Beyond EU Enlargement Volume 1

Iris Kempe (ed.)

Beyond EU Enlargement
Volume 1 The Agenda of Direct Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe

Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers Gtersloh 2001

Die Deutsche Bibliothek CIP-Einheitsaufnahme A data set for this publication is available at Die Deutsche Bibliothek.

2001 Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gtersloh Responsible: Cornelius Ochmann Cover design and illustration: werkzwei, Lutz Dudek, Bielefeld Typesetting: digitron GmbH, Bielefeld Printing: Druckerei Rihn, Blomberg ISBN 3-89204-548-8

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strategy Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategic Challenges and Risks of EU Eastern Enlargement . . . . . . . . . . . . Iris Kempe, Wim van Meurs

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Country Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Russian Challenge for the European Union:

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Direct Neighbourhood and Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Timofei V. Bordachev Ukraine and the EU: The Risk of Being Excluded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oleksandr Pavliuk Belarus and the Process of European Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Anatoly Lebedko, Kirk Mildner Moldova and the EU: Direct Neighbourhood and Security Issues . . . . . . . . . 104 Alla Skvortova 65

Issue Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minority Problems Legacies of the Past, Ethnic and Territorial Conflict Potentials . . . . . . . . . . Eiki Berg, Wim van Meurs Visa and Border Problems Direct Neighbourhood: Border Issues and Visa Regulations An Eastern Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jacek Cichocki Border Issues and Visa Regulations: Political, Economic and Social Implications A Western Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Barbara Lippert Cross-Border Co-operation Regional Co-operation Between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe An Eastern Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Taras Voznyak Cross-Border Co-operation in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Western Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Douglas Merrill Pan-European Security Issues of Pan-European Security in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Polish Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eva Feldmann, Bartolomiej Sienkiewcz Pan-European Security in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Western Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iris Kempe

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Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Key Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abbreviation Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 275

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 6

Preface

At the beginning of the new millennium, the European Union finds itself at the heart of Europe. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the current 15 member states decided to enlarge the Union to a total of 27 members and to grant candidate status to Turkey. Already in the first enlargement round, which is to be expected in three to five years, European polity will be extended to the borders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The trouble-spot of the Balkans will move closer towards European integration. These neighbourhoods constitute challenges to stabilisation policy, whose extent nobody can identify clearly even today. The states of the Western Balkans have been given explicit EU prospects, which are organised along the lines of the Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process, while relations with the CIS neighbours have been extended within the framework of foreign relations. Nevertheless, the follow-up questions arising from eastern enlargement can only be managed to a limited extent with the current instruments of the EU. Eastern enlargement constitutes the core issue in certain respects and often lies at the foundation of the other big challenges: The EU has to define its profile, not only as an economic power and stability factor, but also as a foreign and defence policy player. The future neighbouring states confront the EU with new stability and security policy challenges: First of all, regionally concentrated ethnic conflicts, as in Kosovo or in Chechenya may endanger the security of Europe as a whole. The stagnation in, or even failure of, the transformation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe would have direct consequences for the EU, through migration, cross-border crime and smuggling. Accordingly, the Union is challenged in two respects: In its role as security policy player in crisis management, for which it would have to extend the instrument of a Common Security and Defence Policy correspondingly. Furthermore, in its role as setter of norms for the transformation that goes beyond firm accession prospects. 7

On the one hand, the East and Southeast European neighbour states may cause risks for the EU. On the other hand, the follow-up questions of EU enlargement and white spots in the European strategies constitute security risks for Europe as a whole. In order to reduce these deficits, the editors of the two volumes of Beyond EU Enlargement, Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs, have developed a grid to analyse comparatively the risks and challenges posed by these two bordering or neighbouring regions of Europe. In so doing, the editors were perfectly aware of the substantial differences existing between the various countries. Beyond all differentiation, however, the analysis was aimed at binding both regions effectively into a European order of security and stability. The empirical analysis and the formulation of policy recommendations are centred around the topics of positive and negative implications for the whole complex of common European security and stability, minorities and border issues, visa and customs regulations, as well as regional and cross-border co-operation. In accordance with the objectives of the Bertelsmann Foundation as an operative foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research as a think tank focused on European questions of the future, enlargement towards the east has thus become a starting point instead of the target of these considerations. Thanks are due to the authors from the European Union as well as Eastern and Southeastern Europe, who dealt with each of this topics mentioned above in teams of two. They contributed greatly to the success of this undertaking. Over and above the requirements of a normal anthology, they met for symposia in Sofia, St. Petersburg, Munich and Lviv and discussed the content-related prerequisites of the analysis grid as well as regional peculiarities. The published contributions were completed in September 2000. The two editors of the Beyond EU Enlargement volumes, Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs, created the framework for the constructive dialogue and comparison between East The Agenda of Direct Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe and Southeast The Agenda of Stabilisation and Association for Southeastern Europe. Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Werner Weidenfeld Director of the Center for Applied Policy Research at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt, Munich Member of the Board of the Bertelsmann Foundation, Gtersloh

Strategy Paper

Strategic Challenges and Risks of EU Eastern Enlargement

Iris Kempe, Wim van Meurs

1 Risks of EU Enlargement
The break-up of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of a historical era in Europe. Europe is no longer divided into two parts for ideological reasons or because of opposing systems. There is an opportunity to establish a new, common European order. Enlargement of the European Union (EU) towards the east is a step toward creating security and stability beyond the borders of present day Europe. The new opportunities at the same time also carry some new risks and political challenges. These emanate on the one hand from economically and politically unstable neighbouring states, and on the other hand from follow-up questions beyond the current requirements of EU enlargement towards the east. As the title says, this report will for the first time deal with the potential and risks at the eastern and southeastern borders of the European Union that will be there beyond enlargement, beyond in a threefold sense: Geography as regards those states and border regions for which the EU has not formulated accession prospects so far, and which will thus find themselves beyond and outside the European integration process in the medium term as well; Time as regards the follow-up questions of enlargement towards the east from 2005 onwards for various policy areas; Quality as regards the questions of principle to be derived from enlargement towards the east and the discernible finality of the Union. These three dimensions are not only relevant for the analyses on Eastern and Southeastern Europe presented in the two accompanying volumes, but also for future policies 11

which will be geared towards all of Europe, along and beyond the borders of the EU. As far as the regions beyond the future EU borders are concerned, the key questions of exporting stability without importing instability, of permeability and control, of enlargement process and foreign policy, are unavoidable. At the moment these states can be divided into two groups: The successor states of the former Soviet Union, which after EU eastern enlargement will come to share a border with the Union, and the Southeast European region. Both regions confront European decision-makers with new tasks in the area of security policy, caused by the whole spectrum of transformation problems, ranging from economic crises to minority conflicts escalating into violence. In this context, the EU is required like no other organisation in Europe to play a role as stabiliser in the transformation process and also as soft-security provider. In formulating its policies, the EU has up to now opted for various forms of co-operation that do not offer the perspective of accession: In its co-operation with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, accession has been excluded for the time being. Relations with states that will be in Direct Neighbourhood to the enlarged EU are limited to partnership and co-operation. For the regions of acute crisis in the Western Balkans, on the other hand, the window of opportunity for prospective accession has been opened, and is supported by a Stability Pact as well as the Stabilisation and Association Process. Despite numerous differences, the security and stability problems in both regions can be approached by a comparison of four core areas: 1. Minority problems and legacies of the past; 2. Questions of visa and customs procedures; 3. Regional and cross-border co-operation; 4. Pan-European security. With these topics in mind, the regions of the future eastern border (Direct Neighbourhood) as well as the future southeastern border were investigated in order to identify risks and follow-up questions resulting from the process of enlarging the EU towards the east. Conclusions and consequences can be found in the subsequent policy recommendations.

1.1 Direct Neighbourhood and risks along the eastern borders Up to now, EU decision-makers have made substantial efforts to achieve institutionalised regulations for their relations with their future neighbour states. As successor states of the former Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are members in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The admission of these states to the Council of Europe (CoE) is a sign of progress, but also reveals problems in 12

the democratic development of the countries concerned: The guest status of Belarus, for example, has been suspended since 1997 because of the problematic domestic situation. In order to be able to criticise Russias role in the second Chechenyan war, the parliamentary assembly of the CoE has temporarily repealed Russias right to vote. The European Union has signed Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA) with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. With the exception of Belarus, the agreements have been ratified by all countries and taken effect. Drawn up along the same lines, the agreements reflect Western interest in bilateral political co-operation on democratic foundations as well as Eastern interest in economic co-operation. If the possibilities provided for in the agreements are completely implemented, this will create a broad range of opportunities for political dialogue and economic co-operation on various levels, from summits to concrete working groups, and in the case of economic co-operation may even lead to the establishment of free trade zones. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with Ukraine and Russia are supplemented by Common Strategies for each, instruments of the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy. The difference to relations with the East and Central European countries is that none of the current strategies envisages EU membership. The country reports on relations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the European Union published in the documentation point toward distinct deficits and potentials insufficiently explored. One major point of criticism is raised in the country reports on Ukraine and Moldova. By way of a strategic answer, Ukraine and Moldova passed policy statements of their own on their relations to the EU. These are aimed at an early association and the inherent promise of prospective membership. This has to be seen in conjunction with the foreign policy aim to distance themselves from the hegemony of Russia and to strengthen national sovereignty. While Kiev and Chisinau think of prospective membership as a factor stabilising the transformation process, Brussels regards the fact that the transformation tasks have only been very insufficiently fulfilled up to now as one of the main obstacles to formulating membership prospects. While the East European side perceives the continuing lack of membership prospects as a risk leading to loss of stability throughout Europe, the West European side fears that even a debate about possible accession might endanger internal security and stability in Western Europe. There is a lack of normative and institutional concepts to shape the whole of Europe, though the challenge in this context lies more with the EU than with the OSCE or the CoE. Unlike the other organisations, the EU links stability and security and thus has the potential to manage the extended, i. e., beyond military, risks to security caused by economic and social upheavals. The more manifest the membership prospect, the greater the chances for the EU to exert its influence. This can be seen in the countries 13

that are membership candidates, where the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire have achieved priority status in domestic development. The imbalance between the Ukrainian and Moldovan positions on the one side and the European position on the other leads to a strategic vacuum. In view of the dilemma created by the lack of EU membership prospects and unsolved transformation problems, there is a danger that Ukraine and Moldova will remain politically and economically risky neighbours. Should Poland be among the first East-Central European members of the EU, the asymmetries along this border will continue to grow. It has to be assumed that the security and stability problems will increase too. Complete or partial failure of the Ukrainian and Moldovan transformation would at the same time influence relations with the Russian Federation. In both cases, the countries concerned are ethnically and economically weakly consolidated nation-states. Because of its economic structure and ethnic make-up, Ukraine has traditionally been divided into a Russian-dominated east and the genuinely Ukrainian west. As a result of its uncertain relations with Romania and separatist Transnistria, Moldova is also suffering from the consequences of a fragile national consolidation. Russian dominance over the so-called near abroad also becomes manifest in economic dependencies, in particular the almost complete dependence on energy supplies. Not only are the enormous debts owed to Russia for energy supplies a sensitive factor but also the routes of the pipelines. By leading the Jamal pipeline through Belarus, Russia is making a point of bypassing Ukraine. This decision not only violates the interests of Kiev, it is also regarded as a sensitive issue by Poland. Ukraines national independence and economic strength are of strategic concern to Poland. Through consolidation in the core of Europe, the Polish government is trying to make the Russian influence more calculable. In case of Polands EU accession, the conflict about energy between Russia and Ukraine would also put a burden on European-Russian relations, especially as Russias political and economic interests overlap considerably in the gas and oil sector. The relationship between the EU and Belarus is even more difficult than relations with Ukraine and Moldova. The official foreign policy of the Lukashenko regime concentrates on intensifying relations with Russia, even going so far as to support tendencies towards a Russian-Belarus Union. Improvement of the extremely frosty relations with Europe is occasionally used as a punching ball in domestic policy. The main risk, however, emanates from the domestic and economic policies of the Lukashenko regime. In spite of the deteriorating economic situation, the office holder is not prepared to abide by democratic minimum standards like free elections, economic reforms and orientation towards Europe. Because of the violations of human rights and 14

democracy, the current very low economic attractiveness and sometimes even aggressive behaviour in dealing with Western representatives, international organisations and representatives of the West have distanced themselves from Minsk. The EU has not set up a delegation, but only a technical office responsible for the Tacis programme. Compared with the other CIS countries, the commitment of Western organisations and foreign foundations is also low. The only activities that stand out in this context are the activities of the local OSCE office. As a consequence of the insufficient interest shown by the EU and other international players, the opposition in Belarus and forces within the Lukashenko regime that are interested in reform are hardly ever noted. Even if this group of players may seem small when seen from the outside, their capacity to act should not be underestimated, and could even be increased by targeted support from the outside. This is particularly true because orientation towards Europe carries a high symbolic and normative value for the representatives of reform in Belarus. It is symptomatic, and in this respect similar to developments in Ukraine and Moldova, for a dissociation from Russian hegemonial tendencies in the area and for orientation of the system transformation towards the West. Unlike Southeastern Europe, with its conflicts caused by minority problems, Belarus does not have a serious potential for ethnic conflicts. The potential threats emanating from Belarus are in the first place based on asymmetries in relation to its Polish and Lithuanian neighbours. The continuing economic downturn and overdue democratisation turn Belarus into the European regime most characterised by dictatorial components. The emergence of new dividing lines as a consequence of EU eastern enlargement will increase this tendency and at the same time make Belarus an even more difficult neighbour. Apart from the domestic and economic policy components mentioned, the geopolitical situation of the country is also very important for common European security. Continued national sovereignty is an important factor for the relationship between the Eastern Central European countries and Russia. A reunification of Moscow and Minsk would not only be a burden on national stability, it would, moreover, also not be in the interest of Europe as a whole. In the relations between the Russian Federation and the EU, there is a consensus that in the medium term an accession of Russia is neither a feasible prospect, nor one worth striving for. Under the presidency of Mr. Putin, the importance of the EU has increased: While the Russian side regarded the political role of the EU as comparatively insignificant even as late as 1997, the Russian government at present sees the EU as an influential political player. The reason for this change in attitude is that the EU is increasingly gaining a foreign and defence policy profile over and beyond its economic importance. This has led Russian decision-makers to the conclusion that there is a multilateral 15

alternative to the current unilateral world order dominated by the USA. This position held by the Russian government deviates from the fundamental convictions of European decision-makers. The EU shapes its policy towards Russia as a complement to its transatlantic relations. In contrast to their critical attitude towards NATO enlargement, Russian decisionmakers as a rule welcome the EU eastern enlargement; at least they voice this position in political declarations of intent. The Russian position on some details important for EU enlargement towards the east differs fundamentally from this statement, however. There are uncertainties and differences regarding sensitive specific aspects. Once Poland and Lithuania have become members of the EU, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad will be surrounded by EU member states. Goods and passenger traffic in the region will be cut off from the mother country even more than now. Despite some efforts to design a Kaliningrad strategy within the framework of the EUs Northern Dimension initiativethere are still neither European nor Russian concepts for the visa issue or the integration of economic development in the Kaliningrad region in an overall concept for the Baltic Sea region, which would give due consideration to Russian security concerns. The requirements to be met by a common European strategy for Kaliningrad are increasing because of the regions structural economic weakness, and the strategic interest of some Russian decision-makers to utilise Kaliningrad as a stronghold against NATO and EU enlargement towards the east. A whole range of risks results from relations with the Baltic states. The new national security doctrine of the Putin government strongly underlines Russias role as protector of the Russian population in Estonia and Latvia. In accordance with this position, the Russian government, but also the general public and the media, are very sensitive about the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Points of criticism are deficits in the legislation regulating citizenship, the Latvian language laws, and the generally difficult social and economic living conditions. In some points the Russian criticism corresponds with the OSCE assessment and the Progress Reports by the EU. A greater problem for future neighbourhood relations, however, is Russias policy to exploit the situation of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states for its own political ends, and instrumentalise it as a way to manifest Russian claims. On the basis of this position, Russian decision-makers and analysts have repeatedly claimed a say in the accession negotiations between the EU and Estonia and Latvia. This may lead to a potential conflict between the enlargement process and relations with Russia. The as yet unratified Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian border treaties are a further lever used by the Russian government to try and influence the speed of EU enlargement, as clarification of open border issues is a precondition for EU accession. This instance illustrates particularly well that the Baltic States have become a test case 16

for relations between the EU and Russia far surpassing normative declarations of intent. Thus it is far from sufficient that the Russian government is in favour of EU enlargement towards the east. Rather the degree of approval is measured against the treatment of critical issues like agreement on the border treaties or evaluation of the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Up to now sensitive aspects like Kaliningrad and the question of relations between Russia and the Baltic states have not been sufficiently taken into account in EU strategies. The Union leaves the responsibility up to the Baltic states, without taking into account that even a partially acceptable solution to this problem, so closely related to Eastern enlargement might in the future also lead to conflicts between Europe and Russia. Apart from the risks emanating from inadequate EU strategies, the situation in Russia also contains numerous risks for the Union. According to optimistic estimates, the increase in GDP, which has grown again for the first time in more than a decade, and the rise in industrial production could be interpreted as signs for structural successes of the Putin presidency. In this interpretation, the rise in industrial production and the GNP will be followed by the urgently needed structural reforms and institutional changes in procedures for political decisions. Critics point out, however, that the social basis for Mr. Putins efforts at reform is too slim. The open conflicts he is engaged in at the moment with oligarchs, the media and regional elites, as well as in the Caucasus may be welcome on a certain level, but they require a broad measure of support. The latter is largely missing, however, as Mr. Putins policy is mostly backed by representatives of the middle ranks of the administration and the secret service. And the ordinary man in the street, who is largely preoccupied with finding the means for survival, neither has the feeling of being represented in politics nor any opportunities for social involvement. As long as transformation of the Russian system has not consolidated sufficiently within Russian society, Russia is bound to remain a risk factor for Europe. It is true that in view of its nuclear arms potential, Russia claims the status of a superpower. The modest economic potentials put a narrow limit to the practical importance. The economic crises, social problems and political instabilities not only hamper the ability to act in the field of foreign policy, they also increase the asymmetries between Russia and Europe. The mere promise of EU accession has led to an improvement of the investment climate and economic stabilisation in the Eastern and Central European Countries. Should this tendency continue on both sides, Europe as a whole will increasingly be split into a stable and a risky space.

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1.2 Strategy recommendations on Direct Neighbourhood Differentiation strategy: In formulating policy recommendations, one can distinguish between approaches that focus comprehensively on one complete region, and approaches that concentrate on specific sensitive aspects. By concentrating on the criterion of membership or non-membership, the policy of the European institutions arrives at insufficiently differentiated forms of relations with the so-called outs. Russia, Moldova and Ukraine are members of the CoE and the OSCE. Thus these institutions recognise the progress made by the CIS states in their domestic transformation and foreign policy reorientation. With respect to the EU as the institution most important for economic stability and political integration in Europe, the situation is different: In its strategies and declarations of intent any prospects for membership beyond the borders of what is today Central and Eastern Europe have been rejected. The arguments are largely technical and institutional, focusing on non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership. The development of relations with Turkey, the Western Balkans or the Southeast European accession countries has shown, however, that crises and conflicts may well create political scope to act in the interpretation of the conditions for accession. Setting aside the Copenhagen Criteria, the Ukrainian as well as the Moldavian government make their point for EU membership prospects, with the intention, among others, to consolidate their states internally and to maintain their sovereignty vis--vis the powerful Russian neighbour. Declarations claiming Russias interest in EU membership, however, are limited to spontaneous political exclamations which are not reflected in the corresponding doctrines. This means that the criteria concerning what is expected of the EU are completely different, although all CIS countries suffer from political instability and economic crises. By reducing its decisions to a Yes or No on association and membership, the EU limits its own potential to create security and stability in Europe. The result is a risk-charged vacuum of non-policy. In order to fill this vacuum, it would be necessary to have a strategy of differentiated relations. Beyond the acquis communautaire, Ukraines and Moldovas present European self-perception should be seen as a chance. Beyond the in and out debate, the differences between the future neighbour states have to be perceived in a politically adequate and differentiated way, and strategically implemented accordingly. EU prospects for Ukraine and Moldova: European policy vis--vis CIS countries intent on becoming members of the EU should be to convert the current No on accession into a Yes, in principle. This is the only way in which the potential of the European standard-setting policy can be used as an instrument for conflict prevention and domestic stabilisation even beyond the future borders of the EU. In order to counteract exces18

sive expectations, the European Commission and the governments of the members states will at the same time have to underline that association and accession depend on the success of the domestic transformation process. In the sense of the fundamental considerations outlined above, EU prospects may be introduced into the political debate. Under the premise of a possible association, the opportunities for co-operation already contained in the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and in the Common Strategy, could be used in a more intensive manner. The same should apply to the co-operation between the current membership candidates and neighbour states willing to accede. Supported by European programmes and funds, this could not only help to transfer experiences with the transformation process, it could also bring up the topic of relations between candidate states and the European Commission for discussion. The correlation between success in managing the transformation tasks and prospects for EU association should also be pointed out in programmes for technical co-operation like Tacis and Transform by including references to the adoption of the acquis communautaire in the terms of reference. Efforts and successes in transforming the system would thus be directly linked to prospects for EU membership. Involving Russia in the follow-up questions of eastern enlargement: In the case of the Russian Federation, there are fewer strategic deficits because neither is working toward Russian membership in the Union. There are, however, strategic deficits resulting from specific sensitive aspects of EU enlargement towards the east that concern Russia directly or indirectly. First of all, it must be the task of the EU to define, together with the Russian government and in their common interest, sensitive aspects of EU enlargement towards the east, and outline the limits to which Russia can be allowed to exert its influence. This would mean that Russian decision-makers and analysts would no longer give the impression of being a party to the membership negotiations, as this is a matter between the Commission and the membership candidates. Kaliningrad strategy: Establishing a committee on the topic of EU enlargement towards the east should be discussed within the current framework of RussianEuropean co-operation, for instance in the political dialogue. On its agenda, such a committee should have those items that touch upon the direct interests of Russia as well as those of the Union and the candidate states. On top of the agenda would be drawing up a Kaliningrad strategy. In the process it would be possible to take up existing Russian and EU initiatives. Starting from there, the more sensitive issues of visa regulation, regional development of Kaliningrad and Russian security interests would have to be discussed. According to political signals from Brussels and the member states, there will not be any exceptions for visa regulations to and from Kaliningrad. Nevertheless there are extensive technical and administrative possibilities: Issuing a transit visa within the 19

region must be made as easy and quick as possible by establishing additional consulates. Visa charges and additional insurance should be abolished. A second pillar of the Kaliningrad strategy must be based on the internal stabilisation of the region. In addition to the EU, the Russian government as well as the regional decision-makers are called on to draw up and implement innovative concepts in this process. In the European context, the most urgent political requirement is maximising cross-border co-operation with the neighbouring states of Poland and Lithuania as well as giving support via programmes of technical assistance. Kaliningrad should be granted the status of first-priority funding region on both levels. On the Russian side it is particularly important to minimise military-strategic concerns and maximise investments for national and international investors. Developing Kaliningrad into a centre for technical innovation should be discussed. Avoiding or diminishing asymmetries between Kaliningrad and the neighbouring future EU member states is the most comprehensive guarantee for security. The problem most difficult to solve on the European side is Russian decision-makers endeavouring to instrumentalise the strategic-military potential of Kaliningrad as a stronghold against NATO and EU enlargement towards the east. This risk can only be diminished by ensuring that the stabilisation of Kaliningrad through international co-operation, investment and innovation is beneficial to the Russian economy. Democratisation of Belarus: The difficult neighbourhood in relation to Belarus is not only caused by the dictatorial character of the Lukashenko regime, but also by the fact that Belarus is almost completely ignored in international relations. Removing this strategic vacuum is a necessity, even if only for the sole purpose of not letting go all chances for democratisation and Europeanisation of Belarus that are unused at the present. The development of Serbia may serve as an example: Targeted support of oppositional forces and regional players from the outside contributed to the regime and to the creation of the preconditions for democratic and market-economic reforms. A similar strategy should also be pursued in the case of Belarus. Concessions to Lukashenko must only be made under the premise that he initiates structural change. The release of political prisoners, for instance, should not be regarded as a structural change. Examples for structural change would be the introduction of a democratic right to vote, giving the opposition access to the mass media, or the democratisation of the government system. The foremost aim of the West should be to Europeanise and strengthen civil society in Belarus. An important mainstay for the Europeanisation of Belarus is the presence of European institutions, above all the EU. The technical office currently working there should be developed into a full-fledged EU delegation. This proposal is not primarily directed at co-operation with the Belarus government, but rather at co-operation with non20

government organisations, universities and business representatives interested in reform. In combination with the installation of as many diverse communication channels as possible, information and knowledge about European institutions should be increased. First priority in economic co-operation must be given to supporting the privatisation process. Economic competence can be transferred through co-operation with companies from EU member states as well as candidate states. On the other hand the presence of Western advisors in Belarus should not only be continued but expanded as well. This kind of policy can transfer Western competence to largely isolated Belarus in a targeted way, in order to increase the basis for economic reform in the medium term. Relations between Belarus and Europe as well as the Europeanisation of Belarus can in addition be intensified through an extension and intensification of relations between institutions of the civil society and the educational system. The list of possible schemes is long. It starts with establishing joint training programmes at the universities, continues with a co-operation between institutes of private education and the support of the opposition parties and independent trade unions, and continues through training and co-operation with independent journalists and critical representatives of regional selfgovernment. Just as in the case of Belarus, support of the development of civil society in Russia, Moldova and Ukraine constitutes a core element of overall democratisation, economic reform and transformation. It has to be pointed out at the same time, though, that this is only one element of European strategy vis--vis the countries concerned. Support of civil society must not be used as an excuse for postponing urgently needed political decisions.

1.3 Stabilisation and risks along the southeastern borders The Western Balkans are the crisis region in Europe, for both economic transformation and state consolidation. Despite significant differences, the ten transformation countries from Estonia to Bulgaria have all made sufficient progress in their transformation towards a pluralist democracy and an efficient market economy since 1989/ 1991 to be granted the status of EU accession states under the Copenhagen Criteria. In comparison, the countries of the Western Balkans have a much bigger backlog in the transformation process and worse starting conditions after ten years of war, expulsion and instability than before. The most important economic indicators in all states of Southeastern Europe are below the level of 1989, and apart from the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria also experienced state crises in the 1990s. 21

The Reasons for the increasing falling behind of the Western Balkans may be grouped into four tightly interwoven risk areas, or rather development deficits which partly reach much further back than the post-communist transformation or even the decades of communist rule: (1) the ethnic conflicts and the lack of state consolidation in the region with their consequences for regional stability; (2) the weakness and instability of the political regimes; (3) the deficits in the development of the civil society; and, last but not least, (4) mismanagement of the economic transformation, which on the one hand, starts at a level much lower than in Eastern and Central Europe and shows many elements of a developmental rather than a transformation process, and is, on the other hand, exceedingly misdirected by widespread corruption and criminalisation. Unlike the potential for conflict along the eastern borders, the potential for conflict in the Western Balkans could not be regionally and politically controlled. Unlike the frozen conflicts along the eastern border, the ethnic conflicts following the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia escalated and forced the international community to intervene, leading to the war in Kosovo in spring 1999. Apart from the protection of human and minority rights, this humanitarian intervention also put the prestige and integrity of NATO at stake. In view of these dangers, the Europeans were very firm in their approach, after the phase of military intervention, to stabilise the region permanently and to rule out such escalations of violence at the future borders of the EU and within the developing common European security area. The international community with leading roles for the USA as the only global power and the European Union as regional power has covered the Western Balkans with a network of initiatives, strategies and programmes. The list is almost endless KFOR, SFOR, Partnership for Peace, Stability Pact, SECI, Black Sea Co-operation, Balkan Conference for Stability and Co-operation in Southeastern Europe, OBNOVA, UNPREDEP, UNMIK, Stabilisation and Association Process, and reaches from diplomatic mediation, military intervention, economic assistance or trade support to reconstruction and administration in the protectorates. The overall balance of Western commitment after ten years of war, expulsion, impoverishment and destabilisation is mixed. It is true that the end of the Milosevic regime in Serbia has improved the prospects for the region, but in view of the structural deficits mentioned and the negative consequences of the past ten years, this can only be seen as a precondition for change, not a panacea. Consequently, the EU has decided to apply not only its emerging foreign and security policy capacities to stabilise the region, but above all its tried and tested instruments as a regional power: Massive support for the process of democratic and economic transformation with EU membership prospects as an incentive. The prospects were first acceded to the countries of the Western Balkans in the Stability Pact a commitment 22

which was explicitly made at the European Councils in Helsinki and in Feira. At the same time the roles of Romania and Bulgaria as stabilisers in the Southeast European region were strengthened through the start of membership negotiations (although the economic criteria were only met in part). Overall the stabilisation of the region is now based on qualitatively different preconditions than during Operation Allied Force, and the region is being integrated into the common European economic and security area.

1.4 Regional risks and strategic deficits The list of potential instability risks in the Southern European region and the resulting strategic requirements or rather deficits, however, is equally substantial. In important areas these risk potentials do not even only result from the structural preconditions inherited from the pre-socialist and socialist era or from the post-1989 conflicts, but are caused by external control, or rather European approaches to solve the problems, as shown by a summary of some important risk potentials. The unsolved question of the national and territorial status quo in the region continues to be an essential obstacle to regional co-operation as well as to transformation of the national economies. This is true for the restructuring of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or rather its dissolution, the question of independence for Montenegro and/or Kosovo, and the status of protectorate for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo pushed through by the international community. The open question regarding the status of Kosovo in particular constitutes a substantial instability factor for the region. While the status quo as a protectorate is basically unacceptable to both parties of the conflict, each option for a solution would lead to reactions and follow-up questions, and a new escalation of violence could not be excluded. Under international law, the condition of protectorate status furthermore collides with the requirements of political consolidation and a fresh economic start in Kosovo. As the international community prefers as a solution (at least for the time being) a continuation of the protectorate to the two options with escalation potential, and valuable time and energy that ought to be spent on the necessary development and transformation policy is lost. There is a real danger that the national question remains a dominant issue or may be instrumentalised politically as a substitute for transformation, not only in Kosovo but also in Serbia and the FRY. In the area of economic development, two risks for the future development of the region, which have in part already materialised, must not be underestimated: Aid addiction and criminalisation of the economy. The fact that chances for economic development in Kosovo, Bosnia and Montenegro were limited from the start and have been 23

even further reduced by the war (the term economic reconstruction is misleading) implies that the capacity needed to absorb massive Western aid in a controlled, effective and sustainable way will simply not be there. If this cannot be assured, however, financial aid could often only benefit a small political-economic establishment and increase social disparities. The national economy would become dependent on foreign support and international presence. Accordingly, parts of the political and economic elite are not interested in optimal economic transformation and legal-institutional restructuring, but in a continuation of the opportunities to profit from unregulated economic development. Hand in hand with this development, there will also be criminalisation of several business sectors and intermingling of political and entrepreneurial interests. A strategic dilemma rather than a risk is caused by the heterogeneity of Southeastern Europe itself and the resulting friction between the EU principles of regionality and conditionality. Although the Southeastern European countries find themselves in the bottom half of the East European ranking for all transformation criteria, the structural differences and potentials within the region are considerable. The preconditions of the various steps of approaching the EU have thus led to a division of the region in two respects: As a result of EU conditionality (the preconditions that have to be met with each step), the institutional and contractual relations between the EU and every country of the region are different, ranging from Co-operation Agreements to Stability Pact and SAP candidature up to Europe Agreements, a state of affairs that does nothing for regional co-operation, and even diminishes the willingness to co-operate on a regional level. On the other hand, the instruments of a bilateral approach to the EU have a positive effect on economic development and political stability, which will inexorably lead to increasing disparities and rifts opening in the development within the region. Thus, the EU principles of conditionality and regionality collide when put into practice. With the implementation of the most important EU strategies Stability Pact on the one hand and the Stabilisation and Association Process on the other this will become increasingly manifest. The Stability Pact depends on the concept of comprehensive regional co-operation and has to meet only a basic set of conditions (protection of minority and human rights, recognition of borders, willingness to establish good-neighbourly relations). The logic of the Stabilisation and Association Process on the other hand is based on conditionality, an incremental sequence of bilateral contractual relations with the EU in conjunction with correspondingly increasing conditions ranging from the basic conditionality of the Stability Pact up to the comprehensive acquis communautaire of EU membership.

24

1.5 Optimisation and convergence of EU Balkans policy Since the Kosovo war and especially since the Helsinki European Council, the selfdefinition of the European Union has changed. A decisive impulse for these changes was given by the war in Kosovo, but the consequences reach far beyond the Balkan region. As a regional power, the EU increasingly bears responsibility for a Europe that is bigger than its 15 member states, and reaches even beyond the twelve or thirteen accession states. This means synchronising Europe as an economic power, Europe as a stabiliser in the transformation process and Europe as a fledgling foreign and security policy player. Convergence of the existing EU strategies means first of all a leading role of the European Union in the mega-project of stabilising Southeastern Europe. If the long-term objective is integration into the Union, then it would be useful to structure its first interim stop, the Stability Pact, as an EU institution. This would also benefit sequentialisation and the transition from the Stability Pact to the Stabilisation and Association Process. As dominant initiative, the Stability Pact will also determine the shape of the emerging region. Accordingly, the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria is to be seen as a positive move. On the one hand, the division between these two accession states and the Western Balkans, which have several structural problems in common, is artificial, and on the other, Romania and Bulgaria could take over certain regional stabilisation or vanguard functions. At the same time, the idea to admit Moldova to the Pact could release this state from its position between the CIS and the Balkans, and join it up with the region to which it belongs in terms of history and its present development. Generally speaking, this means that because of the internal heterogeneity of Southeastern Europe and of the experiences in Central and eastern Europe, co-operation should be prompted but subordinated to political-strategic EU integration and its conditionality. The course of differentiated rather than accelerated pre-accession of Southeastern Europe could then be geared to functional considerations and regional associations of the willing and able instead of striving to include every country. EU membership prospects for the Balkan countries and a strategy of differentiated pre-accession should be pursued in parallel with the process of enlargement towards the East. A successful first round of enlargement in 2005 would be the best of all possible guarantees for stability and transformation in Southeastern Europe. Nevertheless the nexus between Eastern enlargement and geopolitical interests or security issues can hardly be denied: The Kosovo war has had a substantial influence on the decisions of Helsinki, which proves that the EU standards of the acquis communautaire are not the only decisive criteria in enlargement negotiations. The capacities and security interests of the union should be recognised as factors, too. 25

2 Regional risks and European strategies

2.1 A European strategy for minority and border issues Although the relationships between ethnic majority and minority in many of the transition countries are not without problems, and some unsettled border issues continue to exist, the European balance of achievements is rather positive in this respect. With no intention of diminishing the existing risks, it is justified to point out that the worst-case scenario after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc ten years ago has not come true. Scenarios for the future of the Baltic states after 1991 especially for Latvia and Estonia often forecast either expulsion/emigration of the stateless Russian-speaking population or a civil war-like escalation. Instead, the high proportion of stateless Russian-speaking residents and the model of an ethnic democracy in Latvia and Estonia led to considerable tensions between the titular nation and minority as well as between national governments and European organisations. In the past couple of years, however, citizenship, language and other minority laws have been changed considerably and have thus been largely adjusted to European standards. It is true that this has not as yet led to a massive speed-up in nationalisation and integration, but the danger of an escalating ethnic conflict has been reduced. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the border issues, which despite lengthy negotiations, have not yet been resolved by treaty. The danger potential inherent in minority and border conflicts in Central and eastern Europe was estimated to be much lower from the outset, as on the one hand, the mutual minorities were not as large and were better integrated, and on the other hand, the ethnic-historical legacies and regional concepts of an enemy were less pronounced. Nevertheless, it has to be taken as a positive sign that there has never been a serious attempt at reversing the numerous border changes made in the wake of the Second World War. Bilateral basic treaties ensure the borders and the protection of minorities in this region. Although there are also positive developments in Southeastern Europe, like government participation for the Hungarian minority in Romania, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or various nationalities living side by side in one state as in Bosnia or Macedonia, the overall picture is still overshadowed by the Albanian and Serbian questions, and the corresponding violent dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in the past ten years. As a consequence, many conflict potentials concerning minorities and borders on the Western Balkans could only be contained by means of massive international commitment, political, diplomatic and military intervention. On balance, the Europeans achieved few successes and many defeats in this region. Even after the war in Kosovo, 26

there still remains a long list of unsolved ethnical-historical claims and persistent enemy figures: the de facto division of Bosnia, the Serb minority in Kosovo, the Albanian minority in southern Serbia, the first stages of a repatriation of refugees, etc. Furthermore, the promising tendencies in the neighbouring states are much too fragile to rule out regional consequences from the conflict potential on the Western Balkans. Overall, the importance of minority and border issues for the transformation and accession countries has decreased significantly, from a domestic policy as well as from an international perspective. Implementation of the laws and social integration of minority groups are challenges still to be met. There are no signs of an escalation of violence or a destabilisation of the national economy and society in any region, and in none of the minorities. The inherent tensions and competition between majority and minority are mainly fought by means of the legal institutions and procedures provided for that purpose, and often have converted themselves into questions of socio-economic or regional disadvantages. Despite some reservations, this positive overall balance is due to the direct and indirect work of several European organisations, whose division of labour is part of the secret for success. The European Union contributed substantially to the success of the transformation to market economy and democracy by means of support from the outside, and since 1993, the Copenhagen Criteria have provided an almost unsurpassable incentive for the transformation countries and their political elites to adjust their minority policy and legislation to European standards. This is also the point where the institutional division of labour started: While the EU limited itself in the acquis to relatively basic requirements, which mainly comprised generally accepted human and minority rights as well as the recognition of European borders, the CoE and the OSCE took on the task of formulating legal norms and the transfer and implementation of these norms. While the CoE formulated important legal norms laid down in the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, OSCE missions mediated in minority conflicts in Tallinn, Riga, on the Balkans, as well as in Chisinau or Tbilisi.

2.1.1 Present and future risks In spite of the success story outlined above, four big risk areas can be identified for the years prior to and after a (phased) enlargement of the EU towards the east: 1. The requirement of a solution to the minority and border conflicts as a condition for EU and NATO membership undoubtedly has its justification and its uses from a European-security perspective. The dangers of this conditionality, however, are just 27

as straightforward: States opposing the EU or NATO membership of their neighbours are given additional political means to exert pressure, and an incentive to keep up conflict-laden issues or even to create them and to torpedo constructive approaches to a solution. While the potential Moscow is able to mobilise among the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states is steadily decreasing in the run-up to EU membership (not, however, the emotional power and capacity for political instrumentalisation of this question on the Russian side of the border), the lack of border treaties is gaining sensitivity and leverage. Not for nothing are the expectations and rates of assent for EU membership among the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states often higher than among Baltic nationals. For Moscow, however, the minorities in the Baltic states and unsolved border issues remain a compelling argument for a say in the process of enlargement towards the east. 2. The question of European responsibility for national minority policy also creates the danger that governments and/or political parties might be tempted in their domestic policy to pass off the adjustment of minority rights to European standards as the unavoidable price for the advantages of EU membership, thus washing their hands of all responsibility, with the resulting consequences for the implementation of the laws and long-term multi-ethnic integration. There may be less cause for alarm because of the dynamism developing in the minority and integration policy of the accession countries in the last couple of years: the ambitious integration projects in Estonia and Latvia, as well as a certain snub of nationalist rhetoric in the politics of other accession states. 3. As a rule, the EU accession of each country will inexorably lead to further stabilisation and development of the national economy, which in turn will increase the economic and social asymmetries along the outer borders. From a European perspective, the possibly increasing asymmetries between ethnic minorities and their home states (or vice versa) caused by this development are less important than the sometimes fatal ethno-political nexus between nationalities policy and transformation policy within the accession countries themselves. Often ethnic minorities are concentrated in regional, sectoral, social, or economic areas, which makes transformation decisions in the corresponding policy fields particularly sensitive and may even prevent decisions. The structural, regional and social policies of the EU are also acquiring an additional dimension. On the one hand, the EU has been given instruments to counterbalance social and regional disparities and thus make a positive contribution to the reduction of potential for ethnic conflict, while on the other hand, ethnic arguments and motives may have a negative influence on the implementation of these EU programmes. 4. Within the framework of the general dilemma between permeability and border 28

control, special attention should be paid to transnational minorities. While there is a widely accepted opinion that state borders might lose their separating effect and turn into bridges between peoples and states within a supranational European framework, decreasimg the separation between the minority and its neighbouring mother country, an unmodified implementation of the Schengen rules would have a counterproductive effect at, respectively, the temporary and the future outer borders of the EU. After enlargement, the outer border of the EU might impede contact between members of ethnic minorities and their respective homelands. The general paradox of this situation is the fact that the price to be paid for optimising the opportunities for contact and integration across national borders within the European Union would have to be paid by the transnational minorities on both sides of the outer borders of the EU. Thus the Schengen acquis and the bilateral border treaties proposed by the EU collide. While some of the risks mentioned would become obsolete with the signatures to the Act of Accession, others would only then unfold their destabilising potential. Generally this leads up to the question no longer hypothetical since the Austrian crisis of an EU strategy in case the legislation of a new member deviates widely from the European standards in the area of minority policy, or fails to implement the laws and international treaties, e. g., because of a change in government or a domestic policy crisis.

2.1.2 A European framework for minority and border issues In view of the successes of the past, the recommendations will be directed at how to prepare for the challenges posed by aligning and integrating Southeastern Europe, and for dealing with the effects of destructive elements in Baltic-Russian relations, on European relations with Russia, and vice versa. In the run-up to enlargement towards the East, the Baltic region will become a point of friction between Europe and Russia. Here regional conflicts turn into European issues. Without conceding a say in the accession proceedings of individual candidate countries to Moscow, there are two ways in which a constructive involvement of Russia could be achieved in order to prevent an indirect blockade, which would furthermore (because of the lack of border treaties) toward the EU policy of cross-border co-operation. Organisations like the OSCE, the Baltic Sea Council or the CoE with a membership beyond the future EU borders to the East, offer a forum and a framework for co-operation which include the neighbouring countries in a constructive way and which allow first steps to turn border regions into sub-regions. On the other hand, a timely decision about date and extent of a first round of enlargement would allow for finding 29

ways to clarify and, wherever possible, limit in a joint effort between Brussels, the border countries involved and the East Slavonic neighbours the negative consequences (e. g., the question of visas, border traffic, transitory regulations, trade policy) of enlargement towards the east for the latter where there is a justified interest. On the condition that consolidation is achieved in Southeastern Europe and especially in the Western Balkans that translates the minority questions from the area of military and civil war violence into questions of national legislation and international treaties, it would be possible to continue the tried and tested division of labour among EU, OSCE and CoE. When all is said and done, the EU will make its biggest contribution towards a solution of the minority and border conflicts indirectly through the normative power of the accession process and the stabilising power of funding programmes, and economic union. It is right in limiting its normative role in the nationality and citizenship policy, which is one of the core areas of national sovereignty, to some few fundamental principles based on a consensus that consists of recognised basic rights and democratic principles. As even the EU-15 have hardly been able up to now to agree on farther-reaching binding agreements, it would be presumptuous for the EU to take the vanguard role in this area. Especially in view of their specific aims, their intergovernmental mode and their broader membership, the OSCE and CoE are better equipped to regulate minority conflicts, even beyond the borders of the ten accession candidates. It will be a special challenge for the EU in view of this pan-European responsibility to use its various economic and political instruments in a flexible way, also with respect to political and social developments, while at the same time bearing its own stability interests and geopolitical aspects in mind, instead of approaching this matter unilaterally in a prescriptive way along strictly normative lines. This requires a strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

2.2 Pan-European security 2.2.1 Regional conflicts as European risks The security policy challenges in Europe resemble an equation with two variables: On the one hand there are numerous regional risks in the future neighbouring countries, which are often difficult to identify and to regulate from the outside because of the multitude of interests and players involved, and on the other, the European players only have limited foreign and security policy capacities and competencies at their disposal. Instrumentalisation of frozen conflicts: This is a special type of conflict which may 30

be characterised as frozen conflict. This type of conflict serves to compensate deficits in shaping the transformation. A striking example is provided by the conflict in Chechenya: Without a concept for economic and political reforms, the escalation and de-escalation of the Chechen conflict has repeatedly been a central topic for Russian election campaigns. Pre-modern, because ethnically dominated, conflict lines are to replace the really sensitive issues of a sustainable implementation of the transformation process. The only insufficiently accomplished tasks of the transformation process in the future neighbouring countries contain a twofold security risk: On the one hand ethnic tensions, weak national consolidation, dependence on Russian raw material supplies, economic problems and social conflicts are causing extended security risks. Even if the development up to now has been much more peaceful than expected at the beginning of the transformation process, there are still regional trouble spots. This means that further escalation cannot be excluded. In addition, the growing asymmetries with Western Europe are increasing the risk potential. On the other hand, there is the fear that political decision-makers will contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts in order to distract from the failures of transformation and demonstrate national strength to the outside world. Given such a scenario, the interest in a lasting solution of regional problems would be limited in so far as they are being instrumentalised for political and economic aims beyond crisis management. With progressing EU enlargement towards the east, a part of these frozen conflicts would move into direct neighbourhood to the EU. Despite some progress in the integration of the Russian-speaking part of the population, Russian decision-makers and the media still claim that Russian interests in Estonia and Latvia are only insufficiently protected. Against Ukraine, too, Putin is taking an increasingly offensive course by demanding settlement of the energy debts and at the same time rerouting pipelines to bypass Ukraine. This policy is being criticised not only in Kiev, but also increasingly in Warsaw. If Poland and the Baltic States are admitted in the first round of enlargement, these conflicts would mean immediate security risks for the EU. Better than any other border region in Europe, Southeastern Europe demonstrates the linkage between hard and soft security risks and thus the value of a combined strategy of CFSP, regional economic power, and membership prospects that could only be offered by the European Union. The nexus between national conflicts, transformation deficits, state crises as well as regional, ethnic and social disparities requires a set of instruments for as broad a range as possible. While NATO and the USA have taken on the burdens and the responsibility for the military phase in the Kosovo conflict, their instruments, or rather their capacities, for involvement in the comprehensive and long -term phase of reconstruction after the war are limited. The EU as a regional power inherently carrying out its Balkans policy without an exit strategy would be in a posi31

tion to use its economic prosperity and political stability to good effect in this context, together with EU prospects flanked by the Stability Pact, as well as stabilisation and association processes as long-term, credible commitment. Nevertheless, the presence of the European economic space and the geographical proximity of enlargement towards the East also contain new risks for Southeastern Europe. Massive guidance form the outside always implies the danger of aid addiction and an excessive expansion of economic crime and state corruption at the expense of the civil society, state consolidation and self-supporting development of the national economy. The dilemma resulting from this constellation and EU strategy is the contradiction between conditionality of eastward enlargement (and the stabilisation and association process) on the one hand and the security and stability tasks of the EU beyond its own borders on the other. Consequently not only are the efforts at transformation rewarded but also, if the worst comes to the worst, transformation failures and regional instability. European security and defence policy: The currently existing security conflicts along the eastern and southeastern borders highlight the European institutions insufficient potential to act. Despite progress in the European security and defence policy, the power of the European organisations is limited to conflict prevention and the setting of norms from the outside. The security and defence policy competence of the EU and the OSCE may in the first place be characterised as peacemaking and norm-setting policy. Consequently their field of action is limited to the prevention of conflicts that have not yet erupted into violence and to rebuilding stability once the military conflict is over. In contrast to American foreign policy, the EU has the advantage that the Eastern European players see it as a regulating power without claims to dominance. The European institutions have correspondingly few possibilities to cope with conflicts that have already erupted into violence. They do not correspond to the threat potential of future neighbourly relations. The imbalance between security policy tasks and the European institutions still limited possibilities to act can however be seen as follows: The new challenges will give important impetus to the intensification of integration and to the extension of security policy competencies in the European institutions.

2.2.2 Strategic elements for an extension of European security policy The combined strength of the OSCE, the CoE and above all the EU lies in the numerous options available to them for conflict prevention. In view of the new security policy challenges in the context of EU enlargement towards the east, it is necessary to extend and specify these competencies in accordance with the given circumstances. The instru32

ments of setting standards through prescribing aims and of supporting the transformation process should be used as far as possible to reduce the asymmetries along the lines of the future outer border of the EU. This recommendation is based on the findings of peace and conflict research that growing asymmetries lead to increasing security risks. This policy has to be seen realistically, though: The range in which standards can be set is defined through the possibilities of linking them to positive or negative sanctions. The biggest influence can be exerted in the phase before accession, when the adherence to Western standards is a condition for accession. In view of the difficulties of the transformation and the limited possibilities of setting norms from the outside, it is only realistic to assume that economic crises and political instabilities will continue to exist. In order to be able to institutionalise the resulting relations in the medium term, recourse can be drawn from experiences during the East-West conflict, when relations were less a partnership between equal players than among unequal players. Despite this inequality, it was nevertheless possible to find institutional regulations for particular aspects of relations. This experience of the creation of relative security in spite of asymmetrical starting conditions is to be utilised in the security policy approach towards neighbourhood relations by the enlarged EU. This approach should be supplemented by the development and implementation of a European early warning system for regional conflicts. The intensified co-operation in security and defence matters agreed at the EU-Russia summit in Paris on 30 October 2000 is a step in the right direction. In view of the high degree of inscrutability in the transformation, the security risks and the players, an effective policy of conflict prevention can only function on the basis of regular and wide-ranging risk reports. Far beyond the present possibilities for conflict prevention, EU enlargement towards the east also represents a security policy challenge which should give European integration a push in the direction of a Common Security and Defence policy.

2.3 Visa policy and border control 2.3.1 The risk of new dividing lines The European Union has been given the historical chance to create a new order in Europe. This task, however, threatens to drift off into the dilemma of diverging interests: On the one hand, Europe is no longer in principle divided into East and West by opposing systems. On the other hand, the disintegration of the old system of power leads to new borders being created. Dividing lines no longer threaten to develop from 33

ideological differences but rather from economic and social asymmetries. Like no other European organisation, the EU is taking on a double function in this context. It is seen as the guarantor of economic stability and modernisation. At the same time it defines its integration area on the inside, and establishes common outer borders through the creation of common asylum, immigration and visa law. The introduction of visa regulations figures among the politically sensitive topics of EU enlargement towards the east, and has additional implications for the new European order. Western decision-makers are faced with the dilemma of divergent interests between asylum, immigration and visa policy on the one side, and foreign and security policy aspects on the other. In normative declarations of intent, treaties and summit meetings, the players underline the importance of extending cross-border co-operation, and it is emphasised that enlargement towards the east should be shaped in as open a manner as possible. Internal security and common European stability: Contrary to these proclaimed aims, the political decisions of the EU are much more dominated by the real or assumed pressure of migration from the outside and the maintenance of internal security: As a precondition for accession, the candidate states have to adjust their visa policies to EU regulations. With forming and consolidating new national states, decision-makers are confronted with new problems of establishing borders, border control and visa regulations. On the rhetorical level at least the Central and Eastern European countries agree with the position of the EU; they aim at avoiding new dividing lines through EU enlargement towards the east. They differ in the way in which they translate this aim into political decisions. The following factors are important in this process: Orientation towards EU standards aimed at accession as early as possible, historical legacies in relations with the eastern neighbours, questions of national sovereignty and identity, and national minorities in the neighbour states. This list makes clear that the introduction of visa regulations touches upon numerous other interests above and beyond the technical-administrative issues. Concrete formulation and the resulting need for action can best be illustrated by taking examples from the regions concerned. The countries closest to the EU position as regards the introduction of visa regulations are the Baltic states. In order to enter Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania from Russia, Belarus or the Ukraine, it is necessary to get a visa. Some few exceptions are limited to regular border traffic and special regulations for public holidays, political dialogue and family matters. As there is a high proportion of Russian-speaking inhabitants in Estonia and Latvia in particular, and in addition frontier regions with unsolved border issues or even divided cities like Narva-Ivangorod, these regulations lead to social hardship and economic problems in individual cases. The difficulties are mainly emphasised by regional decision-makers, who are directly con34

cerned with these problems. The overall picture shows that the introduction of restrictive entry regulations, but creates follow-up problems at the same time. The limited cost-benefit ratio of this policy is demonstrated by the fact that smuggling and crossborder crime continue to be problems in all Baltic states, despite these regulations. Deterioration of bilateral relations: The greatest caution in the introduction of visa regulations can be found in Polish-Ukrainian relations: According to the current regulations, Ukrainian nationals may enter Poland without a visa for a maximum period of three months, which means that the candidate country Poland deviates from the present visa regulations of the EU vis--vis Ukraine. The introduction of visa regulations would not only make the relations more complicated on the administrative level; players on both sides also interpret them as indicators for new dividing lines. At the same time, Poland belongs to the first round of EU applicants, which would according to current EU policy, mean an end to visa-free travel with Ukraine. In order to do justice to both sides, so to speak, the Polish government is postponing the introduction of visa regulation to as late a date as possible. At the same, time individual decision-makers vote for the implementation of exceptional rules or even uphold the maximum claim of visa-free travel. The case of Poland illustrates how the unresolved contradictions between stability beyond the future borders of the EU on the one hand and internal security on the other may condense to a dilemma for Direct Neighbourhood. Against it, Southeastern Europe is not developing into a duty and visa-free zone; there is rather an abundance of intransparent and inconsistent bilateral regulations, between the states and political entities of the region and the EU countries as well as within the region itself. Yet it is an undisputed fact that greater effectiveness, optimisation and wherever possible loosening of the border regulation would strongly contribute to greater understanding between the peoples, cross-border co-operation, reduction of regional and ethnic conflict potentials and strengthening of economic activities. Risk of an aggravation of minority problems: In addition to unresolved questions of nationhood, minority interests also influence the content of the visa regulations. In order to adjust its regulations to EU requirements, the Romanian government has tightened its entry regulations for nationals of neighbouring Moldova, effective 1 July 2000. Now it is necessary to present a passport upon entry into Romania. In order to circumvent these formalities, many Moldovan citizens used the possibility to apply for Romanian citizenship in addition to their Moldovan citizenship. Should Romania enter the EU, Moldovan citizens with double nationality would also obtain EU citizenship. Special problems arise in all those cases, where minorities live in a neighbouring country which would come under EU visa regulations in the course of EU enlargement towards the east. Should Romania not be among the accession candidates in the first round of enlargement, the Hungarian minority would be separated from its home state 35

through a visa border. Neither Hungary nor Romania is interested in straining the political climate through travel restrictions for minorities if they want to travel into their mother countries, or even causing minority conflicts. The list of empirical cases illustrates the variety of constellations and interests, showing that visa regulations embody highly sensitive issues connected with EU enlargement towards the east, over and beyond the technical-administrative aspect of issuing visa, passport and border control. The introduction of visa regulations in accordance with the Schengen agreement will, however, by no means meet all expectations put into it. Cross-border crime, smuggling and migration can only be contained through tightened visa regulation to a certain extent. Questions of minority and citizen rights may be so contradictory to visa regulations that they contribute to circumventing EU regulations. Yet visa regulations need not necessarily lead to the erection of a new Iron Curtain. The important issue is to recognise the political options in time and to use them accordingly.

2.3.2 A European strategy for controlled permeability Up to now the visa strategy of EU eastern enlargement has been restricted to the requirements of the acquis communautaire. Seen in isolation, this is a transparent as well as stringent approach for the accession countries. There is great need for an active visa policy which would go beyond the technical, standardised aspects of the Schengen regulations. In view of strategic requirements, the EU has assumed a great deal of responsibility for maintaining safety and stability in Europe as a whole. Beyond pure norm setting, the EU should take a proactive stance in shaping the process. This approach can be divided into more technically-oriented and more politically co-operative aspects. Technical-administrative optimisation: Technical regulations for visa requirements must be aimed at making issuing visas and entry formalities as simple and cost-efficient as possible. As is already the case at the moment, Phare and Tacis funds may be used to establish and extend border crossings and consular departments according to Western standards. Apart from the financial support, eastern border officials should be trained in the west, and western experts sent to the future outer borders of the EU. These processes could already be started before the accession procedures. The co-operation on the level of customs and visa policy should also be extended to a kind of common migration policy with the future neighbouring countries. The more the process of issuing visas follows the criteria of efficiency and transparency and avoids incurring extra cost, the less the Schengen border will be regarded as a new Iron Curtain. 36

With the help of a targeted information policy, the introduction of technical regulations should be made as transparent as possible. By making the administrative procedures for visas less complicated, it would be possible even today to improve the negative image of the Schengen regulations. The administrative procedures for issuing visas to members of minorities who want to visit their mother countries and to residents of the Kaliningrad region should be made particularly easy. Demands for standardisation or even annulment of the visa and customs regulations in the Western Balkans, however, are still unrealistic and premature. Not only are some weaker states dependent on direct revenues from duties and similar incomes, the new entrepreneurs in particular also profit from the low degree of institutionalisation of the market economy. A future EU border will moreover cut through this region and in the process integrate the more successful and more stable transformation countries and separate them from the region. The asymmetrical trade concessions for the Western Balkans recently declared by the EU are an indication of the new cost-benefits calculations regarding the regions integration with the EU, and a European economic area featuring differentiated integration. Cross-border co-operation: Even a perfect technical and organisational introduction of visa regulations will necessarily lead to new dividing lines being drawn. In order to counteract this process, EU and Council of Europe should establish a second pillar of active visa policy based on measures for cross-border co-operation. This would comprise the whole range of cross-border and inter-regional co-operation, starting with economic co-operation via student exchanges up to co-operation between border administrations. Special attention should be paid to those economic and social initiatives of cross-border co-operation which promise spill-over effects for other areas of co-operation. The political postulate must be to alleviate the consequences of the erection of visarelated dividing lines through as comprehensive a European support as possible for social, economic and political relations reaching beyond future EU borders.

2.4 Regional and cross-border co-operation 2.4.1 The potential of co-operation Multilateral, interstate co-operation and cross-border, sub-state co-operation have similar political and social potential, but they also generate similar resistance and contradictions in the European context. While the continuing process of European integration and the abolition of internal borders create security risks and create new re37

quirements for securing the outside borders, an exclusion of the direct neighbours from this Europe integrating itself would in turn contain a risk potential. Enlargement towards the east thus has stabilising and destabilising consequences at the same time. This issue of finding a balance between the export of stability and import of instability, between internal and external security as well as between border control and permeability is an issue for the EU as a whole but also for the individual states. In this sense it is important for Europe to guarantee a certain institutional plurality, which would reach across the emerging geographical finality of the EU, by way of regional co-operation. The Baltic Sea Council and Black Sea Co-operation are outstanding regional examples for stabilising forums of multilateral and interstate co-operation. For the nation states sub-state, cross-border co-operation has a comparable function. Very often border regions are not only traditionally peripheral and structurally underdeveloped, but have also been hit especially hard by the changes in function and permeability of particular borders in the past ten years, by the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union to start with, and now by the process of EU enlargement towards the east. It would therefore serve the purpose of furthering cross-border co-operation to counteract the increase of economic asymmetries and disparities and to utilise synergy effects across the borders, in order to decrease the corresponding potentials for conflict. Thus regional and cross-border co-operation are not only key factors of European prosperity, but also of European security, in the sense of soft security. Regionality is one of the fundamental principles of EU policy. The East Central European experience since 1989 has shown, however, that the attractiveness of EU membership and competition on the way to full membership have had rather detrimental effects on regional co-operation between the accession states, in particular across the future external border. The development up to now has shown that the East Central European countries commitment to accession has been harmful rather then helpful for political as well as economic co-operation between the candidate countries, and has in addition led to an excessive reduction of forms of economic and political co-operation with respect to the neighbours to the east. Often the commitment to regional co-operation across EU borders will only return after EU accession, in an effort to establish a regional counterbalance, also with respect to foreign policy competence, to the core of Europe. This is why the EU is the driving force behind projects of multilateral regional co-operation. Co-operation in the Baltic Sea region is an excellent example: On a Finnish initiative, the EU supports co -operation among the countries bordering the Baltic Sea in the fields of energy, natural resources, environment, border control transport and infrastructure in the Northern Dimension. This is on the one hand aimed at increasing the coherence of EU policy in these fields, on the other hand at binding Russia closer to the 38

European structures. By using this instrument, the EU succeeds in implementing incentives for cross-border co-operation as a supplement to the focus on accession negotiations in the candidate countries. The successful co-operation in the Baltic Sea area at the same time demonstrates the weaknesses of regional co-operation in East Central Europe. Co-operation between Poland and Ukraine is limited to bilateral commitments. The partly impressive results are only insufficiently taken up by European politics. Potential for EU norm- setting policy remains unused. Despite the more than considerable financial framework supplied and the great number of successful projects carried out, especially in the area of cross-border co-operation, there are still obstacles and deficits to be found in the insufficient co-ordination and adjustment of programmes and funding schemes for cross-border co-operation. Border regions along the future external borders of the EU are beyond the brief of the EU General Directorates. With respect to East Central Europe they come under the heading of enlargement policy, while the border regions in East and Southeastern Europe are treated as part of the EU foreign relations. The funding programmes mirror this distinction: The Phare programme should improve the accession capacity of the EU-associated countries, while Tacis should help stabilise the transformation process in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Applications for projects of crossborder co-operation have to meet the requirements of Phare as well as Tacis. This is not always possible without frictional losses. The new CARDS programme for Southeastern Europe will certainly also include an important component for cross-border co-operation. After Phare already had been converted from demand-driven to programme-driven in 1997 (i. e., funding of measures increasing accession capacity), this prioritisation would also present itself for the other programmes. This would mean, e. g., concentrating the programmes especially in Russia (which is different from the small and enclosed Balkans region) on the region of the western border. In this way it would be possible, bearing in mind the capacity limits of the EU, to reduce the asymmetries and follow-up questions of enlargement towards the east along this border in an optimal way: In the interest of Russia, but also in the interest of stability in Europe.

2.4.2 Policy recommendations for regional and cross-border co-operation At the core of the recommendations in the area of sub-state cross-border co-operation is the recognition of the contradiction inherent in the policy goals and accession requirements for law enforcement and domestic policy on the one hand, and the funding programmes for cross-border co-operation on the other. From an institutional point of view, Phare belongs to the General Directorate (GD) for Enlargement and Tacis to 39

the GD for Foreign Relations, whereas border protection belongs partly to the process of accession negotiations and partly to the GD Justice and Home Affairs. With the approach of the first round of accession in eastern enlargement presumably 2005 and the long-term movement of the Western Balkans, including Yugoslavia, towards accession prospects, the question of an institutional and procedural separation between Interreg-CBC, Phare, CARDS and Tacis increasingly arises. In supporting measures for cross-border co-operation, it is advisable to have a close look at which measures promise which success. Experience has shown that economic and social approaches also offer possibilities to overcome obstacles to co-operation like difficult political conditions or historical enmities. This kind of co-operation may then generate spill-over effects for a reduction of the number of politically sensitive aspects. Based on the positive results of the Northern Dimension, this approach should be translated to Central Europe in the sense of providing a model for best practice. With a kind of East Central European Dimension the EU could make it clear that the fears felt by decision-makers in Kiev and Warsaw concerning new dividing lines are unfounded. At the same time the links between Ukraine and Europe would become more stable, which could contribute to the strategy of EU prospects for Ukraine. The European Unions role and balance of achievements with respect to regional and cross-border co-operation have not been realised in an optimal way up to now; however, because the different functions of the Union as security provider, economic community and political alliance collide with each other in exactly those policy areas.

3 Beyond EU Enlargement the Agenda

With its enlargement towards the east, the EU contributes to ensuring stability, and preventing conflicts in todays Europe. Despite the historic importance of this process, European politics has by no means reached its final peak. On the contrary, enlargement towards the east entails new risks, but also new chances. Continuing instabilities in the neighbourhoods of the EU the Direct Neighbourhood of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Moldova for whom the Union has not formulated accession prospects so far, and the trouble spot Southeastern Europe with promises of EU prospects challenge the Union in its capacity for setting norms. The European security risks increase the pressure to establish a European regional power in the area of foreign and defence policy. New challenges are to be faced by synchronising various policy areas, requirements to act and European self-perception. These challenges are emerging especially in those areas where EU integration, enlargement towards the east and foreign relations overlap. 40

1. The European Union is increasingly taking over responsibility for security and stability in a far-ranging concept of Europe which not only comprises the accession states but also regions beyond the future external borders of the EU, whose instability has or may have repercussion on Europe. As a consequence, however, the other mega-projects of the EU, like enlargement towards the east, can no longer be dealt with in a purely normative way along the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire but have to be seen in the broader context of regional stabilisation and geopolitics as was recognised in Helsinki where the accession negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria were brought forward. The contradiction between the normative conditionality of the accession process and the regional security policy requirements of a regional power, between quality and speed of enlargement towards the east is of a structural nature. However, as a consequence, it is not only the transformation efforts that are rewarded, but also, in the worst case, transformation failure and regional instability. 2. One strategic deficit of the policy of the European Commission vis--vis the CIS is its insufficient differentiation. Decisions must not be made along the lines of system transformation, but in addition also have to take the European self-determination of the states into account. The basic No to accepting CIS states willing to become members entails the risk of increasing instability caused by the rejection. At the same time the norm-setting policy of the EU loses its attractiveness and influence, as movement towards Europe or overcoming the problems of transformation respectively no longer carry the promise of positive sanction. In order to eliminate the strategic deficit of the basic No to EU accession of Ukraine and Moldova, the European Commission should formulate EU prospects for Ukraine and Moldova. The implications of this reversal of policy will, however, be limited to rhetoric until the states willing to accede can prove that they have made real progress in their transformation processes. This makes it even more important for the EU to emphasise the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria in its dialogue with the states concerned. In the Tacis projects to support the transformation process it is also important to point towards the acquis communautaire of the European Union in the sense of a normative aim. 3. As long as Belarus is dominated by the Lukashenko regime, it will remain a risky neighbour. It is in the European interest to contribute to securing stability through a democratisation of Belarus. Following the experiences in Serbia, it is necessary to support regional players and supporters of economic reform to bring about domestic change in Belarus and in this way to tighten the countrys links to Europe. Apart from numerous possibilities of co-operation, it is first of all necessary to increase the presence of European institutions in Minsk. 41

4. In the relations between Russia and Europe, there is an important need for drawing up a Kaliningrad strategy in the context of EU enlargement towards the east. Technical questions regarding traffic of goods and people to and from Kaliningrad into the rest of Russia need to be treated in accordance with the EU regulations; solutions must, however, be easy to administer. The regional climate for investment in and around Kaliningrad must be improved through an extension of regional co-operation with the future EU members Poland and Lithuania. Russian decision-makers should strive to ensure political and legal stability. Under the proviso that Russia benefits from the innovations in the region, Moscows isolationist and security policy reservations will also diminish. 5. In the case of Southeastern Europe the dilemma between the two EU principles of regionality and conditionality is much stronger than in the case of the ten present East European accession countries. In view of the attractiveness of EU membership and the heterogeneity of the neighbouring regions (e. g., Western Balkans) regional co-operation will realistically come second behind a conditional, bilateral convergence with and integration into the European Union. Regional co-operation should accordingly be supported as a supplement to rather than as an alternative to EU integration. 6. By the same token, it is necessary to synchronise EU integration and multilateral regional co-operation in sub-regions which could eventually stretch across the external border. Organisations for interstate regional co-operation offer a constructive forum for dialogue and co-operation throughout Europe, especially where their aims, or rather their membership, reaches across present and/or future EU borders: Northern Dimension, Black Sea Co-operation, Baltic Sea Council and OSCE. On the other hand they serve as an important counterbalance for centripetal tendencies in Europe and turn peripheral border regions into European sub-regions. 7. Especially in the area of cross-border co-operation, it is imperative to subordinate the institutional-procedural framework to the functionality of the respective funding programme. Accordingly an adjustment or rather a merger of the EU programmes for cross-border co-operation Interreg-CBC for EU members, Phare for accession countries, Tacis for CIS states, CARDS for the Western Balkans would be appropriate for the state of the European integration and enlargement. As a model for interregional and cross-border co-operation, the EU initiative Northern Dimension should be translated into the form of an East Central European Dimension to relations between Poland and Ukraine. 8. Prioritising cross-border co-operation also requires a reconciliation with the requirements set for accession candidates by the Schengen criteria. While in view of the visa requirements, the erection of new dividing lines and thus an increase in the 42

asymmetries along these borders is unavoidable, the negative consequences, especially for the border regions, can be limited with the corresponding preparation and commitment. An effective visa strategy must consist of a dovetailed approach combining an optimum of technical-administrative procedures with measures of crossborder co-operation. Overall it is part of the open self-definition of the EU not to pursue a foreign policy in the classical sense vis--vis its neighbours, but to offer conditional accession prospects. Up to now the inner prosperity and stability of the EU as well as the attractiveness of this accession offer have proved to be highly effective instruments in relations with the neighbouring transformation countries. The debate about limits to enlargement should, however, give more consideration to the time dimension and the capacity of the EU to integrate new members. A Union which would, e. g., offer accession prospects to Ukraine with the corresponding expectation management and time tables can contribute more to a long-term reduction of national instability and transformation deficits of this neighbour. At the same time, guaranteeing the quality and the capacity of the union to integrate new members requires a more concrete concept for enlargement towards the east. Realistic expectations of management as well as the best-possible arrangements for follow-up issues in connection with the future neighbours, not least Russia, require an early setting of the date and the names for a first round of enlargement. If the EU were to come to a decision soon, this would on the one hand curb unrealistic expectations on the side of the candidate countries, and on the other hand leave enough preparation time to cushion the consequences of a temporary concrete exclusion for accession countries and third countries beyond the union. Typically, this will lead to a differentiated political and economic integration, in order to counterbalance destabilising asymmetries along the external border. Moreover, the process of reform and integration within the EU, Closer Co-operation as well as the gradual integration of the ten accession states will, in any case, bring the paradigm of differentiation to the fore in Europe. Differentiated integration were to acquire a particular urgency for security issues, if a new NATO enlargement were to occur prior to a first round of EU eastern enlargement. Differentiated integration overall requires a strengthening of CFSP, as apart from the norm-setting function, it is above all also the reactive capacity to decide and competence to act which will decide about the success of EU objectives for stabilising Europe as a whole.

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Country Reports

The Russian Challenge for the European Union: Direct Neighbourhood and Security Issues
Timofei V. Bordachev

I Introduction: The strategic framework of Russian-EU relations

Accession of new countries to the EU brings a new geostrategic reality to the European continent. For the first time in history, the EU is supposed to develop neighbourly relations with countries that can neither join the Union in the medium or long term nor be excluded by substantial system differences. 1 Moreover, all of these countries are stressing their European identity and their intention to cooperate with the EU. Among these states, only Russia is a key actor in the European security architecture. This role is given to it by the simple nuclear definition as well as by the extent of its borders and its economic potential. The direct neighbourhood problematic with regard to Russia appears to be twofold. On the one hand, all prospects and the possible format of relations between Russia and the EU as such are still unclear despite the existing legal basis (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement). These relations will be influenced to a large extent by internal Russian developments. Moreover, the entire external policy of the Russian state, including that towards the EU, will be determined by internal factors, and the whole design of that policy directly depends on the Russian political and economic state of affairs. On the other hand, the relations of Russia with its direct neighbours from the accession countries will play a very significant role. Before the Central and East European countries join the EU, these relations will primarily be defined and discussed on a bilat-

I. Kempe (ed.): Direct Neighbourhood. Relations between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998.

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eral basis, although the accession countries are expected to take into account the acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, settling existing problems between Russia and the accession countries before the enlargement happens is crucial for both sides (for the time being actually for three sides Russia, the accession countries and the EU). In order to describe the main risks caused by the EU-Russian direct neighbourhood and possibly outline the relevant responses, the following questions should be addressed: What is the nature and content of current EU-Russian relations? What kind of Russia is about to emerge and what are the implications for the EU? What threats and challenges may direct neighbourhood with Russia present for the EU? What medium or long-term opportunities regarding Russia are available for the EU?

II Current relations of Russia with the EU

Features of the Russian approach (strategies and statements of the Russian government concerning the EU) Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has lacked a clear-cut foreign policy guideline, specifically with regard to Moscows policy towards the EU. Russian general knowledge about the EU has always been very limited. For a long time Moscow did not have a clear view on what was happening in Europe and what the integration process was all about. Europe was always perceived as a certain safe haven where Russia could have some breathing room after heated discussions with the United States. As a result, from the beginning of the 1990s, Russia has not developed any consolidated approach to the European Union. At the same time, the general attitude of the Russian leadership and the Russian public towards the EU has always been very positive. There are several reasons for this, but the most important one is based on the traditional assumption that Europe is more friendly towards Russia than the USA. The EU also has closer economic ties to Russia.2

The EU as an alternative to NATO In Russia, the EU is traditionally perceived as a certain alternative to NATO. The current political-military ambitions of the EU (European Strategic Defense Initiative) are generally seen as less promising in a pure military sense and thus not as threatening to
2 A. Arbatov: Bezopasnost, Rossiysky vybor, Moscow 1999, pp. 189 209.

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Russia.3 Moreover, Russia sees the EU as a strong stabilising power which can create a security umbrella over Central and Eastern Europe and, consequently, manage existing European conflicts.

Economic partnership The EU is presently the largest and most important external economic partner for Russia. About 50 per cent of Russian foreign trade is with EU countries, much more than with the USA or Japan. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the volume of RussiaEuropean trade has increased significantly. 4 Despite the consequences of the 1998 crisis for mutual trade, the EU is still regarded in Russia as a major foreign partner with no real alternative.

The EUs role as stabiliser, and the imagined national identity anchor There are also new factors influencing Russian attitudes towards the EU. Two primary factors are most essential: the Russian view of Europe as a stabilising power and the hope to obtain a new national identity on European ground. The EU is widely viewed in Russia as a stabiliser of Europe in general. The potential of EU internal political and economic stability is widely perceived in Russia as very high. The positive role of the EU in settling potential ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (e. g., between Romania and Hungary) has reassured the Russian public and elite in considering Europes military dimension. Thus, the EU should be aware of these expectations and take them into account in its policy towards Russia. Moreover, contemporary Russia is seeking its new identity on the international scene. This identity is very likely to be perceived as European. Clear evidence of such thinking can be found in Russian academic thought as well as official statements.5

3 4 5

D. Danilov: Potentsialni soyuznik Mosknvi, in: Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozrenie, No. 47, 1999, p. 3. World Economic Situation and Prospects of Development. The Bureau Of Economic Analysis. Bulletin No. 19, December 1999. D. Trenin: Vneshnaya politika Vladimira Putina, in: Polit.ru. 22 June 2000. http://www.polit.ru/documents/252771. html/.

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The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) The history of official Russian-EU relations is both brief and recent, and their contractual basis was established rather late relative to other transitional countries. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between Russia and the EU was signed in 1995, but actually came into effect only in January 1997. According to the Russian view, this document represents a very solid basis for further co-operation, and together with recently adapted strategies, must be seen as a long-term constitutional framework.6

Russias medium-term strategy In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne adopted a Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. This initiative was met with great interest and enthusiasm in Russia. The official Russian response was the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of the Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000 2010) (which was also linked to the issue of enlargement), prepared specifically for the participation of then prime minister Putin in the Russian-EU Helsinki summit.7

Groundless optimism (Russian reactions and decisions concerning EU enlargement) EU enlargement is generally perceived in Russia as positive. In contrast to NATOs eastern expansion, Russian politicians and the public accept the rapprochement of the former Soviet bloc countries to the EU as a process which can potentially improve the relations of Russia with the EU, as well as those of Russia with Central and East European countries. The reason for such a positive attitude towards the EU and its enlargement is twofold: First, for Russian officials, academics and the public, the EU is more favourable than NATO in any respect. In the Russian view, the EU can currently play the same political role but without the extension of military means. Secondly, Russia expects the EU to play a positive role in improving its relations with Central and Eastern Europe, economically as well as politically. Russias trade experience with Finland demonstrates that even after the short period of decrease in bilateral trade, recovery and improvement are possible. In political terms, Russia is expecting the EU to
6 7 Y. Borko, V. Zhurkin, V. Shemiatenkov (eds.): Looking into the 21st Century: The European Union and the CIS, Moscow 1998. Strategia pazvitia otnoshenii Rossiiskoy Federatsii s Evropeiskim Soyuzom na srednesrochnuyu perspectivu (2000 2010), Russian Federation Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1999.

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influence the Central and East European countries, especially the Baltics, to improve the situation with regard to Russian-speaking minorities. Nevertheless, there is a certain fear in Russia that Western institutions (and including the EU) will deny the eastern part of the OSCE zone the due attention and positive influence of the integration process. In this case, Russia should deal with these conflicts by itself, which could potentially threaten Russian-EU relations. The other concern of Russia with regard to EU enlargement is the economic consequences for Russian relations with the accession countries. Many problems in bilateral relations remain unresolved, and the current state of the negotiations is not promising substantial progress. These fears were outlined in the List of Russian concerns with regard to EU enlargement, which was submitted to the EU Commission on 25 August 1999.8 The paper outlined major Russian concerns on issues that were to be affected by the acquis communautaire as soon as accession countries join the EU. In reality, this document expressed nothing more than the current state of Russian Foreign Ministry views on the EU and should not be overestimated as a solid basis for future negotiations. The overall idea of the document was to express the official Russian position and point out the major issues which need to be resolved before EU enlargement. The EU did not respond adequately and does not seem to be intending to do so. In fact, the problem is in the weak Russian understanding of EU goals and strategic aims, mainly on part of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, the EU should stimulate a more careful Russian perception of the enlargement issues.

Governance in transition: Key actors and decisive factors within the Russian state General outlook The entire Russian political system is now undergoing a rapid transformation, and the primary question the EU is facing is one of direction. In general, Russian external policy-making is strongly affected by internal developments. Two of them will certainly influence Russian relations and attitudes towards the EU: centre-region relations and the Moscow power balance. Current Russian political life and interaction among the key actors within the Russian state are determined by the growing struggle between federal government and regional authorities. 9 In his struggle with regional governors, Putin is receiving strong

8 9

Perechen rossiiskich ozabochennostei v sviazi s resshireniem ES. Unpublished. Russian MFA source. The same is true for the situation with the latest Putin initiatives toward the Federal Council.

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support from the lower house (State Duma) of the newly-elected Russian parliament. However, although the president himself has strong constitutional rights, and the revision of the 1993 Constitution is now indefinite,10 he is, in the medium-term, facing the task of establishing his authority and is still likely to be forced to preserve a Yeltsin-like regime.11 There is still no clear picture of the governments internal composition. Two basic groups are competing: the so called St. Petersburg reformist group and the Moscow group. The first consists of the pro-market economists and bureaucrats from Russias Northern Capital, including important personalities such as: Andrey Illarionov and German Gref. The second group, led by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, is not radical in economic terms and associated with Yeltsins Russian elite. The EU will most likely find support among young liberals from St. Petersburg who are a) close enough to Putin personally; b) European-minded; and c) Western-oriented.

The EUs potential concerns With regard to external relations, including Russias European policy, three strategic actors can be distinguished: the presidential administration, the Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The presidential administration, currently led by Alexander Voloshin, is still playing a very important role. Inside the administration, Sergey Prikchodko is in charge of external relations. His role is mainly technical, and internal observers do not consider Prikchodko a serious or potential policy-maker. Nevertheless, given the high importance of the presidential administration in the Russian political system, the EU should pay attention to this body as a relevant counterpart as far as Russias external behaviour is concerned. In contrast to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the presidential administration is a much more reactive and creative body that is capable of producing decisions on a relatively short notice.

10 11

Before the December 1999 Duma elections, speculations about needed constitutional reform largely paralleled the weakening of Yeltsins power. Putins situation is (...) complicated. His political background did not provide him the opportunity to build a strong team. Meanwhile, todays head of state lacks authority among various elites to be able to move resolutely, without fear of resistance by vested political, administrative, financial, or industrial interests. In addition, Putins public support is qualitatively different from Yeltsins: Since a desire for paternalism has gradually come to dominate the mass consciousness, even a very popular new president would be unable to count on public support of the activist kind. Immediately after being elected, Putin would face the vital task of establishing a vertical presidency and building his own political team in order to consolidate national statehood on that basis. From: A. Ryabov: The Presidential Elections and the Evolution of Russias Political System (an attempt at a political forecast), Carnegie 2000.

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The Security Council is presumably becoming the most important institution a separate office within the presidential administration, chaired by the president and actually conducted by one of Putins fellows, General Sergey Ivanov. The influence of this office has increased dramatically since Putin came to power and is still growing. In Putins political scheme, the Security Council is supposed to be a kind of presidential watchdog responsible for nation-wide controlling of other governmental bodies as well as for the framing of strategic policy issues. Because of this important role, its Secretary (General Ivanov) is often considered as a key actor in shaping foreign policy. All recent governmental initiatives, like the National Defense Doctrine or Putins federal reform were outlined in the Security Council. The main characteristic of the Security Council is its independence from traditional business influence groups. However, the problem is that Security Council staff consider foreign policy mainly in traditional national-security terms. Their connections with the academic community or independent think tanks are very weak.12 In dealing with Russia, the EU must separate this body from others and take into account its special role, particularly under the Putin presidency, as well as the fact that Sergei Ivanov is possibly one of the most strategic actors in Russian realpolitik. The practice of national foreign policy making is more and more concentrating in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite frequently being inadequately informed on the actual state of affairs in Europe, the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continue to be primary newsmakers in the foreign affairs arena. EU officials should be aware of their lack of full understanding. On the office level, the Department of PanEuropean Co-operation is responsible for the EU and all the meetings prepared by this body, according to the guidelines of the Security Council and the administration. Russian external policy has been, and continues to be, strongly affected by the interests of different business groups. Among them, the most important role is played by exporters of natural raw materials (oriented to Western markets) and the defence industry (oriented to the East). Since the beginning of Putins reign, the role of the latter has grown significantly and may prove to become a basis for worry. At the same time, natural resources are the main source of revenue for the Russian budget, and the regime is not interested in seriously decreasing the influence of this sector. In the foreseeable future, the role of exporters will not be as important as it was during Yeltsins time when the interests of Gazprom (natural gas monopolist) basically rescued RussianWestern relations from disaster.13

12 13

The main reason for this is a natural failure of Russian academia to establish strong and influential non-governmental bodies affecting external policy-making. V. Chernomyrdins mission on Kosovo appears to be a good evidence.

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Besides the other actors, the media still plays a primary role in Russian society and political life. Both of the largest media groups (Media-Most of V. Gusinsky and B. Berezovskys) influence public attitudes towards Europe and EU politics. However, the relations of Russia with the EU are not among the prominent items of national media discussion, and the basic portrayal of the EUs role in Europe is generally positive, although some reservations exist with regard to the EU position on Chechnya and with regard to Russias external trade. Russian media controlled by Berezovsky back the Kremlins Chechen war and are cautiously supporting Putin. However, in the medium and long term, they can rapidly turn from this pro-governmental position if their patron starts to lose his influence to Putins team. Media sources like ORT (Public Russian Television) or Nezavisimaya Gazeta demonstrate a sceptical attitude towards Europe and its attempts to influence Russia on the Chechen issue. The position of the Gusinsky group seems to be more pro-Western and, in the medium-term perspective, available to the EU as an inside ally. Nevertheless, EU policy should not totally rely on this media group, for it is still a business group (which will with no doubt use Western support to achieve its own material goals) and, equally important, such a policy could disappoint Russian officials in Europe and lead to additional tension. In general, the EU should realise that Moscow does not have clear European policy as such. In contrast to other post-communist transition states, Russia is not separating its European policy from other foreign policy issues, and the natural consequences of such an approach should be clearly perceived by the EU in dealing with Moscow. At the same time, Europe is increasingly important in Russian foreign policy thinking. After the apparent failure in Russian-US relations, Moscow is looking towards Europe as a possible Western counterpart and, in this context, the significance of the EU is growing. Without doubt, the EU should pay more attention to informing Russian society on Europe and, in doing so, clarify possible areas of interaction.

III Aspects of the political, economic and social transition with an impact on the EU
Russia still suffers from general instability. The protracted transition of the Yeltsin period led to numerous misgivings in the national economy and political life, and brought frequent tensions among the key actors on the political scene. Currently, a liberal segment of Putins entourage intends to reform the Russian state significantly and to bring in a new model of governance.14 If the reformist team fails, the EU will border an

14

German Gref, Minister of Economic Development and Trade. Presentation at Carnegie Moscow Center, 23 May 2000.

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unstable country suffering from numerous internal contradictions. If they succeed, an enlarged EU is expected to deal with a presumably already transformed Russia that will have little in common with the country as it was under Yeltsin. The current Russian government (at least its reformist wing which, for the time being, is strong) is pledged to reform the Russian economy and society and, given public support and sufficient power, can achieve success.15 Nevertheless, some problems of a very essential nature are still persisting in Russian society. Among these are issues of ethnic conflicts, economic instability, continuing state weakness and lack of civil society, all of which could provoke public disorder and incoherent external policy acts. The EU should be very concerned about the maintenance of the Russian state, the weakness of civil society, and the ability of the government to execute pragmatic internal and external policy. Furthermore, general instability, caused by problems such as widespread ethnic conflict, economic failure or defeat of the Kremlin in its struggle with regional barons, could result in aggressive attitudes of the Russian government towards the EU accession countries. The aim of such behaviour could be twofold: to respond to xenophobic public sentiment or to gain possible short-term economic benefits from such pressure.16 Such behaviour would definitely meet with firm EU resistance, result in a decrease in co-operation and further the vicious conflict spiral.

Ethnic conflicts Although the problems of ethnic tension and violent conflicts in the Russian Federation still rank among the principal concerns of the country, these conflicts have not developed as was expected at the beginning of the 1990s. It is important to note that the first stage of ethnic instability in Russia (when nonRussian ethnic groups were discovering their national identity) is over. This period produced two major violent conflicts: in Chechnya and North Ossetia-Ingushetia. The first was caused by the strong intention of the local proto-elite, widely supported by the population, to achieve national independence from Russia. The ongoing violent conflict in the Chechen republic seems to be a special case caused by the particularities of the local situation. The conflict in Chechnya is likely to transform into a long-term guerrilla war between the Russian authorities and Chechen separatists.

15 16

Pravitelstvo. Kasyanov VCIOM polls from 26 29 May 2000. Cf. http://www.polit.ru/documents/243270.html. The most obvious examples here are both Latvia and Ukraine as bound with Russia by economic and political links.

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Incoherent perspectives on the war in Chechnya could potentially affect Russian-EU relations through two major developments: First, Russian authorities could impose strict military rule in Chechnya that could lead to further civilian victims, disregard for civil rights and disagreement between Russia and the EU. The EU would have to decide between granting concessions towards Putins economic and political reform (but only if such reform appears to be on a good track), and its own human rights principles. Second, if separatist activity spreads further in Russia, it could potentially threaten EU citizens, business and the EU itself. Russia is currently not able to protect its neighbours from the terrorist attacks. Dagestan and, primarily, Ingushetia are very likely to be a target for separatist attacks from Chechnya that could bring tension to the relations between local authorities on one side and federal forces, as well as administration, on the other. The latter will attempt to take control over neighbouring areas of Chechnya that are no doubt inappropriate for local leadership. The other areas of ethnic tension in Russia like Karacheyevo-Cherkessiya do not represent a potential threat. Generally, ethnic relations in Russia have not led to large-scale tensions. The principal reason for this state of affairs is that local national elites actually managed to stabilise their regimes during Yeltsins rule. Presently, the primary source of ethnic tension in Russia could be the ongoing struggle between the centre and the regions, notably with respect to the national republics of the Volga region. The President of Tatarstan has repeatedly addressed the potential rise of the ethno-religious instability in Tartastan if Moscow were to restrict his powers. Presenting themselves as guarantors of societal stability, leaders of the national republics, if not strongly coerced by Moscow, are likely to stimulate nationalism by opposing the centralisation process. The other potential threat lies in the sphere of national relations in ethnically Russian regions as a result of growing immigration from the Caucasus and Central Asia.17 Xenophobic feelings are a constant trend in contemporary Russian society and, if the present migration tendencies hold, could represent a major threat to national stability. In some regions, migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus already represent about 17 per cent of the local population. At the same time, negative attitudes towards immigrants are rising and, given the socio-economic situation, are likely to produce serious conflicts even in the medium term. But the main reason for possible public tensions lies in economic distress and constant lack of structural reforms.

17

G. Vitkovskaya, A. Malashenko (eds.): Intolerance in Russia: Old and New Phobias, Moscow 1999.

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Unfinished reform and possible economic crises The Russian economy is constantly suffering from unfinished structural reforms and is likely to see periodic crises in the future. From the beginning of the 1990s, the government has been unable to avoid both a budget and a foreign trade deficit.18 Despite the current Russian economic performance that is mainly due to rising prices of natural resources and devaluation effects after the financial crisis in August 1998, the national economy still needs serious structural reforms.19 At the same time, distinguished observers note that ongoing economic growth in Russia is related not only to two factors mentioned above (oil price and devaluation), but also to the development of investment activity.20 This is an important indicator of future Russian economic development. However, a fall in the price of oil and, more importantly, an increase in political instability due to the failure of the liberal economic team in the Russia Project, would severely affect the national economy and could potentially result in new crises. Thus, the EU should be watching Russian economic trends very carefully and should cautiously support the development of the investment process if backed by a strong Kremlin administration.

Instability of state institutions Instability of state institutions is a major problem affecting Russia, representing a threat to its neighbours. It has been mentioned already that the Russian state is currently on the eve of a serious transformation. This transformation is, unfortunately, likely to take the form of a protracted quarrel between the centre and the regions, which will badly affect internal and foreign policy. The possible outcome of internal state instability could be very grave for the EU. If Putin fails with his ambitious Russia Project, the situation could soon resemble Yeltsins era, which consisted of constant quarrels among oligarchs and a generally negative decentralisation of the state. In this case, the EU should be prepared for an unstable Russia threatening its direct neighbours in the Baltics and Ukraine, as well as acting unpredictably on the international scene. Existing instability of state institutions means that foreign policy decisions of the Kremlin result from the rivalry between elite groups and business clans. This was clearly illustrated by

18 19 20

The Bureau Of Economic Analysis. Survey on Economic Policy in Russia 1997. 1998. The Bureau Of Economic Analysis. The Russian Economy at the Turn of the Millennium: Current Issues and Prospects of Development. Bulletin No. 15, June 1999. The Bureau Of Economic Analysis. An Analysis of the Current Economic Situation. Russian Economy: Main Macroeconomic Trends of 1999 and Prospects for 2000. Bulletin No. 20, December 1999, p. 2.

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the controversial moves of Yeltsin diplomacy, in particular during Primakovs term (1996 1999), when the foreign ministry (and later the cabinet) attempted to play an independent role governed by the special interests of economic groups and the academic views of their leadership.

Deficits in the development of a civil society The last Duma and presidential elections proved that Russian society has not managed to develop the institutions of civil society in the traditional sense. Russian NGOs, public movements and even political parties are still weak and lacking popular support. NGOs are traditionally concentrated on a very narrow field of activity and do not play a substantial political role. Public movements are usually short-lived and do not lead to the establishment of strong political actors. One should note the total failure of the Russian party system, and the widely recognised fact that there is only one real party in Russia the Communist Party (KPRF) that has managed to build a comprehensive party structure. Liberal movements are very weak and lack strong leadership. The most notable example is Yabloko which, despite the support of oligarchs (Gusinsky Group) and a large part of the city-based intelligentsia, neither managed to get more votes nor even keep the previous authority. At the same time, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) seemed to be on the right track during the parliamentary elections. The future fate of this group is controversial, but there are some indications that the co-operation with part of Yabloko during the gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg can serve as a good basis for the future establishment of a strong and influential liberal party. Nevertheless, the general conclusion about the Russian civil society will be fairly pessimistic. Due to this weak civil society and political system, the most strategic actor contributing to the Russian market and political reforms remains the government, which at best may prove to be reformist. The current presidency demonstrates intentions to not only reform the Russian economy and governance system, but also to influence the entire political process and party life. This task is ambitious and it remains unclear whether Putin will accomplish it. If he fails, the final outcome will be very detrimental for both the Russian state and its direct neighbours.

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IV Uncertain Neighbourhood: Russia and the Baltics

Relations between Russia and its neighbouring EU accession countries are suffering from a number of problems. 21 The rapprochement of these countries to the EU does not resolve existing problems automatically, and to a certain extent may even make them worse. The EU should recognise these shortcomings in relations between Russian and the accession country and the need to help resolve them jointly with both Russia and the accession countries. Among these countries, the Baltic states play the most important role due to their geographic proximity and the relatively long history of existing within the Russian state.

The Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states The problem of the Russian-speaking minority has proven to be the most pressing one in the relations between Russia and the Baltic states.22 The common ethnic problem facing all three countries reflects internal economic and political issues of great importance. 23 In Lithuania, all current inhabitants were granted Lithuanian citizenship. The Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania is unlikely to produce long-term tensions and thus affect EU stability. The crucial positive factor for Estonia is its economic well-being and rapprochement to the EU. There is thus clear evidence of the positive role of the EU for the stabilisation of accession states, and a direct link between ethnic relations and economic factors. Estonia is taking the acquis communautaire in its full extent, and most Russian inhabitants are very much in favour of such a perspective.24 The relatively peaceful spirit of Tallinns relations with Moscow is also playing an important role. Estonia is actually benefiting from the aggravation of Russian-Latvian relations as well.25 Latvia constitutes perhaps the worst case in the entire spectrum of Russian-Baltic relations. The problem of the Russian minority here is severely aggravated by the issue of Latvian transit ports (primarily Ventspils) and Latvian internal politics. The European Union should pay more attention to the internal Latvian state of affairs and make

21 22

23 24 25

I. Oldberg: No love is lost Russias relations with the Baltic states, in: G. Arteus, A. Leins (eds.): Baltic Security. Riga 1997, pp. 152 186. For a moment when the three Baltic republics gained their independence, the percentage of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was 30.3 per cent, in Latvia 34 per cent and in Lithuania 9.4 per cent. Since 1991, this data has not changed significantly. Hence the minorities issue should be considered by the EU in a very serious way. J. Talavs (ed.): The Baltic States At Historical Crossroads, Riga 1998. Estonian Ministry for Foreign Affairs www.site. http://www.vm.ee/euro/english/. A. Mitropolsky: Vneshniya torgovlya I investitsionnaya deyatelnost v Estonii, in: Economika I politika Rossii I gosudarstv blizhnego zarubezhya. Moskau 2000, pp. 51 53.

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concessions only if the Riga government can overcome the local oligarchy influence, as well as succeed in stabilising the state.

Discussion and signing of border treaties The border issue between Russia and the Baltics is also one of great importance. Just after gaining independence, two of the Baltic states laid claim to some areas of the Leningrad and Pskov regions of about 2,300 sq. km.26 Russia and two Baltic states have not yet managed to definitively resolve the border issue, despite the fact that the border treaty with Estonia was due to become effective in March 1999. The border issue in Russian-Lithuanian relations has not been marked by any claims or serious disputes. The delimitation of the state border between the two countries was finally completed on 24 October 1997 with the signing of a treaty on defining the state borders between Lithuania and Russia, and a treaty establishing the exclusive economic zone near the Baltic Sea.27 Lithuanias relation with the Kaliningrad oblast of Russia plays a substantial role in the bilateral relationship. The Kaliningrad region is linked with Lithuania by geographic proximity, mutual economic interests and extensive human contact. An agreement with Lithuania on economic, social and cultural co-operation in the development of the Kaliningrad district of the Russian Federation was signed on 29 July 1991 and became effective on 4 June 1992. A new agreement for long-term co-operation between the regions of Lithuania and Kaliningrad oblast was signed on 29 June 1999. At the same time, a state border agreement was signed in 1997 but has not yet been ratified by either the Lithuanian or Russian parliaments.28

Economic and social issues Economic issues and, in particular, new regulations of regional border traffic as a consequence of enlargement constitute some of Russias major concerns. Current bilateral trade is not perceived as sufficient from the official Russian point of view, and the accession of the Baltic countries to the EU will, in the short and medium term, worsen this situation. Any progress is likely to be achieved between Russia and Lithuania, yet is
26 27 28 I. Busygina: Russia, Baltic states and the European Union, in: J. Talavs (ed.): The Baltic States At Historical Crossroads, Riga 1998. http://www.urm.lt/political/russia.htm. BBC Monitoring, 17 June 1999.

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dependent on the desperate need of Vilnius to answer the Kaliningrad issue and the improvement of bilateral relations with Russia in general.

Measures, initiatives and agreements on cross-border co-operation The situation in this area also differs from country to country. Estonia simply does not intend to have any definite bilateral agreements with Russia, as it regards itself as a de facto member of the EU. Latvia currently has certain agreements with Russia that are dependent upon the course of Rigas rapprochement to the EU. A more controversial case is Lithuania, which is why the most remarkable initiatives in this sphere were proposed by Vilnius.29 Lithuania intends to apply for some medium-term concessions from the EU with regard to border crossing and regional co-operation.

Status, barriers and development of bilateral trade relations between Russia and the EU candidate states Problems of overcoming the future EU eastern border will rise significantly as soon as the present accession countries join the EU.30 Approaches to cross-border co-operation mainly lie in the creation of transport corridors and, to a certain extent, inclusion of Russias regions into the Euroregions project.31 It finally shows the inevitable character of Russias involvement in the pan-European economic environment and should lead to relevant EU initiatives and practical decisions. In all these areas, the EU should not simply condition the accession by the terms of the acquis but also influence the ongoing processes by directly intervening in the course of bilateral relations between Russia and future EU members. Given the generally positive attitude of Moscow towards the EU, the latter could create a positive environment by addressing Russian concerns and supporting accession countries (in particular Poland and Lithuania) in their attempts to settle economic and social problems with Russia.

29 30

31

Russian Federation in Lithuania Foreign Policy. http://www.urm.lt/political/russia.htm. The present status of bilateral trade between Russia and the accession countries is defined by the Agreement on Principles of Economic and Trade Relations (signed in 1992) with Latvia; the Agreement on Trade and Economic Relations, which established the most-favoured nation status for both states, and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and on Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed on 29 June 1999) with Lithuania. Currently the main trends consist of a decrease in Russias Baltic trade, mainly as a result of the Russian internal economic developments. Prospects for Future Cooperation/Relations Between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. http:// www.urm.lt/political/russia.htm.

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Russian relations with accession states are affected by the legacy of the past. Numerous unresolved bilateral problems block progress. Relations between Russia and its future EU neighbours are affected by many problems which cannot be solved on a bilateral basis and should thus not be treated in such a way. Without compromising its primary principles, the EU should act according to the regional realities, which are tremendously affected by the heritage of the Soviet bloc and the binding relations among its members. One should take into consideration that Russia can neither be marked off by systematic differences from Europe nor can it easily break existing ties with most of the accession countries.

V Conclusions
Russia is in the process of a transition the outcome of which remains ambiguous. A decade of Russian reform has not brought a comprehensive answer to the question of Russias ability to join the western community based on a liberal market economy and civil society. General Russian instability presents a huge potential problem for the EU, as well as for the stability of the whole region. Russia is currently incapable of performing a role of security guarantor for its periphery. Despite numerous attempts, Russia has failed to convince the former Soviet Union states of its (self-perceived) positive stabilising role and potential. Also, Russia still does not have any clear policy towards the EU as an entity which may become a unique single player in Europe. Russian attitudes towards the EU can be characterised by a lack of understanding of the European integration process. The acquis communautaire is still badly perceived by Russian authorities as a burden to be dealt with. Thus, the government does not have a clear vision of internal EU dynamics and legal norms. At the same time, there is willingness in Russia to get closer to the West. Moreover, Russia counts on the EU to improve its relations with accession countries. Given all the short-term negative consequences of enlargement, Russian officials and the public regard long-term perspectives as very positive indeed.32 Regarding Russian foreign policy in general, it should be stated clearly that it is currently less affected by internal matters than only a few months ago. The new presidency shows clear signs of its intention to take control of what is happening in the
32 There are some voices existing and potential problems in the Russian foreign ministry that the EU, Russia and the accession countries could negotiate on a trilateral basis. Albeit this position is not consistent with the Brussels approach and not imaginable in practice. The EU should play much more of an active role in settling existing problems between Russia and its future EU neighbours.

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external sphere. National policy-making may become more centralised institutionally, and the country will at last speak in one voice. As it was mentioned in Putins Open Letter published by the Russian media just before the elections, Foreign policy is a means of improving the national well-being. For the present Kremlin administration, national prosperity depends on economic performance and requires both investment and economic co-operation. The policy which is likely to be adopted is indeed pragmatic. This kind of policy, which will characterise Russian behaviour during Putins presidency, is conditioned by the set of circumstances Russia is confronted with, as well as by the international environment. At the same time, Russian policy appears to be more reasonable and predictable for the West. A brief review of Russias current state of affairs and its relations with direct neighbours from the list of accession countries allows an observer to come to cautiously optimistic conclusions. Russias transition is directed towards becoming more perceptive of international realities as well as of the actual needs of the nation. The first point means that the EU is likely to enjoy a more predictable and business-oriented Russia; the second means that Russian law conformity is likely to mature and be more comfortable to deal with. The present process of Russian consolidation should be considered neither as a threat to cross-border co-operation of an enlarged EU with Russian regions, nor as a symbol of reviving Russian totalitarian rule. In economic terms, if Russian regional economic players are freed from the control of local authorities, they may be able to conduct business more effectively and legally correct. In political terms, the Russian state is about to become more manageable, and questions posed by Russias European partners will be met with coherent answers much faster than previously. At the same time, current relations between the EU and Russia cannot be evaluated as incontestable. Both sides lack a correct view of internal developments and a solid framework for their relationship. The Moscow May 2000 summit did not produce a breakthrough in relations due to the incomplete character of Russias transition; however, the EU should above all support Russia in developing a legal framework for the future. The scale of the risks presented by Russia with the expansion of the EU should not be overestimated. The primary risk is the possible failure of the initiatives to reform the state, the so-called Russia Project. Under the present circumstances, a loss of central governmental authority would undoubtedly lead to the disorganisation of the whole state system. The immediate outcomes for the EU would be rise of the Russian nationalism, aggressive moves towards Ukraine and the Baltics, further economic troubles and a minimally restricted wave of migrants. In more practical terms, there is a high potential for risk regarding Russian threats to Latvia because of Kaliningrad. However, the 63

aforementioned scenario seems unlikely, which is why in the short term the EU should primarily address issues of Russian relations with regard to the extension of the acquis to the accession countries. Solving these problems on a trilateral basis seems to be promising and will certainly be very welcome in most of the accession countries. Currently, the EU is looking forward to a direct neighbourhood with Russia. New Russia does not represent a threat in the traditional military sense, and even soft security risks have noticeably decreased, compared to a year ago. In response, the EU should attempt to engage Russia step by step rather than isolate it. Given the present positive attitude of the Russian elite and public towards Europe, it would be beneficial to support these attitudes. Such a strategy of engagement will help the EU to develop a reasonable partnership and avoid having an insecure and moneyconsuming neighbour in the future.

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Ukraine and the EU: The Risk of Being Excluded

Oleksandr Pavliuk

I Introduction
With the accession of Poland and Hungary (and possibly Slovakia) to the European Union over the next few years, Ukraine and the EU will share a common border of at least 677 kilometres. For the first time ever Ukraine, which is currently undergoing an extremely difficult domestic transformation and striving to become an integral part of Europe, will become a direct (or immediate) neighbour of the EU. As a result, Ukraine will get to experience the impact of European integration in a much more profound way than it does today, while the EU will be directly affected by the developments in and stability of Ukraine. This new reality should open significant new opportunities for more intense and closer EU-Ukraine co-operation, but it will also raise new challenges and present new risks that both sides will have to face and cope with. The challenge is a particularly hard one given the fact that after almost 10 years of Ukraines existence as an independent state, there is still no clear consensus, neither inside the country nor in the EU, on Ukraines future vis--vis the mainstream process of European integration.

II EU-Ukraine relations: persisting ambiguity

There are three important benchmarks that have marked the development of relations between Ukraine and the European Union since 2 December 1991, when the European Community welcomed the results of the Ukrainian referendum on independence and called for an open and constructive dialogue between Ukraine and the EC. The first benchmark was the signing of a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 65

(PCA) on 14 June 1994. Ukraine became the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to sign the PCA, which provided an overall legal framework for EUUkraine relations and outlined specific areas for co-operation: industrial co-operation, promotion and protection of investments, public procurement, mining and raw materials, science and technology, education and training, agriculture and agro-industrial sector, energy, civil nuclear sector, environment, transport, regional development, social co-operation, information and communication, etc. The PCA was meant to become an instrument to bring Ukraine in line with the legal frameworks of the single European market and the GATT/WTO system. It included the prospect of a free-trade area between the EU and Ukraine; but contrary to the Associate Agreements concluded earlier between the EU and Central European countries, the PCA did not give Ukraine a prospect for EU membership in the future. Reflecting the growing comprehension of Ukraines importance, the EU approved the Common Position (28 November 1994) and the Action Plan (6 December 1996) on Ukraine, pledging to support Ukraines independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, its democratic transformation, economic stabilisation and integration into the world economy. In June 1996, the European Council decided to consider Ukraine an economy in transition that provided for better access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market. Special trade agreements regulating two sensitive areas in EU-Ukraine relations steel and textiles were also agreed upon. The EU-Ukraine co-operation has been growing steadily, and the EU has become the largest bilateral provider of foreign technical and macro-financial assistance to Ukraine and the second largest (after Russia) trading partner of Ukraine: at present, trade with the EU comprises about 22.5 per cent of Ukraines total trade flows. Ukraine also benefits from a number of EU technical assistance programmes, including the national Tacis programme, the nuclear safety programme, the cross-border programme, and the interstate programme, as well as a number of smaller facilities (Democracy Program, Bistro, Tempus, etc.). Ukraine announced in the course of 1996 that its strategic goal was to integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, with priority given to full membership in the EU.1 Nevertheless, until mid-1997, it was NATO, rather than the EU, that had been attracting most of Kievs attention. Responding to NATOs enlargement to the first three Central European countries, Ukraine was preoccupied with assuring its own security, and strove hard to sign a document establishing special relations with NATO.2

1 2

Initially, this was stated by President Kuchma in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 23 April 1996, and in his speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU on 5 June 1996. The Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO was signed in June 1997.

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However, much to Ukraines frustration, it took the EU almost four years to ratify the PCA. 1998 marked the second benchmark in the development of EU-Ukrainian relations. On 1 March 1998, the PCA finally came into effect. Consequently, in the course of the year an institutional framework for EU-Ukraine co-operation was established in accordance with the PCA: Co-operation Council (meets annually at ministerial level), Co-operation Committee (annual meetings at senior official level) and its six subcommittees,3 and Parliamentary Co-operation Committee. At the same time, in response to the new situation posed by the EU naming six new accession candidates, including Ukraines immediate neighbours Hungary and Poland, official Kiev became much more pronounced about its own European aspirations. On 11 June 1998, President Kuchma signed a decree adopting the Strategy of Ukraines Integration to the European Union. The Strategy has officially fixed membership in the EU as Ukraines long-term strategic goal. Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian diplomacy started to actively push for a clear and distinct EU statement on the future of EU-Ukrainian relations. This effort was further intensified when the EU summit in Vienna in December 1998 took a decision to prepare four EU Common Strategies, which were meant to become new and effective instruments of EU external policies within the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Ukraine became one of only two countries (together with Russia, and in addition to the Balkan and Mediterranean regions) for which such a Common Strategy was supposed to be elaborated. Throughout almost the whole of 1999, the primary issue in the EU-Ukraine dialogue was the future of their relations. The evolving discussions, however, led to many mutual disagreements and frustrations. Although having problems with the implementation of some key provisions under the PCA, Ukraine was trying hard to get EU recognition of the possibility for its future membership in the EU and to fix this right in the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine. In doing so, at some point Kiev was even questioning the sufficiency of the PCA signed almost five years ago and its applicability to the new situation. The EU, however, viewed this Ukrainian ambition as an exaggerated demand: EU officials pointed to Ukraines many domestic problems and its breaches of the PCA provisions, in particular by applying discriminatory measures affecting EU exports to Ukraine, and insisted that Kiev should give first priority to PCA implementation rather than to speculation on the future of its relations with the EU. In turn, Kiev blamed the EU for the absence of a clear and coherent inclusive strategy toward Ukraine and for the

They cover trade and investment; financial, economic issues and statistics; energy, nuclear issues and environment; customs, cross-border co-operation, illegal immigration, money laundering and drugs; transport, telecommunications, science, technology, training and education; and coal, steel, mining and raw materials.

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unwillingness to even consider Ukraine as a prospect for full membership in the future. Fears and perceptions of being excluded or marginalised were growing in Ukraine. These Ukrainian concerns were exacerbated in view of the EU eastward enlargement. Overall, Ukraine took a very positive attitude toward EU enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe and welcomed the invitation to accession negotiations extended to its western neighbours. At the same time, not being a direct party in the integration process and not even considered as a remote prospect for EU membership, Ukraine was getting increasingly nervous about a potential new dividing line on its western borders and its corresponding geopolitical implications. With the adoption in mid-1999 of the EU Stability Pact for South East Europe, aimed at bringing the five Balkan countries into the European integration process by giving them a perspective of EU associate membership, Ukraine (together with Moldova) has remained the only post-communist country in Europe (out of those expressing their aspiration to join the EU in the future) left outside of the mainstream of European integration. In addition, Ukraines neighbours to the west, which are soon to become EU members, will have to introduce new border regulations and stricter visa policies on their eastern borders, given that improved border control is viewed as an important condition for EU membership. Responding to EU pressure, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have already cancelled visa-free travel with Ukraine as of 28 June 2000. It is likely that Hungary and Poland will be forced to do this as well, although Warsaw has expressed its intention to keep its visa-free border regime with Ukraine as long as possible.4 Unless proper solutions are found, the new border restrictions are bound to have a negative impact on human relations, the situation of national minorities, existing freetrade agreements between Ukraine and some other Central and East European countries (e. g., with the Baltic states), bilateral cross-border trade, and transborder and regional co-operation. This would further exacerbate the existing differences in socioeconomic and political development and widen the psychological distance between Ukraine and its western neighbours, artificially pushing Ukraine eastward rather than anchoring it more firmly in Central Europe, and thus increasing the danger of Ukraines regional isolation. The change of a border-crossing regime will have a special detrimental effect on Ukrainian-Polish relations. Over the past several years, Poland has become the most open Western country for Ukraine. As believed by some experts, millions of Ukrainians visiting Poland every year (closely to five million per year) undergo a similar psychological process as the Poles did in the 1970 1980s when traveling to Germany and

This, for example, was stated by then Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek: Polska-Ukraina: jak najdluzej bez wiz, Rzeczpospolita, 26 February 1998, p. 5.

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other Western countries.5 For them, Polish experience and achievements are the best indication of the need for continuation of market reforms in Ukraine. For Ukrainian elites, Poland serves as an important additional link bringing Ukraine closer to Europe. Consequently, a non-visa-free border regime between the two countries would have a major psychological impact on Ukraine, its people and the reform-minded and Westernoriented political forces in the country. Under those circumstances, the bordering regions of Western Ukraine will suffer most. At present, Poland is the third most important trading partner (10 per cent of trade) in overall trade of the Lviv region; and it is also believed that the volume of unofficial cross-border trade between the border regions of the two countries is twice as high as the official data suggests.6 Furthermore, potentially negative consequences of new border regulations very much threaten the economic interests of many Polish families, especially in the eastern regions bordering Ukraine. Some Polish experts indicate that in the overall trade balance with Ukraine, one in every five Polish zloty originating from exports to Ukraine is generated by companies from the border region.7 Significantly, concern over the consequences of new tariff and visa regulations has come on the agenda of states on both sides of an anticipated dividing line.8 The third benchmark in EU-Ukraine relations came with the adoption of the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine at the EU summit in Helsinki on 10 11 December 1999. Although the Strategy did not include, as hoped in Ukraine, a special clause recognising Ukraines right to become a full-fledged EU member pending its completion of the Copenhagen criteria, it nevertheless has for the first time acknowledged Ukraines European aspirations and welcomed its pro-European choice. It has thus opened new opportunities for EU-Ukrainian co-operation. The Strategy has signaled three primary directions for further deepening EU-Ukrainian relations: support for the democratic and economic transition processes in Ukraine, meeting common challenges on the European continent (stability and security in Europe, environment, energy and nuclear safety), and support for strengthened co-operation between the EU and Ukraine in the context of enlargement (support for Ukraines integration into the European and world economy, and co-operation in the field of justice and domestic affairs).

6 7

P. Zurawski vel Grajewski: The Impact of the Accession of Poland to the European Union on Polish-Ukrainian Relations, Paper presented at the conference Lessons of European Integration Experiences for Ukraine, Prague, 24/25 October 1998. Postup, 31 March 2000. B. Klich, A. Nowosad: Strategic Partnership of Poland and Ukraine: the Polish Perspective, Paper presented at the international conference Ukraine: Perspectives of Integration into Europe in Light of the Presidential Elections, Paris, 19 November 1999. A. Lieven: EU accession raises visa worry in east. Financial Times, 26 February 1998.

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Ukraine has decided to temporarily shelve its claims that the EU should recognise Ukraines right for EU membership and to concentrate instead on domestic change. The new government led by Prime Minister Yushchenko, appointed after the last presidential elections in the fall of 1999, has committed itself to a more rapid progress in PCA implementation and has taken measures to eliminate a number of existing breaches of the PCA. On 5 June 2000, Ukraine took another important step to improve its relations with the EU: it was announced that the Chernobyl nuclear power station, which had constituted a major irritant in EU-Ukrainian relations over the past several years, would be fully decommissioned by 15 December 2000. As a result, EU-Ukrainian relations seem to be entering a new and more pragmatic period. Yet serious problems hampering their progress continue to persist. Ukraine is still only a marginal trade and economic partner for the EU, comprising a mere 0.42 per cent of EU total trade. While joining the WTO is a necessary step on the way to closer ties with the EU, Ukraines movement toward the WTO, although declared as one of its key priorities, is proceeding extremely slowly, meeting with objections and resistance from certain industries and lobbying groups. Many obstacles to free trade remain: Ukraine applies some protectionist measures that are viewed by the EU as violating PCA provisions, while Ukraine criticises the EU for unfair treatment, referring to the fact that the EU has still not recognised Ukraine as a market economy. EU direct investment in the Ukrainian economy is also very low due to Ukraines unfavourable investment climate and high-risk business environment. In addition, EU-Ukraine relations lack broad co-operative ties and are characterised by insufficient mutual knowledge and understanding. The two sides still see the future of their relationship quite differently, while their current policies vis--vis one another remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the EU pledges both its recognition of Ukraines importance for European security and its support for Ukraine and the countrys transition. On the other hand, political and intellectual elites in the EU are very reluctant to consider Ukraine politically and culturally as a part of Europe or even a prospective candidate for future membership in the EU, seeing it instead as a part of the post-Soviet or CIS space. This leads many in Ukraine to believe that for the EU, Europe ends where the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic countries) begins. Although EU officials strongly object to such a division, some of their practical steps raise further concerns in Ukraine: For example, as a result of the recent restructuring within the European Commission, Ukraine has been placed in one unit together with Russia, Belarus and Moldova four countries that are very different in their ambitions and attitudes towards the process of European integration.9
9 Formerly, Ukraine comprised one unit together with Belarus and Moldova.

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Ukraine, for its part, remains ambiguous about its European ambition. On the one hand, both in his inauguration speech of 30 November 1999 and the address to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament of Ukraine) devoted to Ukraines social and economic development from 2000 to 2004, President Kuchma strongly reconfirmed that membership in the EU is Ukraines strategic goal. European integration has also been set as one of the key priorities in the programme of the new cabinet under Yushchenko, and the government has intensified its work on elaboration of Ukraines National Program for European Integration to be adopted in late 2000. The latest independent public opinion polls demonstrate the growing public support to the idea of Ukraines European integration: 57 per cent of those polled believe that Ukraine should strive to join the EU; of those, 44 per cent think that Ukraine should aim to achieve this in the next five years, 9 per cent in the next ten years, and 4 per cent in the next 20 years, while only 20 per cent speak against the countrys accession to the EU.10 On the other hand, European integration has not yet become a wide and conscious societal choice and a practical priority for all branches of power and levels of government in Ukraine. Key actors truly favouring and striving to promote the countrys European integration are limited to certain segments of the government, centre-rightist political forces and their parliamentary factions, a number of intellectuals, some NGO representatives, foreign policy experts and political scientists. In principle, no political force (even the Communist party) objects to the need for Ukraines accession to the EU or deems it as unacceptable. In practice, however, Ukraine lacks strong domestic constituencies genuinely interested in and capable of effectively arguing and promoting both domestic market reforms and the countrys return to Europe. Overtly pro-integration political parties, whose programmatic documents and practical activities unequivocally favour Ukraines European integration and which at the same time have formed their factions in the parliament after the 1998 parliamentary elections, are by and large limited to the liberal Reforms and Order Party and two branches of a once very influential and now divided national-democratic Rukh party (Narodny Rukh Ukraine and Ukrainsky Narodny Rukh).11 Being divided and holding a total of about 55 (out of 450) seats in the parliament,12 they do not constitute a coherent and powerful force at present. Other Europe-oriented political parties are even less

10 11 12

This public opinion poll was conducted in April 2000 by the Kiev-based Centre for Economic and Political Studies. V. Chalyj: Dolgaia doroga v ES, Zerkalo nedeli, No. 21, 27 May 2000, p. 2. On the programmes of various political parties in Ukraine cf. Politychni partii Ukrainy (Political Parties of Ukraine), Kiev 1998. If combined with individual members supportive of Ukraines European integration coming from some other parliamentary factions and groups (Independents, Greens, National Democratic party of Ukraine, etc.), pro-European forces in the Rada would roughly comprise up to one third of all MPs.

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influential and lack representation in the Verkhovna Rada. In general, Ukrainian political parties remain ill-connected to Europe and their European counterparts. They also do not represent real power. Key policy decisions are influenced not by parties and open political competition but by powerful political and economic pressure groups possessing sufficient financial and administrative resources and controlling major media sources, parliamentary factions or even entire political parties. These groups use personal networks and behind-the-scene channels rather than open and transparent political mechanisms. Their pragmatic financial and political interests, as well as the fear of increased international competition, have so far dictated the need for protectionism and preservation of the existing political and economic systems in Ukraine rather than their adaptation to European norms and principles. There are also no large Ukrainian businesses that have a strong stake in the EU market and can serve as a driving force for Ukraines European integration. The majority of the countrys largest and most successful businesses are financially and economically tied to the markets (first of all, energy markets) in the East, and feel more comfortable with developing co-operation with their Russian, rather than their EU, counterparts. At the same time, small and medium entrepreneurs who are genuinely interested in Ukraines movement towards European standards and regulations (given the fact that this process should not only open new markets and bring new technologies but would also assure more transparency and rule-of-law to Ukrainian political and economic systems) remain weak, disorganised and lacking in political influence. Very often Ukrainian entrepreneurs are either closely connected to the government or operate in the shadow economy and thus lack the necessary freedom and political will to pursue any public policy initiatives. Potentially a strong pro-European force, regional elites and regions on the whole practically stay away from the process of European integration, with the exception of western Ukrainian regions, which are engaged in cross-border co-operation with neighbouring Poland and Hungary (and to a much lesser extent with Slovakia and Romania). Ukraine still needs to carry out a comprehensive public administration reform, decentralise its system of governance and adopt a programme of national regional policy. The gradually evolving debate on European integration and EU-Ukrainian relations has yet to be extended from Kiev to all the regions across the country. With very few exceptions, Ukrainian civil society actors, such as mass media and NGOs, have also not yet become an effective lobbying force for European integration. The public at large, although in its majority favouring Ukraines movement towards Europe, remains passive and uninvolved in the process, as well as ignorant about its costs and benefits. In general, being pre-occupied with daily socio-economic problems, the population shows limited interest in foreign policy issues, while the government has 72

done practically nothing to launch and conduct a broad and energetic public awareness campaign on the importance and essence of European integration. Framing the countrys foreign policy on the whole and its European vector in particular remains a constitutional prerogative of the Ukrainian president. Despite his many pro-European statements, president Kuchma, however, has not proved to be a determined champion of Ukraines European choice. In the government, European-minded and EU-oriented actors are concentrated mostly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as in some other governmental bodies dealing with co-operation with the EU (relevant departments have been created in practically all Ukrainian ministries). Ukrainian bureaucracy on the whole is largely ambivalent or even suspicious of the countrys European integration, as well as of consistent domestic reform. Besides, many officials, including even those responsible for relations with the EU within their respective ministries, lack proper understanding of the EU, its mechanisms and functions. They underestimate the complexity of the process of European integration. There has also not been enough political will to move forward on practical issues of PCA implementation, adaptation and approximation. Practical actions and steps have often been substituted by political slogans and declarations. In many cases Ukraines European policies have remained of a declarative nature. In addition, Ukraines European ambition has been seriously constrained by the slow progress of domestic reform. This mixture of insufficient knowledge, weak political will and poor transition performance results in a situation in which Ukraine often fails to deliver on the agreements already signed, raising doubts in the EU about its commitment toward and seriousness about European integration.

III Ukraines transition and European integration: essential links and potential risks
Since independence, Ukraine has remained in a very difficult transition process, as periods of change have often been followed by those of stagnation. Its transition has turned out to be much more complex than in most other post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraines historical legacies, its diversity (regional, economic, ethnic, political, language, religious, etc.) and overwhelming challenges (building its statehood, democracy, market economy and civil society) that need to be addressed simultaneously and in a rather short period of time, have all contributed to the slowness of Ukraines economic, social and political reforms. The failure to develop a consistent reform programme and in many cases the lack of necessary vision and sufficient political will to take a decisive step towards reform have further aggravated the transition problems of the country. 73

Since 1990 Ukraine had been experiencing a steady decline in its GDP. Ukrainian economic reforms have by and large been limited to macroeconomic stabilisation and price liberalisation. Macroeconomic stabilisation has not been supported with necessary steps at the microeconomic level. As a result, Ukraines economy is still characterised by the absence of structural changes, intra-regional discrepancies, unfinished privatisation, the persisting crisis of non-payments, and a growing domestic and external debt. The business environment remains over-regulated, unstable and non-transparent, and consequently most businesses opt to operate in the shadow sector, while neither foreign nor domestic substantial investments are entering the country. As a result, after a decade of reforms the countrys overall economic situation remains difficult, and its dependence on outside financial assistance and energy supplies is growing. At the political level, Ukraines transition has been marked by an instability of state institutions, political tension between branches and centres of power (president parliament government), a poor quality of state policy, the lack of responsibility and accountability, and low effectiveness of government. Ukraine has often been criticised both inside and especially outside the country for its bureaucracy, corruption, and corporate closeness of the system of governance. Reflecting the countrys substantial shadow economy, Ukraines political process is not transparent: politics are defined not by the competition between ideologies and party programmes, but by behind-the-scenes squabbling of powerful financial and political groups or clans. Ukraine has yet to establish the vibrant rule of law and strengthen its civil society. Major components political parties, NGOs, independent media, etc. remain weak, have little influence on the domestic political process, and are often controlled or dominated by vested shadow interests or as they are often referred to oligarchs. Ukraine still lacks a stable national consensus on key issues of its domestic development and foreign policy. The countrys economic and political instability and its strong dependence on Western financial assistance and Russian gas and oil supplies explain Ukraines growing vulnerability to outside pressures and influences. As a result, both the nature and geopolitical future of the Ukrainian state are still uncertain. At the same time, despite all the above-mentioned problems, its many competing interests and strong potential for social conflict, Ukraine has remained relatively stable and its transition has been remarkably peaceful. While some were predicting a clash between the eastern and western parts of the country or Ukraines collapse under the overwhelming burdens of transition and its re-absorption by Russia, the country has managed to consolidate its independent statehood and establish certain elements and institutions of pluralist democracy. In mid-1996, a new post-communist constitution was adopted in a spirit of political consensus. The country has skilfully avoided disruptive social conflicts and preserved ethnic peace, including finding proper solutions to the 74

situation in Crimea that presented a serious challenge in 1992 1994 to Ukraines integrity and peace. In the international arena, Ukraine has so far been a positive contributor to regional security and stability, rather than a risk factor. In 1996 1997, Kievs balanced position helped to assure the non-confrontational and non-dividing nature of the first wave of NATO enlargement. Ukraine has worked to develop friendly relations with all of its neighbours. In spite of many fears immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite many mutual disagreements and suspicions, Ukrainian-Russian relations have on the whole been peaceful, with both sides demonstrating enough moderation on controversial issues and at critical moments. Finally, independent Ukraine has set a positive example by making the hard choices on nuclear proliferation. The countrys nuclear disarmament was a truly significant event. Not surprisingly, as underscored in the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine, The fact that since independence Ukraine has been a source of regional stability, despite its domestic difficulties and diversities, is a laudable achievement. As a result, at this point Ukraine poses no threat and presents little risk to the EU and its Central and East European candidates. While Ukraine is economically weak, its international behaviour is civilised and predictable, and politically the country remains relatively stable and does not create problems for the region or Europe as a whole. Yet potentially, Ukraine can become a risk factor, especially if the country remains in its current state of economic instability, political uncertainty and external vulnerability. Protracted economic crisis and failure to improve the business environment, to restructure industries (especially the energy sector), to assure both internal and external energy payments, and to attract substantial foreign direct investment might well lead to the failure of Ukraines transition and to an internal explosion of the Ukrainian state, with all the resulting consequences for regional security and stability. Deteriorating social conditions (low salaries and declining living standards, high unemployment, wage and pension arrears, insufficient medical care, the growing gap between the richest and poorest levels of society, etc.) create a sufficient basis for social discontent. Ukraine has already experienced a number of strikes involving mostly coal miners and teachers, and until at least the countrys most burning social problems are solved, social tension will persist, threatening Ukraines stability. Despite Ukraines positive record of ethnic minority treatment, potential for ethnic conflict continues to exist as well, especially in Crimea where the issue of Crimean Tatars who currently comprise over ten per cent of the local population, has yet to find its proper solution in terms of their socio-economic conditions and political representation. Persisting economic difficulties could lead to serious environmental problems. This danger is particularly troublesome given Ukraines tragic experience with the Chernobyl nuclear power station back in 1986, and the fact that the 75

country hosts five other nuclear power stations.13 Ukraine still has some unresolved problems in relation to its immediate neighbours, including EU applicants: in particular, Romania remains at odds with Ukraine on the treatment of national minorities and the two countries still disagree on the delineation and demarcation of the Continental Shelf in the Black Sea. There is also a risk of the growth of organised crime and the increase in refugees and illegal migration via and from the Ukrainian territory. Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has become a major route for illegal immigration and drug and human trafficking. There is no comprehensive and fully reliable statistical data on illegal immigration. Estimates vary from 20,000 to 500,000 illegal immigrants already living in Ukraine. Most of them have arrived from Asia (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, etc.) and some African countries (Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc.). While over the past several years the overall traffic of passengers and cargo through the borders of Ukraine has decreased, cases of illegal border crossings and other violations keep growing. According to the State Committee of Border Protection of Ukraine, in 1999 the number of intercepted illegal immigrants was 19.8 per cent higher than in 1998, and 26.4 per cent higher than in 1997. Whereas in 1998 the border guards of Ukraine, jointly with other law-enforcement agencies of frontier regions, detained almost 12,000 illegal immigrants, in 1999 they intercepted about 15,000 illegals.14 There is no substantiated data on how many have actually succeeded in illegally crossing the border. 90 per cent of these immigrants use established channels of illegal immigration, which are controlled by international criminal groups. In most cases illegal immigrants only stay in the country until they eventually slip through to the West.15 The situation is complicated by the fact that Ukraine has no special detention camps and resources to keep illegal immigrants and cannot afford to send them back; the country still lacks necessary legislation in this field, a unified administrative structure (an immigration and naturalisation service) and an efficient deportation mechanism; its border control equipment is often old and outdated. Of special concern is the fact that Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Belorussian borders are not properly demarcated. There is also no extradition agreement between Ukraine and Russia. This quasi-control of Ukraines eastern and northern borders and, on the other hand, the more proper regulation of the countrys western borders (according to official data, illegal migrants are intercepted 4.7 times more often at their attempts to depart from Ukraine than at their attempts to enter the country), lead to a dangerous situation where Ukraine is
13 14 15 Some estimates indicate that more than 3.5 million people, including 1 million children, have suffered significant health problems as a result of the Chernobyl explosion. To compare, in 1991 only 148 illegal immigrants were detained by Ukrainian border guards. L. Hide: Immigrants to the West Create Disaster For All Concerned, RFE/RL Weekly Digest, 27 June 2000.

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turning into a kind of a holding tank for illegal immigrants aiming to go to developed western European states. More than 60 per cent of illegal migrants arrive in Ukraine via Russia (mainly via Moscow) and the rest via other CIS states, taking advantage of the current openness of Ukraines northern and eastern borders. According to expert estimates, there are now from 700,000 to 2 million illegals staying on the territory of the Russian Federation; if the Russian government fails to take proper measures, this number might soon increase up to 3 million. This explains Ukraines desire to assure proper delineation, demarcation and control of its border with Russia a problem that Ukraine perceives as one that affects the security of both Ukraine and Russia, as well as that of the EU. The EU, however, has so far done little to help Ukraine address these problems: EU policy in this respect has aimed at strengthening control over Ukraines western borders, rather than helping the country to improve its eastern border. The rising illegal migration and human trafficking result in the growth of drug and weapons trafficking, corruption and other criminal activities in Ukraine itself and in the border regions. Migration pressure on Ukraine and consequently on the EU is almost certain to increase when Ukraine becomes a direct neighbour of the EU. In addition to illegal immigration via Ukraine, there is also a problem of illegal labour from Ukraine in some Central and East European countries that are about to join the EU: according to various estimates, there are about 10,000 Ukrainians working illegally in Hungary, over 40,000 in the Czech Republic and from 60,000 to 100,000 in Poland. Due to its poor economic situation, Ukraine is not able to effectively cope with these problems, and the situation is likely to get even worse if Ukraine fails to succeed in its transition. It is, therefore, the unfinished nature of Ukraines transition and the countrys remaining uncertainty that present the main potential risk for the EU. After several years of economic and political stalemate, some new hopes emerged in Ukraine immediately after the presidential elections in the fall of 1999. Following his re-election, President Kuchma announced his intention to speed up domestic reforms. Viktor Yushchenko, the former Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine who is credited by many as a top professional and has a reputation as a reformer, was appointed Prime Minister. The new government set forth an ambitious programme of reforms, and the Verkhovana Rada passed that programme, as well as the first ever zero-deficit budget. For the first time since Ukraines independence, a more or less permanent and organised non-leftist majority was established in parliament, providing a chance for constructive work between the government and the Verkhovna Rada. The government succeeded in restructuring Ukraines short-term foreign debt of about US-$ 2 billion that prevented a fully-fledged financial crisis. The government has also launched the longawaited public administration and land reforms, outlined its programme for privatisation of strategic enterprises to be conducted in a transparent way and for cash, and is 77

making hard efforts to reform the countrys energy sector. The first quarter of 2000 brought the first signs of economic growth in Ukraine: after ten years of economic decline, GDP grew by 5.5 per cent. Nevertheless, the country has yet to achieve the necessary consolidation for development and turn the corner in its transformation. Ukraines key task and challenge at present is to make this new reform momentum sustainable and transform it into a new and more successful phase of transition, departing from the track of failed reforms. This is an overwhelmingly difficult undertaking both for internal and external reasons. Externally, the IMF has delayed (for more than half a year already) the important resumption of its Extended Fund Facility by allegations about the irregular use of IMF funds. At home, the persisting diversity of interests and the existing balance of forces do not encourage rapid reform. While forces of change (centrist and rightist political parties, small and medium-seized enterprises, part of the intelligentsia, NGOs, etc.) are weak, often poorly organised and lack enough leverage to exert sufficient pressure from below, anti-reform forces (leftist political parties, state bureaucracy and clan and corporate interest groups) are still powerful and influential. As a result, Ukraines transition is likely to remain a protracted and painful process, with no simple prescriptions. While Ukraines independence is hardly at stake any longer, the nature of the state and its geopolitical future are still uncertain. The real dilemma for Ukraine in the coming years is whether to become a democracy and a market economy, integrated into Europe, or a weak and isolated state, and, as such, a risk factor and a source of regional and European insecurity. To succeed in solving this dilemma, it is necessary to realise that there is a close, intrinsic link and vital synergy between domestic reform in Ukraine and its European choice. In todays Ukraine, pro-European means pro-reform. European integration is not possible without the success of domestic reform. But without aiming at becoming an integral part of the process of European integration, it would be even more problematic (if possible at all) to stabilise Ukraines economy, mature its democracy, achieve national consolidation and fully realise the countrys potential as a factor of regional and European stability. In this situation, the role of external factors, namely of the EU and EU integration that have significantly shaped the transition process in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, attains a special importance. The process of European integration and enlargement has proved its strong potential to consolidate aspiring states domestically and promote reconciliation with their neighbours.16 The EU, how-

16

K. J. Ners, M. Palmer and A. Fyfe: Assistance to Accession and Beyond. Warsaw: Policy Education Centre on Assistance to Transition, 1998, p. 7.

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ever, seems to neglect the positive role it could play as a catalyst for domestic change in Ukraine and in helping to shape Ukraines ultimate geopolitical future.

IV EU-Ukrainian co-operation: mutual stakes and interests

By and large, European integration and rapprochement with the EU are vitally important for Ukraine for two sets of reasons: movement towards Europe both stimulates domestic reform and comprises a central vector of Ukraines geopolitical orientation. First and foremost, Ukraine needs European integration to succeed in its transition. As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, if a conscious choice, European integration can become an important (if not decisive) incentive for the ultimate success of economic and political transformation, as well as a basis for national consolidation. Given the existing balance of political forces in Ukraine (roughly one third are leftists, one third are controlled by oligarchs who are not genuinely interested in radical domestic change, or in Ukraines European integration, and only about one third truly favour meaningful reforms and Ukraines European choice), the importance of outside support and encouragement for Ukraines domestic reform and European aspirations becomes crucial. Reforms in Ukraine are needed regardless of its ultimate relationship with the EU. Yet, the goal and prospect of European integration will make the reform process more effective and less costly. European integration today is not merely a sequence of reforms and a set of criteria to achieve membership in the EU. It is an essential guideline to overall societal development of post-communist countries, comprising democratic values and principles, and as such it is strongly needed by Ukraine. A conscious and genuine European option results in the commitment to introduce European standards and norms and bring about necessary domestic change. Movement towards the EU will help reform Ukraines economy, accelerate the modernisation of Ukraines legal system and increase stability of Ukraines democracy. It is not the ultimate result of membership in the EU, but the process of moving towards European norms and standards that matters most for Ukraine at present. By encouraging Ukraines European aspiration and leaving the door for Ukraine open, the EU would keep reminding Ukraine of a choice that the country has and thus stimulate its movement towards market economy, democracy and stability. In a broader sense, Ukraines position vis--vis the EU will affect Ukrainian statehood. Ukraines very independence has been built on the notion of a return to Europe. As early as in its resolution On Realization of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the Sphere of External Relations of 25 December 1990 (before the country proclaimed its independence), the Ukrainian parliament authorised the government to direct its efforts to secure Ukraines direct participation in the pan-European 79

process and European structures. As indicated above, since 1996 membership in the EU has officially been proclaimed as Ukraines primary strategic goal. Given the fact that its relations with NATO are a much more controversial issue in Ukrainian domestic politics, the EU has in a way become the most acceptable (if not the sole) agency that is able to provide Ukraines inclusion in the mainstream process of European integration. Consequently, failing in this regard would, as was correctly indicated by some analysts, naturally be seen as [a] setback for the state itself.17 Secondly, a relationship with the EU is a key to ultimately shaping Ukraines geopolitical future vis--vis Russia and the West. Since both Russia and the West have often divergent interests in Ukraine and the region, the European vector of Ukraines foreign policy and in the wider sense of the countrys societal development becomes the most important rationale for Ukraine. It is not only the least controversial in Ukrainian domestic politics, but also practically excludes tension between Ukraine and its neighbours, either to the west or to the east.18 In addition, the beginning of EU and NATO enlargement leaves Ukraine with no choice other than to become an active part of the European integration process. To the west of Ukraine, the European present and future is primarily defined by the process of European integration and enlargement. To the east, Ukraine is faced with unstable Russia, whose transition is most likely to be protracted and whose development continues to exert significant influence on Ukraine. Given the fact that Ukraine is unwilling and actually unable to follow Belorussian (or similar) paths of voluntary reunion with Russia, and that reintegration within the CIS contrary to the beliefs of some will not lead to economic consolidation and political stability of the post-Soviet states, but will strengthen their current de-industrialisation trends and freeze both the existing underreformed and chaotic economic structures, and the underdeveloped and often nondemocratic political systems, there is no sound alternative to Ukraines European integration. Any possible alternative would mean economic underdevelopment, internal political instability and regional marginalisation for Ukraine. Such an alternative does not serve the interests of Ukraine itself nor those of the EU and of European stability. In this case, Ukraine risks becoming an outsider or even a pariah state bordering the EU, and such a country would present security risks both domestically and internationally. Given Ukraines size, location and significance for its neighbours, it has the potential to cause serious trouble for the rest of Europe.

17 18

J. Sherr and S. Main: Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Kosovo, Research paper. Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, April 1999. For more on the importance of European integration for Ukraine, cf. I. Burakovsky, H. Nemyria and O. Pavliuk: Ukraine and European Integration, in: Roadway into the Future Roadway to Europe. Ukraines European Integration, Kiev: Center for European and International Studies, 2000, pp. 9 25.

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The EUs stake in Ukraine is certainly not as high as Ukraines stake in the EU. Because of its domestic problems, Ukraine remains of little attraction to the EU and its member states as an economic partner and investment market. Nevertheless, the EUs stake in Ukraine is high enough to pay more attention to Ukraine and give more thinking to the future of EU-Ukrainian relations. It is also clear that the EUs stake in Ukraine will continue to grow as the EU enlarges to the east. As an immediate neighbour to the EU, Ukraines domestic situation and foreign policy will increasingly affect Europes consolidation, security and further development. Consequently, the first EU interest is to have Ukraine as a stable and predictable neighbour. As concluded in a recent study, A peripheral and stagnant Ukraine would increase the danger that enlarging European institutions like NATO and the EU would find themselves on a much more unpredictable and unstable frontier.19 The situation in former Yugoslavia and, in particular, the Kosovo crisis of 1999 have demonstrated potential dangers for European stability arising from internal problems of even small states on Europes periphery. Ukraine is a big state, with a population twice as large as the populations of Croatia, FRY, FYROM, Bosnia and Albania combined. The EU should comprehend, however, that Ukraine will not be able to become a stable and secure neighbour and reliable partner unless the country itself becomes an integral part of Europe. It will be much more difficult (if possible at all) for Ukraine to become stable and capable of coping effectively with new security threats such as illegal immigration, organised crime, drugs and human trafficking if it remains chaotic at home and marginalised in the process of European integration. Secondly, despite the complex heritage of history, the decade after the collapse of communism has been marked by normalisation and the improvement of relations between states in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the process of building stable interstate relations and regional co-operation has yet to be completed. In the coming years, inter-state relations in the region will be increasingly developing in and defined by the broader context of European integration, in particular by EU enlargement eastward. It is in the interest of the EU to avoid a new and hostile division of Europe and the reemergence of tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. This, however, can also be achieved only if Ukraine becomes a part of Europe following the example of all of its western neighbours. Due to the different speeds of domestic transformation, the development of Central and East European countries has been uneven and unequal, which is reflected in the speed of their integration into NATO and the EU. For an extended period of time, the region of Central and Eastern Europe is certain to be divided into the

19

S. Garnett: Like Oil and Water. Ukraines External Westernization and Internal Stagnation, in: T. Kuzio, R. S. Kravchuk and P. DAnieri (eds.): State and Institution Building in Ukraine, New York 1999, p. 130.

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ins, pre-ins and outs. As a result, the whole issue of whether security on the continent will be inclusive and transparent or exclusive and divisive depends to a large extent (in addition to relations between the West and Russia) on the situation of the countries in the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation. Ukraine is the largest state in the region and an essential neighbour and partner to other Central and East European states. As such, it is a key to avoiding the emergence of a new dividing line in Europe. If successful, Ukraines transformation will positively influence the progress of Belarus and Moldova (as well as of the whole GUUAM group20), while securing and furthering the gains achieved by Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Conversely, Ukraines protracted economic stalemate and the resulting political instability will have negative consequences for the stability and security of all its neighbours, including those joining the EU. The EU also needs to have Russia as a democratic and friendly partner and ally. Russia is more likely to become such a partner if Ukraine succeeds in joining the EU. By taking a favourable position on the first wave of NATO enlargement back in 1996/ 1997, Ukraine narrowed the options for possible Russian reaction. In the coming years, if Ukraine makes serious progress in its movement towards the EU, this would help to consolidate the growing ties between Russia and the EU as well. Achievements on the way to Ukraines European integration will also become an important factor for the improvement of Ukrainian-Russian relations, making them more equal, balanced and based on internationally recognised norms and agreements. Only a stable Ukraine with a proper place in Europe would be a better partner for Russia. Ukraine could then become more confident and view its geographic proximity with Russia as beneficial rather than threatening. Conversely, Ukraines failure to enhance its relations with the EU would negatively influence the course of Ukrainian-Russian relations, threatening regional and all-European security and stability. Finally, for the EU, Ukraine is an important transport and energy corridor: almost 20 per cent of EU natural gas consumption and 16 per cent of its oil reaches the EU via Ukrainian territory. Ukraine is also an important bridge to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and a natural link between the Baltic and the Black seas. Ukraines stability and the ultimate success of its transition are an essential pre-condition for the countrys ability to effectively serve this function in the future, as well as for its economic potential to be fully utilised for the benefit of all Europe. Thus, a successful, stable and secure Ukraine integrated into European structures is in the best interests of the EU.
20 GUUAM includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. For more on GUUAM, cf. O. Pavliuk: GUUAM. The Maturing of a Political Grouping into Economic Co-operation? In: R. Dwan and O. Pavliuk (eds.): Building Security in the New States of Eurasia: Subregional Co-operation in the Former Soviet Space, New York 2000, pp. 33 56.

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V Conclusion
Aside from trade disputes and some other disagreements that by and large are not exceptional in relations between states or institutions, two fundamental problems continue to overshadow current co-operation and prospects for future relations between Ukraine and the European Union. On the one hand, there is an imbalance between Ukraines European ambitions and the actual state of its economic and political transformation. On the other hand, there is an imbalance between Ukraines European aspiration and Europes response to it. While the first one is the cause for significant frustration or even irritation on the EU side, the second leads to a noted consternation on the Ukrainian side. At the same time, mutual stakes, interdependence and the importance of EU-Ukrainian relations are growing as the EU is moving closer to Ukraines borders. To assure that the EU and Ukraine take full advantage of the emerging new opportunities resulting from the EU enlargement eastward and exclude or at least diminish any potential risks at the same time, much remains to be done on both sides. Ukraine has yet to prove that it will not become a risk factor for the EU but a reliable neighbour and partner, working hard to become a future EU member. Ukraines progress on the way toward European integration is conditioned primarily upon the results of its domestic reform. It is most important at present to close the gap between political declarations and practical actions: Ukraine must show its interest in and commitment to European integration in a much more serious and profound way. Consistency and implementation should become key words describing Ukraines policy vis--vis the EU. For the EU, concrete steps and practical achievements with economic and political reforms and with the WTO accession will become the best possible indicator of the seriousness of Ukraines European aspirations. Ukraines relations with the EU can either facilitate or complicate Ukraines domestic performance. Without active EU engagement, encouragement and assistance, the task of becoming developed, stable and prosperous might well be too hard for Ukraine alone. Ukraines domestic failure will inevitably turn the country into a major risk factor bordering the enlarged EU and threatening Europes security and stability. Given the close link between Ukraines transition and its European integration, the chance that Ukraine might become such a risk factor will increase substantially if the country finds itself excluded from the process of European integration. While Ukraine should prove its ability to qualify for EU membership, the EU has yet to start viewing Ukraine as a potentially full-scale participant in the process of European integration. Exaggerated hopes might be misleading, yet the lack of positive expectations is of no help either. At present, however, many in the EU still follow the logic of Europes division into ins and outs, with a dividing line running along Ukraines western borders, rather 83

than the concept of one larger Europe. Dividing lines on the European continent have always existed and are very likely to remain in the future. It is important, however, that they do not become the lines of tension and conflict, and it is most dangerous if these lines become fixed and frozen in peoples minds. It is also important to avoid the tendency to simplify the situation, narrowing it to the existence of the EU and its official candidates on the one hand and the neighbouring countries on the other (in the east, these are the CIS states that the EU places in this category). The reality of the situation is much more complex, and the boundaries of these entities are mobile. EU candidates differ in the speed of their domestic reform and EU accession: some are likely to join the EU soon, others might not do so for many years to come. The direct neighbourhood countries are very different as well: some see their future as a part of the EU (e. g., Ukraine and Moldova); others prefer to develop a close co-operation with the EU but do not aspire membership (Russia); while Belarus is likely to come back to the debate about its geopolitical future pending domestic political changes. As a result, the process of economic and political development, as well as geopolitical configuration of Central and Eastern Europe, although already punctuated and marked by new relations and new divisions, is far from being finished. This process will most likely take at least another decade. While there is no direct neighbourhood as a unified whole, there cannot be a single model for EU relations with the countries of the direct neighbourhood. Rather, there should be several models, and respective EU policies should differ depending on a subject towards which these policies are applied. In the case of Ukraine, the EU should try to engage the country in as many EU domains as possible, even if Ukraines membership in the EU is unrealistic or seems inappropriate at present. In particular, more potential for practical co-operation exists in those areas where EU and Ukrainian interests significantly coincide: foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, transport and energy development.21 It is of no less importance that with the accession of the first Central and East European states, the door to the EU remains open. The EU needs to assure that the enlargement process does not create a wall on Ukraines western borders alienating and isolating the country and weakening its fragile pro-reform and pro-European forces. In the coming years, Ukraine will become a direct neighbour of the EU. The next step for the country should be to become an integral part of the European integration process. Naturally, Europe is home for Ukraine.

21

For more on this, cf. O. Pavliuk: The European Union and Ukraine: The Need for a New Vision. Policy Paper, New York/Prague/Kiev 1999.

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Belarus and the Process of European Integration

Anatoly Lebedko, Kirk Mildner

I Introduction: The nature of risk in the context of European integration

With the fall of the iron curtain in Europe, the cozy world of the realist paradigm in international relations and security studies came to an end. A new understanding of security and correspondingly a very different hierarchy of risks had to be developed. The case of Belarus very clearly illustrates this trend: Traditional hard security risks become of less importance in comparison to so-called new risks and soft security risks. As military violence against its neighbours by an independent Belarus seems rather unlikely, the primary hard security risks arise from the prospect of unification between Belarus and Russia. Already today Belarus has become a major arms dealer for Russia, especially with rogue states like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Cuba. Furthermore, Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly discussed the issue of the return of nuclear weapons to Belarus in public. Rumour has it that Russia and Belarus signed a secret protocol on nuclear weapons at the beginning of 2000. The set-up of a joint Russian-Belorussian army and an increase in manpower from 80,000 to 300,000 was also announced, though in practice not much has happened yet. In addition, after unification with Russia, the threat of the Ulsterisation of Belarus has become a real possibility as substantial parts of the Belorussian population are clearly against unification and splinter groups seem quite willing to defend independence by radical means. In the same context, ethnic tension with the Polish and Lithuanian minorities may arise. New risks, in particular organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in women and illegal immigration have dominated the public discussion in EU member states concerning internal security and East European affairs for several years. The threat to the EUs security by the Russian Mafia or other forms of organised crime, however, seems 85

grossly overrated by Western populists, the press and by vested interest groups like the Western intelligence communities. New risks concerning the environment and nuclear safety seem to be more important. Fortunately, no nuclear reactor exists in Belarus. However, the cyanide pollution of the Danube, after the dam overflow at the Baia-Mare gold mine in northwest Romania on 31 January 2000, has shown how vulnerable third states (in this case Ukraine, Hungary and Serbia) are against weak legislation and the enforcement of environmental safety even from industries not highly technologically advanced. However, these new risks are essentially just indicators of a weak state and thus, as with hard security risks, are derived. At the heart of the matter in the Belorussian case are rather, as this paper will show, soft security risks that are closely connected with globalisation and growing interdependence. Over the past few years, Eastern Europe has witnessed a remarkable policy convergence in the fields of political, legal, economic and social reforms. Even if one can single out various groups concerning the progress and speed of transition, the general direction towards democracy, civil society and market reforms seems clear. Belarus has so far displayed a stout resistance to this convergence process. The return to authoritarian rule and the lack of economic reforms, thus, seem to present the most dangerous security risk for Belarus neighbours and the European integration process. After a brief discussion of the relations between the EU and Belarus, the political, economic and social developments in Belarus will be dwelt upon in greater detail, in particular concerning their compatibility with the European integration process. From the results of this discussion, scenarios for future development and policy recommendations will be deduced.

II The EU and Belarus

Current EU policy towards Belarus The last nine years of relations between the EU and Belarus may be subdivided in three main phases (a) 1991 1996, (b) 1996 1999 and (c) since 2000. a) Initial Steps 1991 1996: After gaining independence, Belarus opened up to the West and became a member of international organisations such as OSCE, World Bank and the IMF. In 1992, Belarus received guest status in the Council of Europe and applied to become a full member a year later. Since 1992, a first dialogue between the EU and Belarus has developed. However, Belarus was not in the focus of the EUs policy towards the region. Indicative of this lack of policy was the fact that the EU did not 86

open a full-fledged Delegation in Minsk. Even now, only a technical office exists in Minsk, which is subordinated to the EU Delegation in Kiev. Unfortunately, the policy of the EU and its member states towards Belarus was somewhat reduced to the question of nuclear disarmament and the transport of its 81 SS-20 and 1141 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia right from the start. Additionally, the EU Commission got disappointed very quickly by the slow reform progress and difficult negotiations on the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation that was supposed to be the basis for further co-operation between the EU and Belarus. In March 1995, Belarus was the last East European country to sign the PCA and the Interim Agreement concerning trade issues with the EU. b) Ice Age 1996 1999: The relations between the EU and Belarus worsened in the course of 1996 due to human rights violations of the Lukashenko regime and further deteriorated in the wake of the referendum in November 1996. Before the referendum, the EU communicated very clearly to Lukashenko that it would not recognise the results of the referendum (cf. the dmarche on 14 October 1996). As is well known, the referendum turned out to be a constitutional coup dtat by Lukashenko which, in essence, changed the democratic system of Belarus based on the 1994 constitution into an authoritarian presidential system. A mediation attempt by the European Union and the Council Europe in the spring of 1997 to restore the democratic constitution of 1994 by way of a tripartite round table failed. As Lukashenko was not willing to hold discussions on the basis of the 1994 constitution and to alter the results of the referendum in any way, further missions to Minsk and other attempts by the EU to solve the crisis also met with failure. Thus, the member states decided on 15 September 1997 on various sanctions towards Belarus that set the framework for EU policy during the period of 1997 to 1999. The main points of the council conclusions were: No conclusion of the PCA and the Interim Agreement; No support for Belarus membership in the Council of Europe and suspension of Belarus guest status; No relations at ministerial level (except with the Presidency or the Troika); Suspension of the EU Tacis National Program for Belarus, with the exemption of ongoing projects, humanitarian aid, regional programmes and programmes that directly supported the democratisation process; and No recognition of the Lukashenko Parliament. The European Parliament and member state parliaments supported this approach in various resolutions but did very little to support democratic structures in Belarus, in particular the Supreme Soviet, the ousted constitutional judges and democratic par87

ties, as well as the independent unions. To find a way out of the deadlock in the relations between the EU and Belarus and to pave the way for a return of the latter to democracy and European values, the OSCE established an Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG). The AMG received the mandate to assist Belarus in the development of democratic institutions and to monitor the compliance with OSCE principles. Lukashenko only agreed to the establishment of the AMG in Minsk after substantial pressure from Moscow. Since then, the OSCE and its AMG have taken the centre stage in the relations between Belarus and the West. The main tasks of the OSCE are The establishment of working groups on a number of legislative projects such as election law, penal code, media legislation and ombudsman; The strengthening of NGOs and the infant Belorussian political parties; Civic education; Monitoring of human rights abuses and information of the Western public; and The setting up of a dialogue between the presidential administration and the opposition to achieve a negotiated consensus on the first steps for a return to democracy, in particular free, fair and internationally recognisable parliamentary elections, access to the mass media for the opposition and a meaningful parliament. In summer 1998, the relations between the EU and Belarus further worsened in the context of the Drosdy conflict. To demonstrate the West his unlimited power, Lukashenko decided to evict the ambassadors from their residences in Drosdy, breaching not only the Vienna Convention but also local law. Consequently, the West recalled its ambassadors, who only returned in January 1999, and imposed a travel ban to the EU and the United States for the Lukashenko elite and high-ranking officials. c) Limited Dialogue 1999 2000: As the policy of isolation neither helped solve the constitutional crisis in Belarus nor brought about socio-economic change, the Commission and the EU member states redirected their policy towards Belarus in the course of 1999, developing a step-by-step policy depending on the progress of democratisation and human rights. To communicate this policy towards the Lukashenko regime, various high level meetings took place, and in January 1999 the EU ambassadors returned to Minsk. Another gesture was made at the end of 1999 when the EU Commission decided to introduce a new Tacis national programme for the year 2001, thus correcting the highly questionable decision to freeze most of the Tacis funds for Belarus. The new national programme should cover civil society development (mainly in the framework of the civil society development programme), 88

private sector development (small and medium-sized businesses, vocational training, management training), projects of social consequence for transition (health, retraining and education) and even policy advice. However, very little progress has been made in the framework of this step-by-step policy, as the human rights record of the Lukashenko regime worsened during 1999, the local elections did not meet democratic standards, a leading member of the Gonchar opposition disappeared, and former Premier Minister Chigir was imprisoned for his participation in the alternative presidential elections. As positive steps of the Belorussian government towards the EU one can only mention the signing of the Tacis Civil Society Development Programme by the Belorussian government on 2 November 1999 and some initial progress in the dialogue process between government and opposition organised by the OSCE. Early in 2000, it became unmistakably clear that the Lukashenko regime was not willing to accept the results of the dialogue process, and lacked honest interest in solving the political and constitutional crisis in the country. With the signing of the undemocratic electoral code on 15 February 2000, Lukashenko deliberately precluded the dialogue process and a rapprochement between Belarus and the EU. What conclusions may thus be drawn from the last eight years of European-Belorussian relations? First, the risk assessment on which the EUs regional policy was based focused mainly on traditional security issues. Risks arising from weak civic structures and a delayed transition were largely overlooked. Furthermore, an active policy towards Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other strained resources and left Belarus on the sidelines. Even in the first year of Lukashenkos dictatorship, interest in Belorussian affairs was quite limited at the European level. Only the referendum and the ensuing worsening of the situation forced the EU to come to terms with the Belorussian issue. The first steps by the EU in 1997 were neither coherent nor particularly convincing. Above all, one has to criticise the lack of any substantial support by the Supreme Soviet, the hitherto legitimate parliament of Belarus, NGOs and other institutions of the civil society. Only in the course of 1999 did the EU realise that an improvement of the situation could only be brought about by interdependence and civil society development. Prospects for a future strategy of the EU and policy recommendations will be outlined in sections V and VI.

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Lukashenkos policy towards the EU Lukashenkos policy towards the EU can only be understood by taking into account the authoritarian character of his regime. On the one hand, the steps to be taken by Lukashenko for a rapprochement with the EU are clearly laid down in various documents. At the core are both compliance with the principles of the OSCE in general and the solving of the constitutional crisis in particular (fair elections, a true parliament, access to mass media for the opposition) and compliance with the provisions of the aforementioned PCA. On the other hand, the steps necessary for Belarus integration are not compatible with the style, institutions, personnel and values of the Belorussian government. This point will be developed further in section III. Lukashenko even sees interdependence with the West in political and economic terms as a threat to his reign and does everything to weaken that interdependence. To fulfil his power goals, Lukashenkos foreign (economic) policy is entirely oriented towards Russia for the following reasons: a) Russia accepts the authoritarian Lukashenko regime with its poor human rights record and blatant violations of democratic principles primarily for geopolitical reasons. b) Russia subsidises Belarus with approximately US-$ 2 billion annually (6 per cent of the Belorussian GDP), particularly with regard to energy resources, as Belorussian energy debts are periodically written off and the customs union is misused. c) The barter economy provides ample opportunity for rent-seeking. The distribution of these rents is one of the major steering instruments of Lukashenko and financing source for his presidential clan and the security apparatus. Thus, it is in Lukashenkos interest to strengthen barter economy ties with Russia. d) Russia or the Soviet Union offers an imperial ideology for Lukashenko to explain economic hardship and justify his policies. Due to the greater progress of transition in all neighbouring countries of Belarus, Lukashenko has been coming under increasing pressure. Furthermore, one should not forget that Soviet ideology and the sense of belonging to a great superpower is still popular in a certain section of the Belorussian society (pensioners, war veterans, farm workers and state trade unions, in particular in the Eastern parts of Belarus). For Lukashenko, the EU is only a bargaining device to loosen the dependence of Belarus on Russia from time to time. To tease the Russians, Lukashenko developed a new policy oriented towards the West in summer 1999, publicly admitting that the previous orientation towards the East was a mistake in Belorussian foreign policy. However, this new policy proved to be simple propaganda, as it was never followed up by concrete steps. At this point it should not be omitted that some representatives of the Lukashenko elite 90

seem to have a genuine interest in strengthening the Western vector in Belarus foreign policy. So far, however, they have not been able to produce any substantial and sustainable change in Lukashenkos policy. The appearance of Vladimir Putin as the new political star in Russia and the arguably growing Russian imperialism will not be without consequence for Russian-Belorussian and Belorussian-EU relations. The leadership decision in Russia in favour of Putin has more or less crushed Lukashenkos aspirations to the Moscow throne. Lukashenkos weakened position and the continuous deterioration of the economic situation has thus enhanced the dependency of Belarus. In this context, the Russians made it quite clear that the Union between Russia and Belarus would not be a Union of equals. Nevertheless, to deduce from this that Lukashenko is now forced to look seriously at a rapprochement with the EU seems quite nave since, as was mentioned before, the key for a new Western policy lies in the structural changes of the political, economic and social systems in Belarus. Section III will show that these changes are highly unlikely.

The Belorussian opposition and the EU At the beginning of the transition process in Belarus, the opposition forces lacked a clear understanding of the EU, its institutions and its role for the future of their country. Some favoured strengthening the Western orientation in Belarus simply as a counterbalance to Russian domination. In the meantime, however, the main democratic opposition parties (United Civic Party, Social Democratic Party, Belorussian Popular Front) have developed a clear vision of Belorussian integration into European structures. Besides the establishment of close links with parties from Poland, the Baltics and Western Europe, the opposition works actively with European institutions (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE) to raise the Belorussian Question at the international level. Even more importantly, the opposition seems willing to implement the required structural political and economic changes to create the basis for such an integration of Belarus into Europe.

III Progress in transition: political, economic and social asymmetries

Over the past few years, Eastern Europe has witnessed a remarkable policy convergence in the fields of political, legal, economic and social reforms. Even if one can single out various groups concerning the progress and speed of transition, the general direction towards democracy, civil society and market reforms seems clear. A primary catalyst behind this progress is the goal of EU membership, which serves as a stimulus to create 91

compatible political, social and economic institutions. However, some states, Belarus included, have so far displayed a stout resistance to this convergence process. In this section, the political, economic and social developments in Belarus will be dwelt upon in greater detail, in particular concerning their compatibility (asymmetries) with the European integration process.

Political asymmetries Due to its frail civic culture, the lack of national consciousness, the weak mobilisation of the population after gaining independence, the entrenchment of the old, mostly Russian-dominated elites and the lack of radical economic reforms, Belarus was a prime candidate for hard restoration (Wnuk-Lypinsky 1998). After the referendum of 1996 and the ensuing constitutional coup, Alexander Lukashenko completed this restoration with the introduction of a totalitarian system. Lukashenkos system of government is based entirely on the paradigm of personal power and backed up with a crude ideological cocktail (Lukashism) of communist nostalgia, populism, chauvinism and antiWesternism. At present, the political situation in Belarus is best characterised by (a) the lack of democratic institutions, (b) the absence of the rule of law, (c) bad governance and (d) human rights violations. a) Lack of democratic institutions: Lukashenko has established an authoritarian system with himself at the top. The abolition of the division of power was completed after the referendum at the end of 1996 with the dismissal of the 13th Supreme Soviet and the constitutional court, as well as the establishment of a puppet parliament. Despite considerable efforts on part of the Western community to bring about change by helping to negotiate a way out of the political and constitutional deadlock, prospects for democratic elections in the near future remain doubtful after Lukashenko signed an undemocratic electoral code in February 2000. According to the authoritarian nature of the Lukashenko regime, there exists no regional and local self-government. The president also appoints all regional governors and mayors. b) Absence of the rule of law: Besides the unconstitutional ousting of the constitutional court and the Supreme Soviet in 1996 already mentioned, Lukashenko repeatedly breached not only the Belorussian constitution, but also international treaties like the Vienna Convention in the case of the Drosdy conflict. The judiciary has lost all independence. Political trials of political adversaries of the president such as deputy Klimov or former Minister of Agriculture Leonov are the order of the day. Citizens and businesses have almost no legal instruments to appeal against state decisions. c) Bad governance: Under the rule of Lukashenko, a paternalistic and clientelistic 92

system of decision-making and resource distribution has flourished, which produces erratic policies and has fostered the spread of systematic corruption. d) Human rights violations: Serious human rights violations by Lukashenko began in 1995 but became widespread and systematic after the referendum in 1996. Violations of the freedom of the press, such as the closure of radio stations and newspapers, harassment of journalists, tight state control over television and radio are common occurrences in Belarus. Besides the media, the institutions of civil society and higher education are the main target of the oppressive politics of the Lukashenko regime.

Economic asymmetries The economic policy of Lukashenko is closely intertwined with the authoritarian character of the regime. This subsection deals with the comparative analysis of the fundamentals of Lukanomics and the state of economic reforms and the ensuing consequences for the economic development of Belarus. a) The fundamentals of Lukanomics: The political economy and subsequently economic policy of the Lukashenko regime is totally subordinated to the power paradigm of the authoritarian state. Its governance backbone are paternalistic and clientelistic structures, while its instruments are rent-seeking and systematic corruption. It is interesting to note that Lukashenko has set up a variety of new economic policy institutions (Control Commission, Security Council), while depriving classical institutions (Central Bank, Ministry of the Economy) of their power. These new institutions share their power with a network of private and state-owned firms under the protection or even management of the presidential administration. b) The state of economic reforms: The state of economic reforms in Belarus corresponds with the above-mentioned fundamentals of Lukanomics.1 While some successes in small-scale privatisation were achieved, large-scale privatisation has basically stopped. Price controls for many product categories are still in place and state sectors like agriculture, construction and heavy industry are heavily subsidised by cheap loans from the Central Bank, doubling the money supply on a yearly basis and pushing inflation. Control of imports and exports, limited access to foreign currency and a multiple exchange rate system are a further indication for the poor progress of economic reform in Belarus. State interference in the management of companies and

For an in-depth discussion of Lukanomics, cf. Mildner, K.: Belarus: Kritische berlegungen zu Politik und Wirtschaft Lukaschenkos, Berichte des BIOST, 2000.

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banks as well as the assignment of state propaganda commissioners to big enterprises completes the picture. Thus, Belarus has the worst ranking of all European transition economies concerning economic reform. c) Effects of Lukanomics: The effects of Lukanomics are depressing. The standard of living has fallen substantially over the last year, resulting in the impoverishment of the population. The average monthly wage in Belarus is the lowest in Europe, which, particularly in the agricultural sector, aggravates social problems. Furthermore, in Belarus there is no thriving shadow economy that creates new jobs and additional income like in Ukraine to balance poverty. Shortages of foodstuffs and other products are widespread and made worse by administrative distribution systems. Belarus has the lowest private sector share of GDP in Eastern Europe (20 per cent), the worst investment climate and consequently the lowest foreign direct investment per capita in Eastern Europe. The Belorussian currency is characterised by high inflation (180 per cent in 1998). The industrial base is deteriorating due to the lack of investment and productivity, and the competitiveness of Belorussian firms and products is shrinking. Belarus has the least effective agricultural sector with the lowest share of private ownership and investment in comparison to all other transition states. Like its industrial base, the human capital of Belarus is also vanishing. In a constant brain drain to Moscow, Kiev, Prague and the West, the best professionals are leaving the country.

Elite and value asymmetries Analysing the elite and value asymmetries between the West and Belarus, one has to differentiate between (a) the elite in power, which is subdivided into the old nomenklatura and the new Lukashenko elite, (b) civil servants and the professional policy community and (c) the population: a) Elite in power: When Lukashenko came to power, he had to make the choice between the new but rather weak democratic elite of Belarus, a part of whom had supported him in his presidential campaign, and the old nomenklatura. At the beginning there was a balance between new and old elites. However, by 1996 most of the reformers (Bogdankevich, Badey, Sasonov and others) had left Lukashenkos government and were replaced by representatives of either the old nomenklatura or the new Lukashenko elite. The old nomenklatura (e. g., Head of Presidential Administration Myasnikovich or Prime Minister Yarmoshin), which dominated the enterprise sector but also academia, consists mostly of ethnic Russians who are pragmatic, are in favour of Belorussian integration with Russia and show no interest in radical 94

change and reforms. Oriented towards the state, they lack a general understanding of the need for civil society development and Belorussian integration into Western political and economic structures. As natural rent-seekers, they have no interest in real restructuring or competition. Their clan-like networks are closely linked with Russian political and corporate interests. The new Lukashenko elite seems to be even more of a threat to Belorussian modernisation and European integration. They come from the eastern regions of Belarus or Russia, possess little professional expertise and are totally dependent on the president (Head of National Bank Prokopovich, Head of Security Council Sheyman, First Deputy Prime Minister Dogolyov, Vice-Speaker of Parliament Konoplyov, etc.). Their values are generally anti-democratic, authoritarian and anti-Western. They are highly suspicious of the eastward expansion of the EU, as well as of the Polish factor in Belorussian politics, and will resist any major change of policy or regime. b) Civil servants and the professional policy community: The values of civil servants and members of the professional economic policy community are clearly different from the ones of the Lukashenko elite. One can still identify quality professional knowledge, in particular in the National Bank, the Ministry of Economy, the Foreign Ministry and partially in Regional Administrations. There seems to exist a genuine interest in Western expertise as well as lesson drawing from candidate states. Close links to Warsaw, Vilnius and Kiev have been kept despite the policy of self-isolation by the Lukashenko regime. Though this elite does not represent any real power at the moment, it can facilitate reforms when the political regime changes. c) Population: At the beginning of the transition process, Belarus had a very weak national elite. In particular, the economic and academic spheres were clearly dominated by Russians. Thus, the independence of Belarus resulted not from a process of social mobilisation, but rather from the disintegration of the USSR. Due to the lack of societal mobilisation, neither a radical elite nor a value change took hold in Belarus. Consequently, no public consensus on reforms and transition goals (honeymoon of transition) existed to push through reforms. In addition to this difficult starting point, the lack of reforms and the restoration of an authoritarian system has evidently slowed down the process of value change even further. However, over the past years there has been a remarkable value change with regard to economic reforms, democracy and independence (see Section V). Furthermore, the number of Belorussians who favour the European integration of Belarus rather than the incorporation into Russia is continuously growing, not least due to Russias Chechnya policy.

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IV Relations between Belarus and its EU candidate neighbours (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia)
Since independence, the focus of Belorussian foreign policy has been on Russian-Belorussian relations and integration. The Russian-Belorussian relations have also been the paradigm for Belarus foreign policy towards its western and northern neighbours, yet it was never high on the agenda. Since Lukashenko came into power, neglect has developed into aggressive propaganda as successful transitions, in particular those of Poland and Lithuania, only too clearly highlighted the disastrous consequences of Lukashenkos policies. In this section, the scope of interdependence and the potential for future conflict and opportunities in the relations between Belarus and its two neighbours Poland and Lithuania is analysed. Relations between Latvia and Belarus seem to be of lesser interest in this regard, as interdependence and potential for future conflict are relatively low.

Poland The scope of interdependence between Poland and Belarus is comparatively high for historic, ethnic and economic reasons. Above all, the history of Belarus is deeply intertwined with that of Poland and Lithuania, with whom it shared a common state in the past. A considerable part of Belarus was Polish until the Hitler-Stalin pact. After Russians and Ukrainians, Poles are the third largest ethnic minority in Belarus (4 per cent of the population), settling mostly in the Brest and Grodno regions. While close links in the fields of culture and education exist, economic interdependence between Belarus and Poland is quite low due to the economic backwardness of Belarus. Foreign trade with Poland only accounted for 3.8 per cent of Belorussian exports and 3.2 per cent of Belorussian imports. The activities of thousands of Belorussian peddlers who cross the Belorussian-Polish border every day and other forms of economic and social crossborder co-operation, which do not show in official statistics, seem to be far more important politically. Correspondingly, the high level of interdependence means that the potential for future conflict is considerable: a) Over the past years of the Lukashenko reign, close links between Poland, the legitimate Parliament of Belarus and the Belorussian opposition have been developed. Deputies of the Polish Sejm participate in the International Group of Parliamentary Solidarity in Support of Democracy in Belarus, which repeatedly criticised the Lukashenko government for its human rights violations and the oppression of the opposition. There is also a very active Poland-Belarus group of deputies in the Polish 96

Sejm, which works closely with the Belorussian opposition. On 22 January 2000, the Sejm passed an address to the Belorussians, expressing support of Belarus opposition. Such action usually provokes harsh replies by Lukashenko or his puppet parliament. b) Lukashenkos aggressive anti-western propaganda, which focuses on NATO and Polands membership, and his publicly expressed regret over the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus are a constant strain to Polish-Belorussian relations. In addition, the Belorussian factor plays a major role in Polish-Russian relations. On the one hand, Poland is highly suspicious of Russia supporting the aggressive regime of Lukashenko; on the other, Russia uses its Belorussian proxy to exercise pressure on Poland for NATO membership and its active Ostpolitik towards Ukraine. c) As Lukashenko sees the Belarussisation of Belarus as a prime threat to his regime and his imperial Russian fantasies, his government his highly suspicious of all agents of Western civilisation, such as the Polish minority and the Catholic church. Recently, the first signs of oppression of the Polish minority by the Belorussian government could be noticed, for instance in the field of education, Polish-language press and religious freedom (Belapan, 27 May 1999). Despite the high potential for conflict in Polish-Belorussian relations, there also exist considerable opportunities. Due to its relatively high degree of interdependence, Poland can decisively support the Belorussian transition process at the micro-level. Recently, the Polish government started to develop an active Ostpolitik, in particular towards Ukraine. Since Ukrainian Prime Minister Jushchenko came into power, contacts have not only been intensified at the highest level but also at the working level. Poland also takes the role of an advocate of Ukraine in European structures. A similar approach could be developed for a Polish Ostpolitik towards Belarus. However, the scope for an active policy in the near future seems more limited than in the Ukrainian case, due to a lack of interest by the Belorussian government and limitations of capacity on the Polish side.

Lithuania The scope of interdependence between Belarus and Lithuania is somewhat lower than in the Polish case but still considerable. Much of what was said about Poland is also true for Lithuania, although the Lithuanian minority in Belarus is only two per cent of the Belorussian population and less of a political factor than the Polish one. Foreign trade with Lithuania accounts for only around two per cent of all Belorussian exports and imports; however, economic co-operation in the border region is quite substantial. Until 97

the summer of 1999, Belarus imported substantial amounts of electricity. As Belorussian debts rose to over US-$ 100 million, Lithuania ceased to supply Belarus. The potential for future conflict is very similar, as the speaker of the 13th Supreme Soviet Sharetsky is in exile in Vilnius and the Lithuanian government and parliament repeatedly condemned Lukashenkos violations of the constitution and human rights. Lithuanian parliamentarians also participate in the International Group of Parliamentary Solidarity in Support of Democracy in Belarus. Human rights associations of Lithuania take great interest in the developments in Belarus and have close links to Belorussian NGOs. As mentioned above, Lithuania is also a prime target for Lukashenkos propaganda against economic reform in the Baltics and the so-called oppression of the Russian minority. Furthermore, Lukashenko publicly supported former KGB officers currently undergoing trial in Vilnius for committing crimes against humanity. As for opportunities, Lithuania can (like Poland) support the micro-transition of Belarus by strengthening interdependence, in particular in the fields of education and NGO work, and by raising the Belorussian question at the European level.

V Prospects for change

One can single out four scenarios of possible developments in Belarus, three short-term and one long-term. The scenarios differ in their probability and bear different consequences for the EU and its expansion to the East.

Scenario 1: Short-term stagnation The structure, style, staff and values of the Lukashenko regime are not compatible with reform policies. Therefore, the adaptability of the present regime is very limited. Neither democratic nor market reforms can be expected in the near future. Due to Lukashenkos economic policy, the Belorussian economy is heading for collapse. However, Russia continues to support Lukashenko for imperialistic reasons as well as vested industrial interests and thus keeps the country alive. As the economic situation worsens, the discontent of the Belorussian people with the Lukashenko regime will grow. Regardless, Lukashenkos grip over the security services and the rest of the administration is still strong enough to suppress the opposition, and intimidate the Belorussian people. Due to the appearance of Putin as the new star in the Russian political arena, Lukashenko will abandon his policy to conquer the Russian throne via the unification of Belarus with Russia. While unification propaganda will continue, not least to ensure the Russian 98

rent, Lukashenko will opt for retaining the independence of Belarus. The consequences of the stagnation scenario are as follows: The economic situation will deteriorate further, thus provoking an increase of state interference and consequently further economic decline. The gap between the economic systems of Belarus and the candidate states will grow, thus lowering interdependence and widening income inequality. The brain-drain from Belarus to the neighbouring countries will speed up. The discontent with the economic and political situation among the population will grow, thus provoking an escalation of Lukashenkos oppressive politics. The deterioration of the human rights will lead to further isolation of Belarus from the West and the candidate states. As Russia continues to support the criminal regime of Lukashenko, relations between the EU and the candidate countries, on the one hand, and Russia on the other, will deteriorate. Eventually, the European Union and the Council of Europe have to table the Belorussian question in their relations with Russia. However, since the status quo will not be sustainable in the long run, the deterioration of the situation will sooner or later lead to one of the following three scenarios.

Scenario 2: Incorporation into the Russian Federation In the wake of increasing Russian imperialism, the Kremlin decides to incorporate Belarus as the 90th subject of the federation. This move will also save the Russian government a lot of money, as Belarus has proved to be, besides the war in Chechnya, one of the biggest black holes in the federal budget. Since Lukashenko is not the man to do this with, the Kremlin will oust the Belorussian president and install a person of Russian choice without ambitions of his own and no strong feeling about Belorussian independence (for instance Myasnikovich). The puppet president will than be willing to practically sell Belarus to Russia, facing economic collapse and civil unrest. The consequences of the incorporation of Belarus into Russia are most grave: The incorporation of Belarus in the Russian Federation will further postpone change and democratisation in Belarus, fuel Russian imperialistic aspirations and thus also hamper the modernisation of the Russian state and society in the long run. The incorporation will lead to the constitution of a Belorussian exile government, probably in one of the candidate states (either Poland or Lithuania), aggravating relations between the EU and the Russian Federation and thus endangering the EU accession process in general. The EU will not be able to acknowledge the incorporation of Belarus into Russia, as 99

it will have been decided by illegitimate Belorussian institutions. Thus, EU-Russian relations will deteriorate, Russia will be excluded from international organisations and the introduction of economic sanctions would be a high probability. The international isolation of Russia will also delay the modernisation process in Russia itself. Sanctions and counter-measures by Russia could disrupt trans-European transport corridors. The disruption will hit candidate states most. The general instability in the region will lead to an increase in investment risks in neighbouring candidate states and put pressure on their stock markets as well as their currencies. Thus, exported instability in the candidate states can delay the accession process considerably. As large parts of the Belorussian population are clearly against the loss of independence, one should expect civil unrest as well as more violent forms of protest. The Ulsterisation of Belarus seems a not too unlikely prospect. Incorporation will also trigger a wave of migration towards the West, in particular to candidate states. According to sociological surveys, ten per cent of the population would leave the country in case of incorporation. The pressure is the highest among the Lithuanian and Polish minorities.

Scenario 3: Rapid short-term change while keeping independence The economic and social decline in Belarus leads to a substantial decrease of Lukashenkos popularity, and to public mobilisation. The protest is led by small businessmen and independent trade unions and will spill over to the hitherto passive population. The opposition will gain strength through consolidation, closing of ranks and development of positive reform policies. The OSCE succeeds in organising a negotiated transition with democratic elections. Lukashenko loses power and a new reform-oriented government replaces the authoritarian regime. This scenario seems unlikely at the moment but could became a real possibility if Russian President Putin makes a U-turn in Russias Belarus policy and works together with the West to bring about a solution. So far, Putin has not disclosed his plans for Belarus; however, relations between the two presidents seem to be strained and Putin has announced some measures which would reduce Russian subsidies for Belarus dramatically. A short-term regime change in Belarus will have positive consequences: A new reform-minded government in Belarus will provide the basis for a new start in European-Belorussian relations. However, the new government will face enormous economic and social problems, though accelerated transition is possible, as Belarus does not face substantial governance problems like Russia or Ukraine. 100

 Russia is likely to sabotage the new government by mobilising the Russian faction within government and industry as well as by cutting subsidises. The relations between Russia and the EU will probably deteriorate but to a much lesser degree than in the case of unification. The new government will be in desperate need for cash to stabilise the currency, finance the budget deficit, recapitalise the banking system and ensure a sufficient supply of foodstuffs. Hence, the EU and the IMF will have to implement immediate, large-scale support programmes to stabilise the new but weak government.

Scenario 4: Long-term change As already stated, the status quo in Belarus is not sustainable in the long run. Even if Belarus keeps its independence and Lukashenko continues to torment the country for some more years, long-term change will be inevitable due to the incremental development of civil society and changing values.2 As demonstrated, for instance, by polls of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, the number of Belorussians preferring a market-type economy over an administrative economy has been growing substantially over the past three years. In the summer of 1999, over 70 per cent preferred the market-type economy while only 25 per cent wished for the return of the old command economy. In particular, the younger generation of Belarus is distinctly in favour of independence, economic reforms, European integration and modern values. Whereas less then 14 per cent of those under 30 prefer the command economy, over 35 per cent of those over 50 are in favour of it. The same is true concerning the question of independence. In a hypothetical referendum on the unification of Russia and Belarus, 47 per cent of the population under 30 would vote against unification, while 45 per cent of those over 50 are in favour of it. These figures clearly indicate that micro-transition can be slowed down but not stopped by authoritarian policies. As Belarus is a small country that is far from self-reliant, change through interdependence will prevail over authoritarian isolation and will eventually lead to the end of Lukashenkos authoritarian rule in Belarus.

For changing values in Belarus, cf. the monthly publications of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies in Minsk as well as K. Mildner: op. cit., 2000.

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VI Conclusion: Policy recommendations

The best agent for long-term change in Belarus is interdependence with the West in general and the candidate states in particular. EU policy therefore should be oriented at enhancing interdependence at various levels: a) Europeanisation of Belarus: The EU should strengthen its presence in Belarus by setting up a full-fledged delegation with an ambassador instead of a technical office, by broadening its information policy, taking public relations seriously, and by introducing European Integration Studies at one of the major state universities. Equally important is the support of those NGOs in Belarus that are interested in European affairs and European integration. b) Economic Interdependence: While keeping up pressure for a change in economic policy via the IMF and the World Bank, the EU should support private sector development and provide technical assistance for enterprise restructuring in mostly privatised sectors like textiles, wood processing, furniture, building materials and food processing. Furthermore, programmes should be set up to enhance co-operation between Belorussian enterprises and those in the EU and candidate states, including internships for Belorussian managers in the West. Despite the importance of technical assistance, the opening of EU markets for products of privatised Belorussian firms in competitive sectors also seems necessary. The increase of textile quotas was the right step forward. c) Educational Interdependence: The enhancement of co-operation between universities of member and candidate states and Belorussian institutions is of great importance to the Belorussian transition process. Instruments are above all the initiation of common study programmes, the training of lecturers, internships and study opportunities abroad for Belorussian students, and the financing of joint research projects on economic and political transition. Institutional funding should also be granted to private universities in Belarus, which suffer most from Lukashenkos authoritarian education policies. Apart from the universities, one should not forget vocational education. d) Societal Interdependence: The EU should spend more attention on effective support for civil society development, in particular NGOs, and create transnational NGO networks (human rights, youth organisations, independent trade unions, lawyers, journalists, etc.). Such an approach should comprise training and exchange programmes for young politicians and NGO activists, expansion of the usage of the Internet in Belarus, training and internships for Belorussian journalists and the development of local self-government, in particular in a cross-border context. Equally important are small grant schemes that help to strengthen the weak financial basis of NGOs in Belarus. 102

e) Elite Interdependence: While there seem to be no prospects of enhancing interdependence or dialogue with the Lukashenko elite, the support of the professional economic policy community (state institutions, banks, research institutes) is key to building a capacity for long-term change. To enliven the policy dialogue, one should continue economic policy advice projects, even if the Belorussian government is not prepared to implement the advice. The presence of Western long-term advisers plays a crucial role in isolated Belarus. Besides training measures, one should finance joint research projects also with the inclusion of representatives of state institutions, such as the Ministry of the Economy and the National Bank. In addition, attention should be paid to the integration of Belorussian specialists into transnational policy networks. It has to be stated very clearly that strengthening interdependence does not imply an appeasement policy by the EU towards Lukashenko. Violations of human rights and other democratic principles should be denounced as in the past. Furthermore, the EU should stick to the step-by-step policy. Concessions towards Lukashenko should only be granted if structural change is introduced. The release of individual political prisoners, for instance, is a precondition for the improvement of relations, but would not count as structural change. Structural change in the Belorussian case would comprise the passing of a democratic election law, the granting of access to mass media for the opposition and the return to a democratic system of government with a meaningful parliament and a division of power. The most important point is that Brussels should make every possible effort to keep Belarus engaged and communicate to the Belorussian people that the way to Europe is not only open but also feasible. While the Russian factor in the EUs East European policy is definitely an important one, the EU has to develop and conduct a clearly distinct policy for the countries left in the gap between the candidate states on the one hand and Russia on the other. Without the integration of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova into the European structures, the region will remain unstable, and a threat to its Western neighbours, and will nurture resurfacing Russian imperialism.

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Moldova and the EU: Direct Neighbourhood and Security Issues

Alla Skvortova

I Introduction
Moldova is situated on the watershed between Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It is a small country of 4.5 million inhabitants and 34,400 sq.km. Moldova remains the only western newly independent state where Russian troops are located (apart from Sevastopol) and the only western newly independent state that experienced an armed conflict. Warfare ended in 1992, but the conflict has not been solved: The separatist region of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (hereafter PMR Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika) enjoys de facto independence and constitutes a major destabilising factor in the region. With the eventual acceptance of Romania, the EU will face this permanent source of instability right at its border. Its new neighbour Moldova would mean further instability risks, especially in case of a revival of the idea, held by some Moldavian political forces and a part of the population as well as by some Romanian politicians and citizens, that the territory of Moldova belongs to Romania by historical and ethnic right. A rise of these forces when Romania joins the European Union might create significant security problems for the EU, both in relation to PMR and to Ukraine, which also incorporated some Romanian territories in 1940. At the same time, domestically, the worsening economic crisis in Moldova increases the likelihood of a communist return to power. The geopolitical orientation of its future neighbour is a matter of some concern for the EU. Whether the EU will be able to establish relations of a mutually beneficial partnership and co-operation with Moldova, or whether it will have an unpredictable neighbour (or even enemy), depends on balancing Moldovas foreign-policy orientations and economic dependencies on the West and Russia. 104

Since independence (August 1991), Moldovas political orientation has been unstable, much like the political landscape. Right after independence, clear and determined steps were made to cut ties with the former Soviet countries. Since the mid-1990s, the new political majority re-oriented its foreign policy preferences towards the East, primarily towards Russia, because of Moldovas economic dependence on Russian energy supplies and markets as well as the lack of interest in the West. In other words, new ties with the West failed to compensate for the loosening of ties with Russia and the CIS. Thus, Moldova was on its way to becoming a new no mans land between the East and the West. However, when Russian strategic interest declined in the mid-1990s, Moldova could no longer benefit from any privileges in economic relations with Russia. The parliamentary elections of 1998 with the communist victory marked another re-orientation of economic interests towards Russia despite Moldovas political interest in a pro-western orientation. In the mid-1990s, Moldavian high officials Presidents Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi, members of parliament and prime ministers have on numerous occasions reiterated that the integration of the republic into the European family was one of the strategic priorities of foreign policy: The country could neither overcome the existing difficulties in economic and social issues nor solve political problems connected with the separatism of the eastern territories (PMR) without assistance from the West.

II Moldova and EU enlargement

Instead of joining the 1992 CIS military alliance, Moldova joined the NATO Partnership for Peace. The creation of the Parliamentary Committee for Co-operation Between the Republic of Moldova and the EU in 1999 was communicated as a positive indicator for the admission of Moldova to the process of EU enlargement at least, that is what local politicians wanted the public to believe. Mass-media highlighted the expected technical and financial assistance from the EU for economic reform, the attraction of Western investors and the access to Western markets for Moldavian products. Supposedly, this would in the end reduce Moldovas dependence on Russian energy supplies and markets, solving the Transnistrian conflict on the fly. In 1999, expectations on the EU to include Moldova into the list of candidate countries reached their climax. Moldova itself was actively negotiating with the Central European Initiative and worked towards participation in the Southeast European Cooperation Process and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.1 The Ministry of
1 V. Atamanenco: Uniunea Europeana inspira Moldovei curaj, Moldova si Lumea, No. 11 12, 1999, p. 5.

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Foreign Affairs elaborated The Strategy of the Republic of Moldova for Association with the EU2, which described the necessary measures to be undertaken in the spheres of the economy, legal reform, activation of participation in the regional and sub-regional bodies, as well as the intensification and diversification of contacts with the southeast European countries. The declaration made by the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 with an invitation to open accession negotiations for six more countries but not Moldova apparently came as a shock to the Moldavian Foreign Ministry. According to the Head of the Section on European Integration, Oleg Ungureanu, We hope that the omission of the Republic of Moldova from the group of states invited to join the EU was not due to the fact that the Helsinki Summit coincided with our government crisis. We expect to be taken into account. We believe that Brussels and the countries EU members cannot postpone the answer we are waiting for any longer.3 The exclusion was by all appearances taken as an offence and evaluated as a total failure of Moldovas foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Tabacaru, was forced to make public explanations on national TV.4 Apart from political rhetoric, the Helsinki decision indeed relegated Moldova to an awkward position between those invited to join the integration process, including Romania, and those covered by Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA) and Common Strategies, 5 Ukraine and Russia. This prospective isolation strengthened political forces favouring a re-orientation towards Russia and the CIS. However, after the first shock, state officials began to adjust their rhetoric to reality. President Lucinschi and Prime Minister Dumitru Braghis admitted that it had been a mistake to expect the invitation from the EU to come then, when Moldova was not ready, neither economically nor politically. They had to confess that the EUs main condition for integration was a guarantee of stability and security, while all Moldova had to offer was a whole range of internal political, social and economic problems, including the unresolved Dniester conflict and inadequate border controls on the border with Ukraine.6 The Government expressed its sincere commitment to take all steps necessary and to instigate reforms to meet EU conditions. Prime Minister Braghis repeatedly declared
2 Prime Minister of Moldova, Dumitru Braghis, announced that the Strategy had been passed for discussion to the Ministries on April 4 2000, but it was already circulated as the working paper in 1999. Moldova Suverana, 4 April 2000. (Hereafter: MS) R. Moldova se chinuie intre CSI si Uninea Europeana FLUX, 26 January 2000. A. Okuneva: Provaly vneshnei politiki, Ekonomiceskoe Obozrenie Logos Press, No. 4, February 2000. (Hereafter: EO-LP) Ibid. FLUX, 27 March 2000; Saptamina, 28 April 2000.

3 4 5 6

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that the foreign policy strategy for the integration of Moldova into the EU would include the signing of bilateral treaties with Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, the implementation of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (signed in 1994 and becoming effective on June 1, 1998)7 and the inclusion of Moldova into the Stability Pact. This attitude has found some support: Josette Durrieu, the head of the French parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly said she believed that Moldova should be the thirteenth country on the list of EU candidates.8 At a press conference held after a meeting of the sub-committee on the trade and investments of the PCA, an expert on EU trade preferences, Wolfgang Plasa, said Moldova had shown some success in the adjustment of its trade legislation to international standards, and after obtaining further results, especially in the field of tax law, the country could receive the most favourable regime for trade with the EU.9 Other European actors, however, were more reserved on the issue of Moldovas perspective to join the EU. The head of the EU Delegation to Moldova, Andr van Haeverbeke, said that only a Moldova fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria could be considered as a serious candidate. The country still needed to develop a true democracy, i. e., not just free elections, but protection of minority rights and rule of law, and make significant progress in creating a free market (i.e. implementation of the conditions of the PCA).10 At the same time, the attitude of the major political parties is different towards integration with the EU. On May 11, 2000, 20 out of 29 active political parties signed a Common Declaration on Joining the European Union by the Republic of Moldova.11 The Declaration supported principles and values of the EU and made accession the fundamental strategic objective of the Moldavian society. The signatories decided to form a working group for the elaboration of a strategy, which included measures for political stabilisation, further economic and legal reform and the settlement of the Dniester conflict. President Lucinschi explicitly supported the initiative and underlined that European integration is also the primary foreign policy priority of his government. Although the president has a decisive word in foreign policy issues, the presidential elections in 2000 made the president an uncertain factor rather than a key actor in the process. The main rival to the current president will be Vladimir Voronin, Chairman of the Communist Party of Moldova, whose constituency increases as the economic crisis worsens. As

7 8 9 10 11

Evropeiskii Soiuz idet na sblizhenie, Moldavskie Vedomosti, 15 April 2000. (Hereafter: MV) FLUX, 14 April 2000. MV, 26 April 2000. Ibid., 6 May 2000. The fifth Parliamentary party, the Communist Party, did not join the Declaration because of the possible negative effect the Declaration could have on the relations with Russia, EO-LP, No. 18, May 2000.

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president, he would be bound to do his best to reorient Moldavian foreign policy once again towards the CIS and Russia. His party did not join the Declaration, calling it premature for Moldovas current situation. His views are supported by 40 (out of 101) members of the Communist Party faction in parliament and a few independent parliamentarians. The signatories of the declaration, however, differ significantly as to their position in domestic policies and in their vision on other key issues of Moldavian foreign policy. Over the years, the political landscape has changed repeatedly: Currently, the most influential signatory is the recently created right-centrist Alliance for Democracy and Reforms. The Alliance is the second-largest faction in parliament and holds the chair of speaker. Other signatories are either of minor influence or have very specific views on the methods of integration. The Party of Democratic Forces hides its dream to join Romania under the cloak of European integration, while the other members of the Alliance are primarily in favour of strengthening Moldavian independent statehood.12 Both the National-Christian Party and its leader Yuri Rosca, with a few seats in the parliament, and the National-Liberal Party of Mircea Rusu champion the idea of making the Dniester River the eastern border and joining Romania. They use the EU issue for promoting the unification idea and argue that, as a part of Romania, Moldova would become a member of the Union much more easily than as an independent state. Taking into account that the majority of the population is against unification, this position is one more factor of political destabilisation. Table 1: Parliamentary Elections in Moldova, 1994 and 1998
1994 party Agrarian Democratic Party Socialist Unity Bloc Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals Christian Democratic Popular Front votes 43.2 % 22.0 % 9.2 % 7.5 % seats 54 27 11 9 orientation leftist anti-reform and pro-CIS moderate communists and International movement moderate pro-Romanian extremist pro-Romanian

12

The leader of the Party, Alexandru Mosanu, said at a Parliamentary session, dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of Declaration on Sovereignty: Only together with Romania, next to Romania, unified with Romania will we be able to make our way to Europe, EO-LP, No. 22, June 2000.

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1998 Party of Communists Democratic Convention 30.1 % 19.4 % 40 26 communist, pro-Russia a bloc of the Party of Conciliation and Revival (for independent Westoriented Moldova) and Christian Democratic Popular Front for independent West-oriented Moldova former Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals

Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Party of Democratic Forces

18.1 % 8.8 %

24 11

Of course, there is no uniformity among the parties members. The more promising promoters of the idea of European integration are younger political leaders and state officials, such as Alexei Pulbere and Vladimir Solonari, members of parliament; Yurie Pinzaru, adviser on international relations to the president; Oleg Ungureanu, head of the European Union Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Alexandu Palii, adviser to the Parliament Committee on International Relations. Businessmen feel the negative impact of the shortcomings of economic legislation, illicit trade and the shadow economy on their business. They are thus interested in access to Western markets for their business. On numerous occasions they have requested the state structures to change the situation in favour of the introduction of civilised Western (European) rules for business activity in the country. More active in this respect were Vladimir Babii, Victor Shelin, Igor Krapivka and Grigorii Sonic. In Moldova, the government is the most vulnerable component in the state structure. Because of the economic crisis, the absence of a clear majority in parliament, the presidents quest for more power by constitutional amendment and the structural conflict between president and parliament, the government has hardly had a political stance of its own. In 1999, the government was dismissed twice and the country had three prime ministers and three cabinets. However, the foreign policy programme largely remained the same. Thus, the government is still the primary institution for communication with EU officials. The government is primarily responsible for the economic situation in the country and is therefore looking for external financial assistance. Due to the fact that the instability and political orientation of Moldova is a matter of concern for the EU, conditional economic-financial support is the best instrument to help Moldova improve the situation and to ensure stability in the region.

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III Aspects of transition with an impact on the EU

Today, Moldova represents a combination of potential hard and soft security risks for the European Union. The intractable Dniester conflict itself has both hard and soft security aspects: As an obstacle for Moldova improving its relations with the EU as well as for the transition process, this regional conflict also represents a security threat to the enlarged European Union.

Ethnic and territorial conflicts

The Dniester Conflict In 1989, the population of the territory known today as the Dniester Republic (PMR) was composed of 40 per cent Moldavians, 28 per cent Ukrainians and 25 per cent Russians (compared to 70 per cent Moldavians on the other bank of the Dniester). Therefore, the opposition to Moldavian as the state language, the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moldavian independence and pro-Romanian rhetoric of the Moldavian Popular Front are concentrated on the left bank of the Dniester. The opposition started with a demand to grant the region a different language regime and the status of free economic zone (the left bank possessed 40 per cent of the industrial potential of Soviet Moldova) and ended with a demand for full autonomy. Chisinau refused, and the Soviets of the Dniester Republic declared independence in August 1991. The Moldavian authorities failed attempts to regain control of the region led to a full-scale armed conflict in the spring of 1992. PMR forces enjoyed the decisive support of the Russian 14th Army located in the region. Since the June 1992 armistice, Russian peace-keeping forces have been posted along the Dniester, giving Moscow leverage over both Chisinau and the PMR capital of Tiraspol.

Initially, the conflict in Moldova had all characteristics of ethnic strife, with the Russophones opposing Moldavian as the official language and state independence, fearing the loss of their nomenklatura positions in the republic. Later its ideological-political, and most of all, regional economic character came to the forefront.13 The main reasons for conflict escalation were the break-up of the USSR, the polarisation of the Moldavian political elites (unable to consolidate society and oppose secession by a constructive compromise), and last but not least the support to the separatists offered by Russian political forces (nationalist and pro-Soviet political movements, former Vice-President Alexandr Rutskoi, the leader of the National Liberal Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskii,
13 P. Kolsto and A. Malgin: The Transnistrian Republic: a Case of Politicized Regionalism, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998, pp. 103 146.

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former MP Sergei Baburin, communist Anatolii Lukanov), as well as the presence of the Russian 14th Army on PMR territory, serving as a strategic Russian regional stronghold.14 The Russian authorities never officially supported the Dniester Republic. Instead, support for the territorial integrity of Moldova was common in official rhetoric. Some important Russian decision-makers also provided this support in the first years of the conflict, though less so later. The Dniester Republic developed all attributes of a state, although it was never officially recognised by any state. The Dniester conflict is commonly considered as one of the major security threats in Europe. The extensive armouries of the 14th Army drew on the Soviet stock of armament for the Balkan region. With the reduction of the 14th Army, weaponry is now dissipating, finding its way to the PMR regime, separatist regimes in Russia and Georgia or even to Iraq and other authoritarian military regimes in the Middle East. The PMR regime increasingly depends on gunrunning as well as the production and sale of ammunition and, therefore, represents a serious security risk for Europe. Currently, neither the Dniester authorities nor the Moldavian government are inclined to end the deadlock with the use of military force. Only a return to power of Moldovas pro-reunification politicians of the early 1990s might lead to escalation and another armed conflict: The Popular Front and some of its successor organisations were and are ready to trade Transnistria with Ukraine for the territories of northern and southern Bessarabia which were arbitrarily given to Kiev by Stalin in 1940 and 1941.15 After the Helsinki invitation to Romania, these voices became louder once again. Major newspapers advocating unification of Moldova with Romania insistently repeat that because the left bank has never been a part of the Romanian state, the Dniester Republic should be conceded to Ukraine.16 External actors, moreover, contribute to the increase of tension: During an official visit to Moldova this year, the Chairman of the Romanian Senate, Mircea IonescuQuintus, declared that after Romanias invitation to start negotiations with the EU, the Union should consider that its eastern border after the completed enlargement will be drawn along the Dniester, which divides core Moldova from Transnistria, and not along the Pruth the current border between Romania and Moldova.17 This statement provoked the Moldavian Russian-speaking community and PMR officials to publicly condemn the silence of the Moldavian government after this dangerous statement.18

14 15 16 17 18

Moldova in tranzitie. Privire economica, No. 4, 1999, Chisinau: Centrul de investigatii strategice si reforme, p. 135. Sovetskaia Moldavia, 22 February 1990, 13 July 1991 (Hereafter: SM); Edinstvo, 13 February 1991. FLUX, 31 March 2000; For the Transnistrian ideology and views on the issue see: N.V. Babilunga, B.G. Bomeshko: Pridnestrovschii konflikt: istoricheskie, demographicheskie, politicheskie aspekty, Tiraspol: RIO PGU, 1998. FLUX, 20 April 2000. Kishinevskie Novosti, 5 May 2000. (Hereafter: KN)

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The Minister of Security of the Dniester Republic, Vladimir Antiufeev, stated that it would be possible to talk about the complete elimination of the military threat only once a decision on Moldovas demilitarisation had been taken.19 In the meantime, the PMR itself continues to increase its military forces, locating military units in the vicinity of the security zone between Moldova and the PMR.20 Russia is another international actor representing a potential security risk related to the Dniester Republic, not just because of its role in the armed conflict or the presence of a Russian army on the left bank (illegal by international standards), but also because of its strategic interests in the region. Once Moldova and Transnistria agree on a solution of the conflict in terms of autonomy or a (con)federation, Russia would be a thousand kilometres further away from the Balkans. Therefore, Russian diplomats have begun to look for ways to keep the Russian military at the Dniester River, recently negotiating simultaneously with Moldavian and Dniester authorities. After a meeting of PMR President Igor Smirnov with Vladimir Putin, Russia annulled part of the PMR debt (US-$ 6 million) as a compensation for the debts of the 14th Army to the local administration, thus showing that Russia is ready to pay for its army stronghold abroad.21

The Moldavian State The Moldavian state was formed in the middle of the 14th century as a principality situated between the River Dniester, the Carpathian mountains and the Black Sea. After a RussianTurkish war, the eastern part of the Moldavian principality lying between the Dniester and Pruth rivers was annexed by the Russian Empire as a war trophy in 1812. Russians called the new territory Bessarabia. The western part of the Moldavian principality remaining under the Ottoman protectorate joined the Wallachian principality in 1859 to build the Romanian state, independent since 1878. In the imbroglio of the 1917 Russian revolution, Moldova first became independent and then joined the Romanian state, first as an autonomous province. In 1940, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union also occupied Bessarabia. A new Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940, by joining the territories of Bessarabia and the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic created in 1924 on the left bank of the Dniester. However, significant northern and southern parts of both Bessarabia and the autonomous republic have been transferred to Ukraine. Thus, the territory of Bessarabia had been a part of the Romanian state for 22 years (1918 1940), while the territory of modern Moldova situated on the left bank of the Dniester river has never belonged to Romania.22
19 20 21 22 KN, 19 May 2000. In ultima luna, separatizmul a devenit mai agresiv. Interviu cu Gh. Roman, copresedintele comisiei unificate de control din partea RM, FLUX, 14 June 2000. C. King, The Moldavians: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, Ca., 2000. FLUX, 29 March 2000.

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At the same time, the prime minister of Moldova publicly stated that it was possible to grant the Russian Army in Tiraspol the status of a military base. The statement was forced by the critical situation in supplying Moldova with Russian energy and gas and by the results of the Russian presidential elections.23 Moldova owes Russia at least US-$ 800 million for energy supplies. It is obvious that the country will never be able to repay this debt. Russia already made the point of cutting down the gas supplies to Moldova for several days.24 It will be very difficult for the Moldavian government to keep the balance between the desire to join the European community and its economic dependence on Russia for energy and raw materials and as the main market for the export of Moldavian agricultural products.25 The negotiations between the PMR and Moldova continue with the mediation of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, but without much progress: Tiraspol insists on a confederal solution unacceptable to Chisinau.26 PMR authorities are more interested in a loose confederation or an alliance with Russia than in settling relations with Moldova. The chairman of the PMR parliament, Grigorii Maracutsa, recently told journalists that once 60 per cent of the population of the region has received Russian citizenship (and this process continues very actively), the Dniester Republic will change its state flag for the Russian one.27 Russia, as a key player in the conflict, still protracts the evacuation of its 14th Army and links the evacuation to the final settlement of the conflict. A small part of the Army (2,500 soldiers) is still located in the Dniester Republic, but the stores of ammunition remain substantial at 41,000 tons. As the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William Hill, stressed, such storages represent an increasing threat to European security.28 Russia and its new president are interested in preserving Moldova as a hotbed of instability on the border of Europe and behind the back of an unruly Ukraine.29 The situation might escalate further in the case of a victory in the presidential elections in Moldova of the communist leader Vladimir Voronin, as he will be inclined to grant the Russian 14th Army the status of a military base. Any radical change of the political forces in power along with a re-orientation of foreign policy could cause major political instability in the country. A turn towards the

23 24 25 26

27 28 29

Moldova na poroge okonchatelnogo geopoliticheskogo opredelenia, Novoe Vremia, 5 May 2000. K. Kaminskaia: Gaz i Politika, MV, 4 March 2000. Moldova in Tranzition, Vol. 4, p. 36. Pridnestrovie ignoriruet Moldovu, MV, 3 April 2000; Grigirii Maracutsa, Treshchinu poka mozhno pereprygnut, KN, 5 May 2000; Chisinaul si Tiraspolul n-au reusit sa depaseasca divergentele de ordin politic, FLUX, 17 May 2000. Conducerea Transnistriei doreste unirea cu Federatia Rusa, FLUX, 29 March 2000. KN, 9 June 2000. Idem.

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East would cause the rise of Romanian and/or Moldavian nationalism; a turn towards Romania would create a new ethnic conflict and attempts of secession. Although the way Moldova solved the Gagauz issue was considered a successful, unprecedented model by the international organisations, there are recent signs that Gagauzia too might create new instability.

The Gagauz Minority The Gagauz, a Turkish-speaking and Orthodox Christian people, settled in southern Bessarabia in the 18th and 19th centuries. Currently, they number 153,000 people, equal to 3.5 per cent of the total population of Moldova. Gagauz formed a strong opposition to the new language legislation in 1989, demanding their Russian be the second official one. When their demand was not satisfied, they proclaimed an Independent Gagauz Republic on 19 August 1990. The election to the Gagauz Parliament, scheduled for 28 October 1990, provoked the most serious confrontation between Chisinau and Comrat (the actual capital of GagauzYeri). In the end, elections were held. Until the agreement in late 1994 between Gagauzia and Chisinau, Gagauzia was de facto independent. In 1994, by constitutional provisions and the law on the status of Gagauz-Yeri, a special status of administrative-territorial unit was granted to Gagauzia. Article 1(4) of the law states that in case of a change of the Republic of Moldovas status as an independent state, the Gagauz people have the right to external self-determination.30

The ethnic-political polarisation in Moldova gives the small Gagauz Republic excessive leverage: On 31 May 2000, the Popular Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri approved a resolution accusing the central government of failing to implement the provisions of the agreement on its autonomous status. The assembly declared it would demand the status of a third equal partner alongside Tiraspol and Chisinau in negotiations on Transnistria. It also said it may refuse to participate in the 2000 presidential elections if Chisinau does not stop its economic and financial blockade of Gagauz-Yeri.31 At a meeting with representatives of embassies to Moldova and the OSCE, the Chairman of the People Assembly, Mikhail Kendighelean, said that Gagauzia is in favour of the federalisation of Moldova. He added that, because Russian has official status in both Transnistria and Gagauzia, Moldavian legislation should be amended in order to grant Russian the status of the second official language in the country.32 Thus, Moldova still is at risk of disintegration along ethnic lines.

30 31 32

J. Chinn and S.D. Rooper: Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia, Nationality Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998, pp. 87 101. Gaguzia obviniaet, KN, 2 June 2000. FLUX, 7 June 2000.

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While the unsettled Dniester conflict represents a hard security risk for the European Union, the combination of political and economic features characterising Moldova at the present stage constitutes a soft risk. High on this list are political instabilities (i. e., the fluidity of the party system, ethnic politics and the dichotomy between president and parliament), making Moldova an unreliable political partner for the EU.

Political instability Due to the rather complicated landscape of political forces, fluid frames and short cycles of political alliances, a number of scenarios could appear on the Moldavian stage. The danger of a communist return should not be underestimated. In the parliamentary elections of 1998, the communists came close to an absolute majority. Their failure to improve the economic situation discredited the centre-right parties, which might attract more voters to the communists in the next presidential and parliamentary elections (2000 and 2002 respectively). Once in power, the communists would reorient Moldova towards Moscow, with all the dangers for stability in eastern and southeastern Europe. Another security risk is the hybrid form of the political system33 existing in Moldova: President, parliament, and government are characterised by rather complicated lines of dependency and subordination and a lack of a clear division of responsibilities. Although Moldova has a good record of democracy, this is threatened by the attempts to establish presidential rule. For example, in 1996 Mircea Snegur declared that he needed more power to improve the situation in the country, especially regarding the control over the government, the right to appoint and dismiss ministers without parliamentary consent. Parliament opposed these demands, and the country found itself at the edge of an armed conflict when the president tried to enforce the dismissal of the minister of defence. Current President Lucinschi started a similar campaign in 1999 by suggesting amendments to the constitution. A group of MPs in opposition to the president elaborated alternative amendments that would lead to the elimination of the presidency in Moldova. The new conflict has been suspended but was not resolved by the involvement of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.34 The combination of authoritarian tendencies with nationalist trends and communist revanchism remains a long-term danger; it also precludes partnership and co-operation with the EU.

33 34

I. Kempe (ed.): Direct Neighbourhood. Relations between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998, p. 29. Seful statului provoaca un nou focar de tensiune, Dialog, 12 May 2000.

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Economic and social problems of transition Moreover, the instability of political structures represents a source of further failures in economic policy leading to a deepening of the economic crisis, creating additional hardships for the population and provoking social unrest. External observers initially expected the transition process in Moldova to develop more rapidly and effectively than in other CIS countries.35 At the present stage, Moldova cannot survive without foreign economic assistance, though loans and sporadic humanitarian aid alone tend to create a consumption mentality rather than stimulate an increase in domestic production. Therefore, the risk of non-returnability of foreign loans increases as their effectiveness decreases. Foreign assistance in a structural economic crisis and deficits in the legislative framework foster corruption and the shadow economy. The current economic crisis leads to a stagnation of the privatisation process, protectionist tendencies, instability of the banking sector, inefficiency and frequently changing economic legislation, which, along with political instability, growing criminality and corruption, makes for an unfavourable investment climate. International financial institutions suspended their support of Moldova in April 2000, after parliament had voted against privatisation of the wine and tobacco industry, the main condition for further financial support set by these institutions.36 By now, many sectors of the Moldavian economy are worse off than in other republics of the CIS. In 1999, all of these countries except Moldova and Ukraine registered a moderate growth of their GDP.37 Primary reasons behind Moldovas poor economic performance include the absence of natural and energy resources, decrease of the exports to the CIS markets due to the economic crisis in Russia, high costs for transit through Ukraine and a shrinking domestic market. The 1999 GDP was less than 60 per cent of the 1991 level.38 In the period of January to September 1999, industrial output declined by 12.8 per cent, agricultural output by 7 per cent.39

35 36 37 38 39

The Economist wrote in March 1995: Moldova is a model of correct reform, and the fact that it is a small country, makes it possible to transform it into a perfect laboratory for running reforms. FMI isi face valizele, Tara, 21 April 2000; Saptamina, 28 April 2000. Nezavisimaia Moldova, 23 March 2000. (Hereafter: NM) Acceleration and deepening of the reforms a unique path towards overcoming the crisis. Government Declaration, NM, July 1999. National Human Development Report. Republic of Moldova 1999. Chisinau: UNDP, p. 25. (Hereafter: NHDR Moldova)

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Table 2: GDP Indicators by Main Types of Economic Activity40

Indicators total GDP* Industry Agriculture Construction
* (1993 = 100)

1994 69 71 83 47

1995 68 73 85 39

1996 63 65 74 34

1997 64 66 82 32

1998 62

1999 60

The average salary in Moldova is the third-lowest in the CIS countries,41 the rate of unemployment, especially hidden unemployment, is high. The real average salary per employee in 1999 amounted to half of the level of 1990, with frequent wage and pension arrears. Most elderly persons, the disabled, families with many children and many rural dwellers are below subsistence level. In accordance with experts evaluations in 1998, about 90 per cent of the population had a daily income of less than US-$ 2. Compared to 1990, the death rate has increased by 15 per cent, exceeding the birth rate, which has dropped by 38 per cent.42 The losers of transition can easily be mobilised against reforms and against the West. The critical threshold in social development is bound to cause a sharp contraction of the social basis of support for reform. If this happens, extremely negative consequences are bound to follow for the development of democracy, strengthening of the rule of law and reinforcing civil society. The high rate of unemployment (while the officially registered unemployment rate stands at 2 per cent, the real unemployment rate according to Lindauer is 14.1 per cent)43 leads to illegal migration. There are no official data, but an estimated 300,000 Moldavians left for foreign countries and are employed by the black labour market in Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal. They enter Western countries with tourist visas, stay there illegally for years and send their earnings to their families in Moldova. Because of their illegal status, they often become victims of local organised crime as underpaid workers or prostitutes, or they join criminal gangs. Migration as such is not a security problem, but uncontrolled or illegal migration is.44 Thus, migration from Moldova creates financial and social costs, and contributes to internal instability and criminalisation in a number of Western countries. The socio-economic gap between the future enlarged EU and Moldova is increasing.

40 41 42 43 44

NHDR Moldova 1998, p. 30; NHDR Moldova 2000. Draft, p. 145. NM, 23 March 2000. NHDR Moldova 1999, p. 27. Moldova in Tranzitie, Vol. 4, p. 94. I. Kempe: op. cit., p. 44.

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People escaping from poverty, as well as illegal trade flows from Moldova, are the direct result of socio-economic asymmetries. Economic and political instability in Moldova makes the state an uncertain factor in EU neighbourhood relations, as well as an actor increasingly dependent on the Russian Federation.45 After the withdrawal of the World Bank and the IMF, Moldova faces bankruptcy. The budget for 2000 is only US-$ 28 million less then for 1999, but the lei-dollar rate has doubled.46 Again, the budget includes revenues from the privatisation of the winemaking and tobacco industry and new international loans. As both will not be forthcoming, the government announced a severe fiscal policy to control the budget deficit. However, this would only contribute to the growth of the shadow economy that currently generates 60 per cent of additional income compared to the formal economy. Tax evasion grew from 4 per cent of the consolidated budget income in 1994 to 32 per cent in 1998.47 The growth of the shadow economy is directly connected with illegal trade. Goods marketed through illegal trade include alcohol, tobacco and drugs. An inadequate border regime and thriving corruption make Moldova an important crossroads in the drug trafficking to the EU countries; a crossroads which will become even more important once the republic will become a direct neighbour of the EU.48 There are reports on illegal trade operations made by Moldavian criminals with gas and petroleum in Romania, which cost the Romanian budget the equivalent of US-$ 5 million.49 Since the Russian economic crisis of 1998, Moldovas foreign trade has been reoriented towards the West. While in 1998 exports to Russia accounted for 59 per cent of all exports, this share fell to 39 per cent in the following year, whereas 54 per cent of all exports went to Central and Western European countries.50 The insecure eastern borders, created both by the insufficiently regulated control on the border with Ukraine and by the existence of the Dniester Republic, make Moldova a corridor for illegal migrants, human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling directed to the EU. Illegal imports from the PMR are reportedly booming, and probably at least part of it is transit to Romania and to the West.51 The Chisinau tobacco plant exports five to six billion cigarettes annually, but only ten per cent are exported legally.52 For EU security, the unsettled Dniester conflict represents a further soft risk. The
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 Idem, p. 10, 29. MV, 6 May 2000. Novoe Vremia, 9 June 2000. NHDR Moldova 1999, p. 63. Mafia moldoveneasca dace ravagii in Romania, Tara, 21 April 2000. Moldova in Tranzition, Vol. 4, p. 26. Tara, 19 May 2000. Ibid.

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main economic source sustaining the present status of Transnistria are profits from the special economic relations with Russia. It is recognised that the deadlock in negotiations between Moldova and the PMR is caused by a strong lobby from Moldavian shadow business and corrupted state officials that use the PMR for criminal transactions. Some estimates show that the volume of contraband into Moldova through Transnistria in 1998 is at US-$ 500 million, twice the budget of Moldova. The annual losses in terms of tax evasion and illicit trade through Transnistria are comparable with the whole amount of financial assistance allocated by international organisations to Moldova since independence.53 In view of these risks, the pro-unification Movement of National Salvation has suggested a new project for resolving the Dniester conflict: involving more international actors in the mediation process, while declaring an economic and political embargo on Transnistria, breaking off all economic contacts with the separatists, isolating Transnistria completely and starting an indictment in Moldova against Dniester leaders as participants of anti-constitutional mutiny and illegal economic activity. The Movement of National Salvation believes that a political and economic embargo will eliminate illicit trade in the region as the most important source of income for Transnistrian separatism. On the other hand, the administrative isolation of Transnistria from Moldova would minimise the negative influence of Transnistria on Moldova, which often results in the growth of criminality and corruption, and would help to re-establish the rule of law and go further in the process of reforms.54 Both the shadow economy and illegal trade are a result of and a stimulus for a high level of corruption with a detrimental impact on the economic, social and political development. According to Transparency International, the corruption indicator for Moldova in 1999 was 2.6 (out of 10 = no corruption).55 Corruption entails a rise in the costs of public projects, a general rise of processing for goods and services, inequity in the access to public funds, a decrease of public services available for the poor, the creation of an excessive tax burden and a decrease of investments and economic development in general. Corruption causes a loss of credibility towards reforms in the country, affects the human rights of the citizens and contributes to the criminalisation of the society. These circumstances make Moldova attractive for international organised crime. It is obvious that an intensification of the reforms by the Central and East European countries, aimed at integration into the EU, will enlarge the gap in the level of development between Moldova and those countries with which Moldova has well-developed

53 54 55

MV, 30 September 1999; NHDR Moldova 1999, pp. 59 60. Den, 21 April 2000. Moldova in Tranzition, Vol. 4, p. 113.

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economic and political relations. Central and East European countries will lose their already limited interest in developing relations with Moldova. Consequently, Moldovas dependence on the CIS and Russia will increase, and as a result, the slow process of reforming of the countrys economic and political system, the process of democratisation and the development of the civil society will suffer accordingly. The struggle of pro-Moscow, leftist political forces with a strong desire to re-establish an authoritarian regime will be facilitated and the eventual deepening of the economic crisis will create preconditions for social unrest. All democratic achievements and economic reforms implemented would be endangered.

IV Moldova and its future EU neighbour, Romania

President Lucinschi and Moldavian Ambassador to Romania Emil Ciobu declared that they would take all necessary steps to benefit from the new situation with their neighbour Romania as an EU accession state. Official rhetoric reiterated that Moldova should find new, more efficient forms of collaboration with Romania and try to take advantage of Romanias new position.56 In this context, the development of the free economic zones at the Upper Pruth and Lower Danube (which so far have not proceeded past declarations of good intent) might be a relevant initiative.57 It has been further stated that Moldova has found itself in a more advantageous situation since Romanias invitation because it had privileged relations with Romania, and could learn from the Romanian experience of reforms and changes required by the EU. As an example of wishful thinking, Romanias invitation was even interpreted as a sign of the eventual invitation of Moldova as both countries share similar problems in the political, economic and social spheres. 58 The opposition immediately responded that most Europeans would not be able to locate Moldova on a map, while a trip to Frankfurt or even to Budapest would suffice to realise that Moldova and Europe are worlds apart.59 Political forces favouring unification of Moldova with Romania tried to take advantage of the situation. They were well aware that the overwhelming majority of Moldavians would not be willing to give up the idea and the status of independence in favour of joining Romania. Therefore, they argued that while Romania might not be attractive enough for the Moldavians, the idea of an opportunity for Moldavians to become

56 57 58 59

FLUX, 30 and 31 March 2000. W. van Meurs: Direct Neighborhood and Euroregions, in: Romanian Journal of International Affairs, 4/4, 1998, pp. 200 212. Interview with the Moldavian Ambassador to Romania, Emil Ciobu, FLUX, 30 March 2000. D. Chiubashenko: Moldova dvoechnitsa Evropy, MV, 26 January 2000.

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citizens of an EU country by joining Romania might be much more attractive. Thus, the National Salvation Movement used this slogan in favour of a new state alliance with Romania, but this did not seem to be successful.60 It seems that the low interest of Romania towards the development of economic relations with Moldova could completely disappear with the development of Romanian-EU relations. Romania has very limited resources which are spent entirely on the economic and legal reforms required by EU accession, as well as on attempts to make Romanian products competitive in the Western markets. In the other words, objectively, Romania will be too preoccupied to notice its poor neighbours needs and pay any attention to them; essentially, Romania may not have enough resources to maintain and improve bilateral relations with Moldova.

The Moldavian-Ukrainian Border The Moldavian-Ukrainian border is not legally demarcated, though the basic treaty with Ukraine was signed in 1993. For seven years, a group of experts from both countries has been consolidating the border line. A treaty on the state border was then signed on 18 August, 1999. The document foresees an exchange of territory in the south: Moldova is giving a 7.7 km stretch of the Odessa-Reni highway to Ukraine, and receives 400 metres of the Danube bank to build an oil terminal in return, as well as a piece of land and a railway station near Basarabeasca. However, while Ukraine has ratified the Treaty, in Moldova it has been received with much criticism, especially by rightist pro-Romanian parties, accusing the government of betraying the national interests. The ratification of the treaty by the Moldavian parliament was postponed, but a majority of the Communist Party and the Democratic Party is ready to vote for ratification.61

However, Romania has so far been attentive in its bilateral relations with Moldova. It is an EU requirement for candidates to settle relations with neighbouring countries, and Romania did not have a basic treaty with Moldova. In order to facilitate ratification of the treaty, Romania promised to allocate US-$ 1.2 million for support of the project towards strengthening of the privileged partnership between two countries in the year 2000 and to continue political, economic and diplomatic support to the Euro-Atlantic orientation of Chisinau.62 At the ordinary meeting of the Romanian-Moldavian inter-departmental committee, it was agreed that this required a basic treaty and the adjustment of legislation in both countries to European standards. The basic treaty was signed in May 2000 during the official visit of Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
60 61 62 NM, 24 March 2000. Otnoshenia s sosediami i prioritety Moldovy, EO-LP, No. 22, June 2000. NM, 26 March 2000.

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Petru Roman to Moldova. However, the text of the treaty has not yet been made public and has received negative comments of the local pro-Romanian political parties because of Romanias lack of (special) interest in Moldova. These parties did not expect Romania to conclude a treaty with Moldova on conditions similar to those with other countries. They based their ideology on the idea of the existence of two Romanian states that inevitably would merge one day. They wanted this prospect to be included in the treaty, as well as a statement on the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Moldova and Romania. The latter might be understood to mean that Transnistria did not legally belong to Moldova and the eastern border of Romania should be drawn along the Dniester. Romania actually insisted on including these statements into the basic treaty for a long time, and this request was one of the main obstacles to an earlier signing. Dniester authorities, in turn, used the fact that the Moldavian parliament denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1990 to prove the PMRs right of secession.63 With the Helsinki perspective of EU accession giving Romania many more benefits and profits than acquiring the territory of Moldova could, Bucharest has changed its approach to the Bessarabian question from the desire and readiness (though unexpressed officially) to accept this territory as a historical part of the Romanian state to an attitude similar to one towards any other neighbouring state. The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed in an interview that the finalisation of the treaty had been stimulated by the opening of accession negotiations with the EU.
64

The Moldavian

Ambassador to Romania, Emil Ciobu, explained that Romania was obliged by NATO to sign political treaties with its neighbours.65 However, the opposition to the treaty in both Romania66 and Moldova negatively affect Romanias status as an EU candidate. The political forces in Moldova which have made reunification with Romania their main goal have thus lost an important component of their ideology. The special relations of Romania and Moldova, discussions of claims on the territory of Moldova in the Romanian media and the presence of political forces in Moldova that would push the merger have helped to maintain an unstable balance between Eastern and Western orientation in Moldavian foreign policy. The loss of an interested partner in the West might topple the balance and cause Moldova to drift towards Russia, which would create additional risks for security in the EU direct neighbourhood. This risk only grows as both extremes (reunification and Dniester separatism) involve territorial changes and the dismemberment of the Moldavian state. Thus, even technical issues of border demarcation become highly politicised issues, such as the minimal rectification of the
63 64 65 66 Bessarabskii vopros i obrazovanie PMR, Tiraspol: Tiraspol University, 1993, pp. 96 97. FLUX, 3 May 2000. Succesul international al Romaniei ar trebui sa ne bucure, FLUX, 30 March 2000. NM, 24 May 2000.

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Moldavian-Ukrainian border in the south (see the inset: The Moldavian-Ukrainian Border). The EU request to settle relations with the neighbouring countries has yet another dimension besides the signing of basic treaties: border regulation and border controls.67 It is obvious that the EU would not be interested in maintaining the current border regulations between Moldova and Romania with free travel across the border for the citizens of both countries. Strengthening of the border control, which the EU will eventually require, might negatively affect economic relations and cross-border co-operation between the two countries. Actually, Romania has already begun to change the border regime for Moldavian citizens. Every Moldavian citizen must fill out a special questionnaire, which is kept at the border checkpoint. The introduction of new rules immediately created eight-hour delays at the checkpoints. Moldavians go to Romania to visit their relatives or children studying at Romanian educational institutions,68 though most of them go to Romania to do business, to find a job or to do shopping. These contacts will be damaged by the new border regulations and will cause negative attitudes and tensions. It was announced in April 2000 that from 1 January 2001, Moldavian citizens will be allowed to travel to Romania only with their passports rather than with the IDs they use for travel now. In June, the date for the introduction of this new rule was even advanced to 1 July 2000.69 Many of the Moldavian citizens decided to solve the problem themselves and ensure free travel to Romania by applying for Romanian citizenship. Unlike that of Moldova, Romanian law allows for double citizenship, including for those citizens of Moldova whose ancestors had Romanian citizenship before 1940 (along the lines of the Baltic legal argument on state continuity). However, Moldavians have applied for Romanian citizenship primarily because it gives them some economic advantages: as Romanian citizens they have the right to bring some goods into the country, including two cars, without paying custom taxes. Businessmen specialising in imports usually buy these rights from the new Romanian citizens. But the perspective to receive, along with Romanian citizenship, the possibility of free travel and the right to work within the territory of the Schengen agreements after accession to the EU has multiplied the number of those applying for Romanian citizenship.70 Reportedly more than 300,000 Moldavians have received Romanian citizenship so far, and the number of those apply67 68 FLUX, 3 May 2000, reprinted from Romanian newspaper Adevarul. Currently 10,000 students from Moldova study in Romania MS, 15 February 2000; in 2000 the quota of Moldavian students who took up their studies at Romanian liceums and Universities was equal to 1,800 persons. Some estimations show that around 60 per cent of graduates remain in Romania, FLUX, 26 May 2000. MV, 26 April 2000; FLUX, 13 June 2000. Respublika Moldova riskuet ostatsia bez (...) grazhdan, NM, 17 February 2000, reprinted from Romania libera, No. 3007; MV, 4 March 2000.

69 70

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ing increases every day.71 Moldavian authorities made a half-hearted attempt to reduce the wave of people with double citizenship by making the issuance of certificates proving the right of a Moldavian for Romanian citizenship more difficult. Simultaneously, Romania facilitated the process of application by giving local Romanian administration (regional police departments) the right to grant citizenship. If Moldavians with Romanian passports received rights equal to those of Romanian citizens after Romania has become a part of the Schengen area, this would mean that several million additional people would have the right to travel freely in the EU and enter the Western labour market as cheap labour. Of course, along with people looking for jobs and a decent life in the West, criminals will also attempt to extend their networks as far as possible. It should be mentioned that a reported 140,000 Moldavian citizens have received Russian citizenship, keeping their Moldavian passport, 60,000 have Israeli citizenship, and several tens of thousands Ukrainian citizenship.72 Presumably, having triple (Moldavian-Romanian-Russian) citizenship is an advantage for illicit trade, trafficking in goods and persons, joining gangs in the West and support of terrorism. Romanian authorities could try to change the status of Moldavians with Romanian passports, but it would cause huge queues and possible unrest at the border checkpoints or the overnight influx into Romania of a million new citizens would create significant problems in the labour market, social insurance, medical care, education and other spheres, not just for Romania, but for the EU as a whole.

V Conclusions and recommendations

The current Moldavian state is a small country squeezed between the CIS and the EU accession states of Eastern Europe. It is often neglected in the European discourse, underestimating the qualitative, if not quantitative role of Moldova in the system of European security. A number of external and internal political, ethnic and social rifts heightens the countrys potential for instability, insecurity and even armed conflict. Evidently, the worsening economic situation in the country will facilitate a communist victory in the presidential elections. The new president might establish an authoritarian political regime, reorient Moldavian policy and economy towards Russian interests and isolate Moldova from the West. In general, even if only one item of this agenda is implemented, Moldova as a factor of security risk will greatly increase. The cooling of

71 72

NM, 3 May 2000. Ibid.

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Moldavian relations with the Central and East European accession countries will accelerate this process. Due to the fact that this regime will not be able to improve the economic situation significantly, negative economic phenomena such as corruption, illicit trade, traffic in arms, drugs and persons will disproportionately multiply and constitute a real danger for neighbouring countries. The existence of the uncontrolled PMR thriving on illegal activities and an unsettled border with Ukraine are other factors in this regard. In order to stabilise the political and economic situation, thus contributing to a reduction of security risks, the international community might consider: A more active involvement in the solution of the Dniester conflict, inducing Russia to withdraw the 14th Army and simultaneously inducing Transnistrian leaders to seek a realistic compromise with Moldova. Including the Dniester issue in the wider framework of co-operation with Russia, keeping in mind the important role of Russia in the conflict. The decision to withdraw the 14th Army from the region has to be Moscows decision. Opportunities for financial support of the process of economic reforms in Moldova, currently in a state of stagnation with a potential for a reversal of reforms. This support should be made conditional on Moldovas commitment to promote political, legal and economic reforms in the country; to fight corruption, the shadow economy and smuggling; and to introduce reliable border regulations, especially with Ukraine. Assistance to Moldova in finding alternative energy supplies and raw materials, thus reducing its dependence on Russia. Inducing Romania and Moldova to settle the issue of dual Romanian-Moldavian citizenship in line with European rules, and to elaborate pragmatic solutions for Moldavians with double or triple citizenship.

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Issue Reports

Minority Problems Legacies of the Past, Ethnic and Territorial Conflict Potentials
Eiki Berg, Wim van Meurs

I Introduction
The disintegration of the post-war political order dramatically changed the situation of national minorities in Eastern Europe. The breakdown of communist rule led not only to changes of government, but also to a reorganisation of statehood. It provided new opportunities for the emergence of democratic regimes and for the self-determination of those nations that had failed to gain independence after the First World War, particularly Slovenia, Croatia and Slovakia. At the same time, almost all the new post-communist states inherited sizeable national minorities and, in other cases, faced the upsurge of new emancipation movements. Both newly created and consolidated states restored to independence opened a new phase of state-formation and nation-building, using tools that guaranteed majority rule and territorial integrity, partly at the expense of minority rights. Cultural standardisation and other nationalising policies were found to be in practice even in consolidated and rather homogenous nation-states such as Poland and Hungary. The numerous cases of escalating ethnic strife within post-communist states have demonstrated that domestic ethnicity is an important factor of post-Cold War European security because of the internationalisation of ethnic relations. For the international community, the perceived need to regulate minority rights in Eastern Europe on the grounds of security concerns and democratic values was given additional impetus by the escalation of violent conflict in former Yugoslavia. The Balkan Wars and the diverging responses from within the EU reinforced the dangers of encouraging minority secession.1

D. Chandler: The OSCE and the Internationalisation of National Minority Rights, in: K. Cordell (ed.): Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe, London 1999, pp. 61 73.

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The only state on the current EU Eastern external border with no significant minority or border problems is Finland, where the traditional Swedish minority has been fully integrated into the Finnish society with territorial autonomy for the Swedish-speaking land Island, while the status of Finnish-speaking but Orthodox Karelians across the border is not seriously enough involved in bilateral Finnish-Russian relations to cause tensions or result setbacks. The theoretical framework of this analysis involves both the input of the minority survey and the output of policy recommendations. On the input side, the assumptions are that nations are constructions or imagined communities and that a collective (national) past is on the same ontological level. This distinction between categories of practice and categories of theory identifies ethnicity and the past as real risk potentials, without attributing a Huntingtonian clash that is beyond remedy and leaves containment as the only possible strategy.2 Rather, the enlargement of the EU should and does contribute actively to stability and a reduction of risks along its future border. Without accepting a functionalist reductionism denying the self-momentum of historical and ethnical arguments, the connections between these arguments and current political, socioeconomic and systemic tensions should be emphasised here: The EU enlargement is both a stabilising and a destabilising factor as far as minorities and legacies of the past along the future external border are concerned. On the output side, recommendations and caveats for a European policy dealing with these specific risks in borderland politics will be formulated. As a consequence of the theoretical assumptions noted above, the following survey on minorities merely serves as an orientation, a heuristic instrument, not as an explication of the actual problems and risks themselves. The structural causes and political functions of ethnical and historical conflict potentials in a region between post-communist transition and EU integration suggest a comparative perspective for both empirical analysis and policy recommendations, despite the specifics of each border segment. The consequences of historical legacies as well as ethnic and territorial conflict potentials along the border of a future enlarged EU from Murmansk on the coast of the Barents Sea in the north to Galati on the Danube estuary in the south are all surveyed from the perspective of the enlargement process. Thus, the three largest minority groups along this border are Russians/Russophones,3 Hungarians and Romanians/Moldavians, as well as the largest territorial change, that of the westward shift of the Polish state and the consecutive territorial enlargement of Ukraine and Belarus. Four different minorities are highlighted to the
2 3 Huntington: Clash of Civilisations. Russophones refers to all former, non-Baltic Soviet citizens in the Baltic states as they tend to be Russified to a large degree. Russian-speakers would be a misleading term as many Balts also speak Russian as a second language.

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extent that vector constellations of minority genesis, political mobilisation, post-communist transition, regional state relations and EU enlargement are demonstrated:4 1. Russians (or Russophones) in the Baltic States (northern tier); 2. Poles in the former Polish territories to the east (central tier); 3. Hungarians in the neighbouring countries (southern tier); and 4. Romanians in the neighbouring countries (southern tier). Comparative ethno-demographic and socioeconomic data as well as information on historical background, nation-building processes and the current minorities legislation of the host countries are used to demonstrate the specifics and to define the decisive factors for a (de-)escalation of conflict potentials on a comparative level and, thereby, serve as the starting point for European strategies. Thus, policy recommendations are neither reduced to Vlkerverstndigung measures and other soft policy instruments implied by a discourse analysis, nor to external diplomatic pressure interfering in classical minority legislation. The EU, moreover, is perceived not only as a high-capacity generator of economic development and social stability, but also as an enhanced foreign-policy and security actor, no longer restricted to accession negotiations in its policy instrumentarium. The time dimension is emphasised in the processes of triangular majority-minority-homeland relations in the past decade on the one hand, and in the EUs window of opportunity to influence interethnic relations both before and after Eastern enlargement on the other hand.

II Ethnic and historical identities as political constructions

To understand the processes of state-formation and nation-building in Eastern Europe better, one should not merely reduce the upsurge of ethnic tensions and revival of nationalism to the post-communist political instrumentalisation and historical legacies, although all these do bear importance. Quite similarly, the presumed post-communist revival of pre-communist history and nationalism cannot ignore the transitional dimension as a current conflict potential. Therefore it looks reasonable to take socioeconomic, regional and other factors into consideration as well. Following this logic, ethnopolitics5 includes all policies relevant to the (power) relations between nationbuilding majorities and ethnic minorities. Lynn Williams has put it in other words to show how some groups wield the political power to construct a national identity,
4 The issue of the Roma population in Central and Eastern Europe has been excluded, as the authors consider this an issue of social integration and discriminatory perceptions, involving no external homelands and classical minority legislation only to a limited extent. J. Rothschild: Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework, New York 1981.

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whereas others seek political power in order to protect and even reconstruct a national identity that they believe already exists.6 Despite the common denominator nationbuilding, the post-communist variety should be distinguished from earlier processes of nation and state-building in terms of interfering processes taking place simultaneously: the triple transition, the transfer of sovereignty to a European level of decisionmaking, the growing importance of regional (sub-state and inter-state) co-operation as well as the dialectical integration of earlier (communist and pre-communist) phases of nation-building. The doctrine that nation and state must coincide has led multicultural states to engage in the construction of a single nation and the assimilation of the minority groups within their borders into the culture of the politically dominant group. Conversely, it has led minorities to defend their separate identity by seeking political control over their own affairs. In the post-communist era, ethnic communities have become more assertive, forcing the young democracies of Eastern Europe to respond to the challenge of ethnicity. Moreover, the correspondence between nation and state has been extremely fragile. To be more precise, nation-building and state-formation in post-communist Eastern Europe has been a complicated task given that in many of these states the understanding of state and nation is not synonymous. The understanding of nationhood has often been ethnocentric and differentialist, making it an ethnocultural rather than a political fact. These countries have used tools (or states nationalising policies) such as the use of official language policies to promote nation-building (cultural standardisation), or even the use of immigration and naturalisation policies to protect or promote a particular national identity (ethnopolitics).7

Integration of past and present nation-building phases Nation-builders are engaged in reinventing, defining, clarifying and homogenising boundaries. These practices of nation-building involve ensembles of acts to create nation space and nation time, the projection of imaginary community and the homogenisation of nation space.8 These nationalising practices are at work in the founding constitution of community and the re-negotiation of boundaries of citizenship and be6 7 L. Williams: National Identity and the Nation State: Construction, Reconstruction and Contradiction, in: K. Cameron (ed.): National Identity, Exeter 1999, pp. 7 18. E. g., W. Kymlicka: Ethnic Relations and Western Political Theory, in: M. Opalski (ed.): Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe, Forum Eastern Europe 1998. E. g., G. Dijkink: National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain, London and New York 1996.

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longing. This applies to the largely disenfranchised Russophones in the Baltic states, to the neglect of Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, and to the Romanian-speaking Moldavians who perfectly fit into the Romanian nation idea, although they prefer to build a state of their own. Thus, any identity can be defined in terms of opposites by either a common origin or a common structure of experience (colonised/colonisers, immigrants/indigenous) or both.9 This has also very much to do with legacies that refer to the history of interethnic relations, including historical evolution of conflict, related collective memories, ethnically relevant ideologies and policies pursued by the regime or its antedates. 10 Legacies are important, as ethnic groups not only inherit but also reshape collective myths and beliefs. In the process, the past is redefined: What is believed about history and what is remembered or forgotten in collective memory is decisive for current mobilisation and risk potentials. In such essentialist accounts of the past, identities are therefore represented as linear, continuous and above all singular, part of the project bound up with primordialisation of the nation through searching for and delineating a pre-communist and pre-colonial cultural purity for the nation, which is juxtaposed to the more recent heterogenisation and transformed colonial past that threatened or destroyed the nations culture. Rediscovering an ethnic past or a national history, especially of a Golden Age of ethnic unity and well-defined stateness acts as an inspiration for contemporary problems and needs in Eastern Europe.11 The past is marked by the break of communist rule, an artificial interruption of nation-building, one that did not follow the majority will. The past also casts a long shadow on the present, shapes the environment in which the battle takes place to define and defend new institutions. In this light, regime transitions acquire additional explanatory value, although often resulting in rather contradictory conclusions. Here the point of departure is the idea that cultural standardisation provides a necessary building block for the post-communist states economic and political modernisation. Thus, nation-building may catch up in a form of identity politics, designed to produce and reproduce nationally defined contours of community and to reflect nationally defined interests and values in which nation and state should be spatially congruent. Linguistic, cultural and educational standardisation in Eastern Europe is therefore commensurate with running a more efficient national economy and with producing a

9 10 11

G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr, E. Allworth: Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities, Cambridge 1999, p. 15. A. Aklaev: Democratisation and Ethnic Peace. Patterns of Ethnopolitical Crisis Management in Post-Soviet Settings, Aldershot 1999, p. 88. G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr, E. Allworth: op. cit., p. 15.

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more harmonious and loyal citizenry. This is also the reason why one may often agree that the triple transition the simultaneous transformations of state identities, political regimes and economic systems has failed to attenuate nationalist tensions. However, within the context of triple transition, the decisive ingredient with regard to the mobilisation of people around the banner of ethnicity is still the economy. When the economy begins to malfunction, or where there exists the perception that the economic product of society is not being distributed equally, the possibility for disturbance arises.12 Despite different (normative) views on the role of democratisation to the revival of nationalism, one may still agree that state, nation and identity have been at the very centre of post-communist transition.13 First, nationalism played a decisive role in undermining the socialist states in Eastern Europe. It was not simply a return to the pre-communist past with the resurgence of old cultural, religious and territorial conflicts, but also included new dimensions and dynamics of nationalism. Rather than serving as a vehicle of mass mobilisation, ethnicity is mostly being used by the newly established governments as an instrument for the consolidation of their power. Second, ethno-nationalist values have become salient in political discourses not only of minority groups seeking greater self-determination, but also of majorities fearful of losing influence or access to key resources. Third, in some cases, the nation has become not only the vehicle for dismantling communism, but also a refugee for those seeking scapegoats for the pain of economic transition. Fourth, ethnicity has had a powerful impact on the definition and the practice of citizenship.

Majorities, minorities and external homelands Nationalism has been central to politics in and among the newly created nation states whereas nationalising claims, made in the name of a core nation, defined in ethnocultural terms and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole, have helped to build the nation from the position of the legitimate owner of the state.14 The external national homelands are directly challenging these nationalising efforts. A state becomes an external national homeland when cultural or political elites construe certain residents and citizens of other states as co-nationals, i. e., as fellow members of a single transborder nation, and when they assert that this shared nationhood makes the state

12 13 14

Ibid, p. 8. A. Aklaev: op. cit., pp. 108 109. R. Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge 1996, p. 5.

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responsible for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states and possess other citizenships.15 This kind of triadic relational interplay between national minorities, nationalising states and external national homelands has had a significant impact on the post-communist political space in the Eastern Europe where Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles and Hungarians have found themselves mismatched, attached by formal citizenship to one state, yet by ethno-national affinity to another. The same border regions and people with contested ethnic belonging and unclear political (civic) affiliation in the East is a symbolic battlefield for many Westerners, a risk potential to be taken seriously as long as the EU Eastern enlargement is on the agenda. Therefore, deeply rooted and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging may potentially make the dynamic interplay between non-Russian successor states, Russophone minorities (including ethnic Ukrainians and Belarussians) and the Russian Federation a locus of a refractory and potentially explosive conflict in coming years.16 Again, this view is supported by the fact that majority nationalists regard the existence of ethnic minorities as an awkward anomaly, as their self-perceived role in the political community is difficult to reconcile with the ethno-nationalist definition of the state. 17 At worst, minorities are regarded as an outright threat to national security and the states territorial integrity, especially when members of the minority population consider themselves to be the ethnic relatives (or co-nationals) of a population dominating a neighbouring state. In this respect, the threat perceptions are not uniform across the region, but uncertainty and insecurity still are and to a considerable extent remain pervasive because of the security vacuum between East and West that heightens a sense of vulnerability.18 The dynamic relationship between nationalising regimes and national minorities offers two important perspectives.19 The first concerns the extent to which minorities constitute a regionalised community, inhabiting a particular region with which they have had a long association or which they regard as their ancestral homeland. The second important variable is whether a minority possesses a patron state or external homeland, one which considers co-nationals living in a borderland state as part of its responsibility and which is willing and able to devote considerable economic, political and even mili-

15 16 17

18 19

Ibid, p. 5. Ibid, p. 54. S. Mihalikova: The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia: Conflict over Autonomy. Managing Diversity, in: M. Opalski (ed.): Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe, Forum Eastern Europe 1998. A. Aklaev: op. cit., p. 39. G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr, E. Allworth: op. cit., p. 18.

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tary resources to protecting and advancing their interests. Where regionalism and patronage overlap, they create a potential to question the territorial integrity that is invariably perceived by the nationalising state as the greatest threat. Concerning the East European region, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Romania and Hungary are clearly in the position of patron countries, while Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania have regionally concentrated border minorities. This fact alone does not mean that secession and irredentism are unavoidable. Predominantly, East European states have managed to regulate majority-minority relations at a satisfactory level without ethnic clashes, forced migration and civil war.

III Ethnic minorities along the future eastern border of the EU

Most East Europeans belong to the so-called delayed nations,20 where the complexity of inter-ethnic relations has been aggravated by the poor fit of national and ethnocultural borders, unsettled territorial claims and the ingrained practice of turning minorities into the subjects of political manipulation. Even today, inter-ethnic relations by and large depend on the developments concerning the transnational diasporas, especially when these minority groups, such as Hungarians, Russians, Poles and Romanians, are calculated in millions (see Table 1). The other side of the coin of the state nation misfit is the ethnic composition of the nation-states themselves: The dominant ideal of the ethnically homogeneous nation-state has in some cases made the titular nation hesitant to admit the mere existence of (small) minorities e. g., in the case of Poland or eager to apply heavy-handed nationalising policies against larger (particularly formerly dominant) minorities e. g., in the case of Latvia or Estonia and the Russophones. The transition process towards pluralist democracy and market economy in the first half of the 1990s and the requirements of EU accession in the second half have really been key factors in the triangular majority-minority-homeland relations, both positively and negatively; the prospect of EU membership has pressured national governments to amend discriminatory legislation and review its minority policies in an integrationist, European sense and eliminated many a minority problem between two future/current EUmember states from the political agenda. This policy priority of national governments, however, has, in some cases, given minority representatives and external homelands excessive leverage, while allowing national governments to divert the responsibility for unpopular changes in minority policy and legislation to the EU.

20

G. Brunner: Nationality Problems and Minority Conflicts in Eastern Europe, Gtersloh 1996.

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Table 1: Congruence of nation and state along the EUs future eastern border 21
Nation-state Co-nationals in neighbouring countries per cent of titular nation Finland (1998) Estonia (1997) Latvia (1989/96) Lithuania (1997) Poland (1992) 50 in Russia, 10 in Estonia 60 in Russia, 10 in Finland 47 in Russia 40 in Latvia, 20 in Poland 420 in Belarus, 250 in Lithuania, 220 in Ukraine 110 in Hungary 1,620 in Romania, 570 in Slovakia, 340 in Serbia, 160 in Ukraine 2,810 in Moldova, 800 in Ukraine, 40 in Serbia 1% 7% 0% 2% 2% 380,000 510,000 1,060 680,000 810,000 Minorities in the nation-state per cent of total population 7% 35 % 43 % 18 % 2%

Slovakia (1991) Hungary (1992)

2% 22 %

760,000 900,000

15 % 9%

Romania (1992)

15 %

2,140

11 %

Ethnic entrepreneurs have found fertile ground for minority mobilisation due to the overall upheaval of institutions, the de-legitimisation of existing structures and the unequal (re)distribution of socioeconomic resources and civic rights. Many further increased the domestic and international destabilising potential of minority issues by searching eagerly for their home countries protection (or by being sought after themselves by political entrepreneurs from their home-countries).22 Within the larger framework of nation-building and minority reactions, Eastern Europe presents a variety of cases. The demands pressed for by ethnic Russians in the Soviet successor states reflect the anxieties of adjustment to an insecure, unwanted and previously unimaginable status that of a national minority. The second largest minority of Eastern Europe, the
21 Sources: Demographic Data Collection of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1998; Latvia Human Development Report 1997; Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/tk/tp/tasku/index.html) 29 May 2000; J. Bugajsky: Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organisations and Parties, Armonk 1995; M. E. Sharpe, O. Kurs, R. Taagepera: Karelia: Orthodox Finland, in: R. Taagepera: The Finno-Ugric Republics and the Russian State, London 1999, pp. 100 146. J. Snyder, K. Ballentine: Nationalism in the Marketplace of Ideas, in: Michael E. Brown (ed.): Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, pp. 61 96.

22

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Hungarians, are unlikely to drop their demands of cultural and territorial autonomy in Slovakia and Romania; demands which are continuously but cautiously supported by the government in Budapest. On the other hand, Polish minorities in the East are hardpressed to find sufficient ethnocultural identity to distinguish themselves from neighbouring ethnic groups and force the nationalising state to recognise their cause. Finally, the issue of the Romanians and/or Moldavians in Ukraine and Moldova combines territorial claims across a future EU external border and a state-building nation refusing to be relegated to the status of a minority by its external homeland. With the EU Eastern enlargement project, a new dominant player has appeared on the scene in the classic Brubakerian triangle,23 and its interference in minority and border issues along the external border before and after enlargement is both politically intentional and structurally unintentional. The following section deals with four dimensions of this issue: legacies of the past and current ethno-demographic data constitute the first dimensions determining the current development of minority and border issues in the context of post-communist transition and EU Enlargement, the other dimensions being nation-building and minority legislation; the nexus of socioeconomic status of minorities and post-communist transition (ethnopolitics and market dynamics); and the complex relation between two nationstates/homelands and one (or two reciprocal) minorities.

IV Historical background and the ethno-demographic situation

The minorities and border issues dealt with in this survey are restricted to those of the future external border of the EU, assuming a one- or two-phase enlargement of the Union to be finalised in the medium term. With the accession of the ten Central and East European states in the foreseeable future, a new EU external border will be defined both to the east and to the southeast. The eastern border seems quite certain for years to come: By means of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements24 and the more recent Common Strategies for Russia and Ukraine, the EU has successfully strengthened bilateral relations with Moscow, Kiev and Chisinau without the option or even perspective of accession. Conversely, with the Stability Pact as well as the Stabilisation and Association Process, all the countries of Southeastern Europe now do have this perspective, no matter how distant. As Southeast European borders will be dealt with in a separate

23 24

R. Brubaker: op. cit., pp. 3 7. The PCA with Belarus being on hold for obvious reasons.

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chapter in Volume II, only the border from Murmansk to Galati need concern us here, involving nine countries inside and four countries outside the future European border. Thus, the German-Polish border does not figure here any more, while somewhat arbitrarily the Romanian-Hungarian border is included as it might be a temporary external border, assuming a two-phase model of enlargement with a Luxembourg and a Helsinki group, whilst the Czech-Slovakian border is not included, for lack of substantial minority conflict potentials. Similarly, the interesting case of the lengthy Finnish-Russian border and the Karelian issue is also excluded.25 The Russophone minorities in the Baltic Republics were largely the product of the close neighbourhood of the Russian Federation by the central authorities that encouraged the large-scale immigration of the labour force to meet the local demands of Soviet industrialisation and national policies. A socioeconomic specific of Russians in the Baltic region as compared to overall Russian and Russophone migration to the national republics tended to be their blue-collar socioeconomic profile. Those in other republics tended to be concentrated in the nomenklature, economic management and other white-collar professions. Consequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union affected mostly the Russian people and other East Slavic groups such as Belorussians and Ukrainians who suddenly found themselves living in states which they did not consider their own. The post-communist transition also affected these Eastern Slav immigrants disproportionately with regard to the decline of the Soviet industry (cf. the subsection below entitled: Post-communist ethnopolitics and the economics of ethnicity). The Russian nation as a whole has to come to terms with the fact that today 25 million of their group members (17 per cent) live as minorities in other nation-states. This fact pertains directly to post-imperial identity configurations in Russia and the classic dilemma of the specific merger of national and imperial identities in the Russian case, often summarised in the bonmot: Great-Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire. The same is true for seven million Ukrainians (15 per cent) and two million Belorussians (21 per cent) residing beyond the state borders. Ukrainians and Belorussians living abroad are to a large extent linguistically russified. In respect to the Baltic countries, Russians number 1.5 million people and constitute the biggest minority group in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Tab. 2). Geographically they are strongly concentrated in the capital cities, some other major cities and the industrial regions of Estonias Northeast and Latvias Latgale province as well as the city of Snieckus at the Ignalina nuclear power station. In particular in Estonia and Latvia, Russophones do not constitute a homogeneous minority group, neither in terms of civil rights (citizens of the Baltic states, non-citizens or Russian citizens) nor in terms of socioeconomic status (winners of
25 R. Taagepera: op. cit.

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transition in the western cities and among businessmen, losers of transition in the eastern periphery and among pensioners). The number of Poles abroad should nowadays amount to 0.9 million people living in the independent nation-states of Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, including the descendants of those who lived in the Rzeczpospolita prior to the Second World War. As a result of the Soviet-German Pact and the Secret Additional Protocols of 23 August and 28 September 1939, these Polish Eastern Territories came under Soviet rule. Whereas the Polish minorities have widely been assimilated in Belarus and Ukraine and do not represent a potential for minority conflicts any longer, in Lithuania they have clearly maintained their national identity. But even this may be doubtful since many continue to argue whether these people are really Poles because of their language and culture which is rather similar to Belorussian.26 According to this view, the Vilnius region became Polish only because of the predominant Catholic faith and forced assimilation during the interwar years. Whereas Polish national parties and movements have a limited attraction and mobilising effect in the relevant regions of Belarus and Ukraine indeed, Poles constitute a better organised and more vocal minority in Lithuania. The Hungarian minorities in Hungarys neighbouring countries together represent one of the largest, most developed and internally self-contained ethnic groups. They settle in a relatively compact way in those regions that were cut off from Hungary after World War I, namely Transylvania in Romania, Southern Slovakia, province of Vojvodina in Serbia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. This minority consists of more than three million people approximately a quarter of all Hungarian people live beyond the national borders today. In all of these cases, a strong linguistic and cultural homogeneity and a marked political feeling of identity distinguish the Hungarians. This is also demonstrated by almost unanimous political preferences and ethnic voting patterns, particularly in Romania and in Slovakia. However, the Hungarian share in the total population of the neighbouring countries is gradually decreasing due to lower birth rates, continuing emigration and (to a minimal extent) assimilation into the dominant groups. As the Hungarians also tend to vote ethnically, this tendency erodes their political standing in the long run.27 Another group of similar size are the approximately 3.5 million Romanians and Moldavians living abroad. Following the annexation of Bessarabia and North Bukovina

26

27

E. g., E. Gordon: The Revival of Polish National Consciousness: A Comparative Study of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1996, pp. 217 235; S. Burant: Belarus and the Belarussian Irredenta in Lithuania. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1997, pp. 643 657. E. g., G. Brunner: op. cit.; A. Bell: The Hungarians in Romania since 1989. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996, pp. 491 507.

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by Stalin in 1940, they came under Soviet power. Today they make up just under 15 per cent of the Romanian nation, whereas the 2.8 million Moldavians aka. Romanians constitute a two-thirds majority of the population in the Republic of Moldova. The rest of them live in Ukraine Southern Bessarabia (the Odessa territory) and North Bukovina (the Cernovcy Oblast).28 What requires a special reference here is the identity of Moldavians who, in spite of the common language which is Romanian, claim to form a distinct group deserving its own state.29 Twentieth century policies of identity-making and shifting state borders have made for a particularly complex interplay of legacies of the past and ethnic identities: 100 years of contradictory Romanian and Soviet efforts to shape and remould the identity of the local Romance population have made the current Moldavian nation and state-identity rather fragile and subject to a seemingly endless debate, involving both Moldavian politicians, Romanian interference and discursive legacies of the past. Thus, while even the 1989 Soviet census distinguished between Moldavians in the Moldavian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) and Romanians in the adjacent Cernovcy Oblast, now the debate continues whether Moldavian belongs to Romania on historical and/or ethnic grounds or whether it should be an independent state as a Moldavian nation-state or a multiethnic civic state.30 Additionally, Romania may claim the Moldavian state (giving up the Dnestr Republic) and parts of Ukraine on grounds of ethnic state-building and/or historical justice. Russia claims no territory, but influences Moldavian politics, using the 14th Army base and the puppet regime in the break-away region of the Dnestr Republic as leverage. The regime in Tiraspol in turn demands a confederalisation of the Moldavian state, all the more so in case of Romanian-Moldavian unification. Ukraine is generally supportive of Chisinau as it objects to both Romanian claims and Russian influence. Moldova could (and in some politicians view, ought to) lay claim on parts of Ukraine and even parts of Romania under the header Moldavian state reunification.31

28 29 30 31

W. van Meurs: Romanen, in: Studienhandbuch stliches Europa II, Berlin 2000. Cf. also J. Chinn, S. Roper: Ethnic Mobilisation and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1995, pp. 291 323. Carving a Moldavian Identity out of History, in: Nationalities Papers. Vol. 26, No. 1 1998; C. King: The Moldavians: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, Hoover Institution Press 2000. To these issues, cf. also Skvartsova Vol. I.

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Table 2: Ethnic composition of the states along the EUs future eastern border 32
(x 1,000) per cent (x 1,000) per cent (x 1,000) per cent (x 1,000) per cent Finland (1998) Titular nation Russians Belorussians Ukrainians Total Titular nation Russians Belorussians Ukrainians Total Titular nation Russians Moldavians Poles Hungarians Belorussians Ukrainians Baltic nations Karelians Total 19,152 4,335 291 2.9 600 13.8 418 4.1 4,779 23 n. a n. a 5,160 Poland (1992) 37,605 n. a 200 300 38,418 Belarus (1989) 7,905 1,342 77.9 13.2 97.9 n. a 0.5 0.8 92.6 0.5 Estonina (1997) 950 413 22 37 1,464 Slovakia (1991) 4,512 n. a n. a 14 5,269 Moldova (1989) 2,795 562 64.4 12.9 179 95 57 1,206 4,363 163 125 147,022 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8 3.0 0.1 0.1 51,471 0.3 85.6 n. a 65.0 28.2 1.5 2.5 Latvia (1997) 1,394 742 104 68 2,480 Hungary (1991) 9,477 n. a n. a n. a 10,375 119,866 81.5 91.4 56.2 29.9 4.2 2.7 Lithuania (1997) 3,024 305 55 37 3,707 Romania (1992) 20,353 39 n. a 67 22,760 35,489 10,472 416 258 164 73,6 21,1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 89,4 0.2 81.6 8.2 1.5 1.0

Russian Fed. (1989) Ukraine (1989)

The prominent factors in the above minority profiles the background of territorial conquests as well as the current demographic strength and regional concentration of minorities have, however, been a rather minor and indirect factor in the development of majority-minority relations in the last ten years of the 20th century as a period of momentous political and socioeconomic transition. This is true also for nation-state and geopolitical rearrangements related to the end

32

Sources: Demographic Data Collection of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1998; Latvia Human Development Report 1997. Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/tk/tp/tasku/index.html) 29 May 2000; J. Bugajsky: op. cit.; G. Brunner: op. cit.; Rossijskij statisticeskij ezegodnik, Moscow 1996, pp. 42 44.

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of communism and the prospect of EU Eastern enlargement. As illustrated by the minority profiles, moreover, historical justice and ethnic logic often fail to coincide. In the transition process and the concurrent competition between minority emancipation and nationalising states, the current cultural, linguistic and, last but not least, socioeconomic distinctions between majority and minority were a key factor. Typically (and historically), in the central tier of the Polish, Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian neighbourhood at the eastern border, the nations and minorities lack the objective and obvious distinguishing characteristic: Languages and cultures by and large constitute a regional continuum. Together with the long accumulation of divisions and identifications, this may water down at least the ethnic, if not the historical factor in the transition, reducing the risks of ethnopolitics. Furthermore, minorities here are not overly and visibly concentrated in specific economic sectors, economic regions, in the centre or the periphery, etc. Nor do they have a radically different level of urbanisation, modernisation or education from neighbouring nations and nationalities.33 Conversely, both in the northern tier of the Baltic-Russian neighbourhood and in the southern tier of the Hungarian, Romanian, Moldavian, Slovak and Ukrainianneighbourhood,thedistinctionsaremorepronounced.TheBalticnationshavemodernised early enough to have their own urban population and elite and to consolidate their national language and culture vis--vis the Russian immigrants: In many cases, longstanding Slavic immigrants feel they have become (in terms of mentality and culture, rather than language) more Baltic and estranged to mainstream Russian life.34 What makes the Baltic states an exception among the accession states are the fifty years of Soviet imperial hegemony and Russian cultural/linguistic dominance as well as the extreme socioeconomic asymmetries between majority and minority as a consequence of Soviet modernisation and nationalities policy. Hungarians distinguish themselves from the neighbouring titular nations by language and religion, historically belonging disproportionately to either the urban or the rural middle class. Moldavians do not have these clues for self-identification versus their Romanian neighbours, who perceive them pejoratively as peasantry and lower class co-nationals. Moldavians, however, distinguish themselves on all accounts from their Russian/Ukrainian neighbours, in particular those in the Dnestr Republic: linguistically, culturally as well as in terms of socioeconomic status and orientation. Compared to Tiraspol, the more rural half of Moldova is doing quite well in economic transition. The communist-conservative economic policies of the Dnestr Republic are closely related to

33 34

Ethnic Conflict and Migration in Europe, Rome 1999, pp. 37 168. P. Kolstoe: Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London 1995, pp. 127 133.

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the high concentration of Soviet-time military and heavy industry, to a certain extent comparable to Russophones in the Baltic states. In sum, two priority tasks have been set for the reborn post-communist nationstates: first, the restoration of the dominance of the titular nation, its political elite, language and culture by means of classic minority policies and second, ethnopolitics, that is, balancing the nexus between transition policies and relative socioeconomic position of majority and minorities.

Nation-building and state-formation in Eastern Europe The break-up of the Soviet Empire and the Eastern Block did not lead to completely new frontiers but rather turned sub-state federal borders into state borders along the fault line of the future EU Eastern border. Nevertheless, in line with a concept of the state as the property of the nation-state and with recurrence to a pre-communist past reputed to have been in line with that concept, all future states along the future EU border went through a phase of reaffirming this concept of state and nation in legislation: constitution, language law, citizenship law, naturalisation regulations, etc. Thus, federal republics turned into states and dependent states into independent states. The vigour, direction and endurance of these nationalising state policies depended and depends on a complex of vectors, producing quite different resultants for Russians, Hungarians and Romanian/Moldavians outside the state borders and across future EU borders.

Restoration of statehood and citizenry in Estonia and Latvia In Estonia and Latvia the nationality question was intensified by the dominant ethnic concept of the homogeneous nation-state. These titular nations perceived the Russian population as a legacy of the Soviet past and, in consequence, as a minority which was not historically grown. The naturalisation legislation was based on the principle that Estonia and Latvia, in contrast to other former Soviet republics, are neither new states nor successor states of the Soviet Union. Thus, the legislation was mainly shaped by the national line which gave the protection of the titular nation priority over an integrative concept of the nation: initially, only those who could prove their ancestry dating back to the pre-war republic automatically got citizenship. All other, predominately Russian-speaking post-war immigrants turned out to be subject to naturalisation. The restored body of citizens came to be 90 per cent Estonian in Estonia and 78 per cent Latvian in Latvia. 144

Within the last eight years, the number of non-citizens has not diminished much, especially in Latvia where strict naturalisation regulations were applied from 1995 to 1997. More precisely, the alien population was divided up into various age brackets, each of which was entitled to apply during a specific year, applications from persons in the last of these brackets only being accepted in 2003. As a consequence, less than 5 per cent of eligible non-citizens had applied for citizenship and undergone naturalisation in Latvia. In Estonia, naturalisation policies turned out to be slightly more liberal, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, recognising general knowledge of the state language and two years of permanent residence in Estonia sufficient to become an Estonian citizen. Still, 25 per cent of the Estonian population is alien today and among non-Estonians about 30 per cent have gained Estonian citizenship (in Latvia 28 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively). Non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia are barred from certain occupations, cannot directly acquire ownership of land and have no right to vote in national elections.35 Although there has been tension in ethnic relations, non-violent but tense interethnic relations have been the norm.36 Low levels of participation and weak political identification have mitigated the tension of possible confrontation in ethnic relations. Paradoxically, political alienation among minorities has become a stabilising factor. As noted above, the possibility of ethnic confrontation in Estonia and Latvia has also been reduced by disunity and diversity within ethnic groups. Another stabilising factor has been the active involvement of the international community in the promotion of integration and the modification of nationalising legislation. As recommended in the Commissions 1998 Regular Report, the Estonian and Latvian parliaments have adopted amendments to their citizenship laws concerning stateless children, and both governments have put force action plans to mandate the Integration Foundation with the task of elaborating a state integration programme for the period of 2000 2007. Furthermore, in Estonia, the government decided to open a representation of the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs in the northeast of Estonia, a region populated predominantly by Russian-speakers.37 Although, the previously existing age windows system was abolished in Latvia, certain restrictions remained. Non-citizens are still not

35 36 37

Commission Opinion on Latvias Application for Membership of the European Union (July 15, 1997), http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/latvia/op_07_97/b1.htm (15 January 2000). E. Berg: Estonias Northeastern Periphery in Politics: Socioeconomic and Ethnic Dimensions, Tartu likooli Kirjastus 1999; Latvian Human Development Report 1997. UNDP. Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 13 October 1999, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/estonia/rep_10-99/b12.htm (15 January 2000).

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allowed to practise some professions (lawyer, armed security guard and private detective) on the grounds of state security.38

Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine face-to-face with the Hungarian minority The post-communist East European states with sizeable Hungarian minorities have in most cases excluded this group as the most numerous and vocal one from participation in nation-building as a state-forming subject.39 For example, the minority policies of the third Meciar government in Slovakia (1994 1998) enforced the concept of the dominant, state-forming, and ruling Slovak nation in many areas of social life. Its manifestations were a new language law, the radical limitation of state support to cultural organisations of minorities, the enforcing of bilingual education for the Hungarian minority and the progressive restriction of the minorities participation in the state administration.40 Similar tendencies have been largely evident also in Romania, where the Constitution (1993), public administration (1994) and education (1995) laws have sanctioned the status quo of discrimination. The constitution defines Romania as a nation-state, sovereign, unitary and indivisible. 41 The public administration law of 1994 established the exclusive use of Romanian language; and the educational law of 1995 placed restrictions on schooling in the mother tongue and on religious education.42 The termination of Vojvodinas autonomous status by Serbian president Milosevic and the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991 led to the exodus of 50,000 ethnic Hungarians.43 Today, the situation of the Hungarian minority can be described as totally satisfactory only in Slovenia and in Croatia, where the protection of minorities is guaranteed by bilateral agreements with Hungary. In Carpatho-Ukraine, too, where they benefit from a co-operation in minority questions agreed upon early between Ukraine and

38 39 40 41 42 43

Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 13 October 1999, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/latvia/rep_10_99/b12.htm (15 January 2000). M. Kusy: The Politics of National Minorities in Slovakia. Paper presented in the conference on Multiculturalism and Democracy in Divided Societies, Haifa 17/18 March 1999. E. Bakker: Changing Status of Slovakias Hungarians: From Minority Without Rights to Political Partner. Paper presented in the conference on Multiculturalism and Democracy in Divided Societies, Haifa, 17/18 March 1999. A. Bell: op. cit. Ethnic Conflict and Migration in Europe. First Report of the Eurobarometer Programme (May 1999). CSS CEMES, p. 83. A. Reisch: Hungarian Foreign Policy and the Magyar Minorities: New Foreign Policy Priorities. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996, pp. 447 463.

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Hungary, the situation of the Hungarian minority does not give cause for any substantive complaints.44 In Slovakia, the controversial Law on the State Language adopted in November 1995 repealed the earlier provisions allowing the use of a minority language for official communications in any town or village where the minority represented more than 20 per cent of the population. It significantly limited the use of languages other than Slovak in schools, state institutions and in the media. This ambiguous situation was further aggravated by certain government decisions such as reductions in the subsidies granted to Hungarian cultural associations and the cessation of bilingual school reports in Hungarian schools. 45 The display of bilingual signs in the cities and villages of Romania with minority populations even when they formed the local majority were not allowed. The same applied also to the local council meetings in Romania where minority languages were prohibited.46 Slovak and Romanian Hungarians have called for cultural and territorial autonomy, or collective rights that would enable the ethnic Hungarians to become a state-forming nation and not just a traditional national minority.47 The Slovak authorities have quite recently made significant progress in the area of minority rights. A Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, National Minorities and Regional Development was appointed soon after the change of government in 1998.48 Parliament established a Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities, including a commission for Roma issues. The Law on the Use of Minority Languages in Official Communications provides that persons belonging to minorities are able to use their language in official communications with public administrative organs and organs of local self-administration in those municipalities where the minority constitutes at least 20 per cent of the population. The conditions for use of minority languages in Romania, in particular Hungarian, have improved, too. In July, 1999 both chambers of parliament adopted the final version of the new education law which created the legal framework for establishing multicultural universities and gave national minorities the right to study in their mother tongue at all levels and forms of education when there is a

44 45 46 47

48

I. Kempe, W. van Meurs, B. von Ow (eds.): Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten und ihre stlichen Nachbarn, Gtersloh 1999, pp. 55 103. Commission Opinion on Slovakias Application for Membership of the European Union (15 July, 1997), http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/slovakia/op_07_97/b1.htm (15 January 2000). G. Szepe: The Position of Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia in 1996. Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999, pp. 69 88. M. Brusis, V. Niznansky: Die slowakische Verwaltungs- und Gebietsreform unter minderheitenpolitischem Aspekt, in: Sdosteuropa 46, Heft 3 4/1997, pp. 197 212 ; R. A. Haynes: Hungarian National Identity: Definition and Redefinition, in: P. Latawski (ed.): Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe, Basingstoke 1995, p. 98. Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 13 October 1999, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/slovakia/rep_10_99/b12.htm (15 January 2000).

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sufficient demand. In addition, the new law on local administration stipulates that civil servants working directly with the public must speak the language of an ethnic minority in areas where the minority represents at least 20 per cent of the population.49

A stateless nation The Polish minority in Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus could be seen as a stateless nation with the identity they have constructed for themselves. Some Poles feel themselves to be members of the Polish nation and nonetheless are integrated in the state to which they belong. Many Poles are residing in lands that historically have changed hands between Poland, Russia, Lithuania and today belong to Ukraine or Belarus. For many, their allegiance is to a state that no longer exists.50 The revival of Polish national consciousness is intertwined with attempts at stateand nation-building in Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus. The issues over which Lithuanias Polish minority appears willing to engage the government include the use of the Polish language, access to education, and regional autonomy. In making a claim for political autonomy, the Polish population was demanding acceptance of their status as a nationality in a manner similar to earlier Lithuanian demands for an independent state.51 However, in 1995, the Lithuanian parliament passed a new State Language Law which requires officials to pass exams in the Lithuanian language as a condition for holding government posts. At the same time, amendments to establish Polish as an official language in Polish-populated districts in the southeast of Lithuania were defeated. The Lithuanian parliament has also passed a law on territorial administrative units and their borders. The new law merges the capital with the Vilnius region, thereby significantly changing the ethnic composition of the city and making possible the elimination of Polish self-government. Polish discontent with their minority status in Ukraine and Belarus has not really been an issue for two main reasons. First of all, these new states have adopted liberal minority legislation, either because of the fluid national idea such as it is in Belarus, or rather complicated ethno-demographic structure as it is the case in Ukraine. Secondly, Polish identity is rather weak in these territories, without strongly supportive cultural attributes, except the Catholic faith.

49 50 51

Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 13 October 1999, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/romania/rep_10_99/b12.htm (15 January 2000). E. g., E. Gordon: op. cit. Ibid.

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One nation, two states? Conflicts of nation-building in Moldova Historically, Moldova was ruled by Russian tsars from 1812 until 1917, then incorporated into the Romanian state and after the Second World War annexed by the Soviet Union. Due to the legacy of the past, Soviet authorities succeeded to create the notion of a Moldavian language, returning to the original Cyrillic script and distinguishing Moldavians from Romanians. As a result of its history, Moldova never developed independent state structures apart from those of an (autonomous) Soviet Republic and witnessed an erratic process of state-formation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Moldavians can be considered Romanians, as they share the same language, practice the same faith and have the same history. It is a territory without its own separate nation, a political notion rather than an ethnic reality. However, civic nationbuilding proceeds as well as state-formation, for the majority of Moldavians rejected the re-unification with Romania in the 1994 referendum, the Chisinau government still does not control sovereignty over the self-proclaimed separatist Dnester Republic and has only limited control over the Gagauz territorial autonomy. It is hard to find a better example in the former Soviet Union of a new elite and government dominated by a titular nationality that was more accommodative to minorities in general and to the Russian minority in particular than the government that took power in Moldova in 1991. Citizenship was immediately granted to all; the language policy was both moderate and patient; education was supported in a variety of languages; and political representation was available to all groups.52 One of the aims was also to bring the Romanians and the Russians closer together to create conditions so that the Russians and the other minorities do not feel compelled to leave. To this end, each ethnic group has its own state-supported educational and cultural institutions. Romanian-speakers, while frustrated at the necessity of having to use Russian, have not forced the language issue, preferring instead to let the younger generations come to terms with the reality of Moldavian independence and assuming that time is on the side of the new state. On the other hand, reinforcing ethnic content with territorial identification has fostered the desire for total autonomy and independence. While attractive because it decentralises control over many day-to-day functions and services, the Moldavian policy also made the nation-building and state-formation task rather complicated to perform.

52

Cf. also J. Chinn, S. Roper: op. cit.

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Post-communist ethnopolitics and the economics of ethnicity One key factor of interethnic conflict is often underestimated or even denied by those involved: the linkage between ethnicity and socioeconomic power, between transition to a market economy and ethnic marginalisation. Earthly motives like a reorganisation of access to economic resources, social status and cultural capital would degrade the moral cause of national revival. Causal or more complex linkages between nationbuilding as a metaphysical imperative and post-communist transition run counter to the common myth of a natural process of re-emerging nations and national movements after half a century of communist repression. Nevertheless, the economics of ethnicity constitute a major factor in the consequences of the enlargement process, as well as for EU policy imperatives and options. Typically, the communist strategy of modernisation reinforced older and created new concentrations of nationalities in specific urban or rural regions, specific economic sectors or branches and specific social categories. Evidently, the concentrations and socioeconomic rifts generated by pre-communist regimes and policies were far less radical than those of communist social engineering. By the same reasoning, the socioeconomic and ethnic changes were far less drastic in the countries of the Eastern Bloc than in the republics of the Soviet Union. In these republics the early revolutionary fever and Stalinist forced migration, collectivisation and industrialisation had completely changed the socioeconomic and ethnic structure of regions that had barely reached the beginning of the modernisation process. The Baltic states became Soviet republics only in 1940, but the impact of Soviet modernisation and nationalities policies in these small states was nevertheless far more thorough and radical than in the seven other EU candidate countries. The radical transition process since the demise of communism has in most cases aggravated or reversed rather than alleviated these socioeconomic rifts, some of them along ethnic lines. In Estonia, for instance, employment declined by 23 per cent from 1989 to 1998. Due to the language-based division of labour of the Soviet period, this has affected Estonians and non-Estonians in different ways. The professional status of non-Estonians has become lower, particularly for managers and specialists, but also for qualified workers. On average they have lower incomes, lower positions and a higher unemployment rate (13.8 per cent, compared to 7.4 per cent).53 Part of the explanation may be that most of the previous all-Union enterprises that employed a predominantly Russian-speaking labour force went into bankruptcy. In order to apply for positions in the public sphere, Russian-speakers face the preconditions of Estonian language knowledge,
53 Estonian Human Development Report 1999. UNDP. http://www.ciesin.ee/undp/nhdr99/en/2.3.html.

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which they mostly lack, particularly in the Russian-dominated northeast of Estonia. The November 1996 Baltic Barometer survey results revealed similar tendencies in Latvia where the non-Latvians were over-represented among the poor.54 Also, the unemployment was the highest in the Russian-dominated Latgale region. Consequently, inter-ethnic tension and a mutual perception of competition and mistrust is often related to a visible coincidence of ethnicity and socioeconomic characteristics. Thus, as the socioeconomic positions and prospects of Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians in the peripheral regions of each of these countries are not that different, at least one incentive for ethnic conflict, the nationalisation of competition over scarce socioeconomic resource has been reduced. Conversely, northeastern Estonia and Latgale in Latvia have the profile of a peripheral Soviet industrial region victimised by the transition to a market economy and Baltic independence. Nevertheless, as Latvians and Russians share the same fate in Latgale, it is primarily perceived as a conflict between centre and periphery, whereas the purely Russian population of the industrial cities in the northeast of Estonia are bound to perceive their case as one of ethnic discrimination. Thus, until recently, a tendency existed for the population in northeastern Estonia to expect local (Russian) politicians and managers to solve their problems, rather than the Estonian government in far-away Tallinn, thereby offering local politicians a window of opportunity for ethnic mobilisation. In Latgale, Latvians and Russians alike turned to the Riga administration asking for special exemptions and funding for their region. Logically, the lowest ratings for the quality of inter-ethnic relations are found in the locations of high competition in economic transition the boom towns on the Baltic coast: Riga, Tallinn, Klaipeda, Prnu.55 Similarly, Hungarians in Carpatho-Ukraine live in quite poor socioeconomic conditions, but mainly as a result of the general crisis that has hit Ukraine and this region in particular in the 1990s, rather than ethnic discrimination. The economy of the region is prevalently rural, structurally of low efficiency, and has been particularly hit by the fall of the planned economy. However, Hungarians are suffering the current transitional crisis more than Ukrainians and Russians because of the social position they occupied during Soviet times: employment on a lower level because of the language problem.56 Thus their position may be perceived by some as an ethnic issue, but with limited chances of success because of the rural character of the region and the lack of a vocal Hungarian elite in Ukraine. In sum, as in many East European countries, socioeconomic divides tend to coincide with ethnic asymmetries. Policy decisions intentionally or un54 55 56 Latvian Human Development Report 1997. UNDP. Die Transformation in den baltischen Staaten. Baltische Wirtschaft und russische Diaspora, Kln 1999 (Berichte des BIOst 6). Latvia Human Development Report 1997. UNDP, p. 90.

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intentionally influence the relative prosperity and the socioeconomic status of majority and minority populations on a national, transnational, regional or local level or are perceived to do so by the disadvantaged. Thus, rational and strategic decisions in policy areas like privatisation, regional policy, industrial restructuring, environmental protection or urban housing may have destabilising effects on inter-ethnic relations or conversely may be hampered by this destabilising potential. Such policies beyond classic minority legislation perceived to give an advantage or disadvantage to an ethnic group may offer disenfranchised elites on both parts a window of opportunity to mobilise their co-nationals.

Homelands and eastern enlargement: Between Europeanisation and regionalisation The difficult process of nation-building does not only have a domestic component or involves the close neighbourhood, but also includes other instruments which lead to region-building new nations are readily and fully accepted as new members of the European family.57 East European countries have not only had to overcome economic and political hurdles in joining Europe, but they also had to convince the Western European audience that Budapest and Sofia, as well as Tallinn and Riga are capitals of European countries, with a European history, culture and mentality. For these states, this acceptance as part of the European family has therefore been the basis on which to build a strategy of a return to Europe in institutional terms. From this perspective, EU accession becomes a fundamental question of civilisation and an absolute priority of state policy. Since most of the East European states are considered EU applicant countries, which already face the transfer of sovereignty to a European level of decision-making as well as the growing importance of regional (sub-state and inter-state) co-operation, the ultimate problem of Russian minorities in the Baltic states and the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Hungary and Romania is not only the question of internal stability but also that of the democratic legitimacy of the future EU status.58 International pressures influence the direction of post-authoritarian transition: the level and kind of foreign aid and investment, conditional support for reforms through pressures to introduce internationally recognised standards for minority rights and the role of foreign experts in actually devising new institutions. As a consequence, the inter57 58 P. van Ham: The Baltic States and Europe: Identity and Institutions, in: O. Knudsen (ed.): Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian, Nordic and European Aspects, London 1999, pp. 223 238. I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood. Relations Between the Enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998.

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national environment can also act as a third party by mediating on-going domestic conflicts. The constant pressure of Europe, with which applicant countries strive to be integrated, is pushing these states towards a more inclusive minority policy. It stipulates that integration should take place on the basis of civic liberties and individual freedoms that may inspire minorities and encourage them to give up their previous group identity. Without worrying about potential electoral defeats, the ruling elites in Eastern Europe have become more pragmatic and confident in the call for new strategies of rapprochement. Does this mark a new phase in identity construction where Baltic Russophones no longer intend to leave their countries but instead tend to advocate possible EU membership more enthusiastically than the titular nations themselves? Many have noticed already that Baltic Russophones are more keen on learning English than local languages, which they perceive rather useless and parochial in the future common labour market of the EU. Indeed, Latvia and Estonia have become laboratories, which in spite of all the previous nation-building efforts now experience Europeanisation in a way that leaves signs of identity shifts among the minority groups. The examples of minorities along the future Eastern border of the EU demonstrate that a dominant concept of nation and state is not beyond political rationality. The Estonian and Latvian change of integration policy is at least partly related to the combination of a booming national economy and a shrinking, ageing titular nation, making the young Russophone generation a vital labour force rather than an alien element. Ukraines liberal minority policy was definitely related to the destabilising potential of the Russian minority (and homeland) for the Ukrainian state. Consequently, Ukraine also took a constructive position vis--vis the Ukrainian minority in Moldova and the minority policies of the Moldavian state. Similarly, Moldovas zero-option in the citizenship debate and its tendency to make multi-ethnicity a defining characteristic of the new state were without alternative in view of the Romanian ethnic and historical claim to Moldova and the separatism of the Dniestr Republic. Thus, positive and negative feedback occurred: The Slovak state had to rely on an ethnic concept of the nation-state to legitimise the end of the federation of Czechs and Slovaks, which in turn may have contributed to the nationalising policies towards the Hungarian minority.59 Being among the first-round candidates for EU membership and having far more co-nationals living in neighbouring states than ethnic minorities in the nation-state, Hungarians do not believe that the nation-state is necessarily the best means of solving the regions ethnic disputes. Hungary championed a certain protecting role for its minorities and permeable borders to Vojvodina, Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania. Whereas irredentist politicians became effectively side-tracked in Hungary (with the exception of the
59 M. Brusis: Ethnopolitische Konflikte in Osteuropa: Probleme und Strategien, CAP Working Paper: Munich 1999.

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Independent Smallholders Party), the ruling National Salvation Front and the extremist right in Romania thrived on the presumed Hungarian threat to the Romanian nationstate and Transylvanian separatism until 1996, whereas the democratic opposition felt obliged to support the Moldavian Popular Front and Romanias historic claim to Moldova.60 In sum, the process of Eastern enlargement as well as the wider trend of globalisation, on the one hand, tend to turn unsolved bilateral problems along the future Eastern border into European problems and responsibilities, while, on the other hand, increasing the importance of sub-state regions as an adequate level for solving part of the bilateral conflict potentials along the external border.61 An emerging common European identity and the disappearance of borders within the enlarged Union will create optimum conditions for superseding cross-border minority problems by creating permeable borders and regional and/or European alternatives to ethnic identification. At the same time, the European Unions finalisation will achieve quite the opposite for minority issues along the external border: Here, permeability will decrease and European identity will be an exclusive rather than an integrative factor.

V European policies on minority conflicts: Stabilising and destabilising factors in the enlargement process
Minority conflicts and territorial issues came late to the agenda of European Union integration. The prospect of enlargement with up to ten Central and East European states made these conflict potentials a priority issue for European policy makers: Disputes between acceding members and their eastern neighbours could constitute potential security threats for the Union and will have to be effectively addressed.62 The initiation of the Balladur Stability Pact for Europe shortly after the formulation of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession (Copenhagen European Council, June 1993) was, therefore, no coincidence. The pact was finally adopted by the 52 member states at the OSCE conference in Paris, March 1995. Not unlike the current Stability Pact for Southeastern

60

61 62

Workshop Gewaltsame Nationalittenkonflikte in der Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Faktoren der Eskalation und De-Eskalation im europischen Vergleich at the Centre for European Comparative History, Berlin, May 2000. I. Kempe: op. cit. Impact Study, The Effects on the Unions Policies, of Enlargement to the Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 15 July, 1997 Agenda 2000, 1. [http://EUROPA:EU:INT/comm/enlargement/agenda2000/impact/ 21.htm].

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Europe and the related Stabilisation and Association Process,63 the Balladur Plan targeted good-neighbourly relations and the establishing minority rights on the basis of existing international standards as an a priori condition for eastern enlargement. These non-EU international standards for minority rights are the older European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), as well as the current legal framework, the Council of Europes Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which went into force on 1 February 1998, despite its main deficit of not giving a definition of the national minorities it aims to protect. Additionally, the European Charter of Local Self-Governments and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages64 are relevant treaties concerning the rights of national minorities. Rule-setting is mainly achieved in the framework of the Council of Europe, while both the Council of Europe and the OSCEs High Commissioner on National Minorities engage in diplomatic initiatives, monitoring and policy recommendations in the field of minority legislation and its fair implementation. Table 3: Ratification of human and minority rights treaties by accession states (as of August 2000)65
European Human Rights Convention (1950) Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified ratified European Charter of Framework Local Self-Govern- Convention ments (1985) (1995) ratified 1995 ratified 1999 ratified 1994 ratified 1994 ratified 1996 ratified 1999 ratified 1993 ratified 1998 ratified 2000 ratified 1996 ratified 1999 ratified 1998 ratified 1997 ratified 1995 ratified 2000 ratified 1995 ratified 1995 ratified 1998 European Charter for Languages (1992) ratified 1995

63

64

65

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Cologne, 10 June 1999 [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/ stapact/10_june_99.htm]; The Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe [http:// europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/index.htm]. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ETS No. 148) (1992) [http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/ Treaties/Html/148.htm], European Charter of Local Self-Government (ETS No. 122) (1985) [http://conventions.coe. int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/122.htm]. Information Council of Europe [http://conventions.coe.int/].

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Mutual recognition of existing borders and settling all issues related to national minorities became preconditions for participation in the long-term process of EU integration. Thus, a guarantee for stability in Europe was built into the enlargement process. Although it was never a formal criterion, the political elites in the accession states were well aware that the resolution of potentially volatile border and minority issues constituted a conditio sine qua non for accession that could not be compensated for by the best economic key figures or records of democratic reform. The Copenhagen Criteria as such, while failing to refer to minorities under the economic criteria, subsumed minority rights as a separate issue under the political criteria: Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidates ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.66 Thus, in the Copenhagen Criteria, Agenda 2000 and in the subsequent Progress Reports, minority issues were typically seen as an issue of legal frameworks and political will (Tab. 4). Other, no less crucial issues were not addressed: The political instrumentalisation of minority issues on both sides of a border; Reciprocal integration policies and questions of state and nation concepts in public opinion; and The conflict potentials caused by links between ethnicity and post-communist economic transition (except for the issue of the Roma minority). Table 4: The accession states and their EU record in minority protection67
* Bulgaria Czech Republic EU Opinion

1997 (...) the Turkish minority seems well integrated (...) 1999 Further efforts need to be undertaken to protect minority rights (...) 1997 The Czech Republic presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.

66 67

Copenhagen European Council 21/22 June 1993. Presidency Conclusions [http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/ ec/en/cop.htm]. EU documents at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/; again, EU opinions concerning the Roma issue have not been included.

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* Estonia

EU Opinion

1997 Estonia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Estonian society. 1998 It is regrettable that the Parliament has not adopted amendments to the Citizenship Law to allow stateless children to become citizens. Continuing attention needs to be paid to public administration reform and the reinforcement of the judiciary, particularly to training of judges and promotion of Estonian language learning among non-citizens. 1999 The adoption of the Language Law, which restricts access of non-Estonian speakers in political and economic life, constitutes a step backwards and should be amended. In the meantime, the Commission will closely monitor the implementation of the law to see what impact it will have in practice. AP Align the Language legislation with international standards and the Europe Agreement, implement concrete measures for the integration of non-citizens including language training and provide necessary financial support.

Hungary

1997 The rights of minorities are guaranteed and protected. Hungary presents the characteristics of a democracy with stable institutions which guarantee the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and the protection of minorities. 1997 Latvia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated into Latvian society. It should also pursue its efforts to ensure general equality of treatment for non-citizens and minorities, in particular for access to professions and participation in the democratic process. With the reservation that steps need to be taken to enable the Russian-speaking minority to become better integrated into society, Latvia demonstrates the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and human rights. 1998 Major progress has been made in dealing with weaknesses identified in the Opinion and Accession Partnership priorities, in particular as concerns the integration of non-citizens. Confirmation by referendum of the parliaments decision to end certain restrictions on citizenship brings Latvia into conformity with international standards and should facilitate the Naturalisation Process. Continuing attention needs to be paid to the promotion of Latvian language learning among non-citizens. 1999 Although significant progress has been achieved in the integration of noncitizens, it will be necessary to ensure that the final text of the Language Law is compatible with international standards and the Europe Agreement. AP Align the Language Law with international standards and the Europe Agreement; implement further concrete measures for the integration of non-citizens including language training and provide necessary financial support.

Latvia

Lithuania

1997 Lithuania demonstrates the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.

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* Poland

EU Opinion

1997 Poland presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 1997 (...) the Hungarian minority seems well integrated (given the recent improvement in its situation) (...) 1998 Continued efforts have been made to respect and protect the rights of the Hungarian minority.

Romania

Slovakia

1997 Improvement is also required in the treatment of the Hungarian minority, which still does not benefit from the General Law on the Use of Minority Languages which the Slovak authorities have undertaken to introduce and for which there is a provision in the Constitution. 1998 Continued efforts are needed to protect minority rights. 1997 The rights of minorities are guaranteed and protected. Slovenia is a democracy with stable institutions which guarantee the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and the protection of, minorities.

Slovenia

* 1997 Agenda 2000; 1998 1st Progress Report; 1999 2nd Progress Report; AP Accession Partnership (short-term 2000 political criteria)

European policy dilemmas It follows from the above that a number of issues of high-risk potential and relevancy for the stability of the future enlarged Europe cannot be framed by formal accession criteria and monitoring. They may in some cases even be counterproductive. Thus, the European Commission faces a threefold dilemma in this aspect of conditional accession: accountability, prescription and instrumentalisation.

Accountability The government of an accession state can be held accountable for the installation of a legal and institutional framework for ethnic and religious minorities within the nationstate, but the actual integration of the minority population in society is a more protracted and arduous process. Government and administration evidently have only limited influence on this process, which often relates to popular perceptions of national history and inter-ethnic relations in the past. Thus, the EU evaluations criticised Latvian and Estonian minority legislation, as they violated some basic European values of Rechtsstaat, democracy and non-discrimination, 158

but demonstrated more understanding in their recommendations concerning integration policies. Together with the OSCE, the EU used its Phare-programme instruments to stimulate integration, e. g., by giving priority to language training for minority groups in the Phare programmes for Latvia and Estonia.68 The real key in the accountability dilemma is the willingness and ability of accession governments to hold themselves accountable and to accept full responsibility for integrationist policies ordained by Brussels as a package deal for EU accession. In view of the volatility of the political landscape and the preferences of the electorate, many politicians are tempted to instrumentalise ethnic rhetoric for popularity and hold the EU responsible for unpopular integrative legislation. The fact that the dominant interest in EU integration and the broad consensus in favour of it in all accession states pre-empted these temptations is clearly one of the main positive aspects of Eastern enlargement. Ratification of European and international treaties for the protection of human and minority rights as well as the approximation of national legislation is one thing, an active policy for social integration and a civic concept of the nation is another. Thus, most Romanian politicians and parties have come to accept the arrangement with their Hungarian neighbour, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and its political representation. In the end, tolerance and a multiethnic society can be as much a factor of identification and state-building as ethnic homogeneity. Even more prominently, despite protracted and unfriendly negotiations with EU and OSCE representatives, Estonia and Latvia finally not only amended citizenship and language legislation, but also presented long-term plans for reciprocal integration of society. The Latvian plan was applauded by the 1999 Progress Report: The framework document of a National Programme for The Integration of Society in Latvia had been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in September 1998, and was widely discussed in the country during a public hearing phase from March to May 1999. The initial document covered education, language, culture, citizenship and naturalisation, repatriation, migration and co-operation with Latvians abroad, information, NGOs, regional aspects, support for integration-related research and integration-related institutions. This process, led [sic!] by a steering group created in February 1999 and chaired by the Head of the Naturalisation Board, allowed for a large number of actors (officials, academics, politicians, consultants, NGOs, representatives from international organisations, etc.) to voice their views and concerns, thus spurring a public debate on this important issue.69

68 69

1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvias Progress Towards Accession; Idem, Estonia. The Integration of Society in Latvia A Framework Document (Riga: The Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 1999); State Programme Integration in Estonian Society 2000 2007 (Approved by the Government of Estonia on 14 March, 2000) [http://www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/].

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Prescription Even as far as the concrete legal framework for minority policy was concerned, prescription was not an option. Neither the European Treaty nor the acquis communautaire offered guidelines for a set of minority-related laws (citizenship law, naturalisation law, immigration law, language law, cultural autonomy, electoral law, etc.). Among the 15 members of the Union, minority policies are extremely diverse, depending on the size and genesis of the minority populations, national cultural and legal traditions as well as minority integration. They range from consocietal or power-sharing models to territorial or cultural autonomy.70 Consequently, respecting minority legislation as one of the cores of state sovereignty, the EU stood by its principle of governance and rule-setting on the basis of the Council of Europes Framework Convention and the European Human Rights Convention. Minority legislation impinges directly on state sovereignty, concepts of state and nation as well as on national history. Therefore, the European Union as a community of sovereign states had never even attempted to come to a set of prescriptions for positive law. Despite this soft-law position, the EU insists on the abolition of the death penalty in all member states and accession states and found harsh, undiplomatic terms for Estonias and Latvias definition of minorities as excluding those inhabitants without citizenship: In any assessment of the situation of the minorities in Latvia, a distinction has to be made between rights and safeguards connected with membership of an ethnic and cultural community regardless of the nationality held. (...) The differences in status between citizens and foreigners are contrary to the Latvian Constitution and the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights. As rule-setting, these minimum conditions are, however, too limited as preventive and stabilising frameworks.71

Instrumentalisation As the absence of minority and border conflicts was a non-negotiable precondition for EU accession, these conflict potentials are liable to instrumentalisation by opponents of EU accession both domestically and regionally. As a consequence, the EU insistence on solving problems might thus make for the prolongation or even escalations of these problems, especially in cases where the problem-solving incentive (i. e., the perspective

70 71

R. Caplan, J. Feffer (eds.): Europes New Nationalisms: States and Minorities in Conflict, New York 1996. Commission Opinion on Latvias Application for Membership of the European Union (15 July, 1997) [http://europa. eu.int/comm/enlargement/latvia/op_07_97/b1.htm].

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of EU accession) would be one-sided. This constellation would make any accession government vulnerable to political pressure or blackmail by parliamentary opposition, endogenous minorities and their homelands. Such counterproductive effects occurred in the case of the Baltic States. As Russia objected to NATO and though less vehemently EU membership for the Baltic republics, minority and border issues provided leverage: The Duma has persistently refused to ratify the border treaties with the three neighbours although all contested issues have been resolved after protracted negotiations. The Russian minorities living in the border regions may be worried about the consequences of the coming EU external border, but Moscows policy of keeping the status and demarcation of the border pending cannot be in their interest.72 Occasionally, Russian politicians even admit publicly that a final settlement for the minority and border issues in the Baltics would deprive Moscow of a trump card in the geopolitical game of EU and NATO enlargement.73

Recommendations for EU policies prior to and beyond enlargement The current process of EU enlargement has both potentially positive and potentially negative repercussions for the stability of the region as a whole and in particular for ethnic and border issues. As demonstrated in the above survey of risk potentials on the basis of the preceding theoretical notions on the character of post-communist minority conflict potentials, the main effects of enlargements (both before and after accession) will be much broader than simply those on the issues of classic minority legislation, international conventions and societal integration programmes highlighted in the EUs Copenhagen Criteria and the subsequent Progress Reports. a) Diplomatic pressure and rule-setting in minority and border issues before accession should indeed be mainly a matter of the OSCE and the Council of Europe rather than of the European Union: Implicitly, the prospect of EU accession may be the most effective pressure tool for these organisations. As minority policies impinge directly on state sovereignty and as the EU-15 lack a set of uniform rules and policies, only basic principles can be included in the conditionality of accession. However, the stalemate between the EU-14 and the new Austrian government forcefully demonstrated the inadequacy of the European Union in dealing with post-accession con-

72 73

I. Kempe, W. van Meurs: Regionalpolitik zwischen Estland und Ruland, Kln: Aktuelle Analyse des BIOst, 44 1998. A. Moshes: Overcoming Unfriendly Stability. Russian-Latvian Relations at the End of 1990s, Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti 1999; Vetschernaja Moskva (26 August 1999); M. Huang: Estonias Birth Certificate, RFE/RL Baltic Report (endnote), 14 February 2000.

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flicts of values (rather than policies). Chances are that the instability of domestic party politics and public opinion might lead to changes in the implementation of minority-relevant laws and policies (rather than in the actual legislation and adherence to international conventions) in some new member-states. Part of the current integrative policies are contre coeur and may amount to pretended change. Therefore, the European Union ought to be prepared for the idea that once the ten Central and East European countries have become members, they will be less inclined to heed advice by the OSCE, the EU or other organisations in the modification or implementation of national legislation or to accept their integrationist programmes, whereas the framework set by the basic norms of the European conventions will prove to guarantee a minority policy that is up to European standards. b) The preceding arguments on ethnopolitics and the economics of ethnicity demonstrate the ethnic dimension of many policy areas involved in European integration and the acquis. Consequently, the EUs main strength as a stabilising and consolidating factor is not so much in the direct interference in classic minority legislation, but rather in counterpoising and equalising regional, socioeconomic and other asymmetries within a nation-state that might acquire a dimension of ethnicity and interethnic conflict. Thus, EU programmes like Phare, ISPA and SAPARD may be imminently relevant for ethnic peace. Conversely, in applying these instruments, the EU should be aware of the ethnic risks involved: The EU will thus get involved in national ethnopolitics and may find its infrastructure or regional-policy assistance a matter of political dispute not only between the centre and the periphery, but also between majority and minorities. Much will depend on the adequate distribution of resources and the decentralisation of distributing powers, both before and after accession. c) As the European Union has demonstrated, the characteristics of an empire in the post-modern sense, i. e., allowing a loss of control at the peripheries, the Schengen rules in their current strictness are bound to aggravate ethnic tensions along the future outer border as much as they create favourable conditions for the alleviation of these tensions within the Schengen area: At the outer border, a European identity will be exclusive rather than integrationist. EU policies will generate increasing asymmetries in socioeconomic stability and prosperity along these divides. Full implementation of the Schengen rules might provoke rather than counter delinquent regimes and other soft-security risks at the European periphery. In this respect, the EU policy of differentiated pre-accession for the countries of the Western Balkans74 and the

74

The Balkans and New European Responsibilities. Strategy Paper for The Club of Three and The Balkans, 29/30 June 2000, Brussels, Gtersloh 2000.

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non-policy in the case of Kaliningrad seem to indicate that producing soft-security risks pays. In view of similar socioeconomic asymmetries at the Eastern border, Phare cross-border co-operation is a poor substitute for the Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process at the southeastern border. In sum, Charles de Gaulles postulate that no political problem is so large that it cannot be solved by ignoring it and not taking any decisions for a longer time may be both true and false in the case of the decision to accept the ten Central and East European countries as new EU members and the minority problems of the region: True, as the finalisation of enlargement would turn inner-European borders into permeable borders between minorities and their homelands. True, as the whole range of EU support programmes, ranging from Phare/Tacis to SAPARD and ISPA, might alleviate the common nexus between transition and ethnopolitics, even between ethnicity and prosperity. False, as the Austrian example has demonstrated that the EU loses much of its political leverage once a candidate country has become a member state. False, as a postponement of Eastern enlargement would perpetuate Russian interest in using their EU candidate status as political leverage against its neighbours rather than developing a stake in constructive solutions for minority and border issues.

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Visa and Border Problems Direct Neighbourhood: Border Issues and Visa Regulations An Eastern Perspective
Jacek Cichocki

I Introduction
It increasingly appears as though an enlarged European Unions eastern border with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova may prove to be of a permanent nature. The lack of true internal reforms in those countries to align them to Western European political and economic standards means that, within the next two decades, it will be difficult to move that border eastwards.1 It is for this reason, perhaps, that Brussels has not been formulating membership perspectives for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Furthermore, this border will divide the European continent into two regions greatly differing in terms of political, economic and social processes. As a result, to a large extent it will constitute the border between two different civilisations. Thus, on the one hand, this border should shield the enlarged EU from the negative phenomena that are taking place in the East (drug trafficking, organised crime, illegal immigration not only from CIS countries but also from Southeast Asia, for which the post-Soviet republics are a transit route, etc.) On the other hand, this border should make it possible for the European Union to influence the situation in neighbouring countries, particularly in Ukraine and Belarus. It should enable the EU to inspire processes that could help bring post-Soviet countries up to Western standards and create a sphere of stability east of the enlarged EU. Therefore, this border should by no means harm contacts that both the elites and the ordinary people of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova have managed to develop so far with the West and EU candidate countries. On the contrary, it should foster such contacts.

I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood. Relations between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998.

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This border between the enlarged EU and its eastern neighbours will also create a platform for solving security problems on the European continent that arise as a result of the enlargement process itself. For that to happen, however, one should not concentrate solely on technical problems that are connected with the introduction of standards laid out in the Schengen Treaty. Instead, development of this border should be determined by broader strategic goals that are part of the EU foreign policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.2 When looked at from this perspective, population movement across this border as well as regulations concerning granting visas to citizens of countries east of EU are of particular importance.

II The future eastern border of the enlarged European Union after accession of the candidate countries from Central Europe 3
Decisions taken by the European Union during its Helsinki summit in December 1999, which called for opening accession negotiations with more Central European countries, greatly simplified the problem of the future EU eastern border. Once those countries become new members, the European Union will, for the first time in its history, share its border with Ukraine (1,152 kilometres), Belarus (1,248 kilometres), and Moldova (450 kilometres). Its border with Russia will also become longer (to reach 2,257 kilometres). A Russian enclave the Kaliningrad region (its border with Poland is 206 kilometres long, and with Lithuania 227 kilometres long) will find itself surrounded by EU territory. With the exception of the Baltic countries, the EU border will run along the former border of the USSR and Central European countries, and the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Despite close links between the countries of the former Socialist bloc and official declarations of their brotherhood and friendship, the European border of the USSR, just like all other borders of the imperium, was strongly fortified and constituted a hermetic cordon which separated the country from the external world. Until today, along most of its parts there existed the so called sistema the dual system of wire entanglements with a strip of ground that was levelled in between them , which greatly facilitates the fight against illegal border traffic and smuggling and which can, in the

G. Amato, J. Batt: Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border, European University Institute, Florence, Robert Schuman Centre, Policy Papers 99/4, San Domencia di Fiesole 1999. Although normally this term is understood much more broadly, by Central Europe the author of this paper means those countries from this region that are aspiring to EU membership.

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future, help the EU to exercise a tight border control.4 Thanks to the existence of this border for the past 50 years, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the already sovereign countries of Central Europe have not faced problems in either drawing their borders with former Soviet republics, including Russia, or in signing appropriate border treaties. The former Baltic republics have faced a dramatically different situation. As the Soviet Union collapsed, they practically had to develop a new border with Russia and Belarus, beginning with its demarcation and ending with the development of the requisite infrastructure.

III Regulations concerning human traffic on the future EU border: 1990 2000
Of all Central European countries seeking EU membership, the Baltic states were the first to introduce entry visa requirements for citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other post-Soviet states. This occurred in 1993. As a reaction, CIS countries also decided to introduce visas for citizens of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Only those with the so called non-citizen status members of Slavic (mainly Russian) minorities who live in Latvia and Estonia and are not citizens can travel without visas at the moment.5 Non-citizens who want to travel to Russia do not need visas at the moment; a stamp in their passports issued by any diplomatic outpost of the Russian Federation is sufficient. It is worth stressing that when introducing visa requirements for CIS citizens, the Baltic states opened their negotiations with Western Europe on visa-free travel (at first, only with Scandinavian countries). Bearing in mind the geopolitical situation of the early 1990s, the move constituted a clear and courageous manifestation on part of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of their pro-Western orientation. Other countries of Central Europe that aspire to EU membership did not introduce visa requirements for citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other postSoviet countries, but initially maintained regulations that dated back to various treaties of the Soviet era.6 Under those regulations, members of organised tourist groups who possessed certified invitations, vouchers (which are a confirmation that a hotel or other

4 5

T. Komornicki: Granice Polski, Analiza zmian przenikalnos ci w latach 1990 1996, Geopolitical Studies, Vol. 5, IGiPZ PAN, Warsaw 1999. According to the data of the Board for Citizenship and Migration Affairs of Latvia, in the beginning of 2000 in Latvia there were 588,225 non-citizens about 25 per cent of the population (393,190 of these were Russians; the share of all Russians among the Latvian population is about 34 per cent). According to the data of the Estonian Human Development Report 1999, in September 1999 in Estonia there were about 300,000 non-citizens about 21 per cent of the population (the share of all Russians among Estonian population is about 30 per cent). In the case of Poland, a treaty between Poland and the USSR was signed on 13 December, 1979. Under the treaty, citizens of Poland and Russia were exempted from visa requirements when travelling to the neighbour country.

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form of lodging has been booked) or appropriate stamps in their passports (AB for those travelling on business trips, AC for those who travelled to seek medical treatment, AO for those intending to visit workers contracted in countries belonging to the Council of Mutual Economic Co-operation), were exempted from visa requirements. 7 Between 1990 and 1996/97, provisions exempting people from visa requirements (if they had vouchers) allowed for practically unlimited cross-border travel between Poland, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary and the postSoviet countries. At that time, for the price of US-$ 1 to US-$ 2, one could easily buy a fake voucher. During that period, cross-border trade flourished: thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Moldavans, along with citizens of other post-Soviet states, would come to Central Europe to sell their cheap industrial products on the markets and buy products which they lacked in CIS countries (clothes, shoes, furniture, food, etc.).8 An analysis of the cross-border movement of people between Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, as well as factors that influenced that movement during the 1990s, is presented as a supplement to this article. Closer co-operation led some countries in Central Europe and post-Soviet states to sign new treaties regulating cross-border travel. On June 25, 1996, Poland and Ukraine signed an agreement on visa-free travel. A year earlier, a similar agreement was reached between Slovakia and Russia. Both Russia and Belarus block signing further agreements with other countries in the region, as both Moscow and Minsk oppose agreements on re-admission. Between 1997 and 1998, governments in Central European countries launched attempts to introduce greater control over cross-border traffic: Invitations issued to citizens of post-Soviet countries had to be registered by provincial authorities, and the authenticity of vouchers began to be verified. The best example of what kind of problems with cross-border travel these attempts led to was the so-called Polish border crisis of 1998.

IV The Polish border crisis of 1998

Since the beginning of 1998, Poland has become more rigid about implementing the new law concerning foreigners, which was passed by the Parliament on June 25, 1997. As a result, Polish border guards began to demand that citizens of former Soviet states
7 8 T. Komornicki: Granice Polski, Analiza zmian przenikalnos ci w latach 1990 1996, Geopolitical Studies, Vol. 5, IGiPZ PAN, Warsaw 1999. Report by the Government Centre for Strategic Studies, Situation on bazaars and markets in 1998, in the context of new law concerning foreigners, Warsaw, April 1998.

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with whom new agreements on non-visa movement were not signed should produce an invitation that had been certified by Polish authorities or vouchers which could convincingly show that lodging in Poland had actually been arranged for. This resulted in a huge increase in the price of the vouchers from US-$ 1 US-$ 2 to US-$ 20 US-$ 30 , which in turn led to a serious reduction of trips to Poland undertaken by Russians or Belorussians. Great confusion on the Polish-Belorussian and Polish-Russian borders occurred as a result of those new requirements during the first months of 1998. Referred to as a border crisis by pundits and commentators, the situation worsened as Russian and Belorussian authorities decided to strike back. Both Minsk and Moscow started requiring that Poles who intended to cross the border should meet similar requirements. Additionally, Belarus imposed new restrictions on its own citizens, who were not allowed to cross the border with more than a big-sized travel bag. This border crisis greatly reduced the intensity of cross-border travel between Poland and Belarus, as well as Poland and Russia in the first months of 1998. This was accompanied by the reduction in volume of cross-border trade, which greatly affected the regions near the border.9 After several months, trade volume returned to its previous levels as those crossing the border got used to the new requirements (prices of vouchers fell to US-$ 10). The cross-border trade between CIS states and countries in Central Europe collapsed only following the 1998 Russian crisis and depreciation of currencies in the former Soviet states. The 1998 border crisis can be treated as a kind of a litmus test of what will happen once visa requirements are introduced on Polands eastern border. The following conclusions can be drawn: Introduction of visa requirements should be preceded by an intensive information campaign, both in Poland and in neighbouring countries, on how visas will be granted, where they can be obtained and for what price, etc. The fact that visa requirements are introduced should not be exploited by post-Soviet countries for propaganda reasons (e. g., by President Alexander Lukashenko) to reach certain political goals and discredit pro-Western ideas in their societies. Visa regulations will make trips to countries of Central Europe more difficult, but will not halt them if appropriate economic conditions exist which are mainly economic conditions that influence the intensity of the cross-border traffic.

Ibid.

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V The importance of cross-border co-operation

Because of trade during the 1990s, the transborder regions on both sides of the former European border with the USSR experienced a period of intense growth. Cities like Lviv (Ukraine), Grodno, and Brzesc (Belarus) or Przemysl and Bialystok (Poland) flourished. During that period, food and other light industries in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that were exporting goods to the East experienced a boom, which helped a number of small and medium-sized companies in those countries. Apart from trade relations, human contacts also intensified and took place not only in bazaars or markets, but also among and within elite circles. Intellectuals in postSoviet countries, deprived for years of contacts with people abroad, could now develop friendships or working relations with their colleagues in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. So far, co-operation between non-governmental organisations has been most intense. For example, in Lviv, of the several hundred non-governmental organisations active in Western Ukraine, almost 90 per cent maintain more or less regular contacts with Poland. A great majority of these organisations were founded over the last five years, when development of such contacts became particularly easy. Their joint endeavours primarily include projects in education, economy, ecology, culture and other issues. In 1998, one foundation which is active in Poland, the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, supported more than 200 non-governmental organisations in Belarus and more than 100 independent newspapers or magazines. For many Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and citizens of other post-Soviet states, trips to Central European countries successful in their structural transformation offered a first opportunity to experience how the free market system and democracy work. Such possibilities have had a great influence on the younger generation the most active social group in the post-Soviet countries as it shaped their way of thinking. This is confirmed by results of social research conducted in Belarus. According to Belorussian sociologists, some 40 to more than 60 per cent of the society favours integration with Russia. Some 25 to 33 per cent is against it, including mainly young and well-educated people from big cities. Most of them support market reforms (84 per cent), capitalism (58 per cent) and believe that private property is the most effective form of ownership.10 In Ukraine, on the other hand, research that has been conducted on a regular basis since 199411 shows that the percentage of those favouring co-operation with the West rather

10 11

NISEPI Bulletin, No. 1 1996. Cited in: K. Bachmana: Polska kaczka europejski staw, Warsaw 1999. N. W. Panina, J. I. Goowacha: Tendecji rozwytku ukrajinskoho suspilstwa 1994 1998, sociolohiczni pokaznyki, Kyiw 1999. Unpublished data made available by authors of the 1999 study.

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than Russia is constantly on the rise. In 1994, 13 per cent of Ukrainians supported the idea, a figure which rose to 16 per cent in 1999 and constituted the best result during the last six years. It is worth mentioning that support for the integration with the West differs from region to region; most of those who favour integration live in the western regions of Ukraine and its capital, while the idea enjoys only weak support among those who live in the east or in the south. This pro-Western shift in the way of thinking among the citizens of post-Soviet countries is a gradual and slow process. Quite often, this process is hampered by the situation in those countries which show little to no political or economic mechanisms that would resemble Western standards. Thus, the ability to travel is of particular importance for the transformation process. Hence, the creation of appropriate possibilities by Central European countries that would facilitate such contacts, even after visa requirements and other provisions of the Schengen Treaty are introduced, seems of particular importance. It will have a great impact on foreign policy and strategy employed by the European Union towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

VI Activities undertaken by countries aspiring to EU membership to secure its borders and implement the Schengen Treaty, in particular visa regulations
All Central European countries aspiring to EU membership will have to adjust their external borders (shared with non-EU and those countries not seeking membership) and align them to the EU standards laid out in the Schengen Treaty. Because of that, governments of those countries will have to tackle a number of problems. Specifically, they need to: Review regulations that concern travel across external borders of the EU and introduce visa requirements for citizens of those countries that are also required to have visas by the European Union; Introduce EU procedures that regulate trade exchange with non-EU countries; Implement tighter control over external borders, integrate border control and state security forces into one common EU security system responsible for border protection and capable of sharing information; and Develop a border infrastructure so that border crossings and cargo terminals meet EU standards and can meet the needs of the growing pan-European East-West transportation network. Countries which seek EU membership, particularly those who are advanced in their accession negotiations (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Estonia) have already undertaken a number of steps that aim at bringing their eastern borders to EU standards. 171

Since the mid-1990s, each of these countries has been expanding and modernising border infrastructure. New border crossings are being opened, and roads that lead to borders are being upgraded. For example, in 1999 Poland completed and opened one of the largest installations on the future EU eastern border a modern cargo terminal in Krotoszyn on the Polish-Belorussian border. Each of the EU candidate countries has been conducting simulations to demonstrate how the introduction of EU trade regulations is going to influence the exchange with their eastern neighbours. However, the most difficult task from the social and political point of view will be the adjustment of regulations concerning cross-border travel to EU standards, particularly the introduction of visa requirements for citizens of the former Soviet republics. Apart from the Baltic states, which had already done so in 1993, other candidate countries have decided to introduce visas for citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other post-Soviet countries in 2000 or 2001 (see the table below). This way, one of the main conditions imposed by Brussels concerning issues of security of the external borders of the enlarged EU will have been met even before Central European states gain membership. Cross-border travel between Poland and Ukraine, as well as Hungary and Ukraine, will be an exception. Both Warsaw and Budapest plan to introduce visas once they become EU members. In the first case, the decision reflects the priorities of Polands foreign policy. Poland and Ukraine share a strategic partnership, and by delaying introduction of visa requirements for Ukrainians, Poles are trying to add a special dimension to this partnership. Possible introduction of visa requirements to Ukrainians arouses some emotions and controversies among Poles. In particular, concerns are voiced by some right-wing politicians who fear such a move may hamper contacts with the Polish diaspora in Ukraine. Furthermore, residents of cross-border regions, particularly those involved in small business, fear that introduction of visa requirements may negatively affect trade. Proposals have been put forward to introduce regulations that will facilitate obtaining visas for residents of cross-border regions and for Poles who live in Ukraine. Despite all that, however, it seems that there is unanimity on part of the rightist government, the leftist parliamentary opposition and the leftist president that the introduction of visa requirement for Ukrainians is the price Poles will have to pay for EU membership and, as such, is inevitable. Hungary on the other hand, is concerned about its minority in Ukraine and tries to facilitate its travel to the homeland.12

12

According to the last census data (1989) in Ukraine there are about 163,000 Hungarians (after Nacionalnyi sostav naseleniya SSSR po dannym vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1989, Moscow 1991).

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Table 1: Introduction of visa requirements by Central European countries aspiring to EU membership for citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova (at present and in the future).13
Russia Czech Republic Estonia Lithuania Latvia Poland Romania Slovakia Hungary 2000 1993 1993 1993 2001 2000 2001 2001 Ukraine 2000 1993 1994 1993 EU* 2000 2000 EU* Belarus 2000 1993 1993 1993 2001 2000 2001 2001 Moldova 2000 1993 1993 1993 2001 EU* 2001 2001

* EU visa requirements will be introduced once the country becomes an EU member.

VII The EU border with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova: security issues
Tight border control Certain security issues are linked with the process of building the future external border of the European Union. These issues include ensuring tight control on the future EU border so that it is possible to protect the EU from illegal immigrants, organised crime and trafficking of drugs, alcohol and other goods that are normally subject to customs control. Whether those problems are solved will depend on the pace and scale of the adjustment processes undertaken by particular candidate countries as well as the actual level of financial support extended by the EU. Efforts to attain that goal have been made by governments of all Central European countries.

Demarcation of borders In the case of the Baltic states, the problem of final demarcation and establishment of borders with Russia and Belarus is of particular importance. Membership of the Baltic states in the European Union or other western organisations to which those countries
13 Source of the data: Research conducted on the basis of official information from foreign ministries of Central European countries as well as information in the media.

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are aspiring (e. g., NATO) will not be possible before this problem is solved. Meanwhile, Russia has been delaying a decision concerning this issue. Both Tallinn and Riga unilaterally demarcated its borders with Russia, making some territorial concessions that were advantageous to Moscow and that concerned several disputed territories. Despite those concessions, Russia has been delaying the signing of those border treaties. It has also been putting negotiations on other territorial disputes (e. g., the Pechory village on the border between Russia and Estonia). Even though Lithuania did sign a border treaty with Russia, the Russian parliament has so far been delaying its ratification. Crucial for the future security of the eastern EU border is also the fact that so far, borders between Russia and Belarus, as well as between Russia and Ukraine, have not been tightly controlled. There is no doubt that this will have a negative impact on the eastern EU border in the future.

Problems connected with the introduction of visa requirements Apart from problems that are normally associated with security issues, the future border of the enlarged European Union will also affect other spheres that are very crucial for the security of the European continent. Those areas involve some social issues that will be affected in particular by visa requirements for the citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other post-Soviet states who intend to travel to EU candidate countries in Central Europe. Undoubtedly, this will lead to negative reactions in those countries, particularly among the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian elites, who perceive the possibility of co-operation with the West as a chance for their countries development. It will also be a set-back for the so called pro-Western option position of those who are determined to build and develop democratic institutions and mechanisms (such as independent media and non-governmental organisations) and the free-market economy. Additionally, the fact that visas are introduced and that many people feel rejected by the West may be used by the governments of the post-Soviet countries for propagandistic reasons in an attempt to discredit co-operation with the West. This will most likely happen in Belarus. Apart from that, the new regulations that will make crossborder travel more difficult may undermine economic and other ties that were so painstakingly built over the last ten years. This co-operation between countries of Central Europe with post-Soviet states has already resulted in many joint economic projects the economic growth of the transborder regions in Ukraine and Belarus is just one example. Also, many projects that aimed at the development of civic society in western 174

Ukraine or on the borders of Estonia and Belarus originated as a result of such co-operation.14 All those negative factors would definitely hamper, in some cases even bloc, the process of building stability on the EU external borders, which is one of the most important goals of its future security policy. This stability can be built only by fostering pro-Western sympathies in the neighbouring countries i. e., the development of mechanisms both in the economic and public sphere that are concurrent with the EU standards. To avoid those negative consequences that would affect the security of Europe (a new division of the continent into two separate parts would probably be most worrying), a very careful strategy must be developed for the implementation of new regulations that will introduce visa requirements for the citizens of post-Soviet countries.

National minorities The new borders of the enlarged EU and the introduction of visa requirements may hamper contacts of many national minorities in Central Europe with their home countries. This will mainly affect the Polish minority in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, the Belorussian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland,15 the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, and the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia. Some activists of the Polish minority in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are already voicing their concerns. They say that introduction of visa requirements for those who intend to travel to Poland will bring the situation back to the period when the USSR was still in power, and it will again become very difficult to visit their home country. Special regulations concerning cross-border travel, proposed below, could help to avoid such a situation.

14 15

The Polish-Estonian initiative, called the Center for Transboundary Co-operation, is worth mentioning here. There is no exact data about the size of these minorities. According to the newest census conducted in 1999 in Belarus, about 400,000 Poles live in the country. Activists of Polish organisations in Belarus believe this number to be twice as high. The size of the Belorussian population in Poland is not exactly known due to the lack of studies on these issues. According to estimations, this number is between 250,000 and 300,000. According to the last available census data in Ukraine (1989), there are about 220,000 Poles. This number is questioned by those who co-operate with the Polish minority in the East. According to their estimates, this number is about twice as high. General estimations indicate the number of Ukrainians in Poland to be between 200,000 and 300,000.

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VIII Recommendations: Visa regulations as an instrument of shaping the security policy of the enlarged EU
As mentioned above, the strategy for the introduction and implementation of visa requirements for the citizens of post-Soviet states travelling to EU candidate countries in Central Europe should take into account the following elements:

An information campaign Introduction of visa requirements should be preceded by an information campaign that will teach people about the new regulations, explain the new criteria that will be used when visas are issued, inform them about where they can be obtained and for what price. This campaign should be carried out both in post-Soviet countries and countries of Central Europe. It should target particular social groups. Ideally, they should be defined through careful sociological research, especially those interested in maintaining cross-border contacts. These will mainly include businessmen, small entrepreneurs and activists of non-governmental organisations. The campaign should also attempt to convince people in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova that the introduction of visa requirements is not aimed against them, but will hopefully help to build more secure borders and may even prove advantageous to them, for visas which they obtain will allow them to travel to all EU countries.

Differentiation of criteria used when visas are issued When introducing visa requirements for CIS citizens, the enlarged European Union should use differentiated criteria. It should be possible for certain groups (those with whom the EU is particularly interested in maintaining good ties) to obtain visas quickly and use them effectively. This in particular will concern entrepreneurs, activists of non-governmental organisations, scientists, artists, journalists and others. Such differentiation could mean that procedures for granting visas to those groups are simplified or that they can obtain multi-entry visas that are valid over longer periods of time (of one year or longer) if the applicant does not have a criminal record. Such differentiated procedures could become a means of helping the European Union influence the situation in the post-Soviet countries by promoting certain attitudes and activities without interfering with the basic principles that govern the protection of the security of the external borders. 176

Special regulations concerning border trade To maintain co-operation of the transborder regions and to foster ties between minorities and their home countries, it seems advisable to introduce special regulations that will govern the so called small border movement of people. If residents of areas which lie within the border zone (several dozen kilometres on both sides of the border) could obtain cheap visas that would be valid over long periods of time and could easily be extended, many of the factors that could have a negative influence on the co-operation of cross-border regions would be alleviated. However, the goodwill alone of EU candidate countries in Central Europe will not be enough to implement these recommendations. Understanding and acceptance on the part of EU policy-makers and institutions responsible for the enlargement process, as well as those who will shape future policy of a united Europe, is crucial. The main advantage of the proposed solutions is the fact that they do not undermine the necessity of introducing visa regulations, but try to provide a broader formula that could become an important instrument in shaping future EU security policy. This solution, apart from creating conditions for tighter border control, could also bring additional advantages to the enlarged EU, as it would provide tools that could be used to shape an active policy towards neighbouring countries. Delineation of borders will also be impossible without strong support of the European Union and its current member countries. The Baltic states are too weak to force Russia to sign and then ratify border treaties. Pressure from the West could encourage the government of Ukraine to establish and protect its borders with Russia, which, in turn, would help to reduce the number of transit routes that can be used by illegal immigrants.

IX Conclusions
For a number of reasons, ensuring stability in the neighbouring countries and bringing them in line with Western standards will bring a lot of advantages to the European Union, particularly after it has admitted new members. Otherwise, it will be impossible to ensure the security of the enlarged EU. Border issues and regulations concerning cross-border travel are an important instrument that can serve to attain that goal. In order for that to happen, changes in policy have to be both desired and well-planned. These policy changes have to become an instrument that is actively used by the European Union in shaping its security policy, and they cannot be reduced to mere technical regulations implemented as part of the provisions of the Schengen Treaty. 177

X Supplement: An analysis of the intensity of cross-border travel

When analysing the intensity of travel across the borders of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia) with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in the 1990s, one can differentiate several stages and then identify factors that influenced travel in particular periods.

Stage One: 1990 1992 This period brought an extremely dynamic growth of cross-border travel compared to the 1980s, when the former Soviet Union was still fairly secluded. In 1990, travel doubled or in some cases even trebled. In subsequent years, as the Soviet Union fell apart and regulations concerning travel from the post-Soviet countries were liberalised, the volume of cross-border travel increased by another 50 per cent annually. During that period, the intensity of cross-border travel depended first of all on the profitability of small trade carried out by Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian traders on markets in Central European countries.

Stage Two: 1993 1997 During this period, the intensity of cross-border travel rose even further to reach its climax in 1996 1997. In 1997, a record 29 million people crossed Polands eastern border. This number rose by 52 per cent compared to 1993 (when the border was crossed by 19 million people). During this period, significant changes affecting trade between countries of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe took place. Because of shortages of locally produced goods and high prices, demand for imported products rose significantly, particularly for competitivly priced products from countries of Central Europe. Those countries became the target of most trade excursions. During this time, a great number of small companies producing goods for the Eastern markets and re-exporting certain products from the West (sweets, fruit preserves, diary products, etc., as well as furniture, textiles and cosmetics) flourished. Furthermore, trade conducted on local markets and bazaars intensified. In contrast to what was taking place during previous years, during this period Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians were buying rather than selling products.

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Stage Three: 1998 1999 In 1998, the financial crisis in Russia had a negative impact on the economic situation in other post-Soviet countries that had close links with the Russian economy, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Because of the devaluation of local currencies, imports even of the relatively cheap products from Central Europe became less profitable. Furthermore, the number of small traders crossing the border diminished. As a result, cross-border travel became less intense. So far, it has not returned to its 1997 level. Once plans to introduce visa requirements for the citizens of post-Soviet states are implemented, cross-border travel will diminish even farther. It is worth mentioning that as differences between wages in the post-Soviet and Central European countries grow, it becomes more and more common for citizens of the latter to come to work in the former (such as Poland, Hungary). The following graph shows how the intensity of cross-border travel on Polands eastern border developed in the 1990s. Of all the EU candidate countries, Poland noted the most intense movement of people travelling to and from the territories of the former Soviet Union. Graph: Travel across Polands eastern borders in the 1990s16

Number of travellers 35,000,000 30,000,000 25,000,000 20,000,000 15,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

IXI 1999

16

Source: Turystyka w 1998 roku, Main Statistical Office, Warsaw 1999. Also bulletins of Poland Border Guard.

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Border Issues and Visa Regulations: Political, Economic and Social Implications A Western Perspective
Barbara Lippert

I Introduction
Border issues and migration have been key areas of concern for Europe and for the enlarged EU in particular since 1989. Enlarging the EU to the east and southeast is conducive to the longstanding aspirations of the OSCE process.1 However, for those outside the EU the effects of integration are increasingly troublesome. Unlike the candidate countries, they lack privileged access and participation in rule making but have to cope with the external effects of a larger union. The EU and the candidate countries on the other hand are confronted with a new set of problems in the areas of border control and migration. Here, problems mainly fall into the following categories: 1. The enlarged EU will border directly on a relatively poor region that is politically, socially and economically heterogeneous. Any problems in this border region might well spill over into the EU. 2. Global trends of increased migration and the internationalisation of crime are manifest in the direct neighbourhood of the Union: the countries of Central and

The chapter largely relies on analysis and information in the following publications: Heather Grabbe: The sharp edges of Europe: security implications of extending EU border policies eastwards (Institute for European Studies Western European Union, Occasional Papers 13), Paris 2000; P. Hgel, Chr. Deubner: Wenn Staatsgrenzen zu EU-Grenzen werden: Gefhrdete Nachbarschaften in Osteuropa (SWP AP 3125), Ebenhausen 2000; I. Kempe, W. van Meurs, B. van Ow (eds.): Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten und ihre stlichen Nachbarn The EU Accession States and Their Eastern Neighbours, Gtersloh 1999; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Potential in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva 1998; S. Lavenex: Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest 1999; J. Monar: Die Integration der mittel- und osteuropischen Lnder in den Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts, in: B. Lippert (ed.): Osterweiterung der Europischen Union die doppelte Reifeprfung, Bonn 2000.

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Eastern Europe and the newly independent states have become attractive destinations and transit countries for migrants as well as transit countries and platforms for organised crime. 3. EU candidates face specific problems due to their stage of transformation. From this ensue manifold (legal, administrative, technical) deficits in fully applying the acquis, in particular in the area of justice and home affairs/internal security. 4. The applicants have to keep pace with the dynamic development of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice inside the EU. The expected legislative boom is comparable to the internal market legislation in the eighties and can lead to a growing gap between new and old members in terms of resources, capacities and legal framework. 5. Conflicts of interest are emerging between the EU and candidates on specific aspects of the acquis itself. Examples are the list of visa requirements and the potential disruption of the delicate regional balance through the EUs trade and customs regimes. 6. The political identity of the EU is challenged by accusations that it is turning into a fortress. 7. Sensitivities of public opinion both in the EU and in the candidate countries considerably narrow the governments scope of action. The debate highlights the repressive aspects of the EUs policy towards the candidates and non candidates (hard external borders) but takes the advantages for new members (soft internal borders, free movement, controlled and well managed external borders) for granted. This criticism appeals to the political identity and credibility of the EU as a union based on the rule of law, democracy, the respect for human rights, etc. These values are being challenged by alarming scenarios about the spread of organised crime and about waves of migration into Western Europe. A risk study on two selected issues border control and visa regulations may help to get a fuller picture of the new neighbourhood problems and the ways to cope with them.

II Problem areas an overview

With regard to five specific areas migration/asylum, visa regulations, customs regulations, border security and organised crime the scope and nature of the problems (as seen from the perspective of the EU) are outlined. The nine subsections of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) acquis that are currently being negotiated with the candidate countries refer mainly to these aspects. 181

From an EU perspective, most of these issues are linked to the Schengen regime. Within a period of four years, i. e., in 2004, the Schengen acquis, concerning visa, asylum and immigration rules, will become part of the EC pillar. The new members of the enlarged EU will have to accept the Schengen regime upon entry in full. Any opting out, as in the cases of the UK and Ireland, is denied. A first enlargement phase, including the current Luxembourg-5, will lead to strict control of external frontiers and the implementation of common visa, asylum and immigration policies as well as the standards of border control and police co-operation with the help of the Schengen Information System.

Migration and asylum According to the Amato report, 10 to 14 million border crossings of the Central and East European East European borders were counted in 1996.2 The Polish border was the one crossed most. In 1999, 27.3 million persons (including cross-border commuters) crossed the eastern Polish border, which is an increase of 16 per cent compared to 1998.3 Today about 50,000 illegal permanent residents are counted in Poland.4 The International Centre for Migration Policy Development reckons that some 400,000 500,000 illegal migrants enter the EU annually. Even before ascension, the candidate countries, traditionally countries of emigration, have become countries of immigration as well. Thus, besides Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are also desirable destinations for migrants. Countries like Ukraine and Russia with lax controlls along their Western borders attract large numbers of migrants, at least 450,000 illegal immigrants and transit migrants in the Russian Federation alone. All these countries are politically unprepared and ill-equipped in terms of legal provisions and material resources to cope with these numbers of migrants. Whereas the EU has high barriers for migrants, the candidate countries and, even more so, the countries further east have low legal and social thresholds for migrants. For example, it is quite easy to get a work permit. The estimated number of foreigners staying and working in Poland alone is at least 50,000, possibly up to 200,000.
2 A. Giuliano, J. Batt: Mobility in an Enlarged European Union. Report of the Reflection Group on the Long-Term Implications of Eastward Enlargement of the European Union: the Nature of the New Border, European University Institute, Florence, Robert Schuman Centre, Policy Papers 99/4, San Domencia di Fiesole 1999, p. 7. It is generally very difficult to get valid statistical data on the development of legal and illegal immigration into Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states. Die Welt, 8 March 2000. B. Schweda: Mit der Freiheit kamen neben der Vielfalt auch die Probleme, in: Das Parlament, No. 12, 17 March 2000, p. 17.

3 4

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The EUs migration policy concerns stays of foreigners that exceed a period of three months. The priority of the EU is to combat illegal immigration through tightening border controls. Economic refugees, many from non-European countries, often cross the border to the EU with the help of criminal organisations and use the Central and East European countries as a transit route. 25,000 to 30,000 transit migrants are detained en route to Western Europe annually, which is estimated to make up only 25 to 30 per cent of the total number.5 Uncontrolled migration from Vietnam, Korea and China forms the core of an estimated half a million migrants from Asia in the years from 1991 to 1994 that used the CIS as a transit corridor. This kind of migration creates social conflicts, frequently leads to crime (drugs, prostitution) and has a destabilising effect in general. A different type of migrant legal and illegal are short-term residents who cross the border for a limited period of time, work and then go back to their home country. They have a restricted cross-border range of mobility. In addition to migration towards the West, there is also significant interregional migration in the Russian Federation. This is particularly the case in Siberia and the Far East. West Siberia has turned into a priority destination. In 1994, 134,000 migrants came from the Central Asian republics and 34,000 from the European republics to Siberia. Most of the migrants came from Kazakhstan with which Russia shares a common border.6 The development of migration in Europe largely depends on the migration potentials in Russia, other newly independent states and North Africa. A complex set of factors will determine the scope of migration to the West and into the candidate countries: political instability and economic deterioration, ethnic tensions and discrimination, and the chance for emigration on the basis of ethnic ties, as in the case of German and Jewish minorities in the newly independent states. For example, in Ukraine there is a high migration potential because of the bad economic conditions. More than one third of the citizens is interested in temporary labour migration. This corresponds with the pattern of Ukrainian labour migration to candidate countries, mainly the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. In Belarus, the pull factors of migration outweigh the push factors, despite the authoritarian political regime. Prospects of better living conditions attract those who are ready to leave their country temporarily.7 The EU-15, the candidates and also the transit countries share an interest to co-operate because of the challenges to internal security through illegal migration. The EU requires a systematic adaptation of national law from the candidates, e. g., a comprehensive law on foreigners as part of an immigration policy. To date, the respective laws in
5 6 7 Amato report, p. 7. N. Wein: Bevlkerungsbewegungen im asiatischen Ruland. Migrantenstrme in Sibirien und im Fernen Osten nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, in: Osteuropa 9, 1999, pp. 908 922. IOM, Migration Potential.

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the candidate and other transit countries are often far more liberal than in the EU countries. Clear and consistent rules to grant and prolong residence permits have to be in place, and well-functioning law enforcement, including repatriation and re-admission, is expected. Asylum policy is a different case.8 Candidate countries are increasingly becoming attractive destinations for those seeking asylum, which is quite a new situation for the Central and East European countries. From January up to November 1999, 10,783 applicants were registered in Hungary, 6,486 in the Czech Republic, 3,013 in Poland and 1,172 in Slovakia.9 Also in this regard, the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the EU members increasingly share the same problems, although they still differ in scope significantly. The EU expects effective minimum guarantees for the asylum procedure in the candidate countries, including the legal right to an appeal. Co-operation of administrations between EU member states, counselling, support for refugees and those seeking asylum must be provided for. Deficits in the candidate countries include legislative gaps, an incomplete material law, and a lack of clear definitions of safe countries of origin or safe third countries. Often, border personnel cannot speak English to communicate with those seeking asylum. Basic requirements like the right to legal advice or an interpreter during the legal proceedings are frequently not met. Some Central and East European countries which are used as transit countries have introduced time limits for the submission of an asylum application, which operate as procedural barriers to having an application examined in substance. Improved administrative and legal capacities are indispensable because the EU heavily relies on the implementation of agreed minimum standards. Most of the candidate countries have already signed re-admission agreements with EU member states and have built comprehensive networks with their eastern neighbours so that they can send back asylum applicants to a safe third country.

Visa regulations The question of visa regulations for non-EU countries is directly linked to the Schengen regime within the EU. Poland and all other new EU members will only become Schengen countries if they have proven their ability and political willingness to live up to the Schengen rules. The implementation of common entry conditions means harmonising
8 9 In detail: A. Subhan: Migration and Asylum in Central and Eastern Europe. Working Paper, European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Brussels 1998. In Romania 1,529 and in Slovenia 879, as compared to 88,239 in Germany and a total of 395,002 in Europe of which in the EU: 316,514. Numbers according to UNHCR statistics.

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visa policy, introducing carrier liability and imposing penalties on those assisting unlawful entry. It also includes regulations for stateless persons and refugees and for documents of not-recognised countries. More specifically, new members must accept a common list referring to those countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external border of a member state. The current common list for visa includes all newly independent states, plus Albania, Bulgaria, FRY, FYROM, Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, only eight out of the ten candidate countries enjoy visa-free travel to the EU.10 Besides the technical and financial implications of adjustment to the acquis, the special relations between new EU members and their neighbours that will remain outside the EU in the foreseeable future deserve close attention. Whereas the Polish government argues, that economic, political and social ties with the Ukraine will suffer through the introduction of the EUs visa policy, Hungary is mostly concerned about the access of ethnic Hungarians living in the surrounding countries. Both countries are reluctant to introduce EU visa rules, at least before membership. For the five frontrunners negotiating membership, an overview of the divergence from the EU list of visa requirements is given below.

Visa regimes of the Luxemburg-5 candidates Visa regulations deviating from the Council regulation (EC) 06045/99, as of June 1998
Estonia Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria Georgia Iran Yugoslavia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Cuba Macedonia Moldova F1 Poland F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR F1 F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR F3 F1 F1, AR F3 F6, AR F6, AR F1 F1 F6, AR F1 F1 F1, AR F3 F1 F1 F1 F1 Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR F3

10

Denmark, the UK and Ireland have special regimes.

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Estonia Mongolia Romania Russia Tajikistan Turkey Tunisia Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

Poland F1 F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR

Slovenia F1 F3, AR F2 F3

Czech Republic Hungary F3 F1 F1 F1, AR

F1, AR F3 F3

F6, AR F6, AR F6, AR

F1, AR F1, AR F1, AR

F1-6 Visa-free entry with maximum duration of stay in months. AR Additional requirements for the entry, e. g., proof of funds or invitations. Information according to ICMPD, Towards a Joint European Visa Regime, p. 38 and Annex II. Source: Hgel, Peter/Deubner, Christian: Wenn Staatsgrenzen zu EU-Grenzen werden: Gefhrdete Nachbarschaften in Osteuropa, Ebenhausen 2000.

The Hungarian diaspora is as large as three million people. The Hungarian minority in Romania comprises approximately 1.7 million people, but in Ukraine only about 200,000. Hungary has shared a well-functioning Schengen border with Austria since 1995 and borders on three candidate countries (Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), plus Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine. Slovakians are granted visa-free travel to Hungary with easy access to the labour market for ethnic Hungarians, but also for other citizens of Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and the former Yugoslav republics. Hungarian small cross-border trade in the east and the southeast both legal and illegal is intense and depends on family ties and ties with diaspora communities. Against this background, the Hungarian government rejects implementing the EU visa regimes before membership and looks for negotiating a compromise or transitory solution. It proposes the introduction of national visas and long-term visas for Hungarians in Romania and other neighbouring countries until the Schengen agreement becomes fully effective. However, the EU would strictly oppose any discrimination against citizens from third countries on the grounds of their not being of Hungarian ethnicity. If derogations are considered, they must ensure fair and equal treatment of citizens from a third country. Hungary could also consider a specific law for ethnic Hungarians abroad that would give them a privileged status with regard to easy visa practices. From the EUs point of view, introducing statutory dual citizenship to millions of ethnic Hungarians would be a more consistent, albeit expensive, approach. Romania and the Ukraine will remain difficult countries because they will not become EU members in the medium term. The EU will probably allow visa-free travel for Romania only at a later stage. Until then, Hungary

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will try to postpone the Schengen acquis from taking effect.11 On 1 July 2000, Romania introduced visa requirements for the newly independent states, including Ukraine with a Romanian minority of ca. 460,000. Moldova is seen as a special case because of the Romanian identity/nationality of 2.8 million Moldavan citizens. However, Romania threatens the government of Chisinau with tightening border controls and controlling the influx of illegal transit migrants or discontinuing the practice of visa-free entry for Moldavans. Questions concerning citizenship and border demarcation are not addressed in the basic bilateral treaty. Unlike Romania, Moldova does not accept dual citizenship. The Romanian government does not encourage Moldavans to apply for Romanian citizenship and welcomes the fact that the wave of applications of early 2000 has already died down. Overall, Hungary and Romania try to restrict migration from neighbouring countries with ethnic Hungarians and Romanians, respectively. Instead, they try to maintain open and friendly borders for visitors and short-term migrants. Governments act cautiously because they are aware of a sensitive public opinion that makes the acceptance and the legitimacy of the integration efforts of their country dependent on maintaining special neighbourhood relations. Romania is still a country with huge numbers of illegal migrants. In November 1997, the unofficial number reached 25,000. In Romania three routes for migrants from the newly independent states and Asia cross: that from Moscow to Chisinau to Hungary, that from Moscow to Kiev to Hungary and that from Iran/Iraq to Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary.12As a buffer-country without visa-free entry into the EU, Romania is interested in executing a strict visa regime to improve its credentials as a reliable third country. Bucharest enacts restrictive visa requirements for 85 countries that have a significant potential for illegal migration. It has concluded a series of agreements, among them 31 re-admission agreements, and is aligning its new border law with that of the EU. Hungary, too, put pressure on the Romanian government to strengthen border control and tighten the visa regime. The effectiveness of border control, however, remains doubtful. Without a significant ethnic minority in Ukraine and underdeveloped bilateral relations, Slovakia was ready to announce the introduction of visa requirements vis--vis the Ukraine in August 1999.13 The Czech Republic had put pressure on Slovakia because of growing illegal migration into the country. Hungary is only slowly strengthening border control. From 1 September 1999, everybody crossing the Hungarian borders in either direction has had to be registered (with data being stored for 60 days).
11 12 13 Which does not necessarily mean to ask for derogations (cf. the cases of Italy and Austria). A. Subhan: Migration, op. cit. p. 52. President Schuster criticised this decision of the government and applauded similar statements by his Polish and Hungarian colleagues Kwasniewski and Gncz. It is quite clear that this is a psychologically important question.

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By comparison, Poland is most concerned about good relations with Ukraine as a strategic partner, and the negative economic effects of regulating border crossings on the basis of a strict visa regime. Poland is a crossing point for people from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus who can enter without a visa or only need a voucher. Moreover, the eastern border of Ukraine is an open gate for migrants from other CIS countries and beyond, which also constitutes a problem for Poland. The introduction of the voucher system in 1998 led to a dramatic drop in cross-border travel and small border trade. The introduction of additional entry requirements aggravated the situation, with adverse effects for the economy of both Poland and Ukraine. Latvia, with a Russian-speaking minority of approximately 25 per cent of its population, has simplified local border crossing procedures with Russia and Belarus. This is not true for Estonia which has the highest convergence with the EUs list of visa requirements among the candidate countries. Among other documents (appropriate invitation, accommodation voucher or documentation about sufficient funds for the stay) Estonia, also requires a health insurance policy with a coverage of at least country in their home country, but not at the borders. As an enclave, the Kaliningrad oblast constitutes a special case.14 Citizens of the Kaliningrad oblast have a Russian passport and will be treated accordingly in terms of the visa regime in the enlarged EU as well. Thus, Kaliningrad will soon border the EU members Poland and Lithuania. Today, visa-free travel between Lithuania and citizens of Kaliningrad and Poland and Kaliningrad facilitates cross-border economic activities. Upon obtaining EU membership, a change of the regime will be necessary. Now, Poland is strengthening border controls and requires vouchers for visitors from Kaliningrad who need to provide proof of sufficient funds and accommodation. Proposals to include Kaliningrad into a Baltic Schengen are unlikely to be negotiated even at a later stage of enlargement, because Kaliningrad remains a constitutive part of the Russian Federation. Russia perceives Kaliningrad as an outpost for its integration into the West. The Baltic countries, mainly Lithuania, are under heavy pressure from the EU to tighten their borders and from Moscow to ease their visa regimes. Russia looks for a consensual solution to the problem of a visa regime for the triangle of Lithuania, Poland and Kaliningrad. Moreover, for Russia, Kaliningrad has become an important issue in consultations with the EU. EU officials stress that up-to-date customs and border-crossing facilities are prerequisites for any talks on specific solutions for Kaliningrad. 10,300 per stay. Normally, visitors should apply for visas at the embassies or consulates of the respective

14

Cf. for the section on Kaliningrad R. Vetter: Kaliningrad und die Osterweiterung der Europische Union. Kooperationsbemhungen zum Ausgleich zivilisatorischer Unterschiede, in: Osteuropa 2, 2000, pp. 144 160.

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The Schengen regime of the EU also influences decisions in Ukraine and other newly independent states that announce the adoption of the visa list of the EU. For example: Kazakhstan announced that from 1 February 2000, citizens of CIS countries have to obtain transit visas to travel through that Central Asian country. The same is true for Uzbekistan. Distrust among newly independent states is growing. All these developments show the tendency of blocking migration mainly through tightening borders. Up to now, the Finnish-Russian border has been set as a positive example for functioning border controls including a Schengen visa regime, though under comparatively favourable conditions.

Customs regulations and economic effects Besides the human dimension of border arrangements, there are of course economic aspects to be considered. The candidate countries argue that in view of their eastern neighbours outside the EU, the EUs acquis on customs and trade regulations has to be modified. They expect a severe deterioration of economic relations with the neighbours. While it is surely in the interest of the EU to soften and not aggravate the economic and social gulf between ins and outs of the EU, it may tolerate only a limited number of transitional arrangements. Which new problems occur for third countries vis--vis the enlarged EU? The excluded countries are confronted with higher tariffs across the board because they lose preferential access. For example, Moldova currently has a free-trade agreement with Romania, Croatia one with Slovenia and Ukraine one with the Baltic States. The new members have to adopt the common external tariff of the EU. Higher tariffs affect both agricultural products and manufactured goods. However, complicated border formalities, product standards and certification rules are worse than tariffs. Thus, the former partners in the free-trade agreement will suffer a decline in market access. Moreover, as a structural disadvantage, they will fail to achieve the same improvements in access and liberalisation that their neighbours have or will acquire through membership. So, the widening gap between ins and outs seems the biggest harm. The effects on the Ukraine with a shrinking and still deteriorating economy are particularly worrisome and underscore the fundamental Polish interest in stabilising their eastern neighbour as a sovereign state with a pro-Western orientation. Losses for the new EU members are less severe. The importance of the Eastern markets varies. Polish exports to the former USSR including the three Baltic states totalled US-$ 2,55 billion in 1999, compared to US-$ 19,32 billion in export value to the EU. As far as Polish exports are concerned, Russia and the Ukraine are of similar importance, 189

whereas Russian exports to Poland are nearly eight times higher than those of Ukraine.15 Estonia will have to raise most of its tariffs and is currently reluctant to do so. For Poland and Hungary, membership will reduce manufacturing tariffs but raise agricultural barriers. This balance sheet only refers to registered trade. When looking at the Polish-Ukrainian border, losses in terms of unregistered trade (e. g., bazaar trade) are significant and have at least a strong regional impact on the labour market.16 This unofficial cross-border trade is estimated to account for 25 per cent of the overall Polish trade with its eastern neighbours. Thus, the EU together with the member states should focus its regional policy and assistance on these areas and increase support for the eastern neighbours (infrastructure, economic development, export promotion schemes, etc.), because this is how it may also contribute to regional stability. Negotiations on compensation with the European Council would only be possible if the affected third countries like Russia and the Ukraine were WTO members. They could correctly claim trade diversions in connection with the enlargement of the EU as a regional trading bloc. This is surely true for Russia, which seeks to increase the volume of trade with the enlarged EU.17 However, enlargement adds to the emergence of regional trade blocks and to the challenges for the multilateral trade systems, which indicates a more general problem.

Border security Border control is a fundamental prerequisite for coping with most of the problems dealt with in this chapter. It affects a proper visa and customs policy, the fight against organised crime and the immigration policy. It is a key interest of the EU that all new members guarantee security through border control by EU standards on the external borders of the Union. Problems of meeting the challenges are not only linked to financial and technical assistance. They concern behavioural and mental patterns, but it is also a question of basic political decisions and priority settings. A renovation of border control is needed in areas such as: organisation and practice of border control, technical equipment, training of border police, international co-operation and staff numbers. A basic requirement is proper border demarcation. Russia for example does not have clear border demarcations, particularly in the east and south. Other countries, like Lithuania, support their neighbours (Belarus) financially and
15 16 17 Data provided by Polish Foreign Trade Information Centre. In 1996, the 15 biggest bazaars had a turnover of 7.42 billion Zloty. In 1999 the exports from Russia to the EU amounted to 22.9 billion, while the imports from the EU amounted to 13.1 billion.

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technically so that they can complete border demarcation between the two countries. Moreover, borders are disputed and show unresolved bilateral issues. Border problems, different in nature and scope, but all with a potential for conflict exist for example between the Ukraine and Russia (Crimea); Russia and the Baltic states (demarcation of the borders is still pending); Hungary and Romania (minority issues) and Romania and the Ukraine (border demarcation/Black Sea). Despite basic treaties between Romania and Moldova and the Ukraine, the independence of Moldova as a nation state with a huge population of people with Romanian identity may not be definite. A secession of large parts of Bessarabia and Northern Bukowina that would be integrated into Romania could be pursued in the longer run. This would also mean that the Ukraine would have to cede territory to the larger Romania. Today only the practical problem of the border demarcation in the south along the Danube is still in dispute. From the EUs point of view, Poland is a key country for ensuring an effectively controlled external border. 15 new border crossing points are to be built on the Polish eastern frontier by 2001, compared to only four official crossing-points on the PolishUkrainian border today. At the German-Polish Schengen border 26 such crossing points already exist. Poland will also increase the number of border guards. Along the Finnish-Russian border of a length of 1,200 kilometres, there are only nine border crossings, which seems to contribute to their good management. However, the region of Karelia, for example, is scarcely populated and cannot be compared with the eastern border of Poland, which is under heavy migration pressure. The quality and intensity of political relations between the candidate countries and their eastern neighbours form the basis for any mutually beneficial relation after EU membership of Poland or the Baltic states. Moreover, new EU members will also have to demilitarise their border troops, increase civil personnel and reduce interagency rivalries through a more efficient organisational structure. Another point is of course the equipment of border crossing points. Out of 64 border points in Romania, only five have proper equipment to check the validity of passports and visas. Most of the candidates do not use extensive electronic data processing equipment, which is less of a problem at airports, but a severe one at the external borders. Screening facilities are underdeveloped, e. g., for reading passports electronically. Border guards must carry out border controls systematically and checks intermittently. The Schengen border control regime calls for checking cars, persons and the authenticity of documents, for which trained personnel is needed. This is also the case for risk-profiling and risk-testing procedures. Most border guards only have a basic training as policemen or soldiers but lack any special expertise. For example, specialists for identification of forged documents etc. mainly work at airports rather than at land border crossings. Another deficit are weak capacities for international co-operation 191

because of a lack of language skills, specialised training and operative co-operation between border and police units in third countries.

Organised crime Organised crime is a potential threat to the stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, the market economy and social and economic progress. The countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe and newly independent states are particularly vulnerable. Organised crime comprises terrorism, trafficking in humans, prostitution, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, corruption, fraud, smuggling, production and dissemination of counterfeit money, money laundering, receiving stolen goods and high-tech crime.18 Organised crime networks are active with the involvement of the state, as in the cases of the Ukraine and also the Russian Federation. Criminal organisations of nationals from those two countries are perceived as the most active in Central and Eastern Europe. It is, however, difficult to name the extent of organised crime in Central and Eastern Europe. According to EU information, there were more than 640 local and foreign groups with 5,500 members active in Poland in 1999. Many of these were from Russia. Poland is a basis for activities like drug trafficking, prostitution and trafficking in humans. Poland has also become a major producer of synthetic drugs: 10 20 per cent of amphetamines that are confiscated in the EU come from Poland. In March 1999, an agreement between Poland and Ukraine to combat organised crime was concluded. The aim is to dissolve more than 60 criminal gangs, operating in both countries, and to control the situation along the Polish-Ukrainian border. Apparently, the Ukrainian mafia is the largest criminal gang operating on Polish territory.19 Hungary also gained an increasingly bad image in terms of organised crime in the nineties. Since 1991, around 140 bomb assassinations have been registered, mostly because of rivalries between gangs from the newly independent states and local ones. Factors encouraging these criminal activities are: a free market, an open society with a reduced role of the state, closeness to Russia and also the embargo against Yugoslavia. The Hungarian oil mafia has strong ties to the domestic political class and army. Prime

18

19

Cf. Transparency International (TI) 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks Estonia as the best Central and East European Country (25th out of 99 countries) and Russia as the worst (82th), at: http://www.gwdg. de~uwvw/1999Data.html. For the paragraph on Poland and Hungary, cf.: H.-J. Hoppe: Geheimdienste und Sicherheitsstrukturen in Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn. Reformanstrengungen und Defizite bei den neuen NATO-Mitgliedern, in: Osteuropa 9, 1999, pp. 983 907.

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Minister Orban and his government announced that they would fight against organised crime, purge the police and judiciary, strengthen anti-corruption units and the tax police. In August 1998, a new office for national security was established. Illicit drug trafficking occurs along different smuggling routes. The first route goes from Central Asia, namely Pakistan and Afghanistan via Russia to Western Europe. The second route starts in Iran and Turkey and runs across the Black Sea and via Ukraine to Western Europe. The Balkan has become a major corridor for trafficking in drugs, arms and humans. These routes are also used for trafficking raw materials and nuclear materials. Neighbours to Russia feel particularly vulnerable because of numerous terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation. They take special efforts to secure nuclear plants, strategic industries and infrastructures. The Central and East European countries and CIS face a series of problems. There are deficits in criminal law with regard to fighting organised crime because it is a new phenomenon. In many former socialist countries, organised crime first has to be defined in criminal law. Also, special police units and special units in the ministries of home affairs and justice have to be formed. A clarification of competencies, better interagency coordination, higher financial investment and technical modernisation are needed. To this end, a Central European Police Academy was established in Budapest; a special Task Force exists within the Baltic Sea Co-operation Council. Any improvements depend on successfully fighting corruption in public administration. Low incomes, little control, poor working conditions and a widespread mentality of looking for a second source of income have to be overcome. The pact between the EU and the candidate countries on organised crime is an example of the pre-accession strategy that should be built on in relations with the newly independent states as well. From an EU perspective, the Russian Federation is a priority for any improvements. The exercise of EU Russian Federation conferences on organised crime aims at strengthening judicial and law enforcement co-operation (trafficking in humans, drugs, arms and stolen property) and is accompanied by strengthening the role of member states liaison officers in the Russian Federation. Other key partners of the EU are the Baltic countries, Cyprus, Russia, Ukraine, the US and Canada, which signals the degree of multilateral co-operation that is needed to act effectively. The key question remains whether the tightening of borders is the most effective way to combat organised crime. The Amato report recommends developing administrative, judicial and policing capacities, deepening bi- and multilateral co-operation, and finding a better balance between repressive and preventive measures.

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III Implications and recommendations for the (enlarged) EU

What are the political, economic and social implications of border politics for the enlarged EU?

Political implications The enlarged EU shifts the buffer zone and migration burden further to the east. Whereas the candidate countries will accept the EUs acquis because of the prospect of membership, this incentive cannot be used for handling relations with CIS neighbours. The EU must develop a full-fledged neighbourhood policy with the countries in its periphery that will follow the concept of enhanced inclusiveness. Major elements are free/preferential trade regimes, a controlled opening of labour markets for migrant workers, facilitating small border traffic and creating new instruments and procedures to build trust and reciprocity between ins and outs. Transparent and efficient control arrangements at the Schengen borders may improve the overall psychological and political climate. Managing the special relationships with the EU neighbours must become a priority of the common foreign and security policy. An early involvement of the Central and East European countries in shaping the CIS policy of the EU is recommended. In return, the new members from Central and Eastern Europe must use the special relations with their eastern neighbours for the benefit of the EUs foreign policy. One might expect that the accession of the Baltic states into the EU will lead the Russian Federation to clarify and normalise the relations with its Northern neighbours. After enlargement, a formalisation of all cross-border activities with non-EU neighbours will be necessary. The necessary agreements must be concluded in a spirit of co-operation. Moreover, a high degree of multilateral co-operation beyond the EU framework and with the EU as the central actor e. g., in the area of fighting organised crime is indispensable. This has major implications for the deepening of co-operation in justice and home affairs of the EU and the coherence of actions taken under the three pillars of the EU. It includes further harmonisation of visa regulations, practices within the EU and the development of a modern immigration policy. In the longer run, the EU should consider a European border police to guard its external borders or multinational border troops that are co-financed through the EU budget. On the other side, enlargement risks aggravating the fragmentation and inconsistencies of the existing acquis already in the first round of enlargement. The EU needs to consolidate the consent among new and old EU members on border issues after membership. Poland is of strategic importance for 194

effective security and also for maintaining cross-border economic ties in the region, whereas Hungary is a test case for combining security interests of the EU with special bilateral relations of a new member state (i. e., to Romania). Permanent residency in the Central and East European countries is often the result of incomplete migration. This constitutes a new challenge for the eastern EU members. The EU has to take safeguards against the weakening of the international refugee regime and the violation of basic norms of international law. The EU must establish a system to monitor adequate implementation of the Schengen acquis after enlargement, in particular if exceptions are agreed to with regard to quality and the operative skills and capacities of the implementing agencies and actors. In principle, the applicants/new members own efforts for their internal security are crucial. For all these reasons, the enlarged EU will maintain high border-control standards. The coincidence of free movement for EU citizens from new Central and East European member states with massive pressure on the EUs new eastern borders, and with a potential rise of immigration from the direct neighbourhood into the enlarged EU, is a challenge for the member states. Compared to previous rounds of enlargement, any prognosis of migration flows and patterns remains very difficult. Besides the economic push and pull factors, potential political instabilities and ethnic tensions form the complex conditions for migration. Migration (permanent or temporary) on the basis of ethnic ties and minority interests is most frequent in Southeastern Europe. Ethnic ties and tensions make an efficient and rational treatment of border issues more difficult. Thus, it is mostly in combination with other factors of bilateral relations that visa regulations can produce conflicts. Effective security requires a communication strategy that prepares public opinion for new threats, complex problems and constructive problem solving. Also, the EU has to address the problems connected with a phased enlargement. Because of free trade agreements, customs unions and other existing ties between the countries, any leftovers would cause severe problems and costs. A probable consequence is that the EU will maintain Schengen borders with new members but will not allow exemptions from the full integration into the internal market. The EU should not go for a geopolitical approach to enlargement but stick to the membership criteria when taking decisions on accession in any specific case.

Economic and financial implications Economic implications of border issues for the candidate countries are mostly overplayed, although trade diversion effects will occur for third countries. Trade losses for new EU members and their neighbours outside the European Economic Area are caused 195

by higher tariffs, border formalities and differing product standards. A negative impact on investment is likely. The wider the economic gap between the enlarged EU or the successful candidates and the peripheral non-EU neighbours, the stronger the migration pressure on the eastern borders of the EU. The candidate countries of today will be the first target countries for economic migrants and refugees from the East. In terms of compensatory measures, the EU should think of special regional aid schemes, preferential trade regimes, opening of labour markets, long-term visas for businessmen, etc. The existing customs unions among newly independent states could be enlarged. Overall, the EU must with the help of a strong commitment of new members support the creation and development of Euro Regions. Therefore, strengthening regional and local authorities and actors is an essential prerequisite. As for the financial implications, massive investment to meet requirements for border control in applicant countries is already needed during the pre-accession phase. Burden sharing across the EU after enlargement may be highly controversial in the case of border control as well.

Social implications Within the enlarged EU, the diversity of political and administrative cultures in terms of internal security will grow. The EU has to take into account public opinion in old and new member states. However, within the next years an approximation of threat perceptions between the EU-15 and new members can be expected. This must not lead to neglecting the Eastern neighbours. Within the old EU, migration and the rise of organised crime are often seen as hanging together. Against this background it will be difficult to create and stabilise a positive climate on migration and cultural diversity in all member states. Working against anti-immigration sentiments is a major task for the EU. Another contentious point is balancing the asymmetrical socio-economic effects of migration across the EU. Fair burden sharing has to be established that helps the target or most affected member states to cope with these tasks. In border regions and in the preferred destinations of migrants, there will be significant effects on the EU labour market, particularly in low-wage segments.

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IV Conclusion: Overall assessment

Today the EU is miles away from a holistic and coherent approach for coping with the complex problems of border issues. The candidates are also under pressure to respond to the demands of membership and pay tribute to their geographic situation. While the candidates will eventually link their political destiny with the EU, the non-candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states need more attention. The politicisation of ethnic diversity and historical legacies remains significant along the future eastern border of the enlarged EU. In this respect, problems are strongest in South Eastern Europe. Here, the EU has to defend and probably refine its general stance on questions like minorities, citizenship, non-discrimination, etc. The export of the EUs acquis on visa regulations and border issues does not necessarily conflict with the broader foreign and security objectives vis--vis the eastern neighbours of the enlarged EU. While new or moved dividing lines seem unavoidable, these borders can be very different in nature and need not be a cause of concern per se. Also in the crucial cases of Hungary/Romania and Poland/Ukraine, technical improvements could relax the application of the visa regimes. Moreover, opening additional consulates in countries of emigration could improve the situation in non-Schengen countries. However, tensions between external and internal security policies will exist as long as reactive and preventive measures are not planned together by the EU. The more effective assistance and co-operation are in the neighbouring countries, the easier it is to reduce negative effects of a strictly internal security policy of the EU on outsiders. Tightened borders are a precondition but not a panacea for improving internal security and controlling migration into the enlarged EU. The candidate countries face transitory problems and demands in the years leading to accession. Romania was confronted with increasing numbers of Moldavians who applied for Romanian citizenship in anticipation of a Romanian visa regime modelled on the EUs. Hungary is under pressure too, to clarify its legal treatment of ethnic Hungarians from Romania or the Ukraine migrating to Hungary. In the first place, the EU expects all new members to have resolved border problems and relations with their neighbours. The EU is also not prepared to accept any loss in internal security in the course of enlargement. With the first round of enlargement, the EU will lose its second line of defence against illegal migration. Despite the efforts taken, all candidates show clear deficits in implementing the respective acquis. As things stand today, accession will be delayed, or the EU will not abolish its current Schengen borders with the applicants even after accession. Countries that lose hope in a mediumterm accession may establish a border regime without considering the EUs interests and requirements. This kind of regression could impair political and also economic relations 197

overall. Therefore, the EU will also have to assist the outsiders in the Phare and Tacis regions. Today, the candidates try to postpone decisions on introducing visa requirements for their eastern neighbours for several reasons: They fear a decline of economic and political relations in the region, and they withhold definitive decisions as long as the date of membership has not been announced by the EU. While Poland reassures Ukraine that it will introduce visas only at the last moment,20 the Czech Republic has introduced visas for Ukraine, Russia and Belarus together with a new law for foreigners. The government argues that this was also done to fight organised crime and illegal employment. This indicates that the new ins will increasingly share the same interests with the present EU members. However, it may be prudent to concentrate membership negotiations primarily on visa regulations and the policing of external borders according to Schengen standards. The global and complex problems of steering migration and fighting organised crime need a constant and long-term commitment and further international and multilateral co-operation. As to the economic losses, they mainly have regional or local impact. Moreover, the EU has to strengthen its regional schemes and make Phare/Tacis co-operation more feasible for example. Strengthening transborder co-operation could work as an important factor of regional stability in Europe and ease tensions caused by a strict internal security policy of the EU. The EU must work against a growing feeling of regional isolation in countries left out of the accession process. Overall, the expectation that enlargement as such and visa regulations in particular will aggravate border issues seems overstated. The EU has become the central body for effective and concerted action for the candidate countries as well. The new members must commit themselves to investing more money, personnel and political resources into internal security policies for their own sake. All new and old members share the interest of developing a modern immigration policy because of the overall demographic trend. Standard procedures of accession and enlargement do not provide for a profound definition of shared interests, but focus on the export of the acquis communautaire and its proper implementation in the new member states. Already in the pre-accession phase, a territorial extension of EU rules is taking place that gives the two parties involved and the three sides affected some room to explore viable solutions. However, it seems indispensable for the EU to reach a common understanding of the interests,

20

The Polish cabinet, however, made a statement in January 2000 that during the coming years it would revoke visa-free travel affecting 15 countries, namely Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Russia, the Ukraine and other CIS and also former Yugoslav countries.

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problems and options of acting effectively and legitimately in the security area at an early stage. In the pre-accession fora and high-level meetings with the candidate countries as well as in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, the EU has to intensify the political dialogue and follow-up measures on all these issues.

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Cross-Border Co-operation Regional Co-operation Between the EU and the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe An Eastern Perspective
Taras Voznyak

I Introduction
In discussing the pan-European integration process within the framework of the EU, it is necessary to underline that despite governmental and presidential declarations, at present Ukrainian integration into the EU is out of the question. This idea may please some in Brussels or Moscow, but it is a premature conclusion. For internal and external reasons, Ukraine is unfit for integration. This is problematic not only for Ukraine itself, but also for the EU, which soon will become its neighbour. An important factor of the modern political process in Europe is its differentiation. There is a stable economic, political and military space in Western Europe. At the same time, disintegration is occurring in Eastern and Southern Europe at all levels. Therefore, the EU should search for new forms of integration or seek to constrain further disintegration if these states are to have a chance to be integrated in the EU in the near future. Indicative of these problems is Ukraine. Integrating such a large country in the EU is hard enough. Ukraine also faces the task of internal homogenisation and integration. It is most likely that step-by-step or regional integration can be effective. One can hear voices in support of this idea in the Transcarpathian region Zakarpattya, Galychyna and Odessa.1 In this context, the experience of neighbouring Hungarian provinces is very important for Zakarpattya. For example, the provinces of Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen and Sa-

B. Pankevych: Materials of political science conference Ukraine Poland role and place during the European integration, Lviv 1998.

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bolch-Satmar-Bereg use their periphery location and their status as an economically depressed area for initiating a new strategy of regional development inside Hungary. Provinces of New Opportunities gain support from the EU in the framework of the Phare programme. Paradoxically, the peripheral location of the aforementioned territories in relation to the rest of Europe is their main trump card, as northern Hungary can serve as a bridge to the East, and the East begins on the territory of Zakarpattya. For integrative processes it is very important not only to move in a definite direction, but also not to lose the initiative or reduce speed. This is because, first of all, a political-economic vacuum cannot exist in the long term, as it will quickly be filled from elsewhere east or south or from across the Atlantic. Secondly, it is impossible to always predict the behaviour of a population angered by economic ailments. Thus, any positive perception of the idea of Ukrainian integration into the EU or, at the lowest level, regional co-operation with its closest Western neighbours (and not just as a declaration and a way of learning about the benefits) is limited. As Ukraines place in the European markets is taken by competitors, entry into these markets becomes more and more complicated. Eventually, this process can result in the creation of an anti-European economic and political lobby, examples of which already exist. The largest achievement of Ukraine in recent times is its attempt at self-determination. In 1996, official Kiev took a concrete and precise position concerning the processes of pan-European integration for the first time: The strategic goal of Ukraine was identified as integration in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, specifically integration with the EU. Russia rejected this idea. Belarus did not even touch this issue. Lukashenko appears more likely to unify Belarus with Russia. The solution to move towards the EU makes Ukraine closer to its direct neighbours Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, a reorientation towards Europe has shown positive effects for both the Ukrainian elites and the general population. The same is true of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However, these countries stand a real chance of becoming EU members. Perhaps, as a first step, Ukraine should coordinate its path towards the European Union (though it is far away from membership) with the other Central European countries, which are all candidates for membership in the EU. The form of new relations between Ukraine and its accession state neighbours depends on the level of this synchronisation. In case of the final accession of the countries mentioned into the EU, these relations should correspond to the relations between the EU and Ukraine, as well as bilateral relations. Summing up, we can state that: 1. Different countries on the future eastern EU border see their relations with the EU in different ways. Russia does not regard itself as a potential EU member. The 202

political leadership of Belarus does not seem interested in developing relations with the EU. Ukrainian political authorities are oriented towards integration with the EU. Nevertheless, Ukrainian left-wing and extreme right-wing groups are against such integration. 2. The EU does not regard Russia, Belarus or Ukraine as potential members in the future. 3. The EU is not ready to settle the question of regimes on its new eastern border. The EU has no consensus on this question. 4. New possible members of the EU (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania) do not have enough weight to influence the situation on their Eastern borders. 5. New possible members of the EU are actively reorienting their economies towards the West; contact with the East is diminishing, which explains the lack of interest in infrastructure development on eastern boundaries. 6. In border zones, disappointment, frustration and ethnic intolerance are increasing. This article will discuss regional co-operation and its prospects for influencing the process of a new separation in Europe.

II Regional co-operation
Principles One of the conditions for any country to enter the EU is development of its horizontal regional co-operation. Evidently, this displays the concept of regionalisation in Europe and its conversion into a Europe of Regions. Such regions are capable of breaking national and state boundaries. Legally, such a direction of EU development is captured in the Charter of Regionalisation, created at the 1985 Council of European Regions and European Regions Assembly. Such types of regions as natural, economic, administrative and cultural were accentuated. These regions encompass several modern states. Due to the extension of the EU towards the east, the Lviv state administration has put forward the initiative of making the whole region of Western Ukraine a buffer zone along the future border with the EU.2 The head of the Lviv administration has reported accordingly to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Its reason is to improve the strategy of co-operation with an expanded EU in an attempt to distribute activity of

B. Pankevych: Ukraine and the Idea of European Integration. Initiative of the Lviv Region, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 14, Lviv 1998.

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such funds as Phare on part of Ukrainian territory. This zone could become a bridgehead for dynamic and safe investment activity. The first steps in this direction have already been taken some projects with mixed Phare-Tacis financing have already been actualised. Creation of this buffer zone could soften the negative repercussions of the Schengen zone extension to Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Perhaps this is the way to whittle away at the New Iron Curtain syndrome.

National prejudices At the same time, in the Central European region we can observe some national prejudices; for example, between Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. Perhaps, occasionally, an old bad memory works its way to the surface. The Ukrainian-Polish ethnic conflict of 1943 1950 still hurts because it was practically a full-scale civil war. Victims of mass deportations of Poles and Ukrainians from Ukraine to Poland and from Poland to Ukraine and to formerly German areas, which now belong to Poland, are still alive. Recently, the sad 50th Anniversary of the Visla deportation operation (1947) was commemorated, when entire ethnic groups of Ukrainians (Lemky, Kholmschaky) were practically rooted out from their lands.3 The problem is that after World War II it was difficult to construct borders along ethnic lines, and therefore they were created in the abstract, and caused a lot of conflict.4 It resulted in conflicts, for example, in Przemysl (Poland) between Polish rights and the Ukrainian minority. Fortunately, this conflict was local, or near Vilnius, between the Polish minorities and the Lithuanians. 5 The same situation applies to the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia. They want to create a detached administrative unit (Pritisyansky district) along the border with Hungary, as the territory is populated mainly by Hungarians. A similar conflict occurs in Lviv concerning the Polish military cemetery. There are graves of the soldiers killed in the Polish-Ukrainian War in 1919. The level of differentiation between these neighbouring regions is sharply increasing and, as a result, constitutes a menace. For example, recently proportional average wages
3 Y. Dashkevych: Tang of Visla operation, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 10, Lviv 1998. The anniversary of destruction of the Polish population in Volyn was sad as well. (T. Olszanski: The Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1943 1947, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 10, Lviv 1997). T. Olszanski: Zur Entstehung der polnisch-ukrainischen Grenze, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 12, Lviv 1998; A. Rogowska, S. Stepien: Die polnisch-ukrainische Grenze in den zurckliegenden 50 Jahren, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 11, Lviv 1998. A. Pawlyschyn: Perspektiven fr eine Verstndigung an der Grenze, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 12, Lviv 1998.

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in Poland and Ukraine are now absolutely disproportional: US-$ 40 in Ukraine compared to US-$ 400 in Poland. A demarcation between poor Europe and even poorer Europe has been occurring in front of our eyes. A German political analyst, Walter Mossmann, has defined these relations as a ladder of scorn.6

The intergovernmental level: the role of Poland for Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania It is without a doubt that Poland is a priority for Ukraine as a result of the direct neighbourhood. There are historical and geopolitical reasons for this.7 The same can be said about Polands role for Belarus and Lithuania. There have been a few attempts to elaborate the forms and frameworks of co-operation between the states within the framework of co-operation in the entire Central European region. They thus took on the form of Visegrad triple/quad, Baltic-Black Sea arc, Central European initiative, or the Three-Sea conception. In all these models, different states saw themselves in different spectrums. However, at that stage, the central link or leader of the region was Poland. However, Central Europe was not consolidated into an independent geopolitical unit, and a partition of the region into Western and Russian zones of influence occured. Thus, Polands current ability to play a leadership role has been weakened. As a result, Poland has been operating pragmatically, attaining NATO membership and moving towards the EU, as well as playing the role of dispatcher of the West in Central and Eastern Europe. Such a dispatching role of Poland is becoming more and more overt Zbigniew Brzezinski in Lviv has said that Poland can be considered a magnet which will involve other countries in the processes of European integration, as well as in the Euroatlantic union.8

Formation of regional co-operation along economic interests Investigating different aspects of regional co-operation at the present phase of development of various infrastructures, we often find that the traditional definition of regional co-operation covers, on the one hand, much larger regions, and, on the other, is

6 7 8

W. Mossmann: Zeitung zum Sonntag, 12 December 1999. T. Voznyak: Modelle des polnisch-ukrainischen Zusammenseins: Rck- und Ausblick, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 11, Lviv 1998. Z. Brzezinski: Ukraine Poland: a role and place in European integration. Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 14, Lviv 1998.

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shaped not along natural boundaries but along lines of interests. Thus, paradoxically, for the Galychyna region Wroclaw is much closer than, for example, equidistant Bratislava. In this sense the co-operation in the new association GUUAM seems to be very interesting. The political-consulting forum of four states of the post-Soviet space, GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), was formed on October 10, 1999 in Strasbourg during the presidential meetings of these states. The Strasbourg Declaration fixed a level of political rapprochement and practical co-operation between the countries of this group, due primarily to their shared international problems which concern processes in the post-Soviet space. Later, on April 24, 1999, during the Washington Summit of the members and partners of the NATO, Uzbekistan joined the forum. Expanded in that way, this association of states has received the title GUUAM. This new and rapid alliance formation taking place in Eastern Europe has been made possible by the shared perspectives of economic and political interests in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Moldova, in particular, and has been connected with a search for alternative channels of Caspian petroleum transportation and the implementation of the Eurasian Transport Corridor Project. Joint economic interests of the GUUAM states are mostly concentrated around two questions: the transportation of Caspian energy resources and the location of new transit routes through the Caucasus region. Ukraine has a strategic role in the transition of an energy carrier to the European countries, and thus can be important for developing co-operation with European and Euroatlantic institutions. The geopolitical power of its industry further heightens the potential for Ukraine to become an important part of European economic safety. Usage of Ukrainian territory cuts the distance petroleum needs to travel from the Near East to the rest of Europe more than in half. The Ukrainian-Georgian transport corridor, with its petroleum supply to Europe, is also much shorter than alternative routes. Transit income will allow Ukraine to compensate for the costs of the energy carrier import and to settle its own energy problems. A trilateral Ukrainian-Georgian-Azerbaijan Agreement on the creation of a Transcaucasus transport corridor exists. Creation of an exclusive transport service for passengers and traffic flows is provided. It will connect Baku, Tbilisi, Poti, Odessa and Kiev. This line will become an important part of the Eurasian transport corridor (project TRACEKA) between Western Europe, Central Asia and countries of the Far East. Even something as simple as co-operation along the lines of economic interests can be valuable in forming cross-border co-operation, for example, between Belarus and Poland, especially along the Minsk-Brest-Warsaw route, and the new gas pipeline from Yamalu. Key to this process is political motivation in Belarus itself. However, such motivation does not currently exist. Transboundary co-operation in the region can also 206

spread past the economic plane and along a vertical social line especially as in regions located along those routes, schools, cultural organizations, groups of people and some individuals are beginning co-operation initiatives.

Example: Lviv as the centre of the integrative efforts the city of meetings between East and West Building on earlier frameworks at a higher political level, regional and urban authorities are developing direct co-operation along the border. Experience demonstrates that development of cross-border co-operation derives not only from adjacency of definite regions but also from economic interests. Thus, contacts and co-operation do not move along the border but can run deep into a territory of a neighbouring state along important routes, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, etc. Therefore, co-operation comes naturally rather than as a result of administrative methods. Thus, development of such crossborder co-operation along economic interests is the first resource which should be developed not only on the Polish-Ukrainian border, but on the Belorussian-Polish or Ukrainian-Hungarian ones as well. Investments in the Lviv region come from Holland (24.2 per cent), Cyprus (24.2 per cent), Poland (8.8 per cent), Germany (8.6 per cent), Italy (6.8 per cent) and the USA (6 per cent). Production exports go to Russia (48.6 per cent), Germany (10 per cent), Poland (3.5 per cent), Austria (3.3 per cent) and Canada (2.1 per cent). Transport, electronic equipment, petroleum and mineral oil dominate imports, which come mainly from Russia (28.7 per cent), Poland (14.7 per cent), Germany (12.34 per cent), Netherlands (6 per cent), USA (4.6 per cent) and Austria (2.3 per cent). According to research conducted on the projects by the British Ministry on International Development, Poland occupies a special place for the region with regard to commodity exchange. It ranks third in the total amount of foreign trade exchange with the Lviv region, whereas for Ukraine, Poland is only the seventh partner after such states as Russia, USA, Belarus, China and Turkmenistan. One of the tasks set by the President of Ukraine is the project to convert Lviv into a sort of gate and showplace of Ukraine at its western border. For this purpose, an appropriate state programme has already been developed that will, however, be realised only with significant effort. The project includes creating the image of the region and city as meeting points for Central and Eastern Europe. There are some proposals towards installing the western residence of the Ukrainian President in Lviv. The Summit of the Presidents of Central and Eastern Europe was held in Lviv in May 1999. Furthermore, the European Ukrainian Project may be organised in Lviv. Perhaps this experience 207

could be used by Russia and Belarus to implement their European Project in such cities as Kaliningrad and Brest. At the same time, this is a good direction for creating special economic zones that would be oriented precisely towards co-operation with the EU, which is what, for example, Western Ukrainian authorities are trying to develop. Located near the Polish border, Lviv is a particularly important resource of Western Ukraine.9 After Polish accession to NATO, and even more so after its introduction into the European economic institutions, Lviv will play an important role on the border with the EU. Thus, one can say that political and economic interests of Ukrainian politicians are directed towards Lviv. Lviv is a city of many nations and cultures, and it has a chance to become a kind of forum of Central and Eastern Europe; a possible city of conciliation between Ukrainians and Poles. Financially, this could be shown by the creation of permanent supranational institutions, the operation of centres of dialogue for politicians, scientists and artists. The success of the European project for Lviv will determine the development of infrastructures, which today are being vigorously advanced.

A crossroad of European through-routes First of all, the city should become an effective gate to Ukraine for European transport trucks. For example, five main highway lines pass through the Lviv oblast. Today, primary attention is given to construction and reconstruction of modern high-speed roads. The transport coordination group G24, which functions as the Transport Ministry of the European Union, has approved the schedule of prospective development of the European transportation network. It provides for development of nine transport corridors for cargo and passenger carriages across Europe. Two of them will intersect in Lviv: No. 3 Berlin-Wroclaw-Lviv-Kiev, No. 5 Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Chop-Lviv. In addition, the city has an airport which is, however, insufficient even for todays requirements. Until recent times, all foreign transportation went through Kiev, making interaction difficult with the rest of Europe. However, there is an effective co-operation between the Lvivairlines company and the Polish airline Lot. As a result, the Western Ukrainian region is open to the West via Warsaw. Thus, it is no longer necessary to go 500 kilometres east to Kiev in order to travel to Frankfurt or Vienna.

Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 14, Lviv 1998.

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Development of relations between cities The second resource for the development of cross-border and regional co-operation is the development of an extensive framework for friendly relations between cities. Those relations are not dependent on the political situation in neighbouring countries, and could even help to calm potential conflicts. It is these relations between Western Ukrainian and Polish cities that may serve as a mechanism to mitigate the recurrence of ethnic conflicts on the border. Mediation by city mayors on both sides of the border can help to reduce tensions. Sometimes there are so many relations between cities that it leads to co-operation between self-governed communities and territories, for example the co-operation between the Lviv Cities Association and the Przemysl Cities Union or between the Malopolish Cities Union and the Ukrainian Cities Association. There are active exchanges of experience on the questions of self-government between them. Let us come back to the example of Lviv. Lviv actively develops co-operation both at a regional level and within the framework of co-operation between cities. When speaking about regional co-operation, first of all, this is a co-operation between Polish Voyevodstva and the Lviv and Volynsk areas. The Buh and Carpathian Euroregions serve as the political framework of this co-operation. At the same time, a number of concrete agreements are signed between the administrative territories of both countries. In addition, the informal co-operation with the Polish cities of Lublin, Zamosc, Lutsk, Rzeszow and Pszemysl is even more effective. Throughout these cities, wholesale and consignment warehouses handle the large flow of goods from the EU and the countries of Central Europe. At the same time frontier cities formalise their friendly relations according to concrete interests. For example, Lviv formalises and develops relations with cities that are located along similar transit routes: the west along the European transport corridor No. 3 with Rzeszow, Przemysl and Krakow. Furthermore, important relations are in the south with Olomouc (Czech Republic) and in the west with Wroclaw, Chemnitz, Freiburg (Germany) and Lyon (France). Lvivs Zakhidtranskordon and Transmahistral corporations deal with the development of these transport corridors. A further branch on the Warsaw line is Zamosc, Lublin, Gdansk, and Szczecin. This spans the 80 per cent completed strategic Odesa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline. The Ukrainian concern Druzhba is its main investor and has its headquarters in Lviv. As a result of this branch, the national problem of an alternative pipeline for Russian and Ukrainian petroleum is to be settled by way of Poland, or by exporting Caspian petroleum to Scandinavian countries. Moreover, the problem of supplying petroleum to the border regions should be worked out. 209

The development of cultural and human contact co-operation between cities, in addition to moderate-sized co-operation among firms, provides a strategic basis for cooperation in the future, co-operation that is founded on a real economic base.

The organisation of free trade zones and a special economic zone Another form of regional initiative is the development of free trade zones in the most socially dangerous regions along border. There are organised zones of free trade Yavoriv and Resort-polis Truskavets to help mitigate negative social tendencies in such socially dangerous regions as Yavoriv. Their development is now proceeding, and they are immediately attracting foreign investors. It is a further distinct possibility that the development of such zones along the entire Polish, Hungarian, Belorussian and Russian boundaries could reduce economic differentiation between them. A similar idea was generated in 1994 1995 by the leadership of regional governmental bodies who pushed prioritising of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations,10 emphasising the need to create a Special Economic Zone in the town of Chop and its vicinity and to hold negotiations with the Hungarian side in order to harmonise its activities with the development of the similar zone in the area of the town of Zahony. After the formation of the Special Economic Zone Zakarpattya in 1999, the question of the evolution of the united Ukrainian-Hungarian enterprise zone has received new impetus.

The organisation of regional chambers of commerce and industry One more resource is the development of regional Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and co-operation among existing local and regional Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Taking this into account, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Lviv, Krakow, Rzeszow have implemented their co-operation. A Ukrainian-Polish Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Construction with headquarters in Rzeszow and Lviv was created recently.

10

Adopted by the Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine in June 1995.

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The organisation of a regional system of banks Recently, there have been problems with payment of goods and services. However, today there is a developing system of banks in Ukraine. Some of them contain a substantial amount of Polish capital. They are: BDK in Lutsk, Kredyt Bank PBI S.A, and the Western-Ukrainian Commercial Bank in Lviv. The involvement of Polish capital in Ukrainian and joint-venture banks adds measurable stability to the process of co-operation. This experience should be seen as a model which could be effective in other countries.

Efforts of co-operation at the Euroregion level: Buh, Carpathian, Upper Prut and Lower Danube Euroregions The Carpathian Euroregion established on February 14, 1993, was the first Euroregion created exclusively by the countries of the former Eastern bloc. In fact, this was an attempt to apply the model of the Euroregion (which is Western European in spirit and practice) in Central and Eastern Europe. The founders of the Carpathian Euroregion made no secret of the fact that the Euroregion Region Basiliensis (Basel Region) on the Switzerland-French-German border was used as a model for its creation. They wanted to show that cross-border disputes can be solved in a civilised manner through co-operation. Thus, the impetus for establishing the Carpathian Euroregion lies not in Western Europe, but in the region itself. Two aspects should be noted: Firstly, the Euroregion consists of the less developed areas of all participating parties (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine), and secondly, the ethnic and sectarian patterns of the region are extremely diverse.11 However, the intensification of co-operation does not seem to be resulting from the declared Carpathian Euroregion, and often it is seen as nothing more than a mere declaration. Institutions responsible for organising co-operation in the Euroregions have little budgetary funds. Moreover, differing levels of freedom of regional authorities prevent effective co-operation. For example, freedom in Poland is considerable, but insufficient in Ukraine or Romania. Nevertheless, the primary questions of Euroregion activity are dealt with in
11 S. Oustich: Carpathian Euroregion Anniversary, in: P. Helsinki (ed.): Carpathian Euroregion 1993 1998, Five Years of Dialogue and Co-operation, Krosno 1998; B. Pankevitch: The Carpathian Euroregion An Opportunity for Implementing a Strategically Important Step Towards Creating a New Europe, in: P. Helinski (ed.): op. cit., Krosno 1998.

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Kiev, Bratislava or Bucharest. Rarely can we observe a decided opposition. However, legislation in Central and Eastern Europe more frequently takes into account regional interests and the principles of self-government. Thus, it enhances the possibilities of regional co-operation. The model of a Euroregion has been tested for seven years in the eastern European environment. Ukraines successes and failures on using this locomotive of cross-border co-operation have also been shown as well as how to avoid these failures. This essay will now discuss the successes, failures and perspectives from a multi-level perspective. These levels are the Ukrainian state, international organisations, local governments, and the people: The Ukrainian state. Ukraine has not been invited to enter either the EU or NATO, but has been admitted to the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian state did not lose its political interests in the Carpathian or the Buh Euroregions. International organisations. The Carpathian Euroregion was lucky to have the Institute for East-West Studies (now the East-West Institute) involved in the process of its creation with generous interest in its development. Local governments. In Ukraine, the state still looks very suspiciously on any selfinitiatives of governmental bodies, especially if these initiatives take place near the state border. Strong central control leaves little room for regional initiatives in crossborder co-operation. Local authorities are also very limited. The Cross-Border Cooperation Programme of the Carpathian Foundation provides grants (up to US-$ 25,000) to local governments, which is not enough. Restricted both economically and politically, local governments are gradually losing their interest in the Carpathian Euroregion. The local people. Only a small portion of Ukrainian citizens is fully aware of those possibilities that the Carpathian Euroregion could provide them as individuals. These include mostly local businessmen and activists in the spheres of nature protection, culture and ethnic minorities issues. Ukraine, Romania and Moldova established two Euroregions Upper Prut and Lower Danube. The characteristic feature of these Euroregions is their much more central-governmental nature than in case of the Carpathian and the Buh Euroregions. The central government wants to control cross-border co-operation more efficiently and fully. The emphasis in the newly created Ukrainian Euroregions is not on interregional, inter-community or inter-personal, but rather on inter-state co-operation. Thus, with the expansion of the EU, one should neither place too much emphasis on the Euroregions nor forget their often mere declaratory nature. Instead, real co-operation must be developed in smaller territories, but with real programmes and resources in order to solve real problems. 212

Co-operation among NGOs and at the level of academic institutions A great regional achievement of the last decade in the region is the rapid development of non-government organisations (NGOs) on both sides of the border. For Poland and Hungary this has been a normal process, and now the same can be said about Western Ukraine. However, this cannot be said about the country as a whole. The reason for this is the persistence of Sovietisation. At the same time, close co-operation can be observed between different Polish and Ukrainian foundations and NGOs. Representatives of both sides are actually present at each international conference, which aids in effectively overcoming mutual stereotypes. Some programmes are directed towards the development of Ukrainian-Polish co-operation, with funding not only from Western sources like Fundacji Batorego or International Fund Vidrodzhennia (both of them belong to Soros), but also from Polish sources.

The establishment of regional universities The establishment of regional universities such as the German-Polish university Viadrina can also become an interesting form of co-operation on the new border of the EU. Initial steps towards establishing a Ukrainian-Polish university in Lublin have been made. This university will probably resemble something like the aforementioned German-Polish university. The development of a Russian-German University in Kaliningrad or Polish-Lithuanian one in Vilnius could follow suit.

Co-operation between universities We can observe co-operation between schools of higher education that often conclude contracts on co-operation (Lviv and Krakow universities). For example, there is an active teachers exchange where Ukrainian professors teach in Polish high schools. Such co-operation is slowly becoming a norm.

The organisation of regional TV channels A further avenue of regional co-operation could be the creation of joint regional TV channels. Such channels could be established in border regions where language barriers are minimal. There could be a Hungarian-Ukrainian-Slovak TV channel in the Trans213

carpathian region, a Polish-Ukrainian one in Galychyna, Volyn and nearby to Polish territories, a Polish-Russian-German one in the Kaliningrad oblast and the Varminsk region.

Border crossings One of the characteristics of cross-border co-operation is the quantity and quality of border crossings. There are 205 crossings on all Polish borders, and only six of them are on the Ukrainian-Polish border. They are: Medyka-Mostyska, Grebenne-Rava Ruska, Dorogusk-Yahodyn, Zosyn-Ustiluh, Smilnytsia and Korchova-Krakivets. Is this enough for strategic partners? One can be proud of the fact that the Korchova-Krakivets crossing is the largest one in Eastern Europe. Yet, the inhabitants of adjacent Polish and Ukrainian villages still have to go 40 kilometres to the crossing and then come back to an adjacent village, which is actually only several kilometres away. Cross-border contacts between the inhabitants of villages and towns are a part of co-operation, not just contacts between officials of different levels. Ordinary citizens do not cross the border because many wish to save room for visa stamps in their passports. Taking into account bureaucracy, these are very difficult to receive. In addition, they are quite expensive. Thus, in the future, the quantity of border crossings should be increased, especially for pedestrians of the nearby towns and villages. This concerns the entire Eastern border, especially if the future EU refrains from limiting mobility along the border, and chooses to widen contacts.

Bureaucratic obstacles When speaking about transparency of the present borders of Poland and Ukraine, one should notice an obvious border Sovietism for the typical visitor to Ukraine. Sovietism does not refer to Soviet uniforms of soldiers or the Russian language but rather a style of relating to the visitors. Also, it is inconsistent that local and border duties and taxes in the Lviv oblast differ from taxes and duties in the Volynsk oblast.12 Further, it is difficult to discuss corruption in customs services of both states, for in crossing a border one must deal with both of them. Real trade value is twice as great as official statistics show. This fact testifies to widespread corruption.

12

J. Wezlowska: EUROREGION Press No. 5/6. What is necessary to know crossing a border with Ukraine, Lublin 1998.

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The New Berlin Wall effect One of the future dangers to be anticipated is the actual development of a New Berlin Wall on the western boundaries of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. After the fall of the Berlin wall, prospects appeared for a united Europe. However, differences what exactly constitutes European rapidly became apparent in Eastern Europe. Some perspectives regard Europe as coterminous with the EU. Others see things differently. Moreover, even inside the future expanded EU, a definite medullary Europe, with a centre in France and Germany and a periphery on the boundaries of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, can already be seen. Thus, the potential creation of new separating boundaries in Europe can be observed, running approximately along the border of former USSR, with the exception of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, the strong reorientation of these countries in the EU and their withering interest in the East only helps to deepen the differences along this potential new division line. Ukraine exemplifies such division, as it develops slowly or even stagnates in the face of successful investment in Poland and the Czech Republic. As a result, Ukraine lags behind and this difference is increasing. Thus, expansion of the EU often causes annoyance, which in the course of time may turn to hostility and, eventually, can develop into an inferiority complex and aggression. Moreover, due to economic stagnation, Ukrainian society is frustrated and demoralised. A similar scenario is true of Russia and Belarus which both appear to be self-absorbed and potentially aggressive. Returning to cross-border co-operation, it is necessary to underline that mostly Lviv, Volyn and Zakarpattia oblast of Ukraine, Brest oblast of Belarus, Kaliningrad oblast of Russia and Warminskie, Lublinskie and Podkarpatskie vojevodstvo of Poland will suffer from the introduction of Poland and Hungary into the EU. They do not have enough economic resources and are dependent upon an open border.

The formation of a new resistance in Europe and the concept of neutral territory that doesnt belong to anyone As a result of the aforementioned problems, the creation of a new opposition in Europe can be observed. Russia and Belarus have already clearly expressed their attitude to this process. Ukraine stands at the crossroads. On the one hand, it has significant leanings to be a part of the Common European Home but, on the other, both the USA and Russia (for varying reasons) are hampering the possibility of a close approximation to the EU. Even now, the extreme right and left are opponents of co-operation and integration 215

between Ukraine and the EU. The left represents the Russian-language part of the population that lives in the east. In contrast, the motives behind the right-wing opposition (located in western Ukraine) to European integration are unclear. The fact that such extremists are strongest just at the future EU border is problematic. There is also the potential push-pull that Ukraine feels between two large forces like NATO and Russia with its satellites. There will be a huge polygon, some territory that doesnt belong to anyone, without any investors. But it will happen if Ukraine remains a minor pawn in the game between major players like the USA, the EU and Russia. Nobody, except Ukraine itself, will care about its interests. To play any role in the world, it is necessary to accept the solutions of, but not simply follow, others.13 Unfortunately, nowadays there are many objective and subjective factors that may lead towards the development of a new opposition. Caught between major regional and global actors, it appears unlikely that Ukraine can effectively control its own destiny; it will remain a territory that doesnt belong to anyone, with all of the repercussions.

The influence of border status on personal relationships in the region One of the largest resources of regional co-operation is the practical transparency of the present Western border of Ukraine. However, the majority of the EU accession candidates have declared (Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) or have even already put in practice a visa requirement (Czech Republic). The basis for such a change lies with the influence of Brussels and the status of the domestic labour market (Czech Republic). It is necessary to expect a sharp aggravation of this situation in the future. With the implementation of the Schengen limitations, the complexity and cost of these crossings will sharply increase. Presently, all that is required of a Ukrainian citizen is to sit in an automobile and not to forget a passport. But soon, a visa will be required. In addition, one will soon have to go to the embassy or consulate (a ticket to Kiev costs a months salary of a common worker) and pay for the visa (another months salary). Even if one can pay for the visa, it is not guaranteed that it will be granted. For example, suppose 40,000 citizens cross the Eastern border of Poland daily it seems unlikely that the Embassy of Poland and two General Consulates can process such a daily quantity of Schengen visas. That is why the New Berlin wall will not appear as a result of anybodys ill will but only as a mathematical certainty. Such limitations will sharply reduce

13

G. Erler: Poland und Ukraine: Subjekte oder Objekte im Prozess der Europischen Integration?, Independent cultural magazine Ji, No. 12, Lviv 1998.

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the possibilities for regional co-operation. Thus, an important goal is to adopt some special measures to prevent the complication of border statuses.

III Conclusion: The specific strategy of Ukraine toward the eventual EU expansion
At a given stage, Ukraine should be prepared for the introduction of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the EU. It is important for Ukraine to first build the most extensive contacts possible with the EU and NATO, especially with regard to receiving some sort of special status. One variant of the organisation of the EU-Russia/Belarus/Ukraine relations can be the institutional interlacing of interests. It provides installation of diverse links with these countries through the NATO, the EU, financial organisations, the G 7, etc. In sum, when speaking about the Western region of Ukraine and developing regional co-operation, we should count on the following points: There is a real level of economic co-operation in the region with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in border regions. There is a high level of co-operation among NGOs in Europe. There are main lines of development of regional economic interests (Odessa-Gdansk, Kyiv-Berlin, Kyiv-Triest, Moscow-Minsk-Warsaw-Berlin, etc). There is the resource of interethnic reconciliation elaborated during Ukrainian independence. What remains to be developed is a frame of co-operation between cities and self-governed territories; the creation of free trade zones along the borders; the creation of Regional Chambers of Commerce and Industry; the creation of joint banks; the establishment of relations between universities, the creation of regional universities and the creation of regional multi-language TV channels.

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Cross-Border Co-operation in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Western Perspective

Douglas Merrill

I Concepts of cross-corder co-operation

The border regions in Central and Eastern Europe are a prism for the problems, challenges and opportunities of bilateral and multilateral relations in the area. On the one hand, border areas often suffer from grave structural difficulties, resulting from the relative impermeability of the border; new problems may also result directly from the enlargement of the European Union. Restrictive customs and visa regimes hinder not only the social and economic relations between two states but also relations as such between border regions. On the other hand, in the most positive result of the direct neighbourhood between the European Union and transition states border regions have the potential to become areas of particularly intensive exchange and communication. Given political interest, economic opportunity and effective border controls, it is possible to transfer positive transformation experiences across borders in post-communist Europe, resulting in relations that make use of the comparative advantages on both sides of the border. Cross-border co-operation is also the ground level of the edifice of European security. Along the future eastern border of the European Union, cross-border co-operation projects should demonstrate that there is no true dividing line by helping to spread some of the prosperity and stability of the European Union to countries that do not have prospects of joining the Union. By improving the economic situation in immediate border areas, these projects may help to limit unwanted migration. They should also help to improve environmental management of watersheds that cross the future border. They should bring local governments into more regular contact with each other, making the neighbours less foreign and helping to contain any tensions while they are still manageable. In this respect, cross-border co-operation represents one of the best case options of 218

direct neighbourhood.1 Its opposite pole measures for border security and visa controls. While the goal of cross-border co-operation, including greater permeability of borders, is in the common interest of both EU member states and their future neighbours, it is often in conflict with calls by EU leaders for internal security and stability of the Union, particularly with the introduction of visa regimes that conform with the Schengen agreement, modernising border controls, and tightening customs controls. There is no cohesive strategy for resolving this conflict. For this reason, calls for crossborder co-operation appear as something of a panacea in the political declarations and documents of the European Union, but one that is granted only limited fulfilment by the leaders of the EU and its member states. This disparity makes researching and understanding the institutional developments in the regions along the future EU borders even more important. The need for cross-border co-operation between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation, between Poland and neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus, and between Moldova and Romania first arose with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Since then, the Russian Federation, as the successor to the Soviet Union, has had to give up, at least formally, its claim to hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. New geographical borders and new centres of power have arisen through the dynamics of the Soviet collapse and the post-communist transition. The introduction of visa regimes, particularly along the border between Russia and the Baltic states, went far beyond technical and administrative procedures and served as a means of reinforcing the smaller republics independence from Russia. In this context, cross-border co-operation was not given a high priority. As regional problems such as separation of relatives or structurally weak cities that are divided by the border, like Narva and Ivangorod, became more apparent, the need for political negotiations rose. On the basis of previous research on cross-border co-operation in the context of direct neighbourhood, three factors appear to have a particular influence on the results of co-operation.2

Overcoming negative images and legacies of the past One of the preconditions for cross-border co-operation is overcoming or at least regulating problems with ethnic minorities. As in the case of the Russians in Estonia, for

1 2

I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood: Relations Between the Enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998. I. Kempe et al. (eds.): Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten und ihre stlichen Nachbarn, Gtersloh 1999, pp. 9 54.

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example, minorities make up a greater proportion of the population in border regions than in the rest of the country. In these situations, measures of cross-border co-operation are tied to the question of consolidating the nation-state and fears of political or territorial claims made by neighbouring states. Another precondition for cross-border co-operation is the demarcation of borders; without signed border treaties, any efforts at cross-border co-operation will be overshadowed by suspicions of territorial claims or attempts at imposing hegemony. In short, only partners enjoying legal equality can expect to use cross-border co-operation as an effective instrument in their relations.

Common interests and problems within the border region A major problem of the border region of the direct neighbourhood is structural weakness. Although this problem has existed for a long period on both sides of the future EU eastern border, the progress of the transition is leading to increasing asymmetries, a trend which is likely to continue. The EU associate states are showing much swifter progress in transforming their societies than their eastern neighbours. This means that increasing asymmetries between states and societies on either side of the future border may reduce the commonality of interests. The future EU members are orienting themselves ever more towards the West, while their eastern neighbours have less clear points of reference for their transformations. This disparity may cause problems for intensifying cross-border co-operation.

Normative models The concept of cross-border co-operation is not a new one, but rather springs from the history of postwar reconciliation and the construction of the European Union. The EU has developed a number of programmes to foster cross-border co-operation, particularly for co-operation in the framework of so-called Euroregions. These regions, more than a dozen areas of heightened co-operation across borders within the EU, stretch from Spain and Portugal in the south to the German-Danish border in the north. Furthermore, Western decision-makers see cross-border co-operation as an important tool for stability. Without contradicting the goal of securing the future border as a means of increasing EU internal security, the Baltic realm has become a particularly active area of regional and supranational co-operation under Western direction. Normative models derive their influence from the positive experiences of the European Union, from the 220

EUs programmes and development funds, from the Unions ability to set certain norms as preconditions for accession and from its ability to show the benefits of concrete examples of cross-border co-operation. This paper examines the current state of cross-border co-operation along the European Unions future eastern border, considers the relative success of different approaches, discusses some of the limits of cross-border co-operation and concludes with recommendations for future endeavours in this area. First it places cross-border co-operation in the context of systemic transformations occurring in both eastern and western Europe, giving brief attention to the positive contribution that cross-border co-operation can make to European security. It then looks at the institutional framework of cross-border co-operation. Where are multilateral initiatives involved in cross-border co-operation? Which levels of government are involved and which levels produce difficulties? Third, it considers existing development programmes and funds. How much of their resources are the EU and various nation-states applying to cross-border co-operation? Fourth, it analyses the relationship between cross-border co-operation and European integration. Is integration into the European Union creating new barriers along the future eastern border? Is cross-border co-operation with countries to the east of perspective members slowing their entry into the EU? From a territorial point of view, there are two areas to consider: the Baltic littoral, with a focus on Baltic-Russian relations, and the eastern part of Central Europe, particularly Polish-Ukrainian relations. This paper will conclude with recommendations for enhancing cross-border co-operation so that the direct neighbourhood of the expanded EU can become a zone of stability rather than a source of conflict.

II Cross-border co-operation in the context of European transformation

In the early years of the twenty-first century, the European Union will undertake an unprecedented project of enlargement, admitting as members numerous countries formerly under communist rule whose level of prosperity stands far below Western European averages. The enlargement comes at a time of considerable metamorphosis within the EU. Structures designed for six states in the 1960s and 1970s are being stretched to the limits of their capacities by the demands of the early 2000s, and EU member states are investing time and resources in reforming these institutions to function more effectively. The Union is simultaneously engaging in the great experiment of a common currency, working to build a common defence identity, strengthening its common foreign and security policy, and continually deepening internal harmonisation and coordination. Each of these major initiatives competes for the time and interest of 221

the Unions leaders; each of them also raises the bar for applicant countries, making the process of adding the acquis communitaire to local law a continuous endeavour. The prospective members, from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south, are themselves in the middle of a metamorphosis, undergoing a triple transition at varying speeds and with varying degrees of success. First, after changing from one-party states to systems of democratic government, they are working to consolidate multi-party parliamentary government and to overcome the legacies of authoritarianism in public life. Second, they are transforming former command economies into social market economies along Western European lines. Finally, having regained full sovereignty with the dissolution of socialism and Soviet controls, they are preparing to share sovereignty with other EU members. Each of these transitions presents considerable challenges. With its enlargement, the EU will not only admit new members that are considerably poorer than the average current member. Enlargement will also create an external border with countries that are, on average, poorer still and which have virtually no prospect of membership. New members will benefit economically from membership, both by being a part of the common market and from subsidies, while the states on the other side of the new border will not enjoy these benefits. This is just one of the problems of direct neighbourhood along the EUs future eastern border3 that have the potential to undermine the stability of the border region and thus contribute to security risks in Europe.4 Amidst all of the activity within the European Union, preparations for enlargement and expectations about its effects have seldom commanded headlines or the attention of top-level Union politicians. At the operative level, however, numerous initiatives have emerged to address potential problems along the future border, from applications of the Tacis and Phare programmes to the creation of Euroregions, from relaxed travel restrictions to broad-based environmental initiatives, and from enhanced bilateral co-operation in border regions to multilevel forums involving larger groupings of states. All these efforts, grouped under the heading of cross-border co-operation, contribute to long-term European security by seeking to remove concrete items of conflict, to encourage habits of co-operation among officials in different states, to lessen the degree of

3 4

I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood, op. cit. While this study also presumes that enlargement of the European Union will occur in at least two waves, it concentrates on cross-border co-operation along the final expected border, i. e., with Russia, Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine. Similar questions about cross-border co-operation will arise along the middle-term border between first-wave entrants and second- or third-wave EU members, although the prospect of eventual membership means that approaches to cross-border co-operation will be seen as a part of the accession process, whereas along the presumed final border, cross-border co-operation measures will take on a more permanent character. Eventual Turkish accession to the European Union will present the Union with even more dramatic problems along an outer land border with the Caucasus and the Middle East. These issues are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

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disparity between future EU members and non-members, and to include citizens of states that are unlikely to join the EU in the benefits enjoyed by their neighbours in the future member states. The theoretical framework of this study is based on a broad concept of security: the security of a country or a region is not solely determined by military strength and balance-of-power considerations; democratic forms of governance, regularised communication, habits of co-operation and economic interdependence all contribute powerfully to peaceful relations between states. This approach to security has underpinned many of the most significant developments in postwar Europe, from the Treaty of Rome to the Helsinki Final Act and Western engagement with post-socialist Europe. A broad approach to security also rests on the assumption that in the twenty-first century, territory as such is no longer a significant determinant of national power. In a technologyoriented industrial society, economic strength, a productive citizenry and an attractive way of life translate much more readily into influence in the competition among nations than the simple possession of land. Thus the European Union finds itself with ample influence in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as it appears to offer a path to stability and prosperity. Security in its broad definition becomes an integral part of the institutional architecture of a continent simultaneously pooling sovereignty, pursuing economic development and overcoming the legacies of the socialist past.

Overcoming negative images and legacies of the past The attraction of the EU is proving a powerful instrument in one of the key factors for the success of cross-border co-operation, that of overcoming historical images of enemies and other burdensome inheritances. This process is proceeding very differently in the Baltic area and in the eastern part of Central Europe. The reference to common historical roots has become an important motor for co-operation among the Baltic littoral states; the myth of the Hansa may be as powerful as the trading league itself ever was. In this area, the relations with the Russian Federation are the most problematic element. Russian decision-makers have often shown a tendency to return to habits formed during the time of Soviet hegemony. Following their struggle for sovereignty, decision-makers in Riga and Tallinn, in particular, have shown little interest in normalising relations with Moscow. Key factual questions such as signing and ratifying border treaties have been subordinated to political concerns. The high proportion of Russophones in Latvia and Estonia has led to further difficulties.5 They account for 80 per
5 E. Berg, W. van Meurs: Legacies of the Past, Ethnic and Territorial Conflict Potentials, in this volume.

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cent of the population in certain regions along the Russian border, leading to a volatile mix of citizenship and language policies designed to benefit the titular nation alongside an aggrieved and economically marginalised minority just across the border from a former hegemonic power. The question of how far this political constellation hinders cross-border co-operation in the Baltic region is addressed in greater detail below. In the early stages of the transition, relations between Ukraine and its western neighbours were also fraught with uncertainty. In contrast to the Baltic region, major steps have been taken in reducing uncertainties, steps which have also helped fulfil the preconditions for productive cross-border co-operation. Ukraine has signed treaties regulating issues of bilateral concern with all of its western neighbours, most importantly with Poland. These issues include the handling of minority issues and the mutual recognition of borders. 6 Following the end of the Meciar government in Slovakia in 1998, the preconditions for cross-border co-operation with Bratislava have also improved.7 Although this paper will concentrate on examples from the Baltic area, it should be noted that along the future eastern border of the EU, perhaps the most complicated case that calls for cross-border co-operation is that of Romania and Moldova. Relations are not clear on many important points, from an incompletely demarcated border to open questions about citizenship. The resolution of these difficulties can be aided by the institutional framework of European integration.

III Institutional framework of cross-border co-operation

Cross-border co-operation along the European Unions future eastern border takes place within a rich framework of international institutions. The wealthy nations of the EU are engaged in the area collectively through the Unions activities, directly through their foreign assistance programmes and indirectly through the participation of their citizens in non-governmental initiatives. European states that are not members of the EU also participate in regional forums that encourage cross-border co-operation. Finally, extraregional countries, notably the USA, play an active role in encouraging forms of co-operation and trade that aim to improve European peace and stability. This aspect of cross-border co-operation emphasises the second success factor noted in the introduction, common interests within the border region. In general, the recognition of common interests among states of the region leads to a top-down approach to
6 7 M. Ludwig: Zur Vershnung mit den Nachbarn im Osten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 108, 12 May 1997, p. 114. Z. Ludvig, L. Pti: Cross-Border Co-operation: The Case of the Carpathian Euro-Region, in: I. Kempe et al. (eds.), Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten, op. cit., pp. 77 82.

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cross-border co-operation, with policy-makers in capital cities setting priorities in accordance with their perceptions of national interests and then identifying or creating groups in the region to advance those interests. The Northern Dimension, the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Northern Europe Initiative are all examples of this approach.8 The Center for Transboundary Co-operation combines local initiative and higher-level support.9 States from within and beyond the border region have launched a number of multilateral forums to place issues of direct neighbourhood in a broader context. Bilateral co-operation at the regional level helps to focus on concrete issues and decreases the chance that national leaders will instrumentalise local conflicts. The multilateral approach is designed to place local questions within an overall context, allowing mediation by disinterested parties who are close enough to appreciate local idiosyncrasies. There are two principal types of multilateral initiatives in cross-border co-operation: broad-based platforms such as the Council of Baltic Sea States or the US-sponsored Northern Europe Initiative, and the Euroregions backed organisationally and to a lesser extent financially by the European Union. These broad-based platforms serve to create an overarching regional identity and to strengthen practical co-operation based on perceived shared values. The initiative Northern Dimension of the European Union is a good example of this. Officially presented by the Finish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in September 1997, Northern Dimension has two goals. It aims at increasing the general awareness of the Union of specific Northern concerns and at making the Unions policies in the area more coherent and efficient. Secondly, (...) to integrate Russia into Europe as a democracy and a market economy.10 The Finnish government used its presidency of the EU in the first half of 2000 to highlight the Northern Dimension, bringing the attention of all of the Unions leaders to the efforts being made in the region. While the concrete implementation of the Northern Dimension does not foresee additional funds from the EU, it does call for the closer coordination of existing efforts and for the consideration of how these efforts fit together into a coherent whole along the Unions northern rim. The disadvantage of not earmarking additional funds is that it makes execution of the

8 9 10

Ch. Meier: Russland und die regionale Wirtschaftskooperation in Europa, in: Ch. Meier (ed.): Russland in Europa: Innere Entwicklungen und internationale Beziehungen heute. Kln, Weimar, Wien 2000, pp. 187 198. Center for Transboundary Co-operation and Sustainable Development. Activities Report, 1997 1998, Tallinn: CTC, 1998. T. Forsberg: Soft Means to Hard Security: Finland and the Northern Dimension of the European Union, modified draft (17 June 1999) of T. Forsberg, and H. Ojanen, Finlands View of the Northern Dimension, in: G. Bonvicini, et al. (eds.): The Northern Security Dimension of the EU Comparative Views of Member States, forthcoming, p. 2.

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Northern Dimension dependent on the political engagement of the EU Presidency. Under the umbrella of the Northern Dimension, the EU has focused on five areas: energy, raw materials, environment, border controls, and transport and infrastructure.11 The operational recommendations for implementing the Northern Dimension particularly emphasise nuclear safety as a part of the environmental engagement of the EU, calling the radioactive waste in the region an environmental hazard of global dimension.12 The Northern Dimension includes EU member states Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden, candidates Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and non-members Iceland, Norway and Russia. Belarus is also considered a possible participant once it fulfils democratic prerequisites. The Northern Dimension asserts that this group of countries has specific common interests and values, that they are a coherent unit, one in which all have a stake and which all can improve together. Though the EU does not promise special funding, the attention of the Commission in making Union initiatives work together in the region is an added value for the Northern Dimension. Existing EU programmes, notably Tacis and Phare, provide material incentives for co-operation. The Northern Dimension also involves Russian officials in issues that touch on security concerns without labelling them as such, and without the involvement of the United States. This allows discussions on sensitive topics in a forum where the stakes are perceived as lower; it also engages Russia as a partner rather than as a potential adversary. The Northern Europe Initiative springs from many of the same fundamental sources and engages the same group of states, but it is sponsored by the United States government. It thus serves as the vehicle for American aid to the region, from atomic waste cleanup programmes to support for non-government organisations. The Northern Europe Initiative also emphasises trade and investment more than the EU approach and naturally serves to raise the profile of the US in the area. The overlap leads to a certain amount of forum shopping for issues and among participants leaders in the Baltic republics, for instance, are perceived as more willing to press issues within the Northern Europe Initiative but this same overlap means that many officials are involved with both and benefit doubly from the enlarged context for regional problems. The Council of Baltic Sea States was founded in 1992 on the initiative of the Danish and German foreign ministers and is an overall regional forum focusing on the need for intensified co-operation and co-ordination among the Baltic Sea states. Its purpose is to promote genuinely democratic development in the Baltic Sea region and greater

11 12

Ibid, p. 7. Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union (COM(1998)589/3), from [http://www.baltinfo.org/Docs/eu/ ND.htm].

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unity between the member countries, and to ensure favourable economic development.13 Eleven states plus the European Commission are members of the Council, with three working groups supplementing the official meetings at the ministerial level. The Council serves to focus high-level attention on the Baltic region. A rotating chairmanship, held by Germany in 2000 2001, lends weight to the action programmes adopted by the Council. Additionally, nearly a dozen different organisations officially co-operate with the Council and its permanent secretariat in Stockholm. Governments of the region use the Council as a platform for emphasising their own initiatives for increasing Baltic co-operation, as the Swedish government has done with its Baltic Billion investment funds14 and will do when Sweden makes enlargement, and particularly Baltic enlargement, a priority of its presidency.15 In contrast to the broad-based forums, the Euroregions concentrate on relatively limited geographic areas and emphasise co-operation on local issues at the operative level. Where the forums seek to dissolve potential conflicts in a larger context, the Euroregions seek to prevent conflicts from escalating by encouraging solutions among the people most directly affected. The Buh Euroregion, for example, is one of the largest stretching from Lublin in Poland, east of Pinsk in Belarus and as far as Luck in Ukraine, with a population of more than five million distributed among the three countries. The Buh region has been the recipient of EU funds for improving border crossings. This serves both the local interests of improving trade and communication and the EU interest of having more secure frontiers along its future border. The Buh Euroregion also has the right to implement projects within the Phare programmes Small Projects Facility. This gives an international dimension to projects, strengthening the skills of local managers and preparing them for closer engagement with the EU as enlargement proceeds. In November 1998 a representative of the Buh region was elected to the leadership of the European Border Regions Society, further increasing international experience within the region.16 Other Euroregions, such as the Carpathian Euroregion (with parts of Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine) or the Baltic Sea Euroregion (coastal sections of Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and Russia) show a similar focus: ease border restrictions, improve the infrastructure in frontier regions, strengthen local connections, access international assistance for local needs and build habits of co-operation. Broadly speaking, the most difficult political level at which cross-border co-operation is addressed is that of the national governments. National governments are more readily
13 14 15 16 History of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, http://www.ud.dep.no/balt/3_0.html. http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/inenglish/policy/balticbillion/index.htm. http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/inenglish/pressinfo/information/factsheets/p df/00_n05.htm. Relationship Trans Bordelines [sic] Euroregion Buh. Euroregion Buh, Chelm, Poland, 1999.

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tempted to abuse issues that arise in border regions than either local officials who are directly affected by them or international bodies that are concerned about European security as a whole. For instance, national governments in both Estonia and Russia have scored points with their electorates by making use of the closely related issues of the Russophone minority in Estonia and cross-border co-operation in the Narva/Lake Peipsi region in northeaster Estonia. The visa regime enforced in this region is another example of using the specific situation of border areas to make larger points. The Finnish intention to use the Northern Dimension to help incorporate Russia into European structures could also be seen as an instrumentalisation of cross-border co-operation. When well conceived, executed and supported, cross-border co-operation can be most intense and most productive at the local level. Even in the problematic region along the Russian-Estonian border, organisations like the Center for Transboundary Cooperation and Sustainable Development are able to organise many activities to address local needs. In 1997 1998, when the demarcation of the border was under intense negotiation between Tallinn and Moscow, and bilateral relations were correspondingly frosty, the Center undertook nearly two dozen projects from childrens exchanges to organising conferences of local authorities and developing a framework for the environmental management of the Lake Peipsi watershed.17 Local governments and institutions are generally the strongest advocates of cross-border co-operation, as they benefit directly from improvements in stability and economic opportunity. One significant obstacle to productive co-operation at the local level can be the drain of qualified personnel away from border regions, which are some of the weakest areas of the post-communist countries economically. Migration to the capital cities is a common feature of the triple transition, and border areas may be losing their most promising leaders to better opportunities in Riga or Budapest or Warsaw. The experience of the Center for Transboundary Co-operation and Sustainable Development demonstrates both the potential for positive spillover effects between different levels of government and the limits of this potential. The Center began as an informal organisation focused on researching environmental issues on the Russian-Estonian border. In the course of five years, it grew to have representatives in Tartu, Narva and Pskov, and to function as a form of clearing house for initiatives in the Peipsi region. The Center involves governments on both sides of the lake, foreign aid programmes of several EU member states as well as the USA and non-government organisations with social, cultural and environmental interests. Its growth has strengthened NGOs throughout the area, partly by example, partly by explicit design. The Center for

17

Center for Transboundary Co-operation and Sustainable Development. Activities Report, 1997 1998, Tallinn: CTC, 1998.

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Transboundary Co-operation and Sustainable Development has, for example, organised a series of seminars on the role of NGOs in regional co-operation which showed common problems, worked on solutions, and accustomed people in the third sector to working with their counterparts across the border. The interface between civil society and the government was also explicitly addressed: No less important, discussions at the seminars with invited representatives of national and local authorities, also helped to develop contacts with the decision-makers.18 At a time of difficult bilateral relations on the national level, working with a Russian region that was the only one to elect a member of Zhirinovskys Liberal Democratic Party as governor,19 the Center was able to complete a large number of projects, and build links among government and civil society on both sides of the border and set the stage for continuing co-operation, all examples of positive spillover. On the other hand, the success of a regional initiative like the Center for Transboundary Co-operation and Sustainable Development was not sufficient to change national priorities on issues affecting the region. The general requirement for travellers between Estonia and Russia to acquire visas was not lifted, and only limited exceptions were allowed for inhabitants of the border region. Progress was made on the demarcation of the border, but the relevant agreements have not been finalised or approved, and the border question remains a potential source of instability. Pending resolution of the border question, tariffs hinder trade relations on both sides. Questions of minority rights within Estonia continue to trouble the bilateral relationship, with both Tallinn and Moscow showing a willingness to instrumentalise this issue to advance their interests in other areas. The Center for Transboundary Co-operation has enjoyed an exceptional level of support from Western institutions because of the sensitive nature of the Russian-Estonian border region, and because of the perception among decision-makers in the EU and USA that supporting broad forms of security-building can mitigate the risk of a touchy local situation escalating into a danger for European security. While most other institutions engaged in cross-border co-operation will not be able to count on such support, they will also not be operating in an atmosphere characterised by such tension.20 The rich institutional infrastructure for cross-border co-operation along the future borders of the EU provides for depth of expertise and a variety of forms of practical co-operation. The flexibility shown by both current and future members allows govern-

18 19 20

Ibid, p. 9. G. Roll, T. Maximova: External Relations of the Pskov Region of the Russian Federation, unpublished draft, 2000. For additional examples supporting these conclusions while drawing on the experience of Poland and Ukraine, cf. T. Voznyak: Regional Co-operation of EU and Countries of East and Central Europe, in this volume.

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ments, players from the third sector and private enterprises to work together on issues of mutual concern. On politically sensitive issues, this can lead to forum shopping as interested parties seek an arena most favourable to their views. Overlap among forums and programmes allows for adaptation to local conditions along a long and heterogeneous border, producing better results than a one-size-fits-all approach.

IV Development programmes and funds

Like any other initiative, cross-border co-operation requires operating capital and funding. Since the countries on both sides of the future EU border cannot count on many grant-making institutions, much of the funding for cross-border co-operation comes from Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States. On the other hand, the active engagement of officials in the direct neighbourhood represents a significant commitment on part of the local authorities. The details of programmes and funds show the third element for successful crossborder co-operation mentioned at the outset of this paper, normative models. The European Union has a clear model of cross-border co-operation projects involving partners on both sides of the future border, that are designed to facilitate and encourage mutual exchange, improve trade and secure the EUs borders and it supports this model with the funds necessary. The two largest channels for EU funds in the area of direct neighbourhood are the Phare and Tacis programmes. Tacis, Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States, is a European Union initiative to provide grant-financed technical assistance to support the process of transition to market economies and democratic societies21 in those countries, apart from the Baltic republics, that were a part of the Soviet Union. Phare, the main channel for the European Unions financial and technical co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe22 has similar objectives, with particular emphasis on helping those countries prepare for accession to the Union. Both programmes supply hundreds of millions of Euro in aid, and as such represent a major western commitment to underwriting a successful transition along the future external EU border. Since 1996, the Tacis programme of the European Commissions External Relations Directorate General has supported a programme explicitly designed to promote crossborder co-operation. The programme has devoted substantial funds to the construction,

21 22

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/tacis/intro/tacis_1.pdf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/index.htm.

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modernisation and development of border crossings and associated infrastructure along the EUs future external borders. The programmes 1999 report is explicit about the security rationale: A key factor behind the reinforcement of cross-border co-operation in this region is the need to ensure stability on the common EU/NIS border. In the context of the ongoing enlargement process, cross-border co-operation activities at the potential future EU borders are becoming more and more important.23 Between 1996 and 1998, this programme earmarked more than 37 million for border-crossings in Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. In Russia, for example, construction took place along the Finnish border, i. e., directly on the EU border from 1996 to 1998, while the proposals for 1999 included crossings on Kaliningrads future border with Poland and Lithuania and at Narva in Estonia. A crossing at Giurgiulesti in Moldova serves Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, and is thus important for improving relations among all three countries. For the period of 1996 to 2000, roughly 65 70 million were budgeted for infrastructure, equipment and technical assistance aimed to make border crossings both more efficient and more effective, securing the border in general while facilitating local transit across the borders. By setting these goals, the EU is acknowledging that its eastern border will remain permeable after enlargement and that provisions for travel in and out of the Union for people living near the frontier will diminish pressure for migration into member states. Reflecting the importance that the Union places on this issue, funding for border crossing improvement accounts for 60 per cent of budget of the Tacis cross-border co-operation programme.24 Beyond border crossings, Tacis support of cross-border co-operation concentrates on environmental programmes and developing cross-border tourism. For instance, the EU plans to support a project to reduce agricultural and industrial river pollution along the Niemen River between Belarus and Lithuania, with a significant effort to reduce agricultural pollution along a tributary in Poland. This project promises to produce benefits along the entire course of the Niemen. It is the kind of project that can only be undertaken from a cross-border perspective, and one that contributes to easing tensions by improving the quality of common resources. Tacis also supports a Small Project Facility, designed as a flexible fund for financing projects not large enough to attract the interest of EU authorities. Grants of up to 200,000 will assist in the improvement of communication networks across the borders in surrounding areas, will promote common approaches to cross-border issues, and help in the development of business links in border areas.25 With this approach, and the even more innovative commit23 24 25 European Commission: Tacis Programme 1999 Cross Border Co-operation Programme, Brussels, September 1999, p. 3. Ibid, p. 5. Ibid, p. 8.

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ment to funding micro-projects with grants capped at

10,000, the European Union

recognises the leveraging power of small sums in the border regions. As a seed for co-operation and for the development of cross-border businesses or new non-government organisations, these sums that are paltry by EU standards but may have an influence much greater than the resources committed. On the other hand, coping with the requirements of Brussels can be a burden for local initiatives, particularly those with limited resources or those new to working with international partners. Furthermore, cross-border co-operation is addressed by both the Tacis and Phare programmes. In the worst case, the two programmes might be divergent enough in their aims to actually hinder co-operation. Even in the best case, bridging a gap between two major programmes of the EU presents an additional administrative challenge. The Swedish governments initiative in making the year 2000 its Year of Baltic Countries demonstrates the range of bilateral actions that can be undertaken by a Western country in supporting regional co-operation. It also illustrates two limitations with consequences for the direct neighbourhood: first, heightened attention is likely to be of limited duration, driven by external events such as a countrys EU Presidency, and second, co-operation with a Western partner will be more strongly promoted than co-operation across the future EU border. The Swedish government will promote special citizen exchanges, media attention for the Baltics in Sweden and for the EU in the Baltic states, Swedish-Baltic days in nine towns emphasising business and culture, and special seminars on regional co-operation and security policy. These are all seeds of future co-operation. The two Baltic Billion funds each earmark a billion Swedish kroner (approx. US-$ 100 m) to help in the areas of food, energy systems, exchange of know-how, infrastructure and the environment, as well as to stimulate trade and investments and further strengthen co-operation between states and industry in the Baltic region.26 The scope is impressive, and the two funds represent a significant commitment to the region over a period of time reaching until at least 2003. On the other hand, the mandate for the second fund includes the goal of strengthening the position of Swedish companies in the Baltic region and to improve their prospects for participation in the development of the regions business sector.27 This suggests that much more effort will go into promoting ties to the West, and Sweden in particular, than to promoting co-operation across the future EU border. On balance, the European Union programmes tend to be broadest in scope and more likely than bilateral initiatives to consider their impact on the region as a whole.

26 27

http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/inenglish/policy/balticbillion/index.htm. Ibid.

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V Regional impacts on European integration

Instances of cross-border co-operation offer opportunities both for identifying problems that could have wider European implications at an early phase and for building networks to address these problems before they escalate to cause wide concern. Viewed from Western Europe, the most dramatic potential problems arising from the EUs future eastern border include territorial disputes, uncontrolled migration and the influx of international crime. Less dramatically, an absence of cross-border co-operation may increase environmental hazards, hinder economic development and perpetuate misunderstandings among peoples living on the border. The dramatic problems can quickly become an acute concern for pan-European security, while the less dramatic problems create the conditions in which serious disputes are hard to resolve. Regular habits of cross-border co-operation help to ameliorate many of these conditions. The period before the enlargement of the European Union is a crucial one, because officials in countries on both sides of the future border believe that the frontier will become more of an obstacle once countries begin to join the EU. The Polish reintroduction of visas for travellers from Belarus, and pressure to do the same for Ukraine, are seen as examples of tightening border controls once EU membership is near. Thus the time for establishing patterns of co-operation is in the period leading up to accession. Cross-border co-operation has a direct impact in limiting misunderstandings between peoples separated by an international frontier. Along the Russian border, such misunderstandings are on the one hand supported by the myths created in the quest for national independence, but on the other hand lessened by Russians or Russophones living within the EU candidate states. (In that case, the fault line of misunderstanding is an internal problem of integration.) In the Slavic heartland of central Europe, there is considerable continuity among dialects and traditions. This territory has been in flux politically since at least the early days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 15th century, so it should not be surprising that interpersonal relations take little notice of governments.28 Cross-border co-operation plays an active role in economic development. Without active engagement of cross-border co-operation initiatives, trade will tend to move away from border regions; indeed, even across the unguarded and often barely-noticed US-Canadian border, trade across the border is less than what would be expected between localities in the same country. Given that the regions near the future EU external frontier are some of the weakest of their respective states economically for in28 E. g., N. Davies: Gods Playground, Vol. 1, New York 1982, esp. pp. 115 159.

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stance, industrial production in Pskov in 1996 was 37 per cent of its level in 1987 the need for extra attention to cross-border co-operation in the economic realm becomes apparent. Environmental questions also require active co-operation across borders. The work of the Center for Transboundary Co-operation mentioned above shows the advantages of co-operation: common understanding of air and water quality issues, management based on natural regions rather than political boundaries, and sustainable planning for natural resources. Patterns established by working on these issues set the stage for governmental interactions on problems that offer more acute threats to security. A border with low levels of co-operation may be characterised by mutual mistrust, lacklustre economic development and possibly even environmental degradation that each side blames on the other. In this setting, the dramatic problems of cross-border crime and uncontrolled migration find much more favourable circumstances. The most acute problems of crime, drug trafficking and trafficking in humans (usually young women for prostitution but also illegal immigrants from further east) depend on areas where borders are poorly enforced, where a weak economy makes ill-gotten gains seem the only alternative. The Tacis projects listed above are designed to combat the technical problems at border crossings that encourage illegal activities. Initiatives like Euroregions and the Northern Europe Initiative and favourable investment terms offered by Phare aim to strengthen border economies and make crime less attractive. All of these methods also address the pan-European problem of unwanted migration by giving people incentives to stay in their country of origin and by giving governments greater control of movements across their borders. Cross-border co-operation can make crossing the border both more efficient and more carefully screened. While examples of cross-border co-operation point to ways of addressing broader European challenges at the local level, the very same initiatives have the potential to throw a spanner into the works of European integration. The special arrangements that give participants in cross-border co-operation advantages or incentives may conflict with the EU imperative of harmonisation. More acutely, cross-border co-operation may require measures that stand in the way of larger EU priorities, such as control of the future external border. Visa regimes that make exceptions for people living in border regions are likely to prove a bone of contention, as the European Union insists that future member states adhere to the procedures on visas and border crossings agreed to under the Schengen Agreement. The abolition of visa-free travel in general between Poland and Ukraine will hinder not only cross-border co-operation in particular but also economic development in the shared border regions in general. If Poland, for example, chooses to continue the visa-free regime, or even some limited version of free movement in the border region, it 234

comes into conflict with the European Unions efforts to guard against unwanted migration. The perception of such a conflict would complicate Polands accession negotiations with Brussels. Given the weight that Western European politicians place on internal security and migration control, visa regimes are likely to become a contentious issue along all of the EUs future eastern border. Prospective member states are likely to be forced to choose between certain elements of cross-border co-operation and delays in joining the EU.29 Second, elements of cross-border co-operation may give special trading privileges to persons from border areas, privileges that are incompatible with the single European market or with attempts to reduce trade barriers among transition countries prior to EU accession. Once again, leaders would be obliged to choose between the goal of crossborder co-operation and that of greater integration with the rest of Europe. Cross-border co-operation can be expected to suffer in such a constellation.

VI Conclusions and recommendations

As countries of Central and Eastern Europe build programmes of cross-border co-operation, either on their own or with Western partners, the four decades of successful integration that have built the European Union serve as the most important model for decision-makers in the region. They have seen how habits of co-operation in one field have positive effects in another; they have observed how regular meetings at all levels help to change negative images from the past into active working relationships that address common problems. Common interests exist across borders, and leaders who address these interests increase both their domestic and international standing. In the context of the fundamental transformation in both Eastern and Western Europe, however, cross-border co-operation cannot be expected to play a central role in driving the process. But cross-border co-operation efforts can make processes tangible that would else be very abstract. The Swedish Baltic Billion funds, for example, will make co-operation in the Baltic region very concrete. Environmental projects in particular make the commonalities among people in different countries immediately apparent. Efforts at improving the health of the Buh watershed bring home the fact that nature knows no political boundaries. These concrete projects take place within a rich framework of institutions. The down

29

Cf. the discussion on the Consequences of Schengen in: W. Matwiejczyk: Soziale, historische und kulturelle Aspekte der polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der EU-Osterweiterung, in: I. Kempe et al. (eds.): Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten und ihre stlichen Nachbarn, Gtersloh 1999, pp. 201 204.

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side of this abundance is a certain measure of confusion, and the occasional exercise in forum-shopping, as one group of leaders looks for the most sympathetic audience for a particular point of view. More positively, the competition among organisations, forums and institutions means that most projects will be able to find support, that leaders in Western Europe have committed substantial resources to initiatives in Eastern Europe and that no single viewpoint is being imposed on ideas for cross-border co-operation. The normative goals set by the European Union have met with success, and the EU should build on this success by aligning cross-border co-operation with the process of accession for the Central European states. As discussed above, the Union enjoys great prestige in the region of direct neighbourhood, despite a certain amount of grumbling about Brussels slowness or arbitrariness. This prestige will allow the EU to continue to attach conditions to its aid that bring the transition countries closer to European norms. The EU should also initiate and support programmes beyond the future EU border. Involvement in Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldova, or in projects along borders between them, will give substance to the assertion that the Union is not creating new dividing lines within Europe. Cross-border co-operation will be even more important for regions that cannot look forward to the eventual umbrella of the EU to mitigate differences. Local leaders beyond the future EU border are, in a sense, in the same situation that the Unions founders were in: bound by geography and history, wanting to overcome burdens of the past, but without a clear model or precedent in a time of transformation. Existing programmes of the European Union would benefit from greater coordination and more resources. Co-ordination between Tacis and Phare is particularly important for the region of direct neighbourhood, as the future border runs along the dividing line between the areas of responsibility of these two programmes. Supporting crossborder co-operation requires cross-bureau co-operation in Brussels and could include placing cross-border co-operation projects under the administration of either Phare or Tacis, while allowing them to draw funds from both. Successful cross-border co-operation projects also deliver tremendous value for the amount of resources committed; they are a classic example of an ounce of prevention equalling a pound of cure. Prospering and co-operating border regions limit all manner of risks for European security, from smuggling to migration and environmental damage. For the relatively small sums invested in cross-border co-operation, the European Union reaps benefits on a much larger scale. An increase of these funds would help increase the depth and breadth of cross-border co-operation projects. EU programmes should continue to show flexibility in adapting to local conditions. While the influence of European norms is strong, the process of adapting to them is 236

long. The most important aspect of this is an ongoing commitment to support initiatives developed by persons within the region, rather than bringing in too many concepts from the outside. While making clear the interests of the EU, it is important to emphasise regional conditions and initiatives. Finally, Tacis resources should be steered toward border areas. While the potential for improvement through Tacis is vast throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States, the EU will gain the most from projects implemented close to home. Because border regions are some of the structurally weakest to begin with, Tacis projects can also be expected to have a greater impact in such areas. The border regions of Central and Eastern Europe reflect the problems, challenges and opportunities of European transformation. In the border regions, people come face-to-face with historical problems, environmental challenges and economic difficulties amplified by political conditions. Initiatives for cross-border co-operation serve to reduce tensions, to build positive habits and relationships than can have beneficial spillover effects and to solve concrete problems that could not be addressed in a national context. The European Union brings both resources and norms to its future border region, two potent tools for improving conditions prior to enlargement. While crossborder co-operation is not a panacea for the woes of the border areas, it can make a substantial, tangible contribution to solving problems of European integration and security in the early years of the twenty-first century.

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Pan-European Security Issues of Pan-European Security in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Polish Perspective
Eva Feldmann, Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz

Although security issues concerning the expansion of NATO have been discussed vividly in recent years, the forthcoming EU enlargement will also have important security implications for the current members as well as for new members and for those states that will be left out during the first enlargement phase. This chapter summarises the impact of admitting the first group of Central European candidates such as Poland into the EU on pan-European security in terms of benefits and risks. In addition to the traditional narrow definition of hard security, that relates security to military threats, equating it with the ability of states to preserve their territory and identity, this paper stresses soft security aspects, considering the political, economic, social and environmental sectors under a wider definition of security.

I Redefinition of security introductory remarks

The issue of national security has been a question of To be or not to be for Poland over the last two centuries. It has always been seen in a European context. The romantic national poet Adam Mickiewicz expressed this as early as 1849 in the following words: The European situation today does not allow one single nation to prosper on its own, regardless of the other nations, without endangering itself as well as the common cause. Nevertheless, the concept of security has changed diametrically over the last 150 years. After the recovery of Polands sovereignty in 1989, the end of the Cold War period, the fall of the USSR and a decade of violent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, it has be239

come obvious that the former classical understanding of European security, which had mainly been based on military factors such as the theory of deterrence, defence and the balance of power, needs to be revised. In a world of globalisation and interdependence of nations, the political aspects of security, as well as the social, economic and environmental ones, are becoming noticeably more relevant. In addition, conditions in Europe have changed fundamentally with the expansion of NATO in 1999 and the forthcoming EU enlargement. All this places the problem of European security in a new light. The division of Europe into coalitions of states based on military and ideological rivalry has vanished, as has the significance of the military potential of individual states. During the 1990s, the following issues were of foremost importance: internal stability of states, prevention and resolution of existing conflicts against the backdrops of ethnic or religious disparities and border disputes, the necessity of countering new threats that have surfaced in the last decade, such as illegal migration, organised international crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in humans and terrorism. Today it is nearly impossible to identify pure national interests. Interests are rather strongly linked to common, international and interregional problems. Against the background of the new definition of national interests during the last ten years, European security identity has changed radically. Europe has become more and more a community of interests, especially with regard to states beyond EU borders. This change leads to a wider definition of security. It no longer merely means the non-existence of threats, but also peaceful and constructive co-existence in Europe. If the notion of security is not connected to confrontation, and establishment of stability becomes the main aim, security no longer implies a zero sum game, but an all win strategy. In this context, security policy in Europe deals with the concept of co-operation in the military, political, societal and environmental sectors. Because of the interdependence of problems and concerns that first affect the internal stability of states, and then the stability of the region, security must be redefined as a regionally-based security complex.1 This enlarged understanding of security is mirrored even in the new Polish constitution of 1997, which was one of the most important steps towards a modern concept of state. After a long period of violent political disputes, especially about article 90 on ceding national sovereignty rights in favour of supranational structures, the new Polish constitution can be considered as a prime example of the pro-European and securityestablishing spirit of its authors.

Buzan (et al.): Security. A new framework for analysis, London 1998, pp. 10 20.

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II Asymmetries resulting from the EU enlargement as potential security problems

Only from the perspective of the changing security paradigm can one consider the effects of the future direct proximity of the European Union to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. For the European Union, the issue of relations with these states is not only the result of capital and economic involvement, but above all a political task that concerns European stability within the EU borders.

1. Polands policy on its eastern neighbours The most important issue for Warsaw in the last decade has been the security of its eastern borders, understood in a manner very similar to the EU perception of stability for the continent as a whole. In spite of its strict orientation towards the West, Polish foreign policy, regardless of political conviction, stresses establishing good neighbourly relations with all successor states of the former USSR. Since 1990 all Polish governments have given priority to the double-tracked Eastern Policy initiated by the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski. He had declared the recognition of Polands eastern border as one of the most important political goals. Against this background he wanted to build good relationships with all newly independent states as well as with the Russian Federation. This guideline implied differentiating relationships with Polands eastern neighbours, in order to ensure the dissolution of the communist bloc structure and to strengthen economic, cultural and political co-operation as one of the key elements of regional stabilisation of Polands international relations. By means of bilateral agreements with all neighbour states in the early 1990s, Poland succeeded in establishing a stable network of diplomatic, political, economic and societal relations.2 The consistent support shown by Poland for the independence of the newly established states after the fall of the USSR, such as Lithuania or Ukraine, was supported by simultaneous efforts to maintain friendly relations with the Russian Federation. The essence of this policy was the belief that the more similarities in the economic and political systems of Poland and its eastern neighbours could be found and the more concurrent the aspirations and values shared by the neighbouring societies were, the smaller the risk of bilateral problems that might affect state security would be.3
2 3 A list of agreements since 1989 between Poland and the post-Soviet states: E. Feldmann, S. Gareis: Nach der Nato-ffnung: Wie setzt Polen den Stabilittstransfer fort? WeltTrends No. 18, 1998, pp. 151 152. E. g., Policy speech of then Polands Minister of Foreign Affairs Prof. B. Geremek on the directions of Polish foreign policy, announced in the Sejm on 9 May 2000 and 8 April 1999.

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For over a decade Polands policy has been conducted with a view to not only formally regulating relations with its eastern neighbours, but its activity was understood as levelling out differences that could generate security problems in this part of Europe in the future. This is a good starting position for a secure course of the enlargement process of the EU, but it can cause serious security problems as well if the requirements of EU expansion demand a relapse beyond the status quo, for example in the field of visa or trade agreements. One of the most urgent problems relating to EU enlargement and the border regions is the contradiction between the Schengen acquis and the actual practice of visa regulations. The European Union should be more flexible in considering these issues as issues of pan-European security interest, rather than insisting on the acquis as it is.

2. Social and economic differences When considering the consequences for European security resulting from direct neighbourhood, it should be remembered that over the past ten years differences have not vanished, and in the case of some countries they have even become more pronounced. The problems facing the peoples of such countries as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, which resulted from being within the range of the united Soviet state for more than forty years, considerably exceeded the scale of difficulties of such Central European countries as Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary. The western border of the former USSR was a border of contrasting standards of living, civil liberties, i. e., largely a border of civilisations within the eastern bloc. Thus the extent of difficulties in reforming the economy, transforming social and political mechanisms has been much greater in Ukraine or Russia than in Poland for instance. In 1990, for example, the GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity, was US-$ 4,490 for Ukraine, and in 1999 US-$ 3,376, while in the same year it was US-$ 8,910 for Poland, and US-$ 6,812 for Russia. This can be seen even more clearly in a comparison of average monthly salaries, which were US-$ 213 for Poland in 1992, US-$ 23 for Russia, and US-$ 50 for Ukraine. Six years later (in 1998) this indicator was 355 for Poland, 114 for Russia, and 61 for Ukraine. Among Polands eastern neighbours, Lithuania came closest with US-$ 288.4 Polands eastern border is, therefore, a border of incongruent economic and social systems except for the Baltic states which show the closest political, economic and

Data after Business Central Europe (http://www.bcemag.com).

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social similarities with Poland. This differentiation is concurrent with the process of Polands integration into Western European structures such as NATO and EU, increasing the difference in the perception of ones place in the world between Poland and Russia, Belarus, and to a certain extent also Ukraine. Poland acts towards reducing the contrasts this border implies an obvious requirement of security on the continent.

3. Consequences of Polands EU membership From the point of view of Poland as a future member of the EU, the most important thing is that eastern enlargement of the European Union should not reinforce the eastern border of Poland as a border of contrast in civilisations and political systems. In Poland, great weight is attached to EU membership of the Baltic states. In this context two aspects should be pointed out: First of all, EU membership of these states was a clear signal to the countries in the direct neighbourhood, such as Ukraine, Belarus or Russia, about the profitability of economic transformation and the ensuing benefits. Membership of the Baltic states would extend the area of stability to the east of Poland, at the same time minimising the role of Poland as a border state. The other aspect is settlement of the dispute between the Baltic states and Russia, concerning the course of the borders. Experience from 1991 to 1993 indicates that without diplomatic support of the West, the Baltic states would not succeed in quickly closing negotiations on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from these countries (the Stockholm Group). It appears that at the moment some similar diplomatic support of the European Union is necessary to help attain a compromise between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation on issues concerning their borders and the Russian minority. The Russian Federation may use these unresolved problems as a kind of regulator of EU accession of the Baltic states and an element of pressure in bilateral relations. This is a potential security risk. Another significant security element from the Polish point of view is the issue of the situation in the Kaliningrad region, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Another problem for Warsaw is the stark discrepancy between Belarussian and European standards. The authoritarian government of President Lukashenko is characterised by curtailing civil liberties, violating human rights and limiting the freedom of economic activity. The countrys economic system is radically different as well. Expansion of the European Union eastwards will bring the future EU border in contact with a state that in its model of government and democratic standards is closer to the regimes of Central Asia or such countries as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia than the countries of Central or Western Europe. Russia remains in an interstate union with Belarus and it 243

appears to be the only country on the continent capable of influencing the internal situation in Belarus, a point which should be brought up in the dialogue between the EU and Russia. Finally, of utmost importance to Poland are good relations with Ukraine. EU enlargement may seriously affect those relations, because EU requirements will force Poland to introduce new visa regulations. Most importantly, however, the issue of Ukrainian security is closely related to its economic transformation. Although this transformation is not directly linked with the process of EU enlargement, the importance of support, assistance and encouragement of such reforms offered by the Union cannot be overestimated. Poland is highly interested in a politically stable situation beyond its eastern border. Nothing would have more negative effects on the internal and pan-European security situation than a serious worsening of the Polish bilateral eastern relations, which must be seen as an important stability anchor of the future EU border region. The geo-strategic situation as well as the fact that Poland is economically stable and quite well developed, make Poland an active and interesting partner in the interaction between the West and different partners in the East. On the one hand, this position can be a big chance for shaping the direct neighbourhood, on the other hand, it is a very vulnerable position indeed unless the EU grasps the complementarities of common security interests.

III Essential regional conflicts as potential security problems

After 1989, the character of security risks has changed decisively in Europe. Actual conflicts are no longer a question of an ideological or military either-or, but are characterised by an increasing complexity of minority problems, border conflicts, politicised economic relations or environmental problems. It is more and more difficult to identify all sources of risks and to estimate the domestic, regional and international consequences of different conflict areas.

1. Political conflicts and ethnic problems Considering regional conflicts, it has to be taken into account that Europe has, on the one hand, especially in the social sector, strong regionalising dynamics, while on the other hand, there are cross-border minorities in all eastern neighbour states of the enlarged EU, which cause special problems. The future of the European integration 244

depends on the complex constellation of minority, and national and European aspects of multiple identities. Many local conflicts are of special security interest, because they are related to a competition between nation-states and minority-nations,5 and are strongly linked with political aims or economic problems.

The problem of the Russian minority in the Baltic states In Estonia as well as in Latvia there is a large group of Russian-speaking people that has been perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of these states since the beginning of independence of these Baltic states.6 The Russian-speaking population in these countries consists of immigrants, settled there by the Soviet Union as a means of coercion and control of seized territories, first after 1940, then after 1944 until the end of the USSR. The authorities of Estonia and Latvia have created numerous legal barriers that constrain the process of formal acquisition of citizenship for the Russian minority, considerably raising the actual and legal assimilation threshold for this group.7 In the last decade, this has been the topic of numerous controversies as well as diplomatic crises between Moscow and Tallinn and Riga. Despite eased regulations on naturalisation, mainly as a result of pressure and suggestions from European institutions, the problem still exists.8 In spite of similar problems, the tensions between Russia and Latvia are much more acute than those between Russia and Estonia. It is worth noting that there is reason to believe Russia is not truly interested in improving the situation of these authorities, since it can use their treatment for political ends. The third of the Baltic states, Lithuania, has chosen a different path in the matter of granting citizenship. Lithuania adopted at independence the zero option and recognised the entire population residing on its territory at the moment of regaining independence as its own citizens. However, it should be remembered that in the quantitative sense the issue was less pressing in Lithuania than in the other Baltic states.

5 6

7 8

Buzan (et al.): 1998, p. 132. According to data of the Board for Citizenship and Migration Affairs of Latvia, in early 2000 Russians accounted for about 30 per cent of the population of Latvia. There is a similar percentage of Russians, about 30 per cent in Estonia, based on Estonian Human Development Report 1999. From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, Carnegie Endowment, Spring 2000. Under the pressure of international organisations and Russia, which in spring 1998 introduced economic restrictions for Latvia, the Latvian authorities amended the Act on Citizenship on 3 October 1998, significantly liberalising provisions on acquiring citizenship.

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The problem of regulating borders of the Baltic states with Russia An additional problem between the Baltic states and Russia are unregulated borders. Neither Latvia nor Estonia has signed a border agreement with Russia, and attempts to resolve this problem have failed. Even the one-sided declaration of Riga on starting delineation did not evoke any willingness to take up a dialogue on this subject in Moscow. Although this border does in fact exist, and its course is designated, Russia is avoiding confirmation of its existence by a treaty. As in the case of the minorities, there is conjecture that Russia treats border issues as a political bargaining card that Moscow can use to torpedo the process of expansion not only of NATO, but also that of the EU to include the Baltic states. This conjecture is confirmed by the fact that the signed treaty on the border between Russia and Lithuania has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma.

Ethnic problems in the Crimea Another element of potential nationalistic conflicts is the internal Ukrainian dispute concerning the Russian population in the Crimea.9 After the mid-1990s, when this conflict was as its height, posing the threat of a real secession of Crimea with the support of some of the political forces in Russia, Ukraine managed to ease the tension and reach a political compromise. At the moment there are no intense tensions between Kiev and Simferopol; nonetheless, another problem may arise in the future, that of the Crimean Tatars. Displaced under Stalins policy of collective responsibility, they have been returning to their old homes since the late 1980s and their share of Crimeas population is steadily rising, further increased by the unusually high birth rate in this group. There are grounds to say that in the long run the importance of the Crimean Tatars in this area will increase, and the interests articulated by them will lead to tension in relations with the Russian population, which may create serious problems for the authorities in Kiev. An example of this are the protests of the Tatars in the spring of 2000 due to the omission of this group in the process of division of land.

According to estimates, Russians account for about 60 per cent, Ukrainians 25 per cent and Tatars about 10 per cent of the population in the Crimea today.

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The problem of the Polish minority in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania Another issue to be considered are the relations between the Polish minority in Belarus and the authorities of this state. There are no grounds to presume that the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenko is particularly hostile in its treatment of the Polish minority in this country. Nevertheless, the nature of the regime makes Poles in Belarus the subject of administrative pressure and threats like all other parts of the population of Belarus that wish to conduct activity independent of the authorities in Minsk. So far there have been no situations that would raise the problems of the Polish minority in Belarus to an issue of bilateral concern. However, the fact that Poland often appears as an unfriendly state interfering with the West in Belorussian affairs in the statements made by President Lukashenko may have a negative impact on the treatment of the Polish minority. A somewhat different picture is presented by Polish-Ukrainian relations. Many times both sides have signaled anxiety in problems related to national issues, but not with regard to the civil liberties and freedoms or respect for the right to cultural dissimilarities, but with regard to the expression of historical memories (in the form of cemeteries, monuments and commemorative plaques),10 which is a subject of controversy between both nations. Another nationalistic problem existing in this area are occasional Polish-Lithuanian disputes over equal treatment of the Lithuanian minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Lithuania.11 These disputes are not as strong as the Russian-Baltic controversies described above, and over the last decade both states have worked out effective forms of dialogue on this subject, significantly lowering the tension around this issue. Nonetheless the long presence of these problems in the Polish-Lithuanian dialogue is caused not only by mental factors such as thinking in categories of historical resentments, occurring on both the Polish and Lithuanian side, but above all by the pauperisation of the Polish minority in Lithuania, which is one of the poorest social groups in this country. To refer to minority problems as a potential security risk in greater detail seems beyond the scope of this article which focuses on pan-European security issues from a Polish perspective. The examples, which were mentioned above, should rather demonstrate the complex links between political aims, social and economic differences and the local ethnic conflict itself. If regional minority problems are instrumentalised in a
10 11 According to the last census in Ukraine in 1989, there are about 220,000 Poles living there. This number, however, is questioned by many who estimate that the Polish population in Ukraine accounts to twice that number. According to official data of the Lithuanian Statistical Office, Poles in Lithuania account for about 7 per cent of the population, although Polish emigrant activists say that this is about 10 to 12 per cent.

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national or international context, they can truly harm pan-European security, especially when accompanied by economic and social problems. In addition to these hard risks, mental attitudes have an enormous impact on the security situation. The examples of the minority problems clearly illustrate that there are many reasons for ethnic conflicts among these historical resentments and differences of opinion concerning legal questions or symbolic acts of forgiveness and reconciliation.

2. Economic problems The concept of economic security is no less politicised and controversial than the question of ethnic conflicts. There is no doubt that the economic modernisation of the Central and East European countries will be the decisive factor for stability and security in todays and the future Europe. The main question is which factors constitute economic stability and which factors threaten it. A successful economic modernisation in terms of security is challenged by several structural factors and many practical problems, which result mainly from the existing economic differences in the future eastern border region of the EU. Some experts even consider the enlargement of the EU as a danger to stability from an economoc point of view, because it would create a further fault line at the new border.12 The potential risks related to the economic sector can be grouped into three areas: oil and gas, their transit and new customs barriers.

Oil and gas The Baltic states and Belarus, Ukraine and Poland are states of key importance for Russia in its exports of petroleum and gas to Western markets. On the one hand, this is conducive to a pragmatic approach by Russia to co-operate with these states.13 On the other hand, this supplies Russia with a strong tool of economic pressure. The last decade has furnished many examples of such conflicts. In the future, two scenarios seem to be the most viable. The first that of rivalry of the Baltic states over revenues from the transit of Russian petroleum, the second that of Ukraines profound dependence on

12 13

A. Inotai: Economy, Bertelsmann Foundation, in: Research Group on European Affairs (eds.): Cost, its and chances of eastern enlargement for the European Union, Gtersloh 1996. Among other things in a situation of an acute conflict of strategic interests between Poland and Russia against the background of NATO expansion, an important agreement was signed on the transit of Russian gas to the West, while past calls, especially of Russian parliamentarians, for Russian economic sanctions against Latvia have always met with objections of the fuel lobby, which exports petroleum via Latvian ports.

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supplies of Russian liquid fuels, affecting the political relations between both states.14 This dependence also concerns Belarus, where the authorities would face the same problem in the case of a change of authority and political orientation into a more prowestern one.

The transit of oil and gas The future EU will be confronted with seeking alternative ways of supplying energy in order to be independent of Russia. It is worth noting the lack of success of the Lithuanian government in this area, especially when privatising the fuel and power sector, and the continuously diminishing prospects of incorporating Ukraine as a transit state for Caspian petroleum. One can predict that any attempts to create energy supply sources alternative to the Russian sources will lead to political tension over this issue. A distinct example of this is Russias activity in Transcaucasia, aimed at gaining control of the production and means of transit of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, which in the past had often led to tension in the region (including the civil wars in Georgia or the armed conflict over Nagorni-Karabakh).15 It is worth emphasising that the stability of the Caucasus largely depends on the ability to reach a pragmatic trilateral compromise: between Russia, states like Azerbaijan or Georgia that wish to produce oil and gas or allow their transit across their territory, and the big Western power corporations, supported by the political involvement of their states. Without reaching such a compromise, the Caucasus will remain a region with lowered security and stability.

New customs barriers Even if the EU is Polands most important economic partner, there exists a well-developed regional co-operation between Poland and its eastern neighbours. According to the eastern neighbours, Poland is because of the intensive economic and political relations with the EU an attractive and strong business partner, which represents Western standards and Western quality and which is, in comparison to the EU, relatively easy to reach. Local knowledge, socio-cultural compatibility and financial reasons like trans-

14 15

S. Tsokolenko: Gdie nachinayetsa nieft, tam zakanchivayutsa natsyonalnye interesi?, in: Zierkalo niedieli No. 292, 13 May 2000. J. Cichocki: Transcaucasian Account of Opportunities, in: Eurazja No. 2, Warsaw, 30 June 1994.

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portation costs may give Poland an edge over trade and investment partners from the EU. The enlargement of the EU will inevitably lead to the creation of customs barriers, which will have consequences for the regional economic dynamics. On the one hand, this creates a strong impulse for the economies of these countries through the necessity of increasing productivity. On the other hand, in the beginning it will lower trade turnover from cross-border trading between the new members of the European Union and the neighbouring states. For the most active parts of the populations of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and other post-Soviet states, cross-border trade is a significant source of income, to some degree compensatory for impoverishment of these nations in the last decade. New customs barriers, which will be introduced in the course of EU enlargement, will provoke a double security risk for the internal and external regional economic situation of the EU. Firstly, because of the increasing unemployment rate in the Polish border region, which is a structurally weak region even today; and secondly, because of a lack of trade alternatives for many enterprises in the countries beyond the future EU border, which will possibly lead to a collapse of the regional markets. This type of conflict is above all related to the pauperisation of the population of states bordering the European Union. This especially concerns Belarus, Ukraine and the Kaliningrad region, but also the population of Poland and thus the future EU border region. These problems will inevitably lead to social conflicts that affect the internal stability of these states and the EU itself. It may seem that because of those social conflicts, which result from economic problems, that economic migration to the more prosperous countries of the enlarged EU may become another security issue. However, research conducted by the International Organisation for Migration shows that one should not expect a great wave of permanent migration from Russia, Ukraine or Belarus to the EU. Should any migration occur, it will involve mainly seasonal workers. However, migrants from South-East Asia who treat post-Soviet states as transit countries to the European Union may pose a real threat to pan-European security.

IV Case study of security problems Kaliningrad and Transdniestria

The following case studies have been selected to illustrate two important issues. They focus on two kinds of security problems that the enlarged European Union will have to confront. The first issue is linked not so much to a potential military conflict, but instead to a 250

possible deepening of a social and political trouble spot that could also pose a threat to the regions security Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad is not an area of political crisis, there are none of the classical dangers to regional stability here. Nonetheless, the Kaliningrad enclave will be surrounded by EU states in the future and problems now related to the situation in Kaliningrad will become problems of the close foreground of the European Union. For this reason, the situation inside this enclave and around its borders deserves particular attention. The second issue concerns the classical security problem (potential military conflicts that may pose a threat to regional stability) of Transdniestria. The problem discussed is the armed conflict that occurred as a result of the separatism of Transdniestria. It is worth noting that the war in this region was the only armed conflict in Central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the USSR. The situation in Transdniestria may affect the stability of the region, and for such states as the Ukraine, Moldova, Russia or Romania it represents a challenge to their security or regional interests. The cases of Kaliningrad and Transdniestria are examples of the challenges that the EU will face in its future foreground.

1. Kaliningrad The Kaliningrad enclave, formally having the status of an oblast (region) of the Russian Federation, was separated from the rest of the Russian territory as a result of the dissolution of the USSR and the proclamation of independence by Lithuania. In the early 1990s, the particular location of this enclave was seen as an opportunity by local politicians who favoured the implementation of economic market reforms and broad cooperation of the region with other countries. The argument that the geographic location predetermines that the enclave will play the role of an economic bridge between East and West was received well, and in June 1991 Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the establishment of the Yantar Free Economic Zone on the territory of the entire region. The leader of the liberal group and author of this idea, Yuriy Matochkin, later became governor of the district. Maintaining customs reliefs and tax exemptions, as well as financial and legal guarantees conducive to investment, was of key importance for the region. None of these requirements were met and soon internal political struggle, particularly intense from 1991 to 1993, paralysed the executive capacity of the authorities of the region. Left-wing politicians, at the time in opposition to the regions authorities, were opposing free-market reforms in the enclave and favoured maintaining its primarily military character. It must be recalled that the district was one of the most highly militarised territories 251

in Europe and that in the early 1990s, apart from the huge quantities of military equipment, more than 200,000 troops were temporarily stationed there. Moscow pursued an incoherent and inconsistent policy towards Kaliningrad, disregarding the provisions of the establishment of the Yantar Free Economic Zone and changing its charter. The best example is the repeated elimination and subsequent restoration of customs reliefs from 1992 to 1996. In 1996 there was a change of power in the region: the liberal Matochkin was replaced by the leftist conservatist Leonid Gorbenko. During his term in office, imports were limited and a number of protectionist measures were taken, which fueled the economic instability of the enclave and constrained its development. In addition to this, the new governor turned out to favour authoritarian actions, destabilising the political situation in the region. After ten years one can say that the experiment of Kaliningrad as a bridge has failed as a result of the political conditions inside the enclave and the lack of decisions by the federal center regarding the future role of Kaliningrad. The region is in the midst of a deep economic and social crisis. Thus a breakdown of the concept of a free economic zone and the attempt to introduce state protectionism worsened the social situation. The inhabitants of the enclaves earnings are nearly half of those in other regions of Russia, while prices of staples are generally higher. There is also a high growth of crime and rising proprietary stratification: 8 per cent of the population receive 80 per cent of the districts income. The region has the highest HIV rate in Russia, and recently a tuberculosis epidemic broke out there. The average monthly per capita income in July 1998 was US-$ 93.3 in Kaliningrad and US-$ 143 in Russia. Trade between the region and neighbouring countries is declining steadily. The borders between the region and the rest of Russia, Lithuania and Latvia, caused a rise in the costs of transit of Russian goods into the region, which the authorities in Moscow use as major proof of the fact that any economic growth of the enclave is feasible only if the problem of customs-free transit to the enclave can be resolved. Both Lithuania and Poland were subjects to Russian pressure in this matter, with the demands for establishing extra-territorial transport routes to Kaliningrad. For states bordering the enclave directly Lithuania and Poland the most important question is the issue of the fate of changes in Kaliningrad. Maintaining the existing economic policy in the region effectively paralyses its development, while the military presence of Russia causes a natural distrust towards any initiatives aimed at establishing special transit schemes. The European Union treats the Russian enclave as one of the priorities in dealing with Russia, which is shown e. g. in the Northern Dimension programme and other assistance programmes addressed to Kaliningrad. A common feature is the attempt to halt the economic collapse of the enclave. Only the European Union as a whole, expanding to include countries adjacent to Kaliningrad Poland and Lithuania is capable 252

of building political and economic trust with Russia that would fulfil two factors at the same time: a) ensuring economic growth of the enclave, creating a rise in the standard of living of the inhabitants, of which the federal center would also benefit, and b) making it possible to reduce fears and distrust on the part of Poland and Lithuania, which could result in easier transportation to and from the Kaliningrad region.16

2. Transdniestria On September 2, 1990, the Dniester Republic of Moldova was proclaimed. Kishinev lost control of the left bank of the Dniester River and the city of Bendery on its right bank. The secession was induced by fears of the Slavic population (mainly Russian) predominant in Transdniestria about a trend towards unification with Romania, prominent within the Moldovan elites. Moldova lost its most highly developed industrial region (50 per cent of industrial output). In the spring of 1992, armed fighting broke out between Moldova and Transdniestria, in which the Russian forces resolved the conflict in favour of Transdniestria, supporting the separatists in the final phase of the war. Since then many attempts have been made to settle the conflict, which, although suspended, is dividing both countries. For the entire decade the leading role in these negotiations had been played by the OSCE. The authorities of the Russian Federation delayed any decisions concerning the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Transdniestrian area for eight years, which was the main precondition for a lasting agreement between Transdniestria and Moldova. The Russians used Transdniestria to exert economic, political and military pressure on the Moldovan Republic. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, Russia accepted the timetable for the withdrawal of its armed forces and the destruction of immense arms depots, located on the territory of Transdniestria. The OSCE proposed that the date for its completion be determined by the end of 2001, an agreement to withdraw the armed forces by the end of 2002. Despite this turning point in the Istanbul agreement, there are reasons to believe that this schedule may be delayed: the resolution of the Duma Commission for the Commonwealth of Independent States in April 2000 and the statement by President Putin, who gave the year 2003 as the earliest realistic time for withdrawal, citing technical reasons. In the light of international law, Transdniestria is formally a territory of Moldova. Nonetheless, the Dniester Republic of Moldova has all the attributes of a state entity: borders, a flag and a constitution that defines the republic as a sovereign, independent,
16 Kaliningrad and the Future of Russia EU Relations, EastWest Institute, Moscow, September 1999.

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democratic state of law. Taking advantage of Russian support and the protection of Russian forces, Transdniestria has become a kind of customs-free zone for the entire region. Most cigarettes and alcohol smuggled into Moldova enter the country via Transdniestria. Other items traded on the black market between Russia, Ukraine, Moldova use the territory of Transdniestria as a transit route as well. Transdniestria also manufactures and exports arms which are later smuggled beyond the area of the former USSR. An intact system of command economy, controlled and largely owned by the local nomenclature, has been preserved on the territory of the Dniester Republic. The economic crisis in this enclave has led to an immense rise in crime. With the purely nominal character of the borders, smuggling has become commonplace. It must be said that illegal economic operations carried out on the territory of Transdniestria would not have been possible without the co-operation of corrupt officials in Moldova, Ukraine or Russia. For the elites of Transdniestria, in full control of the political situation inside the republic they created themselves, the withdrawal of Russian forces and a normalisation of the situation in the enclave is inevitably linked to a limitation of their opportunities to obtain income from illicit sources. This could mean that these elites will take a number of measures to delay the implementation of the compromise agreed on in Istanbul, which may lead to further conflict. The refusal on the part of the authorities of Transdniestria to admit OSCE observers to supervise the process of arms destruction supports this assumption. At this point it should be noted that the European Union has not become involved in attempts to resolve this problem. Meanwhile, the issue of Transdniestria represents only part of the question concerning the timetable of withdrawal of Russian forces and arms. The second part of the question concerns the current standard of living. The OSCE has no economic instruments at its disposal that could affect the situation in Transdniestria, and it is these that will determine the solution of the problem of separatism of Transdniestria. Transdniestria will remain an unresolved conflict Central and Eastern Europe without any distinct prospects for change, capable of generating problems that can affect the stability of the region in the future.

V Conclusions and policy recommendations

The eastward enlargement of the EU undoubtedly creates a big opportunity for Central and Eastern Europe, if at the same time security and stability can be ensured in this area. As this article shows, pan-European security in the framework of direct neighbourhood mainly has to deal with two difficult aspects of security: the political and economic sectors as discussed with examples of asymmetries resulting from EU expansion 254

 and essentially regional conflicts. The case studies on Kaliningrad and Transdniestria showed the necessity of a new and clearly defined security identity of todays and a future EU in order to be able to not only react adequately but also to manage long-term possible security problems of this region. The analysis of the political and economic situation in the border region makes clear that mechanisms should be created so that EU enlargement does not lead to a feeling of rejection in the countries in the direct neighbourhood, above all through activity in the area of information and co-operation. The people of Ukraine or Belarus have minimal access to reliable information on the European Union, the mechanisms of its operation and the values this organisation is based on. According to press analyses carried out by the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, in the Ukrainian and Belarussian media, the European Union appears almost solely in a negative context, as an organisation that enforces closing of borders and a change of visa policy in countries of the immediate neighbourhood. These societies have minimal access to information that would explain why the proximity of the European Union is a chance for their own development and a strong incentive for economic change. The information policy of the European Union should not be geared towards the political elites but to the people, as only then can there be a belief in the benefits resulting from direct neighbourhood. Another element should be increased efforts of the Union oriented towards transboundary co-operation of a local nature. Kaliningrad is an excellent place for locating such activity, but this also concerns the border areas of Latvia, Estonia and Russia, and of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. The economic advancement of regions directly bordering an enlarged EU may effectively prevent tensions resulting from misunderstanding the process of enlargement. The direct neighbourhood of the European Union with the countries of the former USSR has to serve as an incentive and strong impulse for the people of these countries to transform their economies and change social conditions. For that reason, interim regulations in visa and trade questions will be imperative in order to keep the political conflicts manageable that will likely result from the social asymmetries. If the EU wants to ensure that the enlargement does not lead to new dividing lines or disparities that can harm security in Europe there should be tangible facts like such interim regulations. From this point of view it appears that dialogue between the European Union and Russia is of key significance. Creation of mechanisms that would incorporate Russia into the benefits stemming from the close proximity of the European Union would mean obtaining Moscows willingness to co-operate with the European Union in building economic order and stability east of the EU borders. This is especially necessary because, even in the long run, one cannot expect to see EU membership of Russia, Ukraine or 255

Belarus. Thus it is necessary to outline the mechanisms inside the European Union for co-operation with countries that cannot enjoy a position equal to that of the candidate states. These mechanisms have to take into account a certain extent of privileges in EU contacts with these countries in the name of acting on behalf of their internal transformation and the creation of similar economic and political systems. Just as prospects of EU membership for the candidate states have led to an acceleration of the transformation process and to stability and accountability of these countries on the political scene, it is necessary to devise similar instruments that could be attractive for the countries in the direct neighbourhood. Nonetheless, the basic requirement of such a dialogue with Russia is that the authorities of the Russian Federation relinquish the policy of arresting the EU expansion with demands for special compensation or exceptional treatment of its economic interests compared to the other countries of the region, such as Ukraine or Moldova. The issues of pan-European security from a Polish perspective discussed here show that the need for cross-border co-operation between Poland and the new direct neighbours of the EU cannot be overestimated with regard to security: Regional cross-border co-operation is an important factor for paving the road to effective prevention and resolving conflicts on the international level. For this reason, the main goal concerning the construction of a stable, prosperous direct neighbourhood must be an intelligent strategic concept presented by the EU that gives cross-border co-operation a key role with regard to security. However, it already appears to be obvious that enlargement is going to require a much more active policy on part of Brussels toward the countries in the direct neighbourhood, a policy that involves measurable financial resources, pursued in timeframe of decades, not years.

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Pan-European Security in the Framework of Direct Neighbourhood A Western Perspective

Iris Kempe

I Introduction
The disappearance of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Treaty and the beginning of the transition in Eastern Europe has led to radical changes in pan-European security threats and conflicts and, consequently, in measures of conflict prevention and their resolution. During the Cold War, which can be characterised as the apex of the EastWest confrontation, the dominant rift was caused by a combination of two factors. The first was power-based conflicts between sovereign nation states, and the second was an ideological conflict of value on which system was right, good, or had the best social order.1 Thus, peacekeeping and conflict resolution were associated either with the balance of military power or the character and efficiency of political, economic and social systems. Defined by these power-based and ideological confrontations, conflicts centered on the national or systemic level. Issues pertaining to inter-regional relations were of no substantial security concern. In general, any kind of regional perspective did not fit into the concept of centralised power of the USSR. Therefore, regional leaders within the Soviet Union as well as within the former Comecon states had limited decision-making opportunities. From an analytical point of view, regionalism was also seen as a threat because it led to fragmentation, anarchy, chaos and increased insecurity.2

1 2

M. Zrn: Konfliktlinien nach dem Ende des Ost West Gegensatzes global handeln, lokal kmpfen, in: K. von Beyme, C. Offe (eds.): Politische Theorien in der ra der Transformation, PVS 21, 1995. P. Joenniemi: Interregional Cooperation and a New Regional Paradigm, in: P. Gangster, A. Sweedler, J. Scott, W. D. Eberwein (eds.): Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America, San Diego 1997, pp. 65 79.

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Since the beginning of 1989, and in particular after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the nature of conflicts has been changing radically: The power-based and ideological risks of pan-European security, easy to characterise, were replaced with those resulting from a diversity of sources. Conflicts about the right or wrong order and the potential for military confrontation have decreased or even disappeared. Nevertheless, pan-European stability and security have not increased: Minority problems have escalated into violent ethnic conflicts, territorial claims and border conflicts have halted the accession to international institutions, economic relations are being instrumentalised by political issues, and environmental catastrophes have the potential to escalate into bilateral conflicts. This increased complexity of conflicts is not simply limited to the causes of risk, but also entails relevant territorial importance. By transpiring on the regional or international level, security threats go beyond the nation state.3 Compared to the Cold War, Europe has not become more secure, but major characteristic changes in the nature of conflicts can be identified. On the one hand, the variety of security problems makes conflict prevention and regulation more complicated, but on the other hand, the current security dynamic contains opportunities for regulation through institution building.4 In order to maximise new opportunities for conflict management, it is necessary to recognise those threats at an early stage. In this process, the analytical focus, as well as the perspective of political decision-making, should take into account varying territorial levels of a conflict as well as different conflict areas.

II The changing character of security risks in Europe in the framework of direct neighbourhood
Relations between the European Union and their future neighbouring countries (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States), CIS, a crucial aspect of European security, can be characterised by stark asymmetries.5 At present there exist substantial structural differences between the EU-associa-

D. Trenin: Security Cooperation in North-Eastern Europe: A Russian Perspective, in: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Institut fr Europische Politik (eds.): Russia and the United States in Northern European Security, Kauhava 2000, pp. 15 54. V. Rittberger, M. Zrn: Transformation der Konflikte in den Ost-West Beziehungen. Versuch einer institutionellen Bestandsaufnahme, in: W. Seibl, M. Medick-Krakau, H. Mnkler, M.Th. Greven (eds.): Demokratische Politik Analyse und Theorie, Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 383 430. I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood. Relations between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998.

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ted countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. The shift away from the former Soviet system towards Western organisations has resulted in a stabilising change of the political systems, economic reform, the improvement of the domestic and foreign investment climate, and the construction of adequate social security systems. 6 This foreign policy orientation is most clearly demonstrated by the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO. Despite setbacks and stagnation in the transformation process, the capitals of Central and Eastern Europe have decisively chosen a Western orientation. The situation differs starkly in the future neighbouring countries of the EU. The political, economic, and social situation can most accurately be described as a mix of parliamentary democracy and autocracy, market and command economies. They are characterised by the first social attempts at emancipation from an omnipotent state.7 With the accession of the Central and East European countries, the gap with the CIS countries threatens to widen further. The discrepancies of inner development could be augmented through the rise of new economic and social divisions due to rigid visa regulations and trade barriers. As a consequence of EU eastern enlargement, security risks are shifting from the Central and East European states to the CIS countries. As a result, the future EU eastern border would constitute a dividing line for political, economic, and social relations. According to the fundamental assumptions of peace and conflict research, symmetrical relations result in stable security and political situations, while increasing asymmetries increase the potential for conflict.8 Consequentially, the asymmetric relation of the Direct Neighbourhood is a primary security risk for the future. Even today there is a range of individual conflict areas with different potential for the escalation into violence. The clearest demonstration of military force is the Russian war in the northern Caucasus. However, even conflicts that have not escalated as violently weigh upon the neighbouring relations of the EU. For example, the region of Kaliningrad can be seen as a test case for European security in the future.9 On the one hand, Kaliningrad will be an island inside the future EU and, as such, sees the resolution of the transformation crisis through a close tie with Europe. On the other hand, Kaliningrad represents Russian military strategic interests and a future

6 7 8 9

H. Brcker und W. Schrettl: Entsteht eine neue wirtschaftliche Kluft in Europa?, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen 44/45, 1997, pp. 17 26. G. ODonnell: Delegative Democracy, in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, No. 1, 1995, pp. 51 65. E. - O. Czempiel: Im Frieden Handeln. Von den Schrecken des Krieges und den Problemen der Struktur, in: Vierteljahresschrift fr Sicherheit und Frieden, No. 1, 1995, pp. 13 16. P. Joenniemi, S. Dewar, L. Fairlie: The Kaliningrad Puzzle: A Russian Region within the European Union, COPRI Working Paper, Copenhagen 1999. I. Kempe, W. van Meurs (eds.): Strategies of Direct Neighbourhood for the Baltic Sea Region and Northwestern Russia, CAP Working Paper, Munich 1999.

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bulwark against the West and, more notably, NATO. Further security risks result from non-demarcated borders and territorial claims such as those that exist between Russia on the one hand and Estonia and Latvia on the other.10 Aside from its economic and political transition problems, Ukraine illustrates potential centres of conflict currently characterised by their frozen stability: ethnic tensions in the Crimea, the non-demarcated Russian-Ukrainian border, and problems linked with the Black Sea Fleet. Like Ukraine, Moldova also suffers from transitional crises. Furthermore, Moldovas external relations with Romania (minority issues, statehood, open border questions) as well as with Russia (Transdniestrian conflict) entail potential risks with a high European impact. Due to the authoritarian character of Lukaschenkos presidency, European decision-makers have very limited opportunity for co-operation and conflict prevention on a democratic basis. Security risks caused by Belarus are linked with economic instability, the authoritarian political system and the unresolved question of a Russian-Belorussian Union. A peculiarity of the territorially and causally differentiated conflicts is a potentially increasing diversity of risks that may mean further security problems. An important starting point for the mitigation of these problems is the clarification, case by case, of the territorial and intentional characteristics of the security risks in the direct neighbourhood region. Two examples can demonstrate the point: the conflict in the Caucasus and the relations between Russia and the Baltic states. The problematic situation in the Caucasus pertains to a conflict that, aside from its regional and national importance for Russia, is a matter of relevance for pan-European security. The historically problematic and currently tense relations between Russia and the Baltic states are one of the direct threats to the process of EU expansion. If the problems between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other remain unsolved until accession to the EU, they will lead to security conflicts between the EU and Russia. The following case studies do not aim to cover the entire list of potential conflicts, but to illustrate security risks which have different territorial origins and which are connected with multilateral levels of interest.

10

A. Moshes: Overcoming Unfriendly Stability. Russian-Latvian Relations at the End of 1990s, in: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Institut fr Europische Politik (eds.): op. cit.

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III Case studies of conflict genesis in the framework of Direct Neighbourhood

Russia and the Baltics Relations between Russia and the Baltics are based on the legacies of a Soviet-dominated past.11 One crucial point is the status of sovereignty of the Baltics. In fighting for independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were driving forces of the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, since the Russian Federation was established as the successor of the Soviet Union, Russian decision-makers have continually been manifesting claims on the Baltics. In doing so, they have continued to interfere with the domestic politicals and the economy of the country in order to prevent EU and, in particular, NATO membership. At the same time, decision-makers within the three Baltic capitals have been trying to distance themselves as far as possible from Russia and to orient themselves towards Western institutions. After the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic States, the Russian-speaking population in the Baltics and the border question remain potential conflicts. Although the Russian-speaking population is sometimes referred to as a minority, it makes up more than one third of the Estonian and Latvian society. Only in Lithuania is the number of Russian speakers remarkably lower. In some Latvian and Estonian cities, the Russian-speaking population represents more than 80 per cent of the inhabitants. The situation is even more complicated in some Estonian regions, where such cities are concentrated at the Russian border. The origin of the Russian-speaking population can primarily be divided into two segments: The first emigrated from Russia at the beginning of the 20th century due to individual interests. The second came to the Baltics as a result of the Soviet policy of industrialisation (blue-collar workers) in order to establish a power base for the USSR and the Communist Party (white-collar workers). After 1991, the Russian-speaking population was more or less automatically naturalised in Lithuania. However, in Riga and Tallinn the process has been much more complicated. In order to apply for citizenship, one must pass language examinations, swear an oath on the constitution, and demonstrate substantial national knowledge. This naturalisation practice has led to an alarmingly high number of non-citizens in both Estonia and Latvia.12 As non-citizens, this part of the population has lost the right to vote and social rights.13 The legacies of the past, in addition to the issue of the Russian-speaking population,
11 12 13 E. Berg: Historical and Cultural Dimensions of Estonias Relations with Russia, in: I. Kempe, W. van Meurs, B. von Ow (eds.): The EU Accessions States and Their Eastern Neighbours, Gtersloh 1999, pp. 124 144. A. Lieven: The Baltic revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the path to independence, New Haven 1993, p. 432. I. Kempe: Direct Neighbourhood, op. cit., p. 42.

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are causing rifts between Russia and the Baltics.14 A relevant part of the problem is concentrated on the regional level: much of the Russian-speaking population lives in border regions; there is a structural weakness of such regions due to new dividing lines (complicated and expensive visa regulations); and there are further economic issues, such as double custom tariffs. However, despite concentration on the regional level, the real cause of these problems results from national interest. The Estonian and Latvian governments, on the one hand, show limited interest in integrating the Russian-speaking part of the population. This stems from a strong desire to strengthen their independence from Russia. On the other hand, Russian decision-makers continue to manifest claims on the Baltics in order to protect rights of the Russian population living abroad. Russia as well as the Baltic states tend to pursue a kind of non relation to the direct neighbour, which is much more dominated by disassociation and maintaining frozen conflicts than by reducing problems through co-operation. Complicating this problematic situation is the fact that as a side effect of the Baltics accession into the EU, these problems will become European. Consequentially, arising conflicts could threaten not only bilateral and cross-border relations, but could also give rise to a pan-European security risk. On the regional level, mutual threats prevent economic and social co-operation. The signing of a Russian-Estonian and of a Russian-Latvian border treaty has been a particularly important issue. The border treaty is a prerequisite for co-operative regulations of regional border traffic and abolition of the double custom tariff for Russian exports into the Baltic states. Such tariffs illustrate the consequences of new dividing lines that have led to economic weakness and social conflict in the region. The potential risks between Russia and the Baltics are first and foremost grounded in political terms. For example, many political issues such as minority conflicts and border problems are instrumentalised in order to attain current political goals (like victory in election campaigns). Economic and social aspects are used as political instruments. Russian decision-makers have been threatening to use economic sanctions and energy boycotts in order to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population, as well as to demonstrate the still-existent Russian hegemony.

14

A. Moshes: op. cit.

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The Caucasus wars Since 1994, the war in the northern Caucasus has been one of Russias most dangerous security risks.15 However, this security issue is not limited to Russia, but also presents a potential pan-European problem. In 1991, Chechnya refused to become part of the new Russian Federation. The government did not sign the Federation treaty and the regional population elected president Dudaev. War broke out after Russian army troops unsuccessfully attempted to storm Grosny in November 1994, and then continued for one and a half years, claiming more than 80,000 lifes. Although the Russian general Lebed succeeded in signing a peace treaty with Chechnya in the autumn of 1996, Russia did not accept the independence of the republic. Since then, Russian and Chechnyan decision-makers have neither been negotiating about its status nor attempting to build an effective, modern administration within the region. The weakness of regional state power and institutions was one reason for the ongoing violence within the northern Caucasus. In addition to this ongoing conflict, two further reasons for the second Caucasus war beginning in 1999 can be mentioned. In August 1999, Chechnyan opposition leader Basaev, supported by 1,200 members of the armed forces, penetrated into the neighbouring republic Dagestan and declared a united Islamic Chechnya-Dagestan state. This attack was ultimately repelled by a Russian counter offensive. A second reason are the terrorist attacks against flats in Moscow and southern Russia during the summer of 1999. Although it remains to be proven that these attacks were carried out by Chechnyan terrorists, the majority of the Russian decision-makers, as well as the public, is very much convinced of Chechnyan authorship. At first glance, the violence and conflict escalation in the Caucasus seems to be concentrated on the regional level with implications for regional actors only. A more detailed analysis that also considers national and pan-European factors presents different results. Both instances of conflict escalation in the Caucasus coincided with domestic difficulties in the Russian Federation and, particularly, its elections. In October 1993, Russian president Yeltsin had to use military violence to protect his power against the shadow cabinet of Duma speaker Chasbulatov. Consequently, Yeltsin lost much of his popularity and attempted to improve his image as a strong politician fighting for law and order. Thus, the first Caucasus war was a useful political instrument. The war continued until the presidential elections in 1996, when the war fraction (the military,

15

M. Sapper (ed.): Russland und der zweite Tschetschenienkrieg. Fakten, Hintergrnde, Interpretationen, Mannheim 1999.

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military industrial complex, and Yeltsins bodyguard Korschakov) lost domestic influence and general Lebed succeeded in signing a peace treaty. On the eve of the second Chechnya war, acting President Vladimir Putin had yet to define a strong political image. As a result, he has been strengthening the old rift within the Caucasus in order to demonstrate his competence as a strong statesman successfully fighting against terrorism and separatism. During the presidential elections in 2000, the struggle for law and order was also a crucial aspect of Putins campaign. Besides this political dimension, the war is also fueled by economic interests concerning raw materials (most notably oil and gas) and pipelines running through the region. All in all, both cases show similarities: As with the Baltic-Russian problematic, the Caucasus conflict has regional roots, but is very much instrumentalised for national interest, and thus strengthened by federal decision-makers. Although motives seem to be concentrated on the political level, real interests are also connected with economic claims. Furthermore, in other regions such as central Asia, there is a clear tendency in Russian foreign policy to instrumentalise regional ethnic factors for economic and security interests. As such, the elimination of the true causes of conflict (such as the Russian-speaking population in central Asian successor states) does not lie within the interests of the Russian government. The decision-makers are rather striving for a sort of frozen stability, which allows them to demonstrate foreign policy strength despite domestic weakness.16

IV Approaches for conflict prevention and solution

The differentiation of the security risks at various regional levels, as well as the diversity of the causes of conflict, confront European institutions with new challenges for conflict management. It is especially worth asking how the European decision-makers can counter the trend of conflicts transpiring on a regional level to be primarily caused by national interests. A second key point refers to the possibility of European actors for shaping EU foreign relations. There exists a lamentable discrepancy between the success of foreign trade and the failures of the EU security and defence policy.

16

U. Halbach: Moskaus Sdpolitik: Russland und Europa im kaspischen Raum, in: Bundesinstitut fr ostwissenschaftliche und internaionale Studien (ed.): Russland in Europa? Innere Entwicklung und internationale Beziehungen, Kln, Weimar, Wien, pp. 258 259.

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The establishment of normative standards through integration and association One instrument of the EU in shaping its foreign relations is its attractiveness as an economically stable and politically integrated area. As a result, accession to the EU has been and continues to be a milestone for the systemic transformation of the Central and Eastern European states. For its part, the EU saw the chance to extend the Western security community to Central and Eastern Europe, and formulated required accession criteria at the Copenhagen Conference in 1993.17 Generally speaking, acceptance to the EU requires the following conditions: institutional stability, a functioning market economy, and the assumption of the duties that correspond to an EU membership. The eastern expansion is the best example of how the EU, in the middle term, promotes the stabilisation of security in Europe by the establishment of normative standards. In contrast to the Central and Eastern European states, the CIS states are not currently pursuing EU membership, and as a result, the potential for furthering security policy by normative standards is limited. The EU nevertheless attempts to implement democratic and market-oriented principles through its contractual relationship with the CIS states. In the preamble of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Russia is required to uphold democracy and human rights as set out in the basis of the Helsinki Final Act. In return, Russia is treated as a transitional economy rather than a command economy.18 Furthermore, the acceptance of Russia (1996) and Ukraine and Moldova (1995) to the Council of Europe is associated with the recognition of democratic and legal principles. Among the CIS states, Ukraine is currently most interested in the establishment of European norms. In addition to domestic and foreign policy reasons, this interest is also connected with the consolidation of Ukraine as an independent nation-state. Since its independence from the former USSR in 1991, Ukraine has suffered from sustained transformational problems. However, despite political instability and incomplete structural reforms such as privatisation, the creation of viable businesses and the construction of a functioning market, Ukrainian decision-makers were successful at monetary and currency policy during the first years of transition. This early success was not sustainable, and in the aftermath of the Russian financial and currency crisis in August 1998, the Griwna had to be devalued. Ukraine was again facing a decisive transformation crisis, which was also complicated by a large foreign deficit amounting 40 per cent

17 18

K. W. Deutsch: The Analysis of International Relations, Engelwood Cliffs 1978, p. 251. Beschluss des Rates und der Kommission vom 30. Oktober 1997 ber den Abschluss des Abkommens ber Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Europischen Gemeinschaften und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Russischen Fderation andererseits, ABL L 327, vom 27. November 1997.

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of the GDP at the end of 1998.19 The constant and even increasing transformation problems, the issue of the Russian-speaking eastern part of the country and the high dependence on raw material exports all threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine. With the goal of mitigating the transformation crises, as well as consolidating foreign policy, Ukrainian decision-makers are orienting themselves towards European norms and are striving for association and partnership with the EU.20 This state of affairs, which has previously been unable to achieve transformational success, can be interpreted in two ways: There has indeed been a lack of a clear establishment of a normative framework due to the European Commissions failure to formulate an accession perspective for Ukraine. However, the European Choice for Ukraine cannot be simply managed by a normative framework alone. In addition to Ukraine, Belarus may also prove an important case for which an orientation towards Europe can change guidelines and goals of transition radically. Reinforcement of a democratic opposition should at least be considered as an alternative option to current policy. Strengthening the attempt to establish democratic and market-oriented norms from outside is part of preventative diplomacy. However, if an escalation of conflict occurs, the limited efficacy and range of mere statements are quickly seen. This can be illustrated by the two examples mentioned above. The war in Chechnya, being a forceful military operation against an ethnic minority, is an extreme violation of European democratic standards, in addition to posing pan-European security risks. As a result, European institutions responded with the following attempts at intervention. At the European conference in December 1999 in Helsinki, the Council of the EU threatened to review the previous agreement with Russia as well as reduce technical co-operation if the conflict were not resolved in a peaceful manner.21 Furthermore, the Council of Europe initiated expulsion proceedings in order to press for a solution of the conflict through open dialogue.22 However, despite the fact that both sanctions have been implemented to a substantial degree, neither has resulted in any change of Russian policy. Baltic-Russian relations are a further example of the limits of democratic norms for conflict regulation. The EU is interested in constructive relations between Moscow on the one hand and Vilnius, Tallinn and Riga on the other. However, as before, there is a

19 20

21 22

Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft und Technologie (ed.): Wirtschaftslage und Reformprozesse in Mittel- und Osteuropa, Berlin 1999, pp. 165 173. Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 4 June 1999 in: http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en. Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine, in: Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10/11 December 1999. Declaration on Chechnya, Presidency Conclusions Helsinki, 10/11 December 1999, Annex II. Council of Europe threat to Russia on human rights, in: Financial Times, 7 April 2000, p. 2. Council of Europe Press Service (ed.): Declaration on the conflict in Chechnya, 16 May 2000, in: http://www.coe. fr/cp/2000/348a(2000).htm.

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serious background of existing minority problems, open border questions and a sense of non-relations, all of which could be instrumentalised for a political crisis. With regard to the Baltic states, the EU policy has restricted itself to making a solution of the minority question and the signing of border treaties a necessary requirement for accession. As for Russia, the EU leaves conflict prevention to the OSCE, which has focused on minority problems. Complicating the situation is the fact that while the EU is seen as a good partner for rapid European integration, the OSCE more often appears as constantly critical. However, there is no comprehensive concept that connects the incentives for European integration with the OSCEs means of conflict management. Russia is thus indirectly in the position to halt the Baltic accession through manipulation of the remaining open questions. The advantage of the norm-establishing policy of the EU is that it does not attempt to solve regional conflicts on the regional level, but rather aims at establishing national standards on the level where the conflicts are initiated. The limits of this policy are characterised by the reduced ability of the EU to hold the CIS states to their obligations, as well as to manage escalated conflicts.

Stabilisation of the transformation Corresponding to the fundamental assumption that asymmetries pose a primary cause for security risks, the EU is endeavouring to mitigate these imbalances. For that purpose it is employing a double strategy of stabilising the transformation process as well as establishing the connection between economic and political aspects. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are central to the contractual relations between the EU and the CIS.23 Since 1999, these agreements are supplemented by the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia and the Common Strategy on Ukraine.24 From the perspective of the EU, these treaties primarily had political intention. In contrast, the CIS states saw their participation primarily from an economic perspective. The EU is attractive economically because it is an important trade and modernisation partner. For instance, EU member states account for approximately 40 per cent of Russias foreign trade, and the EU is a source of more than 50 per cent of foreign direct investment in Russia.25 Next to this important function as a trade partner, the EU also takes on the function of a lawyer for the CIS states with regards to their integration in international economic

23 24 25

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, op. cit. Common Strategy, op. cit. H. Timmermann: Russland und die internationalen und europischen Strukturen, in: Ruland in Europa? op. cit., pp. 199 213.

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organisations, especially the World Trade Organisation. As a modernisation partner, the EU supports transformation through Tacis (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States), and attempts to shape this transformation in ways compatible to European structural elements. Among the list of promoted activities are consultation projects in the grocery industry and farm economy, telecommunications, energy questions and nuclear safety, environmental protection, administrative reform and restructuring of businesses, as well as the reform of public administration and the promotion of democracy.26 As a rule, these measures are carried out in co-operation between regional experts and consultants from the EU member states. Thus, in comparison to both individual countries and other international organisations, the EU is most important for guaranteeing technical support of the transformation process in the CIS states. Because of the weakness of European defence and security policy, the EUs potential as a soft security actor depends on its attraction as a trade and modernisation partner. This perception differs among the CIS states. The association or even integration of Ukraine into the EU is of primary interest to Ukrainian decision-makers. The solution of transition problems is seen as a more or less automatic consequence of the orientation towards and association with Europe. In contrast to this position, initial stabilisation of Ukraine is primarily an EU interest. This conflict of interest limits capacities to stabilise the transition and to manage soft security risks. The role of the EU as an economic and modernisation partner strengthens its attractiveness for Russia in a political and security sense. Russian decision-makers are increasingly regarding the EU as a security alternative to a US-dominated world order. In contrast to these assessments, European decision-makers see themselves as a transatlantic co-operation partner. Although the transformation of the CIS states from the outside can only be a limited one, and although the transformation process is ultimately the responsibility of the states themselves, utilising corresponds to the assumption that the conflicts arise out of asymmetries and frequently contain economic causes. Nevertheless, conflicts cannot be managed solely by the stabilising of the transformation process. Although Europe is a political and economic world power, it can use this potential to a highly limited degree only regarding its own security and defence policy. Europe is a power without claim to dominance, with a limited potential to resolve conflicts.

26

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/tacis/framework/frwrk_assis.htm.

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Regional and subregional co-operation Regional conflicts can be a catalyst for regional co-operation, since regional problems can be dealt with directly on the regional level. Next to bottom-up approaches, the EU works and supports the process with its top-down programmes for regional and subregional co-operation. Previous experiences in cross-border co-operation have demonstrated that success is dependent on overcoming historically grounded obstacles to co-operation, as well as the recognition of common interests and goals.27 Major obstacles to co-operation are historical antagonisms and current political resistance. These obstacles are also revealed in the pending ratification of the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian border treaties and the restrictive visa regulations. By comparison, success is obvious in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where current co-operation is based on overcoming historical conflicts. Common interests can be defined by the daily problems of structurally weak border regions. This heightens the pressure to decrease the structural weaknesses of cross-border economic and social co-operation. Even if the attempt to eliminate historical antagonisms and political weaknesses proves unsuccessful, there will nevertheless be positive consequences for cross-border co-operation.28 In this respect, European initiatives are an important motor for the definition of role models. Moreover, European programmes, through their financial support, help to establish cross-border co-operation. Examples of such programmes are the Northern Dimension, the Northern Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents Sea Council. 29 The primary problem of interregional co-operation is the lack of comprehensive concepts. The multitude of subregional measures is concentrated on the Baltic Sea region, while comparable initiatives are lacking in central Europe. The most difficult partner is Russia. On the one hand, the present decentralisation of Russia contains new possibilities for interregional co-operation. On the other, it will be hard for Russian decision-makers not to develop new claims to dominance.

27 28 29

I. Kempe, W. van Meurs, B. von Ow: op. cit., pp. 50 53. G. Roll, T. Maximova: External Relations of Pskov Region of the Russian Federation, Working Paper, Tartu 1999. P. van Ham: Testing Cooperative Security in Europes New North: American Perspective and Policies, in: The Finnish Institute of Interantional Affairs, Institut fr Europische Politik (eds.): op. cit. Kauhava 2000, pp. 57 95. Ch. Meier: Russland und die regionale Wirtschaftskooperation in Europa, in: Russland in Europa, op. cit., pp. 187 198.

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V Conclusions and comments on policy recommendations

Pan-European security in the framework of direct neighbourhood is similar to an equation with two unknowns. The first is the internal economic and political situation and the search for a new foreign-relations identity in the CIS states that has changed European security risks. In general, potential conflicts are closely linked to political, economic and social asymmetries between the EU and its future neighbouring countries. EU enlargement has the potential to increase these asymmetries. The variety of possible conflict makes it difficult to identify both security problems and key actors among the CIS states. Thus, conflicts are unpredictable and difficult to manage. In order to identify problems at an early stage, a kind of early warning system focusing on current developments in the CIS countries should be developed. In addition to the reduction of already existing asymmetries, EU policy should seek to ensure that eastern enlargement does not cause new disparities or even new dividing lines. In order to transform this goal into strategic concepts, the enlargement process should be connected with a concept of direct neighbourhood linking the CIS countries with Europe. Approaches of interregional/cross-border co-operation can serve as a catalyst for the development from frozen conflicts rooted in national interests towards stable relationships with future neighbouring countries. All in all, due to their transition problems and search for international orientation, the CIS countries are difficult partners that confront the EU with new challenges. The second unknown arises from the EUs experiences with and capacities for managing security problems. Currently, the EUs opportunity to influence foreign and security policy is augmented by its attractive economic power and political integration, yet at the same time limited by a continually weakening defence and security identity. The EUs function can be described as a peace-building and rule-setting power without dominant claims. On the one hand, the EU has the ability to reduce soft security conflicts without hurting Russian interests. On the other hand, experiences with capacities for conflict prevention and management are limited to a pre-escalation stage of conflicts. As a result of the EUs failure to provide a perspective of membership, primary strategies such as the establishment of normative standards through integration and association and the stabilisation of the transformation have only had limited influence on the CIS countries. Consequently, the scenario of direct neighbourhood entails a need for the EU to strengthen its defence and security identity.

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Map

Finland Sweden Norway

Estonia

Russia

Latvia

North Sea

Denmark

Baltic Sea
Russia

Lithuania

Belarus

Poland Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg Germany Ukraine

Czech Republic Slovakia

France Austria Switzerland Slovenia Croatia Italy BosniaHerzegovina Hungary Romania

Moldova

Black Sea
Yugoslavia Bulgaria

Corsica

Macedonia Albania Turkey Greece

Sardinia

Mediterranean Sea

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Key Documents

Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) between the EU and the Russian Federation http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/pca_legal/index.htm Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/common_strategy/index.htm Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000 2010) http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/ index.htm Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) between the EU and the Russian Federation http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/en/doc-pub/index.html European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine http://www.delukr.cec.eu.int/en/doc-pub/index.html Tacis http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/tacis/intro/index.htm http://www. eur.ru/eng/tacis/index.html Phare http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare.htm

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Abbreviation Index

AMG CIS CEFTA EC EU FRY FYROM GATT GUUAM GDP ICG IGC ISPA IMF JHA NGO NATO OSCE Phare RSFSR SAPARD Tacis USSR WTO

Advisory and Monitoring Group (established by the OSCE) Commonwealth of Independent States Central European Free Trade Agreement European Commission European Union Former Republic of Yugoslavia Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Includes: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova Gross Domestic Product International Contact Group Inter-Governmental Conference Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession International Monetary Fund Justice and Home Affairs Non-Governmental Organisation North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Restructuring (EU Assistance Programme) Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Trade Organization 275

About the Authors

Eiki Berg (1970) is Associate Professor and Department Chairman at the University of Tartu, Department of Political Science, with a particular interest in the field of critical geopolitics. He also studied ethnoregional movements, borders and border regions, and is currently running a project on Geopolitical Reasoning and Discourse in Post-Soviet Estonia: Identity, Boundary-Producing Practices and Context. Most recent articles: Current Geopolitical Thought and Estonia: A Critical Approach. Croatian International Relations Review. Vol. IV, No. 12/13, 1998; National Interests and Local Needs in a Divided Setumaa: Behind the Narratives, in: H. Eskelinen, I. Liikanen, J. Oksa: Curtains of Iron and Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, 1999; and Writing Post-Soviet Estonia on to the World Map, Political Geography Vol. 19, No. 5, 2000. Timofei Bordachev (1973) is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Europe (IE) Russian Academy of Science, where he heads the European Conflicts Research Group in the framework of the institutes Department of European Security. He also serves as Assistant Editor of Pro et Contra, Carnegie Moscow Centre. He received his M.A. in European Politics and Administration (1997) from the College of Europe in Bruges and Ph.D. in International Relations (1998) from Saint-Petersburg State University (School of International Relations). Casual columnist for Vremya Novosti newspaper where he covers the issues of Russian Foreign Policy. Areas of interest: contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia EU relations. Selected publications: Novy Interventisionism i Sovremennoye Mirotvorchestvo (The New Interventionism and Contemporary Peacekeeping), MONF, 1998; European Security After Kosovo (with D. Danilov and A. Moshes), Institute of Europe, 1999. 277

Jacek Cichocki (1971), heads the CIS and Baltic States Department of Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. He studied sociology at the Warsaw University. Selective bibliography: Nowe szlaki transportowe na poudniu WNP, Warszawa 1998; Spoeczne naste pstwa regulacji ruchu osobowego na pnocnej i wschodniej granicy Polski w perspektywie czonkostwa w UE, Warszawa 2000. Eva Feldmann (1965) has been an advisor for Central and Southeastern Europe at the Heinrich Bll Foundation in Berlin since 1996. Since 1995, she has been a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich, in the research group Youth and Europe in the field of Central and Eastern Europe. Areas of interest: development of educational programmes for European education to democracy and participation in Central and Eastern Europe. She has been committed to furthering German-Polish relations since 1985, first as director of the German-Polish Culture and Exchange Centre in Freiburg, then as coordinator in the German-Polish Youth Office in Warsaw. Selected publications: Nach der Nato-ffnung. Wie setzt Polen den Stabilittstransfer fort? (with Sven Gareis) Strausberg 1996; Herausforderung der Identitt? Zur Neudefinierung der Erziehungsaufgaben im Transformationsproze, in: H. Hahn (ed.): Kulturunterschiede, Frankfurt/Main 1999; Polen: Fr Eure und unsere Freiheit Zum Verstndnis der polnischen Gesellschaft, Kultur und Identitt, Frankfurt/Main 2000. Iris Kempe (1968) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich, where she is director of the project Direct Neighbourhood and co-ordinator for the CIS and the Baltic States. She received her Ph. D. on Problems of Social Policy and the Russian Transition at the Free University Berlin. Since 1993 she has been project manager and expert in international assistance programmes, such as Tacis and Transform. From 1993 1996, she served as a project assistant at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Moscow. Selected publications: The EU Accession States and Their Eastern Neighbours, (ed.) Gtersloh 1999; Direct Neighbourhood. Relations between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Gtersloh 1998; Ruland am Wendepunkt. Analyse der Sozialpolitik von 1991 bis 1996, Wiesbaden 1997; The European Union and Ukraine: Interest and Strategies, in: Between Russia and the West: Foreign Policy of Independent Ukraine, eds.: K. R. Spillmann, A. Wenger and D. Mller, Bern 1999; Die Ukraine und Europa, in: Europa Handbuch, ed.: W. Weidenfeld, Gtersloh 1999. Anatoly Lebedko (1961) has been President of the Belarussian Euroatlantic Association since 1997. He is one of the leaders of the united political opposition in Belarus, serving 278

as deputy chairman of the United Civil Party since 1998 and as chairman since April 2000. He has been a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE since 1995. He studied at the Belarussian State University, Faculty of Law, and at the Minsk Pedagogical Institute, Faculty of History and French. Author of over 80 publications on political, legal, social and security issues in various mass media such as Belarusskaya Gazeta, Belarusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, Narodnaya Volya, Narodnaya Gazeta. Barbara Lippert (1962) is Deputy Director of the Institute for European Politics in Berlin. She received her M.A. from the University of Bonn in 1987 and her Dr. phil. from the University of Bonn in 1996. Areas of interest: EU integration, EU enlargement, German EU policy, political and economic transformation in Central and Eastern European countries. Selected publications: German Unification and EC Integration. German and British Perspectives, London 1993 (co-author); Monitoring Association and Beyond: The European Union and the Visegrd States, Bonn 1995 (co-editor); No Integration without differentiation. On the strategy for a scaled eastern enlargement of the European Union, London 1996 (co-author); Towards EU-membership. Transformation and Integration in Poland and the Czech Republic, Bonn 1998 (co-editor); The Dynamics of Eastward Enlargement of the EU: Implications for Transatlantic and US-German Relations, in: CFSP/GASP Forum 2/99; Osterweiterung der Europischen Union die doppelte Reifeprfung, Bonn 2000 (editor); Conflict and Co-operation in the enlarged EU: British and German Interests, London, forthcoming (co-author). Douglas Merrill (1968) is a Senior Research Fellow in the research group on Global Future at the Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich. He writes regularly for Tornado-Insider.com, the European magazine for entrepreneurs. He is a partner in First Tuesday Munich, helping Internet start-ups find financing and strategic services. Prior to joining the CAP, he worked for the G7 Group, the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Warsaw and Budapest Business Journals. He earned his Masters Degree at Georgetown Universitys School of Foreign Service in 1996 and his Bachelor at The University of the South in 1990. Wim van Meurs (1964) has been a Senior Analyst at the Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich since 1997, in charge of Southeast European affairs. He received his M.A. (1988) and Ph. D. (1993) in International Relations and Russian and East European Studies at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. He served as a Postdoc and lecturer at the Free University and the Humboldt University in Berlin (1994 1997 and 1997 1999, respectively). Selected publications: The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography, Boulder, Colo., 1994; Carving a Moldavian Identity out of 279

History, in: Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1998; Die EU-Beitrittsstaaten und ihre stlichen Nachbarn The EU Accession States and Their Eastern Neighbours (with I. Kempe and B. von Ow), Gtersloh 1999; Social Citizenship and Migration: The Immobility of the Russian Diaspora in the Baltics, in: R. Munz, R. Ohliger (eds.): Ethnic Diasporas, Berlin 2000; The Club of Three and the Balkans, The Balkans and New European Responsibilities, Strategy Paper, 2000. Kirk Mildner (1969) heads the coordination unit for economic advice, German Embassy, Kiev. He studied political science, economics and international relations in Berlin, St. Petersburg and St. Andrews. He received his Ph. D. from Humboldt University Berlin in 1996. After joining the Kreditanstalt fr Wiederaufbau and working at its headquarters in Frankfurt, he was assigned to the German Embassies in Moscow and Minsk. In January 2000, he took the above-mentioned position in Kiev. He has published extensively on questions of transition, political economy and public administration in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Oleksandr Pavliuk (1962) is Director of the EastWest Institute, Kyiv Centre. He received his Ph. D. in history from the Kyiv State University in 1993. An expert on European security, he has published widely on issues of regional relations and co-operation, Ukrainian foreign policy, EU and NATO enlargement. Selected publications: Ukraines Struggle for Independence and the U. S. Policy, Kyiv 1996; The European Union and Ukraine: The Need for a New Vision, New York Prague Kyiv 1999; Building Security in the New States of Eurasia: Subregional Co-operation in the Former Soviet Space (co-editor with Renata Dwan), New York 2000. Bartomiej Sienkiewicz (1961) is Deputy Director of the Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. He studied history at the Jagielonsky University in Krakow. Alla Skvortova (1956) is Researcher-Coordinator at the Institute of Inter-Ethnic Studies of the Academy of Science of Moldova and Manager of the Human Rights project at the UNDP Moldova. She graduated from Kishinev State University in 1978 and received her Ph. D. from the Institute of History of the Academy of Science of the USSR, Moscow, in 1983. She was a member of the international research project Nation Building, Integration and Ethnic Conflict in Estonia and Moldova (1997 2000). Author of several articles on the history of Moldova and the USSR from 1917 1940 and on the current situation of ethnic minorities in Moldova. Recent publications: Human Rights for All in a Multi-Ethnic Society, Chisinau 2000; Ethnic Identities and the Problems of InterEthnic Integration in Moldova, in: Ethnic Mobilization and Inter-Ethnic Integration, 280

Moscow 1999; The Russians in Moldova: Political Orientations, in: National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1998; Ethnic Harmony in Moldova: A Real Prospective or an Unrealistic Dream?, in: Arena Politicii, Chisinau 1998. Taras Voznyak (1957) is Director of the International Relations Department, Lviv City Council. Areas of interest: philosophical hermeneutics, political tolerance and realism. Member of numerous international commissions and manager of different projects for trans-border regional co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe. Editor and publisher of the independent culturological journal . Recent topics: problems of European identity, Ukrainian-Russian relations, Polish-Ukrainian relations, post-Austrian culturalpolitical space in Europe, ideology of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Author of numerous political essays and articles published in Ukraine, Poland, Germany, USA and Israel.

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