hero.

Lessing *s

play is de
consists

inspire

affection and respect

for

a man whose action

(Handeln)

(Handeln),4 and whose virtue is the power to reckon profits chiefly in trading and losses rightly. By elevating such a man to the rank of paradigm for emula

tion,

Lessing

hopes to

win us

for that post-feudal,

modern world

in

which

willy-

nilly we Of course, Nathan's lack

dwell.5

of

daring

would

gratuitously
cent of
of

evasive.

It is

essential

that we

merely be mean-spirited if he were know that he had sized up his situa

tion quite correctly: The sultan, though

the

king

the

Faithful,"

he may have sounded vaguely reminis in Jehuda ha Levi's Khusari, is not a pagan ruler but "Defender charged by his office to restrain, if need be by force, all who, in

his judgment, threaten Islam. In Saladin's Jerusalem the Jew is, at best, a toler ated alien, such as Shylock was in Christian Venice. The Jew cannot speak freely. The
sultan s

opening

words

to

Nathan, commanding him to

shrink protec

tive distance
COME

and abandon

fear,

make this plain:

AND HAVE NO FEAR.

CLOSER, JEW. STILL CLOSER. STAND RIGHT HERE.

Here's how the interview develops:

Saladin Nathan Saladin
Nathan
you say you're nathan?
yes.

wise nathan? NO. if you don't say it,

the people

Saladin

still,

the people do.

Nathan may be, Saladin surely, Nathan

you don't suppose that i despise the people's voice?

I LONG HAVE HAD THE WISH TO KNOW THE MAN WHOM THEY CALL WISE.

what if it were in scorn they called him so? what if, to them,

wise meant nothing more than shrewd and that man's shrewd who knows

the way to gain his own advantage?

Saladin

you

mean, his true

advantage?

Nathan why, then, indeed,

most selfish were most

shrewd,

AND SHREWD AND WISE WERE ONE.

Saladin

i hear you demonstrate what you'd deny: the true interests of a

HUMAN BEING, WHICH THE PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW, ARE KNOWN TO YOU. AT

LEAST, YOU HAVE TRIED TO KNOW THEM, HAVE PONDERED THEM. THIS OF ITSELF
produces the wise man.

(das

auch allein macht sclion

den Weisen)
jeder
diinket)6

Nathan
4. 5.

which every man at bottom thinks he is

(der

sich

il.iii. l8f.

Cf. Spinoza's Ethics, Preface to Part IV,

cf.
Descartes'

p.

6. m.v;

opening

paragraph of

189 Dover ed., Short Treatise IV, 23L Discourse.

p. 75.

On the Wisdom of Nathan

Those
who

351

have

caught the phrases reminiscent of

Socrates,

of

Descartes,

of

Hobbes,

Spinoza in this brief exchange between the Moslem king and the Jew ish merchant may ask: does Lessing want us to size up Nathan not just as a Jew
of

and a merchant

but

as a philosopher?

so regards him, who has heard barely more from Nathan than Unlike you, Saladin has heard about Nathan, and does not entirely dis count a man's reputation. When just now I cited the Sultan's words you probably noticed how he in effect chides Nathan for attributing disdain of the people's opinion to their ruler. If Saladin was sincere there, this might account for his Nathan to know more than has been said so far. trusting The king gives voice to his disappointment:

Clearly, Saladin
you.

have

BOTHER YOUR RINGS! DON'T TRIFLE WITH ME. I SHOULD THINK

THAT THE RELIGIONS WHICH I NAMED ARE EASILY TO THEIR

DISTINGUISHED,

DOWN

CLOTHING,

DOWN TO FOOD AND DR1NK\

Fully

ruler and philosopher, it is necessary to know that Saladin, in trying to entrap the Jew into actionable at tack on Islam, is himself trapped. Saladin is a man of honor. Also, as the lines I

to savor the bitter humor of the tete a tete between

have already shown, he is steeped in the writings of the philosophers. But the ancient philosophers have not prepared him to deal with money and matters
quoted
economic. must

face the fact, he knows

haps, by

So he is late to learn that his treasury is empty and when at last he not where or how to turn to refill it. Mistaught, per the ancient philosophers, who treat goods of the body with disdain and
trade and money, Saladin becomes putty in the hands
with of

who mistrust

his sister,

Sittah. He falls in
violence, the Jew

her be

schemes
made

because he his

supposes

that,

could

to serve as money lender

own religious

barring outright only by trickery

allow

(Ill.iv). Neither the

philosophers nor

tradition

Saladin to

look

finance rationally, so that charging interest would be fair exchange for risk taking and interest rates charged of the one
upon

understood as

impersonating
the benefit to

the state would be kept

moderate

because the financier

protected.7

recognizes

himself of

having

his life

and goods

7. See i.iii, n.ii, v.i. Al Hafi's bitter outburst "Es war nicht Geckerei bei Hunderttausenden die Menschen driicken, ausmergern, plundern, martern, wiirgen: und ein Menschenfreund an Einzelnen sein wollen? Es war nicht Geckerei des Hochsten Milde, die sonder Auswahl uber und Gute und Flur und Wiistenei, in Sonnenschein und Regen sich verbreitet, nachzuaffen, und nicht des
Bos'

Hochsten immer
words

voile

Hand

haben"

zu

at m.i. I07fif

is

not a mere

venting

of

feeling. It

contains a a party.

di

agnosis of the source of the economic evil to which the

dervish
"

refuses

any longer to be

The

italicized

Jesus'

allude

unmistakeably to

teaching:

love your enemies and pray for

THOSE WHO PERSECUTE YOU, SO THAT YOU MAY BE SONS OF YOUR FATHER WHO IS IN HEAVEN. FOR HE MAKES HIS SUN RISE ON THE EVIL AND ON THE GOOD AND SENDS RAIN ON THE JUST AND THE
JUST."

IN-

Lessing's dervish

continues

the

reflection

to which Shakespeare's use of the Gospel passage (in

"compel"

men to Merchant of Venice IV.i) gives rise: A moral and religious teaching that would foreswear the principle of mutuality, of exchange, especially when it is adopted by a ruler, breeds the most terrible injustice, because it so much strengthens men's longing for God-like generosity that

they will disown those deeds that might bring home to them that they lack des Hochsten immer voile who need not be Hand, that they are not natura naturans. How dear the picture of himself as "given is to Saladin Lessing shows in the opening scene of Act V.
"giver"
to"

352

Interpretation
not

Nathan does

know the his

ruler's character.

himself
mits

Saladin*

against

s wrath,

he

must

be

more

He only knows that, to protect forthcoming. So Nathan ad

unlike the

the shallowness of

ring

image: the three religions,

as to their grounds:

rings,

man

ifestly

differ! But not, he claims,

ARE THEY NOT ALL GROUNDED IN

HISTORY, WRITTEN OR ORALLY TRANSMITTED? TRUST, CAN WE

BE HEIRS TO
HISTORY?8

AND

HOW,

EXCEPT THROUGH FAITH AND

NOW TELL ME, WHOSE FIDELITY AND FAITH ARE LEAST SUBJECT TO DOUBT?

SURELY,

THOSE OF OUR OWN

PEOPLE, WHOSE BLOOD WE

SHARE.

HOW CAN I TRUST MY FATHERS LESS THAN YOU TRUST YOURS?

OR, TURNING

THINGS AROUND, HOW CAN I ASK OF YOU THAT YOU YOUR FOREBEARS GIVE THE LIE SO THAT MY ANCESTORS NOT BE GAINSAID? THE SAME HOLDS FOR THE

CHRISTIANS, DOESN'T

IT?

(lII.vii.75-90).
not overlook

The

merchant's evenhandedness

is pleasing, but do
unattended to.

that differ

ences of creed are allowed ence

to slip

by

And

note

the sultan's refer

to

diversity
nor

of

food

and

drink

and clothes:

(mere externals),
vout

one could

be

judging by
have

In writing these off as inessential Pauline standards which neither de

Jew

Moslem (both
accept.9

of whom

dietary

and even

in

some measure a

dress code), would Most important, don't blanch rival faiths is

at

the thought that the equal

equal

dignity

of

the three
ac

hardly

distinguishable from their

indignity: None can, for

cording to Nathan, make good on its claim to deserve reverence for tradition and recognition of the human
claim which

fealty except on grounds of

need
such

reverence, a

is both very strong

and

weak!10

very
VIII, 9-14; Lessing's Werke, Jerusalem, Arkush tr. (Hanover, NH: Univer
und

8. Cf. Lessing's "Ueber den Beweis des Geistes

(Miinchen: Carl

der

Kraft,"

Hanser, 1979), sity Press of New England, 1983),

tion between eternal truths,
of a physical

and

Mendelssohn's

pp. 90ft.

Lessing

and

Mendelssohn both rely

on

Leibniz's distinc is less

which are

general, though

they may be

of either a mathematico-logical or passage

sort,

and

temporal truths, which are singular.

Since the Mendelssohn

writes:

eas

ily

available, I shall cite from it. Of temporal truths Mendelssohn

occur

"Those

passages which, as

it were,

but

once

in the book

of

nature,

hensible;
time and
mony.

that

is, they can only be

perceived,

must be explained by themselves or remain incompre by means of the senses, by those who were present at the

place of

their occurrence in nature. Everyone else must accept them on authority and testi those who live at
attested no
another

Moreover,

time must rely altogether on the credibility of the testi

.
.

mony,

for the thing

longer

exists

of the narrator constitute the

only evidence^]

without

In historical matters, the authority and credibility testimony we cannot be convinced of any his
itself."

torical truth.
9.

Without authority, the truth of history vanishes along with the event Cf. Maimonides, Mishne Torah i. 1 : "We should not follow the customs of the
or

gentiles nor

im

itate them in dress

and

in their way

of

trimming

the hair. The

Israelite

shall

be distinguished from them

as

be

recognizable

by

the way he dresses and his other activities

and

just

he is distinguished from is in

them

by

his knowledge

his

principles."

(Isadore

Twersky, Maimonides Reader, New York:

deserves
respect shown

Behrman House, 1972). That fascinating way in Lord

Maimonides'

judgment

as a sociologist campaign

Kinross'

account of

Ataturk's

to

modernize

Turkey. His Ataturk,

Rebirth of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld, 1964) holds the wearing of the fez!
10.
cal

a chapter about

Ataturk's expressly

forbidding

Cf.

Maimonides'

"Letter

Astrology,"

on

Ralph Lerner is

and

Muhsin Mahdi, Medieval Politi

a man to accept as which there

Philosophy,

p. 228:

"Know, my

masters, that it

not proper a

for

trustworthy
clear proof

anything

other than one of

these three things. The first is

thing for

is

On the Wisdom of Nathan

Nathan is
which

353

beginning
me

to sound a little like some of our better anthropologists

up sharply against the question why he doesn't "go that is, why he has not become a Moslem. In phrasing the question this way, I may already have answered it in part! When first Saladin commanded Nathan to say what faith and law carry con for him, Nathan had simply answered: "Sultan, I am a (m.v.40). The Sultan, however, had pressed Nathan, insisted that a sage is bound to trans
viction
Jew"

brings

native,"

form

chance

into

choice:

A MAN LIKE YOU DOES NOT STAY PUT WHERE ACCIDENT OF BIRTH HAS CAST HIM.

OR IF HE

STAYS, IT IS FROM INSIGHT, HE HAS REASONS, CHOSE

THE BEST.

IMPART THIS INSIGHT. LET ME HEAR THOSE REASONS!

(lII.V.42f).

We,
nates

who

have heard Nathan's soliloquy, know from it that Nathan discrimi

"positive"

"coined"

or

from

"natural"

religion.

We must, therefore,

ask

why Nathan perseveres in the religion of his forebears. Remaining not only inconvenient and expensive but even dangerous. The
"insight"

"peculiar"

is

(if that is

what

it

is)

which prompts

Nathan to

remain a

Jew is

chiefly expressed through his way of winding up the fable of the three brothers. But it may be prefigured in his name. This name, Nathan, was chosen by Les
sing.

In Boccacio's Decameron,
called

where

the

ring-story

first occurs, the Jew

who

tells the story is not

Nathan but Melchizedek.

Nathan, in Hebrew, means he (presumably, but not necessarily, God) has given. By equipping his merchant-philosopher with the name Nathan, Lessing
focuses
at
attention on

the

singular qualities of

Nathan's patience,

of

his

not

chafing

the fact that human life is

well as

shot through with

male

arbitrariness, the sheerly given.

The Sultan (as

vish and a

two other

characters, not yet mentioned, a Sufi Der

Christian Monk) differs from Nathan in this respect: The Sultan yearns to become sala ad dunyah ve-ad din, improver of the world and of the law. From Nathan he wants to learn what he must do to become deserving of
that
name.

What Nathan tries to teach the

not

ruler

is to

think small, to choose

ends

(as

does Nathan himself) cording to his means. Such in Nathan's deriving from
the
case.

only

means

according to his

but

even ends ac

an attitude of resigned realism

Having

gained

easily turns into callous passivity. Not so the Sultan's good will, he steers it toward free,
geometry, and
astronomy.

man's

reasoning

such as arithmetic,
.

The

second is a

thing

that a man perceives through one of the five senses

prophets or all

The third is say 'This I

thing

that a man receives from

from the righteous. For every

accepts as

reasonable man ought

to distinguish

in his

mind and

thought

the things that he

trustworthy

and

accept as

trustworthy because
Anyone
simple

of

reason.'

tradition,
as
thing'

and

this because of sense perception, and this on that

grounds of

who accepts

trustworthy anything
(Proverbs divisive

is

not of

these three species, of him

Falk,"

it is

said

'The

believeth any
on

14:15)."

See

also

"Ernst

und

Second Conversation, VIII, 462, Werke,

the

inherently

nature of

the sources of solidarity among human beings.

354

Interpretation
of

because rationally grounded, renunciation a judicial verdict about religious

truth."

the

right to

use state power to

issue

He
other.

continues

his fable
who

of

the brothers
case

by having

them

bring

suit against each

The judge perjury have been

hears their

dismisses it. He does

received

not accuse

the broth

ers of
and

when each claims

to have

to

promised privilege

by

dint it.

of

his ring directly from the father grace. But he denies the court's

competence, so
coercive

long

as

he

presides over

Carefully distinguishing verdict (with

the three:
wie sie

authority) from advice, he

advises

take things as they fell out

(nehmt die Sache

liegt):

IF EACH OF YOU RECEIVED HIS RING FROM HIS FATHER

LET EACH BE FIRM IN HOLDING THAT IT IS THE TRUE ONE. PERHAPS THE FATHER WISHED TO TOLERATE NO LONGER

IN HIS HOUSEHOLD THE TYRANNY OF JUST ONE RING.

The judge does

allow

that some time in the distant

equipped

future

a man wiser than

he

may hold his office and be Sultan, Nathan says:

to issue judgment.

Turning directly

to the

IF YOU FEEL THAT YOU ARE HE, THAT WISER JUDGE WHO IS PROMISED

US, THEN.

In

answer

Saladin takes Nathan

.

by

the

hand

and exclaims:

I? MERE PARTICLE OF DUST?

NATHAN, DEAR NATHAN

THE THOUSAND TIMES THOUSAND YEARS THAT YOUR JUDGE SPOKE OF ARE NOT YET UP.

Saladin, in declining
offering him
and

the messianic competence that

Nathan

pretended

to be

choosing instead to identify himself with the judge in the fable who acknowledges his judicial impotence, is freed for the modesty to which, by temperament, he is inclined. Whether Saladin will be able to act according to his insight is As I
self a

different

matter.

construe the

fable,

the modest judge spoke also

ring"

for Nathan. Nathan him

would make us

believes that "just

one

would

be

or

become tyranny, Jew.

forget that the thousand

times thousand years are not yet up. To stave off the
via while

forgetting

of our

being

in

in

patria

he

stays a

The interview that had begun

cludes with

harshly ("Come closer, Jew the Sultan's cry, "Nathan, dear Nathan, be my
so
would

...

")

con

friend"

(in. vii.

155).

Or rather, it

there, had it been up to Saladin. Nathan, re the king's wars and need for cash, gracefully offers to supply what is membering needed. In thus saving both the king's and his own dignity, he seems to be
concluded

have

confirming Saladin's faith in the

11.

people's

ability to judge
pp.

who

is truly

wise.

tion to the double motivation of

Cf. Spinoza, Theol.-Pol. Tr. xx, especially Nathan's name I

who

258,9

of

the

Dover

edition.

In calling

atten

mean

to ask, among other things,

whether

the

Prophet,
least Tamar

may

well

have been the historian through David's

misconduct was

whom we

learn

of the

fate

of

kings, knew (at

via the rape of

by hindsight)
and the

that

first in the

causal chain that

led,

going

unpunished of the crown prince

Amnon,

to the rebellion

of

Absalom.

On the Wisdom of Nathan

The
oasis of

355

friendship
wars.

Moslem-Christian

his way to remind us like me, you cannot help wondering whether pockets of peace in the deserve to be so much celebrated, you were probably also worried
"blood"

pretty picture. It does nothing to stop the In the concluding act of the play, Lessing goes out of that the tumult in Egypt and in Lebanon continues (v.ii). If,
makes a midst of war

by

the word

in Nathan's

speech

in defense

of religious pluralism:

THOSE WHOSE BLOOD WE

SHARE,

THEY ARE THE ONES WE'RE PRONE TO TRUST.

I believe
but
not

Lessing
Bear in
that I

wants us to

squirm, that his design

was must

to make us uneasy,

too easily

uneasy. mind

To

show

why I think this I

and

briefly
III,

recount the

play's plot.

that the

fable

the entire encounter between ruler to the center, Act

of a

and merchant
play.

have described

belong

five-act jour

At the
ney,

play's

opening, Nathan has just

as

returned

from

long

commercial

Babylon. His daughter Rachel's nurse, Daja, welcomes without her charge. She is full to bursting with the story of a recent him, alone, fire that threatened Nathan's house and nearly cost Rachel her life. Had it not
as

taking him

far

been for the heroic intervention

cries,
rushed a

of a

Knight Templar who,

hearing
with

Rachel's

That
should

into the flames, the girl would surely have Knight Templar, openly wearing his white
march about

perished. mantle red

cross,

Saladin's Jerusalem is mighty strange, freely since the Order had just treacherously broken the Christian truce with Saladin (i. v.i 08) and every member of the Order could expect death at Moslem hands.
streets of

in the

The knight's life has been spared, Daja reports, because blance to the Sultan's deceased elder brother.

of

his uncanny
may
at

resem

Nathan,
set some of

whose

snubbing

of

the nurse's love

of melodrama

first have his love

the theatre

audience against

him,

soon redeems

himself

by

for his daughter. He wants, of course, to express his gratitude to her savior, the Knight Templar. But this is made difficult, not only by the oath of poverty sworn

by
no

all such

knights,

and

by

their

violent contempt overcome

for

Jews,12

but also,

even pri

marily,

by

the self-loathing that has

him.13 rights14

the dishonored
an

knight. His life is

longer his own,

to

have

slain

having been granted him by the Templar's By

the Jew until Act
enter

enemy who might, and ought, status is that of a slave to Sala

din. The knight

ther's

avoids

II,

scene 5.

Then,

softened

by

the

fa
sa

remarkable

ability to

into both his daughter's feelings

(II. v. 72), the knight becomes
kindness.15

and

her

vior's sense of what

honor

requires

enraged when now

Nathan

proceeds

to preach about universal human

The knight

blurts
12.
13.

out

his

real rancor:

E.g. l.iv.58, n.v.20, n.v.39, n.v.47, 1v.iv.119f. m.viii. n.v.27 and knight's soliloquy at
iv. iv.

14. 15.

Cf. Merchant of Venice

on

kind

and

kindness.

356

Interpretation

WELL SAID INDEED! BUT DO YOU KNOW THE PEOPLE

THAT WAS THE FIRST TO CARP AT OTHER TRIBES?

WAS FIRST TO CALL ITSELF THE CHOSEN PEOPLE?

SUPPOSE THAT I DO NOT EXACTLY HATE BUT FOR ITS PRIDE AM FORCED TO SCORN THIS PEOPLE?
THIS PRIDE IT HAS PASSED ON TO CHRISTIANS, MOSLEMS

EACH GROUP CLAIMING THAT ITS GOD ALONE IS THE RIGHT

GOD.16

I'm

curious

how

you

feel

about

Nathan's

response.

He

says:

COME, WE MUST, WE MUST BE FRIENDS !

DESPISE MY PEOPLE AS MUCH AS YOU LIKE

(iI.V.

108).

Can these ready

words

be

squared with what

Nathan

says to
and

Saladin in the

next act

(al

discussed),
to one's

where

he

reminds

the ruler,

ourselves,

of the sweetness of

loyalty

own people?

than enjoys among his own

Are they honorable, considering the reverence Na people (according to the Christian nurse's [Daja]
i.vi.22ff)?
ends

probably trustworthy testimony,

tween the
merchant and

the

knight,

in

They do work: this friendship pact.

meeting too, be
prevails over

hardly

need tell you that the

inevitable happens: Nathan

Rachel. The

the

knight

and persuades you'd

him to

call on

man and maid converse.

The

man, as
ence

expect, is caught in a second

fire,

and rushes

from the

girl's pres

to save himself (m.ii.8).

escape
too,17

his passion, unwilling perhaps his love for Rachel to her father (m.ix), who is slow to
Unable to
suit.

the knight confesses

encourage

the Templar's

Nathan's standoffishness,

which

Lessing
without

exhibits

by having

the

knight
gesture

bestow the title

of

father

on

Nathan

Nathan's completing the

through the counter-gift

self-despair.

calling the knight son, exacerbates the young man's The knight had abandoned himself to his passion for Rachel to fill
of when

the void
given

left in him

bereft

of the

organizing

purpose of

his life previously

him

as member of

his

chivalric

order.18

Himself suspecting that he is a bastard, he interprets Nathan's inquiries about his lineage as a half-knowing proving of his illegitimacy.19 Deprived of Rachel, on whose love he has, as he believes, a legitimate claim, even according to her

father, he is
and

now overwhelmed

by

the recognition that

he is illegitimate through
and

through: his former purpose, as

ii.v.89;

knight, is

ashes20

his

new

purpose, as

16.

Yemen,"

also

cf. Deuteronomy 10:15, 7:7> 4;8, cited in this order by Maimonides in "Epistle to Isadore Twersky, Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, 1972), p. 439. See Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Hi.

17. 18. 19. 20.

Cf.

hi. viii. 2-30.

at m.i. I7f.

Cf. Rachel's lines

Cf. Oedipus Rex

1062 and 1070 with

Nathan

in.

ix. 42-50.

Cf. Nathan

11. 5 with

Iliad

ix. 316-65.

On the Wisdom of Nathan

357
given

husband,

to which

his

fancy

had

the glow of

emulation of

his

father,21

is

blocked. While the knight is in this utterly vulnerable condition, Rachel's Chris tian nurse, Daja, gives him the information that Nathan has no right to stand in
passion's
was

way,
of

born

his daughter is daughter only by thieving adoption: Rachel Christian parents, baptized as a Christian too! (iii.x).
since

In his confusion,
erlaubt,
allowed

outrage

(m.x.l

18:

Wie? Der weise,

gate

Nathan hdtte

sich

die Stimme der Natur himself so

much

so zu verfdlschen?

What,

that wise, good Nathan

spiritual

to

falsify the voice of nature?) the knight seeks

points out to

guidance.

He might,
as would

as

Saladin later

him, have

gone to the

Sultan

for advice,
out

have befitted the

supposed new

in his

soliloquy.

But,

proaching the
chosen as

cloister.

at the opening of Neither he nor we, the audience,

identity he had been trying next the act, we see the knight ap
are certain whom

he has

mentor,

whether

the

lay

brother Bonafides

or the

Patriarch

of

Jerusa

lem (the only character in the play who has no proper name). The lay brother is standing in the porch of the monastery and the knight's first words to Bonafides
are

to the

effect

that

he's been

looking

for the

monk.

But just

little later

(iv.i.36)

we

hear that the knight

of

wants to consult with the

you were

Patriarch.

If, instead
rectly but
the

listening to this lecture,

have
met

play, you would

attending a performance of the the Patriarch (i.e., the local Bishop) in Act I, not di
Bonafides'

by

proxy:

Taking

advantage of used

monastic oath of

obedience,

Patriarch, in Act I, had

infatuation
made with

the monk as

his

messenger

to the knight. The

message was

that the knight should serve Christendom

by capitalizing on the Sul

tan's

him

so as

the

more

easily to assassinate the Sultan (i.v).

the Patriarch's
wickedness

Lessing

us

witness

the interview between the Patriarch's go-between,

not

Bonafides,
a crown confuse

and

the Knight

only to

exhibit

but

also

so that we might see

the Knight's

moral steadfastness:

The Patriarch's

promise of

in the hereafter for rendering assassin's the knight. Nor did his Order's breaking
gift of

service

to the church

failed to
him: The

of the truce confuse

Knight felt bound

for the

by that natural code of honor which deems murder in exchange being saved alive base ingratitude. The knight (greatly to the
stayed ritterlich

messenger's

relief)

(knightly). But now, in Act

as

IV,

our

knight
the

would use

this

same treacherous

Patriarch

his

spiritual

advisor!

True,

knight
as

seems relieved
approaches

to come

upon

Brother Bonafides

rather than the

Patriarch

he

the cloister.

Unfortunately,

the good monk,

apprehensive of

his conscience, begs off from hearing the sharing intimacies that would burden knight out. Consequently, it is to the Patriarch of Jerusalem himself (now substi despite the tute for his substitute!) that the knight puts his case of conscience, knight's
moral and even physical revulsion at
REVEREND

the Patriarch:

SUPPOSING,

FATHER, THAT A JEW

POSSESSED AN ONLY CHILD, CALL IT A GIRL WHOM WITH THE GREATEST CARE HE HAD BROUGHT UP
21.
HI.vili.30ff.
. .
.

358

Interpretation

AND NOW WE ARE INFORMED THE CHILD WAS NOT

THE JEW'S OWN DAUGHTER

THE GIRL WAS KNOWN TO BE A CHRISTIAN

CHILD,

BAPTIZED. THE JEW HAD MERELY REARED HER AS A JEWESS TELL

ME, FATHER, IN SUCH A CASE,

WHAT SHOULD ONE DO?

The

patriarch answers
must

that the Christian child must be removed and that the

foster-father

both imperial

and

burn: in seducing a Christian to apostasy, the Jew has broken Papal law. For the child it were better that it had died than that

for its damnation everlasting its earthly life were to be saved apart from Christian doctrine. Repelled by such unreason, the Knight tries to extricate himself. Too late!
as

According

to the articles of the recent

humiliating truce,

Sultan Saladin,
to enforce the

local

secular ruler

from the Christian standpoint, is

and
law."22

obligated

Christian Church's "rights, doctrines,

thank

god, the Patriarch exclaims,

thank god

WE HAVE SALADIN'S SEAL TO THIS AGREEMENT.

AND EASILY I'LL MAKE HIM SEE WHAT DANGER

LIES FOR THE STATE ISELF IN LACK OF FAITH: ALL CIVIC BONDS DISSOLVE
.

WHEN MEN NEED NOT

BELIEVE.23

We

can

be be

sure

the Patriarch will ferret out Nathan's

identity
the

Saladin
war will

refuse to abide renewed

by

the

written

terms

of

the

truce,

that, should Christian-Moslem

and

in Jerusalem.
this course
of events were

We it is
or of

could

be

sure of

Nathan the Wise

tragedy. But

Lessing's play, somewhat like Shakespeare's Much Ado about Nothing Moliere 's Tartuffe, tends toward a disaster that does not come to pass. The fall
not.

the spoudaios (who is not a ruler,

a

"real"

not even a

father, but merely a private

person,

merchant,
and

friend,
how

and

teacher) is

prevented

by

the conspiracy of stub

"knot"

born

decency

luck.24

Before
and

we examine

Lessing

expressly

consider what

for the untying of the play s justice there was in my claim that the plot is
arranges
regard

con

trived so as to make us have

for

and

to look askance at the mystique of

wir

blood (m. vii. 7 "Gut

turn to

and

Blut"; m.vii.85 "deren Blut

sind"), let us

briefly re

Sir Knight; also, give further instances of Nathan's wisdom. May it not fairly be said that the knight, subjected to the test of the rushing waters of returning chaos, that is, of the loosening from all bonds of habitual sol

idarity, fails? The ins

cal

and outs of

this failure are studied

with greater psychologi

nicety than
22.

anything
cf.

or anyone else

in the

play.

Even after,

as we

thought, he

1v.ii.100, 139L
ruler's

Shakespeare's Measure for Measure where,

with

the enigmatic ruler's

connivance, the

placetaker,

Angelo, representing

secular authority, enforces a stricter than

civic ecclesiastical sexual code.

Cf. Werke. VIII, pp. 102, 115L and company in Act V, scene i Brother Bonafides.
23.
24.

iv. 11. 107.

Cf.

Dogberry

of

Shakespeare's Much Ado

about

Nothing with

On the Wisdom of Nathan

has been brought to his
senses

359
the

by

Patriarch's

naked

villainy,

we're made to

hear the knight's terrible

words:

HE'S BEEN FOUND OUT! THAT BABBLER OF TOLERANCE IS UNMASKED

I SHALL CONTRIVE TO SET UPON THIS JEWISH WOLF

IN PHILOSOPHIC SHEEPSKIN HOUNDS WHOSE TEETH

SHALL TEAR HIS FLEECE TO BITS.

(iV.iv. I

IO,f).
falls.25

And

we are made

to know why the

knight

In pitying
saw the

him,

we

fear for
despair

ourselves.

Was it in
and

anticipation of such
arm

failure, because he

young

man's

hoped to

him

with a new

solidarity, that Nathan earlier embraced him so

unreservedly
than said:

with

the words which, earlier in this

lecture,

gave me pause?

Na

COME, WE MUST, WE MUST BE FRIENDS.

DESPISE MY PEOPLE AS MUCH AS YOU LIKE. NEITHER OF US HAS CHOSEN HIS OWN PEOPLE. ARE WE OUR PEOPLE?

(lI.V.I08f).

If Nathan

spoke

from

solicitude

for the knight's weakness,

was

that not

wisdom?

Surely

it

was

kindness?
unkindness.26

kindness, like Spinoza's, has its own Lessing con trived that when first we meet Nathan, in Act I, we find him quite tough, toward his daughter. Rachel, unable to bear the thought that she is despised by one her savior from the fire, the Knight Templar whom she must needs admire has transformed him, with Daja's enthusiastic assistance, into a being so high
Nathan's
that

he

cannot

but "look
We're

down,"

an angel sent

to save her.

Lessing

seems

to be

sketching
angel's

a miracle-tale

in the

making:

the Templar's white mantle

has become
cure

wings.27

his daughter
cial

of

how Nathan does everything in his power to the self-gratifying delusion that supernatural powers take a
shown wants

spe

interest in her. He
of

to

free her for

pot's

active gratitude

to a

fellow human be
the fire
with sil patterns

ing. For the vanity

ver

"the iron

wanting to be drawn

out of

silver"

tongs,

to think

itself

a pot of

he

substitutes

delight in the

made

by

sheer coincidence:

A CURVE, AN ANGLE, WRINKLE. MOLE

.

ON A RANDOM COUNTENANCE

FROM EUROPE, AND YOU ARE SAVED FROM FIRE, IN ASIA. IS THAT NO WONDER, WONDER-AVID FOLK? WHY MUST YOU CALL AN ANGEL DOWN FROM HEAVEN?

(i.ii.

IO3).

25.
26. 27.

iv.iv, v.iii, v.v, v.viii. Cf. Spinoza's Ethics iv.9,

p. 238

Dover

edition.

See

also i.i.

109, 123L

360

Interpretation
on the

Nathan is commenting
to stir

fact that the features

of

the Knight Templar

happen

Saladin,
same

so much so as

that he spares the Templar's

life;

that this Templar

happens to be
The

by

the fire threatens Rachel.

also shows

opening act in which we see how Nathan takes his daughter in hand how coolly he bribes the nurse when she too insistently mentions her its demand that
she

Christian
you

conscience and

disclose Rachel's
resist.28

origins

(i.i. 41 ). If

don't like my calling it bribery, say that the merchant, to distract the nurse, Nathan has no compunction overwhelms her with gifts too glamorous to
about

buying

the

nurse's silence.

Someone

raised on

Kantian

notions of respect

may Daja

well

be troubled: Wasn't it from her father that Rachel learned to

that she

accept

miracle-tales-and-all

learned

also

that Daja must torment

from

love,

that Daja cannot (since she believes that her Christian way alone leads to
stand

salvation) patiently
walk to

by

when

the

child

that is

so

dear to her

continues to

what, from her Christian perspective, is perdition? (v.vi). Now offering bribes instead of words shows disrespect. Yet Rachel's more than patience, love

for Daja

as a

Christian, is
welchen

kind

of

respect, albeit not

of

the Kantian sort, since it

seems, paradoxically, to relish

man man

"heteronomy"

and sheer givenness. man gebohren wenn nicht

(Wie

weiss

denn fur

Erdklotz

fi

den auf

welchen

gebohren?) It is

a respect

that is indistinguishable from resignation emotion, is

active affection.

but, in
to the

stead of

being

felt

as a passive

According

Knight, it was through Nathan's raising that Rachel developed such suppleness. There must, then, be some kind of affection in Nathan's ability to size up who each is and in his freedom to give daughter, nurse, Knight Templar, Sultan
to each what

is

"fitting."29

This virtue,

(agape), is,
to argue

as aydnr) The play seems that the merchant-philosopher, because it is his business to deal with de most

which some

Christians

might

be tempted to

identify

paradoxically, linked to

commerce

by

our play.

tachable circulating
man

goods and

being's ovoia,

being

money (things which cannot be mistaken for a hu made for alienability), because he is landless, can be
made

clear-eyed about who stands since

before him. Thus the very condition that first they were dispersed an object of suspicion their in Lessing's play made a source of freedom.

Jews

"unrootedness"

is

good

From the Sultan's trap Nathan was rescued by his own wit and the Sultan's heart and aspirations to nobility. From the Patriarch's law he is saved by
Brother Bonafides, the fact that
of
men

three

the

world over give a certain pri

macy to bands
admit.

kinship

(die

ersten

Bande der Natur.

iv.vii.

written evidence such as a modern court and a modern

160) "critical

and a piece of
would

historian"

Brother
28. iv. vi:

Bonafides,

always

obedient, though

inwardly

protesting,

go-between

It's probably not unimportant that Nathan's distractive manoeuvres work not because is greedy but because she sees Nathan's goodness in his generosity. 29. Cf. Republic i, Socrates's conversation with Polemarchus; cf. also Spinoza p. 238, Dover edition, appendix to part iv of the Ethics.
the nurse

On the Wisdom of Nathan

361
act

before, in
adoption

the play's penultimate

(iv.vii)

takes the
monk

initiative

of

than that the

Patriarch is

on

his track. The

knows the facts

warning Na of Rachel's

because, eighteen years ago, he had been the horseman who brought Rachel, then a babe-in-arms, from war-torn terrain to Nathan. In so doing he was carrying out the wishes of the baby's father, recently bereaved of his Christian
has piously preserved, through all those years, a prayerbook that belonged to Rachel's father, in which are written, in Arabic script, the names of
wife.

The

monk

both the father's daughter

will not

and

his

wife's

kinfolk. Thus it is learned that Rachel is the

safe:

of

Sultan Saladin's deceased brother. Rachel is Saladin

when

Even the Patriarch

defy

the Sultan defends as his own a brother's daughter!

(v.iv.28f).

We have
are that

almost reached
curtain come

the end

of

the play. The stage directions

for the finale

the

down

as all who are

plus

left

on stage

Moslem ruler, Jew

ish merchant-sage, Christian knight, ter, Sittah,

"Ode to
might

the two female

figures (the

ruler's sis

embra

and

the

merchant's

daughter, Rachel) "repeatedly

scale the picture
saccharine
.

On

a s

(fortunately) very
Joy,"

much reduced

is

reminiscent of

Schiller

and almost

equally

until one asks oneself what

be the implications

of three

final facts:
Christian infant's life
and

First,

that the man who

long

ago saved the

now,

as

part of the action of

Bonafides

is

as

the play little included in the final

still

Nathan the Jew as well, namely the

embrace as

lay

brother

is

the sufi

dervish Al

Hafi. Al Hafi is probably for Bonafides, I'm not at days in the hut
on

wandering eastward, toward the river Ganges. As

that

all confident

he

will

be

allowed

to spend his last the Patriarch of

Mt. Tabor that he's

always

dreaming

of:

Jerusalem, his
continues

superior, unlike the Queen of the Night in Mozart's Magic

Flute,

to

reign.30

Second,
us:

we're

being
not

deprived

of the

ending that the play every decent

seemed

to promise

The knight does

marry Rachel.

Third,
kinsman

though Nathan may end

up

as

person's

friend, he has
as

no

and no equal.

In the

midst of

those

embracements

he is

solitary

as the

misanthrope sufi.

Every comedy I know of Measure for Measure, like ones dark (barring Aristophanes), even and especially non-wedwith a concludes culminates in a wedding. Lessing's Nathan the Wise
Let
me elaborate a

little

on the

last two

observations.

Lessing's play are much akin. Both are Masonic drama. The Queen of Kingdom of Darkness. the Night corresponds to the Patriarch of Jerusalem. She is Ecclesia, laythree messenger boys are the The Daja. Lessing's are court Queen's The three ladies from the Sufi Der is the see imagination to this) brother Bonafides. Papageno (though it takes a trick of the and Tamino. Nathan is, of course, Sarastro (Zoro
30.

Mozart's

opera and

Hobbes'

This leaves Sarastro, Monstatos, Pamina, Mozart's Prince and Princess and It is precisely because one runs into difficulty in matching up comparison: Each effort to see by the urge I Moor with Lessing's Knight, Daughter, and Sultan that darkening. Lessing's play, performance of which was prohibited in Sax
vish.

aster)

seeing-as

illuminates

while

ony

and

Austria,
in

was

first

performed

in Berlin, in 1783. two

first
performed at

years after

Lessing's death. It had been

published

1779.

Mozart's

opera was

the Imperial Royal Theatre of

Vienna,

in

1791.

362

Interpretation
cannot

ding: The knight's love for Rachel

is Rachel's brother.

issue in

wedlock

because the

same

lit

tle prayerbook that proves Rachel to be Saladin's niece

establishes

that the

knight

Why

this shock to our sensibilities?

suffering to the knight? To the

learn that, despite the

knight,

not

to Rachel.

Why mete out such Lessing makes sure that we

unrelenting efforts to couple her ward with the Christian knight, for Rachel the gaining of a brother is total gain: The stage direc tions at v. viii. 98 call for Rachel's approaching and the knight's withdrawing at
nurse's,

the news of their blood relationship. That the asymmetry is

shown

by

the

fact

that

in Act II Nathan

checks on

carefully designed is Rachel's feelings towards the

entry.

knight

and

finds that

amorous

thoughts have found no

of the

(11. iv. 1-20). When

in Act V,
checks

now

in full knowledge
of

knight's

again, the fact

so obvious

Rachel's
even

never

family history, Nathan worriedly having left the father-daughter cocoon

it (v.
viii. 12-22).

becomes
I

that

the knight

registers

cannot answer

my

own question what

Lessing
on

means

to show

by involving
is, I
take
great success

the knight in innocent almost incest. The effect

the theatre audience

it,
of

to be reminded

of

barriers. Is

Lessing

apprehensive

lest the too

doctrines that

would make us

tear down boundaries

reducing the number and kinds of attachment and ings? Or is he punishing the knight, not for his passion, but for remaining a lover like Palamon and Arcite in Chaucer's "Knight's incapable of conceiving
Tale,"

destroy humane life by intimacy among human be

of

confessed

reciprocity between a man his love to Rachel,

and a woman?

The knight had never, it turns out,

ought except

never

imagined that

Nathan he

and

Na (cf.

than's pride could stand

v.vii.3off and 111.ii.3ff).
and

between him

and union with the girl

rescued

Or, finally, is Lessing using the sibling relation between Rachel to drive home that the exasperating deliberateness of Na than, the stuffy carefulness of the bourgeois, no matter how unloveable it looks
the knight
next

spontaneity and daring of the knight, deserves our This last suggestion brings us back to the hypothesis that
to the
nostalgia

grateful respect?

Lessing

contrived

his play to cure his countrymen of mercial feudal world. In Germany,

Lessing

for the supposedly finer pre-comseems to have been the first man of
of a mercantile mentality.

letters to

appreciate and teach

the power for good

Else

where, in France and England and the

Netherlands,

the merchant had had his de

fenders in
31.

more or

less

popular

literature.31

Voltaire writes, in the Sixth Letter

place much more

on the

English Nation: "Go to the London Stock Ex

than any number of courts. There you

change, a

deserving

of respect

(respectable)

will see representatives of all

the nations assemble to serve the good

with each other as

(utilite)
they

of mankind.

There the

Jew,

the

Moslem,
infidel

and the except

Christian deal

though

were of one religion and and

count none

the bankrupt. There the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist

p.
"

the Anglican

accepts the

Quaker's knit

promise"

21, Lettres

sur

(Spectator, May
chants.

19, 1717):
mankind

There

are no

les Anglais (Cambridge, 1 96 1 ) Addison remarks more useful members in a commonwealth than mer
.

They

together in mutual

intercourse

of good office,

distribute the

gifts of nature,
observes

find

for the poor, his essay "Of Civil

work

add wealth to the

rich,

great."

and magnificence

to the

And Hume

in

Liberty"

(Hume

Moral

and

Political Philosophy, Hafner

mentions

edition p. 316):

"Trade

was never esteemed an affair of state

till the last century, and there scarcely is any ancient writer on

politics who

has

made mention of

it (Xenophon

it, in Hiero: Plato in

the

Laws,

excludes

it)

On the Wisdom of Nathan

But how
can

363
medium

drama,

which

has been, traditionally, the

for giving li
restorative

turgical expression to the gratitude we owe to those who accept the risks of great
ness

(tragedy)

or, again, for

infecting
can

us

with

confidence

in the

powers of smallness

(comedy), how
allegiance

drama be

made to celebrate

middling

people, merchant go-betweens like Nathan? How

persuaded

can

the human imagination be

to shift

its

from the

extremes to the middle?

By revealing
This brings from

the
me

source of

this moderation.
what

to

saying

I deem to be the

real reason

for Lessing's
who

choosing to make a Jew of his hero of the middle. Unlike

prejudice

Voltaire,

is free

toward Islam but full

less than

scrupulous

it toward the Jew, especially when his business dealings make intimidation in good conscience
of

convenient,

and unlike

Kant,

who

delivers himself in

private

letters

as well as

in

his Anthropology
ers
von

of remarks of such mean-spirited

bigotry

as to make

his

admir

blush, Lessing is

a genuine practitioner of

the

(piXavdgojnia
preaches.32

(unbestochenen,

Vorurteilen freie Liebe, 1n.vii.135f) which he He is neither an antinor a philo-semite. He makes Nathan a Jew, not because he puts any stock

in

a mystique of

chosenness, but

because,
IV,

with

Aeschylus, he believes
ordinance we

that

Zeus,

whoever

He

might

be, has

established as a

fixed
vii,

that wisdom,

if it

comes,

comes

from

suffering:

In Act

scene

learn the

circumstance of

Rachel's bondage

adoption.

Thereby
in

we

learn how human freedom

springs

from human

rightly Speaking strictly

understood. private

to the

lay brother Bonafides,

pogrom against

Nathan tells him that,

populace of

shortly before their meeting

happened for safety,

eighteen years

ago, the Christian

the

town of Gath had been roused to a

the local colony of Jews (as

those killed were Nathan's

frequently during
was set on

the Crusades).

Among

wife and seven sons.

His brother's house,

where

Nathan had brought his

family

fire

consumed.33

and all within were

Hume

goes on

to

point out

that the

supposition

that the

flourishing of the
What is

arts and sciences goes

freedom is erroneous, as the French "commerce can never flourish but in free
with political

example shows.

much more

true

is that

government.

He

cites the examples of

Athens, Syracuse, trading

Carthage, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Holland, England. "The Mfree cities now in Europe are London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg
.

three greatest
. .

towns

He

adds the

important
se

observation: cure

"Commerce

is

apt

to

decay

in

absolute governments not

because it is there less

but because it is less honorable. A

subordination of rank

monarchy.

Birth, titles,
all

and place must

be honored

above

is absolutely necessary to the support of riches and industry, and, while these no
commerce

tions prevail,

the

considerable

traders will

chase some of those

32.

employments

to

which

be tempted to throw up their privileges and honors are

with

in

order

to pur

annexed."

krantz

and

Cf. Lessing's early play Die Juden Schubert ed. vn/2, 112.

Kant, Werke, Cassirer

ed.

ix.396; X.235L Rosen-

threatens Nathan's house and daughter in 33. I hardly need belabor the fact that the fire which Act I, the fire with which the Patriarch thrice threatens Nathan in recompense for his adoption of a baptized girl child (1v.ii.79), and the fire of eighteen years earlier by which Nathan lost all his inti fire. They correspond to the Sabeans, Chaldeans, and light mates are one and all Masonic trials by

ning

and gale

vealed

Job to detach him from "sent the Whirlwind. from Voice in the
to"

all

that was his except "his very self and Nature as re

364

Interpretation
ME,
I HAD BEEN LYING IN DUST AND ASHES FOR THREE DAYS CALLING GOD TO ACCOUNT, RAGING AGAINST HIM.

WHEN YOU MET

AND

NIGHTS, WEEPING,

IN A FRENZY OF REBELLION I CURSED MYSELF AND THE AND SWORE UNDYING HATRED TOWARD CHRISTENDOM
.

COSMOS,

BUT

REASON,

RETURNING BY

DEGREES,

ADDRESSED ME

GENTLY,

SAYING:

"NEVERTHELESS

GOD IS. THAT TOO

WAS HIS DECREE. COME. PRACTICE WHAT LONG YOU'VE UNDERSTOOD. THE DOING OF WHICH IS NO HARDER THAN IS ITS COMPREHENSION.
RISE."34

WILL."

I STOOD AND CRIED TO GOD:

"l WILL ACCORDING TO YOUR

THEN YOU DISMOUNTED AND HANDED ME THE CHILD

The

second

and modest
constitution

that to us

Nathan, having suffered greatly, Americans, beneficiaries

acts on a scale so circumscribed

of a war

for independence

and a
self-

that have

made separation of church

from

state seem almost as

human equality, he and the play named after him may seem petty. Nathan's efficacy is purely private: He makes friends of a Moslem and a Christian and he gives a fine raising to a baptized girl-child. True, the Moslem he befriends is a king, so that "taking him aside may bear public conse
evident as quence.

privately"

True,
one

the child

who girl

largely
for

owes

the goodness of her second nature to

Nathan is
dered

Christian

seven sons of

his

own

begetting
seems

that were mur

by

her

mother's co-religionists.

Nevertheless, it
make us

to me that

Lessing
of

goes out of works of

his way, presumably to

Saladin
not

believe in the possibility foster

religious

the

reason, to picture them as

advice to

fairly

small, unheroic,

and self-interested:

Nathan's
to his

to use state power to

own

advantage,

as are those reason

friendship

pacts and

the

adoption of

uniformity is Rachel. love

Nathan's returning
34.

taught him that nothing except a

well-focused

Because

of the sentence

I italicized,

which makes no sense except on

Spinozist

grounds of

understanding (Ethics 11 corollary to proposition 99), I see no providence in Lessing's play except such as Spinoza and Maimonides both would acknowledge. Thus Nathan the Wise, where the Sufi and the Jew agree that a man must do the good which he clearly perceives to be

identifying

will with

such, seems to

me

to teach the same determinism as do the Dialogues for Freemasons: In the Dia
clear-eyed and

logues for Freemasons Lessing's

unable

to say things that he had better leave

unsaid"

far-sighted Falk (falcon) maintains that "the sage is (Der Weise kann nicht sagen, was er besser

verschweigt, Werke

VIII,

459).

Rightly

or wrongly,

Lessing
VIII,

seems

to

me

to

hold

with

Spinoza that

reasons necessitate as much as causes

(cf. Werke

427, the

"Zusatz"

to his young friend

Jerusalem's essay on freedom). In the Hamburgische Dramaturgic (2nd piece, Werke IV, 242), Lessing denies the possibility of Christian tragedy. The expressly stated reason for this impossibility is that the true Christian's imperturbable meekness is inherently untheatrical. But putting two and two
together I believe the deeper
reason

is that to the Christian death lacks

finality
It

and

that,

where

for the

Christian
requires

moral miracles are

possible,

tragedy

as

tragedy

rules them out:

admits neither the creative

rupture of

divine

grace nor the

and

(in truth,

annihilating rupture of a man who wills evil for evil's sake. Tragedy in Lessing's judgment) that we confess that "this character, placed in this situa
this passion, could not
of

tion,

and overcome
judged."

by

have judged

except as the playwright shows

him to
and

have

The determinism
truth. The upshot

"philosophic"

tragedy Lessing identifies (Werke IV, 243) as the of all this is that the famous (or infamous) conversation
even the prime evidence

"absolute"

with

Jacobi

zism."

(Werke VIII, 563flf) is very far from being the sole or Hence my citation of passages from Spinoza.

for Lessing's "spino

On the Wisdom of Nathan

is strong
enough to overcome

365
and

hatred (cf. Spinoza, Ethics 111.54, iv.14, 15)

that the man whose sense of

of all causa sui
.

life derives from hate is in bondage to the past, least (cf Spinoza, Ethics in, definitions 1 and 2 and proposition 1 pp.
,

I29f

Dover

ed.).

He is

not without courage

Jew's adopting

of a

baptized in

fant is
vii.

risky

8),

and most of

business. But he takes risks only wenn's notig ist, und niitzt (in. the time his virtue as a free man is shown by the intelligence
or circumvents rather

with which

he declines

than overcomes dangers (cf Spin

.

oza, Ethics iv. 69).

If Nathan is
Musterbild der

hero, he is

hero

of

sobriety

and as such

being

offered as

menschlichen

Natur (cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Preface to

with

part iv).

Thus the
goodness

chief question
so gut als

that the play leaves me

so

is

whether

Nathan's

klug,

klug

als weise

(i.iii. 88)

is

sufficient to

inspire

one

to

self-exertion.

Social

Theory
a special

and
issue
on

Practice

Marxism/Feminism: Powers
of

Theory/Theories
and

of

Power

Guest Editors: Roger S. Gottlieb

Nancy Holmstrom
on

We welcome critical (not historical or exegetical) papers

all

aspects

of

the

present

and

future

feminist theory. Papers

though

should address one over

Marxist and both theories, al

of

they may emphasize papers by June 1, 1988 to:

the

other.

Submit

Social Theory and Practice Department of Philosophy Florida State University

Tallahassee,

FL 32306-1054

Robert H.

Horwitz,

1923-

1987

Will Morrisey

In his

class on modern political

philosophy

at

told a story on
with

himself. He

recalled

walking along

Kenyon College, Bob Horwitz a street in Chicago at night

his friend Herbert Storing, when some youths, out to intimidate, ran di rectly at the two professors. (These were not former students.) "Storing stood
there
and

like

man,"

a real

Bob said,

illustrating

this

by

expanding his chest. Then, his enormous eyes shuffled a few steps to the left, narrowed his eyes in
got off

planting his own feet firmly widened in mock terror, he

a sideward

glance,

and mut

tered, "/
He
and

the sidewalk.
undergraduates

was

teaching
man.

the difference between Aristotelian citizen

Hobbesian

The lesson

worked:

I have remembered,

and now you prob

ably will, too. But Bob left the teaching unfinished, with respect to himself. Six teen years later, back at Kenyon for his memorial service, I learned that Bob had
won

the Bronze Star in World War II. His laugh came back to me then; it always

sounded as

if Santa Claus had

read

Machiavelli

not

losing

his

liberality

but

putting a surgical edge on it. At the service, Bob's student, colleague, and friend Phil Marcus said, "Bob Horwitz was always more than most saw, until it was too
late."

Robert
mained a

Henry
kind
of

Horwitz Texan

was

born in El Paso

on

September 3, 1923,

and

he

re

all

his life. He thought big. He talked

and acted

to back

up those thoughts, for the sake of them and the friends who shared them. He didn't talk or act for the sake of just anybody, having a Texan contempt for "the as he himself once pusillanimous and the timid, the compromisers, and the
like,"

put and

it. A

student wrote

that Bob "knew two things I didn't: how to have enemies

time."

how to have fun. Preferably at the same Bob learned early how to reconcile contraries, Tennessee, a Jewish Southerner in the 1930s
minorities sometimes embattled.

or a

balance them. He
minority him
of a

grew

up in

minority, both

This

must

have

given

a certain

distance

from, but
It surely

a nonetheless passionate

interest in, the

the

workings of

the

political order.

prepared

Bob to

appreciate

response made whose careful

to the political order

by

rediscovered

supremely intelligent man, John Locke, by Leo Strauss. By striking

the
of

way
or

of

writing

was

to be

coincidence

providence, Bob's

confirmation statement concerned

relation of

John Locke's thought to the

artful

Declaration

Independence. The fruitful tension, the

contradiction, the
or teachers at at

occasional outright conflict:

Bob learned these prep school,

then

not

from books

first,
his

but

by

experience

in

a southern
where

in the European war,

the Juilliard
where

Amherst
met

College, in New York,

match and

he
and

studied piano at

School,

wisely

married

her,

in Hawaii,

he

undertook

the Sisy-

368

Interpretation

phean task of

teaching

adult education

! He learned the Lockean lesson

war

of

toler

ance, and of the limits of tolerance

the latter not only in the

in 1948,
one

when

Stalin's troops

crushed

Czechoslovakia
the evil
of

and

harshly

but especially taught at least

At the

Henry University of Chicago,

a

Wallace -style

student about

leftist totalitarianism.

Leo Strauss took Bob's

knowledge,
it
so

acquired

by

reconnoitering

wide,

sometimes rough

terrain,

and elevated

Bob

could see
what phi

the whole all at once

and measure

its

proportions. must

Strauss taught Bob

be, if philosophy is to losophy is, and what political philosophy Bob never forgot these lessons. Out of them he fashioned a life with
sometimes

survive.

friends,
it.
modern

in

collaboration

with

fortune's wheel,
neither

as often

in

conflict with nor

With

respect

to fortune if

not

friendship,

the ancient

the

stance could quite quired and

satisfy Bob. So he assumed either one, prudence advised. He didn't lose his balance.
the work Bob

as circumstance re

Almost

all

did

during
the

and after

his

years

in Chicago

concerned

political philosophy's practical aspect or

embodiment, civic education. In his

doctoral dissertation he
seek

contrasted

ways

Aristotle, Rousseau,

and

Dewey

to educate citizens in

various regimes.

mistic

belief that

"growth,"

conceived as

He sharply questioned Dewey's opti the infinite expansion of democracy,

man.

could overcome modern

the tension between city and those

attempts

Bob

co-edited

two books on

ideologies,

to make political structure and propaganda co

sanguine view

here

with

of such

philosophy reconceived as science. Bob had a less than schemes. He also had too much respect for 'the common

man'

to believe

that

citizens would sit still

for

enlightenment.

And he knew too

much about phi or even

losophy
regard

to imagine
as well

it identical to the

propaganda of modern

science,

to

it

defended

by

that propaganda.
effect of modern social science methods.

Bob particularly deplored the

was convinced

He

that

they

narrow and vulgarize

the way students conceive of

poli

tics,

and thus

to Essays on

ultimately debase the way politics are practiced. In his contribution the Scientific Study of Politics, a book he conceived, he dissected
propaganda"

the "scientific
cal

of

Harold D. Lasswell. Lasswell

art, but slyly

rejected the classi subordinated scien

idea

of political science as an architectonic and prediction

tific description

to a program of social control

by,

as

Bob
s

called

"psychologist-kings."

them,
class was

Unlike Plato's philosopher-kings,

wither

Lasswell'

ruling
even

to be empowered only to

away; the master propagandists

nature

tually
versal

will so arrange

human

life,

redo

human

itself through

a sort of uni

be necessary any longer. This strange, simultaneous maximizing of tyranny and anarchy elicited Bob's vigorous con demnation, and he was struck by the equally vigorous condemnation the Essays
enlightenment, that
no politics will

provoked

in

professional

journals,

then

firmly

committed

to

'behaviorism.'

With

Professor Strauss, Herbert Storing, and Walter Berns, Bob went through enemy fire in a different kind of war. He knew that simply to provoke that war, to force social scientism to defend itself on territory not its own, was to win a battle, if
not

the

war.

Robert H. Horwitz, 1923-1987

Bob did
some work

369
the sort of
work

that

came close enough to

done

by

most

contemporary political scientists to demonstrate clearly the difference between his understanding and theirs. In the mid-1960s, Bob published a series of mono
graphs on

land

use and politics

in Hawaii;

a student of use of

his in those days

remarked

that Bob showed

how

politics

determined the

the

land, how "the very

Now

trees

growing

on the watersheds were the outgrowth of the

regime."

more than

twenty

years

old, these

studies are still used

by

specialists, some

of whom might

learn from them things beyond their specialty, as might citizens and legislators. Bob thought of his political science classes as opportunities for the civic edu

his students, who could be depended upon not to have had much of that previously. During his ten years at Michigan State University, he conceived and
cation of

taught courses on modern

with

ideologies

and on political philosophy.

He

worked

the University's College of Education to

establish courses on civic educa

tion

itself. He did

not confine

his teaching to academia, but

addressed state and

legislators, secondary school teachers, military personnel, hospital ad ministrators, Rotarians and Lions; he appeared on several radio programs and, at
federal least once, Bob
on television.
went

to Kenyon College to serve as chairman of the

a

political science

de
re

partment. called:

In

letter

written

shortly before Bob's death, Robert Goldwin

Kenyon then
no

was

probably the best liberal

arts college

instruction in

political studies at all.

Under

your

in the country to have virtually leadership, we built the best

It helped that
we

undergraduate political science

clean

department in the

country.
was

had

slate, but that was only

part of

it. Your

"plan"

the essential element.

you used to explain your plan

Before I left Chicago for Gambier, I tried to draw for Leo Strauss the little diagram for the department: a base of political philosophy; one
our political

pillar,

system; the

other

pillar, other political systems; across the

top, in
asked

ternational
what

relations.

Strauss

showed

little interest in the diagram, he said, "If there is

a plan

and when

he

thought of Horwitz's scheme, than all the

people

for the department, it

others."

is already better

Bob found the right

(among

the first and surely the foremost in service to

subjects.

Kenyon, Harry Clor) With Goldwin, he

Chicago

to teach these

Then he let them teach. brought

transplanted the

Public Affairs Conference Center from

prominent politi
started out

to Kenyon. The PACC

annual conferences

cians, scholars, and journalists to

Gambier, Ohio

to educate

(they

by

assuming) and to be
this process, and

educated

(they
and

stretched

it

out over their

quickly lifetimes. Later on, Bob

realized).

With

students

he

reversed

worked with

two young colleagues, Charles the

Leslie Rubin, to
"plan"

teaching

of political science, a course that

distilled the lessons learned

was

develop a summer course on by the

in
effect.

teachers at Kenyon
of

during
work

the years his

Justice,"

Now

some version schools. partic

on

that course, "The Quest for

exists at more

than one

hundred

Bob's scholarly

for the last fifteen

writings.

years centered on

John Locke,

ularly Locke's

educational

Bob

collaborated with

Judith Finn

370
study
of

Interpretation
Locke's
artful

reworking of Aesop's Fables; he wrote on Lockean civic education for his anthology The Moral Foundations of the American Republic; and, in what will likely be recognized as his finest work, he wrote an introduc
tion to and an
extensive

commentary

on

Locke's Questions

of Nature, to be

lish translation
manuscript

an Eng scholarly apparatus Clay. Bob discovered portions of this Strauss missing by Jenny (controversial portions Locke himself had hidden with various
published with

Concerning by Diskin Clay and

the

Law

friends),
his

and proved

that

they

were

intended to form

part of

the

whole.

In

each of

essays

Bob

concerns

himself

not

Locke taught
whose

and

for

whom

Locke

wrote.

only with Locke's teaching but with how Locke was indeed an Aesopean writer
the labyrinthine character of
use

life,

as

Bob demonstrates,

mirrored some of were prepared

his
the

writings.

Locke's Questions

for

in the university,

where

philosopher addressed

future English

rulers with

the consummate circum

spection a

theologically

sensitive

topic deserves.
and

Bob described Locke

circumspection.

as

his hero,

he did

emulate

Locke in

some of

this

friend to controversy as Locke was not, confessing that he "attempted to be unfailingly kind and gen erous in helping his friends, but could never understand the maxim that we

But,

as

he

immediately

added, Bob

was a

should

love

enemies."

our

He

saw

that Locke's thought and

influence had helped

to
show

to

make such spirited confrontations

civil, but he

also wanted

that Lock

ean commercial republicanism need not extinguish all

spiritedness, especially

the spiritedness needed to defend the regimes of tolerance.

Bob's final controversy at Kenyon was a defense of civility in its academic form, liberal education. The same kind of ideology he had espoused in the
1940s,
studied

in the 1950s,

and opposed on campus and within the

American early

Political Science Association

1970s,
ism.'

during

the 'New
1980s

Left'

days
of

of the 1960s and

reappeared at

Kenyon in the

in the forms

feminism into is

and 'global-

Their

partisans wanted

to transform

liberal

education

political educa

tion in the propagandistic sense, asserting that "all education

cause

politi

be

they

saw no

difference between

rhetoric and

philosophy that
adversaries a

is

politic.

Physically
in
politics

weakened

by

chronic

illness, Bob

gave

his

few lessons

both in his
and

sense of the word and

in theirs. lead to
civility.

Both Aquinas

Hobbes teach that fear

read and taught

can

As

founder in

his

own

sphere, Bob

Machiavelli
or

and regarded

it he

as an open might

question whether

it is better to be loved
upon

feared. I think
question."

finally
he

have
to in
re

answered, "That depends

spire

the souls in
came

In

some

preferred or at

fear,

simply.

In others, fear

first, but led

to

friendship
all

least to

spect. much.

A very few others needed not to fear him at Women students and colleagues had a certain

or,

at

least,

not too

advantage

in this, because

Bob
U.S. my

never

lost
/

degree

of of

Army boy

University

Southern courtliness, piquantly mingled with that Chicago brashness. Bob was almost unique among him
a as an over

acquaintances

in that I

never met a woman who regarded

grown

as most women quite

properly

regard most men.

To

woman,

they

Robert H. Horwitz, 1923-1987

371

thought him a man, one of them going so far as to write, "You are drawn to the
problems

that separate the men from the

boys."

If I

ever

discover how he

man

aged

this effect, I shall report back for the benefit of men everywhere.
men

Nor did
often

think of him simply as an intellectual warrior, although with us

way:

it

began that

professor who met was no

him in

1980 recalled,

"They
he
wasn't

told

me

he

was

older, he had mellowed, he

longer

as combative as

used to

be.

This may have been true, but I still found him fore the laughter came, if you deserved to share it. One
called

exhausting

But it

long be

of

his last

students re

how Bob "would

telling."

defiantly

fire

a piece of chalk at a

buzzing clock marking

the end of class: time was short,

needed

and

there were many important jokes which still

For

a short

time after Bob's

might

death,
exist

some of us worried

that his commentary on

Locke's Questions
were

only

in

notes or

in

some unpublishable

form. We

wrong; the

manuscript was co-workers.

discovered,
will

nearly complete, to be
published

finished

by
of

several

longtime
as

So it

be

thanks to both parts

Bob's life
shared

his

passion

I knew it: his scholarly passion and his friendliness with those who for knowing and his prudent but no less passionate care for the
to

ways we come

know,

and to wonder.

PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM

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Quarterly

Journal / Volume 12.1 987, No 2-3 :

THE FINAL FOUCAULT

A Special Double Issue $9.95

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Book Review

The Fate
Corngold.

of

the Self: German Writers

and

French Theory.
1986.
xiv

By Stanley
+ 279
pp.:

(New York:

Columbia

University Press,

$28.50.)
Will Morrisey

German ics
assert

writers seldom efface themselves.

self.'

'the death

of

the
critics.

North

Contemporary French literary crit American literary academics assert the

'Indefinitely,'

apotheosis of

the French

How

long can this

A Paul de

go on?

Pessimists say,

but

Stanley
a

Corngold
stu

is

no pessimist. of

professor of comparative and a native of

literature

at

Princeton,

former

dent

Man,

Brooklyn, he

comes well positioned and of common sense.

'deconstructionism'

equipped

to arraign

before the bar

His de

parture from or overcoming of Brooklyn did not include any foolish attempt to jettison every ounce of Brooklyn baggage. But he knows that Brooklynite com

itself convince academics, who remain genteel even while that is to say, themselves. assaulting Western civilization and the bourgeoisie So he writes his critique in 'Eighties-academic prose. ("My purpose is to institute
mon sense will not

by

the modern the

self as

the copresence

['structure']

of various narratives

['effects']

of

self which earlier writers

have produced.") He be

also gives

every

sign of actu

'deconstructionists'

ally
cists

having
have

read most of what the an ascesis more to

and their academic publi

written

admired than emulated.

Each
and

reader will

find his favorite

example of this

happy

conjunction of style

substance, but
quotes

your reviewer recommends

footnote 35,

page

244.

There
on

Corngold
Heidegger

an

as-they-say dense

passage of

by

Professor Victor Lange

"methodological

life,"

acces

("Historical

concretizations

"suprapersonal

"hermeneutical phenomenology"); with that convin

perfect

cing poker face you hard to say this any

own

better."

only in the old neighborhood, he comments, "It is with its Truly, Corngold attacks
"deconstructionism'

heavy

instruments. It is inconceivable that

even

his

most

insensible targets
"disown'

will not

flinch.

The

poet's self
order

is Corngold's
of the

topic

"a

paradoxical

being
a

that must
poetic
self-

exist."

"Disown"

itself in
assertion

to

is Holderlin's word; he likens in

ancient

sacred"

to the

"feeling

tragedies,

feeling

that can no

longer find immediate

"spirit"

recognition,

but to

which modern readers can

their own the

(Geist)
its "objective
perceive

and experience.

This

carrying-over works

carry over both ways;

what

material,

poet's self carries over

into "foreign

analogous

into

T. S.

Eliot

calls

and

the reader's self carries over,

from itself, to
man writers

the poet's intention.

all of whom

Holderlin is the first

of seven

away Ger

Corngold presents,

insist that this carrying-over, though

374

Interpretation
occur.

problematic, does
('shattering'

The

'deconstructionists'

claim

that the self loses its way

'diffraction'

and
tures.'

are

the usual metaphors) among outside 'struc

res

structionists'

Attacking deny the

and as

the notion of the Cartesian subject,

existence of

cogitans, the 'decon the

self as a

self-knowledge,

reject

"coercive
agent of

authority"

the basis of
and

autonomous

individuality. The

self

"as the

its

development"

own

the

source of poetic

making, amounts to little more

than a myth.

Corngold
cannot

agrees

that "the self as particular, the

self as self

be

represented

in the concept"; the

itself."

self

"cannot

at once stand

is precisely what inside itself

and give a regress

full description

of

The

attempt

to do so

would yield an

infinite
infinite

(not

knowing

when you've reached

the self's

foundation)
be itself

or an

'progress'

(selves followed
which

by

super-selves).
it?"

"Can

a self

and

know that

the act

by

it is known he

'disowns'

Corngold

affirms that
"effect"

"history,"

by

which

means narrative.

Narrative is

an

it can, thanks to issuing from but

not

parts of the originative self

identical to the self, opposing but not obliterating other selves that the dominant part of that self finds
both

(including
objection

able); the synthesis of these effects approximates "a third term, a projected total
ity"

that objectively confirms the existence

of

self and other-than-self

"The

integrity
with

of the self

is

established

by

a style open

to the

history [here,
in the

"history"

also means

experience] it

suffers and perceives

and makes

stories

it tells,
lit

others' collaboration."

Corngold

would

defend Rousseau

by

means of a

erary Hegelianism. Rousseau "figures in the essays. He is my eighth 'German

...

carpet of almost everyone of these

writer.'"

Corngold's German-language
and

writers are

Holderlin, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Mann, Kafka, Freud,

find themselves decease.
self's consciousness of subpoenaed

Heidegger,

many

of whom

by

'deconstructionists'

as witnesses

to the self's alleged

Holderlin teaches that the

most radical

its

own

mortality,

of

the

otherness, impels it to Bildung, development. This "divided

'deconstructionists'

self"

does

merely contradict itself, as toward historical and sacred objects

not

assume.

Bildung

"turns

and
. .

finally

toward Nature as that generality

negat

enabling, sustaining,
ture makes the self

particular contacts and enveloping possible. It also makes self-knowledge possible

and

Na

the self a perspective outside the self.

with

Holderlin's
"Nature"

"Nature"

stable, Platonic

forms; it is
time, both

as mutable as the self

by affording has nothing to do hence its affinity with

themselves.
a

the self. At the same

artful

self and

do

sustain

Poetic,
medi

language "assures

the permanence

[perhaps too strong

word]

of relations

between signifier and arresting an eternal ates between self and other, thus imitating all-encompassing does not attempt to prove Holderlin's scheme to be rationally

'slippage'

signified

Language

"Nature."

Corngold

sustainable or co

herent;
which

a proof of

this would require

justifying

the emphasis on the

mutability

of

death

serves as
makes

the most striking example. But he does argue plausibly

more sense

that Holderlin

than the

"deconstructionists'

do. Corngold

Book Review
shows

375
and

that

Lacan, Leplanche,

the self even

in the formulations they

Foucault unwittingly use to deny it. be in

order

imply

the existence of

In Dilthey, nature,
political

even nature conceived as mutable, gives must a poetics

way to

social and

history. "What
of a poet

to sustain the

view

that the
forces?"

subjectivity may be authentic and representative of social contends that historical Dilthey activity includes the study of history, that study makes history, is a praxis. The self itself by political activity, art,
'objectifies'

and scholarship.

"Literature is

an

institution because it institutes

and
"force"

relations of

force between
enter

acts of

creation, reception,

order."

the public

But the

notion of

understanding whose thrust is to implies much more than mere

nature

history-as-narrative. Predictably,
soul,"

Dilthey
the

brings

in

under the cover of

his

tory, saying that statesmen, poets,

of

and philosophers share a

"powerful life force

the capacity to

"energy

of experiences of and

heart

world,"

and of the

generalize

those experiences,

"the

power of not

tion of "historical

psychology"

only Corngold entirely appreciates this, but the former does write, and the latter repeats, that literature's "highest is "to represent the dignity of

implies

inspiring history but

conviction."

The

no

also "jv%r].

Neither

Dilthey
the

nor

function"

person

in the

midst of

its

determination"

by

history.

In the
rejects poet's

argument

between Rousseau
of art as a

the understanding
self

Hegel, Nietzsche incites to war. He means of Bildung. If art is Dionysian, the

and susceptible

becomes

more

problematic, a field

to possession. For

Nietzsche, questioning distinguishes the self from merely determined phenom ena. "The self wants itself as a question"; it "exists as the question of its being
and to this extent self.

is

self-determined,

as no outside
conception of

force

causes

it to

question

it

Corngold finds Nietzsche's

the self to be

dubious, because

Nietzsche
are

appears nearly to identify the self with the body, whose many drives merely asserted to have a rank. Disorder cannot be said to determine itself. But Corngold adds that Nietzsche's will to power itself consists of contradictory

forces; if
ward

the self produces

and

language, kdyoc,
overcoming.

then language, an "enterprise of the will to therefore logic, are not oriented toward discovery but to
self's

power

The

self-questioning
question of yet

means

not self-doubt

but

self-

overcoming,

questioning.

"The

the self must

live

as an openness, an
virtual answers one

unansweredness

toward

being,
as a

it

must

bend the

world will

into

in

question."

order to preserve

itself

Nietzsche's
Rousseauan

to power,

might

observe, synthesizes

part of

nature with part of contention

Hegelian history.

Corngold dismisses the

"pan-ironic"

'deconstructionist'

that Nietzsche's texts are

that Nietzsche's strong assertion of self surreptitiously undercuts

itself
irony"

by

noting that

"irony

can

take place only through

punctual abrogations of

much

Of the two twentieth-century literary men Corngold discusses, Mann does interest him whereas Kafka does. The latter's novels contain
as when

not

"breaks"

in

perspective

Joseph K. is described in the third person,

a violation of

376

Interpretation
point-of-view. call

non-"authorial"

the novel's otherwise

'deconstructionists'

Such

"breaks"

appear of a

to

"undecidability"

exemplify matic of "the death

"breaks"

what

the
might of course

text,

sympto

of

the

Author."

One
of a

suggest

that these

instead

reveal as an

the

incompetence

the author, but Corngold has a better

suggestion.
more

Even
of

author, Kafka has

horror

of

construction,

which

is

one

instance

the mastery or control satirized in The Trial. Kafka objects to

on principle. and

perfection of

technique,

Therefore, Kafka's
as are

narrator

"is

as much

subject

to

inauthenticity
procedures

blindness

any character"; "like the loopholes in

the institutional equivalent
grant

bureaucratic
of

which, as Adorno writes,

narrative

mercy, random breaks in

consistency
'character,'

the hero a sort of merci

privations of an

ful liberation from the mediably

one who personal

schematism of

from the only

irre

perspective."

Of course, this
stand.

can

go so

far. Kafka is the

lets the

"random"

breaks

In

being

allowed

to stand,

they

are no

longer
senting

random.

Corngold does

not quite

say it, but Kafka

cannot avoid pre

mercy to his suffering characters. He cannot really relinquish control, only imitate such relinquish ment. He approaches relinquishment of control in fiction.
us with a coherent self even attempts to show

in his

Corngold

attacks the "deconstructionisf method

interpretive
bent
on

involved
own

as

misreading of Freud, "the disfigured expression of a

describing
will

the

to power

masking its

contradiction."

Freud's texts
"cure"

"insert"

choanalyst attempts to

the reality of

literary. The psy biological life into fiction invented

are not would self

by

a patient or a writer. who

To Kafka,

such a

itself

cause
not

injury; like
particular
play,"

Rousseau,

deplores self-interest, "Kafka's its

narrative attentiveness to

is defined

by

interests but

by

the products of dream

by
what

"indifference to the
'Deconstructionists'

consciousn

practical concerns of an aimed empirical call

Freud's texts

literary because they do not know

lit
or

hostile to it. Although they claim to der to liberate readers from allegedly coercive grip, they in fact texts into saying nothing, the better to fit them into the
erature

is,

'deconstruct'

or perhaps are

in

authors'

coerce con

'deconstructionist'

struct.

Heidegger "joins
which
logic."

a tradition subverting the western philosophy of language founds normally meaning on, and subordinates rhetoric to, grammar and The "most character of Heidegger's notion of Dasein is a res
primordial"

olute return to
sees eral

"one's

Self."

ownmost
will

Whereas Nietzsche begins

with self and

his

general

principle, the
which

to power, in

it,

Heidegger begins
to the

with

his

gen

principle,

the emphasis

Dasein, falls, this

"make[s]

Self."

a resolute return

Wherever

antirational
mere

tradition attributes a cognitive significance to

feeling."

human

"moods,"

beyond
stands

"sensation-bound disclosive

From Rousseau to

Heidegger, "mood

for

power whose reach cognitive under

attain."

standing cannot Corngold's Germans

"strange"
tic'

The disclosive

power of moods

evidently has
are

waned. and

increasingly

perceive

that

"'fragile"

moods appear

when one sees

them in others, even if

they

in oneself;

one self/subject cannot often coincide with another

strong if the

and "authen means of

Book Review
coincidence

311 Corngold he does

sees

is

mood.

that historicism arises this fact as

from

this

increased
might

subjectivism,

although

not elaborate on

much as

he

having

availed

himself

of a sort of

historicism.

Corngold

would

'deconstructionism,'

halt this waning of Rousseau's project before it slides into which he rightly considers an absurdity. "If a text were

only duce basis

tion of nothingness,
a of

self-deconstructing motion, a play of ineffable differences, a representa it could not weigh heavily enough upon the reader to pro
mood."

For

all

the

their enterprise remains embarrassingly

formidable doctrine historicists have produced, the natural even if so inchoate a

moods.

naturalness as that seen

in human

Corngold may

concede too much to

with

historicism
an

and also to

Rousseau,

who at

times has been credited

inventing

early form of historicism. When historicism, following subjectivism, eschews dialectic based on the principle of noncontradiction and asserts a "mood"-based dialectic
A
of synthesizing opposites, it finds such projects as logic, scholar
might explore an effort

that eventually ranks rhetoric over

'deconstructionism'

hard to

resist.

this matter

by

Nietzsche

with an eye

toward the classical reason

examining Rousseau, Hegel, and they attacked and the 'decon

"postscript" "prospect"

structionism'

they

somehow

fostered. Corngold's

and

bring

to mind a less elephantine approach.

of

Identifying
to disown

his

own

book

as a con

fession

sorts, a confession of the distance traveled between Brooklyn and

'Germany,'

Corngold indicates

'Germany,'

a readiness

or overcome

too. One way of

against the

doing
of

this would be to measure the language of Brooklyn

'Germany,'

language

and vice-versa,
'Germany'

in

order

to

determine

what

common sense
mon sense can

lacks that

'Germany'

offers,

and what

offers that com

bring

down to earth,

or even

gins with

the language of the marketplace,

falsify. (Socrates, for example, be transcending it only when it deserves

post-Rous-

to be transcended). Despite the egalitarianism of many aspects of

seauan

convolution
'Germany'

thought, this thought betrays a contempt for common sense that yields in theory and extremism in practice. One way to get beyond is to return to
'Brooklyn.'

Philosophy
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TJ
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z o
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8
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x >
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