German Industrial Productivity and Exploitation of Occupied Europe During World War II: New Insights from Revised

German Import Statistics

Jonas Scherner German Historical Institute, Washington D.C. and University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract According to estimates made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after World War II, German industrial labour productivity grew significantly during the war, especially in 1940 and 1941. These estimates are based on the assumption that the intermediate input sale ratios in the different industrial sectors remained constant over time. However, after the beginning of the war, German armament producers started to outsource the manufacturing of intermediate goods to other companies, especially to firms in occupied Europe. In order to trace the impact of such outsourcing, German imports are re-estimated on the basis of information given about payment flows because the official German import data are highly distorted, suggesting that German net imports during the war were almost insignificant. Instead, this re-estimation shows that Germany imported a huge amount of goods from occupied countries, especially intermediate inputs for the armament production. Consequently, Germanys industrial labour productivity grew much less than assumed by the study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

November 2008 Preliminary Please do not cite without permission

1. Introduction Based on data provided by the German Armament Ministry, labour productivity in the German armament industry during World War II only increased significantly after 1942 the event known as the so-called armament miracle.1 In this year, Albert Speer was appointed armament minister and implemented measures which allegedly caused this growth. However, the data provided by the armament ministry has several shortcomings.2 Adam Tooze recently questioned whether this data really reflects the production of armaments at least in the first years of the war.3 His critique is based on figures of the Industrial Sales Report, a survey compiled by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which was never published and which was rediscovered by Tooze.

According to this report, labour productivity in German industry grew significantly throughout the duration of World War II. The growth was particularly impressive during the first two years of the war. It was mainly caused by the productivity growth of the metalworking sector which included the bulk of German armament industries. In light of these figures, and given that the share of armament production on metalworking sectors total production made up about 70%, Toozes recent conclusion seems to be plausible, namley that labour productivity in the armament industry could not have decreased during the first years of war in contrast to what the data of the armament ministry suggest. Otherwise, labour productivity of the civilian metalworking production must have increased in an amount not
1

R. Wagenfhr, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, Berlin 1954, p. 125; D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der

deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, Vol. 2: 1941-1943, Berlin 1985; R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford 1994, p. 344; W. Abelshauser, Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles, in: Harrison, M. (ed.), The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge, 122-76.
2

J. Scherner/J. Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rstungswunder , in: J. A. Tooze, No Room for Miracles. German Industrial Output in World War II Reassessed in: Geschichte

Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 93, 2006, pp. 172-96.

3

und Gesellschaft 2005/31,3, pp. 439-44.

credible. However, growth rates in 1940 are a little bit misleading: First, the adaption process from a peace to a war economy which led to significant productivity losses, as often reported, took place during the last four months of 1939. Second, the adaption process meant that at its end a big share of workers was re-allocated from civilian sectors which had an under-average value-added per worker (such as the textile industry) to industries which had a over-average value-added per worker (such as the metalworking sector. Finally, labour productivity numbers were calculated on the basis of the survey of workers conducted each May of the respective year. Whereas in the years from 1940 on, the May-figure represented more or less the average monthly employment figure in the respective year, it also represented the peak of employment in 19394, such that the use of this figure led to an underestimate of true labour productivity in this year. However, even if we consider that the growth rate of labour productivity in 1940 calculated by the Industrial Sales Report is exaggerated, Toozes conclusion mentioned above seems to be valid, given that the second highest growth rate of the metalworking sectors labour productivity is reported for 1941.

Table 1: USSBS Estimate of Labour Productivity Growth (% p.a.; 1939-prices) 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Whole industry

9,5

3,1

3,1

5,0

0,5

Whole industry without metal-working sector

6,2

-1,7

1,4

2,3

-8,2

Metal-working sector

13,2

8,6

4,8

7,5

7,0

Source: National Archives, RG 243, Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European Survey, Special Paper No 8, Industrial Sales, Output, and Productivity, Prewar Area of Germany

Bundesarchiv (herafter BArch) R 3901/20238, employment in the industry, fol. 143.

This contradiction regarding a fundamental aspect of the German war economy the performance of the industrial labour productivity, especially labour productivity growth in the armament industry suggests checking the data: those provided by the armament ministry and those employed by the USSBS. In another project, I am checking in conjunction with Adam Tooze and Jochen Streb the data of the armament ministry. Here, I am going to check the USSBS figures. How were these figures derived? Labour productivity is measured by the ratio of real value-added (sales minus value of intermediate inputs) and working hours of the workforce. Prices, sales, and working hours were surveyed continuously by the German authorities. Intermediate inputs value in the different industries was estimated by employing the intermediate inputs-sales ratios erstablished by the industrial census in 1936.5

However, did the ratio between intermediate inputs and sales really remain constant over time? Today we know that in some branches of the German armament industry, especially those manufacturing technical complex armaments such as tanks or aircrafts, outsourcing of intermediate goods within the metal-working sector (wings of aircrafts or other parts of armament goods) increased dramatically during the war, especially at its beginnings, due to several reasons.6 Before the war, armament production was concentrated in central Germany because these regions were out of the range of foreign aircrafts attacks. However, after the
5

About the industrial census in 1936, see especially R. Fremdling, The German Industrial Census of 1936.

Statistics as Preparation for the War, in: Jahrbuch fr Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2005/2, 155-65; R. Fremdling/R. Stglin, Die Industrieerhebung von 1936: Ein Input-Output-Ansatz zur Rekonstruktion der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechung fr Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert ein Arbeitsbericht, in: Vierteljahresschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 90, 416-28. R. Fremdling/H. De Jong, H./M. P. Timmer, British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on Double Deflated Value Added, in: Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2007, pp. 350-78; J. A. Tooze, Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge. Cambridge 2001.
6

For details, see J. Scherner/J. Streb/J. A. Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich, working p aper,

2008.

war had started, some problems arose. The military placed a huge amount of armament demands on the firms in central Germany, exceeding both the capacities of these plants and their workforce. The latter did not seem to be a problem, given that raw materials were mainly allocated to the war-production after the war had started, effecting especially metalworking companies of the border regions which, as mentioned, produced only civilian goods. These companies had to reduce production such that many workers of these companies could be released. And based on the law on Dienstverpflichtung enacted in 1938, these workers could and were commanded by the authorities to the armament firms in central Germany. However, armament producers were not at all satisfied with the performance of these forced German workers (Dienstverpflichtete).7 These workers obviously tried to prove their incompetence in the hopes that they would be released and returned to their families. Also these forced workers were much more prone to sickness than normal workers.8 This unwillingness, coupled with the complaints of regional Nazi leaders of border regions in which metalworking companies were threatened to close down due to the lack of military orders and the rationing of raw materials for civlian production led, some months after the beginnings of the war, to a major change of the procurement policy. The authorities issued an order which stated that armaments assembled as a finished product should be produced in central Germany, whereas intermediate inputs (such as parts of weapons) should be produced also in border regions. This decision was also influenced by the fact that the procurement agencies were aware that a division of labour would increase labour productivity in the long run.

See for example L. Budra/J. Scherner/J. Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing: Explaining

the Continuous Growth of Output and Labour Productivity in the German Aircraft Industry during World War II, Economic History Review (forthcoming).
8

Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.

This outsourcing is shown in table 2, citing the example of companies which produced the engines of the JU 88 and of firms which were involved in the final assembly of this heavy bomber. Notice that the share of the JU 88 on the total German aircraft production between 1939 and 1943 amounted to about one third and a half, and that the aircraft production had a share on total German munitions production of more than 40%.9 The JU 88 production was no exception in the aircraft production. Whereas the ratio between suppliers workforce and workers of companies involved in final assembly and engine production amounted constantly to 0.3 between mid 1936 and summer 1939, it increased sharply after the war had started to 0.45 until May 1940.10 Also, in the production of another technical complex armament good, tank, we can observe a similar development as such shown in table 2.11

Table 2: Share of intermediate goods in total costs in the German aircraft industry Junkers 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 56% 63% 71% 79% 88% Siebel 53% 66% 63% 69% 72% Mimo 58% 64% 66% 68% 72% Weser 41% 47% 43% 54% n.a. ATG 59% 58% 62% 63% 71%

Source: Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing.

Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing. Bundesarchiv-Militrarchiv (hereafter BA MA) RL 3/2638; workforce of the aircraft inustries, monthly data,

10

1933 May 1940. Unfortunately, data for the later period are not avialable.
11

See for example the case of the tank producer Alkett. The share of intermediate goods in total costs of this

company was about 26% in 1938/39; 38% in 1939/40, and 58% in 1940/41. BArch R 2301/5517; audit reports of Alkett.

This data clearly suggests that the labour productivity figures calculated by the USSBS by employing constant input-sales ratios in the metalworking sector are highly distorted. However, the basis, given the data, for calculating the total distortion due to the outsourcing in the German armament industry is small. Only data for some single firms, such as reported in table 2, is available. However, the final producers did not only outsource to German firms, but also to companies in occupied Europe.12 And in this case, as will be shown later, complete data is available for analysis.

The USSBS was aware of the outsourcing to companies in occupied Europe; however, backed by the official German Import Statistics it assumed that the impact of foreign deliveries was insignificant. However, German imports were dramatically underreported in the official statistics. German authorities were aware of this, as noted the Economics Department of the Reichsbank in mid 1944: According to confidential information of the German Statistical Office the German foreign trade statistics only captures exports correctly, whereas the import figures do not reflect in any way true imports.13 The Germans published this data for propagandistic purposes, because this data show that Germany did not exploit occupied Europe, in contrast to the claims made by the Allies.14 The official data suggests that Germanys trade during the war was more or less balanced, and that in the case of some occupied countries, such as Poland, Germany was even a net exporter. Moreover, as shown in the last line of table 3, net imports from all occupied countries were surprisingly small.

12

For details, see J. Scherner, Europas Beitrag zu Hitlers Krieg. Die Verlagerung von Industrieauftrgen der

Wehrmacht in die besetzten Gebiete und ihre Bedeutung fr die deutsche Rstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Christoph Buchheim (Ed.), Europische Volkswirtschaften unter deutscher Hegemonie. (forthcoming)
13 14

BArch R 2/13502, Economics department of the Reichsbank, memo, 8. July 1944 BA-MA RW 19/3189, Europapress-Wirtschaftsdienst, 6.7.1944, fol. 63; Neue Zricher Zeitung, 30.6.1944,

Deutschlands Auenhandel im Krieg, fol. 66; press conference of the German Government, 20.6.1944, fol. 6772.

Table 3: German foreign trade 1940-44 according to German trade statistics (m. RM, current prices) 1940 Imports Exports German net imports German net imports from occupied countries
Sources: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland, Munich 1949, p. 394 (1940-43); BArch R 3102/6039 (1944); BArch R 3/1626a, report about Germanys foreign trade, written for the military court IV in Nuremberg, 17.7.1948.

1941 6925 6840 85 256

1942 8691 7559 1132 1,552

1943 8258 8558 -300 1,141

1944 6827 6767 60 1,999

Sum 1940-44 35,722 34,591 1,131 5,209

5021 4867 154 261

Yet, this result should have given rise to serious doubts with regard to the official import datas credibility, given the financial dues occupied countries were expected to pay to Germany occupation costs and clearing credits they had to grant made up during the war to a total of about 110 bn. RM. And this calls into question how Germany spent this money obviously only a small fraction for financing net imports if we believe that the import statistics figures are true. Anyway, official import data is used until today in the literature and is normally not questioned. 15 However, as mentioned before, given our patchy knowledge about the total amount of outsourcing, our analysis of industrial labour productivity would benefit if we could find information about true German imports and the amount of intermediate input goods.
15

See for example, A. Ritschl, Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence from

Germanys secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940, in: Economic History Review, LIV, 2 (2001), pp.32445; W. Rhr, Forschungsprobleme zur deutschen Okkupationspolitik im Spiegel der Reihe Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, in: Bundesarchiv (Ed.), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus (1938-1945), 8, Analysen, Quellen, Register, Heidelberg 1996, p. 25-343, here: 236. However, some authors had doubts whether the import statistics is correct. See e.g. W.A. Boelcke, Deutschland als Welthandelsmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-8; B. H. Klein, Germanys Economic Preparations for War. Cambridge/Massachusetts 1959.

This paper is organized in the following sections: In section 2 we explain why the German import statistics do not capture all imports and which imports are not included. In section 3, a lower limit of true German imports is estimated employing both the re-discovered detailed German clearing statistics and the data of the military authorities about armament goods produced abroad, which are collected in several archives. Based on this data, we can illustrate how Germany experienced a huge import boom during World War II. German net imports from occupied countries did not amount to only 5 bn. RM, as suggested by the official German import statistics, rather at least to 35 bn. RM. Huge shares of these imports were intermediate inputs for the German armament industry, as shown in section 4. This in turn, as will be shown, has important implications for our knowledge about the performance of labour productivity in the German industry. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion. The paper is mainly based on archival evidence unknown or ignored until today in the literature.

2. Distortion of the German import statistics The German trade statistics were based upon the customs declaration method. Both importers and exporters had to declare quantity, type and value of the products exported or imported in the German customs area.16 Import values were based on cif-prices, those of export goods on fob-prices.17 Importers and exporters had to pay a statistic fee. Customs authorities had a control right. On 19.9.1939, a decree of the Reichsfinanzminister (Reich Minister of finance) established that the so called Wehrmachtgut, i.e. goods owned by the army or goods which were imported to be used by the army, were exempted of import duties, consumption taxes,

16

The German customs area increased during the war. For details, see Statistisches Reichsamt, Sondernachweis.

Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Januar und Februar 1944 , Berlin 1944, p. 1; Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland, Munich 1949, p. 390.
17

BArch R 3102/3587, Introduction in the Trade Statistics, 1941.

and the statistic fee. Further, those goods were to be controlled neither by the customs authorities nor to be registered by the import statistics.18 In May 1940, the decree was modified, establishing that only such goods fulfil the characteristics of Wehrmachtgut which are accompanied by soldiers or by persons charged by the army. Also goods, which were transported by the railways with a so called Wehrmacht ticket, were accepted as Wehrmachtgut.19 From the end of 1940 onward, a further modification occurred and the army had to certify that the goods imported were really Wehrmachtgut.20

Why would Wehrmachtgut be treated differently compared to normal goods? The dominant reasons were to accelerate the transport of such goods and to reduce administration costs, reasons which overruled the interests of the German authorities to collect import data in an accurate way.21 Besides, in the case of goods looted by the army it was normally not possible to establish the country of origin.22

A decree from August 1940 extended the customs duties exemptions to so called armament goods (Rstungsgut), i.e. goods which could not only be munitions (or intermediate inputs of these) in a narrow definition, but also civilian goods for the German market. The idea was that the more civilian goods demanded in Germany were produced abroad, the more German companies, which in peacetime manufactured such goods, were enabled to convert their

18

BArch R 3102/10087, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z 6 II, 19.9.1939; BArch R 3102/4051, note, finance

ministry m, 19.9.1939, fol. 201; finance ministry, Z 2056-120II, 10.3.1942.

19

BA MA RW 19/1903, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z, 18.5.1940. The same regulations were in force for

goods looted in the occupied countries and imported by the Wehrmacht. BArch R 3102/3480, German Statistical Office (SRA) to customs authorities, 12.9.1940; main customs office Stettin to SRA, 23.8.1941.
20 21

BArch R 2/58087, customs authorities Nordmark, Kiel, to finance ministry, 25.2.1941, fol. 164-5. BA MA RW 19/1903, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31. 7.1940, fol. 26; economic department of the

High Military Comand, note, 13.8.1940, fol. 33-4.

22

BA MA RW 19/1903, Wifo GmbH to High Military Comand (OKW), 18.7.1940, fol. 29.

10

production to armament production.23 In the case of all these goods, customs declarations would be normally accepted by the customs authorities without controls in order to accelerate transportation.24 Although, as well as in the case of Wehrmachtgut, the statistic fee was not to be paid for armament goods, they would be registered in the import statistics. The military, the armament ministry, or the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (economic ministry) had to certify that such goods were to be considered armament goods according to the decree. The driving force for the implementation of this decree was the Reich aviation ministry based on the desire to exploit the occupied countries for the planned massive expansion of the air force.25

All these decrees led to many misunderstandings during the following years and contributed to the fact that real imports exceeded by far those captured by the import statistics. First, customs authorities often assumed, due to the fact that no statistic fee had to be paid for armament goods, that these were also exempted from the import statistic.26 Second, the concepts of Wehrmachtgut and armament goods often led to a confusion among the customs authorities. For example, a letter written at the end of 1941 by the military commander of occupied France to the customs department of the Reich ministry of finance stated: As observed during an inspection of the German customs authorities at the western border, they are sometimes confused with regard to the concept of armament goods. Sometimes they assumed that armament goods are the same as Wehrmachtgut and that for

23 24 25

BA-MA RW 19/1614, finance ministry to OKW, 7.11.1941, fol. 27. BA-MA RW 19/1603, finance ministry, decree 0 1oo5Z Allg. 190 II, 31. August 1940, fol. 19. BA-MA RW 19/1603, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31.7.1940, fol. 25-8. Generally about the

expansion of the airforce from autumn 1940 on and the strategic considerations, see Lutz Budra, Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrstung in Deutschland 1918-1945, Dsseldorf 1998; Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London 2006.
26

See for instance BArch, R 3102/4067, General customs office to SRA, 21.3.1941; SRA to General customs

office, 27.3.1941, Hochtief AG to SRA, 5.6.1941.

11

this reason these goods should not be registered.27 Third, control possibilities during the war were reduced compared to peacetime: Often armament goods were transported with army trucks without correct customs declarations, i.e. without information regarding quantity, weight or value.28 However, sometimes the transport officers were not disposed to allow inspections of the customs authorities, emphasizing the urgency of the transport. In other cases, the customs authorities accepted the incorrect customs declaration in order to avoid traffic hold-ups at the borders.29 As a consequence of these procedures, often armament goods would not be registered by the import statistics.

But the concepts of Wehrmachtgut and armament goods were also incorrectly used by military authorities for different reasons. The army sometimes misinterpreted the meaning of armament goods. They assumed that all imports which eventually were used by the army fulfilled the conditions of Wehrmachtgut regardless if these goods were finished armaments (such as weapons) or not (such as shell casings or wings of warplanes). In other words, they treated also the latter as Wehrmachtgut.30 Often parts of armaments were imported by armyowned armament producers or were sent first to acceptance test departments of the army, thereby fulfilling the norms of the decree according to which all goods which are owned by

27

BArch R 2/59000, military commander in France to customs department of the finance ministry, 12.9.1941;

BArch R 2/58993, Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft mbH to finance ministry, 13.6.1941, fol. 148-9; customs office Hannover to Reichsfinanzministerium, 7.7.1941, fol. 150-2.
28

See for example BArch R 3102/4068, customs office Wehr to SRA, 2.12.1941; BArch R 2/58986, customs

office Kln to finance ministry, 1.3.1943.

29

See for example BArch R 2/58088, customs office Niederdonau, Wien, to finance ministry, 19.11.1941, fol.

26-7; customs office Kln to finance ministry, 27.5.1942, fol. 100.

30

For this interpretation, see BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379. See

also BArch R 2/58993, note, May 1941, fol. 109; BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941, fol. 304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol. 310; R 2/58088, customs office Berlin-Brandenburg to General customs office, 14.7.1942, customs office Danzig-Westpreuen to finance ministry, 25.7.1942, Bl. 140; finance ministry to Schichau AG, 31.7.1942, Bl. 142;. BArch R 3102/4067, military procurement agency to SRA, 29.9.1941; SRA, note, 4.10.1941.

12

the army have to be classified as Wehrmachtgut.31 In other cases, the army consciously certified imports of intermediate inputs for armaments as Wehrmachtgut in order to avoid delays of deliveries. Wehmachtgut, as already mentioned, were not be controlled by the customs authorities, and Wehrmachtgut had also a priority compared to other goods in the case of transport shortages or transport stops which occurred often.32 The army was interested that the firms who were producing armaments receive the parts as soon as possible in order to rapidly produce weapons. However, the authorities were aware of the misuse of these certificates. In order to provide the incentive for the army officers to correctly certify goods, the authorities implemented in 1942 the rule that transportation costs of those goods were to be paid automatically by the army, which were delivered by the railways and declared to be Wehrmachtgut.33 However, the implementation of this rule did not bring with it the desired effect because the officers of the occupation armies who were responsible to issue certificates normally assumed that money is no problem.34 In fact, in the case that in an occupied country the occupation revenue was exceeded by expenditures, the Germans normally increased the amount to be paid by the respective country. Therefore, the officers responsible for the expenditure of the occupation army were never able to manage and control expenses in

31

See for example BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to Firma Mikron Optisch-Przisionsmechanische und

elektrotechnische Werksttten, Belgrad VII, 7.5.1942; BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941, Bl. 304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol. 310.
32

See for example BArch R 3/3029, military administration in France, instruction for German orders in France,

fol. 20; BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379; BA MA RW 32/6, German military procurement agency in Italy, monthly report, 30.4.1943, fol. 76.
33

BArch R 2/58088, transportation ministry to finance ministry and to OKW, 29.10.1942. This norm created

also new confusion among the army. For details, see for example BArch R 2/58088, High Army Comand (OKH) to OKW, 2.1943, fol. 354; BArch R 3102/4051, finance ministry, letter, 10.3.1943; BArch R 2/58091, OKH to finance ministry, 17.12.1943.
34

BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to finance department of the OKW, 24.12.1942, fol. 190.

13

an efficient way.35 Also, the fact that authorities of occupied countries did not have the right to control those exports which were labeled Wehrmachtgut generated an incentive to incorrectly certify goods because by doing so the extent of occupied countries exploitation could be concealed.36

In summary, it has been demonstrated that the facts (i) that from 1939 on imports of so called Wehrmachtgut (goods owned by the military or goods which were imported to be used directly by the military) were exempted of statistical registration; (ii) that the several regulations were confusing, and (iii) that these regulations were also intentionally interpreted in a very broad way by the military authorities who were in charge to issue certificates for Wehrmachtgut, explain why the German import statistics included less than claimed in the previously written literature. This literature relies on the information provided by the Statistical Handbook for Germany, published in 1949.37 In this compendium, based on the import statistics of the SRA, it is stressed that only import goods which were already used by the army abroad are not included in the import statistics. 38

However, the import statistics are distorted for further reasons. Normally, imports of country A are the goods which are delivered form foreign countries in the customs area of country A. These imports are basically registered by the method used in Germany. Yet, during the war, exports of foreign countries for the benefit of Germany did not necessarily have to cross the
35

Vgl. z.B. BA MA RW 7/1711a, OKW, instruction for the military finance department in Denmark, 14.1.1944,

fol. 65-6.
36

H. Umbreit, Der Militrbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944, Boppard 1968, p. 317; BArch R 2/58993,

note, May 1941, fol. 109; BA-MA RW 35/262, Final Report of the military government in France, fol 13.
37 38

See e.g. W.A. Boelcke, Deutschland als Welthandelmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-7. Statistisches Handbuch, p. 391.

14

German borders, for example gasoline from Rumania which was directly delivered to the German troops at the eastern front.39 Besides, the imports of the so called Protektorat, i.e. Bohemia and Moravia, are not registered in the German import statistics from March 1939 on. The same is true for imports resulting from black market purchases of German authorities in the occupied countries, which were declared Wehrmachtgut, as well as from black-market purchases of German soldiers.

3. Estimate of true imports In order to estimate true imports, we use information provided in different sources about payment flows between Germany and foreign countries. One source is the statistics about Germanys payments to foreign countries, compiled by the German Statistic Office and the Reichsbank. These compilations subdivide all payments made by Germany according to the method of payments, i.e. whether payments were for example made in foreign currency or within clearing agreements. Also, the use of these payments is broken down, i.e. payments for imports of specific goods, for capital transfer, for the supply of services, and so on.40 Unlike the import statistics, the import figures of the payments statistics also include the imports in favour of Germany which did not cross the Germanys borders. Unfortunately, import values given by the payments statistics and subdivided for different countries are only available for 1943. This problem, however, can be solved by utilizing the detailed clearing statistics, which between 1941 and 1944 are available.41 Due to foreign exchange controls, transactions with foreign countries required the permission of the state from the beginnings of the 1930s on.

39

BArch R 2501/7127, economics department of the Reichsbank, The clearing problem, 15.11.1943; BArch R

3/XX, Industrie, Bl. 11; Statistisches Handbuch, p. 390.

40 41

BArch R 3101/33632, German payments 1943; BArch R 3101/33635, German payments 1942. Politisches Archiv des Auswrtigen Amts (hereafter: PA AA) R 106483, annual reports of the German

Clearing Bank.

15

Given that during the war almost all payments to foreign countries, especially to occupied countries, were made within clearing agreements, the annual clearing statistics can be used as a substitute for the payments statistics.42 Imports were basically registered by the clearing account goods traffic; broken down in subaccounts for each country and for different categories of goods (e.g. grain from France; steel from Belgium).

However, for several reasons, a part of industrial imports in favour of the Wehrmacht were financed in a different way. Both the import values of the payments statistics and the clearing statistics include only imports which are made by regular import payments, i.e. payments according to the German currency legislation, which were registered by the so called Reich entities (Reichsstellen). They do not include payments for imports in favour of the military and other state authorities made (i) by the service account of the German Clearing Bank (DVK) (exactly subaccount: payments of governmental agencies), and (ii) those made by occupation tributes.43

Originally, occupation tributes should, according to the Hague Convention, only to be used to finance the needs of the occupation army.44 Yet, in reality, occupation tributes were also used for financing such transactions which could not be subsumed under the needs of the occupation army.45 A decree stipulated that least all direct demands the military placed in

42

BArch R 3101/34749, interrogation, 14. Aug. 1945, fol. 5-7; BArch R 184/186, memo of the German Clearing

Bank (DVK). For example, import fob-values in 1943 according the clearing statistics made up 11.8 bn. RM and according to the payments statistics 12.1 bn. RM.
43 44 45

BArch R 3101/33641, economic ministry, internal letter, 1.9.1944, foll. 144-5. BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different Reich authorities, 21.10.1941, fol. 154. BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to different Reich authorities, 2.3.1944, fol. 173. For the different countries, see

for example BA-MA RW 35/262, Final report of the department of trade, money and insurance of the German occupation administration in France, fol. 32, 34, 65; C. Buchheim, Die besetzten Lnder im Dienste der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft whrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle fr Wehrwirtschaft, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 34, 1986, S. 117-145, here 129-31; BArch R 3101/32287,

16

occupied countries were to be financed by occupation tributes.46 Black market purchases made by German soldiers and by German governmental agencies were also financed in this way.47

Why did the Germans violate this principle mentioned above regarding the use of occupation tributes? Firstly, clearing debts were debts, which at least in theory had to be redeemed after the war. Therefore, different German agencies, especially the finance ministry, did not want clearing debts to increase too much.48 Secondly, there were occupied countries, whose governments appealing to Art. 56 of the Hague Convention, did not want to see Germany pay the cost of armament imports through clearing measures.49 Thirdly, financing with the clearing method required more administration efforts than financing with occupation tributes, which is why Hans Frank, General Governor of occupied Poland, supported financing as much as possible by occupation tributes, emphasizing that in the end the Polish would incur anyway all expenses in Poland which would be favourable for the German war economy.50 Finally, financing exports with occupation tributes was a method consciously employed by the Germans in order to conceal from the occupied countries the amount of goods exported in

Final report of the armistice delegation, Salzburg, 15. 12.1944, p. 12.; BArch R 184/128, DVK to foreign office, 29.4.1942; BA MA R 19/1602, OKW, economic department note, fol. 20; payment instructions for Belgium, fol. 79; OKW, internal letter, 14.10.1940, OKW, internal letter, 21.10.1940; OKW, note, 28.4.1941, fol. 55; BArch R 2/14117, finance ministry, 26.9.1941, fol. 374.
46 47

PA AA R 107000, economic ministry, decree, 30.1.1941. See for example PA AA R 129064, internal letter, foreign office, 25.11.1941; OKW to finance ministry,

26.6.1942.
48

See for example BArch R 3101/33636, fol. 22-3; BArch R 2/14117, aviation ministry to finance ministry,

11.3.1942, fol. 391. BArch R 3102/3551, Institute of Defence Economy, 3.11.1942, fol. 1-11.
49

BArch R 2/14117, note, 17.6.1942, fol. 396-8; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic ministry, decree no. 36/44 D.St./

27/44 R. St., 22.8.1944.

50

BA MA RW 7/1710a, note, 22.2.1944, fol. 211-3.

17

favour of Germany, as explicitly emphasized in the case of France.51 For similar reasons, imports were also financed via the service account of the clearing operations.52

Unfortunately, neither the service account nor occupation tributes are allocated according to their use. However, the amount of imports in favour of the Wehrmacht financed in this way can be estimated in an indirect way by employing further statistics: (i) the statistics of armament production in occupied countries; (ii) clearing account goods traffic/clearing subaccount: industrial goods imported with currency permissions of the Reich entity for Technical Products (Reichstelle fr technische Erzeugnisse) (RTE).

The statistics of the armament ministry reported monthly figures for the armament production between October 1940 and summer 1944 in almost each occupied country.53 Armament productions of the countries included in these statistics after summer 1944 were probably insignificant for Germany, because from this point of time on, countries were liberated who had significantly contributed to Germanys armament production, such as France, Belgium and Poland. The statistics of the armament ministry include only industrial orders which were exported to Germany. Yet, these statistics do not include the armament production in Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary, and Italy. However, other sources provide the information necessary for a complete picture of German armament imports.

51

PA AA R 107000, German Embassy, Paris, to foreign office, 13.2.1941; economic ministry to foreign office, With this subaccount also imports of the military were finally financed, which before were for several

3.3.1941.
52

reasons provisionally paid by occupation tributes. BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different military branches, 26.6.1942, fol. 156; BA-MA RW 19/1602, note, OKW, economics department, 26.8.1940, fol. 3; note, fol. 66; OKH, payment instructions for armys industrial purchases in France; BA-MA RL 3/2638, aviation ministry, office Paris, 3.8.1940.
53

For the following, and for the data, see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

18

For the armaments imports financed by regular import payments, we are able to estimate an upper bound. This upper bound relies on the currency permissions issued by the RTE, which had to issue these permissions for all industrial orders of the Wehrmacht abroad, which were financed by regular import payments.54 Yet, the RTE did not only issue currency permissions for armament goods, but also for civilian goods produced mainly by the engineering industries, such as sewing machines. Thus, we can conclude that the currency permissions issued by the RTE constitute an upper bound of the import of armament goods import financed on the basis of the currency legislation. Therefore, we can estimate an lower bound for the industrial Wehrmacht imports not financed by regular import payments. This lower bound is the difference between industrial Wehrmacht orders abroad and the currency permissions issued by the RTE.55

Moving further, we can estimate true imports by adding up the payments made for regular imports and the lower bound for Wehrmacht imports financed by the service account and by occupation tributes. This method is checked with an estimate made by the so called plan office. Why did this agency estimate true imports? The plan office (Planungsamt), founded in the autumn of 1943 as an agency of the armament ministry, was responsible for planning the German imports, which was also a precondition for planning the German balance of payments.56 Based on the import plans, the economics ministry, responsible for planning the

54

BA-MA RW 19/2397, OKW, economics department, note, 18.2.1941, fol. 60; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic

ministry, decree, no. 10/41 D. St./14/41 R. St., 30.1.1941; BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to RTE, 15.3.44.
55

These values represent fob figures. For calculating cif-values, we employed the normal cif-fob ratio, which R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer und die Rstungspolitik im Totalen Krieg, in: B. R. Kroener/R.-D. Mller/H.

can be calculated on the basis of the clearing statistics for each country in the different years.
56

Umbreit, Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1942 - 1944/45. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg , Vol. 5/2, Stuttgart 1999, pp. 275-776, here p. 505; BArch R 3101/15263, agreement between the economic ministry and the plan office, fol. 142-4. BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.9.1944, fol. 144-5. About the plan office, see R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer, p. 343-8.

19

exports, prepared negotiations between Germany and foreign countries. Yet, planning imports required correct information about true imports.57 Given that the German authorities were aware of the shortcomings of the import statistics, they decided to estimate true imports. For purposes of propaganda, the Reich did not want to publish these statistics.58 However, the estimation of detailed true import figures was probably never finished due to military events.59 Only some rough estimates for some countries exports to Germany in 1943 were effectuated.

Table 4: Estimates for true imports from Belgium and France and official Figures 1943; m. RM) Belgium
1

France

Regular German payments for imports +

1,442

3,098

Armament imports paid through the service account and occupation tributes (cif)

659 2,101 2,200

644 3,742 3,800

= True imports Estimates of the plan office

Published official import figures (cif)

1

681

1,416

Imports financed by the clearing account goods traffic (cif).

Source: See text.

57

BArch R 3101/33414, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.8.1944, fol. 7; BArch R 3101/33641, economic

ministry to SRA, 13.6.1944, fol. 112; economic ministry, draft of a letter, 18.5.1944, fol. 119.
58 59

BArch R 3101/33641, draft of a letter, 17.5.1944, fol. 119. BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 7.9.1944, fol. 110.

20

These estimates were reported in a survey about the German war economy, written by the plan office in first half of 1944.60 Unfortunately, the report does not explain the way in which these values were estimated. But, we know that the plan office had access to the same data we do. The comparison of these estimates with our estimates suggests that the method applied by us is appropriate, given that the results are almost the same, as shown in table 4. And both estimates exceed by far the official import figures.

However, this method cannot be employed in order to estimate true imports made from all countries in favour of Germany. Neither the Netherlands nor Bohemia and Moravia were included in both the payments and the clearing statistics.61 In the case of the Netherlands, this is due to the fact that the currency border between the Netherlands and Germany was suspended in 1941.62 From this point of time on, imports from Netherlands could be paid in RM. The suspension of the currency border, however, did not imply that the customs controls between the two countries were suspended. Even if tariffs were also suspended, imports and exports until the end of the war were controlled and registered by the customs authorities in order to fight the so called war corruption.63 Thus, in order to estimate true imports from

60

J. Scherner, Bericht zur deutschen Wirtschaftslage 1943/44. Eine Bilanz des Reichsministeriums fr Rstung

und Kriegsproduktion ber die Entwicklung der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft bis Sommer 1944 . Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte, 55, Heft 3, 2007, 499-546.
61 62

BArch R 184/186, DVK, annual report 1944, Appendix 7. BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no. 29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R

184/188, DVK, report about clearing operations.

63

BArch R 3102/SRA to Firma Frans Maas, 24.4.1941. BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no.

29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R 43 II/371 b., note, 9.2.1942, fol. 12; G . Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus. Frankfurt am Main 2005, S. 168; BArch R 2/58987, finance ministry, decree, no. 21/43 D. St./11/43 R. S. , 29.3.1943; BArch R 2/58988, economic ministry to Reich entities, 28.6.1943. The currency border between Germany and the Netherlands was re-implemented in 1944; however, without including the Netherlands in the clearing operations. Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat, p. 167; R 2/56059.

21

the Netherlands, we use the information given by the official import statistics and data provided by the occupation administration about finished goods exported to Germany. The difference between finished goods officially imported from the Netherlands and the figures provided by the occupation administration is added to the official imports. This estimate is very close to one made by the plan office for the true imports from the Netherlands in 1943.64 In the case of Bohemia and Moravia, where not only the currency but also the customs borders with the Reich were suspended on October, 1, 1940, import estimates are available.65 In the case of Italy true imports from 1943 on are estimated in a different way than by the method described above because for this country data about the amount of imports financed by occupation tributes is available. 66

Table 5: Estimate of German Import Statistics 1941-44 (bn. RM; Current prices; excluding looted goods and black market purchases) 1941 Import estimate Official imports
Sources and method: see text.

1942 15.5 8.7

1943 20.7 8.3

1944 17.5 6.8

Sum 1941-44 66.5 30.7

12.8 6.9

Given these considerations, and relying on the estimate method described above, we are able to estimate a lower limit for true imports from all countries between 1941 and 1944. The annual aggregation of all countries exports in favour of Germany is shown in table 5. As mentioned, occupation tributes were also used for financing imports of goods purchased in
64

The plan office estimated that the value of imports amounted to 1.6 1.8. bn RM in 1943, whereas our method

led to a value of 1.734 bn. RM. For the amount of finished goods exported in favour of the Germans, see Barch R 3101/33188, annual report 1943, fol. 33.
65

BA-MA RW 19/1603, note, OKW, economic department, 14.10.1940, fol. 11; J. Krej, The Bohemian -

Moravian War Economy, in: M. C. Kaser/E. A. Radice (Hgg.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 19191975, Volume II, Oxfrod 1986, pp. 452-94, here p. 462 Tab. 19.9.
66

Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

22

black markets of occupied countries. Given that detailed annual information is not available for all countries, we have chosen not to include such imports in our estimate. However, we can assume that such black markets imports in nominal values were considerable: for France alone black market purchases amounted to 1 bn. RM in average at least per year. We have also neglected to include looted goods transported to Germany, because there is not enough data available on this topic.

4. Implications Our estimate shows that true imports were significant for the German economy, citing that for example the German GDP between 1941 and 1944 made up to about 500 bn. RM. Considering that the financial exploitation of occupied Europe amounted to about 110 bn. RM (about 30 bn. enforced clearing credits from occupied countries to Germany and about 80 bn. RM occupation tributes), we can see, that according the revised import statistics, financing of German net imports had a significant impact. If one includes black market purchases, far more than one third of the financial exploitation served to finance the German import surplus in contrast to the official numbers, according to which German net imports had only a small share on use of the money occupied Europe had to pay to the Germans.

Table 6: Real Imports and Import Structure (constant 1928-prices) Imports (1928=100) 1928 1936 1940 1941 1942 1943 100 62 53 109 (67) 121 (72) 147 (58) Share of manufactures for final use (%) 6.2 2.8 2.2 34.4 (11.3) 38.4 (22.1) 44.7 (23.1) Share of manufactures not for final use (%) 6.7 4.4 6.0 13.3 (9.6) 21.0 (12.1) 20.3 (9.3)

Sources and method: see text.

23

But does this nominal import boom also imply a boom in real numbers, given the remarkable inflation tendencies we can observe in some occupied and allied countries? Yes! Relying on import price indexes calculated by different German agencies, an estimate of real imports shows (table 6, estimate in bold letters; official figures in italics) that from the beginnings of the war real imports rose dramatically.67 We can also observe that the import structure changed significantly: Germany became a country, which predominately imported manufactured goods, such that Germanys import structure during the war was more similar to Germanys current trade situation than to the import structure before the Great Depression.

Table 7: The Impact of Occupied Europe on the German Armament Production (I) Armament production in occupied Europe (m. RM; current prices) (II) (I) in percent of true imports

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Source: Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

756 4,226 7,292 8,976 11,397

15 32 47 43 65

Who benefitted from this import boom? not surprisingly the Wehrmacht. Basically, for security reasons, often only parts of armament goods were manufactured in occupied

67

For the price index for official imports, see Statistisches Handbuch; fort he price index of armament goods,

see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

24

countries. 68 About 50% of armament goods produced abroad were not finished weapons but such parts. 80% of manufactures not for final use shipped to Germany were parts of armaments.

Maybe the most important implication pertains to our knowledge about labour productivity growth in the German industry during World War II. According to our import estimate, the metal-working sectors imports of manufactures not for final use (such as parts of armaments) amounted to 4.5 bn. RM in 1943 instead of 600 m. RM (official figure). This means that the intermediate inputs sales ratio of the German metal-working sector increased significantly compared to 1936 (industrial census) as a result of the outsourcing of intermediate goods in occupied countries metalworking sectors. If we consider this, as shown in table 8, labour productivity, both in this sector and in industry as a whole, grew much less than suggested by the figures calculated in the Industrial Sales Report of the USSBS.

Table 8: Labour Productivity in German Industry 1940-44 (% p.a.) 1940 1941 1942 Whole industry (USSBS) Wohle industry (Re-estimate) Metal-working sector (USSBS) Metal-working sector (Re-estimate)
Source: See text.

1943 1944 5.0 4.5 7.5 7.3 0.5 -1.1 7.0 6.0

9.5 8.7 13.2 11.1

3.1 -0,3 8.6 1.2

3.1 0.9 4.8 0.6

One should note that the figure for 1940 is misleading for several reasons besides those mentioned already in the introduction. First, outsourcing in occupied countries was still taking place on a relatively limited basis in this year. Second, outsourcing within the German
68

Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

25

metalworking sector, which increased heavily when the war started, is not included. But there is evidence, based especially on firm level data, that except for 1940 the trend of total outsourcing resembled that of the outsourcing in occupied countries. In other words: The intermediate goods-sales ratio in the metalworking sector seems to have increased throughout the war, but the growth rates were decreasing.So it seems that except for 1940 the trend of the growth rates of the labour productivity figures estimated in table 8 is reminiscent of the trend we would uncovered when one includes data regarding Germanys outsourcing.

Given these considerations, the result supports the hypothesis that labour productivity in the armament industry increased only merely in a significant way during the last years of the war.69 This is in line with preliminary results of a research project of Jonas Scherner, Jochen Streb and Adam Tooze, who are checking and adjusting the armament ministry figures based on monthly data. According to this data, labour productivity was in the annual average more or less stagnating during the first years of the war and only increasing later.70

5. Conluding remarks The published German trade statistics underreported significantly true German imports because of registration problems. The results of the estimates presented in this paper contributes first to our knowledge for which purposes the Germans spent the money occupied countries had to pay them. Second, the results of the estimate reveal who benefitted from these imports unsuprisingly in a significant and increasing way the Wehrmacht, especially because intermediate inputs for armaments were imported in a remarkable amount. And given

69 70

For this hypothesis, see Scherner/Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos. Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.

26

the import of the latter, it seems finally that labour productivity in the German industry grew much less than previously assumed.

27

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