Fall 1990 Leo Strauss

translated

Volume 18

Number 1

Some Remarks

on

the Political
and

by

Science

of

Maimonides

Farabi

Robert Bartlett

Joseph

Cropsey

On Ancients

and

Moderns

Laurie M. Johnson Jacob A. Howland

Rethinking
Socrates

the Diodotean Argument

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics Drew A. Hyland Plato's Three Waves Utopia Pamela K. Jensen Beggars Kings: Cowardice
the Question of

and

and

and

Courage

in Shakespeare's Richard II Christopher A. Colmo

Reason

and

Revelation in the Thought

of

Leo

Strauss

Discussion
David Lowenthal

Comment

on

Colmo

Book Review
Will The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power by Harvey C.
the Prince:

Morrisey

Taming

Mansfield, Jr.

Interpreiauon

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Interpretation
Fall 1990

J. Volume

18

Number 1

Leo Strauss
translated

Some Remarks

on the

Political
and

by

Science

of

Maimonides

Farabi

Robert Bartlett

Joseph

Cropsey

On Ancients

and

Moderns

31
53
and

Laurie M. Johnson Jacob A. Howland

Rethinking
Socrates
Politics

the Diodotean Argument

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

63
and the

Drew A. Hyland

Plato's Three Waves Utopia

Question

of

91
Kings: Cowardice
and

Pamela K. Jensen

Beggars

and

Courage in
111
of

Shakespeare's Richard II

Christopher A. Colmo

Reason

and

Revelation in the Thought

Leo 145

Strauss Discussion David Lowenthal

Book Review

Comment

on

Colmo

161

Will

Morrisey

Taming

the

Modern Executive Power

Prince: The Ambivalence of by Harvey C.

Mansfield, Jr.

163

Copyright 1990

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

Some Remarks

on

the Political Science of

Maimonides
Leo Strauss
translated

and

Farabi

bv

Robert Bartlett Boston College

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
The
phy

recent appearance

in English

of

Leo Strauss's Philosophie

und

Gesetz (Philoso

of Maimonides trans. Fred Baumann [New York: Jewish Publication Society,

and

Law: Essays

toward the

Understanding

and

his Predecessors,
served
was

1987]) has

to

underscore the

importance

of

Moses Maimonides to Strauss's thought. For it

surely

Maimonides
with the
Maimonides'

who aided

him

most

incompatible

claims of

in grappling with the "theological-political Faith and Reason as to the best way of life. Because
to avail

probl

rationalism refuses

itself

the

difficulties

posed to

it

by Revelation,
guarded

of either mockery or obfuscation to skirt it is for Strauss "the truly natural model, the

standard that must

be carefully

against

every counterfeit,

and

the touchstone

shame"

which puts modern rationalism to

(p. 3).

The
ence

following

article was

Politique de Mai'monide
considered a

originally et de

published as

"Quelques Remarques

sur

la Sci
-

Farabi"

in Revue des Etudes Juives

to

( 1 00 (1 936] 1

37) and may be both breaks new

present

necessary

supplement

Philosophy
areas

and

Law in that it

ground as well as explores more

deeply

essay is, for example, the first to make clear and his political science in particular for understanding Maimonides (cf. Shlomo Pines, "Introductory in Guide of the Perplexed [Chicago: University of in
general
Essay,"

previously mined. The the importance of Farabi's thought

Chicago Press, 1963],

Maimonides'

p.

Ixxxix,

n.

56). In

addition,

it

expands upon the argument that

the classical and especially the Platonic conception of law serves as the foundation of
science of the
end

Torah. For it its

natural

was

Law

its

reasonable

and

conditions who

in trying to understand the revealed that Maimonides turned to the had

anticipated

philosophical account of and

law

set out

by Plato,
without

meaning

of

the

divine legislation
unchanged; it

its

being

present

to

fully the possibility him. The Mosaic Law

nature

means to establish the righteous nation

man"

in this

world and with

human

"the heart
the

of the sons of
political order and

must

thus be

viewed as a prescription of

highest
in fact,

hence
to

as a political reality. about

Divine in

origin and thus perfect

the Law
about would

promises

bring

in deed precisely
or

what

Plato

and

Aristotle brought
with what one

regime,"

in speech, the "best

the political
are

pray for": the philosopher-kings lators of Judaism and Islam.

Maimonides'

community "in accord the Platonic counterpart to the

prophet-legis

example above all others

may supply

us with a means to approach the

interpretation. Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

Interpretation
intractable
conflict

otherwise

between Reason

and

Revelation,

a conflict which, prior

to

its satisfactory resolution, leaves in doubt the possibility and For ease of reading as well as to include information on
since the original appearance of the

worth of

the life of Reason.

relevant material published

article, many of the

notes

have been

consolidated.

Nothing
for their
of

has been deleted,

wishes

and additions are enclosed

in brackets.
and

The translator

to thank

Professor Christopher Bruell Social Science

additions

Dr. Hillel Fradkin

help

and to acknowledge the

support.

and

Humanities Research Council

Canada for its

All bracketed
and

to the notes are the responsibility of

the translator.

Dr. Fradkin

Professor Aryeh Motzkin

and

kindly

supplied the translations

and transliterations of the

Hebrew

Judeo-Arabic
and

notes.

The

editors thank

M. Remi Brague help.

the

editor of

Revue des Etudes Juives, M.

Gerard Nahon, for

their

masters and

There is, in the philosophy of Maimonides as well as in that of his Muslim his Jewish disciples, a political science. The principal teaching of
summarized

this science is
guidance and,

in the
a

following

theses: Men need,

order

in

order

to

live,
to

as

result,

law; they

need, in

to live well, to attain

happiness,

divine law

which guides

them not only, like the human

law,

but further toward the understanding of the supreme truths and thereby toward supreme perfection; the divine law is given to men by (the intermediary of) a man who is a i-e., one who
ward peace and moral perfection,
"prophet,"

combines

in his

person all

the

essential qualities of the philosopher as well as

those

of

the legislator and

und

king;

the

activity

proper

to the
ed.

prophet

is legislation.

(Cf. Philosophie

Theologie

von

Averroes,

M.J.

Muller

[Munich,

1859],

p.

98, 15-18

and p.

102, 2-3.)
not appear

The importance

of this political science

monides, for example, does

chapters of
occupies

first sight, rather slight. Mai to have devoted more than four or five

is,

at

his Guide of
medieval

the

Perplexed to it. But Shari'a it

given the position religion

in

thought-that is to say, revealed religion, more precisely

must

the revealed

law,

the Torah or the

be inferred that

political

science,
capital

is the only philosophical discipline treating this law as law, is of importance. It is only in their political doctrine that the medieval philos
which

ophers
which

of their thought, the most profound presupposition by distinguish themselves from ancient thinkers on the one hand and they from modern thinkers on the other: their belief in Revelation.

discuss the basis

The

medieval character of

the politics of

Maimonides

and

the falasifa

is

not

contradicted

by

the

fact that it is nothing

other than a

modification, however

considerable,

of an ancient conception.

For there is

a profound agreement

be

tween Jewish and Muslim thought on the one hand and ancient thought on the
other:

it is

not

the Bible and the

Koran, but

perhaps the

New

Testament,

and

Some Remarks

on

the Political

Science of Maimonides
which

and

Farabi
about

5
the

certainly the Reformation and modern philosophy, break with ancient thought. The guiding idea upon Jews
agree

brought

which
as

the Greeks and the

and

is precisely the idea

the

of

the divine law

a single

total law

which

is
a

at

same time religious

law,

civil

law

and moral

law. And it is

indeed

Greek philosophy of the divine law which is the basis of the Jewish and Muslim philosophy of the Torah or the Shari'a; according to Avicenna, Plato's Laws is the classic work on prophecy and the Shari'a.1 The prophet
occupies

in

this medieval politics the same place the philosopher-kings

politics:

occupy

in Platonic

kings,
city.

enumerated

by fulfilling by Plato, he founds

the essential conditions of the

philosopher-

the perfect city,

i.e.,

the ideal Platonic

The facts just

sketched and studied more

not always received mentions

the

attention

they

merit.

closely in a previous study have Let us note only that S. Munk

"governance,"

in the table
neither

of contents
"city,"

to his edition and translation of the Guide of

"government,"

the

Perplexed

"politics,"

"legisla

tor,"

"economics,"

"ethics"

"morality,"

nor even

or

i.e.,

those

words which are

encountered rather

frequently
and

and,

what

is more,

are of considerable

impor

tance in the Guide. For Munk and for those others who

have followed him, the

doctrine

of

Maimonides

the falasifa is an Aristotelianism contaminated or

corrected

by

neo-Platonic conceptions.

This
one

opinion

is

not

false, but it is

super
of

ficial. As
relation and

soon as

it has been uttered,

is

obliged

to give an account

the

between the Aristotelian

question:

elements and

those of a neo-Platonic origin

of

to pose this

Why

does the Aristotelianism

Maimonides (or

and

the

falasifa does
the

admit of such a great

influence from

neo-Platonism

vice versa)?

It

not suffice

advent of

to reply that this amalgam was something brought about before at least not until one proves in Muslim and Jewish philosophy

advance
who

(as

no one

has

yet

done)

that the

falasifa

were

took what

they found
searching?

and not philosophers who were searching.

conquering barbarians But for

what were

they

Let

us take as an example a phenomenon

apparently
theologico-

as

independent

of

any

choice as

and,

above

all,

as

far

removed

from

political presuppositions,

the commentative activity of

one compares the commentaries of

Averroes

with

Averroes. Now, if the works of Aristotle him

and the
not

self,

one

mented on

dreams

immediately by the Commentator: the Politics on the one hand and divination by dreams on the other. This choice is
sees that was unable
would

two of Aristotle's treatises have not been com

treatise

on

due to

chance:

Averroes
reception

to comment on these treatises of Aristotle

made

because

their

have

impossible the
which

philosophical

explication

of

the

Shari'a. For this explication,

supposition
dreams,"

is

that

the

prophet,
of

whose

justification, is based on the prognostic faculty is related to "true

rather a

is the founder
was

the ideal city in the sense of the Republic or the

against

Laws. It

to

justify

the Shari'a

the objections of heretics or skeptics,

or rather

to

give a reasonable, at

truly
the

philosophical

direction to Shi'ite hopes

concerning the Imam, that,

beginning

of

Muslim philosophy, Farabi

Interpretation

for Platonic politics, perhaps moved by philosophical convictions not reason very different from those Plato had in going to Syracuse; and this is the that, at the end of the epoch in question, Averroes came to comment on Plato's
opted

Republic instead
dreams"

of

Aristotle's Politics

and

to give an explication of
of

"true

which accords

better
of

with such passages

Plato than

with

the trea

tise

so matter-of-fact

Aristotle.2

It is only
all ever can

by beginning from the Platonizing politics of Farabi and not at by beginning either from modern conceptions or from the analogies, how
remarkable,
which

scholasticism

hope to

arrive at a true comprehension of

properly speaking the Muslim

provides
and

that one
philoso

Jewish

phies of

the Middle Ages. It is difficult to believe that no one has profited, so

now Ibn-

far as we know, from the testimony given by Maimonides himself ([Cf. Rosenthal, loc. cit.] [Brackets original trans.]). He writes to Samuel
Tibbon: "Do
not concern yourself with

logic books he has

except

those composed

by
in

the wise Abu Nasr al-Farabi;

particular

for

what

composed

in general,

and

his book The Principles of Beings all of this is of the purest And he adds immediately that the books of Avicenna, though of merit, are not comparable to Farabi's. This testimony, sufficiently precise in itself, gains a decisive importance if particularly book contains
therein
on

flour."

one recalls

that the authentic title of the book of Farabi's

praised

by

Maimonides is The Political Governments; that this

metaphysics

(theology)
the politics

as
of

well

as

politics; that the

politics

is based

directly
that

on

Plato

whose

Laws

were commented politics:

by Farabi;
In
a

and

his

metaphysics

is inseparable from "opinions

of

Platonizing

true metaphysics
city."

is the

collection of the

the people of the perfect

than that of considerably less the sophists and Socrates, where the very bases of human life, i.e., political life, had been shaken by Chiliastic convulsions on the one hand and, on the

"enlightened"

century

which was not

other,
of the

by

a critique of religion the radicalism of which recalls the

and eighteenth mean

free-thinkers

seventeenth

centuries,

Farabi had
from

rediscovered

in the

politics of aims

Plato the
at

golden

only

sanctioning the
of

savage and

equally destructive instincts

removed

a naturalism which
"natural"

of

man,

the

instincts

the

master and

the conqueror; and

from

a supernaturalism which
neither a

tends to become the basis

compromise nor a

of slave

synthesis,

which

a golden mean which is morality is hence not based on the two

opposed

positions, but which suppresses them both, uproots them by a prior, found question, by raising a more fundamental problem, the work
philosophy.1

more pro of a

truly

critical

The
wishes and

Platonizing

politics of

Farabi is the

point of

departure for

anyone who

to understand (and not merely record) the neo-Platonism of the falasifa

which

Maimonides

in the last

analysis

is

like the

neo-Platonism
of a

of

Plotinus himself

a modification of authentic
of which

Platonism, i.e.,
for the

the primordial intention

again

is the

search

perfect city.

philosophy And it is

by beginning

from the

exigencies of

Farabi's

Platonizing

politics that one

Some Remarks

on the

Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

can and must understand

the reception of Aristotle's physics: Platonism did not

give

(or

appeared not to

give)

sufficient guarantees against the superstitions of

dying
basis

antiquity; the rebirth,

Socrates'

menaced

by

hybrid speculations,

of

Platonic

poli

tics was not possible without the aid of Aristotle's physics, which
of and

preserved

the

The

motives visible

Plato's inquiry, the world of common sense. which guided Farabi in his work of restoration are
who

not more

clearly
results.

in the thinkers
Jewish4

followed him:

They
a

maintained

only his

any

satisfactory Muslim philosophy before the tion of the philosophy of Farabi. This reconstitution can only be successful through a close collaboration between Arabists, Hebraists, and historians of
phenomenon of and
reconstitu-

In these circumstances,

one cannot

hope for

analysis of

philosophy.

only hope to begin this work in the following pages showing the influence exercised on Maimonides by the Platonizing politics Farabi.
can

One

by
of

Maimonides treats
encyclopedia of

of political

science

as

such

in

what

one

the sciences,

which

is found in the last

chapter of

may call his his summary

of

ha-higgayon, written in his early youth. This is what he is divided into two parts, speculative philosophy and practical Philosophy philosophy, which is also called human philosophy or again political wisdom.
logic,
entitled

Millot

says:

Political

wisdom

is divided into four

parts:

(1)

governance of man

by himself,
intellec

(2)

governance of the

household, (3) it,

"the

governance of

the city,

(4)

governance of

the great nation or nations. The

first fosters

virtues as much moral as

tual,

and as

regards

philosophers
science

three other parts

of political

have many books on The form a unity in opposition to the first:

the governance of man

mores."

While the
others

one

(ethics) is

concerned with

by himself,

the

treat of

prescriptions

other men.

The

second part

(Hukim), i.e., the regimes by which man governs (economics) conduces to the proper ordering of
(the
governance of
which

domestic

affairs.

The third

part

the city) makes

known

hap

piness and

its

acquisition;

it is this

teaches one to distinguish between

this which estab

true happiness and evil and

lishes the

rules of

justice

imaginary happiness and evil; it is by which human societies are well

the

ordered; it is

by

laws (Nemusim); by these this that the wise of the laws, the nations subject to the wise are governed; "the philosophers have many but we have no need, in books, accessible in Arabic, on all these matters
perfect nations establish
. .

.,

these times, of all that,

that

is,

of

the prescriptions
governance

(Hukim),
men

the ordinances

(Datot),
ters."5

the

laws (Nemusim), the

of those

in divine

mat

Despite the difficulties in the text,

one

thing is beyond doubt: Maimonides

that,"

distinctly

declares that "we have

no

need, in these times, of

all

i.e.,

of

Interpretation
properly speaking,
and even of economics.

politics rather

The final

words

indicate

clearly the reason why they Now, cerning "the divine governs us in a perfect manner in divine To
matters related

are not needed: politics contains rules con we we

matters."

Jews

we

have the Torah

which

all political

matters, and especially

in the

to them: It

is

the

Torah

which renders superfluous poli

tics properly speaking and

understand

economics.6

better this important declaration, it

concerning
on

must

be (he

noted says

that Mai

monides

does

not make a similar remark

ethics

the philosophers

have many books he

it), logic,

or speculative of

simply that philosophy. That

on all

he did
too

not

judge

as useless or superfluous the

recommended

books

the philosophers

these sciences, that

well

the study of these books many

suffices a

known to concerning
the

require proof. politics

It

to remark

times, is that the judgment in

question

"books
des'

philosophers."

of

declaration: Of

all

the

of logic, based on the Here, then, is the complete meaning of Maimoni philosophical disciplines, it is only politics properly

is found in

summary

speaking and economics which On this point, the teaching

are rendered superfluous of

by

the Torah.

the Guide of the Perplexed scarcely differs

from that
gives

of

the Millot ha-higgayon. Maimonides says there that the Torah

only

some

regarding
cerns

political matters,

summary indications concerning speculative matters, whereas, "everything has been done to render it (what con

the governance of the city) precise in all

its

details"

(Guide III, 27. Cf.

Ill, 54 (p. 132a) [pp. 632-33 of the Shlomo Pines translation, hereafter cited in brackets] and I, 33 (p. 37a) [p. 71]). One needs, then, the "books of the philos
ophers"

on

the speculative sciences; but one may do without their books on

economics7

politics,

necessary information regarding politics and is found in the Torah (cf. the remark on the guiding interest of the Rabbis in
since all the
reason

Guide I, Intro, (p. 11a) [p. 19]). Here is the

speaking
mention
of

why Maimonides,

when

the studies which must precede the study of metaphysics, does not
or even

politics,

ethics,

although

the "perfection concerning

political

governments"

by

him

who

is according to him one of the essential conditions to be fulfilled wants to be initiated into metaphysics (Guide I, 34 (p. 41a) [p.
of

78]). The first degree

study of the Torah (Guide 111,54 (p. 132b) [p. 633]): it replaces the study of politics (and perhaps also that of ethics) because the Torah has rendered politics superfluous.
Whether draw
all or not

the studies is the

this is

Maimonides'

last

word on political

science,

we must

the

information
science of

on

the matter

from the few

phrases

he devotes in the

Millot to this

That he divides philosophy into spec ulative philosophy and practical philosophy, that he calls the latter political or human philosophy, that he divides it into ethics, economics, and politics prop
utility.

doubtful

erly speaking, all this is well explained by the Aristotelian tradition whose influence on his thought is known. But here are the facts which strike the present-day reader (1) Maimonides does not mention happiness when speaking of ethics, he does so only when speaking of politics properly so-called; (2) he

Some Remarks
begins

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

by dividing practical or political philosophy into four parts but, later on, he distinguishes among only three; the distinction between the governance of the city on the one hand and the governance of the great nation or nations on
the other,
made with such

clarity

then is it made?
politics

(3)

without

first, appears to be of no consequence; why any prior justification, Maimonides attributes to

at
matters."

Maimonides'

strictly speaking the treatment of the "divine It would not be possible to resolve these difficulties without recourse to [1] immediate source, the political writings of Farabi. Farabi also divides
and
practical or political

sometimes

(madaniyya) philosophy into

concerned with

ethics

(kholqiyya)
between

philosophy

of government

(siyasiyya). But this division does

the distinction

not correspond

to his guiding

idea. Ethics is

bad actions, and between the virtues and the vices; now, this distinction is made in relation to the final end of man, happiness: the virtues are
good and

good

only to the extent that they are means to acquire search for happiness, the distinction between true

happiness;
and

as a

result, the

imaginary

happiness

must precede

the distinction between the virtues and vices, between good ac

tions and bad. But there is happiness only in and through political communities

(k. tahsil al-sa'ada,

p.

14. -Muster stoat,

pp.

53-54. [Cf.

citations

in

n.

8 be

low]). This is why Farabi, in his dissertation on political governments, only speaks of happiness and, with all the more reason, of the virtues after having
explained

the necessity and general structure of political communities; and this

is

also why he teaches there that happy men are those who are governed ideal Chief of the ideal community; the Chief of the ideal community

by

the

estab

lishes the ordering of the actions by means of which men are able to attain happiness. Since happiness depends on the political community, it is no longer
necessary,

it is

no

longer

even

possible, to distinguish between ethics and poli

tics; in his (cf.

still

encyclopedia of

the sciences, Farabi does not even mention ethics

also

k.

tahsil al-sa'ada, pp.

enumeration

14

and

16.) And
passes

what

is

perhaps weightier

in his

of

the opinions which each member of the perfect

community God and the

without

must

have, Farabi immediately

from the

opinions

world

to opinions concerning the perfect

community

and

concerning happiness

saying a word about the virtues in the entire enumeration in question. In the final analysis, there is not in Farabi an ethics which precedes politics or
which

is

separable

des

attributes

the discussion

from it. In any case, it is in following Farabi that Maimoni of happiness to politics strictly speaking. Com
of

pared to ences

the corresponding doctrine

an order

Farabi,

the order of the practical sci

in Maimonides

according to which the discussion of

and

happiness
Farabi

is

connected with politics

presents

with ethics

strictly speaking, itself as a compromise between the

while

the discussion of the virtues

conception of

and

that of Aristotle:

Maimonides, it seems,

view, is intent on preserving a certain

mentis

accepting Farabi's point of independence for ethics as a medicina

Chapters,"

[spiritual medicine] (cf. Shemoneh Perakim III. [See "Eight in Ethical Writings of Maimonides, Raymond L. Weiss and Charles

Butter-

10

Interpretation

Dover, 1983)]; this is why the books of the philoso phers on ethics retain their value for him; but, as regards happiness, he too judges that it is the object only of politics properly speaking (2) According to
worth, eds. (New York:

Farabi,
nations

there are three classes of complete

communities:

the small, which

is the

city; the

intermediate, which is the nation; the large many Cf. k. (or "the nations") (Musterstaat, p. 53, 17-19 Siyasat, p. 39. tahsil, beg. and pp. 21-23). The difference between the complete (kamila) communities regarding their size does not imply a difference regarding their
which union of structure: the city may be as perfect (fadila), i.e., directed by an ideal Chief toward happiness, as the nation or the nations (Musterstaat, p. 54, 510. Siyasat, p. 50). Always there is at least a theoretical preference for the

is the

internal

city:

it is

not

The Perfect

by chance that Farabi entitled his most complete political treatise City and not The Perfect Nation (cf. also Musterstaat, p. 69, 17might

19;

this passage could be the direct source of the respective passage of Mai

monides).

say that the perfect city is the ancient core, borrowed from Plato's Republic, that Farabi tries to guard and leave intact, however he may be
compelled

One

by

the theologico-political presuppositions of to acknowledge the political unities

his time to larger than

enlarge

the Platonic

framework,

the city: the nation or nations. It is equally then in

monides

following

Farabi that Mai

distinguishes between the later in

governance of
or nations

the city on the one hand and the other, a distinction he

the governance of the great

neglects
city.
-(3)

nation

on

on

order to speak of a preference

for the

governance of the and

If it is

political science which makes

happiness known,

if there is

no

true happiness in this

life, but only in

the next (Ihsa al-'ulum, p.

64), in

other

words, if there is no true beatitude without the knowledge of the beings separated from matter (K. tahsil, pp. 2 and 16; tanbih, p. 22), of God and the
things."

Angels,
why the

political science must

most

be

concerned with the political

"divine

This is

important

of are

Farabi's
at

books, The Perfect

metaphysical

City

and

The

Political Governments,
still another connection abi

the same time

politics of

treatises. There
things."

is

between the
Chief"
"Imam,"

Farabi

and

"divine

Far
and

teaches that the "first

of

the perfect city

"legislator"

must

be

"prophet"

"Imam."

"First

Chief,"

and
as such a

are

identical terms (K. tahsil,

(see Musterstaat,
p.

p.

43); the "first Chief is 70, 10, and context). As

gious

founder

of a religion
possible

result, it is not

to separate the

political reli

things from the divine. Farabi drew this consequence

by

subordinating the
to
politics*

sciences, jurisprudence

(fiqh)

and apologetics

(kalam),

It is, then, Farabi's doctrine that Maimonides has in mind when he speaks, in the Millot, of politics. Now the politics of Farabi, for its part, is a modification of the politics of Plato: The "first is, according to Farabi, not only
Chief"

Imam, prophet, legislator, and king, he is also and above all a philosopher (Musterstaat, p. 58, 18-59, 5; k. tahsil, pp. 42-43); he must by nature have at his disposal all the qualities which characterize, according to Plato, the gover
nors of the

ideal city; he is Plato's

king-philosopher."

As

result, the judgment

Some Remarks
passed

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

11

by

Maimonides

on political science accords with politics.

Platonic

politics, or at
poli

least
tics,
the

with a which

Platonizing
is the
search
now

And this judgment

governed

means:

Philosophical

for the ideal city

by

the philosophers,
given

or

for

ideal law, is

superfluous, because the

surpass manner

Torah,

by

(the intermedi

ary of) a prophet whose faculties leads men towards happiness in a

than the political regimes imagined

those of the greatest philosopher,

infinitely
when

more certain and perfect

by

the philosophers.

But it is

one

thing

to search for the ideal law

it is

not yet

known,

quite

another to understand the given

while

being

superfluous

things are certain

ideal law. It may well be that political science, for the former, is indispensable for the latter. Two before any subsequent examination of the texts. First, Mai
and

monides'

politics,

judgment that politics, is rendered superfluous

a political

only politics,
a

and

especially

Platonizing
the perfect

by

the Torah implies: the Torah is first and

foremost

fact,

a political

order,

law; it is

the ideal

law,

nomos, of which all other

a

laws

are more or

less

imitations10

And

second:

being
what

philosopher, Maimonides
raison

must pose

for himself the its

question of

knowing
its

the

d'etre

of

the Torah

is,

what are

reasonable end and

natural

He needs, then, a philosophical discipline the subject of which will be the Torah, the divine law as such; as the Torah is a law and hence a political
conditions.

fact,

this discipline
and

must

be

political

science.

And

as

the

political

science

known to
politics, it

judged

by

Maimonides to

merit some attention

is

Platonizing
the

will

be, in

the final analysis, the doctrines of the Republic and the

manner

Laws

which will

determine the

in

which

Maimonides

understands

Torah.

II

Before
remember

interpreting
his book

any passage of the Guide of the Perplexed, one must that this work is an esoteric book. Maimonides has concealed his
must

thought,

so

be

read with particular attention;

its

subtle allusions

are perhaps more

important than the doctrines developed in

occupies the

an explicit manner.

The divine law

last

place

among the

main subjects

discussed in

the Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides takes up the subject only after
ended the

having
is
of

discussion

of

the purely speculative themes

of

whose conclusion

clearly

marked

by

the interpretation up, to a

the

ma'aseh merkabah

[account

the the

chariot],

which sums

certain

extent, all of

metaphysics"

and of

problems of providence and of evil

which,

being

the conditions

closest

to

prac

tical problems,

mark

the passage from the speculative to the practical domain.

The

part of

the Guide
chapters

treating

of

the divine law is therefore (if one

abstracts

from the last

work

III 51-54

which contain more of a conclusion

to the

in

general

than the discussion of a new subject) the

only

practical part of

the

work:

there

is

no

treatise on morality

included in it. It

will perhaps

be

said

12

Interpretation
possible

that it is not
a

to draw any

conclusion

philosophy"

"system

of

nor even a

from this, the Guide being neither but simply a "guide "summa
theologica"

of the
des'

i.e., it does

not contain a complete exposition of

Maimonides'

Maimoni

philosophical work is a But precisely because philosophical questions the treats because it "guide of the among importance for the philosophizing Jew, the fact only those that have a decisive that it does not contain a treatise on morality, but, in its place, an analysis of opinions.

divine law, merits noting: Morality, as distinguished from the divine law, is not of capital importance for Maimonides (as regards the similar attitude of Farabi
concerning morality, cf. above). The discussion of the divine law (Guide III

25-50)

contains

than, first,
reasonable,
ends of

the

proof

that a divine law insofar as it is a

nothing other divine law must be for the

reasonable

having
given

a manifest

utility, and, second, the

search

divine law, that of Moses. The fundamental questions, why is a (divine) law necessary and how is a divine law distinguished from a human law, are almost not taken up. The reason for this is that they have been treated
the

sufficiently in a preceding part of the Guide, in the theory of prophecy (Guide II 32ff.) The foundations of the theory of the law are hence not found anywhere else than in the doctrine of prophecy. It could not be otherwise: "It is known
that the belief

prophet, there is no

in prophecy precedes the belief in the law; for if there is (Guide III, 45 (p. 98b) [p. 576]).
law"

no

It is difficult to

understand

the exact meaning

Maimonides'

of

prophetology
this doctrine.

if

one

does

not

know first the

philosophical place of
metaphysical

By treating

prophecy before
tion of the

formally

ending the

discussions

by

the interpreta

ma'aseh

merkabah, Maimonides seems to indicate that prophetology

and this conclusion seems attributes

is

connected with

metaphysics,

to be

confirmed

by

theory However, Avicenna does not count prophetology as an integral part of metaphysics; according to him, the doctrine of prophecy as well as that of life
physics. after

the fact that Avicenna expressly

the

of

prophecy to

meta

death

are

but

"branches"

of metaphysics ap.

(see the Latin translation

of

his

"Division

Sciences"

of

the
. . .

Avicennae

compendium

de

anima

etc.,

ab

An

drea Alpago

ex arabico

in latinum

versa,

Venetiis 1546,

pp.

143 b-144

b). Further, he clearly declares that it is

politics which explains

the necessity of

prophecy
pp.

and

the

law,

as

well pp.

as

the

difference between
cf.

true prophets and

and

pseudo-prophets

(loc. cit.,

138 b-139a;

Strauss, Philosophy
view

Law,
after

99-103). But, to understand Maimonides, Farabi's important than Avicenna's. Now Farabi mentions belief in
Chief"

is

much more

revelation
us add

only

the belief in the "first

(Musterstaat,

p.

69, 15). Let

that Averroes

essentially political fact: the action proper to the prophet above). There is then a perfect agreement among the most important falasifa regarding the essentially political character of prophecy and, as a result, regarding the connection between prophetology and political
prophecy as is legislation (see
sees
an

himself

science.

Maimonides did

not

have the

slightest reason

to separate

himself here

Some Remarks

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

13

There is found

from the falasifa, of whose principal theses concerning prophecy he a direct proof of this: In the summary of the philosophical
at

approves.

principles

the

beginning

of

the Mishneh

Torah, Maimonides
ended
so

speaks of

prophecy
expresses

and of

the law only after

having formally
not a

the summary

of metaphysics

(ma'aseh merkabah)

and physics

(ma'aseh bereshit). In In the

doing, he
opinion

the opinion that prophecy is

subject of speculative philosophy,

but

of

practical or political philosophy.

reveal

Guide,

it is true, this

does

not

itself

by
is

the composition;

metaphysics

formally
Guide,

in this work, prophetology is treated before ended; but this alteration of the usual order is, as will
explained

be seen, the necessary order, easily etology

gesis of of the
of
Scripture.12

by

the end, peculiar to the proph

of

establishing the foundation

of

the philosophical exe

Maimonides takes up the theory

opinions principle

prophecy

by discussing

the different

concerning it,
acquired

and

by

establishing,

against the vulgar

opinion, the

that prophecy is linked to

certain natural

conditions, especially to the

ex

perfection,

by

studies,

of

the

intellect (Guide II 32-34). He then

plains that there

is

an essential

that

of

the other prophets:

difference between the prophecy of Moses and The whole doctrine of prophecy, developed in the
the prophecy of Moses (ch. that

following

chapters, does

not address

after these essence of

prophecy,"

preliminary he says, "is

of

clarifications an

35). It is only Maimonides defines prophecy; "the emanation from God, which spreads, by
to the rational

the the

intermediary
imaginative

the Active

Intellect, first

faculty

and

then to

faculty"

(ch. 36). To

understand

better this far too

"scholastic"

definition,
produce

one must pose the not

following

question:

What does this

emanation

if it spreads,
Maimonides'

to the two

faculties together, but only to

to the
of

one of

them?

Here is
rational

answer:

"If this intellectual

spread

emanation spreads

faculty,

without

having

imaginative

faculty

...

only to the it is this

...

(which constitutes) the

emanation spreads

class of

knowers,

the men of speculation.

...

If the

only to the imaginative

faculty

the class

thereby

consti and the

tuted are the governors of the cities and the legislators and the
augers and those who

diviners

have true dreams,

and

similarly those who effect miracles

.

(ch. extraordinary artifices and the occult arts without being knowers 37). I3 Now the prophecy which results from the emanation spreading to the two

by

faculties
spreads

together must unite

in itself the
As
a

effects produced

if the

emanation

to only

one of them. or

result, the prophet

is

a philosopher and and magician.

statesman

(governor
magical

legislator),
of

and at the same

time a diviner

As for the
monides

faculty

the prophet

a theme

dear to Avicenna

Mai

has little interest in it. What

characterizes the

prophet, according to

him, is

the union (which is at the same time a considerable augmentation) of

of

the faculties

the philosopher, statesman, and diviner: the prophet is a philos

Maimonides'

opher-statesman-diviner.

That this is

opinion

is proved, moreover,

by

the

fact that he

adds to the two chapters

treating

the essence and the conditions of prophecy a

14

Interpretation

third (ch.

38), in
three

which

he

explains that the prophet

necessarily

possesses

the
and

following

faculties: the

faculty

of

courage, the
truths

faculty

of

divination,
of

the immediate knowledge

of speculative

without

knowledge

the prem

ises. Now this last,

edge,
the

while

being

an essential expansion of philosophical

knowl

nonetheless remains a speculative

faculty;

we

have then only to

represents

show that

faculty
political

of courage which characterizes

the prophet

or

indicates

his is

function. Maimonides

would not speak of

extraordinary

courage as

an essential condition of exposed

prophecy if he did not believe that the prophet as such to the gravest dangers. Now if the prophet received his inspiration,

whether of a speculative order order

(concerning

God

and

the

Angels)

or a practical

(concerning future matters), only for his own perfection, he would not be exposed to dangers as a prophet. It is then of the essence of the prophet that he
receive

inspiration,
men

that

he

"ascend"

precisely

so as to

"descend,"

to guide and
which neces

instruct

(Guide I, 15);

for,

as a result of this social

function

sarily displeases unjust men, he is in perpetual danger. Although this danger is inevitable even if the prophet restricts himself to instructing men, it is much
more of

menacing

when

the prophet opposes, as a guide of just men, the

injustices

tyrants or the

cited

by

This is why the first example of prophetic courage Maimonides is the example of Moses who, "a lone man, presented
multitude. a nation
him"

himself courageously, with his staff, before a great king to deliver '4 from the slavery imposed by (Guide II, 38 (p. 82b) [p. 376]). The triad
tics
of philosopher-statesman-diviner

immediately
Chief"

calls to mind

the

poli

Farabi according to which the "first of the perfect city must be a philosopher and diviner ("prophet"). It remains to be seen whether Maimonides
also regards the

founding

of

the perfect city as the

raison

d'etre

of revelation. was

It

has been thought that the

proclamation of the most

principal end of revelation

according to him

the

human

opinion, why does he say that the divine law is limited to teaching these truths in a summary and enigmatic manner, while in political matters, "every effort has been made to render precise
what concerns

reason.

important truths, above But if this is the precise meaning of

all

those not accessible to

Maimonides'

the governance

of

the cities in all its

details"

also

(Guide III, 27-28. Cf. I, 33 (p. 37a) [p. 71]; H. Yesode ha-Torah IV, 13; see Falaquera, Sefer ha-ma'alot, ed. Venetianer [Berlin, 1894] pp. 48, 7-9)?

And,
but

above

all, why do these truths form

of a

all the same a part

most

tion of the

a part certainly the most noble part, lawl Not only the proclamation and the propaga important truths but also and above all the founding of a end of

perfect nation
whole

is "the

the efforts of the patriarchs and Moses

of a perfect

during

their

lives"15. The

founding
law

nation, and consequently the procla to the perfect

nation

mation of a perfect

which must serve as a constitution

is, according
the

to

Maimonides,
even seems

the raison

d'etre

of prophecy.

The

proof of this

is

fact

which

to render doubtful all of our argumentation: the

distinction between the prophecy of Moses and that of the other prophets. In deed, if the prophetology of Maimonides has as its object only the latter, as he

Some Remarks
expressly intends,
character
of

on the

Political Science of Maimonides

has

and

Farabi

15

one to suppose that precisely the political is in any way found in the prophecy of prophecy Moses? To this question, which any attentive reader of Guide II 35-38 would
what reason
"ordinary"

not

be

able

to avoid, Maimonides

responds

in the

following

chapter

(39). He

says:

"After

having

spoken of the essence of

prophecy,

made

known its true

state, and

shown that

the prophecy of

the prophecy of the other

perception

Moses, our master, is distinguished from (prophets), we will say that it is this (prophetic)
has had the necessary consequence of call the in question may be summarized by
chapter who

(of

Moses')

alone which rest of

ing

law."

us

to the

The

saying that the

protected or

prophets prior

to Moses prepared, and those

accomplished

followed him

confirmed, the divine legislation

by

(the intermedi

ary of) Moses (cf. also H. Yesode ha-Torah IX, 2) which is the most perfect legislation there is. Moses, chief of the prophets, is hence not less but more a statesman than the other prophets: He alone is the founder of the perfect politi
cal community.

This is the

reason of

repeatedly that the prophecy

even commonplace:

why Maimonides affirms Moses is superior to that of the

so

clearly

and

other

prophets,

to that of the patriarchs. This affirmation is not the

repetition of of

it betrays
of

specific

tendency.

The

passage

something the Mishneh

Torah

which

treats

the difference between the prophecy of Moses and that of

on a similar passage of the

the other prophets

is based

Mishnat R. Eliezer (cf.

und

the remarks of M.

Guttmann, Monatsschrift fur Geschichte

pp.

Wissenschaft

des Judentums [1935],

affirmed archs

150-51). Now in this preceding

source of

Maimonides', it is
of

in

an

immediately

passage that the

prophecy

the patri
passage

is

superior to

that of Moses and the other prophets. And from this

nothing.

Maimonides has borrowed

critique of the principle of of

On the contrary, his prophetology implies a the point of view which dominates the prophetology
the contrary interpretation of [Mishnat R. Eliezer, ed. Enelow (New in Maimonides himself [Guide II, 35, p. 77a

the Mishnat R. Eliezer: he affirms explicitly that the prophecy of Moses is

superior to that of the patriarchs

(cf.

above all

Exodus VI, 3 in

Maimonides'

source
and

York, 1933)
Moses
over

p.

112, 20-23]

(p. 367)]). As

regards the efficient cause of

the superiority

of

the prophecy of

that of the patriarchs,

he

expresses

himself only
of

by

allusions; but
rather

he

"consequence"

shows without cause:

any

reserve

the

this superiority, or

its final
This

Only

the prophecy of Moses

is legislative.
sense or
explicitly:16

only Moses is the philosopher-legislator in Plato's in Farabi's sense. But Maimonides does not say this the "first he limits himself to indicating the signs which suffice for one "who
means that
Chief"
derstand,"

will un

for

an attentive and
would

duly
not

instructed reader;

and

let

us never

forget

that Maimonides
stand

not

have did

considered

the Guide

anyone who

sufficiently instructed to under know Farabi, and especially his treatise on

not

political above

governments.

He had reasons,

only apologetical, but

also

and of

all

philosophical,
of

to be reserved when
prophecy:

speaking

of the

prophecy

Moses, i.e.,

the legislative

He

neither wished nor was

able, nor

16

Interpretation

had any need, to lift the veil which conceals the origins of the Torah, the foundation of the perfect nation. Whether the Torah is a miracle or a natural fact, whether the Torah came from heaven or not as soon as it is given, it is
"not in
thou
heaven"

but
it"

mayest

do

"very nigh unto thee, in your mouth and in your heart, that [Deuteronomy 30:12, 14]. Not the mystery of its origin, the
"Epicureanism,"

search

for

which

leads

either

to

theosophy

or

but its end, the

comprehension of which guarantees obedience

human

reason.

Guided
of

by

this conception,
qua

to the Torah, is accessible to Maimonides, after having explained

legislative prophecy, is distinguished from that of all the other prophets, takes up in the following chapter (40) the fundamental question concerning the end, the reason of the law.
that the prophecy

Moses,

Why
sary?

is the law

the

law in

general and

the divine law in particular

neces

other men

Man is naturally a political being, and he can only live when united with (Guide I, 72 (p. 103a)[p. 191]). But man is at the same time much

less naturally capable of political life than any other animal; the differences between the individuals of the human species being much greater than those between the individuals
men would
of other

species,

one

does

not see

how

community

of

be

possible.

Farabi had

responded to this question

by

showing that

it is precisely as a result of the natural inequality among men that political life becomes possible: inequality is only the reverse side of what is, properly speak

ing,

a graduated order

(K. al-siyasat,

pp.

45-48). Maimonides follows

variation

a some

what

different

path.

From the extraordinary

together

between human individ

uals, he draws the

one

consequence

that men who are so unequal, so different from

guide who corrects or

another,

can

only live

cious

extremes,

either

by

if they have a is lacking supplying

what

the

vi

by

moderating

what

is in

excess.

This

guide prescribes the actions and mores all must

continually

prac

tice, in

accord with the same

rule; he establishes, in

opposition

to the natural

variety of vicious extremes, the conventional harmony of a reasonable milieu; he establishes an law, as equally removed from excess as deficiency
"equal"

(Guide II, 40 (p. 85a-b)[pp. 381-82] and II, 39 (p. 84b)[p. 380]). The task of the legislator, then, is to establish harmony between men of opposed disposi
tions

by

single and

reducing the extremes to identical law which will

"the hardness

just

and

identical

milieu

by

means of a

never

be

changed.

Of these

opposed

dispo

sitions, Maimonides
softness:
of

cites as an example

the opposition between hardness and

of an

individual
of

who will go so

far

as to cut

the throat

his young son on account pity for the violent death of

that"

the violence of

his anger,

while another

feels

a gnat or a

reptile,

having

a soul

too tender for

(Guide II, 40 (p. 85b)[p. 382]). Although this is but

an example,

it

merits

some attention as

being

the only one adduced

or

cisely the

opposition

between hardness
the true

by Maimonides. Now, it is pre ferocity on the one hand, and weak

politics of
"fabric"

ness or softness on

the other, which is of

decisive importance in the

out of

Plato: it is the

end of

legislator

to make a

the opposed

dispositions

of

the

naturally brave

man and

the

naturally

moderate man, dispo-

Some Remarks

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

were not

and

Farabi

17
or

sitions which would

degenerate, if they
alliance out of

disciplined, into ferocity

hardness forges
end
a

and weakness or

cowardice; the city, then,

needs a supervisor who

harmonious

these two disharmonious dispositions17: this

may be

achieved either reasonable

in

governed

by
in

laws;

city governed by philosophers, or in a city in the latter case, the laws must always remain
a

the same

opposition to the unregulated pleasures which are never the same

and which are never

in

relation
"equal,"

to the same things (Laws

must not

660 B-C).

law,

to be

truly
only

meant a

law

which aims

law
and

which

"has

no other end

be purely human. By human law is well-being of the body or, in other words, a than putting in good order the city and its affairs,
at

the

and rivalry from keeping imaginary happiness, which corresponds

injustice

it"

so that

"men may

obtain some sort of

to the view of the respective

legisla

tor."

The

author of a

law

of

this sort possesses only the perfection of the

"imagination"

is

not and not

(Guide II, 40 (p. 86b)[p. 384] and III, 27 (p. 59b) [p. 510]); he cannot be a philosopher (and still less a prophet), he is "ignorant": he
which

does

know true happiness had

is
the

always one and

the same, he

searches

for,

and causes others

to search

for,

one of

the different forms of

governors who

imaginary
not need
faculty"

happiness. Farabi
philosophy,
alone,
rant

"ignorant"

also

spoken of

do

who can achieve their ends

by

means of

the "experimental

by

means of a

city"

vation of

"sensual aptitude"18; and their end the end of the "igno happiness: either what is imaginary necessary for the preser the body, or wealth, pleasures, glory, victory, or liberty (cf. Mus is
an

terstaat,

p.

61, 19-62, 20
of all

and

Ihsa al-ulum,
of

pp.

64-65

and

68-69). True
as of

happiness
perfect as

consists

in the well-being

the soul,

i.e., in the knowledge,

most perfect

possible,

that exists and above all of the

at this that the perfect

beings,

God

and

the

Angels; it is
has

city
of

the divine law according to Maimonides. But as

obtained after man achieved the

according to Farabi, true happiness can only be

aims

"well-being
body"

the

body

which consists

in

governed,"

the city's

being

well

"the divine law has

the well-being of the soul and that of the

and

as an end two things, namely (Guide II, 40 (p. 86b)[p. 384]

which aims at

III, 27). That Maimonides

intelligence
of

characterizes a
law"

law

the perfection
cannot end

of the
a

as a

"divine

appears, at

law

this sort be the

work of a philosopher? was

first glance, surprising: knowledge not the

his laws? Let
the
word

in

relation to which the

Platonic legislator

established

us

recall, this

however, dialogue,
only
at

that Plato began his dialogue on the laws

and no other work and at

"God"

with

that according to him the true law aims not

"human"

goods,

i.e.,

bodily

goods, but also and above

"divine"

all at

goods, the first

of which

is knowledge (Laws 631 B-D. Cf. 624 A

perfect accord with

and

630

D-

E). Maimonides is then in

acteristic of

Plato in seeing

as

the trait char

the divine law the

fact that it in his

aims at the perfection of

knowledge.
given

The
the

perfect

law ("Al-shari'a

al-kamild"

Guide III, 46 [p. 586]),

by

prophet-legislator who unites

person all

the essential qualities of the

a miraculous

philosopher and

the

statesman while

surpassing them in

manner,

18
can

Interpretation
only be
understood and

transmitted

by

men who also

have

at their

disposal

the qualities of the philosopher and the statesman,

although

in

a much more
confided

imperfect
man who

manner:

The "secrets

of the

Torah"

ought

only to be
and the

to a
sci and

is in

perfect who

"regarding
to
present

political governments

speculative

ences

(and

possesses)

with

this a natural penetration,

intelligence,
that
recall

eloquence

order

the subjects to be fulfilled

and

in

such

way

they may be
the

glimpsed."

"conditions"

These

by

the

rabbi-philosopher

"conditions"

(Musterstaat,

p.

60, 14

18

and

59, 5; k. tahsil,
which,

p.

44)

enumer
are

ated

by

Farabi to be fulfilled
conditions

by
at

the "first

Chief,"19

for their part,

derived from the

required

by

Plato

of the philosopher-kings.

The

rabbi-philosopher must

fulfill

least

some of

the conditions of the

of

king-philos legislator Plato

opher,

since

he is the

authentic

interpreter

the

work

of

the

(prophet)-philosopher who, for his part, has

could
must

realized what

the philosopher

only

postulate:

the

divine legislation. It is the

rabbi-philosopher who

guide, as

vicar of

the

understanding the esoteric his direction, they render themselves

governments"

legislator-philosopher, those who are not capable of teaching of the legislator; if these refuse to submit to
without
excuse.20

As

regards the
can

"political

that the rabbi-philosopher must

know,

there

be

no

doubt that

they

are the

juridical

norms contained

in the

written and oral

Torah: It is then

by beginning
monides

from the Platonic

conception of the

arrives at the philosophical

justification

of

philosopher-king that Mai the study of the halakha

[sacred Law].
on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Farabi, when sum Plato's had said: "Insofar as man lives in association with Republic, marizing men of this (sc, corrupt) nation, his life will not be a human life; but if he

In his treatise

separates

himself from them

and

distances himself from their way

of

living by

striving to attain perfection, his life will be miserable and he will never attain what he wishes, for one of two things will happen to him: either he will be

killed,

This is why he needs another nation, different from that which exists during his time; this is why he (Plato) made the search for this other nation. He began by discussing justice and what
or will of perfection.

he

be deprived

true justice
after

is; he discussed having discussed it, he

and

conventional

justice,

practiced

in the cities;

and

acknowledged

that this was true injustice

and ex

treme malice,

that these evils

would endure

for

as

long

as there are cities.

This is why he had to organize another city in which true justice and the goods which are goods in truth would be found, and in which nothing of the things necessary to attain happiness would be lacking, of which the philosophers would be the principal part (Falaquera, Reshit hokhma, ed. David, p. 76).
. .

Now,

the search

for the
and as

perfect

city had been

rendered

superfluous

by

the

divine legislation;

the divine law had not been given to a city but a nation, it was above all the idea of the perfect which had fall into to city

desuetude,
"faithful

to

become

symbol

(Cf, however

the prediction concerning the

perfect city, the

city"

in Isaiah I, 21-26). One finds the

city

of

God,

Some Remarks

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

remarked
as

and

Farabi
his
notes

19
to

as subject of a parable

in Guide III, 51. Munk

in

one of

this chapter: "It seems evident to me that these last chapters,

here,

in many

other passages of

Maimonides has

taken as a model the citizen of the

ideal

State,
Beings
the

whose
. .

depiction Farabi has

and
...

Solitary.

in his treatise, The Principles of the philosopher presented by Ibn-Badja, in his Governance of In the two works we just indicated, many traits are borrowed
given us and

from Plato's Republic

n.

Aristotle's

Ethics"

(Le Guide des Egares,

III,

p.

438
men

4). Farabi had city

said

in the treatise indicated

no means resemble

by

Munk:

"Naturally bestial

are not

dwellers, and by way; but they (political) ing

animals.

do they gather together in a city-dwell in part domestic animals, in part wild

(There

are some

who)

are

found in the

extremities of the

inhabited

earth, either in the extreme North or the extreme South. These must be treated
as

in the cities,

beasts. Those among them who are more human and who can be more useful are to be spared and employed as beasts are employed. Those

among them who cannot be useful or who are harmful are treated like the other harmful animals. One must proceed in the same manner if it happens that bestial is born among the inhabitants of the 57-58). Maimonides takes this description up again; he
someone
cities"

(K. al-siyasat,

pp.

also

speaks of men

living
North

"outside the
and the

city"

like "the

most

distant

of

the Turks

who

live in the far

live in the far South, and those who resemble them in our climate; these are considered as irrational animals; I do not place them among the ranks of man, for they occupy among the beings a rank inferior to Negroes
who
.

that of man and superior to that of the ape

(Guide III, 51 (p. 123b)[p.

as
nonpolitical

618]). But Maimonides

"outside the
and even
city"

characterizes these

men

men,

living

only in a metaphorical sense: These barbaric men, devoid of incapable of all intellectual culture, live "outside the because
city"

they do
God.

not

have the least understanding

the
search

"city,"

of

the

sovereign of

the

i.e.,

of

However,
which

for the

perfect

the divine legislation

could not

the problem of Plato resolved by city be forgotten by the Jew. The Jewish nation
constituted

is the had

perfect nation

to the extent that it is

by

the

perfect

law

and provided that selves

run

it

obeys that

law, did

not

the same risks in Jerusalem as

obey it. Thus the prophets them Socrates in Athens. They had

shown

by

their actions or

by

their speech that the man who

loves

perfection and

justice must leave the cities inhabited exclusively by the wicked, to search for a city inhabited by good men, and that he must prefer, if he does not know of city desert or in
such a or

if he is

prevented

from

bringing

one

about, wandering in the

caverns to

the
as

association with evil men.

This

manner of

acting is

it, basing himself on the teach of Jeremiah (IX, 1) (see H. ing deot VI, 1 Cf. also Shemoneh Perakim IV [ed. Wolff (Leiden: Brill, 1903) pp. 10-11] where the same verse is cited. Cf. Farabi, k. al-siyasat, p. 50).
obligatory for the Jew,
of

Maimonides

explains

the Jewish tradition and relying on a verse

.

And it is this

same passage

that Falaquera

has in

mind when

translating

the

20

Interpretation
of the

passage

Farabian summary
those who,
p.

of

the Republic

which

describes the fate

of

Socrates
But it is

and all

living

in

an unjust

city,

search

for

perfection

(Reshit

hokhma,
not

11. Cf.

above).

only for the city inhabited by good men that the Jew must look. Through the loss of its political liberty, the Jewish nation equally lost the
means nation of

practicing the law to the full extent. The being dispersed among pagan, idolator,
of
surfaced anew.

members

of the perfect

"ignorant"

nations, the question

Plato

The

answer was

supplied

there

by

the hope

of of

the
the

Messiah. The Messiah is

king;

this means that his rank

is inferior to that

legislator-prophet: While the former has

compels men

proclaimed the

to obey the law (cf. H.

will

melakhim

XI, 4

with

divine law, the king Guide II, 40 p. 85b

[p. 382]). The king-Messiah

thus change nothing of the law of

Moses, but,

devoting

his life to the study

of

according to the
will reestablish

written and oral

Torah, attending to the Torah, and compelling Israel

the

commandments

to follow

it, he

the execution of all the prescriptions

which cannot

be

practiced

during
will

captivity (H. melakhim XI, 1 and 4). The days of the Messiah, then, be situated in this world, the natural course of which will not be changed
teshouvah
regime

(cf. H.

IX, 2

and

H.

melakhim

XII, 1). Not

that the goal of the

Messianic
contrary:

is the well-being The Messiah is not only

person

of

the

body

or at

earthly happiness. To the

the same time wiser than

king, he is

Solomon, indeed,

a prophet almost equal

to Moses (H. teshouvah

and

IX, 2). Unit

ing
for
to

in his

the qualities of the

king

the sage, he

will establish peace

all time so that men can at

wisdom and

the

law

without

last find repose, the leisure to apply themselves being troubled by sickness, war, and famine (H.

teshouvah
with

IX, 1-2,

and

H.

melakhim

XII, 3-4). Thus,

without

"the

earth will

be filled

the knowledge of
and

God"

[Isaiah 1 1 :9] be

the difference between the then that the

of

knowers

the vulgar

being

abolished: much

better, it is only
.

privileges of the philosophers will

fully

recognized

(Cf the interpretation

Joel II, 28 in Guide II, 32 (p. 74a) [p. 362]). The Messiah is distinguished from all the other prophets because he does not fulfill the signs and it is not

XI, 3 with H. Yesode ha-Torah X, 12). And is the eternal peace, realized by the Messiah, anything other than the necessary consequence of knowledge, the knowledge of God (Guide III, 11)? The Messiah, being a king-philosopher, will establish for all time the "perfect
asked of

him to do

so

(cf. H.

melakhim

city"

whose

inhabitants

will

faculties,

to the

knowledge

of

apply themselves, according to their respective God, and he will thereby bring to an end the

evils which

today

trouble the

cities.2'

Ill

The

perfect

law,

the
at

divine law, is distinguished from the human laws in

that it aims not only

the

well-being

of

the

body, but

also and above all at the

Some Remarks
well-being

on

the Political

Science of Maimonides
in
man

and

Farabi

21
all

of the soul.

This

consists

having

sound

opinions, above

concerning God and the Angels. The divine law has therefore indicated the most important of these opinions to guide man toward the well-being of the
soul, but only in
vulgar. a manner which reason

does

not surpass

the understanding of the

This is the

it

was

posal the supreme perfection of the

necessary that the prophets have at their dis imaginative faculty:22 imagination makes
the truths
whose

possible the metaphorical exoteric representation of esoteric

proper,

meaning

must

be

concealed

from the
in

vulgar.

For

one neither can nor

ought speak of

the

principles except
law"

an enigmatic

manner; this is what not

only the "men of the only

mark of

but

also

the philosophers say. Maimonides names

one of these esoteric philosophers:

Avicenna,
and

cited

in my study

Philosophy

Plato (Guide I, 17. Cf. a similar and Law, p. 133 n. 71). knowledge
of

re

To
are

communicate to the vulgar a certain

the principles, which

incorporeal

and sensible

intellectual things, they must be represented by corporeal things. Not by just any corporeal things, but by those which oc

cupy, in the sensible

domain,

a place analogous

to that occupied, in the intel

lectual domain, by the principle in question. God and His attributes, then, will be represented by the most noble sensible things (Farabi, Musterstaat, p. 50, 9-15). It is for this reason that the prophets represent divine perception, for
example,

by hearing

and

sight,
even

i.e., by

the most noble sensations, and that

which

they

do

not attribute to

God,

metaphorically, the sense of touch

external

is the

basest

of our senses

(Guide I, 47). But the

than a means

prophets'

speeches are cases

is in

sometimes more which

meaning of the to indicate the esoteric truths; there

the exterior meaning has a value in itself: it may be that the

prophet pronounces some speeches which communicate

a speculative

by

their esoteric sense

truth,
and

while

their exoteric sense indicates "a wisdom useful

others
p.

for

many things,

among

for the

amelioration

of the

state of

human

societies"

(Guide

I, Intro,

7a [p. 12]. A

remarkable example of

this

is found

corporeal

in Guide II, 31 [cf. Rasail Ihwan al'Safa, IV, 190]). There is then among things, worthy of being employed for the representation of the princi
class which

ples, a

particularly lends itself to this use, namely political matters (cf. Farabi, k. tahsil, p. 41). The political hierarchy is an adequately faithful
to the
cosmic

counterpart

king
It

is

so common

hierarchy. This is why the comparison of God to a (Guide I, 46(p. 52b)[pp. 102-3]. Cf. I, 9 and III, 51 beg.)
such comparisons must not

goes without

saying that

contain an esoteric

for

political

meaning while their exoteric life. The divine law attaches so great

be taken literally: they meaning is one of great utility

a value to
men

the representations, to believe not only things

which are

useful

for

political

life,

of

divine

matters

that

it invites
also

in the

most

important

speculative

truths, but
political

in

certain

"necessary
trious

for the

good order of

the

conditions"; it is in this way that it

invites the belief in divine

example of revealed

anger and

this are the "thirteen

God,

to Moses:

they do

not

mercy (Guide III, 28). The most illus [characteristics or attributes] of signify the attributes of God but the most
middot"

22

Interpretation
acting
a of which the most perfect statesman, must take

perfect manner of

i.e.,
are

"the

governor

of

the city

who

is

prophet,"

as

a model;

they

the essential

cities"

conditions of

the "governance
and

the (most perfect)

politics

(Guide

I, 54). How
are one of

ever, the unity

scope of

the dogmatic

included in the Guide

highlighted in
the

no part more

than the

theory

of providence which

forms

principal parts of

this

work.

According
dence is

to

Maimonides,
faults

the

teaching
all

of

the divine law concerning provi

summarized

in the thesis that God

so well

rewards or punishes men

to their merits or

that

that

happens to
of

an

according individual human

This doctrine is
of

being is in perfect accord with the moral value diametrically opposed to the doctrine of the
who

his

actions.

"philosophers,"

i.e.,
believed
what

Aristotle,
How

denies divine

omniscience some

and,

as a

result,
who

particular providence. we

ever,

"there have been

philosophers

believe,
from

namely that God knows everything and that nothing is in any way hidden

him; disias)

these are certain great

also mentions

men prior

to

Aristotle,

whom

Alexander (of Aphro

rejects"

in his treatise (De Providentia), but whose opinion he (Guide III, 16 (p. 31a)[p. 463]). There would be a certain interest in
prior

knowing who the philosophers are, ing providence is in accord with the

to

Aristotle,

whose

doctrine

concern

Biblical doctrine according to Maimonides. As Alexander's treatise De Providentia is lost, one is confined to the succinct summary of this writing given by Maimonides. Here are Alexander s theses:

The

philosophers were

led to

deny

divine

omniscience and providence

first

and

foremost

by

the observation of the lack of order in human matters, the

misfortune of

by

the

observation of

the just and the good fortune

of

the

unjust

(cf.
to

Guide III, 16 (p.31a)[p.

463]

where

this reasoning is expressly

attributed

Alexander, De

Providentia).

They
of

then came to pose the the conditions of

following

disjunc
or

tions: Either God knows nothing

individual humans,

he

knows them; if he knows them, one of these three cases must necessarily be admitted: either that God rules them and there establishes the most perfect
order,
or

that he is impotent or,

while

knowing

them and

being

able

to intro
or

duce

order

there he neglects to do so, either through disdain and scorn,

because

of envy.

Now

of

these three cases two are impossible

or

with respect

to

God, namely

that God is impotent

that he neglects the things

rules

the first case then remains, namely that God the most perfect
manner.

he knows; only the individual conditions in

Now,

we

lated;
and

as a

result, the presupposition

completely unregu that God knows individual things is false,

find

such conditions

part of the first disjunction, namely that God knows nothing of individual things, is true (Guide III, 16 (p. 30a-b)[pp. 461-62]). This argu

the other

ment against particular providence was

certainly

not

invented

by

Alexander. A

trace of it is found in the comparable argument

of

the Academician against the

Stoic in Cicero (De Natura Deorum III, 39, 92). But, what is more interesting, Chrysippus and the Stoics themselves had posed similar disjunctions to those

Some Remarks
cited
and

on

the

Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

23

by

Maimonides

with

the intention (opposed to that of the Academicians

Alexander) of proving that there is a divine providence concerning human matters (cf. Cicero, De Divinatione I, 38, 82-39,84 with De Natura Deorum II, 30, 77). It seems then that the reasoning, summarized by Maimonides, was
first
employed end.

to

affirm providence. of the

It

must even

be

said

that

it

was

invented
to

for this

In the tenth book

Laws, Plato

"exhortation"

addresses an

him who,

while

and neglect
unjust

admitting the existence of the gods, believes that they "scorn human He begins by stating that the good fortune of the
affairs."

is the

reason which

leads

men

to this impious belief (Laws 899 Dff). He

then proves that God is no less concerned with the small

with

(human)

matters

than

the great

(cosmic), beginning from

able to concern

the

following

premises:

(1) God knows

the

all

things, (2) he is

himself

with the small matters as well as

great,
and

(3) being perfectly virtuous, he wishes to be so concerned (Laws 902 E 901 D-E). It is this distinction between divine knowledge, power, and
made posed

will,

junctions

for proving particular providence, which is at the basis of the dis by Alexander with a view to refuting this belief and, before
to confirm

him, by Chrysippus

it;

and one

finds in Plato

some

indications

of

these very disjunctions (Laws 901 B-C

and

902 A). Moreover, Alexander had

begun his reasoning by stating, in the which brings men to deny particular
unjust, which Maimonides
repeats

same manner as
providence

Plato,
good

that the reason

is the

fortune

of

the

in his

own account of providence

(Guide III,

19

beg.) As Alexander had

who

explicitly of philosophers prior to Aristotle believed in divine omniscience, we do not hesitate to conclude that Mai
spoken

monides knew, if only through other texts, at least through Alexander's treatise De Providentia, the doctrine of the Laws on providence. And if Alexander did not cite Plato's text, one would have to say that Maimonides, without his

knowing it,
ion"

re-established

this text: it

was

certainly

not

Alexander

who

had

characterized the negation of particular providence as a

"bad

and absurd opin

(Guide III, 16. Cf. Laws 903 A). But Maimonides not only knew of the doctrine of the Laws on providence, he even approved of it: according to him, the doctrine of certain "great men prior to concerning providence is
Aristotle"

in

accord with

the doctrine of the divine law. And can one judge otherwise,
of

since

Plato

speaks

God's

vindictive with

justice in

almost will

the same terms as

Scripture (cf. Laws 905 A-B

agreement

Amos, IX, 1-3)? It

prophets

be

objected

that the

between Plato

and

the

Plato

affirms

the dogma of
governed

particular and

is specious, it being a given that providence only because of its political

not

utility: unless

city

by laws,

by

philosophers, cannot

be

perfect

the belief that God

established

rewards or punishes men

according to their actions,

not

is there

(cf. Laws 663 D-E). We do

dispute this. But it is

precisely in this sense that Maimonides accepts the Biblical doctrine: While in his discussion of both creation and prophecy he identifies his own opinion with that of the law, he clearly distinguishes, in his discussion of providence, his

24

Interpretation
Guide III, 17 (p. 34b)[p. III, 23 (p. 49b)[p. 494]). Maimonides is thus, here again, in accord

own opinion and

from that

of the

law (Cf.

above all

469]
with

Plato.23

Having

arrived at

this point, one cannot avoid posing the questions,

decisive be be

for the understanding of Maimonides, ology of the Guide and the Platonic doctrine
tween the cosmology of the Guide

concerning the
of the

relation

between the the

the
relation

One,

and

(i.e.,

the discussion of the creation of the

world)

and

the doctrine of the Timaeus. The analysis of these relations must

a subsequent study.

reserved

for

NOTES

1. Cf.
and

Strauss, Philosophy

and

Law [New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1987],

pp.

103

55-56. In R. Sheshet ha-Nasi's letter, published by A. Marx (Jewish Quarterly Review, N.S., XXV [1935], 406ff.), one finds the following note concerning Plato's Laws, certainly based not on
a

direct knowledge
also seen

of

it, but

on a tradition whose

history is

not yet elucidated.

R. Sheshet
composed

says:

"I

have

in the Book

of

the

Laws

of

the intellect [the

our

Laws]

which

Plato

that in it

he forbids the things

which are

forbidden in

holy

Torah. For

example:

Thou

shalt not murder,

and thou shalt not commit adultery, and thou shalt not steal, and thou shalt not
against

bear false

witness

thy

neighbor and

thou shalt not covet and the rest of the things which the
with respect

intellect teaches
commanded to

us to refrain perform

from. Also

to the positive commandments

of the things which

he [i.e.,

Plato]

justice

and righteousness.

And many
Cf.
also

the virtue of the intellect teaches

Torah."

to do are among the things 2. [See] the preceding

Society,"

which are written note.

in

our true and

holy
Conception
of

E. Rosenthal,

"Maimonides'

State

and

in Moses Maimonides, ed. I. Epstein (London, 1935), pp. 189-206. Let us note further that Munk tends to level the political character of the respective

passages of

Le Guide [des Egares] b al-i'mal al-siyasiyya

Let

translating, for example, madani as al-madaniyya which Munk translates as "the

"social"

by

(cf. especially III, 31, p. 68 practice of the social duties").

"state"

us add that the translation of medinah as

instead

"city"

of

is

all

the more

erroneous.

In

philosophical
ment"

texts,

one often ought to

translate even the Hebrew

word medinah not as

"depart

"region,"

or

but

"city.'

as
not

Averroes himself declares that he does

know it [the Politics].

und

According
als

schneider, Die Hebraischen Uebersetzungen [des Mittelalters

die Juden

lin. 1893;
his friends

reprint ed.

translated into Arabic. It may

who

Graz: Akademischen Druck-u. Verlaganstalt, 1956) p. be, however, that Farabi knew it through the intermediary
reports:

to [Moritz] SteinDolmetscher] (Ber 219, it was never

of those of

knew Greek. Averroes

"Apparet

autem ex sermone

Abyn

arrim

[Abi nazr]

Alfarabii, quod inventus est (sc. liber Politicorum Aristotelis) in illis (Aristotelis Opera, Venetiis 1550, Vol. Ill, fol. 79a, col. 1, I. 36-38). |"It is clear, moreover, from Alfarabi's report, that it (Aristotle's Politics) was found in those cities."] Also Averrois Paraphrasis in Plat. Rempubl. (loc. cit., fol. 175 b, col. 1, I. 38-39). Averroes believed that he commented on this treatise [on dreams]; but it is easy to see that his
villis."

paraphrase

is

not

based

on

Aristotle's treatise. One

must

judge in the

words with which

Farabi

claims to summarize the subject of

same way regarding the few Aristotle's treatise (see Falaquera.

Reshit hokhma,
sion that the

Plato
Die

and

David (Berlin, 1902), p. 87, 1. 27-32). (It remains to show on another occa of the Reshit hokhma is the translation of Farabi's book on the philosophy of Aristotle.) Cf. also the remarks concerning the De Somno et Visione of Kindi in A. Nagy,
ed.

third part

Abhandlungen des Kindi (Munster, 1897), pp. XXII-XXIII. As regards the defective knowledge of the Pana Naturalia among the Muslims in general, cf. Max Meyerhof. Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad (Berlin: Abhandl. der Preuss Akad. d. Wiss.,1930), p. 27.
philosophischen

Some Remarks
I
owe

on

the Political
on

Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

25

the

invaluable information
which

this and such other points as bear on the intellectual

atmosphere

thought, to my friend Paul Kraus. Cf. while awaiting his subsequent publications his "Beitrage zur islamischen Revista degli Studi Orientalia, XIV (1934), 94-129 and 335-379.
and
Ketzergeschichte,"

in

Farabi lived

3. This [Opinions of [The

the

People of

the

Perfect

City] is

the title of Farabi's

on the

other major work.

most recent edition appeared under

the title Al-Farabi

Perfect State,

a revised

text

with

introduction,
Cf. the
"Raziana."

translation and commentary

studies on

Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).] Razi that Kraus has begun to publish in Orientalia of Rome under the title

by

4. For

even

[See Orientalia, N.S., IV (1935), 300-334; V (1936), 35-56, 358-378.] the doctrines formed in a Christian setting are constituted only in opposition to
thus cannot

Maimonides; they
which presupposes

be interpreted
last

without

the

preliminary interpretation
seems to

of

the

Guide,

the reconstitution of the Farabian doctrine.

original of the part of the

5. The Arabic
"Maimonides'

Millot

be lost;

see

Steinschneider,

Hebraische Uebersetzungen, p. 434. [The Arabic text has now been recovered. See Israel Efros, Arabic Treatise on Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Re
Logic"

search,

XXXIV(1966).]

We read,
anashim

following

the

Ms. Mm. 6 24 (fol. 29a)

of the

Cambridge

University Library,

Ha-

Haham ["those people"] instead of ha-anashim ["the people"] of the [printed] editions. 6. It is, moreover, in this way that the passage in question is understood by the commentators
able

we

have been Ramah

to

consult

(an

anonymous commentator

in the

edition of

Cremona, Comtino,

and

Mendelssohn).
unah of

One finds

some

interesting

parallels which confirm our

interpretation in

the Em

and 101) and in the fragments, published by R. Gottheil, of an encyclopedia of the sciences composed by an unknown Muslim author (J.Q.R., N.S., XXXIII [1932], 178). We do not dispute that the words "in these may be taken in the
times"

Abraham Ibn Daoud (pp. 98

Understood in this way, the final phase implies: political science was "during needed when the Jewish state existed, and it will be needed again after the coming of the Messiah.
sense

captivity."

According

to this

interpretation,

the practical importance of political science would

we

be

greater

than

Maimonides'

it is according to the interpretation doctrine.

7. Cf. Guide III, 28 (p.

have

preferred as

being

better in

accord with the whole of

61b) [p. 513]

and

III, 51(p. 127a) [p. 624]. As

regards the relation

between the household

Guide III, 41 (p. 90b) [p. 562]. 8. [For Farabi's divisions of philosophy:] K. al-tanbih 'ala sabil al-sa'ada (Hyderabad, 1346 A.H.) pp. 20-21. The division of practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics is found
and

the city, see

in

one of the

Philosophische Abhandlungen,

published
ed.

by [Friederich]

[Alfarabi's Abhandlung der] Musterstaat, [Reprinted 1964.] [See note 3 above.]

"Political
the

Dieterici (Leiden: Brill, 1895),

Dieterici (p. 51, 19-21). pp. 46, 18-19. depend

ends
on

science examines the types of actions and ways of

life

which

the will, and

which

habits

from

which

actions are performed. and

and

life derive, and the And it distinguishes between the ends for which the
these
actions and ways of

for

these

actions are performed

the ways of life are

followed;

and

it

explains

that there
of

is

an end which

is

true happiness

it distinguishes between the in

a

actions and

the ways

life,

and explains

that those

by

which one

attains

true happiness are the praiseworthy

man

goods and virtues

and that the condition of their

existence nations

is that the

perfect actions and perfect ways of

life be determined in the

cities and

in

hierarchical

manner and

that

1931), p. 64. Compare (Hyderabad, 1345 A.H.),

the
pp.

parallels

they be practiced in in Musterstaat, p. 46, 7-21

common."

'Ihsa al'ulum;

(Cairo,

and

in the k.

tahsil al-sa'ada,

15-16. [The Ihsa has been partially translated

by

Fauzi M. Najjar in

Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds; for the Mus terstaat see note 3 above; the k. tahsil al'sa'ada is available in Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, translated by Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).] k.
al-siyasat al-madaniyya,

(Hyderabad, 1346 A.H.),

ed.

pp.

42

and

50. [This text has been

edited more recently:

Al-Farabi's The Political Regime

Fauzi M. Najjar (Beyrouth: Imprimerie

Catholique, 1964);
Sourcebook.]
[For the

a partial translation also

by

Najjar

appears

in Medieval Political Philosophy: A

importance is
noted

sciences

see] 'Ihsa

al-ulum.

This

small

treatise,

whose singular

by

26

Interpretation
the sciences on the

Ibn al-Qifti, is more a critique of the sciences, a note distinguishing between basis of their value, than an encyclopedia properly speaking. [On the
virtues

see]

Musterstaat,
of ethics and

p.

69.

In the

parallel

text (L

al-siyasat

al-madaniyya, p.

55),
his

the actions which conduce to happiness are mentioned at the end of the

enumeration.

[On the

inseparability

politics:] That

is, if one bases

the interpretation of
of

Farabi

on
al-

principal writings.

At present, it
of

suffices to note that even the

titles, for example,

k. tahsil

sa'ada

("The Attainment

("Note
most

Concerning

the Path toward

Happiness") on the one hand, and of k. Happiness") on the other, indicate

confirmed

ala sabil al-sa'ada

rather

important;

this

judgment is
a

by

the analysis of

clearly that the first is the two writings themselves: the first

philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, the second is the introduction to a grammatical work; and only the first is mentioned by Ibn al-Qifti as one of the most important writings of Farabi. The distinction between ethics and politics is found only in the second.

is the introduction to

book

on the

of

Aristotle

Compare the attempt, similar to Maimonides', to reconcile the Farabian point of view with that which is found in the fragment of an encyclopedia of the sciences published by Gottheil
on

(see

n. 6); according to the unknown author who, moreover, cites Farabi's treatise city as one of the classic books on politics, the order of the practical sciences following: (1) politics (2) ethics (3) economics.

the perfect

would

be the

Let

us recall that

Maimonides himself
[linguae hebraicae

nations."

speaks of

"perfect
nations:]

[On the distinction between the

saurus philosophicus

governance of cities and of

et veteris et

According

to the

The

recentioris]

of

Halmut to

(s.v. Hanhagah) Hanhagat HaMedinah would correspond external or world politics ("Weltpolitik"). The origin of this misunderstanding seems to be the explication of the words in question given by Mendelssohn in his commentary on the Millot.

33]

Klatzkin [Berlin, 1928to internal politics, Hanhagat

[Jacob]

Mendelssohn,
politics of

a student of as

Chr. Wolff

and other theoreticians of modern natural

error also caused

right,
of

translates
of the

Hanhagat HaMedinah

"Polizei."

Another

by

insufficient knowledge

Farabi is the translation

of

Medinah MeKubetzet

by

"Republik"

instead

"Demokratie"

(see

op.

cit., s.v. Medinah).

classified as a

This [The Perfect City] is the Bodleian Library.

"political

book"

in the

mss. of

the British Museum and

Musterstaat,
brought

p.

58, 18-59, 11;

of

cf.

ibid.,
of

p.

69, 15:

The first Chief

and

how

revelation

is

about."

This is the title

political science and

the last chapter

his

encyclopedia of

the sciences (Ihsa al-'ulum): "On

kalam."

the science of thefiqh

and

the science of the

passage

9. Musterstaat,
10. This is

p.

59, 1 Iff.; k.
says

tahsil,

pp.

44-45. This

is found

almost word

for

word

in the Rasa'il Ihwan

what ed.

al-Safa

(Cairo, 1928),
p.

vol.

IV,

pp.

182-183.
ed.

Falaquera

in his Sefer ha-mebakesh,

also the analogous
which marks

Traklin

p.

90. Cf. Maimonides,

the ma'aseh bereshit

Consultations,
[account
physics.
of

Freimann

337. interpretation
of

11. Cf. Guide III, 7 beg. Compare

the

beginning]
of

in Guide II, 30,

and

the conclusion of the discourses on

12. The discussion

prophecy

law

is

found in H. Yesode ha-Torah VII-X;

chapter of

cf.

the conclu

sion of the metaphysics and physics,

This is why Maimonides In ogy (Guide II, 48 beg.)

of

attaches

loc. cit., II, 1 1 and IV, 10-13. the greatest importance to the final

the

prophetol

order to understand the composition of the presented

Guide,

one must

take note

the order of the

dogmas

found,

though somewhat

in the commentary of the Mishneh (Sanhedrin X) which is modified, in H. Teshuvah III, 6-8. According to this order, the dogmas

concerning the existence, unity and incorporeality first place; immediately following are the dogmas

of God and the eternity of God alone, occupy the concerning prophecy in general and the prophecy of Moses and the Torah in particular; and only after this the dogmas concerning providence and eschatology. The source of this order seems to be the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the usul [roots] which determines the composition of the Emunot ve-deot of Saadia Gaon (cf. the interesting remark of S. Pines in Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 1935, col. 623). The order in question can be found again in the Guide in as much as the first class of dogmas is treated in the majority of I, l-II, 31, the second in II, 32-48, and the third in III, 8-24. Maimonides departs from this order for different

Some Remarks
reasons,
of the

on

the Political Science of Maimonides

and

Farabi

27

among

others when adopting, to a certain extent, the

of

following

order

"opinions

the

men of

the

perfect city":

(1)

the

first

cause and all

its

attributes

drawn up by Farabi (Guide I, 1-

70), (2) it,

the

their government

bodies (II, 3-9), (3) physical bodies, justice and wisdom as seen in (II, 10-12), (4) the human soul and the way in which the active intellect inspires first Chief and revelation (II, 32-40). This order is followed more strictly in H. Yesode haangels and celestial
must note

Torah. 13. One

that Maimonides
uses as synonyms

"divine

emanation

and

"intellectual

emanation."

In

so

doing, he

acknowledges that

II, 48 beg.,

a passage whose singular

prophecy is a natural phenomenon. Compare Guide importance is noted by Maimonides himself.

Regarding

this passage, Munk (Le Guide

des Egares II,

p.

373)

makes

the

following

remark:

"It may seem strange that the author places legislators beside diviners and counts them among those whose imagination rules over reason. But one sees later (ch. XL. pp. 310-1 1) that the author does
not mean

to speak here of purely political legislation which, as he himself says,

is the
"

work of

he has only had in mind those of the ancient legislators who believed themselves in This remark spired, claimed to be prophets, and presented their laws as dictated by a divinity. is not right. In the passage mentioned by Munk, in Guide II, 40, Maimonides expressly says that a
reflection;

purely

political

law, i.e.,

law

which

has

no other end

than the ordering of

work of a man who

social relations and

the

prevention of

injustice

and

violence,

is necessarily the
other

has

no other perfection

than that of the imagination.

On the

hand,

when

speaking

of

legislation

which

is the

work of

reflection, Maimonides does not only have in mind purely political

laws, but

also and above all

laws

whose end

is the intellectual
the
word

perfection of men, projected

Maimonides
"sensual

"imagination"

uses

in

very broad

laws to the imagination, he follows Farabi's

aptitude"

opinion

attributing the purely according to which these laws are the

sense:

by by

philosophers.

Let

us add that political

work of

(see [below]).

14. Maimonides

immediately

passes

from the

exposition of

the social function of the prophet

(II, 37, last part) to that of prophetic courage (II, 38, beg.). Cf. also II, 45 (pp. 93a-94a) [pp. 395-97]. The Arabic
the courage

word

Maimonides

uses

to designate

(iqdam)

of the prophets recalls

the passage of the Perfect

Chief,"

City

Farabi, in enumerating

the conditions of the "first

also speaks of

(p. 60, 9-11), where this faculty. Let us remark

of

in passing that this enumeration only reproduces the enumeration of the conditions pher-kings in Plato's Republic. Moreover, Farabi, in a parallel (k. tahsil, p. 44),
pressly.

the philoso

cites

Plato

ex

Averroes himself

speaks of

the courage of the prophets when paraphrasing Plato's dis

course on the courage of the guardians; metus

"ideoque

neque

Prophetis,

neque magistratibus

formido,

aut

Averrois Paraphrasis in Platonis Rempubl., Tr. I (Opera Aristotelis Venetiis 1550, Vol. Ill, fol. 176 b, col. I. 1. 64-65). [Cf. Averroes on Plato's Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1974) p. 23: "hence prophets and chiefs ought not to be
characterized as

conveniens."

being fearful."]

or

15. Guide III, 51 (p. 127a)[p.624]. The falasifa attribute greater value to courage than did Plato Aristotle (cf. above all Laws 630E-631C, a passage from which one must begin in order to

understand the

tendency

which

determines the

composition of the

Nicomachean Ethics). The in

"superstitious"

creased prestige

accorded

courage

is

explained

by

two characteristics of Islam: the missionary the polemic against

popular. menaces

tendency

which

is inherent in
were

a universal religion; and

which are

inherent in

a universal religion that

is thereby

Muslims, they recognized the commandment of the holy war, understood rather they were guided by the idea of a civilization realizable by only through civilizing wars: this idea is absent from the thought of Plato. Averroes, in his paraphrase of the Republic, speaks of this in the following manner: "(Dicimus) Platonem, cum de virtutibus tractare instituit, de fortitudine primo initium sumpsisse, enimvero, ratio ipsa, modusque sciendi,
them as a civilizing war or,
quibus earn perfectissimam cives adipiscantur, et servent, ea est, ut quod primum sit operum virtutis propositum
virtutes

As the falasifa

huius
qua
ora-

in

civitate observemus.

Dicendum
si

ergo est

duplicem
seu

omnino viam
seu

esse, ex

in

animis civium reperiantur.

Alteram,
.

illorum animis, disciplinae

ex

Rhetoricis,
in

Poeticis

tionibus

altius opiniones a

imprimentur
rebus

hoc

autem

genus

eos ut plurimum convenit viis

prior

cives, qui

teneris

similibus

assueverint,

atque

his duabus disciplinae

ilia

naturae magis consentanea est.

Posterior

etenim ea

est, cuius usus in adversarios potissimum, ac

28

Interpretation
illis debitis
autem adhaerere recusant, quam quidem viam quis
posteriori viae,

odiosos nobis est, eosque qui virtutibus

nuncuparit castigatricem.

Neminem
non esse.

latere debet huic

inter

cives

huius

Reip.

praestantissimae

locum

Atqui
mores

nonnullae aliae gentes

improbae

adeo

existunt,

minimeque virtuti nisi cum

parentes, quarumque

inhumani sunt,

ut nulla alia ratione

est

institui possint,
quae ab quae ad

Similisque ratio illis confligatur, ut virtutibus obsequantur. humanis legibus non discrepant. Quemadmodum nostra haec lex divina, Deum
armis. gloriosum

in legibus,
via

cum

ipsa,
.,

ducit,
est

sit

duplex:

altera

quidem,

quae sermone, atque oratione nititur:

altera, quae

Sed

cum

haec

particularis ars

(sc.

bellica)

non nisi morali via sensit

tuto perficiatur

haec

certe ut

ipsa haec
si

virtus

fortitudo

estque quod

Aristoteles

de

praestantissimae
videtur non

Reipub. bellis,
eum

Alpharabius hominum

memorat: quod tamen a

Platone hoc in libro dictum

.
.

in

sensum, ut

ars ad eumfinem adinventa sit, verum ob necessitatem genus quoddam

quae sane sententia probabilis

est,

humanas perfectiones, contemplativas prae(loc. cit., fol. 175 a, col. 2,1, 36-175 b, col. 1, 1.50). [Cf. Averroes on Plato's sertim, Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner, pp. 10-13: "And we say that the virtue of courage is that with which Plato began to introduce the discussion of the bringing-about of these virtues. As we have

daretur,

quod proclive ad

esset."

said, the way of understanding how it is attained

by

the citizens and preserved with respect to them

in the

most perfect manner city.

this virtue in the

about

in the

souls of

is primarily intended by the actions of We say that there are two ways by which the virtues in general are brought political humans. One of them is to establish the opinions in their souls

[requires that]

we consider what

through rhetorical and poetical arguments.

only for
ways of

whichever of

the

citizens grew

enemies,

teaching, this one is natural. foes, and him whose way it is

the

This first way of teaching will mostly be possible up with these things from the time of his youth. Of the two The second way [of teaching], however, is the way applied to
not

to be aroused to the

virtues

that are

desired
that

of

him.
way

This

is

way

of

chastisement

by

blows.
. .

It

is

evident

this

will not

be

applied

to the members of the virtuous city.

As for the

other nations, which are

is not human, why there is no way of teaching them other than this namely to coerce them through war to adopt the virtues. This is the way in which matters are arranged in those Laws belonging to this our divine Law that proceed like the human Laws, for the
not good and whose conduct

way,

ways other

in it that lead to God

to

(may He

through war. Since this art of war

near what

be exalted!) are two: one of them is through speech, and the is not completed other than by a moral virtue by which it in the
appropriate time and measure

draws

is

appropriate and

i.e.,

the virtue of
what

courage.

This is

what

Aristotle

asserts about

the wars

of

the virtuous city, according to

Abu Nasr [al-Farabi] reports. But from what we find concerning this in this book of Plato's, why according to him this part [of the soul, sc, courage] is not prepared for this end [sc. war] but rather is on account of necessity This opinion would only be correct if there were but one class
of

humans disposed to the human

pp.

perfections and

especially to the theoretical ones."] Compare

where quoque

Farabi, k. tahsil,

31-32.

When paraphrasing the passage of the Republic brave (486 B), Averroes says: "Ad haec Fortitudo
sine

Plato demands that the

in hoc

philosophers

be

octavum obtinebit

locum,

nam

fortitudine

rationes

illas debiles,

non

demonstrativas, in

quibus eum

(sc. philosophum)

educari

contigit, nee contemneret, neque refelleret, quod quidem magis etiam perspicuum est
sunt."

nostris civitatibus educati

Republic,
be
up, and

p.

73: "The

eighth

in his, qui in (Loc. cit., fol. 182 b, col 1, 1. 40-45) [Cf. Averroes on Plato's [condition is] that he be courageous. For one who has no courage will he [sc. the philosopher] has
phrases
grown

unable to

despise the

non-demonstrative arguments on which

grown

especially if he has
point of critique

up in these cities".] These

imply

a certain critique of

Plato's
the

view, as one sees

by

Averroes. This

is

carried out

comparing them with the passage of Plato paraphrased by in an explicit manner in the paraphrase of the tenth book of
sub-

Republic; "decimus Platonis liber huic civili, quam tractamus disciplinae, nihil admodum (confert) (Plato) suasorias inductiones, ac rationes locis quibusdam probabilibus depromptas didit, quibus animam immortalem esse probaret. Et infert deinde fabulam Enimvero iam nos antea saepius prae diximus, istiusmodi fabulas non esse alicuius momenti. Etenim Platonem videri earn fictam, fabulosamque rationem ingerere, quae tamen nihil ad humanam probitatem
necessaria sit. moribus

Quippe
expertes

quod

homines

non paucos

cognoscimus,
nihil

qui suis
nihil

freti

plane, et rudes

istarum fictionum,

virtute,

vitae

ipsi legibus, atque instituto pro-

Some Remarks

on

the Political

Science of Maimonides
col.

and

Farabi
on

29

fessoribus talium historiarum

concesserint"

(fol. 191 b,
rhetorical or

2, 1.11-39). [Cf. Averroes

is
not

Plato's

Republic,
Then he does
not

pp.

148-49: "What the tenth treatise

thereafter a

encompasses

mentions

dialectical

argument

by

necessary for this science. which he explains that the

soul

die. Then there is

a story.

We have

made us

it known

more

than once that these stories

are of no account.

It is this that has brought

to an untruth such as this. It is not something

necessary to

a man's

becoming
Laws,

virtuous.

For

we see

here many

people

who,

in adhering to
possess

their nomoi and their

albeit

devoid

of

these stories, are not less well off than those

stories.]"

ing [these]
As
regards another

difference in

principle
Chief"

between the falasifa

law"

and

Plato,

see n.

20.

16. One finds the

72 (p,103a)[p.

expression

"first

191]

and

the expression

(al-ra'is al-awwal) used figuratively in the Guide I, "Chief of the (ra'is al-shari'a) twice in II, 40 (p.

86b)[p. 383].

Cf., however,
and speech and

with

the definition of
"

"Imam"

in Farabi (k. tahsil,

p.

43)

the

following

words of

Maimonides concerning Moses:

would ed. ed.

Shemoneh Perakim, ings of Maimonides, 74].

because they would [imitate] his [Moses'] every movement wish thereby to attain happiness in this world and the other in Ethical Writ Wolff (Leiden: Brill, 1903), p. 15 [See "Eight
(world)" Chapters"

Raymond L. Weiss

and

Charles Butterworth (New York: Dover, 1983),

p.

17. Republic 375 C Plato

und

and

die Dichter (Frankfurt

zur platonischen

410 D-412 A; Statesman 306 ff; Laws 773. Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, am Main, 1934), pp. 18-19 [see Platos dialektische Ethik und

andere

Studien

Philosophie, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968)].

We follow here the text
of

18. "Qowwa
confirmed

hissiyya.'

qarihiyya

the Palencia

edition

which

is

by

the Latin translation of Gerard of Cremona.

19. Guide I, 34 (p. 41a)[p. 78]: "Consider how,

as
conditions

by

means of a

text of a

book, they laid down

varieties of political

of

the

perfection

of the

individual, his being

perfect

in the

regimes as well as

perspicacity and understanding and the gift of finely expressing himself in communicating notions in a flash. If all Cf. again this is realized in someone, then the mysteries of the Torah may be transmitted to
speculative sciences and withal natural
him."

in the

his possessing

Guide I, 33 (p. 37b)[p. 72]: ".

that he divine a
notion even

that

he be full

of understanding, suggested

intelligent,

sagacious

by

nature,

among

others

the

following

if it is only very slightly conditions to be fulfilled

He

to him in a

flash."

Farabi

mentions

by

the "first Chief": "He should be

by

nature

excellent at understanding.

should possess natural

perspicacity; when he sees the slightest

should

indication

of a

thing, he

should

himself."

finely

expressing Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985) p. 247]. 20. Guide I, 36 (p.44a)[p. 85]. Cf. Musterstaat,
col.

grasp what the indication points to. He (Musterstaat, p. 59, 16-21). [Cf. Al-Farabi on
p.

have the

gift of

the Perfect

State,

trans.

70, 1-3,

and

70, 23. Cf.

also

Averroes, In
be
eloquent

Rempubl. Plat. (fol. 182 b.

1, I. 50-54). The
attach

condition greater

that the philosopher-king

rhetoric

is

not

mentioned

by

Plato. The falasifa

importance to

that did

according to them, the prophet Faslul-maqal

the
and
revealed passim and n.

is

at once

a philosopher and orator a result, one

(cf. in

particular

Plato; Averroes,

19

above).

As

finds

some

interesting

remarks

concerning

law in the discourses

Averroes, Paraphrase
Averroes'

Farabi, Ihsa al'oloum, p. 26, de la Rhetorique d'Aristote, Paris Ms., Hebrew cod. 1008, fol. 92 b ff.)
of

the falasifa on rhetoric (cf. e.g.,

"Topics"

"Rhetoric"

"Poetics,"

and Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's and the Topics. Let and trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977)] and political science. moreover, the original relation between rhetoric

[see

ed. us

recall,

important question concerning the relation up in the present article the the Mosaic laws given by Maimonides, and political philosophy. We Maimonides twice cites passages from the Nicomachean Ethics in order only note here the fact that [p. 572] and III, 49 beg.). explain Biblical commandments (Guide III, 43, p. 96a

21. We do

not take

between the
to

explication of

22. For prophecy is essentially

representing those of the imaginative

related

to

legislation,

and

the "legislative virtue

comprehend

is

man's art of

speculative concepts which are

difficult to

faculty,
an

happiness,
vulgar

and

the

amphibolous

know

(only) in

ability to produce political actions discourse concerning speculative and practical This is what Falaquera says in amphibolous
and the
manner."

for the vulgar, by means which are useful for attaining

matters

that the

a passage of

the

30

Interpretation
,

Reshit hokhma (ed. David

p. 30, 1 25-27) which is probably founded on a writing not yet identi Farabi's. [See Farabi's Book of Letters (Kitab al-Huruf) Commentary on Aristotle's Meta physics, Arabic Text, ed. Mushin Mahdi (Beyrouth: Darel-Mashreq, 1969).]

fied

as

dence, in
spoken

23. There is, moreover, direct testimony of this; after having set out his doctrine on provi opposition to Aristotle's doctrine, Maimonides declares: "The philosophers have equally

in this

sense

(sc. that

providence watches over

individual humans in
on

accord with

the extent

of their perfection).

Abou-Nasr, in

the introduction to his commentary

Aristotle's Nicomachean

Ethics,
pass

expresses

from

one moral

most."

over them

who possess the faculty of causing their souls to quality to another are those of whom Plato has said God's providence watches Guide III, 18 (pp. 38b-39a)[p. 476]. Maimonides could have found similar texts

himself in these terms: those

in Aristotle; there is

no

doubt that he knew this; why then did he

not cite

Aristotle, but Plato

and

Farabi?

On Ancients

and

Modems

Joseph Cropsey
The

University

of Chicago

To

speak of ancients and moderns

is

inevitably

to

invoke history: there

was

an ancient epoch and

there is
mean

a modern epoch.

Time has passed,

by

which we

are more than

likely

to

that

time has passed. To speak of ancients and

moderns without

further

clarification

is

also

to

leave in doubt

whether

the ques
was

tion concerns the ways of

life

of ancient people and modern people

"then"

(what it

like to

belong
the

to the generality of

mankind

as

or whether

determining

question

is

what appears

to

distinguished from now) be a simply scholarly

true

one: ancient centuries

thought set

beside
the

modern
words

thought.

Finally, it has been

and
regard

for

that merely to

the image of a quarrel.

quarrel as self-evident.

say One's first tendency is to

slight reflection one

"ancients

moderns"

is to

summon

the existence of the

"quarrel"

Upon

tends to dismiss the

as an obvious anachronism and

thus

a self-evident

impossibility: how

can there

be

a quarrel

between be

parties

only

one of whom

is

alive

to participate in the

contest? cients

It

would

more precise

by

the moderns.

simply of the rejection of the an Upon further reflection it appears that there is indeed a
speak might exist and understandings

to

way in
the

which

the quarrel
rejected

be
of

of utmost

seriousness, namely, if

moderns

the

the ancients on subjects that the

ancients

knew to be
such a

problematic and which

they

themselves had already de

bated. In
quarrel would

case, the moderns

which

would appear as

late

entrants

in

debate

or

the issues in

had been defined

the extent
of

by

the

ancients.

moderns'

be

unwise

to

prejudge

the

In any event, it rejection of (quarrel

with, if necessary) the ancient

ancients and moderns will
ment

wisdoms.

I believe that the juxtaposition

of

reveal,

not

surprisingly,

such a considerable agree

regarding the identity of the highest questions that the observer of the not only spectacle will be convinced that there is such a thing as philosophy appar philosophies but the or periodized philosophies or philosophy
"western"

ently timeless

contemplation

of

the timeless. This inference of

an enormous

homogeneity
but far from
preSocratic.

will

have to be

extracted

from

a complex

heterogeneity,
be in

typified

exhausted

by

the disjunction implicit in the distinction Socratic-

If the his

quarrel

between

ancients and moderns can can

some

way
com-

"philosophy,"

composed of

by

appeal

to

the disjunction between the thought

same considerations of

Socrates
This

and

predecessors

be immune to the
at

paper was prepared

for

delivery
the

the Carl Friedrich

von

Siemens Foundation, Munich,

on

May 8,

1990. It is

printed with

kind

permission of

Dr. Heinrich Meier, Director.

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

32

Interpretation
I
will

position? great

try

to show that

it is not,

without

in any way
modern

depreciating
preeminent

the
and

differences between the

nor

understandings of the of

philosophers

the ancient,
sics.

between those

the preSocratics and of the

clas

Further, I
in the be

will attempt

to relate those differences in thought to the

as well as we can envision and modernity.

differ

ences

conditions of

life,

them, between the

multitude of

denizens
obvious

of

antiquity

It

must

that the

foregoing

is

grievously incomplete

statement of

how the

account stands

between antiquity

and modernity.

Certainly
when

there

is

an

antiquity that ined their

is

not

Greek,

as we would remember

if

we stopped to remind

ourselves of what
moral

exactly the moderns passed under review and intellectual patrimony and "rejected
exegetical or

they

exam
one-

antiquity."

Fully

half

Hobbes'

of

Leviathan is
of

ostensibly

exegetical.

Descartes

ad

dressed the doctors

the Sorbonne on questions

belonging

to their province of

theology. Spinoza could not enter on moral and political philosophy without

traversing

the same difficult territory. Locke

was noticed with concern

by

cleri

cal contemporaries.

Rousseau

proposed a civil religion

that had to diverge

from

the scriptural. The list could be extended. We must conclude that our under

standing

of

modernity
of as

could

be

corrupted

from the

outset

by
and

a massive misun

derstanding
"antiquity"

the

"antiquity"

that modernity rejected;

comprehended

the distortion of
revealed element

if it

only its

rational or

only its

would

We

be precisely the misunderstanding that could produce that corruption. are now in a position to set out our schema of inquiry. The Platonic/
regarded as of a

Socratic philosophy is
profane

marking

an

epoch, presenting the image

of

antiquity

as

ening dial

reformation.

consisting The advent

darkling

primordial episode and an enlight presents a more com

of scriptural

dispensations

plicated version of the same general paradigm: there was a conception of the

benighted

primor

divine, displaced by
of

the enlightening

reformation

that

revealed the absolute

in any visible unity form. To this illumination was added a testimony that includes the teaching, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos
the god that cannot be
represented
God,"

was

a thought that resonates

cient pagans of so

the

age

astoundingly with the declarations of before Socrates. I will argue that the manifold that
when our

an we
and

imprecisely

"antiquity,"

call

intention is to juxtapose antiquity

whole, meaning

modernity, had
plain"

as

its

common purpose to explain the

within

by

"ex

to find the

First

it

and

to learn the genus of the First:

whether

it is

irreducible
ther, I
the

corporeal

substance or the

intelligible that in

some

accessible or

inaccessible way inhabits

will argue

the whole as its

innermost

truth or being. And fur

for the

presence

in the

minds of

the thinkers in every age, of

the truth that man's utmost efforts, unaided or assisted, bring to light: do we dwell in a world that is to us as our father's house, or is the
whole an

everlasting innermost truth is

wonder about

how the human

being

lives in

a cosmos whose

immeasurable

ocean of riches and afflictions that are assigned to us

On Ancients

and

Moderns

33

by

the

blind

and

deaf

one who gives and takes

away according to

our aptitude

rather

than our righteousness?

our tour of

We begin

preoccupation with the

of

antiquity with a glance at the archaic men whose First expressed itself in theogony and cosmogony. It is located the First in
that
night and others

less

concern to us that some of them

in

air or some other particular

irreducible than

they

personified that

First

by

giving it
of

a name and

by deeming

it divine. Should that

move us what

ancient act on the part

the poets and the

shadowy Orphics

to speculate whether it belongs

to

humanity

to regard the First as

defining

deserves to be

called god?

But

the First is also the

thing

be described by reference to any That irreducible may be the that from which all things flow; but irreducible itself evokes also the Lowest, the out-of-which all things are composed. In contemplating the minds of those
what cannot else that

irreducible,

is "more

primary."

"Highest,"

archaic
work of

men, we have the singular

opportunity to

observe

human beings

at

the

making their god or gods, which is only to say manifesting their under standing of what it is that deserves the name of god, or deploying their imag

for reconstructing experience, to the same end. The quest for the absolutely primary is apparently the theozetetic deed, the quest for what deserves to be god, a quest that seems inseparable from the essence of the

ination,

that

faculty

human

condition. and

Descartes
certain selves

surely be found among the doings of such moderns as Spinoza, to take two preeminent examples. What is by no means
It
will

is that

all

those who are in pursuit of the primary know or think them

to be in

quest of what

deserves to be

called god.

Perhaps the divine is

primary; but is the primary divine? We receive an early intimation of a differ ence between antiquity and modernity when we notice that our contemporaries have been schooled to detach the search for the first from a search for the

highest. If the
their

preSocratics

did nothing

else

for us, they

would

have

put us

in

natural excess

debt for compelling us to wonder whether the surrounding directs us necessarily to seek a beyond the
"primary"

endeavor
"divine"

to penetrate our that includes an

or whether

the

"primary,"

whatever

it

proves

to

be,
ing,

can

simply

and

have nothing added to it and is precisely because there is nothing that

"divine,"

if the term be
added

must

be used,
not will

can

to it:

not

hearing,
and

not

speaking, and above all not

and

caring. explain

Homer

Hesiod

the other remote ancients indeed sought to

to

themselves their
or

natural

environment,

inquiring

into its Primal,

whether

Night

Chaos (perhaps meaning as in the division of the waters above from the waters beneath) or something else, with which we need not be con cerned any further than to note that they put their minds to the First of all. It is
obvious that

"chasmic,"

they

thought not only of the absolute Before but also of the abso
are

lute Thereafter. We
to the effect
wicked will

told about the

will revel

teaching

of

the archaic

figure, Musaeus,
while all

that the just

condemned

be

forever in drunken gluttony to perpetual fruitless toil or worse. From

the
we

this

34

Interpretation
a great

know
the

deal

about the wisdom of preSocratic

antiquity.

It

encompassed

First,

the

divine,
or

the

irreducible,
is

the

just,

and the life of the soul

in

dimension
either within

of the whole that

not part of our natural experience: explain

they found it
wholly
as a

impossible

inadvisable to

their

natural

experience

their experience. Their

a

intellectual
an

effort might

be

characterized

seeking for

truth, that is to say

to

intelligible,

the necessity of whose exis

experience whose character

tence became plausible to them within a world of

it

is to

"beyond"

point

experience that could not

be had
and

within

this

world of

nature.

In brief, they
"knowledge"

"knew"

of transempirical

"knew,"

truth,

they

of their universe

of

the

immortal soul, that the human

was taken of we

being
these

by way lived in a
good and
we

in

which cognizance

the

difference between
"knew"

evil as practiced on earth. are

When

say that
we

they
not uttered

of

things,

speaking

somewhat

incautiously, for
be in
a position

do

know how far the

sayers of

these things believed them and how far

reasons.

they

them for merely practical

Soon
at

we will

to make a plausible
Socrates'

judgment
To
the

on

this this

question,
should

least

with respect

to some of

predecessors.

all of

be

added

the insight
and

attributed

to the

Orphic

ancients that

whole

is

pervaded

by Necessity
is
to

Inevitability (ananke,

adrasteia),

which

is

at the

very least

consistent with

the notion,

ing,
dim

that the whole

we continue

a scene of

indispensable to any possible ineluctable cause and effect.

"Antiquity"

understand

As

try

to

define

for ourselves,

we pass

from the

region of

the archaic poets into the area populated

and reports of

by

the writers known to

us through

the fragments

their

work preserved

by

commentators

and

doxographers. We

encounter

Anaximander immediately. His

contributions
reported

to cartography do not concern us, but his physics does intensely. He is

(Diels-Kranz 12A1,
most

after

Diogenes Laertius
not

III)

to have discovered that the

elements such

underlying

or

irreducible is

any

of

the hitherto named

as air and water but rather something called the Infinite, Indefinite, or Unde fined (apeiron), that which is presumably "more than anything to which a form or a distinctness from anything else could be attributed. There is

primary"

the primal substance, there

is

eternal

motion,

and

there is a

most

pregnant

doctrine

of coming into being and passing away. According to Anaximander (Diels-Kranz 12A9 after Simplicius, with special reference to the status of ele ments), each thing that comes into being does so through the destruction of

something else, and for this annihilation each new thing must eventually pay with its own dissolution in order to make way for another entity burdened by its
birth
with a

debt that it

can

repay only

with

its death. Like

all

things,

we arise

from the dust to

which we must return.

This is

what comes to

sight as

the

justice
ment

of

the cosmic order.

Anaximander
limits
of

could serve as a

type

of

the

natural

philosopher

in that his

paradigm of

justice

encompasses a scheme of punish

that is complete within the

the natural world alone, requiring no

reference to a state of the

as

immortal soul in a world hereafter. His conception, it is known to us, is asymmetrical, taking cognizance of offense and

punish-

On Ancients
ment

and

Moderns

35

but

not of goodness and reward. not

that a doctrine of universal flux

moral

In any case, Anaximander makes it clear only can but may easily be infused with a

concept,

such as

that

justice

means equal and exact

"paying

back,"

and

especially the paying back

being for being, life for life, in a natural setting of endless becoming, preservation and destruction. This, the law of retaliation, might even be called the law of nature. For future reference, we may note here
of

the rejection

justice
of the

as

by Socrates, early in Would it "paying

back."

the

Republic,

of

the

proposed

definition
eye"

of

be fanciful invoke
to define the

another ancient rejection

eye

law

of

retaliation, the
cheek,"

one

that sought to replace "an

for

an

with

"turn the
ity"

other

as we struggle

"antiquity"

that

"modern

confronted? Whatever may be problematic about it as a definition of jus s Rule has the merit of tice, identifying an unchanging that is deeper than the transient palpable and that embodies universal right.
Anaximander'

Among
phanes

the predecessors of

Socrates,

the preParmenidean Eleatic Xeno-

is

one who commands a certain attention. and suspected as a

Now looked

at askance as a

theologian, poet, he denounced the manufacture of gods in the image of man, recoiled from the baseness of deities so coarsely generated, and insisted that god is one, for all is one and one is god. In his Metaphysics
(986b21),'

Aristotle

says of

Xenophanes that he little

of of

made

nothing

clear

(outhen

diesaphenisen).

Possessing

so

Xenophanes'

writing,
the

we are

inclined to
his in

try

to understand rather than to

judge

justice

of

Aristotle's

severe criti

cism: on sights as
would.

its face, it
wisdoms,

seems to mean that

unsupported

Xenophanes simply

presented

by demonstrations,

as a poet or myth-maker

regard

Aristotle in this, we nevertheless retain Xenophanes in our for his vision of a one divine that is altogether different from and higher

Trusting

everything in the empirical manifold. Clearly present to his notion that will find expression in all the subsequent ages, that is
than tonic

mind

is the Pla

part of

Socratism,

and

that

for

all we

know

was anticipated

by

his

own prede

cessors, namely, that the

will give reason

popular religion

is

form

of

blasphemy. Heraclitus
a

to think that the popular religion

must

be

form

of

blasphemy.
the flux

Heraclitus, like
equally logos: "Hearkening
one"

many
not

of

his age,

saw all

things as in flux

and saw

as

itself

supervened

in flux, namely be what he called by to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree that all things
what was not emou alia tou

are

(Diels-Kranz Fragment 50. Ouk

logou

akousantas hoone

mologein sophon estin

hen

panta

einai,

after

Hippolytus). The

that is all

things is
.

called god

by

Heraclitus: "God is

day

night winter summer war peace

(Diels-Kranz Fragment
aroused
under

67) in

an apparent annihilation of contradiction and

that is known to have

a

Aristotle

that we might be inclined to see as

viewing

of all

things
of

the species of eternity. Heraclitus

a

had the

reputa
recluse

tion in antiquity

being

a rebarbative eccentric

caustic,

riddling
own

whose misanthropic rejection of mankind was a

legend in his

time. What

is there

about

chantment

his understanding that could have led to such a violent disen with and withdrawal from the social and political existence of man?

36
The

Interpretation
most general answer

is that he had learned to

who were on

mistrust and

presumably then
of

to despise the judgment of men,

the

whole

incapable

into the truth

things; for "the nature of things is (Diels-Kranz Fragment 123 physis kryptesthai philei,
of all
mankind

wont

to conceal

seeing itself
and

after

Themistius)
striking

is disposed to ignore the

own

universal

in favor

of

the particular and each

sentences

to judge according to his

reported of

dim lights. One

perhaps

of the most

him runs, just but

after

"To"

(or

better, "In")
be
not

god, all things are

just"

beauti

ful,

good,

and

men

take some to

unjust and some

(Diels-Kranz
pervasive yet

Fragment
struck

102,

Porphyry). Heraclitus may

have been the first to be is absolutely he

by

the curious fact that the

logos

of

the

whole

mankind, immersed in and existing

by
it is

that

truth, is be

largely

impervious

to it. As

he

perceived

the

logos

of god

the all-comprehending,
not to

presented an

image

so

forbidding

and so paradoxical that enlighten spurned

war

wondered at that the mankind

he hoped to

him

and

thus earned his reciprocated rejection.

For he taught that

come about

Celsius),

thus

by harking
of

conflict and

justice is conflict, and that all things necessity (Diels-Kranz Fragment 80 after Origen/ back to s doctrine that each owes its being
universal and
Anaximander'

is

to the death
exchange of

something else, and justice is achieved through the ceaseless death for life. Heraclitus's world is without the consolation of a "Neither any gods nor men made this cosmos, for it was always be everliving fire kindling in measure and quenching in mea
after

knowing

god:

and always will

sure"

(Diels-Kranz Fragment 30
that is

Clement). Heraclitus's

vision was of a

whole within

first in

being

and

divine

by

virtue of

its

utter

totality. All things

it

came

to be and remain in existence

by

and through a

tension,

call

it

"war,"

conflict or

that produced a world rather than a chaos because

a power

supervened over the contradictions and made them

called

fruitful. That

power was

Logos. It

should

equally

well

be

called measure or

proportion, Metra.

The two Greek

oning.

words are rendered

kin through their is to be

common reference to reck

The innermost truth

of pressures

of the whole

sought and

found in the

equi

librium

that imposes limits on the

overpower

the resistance to its expansion.

capacity Within the

a

of each

striving thing to
understand

whole, all things are

commensurate, thus metra and

logos

can ordain a cosmos.

In this

ing
the

Empedocles too

will

concur,
and

envisioning

logos

that is the
as

proportion

that

reconciles

inescapable Love The

Strife,

the two that are

basic to the

world as

four
who

elements.

preSocratic

thinkers were

of course not naive reduction

ists

left

no room

in the

cosmos

for dual

or other manifolds

that

cannot

be

transcended.

in relation to Socrates: Heraclitus rec there is the ordinary understanding of men, and because the generality would not and could not be led up to the light, he renounced their society and their way of life and speech, bitterly and intemperately. He was the immoderate priest of measure, who saw no limit to the hegemony of commensurability in the cosmos and who at the
see

We

dimly

how Heraclitus
there

stands

ognized well that

is philosophy

and

same time abused

On Ancients
the political
glected or

and

Moderns

37

within of

ordinary condition of man because the sacred logos was ne it. He does not seem to have considered that the recalcitrant is
at the root of

ignorance have
shall

men, which

his

esotericism

(only

to them that

be given), is an aspect of the logos of his one god. What political conclusion he drew from all this is faintly indicated to us in his dictum, "The people must fight for the law (nomos) as for the (Diels-Kranz Frag city
wall"

ment

44

after of

Diogenes Laertius II ix 2). He

the
wisdom of

sounds

like
not

one

of

the early

discoverers bulkhead

Hobbes,

those men who

did

trust the

interven
the

tion of nature to provide the pattern of a good

of

human life but

wall

who regarded

law

or convention as the

defensive

that

man must

draw

about

himself in

a world

in

which

the natural rule is the simple exchange of life for

seen

life. Heraclitus may be thought to have

tionalism.

the respectable

face

of conven

As for Socrates, Timaeus

tute the

we see

unfolded a universal scheme

him standing by without expressing objections while in which proportion does indeed consti heart lie
entities

Good, but in

a cosmos at whose

like

pi and

the

inescap
with

able square roots of two and core of the whole.

Socrates'

three, the

spectral reminders of

the irrational in the that

withdrawal

from the

political mankind

drew from him

was

itself

measured:

ironical,

and without

the

disenchantment

that cannot arise except as the epilogue to an illusion. His vast concessions to the

indispensability
nature as much

of political violate

contrivances, institutions that not only do not

are

flow from

but

it,

brought forth

with

pious

reverence

for

do in proclaiming the city to be a natural physis, growth while acknowledging that the actual cities are more or less monstrous deviants. Socrates appears to have found a way to hold the balance between the Aristotle
would

conflicting

elements of partial truth and

thus to have given the

world

its first

example of high philosophy. Who is to say how accurately the difference be tween Heraclitus and Socrates is measured by so petty a quantity as their re spective reputations
an

for freakish eccentricity,

which

is the

popular

judgment

on

eminence's

moderation? a place of

aclitus

deserves

In any event, one may decently guess that Her honor among the preSocratics who stirred the issues
of

that

became

Socrates'

concern.

We

should

take some notice

Pythagoras,
wise

not

so much

because
because
and

of
of

his his

renowned confidence vision of the relation

in the

mathematical reason of

the

whole as

between the

and

the

unenlightened

between

philosophy
obvious.

kingship, subjects whose bearing on the status of Socratism is fullPythagoras, known to us only by report, was the hegemon of a
and

fledged

cult complete with ranks of

and with tenets

initiation into the mysteries,

when

with rules of epigrammatic

strictest secrecy,

that,

perceived

in their

nakedness,
iron;"

astound with

their crankiness. For example: "Stir not the

with

fire

with

"Putting
the
left;"

on your

shoes, start

the

right

foot; washing
and

your

feet,

with

cross-bar;"

"Never step

over a your

"Do

not sit on a quart

nails;"2

"Spit

upon

the trimmings of

hair

and

finger

many

others.

There is

38

Interpretation here for the

exercise of apologetic

much room

hermeneutics,
mystification

of which some

is
to

on the record, but the impression of

cultivated

is hard to

avoid.

Were these

singular oddments a pabulum

for

novices or were we

they intended

be digested
was not

by

the initiate? We do not

know; but

do know that Pythagoras

mathematician of some sort and a only the sachem of a cult but also a
successful

ruler, said to be a

one, of a city, namely, Croton. The clue to

character as mathematician.

his his

importance is to be

found, I believe, in his

Though

famous for his

eponymous

proposition, the profoundest preoccupation of

than geometrical.

Through Aristotle's many following it references to him and his school may readily be seen that Pythagoras had a vision of the whole as having an absolutely intelligible core: to the empirical
was arithmetical rather world

there corresponds a numerical structure of truth so

"perfect,"

deep

and so pervasive must

that the very concept of

stood as applicable

arithmetically,1

conceived

be

under

human dicta
"knew"

world

equally to morality and physics, to the human and the nonalike. In this perspective, it matters little that the Pythagorean

smack of superstition at

its darkest. In their

errant

way, the Pythagoreans

world are

that the contraries that Heraclitus also held to compose the

overridden

by

the unifying truth of number.

How
orean

are we to reconcile the notorious

confidence and

secrecy

and cultishness of

the

Pythag
human
into

movement, its

in the
to

single mathematical truth of

city?

the

and non-human world,

answer

the propensity to rule in the

The

plausible

is that Pythagoras

aspired

bring

the implicit order of the

whole

concrete manifestation on

the plane of politics, but with

an elite

an apparent

intention
either

to restrict the decisive knowledge to

monopolize the arcana of power or sure.

that

he

could

control,

to

to protect the truth from the perils of expo

The

critique of

the Pythagorean project is sufficiently indicated in two

attempted

passages of

Aristotle's4, Aristotle writes, "Pythagoras first

to discuss

virtue
made

(arete) but not in the right way; for by reducing the his study of them inappropriate; for justice is not a
of a e.g.

virtues square

to

numbers

he

numbe

And

"The Pythagoreans had before this treated

few things,

whose

definitions

they
is'."

connected with numbers

the opportune, the

that

just,

or marriage.

But it

was reasonable

in him

[presumably Socrates]

he inquired into the 'what

From these remarks, if not from the Nicomachean Ethics, we can gather that Aristotle considered justice to be beyond a formulaic definition, such as
could

be the

material of a

handbook for

governors.

Further,

considering only

the unsympathetic allusion to the reduction of marriage to arithmetic,

it is easy
man

to see the basis for such a satire on Pythagorean science as is implicit in the

fiasco
in

of

the "nuptial

number"

that Plato offers for the improvement of

kind. If

by

the

shape:

image of antiquity as that image is filled disjunction preSocratic-Socratic, a suggestion comes to mind in this Heraclitus abjured the political society of his congeners and Pythagoras
we continue

to search for the

embraced

it,

each

in

confidence that

he had

seen a

into the truth

of

the

whole.

Socrates

stood

between them,

having

found

way to live

within and without

On Ancients
the

and

Moderns

39

city

and

having

discovered

a mode of parlance

that was reticent

without

being perversely bringing the heavenly

order on

enigmatic or redolent of shibboleth.

order

With

no

illusions

about

down to earth, he
ancient,

never abandoned

the earthly

the ground that it

refused

the transcendent. Can

we prevent ourselves

from

being

reminded of another

Moses,

whose task

it

was

to go up

and

then to descend
regime?

bearing

to earth the

heavenly

legislation for ordering the best

Parmenides
will always

was

another of the preSocratic

legislating
that

sages of

Greece. It

be

matter

for

wonder

that the

men of

bent

who meddled with

the politics and consorted with the governors of cities

Parmenides, Plato
distant

and

Aristotle themselves

lived

out

Solon, Pythagoras, their lives, while Socra

he took
pains

tes perished at the hands of the city

except that

from

whose affairs

to remain
ex

his fellow-citizens

were shrewd enough

to sense the

pansive rule that

perceptive preference

lay latent in his meagerly attended conversations, enough to intuit as contempt what he put forward as a
a private

and also
cautious

for

life. himself in poetry that is notoriously hard to interpret,

who go

Parmenides

expressed

thus making himself available to those few

by

the path of truth and

being
ion,

rather

than to those others who traverse the way of non-being and opin
or

as

he has it,

becoming
one

and mere perception. and motionless

whole out of

time,

indivisible

He taught the unicity of the Being that is the truth within

wisdom with

the swirl of mere experience. He is conducted to

of the sun who

his

by

the

daughters

lead him into light

to the place that

and who

intercede

Justice herself (dike)

for his

admission

is

entered appears

through the gates of night and

day

(Diels-Kranz 1.228 Fragment 1). It

that Parmenides received his great

sun,"

illumination
may
the logos

as an

instruction from the "daughters

of

the

by

which we
men

understand of

those luminaries of the

age.

firmament
if

who

have introduced

to

the universe in every that would

verse of
remain effect

It is Justice
us not

who guards

the access to

truth,
in

a notion

dark to

for the

clarification

implicit
to

Parmenides'

to the

that Justice would not so relax

her

rule as

permit

Being anything 8). No doubt cognizant of Anaximander's Rule

whole wherein

to become or to vanish (Diels-Kranz 1.234 Fragment

of

Universal Exchange in

flux

would otherwise

threaten to impose
as

lawlessness, Parme
nor can

nides takes

his

stand and shows and

Justice

drawing

the line at any exchange there

between

Being

Becoming.

Nothing

can come

from nothing,

by

nides so

any true annihilation within the whole forcefully. If we ask how

who

whose absolute

Parmenides'

unity struck Parme insight differed from Anaxi

a

mander's, for example, it is Plato

provides

dialogue lets it be

named

for Parmenides. There,

tween Socrates
seen

and

Parmenides,

the subject

by being
Being

strong intimation in the contriving the confrontation be

the status of the

Ideas, Plato
in its
of

that Parmenides held the doctrine of the unity of the whole

most extreme

form: only One

is,

the only

that there is is the

Being
is

One,

and

that truth

is the

sovereign

Truth

of

the whole. Anaximander

struck

40

Interpretation
"justice"

by the scheme of imposing within it

existence. commerce

that guarantees the perpetuity of the whole

of strict and equal
compensation
"justice"

by
for

the law

of existence

Parmenides is

struck and

by

the scheme of

that

forbids any
Anax-

between

Being

the meaningless,

unintelligible non-being.

imander's doctrine is driven

Parmenides
reveals that the

Parmenides'

by

physics,
of

by

metaphysics.

Plato's
than
are

Socratic doctrine

the

Ideas,

which

is the Socratic
radical

orthodoxy
the

on

the subject of the One that inhabits the

of

Many, is less
that for

Unity theory

Parmenides in the

obvious sense

Socrates there

many Ones, least in his youth.

what would

though

exactly how many such there are is unclear to Socrates, at Can they all be reduced to a grand exhaustive One, and if so,
name?

be its

Plato's Timaeus

concludes with a climactic

definition
If
side

of

Good that is

reveals prior

Good to be

a composite

held together

by

proportion.

proportion side with

to good, but proportion

pi

is

compelled

forever to live

by

the irrational

in the inner

recess of

the whole, then the unity of the

primordial principle of mensurable are

the whole is an equivocation: proportion and the

a

incom
be
gov

held together in
or

world-producing

conjunction that must

would

erned
tion"

by

proportion,

the power that makes the world to what reconciles itself

fail; but "propor

We hear
voice of
cos-

is the

name given and

with

its

opposite.

echoes of

Heraclitus

Empedocles; but

are we

hearing
If

them

in the
draw

Socrates? Not literally, for it is Timaeus the

mogonic

astronomer who

leads the
on

discourse to its

polemic-irenic conclusion.

we are to

Plato's

Timaeus for
then we
politics

help in assessing the relation between Socrates and any others, must recall that the Timaeus begins with a Socratic discourse about

(a summary of parts of the Republic) that includes the thought that the is performing its most characteristic deed when it is at war. It would appear city that the polemic premise of the Socratic mandate that sets the dialogue in mo
tion agrees

broadly

with

the equivocal composition between proportion and

its

contrary

with which the

dialogue

ends.

any concurrence is only tacit: he never so much as murmurs a reservation. We may conclude, therefore, that Socrates held to a less radical doctrine of One and Many than
that
of

mind once more that

While saying this, it must be kept in of Socrates in the arguments of Timaeus

Parmenides

and more emphatic

than that of the school that taught that

All is War. Again, Socrates

and unwise to

appears as a man of the middle.

It

would

be

unjust

leave this

aspect of
of

the issue that the

palm

separates

Socrates

and

Parme

nides with this silent

awarding

to Socrates as the

more moderate might

thinker because something

stake.

more serious even than moderation

itself

be

at

Parmenides was in pursuit of the absolute all-uniting One that is beyond time, that must be and that the mind cannot distinguish from unsurpassable Being, different from every thing that exists in mere thinghood or partiality. Parmenides was in pursuit of the First and Highest, which is that which is fit to
be
called god.

Why

should

he

not

be honored

above

the man

who

cannot

transcend Proportion unless Proportion is

able

a name

for the

absolute unsurpass which

intelligible serenity,

the

timeless logos

by

virtue

of

there

is

On Ancients Whole,
god.

and

Moderns

41

that noetic

immovable that is First

and

Highest

and

is fit to be

called

Why doubt the gravity of the dialogue between Parmenides and Socrates? Can one deduce from all of this anything about the human or political mean thought? Perhaps this: Parmenides left no doubt that he saw ing of
Parmenides'

mankind as go

divided between those

a view

who

follow the way

path of

truth and those who

the way of opinion

Parmenides'

in

no

remarkable or original.
make

There is

indeed life? If

a cosmic order and

justice; but how does it

is to be taken
which we cannot

its way into human

may sup himself, to be at
we

participation

as a serious act and not a mere

expression of ambition pose that

(as to

be certain), then

he

considered

the rule of a philosopher, one such as

simply indispensable to enlightening the darkened place that is the ordinary habitation of mankind. Parmenides differs from Socrates in the obvious way that Socrates did not rule or seek to rule. But Socrates admit
effective
not

least

in if

ted that a good man could wish to rule

are worse than seemed to

himself,

as

if only to avoid being those who ruled him in Athens

this
reason

ruled must

by

men who

surely have

of power?

rule

assumption Why may And why may we not equally assume that Socrates abstained from because it was beyond his grasp? Our speculations along these lines are
we not assign our attempt

him.

for

Parmenides'

bound to be inconclusive. Would justice held

received

to distinguish the conceptions

of

by

the two men be less so? Parmenides apparently subscribed to the

of

definition

justice

as quid pro

quo,

with

the

meditated restriction that there can

be

no exchange

far-reaching and deeply between Being and

not-

being. Socrates, rejecting this definition in so many words, proclaimed justice to be keeping or keeping to one's own or to oneself. But this, as the basis of
division
of

labor,

points

inescapably
which

to

exchange at

the same time that

it

points

to the philosopher's appropriating to himself sole and unlimited power, a pos

session and a nides and
on

burden for

only he is fit. Is the Socrates have

opposition

between Parme
except

Socrates

a metaphysical one without practical

accident? claimed

consequences,
to

the plane of biographical

of

have

abandoned

the to

study

the

non-human

things and to

given most of

his life's
all

attention

the study of

mankind and

its

condition.

Parmenides, for
politics.

that we know of
who ruled

him directly,
a

appears

to have done the

who recoiled

reverse.

Yet it is Parmenides

city

and

Socrates

from

Are
would

we

forced back
accepted

on

so

slender a support as the conjecture that

Socrates

have

nothing
or

less than the

that

absolute power of

his

supposititious philosopher-king,
success of a

knowing
any

its

occasion

is

as probable as

is the

"nuptial
was

number

other scheme of such rule as

pragmatism could self

dogmatic rationalism;

while

Parmenides

willing to accept

his

subjects would proffer and at

their pleasure, thus

rationalist

that betokens anything but intransigent

ourselves

evincing a dogmatism. If we he devoted him in the

convic

satisfy

that

Socrates,

the more single-mindedly

more as

to the study of
unreason

the human things, the

he

was confirmed

tion that the

is

as embedded

in them

it is

alongside the

Whole,

we would

know that his

alleged simplistic rationalism, and

rationality of hence

42

Interpretation

optimism,

is

a vulgarization of

his thought. So
and

long

as this

issue

remains

in

unclarity, the
will remain

line between Socrates

extent

this most weighty

of

his

predecessors
of

to that

ill-defined,
enough questions

as will the radical

originality

Socrates;

but

what stands out

clearly

is that the

question of

the rule of

philosophy

directs
the

us

to the deepest

character of

the Whole as a

regarding the place of man in the Whole home for man and, therewith and necessarily,
the marginal considera

the existence, meaning

and character of god or gods.

word should

be

said about what might appear as

tion of how Socrates and

as an eminent

his

predecessors expressed poetry.

themselves.
and most

Parmenides,
it touches:
of ra

example, wrote
and

Poetry

at

its best

serious, that is

to say as it the

is in

for itself,

can claim

to be the inner truth of

unimpeded

what

articulation of sheer and

immediate insight
access to the

by

the

drag

tiocination and thus

having

inmost

recesses at

the threshold of thus

which reason encounters plausibilities as often as necessities and

is frus

trated

by

doubts

and alternatives.

In its tortuous locution poetry

veil

doing
at

pays

its

respects

to the sanctity of, the

that obscures the

imitates, and so innermost,

criti

the same time

draping

intuition in the
Socrates'

raiment of

beauty. The Socratic

cism of cism of

poetry on political grounds fades into banality before the radical criti it that is implicit in abstention from poetry as a means of
utterance.

philosophic

In his deed, Socrates demonstrated the

asked while

gulf that

arated

him from Parmenides: Socrates

not

Parmenides told.
the

By

sep his
He

interrogation, Socrates did

men's minds, or of

merely play the

that it is

part of

stimulator of other

the

corrector of their errors was

in the

most

forceful

way.

also,

perhaps enters

primarily,

denying

by

immediate intuition that

man

kind in
a

the secret places of the Whole and that it is

which elevates

by

assertoric

declaration

baritone idiom

itself

above

daily

speech

that

mankind an

nounces

Truth to itself. Socrates the

asker

of

questions

was

the one who

not

claimed

for himself the

wisdom of

knowing

what and

that

he did
be

know. In
the pro

finding

the middle ground between

and

surrender

to the

enormousness of

the curiosity clusively by an intuitive eye, Socrates may have invented future reference, it may be said that he never abandoned doubt.
vince of
province can

confidence that

that

measured con

philosophy.5

For

From this
omitted:

Socrates'

rapid overview of and

patrimony, two names may not be

the sentence, "Of all
are and of the things

Protagoras
is the
that

Gorgias. Protagoras is famous for

of

things that

man

measure are

the things that are that

said

they

not."

are not

they

If he had
meant

only

that man

is the

measure of all

things, he

could

be taken to have

that there is no justice

could

or virtue or even

pleasure except as men

define those things. While he

possibly have been

much more what

a radical conventionalist

likely

regarding justice and the like, it is very that Protagoras had it in mind that to discriminate between
not, or to

is

and

determine being and becoming, is a human task, the responsibility of human wisdom. When coupled with his denial that he knows about the being and character of gods or
and

what is

investigate

that perhaps anyone can know

On Ancients
about

and

Moderns

43

them, he
perhaps

confirms that

knowledge

of whatever can claim

to be primor

dial,

Being itself,
no

resemble stands

Olympus in
relation to

is simply human knowledge. His pantheon would way if the First and Highest were Being itself. How he
perhaps

in

Socrates is
the

best indicated

by

the way

in

which

Plato begins
agree at

and ends

dialogue that bears

asserts and
at

Protagoras'

name.

The two dis is teach

first in that Protagoras

Socrates denies that

virtue

able,

while

they disagree

appears, if one of them is

right,

last because they have exchanged positions. As it the other must be wrong. Why? In Plato's for the
view

Theaetetus, Protagoras is
ception,
and

made responsible all

that

knowledge is

per

thus

by

implication that

is flux. If human knowledge is knowledge

of

neces

sarily

reducible

to perception, then there can be no true to some

Being

without recourse

knowledge that transcends, or enables the flux that is what is known by aisthesis, perception. scend,
of

man

to tran

Only

if Pro
the

tagoras can know of that transcendent can he claim to be the

measure of

being

the things that are; and then, perhaps in the view of

of

Socrates, his
unless

disclaimer
were an

knowledge

of god would

be

self-misunderstanding

it

irony. Which it is is very hard to say. Of Gorgias relatively much survives, but for our purpose little needs to be noticed. He had an inordinate confidence in the power of speech. One might
call

him the

rhetorical parallel

to

Hippodamas,
"reason"

who also

had

an unmeasured
Gorgias'

faith in the suitability of schematic fidence in the power of speech extended

"in
could prove exists.

to practical politics. to the belief that

con

he,

or perhaps man

principle,"

the most outrageous proposition, such as that noth

which attracts at

ing

This

extreme

doctrine,

first

with

its implication that

criticism

persuasion

is

more powerful than

coercion, proves obnoxious to the

that everything it adds to reasoning

boasts
in in

of man's power to make the

it takes away from Reason: it brazenly lesser argument the greater. Not because its

claim outreaches

wisdom as well as

unacceptable

but because the claim itself threatens any confidence in justice, the pretension of Gorgias and his fellows was to Socrates. That in the end he was tarred with the brush dipped

its

power

rhetoricians'

pitch of the
Socrates'

preparation rejection of
"rationalists"

beneath

the intemperate

any implicated him

rhetoricians civic

claim

only testifies to the prudence that lay that speech has unlimited power. As philosophy in their visible implicated him and philosophy in
and can

atheism,

so the

their arrogant
Socrates'

sophistry.

overreaching In his
in
relation

downfall

be

read much of

the ground

of

posture

to his

predecessors.

We

come at

last to the

sophist

Antiphon. One
the necessary

extended quotation
point:

from his

surviving

work will suffice

to

make

Justice, then, is
a citizen. when

not

to transgress that therefore

which

is the law
himself in

of the

city in
with

which one

is

man can

best

conduct

harmony
of

justice,

if

in the company of witnesses he upholds the laws, witnesses he upholds the edicts of nature. For the edicts

and when alone without

the laws

are

imposed

44

Interpretation
artificially, but those of nature are compulsory. And the
arrived at
edicts of

the

laws

are

by

consent,

not

by

natural

growth,

whereas

those

of nature are not a

code evades

matter of consent.

So, if

the

man who

transgresses the legal

those who

have
if

agreed

to these edicts,

he

avoids

both disgrace
of the

and penalty; otherwise not.

which are

But

a man violates against

possibility any

laws
no

implanted in nature,

even

if he

evades all men's not

detection,
is in

the

ill is

less,

and even

if

all

see, it is no

greater.

For he is

hurt

on account of an general

opinion, but because of tmth.

reason, that the

The
of

examination of

these things

for this

majority

just

acts

according to law

are prescribed

contrary to

nature."

The

Antiphon may be tion: "But life belongs to nature,

wisdom of

completed

for

our purpose with

his

observa

and death too, and life for them is derived from advantages, and death from disadvantages. And the advantages laid down by the law are chains upon nature, but those laid down by nature are
free."

What Antiphon has

made

perfectly

clear

to any who would come after him is

that the appeal to nature as the supreme moral

one

way
of

as the appeal to convention

who saw

is in

another.

authority is heavy with danger in Antiphon corrects the wis

that the life lived ac

dom

Anaximander,
nature of

in

nature

the unforgiving morality of a life for a the

life. Antiphon transforms this insight

cording to
and the

with

discovery

is the life

of

freedom,

civil existence

is

form

of

bondage,

law

the city is no

more authoritative

than mere opinion, that much

present case consists of mat

disparaged

alternative to

knowledge,

which

in the

ter that could be fatal to orderly life. Antiphon bequeathed to his successors this
unwelcome antithesis:

life lived

(as it from

would

be lived

by

according to the crystal truth of nature the blood-stained ancestor of Gyges) as against life
that emanate

freely

lived in

constraint under the rule of prohibitions and prescriptions

mere

men, but

men whose natural

does,
cause

that wisdom and

instinct teaches them, if nothing else truth lie in obeying the natural call to advantage. If the

truth of advantage is sovereign in nature and in civil society alike (be justice is only the advantage of the stronger), is not the project for peace ful and noble human life doomed by the power of the natural Whole in which
natural

our existence

is

inescapably
for
us

enclosed?

Would

our

last best hope its truth

a

consist

in

self-induced confidence that speech conquers almost all, and can make an en clave of
able

decency

in

a universe which reveals

at night

unspeak relief?

darkness to

which our

light is the

exception and

daytime

passing
artifact

This
who

may in fact be
would

human

situation.

Then

we

would await

the speaker

detoxify
good at

nature,
man,

declaring
while at

its superiority to every

the same time

in

power

to

bestow society
ophy
of

on

displaying
in

conventional

civil

its

purest and

describing

it

as grounded

nature: the political philos

the best regime. Were such a project to be described as

of nature against

turning

the

neutrality

itself for the

who

purposes of mankind, the

and

description

would appear to

fit the

schemes of

Descartes

Hobbes,

as well as those of
philoso-

the artificers

of

the

Olympians

took notice of man. But if political

On Ancients
phy
could

and

Moderns

45

be

said

to

be the
extent

reconciliation of man to

his

cosmos on not

terms that

ennoble

his life to the

possible,
said to

on premises

that

do

transcend reason
out of

alone, then Socrates

the abundance of his

can

be

have

concocted political

philosophy

inheritance from those

we call preSocratics, and to

have
his

done

so

having
It is

way that distinguished him from his modern successors kept man's nobility always in sight as his star and compass.
a
well

in

by

to make explicit
of one and

what

Socrates did

not

do. He did
and an
and

not

discover the

disjunction

many,

of a phenomenal

flux

intelligible immo

bile,

of a whole cosmos and of a

its inner logos,

of

body

soul, of rational and

of nature saw and

irrational,
Whole
not

few

and

many, of opinion and

speech.

knowledge,

convention, of guarded and unguarded

could not

Others before him

was

that the

be

reduced

to some simple that

free from duality. He did

of an

discover the

goodness of a private

and of a reward and punishment

life, hereafter;

nor nor

the

teaching

immortality
scandal of

did he discover the

the

vulgar pantheon or of an

the whole

is

ruled

by

some

unworthy supernaturalism, or the question whether principle of good and if so what that principle or first to
scrutinize the poets with a critical eye.

justice

might

be. He

was not the

What then did he do? How did he

enlighten

his

age?

I believe that in

creat

ing

political

philosophy, according to the suggestion put forth above,

man who provided

Socrates

proved
most

to be the

the

most moderate and at

the same time the

elevating His disjunction

conjunction of

resolution of

the question, How is

man situated act

in the Whole.

of the philosopher and the polis

in his

is

accompanied

by

his his

the philosopher and the

polis

in his

speech.

Do his

act and

speech cancel each other

by

contradiction or

do they

combine

to teach a lesson?
of

I believe that in their

profane radical

combination

they embody

the substance

the first of the

mean a

Enlightenments

of the western world.

By

an

Enlightenment I

ingathering,

scrutiny,

revision and reorganization of the moral and

intel
to
a

lectual patrimony, with the specific intention of bringing mankind life dominated by the truth of man's positive relation to reason. The
speech of

closer

act and

the

Socrates teach that highest reason, wisdom,

There is
a worm of unreason

yet nowhere rules.

philosophy is ruling that inhabits the core of the

or

overpoweringly rational whole, as we might have surmised by giving due weight to the invasion of the body of mathematics itself by the intractable pi.

Proportion itself, or commensurability, has its limits; and whatever this may portend for the fate of the cosmic whole, its bearing on the perfect adjustment
to each other in political society of the
see who
varieties of

human

soul

is

clear

for

all

to

do

not

blind themselves.
address

How does the Socratic Enlightenment

itself to the demoralization

practical of

latent in the dissemination defined

of such

doctrine? The

task of Socrates is the Whole

and

by

the two aspects of his insight: the

reason

the

unreason in the Whole. In the Statesman, Socrates is made by Plato to concur by implication of silence in the definition of statesmanship as an art of inspirit

ing

and

restraining, according to the

need of

the ruled. In the

Theaetetus,

Soc-

46

Interpretation

with a success rates performs an exercise repeated elsewhere,

dependent

on

the

docibility

of

his interlocutor,
never

by

which

he

encourages

his fellow-inquirer to

into the being of the take heart and up in the struggle to probe reduced his companion to para his having things, an inspiration called forth by lyzed confusion and a reminder never to lose sight of what remains problematic
give

or mysterious. one of

Surely

there are things that

Socrates knew

well

that he

knew; but

them

was what and

that he did not know. His achievement may there

of restrained practical expectations,

fore be
ward and

called an

Enlightenment

driven for
the best

by

an unquenchable purpose

to

keep

his With

congeners mindful of a view to

the highest of which

they

are capable.

later

developments,
of residual

the Socratic achievement might

be

called also an

Enlightenment

doubt. It is
remarkable

that the

Socrates

we

know is

much more an anthropologian at of

and a psychologian

than a theologian. When he

discloses,

the end of his

life,
dis

that

he had

inquiry
reason a view

unpromising the study into the human world, he appears either to have
since given

long

up

as

the nonhuman for

surrendered to a

couragement

that deflected his philosophizing ever after or for whatever other

to have decided to abstain from

inquiry
observe

into the beings

aloft.

Again

with

to later

developments,
but

we

may

that the Socratic Enlightenment

had

human it
was

orientation

could afford

to leave

largely

obscure

the degree to
zetetic

which

circumventing the
and against

received

conception

of

deity. In its

mode, the Socratic Enlightenment

stood out against

the assertoric imposition of

were at

immediate insight,
same time
strained

the poetic revelation of gods that

the

by

embarrassingly natural in their impulses and marvelously the limitations of nature in gratifying them. easily
the
at

uncon

We

remind ourselves

this

point

that there was a sacred as well as a

addressed

profane

antiquity to
as

which

modern

Enlightenment
well

itself,

and that

there was in that area an evolution that might ment,

be described

as an enlighten

indeed

the

absolute

illumination

of mankind

through Revelation. The

only way to characterize the scriptural Enlightenment briefly is to describe it as the immediate revelation of the self-identified First and Highest as the absolute

One,

the utmost principle

of

the universe, communicant with man but utterly righteous, solely

inconceivable by him, absolutely

the existence of men,

hegemonic,

legislative for

mankind and thus careful that the goodness of the whole

invulnerable to
of

the constraint of

be actively present in His natural creation, and

His inscrutability, thus guaranteeing that the universe will always be a mystery. Although a mystery, it may not lawfully be an object of investigation but of into further clauses of the law. the only inquiry The scriptural Enlightenment relieved mankind of the degraded belief that the
a measure

retaining forever

First

and

Highest is

accessible

to the eye and thus can

be

rendered

in any

image, though it remained accessible to the ear, thus accommodating the right eous logos of the whole to the of mankind. The scriptural Enlightentaming

On Ancients
ment presented men

and

Moderns

47

the paradigm of the perfect order that would be installed among if they had not been made, for reasons to remain dubitable, subject to corruption. In ways very different from those trodden by Socrates, the oldest
scriptural

Enlightenment

measured out

the

wisdom of a whole at whose center

lay

a perfection whose reason must remain

forever

veiled

to the human

mind

and whose goodness must remain

forever

an

inimitable

aspiration.

The

subse

quent scriptural of

Enlightenment vastly

enlarged

the promise of an

approximation

the human condition to the cosmic, closing the distance between heaven and

earth

showing the birth and death of God, and displaying his the good to be available to the simplest of men. In the end, the

by

return

to life as

divine

and cosmic with

the human and terrestrial will be sealed

on earth.

intimacy of the by the millen

triumph of

nial rule of men

by divinity
the

In the meantime, the

ultimate

the humblest is vouchsafed through their subservience to the commandment of

love,

enforced with

fullest insistence

of

divinity

exactly because only the

power

that exceeds nature can make the demand that

own

(fallen)
outcry

nature refuses.

The Christian Enlightenment is in its

that

way the

great

against nature,

devastating

disappointment to
universe.

humanity

that craves a more nurturing

domestication in the

When

we speak of

antiquity

and modernity, and of the reaction of

modernity
the

to and against antiquity, we

giants
of

should

have in

mind so

far

as possible what
when

the

modern

Enlightenment themselves

contemplated

they

opened a retrospective eye.

It is

not

impossible for
saw a profane

us

to

reconstruct

that vision.

When Machiavelli looked back, he

of nature and a sacred

antiquity that

expected much

antiquity that accepted little from it.

he it

misunderstood

the

crucial pagans as projectors of so-called

mean that By imaginary repub

this I

lics that

were

intended

as paradigms of concrete civil societies, whereas

stand

in fact

was a work of the

Socratic Enlightenment to

between those

who pro

claimed a

simply

perfect cosmic natural order

that can be translated into the

human

condition and those who saw

other

the

natural order as
understood well

fully
the

illustrated

by

the

jungle. On the
ceived the ation: not

hand, Machiavelli
as

theology
his

that

per

glory

of

God

resting
as

on

the disparagement of God's natural cre

nature

only

must man

be

molded athwart and elevated above

but,
the

in the

same

spirit,

nature

whole

cannot

be

understood

as

defining

possible.

The highest

excellence

is

defiance

of

nature, as the highest truth

is
of

displayed in antiquity

miraculous contradiction of natural causation.

If

Renaissance

was

the cradle of modernity, then it

should

be

said

that the Renais

sance conflated the

that it had tian

not studied

appropriation

Christian antiquity that it knew and the profane antiquity diligently, perhaps because it easily accepted the Chris of pagan philosophy to be its servant. Modernity was gener insight
and an extensive misconception.
will confirm

ated out of a profound

Hobbes

will maintain and

Spinoza

that there can be nothing in

Scripture that is contrary to

reason

if Scripture is

an emanation

from

worthy

48
god.

Interpretation Thus there

grew

up

an

immense

rational exegesis

to

which

Descartes

and

Locke

also contributed.

That

exegesis

had the broad

effect

purpose to eliminate

the

contradiction of nature

by

revelation,

in

to reassert the worthiness of the the

natural

Whole to be

considered as

infused
the

with

logos

of what

deserves
the
of

to

be

called god.

If Descartes
and

himself, in

Meditations, had

not used

ex

pression

First for

Highest, apparently
be
reluctant

to

mean

by

it the innermost truth

the

whole,

we might

to introduce

it into the

account of modernity's
called god.

own quest case of

what

I have

called

that which

deserves to be

In the
condi

Hobbes, it is

made clear

that the true

improvement

of the

human

tion depends on

transmitting to the plane of mankind's everyday existence the decisive knowledge concerning nature. That knowledge might be put summa rily as follows: man's well-being does indeed require an overcoming of nature, not by means that are above but by means that are within nature. Since the time
of

the

Hebrews,
in
which

men

had been

encouraged

if

not constrained

to

look for the

a

ultimate causes of world

things outside of nature. Thus

they

made

for themselves

the demonstration to one another of their most cherished

beliefs
asser-

failed, they
toric,
all

were returned

to the

archaic mode of

discourse,
left to fire

which was

and the verification of verities was a world

inevitably

and the sword

in

in

which

the dictate

of nature

itself only too manifestly favored

nature was

war over peace. understood

Until the true

status of man within

sufficiently
en

by

sovereign and subject

no

alike, there

would

be

no

peace, no

largement
particular more

of

the mind and thus

increase

of comfort to the

body. In Hobbes's
was grounded

view, the

chief obstacle

to the advancement of reason

in the

sacred than

in the

profane

antiquity, although he had to blame

Aristotle for encouraging the Scholastics to multiply substances where there were only accidents. Hobbes complained further of Aristotle that he promoted
popular government

by

preaching down tyranny

mischief-maker

and

preaching up

a natural
always

standard of

right for every

odium

to appeal to against the

nature at

threatened bulwark of sovereignty that holds

bay. Perhaps there is is held

justice in the
partisans of

in

which

Hobbes,

an architect of emancipation,
portrayal of

by

freedom,

as retribution more

for his

Aristotle

as a resource
modern

for demagogues. With

writers who

justice, Hobbes
and

took his place among the

denounced the Aristotelean

Scholastic
and

enlargement of nature

beyond

positive

bounds to include the famous formal

absurd extreme of

himself going to the the face of the most

blow
on

obtrusive evidence.

declaring Exploding

final causes, Aristotle the natural sociality of man, in

these causes was to
moderns
strike a

against that exaggeration of nature's

philanthropy that
glanced

insisted

finding

in

profane

antiquity.

The blow

to wound also the theo

logians

and other

believers

who could author.

the solicitude

of nature's

find in every gift of nature a testimony to It must be said that the simplicism of the
on

interpretation
as visible as

put

by

the modern

Enlightenment
Aristotle

the pagan antiquity becomes

nature to civilize man

in Hobbes's

conception of

as

trusting

it did in Machiavelli's

sarcasms

directed

against old projectors of

visionary

republics.

On Ancients
The
modern

and

Moderns
and

49
the

seminal contributions of

Descartes to the birth

of

modernity

Enlightenment may be
was

seen as

flowing

from

a single philosophic aspi

man.

ration, which

to achieve certainty of knowledge for the good of

The

achievement of
of

certainty is a locution whose negative equivalent is the removal doubt. Descartes conceived that doubting everything was the precondition

for

doubting

nothing.

His demonstration

of

the existence of God and of the

deathless

soul was of course rooted

his labor draws to its logos

the

close on

in doubt, however decently dissembled. As the Sixth Day of his Meditations, it is evident
of

that he has indeed proved the existence

of

the First and Highest: the truth and

Whole,
was

revealed

in

mathematics.
was

Descartes

can

say

with an un

divided
and

mind

that In the

beginning
and,
so

the logos and the

logos

was with

God

the

logos

God,
and

saying, he

can understand

himself to be the
the blas

prophet of phemies of

the true

religion whose communicants are proof against

idolatry

every form
and

of superstition.

The liberation

of man

from

disease, toil,

confusion,

the tyrannies of zeal is the promise that lies

within

the book of the unfolding of nature. No one could

have believed

more whole

heartedly

than Descartes that if

gave

free. Since Descartes

tributed, for everyone that Descartes had only limited

The

mankind knows the truth, it will make them his judgment that intelligence is perfectly dis is satisfied with his share, it may be taken for granted

it

as

confidence
mind

in any

project

for

enlightenment

in

the sense of a penetration of every

philosophers of the modern

by

the truths of highest philosophy.

saw their predecessors of a nature

Enlightenment

the
not

ancient profane

Enlightenment

as

trusting inordinately in
a supernature

they did

have the

means

to understand; and their predecessors of the ancient sacred

Enlightenment

as

trusting inordinately in
The
modern

that no human

being

might ever understand. method

Enlightenment

can claim

to have found the

to exclude the

for removing doubt about the natural whole by redrawing its boundaries dubitable; but it did not, nor does it think it did, thereby render setting
exhaustible

the

whole of our universal

by

science:

modernity

repeats not

in

its

own mode

the wisdom

of

Socrates,

which was

to know that he did

know.
did the

When Kant insisted

sequent

on

purifying
although

virtue

beyond every

consideration of con

good, he

estranged our goodness

from
a

our nature as

radically

as

theologians
religion that

of man's

fall,

as

self-understood

prophet of

the true

is

open

to

reason alone.

So doing, he

gave us yet another reason to

wonder whether the

full

history

the question, How

much of

modernity must not contain a discussion of the modern Enlightenment in an unwitting redis
of
much as we earlier

covery ask how

of

timeless possibilities,

found

ourselves moved of

to

much of
wisdom.

the Socratic Enlightenment

was an

ingathering

the

pre-

Socratic
nality
more

In

one

of the modern

may be confident in the origi Enlightenment's orientation: it was possessed by a spasm

respect,

however,

we

of optimism

for the fate

of man

for

which there

is

no profane precedent.

The
of

that it

tightened man's

hold

on

nature, the more

it loosened the hold

nature on man, with the promise not of a millennial but of an imminent victory over the natural satan. The historical plasticity of the human nature formulated

50

Interpretation
Rousseau found its way easily into the Socialism that
promised

by

freedom

from want, from coercion, from false belief, from unreason whether institu tional or domestic, public or private. In view of how the modern Enlightenment
matured, it is
worth republics.

visionary

recalling that modernity opened with the disparagement of Machiavelli's call to man to take control of his fate was
a vision

heeded

so

enthusiastically that it became the inspiration for

make of

that reveals

itself

now as phantasmagoria.

What then to

Hegel's formulation
"overcome"

of a

dialectic in

which new

the

deci

sive contradictions are at once

perfectly

or mediated?

Is the

dialectic
Dubita-

the transcendence of the Socratic the modern

Enlightenment
resignation

and also an apparent

correction of

Enlightenment's is the

to an

irremovable

ble? It may be left an ern Enlightenment's

whether,

open question whether rationalism

Hegel's

radicalization of

the mod
or

perfection

of that

Enlightenment
of

by grounding

that consummation in the

biography

human

con

sciousness, it historicized the human repository of Being itself. If the latter, then Hegel would deserve to be thought of as an early if not the first post-

Enlightenment modernist, if

not

the

first

"post-modernist."

Can anything be said about the way of life have lived within or alongside those ancient
stand or come
must

of

the

innumerable
them?

millions who

and modern struggles enclosed

to under
ancient

to

terms

with

the
of

whole

that

The

Hebrews disfavor

have lived in fear

whom

God,

the harshness of exile

testifying

to the

of a

father from
he
sent

they

could

only hope

some resumption of

his his

blessing
promise

when

them his annointed to rule them again in a godly

way.

Christians

were confirmed

in that hope because God had fulfilled

part of

before their eyes; for the rest, they must bear their lot in patience, imitating Christ by suffering the world according to the example shown to them

by

Christ

on

the cross. The pagan multitudes lived

we

know
the

not

how. Was it in
of nature man and

the shadow of
also

Olympians, beings
as
we

who somehow were

forces

but
the

flourished

anthropoids, thus
are

bridging
and their

the

gap between

natural

All? Perhaps

limited to the

speculation

that their lives were

we may ask life in any human epoch: What was the characteristic mystery that beset them? What in their daily existence passed their understanding? Their laws were clear to them and their

bounded

by

their poetry, their

laws,

labor. About them

much about

the grand question that, when answered, tells

labor itself
mals.

was

only too
all

self-revealing.

What

was there to puzzle them

rotation of of

but

nature

stupendous seismic

calamity, the

For
and

the enlightenment of the sages

heaven, the birth of ani Greece, and for that matter of

have turned
age on the

Egypt

elsewhere, the wonderment

of ancient men must

mysteries of their natural environment.

This is

no

longer true. In the

domi

by literally surround
nated

the modern

Enlightenment,
are not

the mysteries that are closest to us, that

us,

those

of nature

but

of art.

rious to

us are

they

that their mysteriousness to us

is

concealed

So profoundly from

myste

us.

In

On Ancients
order

and

Moderns

51
to

to work and

in

order

to have respite from work, we

are compelled us

manipulate what we cannot understand. what we niences ment

How many among

literally

know

are

doing
planted

when

we

activate

that

dominate

our existence?

any of the countless tools and conve Very few. It is a paradox of the Enlighten
quotidian

that it

us

in impenetrable
that
nature was

darkness

of artifact

while

relieving
that
crown of

us of the sense
paid

the true mystery. If this was the price

one of

had to be

for the
to

political
well

liberation that is

the jewels in the

modernity, it may

have been

worth paying. condition

We

are entitled

wonder whether

it belongs to the human

that

something be mysterious to mankind, and the difference between one epoch and another lies in the identity of the mystery. But in asking this, we find
ourselves ment: we

involuntarily

thrown
are

back

upon

the

wisdom of

the Socratic Enlighten

without reference not

human beings

to our historical setting,

by

led to know ourselves, with and recognizing what it is that we do

know.

NOTES

1. See G.S. Kirk 1980).

and

J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge

University Press,

2. Iamblichus in Diels-Kranz,

following

Kirk

and

3. Ten, the

perfect number,

is the

sum of

the first four

Raven, op cit. integers,

which, qua point,

line,

trian

gle, and pyramid respectively, are primary entities. Four is itself of divine weight. It seems strange
that a mathematician who
should

knew,

although

have

retained

his

numerological

he certainly did not originate, the "Pythagorean optimism in the face of the irrational numbers that the

theorem"

theorem

brings to

mind. and

4. Magna Moralia 11 82a 11 (Diels-Kranz 1.452)

Metaphysics 1078b21 (Diels-Kranz ibid.)

and perhaps

usefully brought together by Kirk and Raven, op cit. 5. Zeno did not discover dialectic, as is sometimes alleged; he practiced,
ered, demonstrative
or eristic questioning.

discov Pre-So

6. This
cratic

and

the

Philosophers (Harvard

following passage are taken from Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1957) p. 147.

Rethinking
Radford

the Diodotean Argument

Laurie M. Johnson

University

INTRODUCTION

In the Mytilenaean Debate

Thucydides'

of

History

of the Peloponnesian
the

War, Diodotus
"Athenian
war

explains the

full

philosophical and practical consequences of

thesis"

first

articulated

began (1.75.5; 1.76.2). defense

at against

by According
great

the Athenian envoys at Sparta to

before the

Thucydides,

envoys'

the

speech aims

not at a

the charges of imperialism of the various Peloponnesian

power of

cities

but

advertising the

Athens, in

order

to frighten the

Spartans into rejecting war. The envoys claim that the empire was not acquired by force, but was given to Athens after Sparta retired, unwilling to finish off
the remaining Persian

forces

at

the end of the Persian War. The allies asked

power vacuum.

Athens for her

leadership

due to this

Thus, they
driven
at

say, it

was

under the compulsion of circumstances that we were

first to

advance

influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of self-interest as and well; lastly by our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection,
our empire

to its

present

state,

and when you were no

longer

friendly

as

before but
our

suspicious and at variance with all seceders would

us,

it

no

longer
to

seemed safe to risk

relaxing

hold. For

have

gone over

you.

(1.75.3-5; my

emphasis)

The

outlook which characterizes this thesis

that the ambition to

become

ever more powerful of

is

natural and

the

main actors

in the

History

compelling (cf. 4.61.5; 1

is
.69.

shared or criticized

by

some

12). The

use of

the thesis in

the Mytilenaean debate is particularly

a

interesting

because in this

case

it leads to

policy of moderation. Leniency for the Mytilenaeans emerged largely because they did not defend themselves (from a position of weakness), as did the less

fortunate Plataeans

and

Melians, but

were

defended

by

an able

Athenian orator,

Diodotus. Diodotus, as we will see, save the Mytilenaeans from destruction.

used

the Athenian thesis rhetorically to

speech

Diodotus'

is

an example of
also

how

moderation can

be

won

through successful oratory,

but it

illuminates

behind the Athenian thesis. These assump for us the tions, as his argument shows, imply a policy untempered by justice and in formed only by the expedient use of force. This paper will explore
philosophical assumptions

Thucydides'

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

54

Interpretation

subtle

teaching

on

statesmanship in this

opposition

between

Diodotus'

speech

and

his intentions.

THE DEBATE

The Mytilenaean debate took

cians.

place

in Athens between two Athenian

and

politi

Compared

deserve
we

punishment.

have;

nothing to The Melians had done the least, judging by the evidence the Athenians accuse them of nothing (5.87-89). Plataea had been a
or

with

Mytilene, Plataea

Meios had done little

faithful ally of Athens and had treated her Theban invaders shabbily, and thus, while it can hardly be said that these things were enough to warrant a death
sentence,
she an

Mytilene,
She

had done something to provoke Spartan wrath (2.5; 2.74). But independent ally of Athens, not only had rebelled, but had at
with

tempted to take the rest of the Lesbian cities allied

wished

Athens

with

her (3.2).
their

to gain

hegemony
in her

in Lesbos, in
their

hostility

to

Athens,

and she en

listed Spartan fears

of

help

pursuit of

this goal

(3.4; 3.9-15). Although

Athenian

encroachment on

founded, Athens had done nothing

Mytilenaeans themselves Athens
had her
never would

to

independence may have been well threaten that independence directly, as the

admitted attacked

have

(3.11). Indeed, there was a good chance Mytilene, because, unlike other allies, she
revolt

own

fleet. But Mytilene decided to

Athenian interference guilty
of the and

anyway, because

she was even

dissatisfied

with

indirect domination. And

she
was

though she was the most

three,
and

treated with the most

most

leniency,

while

Meios,

the most

innocent,

Plataea,

the

virtuous,

were

treated much more

severely.

The Mytilenaeans had

reassurance

asked

Sparta to

aid

in their

revolt.

They

received

from

Spartan
and

ambassador who

told them "that there

would

be

an

invasion

of

Attica

that simultaneously the

forty

ships which were

to come

arrive"

to their aid would

(3.25). But the Peloponnesian

were compelled

ships were charac

teristically

slow, and the Mytilenaeans

to surrender to and ne
plague-

gotiate with the

Athenians,

who

had

managed even

in their

weakened

condition to send enough ships to subdue

Mytilene (3.3). It As
a

was unclear who oligarchs

in

Mytilene

was responsible

for the

surrender.

last resort, the

the

had

allowed the commons

heavy
in

armor

in

order to attack

Athenians,
longer obey
their
out

but the commons,

commanders, but
whatever

as soon as gathered

they had

got arms, would no

groups and ordered the aristocrats to

bring

food there

come to terms with

distribute it to all; otherwise, they said, they would the Athenians independently and deliver up the city. (3.27.2-3)
was and

would

The oligarchs, realizing that if they did not take part in a surrender, they be placing their lives in undue jeopardy, joined the commons in
the

making

an agreement with

Athenians (3.28). Athens then

allowed representatives of

Rethinking
nian general

the Diodotean Argument

55

the Mytilenaean government to plead their case and await a decision. The Athe

Paches

sent with

the representatives to

Athens those Mytilenaeans

he thought

most guilty of the insurrection (3.28). In this way, the fate of the Mytilenaeans ended up in the hands of the Athenian demos, who were presented with clear evidence from the demagogue

Cleon
put

of

treachery

and

bad faith. On "the impulse

anger,"

of

they decided
to Paches
of

to

the

present prisoners

to death and to kill the adult male population of

My
with

tilene, enslaving the

elty
and of

women and children.

the appropriate orders. the

However,
the

the

next

They sent a day brought

heard

ship

off

"repentance"

the cru

decree,

and

people called

for

a second vote

(3.36.1-5). Accor

dingly, they held

a second

assembly

and

arguments

retaining the decree. Cleon,

whose arguments

both for rescinding had succeeded in convincing

the Athenians to pass the initial sentence,

was "not only the most violent of the far He but at that time had the greatest influence with the citizens, by is the first to speak again in defense of his policy (3.36.6), most of his argu
Mytilenaeans'

people

ment

actions. As we will revolving around the injustice of the Cleon 's argument differs from even though it may be because, see, retribution. it utilizes the common-sense notions of justice and distasteful,
Diodotus'

Cleon

objects

to the Athenian

demos'

softheartedness

decision. He

speaks

to them in support of standing

firm

on

their

in rethinking their initial verdict,

arguing that by passing a death sentence on the Mytilenaeans, the Athenians would be acting justly. Moreover, he says that this poses no political diffi culties because, at least in this case, justice and expediency coincide. Thus, he
tells
them

that

he

will

maintain

his

original

position

regarding the

My

tilenaeans.

Any delay

righteous
says open

anger and

in administering justice will only blunt the therefore benefit the guilty (3.38). Like Pericles, Cleon

Athenians'

that he has not changed his opinion, but

he

wonders at

those who

wish

to

Pericles, his turns into a pointed attack on a political opponent. Cleon would like nothing better than to stifle debate altogether, and he tries to do so by besmirching his
the policy to debate again (3.38). But unlike
opponent's

"wondering"

intentions. Anyone have

who would recommend a

Mytilene

must

some personal reason

for

doing

policy of leniency to so, like a bribe. Moreover,

anger

by

claiming that the time to act is now, before the

questioned

Athenians'

is blunted,

Cleon has Cleon

the usefulness of deliberation of

reasoned

can guide men

better than

policies,

which

any kind. Gut feelings should be suspect.

more

says

he

will attempt

to prove that Mytilene "has done you

which

state."

than any single

cities
which which
was

He distinguishes between revolt,

is

an attempt

injury by
men

are oppressed to

free themselves,
independent

and

rebellion

or

conspiracy,

what

the Mytileneans committed. Rebellion is instigated

by

who are not oppressed, a

but

are

in this case, "men

who

inhabited
there

fortified island

and

had

no

fear

of our enemies except

by

sea,

and even
. .

were not without

the

protection of a
presumed

force

of their own

triremes
right,"

(3.39.2).

No,

the Mytilenaeans

to put "might before

and

they did

so

56
even

Interpretation
though

they

were

well

treated and prosperous.

Indeed, it is

states

that

come suddenly into prosperity which prove to be the most insolent (3.39.5). Cleon urges his audience not to put all the blame on the oligarchs of My

tilene and exonerate the commons. The common people their revolt and should

joined the

oligarchs

in

be

punished

in

equal

measure.

Also, he

reasons, the

Athenians
allies.

should same

consider

the effect a light punishment would

have

on

the

If the

and those who

lenient penalty is handed out for those who voluntarily revolt are forced to revolt by the Peloponnesians, who will not choose
on

to desert Athens
while

the slightest pretext? If such a city succeeds, it wins

not

liberty,
such a

if it fails, it does
and

have to fear harsh

will

punishment.

By setting

precedent,

furthermore, Athens
treasure each

risking lives
regain.

have to fight many time, and the devastation

in tribute
of

more rebellious

cities,

which will result

from

such conflicts will reduce the value

those states Athens manages to

If Athens fails to
not

recover

these cities,
make

it faces
so

even

more

enemies

(3.39.6-8). Would it

be better to
would

revolts

risky

that few cities

would choose to revolt? all others who were what

Mytilene

be

a prime example and a

warning for
shown that
even

is just is

and

contemplating rebellion. He says that he has what is expedient thus coincide in his advice, but
unjust, the Athenians must still abide
and

if the

death

sentence was a

by it,

because their
it (3.40.4-5).

empire

tyranny

the

Mytilenaeans'

deaths

are useful to

Cleon is saying that if the Athenians want their empire, they must do unjust things. But luckily, in the case of Mytilene, they do not have to commit any injustice: the Mytilenaeans deserve full Athenian wrath, and their punishment will set a useful example for the other allies. Cleon seems to subordinate his
argument of

for justice to the demands

that one
can still

of

realpolitik, and yet it is when he speaks

voice.

justice
We

hear the fervor in his

must

not, therefore, hold out to them any

hope,
be

either to

be

secured

by

eloquence or purchased
error was

by

money, that

they
is

will

excused on the plea that their

human. For their

which

act was no unintentional

injury

but

deliberate plot;

and

it is that

is

unintentional which

excusable.

(3.40.1-2)

In this,

and one other place with

(3.39.5-6), Cleon

admits that what the

human."

My

tilenaeans did accorded

denies
nature

what

his

opponent

human nature, or "was Cleon, however, Diodotus claims: that what is done because of human blame. Even if it is
natural

is done

with

less

or no

for the Mytilenaeans

cannot or

to want their

liberty
of

and

to be contemptuous of those who

not unintentional.

do

not

directly
the

control

them, it is

Cleon may be saying, then,

not

that

impulses

human

nature are

strong, but he is

saying that

they

are

in

could

any way be

compelling.

What is is

unintentional

unintentional other than an accident or misunderstanding.

of what

is excusable, but for Cleon nothing Cleon's un

common

derstanding
assumption

unintentional

is the

understanding.

It is the

behind

most conceptions of morality,

for if

people are compelled to

Rethinking
do
"bad"

the

Diodotean Argument

57

things because

of

their nature, how can

they be blamed in any

Athenians'

mean

ingful

sense

for

doing

them? the

Cleon

ends with another attempt to revive

prudent

showing why Thucydides, who admired those consideration, disliked him so.
Do not, then, be traitors to
you

who

initial rage, clearly displayed forethought and

your own

cause,

but recalling
you would

as

felt

when

they
now

made you suffer and

how

then

nearly as possible how have given anything

to crush

them,

pay them back. (3.40.7-8)

deplore the harshness, even bloodthirstiness, of Cleon's recommendations, his prediction of what effect this action will have on the other allies also seems commonsensical. Would not seeing the Mytilenaeans As
much

as

we

might

receive a

death

sentence

for their
of

rebellion

discourage

others

from venturing

down the
as

same path?

Most

Athens'

Mytilene to defend themselves,

to offer Sparta as

might

nearly so well equipped had in the way of military little they incentive for her help. Wouldn't news of Mytilene's
allies were not and

fall,
in

the fall of a relatively strong and independent city, effectively deter those

a much

less
for

advantageous position?

next argues with

leniency

towards

This is precisely what Diodotus, who Mytilene, has to deny in order to compete
what

Cleon's

proposals.

Diodotus

promises

to speak not of right or wrong, but of

on

is in Athenian

interest. In
of

doing

so, he insists

exactly
at

what

Cleon denies: that the impulses follow them

should
Diodotus'

human

nature are

compelling
argument no

and therefore those who

not

be blamed. This is

is

the root of
should

theory

that even

capital punishment

deterrent.
much

Expediency
engaged

be the only factor in

with

considering

when and

how

to punish, he says.

Athens, Diodotus
tilenaeans],
are
us"

asserts, is "not

in

law-suit

them

[the My-,
we

so as to

be

concerned about

the question of

right

and

wrong; but them

deliberating
are

about

them,

to determine what policy

should not

will make

useful

to

(3.44.4). The Mytilenaeans guilty

even unless

be

put to

death if Diodotus

proves

they

it is to the
proves

advantage of

forgiven, Athens. Contrary

harsh

if Diodotus

they

should

Athens, nor should they be be, unless it is for the good of

Athenian
advantage

to what Cleon says, it

is

not to

to

inflict
case,"

punishment on

the Mytilenaeans. Diodotus warns the Athenians not to

which relies more on
Athenians'

heed Cleon's argument,

and

the "legal aspects of the

takes

advantage

of the not

bitterness towards the Mytilenaeans

proposes

(3.44.3-4). Thus it is "claim for

the

that Diodotus

to ignore the

Mytilenaeans'

forgiveness,"

but that this consideration, he maintains,

should not

be

point on which

the Athenians decide. the death penalty does not stop people from committing

Diodotus
crimes,

claims that

an argument not unfamiliar to us today.

If

means that

it thinks it

can succeed.

All

men are prone

city rebels, he reasons, it to error in both private

58

Interpretation

and public

life,

"and there is

no

law

them."

which will prevent

States

will

take
or

even greater risks empire.

than individuals because the stakes are higher

when supported

freedom

The individual leader,

by

the people,

"unreasonably
and a mark

overestimates

his

strength,"

own

and

is thus
a

more

likely

to recommend the

dangerous
of extreme

course of rebellion

(3.45.6). "In

word, it is

impossible,

simplicity, for anyone to imagine that when human nature

on

is

whole

heartedly by any other

on

bent

terror"

any undertaking it can be diverted from it by rigorous laws or (3.45.7). In making this argument, Diodotus is elaborating
nature put

the Athenian

Athenian

envoys at

thesis, the theory of human Sparta. He continues:

enterprises

forth

earlier

by

the

Nay,

men are

lured into hazardous

by

the constraint of poverty, which

makes them

bold, by

the insolence and pride of affluence, which makes them

greedy,

and

by

the various passions engendered

mastered some

in

the other conditions of

and

human

life

as these are and

too, Hope

irresistible impulse. Then, severally by mighty Desire are everywhere; Desire leads, Hope attends; Desire contrives

the plan, Hope suggests the

facility

of

fortune;

the two passions are the most

baneful,
From
the

and

being

unseen phantoms prevail over seen

dangers. (3.45.5-6)

one

perspective, this seems like

actions. would

an argument

Mytilenaeans'

If they

were

lured

or compelled

concerning the justice of by some irresistible

of wrongdo

impulse, if they

transgress laws regardless of the prospect of punishment

by
not

some natural and uncontrollable

urge, how

can

they be guilty
usual

ing? The Mytilenaeans

committed no
Diodotus'

injustice,

in the
while

help

themselves. But

argument,

sense, if they could absolving the Mytileneans

Diodotus'

of

injustice, actually

subverts

the common understanding of justice. Justice

ones'

presupposes the

ability to

control

actions.

But

human beings

cannot even control

themselves when
until

faced

with

the death

penalty.

They

ra

situation'

tionalize their

they

are sure of

success,

no matter who else

has

failed. Punishment, if men cannot learn from mistakes and ishment, cannot even be used effectively as a deterrent a benefit Cleon
others'

others'

pun claims

for his

policy.

It is just this

question

whether or

not

Cleon's

punishment

would serve as a proper now

deterrent

or example

for

other cities

that Diodotus

takes

up.

Cities for

will surrender more

doing
and

so, he

says. out on

won't

they hold
money

quickly if they think they will receive better terms If they have no hope of being treated with leniency, why to the very end, thus making the Athenians spend more

time

the siege?

Current Athenian policy, he

points

out,

encour

ages rebellious cities

to surrender early

keep

up their tribute in the future. But

of such cities and

destruction
them. If

agreeing to paying indemnity Cleon's policy would lead only to the thus the forfeiting of any future tribute from

by

an

and

they

are punished

too severely,

Athens

will

inadvertently
it

punish

itself.

It is

better,

he says, to

punish

moderately,

and

to "deem

proper rather

to

protect

ourselves against revolts, not

by

the terror of our

laws, but

by

the

vig-

Rethinking
ilance of
administration"

the

Diodotean Argument
Instead
of

59

our

(3.46.4; my
they
revolt, as

emphasis).

ishing

free

will,"

peoples when

they "naturally

severely pun Athens should

"watch them rigorously before they revolt, and thus forestall their even thinking of such a (3.46.6). Diodotus is not recommending deterrence at all but
thing"

prevention.

Laws

and the

threat of punishment are

meant

to

deter. Rigorous
of revolt

and vigilent administration prevent not

only

revolt

itself, but the idea

reason

which emerges whenever people are allowed

any

for entertaining false

dreams

of success.

Diodotus'

recommendation, then, is that Athens should

she

try

to prevent revolt

beforehand, but if
This is because,
revolt

cannot, to punish as

few individuals

as possible

(3.46.6).

while men cannot

be

persuaded

but only

prevented

from

at

in the first place, it is possible to persuade them to surrender tempting when their cause appears hopeless. At present, he points out, the commons in the various cities are friends of Athens. But if Athens kills the Mytilenaean
commons, she will be

killing

her

allies and
end.

encouraging the many, in the fu

to

ture, did not take

to support the few to the

part

bitter

According

Diodotus,

the commons

they

could.

But

even

in the revolt, and they gave the city up to Athens as soon as if the people of Mytilene are guilty, they should still be
sake of

absolved, for the

Athenian interest (3.47.4-5).

"And
and

whereas

Cleon

claims that this

[Cleon's]

punishment combines

justice

policy the two cannot be Diodotus says (3.47.5). Diodotus seems to insist on paying attention only to expediency because the compelling nature of human drives makes punishment
appears that such a or retribution meaningless.

expediency, it

in

combined

However,

Diodotus'

recommendations about what could

do specifically with the Mytilenaeans argument from justice.

to

easily have

emerged

from

an

If

we

accept

his

claim acted

that the Mytilenaean commons are not

wrongdoing,

indeed,

correctly, then

Diodotus'

guilty of recommendations for pun

Diodotus'

ishment (not punishing them but punishing those leaders who instigated the revolt) are just in the common sense. Not only that but, contrary to
claims, justice
and

expediency do

coincide.

Diodotus

says

that if the Athenians

decide to kill

all

(aphikesete)

of

Mytilenaeans, including killing their benefactors, and

the

the commons, this

they

will

be guilty
guilty"

will show all

the other allies

that the same

punishment

"is

ordained

for the innocent he

and

for the

(3.47.4-5). Diodotus has

argued that

the commons do not deserve to be pun

says

ished. He has
it
appears

made

this argument even though

a

in the

same and

breath that expediency

potential

that

in

such

cannot

be

combined

he recommends, justice policy (3.47.5). But why bother to mention

as
of

Athens'

guilt or the
matter?

innocence

the

Mytilenaeans, if the justice

on

of their cause

does

not

This argument,
claims

which

rests

justice, is

Diodotus'

opposed not

only to
to the bulk of

to be

concerned

Diodotus'

reasoning

about

only with human

expediency. nature and

It is

also opposed

the value of punishment. The

fact

60

Interpretation
within such an extreme version of
Thucydides'

that Diodotus hides his moderate agenda

the

Athenian thesis

compels us

to ask what

purpose was

in juxtapos
revolt, that
men

ing

the two in

Diodotus'

speech.

When he

will"

says men

"naturally
will

they

are moved

cannot

be held

by mighty fully responsible

and

irresistible impulses, then it follows that

for their

actions.

But how
are

they be deterred
convinced

by

any

sort or punishment or example of

if they

naturally

that,

regardless

the precedents,
which

they

will

succeed?

they

will

not,

is why Diodotus

encourages

According leniency for

to this argument

those who

have
Le

revolted and strict control over

those who have not yet decided to revolt.

niency der early

will encourage those who

when

have already felt

compelled to rebel to surren expense of a

even enter

faced

with

winning force, thus saving Athens the

the other allies will

long

siege.

Strict

control over

keep
to

them

from

taining

thoughts of revolution,
suffice.

while neither appeals

justice

nor examples of

punishment will

consequence of saying that men naturally transgress laws: laws themselves become secondary to force. The only sure way to maintain order, according to this line of reasoning, is through intimidation. Diodotus says that this maintenance of order
natural
Diodotus'

This is the

through constant application of power is

more effective

than

Cleon's idea

of

making Cleon's logic

an

example
Diodotus'

of

the

Mytilenaeans.

It is debatable, really,
the

whether

or

analyses of the situation are

harshest, for if
would

Diodotus'

were

to be carried out in

full,
less

the remaining allies

respect

have less free

dom

and would

be treated
choice

with

than

they

were

before. While Cleon

about whether or

would not

leave the

up to them

albeit a

fearful

choice

to revolt, Diodotus would make sure

they had

no real choice:

We ought,
revolt, to

on the contrary,

instead

watch them rigorously

rigorously chastising free peoples when they before they revolt, and thus forestall their even
of

thinking
blame

of such a

thing;

and when we

have

subdued a revolt, we ought to put the

on as

few

as possible.

(3.46.6. my emphasis)

Thus,

Diodotus'

two arguments,

first,

that crime is

involuntary,

and

second,

that the Mytilenaean commons

who were sent to

are not

to be blamed but that those Mytilenaeans

Athens

difficult to

reconcile.

by Paches as guilty are to be tried and punished, seem The first tells the Athenians to ignore considerations of
second tells them to take the
pointed

justice
actions

as

irrelevant. The
account.

justice

of the
stretched

into

As Orwin has
conclusions

out, if Diodotus had the Mytilenaean

his

argument to not

its logical
and

that
not

even

oligarchs could
would

be blamed have is

therefore

should p.

be

punished

the Athenians
argument's

never

accepted
not

it (Orwin,

Diodotus'

conclusions

491). But effecting his purpose or his intention.

logical

What Diodotus claims, that justice and expediency do not case, then, is false on one level and true on another. Justice, defined it, fits perfectly
with

coincide as

in this

Diodotus has
prescriptions

his

prescriptions

for Mytilene. These

Rethinking
could

the

Diodotean Argument

61

have been derived from Diodotus

even realizes

an argument

exclusively from justice. But they

of

are not.

the need to argue on the basis

aim

expediency,

and

therefore,

if his true

is justice for the Mytilenaeans

contradicts
of

and moderation argu

for Athenian policy, his theory

ment about

both. Diodotus has built his Justice

expediency

on a

foundation

human

nature that admits no reason

not

able notion of

responsibility, guilt,

or punishment.

cide with this notion of

expediency, it

cannot coexist with

only cannot coin it. Diodotus deceives

his

audience

good about ever since

theory antithetical to justice in order to make them feel changing their minds in a way which, after all, they had wanted to they had misgivings about the morality of their first decree. Diodotus
using
a at

by

has beaten Cleon

thesis
was

the

"expediency"

game, and has proven that the Athenian

practice. At the level of theory, the thesis, with its ring of worldly sophistication, appealed to the Athenian people. It could move them to do what they had wanted to do in the first place out of used guilt.

better

in theory than in

CONCLUSION

Diodotus
order

claimed that a speaker whose proposals

believed"

are good

had to "lie in
puts

to be

(3.43).

Diodotus'

lie is the very theory he

Athenians'

forward.
change

He managed,
of

heart.

by skillful They began to

should

oratory, to capitalize on the

initial

think that their decree had been cruel and excessive,

and

they

then

were given an

opportunity to live up to Cleon's

and realistic while still

challenge

that
what

their

decision

be tough-minded

rectifying
would

they

saw as an

immoral decision. Diodotus did

But
without

not so much change their minds

as give them their reasons.

his reasons, it is
Diodotus'

likely they
argument,

have

followed Cleon's

advice.

However,

much of

while pur

posefully winning moderation,

use of power untempered

logically

by

notions

policy dependent on the raw of justice. Therefore the Diodotean exam

a

leads to

ple

serves

two purposes for Thucydides.

First, it is

an

excellent

display

of

statesmanship. are

Diodotus

wins moderation
more

through an argument whose elements

basically

immoderate. Second,

than any other speech in the

History, it

shows us the outcome of sions

like fear,

assuming honor and interest. The

natural compulsions

that

humans

are compelled

to act

by

pas

outcome

is that
not

a great power must argument or

and

humans'

counter

by
of

power,

by

judicial

procedure, but

by

force. The

Diodotus'

Diodotus'

content

argument argument

purpose, indeed his very

action

in making the

itself,

are

fundamen

tally

opposed. plea

hides behind a policy of expediency. But his his impatience deliberation, anxiety to have the thing done before the Athenians lose their rage, shows that he is not truly interested in what is best Cleon's for
retribution with

for Athens in the

long

run as much as

he is interested in

revenge

(Orwin,

p.

62

Interpretation
or retribution as

487). Revenge
"legality,"

has little to do
points out.

with

with

Diodotus later

expediency and more to do Diodotus claims that justice, or among

states

legality,

should not

be

a consideration says
not

in

war

at

it is in

peace
on

among individuals (3.44.3-4). He justice, but that it will be heeded,

that Cleon's argument really

hinges
is

by

a calm consideration of what

just,
im
ex

but

out of

bitterness

and anger.

It turns

out that

the Mytilenaeans

receive more

justice because the Athenians

plies

are persuaded

to think of expediency, which

will

that speaking loudly tremism, that it will be distorted by the own ambitions (cf. Strauss, p. 191).
of

justice in

forum like this

anger,

only lead to

people's

perhaps

by

a speaker's

In the

case of

Mytilene, in
and

which arguments enlightened

from expediency
win.

are

seriously
and

entertained,

moderation

self-interest

At Plataea

Meios, in
forehand
tional
plifies

which

expediency is

either not mentioned or

has been decided be

carries the

and

is

not open

to serious

debate, immoderation

day. The

evidence suggests that political rhetoric must

interest"

rely overtly on arguments of "na speech exem expediency in order to be successful. this strategy. Thucydides gives us the example of Diodotus as an agent of
Diodotus'

or

moderation within a

naturally immoderate
that the

regime.

But if

Diodotus'

we admire

achievement,

we must recognize statesmanship.

moderation

he

obtains

depends

upon wise

his brilliant leaders

Thucydides leaves

us

with

the

hope that

will use

the art of political rhetoric for prudent ends.

REFERENCES

Gomme, Arnold W. A Historical Commentary

1959.

on

Thucydides. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

Realism."

Johnson, Laurie M. "Thucydides, Hobbes and diss., Northern Illinois University, 1990.
Orwin, Clifford. "The Just
debate."

the Interpretation of

Ph.D.

and the

Advantageous in Thucydides: the

case of the

Mytile

naean

American Political Science Review (1984): 485-494.

and

Strauss, Leo. The City

Thucydides.

Man. Chicago: Rand

McNally

& Co., 1964.

History

Cambridge,

of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Charles Forster Smith. Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1980.

Socrates

and

Alcibiades:
and
Politics*

Eros, Piety,
The

Jacob A. Howland

University

of Tulsa

the things that are

and gainful.

He [Plato] investigated the things that are good in the eyes of the multitude and gainful in the eyes of the multitude, whether they are truly good
He
also

investigated
as

whether

the things that are

useful

in the

eyes of

the

multitude are

truly
went

they believe

them to

be

or not.

He

explained that

they

are

not, and here

multitude.

he

through all the things that are good gains

in the

eyes of the

This is to be found in his book known

as

Alcibiades Minor.

Alfarabi (p. 58)

As its title announces,

recently

published collection

of

translations and

interpretive
cal

studies attempts

to reintroduce Plato scholars and students of politi

philosophy to

a part of the
'grounds

Platonic

corpus which

to overlook, on the

that the

dialogues in

question are supposed to

it is currently fashionable be

inauthentic,

or second

rate,

or

both. Thomas Pangle's Introduction to The Roots

of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues (Pangle) offers a cogent defense of the presumption that all thirty-five dialogues listed in the
traditional canon of Thrasyllus are authentic,
each
while

the essays which

follow

translation establish an equally favorable presumption regarding the signif

of

icance

the selected dialogues. But one Socratic dialogue which is named in

the traditional canon, Alcibiades

much so

II, especially
volume

"forgotten"

qualifies

as

so

that it does

not appear

in the

just

mentioned.

This is

partic

ularly

rates and

presents the relationship between Soc different light from that of Alcibiades I, which is very included in Pangle's collection, and of which the former is the dramatic com

unfortunate

because Alcibiades II
a

Alcibiades in

panion and sequel.

Alcibiades I

Socrates'

shows us

initial

philosophical seduc
Socrates'

tion of Alcibiades.
pretation
of

Among
of

other

the

failure

things, Alcibiades II contains his philosophic liaison with Alcibiades,

Alcibiades'

inter
thus

and

provides a critical counterweight

to

speech

in the Symposium.

As I hope to
cal

show

here, Alcibiades
be

II is

a work of considerable philosophi

interest. I

will

not

directly
upon

concerned with
which

determining

the

dialogue's
rea-

authenticity
tors.1

virtually the only

issue

has interested

modern commenta

This study may bear

the question of

authenticity if it

provides

*I
of

would

like to thank David R. Lachterman for his very

of

generous assistance

in the

preparation

the final version

this article.

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

64
sons

Interpretation

for challenging the common judgment that Alcibiades II is inferior (and so, "un-Platonic") in style and content (see, e.g., Shorey, Taylor, the introduc tions to Plato [1927] and [1892], and Heidel, pp. 56-59). But I am primarily interested in exploring the dialogue's
philosophizing,
presentation

of

the

nature

of

Socratic

a subject which was of

interest to
worth

notably, Aristophanes and Xenophon. It is

mination of

besides Plato, most stressing that no final deter

others although the speeches

and

authorship is required for deeds of Alcibiades II are clearly in the light of, the dramatic both Platonic

such an situated

inquiry,

within, and so should

be inter

preted

constellation of

the Platonic

dialogues. Put

broadly, Alcibiades II (the

gages

traditional subtitle of which was "On

Prayer")

en

and non-Platonic portraits of

Socrates

and

Alcibiades in

attempting to elucidate the philosophical and political implications of Socratic and Alcibiadian eros and the nature of Socratic piety. Let us turn directly to the
text to see how these

issues frame the dialogue's

action.

Alcibiades II takes

place

in the immediate vicinity

of a

temple,

as

is

clear

from the opening

prayer

exchange:

"Why Alcibiades,
Socrates"

god?"

to the

"I certainly am,

unless

way to offer a (Ale. II 138al-3. References are

are you on your

to the Burnet edition,

rather

otherwise

specified).

This

strikes
ara

Socrates
ge

as

unusual, if
suggests

we

may judge

by
be

his

tone.
pp.

(His phrase,

[Ale. II

138al],
present counter.

surprise; see

Denniston,
and

32-33, 43.) As in Alcibiades I,

are alone

the dramatic time of

which cannot

more

than a very few years prior to the

conversation,2

Socrates

Alcibiades

during

their entire en

But

on

the occasion when Socrates spoke to Alcibiades for the very

first time, he began

present mode of

(Ale. I 103al). calling him "Son of address suggests that Alcibiades has in the interim in

by

Kleinias"

Socrates'

some not

sense

become his

own man.

In particular, it is

clear that

Alcibiades has
earlier

maintained the

devotion to Socrates he
10). The hopeful

promised at

the end of the

dia

logue (Ale. I
way to
as a

135d9

enthusiasm

he displayed there has

Socrates'

given

dour

aloofness:

Alcibiades

will not meet

eyes or reveal

to

him his apparently weighty thoughts. "You

though you were pondering
rates?"

seem sullen and

look

at

the

ground

something."

"And

what might one

ponder, Soc

(Ale. II 138a4-6). From

answer to

Socrates'

perspective, Alcibiades
"mirrors"

could not

fully
and

know the

his

own question.

For in their first discussion Socrates

are
endowed with the
and

Alcibiades had
"sight,"

agreed that souls,

like eyes,

power of so

and

that each of them could come to know his own soul,

"see"

himself, only

through the reciprocal attempt to

"image"

the soul of the

"reflected"

other

together with his own soul's

(eidolon)
to

as

therein (Ale. I
Socratically(epi-

132c7ff.). induced

Alcibiades'

initial devotion

Socrates followed his diligent

care

conviction that

learning,

practice, and

for himself

Socrates
meleia), and

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

65

in

particular a care grand political

fulfillment

of

his

for self-knowledge, were prerequisite for the ambition (Ale. I 123d4-124b6). But this con
must

viction was not

rededicate

long-lived. In Alcibiades II, Socrates himself to Socrates.

both Alcibiades I
and

bring

Alcibiades to

An
that

ancient editor classified

//

"maieutic,"

as

implying

Socrates'

art of philosophic obstetrics

is

on

display

in both dialogues to the

extent

that Socrates leads Alcibiades to discover

or rediscover

his belief in the

this belief? take
root or

worth of

Socratic

education.

But

what

is the

pedagogic worth of

Specifically, if bear fruit, what

hopeful image

Alcibiades'

initial

commitment

to Socrates did

not

can we expect of

his

renewed commitment? whereas

question, it is important to observe that

of

In considering this Alcibiades I concludes with a

eros,

birth,

and mutual care

(Ale. I

135el-3;

cf.

Aristopha

nes, Birds 1353-57L Alcibiades II is filled with images of strife, death, and psychic disease. This is a strong indication that opportunity for philosophic conception and birth has been lost by the time the second dialogue
Alcibiades'

occurs.

Indeed, in Alcibiades II it is
eye"

Socrates'

diagnosis

Alcibiades'

of

psychic
metaphor of

condition

that the philosophic communion represented in the

"see

is now out of the an image of unanimity and reciprocity In Alcibiades I, on the other hand, Socrates emphasizes the potential reciprocity of his relationship with Alcibiades (see Ale. I 124bl0ff. and Soc

ing

eye

to

question.

rates'

use of

the dual

form

no

["we two"]

at

124d3,

together

with

135el-3).

Like

a patient agrees

finally
the

going to the doctor for the treatment of ophthalmia, Alcibiades to obey Socrates in the belief that Socrates will be able to remove from
around

mist of

folly (aphrosune)
doing

his

soul

(Ale. II 150c6-e8,

with

139el-140b3). He does
runs

the risk of
will

so only after Socrates convinces him that he otherwise himself great harm. But Socrates never actually claims

that he

be

able to

ionship

cannot

heal Alcibiades, and in fact he indicates that his compan improve him until he has been cured of his sickness (Ale. II

150el-5). What's more, the stark contrast in tone between the two dialogues suggests a very bleak prognosis. While the drama of Alcibiades I is illuminated

by

Socrates'

speeches and prospects

about

the

brilliance

Alcibiades'

of

beauty, family,
prospects which

wealth,

for

self-knowledge and political rule splendor of

gain a reflected

brightness from the

the

royal

Persian

and Laca

edaimonian
and

lineages, riches,

and virtues

Socrates

gives

Alcibiades II

dense
of

gloomy atmosphere by invoking such fateful figures as Oedipus, laus, Orestes, Alcmaeon, and Creon, and the corresponding tragic themes blindness, incest, parricide, regicide, madness, exile, and civil war. In
of
Socrates'

Arche-

spite of
surrounds

indication that he himself is free

of

the psychic disease

folly, he

himself

as

well as of

Alcibiades
Alcibiades'

with an atmosphere of reiterates

tragic

expectation.

perception 151b9

At the very end that his fate is intertwined

quotes a passage
Teiresias'

Alcibiades
Euripides'

II, Socrates

his

with

(cf. Ale. I 135e6-8). At

(858-

10 Socrates

from

Phoenician Women

59) in

which

Creon takes

victory

crown as a good omen

for the city

66
of

Interpretation

Thebes,
to

which

seem

myself

to be

is currently besieged by Polyneices no less wave-tossed than like to

Euripides'

and

his Argive forces. "I

Creon,"

Socrates tells Al

cibiades, "and
lovers"

your

victory [kallinikos] over play Creon is soon engulfed by misfortune, for in fact Teiresias brings the news that if Thebes is to be saved ancient crime against Creon's son Menoeceus must die in requital for
would

come off with a noble

(Ale. II 15 lcl 2). But in

Cadmus*

Ares. Seen in this context,

a prediction that

Socrates'

reference

to

Euripides'

he

will

fail to

Alcibiades'

conquer

other

tragedy amounts to lovers, and that this

the Athenian

failure

up a sea of troubles for him. In Alcibiades I Socrates identified his main

will raise

rival

as

demos
of a

(132al).

Victory

over the

demos

would

have

meant the

birth in Alcibiades

noble and winged of

eros; defeat

means

that Alcibiades

will

become

base "lover
that

people"

the
will see

(demerastes; Ale. I 132a3). Socrates foresees, however,

his paternity in Clouds
Alcibiades'

Athens

tyrannical ambition. (Cf.

Apology
in

19b4-cl

Aristophanes'

with

as a whole and
seems

Xenophon, Memorabilia
manner

1.2.9ff.)
which

In quoting Creon, Socrates also his fellow citizens will interpret his
the

to anticipate the

connection with

Alcibiades. To the

Athenians,
shared executed rannical cated:

kinship

between Socrates
gods of

and

Alcibiades Just
as

was evidenced

by

their

irreverence for the for

religious

the

polis.

Socrates

was convicted and

Alcibiades'

Athenians'

crimes, the

suspicions about

ty
he
was

hubris

were confirmed of

by

two criminal acts in

which

impli his
the

the desecration

the Hermae and the alleged

as

profanation of

the Eleusi
offered

nian mysteries. own son's

And just

Thebes

could not survive unless

Creon

life to

appease the god of

war, the Athenians sought to

maintain

benevolence
and

of their

protecting

gods

by

asking for the deaths

and ends

of

both Socrates

Alcibiades.3

To recapitulate, Alcibiades II begins

in

ways

that underscore the

Socrates'

politically Alcibiades. We may take our bearings by the association with Creon, who loses his own child,

philosophically
with

and

problematic character of

example of
anticipates

relationship Creon.
Socrates'

the

failure
of

of

his

philosophic

generativity in the
philosophic eros

case of

Alcibiades. In the language

reproduce

Alcibiades
soul.

I,

Socrates'

fails to

itself in

Alcibiades'

In

addition,
conflict gods.

however,

the

need

for Menoeceus to die brings to light

an

underlying

Socrates'

between Creon's generativity and the requirements of his polis and its association with Creon thus suggests that his philosophic eros,
of

independently
be radically
the

its

success or

at odds with

Athenian piety
assimilated

failure in regenerating itself in other souls, may and politics. It was taken to be so by
Socrates'
Alcibiades'

Athenians, but they

philosophic eros

to

political eros.

According

to

Socrates,
may

these two sorts of eros are

and

fundamentally
respects

different. Hence it is
each of accorded the

crucial to
of eros

determine why

in

what specific

these two sorts

conflict with the reverence

traditionally
of political

Olympian

gods of the polis and the

distinctive form

life these

gods protect.

This is the

central

task of Alcibiades II.

Socrates
II.

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

67

Within Alcibiades II, the tragic lenses through

which we

motifs of madness and sickness

Socrates' Alcibiades'

function

as

Tragedy
as

is

suited

to this role

may view because

Athenians'

and of

erotic natures.
and

its complexity
was

its

subject matter.

The

tragic poetry

profundity both informed

Socrates'

as well

by

and

largely

constitutive

of

their traditional understanding of a citizen's respon

political

sibilities

to his

kin, his
motifs

community,

and

its

gods.

use of endorsement of

tragic figures and

either

does not, however,

constitute a
of

full

the tradition or conventional

shows

interpretations

the tradition. On the con

of madness obscures
Socrates'

trary, Socrates
the
natures of

that the conventional

tragic protagonists like

understanding Oedipus and Ajax

as well

as

own philosophic nature.

Thus,

while

tragic poetry reflects and sustains the tra

of

ditions
many.

of political

community, the insight

the poets is deeper than that of the

understand

On the

other

hand,

their tragic insight does not extend to an

the (This point is developed along different ing of the lines in Howland [1986]). In Alcibiades II, Socrates draws on a rich fund of tragic representations in order to distinguish characteristically tragic madness from his own nontragic philosophic madness, and to delineate the
nature of
philosopher.
Alcibiades'

conventional perspective which was

incapable

of

making this distinction.

madness and sickness are
Alcibiades'

Let

us return

to the text to see how the themes of

developed in the dialogue's opening pages. In response to question ("What might one ponder?"), Socrates tells Alcibiades that it
proper

guarded would

be

for him to be

preoccupied

by

"the

greatest concern

[sunnoian]

namely,

how

one can avoid

are goods

praying for (agatha), inasmuch

cites sons prayed

great

as the gods

ills (kaka) in the mistaken belief that they are disposed to grant our prayers

(Ale. II 138a7, b6-9). He

the

example of

Oedipus,

of whom

say that he
pus at
cian

for his

to divide his patrimony

sword"

by

the

"[the poets] (Ale. II Oedi Phoeni

"mad,"

138b9-c2. See

Aeschylus'

Seven Against Thebes 709ff.

Sophocles'

and

Colonus 42 Iff., 1370ff. Souilhe finds in the

n.l]).
Socrates'

phrase an echo of

Women 64-61 [Plato, 1962, 21,

rejects

Alcibiades
whereas you

the

relevance

of

point:

Oedipus

was

Alcibiades evidently considers himself to be think could bring himself to pray for such things if he
Socrates'

"healthy."

"For

who

do

healthy?"

were

(Ale.

II 138c6-8). At first glance,

ate,
since

example

does indeed

seem goods

inappropri but know

not

he later

asserts that

Oedipus did
see

not mistake

ills for

ingly

prayed

for ills (Ale. II 141a4-5;

was mad when

below). And Socrates does

confirms

deny
the

that Oedipus

he
a

cursed of

his sons; in fact, he

this point.

Oedipus
their

cursed

his

sons

"in

fit

anger"

(141a2),

which was provoked

by

humiliation he
father"

suffered when

"[T]he two of them chose thrones at the price of

cf.

(Oed. Col. 448;

1380). Oedipus

uttered

these

words after

he

discovered
exile while

that Eteocles and Polyneices were willing to

let him languish in

passes over

they fought

over

the

rule of

Thebes. Although Socrates

68

Interpretation
ascent

Oedipus'

to the throne

at

the price of

his

own

father,

the enormity of the

anger

he felt toward his

sons was

foreshadowed in the

great rage which

led him
the

unknowingly to beat his father

to death. In addition,

Socrates

singles out

tendency

to

violent

rage

as

a characteristic of madmen:

madmen are

accus

tomed to strike and beat their fellow citizens thus an example, not of
of a second sort of rage

(Ale. II 139cl0-d2). Oedipus is

ignorance

of

the difference between ills and goods,

but

danger that

must

be

avoided

in

prayer:

praying in

a mad

for ills

which one recognizes as such.

Socrates implies, however, that Alcibiades is particularly susceptible to this second sort of danger, since his remark about the behavior of madmen de
scribes

Alcibiades himself. Plutarch, for example,

Alcibiades'

having

mentioned

Thucydides'

reference and custom

to
respect

great and

habitual "transgression

in passing of law
two

[paranomia] in
which

to his own

body,"

goes on to speak of
men: one a

instances in
other

teacher, the his future father-in-law (Thucydides 6.15; Plutarch, Ale. 6-8). In the
that his attention to Agathon may provoke
a

the young Alcibiades struck older

Symposium, Socrates, pretending

Alcibiades into
devotion"

should attempt to use violent

jealous rage, begs Agathon to "defend me, if he [Alcibiades] force, for I really dread his madness and erotic
sake of
wished

(213d5-6). Later in Alcibiades II Socrates supposes, for the

to
murder

example, that Alcibiades

his

guardian

Pericles (143e8ff).
political signif

This example, in

which parricide

is invested

with an

immediate

icance,
one,

Alcibiades'

makes explicit one aspect of

youthful

insolence:

beating
nurtured

one's elders

is

an act of violence against

the community
Socrates'

which

has
to

and as such

is

kind

parricide.4

of political
Alcibiades'

reference

Oedipus
Oedipus'

underscores the political

murder of cal

dimension

of

insolent behavior:
and

Laius

and curse of

his heirs Polyneices

Eteocles

are on a politi

level both

acts of parricide against supposition

the city of Thebes. In this connection,

murder

Socrates'

hypothetical

that Alcibiades desires to

Pericles
of a

suggests that

Alcibiades'

violent public

kind

of madness akin

to that of

behavior may be the manifestation Oedipus in its nature and significance.

madness, Socrates
with

In his
raise

subsequent exploration of the theme of

of

goes on

to

the question

his

own relation

to Oedipus. He begins

Alcibiades'

distinction between firms the

phronein).
view

being mad and being healthy. Alcibiades unequivocally that being mad is the opposite of being of sound mind
more guarded

af

(to
are

He is

in

response to

Socrates'

next question:

"And

there some human beings who seem to you to be foolish

sound go on one

[aphrones]
and

and some

in judgment
to
agree

[phronimoi]?'

"There

some."

are

Socrates

Alcibiades
no

that some men are

healthy

and others are sick and

feeble, but
same

is in

neither state.

Alcibiades

admits under

questioning that the

thing
is
no

holds

judgment (phronesis); third condition in between these. But if madness (mania) is the sound judgment, Socrates asks, must not and madness be the folly
and sound

true of

folly (aphrosune)

there

opposite of

same thing?

"It

so,"

appears

Alcibiades

responds

cautiously (Ale. II 138dl-139c2).

Socrates
We
the
must not overlook

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

69

the contrast, evident in this

passage and

throughout
Socrates'

dialogue, between

Alcibiades'

relatively

daring

relatively cautious reticence and frankness. Socrates goes on to declare explicitly

what

Al

cibiades would

not, and he presses him to agree with his assertion: "Some of

your contemporaries elders.

happen

For

come on,

by

be foolish, and what's more, some of your Zeus: don't you think that of those in the city few are
to

of sound

judgment,

"Yes, I

do,"

many are foolish, whom indeed you call Alcibiades confesses (Ale. II 139c4-9). Socrates is doubly
and the condemns

mad?"

daring

here because he

democracy,

or

the

rule of

the many,
elders.

and encourages

a presumption on the part of

an answer

Alcibiades

against

his

Amusingly, in de

he is acting rather like a jealous manding answer is philosophically worthless: Socrates may be in a lover. position to verify the folly of the many on account of his regular practice of public dialogue, but Alcibiades certainly is not. All possible jealousy aside,
to this
particular question
Alcibiades'

Socrates may judge it pedagogically useful to stress the foolishness many. This view is supported below in Section IV

of

the

The preceding observations help to prepare us for ironic to himself (as well as Alcibiades) in his ensuing correction of the
madness and

Socrates'

references view

that

folly

are the same

thing. That

Socrates

should proceed

implicitly

to raise questions about

his

own nature

is

not

surprising, since the exclusion of

sound

"some third II

condition

in between [dia
of

mesou]"

judgment

and

folly

(Ale.

139al4)

amounts

to a denial

the possibility of philosophy,

which

Socrates

elsewhere characterizes as an ascent

from

aphrosune

to phronesis (here in

its

highest

sense:

"wise

insight")

that resembles the

improvement

of vision and

originates

in the necessarily intermediate knowledge of one's own ignorance (Rep. 514a-517a). Alternatively, the unmediated opposition between madness
and phronesis excludes all varieties of

divinely
us

given an

mania,

including
point: will

philos

ophy (Phaedrus 244a6ff.). This brings

to

important Socrates

despite his his

apparently
philosophic
mean.5

extreme

behavior,
with

we

may

expect

that

associate

activity

the notions of the middle ground (to meson) and the

Socrates

overturns the simple

identification

of madness and were also

folly

with

the

if the many, foolish as they are, would citizens] long ago have paid the
argument that

mad, "we [fellow

beaten"

penalty"

by "being

struck and
do."

by them, and "[suffering] all the things which madmen are accustomed to What, then, should we say about folly? Socrates has another way of consider ing this question. A sick man may have podagra (gout in the feet), a fever,
ophthalmia,
not
or some other

illness;

while

every

case of ophthalmia

is

sickness,

Fever, podagra, and ophthalmia are all sick every own its each has but (apergasia) and works according to its nesses, (dunamis). own Similarly, cobblers, carpenters, and statuaries are all
sickness
ophthalmia.
"effect" "power"

is

craftsmen, but
way,
men are

each embraces

different

part of craftsmanship.
which

In the

same

distinguished

by

the way

in

they have divided up folly.

70

Interpretation
"mad;"

Those
a

who possess

the greatest share of

"stupid,"

it
or

are called most

those who possess

"big-hearted"

"foolish"

smaller

part,

or

euphemistically
"innocent,"

"silly,"

"inexperienced,"

(megalopsuchos:
"senseless."

or

The

literally "great-souled"), varieties of folly differ from

complex and

one

another,

as

do the kinds

of

art and sickness

(Ale. II 139cl0-140d4).

This

passage makes

is it

deserves

careful consideration.

To begin with,

Socrates

clear

that

conventional opinion cannot give us an adequate

understanding of madness. The list of names commonly applied to the foolish is a conventional one; as such, it expresses the opinion of the many. But Soc
rates and

Alcibiades have The

agreed that

the many are themselves

of prudence or

foolish. From
narrow,
man
self-

the perspective of the many,

folly

is the lack

in

"big-hearted,"

"inexperienced,"

"innocent"

serving

sense.

does

not

appreciate

the way of the world; he is

own self-interest.

garding his
rates'

By
is

convention,

insufficiently folly (a-phrosune)

view

calculative and clever re

is the

privation

of calculative prudence

(phronesis). But this

does

not square with

Soc

account,
absence of

wherein

folly

not the absence of prudence nor sickness the

health. Instead, Socrates represents sickness and folly as distinct wholes, like craftsmanship, of which men may possess a part or in which they may share. Each sickness (and obviously, every sort of art or techne) is charac
terized

by

its

own power and effect.

assert

Socrates does
that the

not speak of the powers and of

effects of other

folly, but he does

as art

kinds

folly

differ from

one an

"just

is

manifest

to

us

[as

differing] from

art and sickness

from differ

sickness"

(Ale. II 140dl-3). Yet

another

while

the various arts and sicknesses

from

one

wholes, Socrates

explains

because they share in different parts of their respective the difference between madness and folly in terms of
of participation

the different degrees

in the

whole of

folly. From this

perspec

tive, the madman would have the greatest share of folly.

Again, however,

Socrates

makes

this distinction in the course of reciting the names commonly

which

applied to the extreme

foolish,
of

indicates

that the conception of madness as the

degree

folly

is

also a conventional one.

Conventional
and

opinion

holds that be

prudence
of

is

knowing
of

what one ought

to

do

say,

whereas

folly

is the ignorance
Oedipus

both

these things (Ale. II

140elmatters.

5). But

madness cannot adduces

understood as extreme
as an

ignorance in these
of one of

Thus, Socrates

example

those who un
contradicts

knowingly

say and do what they himself when he adds that Oedipus

that he was
mad with ness

ought

not, but he

immediately
good

neither prayed

for

things

nor

believed

doing rage, knowingly

so

(Ale. II 140e7-141a4). In
prayed

other

for ills. In

sum:

Oedipus, who was if folly is ignorance, mad

words,
prudence

is

not

folly, for

crucial respect

evidently does not differ from the knowledge of goods and ills.
madness
such a as to seem to the

in

Madness does, however, differ markedly from

power and

prudent self-interest

in its

effects, in

way

many to be extreme folly. be

one and

To be

more

precise,

we should not speak of the power or the effect of madness.

From the

perspective of prudent self-interest all madness appears to

Socrates
the same

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

71

just
the

as

thing, but Socrates suggests that there are different kinds of madness, there are different kinds of sicknesses and arts. Nonetheless, the present
does
not

passage

illuminate

the varieties of madness. On the contrary, it poses

madness

problem of

how

Socrates'

is to be distinguished from Alcibiades'.

In particular, it is striking that Socrates presents himself as a close ally of Alcibiades by adapting the words Homer had Diomedes utter in the Iliad when

he

requested a partner to assures

Socrates

join him in spying upon the Trojan camp: at one point Alcibiades that if he pays attention "we two inquiring together
seek]"

[sun te duo skeptomeno] will perhaps discover [what we (Ale. II 140al2; cf. Iliad 10.224: sun te du erchomeno "we two going together"). Socrates
,

and

Alcibiades,
verbal

this Homeric reference suggests, are a pair of combatants (the

skeptomeno

dual

form

suggests

special

intimacy)

who

are

joining

forces

against a common enemy. prepare us

But

who

is the

enemy?

helped to

for

battle

by implicitly identifying
citizens.

Socrates has already Alcibiades with those

we not

madmen who strike and nessed strike

beat their fellow

But have

just

wit

Socrates himself blows

against

doing

the same sort of deeds

boldly

using

words

to

the fathers of

Athens,

the many, and so the democratic

regime

itself? fellow
citizens will

Socrates'

become

well acquainted with

beat them up in discourse; this is the clearest public ness. The opinion of Theodorus in the Theaetetus is
point.

manifestation of

his tendency to his mad

on this

highly instructive

When

pressed

by

Socrates to his

engage

in dialogue, Theodorus

compares

him to Sciron,
road where

a savage criminal who would

he

sat to wash

feet,

and

force travellers passing along the then kick them into the sea, and to force
strangers

Antaeus,
with

a monstrous son of
until

Poseidon

who would

to wrestle

him

they
and

were

exhausted, and then kill them {Theaetetus 169a9-b4).

Socrates'

To Theodorus
criminal

others,
since

behavior is
no

mad

insofar
and
,

as

it

resembles

violence, especially

Socrates is

Antaeus

his

"victims"

are

collectively far more powerful than he is (cf. Apol. 30e4ff. Rep. 493a6ff). Socrates responds to Theodorus by telling him, "You have made a most
excellent
naked now at

likeness

sickness,"

of

my
mentions

which

he describes

as a

"terrible love

of

exercise"

in

speeches

(Theaet.

169b5 cl).

In the

passage

Alcibiades II
and

hand, Socrates
Given
of

three sorts of sickness:

fever,

ophthalmia,

podagra. playful

Alcibiades'

analogy between sickness and madness, this may be a way referring to his own feverish eros for exercise in speeches, literal and metaphorical blind psychic ophthalmia and
Oedipus' Oedipus'

Socrates'

ness,

and

damaged feet. We
the

must

in any

case

take seriously the

chal

lenge

of

discerning

powers and effects of

the sorts of mania these three men

exemplify.

III.

In Alcibiades II, the tragic figure which we may compare Alcibiades

of

Oedipus

stands as a

third in the light of

we

and

Socrates. In the first place,

have

72

Interpretation
noticed

already
told

that Socrates

alludes

Oedipus'

about

experiences

when

very early in the dialogue to the stories he was in exile from Thebes. These
Oedipus'

stories are pertinent

to Alcibiades II in part because

ambivalence
Athens'

Thebes

Athens'

parallels

toward Alcibiades and

relationship with Socrates and the had

responses of

these men to

treatment of them.
once

Oedipus
to

could not

live

within

the walls of Thebes

his

crimes

come

light, but

at

the

same

time Thebes could not live without him. The oracles

indicated that

Thebes'

strength

depended

upon

him,

so that

Creon,
within

Thebes'

as

emissary, sought to tomb

proved

keep

him just

outside

the city, but not

it, lest his

a

to be unlucky (Oed. Col. 389ff.). Athens treated

Alcibiades in
presence

similar manner after

he left Sparta.

Many

Athenians feared his

in the

city because
toward

of

his tyrannical impulses

appreciated

and

the potential disfavor of the gods

of

Athens'

as a

his military leadership for well-being. Athens needed Alcibiades, but for the sake of its integrity political community desired to keep him engaged in battle beyond its walls

him,

yet

the

importance

(see Plutarch, Ale. 25ff). Along these same lines, Socrates was manifested in the closeness of the vote to
emphasized

Athens'

ambivalence convict

toward
a point

him,

effect,

an

Socrates (Apol. 35el-36b2). Like Oedipus, Socrates was, in exile: his death sentence amounted to a public certification of his

by

political

homelessness.
Athens'

Socrates'

response

to

Oedipus forced

uttered when

he discovered that his

final judgment closely resembled the prayer sons had acquiesced in his en
effect cursed

exile

to the border of Thebes. For Socrates in

Athens

with

a prophecy which he set forth at the time "when human beings most of all and in doing so in deliver oracles when they are about to He predicted a kind of internecine the presence of his supporters did his best to encourage
die."

strife

in Athens:
of

men younger and

harsher than he

would come

forth to

vex

the

fathers

Athens

by testing

soon as

Alcibiades

was recalled

enemies.

He

immediately

refuting them (Apol. 39c2-d3). Similarly, as to Athens to stand trial, he began to aid her spoiled plans to take the Sicilian city of
and
Athens'

Messina

and went on advised

to give the

Spartans invaluable aid; later,

having fled

Sparta, he

the Persian satrap Tissaphernes to play Sparta and Athens

off against each other

Oedipus'

(Thucydides

6.74ff.; Plutarch, Ale. 22-23, 25.1).

his hubristic transgres
political com

exile sion of

from Thebes

came about as a result of

the sacred laws which bind human beings together in

munity. relation

The

points of resemblance noted above sharpen the question of the

Socrates' Alcibiades'

between
aside

and

erotic

dispositions

Oedipus'

and

pe

culiar sort of

hubris

or characteristic madness.

Setting
Platonic

corpus

Alcibiades II, there are only two references to Oedipus in the (Brandwood, p. 614). Significantly, both occur in the Platonic
the search

dialogue devoted to

for the best laws: Oedipus is

of

interest to Plato his

crimes.

especially because of the fundamental political significance Laws 838c5, the name of Oedipus comes up in connection

of

At

with

the topic of

Socrates
incest. Later,

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

of

and

Politics

73

during

discussion
that

the neglect

of parents

by

their children, the

upon and

Athenian Stranger

notes

when

Oedipus

was

dishonored he "invoked

his

own children

things which, everyone sings, came to be

hearkened to

brought to

completion

by

gods"

the

(Laws 931b5-7). The Stranger's

earlier

reference reminds us that

Oedipus became the father

his
own

also

his brothers,

by killing

father
which

and

his children, sleeping with his

of strike

who are

mother.

Oedipus'

crimes of patricide and

incest,

in themselves

directly

at

the

integrity
of

of

the political community as well as the

myth and serve as emblems of

family,
political

reappear on

the

level

traditional

his

hubris.

By leg
sown

end, the Thebans are autochthonous:

men.

they

are

the

descendants

Cadmus'

of

In the terms
the

of

this

legend, Oedipus is

the brother of

for

all share

earth as a common mother.

his fellow citizens, But Oedipus usurps his mythical

mother's role in treating the Thebans as though they were his children (Oed. Tyr. 1, 6, 58, 142). His vision of himself as the father of his mythical brothers

is

proof of a

tyrannical
parricidal

hubris
and

which

is, in

political as well as an

purely

mythical
Oedipus'

terms, both
incest
origins.

incestuous. As
acknowledge a

image

of and

his hubris,

signifies

his failure to

his human,

Oedipus takes himself to be Corinth

guided or

radically

self-made man.

specifically political, Far from being

Thebes'

a son of

Thebes, Oedipus

a stranger

to both cities and a "knowsavior and

nothing"

the

source of

claims to have become only by his wits its life (Oed. Tyr. 37-39, 220, 222, 396-98).

Oedipus'

self-assertion

as of

the

father

of

the

Thebans, his
Oedipus

"earth-born"

brothers, imitates
This

the

incest
the

Uranus,

the son and later the

husband

of

Earth.

association with

pre-Olympian

gods,

which

strengthens when
moons,"

he identifies himself
which

as a son of

he

waxes and wanes

Chance (Tuche) and "kin to the (Oed. Tyr. 1082-83; cf. Hesiod, Theogony implications
Oedipus'

with

371

74),

points

toward the ultimate

of of

hubris. In

denying

his

political polis and

origins, Oedipus
so,

rejects

the authority

the Olympian gods of the

implicitly, of the civilizing laws first established by them laws "whose only father is Olympus, and which the mortal nature of man did not
birth
to,"

give

especially those prohibiting incest

god, Oedipus does away
with

and patricide

(Oed. Tyr.
with

865as

70). Just

as

important, by

aspiring to replace the Olympians

the
political

himself
which

with a cosmic

liberty

the

Olympians
apart
provided

sustained and

defended

and which set empires.

the free citizens of the polis

notes

from the its

subjects of

barbarian

Paul Rahe

that the polis to

citizens

"with

a middle ground

those

qualities that
or

distinguished them from

of

animals,"

(to meson) in or, in

which

display
for
in sup

a subsequent

mulation, "to do
itself"

note,"

port of the claim that

say something "to meson came to be identified

with n.

and

he

provides evidence with political

(Rahe,

p.

282

52

and p.

nonanthropomorphic or

barbarian

god

community 284). Oedipus, who likens himself to a (see Herodotus 1.131), resembles a bar
this middle or common ground.
a

barian despot in that he does away To sum up: Oedipus is marked

with

by

hubristic

madness which

is politically

74

Interpretation
and parricidal

incestuous
and

insofar

as

it leads him to usurp the

element

roles of as

the gods, the

in particular, to
of

attempt

to replace the Olympian gods

and of

the

arche

beginning, sustaining
What Socrates
and

source, ruling Alcibiades? To begin with,

these
men.
Oedipus"

political

community.

we should note

that

Oedipus
"the
ab

seems anerotic compared to sence of all

Benardete, in fact,
p.

speaks of

desires in

(1964,

7).

Socrates'

madness,
of naked

as we

have

in speeches, his philosophic eros. As for Alcibiades, Socrates tells him that his desire for renown is greater than any eros anyone else ever had for anything (Ale. I eros is emphasized by the 124b5-6; cf. 105b7-c4). The strength of
seen,
must

be identified

with

his "terrible love

exercise"

Alcibiades'

fact that, as Rosen notes, Alcibiades is the only character in the Symposium to whom Socrates attributes madness (p. 290; Symp. 213d5-6). This difference and distinct sorts of erotic aside, Alcibiades II shows that
Socrates' Alcibiades'

madnesses compel them

both to
ought

challenge arouse

the authority of the Olympians.

suspicion:

The dialogue's
cibiades on

plot

to

Socrates

encounters

Al

his way to

temple
advice

and convinces

him

not

to pray. As we

will see

in Section V,
we

Socrates'

to Alcibiades implies that it is irrelevant to our

gods through prayers and sacrifices.

welfare whether or not we

worship the
after

For

now,

for

what

may is to

observe come.

that Socrates prepares us in the first lines of the dialogue

Zeus,"

Immediately

swearing ignorant

"by
when

he insists

upon

the

need

for "much

forethought"

(polles prometheias)

praying, in case the

a great

gods should

be disposed to

grant an god

request
or

for

ill, thereby
to
protect us
,

virtually
against

invoking

the rebellious
of

Prometheus

"Forethought"

the ill will

the Father and

King

of

the Olympians (Ale. II 138bl

b6).

These words, however,

cibiades'

also anticipate the

fundamental difference between Al self-moderating

philosophic eros:
"starvation"

Socrates'

extreme political eros and

whereas
so their

Socrates

stands

for the (partial)

neglect or

of

the gods and

(qualified)

replacement

by

philosophic

forethought, Alcibiades desires

of a world

to replace Zeus and the Olympians with himself as the sole arche
wide empire.

IV.

We
rates

now return

to the text

Socrates'

and

characterization of

Alcibiades. Soc
main point: one

uses the example of

Oedipus to

reiterate

his first

and

be very careful not to pray for ills in the belief that they are goods. For example, Socrates supposes, and Alcibiades confirms, that Alcibiades would be
ought to

delighted if the
over all of

god

to whom he

now

intends to pray
all

were

to offer him rule

perceive that

cibiades,
unsafe

Europe, and were son of Kleinias, is

to promise "that

men will

Al

tyrant"

to

accept such an offer

haphazardly

(Ale. II 141b4-5). It would, however, be or to pray for such a thing, as the

confirms.6

fate

of

the tyrant Archelaus and his lover

Similarly, many Athenians

Socrates
who or

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

command

and

Politics
or

75

have desired have

and obtained

military

have been exiled,

killed,

have been besieged

prayed

by

accusers upon

who

for

children

returning home. Finally, have fallen into great misfortune

some of those

as a result of

their prayers

having

been

granted.

As

remedy for

our presumptuous

folly,
do
not

Socrates

recommends

the prayer of an anonymous poet of sound judgment

give to us good

(phronimos):

"King Zeus,

things whether we pray

or

pray, but ward off terrible things even if

we

pray for

them"

(Ale. //143al-2,

reading deina for Burnet's deila). In the center of this passage we find
rates and

clear anticipations of the prime example of an

fates

of

Soc

Alcibiades. Alcibiades is the

Athenian

general

who suffered exile and was

anachronism noted

harassed

by

accusers, and in reflecting

observe

upon

the

above,

we cannot

fail to

that

399,
of

the

year of Ar-

chelaus'

death,
a

Socrates'

was also

the year of
passage

execution.

In this respect,
the
with

and
of

indeed

as

whole, the

at

hand is

reminiscent
Alcibiades'

beginning
his
own.

Alcibiades I, in which Socrates also links Alcibiades I 103a- 106a, Socrates describes
that makes clear the connection between

lot

At

Alcibiades'

erotic nature

in

way

for

children:

Socrates

presents

praying for tyrannical himself as indispensable for

rule and

praying
ambi
with

Alcibiades'

tion of

being
cf.

able to rule

Asia

as well as

Europe,

and so

being
son

able

"to fill

speak"

your name

and

your power all

men, so to
as

(Ale. I

105c3-4, my
of

em

phasis;

Ale. I,

124b3-6). Just

Alcibiades,
of

"dear

Kleinias

and

Deinomache"

(105d2), bears

the name

his

parents and

feels himself to be his

uncle

filled

with

the power of their

families

and

particularly

of

Pericles

(104a6-b9), he hopes in turn to produce a biological child, but a global empire.

Alcibiades identifies
a

as a vessel of

his

name and

power, not

superior renown with superior

honor: he hopes "within

very few

days"

to prove that
lived"

anyone else who ever

he is "more worthy of honor than Pericles or (105bl-3). His impatient ambition must inevitably his guardian, his fatherland,
and

bring
pots:

him into
are not

conflict with

its gods, for his

heroes

democrats,

not

Athenians,

not even

Greeks, but barbarian des

be"

he does

Socrates'

not contradict

supposition
mention

Xerxes,"

he believes "no
we return

6). When
after

worthy of to Alcibiades II, we

the subject of
of parricide.

one

that, "apart from Cyrus and (105c4has ever come to

are

thus not surprised that

immediately
he
goes on
notion un

Socrates has

Alcibiades'

raised

global ambition rejects

to introduce the theme

that, like Orestes

and

Alcibiades passionately Alcmaeon, he wishes to kill his own

raises no objection wishes

the

mother

("No

lucky

words,

by

Zeus, Socrates!"), but he

sake of

to the alternative

supposition, for the

example, that he

to

murder

Pericles (Ale. II ignorance

143c8-144a8).
Socrates
would uses

the latter

example

to illustrate a situation

in

which

be

better than knowledge: Alcibiades would never actually

knife Pericles

if he

always

failed to

recognize

him

when

he

was about

to do so (144a9-bl0).

Alcibiades finds

Socrates'

second example unobjectionable

presumably because

76

Interpretation it

the link

implicitly

establishes

between

violence

and

the love of honor

when

is

already

quite

familiar to him. Oedipus becomes violently angry only

he is

signally dishonored, but Alcibiades is evidently accustomed to angrily asserting the justice of his claims to superiority and to using violence, when necessary, to secure his preeminence in any contest (see Ale. I 1 10bl-c2, Protag. 336el-

2,

and

Plutarch, Ale. 2.1-3).

example

Socrates'

is in its

general

form familiar from the

works

of

the

poets,
own

and

brings to

mind

the deeds of two different

men whose sense of

their

superiority and corresponding love of honor moved them to engage in extraordinary acts of violence. The first is Telamonian Ajax. Alcibiades claims Eurysakes and Zeus, hence also Ajax, the father of Eurysakes, as ancestors;
this is the line from
which

he believes he has inherited his

pertinent

well-born nature what

(Ale. I 121al-2,
respects

with

120dl2-e2). It is thus
resemble

to consider in

Alcibiades may
Socrates'

his

putative ancestors.

It is

also pertinent

to

inquire into

possible resemblance
same passage as

to Daedalus

and

Hephaestus,

whom cf.

he

claims

in the

his

own

progenitors

(Ale. I

121a3-4;

Euthyphro llc-d). Like Prometheus, Hephaetus is a rebellious god. In the Euthyphro, Socrates supposes that father-beating is dear to Hephaestus, pre

sumably because Zeus once threw him down from heaven when he took his mother's side in a quarrel (Euth., 8b3-4; Iliad 1.586-94). Socrates under
scores
when

the political significance of the conflict between Zeus and Hephaestus

he

refuses

to allow the story of their quarrel to be told in the just city

(Rep. 378d3-7).

When Odysseus
approach or address
seus'

visits

Hades in the
of
Achilles'

Odyssey,
in the

the shade of Ajax refuses to

him because

the anger he still

armor

feels

on account of

Odys

having
his

been

awarded rage

contests after

his death (Od.

conviction of

11.541-64). The

Ajax feels

against

the

Hellenes,

the iron

own superior worth

from

which

this rage springs, and the heroic resolution

Sophocles'

to die nobly through

which

he

proves

this worth, are the subjects of

resolves

Ajax. In

Sophocles'

tragic

drama Ajax

to

murder

Agamemnon

and

Menelaus because he feels they contrived to cheat him of the prize he deserved for supreme valor, armor, but when he is at the point of slaying the
Achilles'

two commanders, Athena diverts him with madness

punishment,

she warns

Odysseus, for

Ajax'

arrogance

(Ajax

127-30,

cf.

756-77). Intent

upon

killing

his fellow warriors, Ajax butchers whole herds of captured livestock in their place. Thinking that he is slaughtering the Hellenes, Ajax takes animals for
men
and

fails to
torture

recognize

his

companions.

Thus, Odysseus
to observe him in

whom

Ajax

plans to

and then
Ajax'

kill
wits

(Ajax, 83). When

therefore suicide,
other men.

return,

over a

life

of

safely he chooses autarchy (autarkeia), and yielding to the gods and showing deference to

is

able

his

madness

When Socrates first

approached

Alcibiades, he began by commenting

and

on

the

boy's

unsurpassed

high-mindedness

claims

to

self-sufficiency (Ale. I

Socrates
103b4ff). Socrates
thought
says of

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics
many

11
and

Alcibiades'

lovers: "although they

you"

were

highly of themselves [megalophronon], there was not one who, being outstripped by your pride, didn't flee from under (103b4-5; cf. 1 19dl 2.
Note the ambiguity
of of megalophrosune and megalopsuchia, which

may

connote

either greatness of soul or

mind,

or arrogance.).

And in

a manner reminiscent

Oedipus, Alcibiades

asserted that

he

was

"in

need of no other

human

being

for anything"; by comparison, Ajax boasted that, unlike other men, he needed no help from the gods to win fame through his prowess in battle (Ale. I 1 04a 1

2; Ajax 766-75). But both

Alcibiades'

of

these

boasts

prove

hollow: Socrates

shows that

pride

is in fact

family,
of

and above all

in the reputation, influence, and wealth of his in the power of Pericles (Ale. I 104a6-b9), and the fame
rooted

Ajax

finally

depends

upon the
Ajax'

decision

of

Agamemnon

and

Menelaus in

awarding the prize of valor.

attempt to murder the sons of

Atreus is

futile

and self-destructive rejection of

his dependence

on

the other men and his

and

allegiance

to their gods;

its

unavoidable result murder of

is

infamy

the hatred of gods

and men alike

(Ajax 457-59). The

Pericles

would

be

similarly

self-

defeating
As far
was

assertion of as we

self-sufficiency

on the part of

Alcibiades.
to murder

know, Alcibiades
Ajax'

never attempted of the

Pericles, but he
in
certain re

implicated in the desecration for

Hermae,

an act which

spects resembled

slaughter of men was

the herds. In both cases, a profound con through the widespread and violent

tempt

gods

and

expressed

destruction
other,

of some other
statues.

objects,

in

one case a

domesticated animals, in the

sacred

In addition, there is

mutilation of

these statues, whose

striking similarity between the "characteristic features were knocked off or

levelled,

so that or

nothing
and

was

left

except a mass of stone with no resemblance to

which

humanity
he
7:169).

deity,"

Ajax'

mutilated

in

various ways

unsparing treatment of the herd animals, (Ajax 231-44. The quotation is from Grote

[n.d.],

Socrates'

Alcibiades'

example of

failure

to recognize Pericles also recalls

after

the deeds

of

been

shot

Diomedes. In the Iliad, Diomedes is aided by Athena by the archer Pandarus. Athena gives him his father
the mist from his eyes "so that
man"

he has
great

Tydeus'

might,
nize
of

and also removes god and

[he] may
him

well

recog

both

on the

battlefield. Athena
"great-spirited"

the immortals in this

warning.

battle,
The

except

any for the feeble Aphrodite. But Diomedes disre

warns

not to engage

gards

son of
"overweening"

"over-spirited"

(huperthumos),
Athena
enables

Tydeus, he himself becomes (huperphialon) and "equal to a

,

daimon"

after

him to

penetrate

the disguises of the gods. He

echoes
Zeus."

attacks not plaint

only Aphrodite, but Apollo as well, who that Diomedes "would now fight even Father

Aphrodite's

com
and

Emboldened

protected

by Athena,
egged

who

is angry

with

omedes goes on to strike the god of war

Ares for supporting the Trojans, Di himself. Ares subsequently complains

that Athena

on

Diomedes "to

rage

furiously

against

immortal

gods"

(Iliad 5. 121 ff.).

78

Interpretation
Socrates'

Seen in the light fill

out our

of these

legendary

characters,

example
Alcibiades'

helps to
psyche.

understanding of the Socrates indicates that the young

problematic condition of
Alcibiades'

sense of

his

own

preeminence,
or
self-

like that

of

Oedipus
His

and

Ajax,
of

rests upon

his

conviction of

autarchy

self-sufficiency requires some explanation. In desire for honor only Alcibiades I, Socrates proceeds to discuss after he justifies his observation that Alcibiades takes himself to be superior to
sufficiency.
conception
Alcibiades'

all

other men.

The

Socrates'

Alcibiades'

order of

exposition reflects

attitude

toward honor.

Alcibiades'

desire for honor is

deeply
with

rooted

his

own superior

intrinsic worth; he
nature alone makes

regards preeminent

in his certainty of honor as his due. In

and

Alcibiades'

view, his

"beginning
him

the

body

ending

with

soul"

the
one else

(Ale. I 104a3-4)

superior

to all other men; he needs no

Alcibiades'

tally

because he already possesses in himself everything that is fundamen having. But there is more to say about conviction of self-sufficiency: above all else, he passionately desires honor on a global scale.
worth

I take this to be belief that his

not

only

a measure of

his eros, but

also an

indication

of

his

preeminence

is

absolute

in the

sense that

it is

not relative

to the

scales of appraisal peculiar to specific political

communities, be

they Athenian,

Spartan,
reflects

or

Persian.

Alcibiades'

his

conviction

desire to be first in any and every undertaking that he deserves to be recognized as being quite simply human
contexts.

best, independently
ison has
of

of all particular a

As

Aristophanes'

compar

Alcibiades to

constrain

lion suggests, the bonds of political community cannot him because who he is is not a function of the particular polis which him. He thus
regards

nurtured

himself

as equal to a god

in the fundamental honors implies

a

sense that

his deepest origins,

Alcibiades'

unlike

those of all other men, are apolitical.

superior

Unfortunately,
god who craves

overwhelming desire for

that he does need other men, and for the same

deep

reason

Ajax does: like

worship, his

satisfaction

absolute superiority.
des'

Thus,

prior

lies in seeing others acknowledge his to his being honored above all men, Alcibia
Alcibiades'

need for honor must confront him as a token of his merely human worth. Of course, unsurpassed honor among men might confirm superi in his own but if it need to be were eyes, uncoerced; ority only recognized as divinely self-sufficient requires that honor be freely given to him
Alcibiades'

Even so, it is very doubtful that Alcibiades would be satisfied less than the esteem of the gods as well. Like Ajax and Di anything Alcibiades omedes, passionately believes that the gods are no more worthy of honor than he is. The universal esteem of men alone, however, would help to

by

other men.

with

confirm nature

only that he is the best human being; it would is divine, or superior to human being as such. Apart from the likely inadequacy of all merely human
Alcibiades'

not establish

that his

honors,

there are two

profound obstacles to the satisfaction of

men

eros.

In the first place,

freely

confer superior

honors only
Yet

upon

those whom

they spontaneously
not
sub-

recognize

to be

of superior worth.

Alcibiades'

desire for honor is

Socrates
ordinated, as it ought to

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

that

and

Politics

79

in

calls

virtue (arete). Thus, Aristotle worthy of honor the prize of virtue, and megalopsuchia an ornament (kosmos) of the virtues (Nic. Eth. 1 123b35-1124a2). In accepting great honors, the

himself

be, to the attainment of honor, i.e., excellence or

which alone makes a man

megalop-

suchos, "the
them"

man

who,

deeming

thy

of

(Nic. Eth. 1
of

123M-2),

himself worthy of great things, really is wor receives just what he already deserves (cf.

Aristotle's discussion

those who lack virtue but

imitate

the

megalopsuchos

[Nic. Eth. 1 124a26-l 124b6]). In Alcibiades 1, Socrates biades this lesson

attempts to teach

Alci

by

ing

him that he

can

exposing his dependence upon his family, and then advis hope to compete for renown with the Persian and Lac
care

edaemonian rulers

only through diligent

(epimeleia)

and wisdom
Socrates'

(sophia)
at

or art

(techne; 123d3-4, 124b2-3; see also his boast and 119b5-c5). In Alcibiades II, Socrates insists that the polis
live correctly
needs

lament

or soul

that

intends
with

to

the knowledge of the best (tou beltistou episteme),

out which the other epistemai are

very

likely

to

be harmful to their

possessor

(146d7-147bl). One

could

say that Socrates attempts to replace

with a

Alcibiades'

unfounded conviction of

self-sufficiency
that one

philosophically directed
superior

quest

for

such.

But there is does

still another problem:

will

the achievement of

intrin

sic worth

not guarantee

spontaneously be

accorded superior one

honors. This is true

may
attain through
Socrates'

quite apart

from

whatever measure of

self-sufficiency
end of

arete, and whatever sort of arete this may turn out to be.
with

relationship

Alcibiades is

a case

in

point.

At the

Alcibia

des I, Alcibiades vows to devote himself to Socrates. this is a signal honor. But before Socrates began to
the worth of philosophy, the young
man was

Coming
educate

from Alcibiades,
Alcibiades
about

blind to his something

virtues and regarded of a

weirdo

him

very 106a2-3).
Socrates'

as

strange

more

colloquially,

as

(Ale. I

the young man's

interest in Alcibiades is partly intelligible in light of the nature of eros. For love of honor manifests, albeit incoher
Alcibiades'

ently,

an

underlying desire to

regard

his

own worth

in the light

of standards sanc

which are prior

to,

more

authoritative,

and more universal

than, those

tioned and sustained

prephilosophic

by

indigenous
exempt

custom

(nomos).

Alcibiades'

unexamined or admit

desire to

himself from the

tedly hubristic, but

tes says of the
assert

this aspect of

his hubris is
lovers

hegemony of nomos is shared by Socrates. What

"For
all
mind

Socra

wise

holds true

of

of wisdom as well:

the wise the

king

in harmony, therein really exalting themselves, that (Philebus 27c6-8). for us of heaven and
earth"

(nous) is

Socrates certainly does

Alcibiades'

not

discourage

Alcibiades'

hubris. Instead, he
nature of

at

tempts to

open

eyes to

the necessarily

philosophic

the

highest

self-exaltation, in the

hope, however
ensuing
to
the
which

slim, that his

Socrates'

excessive eros

for

honor may be moderated by (This is the proper context in des

II that Alcibiades

an

philosophic quest

for

self-sufficiency.

understand

demand in Alcibia

acknowledge

folly

of

the

many.

See Ale. II

146a-

80
147b

Interpretation
Socrates'

and

criticism of

the many as teachers of justice Ale. I

110e2ff). he does

Socrates is only partially open eyes, but in the

Alcibiades'

successful

in this

venture.

In

a crucial respect

Alcibiades'

end

eros overpowers

him. Socra

tes feared that this

it is easy to see why. Alcibiades lacks natural defenses against his own eros; his laziness and impatience make him 106b5-6). Socra unsuited for the labor of philosophic epimeleia (Ale. I 105bl
might

happen,

and

tes'

implicit warning to him against knowingly praying in a mad rage for ills proves prophetic: in the Symposium, Alcibiades admits that "I am fully con
scious and cannot not

deny

that I ought not

do

what

this

man

[Socrates]

orders me
many"

to, but

whenever

I leave him I

am

defeated

by

the honor of the

(216b3-5). Alcibiades is defeated in his

own terms

because in assimilating

himself to the many in order to gain the immediate gratification of their es teem a thing which for him requires very little effort (see Plutarch, Ale.

23.3-6)
nomos.

he

proves

the all-too-human

dependence

of

his

own

worth

upon

Alcibiades'

recognition of

his

own

him to is

rage

directed just

as much against

self-defeating himself as against those

character gives

rise in he

of whom

deeply

jealous:
asks

gods and men who appear godlike

protection against

in their

self-sufficiency. rage

Socrates

Agathon for

Alcibiades'

jealous

(Symp.

213c6-d6); Alcibiades goes on to charge Socrates with a hubristic indifference toward all things human (219c2-5; cf. 216d-e and 217e5, where Alcibiades
introduces
non]"). each
Socrates'

rejection of

his favors

as an

"arrogant deed
comes

[huperepha-

In the Republic, Socrates states that "the city of us happens not to be self-sufficient, but in

into

being

because
and ex

need of

many [men

things)"

(369b6-7); in
In

the
a

ception to this rule.

Symposium, Alcibiades portrays Socrates as an manner akin to Diomedes, Alcibiades discerns

Socrates'

the

divine
of

nature

hidden beneath

ironic

Alcibiades'

exterior.

comparison strengthens statues

Socrates to
the

a statue with a god

hidden inside (Symp. 215a6-b3)

one's

suspicion

that the desecration

who

(including
gods and

castration)
men,

of

the

of

Hermes,
jealous
remains

messenger

links

Alcibiades'

symbolizes

Socrates'

rage against

philosophic eros. sees enough sense

sophic casualty:

he

In sum, Alcibiades is a philo to feel acutely his need for philosophy, but
eros prevents accessible

blind in the

that

his

him from advancing toward

humans.7

philosophic

insight into the

divinity

to

Alcibiades, like Oedipus, is inclined

turn,
gins of political community:

to

forget his

political origins.

Both, in
ori

possess certain natural endowments which enable them to

imitate the

ability to

assume the

Oedipus his wits, Alcibiades his chameleon-like looks of other men, and so to imitate the different virtues

different polities are founded. Unlike Oedipus, however, Alcibia des knows himself to be generating sophistical images of self-sufficient origi nality. Like Ajax, the recognition of his neediness leads him madly to attempt
upon which

to

destroy

the political origins from which he cannot

free himself.

Alcibiades'

erotic madness

is tragic insofar
men

as

his

experiences confirm the

and

poets'

perception so

that

it is impossible for

to

become gods,

that the attempt to do

is

inevitably

self-destructive.

Socrates
V.

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

81

As

we

which manifests course of

associated

have seen, the figures of Ajax itself as violence against

and

Diomedes

represent great

hubris
the

men and gods.

Significantly,
connects

over

their relationship both Alcibiades and Socrates are in

with

various ways

these two characters.

While Alcibiades

himself in

birth

and nature with

the end

Ajax in Alcibiades I, Socrates links him with Diomedes at of Alcibiades II when he suggests that he might be able to help remove

the mist
moved

from

Alcibiades'

around

soul

"just

as

Homer

asserts

that Athena re

the

mist

both

man'"

god and

for Diomedes from his eyes, 'so that he might well recognize (Ale. II 150d6-9, cf. Iliad 5. 127). We saw earlier that in

Alcibiades II Socrates

associates himself with Diomedes by adapting a phrase from the Iliad; in the Symposium, in which Socrates again borrows the same phrase, Alcibiades compares Socrates to Ajax (Symp. 174d2, 219e2). Alcibia des also reports in the Symposium that Socrates once compared him to Di omedes
well

(cf. 219al
Socrates'

with

Iliad 6.236). These

attack

multiple associations prepare us

for

hubristic

in

speech upon

the Olympians.

Since the
biades that

gods

we should

may grant whatever we pray for, Socrates suggested to Alci follow the anonymous poet in praying for them simply to
and to withhold

give us good

things,

ills

even

if

we should ask

for them. But

Socrates
give us

goes on to state that the gods

we

the opposite of what

it

was useless

may nonetheless reject our prayers and for (Ale. II 148dl 2). Thus, for example, pray for the Trojans to make lavish sacrifices, since they were hated
case made a mistake

by

the gods (Ale. II 149dl-e3). The Trojans in any

by

trying

to bribe the gods; the gods care more about whether we are pious and
about our gifts and sacrifices

just than

(Ale. II 149e6-150al). Socrates illus

trates this point with an anecdote about a quarrel

and

between the Lacedaimonians

against

Athenians. The Athenians,

even of

having

lost every battle

of

the Lacedaimon

ians

though their offerings to the gods were far greater and finer than

those

their rivals, decided to inquire

with

Ammon (an Egyptian

Ammon
allowed

god whom

the to

Greeks identified
say only that he

Zeus)

why this

was so.

his

prophet

would prefer

the reverent silence of the Lacedaimonians to all

the offerings of the Hellenes (Ale. II 148d3-149b5).

According
the

to

Socrates,
poet,

the

Lacedaimonians,

perhaps

having

been influenced

by

anonymous

cus

tomarily pray only

that the gods may give them good and beautiful things.

Owing

to their

prudent reserve

less fortunate
We may
since to

than any other

human

in prayer, the Lacedaimonians "have been (Ale. II 148b9-c6).

beings"

no

summarize

the preceding account of the gods as follows. No to

offer

matter

what one prays

for, it is irreverent
as

the gods lavish

sacrifices and

gifts,

if they were susceptible to bribery and hence 149e4-5). Beyond this, it is irreverent to pray for to debase them (cf. Ale. II unjust and foolish things even in a nonlavish manner, since this debases the do
so

is to treat them

gods

by implying
even

that

they don't

esteem

justice

and wisdom

(cf. Ale. II 149c 1manner,

4). And

if

we ask quite

generally for

good

things

in

a nonlavish

82

Interpretation

the gods may still send us

ills,

as

has happened

even

to the

Lacedaimonians

(Ale. II 148c6-7); if they have been no less fortunate than other people, Soc rates implies, they have been no more fortunate either. Because the gods are
precaution and

inscrutable, Socrates insists that in the matter of prayer "there is need of much (Ale. II inquiry, concerning what ought to be said and what 149c6-7. Cf. Mem. 1.3.2, where Xenophon writes of Socrates: "He prayed to the gods simply to give him good things, since, as he believed, the gods know
not"

best dote

what sorts of

things
one

are good."). equal

To say too

much would

be to assume,

perhaps

rashly, that

is

to the gods in wisdom. In any case, the anec that the gods demand reverent silence as their
most

about

Ammon

makes
most

it

clear

due. It is therefore ians. Several features

rates

reverent,

prudent,

and most

just to the

gods to

make use of the simple prayers of the anonymous poet and

the Lacedaimon

Socrates'

of

account are noteworthy.

In the first place, Soc

god as an exam

illustrates his

argument about prayer was not

by

using

barbarian

ple,

albeit one who

identification

of

entirely Ammon with Zeus allows Socrates to talk

Socrates'

unfamiliar

to the Greeks.

The

Greeks'

about

the divine

without respect

to the differences in nomos between cities, or even

empires.
gods'

between the
for his

polis and

barbarian
the

main point concerns

the concealed or

hidden

nature of

intentions. Ammon,

a god who was named

love
to

of disguises, provides him with an especially suitable example. According Herodotus, Ammon is represented by a ram's head, in which disguise Zeus

was said

to have once revealed himself to Heracles (Histories 2.42.3-4). Be

is) thought to mean or III. 71 and n. III. 155). (1984, 6, Strikingly, however, Socrates proceeds in this passage to unmask the gods. Having said that the gods care most about whether we are pious and just, Socrates almost immediately substi
nardete notes that the name
'Hidden'

Ammon "was (and

'Concealed'

tutes

"wise"

for "pious": "For it is

are

probable

that both
and

justice

and wise

insight

[phronesis] [nous], and

Ammon

especially
and

esteemed

by

gods

the wise and just are none other

possessing intellect than those who know what it is

men

necessary to do

men"

say regarding

gods and of

(Ale. II 150a6-b3). Whereas

exemplifies the

tendency

the gods to take on many shapes, Socrates the gods

indicates

that the

enduring

nature of

is

accessible

to us in the
and

natures

of men who possess phronesis and nous.

Thus,

the

Greeks,

in

particular

the

Athenians,
gods resent

are

wrong to believe (as in Hesiod's Prometheus

legend)

that the

paltry sacrifices, or that they can be moved by splendid Rep. 364d-e), since they, like men of nous the nearest equivalent
are philosophers
Socrates'

ones

(cf.

of whom

love the

noble

and esteem

above all

justice

and wisdom.

speech equates civic

piety

with reverence

for the true

objects of philo

sophic piety.
Socrates'

virtual
gods'

identification

of

the gods with philosophers sharply limits their

the

capacity to transform
nature

themselves, for
reverent

disguises

conceal a stable
at

interior

(cf.

Socrates'

assimilation of the gods to

the Ideas

Rep. 377 apractice

383a). In the

course of

advocating

silence, Socrates seems to

Socrates
impious is
speech.

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

83

One

could

terpretation of the quarrel

completed

say that Socrates here offers us a Promethean rein between Prometheus and Zeus. This reinterpretation Alcibiades that he
not

by

Socrates'

recommendation to
unsafe

pray

at all.

Socrates tells Alcibiades that it is

for him to

go ahead and

for tyrannical rule)

speaking send him
some

initially planned, irreverently (literally, "blaspheming")

as

he had

since when

the

god

pray (namely hears him

some other

thing
"It

as well

he may reject his sacrifice and (Ale. II 150c3-6). He goes on to give him
to be best to

surprising

advice:

seems to me

keep

silence.

For I do

not

think that

you would wish

to use the Lacedaimonian

prayer on account of your

high-mindedness
folly"

[megalopsuchia]

for this is the

most

beautiful

of

the names

of

(Ale. II 150c6-9). Socrates thereby indicates that it

the practice specifically sanctioned

makes

little dif

ference
ent

whether one offers

the gods of the polis modest sacrifices and rever

prayers

by

Ammon

or

prideful

ly

chooses not to

he implies,
prayer,

are

pray any impotent to affect

tantamount to

or make

sacrifices or offerings at all. our welfare when

The Olympians,

they

are not engaged

by

which

is

fare

any circumstances. Socrates worship, specifically approves the which springs from human arrogance.
under

saying that they are impotent to affect our wel While the Olympians are sustained by human
"starvation"

neglect or

of

the gods

Socrates tells Alcibiades that he

how
one should

should

hold

be disposed toward

gods and

off from praying until he learns human beings (Ale. II 150dl-2,

151a3-4). In addition, he indicates that he himself possesses this knowledge, thereby identifying himself as a wise and just man (Ale. II 150d6 and 151al-2
with

150a6-b3). Just "in

as

Athena lifted the

must

mist

from

Diomedes'

around

eyes,

Socrates tells Alcibiades that he

soul
order

have the

mist removed

from

around

his

only then to employ the means through both the base and the noble. For at present it does
would

which you will recognize not seem

to me that you

be

able

to do

so"

(Ale. II 150d6-e3). The

gods

have
the

now

dropped

out of

the picture;
ede

Socrates'

substitution of

"both the base

noble"

and

(emen kakon

kai esthlon) for Homer's "both god and (emen theon ede kai andra: cf. 150dl-2: pros kai theous pros anthropous) indicates that Alcibiades 150d9; look to
standards
which are more

man"

must

fundamental than the distinction be

as

tween the

mortal and

the

divine, particularly insofar

the

latter distinction is
wise

interpreted

by

the poets.
comes

By identifying

himself

with

the

Athena, how
This becomes

ever, Socrates

to occupy the

place vacated

by

the gods.

abundantly hanos) he had evidently brought 151a7-b2; cf. Symp. 213el-6).

votive
temple]"

clear when

Alcibiades

places upon

him the

crown or chaplet

(Step

to the temple as a votive offering (Ale. II

Pauly

tells

us

that crowns were "a

favorite

the the

offering to the divinity, that the poor as well as the rich could bring [to 1601). Socrates here again associates himself with (1953-73, 1 1
.2:

objects of philosophic reverence or

Socrates'

piety,

which suggests

that the recogni the

tion

of

nobility

is,

as

it were,

prerequisite

for the

recognition of

noble

itself.
criticized

Although he has just

the Athenian

practice of

bribing

the

gods

84

Interpretation
gifts, Socrates does
Alcibiades'

with excessive

not object

to

plan

to present the

gods with all of the customary offerings after his condition II 150M-3). Socrates also does not seem to fear the jealousy; he
gods'

has improved (Ale.

accepts

the crown with pleasure, along with whatever else

Alcibiades may
resonates
word of

wish

to give

him (Ale. II 151b4-5).

And brought
ers"

so the against

dialogue ends, on a note which Socrates and Alcibiades. The last

as

to the

indictments

the

dialogue is "lov

(eraston),

if to

suggest that eros supplants

the perspective of traditional

picture of

piety in Alcibiades II. From piety, there is something rather profane in the
perhaps on the steps of the
temple.8

Alcibiades crowning Socrates,

VI.

At the

beginning
have"

of

the

Theaetetus, Socrates
with

tells his young look-alike that

Socrates'

he

wants

to converse with him "so that I too may examine myself as to what

sort of

extraordinary interest in Alcibiades is presumably also rooted in his tremendous desire for self-knowledge, a desire which leaves him little time for the pursuit of any other aims (Phaedrus 230al-6, Apol. 23b7-cl). For reasons I have already set

face I

(144d8-9). As

Theaetetus,

forth, it is unlikely
in Alcibiades
an

that Socrates expected

of

he

would succeed

in

bringing

to birth

image

his

own philosophic eros.

But Socrates

stands to

learn something about himself even from the failure of this attempt. In particu lar, Socrates may gain insight into the difference between himself and Alcibia des

by reflecting upon the reasons for this failure. This knowledge is especially so much like Socrates in important re important because Alcibiades
"looks"

spects.

While Alcibiades II

completes

the

characterization of

Alcibiades begun

in its draw
as an

companion an essential

dialogue, however, it leaves

to

its

readers

the task of

trying

to

distinction between Socrates

and

Alcibiades. This

strikes me

entirely appropriate way of dealing with the deepest issue raised by the dialogue's tragic characterization of Alcibiades: whether Socratic philosophiz

ing, in its
universal

quest

for

origins which are prior can

to,

more

authoritative,

and more

than nomos,

images des II
can

of self-sufficiency.

itself do anything more than generate sophistical In quite pointedly leaving this issue open, Alcibia
Socrates'

remains

faithful both in

style and substance to

judgment that it

be meaningfully investigated only by assessing the responses of others be interlocutors or, where we are directly concerned, readers of they
Socrates"

Socratic dialogues
Socrates'

to the philospher's erotic madness.

approach the problem at
of

This very openness gives us a way to judgment about the importance

points
Alcibiades' "political"

hand. For

knowledge itself
des.
even

selfcommunity to philosophic toward a basic difference between himself and Alcibia eros for renown is fundamentally apolitical, and

antipolitical, in that it is

exclusive and nonreproductive.

Alcibiades'

eros

precludes the participation of others

in that

which

he deems

most choiceworthy,

Socrates
whereas political account of

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

and

Politics

85

community is founded upon such participation (cf. Aristotle's the polis as a koinonia [community] of perceptions, Pol. 1253a7reason as

18). For this

a

well,

Alcibiades is beloved

by

others

but is

not

himself
share

lover: he does
eros.

not seek out others who share or might

Socrates'

be brought to

in
in

his guiding just these

philosophical eros, on the other

hand, is

political

ing

self-sufficiency in assimilat himself to the many, Socrates tests the legitimacy of his own quest for
respects. short of

While Alcibiades falls

self-

sufficiency by attempting to assimilate others to himself. In particular, he seeks out others in whom he might midwife philosophic eros because this objectification of

his

own erotic pursuit would

help

to confirm its validity. This

Socrates tells Alcibiades that his offspring (Ale. I 135el-3). Socratic philosophizing the

own eros will

be

"tended"

or

is why nurtured by its

actual posses

quest

for wisdom,

rather

than

its

sion requires human community because of the necessity of dialogue for selfknowledge. We may add that philosophic self-knowledge, or the attempt to

distinguish philosophy from sophistry, requires consisting of one's disciples. Alexander Kojeve
the importance
"recognition"

community larger than that makes this point in discussing

a

of

for the

philosopher:

"The

philosopher who world or

shuns prejudices

would,

'market
ter,'

place'

or

then, have to try to live in the outside 'in the like Socrates) rather than in a
street'

(in the

'sect'

'clois

'republican'

'aristocratic'"

whether

or

(Kojeve,

p.

164;

cf. pp.

168-69).

For this reason, Socratic philosophizing could not flourish under the "philo regime set forth in the Republic, or any other regime which discour
sophical"

ages

the

formulation,

much

less the

reasoned public

discussion,

of

competing

conceptions of the

noble, the good, the

just,

and

the advantageous, and so of

the

choiceworthy or exalted life. The free Socratic philosophic discourse.

most

polis

is the best

environment

for

This is

favorable
that
of an

environment.

say that Socratic discourse helps to sustain its most Perhaps its relationship to political community is like infectious disease to its host organism: while it needs political com

by

no means to

munity, it fourishes only at its sharpened the question raised by

expense.
Socrates'

Up

to this point,

we

hubristic

assimilation of

have merely himself to a life

of

barbarian
polis?
much.

god:

Is

Socrates'

erotic madness

inherently

at odds with the

the
as

In

fact,
to

there

is

a crucial respect

in

which what

has been

said

implies

Socrates

uses the maieutic art

for the

sake of self-knowledge.

While his
apolitical.

art attempts

bring

others

to

share

his eros, his

aim

is essentially

He does munity nity

not seek

fulfillment

and could not pursue self-knowledge

in

a com

of

friends bound together be

hold true To
to be

by

philosophy, even though such a commu

of

might well would

generated as a of anyone paraphrase

byproduct
whom

Socratic discourse. The

might succeed

same

thing

in

Socrates

in

reproduc a phi

ing

his

own eros.
ceases

Kojeve's

(1968)
when

point about

Socrates,

losopher

concerned about

the difference between philosophy and

sophistry,

and so ceases

to be a philosopher,

he

no

longer feels any

need

86

Interpretation
Socra

to venture beyond the company of those with whom he already agrees.

tes, however,
and

always regards

the problem

of

the distinction between

philosophy
through the through
philo

sophistry between Alcibiades

attempt

as

an

open

question.

Here

we

find

significant resemblance

and

Socrates: Socrates

pursues self-knowledge philosophic won over.

"conquer"

to

other psyches with

his

eros,

and not

communion with

those

whom

he has already
Alcibiades'

And

Socrates'

sophic ambition

is

"barbarian"

as extensive as of potential eros

tyrannical ambition;
and

it is limited only by the number life. On the other hand,

Alcibiades'

interlocutors

the length of his

Socrates'

love

of victory.

be sharply distinguished from Socratic dialogue does not aim at victory for its
must

Socrates'

own

sake;

terrible

is precisely
stress upon

as great as
Socrates'

stripping and going to the mat in speeches Alcibiades' his terrible love of self-knowledge. (Note

love

of

capacity for victory in speech at Symp. 213e3-5 and cf. 1.2.14-15. While Socrates tests his psychic beauty for the Mem. Xenophon, sake of self-knowledge, Alcibiades decides to use his bodily beauty to try to
conquer

Socrates. His
of

subsequent naked physical

naked

contact with speeches

Socrates is

humorous image 219b4-c2]). One

could sum

Socrates'

exercise

in

[Symp.

217a2-4,
in

up the preceding

point as

follows: Socrates is
fabric. At the his

an extremist

that he values self-knowledge more than

friendship,

and so more same

than those

friendships
the

which

bind together the

political

time,

we

Socrates'

would expect
philosophic

self-knowledge to moderate

philosophic

eros,

since

transcendence
and so

of political

community depends
political community.

upon

the possi

bility

of

dialogue

is itself

rooted

in

Unlike Alcibia

des, Socrates may have remembered his political origins after all: in spite of his advice to Alcibiades, his presence at the temple suggests that he has perhaps
just prayed,
the city.
or

conspicuous and

may be about to do so. (Xenophon writes that Socrates made frequent sacrifices, both at home and at the common altars of
Socrates'

[Mem.\.\.2].)
on

eros

informed

the

most crucial point:

is not tragic, partly because it is his intercourse with Alcibiades has

which

well

con

firmed his intuitions

god
and observe

about

the conditions under

the desire to become a

destroys itself. In part, too, Socrates seems to stand apart from his own life it as an experiment, in much the same way Homer's gods regarded
war at
Socrates'

the great

peculiar self-detach Troy as an interesting spectacle. ment is suggested by his statement that "I would gladly see myself gifts from Alcibiades (151b5) a phrase which more than one commentator has labelled in style. Socrates goes on immediately to compare him
"unplatonic"

accep

self

to

aloof

both Creon and Teiresias at once: he is simultaneously involved in from the human drama. He therefore seeks a measure of divine
which

and
self-

human beings, provided that the middle One would have to say that community his public devotion to the Olympian gods of the polis is both ironic and sincere. Of course, Plato's production of written dialogues which (he claims) are not

sufficiency

may be

accessible to
can

ground of political

be

maintained.

Socrates his, but

bination
are

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

beautiful
and or

and

Politics
and

87

"of

Socrates

young"

grown

"noble

(kalou kai neou; Second

of

Letter, 314cl-4)

Socrates'

suggests save

that
political

peculiar com

irony

and

philosophy, or at

sincerity is unable to least unable to do so in

both

a noble and

community and beautiful way. In this

Socrates'

connection, we must not overlook the potential

cruelty

of

experimen
"indictment"

tal

detachment;

this is an underlying theme of

and

Alcibiades'

of
would

Soc

rates

in the Symposium. An ignoble

of philosophic

ugly Socrates

ultimately be

guilty

impiety. But that is another,

quite complex matter.

NOTES

1.

Among

baum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Munk,

without

Stallnineteenth-century Plato scholars, Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Hermann, and Ueberweg all either assert that the dialogue is spurious, or, most prudent

settling this question, feel it

vol.

to omit it from their

arrangements of

the

Platonic
and

canon

(Grote, 1865,

1,
for

ch.

5;

see

also

ch.

10, 348-51). Joseph Souilhe,

the

editor

translator of Alcibiades II

the Bude edition of

century the tendency to

on

reject

dialogues

as

Plato's works, notes that spurious "a ete exageree jusqu a

moderate critics would now

during

the nineteenth

Tabsurdite,"

but

goes

classify Alcibiades II (among other works) as a dialogue of doubtful authenticity (Plato, 1962, p. viii). Representative twentieth-century assessments of the dialogue may be found in A.E. Taylor (pp. 526-29) and Paul
to observe that practically all of the more

Shorey
accept

(pp. 419-21).

By

modern

standards, Grote's

view

that it is safest and

most philosophical

to

the authenticity of the entire Thrasyllan

canon seems

decidedly

extreme.

Hence the

virtual

nonexistence of philosophical studies of the

discussion
tion and

dialogue. Grote limits himself to a summary and brief its authenticity and major themes (ch. 10), while Souilhe provides a general introduc useful notes. English translations of Alcibiades II are also hard to come by. The Loeb
of

Classical Harvard

Library edition of Plato's works contains a translation by W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge: University Press, 1927), and another is included in the third edition of The Dialogues of
Jowett (New York: MacMillan, 1892), vol. II. not yet twenty in Alcibiades I, the dramatic date
p.

Plato,
at

trans. B.

2. Alcibiades is
takes
of

of which

Steven Forde

places

433 B.C. (Forde,

place.

222,

n.

2). Pericles,

Pericles became

Alcibiades'

died in 429 B.C., is still alive when Alcibiades II guardian after father Kleinias died at the battle
who
Alcibiades'

Pericles

Coronea in 447 B.C. (Ale. I 104b4-6, 112c2-4). Wesley E. Thompson (1970) was probably the first cousin of mother Deinomache.
Alcibiades'

argues

that

3. The charges against Socrates apparently read as follows: "Socrates does injustice by not acknowledging the gods which the city acknowledges, and by bringing in new and strange divin (Xenophon, Mem. 1.1.1; Diogenes Laertius ities; he also does injustice by corrupting the
young"

2.40). In the Apology, Socrates

second see

places

the

corruption charge

first

and

alters the

phrasing

of

the

impiety
him

charge

(24b8-cl). The
events

impiety

and corruption charges are

was

intimately
of

connected;

below,

note

4. The

in

which

Alcibiades

implicated
the

and

the subsequent actions

against
on

are related

in Thucydides, 6.27ff.; Plutarch

mysteries at

quotes

official

indictment

Alcibiades

the charge of profaning the

Alcibiades 22.3.

Grote
parallel

paints

a sensitive picture of the

ch.

impact

upon

the Athenians of the desecration

where

of the

inadequate"

Hermae in his History of Greece, VII,

"the
excitement of a

53, 166-71,

he

suggests as a

"very

Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin (169). Alcibiades was of course recalled to Athens some four years after he was sentenced to death in absentia (Plutarch, Ale 27.1). I discuss below the ambivalence of the Athenians toward both Alcibiades and Socrates; see Section III. Spanish
or

had been defaced

night"

during

the same

or

Beating

demonstration of the superiority of the Weaker 4. See especially the Clouds, in which Unjust Speech over the Stronger or Just Speech leads Pheidippides to beat his father Strepsiades. political community, for to one's elders constituted a radical attack upon the foundations of

Socrates'

88
do

Interpretation
so was

to

challenge not

tionally
appeals

acknowledged gods who

only the authority defended the

more

of

the

generation of

fathers, but

also of

those tradi

claim of

the

city's

fathers to be the

principal

bearers

and teachers of

the stronger,

just

speech

(i.e.,

the traditional speech).

when

Thus, Strepsiades

to

patroion

Dia, "Zeus,
tribes and

the

father,''

protector of

he is

challenged

by

Pheidippides in

the Clouds
of

(1468); Fustel de Coulanges

notes that when

Cleisthenes

replaced

the old religious tribes

Athens

with new

demes,

the demes

Apollo"

the guardian of the walls, and the paternal

tion charge

against

Socrates,

which grew out

"uniformly adopted as their protecting gods Zeus, (1901, p. 377. Fustel's emphasis). The corrup of his practice of reducing to silence the fathers of
gave
with

Athens in the
pleasure

presence of

their sons

to the young (Apol.

21e4, 23al,

whereby he became hateful to the older generation but c3) may be understood in its intimate connection

the

impiety
with

charges when one appreciates the

relationship

of mutual support

linking

paternal au

thority
highest

the authority of the religious tradition.

5. A

similar paradox

manifestation of phronesis

is found in the Statesman, in which the Eleatic Stranger indicates that the is its public self-suppression. (This point is most explicit in the

Stranger's advocacy of the second-best regime at 292e-300c.) According to the Eleatic Stranger, philosophy is both moderate and extreme, for philosophy is obliged to moderate itself when, in the light One
of

its insight into the

nature of political connection

community, it

recognizes

its

own extreme character.

should consider

in this

the essential role played in the search

and the opportune and
extremes"

for the

nature of

the

statesman

by

"the

mean and the

fitting

the needful, and all things that dwell

Kleinias"

in the 6.

middle ground and

Socrates'

unusual

away from the form of address (the

(States. 284e6-8).
"son
of

appellation

occurs nowhere else

in
a

Alcibiades II)

anticipates

his implicit

comparison

in this

passage

between praying to become

the
son

tyrant and praying to have children. It also serves

as a reminder of

futility

Alcibiades'

of

quest

for self-sufficiency; 113b9, 131e2). Socrates

dered

whatever

Alcibiades may do, he

a

remains a

(cf. Ale I 103al, 105d2,

explains that

Archelaus,
was

Macedonian tyrant
assassinated
n.

who ruled
others

by

his beloved,
of

who

in turn

by

after a

from 413 to 399, was few days. Souilhe

mur

notes

alternative accounts of

his death (Plato, 1962, 27

Alcibiades'

2). This

example prepares us
was a

for

Socrates'

introduction
of

the topic of

attitude

toward

Pericles, for Archelaus

(Perdiccas'

bastard

child

Perdiccas II

own

brother), his cousin, and his murdering his uncle brother. (See Gorgias 470d-471d, where Polus argues that Archelaus is the happiest of all
who gained power

by

Macedonians in is
tophanes makes

spite of

sometimes cited
an

his horrible crimes.) anachronistic reference to death as an indication of the dialogue's inauthenticity. But Grote, noting that Aris anachronistic reference to the dioikismos or dispersion of the Mantineans by the
place a ground offers a

Socrates'

Archelaus'

Spartans (which took glaring anachronism 7. Steven Forde

in 384 B.C.) at Symp. 193a2, for disallowing the

observes

that "No one has ever made this

n. x).

Symposium"

(1865, 1:350

very different interpretation

Alcibiades'

of

nature.

He distinguishes

between
Persians love latter is

victory and the love of renown, latter in Alcibiades: "He has been transformed by
the
of and of renown and the contentious reminiscent of a man so to

love

and argues

that Socrates is responsible

for the

Socrates'

speech

[about the

virtues of

the royal

Lacedaimonians in Ale /] into an erotic man. There is a difference between erotic love of victory we saw in the first part of the dialogue. The
like Coriolanus,
who p.

indignantly

insists

on

the honor he has

such

merited

speak"

according to the rules,

common sort of man,
at all.

(Forde,

232). If Alcibiades had been

however, it is difficult
first lover,
and

to see why Socrates would

relatively have been attracted to him

unparalleled in the Platonic dialogues: he describes has been observing him night and day since he was a child, always taking the greatest care (epimelestata) to be present wherever Alcibiades may be (Ale. I 103al, a4, 104d3, 106e4-9, HObl). Furthermore. Socrates insists from the outset that his descrip tion of eros for worldwide renown is no mere conjecture (ouk eikadzo. Ale. I 105c7). 8. As Helen Bacon shows in "Socrates (1959), crowning of Socrates in the Symposium (213el-6) is one of many dramatic indications that Socrates "wins the crown of tragedy and comedy from Agathon and (430; cf. Symp. 175e7-9 with Aristophanes, Frogs 871ff.). Viewed in the light of the Symposium, crowning of Socrates in Al

Yet
as

Socrates'

interest in Alcibiades is

himself

Alcibiades'

Alcibiades'

Crowned"

Alcibiades'

Aristophanes"

Alcibiades'

cibiades

II

represents a

tragicomic

"victory"

Socrates'

of

tragicomic art (cf. Symp. 223d3-6).

Socrates
Socrates'

and

Alcibiades: Eros, Piety,

poets'

and

Politics
but

89

speech appears
tory"

to

win out over

the

traditional tales about the gods,

gesture as

this "vic

is laughable: Socrates
and

pretends

to interpret

Alcibiades'

if he

were an
Socrates'

infatuated
assimila

lover,

he

makes

it

clear

that

he has failed genuinely to

persuade

Alcibiades.
comic

tion of

his lot to Creon's

of

points

toward a tragic depth beneath this

and

surface,

but

as

his

identification

himself

with

Prometheus, Hephaestus,
from
which

Athena suggests, he

maintains a

de
as

tached or godlike perspective

comic surfaces.

the depths

of

human tragedy appear,

once again,

REFERENCES

Alfarabi. Alfarabi's Ithaca: Cornell

Philosophy of Plato and University Press, 1969.

Crowned."

Aristotle. Translated

by

Muhsin Mahdi.

Bacon, Helen. "Socrates Benardete, Seth. The

1984.
"Sophocles'

The Virginia

Being

of

the

Beautiful. Chicago: The

Quarterly Review 35(1959): 415-30. University of Chicago Press,

and

Oedipus

Tyrannus."

In Ancients

Moderns,

edited

by

Joseph

Cropsey. New York: Basic Books, 1964. Brandwood, Leonard. A Word Index to Plato. Leeds: W. S. Maney, 1976. Denniston, J. D. The Greek Particles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934. In The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten For Forde, Stephen. "On the Alcibiades gotten Socratic Dialogues, edited by Thomas Pangle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987: 222-39. Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis. The Ancient City. Translated by Willard Small. 12th ed. Boston: Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1901. Grote, George. History of Greece. 12 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, n.d. Vol. 7.
Plato
and the
I."

Other Companions of Socrates. 3

vols.

London: John Murray,

1865. Vol. 1.

Heidel, W. A. Pseudo-Platonica. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Co., 1896. Howland, Jacob A. "The Cave Image and the Problem of Place: The Poet,
and

the

Sophist,

the

Philosopher."

Dionysius 10(1986): 21-55.

Wisdom."

Kojeve, Alexander. "Tyranny and nell University Press, 1968. Pangle, Thomas L., ed. The Roots
logues. Ithaca: Cornell

In Leo Strauss, On Tyranny. Ithaca: Cor

of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dia University Press, 1987. Paulys Realencyclopddie der Klassischen
vols. Altertums1958-

Pauly, August Friedrich

wissenschaft.

von.

Neue Bearbeitung. 24

Stuttgart: Druckenmuller Verlag, B. Jowett. 3rd

ed.

1973. Vol. 11.2.

Plato. The Dialogues of Plato. Translated Macmillan, 1892. Vol. 2.

by

vols.

New York:

Plato. Loeb Classical Library. Translated

by

R. G.

Bury

et al.

12

vols.

Cam

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1914-1939. Vol. 8. Translated by R. M. Lamb. 1927.

..

Platon: Oeuvres Completes. Edited Paris: Societe d'Edition "Les Belles

and translated
Lettres,"

by

Maurice Croiset

et al.

14

vols.

1951-1983. Vol. 13.2. Edited

by

Joseph Souilhe. 1962.

Platonis Opera. Ed. John Bumet. 5
vols.

Oxford: Oxford

University Press,

1979-1982.

90

Interpretation
of

Rahe, Paul. "The Primacy

89(1984): 265-93.

Politics in Classical

Greece."

American Historical Review

ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. Shorey, Paul. What Plato Said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933. Taylor, A. E. Plato: The Man and His Work. New York: The Dial Press, 1929. Thompson, Wesley E. "The Kinship of Alcibiades and Greek, Roman, and
Pericles."

Rosen, Stanley. Plato's Symposium. 2d.

Byzantine Studies 11(1970): 27-33.

Plato's Three Waves

the

and

Question

of

Utopia

Drew A. Hyland

Trinity

College

One

of

the

important contemporary
centers on

controversies over the

utopia.

interpretation

of

Plato's Republic

the question of

"city in
as an

speech"

(Republic 369a. All

quotations

Was Plato, in setting out his not otherwise identified are

from Bloom.)

a city whose realization considered If he possible? so, the Republic may be genuinely earthly city interpreted as a realizable utopia, and Plato interpreted as a radical political

or

"city

in

heaven"

(592b), constructing

thinker

in

at

least this

sense:

he invites us,

given
with

the

real

possibility

of a per

fectly just city, to be radically dissatisfied fails to live up to that realizable standard of
become
revolutionaries.

which any city every city perfection. He invites us, that is, to
of

Or is the

real

teaching

the Republic quite the re

verse, intended to reveal the impossibility (and perhaps undesirability) of the conditions for perfect justice, thereby teaching us that the standard of perfection is inappropriate in the realm of politics, that there is no to the politi
"solution"

cal

problem,

and

thus that we should

be

political moderates?

Both

sides of this

controversy,
as

which

is important

not

only for the inter

well-

pretation of

Plato but

a core question of political

philosophy, have
part on

known

representatives.1

Their disagreement is based in

we shall

see, the evidence in the Republic

itself is
to

deeply
hinge

fact that, as ambivalent, if not

the

contradictory.

The

crux of

the issue

would seem

on the contents of

Books V-VII, where the famous "three the most formidable obstacles to the establishing
general procedure of most commentators

waves"

are presented
of

by

Socrates
city.

as

the perfectly just

consider

The

has been to
on the

the three waves

together as a unity
of such a city's

is

said about

possibility and desirability into being. adds to the confusion, since what This coming only each of the three waves is hardly the same. My thesis will thus be
and make

their

judgment

that

by looking
and

at what

Socrates

says of each of the waves

separately,

we shall possi

discover

that he has very different attitudes regarding the questions of

bility

desirability

for

each of them.

This

will

lead

us not

only to a reassess

perfectly just city, but also to a reconsideration of its significance for the meaning of the Republic as a whole. In order to accomplish this, a
ment of the

wish

to thank Professors Charles

Griswold, Helen Lang,

and

David Roochnik for their helpful

comments on earlier

drafts

of

this paper.

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

92

Interpretation
is
said of each of

careful examination of what

sary.2

the three waves will

be

neces

Let

us

briefly
of

recover

the context. At the end of Book

IV, Socrates has

completed an outline of the

the types

inferior cities,

just city, and wants to turn next to a delineation of which he finally gets to only in Book VIII. He is because he has, in his outline,
on slipped over some of

interrupted in this extremely

enterprise

controversial

issues,
catch

which, at the
up.

beginning

Book V, Adei
the

mantus and

Polemarchus
proposals.

him

They

insist that he

make explicit and

defend these setting

and out of

Books V-VII

are

his defense,

and constitute

long

the three

waves.

The first wave,

which entails

the equal education

treatment of
which

women

and

men, extends from 45 Id to 457b. The second

of wives and

wave,

lasts from 457c to 473c, includes the commonality

of private

children, the abolition

establishment of genics. of

property, the abolition of the

family,

and

the

extraordinary laws for sexual intercourse in the name of eu The third and much the longest wave, from 473d to 541b, from the end
all of

Book V through Let

Books VI

and

VII,

concerns the

establishing

of phi

losopher-kings
us now

as rulers.

begin tracing the argument at the beginning of Book V The first fact is that when Adeimantus and Polemarchus catch Socrates up at noteworthy the issue 449c, they focus on is in fact what is later called the second wave,

having
"In

women and children

in

common.

our opinion you're

taking it

easy,"

of the argument, and that not the you supposed you'd get

least,

he said, "and robbing so you won't have to

us of a whole section go through

it. And

ordinary, that

after all
will

away with it by saying, as though it were something quite it's plain to everyone that, as for women and children, the
common."

things of friends

be in

(449c)
the charge, Glaucon adds to the community of
when

At

450c, in his
and

reiteration of

wives and children

"their rearing
which seems

they
of

are still

young, in the time between

birth

education,

to be the most the

trying"

(450c). This is

still

the

second

wave, since the first wave treats

guardians'

education when

they

are older. view

In short, there is

no predisposition on

the part of those present to

second wave that

the

first
not

wave as problematic.
Socrates'

It is

what

becomes the

initially
wave.

troubles

interlocutors. Socrates himself introduces

resistance to

the

first

It is

surprising, therefore, that there is less

it.

The

next point of

importance

introduces the
waves:

criteria of
and

possibility
not

to our thesis occurs at 450d, where Socrates decision for the ensuing argument concerning the three desirability in the sense of "what is
best."
man,"

"It's

easy to

went through

things said
come

I said. "Even more than what we through, you happy before, it admits of many doubts. For, it could be doubted that the are possible; and, even if, in the best possible conditions, they could
go

into being,

that

they

would

be

what

is best

might also

be doubted. So that

is

Plato's Three Waves

why there's
a certain

and

the Question

of Utopia
argu

93

hesitation

about

getting involved in it, for fear that the

ment might seem

to be a prayer, my dear

comrade."

(450d)

Henceforward,
The first "the

these are the two standards

will

by

which

the three waves, and so

the city in speech,

wave

be judged.
at

begins
law"

45 Id, though it is

not

named

as

such

until

its

completion at

457b. It is bounded
at

by

references gist of

to "the

female

drama"

at

451c,
be

and

woman's

457b. The

it is that

women and men should

be reared, educated, and treated as equally as tempted to call it the first Equal Rights Amendment,

possible.3

We

might thus

although given

the rig

orously Spartan lives this class will have in the city in speech, it accurately be described as the first "Equal Responsibilities
introduced
"Do

might more

Amendment."

It is

by

analogy

to

dogs:
of

we

believe the females

with

the guardian dogs must guard the things the males

with were

guard

along they stay indoors rearing

them and
as though

hunt

them,

and

do

the rest

in common;

or must and

they

incapacitated have

as a result of all

bearing

the puppies, while the males

common,"

work and

the care of the

the

flock?"

"Everything in
the males as

he said, "except that

we use

females

as weaker and

stronger."

(451d-e)4

We
at

might note this one proviso on absolute equality: such as

When

physical strength

is

issue,

in

battle,

concessions will

be

made

to the

generally
and

superior

strength of men.

We

can acknowledge rulers are

that,

given the nature of warfare at

this

time and the fact that the

of war

to excel

both

at

(543a),

this qualification

is

a significant one.

philosophy But it is no less important

in the

the waging

to recognize that

it is the only
us

qualification on equal treatment granted

first

wave, and

it is

repeated at

456a

and

457a-b. It is therefore
conditions

fair infer
physical
of equal

ence, especially for

strength

today, that
would

should

be

such

that

is

not at

stake, there

be

no exceptions

to the principle
and

education and treatment of men and women.

In any case,
the two

this is the crucial

of

point,

since the men are to

music and

be

educated through

foundations
be
used

Greek
with

education,
ways"

gymnastic, "Then these two arts,

women

and what

has to do in the is

war, must be assigned to the

also, and to

they
out

must

same

(452a; I
given

emphasize the

last

clause

bring

the point that women are

not to

be

the same

education and then treated

differently,

as

so often

still the case).

This

equal

treatment will be so thoroughgoing,

ridiculous"

women and men will even exercise naked together

in the

Socrates continues, that gymnasium. This, he

insists, is "the
should
will

most

aspect of aspect can

the first wave

we

(452a-b),
the

and

this

be

noted.

If this

be relatively

unproblematic.

be justified, It is justified by

may infer,

first

wave

an appeal

to Athenian provin

cialism; once, the Athenians thought the idea was laughable, but now it is accepted as quite

of men

exercising naked together natural (452c). So there is no

94

Interpretation
to suppose that the present attitudes
could not

reason

be

overcome.

Although
'

the convention against men and women exercising

even more

naked

together might seem

difficult to

overcome

than that regarding men alone,

Socrates be

point

remains well

taken;

the problem
Socrates'

is

one of convention and could

overcome.

argument and the evidence of such practices as But perhaps, against nude beaches and nudist colonies, one might regard the problems with mixed nudity, conventional or not, as insurmountable. Nevertheless, it is worth noting

that if one slight

concession

to convention

were

made, that

we allow

the guard
aspect

ians to
of

exercise

clothed,
and

such a

step

would resolve

this "most
of

ridiculous"

the

first wave,
equal

nothing

would stand

in the way
applies

the core of

its

pro

posal, the

treatment

and education of women and men.

Socrates
presents

now employs a

strategy

which

he

in the first

wave

alone; he

the counterargument to the position he espouses and refutes

us recognize a position.

it

(453b-

456b). Let

that this is reasonable strategy when one is arguing

most persuasive arguments often present

seriously for
tive
evidence

The

the posi

for the

position espoused and emphasize

then present the counterarguments

and show their

inadequacy. I

this because the very structure of the

we shall

argument suggests a

tone of seriousness which, as

see, is

lacking

in

the second

wave.

The

gist of the counterargument will

be

immediately
rights

familiar

as the most

common argument used against

women

defenders

of equal

and equal

treatment

of

today: men and women

have different

natures and

therefore should be

treated

differently
replies

and

do different things (453b-d).

what aspect of male and

Socrates

by distinguishing

female

nature

is

different, and whether and to what extent those differences are relevant to ing, education, or fighting. To make his point, he uses, as a reductio ad dum, the analogy of the bald shoemaker:
"Accordingly,
I said, "it's permissible,
as

rear

absur-

it seems, for

us to ask ourselves

whether the nature of the when we agree that

bald

and

the longhaired is the same or the opposite.

And,

longhaired
be."

ones

it is opposite, if bald men are shoemakers, we won't let the be shoemakers, or if the longhaired ones are, then the others can't
ridiculous."

"That,"

he said, "would certainly be enough; only

when

(454c)
be
shown that a

The

point

is

clear

it

can

difference between it difference has

a certain

men and women makes a

difference in
As
we

regard

to education

and treatment will

be

acknowledged as relevant.
so

have already seen, only

strength,

one

been
454e:

acknowledged, that

of physical

which will

have

relevance to the

duties

assigned

in

war.

Socrates

states

this

principle

nicely

at

"Then,"

I said, "if
though

either

the class of men or that

of women shows

its

excellence

in

some art or other practice, then we'll

say that

art must

be

assigned to

it. But if they

look

as

they differ in

this alone, that the female bears and the male mounts,

Plato's Three Waves

we'll assert

and the

Question of Utopia

95

that it has not to

man with respect guardians and

their

thereby yet been proved that a woman differs from a talking about; rather, we'll still suppose that our women must practice the same (454e)
what we're
things."

The
out

positive statement of at

the

criteria of selection

for

a given

briefly
right

455c:

some people

learn better This is

and more

necessary for
the
crucial

a given enterprise.

what

easily determines whether

to ruling,

retain

activity is set information

a person
none

has
the

nature

for

each

activity.

Since,

with regard

of

information to be learned is necessarily tied to gender, Socrates draws the following important conclusion: "Therefore, my friend,
woman

there

is

no practice of a city's governors which

belongs to

because

she's woman, or

to

man

because he's man; but the

natures are nature

scattered alike

all practices, and man

among both animals; and woman participates according to in all, but in all of them woman is weaker than

in

man."

(455d-e)
Women
and men will participate

equally in everything from

music and gymnas

tic to medicine, philosophy, and ruling

concession

(455e-456a),

with, as usual, the sole

being

made

to

relative physical strength. of

Socrates begins his summing up

"Then
set as

the argument

for the first

wave at

456c:

we weren't giving laws that are impossible or like prayers, since the law we down is according to nature. Rather, the way things are nowadays proves to be, it seems, against (456c)
nature."

The first
ture"

is desirable because it is according to nature. is here taken clearly in the teleological sense. For something to be "according to na is for it to be the best that it can be, a view that seems to inform almost
wave

"Nature"

all of

Greek intellectual life

with

the exception
wave

of

sophistry,

which argued

for

is according to nature since in all superiority but one of the requirements for ruling (physical strength), men and women are equally likely to be qualified. Indeed, as Socrates notes, the present practice of
the
of convention.

The first

discrimination against women is against nature. It is possible because, as has been shown, the present strictures against equal treatment are themselves con
ventional rather than natural.

Thus Socrates
escape

concludes at

457a,
wave

the first wave is

both

possible and

beneficial. The

from the first

is

announced at

457b.

Especially

because

of

its

contrast

to the

next

wave, it is
wave.

worth

reviewing the
women and

structure and content of the argument

for the first

The

criteria of possi

bility

and

desirability

are established.

The counterargument, that

be treated differently, is pre men have different sented and refuted on the grounds that the only difference that makes a differ ence when it comes to the tasks the guardians will be assigned, including ruling
natures and therefore should

96

Interpretation
is
physical

and philosophy,

strength,

which

in

education and

treatment

is defended

as

is easily accommodated. Equality desirable because it is natural (in the

present prescriptions against

teleological sense) and as possible

are

because the I find

it

merely
and

conventional.

In short, the
and

arguments

for the first

wave seem struc

turally
The

substantially plausible,

no reason

to hold that Socrates is

desirability.5

not quite serious

in his is

optimism about announced at

its possibility

and

second wave

457d:
is to

"All these

women are with

to

belong

to all these men in common, and no woman

their

live privately

any

man.

And the children, in

own

turn,

will

be in common,
parerjt."

and neither will a parent

know his

offspring, nor a child his

Glaucon
that

acknowledges more as

immediately

that this wave

it is far

dubitable

as regards

its possibility

is far bigger than the first, or benefit (457d), and well

to include
not of

he

might.

For

it is developed, the
more

second wave gets expanded

only the communality of women and children and the systematic

parentage, but also, among its

ignorance

startling proposals, the abolition of private

property (458d), the

genics see who can

abolition of

the

through the control of sexual encounters

family (460d), and the assurance of eu by the fixing of lots drawn to

Clearly, just in
so

have

sex at

the sacred times (459a).

far

as

the

second wave is dubious, its defense, both in structure and content, will have to be all the more powerful than the first wave. As we shall see, the exact
more

opposite

is the

case.

While the

structure of the argument

for the first

wave

is

sensible and plaus

ible,
ment

that

of

the second is bizarre.

Socrates begins
will

by trying

to evade the argu

possi

bility

for desirability, disputed.

whether

hoping

that its benefit

be assumed, though its

"As to
the

it is beneficial,
of women and

at

least, I don't
community
not."

suppose

it

would

be disputed that

community

the

of children are,

good,"

greatest as to whether

I said, "But I

suppose that there would arise

if possible, the a great deal of dispute

they

are possible or

(457d)

When Glaucon plausibly insists that both would be in dispute, Socrates imme diately takes the reverse tack; he asks that its possibility be assumed while he
proves

its

desirability,

and

then

he

says and

here

he

will

go

on

to prove its

possibility.

Claiming
by

that he

is

"idle"

"soft,"

he requests,
later in
what

"I too

am

now soft

myself,

and

I desire to
set

put off and consider

as

way it is possible;

and now,

having
I'll

it down

possible, I'll consider, if you

most advantageous of all

permit me, whether their accomplishment would

be

for

both the city and the other later, if you

guardians.

attempt

to consider this with you

first,

and the

permit."

(458a)

Plato's Three Waves

Though
perhaps

and

the Question

of Utopia

97

strange,

such a

strategy,
not

were

it followed faithfully,

would

probably be acceptable;
criteria,

after

all, it is

possibility
of

or

desirability,

obviously important which of the two should be satisfied first. However, if we

the argument,

now, for the sake

second

seeing the

structure of

leap

to the

end of

the

wave, we see that after

of

having

presented

his

evidence

for the desir

ability
con

the extraordinary proposals of the second wave, and forced

by

Glau
the

to turn to the evidence

for its possibility (471c), Socrates

responds with

following
"Do

strategy, or perhaps

better,

strategem,

which

quote at some

length:
fairest

you suppose a painter

is any less

good who

draws

a pattern of what the

human

being

would

be like he

and renders

can't prove

that

it's

also possible
said.

everything in the picture adequately, but that such a man come into
being?"

"No, by Zeus, I
"Then
of a good
"Certainly."

don't,"

what about

this?

Weren't we,

as we

assert, also making a

pattern

in

speech

city?"

"Do

you suppose that what we

prove

able to

that

it is

possible

say is any less good on account of our to found a city the same as the one in
said.

not

being

not,"

"Surely
"Well,
Socrates

he

said.
it,"

that's the tmth of

(472d-472e)
examined

goes

on, in

a complex

way to be

subsequently, to

develop
(473b)
its

the third wave as the simplest and best way to attain an approximation
of

the second

wave.

Here it is important to

recognize

that even prior to our

second

examination of

the explicit content of the argument

for the

wave,

is suspect, and in a way of which the author of the text must have been aware. Its possibility is never established. We shall have to surely see about its desirability. Let us turn to the details of the second wave.
very
structure

As previously mentioned, the

second wave calls

initially

for the

commu-

nality

of women and children and

the systematic

ignorance

of who one's natu

ral relatives are

among the guardians. As the implications of this are

and

developed,

private

property

the

family

are abolished.

are the steps recommended naked

will

regarding sex. be together, sexually attracted to each other (458d). In control this, "geometric must be imposed on "erotic

Most stunning of all, however, The men and women, exercising

order

to to

necessity," necessity"

borrow Glaucon's phraseology (458d). Strict

encounters,
rules whose connection

rules will

be imposed

on sexual

is eventually ex "nuptial ironic pressed in the notoriously complicated and playfully introduced at 546b (see Rosen and Adam). The secret principle of these rules
to "geometric
will

necessity"

numb

be eugenics,
and cocks.

which

is introduced
Glaucon

by

a comical

analogy

with

Glaucon's

dogs
tion"

Just

as

watches over

their "marriages and procrea

(459a)

and allows

so shall the same

only the best to mate with the best and at the best time, principle be followed with the guardians. Now as we saw, the

98

Interpretation
with animals

analogy

men and women should

had been plausibly used in the first wave to be treated as equally as possible. Here we human
eros with

suggest
must

that

ask, is

it

also plausible to treat

the same

calculated utilitarianism as

we no

apply to animals? Is there

deeper
and more complex

reason

to

believe that human

erotic

feelings

are

than we assume to be the case with animals? It

is,

to say the

Symposium, where erotic attrac tion is characterized as the source of creative inspiration (206cff.) and the first decisive step to philosophy (210aff), and of the Phaedrus, where eros is called one of the four forms of "divine (245bff), really thinks so. To the

least, dubious

that the author of the

madness"

contrary, as these texts attest, Plato is

to genuinely
cance of
passage appreciate

one of the

first thinkers

of our

tradition
signifi present eros

the profundity, the complexity, and so the

total abstraction

deep

human

eros.

His

from this

significance

in the

therefore

cannot

be intended literally.
noted

The

abstraction

from

throughout the Republic

has been

by

number of commentators

(see

Rosen, Strauss,
most

and

Bloom [1968]). The

present passage

ond

wave,

striking instances. It is the first and it is decisive.

serious

is surely one of its flaw in the argument for the sec

In any case, the principle of eugenics is to include: 1 Lies and fixed lotteries to deceive everyone into thinking that it is just
.

by

chance that

the

"best"

people

keep drawing
apparently (460'c).
children

the winning

lots,

and so are se

lected to have sex, 2. Temporary

again and again

(459d-460a).

"marriages,"

lasting

tion to occur, so that

women and children will

only long enough for copula be held in common and natural

parentage will remain unknown

3. The

exposure of

defective

(460c).

4. Incest

prohibitions with rather obvious

loopholes (461e).

At 462a, the details of the structure of the second wave now apparently established, Socrates turns to the defense of its desirability. The gist of the
argument
which

is this: the

greatest good

divides it (462b). If

people

for the city is unity, the greatest evil that have private concerns, desires, possessions,
all

these might at times come into conflict with the concerns of the city and so
cause
vate

divisions (462c-d).

By

eliminating
the
cause of

privacy, therefore,

including

pri

property, the

family,

and even

the recognition of who one's

natural chil

dren are,
parent,
concerns

one could eliminate

divisions in the

or more

generally, my
and
lie,"

family,

there can

for my city. I shall family infamous "noble announced in Book III at 414cff.
abandoned,
was meant

for my

If the city is my be no conflict between my be the perfect patriot. (The

city. and now

apparently

to accomplish the same end.

which entails

There is

a certain tension

between the
parents

noble

lie,

the belief that I am born not of human

and

but

of the earth

beneath my city (414d),

the second wave,

which

entails the

belief that So the

all guardians of a certain age are

my parents, brothers

and of

sisters,

etc.).

second wave will

be beneficial because the community unity

of

wives and children will

be the

cause of the

the city.

Plato's Three Waves

A
number of serious

and

the Question of Utopia

argument.

99

flaws

can

be

noted

in this
a value

First, it

assumes

that political unity, or patriotism,

is

not

just

but the highest

value.

More

fully, it

assumes

that

what

may

problematically
the highest

be the highest
Most

political

value should

straightforwardly be instituted, thereby implying

political ones.

that there are no

of us might

values which might supersede even

agree

that political unity

is

one of

the desiderata in a political

as

community.

But

should we

simply

accept without

argument,
all

Glaucon does
with

at

462b, that it is
in
which

the highest

value?

Are

we

not

too familiar

situations

the

demand for

political

unity

seems more

to

undermine

justice than to
against

encourage whom

it? One

need

only

consider

the case of

Socrates himself,

the

charge of
mined

corrupting the

youth

is clearly tantamount to the

within problematic.

claim

that

he

under

the unity of the city. Even

the project of the Republic

itself,

the

claim

One that unity is the highest value is Socrates does not) that the primacy of unity is implicit in the
of

might argue

(though

earlier

definition in the In any

rule?

justice

as each one

business
case,

of others

minding (433a-b), but this is

the

one's own

business

and not

interfering

hardly

obvious or unproblematic.

what about

the other cardinal virtues, or the knowledge necessary to

what about

Quite especially,
the

leading

candidate

Good itself, which in the Republic for the highest

would value?

be clearly At 504d, Socrates

seem

to

clearly

asserts

that the Good is greater than the

justice,

and so

that even the highest

political values are not

highest

altogether.

In sum, it is
should

hardly

self-evident

that political unity

is the highest

value.

If it

turn out not to

be,
be

then
even

other values might conflict with and even supersede

it. It

would

then

less

obvious that the extreme measures suggested

in the

second wave would

be

justifiable in
of

the light of these other values. In any case, the supremacy of the

principle of political unity, a crucial premise

in the defense

of the

desirability
an absolute

the second wave, has not been argued

for.6

Second,
limit
on

there

is

flaw in the

quest

for the
which

abolition of

privacy,

the

464d: the

possibility of communism, body is irreducibly private.

Won't lawsuits

is subtly

admitted

by

Socrates

at

"And

what about this?

and complaints against one another,

private

in

word, vanish from among them thanks to their possessing nothing

but

the

body,
Is this

while the rest

is in

common?"

(464d; my

emphasis).

a small

qualification,

as
on

Socrates obviously
"private"

wishes

it to be taken? Or is it
and

not rather a

decisive limit Once again,

in

the possibility of communism,

so on

the the

guarantee that I shall never experience

public good? point.
no argument
silence.

desires in

which conflict with

is

presented

support of

this important

It is

passed over

of

Third, it is hardly plausible to assert that one family, divisions and discord will be
arguments and

simply

by believing
As

that we are all

eliminated.

we are all

aware,

discord among

family

members can

painfully be among the most

100
bitter

Interpretation
and violent. own marital

Especially
situation,

considering
we can

what we are given

to

believe

of

Soc

rates'

hardly

expect

him to be

so naive about

this.

Fourth, in any
communism.

case, it is only the guardians, apparently,

entire class of workers and artisans orthodox

who will

have this

The

in the city
property.

will presuma

bly

continue

to have

families

and

private

Will they

not

continue

to have the same old problems, perhaps

even exacerbated

by

the now

enormous

differences between their lives

and of

those of the guardian class? the kind

will

Soc

rates assures ance

Glaucon

at

465b that nothing

occur, but his

assur

any argument. There follows (467a-471c) a long discussion by Socrates concerning the training for and conduct of war by the guardians, which includes such policies
consoling, especially
without

is

hardly

as

bringing
for

the

children

to watch

battles from

a safe

rewards

valor

(468b-c),

and the

different treatment

distance (467e), erotic of Greek enemies than

on

barbarian

ones

(469c-471b). Glaucon

471c, but in

an unfortunate way.

finally catches Socrates up Indicating that Socrates is likely to

now

this at

go on and

on, Glaucon demands that he turn

wave requires would

to whether such steps as the second

so

be

possible.

But in

doing, he
and

grants

its desirability:
ever possible?

"Is it

possible

for this
come

regime to come

into being,

how is it
good

see

that, if it should came into

into being, everything

would

be

for the city in

which

it

being."

(471c)

As

we

have seen, its

of

desirability
of

cially

compared to

the power

been adequately established. Espe the arguments for the first wave, those for the

has

hardly

desirability
Socrates

the second wave are critically deficient.

responds to

Glaucon's

challenge

by

admitting that he has been

overwhelming:

stall
wave

ing, but for

the

reason

that establishing the possibility of the second

requires the third wave, which

threatens to be

"All

sudden,"

of a no

I said, "you
me and

have,

as

it were,

assaulted you

have

sympathy for

my loitering. Perhaps
now

my argument, don't know that

and you
when

I've

hardly

escaped

the two waves, you're

beginning

the

biggest

and most

difficult,

the third

wave."

(472a)
structure of the connection

The logical is thus

between the

second and third waves

somewhat

complex,
on

and needs

to be clarified. The

desirability
of the

of

the

second wave political

is founded
and

the principle of the

unity

the presumption that

human

the same way as the sexual

arguments).

desire
of

of animals

supremacy be treated in roughly (we have seen the flaws in these

eros can
we are now

value of

The possibility

the second wave,

told,

requires

the

third wave, the the third

establishing

of philosopher-kings. and

Thus, it

would seem

that if

wave proves of

possible,

if

we were

to accept the arguments for the

would

desirability

the second wave, then the second wave

have been

shown

Plato's Three Waves

to be both possible and
whole situation

and

the Question of Utopia

Socrates'

-101

desirable. However,

next

steps

throw this

into

question. as we

For his
possibility

next of

step,

the second

have previously seen, is simply to deny that the wave as it stands can be proved. I have already quoted
where

the passage at

472d-472e

he

admits
way.

this.

However, he
up his
saying:

qualifies speech at

this

impossibility
point of

in

a subtle and
of

important
we

If

we pick

the

his denial

its possibility,
it,"

find Socrates

"Well, then,
strive

that's the tmth of

said.

to prove how and

under what condition

"But if then to gratify you I must also it would be most possible (kata ti

dunatotat "What

av eie), grant me the same points again

points?"

for this

proof."

"Can anything be done

not?"

as

it is

said?

Or is it the

nature of

acting to

attain

to less
so or

tmth than speaking, even if

someone

doesn't think

so?

Do

you agree that

it's

"I do

agree,"

he

said.

"Then don't

compel me

way in deed as we could be governed

necessarily to present it as coming into being in every described it in speech. But if we are able to find that a city in a way most closely approximating what has been said, (hos
oikeseien) say that
we've

an eggotata ton eiremenon polis

found the possibility

of

these things

coming into

insist."

being

on which you

(472e-473b; my emphasis)

Here

a number of crucial points must

be

reiterated.

First, Socrates
wave as

admits that

he

cannot prove a crucial

the real possibility of the second

it

stands.

This is
and

already

limitation

on

the

original project of strictest

proving the possibility

an admission of

desirability

of all three waves.

In the

sense, it is

de

feat. Second, only an approximation of the second wave can be established, and Glaucon must accept that. Third, the smallest step required for this approx

imation

of

the second wave

is,

as we see at

473d,

the third wave, the establish

ing

of the rule of philosopher-kings. moment's reflection on

A
seem

this

situation makes clear

that everything would

to depend on precisely how the city

established with philosopher-kings

differ from the city of the second wave. What, after all, is and is not possible in deed as well as in speech? Will the fixed lotteries and rules for
would

eugenics still never told

be in

effect? about

Will

parents

know their

natural children?

Yet

we are we

anything

how the two

cities would

differ. Nevertheless,
wave

must remember that what precise

is

being
but

established

in the third

is

not

the

city

of the second wave

some undetermined modification of

it,

with

philosopher-kings at
ever

its head.

By implication,

the third

wave presents

us, how

quietly, with a different city from the city of the second wave. (To this ac may be added the evidence of Book VIII, at 546-47. There, in count of how the city in speech, even if established, must fall, he attributes its inevitable failure explicitly to the failure to sustain the conditions of the second
Socrates'

wave; the

sex

laws

will

inevitably

be disobeyed. This is tantamount to

an

ex-

102

Interpretation
that even if an approximation
would not of

plicit admission

the second wave were some

how established, it We

endure.)

must conclude of

the second wave, therefore, that a defense of

its

possi

bility is admittedly impossible and the arguments for its desirability manifestly inadequate. We can turn now to the third wave, which, I emphasize again, is
introduced
as the smallest

necessary step to
wave.

render possible some undetermined as we

modification of
possible and

the second

(Since,

desirable,

and,

as we shall

have seen, the first wave is see, the third wave is called unlikely
second

but

impossible [499b-c, 499d, 502a-b, 502c, 540d], the admittedly impossible in the strict sense, would seem to be the
not

wave,

as

most extreme.

It

explanation of this will

is puzzling, therefore, that Socrates calls the third wave the biggest [473c]. The lie in the extreme complexity of the third wave.) The formulation
"Unless,"

of

the third wave occurs at

473d:

I said, "the

philosophers rule as

kings

or those now called

kings

and

there is no rest from ills for the genuinely and adequately philosophize, cities, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind. (473d)
chiefs
"

The working out of this wave, however, takes more than two books (the end of Book V, plus all of Books VI and VII) to accomplish. It is full of philosophi cally important discussions, including the Good, the divided line, and the im age of the cave. We shall be concerned here only with those aspects of the
argument which

directly
as

concern the

establishing
argument,
that

of

the

desirability
with

and possi complex.

bility

of philosopher-kings. we

It

is,

as one might

expect, exceedingly

Suppose
would

begin,

does the

actual

(474dff.)

the question of

desirability.
garded as at

Why

is it

even problematic

having

rulers who are philosophers

repute in most cities, re best harmless but useless, at worst harmful to the cities (487c-d). To deal with this problem, which Socrates acknowledges is a real one (487d), he must distinguish between the reputed philosophers and the true philosophers.

be desirable? Because

philosophers are

in ill

The

elucidation of this and

distinction involves the introduction

of the themes of

being

becoming,

opinion and

pecially 476-80),
unlikeliness of

as well as a

knowledge, long discussion

and of

the

Forms (474dff;

see es
and

the extreme

difficulty

actually developing such philosophers (487dff.; see especially 496b-e). This includes the extremely problematic recognition that such philos
ophers,
were

they

to come along, would not

want

to rule and so would have to

be forced to do

(519cff.). Throughout these passages, Socrates regularly reiterates his contention that the development of such philosophers, and so of philosopher-kings, would be very unlikely, but not impossible (499b-c, 499d,
so

502a-b, 502c, 540d). So far,

The
problem arises

so at

good,

at

least

by

the order of the

argument.
"true"

for the issue

hand because

Socrates'

account of the

philosopher suggests a man or woman

other

(540c)

who,

by

the standards of the

after

dialogues, is less

lover

of

wisdom,

lacking

and

therefore striving

Plato's Three Waves

wisdom, than
a wise

and

the

Question of Utopia
knowledge
not

103
of the

person,

with a comprehensive

only

Forms

and

their relation to phenomena,

but

even of the

Idea

of

the Good itself

(see especially 484b,

484c-d, 506a). (Again, how

"beyond"

could

the Good

be known

comprehensively by anyone if it is being [Republic 508e-509c]?) Thus the

ple who

truth, intelligibility, and even philosopher-kings are described as peo

in
respects"

"grasp

what

is

always the same also

all

(484b),

who

"not only
the

know
others

what each

thing is, but

don't lack

experience or
will

fall

short of

in any
and

virtue"

other part of

(484d),

and who

know the just, the

this
sec wise

beautiful,

the Good (506a). In short, the

apparent assumption of will

tion of the Republic is that the philosopher-kings

with a comprehensive

be in fact

people,
will,

knowledge

of

the whole, in the light of which

they

reluctantly, rule the city.

But the is

whole

thrust of most other Platonic dialogues is that such a situation

of

humanly by

impossible. Wisdom

this sort

is for the

gods

alone,

indeed, is

the

principal called

difference between the

the Delphic

gods and

humans. In the Apology, Socrates is

Oracle the
of

recognition of
man

his lack
erotic, is

wisest of men, and his wisdom is precisely the knowledge (Apology, 20ff.). In the Symposium, hu

being,

as

characterized

striving for completeness, pecially the speeches of Aristophanes

stant

by a radical incompleteness and the con including the completeness of wisdom (see es
and

Socrates),

and

in the Phaedrus, only

the gods are portrayed

beings"

as

being

able

to sustain a contemplation of the "hyper

ouranian

(247-48),

whereas the souls of mortals are

only beings are, like the between the mortal

and wisdom phers are

down

and get

partial glimpses of

these

higher

entities

constantly dragged (248a-c). Human

middle"

eros which and the

is

our

nature, ontologically "in the

divine (Symposium

(Symposium 203e-204a).

Indeed,

at

202d-e), between ignorance Symposium 204b, philoso

and wisdom.

explicitly singled out as in this intermediary state between ignorance The philosopher-kings of the Republic are thus portrayed as hav for the
gods.

ing

achieved an epistemological status elsewhere reserved

heaven"

Not for

nothing is this city referred to as "in Republic itself, as the previously cited

(592b). Indeed, even within the passage at 546a-b attests, the ultimate
wisdom

incompleteness

or

partiality

of

the

philosopher-kings'

is

admitted.
laws.7

They

will

fail in their

efforts to adhere

consistently to the complex sex

This

makes

the question of the possibility of the

as

philosopher-kings

alto peo wis

gether problematic.
ple

it certainly seems, the philosopher-kings are not If, like Socrates who lack wisdom, recognize their lack, and strive for
rather are
wise

dom, but
dialogues humans.
of wise

people, then there is

next

to no evidence in the
possible

as a whole

that Plato believes such an achievement is the question from the standpoint not of
wave

for but

Considering

philosophers

certainly impossible. On the other also more plausible that it would be it is this hand, by (impossible) standard, leaders who genuinely and compre political desirable. Do we not all wish for
people, the third

is

almost

hensively

know

what

they

are

doing?

104

Interpretation
suppose we consider the possibility, not of wise rulers as entertained
more

But
the

in

Republic, but,

realistically, of genuine philosophers of

the

Socratic

stripe

becoming

rulers.

Certainly

it

would

be

possible

for

people

like

Socrates,

who recognize

their lack of wisdom but spend their

the rule of a city. No doubt it would

be,

as

lives striving for it, to take the Republic itself suggests, ex (the

tremely
case of

unlikely,

since

precisely those philosophers would not want to rule

apt

Socrates himself is

fit

the Republic's contention

such a ruler.

here). Nevertheless, such a person would fairly impossible" that it would be "unlikely but not to it any longer be desirable? If it
would

find

But then,

would

be

relatively hensive knowledge

unproblematic

to desire as a ruler someone with a

of the political realm and of

genuinely compre the whole, it is, to say the

would on

least, less obvious that the best of all possible regimes Socratic philosopher, always questioning, never accepting beliefs, caring
whole,
etc.
more

be

ruled

by

faith

conventional
political

for the individual

souls of citizens

than

for the
a

Perhaps

one could generate what would no of such a ruler.

doubt be

long

and

involved

argument

in behalf
Book

But

no such

thing is

presented

in

the Republic.

At the very

end of

VII, bringing his

argument to a

conclusion, Soc

rates reiterates once more

his insistence that the

rule of philosopher-kings

is

hard but
"Do

not

impossible:
that the things we have said about the city and the regime are not in

we agree

every way prayers; that they are hard but in a way possible; and that it is possible in no other way than the one stated: when the tme philosophers, either one or more, come to power in a city (540d)
"

Glaucon,
with of

altogether

reasonably, as

we now

see,

asks

how. Socrates

responds

the

following

striking

conclusion as

to

how

such a

situation, the conditions

the third wave, might be brought

about:

"All those in the city

country; and

who

happen to be

older than

ten

they

will send out

into the

taking

over

their children,

they

will rear them

dispositions they now have from their parents in their own are such as we described before. And, with the city and the regime of which we were speaking thus established most quickly and easily, it will itself be happy, and
most profit the nation

far away from those manners and laws that

in

which

it

comes to

be."

(541a; my emphasis)
would

Are
the

we

to believe that Plato

seriously held that it

be

possible

to

convince

parents of an entire

city

guardians and

philosophers) to
of the

(presumably including artisans as well as potential leave that city, leaving their children under ten
of a new

behind in the hands

founders

city

who would raise them accord

ing
that

to the austere measures set out

it is

altogether more

ironic,

that the

by Socrates earlier in the dialogue? I suggest likely that the claim that such a city is possible is conditions for bringing it about, far from being accomplished
easily,"

"most quickly

and

are

effectively impossible.

Plato's Three Waves

Let
us

and the

Question of Utopia
seen

105

briefly

summarize where we stand so

are
made

far. We have
the

that

signifi

cantly-different
waves. and

judgments

regarding be both
of

first,

second,

and

third

To

review

briefly,

the first wave,

argued to

equal treatment and education of men

possible and

women, was

plausibly

desirable. The
eugenics,

sec

ond

wave,

radical

communism,

abolition

the

family,
political

and their

sundry implications, desirable only on the dubious

est of all values

turned out to be indefensible as

premises

regards

its

possibility, and
was

that, first,

unity

the high

(an

assumption

decisively
and

undercut

by

the claim in Book VI

eros could

that the

Good is the

greatest

thing),

second, that

human

be

fairly

treated with the same cold calculation as that of dogs. termined

modification

Only

a vague and unde

was

allowed, and that only on the hypothesis that the

third

wave would

be

proved possible and

desirable. For
wave

all

intents
sense

and pur

poses,

we

can

conclude

that the

second

in the

strict

is

neither

possible nor proved sense

desirable. The third wave, the establishing of philosopher-kings, in the be structurally the most complex. If we take outlined in Books V-VII, namely, as wise persons with comprehensive
"philosopher"

to

knowledge
most

of

the structure of the whole, then philosopher-kings

would

be

al

obviously desirable but almost certainly impossible. If, more realistically and more in keeping with the conception of philosophy regularly exhibited by Socrates, we take the philosopher to be someone who lacks wisdom, recognizes
that

lack,

and strives

to overcome

it,

then a philosophic ruler seems possible,

though

hardly

probable, but its

not

desirability

becomes

much more

debatable,

and

in any case is from this?

defended in the Republic. What

conclusions can

be drawn

First

and of

most

obviously,

we

see

that

we

should

no

longer

speak

sim-

plistically
ent

the possibility or

impossibility, desirability
at

or undesirability,

of

the three waves taken together,

least

not without

judgments

must

be

made on each separately.

first recognizing that differ If we do take all three waves

together, especially considering the extremely

ond of

problematic character of the sec

wave,

we

may

fairly

conclude

that the weight of the evidence

is

on

the side

those

who argue that

the city in speech is not intended as a

real possibility.

But this

conclusion must always

conclusions are

be

moderated

by

the

recognition

that very

different

drawn for

each of

the three

waves

taken singly.

But another,
the connection

perhaps more of

far-reaching,

conclusion can

the three waves to the

teaching

of

be drawn regarding the Republic as a whole.

perfectly just
project was

To city
the

see

this,

we must remind ourselves

that the

construction of a

was not

the originating

project of

the dialogue. The originating

generated

concern to answer the questions

by

the discussions in Book

I,

especially between Socrates and Thrasymachus: What is justice, and Who is happier, the just or the unjust person? The concern with the city arose as a (368dconsequence of the famous analogy, introduced in Book II
"city-soul"

at justice. 369b) in order to get a "better Keeping this in mind, let us leap ahead to

look"

the apparent

conclusion of

the

106

Interpretation

whole

issue

of

the

"city

in

speech,"

which occurs at

the very end of

Book IX. be

Socrates has been arguing in conclusion that the philosophic concerned with the health of one's own soul, the "regime
comments:

person should

within."

Glaucon

"Then,"

he said, "if it's that he

things."

cares

about, he won't be willing to mind the

political

"Yes, by
perhaps

the

dog,"

I said, "he

will

in his

own

city, very

much so.

However,
comes

he

won't

in his fatherland
"You

unless some

divine

chance

coincidentally

pass."

to
understand,"

"I
now gone

he

said.

mean

he

will

through, the

one that

has its

place

in the city whose foundation we have in speeches, since I don't suppose it is laid up for the man who wants to of what he sees. It doesn't make
For he
would mind

earth."

exists anywhere on

"But in
see and

heaven,"

I said, "perhaps,

a pattern on the

found

city

within

himself
or will

basis

any difference

whether

it is
no

be

somewhere.

the things of

this city alone, and

other."

of

(592a-b; my

emphasis)

The

real

issue,

we are

told in conclusion, to

is

not whether such an actual

city is

possible,
can

which now seems

be

rather

unimportant, but
each of

whether such a

be

established

in

Glaucon's,

and

in

our,

souls.

city About this striking

conclusion a number of observations

First,
speech,

Socrates'

last

exhortation at
with

may be made. 592b (which I

emphasized

in the
of

quota

tion) is in striking tension

where we were

the

whole

thrust of the

setting up
of and a

the city in

regularly

reminded

that the happiness

the individual

is

not

the

issue but the city

must

as a whole

(e.g., 420b, 466a),

they have
the individual soul)

that in particular

the philosopher-kings

be

made

to see that

duty

to "mind the things of this city

make

(i.e.,

alone,"

precisely not but rather to

at the

their concern the ruling of the larger

city (519c-520a). Yet here,

within

end of

Book IX,

we are

told that even if such a real city were established, the the concerns of the city

true

philosopher would mind

other"

his

soul alone,

"and

of no

(592b). In short, this

contention,

crucial conclusion of the

Republic flies
speech.

in the face

of a central

a central

requirement, of the city in

Second,
ogy.

the conclusion clearly

of

invokes

again the

issue

of

the

city-soul anal

An analogy,

course,

is

never an

identity; it

must always

be

examined

to

see where the

analogy works, and where it breaks down. Let us do that

the relevance of the three waves to the

with

particular reference to

city-soul analogy.

What do

we

discover?
of men and women, might seem at

The first wave, equality

correlation when we

first to have

no

turn to the individual soul, and perhaps that

is the

simplest

women within the

way to take it. What, after all, would be the literal correlation to men individual soul? However, one might speculate that a

and
cor-

Plato's Three Waves

relation

and

the

Question of Utopia
"masculine"

107
and

is

possible

if

we

take such equality to

refer

to the

"feminine"

characteristics of the
point of

individual in

soul.

We could then say that the

the first wave, applied to the individual soul, is that,

"feminine"

first,
and

there are

both

"masculine"

and
"feminine"

elements elements

each

soul, and, second, the "mas

culine"

and

in the

soul

must

be treated

nurtured

equally, and that this

is especially true for the

and

philosophic soul.

("Full human
p.

ity

is

discrete

femininity"

mixture of

One

might also note

masculinity Symposium 203bff,

the

[Bloom (1968),

384].

Eros'

where

parentage

is delineated
and

contra

Pausanias

as

heterosexual

couple, Poros and

Penia,

where,

thus, the first

erotic aspect of and

the soul is portrayed explicitly as partaking of both the

"masculine"

"feminine"

parents.) The
would
"feminine"

conclusion of

the

application of

the

wave

to the city-soul analogy

"masculine"

thus be that equal treatment and nur

ture of the
possible and

and

elements

in the individual

soul

is both

desirable.
wave, radical communism of women and children, etc., simply

The

second

has

no specific correlation when we turn sex

to the individual

soul.

Questions

re

garding and how to

correlate

laws,

who should people

have

sex with whom and

keep

from

knowing

their natural

when, rigged lotteries, family members, have no

soul.

in the

relations

between

parts of

the

individual

suspect that this

most unam proved

is

no accident.

Recall that the

second wave was of and

the three the

biguously
wave

problematic

regarding its possibility arguably

to the soul, it

desirability. It

im

possible as

it

stands and

undesirable as well.

But because the

second our

is irrelevant
With

when applied

need not affect

negatively

conclusions city.

regarding the soul, though

to the individual soul,

regard

it certainly must when applied to the then, we can dispense with the morass

regarding the second wave. The third wave, however, the rule of philosophy, does seem manifestly rele vant. Given the triadic structure of the soul (580dff), it clearly appeals to the
of problems

desirability
which

at

of reason ruling over the spirited and desiring parts of the soul, is precisely the point Socrates seems to be appealing to in his conclusion the end of Book IX. It is tantamount to the rule of philosophy in the individ

ual soul.

If
and

we now recall

the ambiguity

of our conclusion

like

apply it to the individual soul, we get, as our this: If comprehensive wisdom were possible for
one's

regarding the third wave final conclusion, something

an

individual, it

would

certainly be desirable to live

life

by

the

dictates

of

that wisdom; but it

for humans. If, however, we take philosophy, more realistically, in something like the Socratic sense, we get, as the real conclusion to the Republic on this issue, that living a life under
seems that such an achievement

is

not possible

the

rule of philosophy, that

is, living

the sort of interrogative

and

life

exhibited

by

Socrates, is
women and

possible,

though

unlikely,

problematically desirable.

For

for

men.

That

seems a

fair

conclusion.

108

Interpretation

NOTES

noteworthy "ideal "Plato

a view as

For the former view, see T.L. Thorson, a compendium of six essays, all of which, with the exception of Leo Strauss's, assume that Plato argued seriously for the possibility of his
state''

The

essays of
of

R.H.S. Crossman, "Plato

Society"

and

the Perfect

State",

and

Karl Popper,

the

Enemy

the Open

are

the most explicit examples of this

not preclude

which, as this volume attests,

does

vigorous

widely held view, disagreement on other issues

an anti-utopian

among its defenders. For representatives of the view that the Republic is Leo Strauss, The City and Man, Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, Role
of

work, see

and

Stanley Rosen,

"The

Eros in Plato's
might

Republic."

2. It ability
the
always

be

objected

that,

on

the surface,

Socrates

seems to affirm the

of all

three waves. To call this surface appearance

serious account of

into
and

question

lines, taking

the possibility

of

irony,

possibility and desir demands reading between construing Plato as not necessarily

Platonic doctrine everything that Socrates says. For an extended hermeneutic of irony in the Republic which addresses these themes, see my The present paper will hopefully be "Taking the Longer Road: The Irony of Plato's

intending

that the reader of the

dialogue

accept as

Republic."

an exhibition of

that hermeneutic. For a different but compatible statement of the

consider the seminal
notion of

complexity

of

in in

terpreting Platonic dialogues,

3. For

"Platonic
and of

provocati

set out

Mitchell Miller's "Platonic Provocations: Reflections

a comprehensive and

on the of

Soul

the

Good in the

Republic"

instructive discussion

the

history

scholarship

on the proposals

for

in Book V, as well as the attitudes towards women generally in the dialogues, see Natalie Harris Bluestone, Women and the Ideal Society: Plato's Republic and Modern Myths of
women

Gender. Bluestone includes the suggestion, which is not developed, that although the co equal proposals (the three waves) are connected as Plato presents them, the justice of each can be
separately.'

"

considered

(p. 106).

4. The

words employed

here,

asthenesterais.

ischuroterois, both have

both
can also

as their

primary

senses physical strength and weakness, although

be

used with

broader
to

connotations

(Liddell
equal

and

Scott,

pp.

256, 843). Especially

given what

Socrates is presently

say regarding

treatment, it is

most plausible to

limit his meaning here to

who

relative physical strength and

weakness.

"absurd

5. Contra Bloom (1968), pp. 380-84, (p. 380), "absurd

as

calls the

conceits" considerations"

(p. 381),

first wave, together with the second, (p. 382) and describes
"nonsense"

Socrates
when

"fabricat(ing)

women,"

a convention about

the nature of
men;"

and

"admit(ting)

that the best

women are always

he

asserts

inferior in capacity to the best (p. 383). Bloom is surely right, however, that part of the teaching here is that "full humanity is a discrete mixture of mas
Politics."

(p. 384), a position on which I shall comment further in my conclusion. culinity and For a view closer to my own, see Dale Hall, "The Republic and the Limits of In reference to the first wave, Hall argues against Bloom and Strauss that "there are none of the familiar signs of

femininity"

irony

or

comedy in Plato's discussion

of equality.

Socrates does
(p. 296). Hall

not appeal

to

absurd

premisses,

nor reason

fallaciously,

nor contradict

himself.

"

goes on, unfortunately, to make

the same claims for all three waves, and

serious and plausible objections to

Bloom, in his reply ("Reply

overall

to

Hall"), is

able

to

raise

Hall's

thesis.
refers to some who
itself"

6. Thus

even

if

one assumes

that

when

Aristotle

believe in

unchangeable

substances as

holding

that "the One itself is the good

(Metaphysics,

1091bl3

14) he is

referring to Plato, and moreover, that he is correct, it is hardly obvious that political unity is identical with the Good itself. Still further, if we do identify political unity with the Good, stunning consequences would follow. Since we are told that the good is "beyond and
intelligibility"

being

(Republic 508e-509c), it

would seem

to

follow that
it

we could
"being."

not

in

principle

comprehensively
per

understand unity/good, nor could we establish

within an

By

this argument, then, the

of

fectly just
cal

city

would

be manifestly impossible. For

the

interesting

discussion

the issue of

politi

unity

with reference to

Symposium,

see

Arlene Saxonhouse, "The Net

of

Hephaestus: Aris

tophanes'

Speech in Plato's

Symposium."

Plato's Three Waves

and the

Question of Utopia
art."

109

such evidence as

7. Cf. Euthydemus, 291 bff. for the impossibility of the "kingly 546a and adopt a version of the "chronological
Plato'

Even if one

were

to ignore
although

hypothesis,"

arguing that
"the
would

"the early Republic away

held to the
"mature"

Plato"

impossibility
as

of comprehensive wisdom, was

mature still

(of the
explain

ignoring 546a)

thought that

wisdom

achievable, one
which ends

have to

such crucial

dialogues

the

Theaetetus.

in

aporia.

REFERENCES

Adam, James. The Nuptial Number of Plato: Its Solution

C.J.

and

Significance. London:

Clay

& Sons, 1891.

Hall."

Bloom, Allan. "Reply

to

Political

Theory 5,

No. 3 (1977): 315-30.

The Republic of Plato. New York: Basic Books, 1968. Bluestone, Natalie Harris. Women and the Ideal Society: Plato's Republic

and

Modern

Myths of Gender. Amherst:

University

of

Massachusetts Press, 1987.

In Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat?, Crossman, R.H.S. "Plato and the Perfect T. Englewood NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963. L. Thorson, edited by Cliffs, Political Theory 5, No. 3 (1977): Hall, Dale. "The Republic and the Limits of
Politics."

State."

293-313.

Hyland, Drew A. "Taking

Metaphysique
et

the

Longer Road: The

Irony

of

Plato's

Republic."

Revue de

de Morale 93, No. 3 (1988): 317-35.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. Miller, Mitchell. "Platonic Provocations: Reflections on the Soul and the Good in the In Platonic Investigations, edited by Dominic J. O'Meara, 163-94.
Republic."

Washington: The Catholic

University

of

American Press, 1985.

Society."

In Plato: Totalitarian or Popper, Karl. "Plato as the Enemy of the Open Democrat?, edited by T. L. Thorson. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963. Review of Metaphysics 18, No. Rosen, Stanley. "The Role of Eros in Plato's
Republic."

3 (1965).

Saxonhouse, Arlene. "The Net

sium"

of

Hephaestus:

Aristophanes'

Speech in Plato's Sympo

Interpretation 13, No. 1 (1985): 15-32. Strauss, Leo. The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Thorson, T. L., ed. Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat? Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice

Hall, 1963.

Beggars

and

Kings: Cowardice

and

Courage in

Shakespeare's Richard II
Pamela K. Jensen
Kenyon College

Shakespeare's play The

cline and

Tragedy
and

of Richard II depicts the

another.'

simultaneous

de
the

fall

of one
a

king

and the meteoric rise of

The

exalted

King By
his

Richard becomes

beggar,

play on his knees, a petitioner to his flagrant abuses Richard himself

rule and

Henry Bolingbroke, who Richard, becomes king in

provokes

is introduced in
Richard's
place.

Bolingbroke's

challenge to

then capitulates to Bolingbroke without

self.

and,

The play is thus a comprehensive portrait with it, the irreversible dissolution of the

lifting a hand to defend him of King Richard's self-defeat

political order over which

he

presided.

Shakespeare likens Richard's England to

of

the garden of Eden at the time

a

the fall. The "sea-walled

garden"

of and

England is

fortress "built

by

Nature

for herself / Against infection

Against destruction
at

the hand of

war"

(Il.i. 42-44; Ill.iv. 43).

a new

its

own

hand, however,
reenacts

the manmade disorder that un

dermines from within,

other

nature can erect no

barrier. Like
the

Adam in "this kind

demi-paradise,"

Eden,

Richard

fall

of man

(cf. Ill.iv. 73-76).

a of

Richard's
to

shattered career

culminates,
political

albeit

unexpectedly, in

tri

umph and self-redemption.

His

fall

proves

in fact to be the

antecedent

his

natural with

loses

rise. An inward regality takes the place of the outward one that he the name of king. For reasons that become clear as the story unfolds,
meteoric political ascent

Bolingbroke's
ward

decline

and

long

merely marks the beginning of his in infirmity. Richard II portrays a double reverse of for
meaning.

tunes,
the

each with a

double
and

One
half

man acquires crown

his

royal spirit

cost of

his crown, Each

man

the other acquires the

ever

royal spirit.

is only

king;

neither

only at is kingly

only at the cost of his

when

he is

king. Like Adam, Richard sins in ignorance about himself. To become a true king, Richard must first be taught to know himself as man. In particular, he
must

discover the
He
quest to

arms with which man

is

endowed

by

nature and

their place
strengths.

on earth.

will come

to

recognize

first his

weaknesses and

then

his

commanding and free nature to a Shakespeare's underlying theme in the play, the natural pattern for

The

join

sovereign

place

is

which

is the

sun uses

the godlike, majestic,

and

imperturbable

natural sovereign.

Shakespeare

this

royal

image to betoken both the

lifegiving

power of royal riches and

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

112

Interpretation
robustness

the manly

of royal

spirit,

slavish, specifically denoted in the

and

by contrast to play by the inverse

and

all

that is

beggarly

and

cold, e.g., cowardice, corpses, peace,

everything pale the lifeless moon, (see Li. 69,

fire"

images

189; I.ii. 34; II. iii. 94; II.iv.10; Ill.ii. 75; III. iii. 98). The resplendent "living that characterizes royal autonomy also leads Shakespeare to use images evoca
tive of the sun and of
out the play.

hotblooded, high-spirited horses interchangeably

plot and the

through

In both the

imagery
men

he

affirms spiritedness and

(in

Greek,

thymos)

as an essential

ingredient

of genuine

regality

highlights its

presence

in the

actions

pertaining to

sovereign

standing up for
rather

oneself against

detractors, defending just

causes,

and

sibility for the care and defense of (IV.i. 284), Richard With a face "like the
sun"

accepting what is rightfully

than

abnegating

respon

one's own.

occupies a place

in the
the

politi

cal

firmament

parallel

to that of the sun in the

actual

firmament.

By

divine

favor that is
said

manifest

in his birth

and

in

accord with ancient

custom, Richard is

to bear the Divine Person on earth.

son of

Richard

compares son of

himself both to

Phaethon,
place:

Apollo (III. iii.

pp.

239-42. See Figgis,

"God's

substitute

God (iv.i. 170-71, 178) vicar and stands in His God's 79-80). He is 5-7, (I.ii. 37-38; / His deputy anointed in His
and

to

Christ,

sight"

IV.i. 126-27). The

vine aegis

political

authority

of

the

rightful

king

who rules under

di

is

presumed

to be

undergirded

by
and

a power which

infinitely greater highly born. The

is
anointing oil,
etc.

than that of any man or

link between the

king

group of the invisible titles,

in its very nature is men, however large or

armies of

"God

om

nipotent"

marked

by

visible signs or symbols

the crown, the sceptre,

which

are,

as

tokens of divine grace, endowed in their turn

with sacred significance.

To indicate Richard's The

sacred character

he is

also given a godlike exterior.

gorgeous opulence and

glittering

splendor of

the court and the

majestic

appearance of the

king

are meant

to represent to the

dull, earthly
of

understanding
"figure"

the

The
of

governance. surpassing beauty God but is in every way a facsimile of God: the type or divine majesty (IV.i. 125).

heavenly king is not

order of things and the

divine

Without
emblems of
other not

ever

reflecting much about it, Richard comes to believe that the divine election, which radically alter his appearance from that of

men, actually transfigure him

office and
allows

only inviolate but also flattered by the

into something more than man, making him invulnerable. Beguiled by the outward beauty of his
semblance or shadow of

divinity
His

himself to be deceived

by

surface appearances.

outward

he bears, Richard likeness to

him to forget his humanity, both his weaknesses and his strengths. He overlooks both his mortal flesh and blood and his genuinely godlike and
a god causes

his majesty in what is visible to the eye, the nature Richard imputes to himself is an inversion of the one he actually has. He en
majestic soul.

Locating
a

dows himself

with

body

rather than an

self-sufficiency that approaches a faith in an immortal immortal soul, as if the king's body rather than his soul
of

were made

in the image

God.

Cowardice

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II
expects

113
his
his

Esteeming himself
own
will

to be virtually the equal of a god, Richard

executed

to be

effortlessly

by

his

mere

command

or

fiat

and

heart's desire

purchased

for the
in

he is
order

spared

the exertions of
own

in his

life

and

Believing that ordinary mortals, he shirks his duty to cultivate his realm. His affectation of divinity essentially
price of or

breath (Ill.ii. 164-65).

amounts

to a

wanton

dereliction

neglect,

an

infamous

evasion of respon

sibility toward himself and what is rightfully his own (cf.

pest,

Prospero, The Tem

I.ii, 75, 89ff.). Indolent beyond measure, as if every day were a holiday, Richard immerses himself completely in an edenic freedom from every toil and care. Disdaining to "trim and the royal political garden, as even Adam
dress"

was charged

to do in
on

Eden, he

turns

instead to

dallying
a

sport and wastes

his

"idle

hours"

trifles and "light

vanities"

(Il.i. 38; Ill.iv. 86). The frequent

claims of commentators that

while not persuasive

Richard is unpolitical, Ornstein.

better

poet

than a

king,

to me, are based on the kind of

king

Richard thinks he is

(cf. Sen Gupta,

a

pp.

118-20

and

pp.

108, 118-20).

Mimicking divine insouciance, Richard is equally careless of friend and enemy. He does not think he needs to cultivate well-armed friends on whose
hearts
ity"

and

hands he
In

can

rely,

nor

to check the spirited self-assertions of

collects mere

well-

armed enemies. and

place of real

friends, he
his

"followers in

prosper

parasites, who consume

substance all

the while appearing to

hold

him up (II.ii.84 85; III.iv.50-51). The first act of the play depicts the

doubly
dire

self-destructive negligence re

garding friends

and enemies

that

is the

most

consequence of

Richard's lack
as

of self-knowledge.

Shakespeare's

presentation of

Richard's dismal failure

the arbiter of the quarrel between Thomas

Henry Bolingbroke,
gardeners'

soon

to be Duke of
assessment of

Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, and Lancaster, confirms the truth of the

king's
errors

royal

famous

the

(Ill.iv). Although

Richard clearly favors the loyal Mowbray over the insolent Bolingbroke and discerns the difference between them (Li. 85-86; 11-17), he neither helps the
one nor

hurts the
his

other.

By

the end of Act

I, Richard has,

on the

contrary,

strengthened

The
and

events of

enemy and cavalierly cast aside his most steadfast friend. the first act mark the beginning of Richard's gradual isolation
real and

divorce from every friend until his death.

"Old"

supporter,

an

irreversible

process

continuing

As the play opens, John of Gaunt brings his lingbroke into court at Richard's command, in order to "make sation of high treason against Mowbray, whose spokesman and

"bold"

son

Henry
his

Bo

good"

accu

surrogate

father

is

no

less than the

king

himself.

Owing

to Richard's

own

dilatoriness (1.5), Bo

lingbroke's damaging allegations have been bruited about publicly for some time, thereby creating an incendiary and highly-charged atmosphere for the proud and bold natures make interview. Richard recognizes that the
nobles'

them
of

headstrong

and

hard to
as the

manage.

"High-stomach'd
fire"

are

they both

and

full hot

ire. / In rage, deaf

sea,

spirits the cool and composed

hasty king thinks

as

(11.18-19). To

curb their

he

need

only

make

them feel his

114-

Interpretation
greater

immeasurably
ously
may,

power,

which

they

cannot

fail to do in his

so conspicu

regal presence.

Let them hurl their insults

must submit.

at one another as

freely

as

they

in the

end

they

As Richard

will

tell

Mowbray, "Lions

make

leopards
"puny"

tame"

(1.174).
of godlike remoteness

Striking
attend an

post

subjects, Richard disdains to take the dispute seriously. Nor

from this petty wrangling of his does he

to

its real,
and

by

contrast

to its apparent, cause.

Proclaiming himself to
makes

be

upright

impartial

known. To

expose

judge, Richard the true and the false

nobles

nevertheless

his

preferences

or counterfeit

subject,

which

he

al

ready knows,
as

Richard invites the

to vent their grievances in a war of

words, casually

responsibility in this affair to his favorite Mowbray, Gaunt delegates his to Bolingbroke. Since men do not necessarily say what

delegating

they feel or feel what they say, the verbal contest is bound to be inconclusive. Indeed, with the exception of the guileless Mowbray, who is incapable of dis sembling (11. 132-34; cf. 11. 41-42), the purposes of all the other characters are
concealed.

Striking
accuses

the pose of Richard's loyal servant that is the perfect counterpart to

a

Richard's pose, Bolingbroke feigns

desire to

protect

the

king
in

(11.31-34). He
general

Mowbray

of

instigating

every treason in the

of

realm

for the

previous eighteen years

and, in particular,

killing

his

and

the Duke of Gloucester.

Swearing by

"the

glorious worth of
whose

Richard's uncle, Bo my
descent,"

lingbroke Abel's
rumors

vows
.

cries

passionately to avenge his uncle, / To me for justice and rough

.

chastisement"

blood "like sacrificing (11.103-6). The

alleging that
us as

Mowbray

killed the duke

Shakespeare leads
Bolingbroke

to conclude

they

are

Richard's behest, although false (IV.i. 86), satisfy the impetuous

at

to Mowbray's absolute guilt (cf.

murderer of

Bullough,

p.

391).

By

accus

ing

Gloucester's

lingbroke
the crime.

confirms that

Contrary

crime, however, Bo committing he is really seeking the author rather than the agent of to appearances, then, Bolingbroke has come to court not as
as

Cain's

Richard's friend, but expose his injustice. Richard's diate

his enemy,

not

to submit to Richard's

justice, but

to

authorization of

Gloucester's

murder

is the

original

sin, the imme

supply the material from which Shakespeare's play is wrought. In keeping with his dramatic theme and the imagery, Shake speare refashions the historical material he read in the chronicles of Raphael Holinshed (See Bullough, pp. 358-60, 390 and Oman, pp. 97 ff.). While not

consequences of which

literally

fratricide,

this

act

does

manifest a wanton and unnatural

indifference
the
natural

to the close ties of

order, Richard is

kinship brutally
he

born

wilful, imperious pride. Inverting hardhearted where he should be clement

of

and metes

out retribution where

should

foster

reconciliation

(I.ii. 3-41; Il.i. 128-31).

house"

As the first Plantaganet "to raise this house against this in violence (IV.i. 145), Richard relaxes the restraints upon illicit ambition in his subjects supplied by filial piety and the sanctity of ancient traditions. He evinces in

Cowardice

and

Courage in Shakespeare's Richard II

115

doing
show

butcher"

this wrong, then, the same reckless self-neglect that Gaunt is said to in complaisantly suffering it to be done, teaching "stern murder how to himself (I.ii. 32). to appearances, Richard

Contrary
human

is

not

godlike

judge, but

an

all-too-

sinner.

Shakespeare designs the first between the

semblance or

scene

specifically to
of perfect

point

up the

ironic

disparity
forms,

facade

justice Richard
adhering to its

presents and

the actual

injustice that lies behind it.

is in truth

Punctiliously
he

outward

the semblance or shadow of justice Richard gives

his

sub

jects

the name and not the

thing

all that

can offer.

Bolingbroke is introduced into the play as Richard's opposite the dauntless defender of inherited rights and of the familial integrity on which they depend.

His father's

apparent willingness

to submit to injustice out of

so

loyalty

to Rich

ard's sacred name and godlike

appearance,

unkingly behavior, is to betray what Taking on himself the royal responsibility for promoting right order that Rich ard contemns, Bolingbroke gives men what they deserve: he chastises the arro
ard's
gant and succors

obviously contradicted by Rich is godlike and regal in himself.

the weak and abused. His real

justice

sets off

Richard's
on

mock

justice

more

clearly

by

contrast.

By boldly

passing judgement

the

king,
not

however, Bolingbroke unequivocally

the

serves notice on the world that

he is

king's

subject. use

Richard's design to

Mowbray

to ensnare Bolingbroke

only incriminates

himself. Under Richard's injunction that he "speak freely,

perilously
own
close

Mowbray

comes

to confirming the open secret of the realm that Richard himself

slew

ordered the

duke's death. "For Gloucester's death / I

Richard
make

disgrace / Neglected my sworn duty in that as far as he can, the reverent Mowbray
up for
an

case"

him not, but to my (11.132-34). To shield

exposes refused

himself, trying
to commit
reaction

to
at

injustice

against

the

Lancasters he

by

tempting
wish with

to pay twice for one he did (11.135-42). Mowbray's

to Rich

ard's unjust request

indicates the
are torn

plight of

those honorable

and

just

men who
war

nothing

more

than to serve their

liege. Richard's injustice

sets

them at

themselves.

They

holding

righteous

causes and

hence

between serving Richard at all are pulled in two directions

with"

costs and at once.

up

They

stay their hands or suppress their hearts, but their hearts can no (V.iii. 53) their hands, shattering "confederate forever the harmony between the inner and the outer man. Mowbray can no
must either

longer be

synchronized or

longer

serve

Richard in

with

his

whole

heart but
to

neither

can

he leave him
speaks or

(I.iii. 170-171).
silent, is
set

Deeming
motion or

himself to
"cased

belong

Richard, Mowbray
at

is

up,"

entirely

Richard's

command

(Li.

123-

24; iii. 87-92,

161-72). He takes

one path and

Bolingbroke takes the other,

emancipating himself from Richard's service in fact long before Richard re leases him from it in form (Li. 181). For one reason or another, Richard has no
whole men ard's

left to

serve

him.

Affecting

to hold

Mowbray

responsible

for Rich

wrong is

a subterfuge that enables

Bolingbroke to

evade

responsibility for

1 16

Interpretation
and

his. Throughout the play, he

of

his

supporters

independent agents to obscure the wrong Il.i. 241-45; IILi. 1-28; V.vi. 38-41). By contrast to Gaunt, who has fixed his gaze on Mowbray (I.ii), Bolingbroke refrains in name only from attacking the
man

intentionally employ the fiction lurking behind the right (see

he deems to be

king

in

name only.

He

sets out

to undo

his father's

work

while

appearing to uphold it. All the sons

at

with respect

in the play follow a similar pattern to their fathers (see Richard at Il.i. 176-83; Aumerle at V.iii. 60V.iii. 1-3, 21-22;
and

69; Prince Hal

in

Harry Percy

at

II.iii.41-43).

Having deigned to vouchsafe the nobles a chance to make good their claims bloody speeches, Richard is satisfied that he has done all that a judge should do. What wounded honor must take to be a mere formality and but the prelude to manly combat, Richard deems to be a perfectly adequate substitute for it, as anger only breath, if the dispute itself were a mere formality and the
nobles'

utterly spent with speaking it (see If their word means nothing, however, his

Menenius'

speech means

in Coriolanus, Il.i. 53-54). everything. As if, like a god,

he

could calm

the raging sea

by bidding
into their

it be still, Richard bids the Just he

fiery

and

"wrath-kindled

gentlemen"

to calm themselves and embrace one another as themselves

own opposites. when

friends;

to

convert

should

be

stern, he is suddenly gentle; where he should reconciliation instead (cf. I.iii. 186-87).

mete out

retribution, he seeks a

This

we

prescribe, though no physician;

too

Deep

malice makes

deep

incision. be agreed,
bleed (11.154-57).

Forget, forgive,
Our doctors say

conclude and

this

is

no month to

Richard's disclaimer that he is

realizes.

"physician"

no

is

more

pertinent

than he

Rather than mollifying the nobles, he has only aggravated their en mity, guaranteeing the very result he seeks to avoid. In his quest for an easygo

ing, lamblike peace, than strong language,

"makepeace"

the mock
assimilates
of

"lion"

Richard,

armed

with

nothing

stronger

himself to his injustice is

uncle

Gaunt, for
feeble

whom

being

ebbing his manly spirits. Neither father can control his son (11.159-86). As Richard fails to recognize his own weaknesses, so does he fail to see his strengths. He judges their natures as his appearances. Effeminate own,
of

even

in the face

a sign of

age and the

subjec

by

Richard may be content between "two eager

are men

with

"the trial

war,"

of a woman's

tongues"

(11.48-49), but they insist

of as

in

some
and

"chivalrous design

knightly

trial"

a shouting match showing that they (11.75-76, 81). on

Mowbray
are

Bolingbroke

are as

Richard is, but

are

determined,

profoundly sensitive of their names as he is not, to live up to them. Although they

conceptions of
and

equally obdurate, they are motivated by inverse dispute has called into question Mowbray's
eignty.

honor. The
sover

fealty

Bolingbroke's
other

One

would show

that he is faithful

and a

true subject, the

that he

Cowardice
is fearless
and a

and

Courage in
wants

Shakespeare'

Richard II

1 17

true king. man,

and

Mowbray

to prove to Richard that he

is, in his
will

heart, Richard's
not

Bolingbroke

that

he is, in his heart, his

the
audacious might

own man.

Esteeming himself
take the chance
site.

to be the equal of the

king,

Bolingbroke

that,
his

by

his obedience, he his

look like the king's

that he submits
beggar-fear,"

oppo not

To

go

back

on

word now might make own

it

seem

to

King Richard, but

"the

succumbs rather to
fear"

"pale

or acts

from

slavish motive of
knights'

recanting

(11.189-193).

The
the

king's

enough

could only have been countered by intransigence. As it is, the mere appearance of a contest is "uncompletely to dislodge Richard's resolve, instantly showing up his

virile, stiffnecked resistance

own

firmness"

stooping heart beneath the

verted

of soul

to be

royal robes.

an empty boast and exposing the beggarly It is Richard rather than the nobles who is con scene.

into his

own opposite

in this

His

beggarly

behavior inverts his

will show no

regal condition.

If Bolingbroke
men

will show no

cowardice, Richard

courage, causing the two

obeys.

to trade places: the subject rules and the

gives

king

Suddenly

reversing himself, Richard

outward

in to the

nobles'

demand for

battle. When his

will

be done, Richard

admits

majesty proves to be impotent to guarantee that his his impotence in order to preserve at least the

outward semblance of

his

majesty.

We

were not

bom to sue, but to command,

Which
At

since we cannot as your upon

do to

make you

friends,
(11.196-99).

Be ready,

lives

shall answer

it,

Coventry,

Saint Lambert's

day

Neither righteous
of anti-knight.

nor

valiant, Richard inverts the

chivalric code.

He is

kind

Richard's
of man

godlike appearance unmans

refuses

him. He

cannot exhibit the strengths

weaknesses.

because he

to admit he shares in man's

In

contrast similar

to

Bolingbroke,
in his

whose vigorous assertions show

part would show
maintain

he is fit to be king,
enhanced status

assertions on
self

Richard's

him to be only man,

demeaning

him he

own eyes.

To

the artificially

to which

himself, he must abjure the actions of a free man. In the first scene, Richard prefers his godlike appearance to what is godlike and royal in himself. His last speech makes clear that this choice is
not

(though

the regime) has elevated

self-defeating.
actual

He

marries

the look

of a who

god,

who

is

more

than man, to the

behavior
shift

of a slave or

beggar,

is less.

In

apparent

conformity
the one

with

indeed

responsibility

Richard's inclinations, the trial by combat does for right entirely from his own shoulders to
and

Mowbray's
the victor's

on

hand,

to

God's,
avoid

on

the

other.

"Justice

[will] design
subjects

chivalry"

(1.203). The troublesome

scene

choice

between

that

Richard

sought

in the first

to

is

now

seized

from him

and the
Rich-

exercise of

his

will proscribed.

Although the

circumstances are

inverted,

118-

Interpretation
same choice

ard

faces the

in the third scene,

a godlike

set at

Coventry,

as

he does in the
precluded

first. He from

can either

look like

king

or act

like one, but he is

doing

both

at once. godlike

In this scene, both Gaunt and Richard feign a ference, which they do not actually feel, out of
ance.

detachment
to the

or

indif

loyalty

king's

appear

Since they

are

by

no means

free

of

human

attachments or at once. can on

the needs of
can no more

ordinary men, they are pulled in two directions turn his back on Richard's insolence than Richard

Gaunt

Bolingbroke's. While only

with

they
and

cannot maintain

their

unnatural

poses,

and serve them

breath
as allow

empty gesture,
men.2

neither

do they

stand

up for themselves

and

their

"own"

free

Delegating
be

their rightful responsibilities to others,

they both

themselves to
almost

swayed against

their best

feelings, only

to

regret

their actions

immediately

and seek to undo

not

them (compare I.iii. 149 and

11.241-46).
as

Godlike kings do
the

fear the

outcome of

judicial battles. At

Coventry,

in

first scene, Richard pointedly inclines toward his favorite in the dispute. Flaunting his insouciant discernment of friend and enemy, he virtually predicts
Mowbray's victory and Bolingbroke's death (11.57-58; 97-98). Just when Richard would seem to be at his most godlike, however, the frail man in him momentarily
sweet rebels.

Like

Gaunt, Richard is
sour"

compelled

to

admit

that "things

to taste prove in digestion

as

(1.236).

Regretting

his decision to let the

fearing reversing himself once he the of seeks to undo effects his own handiwork. more, Richard assumed earlier that Mowbray could not lose the verbal battle, but
trial take place,

its

wider

consequences,

now seems

help
ier

to fear that Mowbray may not win the brachial one. With Gaunt's he banishes Bolingbroke for ten years, only to reduce the term of exile,

out of

doom"

momentary tenderness to Gaunt, to six years, and he imposes "the heav of lifetime exile on the benighted Mowbray. In so doing, he wrests
"sky-aspiring"

from the

Bolingbroke the victory over Mowbray he feared Bo win, only to hand it to Bolingbroke himself. By sacrificing Richard means to appease the Lancasters without hurting himself, as Mowbray, if Mowbray really were, as it only seems, Bolingbroke's true object (cf. Sam

lingbroke

might

uel

Daniel, The First Foure Books of the Civile Warres, Stanzas 64-65, and Holinshed, both cited in Bullough, pp. 438 and 393, respectively; see also Shoenbaum, pp. 11-13). Influenced, no doubt, by his false friends, who
for Mowbray, and by his own blind vanity, which can admit rival, Richard willingly abandons the "bold spirit in a loyal (I.i.181) who was his most stalwart defender. Simultaneously, in place of a real defeat,
no
breast"

would see no need

Richard inflicts
endure.

on

Bolingbroke only

an

imaginary injury

one that

he

will not

By doing Bolingbroke's

unjust work

for him, Richard

makes

himself

Bolingbroke's loyal servant or agent and his own worst enemy. Richard speaks once again as the devotee of everything that has a sweet and pleasing appearance or face. His eyes would hate to see "the dire aspect of civil
wounds"

(11.127-28),

and are

touched

by

seeing Gaunt's "sad

aspect"

(1.209).

Cowardice
To

and

Courage in
view

Shakespeare'

Richard II

119

keep

the

look

of peace

in

at

home,

Richard
of

sends

the belligerent
also

Bolingbroke away, assuming that once he is out of mind (I.iv.37). Richard has in fact upheld the

sight,

he is

safely

out

semblance of genteel concord

in England
his

power to foment civil war. actually doing hand the innocent envisions to be asleep in whom he By baby peace, the country's cradle, is rendered all the more vulnerable to brazen war's rude while

everything in his

own

intrusions. The

apparent resolution

he brings to the
real trial

apparent contest

between
and

Mowbray
lingbroke

and
will

Bolingbroke insures that the

take place.

between himself

Bo

his security demands and gives Still unaware of his frailty and deserve. they of Bolingbroke's vigor, he inverts the order that would obtain "if justice had (Il.i. 227). He gives quarter to the arrogant and inflicts mortal her
Richard does exactly the
subjects

opposite of what

his

the opposite of what

right"

wounds on

the

weak

he

should

be

stern

(I.iii. 172-7;222 24). He is suddenly tenderhearted where and stern where he should be tenderhearted. He metes out
where

"rough

chastisement"

there should be reconciliation and dreams of rec

onciliation where

there

can

speak through him in the

only be inveterate enmity. Refusing to let Justice first scene, shirking his responsibility to promote
wrong.

right, Richard willingly takes responsibility here for

takable

There is

an unmis

irony

in the fact that

unjust

Richard's

"justice"

(1.235)

rather than

Jus

tice designates the victor in the scene. At the end of the true
will

first act, Mowbray's

ambiguity that disparate reac Richard's

kill

loyalty and Bolingbroke's treachery remain in the dark, an Mowbray and immeasurably help Bolingbroke. In their
Shakespeare indicates the full
(See

tions to Richard's sentence.

error

extent of

Mowbray

at

The

characters of

I.iii. 157, 176-77 and Bolingbroke at 11. 144-46). Mowbray and Bolingbroke make clear that the nobles in
which, if properly

the king's employ

redound to the

possess prodigious natural gifts of

directed,

glory

carefully

monitored and

in the training of horses, they must be disciplined to prevent their high spirits from becoming
the realm. As
and

mere stubborn

intractability
and must

lawlessness. To
men,"

avoid

the danger to be

appre

hended from "great

ness.

The

king

growing "wound the

Richard's

gardeners recommend stern

bark"

of

the nation's fruit trees, "[l]est

being

overproud

in sap and blood, / With too much riches it confound itself (Ill.iv. 57-60). Although Richard by no means refrains from brutal and hard
when

hearted severity he permits their

it

suits

him, especially
to
range

toward the fathers of the realm,

without

obstreperous sons
jades,"

freely

bridle

or curb

until,

like Phaeton's "unruly It is not lack of spirit defeats Richard. His

they
as

careen out of control

such, then, but lack of

(III. iii. 179; iv. 30-31). discipline and discretion that

wit

will

"doth mutiny

with"

his

(Il.i. 27-29). Rather than

of uniting in himself the manly resolution and energy of youth and the prudence in age: youth and both defects of untempered possesses the mature age, Richard 91-110 and (cf. rampant and cold effeteness both run II; his soul wilful

folly

Il.i. 19-25). Richard's

own

behavior is like that

of a

refractory

horse;

"young

120
hot

Interpretation
colt,"

been disciplined himself, is now incorrigible (Il.i. 15-16, 28-29, 70). With his untamed and lawless disposition, Richard poses the identical problem for his elders that their sons pose for him. Until it is
who,

having

never

too

late, he

rules neither

them

nor

himself.3

At the

end of

the third scene, Richard does assert his sovereign will over the
and

recalcitrant

knights
of

reap the benefits

releasing them
make, to

their duty.

force them to submit, but only when it is too late to He becomes most fully their king in the act of

as

subjects.

By

his

own

admission, the
as

departing

oaths

they

him,

though not to

God, dissolve
rituals

they

make

them (I.iii. 181). In the

first only

of several such at

divorce
their

in the

play,4

the moment then

of

final sundering; their

air.

king and subjects are united harmony reigns for a fleeting

ensconced
over

moment and

melts

into thin first

Shakespear

affords a at

glimpse of

the

real

Richard,

intimates, just
He heaps

the moment of his

dizzying

pyrrhic

victory

among his Bolingbroke.

scorn on

his

cousin

Bolingbroke,

exhibits a a

dying
jects,

uncle whose

Gaunt,
lives

and above

all, displays

shocking contempt for his callous indifference to his sub

and

livelihoods he is
his

prepared

extravagant pleasure or that of

special

to plunder to pay for his own friends. Richard derides Bolingbroke

for his

people"

"courtship

of the common

he bestows
makes

"slaves,"

reverence on

kneels to "poor

craftsmen,"

and, in general,

beggars feel like kings

(I.iv.24ff). For his

own

part,

however, Richard
in the
on

thinks

wealthiest and most warlike gentlemen

realm as

he may treat even the slaves and beggars. With

the burdensome taxes he imposes trariness he

classes of evinces

the commons and the contempt and arbi

toward the nobles, Richard alienates the affections of both

his

subjects more
into"

certainly

and at a rate almost

faster than

Boling

broke

can

"dive
The

them.

commons quite

hath he

pill'd with grievous nobles

taxes,

And For

lost their hearts; the

hath he fin'd

ancient quarrels, and quite

lost their hearts (Il.i. 246-48).

With the wholly unflattering portrait of Richard that finally emerges in the first act, Shakespeare highlights the discord between the inner and the outer
man.

Richard's

godlike

regality looks to be only skin-deep;

over a myriad of all-too-human vices.

a gorgeous

but

flimsy

veneer, glossing

The

real order

inverts the
the first

apparent order.

act raises an

Rather than exposing the true and the false subject, altogether new question: Who is the true and who is the

king? If Bolingbroke is only the apparent subject, by con Richard is only the apparent king, by contrast to Boling Mowbray, broke. Lacking every regal quality, Richard is the semblance or shadow of a

false

or counterfeit

trast to

king, the name and not Conversely, as even his thing

the
name.

the

thing (All's Well That Ends Well, V.iii. 307-8).

forced
to admit, Bolingbroke

enemies are
a

rightly pertaining to The look is

king (including,
but the

in

some

has every respects, the kingdom) but

the other.

on one side

regal virtues are on

Cowardice
Instead
of

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

121

his

vain response

showing Richard to be a demigod, as implied by his appearance, to his exalted status shows more clearly than anything else
man.

could

do that he is only
endowed as as

The

artificial attributes with which prohibit

Richard be
natural

lieves he is
strengths
selves.

king
not

actually

the development of the

real and

he has

man, creating an antithesis between his

his

apparent

At the

same

time,

being

forced to

restrain themselves

in

recognition

of of

his frailty, his baser passions can enjoy free reign. Inverting the natural order ruling and ruled in his soul. Richard's innocence promotes the exercise of
vices and

his

hampers the

exercise of

his

virtues.

The focus

on

Richard's lack
the
view

of self-knowledge as

the cause of his

problems of

argues against

that

Richard II is
the

Shakespearean indictment

Christian

principles

for

dividing
(cf.

king

from himself
pp.

by dividing
of

his loyalties between heaven

and earth

Bloom,

56, 59-60).
value

Blind to the
cultivation of

the soul's goods, Richard is preoccupied with the

his

godlike exterior.
of more

To

make

his

own court

splendid,

he

copies

the unmanly

novelties

sophisticated proud

and

imperial ones, doting, for

(Il.i. 21
-23),

instance,
himself
portions cence as

on the reports of

"fashions in
of external

Italy"

and surrounds

with other

forms

beauty
pp.

in

sumptuous and

unstinting

pro

(see Holinshed in

Bullough,
were

408-9, 395). He

pursues

magnifi

if the look

of

regality
a

the only royal virtue and

frugality

the only

vice, the latter

implying

beggarly

resourcelessness and

hence

servility.

Vastly

overestimating the worth of glittering trifles, he wastes or squanders everything that is genuinely precious the En Mowbray, the "precious
"jewel"

stone"

gland,

and

reputation,

"the

afford"

purest

treasure

mortal

times

(Li.

177;

II.i.96-103).
Whatever damage he is
career capable of

is bound to be very
will soon

short-lived.

(See Oman,

inflicting, however, Richard's despotic p. 139, Figgis, p. 77). Like

a prodigal

son on a whirlwind

Richard
rassed under

spending spree with his inheritance, thriftless draw down his father's capital and find himself in embar

circumstances,
the burden
of

"bankrout, like
wanton

broken

man"

(1.257).

Nearly
and

prostrate

his

expenditures, the

"declining"

"drooping"

land faces

ruin with

him. he

Representing

the nation, the

which

little breath (1.150),

effort to warn the

dying Gaunt has nothing improvidently squanders on

left to

spend

but

Richard in

one

last

king of the peril of his own improvidence. Gaunt accuses Richard of effectually deposing himself by his reprehensible behavior and fi nally withholds from him the name of king (Il.i. 1 13). Pointing to the inversion of the natural order created by Richard's abuses, Gaunt, who is "gaunt as the comes to life on his deathbed, while boundlessly extravagant Richard,
grave,"

apparently in the full bloom of youth and health, hastens toward a premature death (Il.i. 95-96; Ill.iv. 48-49; V.vi.51-52). The apparently rich Richard
misses

his

real

but it

will not

similarity to the gaunt Gaunt, whose opposite he seems to be, be long before Richard stands literally in his uncle's place.

122
As

Interpretation
soon as

Gaunt

dies,

without a single

ard confiscates
usurps

Gaunt's

estate

to fund his

war

misgiving or second thought, Rich in Ireland, which is to say, he

action

Bolingbroke's

rightful even

inheritance. This

is

so unjust and so palpa

bly

self-destructive

that

York's

long-suffering

patience

finally

gives way.

In the

spirit of a

true

friend, York importunes Richard

to think of

himself. His
the

ostentatious of such

disdain for Bolingbroke's

general

hereditary

rights

undermines

rights in

and mocks the ancient

traditions on which

sanctity his own

security absolutely depends: "for how art thou a king. / But by fair sequence (Il.i. 198-199). Only a king can so effectively dislodge the and
succession?"

pattern
rights"

of

habits
made

and

convictions seem

that Time's "charters and

customary

have

to

immutable.

innocence, Richard escapes the obtrusive reach of his uncle's sober by rushing off to Ireland, while resting secure in the belief that York's obviously just intentions will serve him well at home (Il.i. 221; Ill.ii. 89-90).
In
all counsel

With "signs

war"

of

unnaturally
an apt stand-in

hung

about

his "aged

neck"

the infirm and

feeble York is

for the

king

(II. ii. 74-5; 82-83).

Inheriting

disorderly
own

and

destitute nation, York

must contemplate a resort

to Richard's

tactics to

make even a show of resistance against

Bolingbroke (11.90-91).
advantage of the advantage of

Bolingbroke portunity

returns

to England as Richard

leaves, taking
as

created

by

Richard's "absent

time"

Richard took

op his.

Acknowledging
that while
come

the

irony
gone

of this

fact,
far

the

discerning

but helpless York

and

notes

Richard is
make

"to

off,"

save

Bolingbroke

his friends have

"to

him lose

home"

at

(11.80-83).
of

As York predicted, Richard's dispossession

prompts the wholesale
are at most

the banished Bolingbroke

defection

of

the nobles. While Bolingbroke's own plans

might yet

only accelerated by it, Richard's action turns those nobles who have remained a check on Bolingbroke and his rivals into his staunch
In the
common cause of complaint

supporters.

he

gives

them, Richard

also

achieves an alliance

between

nobles and commoners that would otherwise

be

difficult to The

sustain.

nobles

his

patrimony,"

readily surmise that Bolingbroke's plight, "bereft and gelded can be theirs at any time (Il.i. 240-45). As a consequence
yoke,"

of

of

Richard's abuses, moreover, England herself languishes in captivity. In their impatience to shake off their "slavish adroitly managed by Northumber land, they lightly relegate all scruples and circumspection to the fearful and fainthearted (11.297-299. See Bolingbroke at Li. 69-72). Like their horses,

Bolingbroke's side, "[b]loody with spurring, fiery-red (II. iii. 58). Northumberland knowingly takes advantage of the

they

rush

to

haste"

with

nobles'

liability,

as a consequence of their sophistic plants on

high
about

spirits and resolve never to

self-deception

the

nature

of

look like cowards, to their action. Imperceptibly, he

first

wrong to supersede the by Richard. Relentlessly cataloging Richard's crimes, while affecting to hold Richard's flatterers responsible for them (Il.i. 241, 245) See
seeds of a second

Bolingbroke's behalf the

committed

Cowardice
Bolingbroke
at

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

123

IILi. 8-27), Northumberland takes

pains

to shroud the real goal

in darkness. When it is too late to turn

embroiled

back,

the nobles will discover

themselves in a tangled

web of self-contradiction

from

which

they have they

the

will never

be

able

to extricate themselves. Their second wrong

mimic

will not make a

right.
rights

Nor

can

they

Richard's

crimes without

further

jeopardizing

they
is

meant

to secure.
subjects into a quandary from which between two equally disadvantageous They pull them in two directions at once. They must "find out

Richard's
there

abuses

clearly

plunge

his

no escape.
which

must choose

alternatives,

right
or

wrong"

with

by doing

it

themselves.5

(II. iii. 145; II. ii. 1 1 1-1 16), whether by suffering it to be done To be true to what is best in Richard, his godlike

name and

appearance,

they

must

true to themselves,
pensities of

they

must

is best in themselves; to be be false to Richard. Assisted by the natural pro be false to

what

their ages, the fathers take one path and the sons take the other.

Each

side

is guilty, his

however,

of an equal and opposite excess.

If Richard

and

his

supporters procrastinate and shrink and

back from

real and mock old

age, Bo

lingbroke

supporters are too rash and eager

from

real and mock youth.

much undis

If there is too
ciplined

much of

the feminine in
other.

one

camp, there is too

masculinity in the

With

natural cooperation of

male and

female

ruled out

by

Richard's
age, in the

disorderly
realm as

rending

of

young and old, the familial and

social

fabric,
of

neither side

is

able

to check the excesses of the other, permitting

the defects

both

youth and

selves without reserve.

The

persistent

in Richard, to express them disjunction between action and vision

are,
no matter what

guarantees a tragic outcome.

That the

sons

ously of Bolingbroke's Shakespeare

more
gents'

embroiled

in the

fathers'

quarrels establishes the context

for

they do, peril the truancy

situation.

"unthrifty"

son, Prince Hal (V.iii. 1-5).

nobles'

fully

appreciates the

untenability

of

the

No

however, does he endorse the insur excesses or fall prey to their self-delusions. He apportions moral respon sibility with care and precision. Richard's unjust actions have given way to an
equally
unjust reaction.

than he glosses over Richard's sins,

If

moderation

and

justice

are not

to

be

expected

in

these circumstances,

they

are

to be

desired,

and without them

there can be no

restoration of stability.

fort"

Bolingbroke is already on his way home bearing "the tidings of well before Richard's latest injustice offers him so convenient
Like
a
godlike

com

an excuse

to strike (Il.i. 199-200).

king, he
own

repeals

his

own

sentence,

becomes "his human frailty,

manding
royal
ing"

carver,"

own made

and cuts out manifest

his

way (II. iii. 144;II.ii. 49-50).

man

If Richard has

the limits of

and

virtually

symbolizes

Shakespeare's Bolingbroke typifies

all

that is majestic and com

with

by

nature

in

man.

He is especially associated, therefore,

"self
borne," "uplifted,"

the

autonomy

conferred

by

valor"

arms and the

"body's

and "glitter "braving, (see Li. 37, 46, 76, 92, 108; II.ii.50; II. iii. 80,

95, 112;

III.iii.116).

124

Interpretation
of

Bereft
same

his

name and

high position, banished Bolingbroke

undergo.
birth"

experiences the

disorientation that Richard himself is destined to

Although he is
made

"a

prince

by

fortune

of

[his]

(IILi.

16), Richard's decree has

vagrant,

him
"en

seem

to be a nobody, a
a

contemptible pauper or

an almsman on

forced

vagabond" pilgrimage,"

"wandering

(I. iii. 264; II. iii. 120).

Boling

broke's heart disdains to stoop to his beggarly station. He bluntly repudiates the imaginary reverse of fortunes his father offers to console him during his exile
(I. iii. 279-80, 288-94), in favor
of a real one.

"O,

who can

hold

fire in his

hand /
tite /

By thinking on the frosty By bare imagination of a

with

feast?"

Caucasus? / Or cloy the (11.294-97). Let

plight of

fool their hearts

remediable

hollow words, the

the
and

hungry edge of appe dallying kings try to daring Bolingbroke is

soul, Bolingbroke
sets
"name"

by

force

of will.

Perfectly

armed

in

body

out to recover the

"sign"

or will

seemly exterior complement to his inware spirit, the that is his true inheritance (II. iii. 71; IILi. 25). His kingly behavior lover
utters
of war as

beggarly condition. Bolingbroke is as immoderately a arts of peace. Nearly every speech he

age and reflects

invert his

Richard is
act

of

the genteel

in the first

to arms. His sublime self-assurance exceeds the proper

battle cry or call bounds of manly cour

a
own powers.

is

instead
about

a vain and

distorted

view of

his

He har

bors
site

an

illusion

reasons,

neither

himself that is merely the inverse of Richard's. For oppo Richard nor Bolingbroke believes he can be defeated. If

Richard believes he is invincible because he is

king

and so more

than man,

Bolingbroke thinks he is invincible because he is

self-sufficiency.

man.

Both

affect a godlike

Bolingbroke is thus Richard's So

blinding
limited,

pride.

long

as

he lives

under of

in everything but the delusion that his powers are un

antithesis

and

will elude

is, in this respect, innocent him.

his true nature,

genuine contentment

Bolingbroke's

immunity

to the charms of the goods of the imagination and

hence

of

the soul
of as

possibility seeks the,

indicates that, like Richard, he has never confronted the frustrated desire. In place of such counterfeit goods, Bolingbroke
he thinks,
at

cannot evanesce or melt,

that Bolingbroke is
shield
and

durable prizes, weighty to appearance, that like shadows, into thin air. This is really to say, then, least as concerned for his escutcheon or ornamental
solid and
as

coat

of

arms

for his

real

shield

and

iron

arms

(IILi. 24-27;
most

II. iii. 120-23). In his

quest

to surround

himself

with

the goods that look

costly

and

squanders

substantial, he succumbs to the allure of Richard's golden crown and away what is genuinely precious. Lacking the natural check on the

sensing eye that can only be supplied by the eye of the mind, he becomes the dupe of appearances (cf. Traversi, pp. 28ff). Deceived both about his own
powers,
which are so

immense in

"ostentation,"

and about

in the

substance of a rightful power

for

what will

prove to

his object, he trades be, because he

achieves

it unjustly, its

mere semblance or shadow

a mock

(see Antonio, The Tempest,

to the eye,

I.ii. 112-16). As in Eden,

sweetness,

lovely

is his

undoing.

Cowardice
When Bolingbroke
Richard's
compelled

and

Courage in
his
uncle

Shakespeare'

Richard II

125

encounters

York

on

his return, he his

gives out that

usurpation of

his ducal
against

estate rather than

own self-propelled

haste

Easily

penetrating his
resource

his will, as it were, to return (II. iii. 133-36). him, entirely disguise, York complains in the strong language that is
that

his only

his

nephew's graceful gestures of obedience and

false"

"stoop
to
war

ing

duty"

are all

"deceivable

and of

(11.

83-84; II.ii.49). He only

arms"

stoops

conquer.

Bolingbroke's "ostentation "pale-fac'd

despised

and

the

bloody

he

threatens to visit on the

villages"

(II. iii. 94),

make

his true inten

tions clear enough. Like the "shrewd

steel"

steely, cold,
rights

and

implacable.

Exactly

he carries, his heart is, in truth, mimicking the king he challenges, the

and

fair

sequence and

succession

Bolingbroke insists

on

for

himself,

refusing to concede one

come ard's own

"title,"

he intends to

deny

to

his rival. He has in fact

as

back to force Richard to

surrender not

his

"own,"

he insists, but Rich his

power

(Il.iii. 148-49; III.iii.196).

evident

As Richard's
to attract
traitor"

opposite, Bolingbroke is
of whom

at

the very peak of

friends,

among the closest

a

he

wears

the name of "banished

proudly, like

badge to herald the

the

tee that he is not impecunious and a

It is up to them to guaran beggar forever, forced to dispense his

contrast.
poor"

thanks in words, "the

verbal assurances to

exchequer of

(II. iii. 65-68). In

return

for his

Northumberland's
enables

stance of

his friends, Bolingbroke receives a real service from them. peremptory defiance toward Richard, in particular,
seek

Bolingbroke to do everything to
settles

the crown, while appearing to

do

the opposite.

Bolingbroke ously taking

and on

easily in Richard's absence into Richard's role, himself the work that Richard shunned. Since the just

zeal

cause

the unjust cause are assisted at the same time and

of

by

the same actions, the

cf.

line

demarcation between them is invisible (Il.iii. 165-67;

ever

IILi. 33-34).

Without

having

to show his hand and

by doing

good, then, Bolingbroke

presently gathers strength and momentum for his eventual treason. Bolingbroke's security depends entirely on his ability to evade responsibility for the wrong he does. As if inferring divine approbation of his designs from

his easy success, Bolingbroke insists to York that he does not oppose divine will (III. iii. 15-19). For a time every circumstance contrives to keep him in the dark. He does
seems,
as not so much seem some

to climb on his

"ladder'

Northumberland

as

he

if

by

deft

sleight of

the poet Daniel's

words:

"he

seems not t'affect pp.

fortune's hand, to levitate to the throne. In (see / that which he did

effect"

Bullough,

p.

440;

cf.

Wilson,
place.

xx-xxii;

By
acted

the time Richard

finally
He

realizes

Tillyard, p. 460). his danger, the political inversion has

to his true interests only after
p.

already begun to take

awakens

he has

irrevocably Immediately upon

efficiency

against

them (Holinshed in
return

his

to

Bullough, England, Richard discovers

established

401).
the stealthy and
position

swift

with

which

Bolingbroke has

his

in En

gland,

blanketing

the

countryside with

"hard bright steel,

and

hearts harder than

126

Interpretation
(Ill.ii. 111). The
the
nobles after political

steel"

tempest Richard's dissoluteness threatened to

reversion"

bring
sins.

on

(Il.i. 263-69) is, "in

his,

the

legacy

of

his

own

In

wave

wave, the tidings of calamity crash in on

him (for the

the

tempest

imagery

see

II.ii.99; iv.22; Ill.ii. 3, 105-9). Upon hearing

the

devas
uncon

tating

news,

however,

king

remains at

first

cerned

for his security,

no more worried about

serenely repelling his challenger, now he

nonchalant and

is come, than he

was about

provoking him.

For every man that Bullingbrook hath press'd To lift shrewd steel against our golden crown, God for his Richard hath in
A
glorious

heavenly
fight

pay
the right (Ill.ii.

angel; then if angels

Weak

men must

fall, for heaven

still guards

58-62).

The
that

Bishop

of

God's

grace supports

Carlisle vigorously expostulates with Richard to remember but does not replace the king's arms. It is true that
not

rightful kings intention

are

by

using the mortal weapons

we will not.

left defenseless, but they must they have at

Heaven's
offer we refuse

cooperate with
.

divine heaven

hand"

else

would, / And
succors and cannot call

/ The

proffered means of

redress"

(11. 30-32).

Try

as

they

may,

however, Richard's friends

man's weaknesses.

forth his manly strengths, since he refuses to admit he shares in When they urge him to be a man instead of a coward, he
a

insists he is
ever

king

instead

of a man

(11.

82-85);

188-91).

Any

exertion what

to

keep

his

position
would

beyond the

"breath,"

expenditure of

the

bare

enuncia

equality with his adversary, dragging him down to his adversary's level. Richard finds himself, therefore, once again forced to choose between his real and his apparent strengths, with deference to his god
tion of

his will,

imply

like
men.

appearance

absolutely debarring him from the action appropriate to free Godlike kings need not defend themselves against "weak The one
men." men"

has

but breath, the other must refuse all arms but breath. The is nothing; "the breath of is all (1.56;I.iii.215). worldly To join the combat between heavenly angels and weak men, Richard need only
no other arms of

"breath

kings"

invoke his name,

name

holding

it before him like

/

lodestone. "Is my
name! a

not

the king's
subject

strikes

twenty / At thy

thousand
great

names?

Arm,

arm,

puny

glory"

(Ill.ii. 85-

87).

Richard is

compelled

by

his

predicament

inadvertently

to

acknowledge

that
life-

the king's strength is no more or

less than

the strength of

his subjects; his king's

the

blood is theirs (11. 76-77). The

the

effortless execution of the

will comes

to

sight as a mere stage effect or optical

illusion

achieved

by

hands

and

hearts
evad

king

commands.

Richard's

speech
own

serves, then, to

accuse

himself for

ing

the responsibility

for his

pected to

pay the defenders whom Richard soon learns that his false friends

defense. Heaven cannot, however, be ex Richard has simultaneously preyed upon.

that his true

friends, languishing

too

long

are already dead (11. 138-40), in his disfavor or indifference

and all

Cowardice
his "northern young 3). Like the
ebbs

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

127

castles"

and all

his "southern

gentlemen,"

peers and

commoners,
(11.201-

and old alike

have fled Welsh

with their arms

to "wait
entire

upon"

his foe

dispersing

forces, Richard's

military

strength

steadily

away before a single arrow is (II.iv.7; ii. 73-74). He is completely

unloosed or unmanned:

a single sword unsheathed

he has the

names of

twenty
124
arm"

thousand men,

but

not

the

men

themselves. (2
power can

Henry IV,
be

I.ii. 56-57; Ill.ii.

35). Soon
of
friends,"

all

Richard's remaining
the palsied

measured

by

the "weak

York (Il.iii. 104), and a few "private Salisbury (1.65), the forlorn and ragtag remnants of his once resplendent court. When he leams that even York has "join'd Bolingbroke, Richard must give
arm of
with"

himself up for lost. Those whom Richard

repels are

irresistibly

attracted

into the

sphere of

Bo

lingbroke,
own.
sance

whose name exerts the very magnetic power Richard ascribed to his While Richard has only mock men, Bolingbroke, in a nationwide "renais of manly spirit, is able to convert even mock men into men: "[w]hite-

beards,"

boys

with

"women's

voices"

and

"female

joints,"

and

"distaff-

women"

themselves

impulsively
abandon

rise up, like men,

wild and vain

against

the

king

(Ill.ii. 112-

20).

Finally

forced to

his

hopes

of

rescue, Richard's spirit the physical sense,

plummets to the opposite extreme.

In the

psychic as well as

he is completely unmanned. He goes in an instant from arrogance to abjectness, from fearless nonchalance to "an ague fit of The proud, unflappable king becomes "woe's (11.190,210,215-18). Stunned by the sudden revelation
fear."
slave"

of on

his

own

vulnerability, Richard
which

gives

himself

over

to an extended

meditation

death, in

invincibility
Decked

into
in

he converts, to good effect, the symbol of his apparent memento mod (see Henry V, IV.i. 230-84; / Henry IV, speaking in the formidable accents of royal up his court inside the crown "that rounds the With a sinister delight he infuses the king with "self
sets
impregnable."

III.iii.30-31).
out
royal splendor and

ceremony, "the
mortal

antic"

Death

temples

king."

of a

and vain

walls of

seducing him to believe he is invulnerable and the fleshy Once the unsuspecting and foolish his life like "brass
godlike

conceit,"

king, bewitched by his

arrogance, death
a

looks, has
castle

given ends and

the

fullest

possible scope

to his

comes

in his true guise,

the

ghoulish

charade,

and

"with

little

pin

/ Bores through his

wall,

farewell

king!"

(Ill.ii. 169-70).

Bitterly
to see

chiding his own erstwhile simplicity and guilelessness, Richard seems himself at last through his uncle Gaunt's eyes. He has harbored no
greater than the

flatterer form its

"thousand

flatterers"

who

have

attended

him in the

of regal

prolonged
of

vanity (Il.i. 100). Succumbing to the allure of the crown has not Richard's life, but hastened his death. Its real meaning is the inverse The "hollow
crown"

apparent meaning.

adumbrates

"the hollow
to disinter

ground"

(Ill.ii. 160, 140). At last disenchanted

and wide

awake, Richard

strains

his

real

128
self.

Interpretation He is determined
not

to make the same

again.

mistake

twice and vows never to

be deceived

by

appearances

In his

efforts

to overcome one powerful

illusion, however, Richard merely falls prey to the inverse one. Having previ ously been blind to the man in the majesty, he now insists there can be no
majesty in the
which,
as
man.

Richard has been

man"

attuned

only to the frailties

of

men,

from

king, he believed himself to be blessedly immune. The

leads him to
assume

truth that

he,

too, is only "weak

that he is all weakness.

I live

with

bread like you, feel want,

need

Taste grief, How

friends:
me

subjected am a

can you

say to

thus, king? (11.175-77).

As blind to his

strengths as was

he

was

formerly

to

his weaknesses, Richard's

challenge

false

sense of

security

bound to

give

way in his very first

to the

Imagining any his own, however, Richard disparages man and demotes him from his rank by nature. The king who saw himself to be more than man now esteems himself to
most abject resourceless and without

fear.

himself to be

arms of

be

a natural slave or still

beggar,

who

is less. Still confusing his

self and

his station,

he is

deceived

by

appearances.

forced to forfeit his false likeness to the divine, which lay in an imperishable body, Richard comes very close to denying the true likeness the

Being

priceless
"own."

spark of golden
represents

divinity
man

he

carries

within

himself
dust

and

man's

true
or

Richard

as

soulless

matter or

"gilded loam

clay"

painted call

his

own

(Li. 179). Without the crown, he claims to have nothing left to but death, which is nothing, and that "small model of the barren
"arm'd"

earth"

his bones, which is also nothing (II. ii. 150-52). Although Richard professed to be inwardly against his calamity (11.93, 104), his soul's armor suffers, in fact, from the same neglect and under

draping

development
Richard has The
who

as

does his been

army.

Man's

awareness of
of

his limits is the indispens

Never He

able precondition to the

also

development

his

strengths. courage.

knowing fear,
less to

prevented

from acquiring

surrenders

Bolingbroke than to his

own slavish passions.

"intellect,"

Bishop of Carlisle and later the queen both exhort Richard to remember he is. His regality is, like the lion's, by nature; it resides in his his his "shape and (V.i. 26-33). Not being subject to political
"heart,"
mind"

defeat,

jugation

true regality can only be deposed by vile self-conquest; the sub his naturally ruling to his naturally slavish elements. For Richard to be overcome by superior force is deplorable, but to conquer himself by surren dering to fear is to become his own worst enemy and "a traitor with the Contemning his own natural powers, Richard only augments Bolingbroke's strength and bolsters death's ascendency over him (Ill.ii. 180-82; V.i. 24-25,
man's of

rest."

38-39).

Only

slaves

let themselves be

conquered

by

fortune. From this limits that

non-

Machiavellian perspective, it is

not the recognition of

prevents one

Cowardice
from

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

129

being free, however: fortune derives

Fear
of

all

its

power

from

submission to the

slavish passions.

death
no

and not

death itself

makes

Richard

"servile"

(184-85). If there Bolingbroke has

regal soul

is, in fact,

way for Richard to

overcome the advantages

need not surrender

won
with

by

his

own

remissness, Richard

his

ence and

along between a beggar

slain"

the crown. In these dire circumstances the whole differ

and a

king
be

shows

itself in the

ultimate

decision to "fear

be

or

to

fight

and

slain.

Since this

mastery, it is never too late for the soul to arm the body's armor, but the armed soul need not

depends only on selfitself. Strength of soul amplifies

choice

fail

when

the armed

body

does.
pp.

Properly fortified,

man's soul pp.

is, in fact, indomitable (Machiavelli, Ch. 25,

old greatness or

98-101; Montaigne,
Unable to forget
great name or

150-59).

either

his

his

new

smallness, his

formerly

his newly

great grief

two. In his confusion about what

(III. iii. 136-39), Richard's soul is torn in he is, he sometimes says things he does not
old one

feel, but
almost

which seem appropriate

to his new condition, only to call them back

immediately Striking

as

being

inappropriate to his his true

self

(11.127-36). Through

out, he tries to
station.

gain access one

to

by

adopting the posture

about pp.

befitting
for the

his
one

inauthentic

pose after

another, casting

that

fits, Richard finds

strives to

no satisfaction

(cf.

Ornstein,

109-10).

While Bolingbroke Richard

status,
spirit.

seeks the station

that answers

his

kingly

pride of

heart,
his

humble his heart in

and narrow

accord with the straits

supplied

decline in his

political

as

if his
earlier

reduced

the full

measure of

As

he

mimicked

the posture of proud sovereignty suited only to

spirit

gods, so

ing

does he try assiduously to frame his servility, adopting a posture of "base

now

to a docile and grovel

humility"

suited

only to beggars
against

and

slaves.

If he is

no

longer

a sacred

king,

perhaps

he is

a mendicant pilgrim or

holy beggar,

an outcast

forced to

wander

aimlessly, defenseless
see also

the

abuses of men,

but

still

beloved

by

God (11.147-59;

Richard's intense desire

the two halves of his

somehow or other to restore

V.ii. 1-6, 29-36). the harmony between

being

that
yet

would yield a state of

rest, expresses his

ing

for

self-knowledge. and the

Not

knowing

himself

as

man, who is touched

long by
the
or

both the beggar

other.

king, Richard

assumes

he

must

be

all one or all

His

spirit

thus swings
god

freely

between the two

outermost

boundaries

poles of

existence, from

to

natural slave and

back again,

altogether

bypass

ing man. By contrast

selves
as

first act, however, the discord between his inner and outer that Richard experiences no longer signifies a heart too beggarly to rule
to the
on the

king, but indicates,

contrary, that something in him is too

refuses

royal

to suit

his

beggarly

condition and

stubbornly

to succumb. His royal spirit dis

against

dains

to stoop to his

lowly
to

station and sets

itself

his

own

baser inclina

tions, preparing him

rebels against the

master

them. Almost despite

himself,

the

king
a

within

beggar

without.

As his

apparent strength was married

weakness

to real

weakness,

so

now

must

his

obvious

contest

with

newfound

130

Interpretation

strength, gradually

turning him into his

own

opposite.

Without

denying

the

tragedy
not

of

Richard's

fall,

Richard is destined to discover the

strengths of

man,

by having to bear the utmost adversity and defeat. Pre because his situation is irreparable, he will be forced back on his own cisely hitherto untested resources. An inner victory is thus being prepared for him in

by

winning, but

tandem with his outward defeat. From

combine the

now

on, Richard

will ever more

look

of a

beggar

and

the heart and deeds of a godlike king,

wages with

clearly (see
the

V.ii. 23-33). Because

of

the war he successfully

himself

against

total collapse of his spirits, Richard shows himself to be an

increasingly formi
Richard
cf.

dable rival to Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke is

surprised

to discover that

has installed himself

in Bullough, pp. The closer Bolingbroke behind Northumberland

Flint Castle, for instance (III. iii. 20- 24; 402-3).

at approaches

Holinshed,

the crown, the more he tries to obscure

was so anxious

all

the

regal

boldness he

to

display

in

the first scenes. Although Northumberland doesn't refer to Richard as

king,

Bolingbroke, for his,

ard"

part, is scrupulously

deferential, reiterating "King Rich

five times in

a single speech

(III. iii. 31-66). As the time for

avoid

of

responsibility draws near, he wants to He proceeds toward Richard in the guise

"to

looking

an accounting like Richard's opposite. a vassal come

of utmost

humility, like

beg

enfranchisement
preens

on

his

knees"

(III.iii.114). While Bolingbroke

conspicuously his "fair

himself
he

outside

the king's castle so that Richard may see

make manifest

appointments,"

sends

Northumberland to
heart"

to Richard
as

his foul intentions. As Bolingbroke intends Northumberland to deliver his

sertions of

"allegiance

and

true

faith
with

of

to

Richard, they barely

of

conceal

his defiance (11.36 ff).

adder,"

Speaking
he

the

duplicitous double tongue

gives

he threatens

as

soothes.

An imperial Richard
at

back to
gets.

"lurking Boling
visited

broke,

through the same

Northumberland,

least

as good as on

he

The hide be
Bo

ous scourge of civil war that threatens to

descend

England

will not

by

Bolingbroke's

supporters on

Richard, but by Richard's

gain the crown

supporters on

lingbroke; it

will not

be fought to

but to

keep

it. Richard

prom

ises Bolingbroke, as his own rather than Richard's own, a legacy of as the wages for his sins, which he will inherit long after Richard has
bitter
sand
with

"crowns"

paid the

price of

his. "But

ere

the crown
sons

mothers'

bloody

crowns of
blood"

he looks for live in peace, / Ten bedew / Her [shall] fight Bolingbroke

thou
grass

pasters'

faithful English
misplaced

(11.75-100).
when

From

gentleness, Richard would not

he

had the strength; now that he is willing to do so, he cannot. Having no external resource left but breath, Richard has no choice but to surrender his crown to Bolingbroke's show of force. Descending finally like a falling star to meet
Bolingbroke in the
"base"

court, "where kings grow

base,"

Richard

yields

to

Bolingbroke

all that

his

rival craves

but dares

not ask

for.

Bol:

My

gracious own

lord, I

come

but for
I

mine own.

Rich: Your

is yours,

and

am yours, and all

(11.196-97).

Cowardice
Richard does not,
ostensibly beggarly low as the kneeling Bolingbroke
with a spark speeches with

and

Courage in
give

Shakespeare'

Richard II

131

however,

everything

of

his

own away.

Behind their

body as Bolingbroke's, his heart is equally as high (11.190-95). If conquers in mock humility, like a beggar, Richard surrenders here of real defiance, like a king (cf. V.ii. 9-10, 18-20, and 31-33) In

postures stand

two kings. Not only is Richard's

that combine
voices.

humility
is

and

two

Accordingly,
that he
give

when

imperial grandeur, Richard also speaks Bolingbroke asks only to serve the king, forced to
serve

the

king

makes clear

being

the servant (11.199-201).

exposes the

While agreeing to

the crown to

Bolingbroke, he
to take

breach in the

natural course of succession

that his agreement occasions (11.204-5).

means

Finally,

anticipating where Bolingbroke broke's ultimate goal (11.208-10).

by

him, Richard

exposes

Boling

The

single

broke's final
wrought

long scene depicting Richard's deposition opens with Boling inquiry into Gloucester's murder, specifically to discover "who
the
king"

it

with

(IV.i. 4). On this pretext, Bolingbroke intends to

friends,"

and, in particular, to bring down his Aumerle (V.ii. 4 1-42). To insure his victory, Bolingbroke must render Richard's isolation complete. He employs the semblance of justice solely to
cousin

intimidate Richard's "private

injustice, cancelling out thereby Richard's injustice that came to sight Gloucester's death. Moreover, Bolingbroke's arraignment of Aumerle for Gloucester's death at this juncture automatically dispels the illusion of perfect
promote
with

righteousness
mission that
main

which was

his

accusation of

Mowbray

he

deceived
will

by

appearances.
no

originally created, a tacit The true and the false man

with

ad re

in the dark. There

of their

be

reconciliation

the dead

Mowbray

(IV.i. 86-91) Betrayal

and no proper retribution of

Aumerle (V.iii. 35, 131).

nobles who

former friends is the only offering that those

world"

intend "to thrive in this

ate

new

can make

to the stern new

king

to concili

him (I V.i. 78). Their

efforts

to escape the consequences of

of

one unjust part

Bagot's double treachery in the scene (11.6ff.), are, however, self-defeating. The slippery oath of an oathbreaker can never be trusted. In the united front Bolingbroke and his supporters

nership

by forming

another, in imitation

present

to

Richard, they have

sacred.

given one another

incontestable

proof

that

they

hold nothing honor that is

ii;
of

find themselves sorely pressed to find the They reputed to reign among thieves (see IV.i. 124-25; / Henry IV, I.i; V.ii). As a portent of the future, the bellicose nobles litter the floor with
will soon

their

gloves or not

hands

the merely outward pledges hearts (cf. Bolingbroke at II. iii. 46-50

"gages,"

of

fidelity

and thus a show a par

and v.ii.

11-17). In

ody of this sort of parody of chivalry now prevalent in Prince Hal dissociates himself from the "manual seal of
prostitute's glove as a

the realm, the true

death"

by

wearing

favor (V.iii. 17).

show of

York interrupts Bolingbroke's

justice

with

the announcement that

"plume-pluck 'd broke consents to

Richard"

has

agreed

in

private

to abdicate, whereupon
name."

Boling
only

ascend

the throne "in

God's

The

Bishop

of

Carlisle's

vehement objections to these clandestine and

summary proceedings,

which

132
point

Interpretation
usurpers'

up the

injustice,
he

compel

Bolingbroke to

bring

Richard into court

in person,
presses

whether or not

planned

to do so before. When

Northumberland
that

Bolingbroke,

therefore, to grant "the

Richard

sign

a formal confession of abuses (11.224-27, 272-75. Cf. Holinshed, in pp. 410-11), Bolingbroke calls Richard forward that "in common
surrender"

Bullough,
view

[h]e

may (I. iii. 30), in

sition

(1.48).

Bearing

in

mind

the double
scene

telling
of

usurpation of

his own, the

meaning becomes Richard's depo

of

the word

instead

Bolingbroke's.

himself from blame, Bolingbroke clearly intends to foist on Richard the full responsibility for the usurpation; to make Richard his agent of injustice. Contrary to his stance of sublime self-assurance, his action reveals an

To

exculpate

urgent need

to soothe the unsteady allies he seems to threaten. The supreme

of

importance
more ard's

clearly than anything else could do the truth and practical

Richard's witting complicity in the deposition also confirms import of Rich

of

insistence that "no hand

order

blood

bone"

and

can make or unmake rightful adopted as

kings (III. iii. 78-81). In Bolingbroke himself

mate political

to be

formally

Richard's
sole

rightful
of

heir,

must acknowledge

that Richard

is the

fount

legiti

has

also come

authority and, therefore, the true king. Accordingly, Bolingbroke to urge the near identity of his and Richard's genealogies (IILi.
cf.

16-17; iii. 105-8;

The derelict
self

I.i. 70-71).
seems

On the surface, Richard

and negligent

to comply

fully

with

Bolingbroke's demand.
now

king

who

deposed himself in fact

deposes him titles,

with

in form. "soul's

Freely

his

consent,"

renouncing every Richard makes

state a

one of the royal names and

"glory base, [and]

slave; / Proud majesty a subject,

peasant"

sovereignty (IV.i. 249-52, 203-22).

Bol.: Are Rich.:

you contented

to

resign

the crown?

Ay,

no, no ay;
no

Therefore

nothing be; no, for I resign to thee (11.200-201).

must

for I

In

one

sense, giving his

as

soul's consent to
with

the deposition does indeed

make

Richard,

he says, "a traitor

the

By

so

doing, however, he
prayer

also

retains the royal

autonomy that is the hallmark of kings. As in the

priest and as

in his

opening speech, wherein he takes the parts of "both performs Bolingbroke's part in the deposition as well high thoughts
Aloof
grasp. which

Richard

his

own.

He

surrenders

only to himself. Although he continues to oscillate in this scene between his his low station, the contrast between his sovereignty and Bolingbroke's utter dependence on others has never been more pronounced.
and

and

self-sufficient, like

god, Richard

stands

just beyond his

enemy's

Once he is in court, moreover, Richard actually does everything but that he was called there to do. When he is finally asked outright to catalogue in public, he
reminds

his

crimes

his

of theirs

instead

(11.228-36).

Cowardice

and

Courage in
and

Shakespeare'

s
breath,"

Richard II
confesses

133
his

Refusing
sins

to be judged

by

"subject

inferior

Richard

to no one but

himself (V.v).

Richard does

his is
a

cross"

"sour

himself. Others may have delivered him to (11.170-71, 239-42), but his renunciation of the name of king
not

however,

spare

kind

of

self-crucifixion,

an act of

self-

mortification,

accompanied

by

ago

nizing torment and grief of heart. judgement

on

Serving

himself

and on

Bolingbroke

dedly ing

punishment

giving each exactly what is owing. he deserves. Richard brings himself down for his

jury king should do, Voluntarily inflicting on himself

as
own

his

judge

and

he

passes

as a

just

evenhan-

the

own sins.

Invert

the

first
as a

scene

of

the play,

however, Richard

shows

himself here to be
As Bolingbroke

godlike

judge

rather

than all too human as a sinner.

learned how to be broke how to be

a

an unjust

just

one.

king from Richard, so he has learned from Boling His real justice is the foil setting off more clearly
with which

by

contrast the mock

justice

Bolingbroke

opens the scene.

Like

true

king Richard takes the responsibility for right in this scene and leaves to Bolingbroke, contrary to Bolingbroke's design, the responsibility for wrong.
Richard is
no

longer Bolingbroke's

agent of

tive of his own egregious

others.

folly, Richard does

of

injustice. While profoundly sensi not take on himself the sins of

with

The

usurpers are

guilty
to

breaking faith

God

as well as

him,

a sin

for

which

they

must answer

ard sees

the coming retribution

God, if not to him (1.243). Further, while Rich for the "foul to be directed by divine provi
sin"

dence,

the conversion of feelings animating the passions

it

occurs

according to the ordinary

court

mechanisms of

involved (V.i. 66-68). As he leaves the

neither

for

the last

time, Richard
and

shows

tenderhearted sorrow nor the patient

submissiveness of a national martyr or scapegoat.

Drawn up to his full

others
fall"

height,

indignant

imperial, he calls Bolingbroke and the all, '[t]hat rise thus nimbly by a true king's stein, p. 119).
veyers"

thieves or "con

(11.317-18. Cf. Orn

Paradoxically, then,
site of that

injustice,
broke
and site.

the effect of Richard's surrender is precisely the oppo Bolingbroke intended it to have. Rather than exposing Richard's it shows up Richard's justice. Rather than emphasizing Richard's
reveals

weaknesses, it
wants

Richard's

strengths.

Above all,

and although

nothing his justice combine to

more than

to look like Richard now, Richard's

Boling legitimacy
oppo

expose

him

the apparent

king

as

Richard's

Richard

shows

himself to be

most

fully

king

in the

act of

divorcing

himself only for

from
a

the crown. The

moment.

harmony

between his

soul and

his
or

station obtains

fleeting

Sadly, in

this "woeful

pageant"

anti-coronation, the au

thority he wields so well dissolves as he wields it. Behind Richard's ostensible self-defeat there is
contrast,

real

self-mastery.

In

stark

Shakespeare's

source

Holinshed
the

reports

Richard's

compliance

throughout the

deposition, including
Bolingbroke in

effort to propitiate

order

formal signing of a confession, in an to save his life (see Bullough, p. 408).

1 34
Until

Interpretation
now

Richard has been his

own worst

best in himself, evincing the array of dice that precipitated the fatal crisis.

enemy because he betrayed human failings from injustice to

what

is

cowar

Acting

in

accord worst

with

what

is best in

himself,

Richard is

"traitor"

now a

only to

what

is

in himself. For

kingly

Richard to unking unkingly Richard, negating his of royalty, is to achieve an affirmative result: like every double negative ("no no") it produces
negation

its

own opposite.

By deposing

his former self, Richard for

all of

cancels out

his truant
taken
of
"th'

past and purges

root

his

soul once and

the vanity and

there, choking every

Adam
out of royal courage will gain

wholesome growth

(Ill.iv. 41-46).

folly that had Whipping

fending
His

him,"

Richard

endows
of

himself
royal

with a new

innocence.6

follow in the train

his

justice. for

For every
extent.
equal gain.

that Bolingbroke has made, he must endure a loss of equal

must endure will

Every

loss that Richard

be

compensated

by

an

The deposition

proves and

to have a double meaning in

fact

as well as

in

name.

For both Richard

Bolingbroke, every victory is

wed

to a defeat

and

every defeat to a victory. Bolingbroke's eager receipt

of the crown and cares

that Richard

lays down

proves that
won.

he is dazzled

weight"

by

the glitter of the

"heavy

(1.204) he has

In truth, he inherits nothing but Richard's cares. Bolingbroke will never possess the opulent royal goods that Richard squandered. Once he is actually king Bolingbroke and his supporters will find themselves beggars again, forced
to
content

themselves

with

the "bare imagination

feast"

of a

(Oman,

p.

154; /

Henry IV, Ill.ii. 56-59, IV.iii.74-76; 2 Henry IV, I.ii. 236-37). Bolingbroke
already knows all he execution of his will,
that
self.
will ever which

know
once

of

"the breath

kings,"

of

the effortless sarcastic,

he

noted,

in

a voice as wistful as

King

Richard enjoyed,

and

largely

as an effect achieved

by

Richard him

every exertion beyond breath and killing looks (Ill.ii. 165), Bolingbroke has so far undergone nothing but "the trial of a woman's Precisely because Richard's self-conquest has rendered Boling
spared
war."

Since he has been

broke's "shrewd
the

steel"

unnecessary, he becomes

the much vaunted strength of

crown
when

his

"glittering"

king without ever having tried arms. Only after he already has
commend prove

he imagines he really his

own arms.

can

his

arms

to

rust

(III. iii. 1
to

16)

and concentrate on reconciliation

does it

try

to

win

it

by

The
one

feasible title

to the crown,

is the

thing he cannot thing he needs. He finds himself ham

one

necessary for him conquer, the inde

strung by his own injustice. As Richard's crimes strengthened Bolingbroke, so do Bolingbroke's crimes once more restore vitality to Richard's cause (IV.i.

324-34). Bolingbroke's
looks like Richard's
own arms and crown.

new

weakness, like his old strength,

arises

because he
of

opposite.

Bolingbroke is destined to learn the limits

his

thus of the power of man, not

by losing,
of

but

by

gaining the
with

An inner defeat is therefore His

cowardice will
of

being

prepared

for him in tandem

his

outward victory.

his

situation

exactly the inverse

his injustice, making Richard's. As in Richard's case, the har-

follow in the train

Cowardice

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II
moment.

135
When

mony between his soul and his station reigns only for a fleeting Bolingbroke finally becomes king in name, he is king in name

only.
awesome

Only

when

he is

king

himself does Bolingbroke

come to

feel the

power of

Richard's legitimate authority and, for the first time, to fear him (V.iv). Abandoning his original intention to win friends by mildness, he de
to kill Richard (see

cides

IV.i.271, 304, 310, V.i. 51-54, 84). Amidst

fallen
rebels at

the

numerous

happy
thy

reports of other

the

end of

the play, Exton

congratulates
mightiest of

Bolingbroke
greatest

enemies,"

heartily for attaining the death of Richard, "the inadvertently exposing the depths of Boling
(V.vi. 30-32).

broke's previously "buried If Richard's life shows

fear"

edenic

idleness,

surfeit,

and monstrous

waste, Bo

lingbroke's, in keeping
consists
"holiday"

with

the post-edenic

in unremitting, frenzied, and he dreams of as respite from the

near at

imagery Shakespeare employs, heartrending toil. In all his reign, the

works of

war, and

which

seems

tantalizingly

hand (IILi. 44; V.vi. 49-50),

eludes

recedes

farther

and

farther

from his grasp and forever The arms of the unruly

him (2

nobles are
more

Henry IV, IV. v. 197-98). rendered by Bolingbroke's violation

realm than

of

hereditary

principles

infinitely

dangerous in the

they

ever were

before. Bolingbroke has simply

restraint upon

removed what was

the single most important

their political ambitions,

dangers"

fore,

the "thousand

with which

calling down on his own head, there York threatened Richard. His inces
Richard's
alienation of

sant wars also

doom Bolingbroke to

repeat

the com

mons,

whose pursestrings are the

keys

to their

with whose assistance

he

might

have

checked

heartstrings (II. ii. 129-31) and the nobility. Finally, Bolingbroke

aggravates a count at

baneful

ecclesiastical

ambition, from which, in Shakespeare's ac

least, Richard was spared. Once their fate is divorced from that of the sitting king, the clergy strive all the more to become an independent fount of
use of the

power, making full

zeal and

distinctive
vex
and

weapons at their

disposal
and

religious

"the

sacrament"

to

harass Bolingbroke

his heirs

7 (IV.i. 133, 326-29; V.ii. 97-99). The inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that in the achievement of the crown, Bolingbroke has only won a pyrrhic

victory,
weigh

one

the costs of
possible

which

to self, to

dynasty,

and

to country

far

out

any
pp.

Ribner,

benefits, and hence one more apparent 160-62, 164-68; Campbell, pp. 168, 212).
world,"

than real

(cf.

Richard's "little but

the

populous

English commonwealth,
prison

finally

con

tracts itself to the "little

not a creature can

world"

he inhabits in his

cell, where there "is

that

myself

(V.v.4,9; II.i.45, 105). Only

own

now

Richard try, really for the first time, his and body is enslaved, Richard's
"brain"

inner

resources.

he is nothing Although his

self-

"soul"

unite

to

display
His

a godlike

sufficiency.

Lacking

every

material

to form or animate, from

men and conditions.

nothing.

Richard

brings to life

all manner of

imaginary

political a prison

king
cell,

dom may have shrunk to the impecunious and gaunt contours of but his inner kingdom expands to encompass the whole world.
In
one

sense, Richard's

mock men confirm man's smallness.

From nothing

136

Interpretation

man can sage

in fact
rather

make nothing.

Richard's
the

death

than

life; like

imaginary progeny, queen's own "life-harming

it
mimics

moreover, pre
heaviness,"

this

pregnancy is the

antithesis of of

the

natural operation

(II. ii).

By intimat

ing

his ineffable soul, however, Richard's ephemeral creations Nature herself deceives by appear show the way to his true self and ances. The real order inverts the apparent order: the insubstantial shadow is the
the

durability

"own."

substance and

the

palpable substance

the shadow. The

dazzling

material

goods,
noth

heavy
ings"

in appearance,
that are worth

of which

Richard is

deprived,

are

actually

"heavy

which seem

less than they seem. The shadowlike goods of the soul, to be light and airy nothings, mere breath or the stuff of dreams,
and of priceless worth.

prove

to be incorruptible
and

Richard's invisible
or

soul

is

profusion of riches

source of

life,

a garden

womb, and his durable-

seeming
must

body

the soul must

be

"banished"

over which, to live fully, tomb, the "frail sepulchre of declare its sovereignty and from which, to live forever, the soul (I.iii. 196). As an amalgam of body and soul, man is a

is

flesh"

compound of substance and

shadow, something
"nothing"

and

nothing, and,

as

Richard

himself
might

will

discover,

never

seem, Richard still

of

in every sense. Thus, however much it keeps something of his own. He has undergone the
of

dissolution
Richard

enters

everything but himself (IV.i. 261-62). vicariously into the lives of all the inhabitants
contented"

his imagin

ary kingdom many people,

or

without and

availing himself of any comfort. He plays "in one person none (V.v. 37-38). Assembling themselves into a
represent

three-tiered social order, Richard's thoughts

conceit"

the varying sorts of "vain

most

men's

hubris underlying lives. At the apex of the

the restless

discontentment characterizing

soul's regime the sophisticate reason

proudly
the
1-

asserts

"scruples"

its sovereignty over humble faith, only to founder on the it throws up for itself, and "setfs] the word against the
V.iii. 1 19-222). In the
viz,
own a next

shoals of

word"

(11.1

14);

see also

class,

ambitious and

lionlike

thoughts

"plot unlikely which they "die in their

est and
with

wonders,"

pride"

from prison, inevitably failing stunning (11. 18-22). Even Richard's ostensibly mod
escape
beggars"

lowly thoughts, like "seely the flattering reflection that others

slaves."

in the stocks,
where

console themselves

have been

tune's
and

Insofar

as

they fail to

reckon with their own

they are and "for faults, however,

can

bear their

others'

misfortunes on once

backs (11.29-30), they

only win,

as

Richard himself
each of

these

did, a counterfeit equanimity that cannot be sustained. In instances, the vanity impeding the soul's composure arises be
failure to
acknowledge

cause of man's

his

own

limits: the

weakness

of

his

vision, the vulnerability of his arms and the mortality

ward
pull of

the

appetites.

Richard's
or

case

shows,

of his body, the down however, that whether

through their own blind sinning

that of others, even sacred kings can find

all men must

themselves beggars. In Richard's case, then, themselves (cf.

learn to

recognize

Tillyard,

pp.

246, 251-52). Out

of the

deposed

King

Richard
who

Shakespeare fashions the

perfect

type or figure of man, the vicar of man,

Cowardice
stands

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

137
shall

in his

place.

"Nor I,
eas'd

be pleas'd,

till

he be

nor any man that but man is, / With nothing / With being (11.39-41).
nothing"

repeatedly recrowning and redeposing him, Richard's imagination ently consigns him to ceaseless desultory motion.

By

appar

Sometimes
Then treasons And Then And
so

am

make me wish myself a

I king; beggar,

am.

Persuades
am

me

Then crushing penury I was better when a king;

and

I king'd again,
am unking'd

Think that I

by and by by Bullingbrook,

straight am

nothing (11.32-38).
wild

With Richard
the

characteristic acts out

self-sufficiency, in the
tragic mode the
scene:

fluctuations

of

his

spirit

in

immediately

Yorks in the

matter of

preceding Aumerle

burlesque rendering of the the comic risings and fallings

Bolingbroke's
of the

main plot

in

of

the three
response
King"

and

own oscillations

in

to them, which remind

him, he

says,

comedy "The Beggar

and

the

(V.iii. 76-80).

Finally bearing
Richard
of accepts

his

misfortunes on

his

own

back,

a wise man now

(1.63),

the full responsibility for

time."

irrevocably destroying

the "concord

my state and Inverting the perspective of the royal gardeners, who discern the political disorder on the basis of the "law and form and due propor
tion"

they
and

cultivate

in their little world, Richard infers the

need

for

moderation

regularity from the disorder he has wrought in his coming route to the same conclusion. When he hears time kept poorly
"proportion"

by

the opposite

and

the lack of

in the
of

music and

that

dered

string"

hours

days that

filters into his cell, Richard recalls the "disor comprise his own life. He bitterly chides

himself for possessing sensibilities so acute he can detect minute mistakes in music, while he was for so long utterly heedless of the gross discord and law lessness engulfing him (11.44-49). "I
me."

wasted

time,

and now

doth time

waste

have been, the possibility of his own composure is born. Like Adam, Richard sees himself clearly only in retrospect. His self-knowledge is presented by Shakespeare as
rueful

In this

backward

glance and reflection on what might

the equally tragic

and comic residue of sin. meditations culminate order on chaos.

Richard's fretful
enables

in

final burst

of

high
To

spirits that

him to impose

His last deed is

a courageous and

daring
the

act of self-defense that

has

no

hope

whatever of succeeding.

arouse

anger that can

help

to conquer

fear

and

to give vent to her own, the queen once

of

held up for Richard's imitation the defeated king "the lion dying [who] thrusteth forth his paw
pow'r'd,"

beasts (V.i. 29-34). Like

with rage

/ To be

o'er-

Richard hurls defiance

two
of

at those who

have

come

to

overpower

him,

brutally killing by the doomed

his

wouldbe assassins

before he is himself brought down

Exton (V.v. 107-8, 1 15-16; V.vi. 34-36, 42-44). In his barren

138

Interpretation
cell,
stripped of of

and tomblike priated

the

royal

insignia, wielding
sceptre, Richard

a profane and expro

experiences

axe

instead

his

own

sacred

his

most

fully

majestic moment.

Despite

appearances

to the contrary,
rags.

one cannot

fail to
with

recognize

the royal heart beneath the

Lancaster"

beggar's

At the last, Richard he had

holds from "Henry of bequeath to him. He finally

death himself
and what

the name of
accepts the royal own.

king
His

seemed earlier

to

responsibility to defend to the

regal

is rightfully his

behavior inverts his

beggarly By making
broke has
man's

condition.

himself the implacable

an

arm of

lates himself in
come

instant to the best

qualities

avenging justice, Richard assimi in his adversary. While Boling

strengths.

unwittingly to His stunning

play.

represent man's exhibition

limits, Richard

now embodies of arms and exemplar of

manly trial in the

blood"

In

death, if

not

is indeed the only feat in life, he is the foremost

the code of chivalry: as warlike as righteous and "[a]s full of valure as of royal

(V.v. 113).

Richard
and

finally

achieves

self-rule, overcoming the oppressive fear of pain

death

which

threatened to unman
cannot

him

and

bound him like

an abject slave

to

his

enemy.

Richard

turn back the

clock or work

the miracles that would

created.

heal the
cannot

rupture

in the

social order or
of

in his life that he himself

If he
walls,

literally
up."

break free
out of the of

his

enemy's

grasp

and

tear

down the

prison

he does break

inward

prison within which

his

regal spirit

has been

"cased his human frailties, Richard has always been his own greatest enemy. Now, however, the conquerer of himself becomes the master of himself and restores the natural order of ruling and ruled in his soul. Al Because
though forced to
submit

to his body's enemy, he

lays his

soul's

Resolving
thrall.

for

a noble over a

their opposites and

liberates himself,
slain

base death, Richard converts as Carlisle instructed, from fortune's

no worse can come

enemy to rest. death and defeat into fight die is

(Ill.ii.

"Fear,

and

be

to

fight,

and

and

death

destroying

death / Where

fearing dying

pays

death

breath"

servile

183-85).
If Richard's
god, his
response

to his exalted station shows him to be only man, not

enslavement proves that

response to

his

he is

at

His

armed resistance to

Bolingbroke's

agents preserves

least man, not beast. the distinction between

might and right

that would be blurred

caused

by

passive acquiescence and overcomes

power of

the

indifference to justice
Richard dashes his
poisoned

by

the

overwhelming

the

appetities

or animal passions.

eating impossible the "report

hopes that he would conveniently kill himself by food (V.v. 97-101). Shakespeare's depiction thus shows to be
of common
fame"

killers'

that Holinshed holds to be improb

able, namely that Richard

was
of

defeated,

as

he

allowed

himself to be deposed,
said, "tantalised
with

by

an appeal

to the to

frailties
death"

food

and starved

his flesh. He was, it (see Bullough, p. 413).

was

Richard's inspiration is his former

groom's report of

Bolingbroke's

usurpa-

Cowardice
tion of the royal

and

Courage in
and

Shakespeare'

Richard II

139
with

horse

Barbary
to

Barbary's blithe

assent

to it. Richard

draws the

accusation of

treason

he

initially
and

levels

at

his horse, only to depict

as an slave and

him, for his indifference

justice,

unusually cowardly and docile animal. and the blackhearted barbarism of Bolingbroke that turns the "Christian
climate"

contrary to customary usage, The name invokes both barbary

refined

(IV.i. 130-31, 138-44; V.ii. 36). Even the most characteristically high-spirited animal is only an animal, a natural slave or beast of burden, "created to be aw'd by man (V.iv. 84-91). By analogy, for

into its

opposite

Richard patiently to abide Bolingbroke's treachery is to transform himself from a man into a vile slave or barbarian and a beast of burden.
I
And
yet was not made a

horse.
an

I bear

burthen like

ass,

Spurr'd,
Richard

gall'd, and tir'd

by jauncing
to his

Bullingbrook (11.92-94).

makes a spirited response

spirited animal.

By helping
be

to con

travene the power of mere appetite, the spirited claim to something

oneself

more

for

than is available to all,

man and animal

alike,

can

enlisted

in the

service of
most

the development of the qualities that make man's distinctiveness

pronounced,
even

bolstering, in
of

this case, Richard's refusal to act

understand

beneath him
courage

self,

in the face

death. To

the nature of

Richard's

properly, it is necessary, therefore, to transcend the merely metaphorical equa tion of free men and their horses prominent in the play. The intransigent refusal
to succumb to injustice is a peculiarly human response. Without man's recogni tion of

himself

as a

free

being

rather

than a slave, possessed of a godlike soul,

there can be no deliberate resistance to

ness.

injustice,

as

distinct from
a

mere rash

Nor is Richard's
"paw"

uplifted arm a reflex against p.

pain, like

the lion's

(see Melville,
of

99). The true

courage such as

shooting out of Richard ex

and will. view

hibits in this

scene requires

the cooperation of reason and spirit, wit

In his depiction

Richard's final action, Shakespeare indicates his

that

nature ordains the marriage of man's spirit and

his spirituality,

manliness and

godliness, and, thus, that

As Richard
act of

showed

regality is the province of man himself in the deposition scene to be most

genuine

as such.

kingly

in the

uncrowning himself, so does he now come most fully to life in the act of ending his life and, hence, in both cases, with tragic tardiness. Richard displays
the full plenitude
armed
of

human

powers

the

perfectly

concerted

actions

of

the

body

and the armed soul

and permanent

divorce,

as

only at the moment of their violent rupture the bands attaching him to life dissolve. For one

fleeting moment, he is both a rising and a falling king. In both a sacred and a secular sense, Richard's spirit rises as his body falls. "Mount, mount my soul!
is up (11.111-12).

thy

seat

on

high, / Whilst my
paradox of

gross

flesh

sinks

downward, here

to

die"

The mystery or alludes in his final

the resurrection

of

the spirit to which

Richard

speech represents

the ultimate transmutation or conversion

140

Interpretation

In life there is death, but in death there is eternal life. The double inversions of Richard II, which show everything turning into its own opposite, adumbrate this fundamental doctrine. Rather than discord
of one

thing into its

opposite.

between heaven
secular and

and earth.
sacred

the

resurrection.8

Shakespeare's play implies a harmony between the With the grace of God, Richard ransoms his fall (Il.i. 31-39). Bolingbroke Shakespeare
crafts a natural
and

himself from the

In the
parallel

sins that produced

lives

of

Richard

pair, composed of elements that are indispensable to one another and therefore
meant

by
of

nature

to reside together for their mutual benefit. Although set at odds

by

their respective acts of

injustice, Richard

and

Bolingbroke

represent

two

halves

the same whole,

each

the inverse or mirror image of the other. Rather

than cousins,

they appear in the play as brothers, each one Cain and each one (III. iii. 108. See Abel, "[c]urrents that spring from one most gracious I.i. 104; V.vi. 43). The indissoluble union their relationship is meant to describe
head"

corresponds and

to man's own dual nature, in which

are welded together. soul and

body
nor

and

soul,

weaknesses
attains

strengths,

Neither Richard
station that

Bolingbroke

the

harmony

between his

his

he desires because

neither man

finds his necessary complement in the other. Each possesses only half the truth about man. Until it is too late, Richard sees only man's weaknesses and Bo lingbroke only man's strengths; Richard sees every sort of being but man, and Bolingbroke sees only man. The lives of Richard and Bolingbroke bring Shake
speare's audience

by

opposite routes

to the same conclusion. It must be said,

off

however,
greater

that Bolingbroke remains throughout essentially the foil to set

the

Richard

by

contrast,

as

indicated
of

to comedy for

Shakespeare's

history

by Henry IV Richard's
of
sub-

the shift from the plane of

tragedy

range of experi

ence, like

Prospero's,
into

alone permits the

incorporation

and trans-political

perspectives

one's view of

human life.

Richard II depicts the

which was established

negation

by

the rough, uncouth hand of man of that

and nature's

by

custom, nature,

God. The

restoration of

concord to

England is

not a task that can

be

accomplished

by

the hand of man,

however,
eration of

and proves rather

to

depend

on a

certain,

perhaps

providential, coop

man,

nature and

time.

By

his
of

own

admission, Bolingbroke's death

could not

achieves what all the

incessant labors
man

his life

198-200). Although
arms

cannot

supplant

nature's
work.9

Henry IV, IV. in creativity, however, the

(2
must

he has

by

nature give

him

distinctive

Man
and

husband
the

nature's

rich

profusion

in

order to

overwhelming
are

presence of

bring forth deformity,

its best fruits

wildness,

to

check

otherwise

and waste. wisdom

Since

man's powers

neither

superfluous nor unlimited,

political

requires

that

clear

sighted appreciation of man's strengths

of

be

wedded to clearsighted cognizance

the

"vain

conceit"

insurmountable limits to his powers. and the beggar's "base

must

Eschewing

both the blind king's

humility,"

genuine pride and genuine

of political wisdom

humility

be

conjoined.

The truth

at

the core

is,

then,

Cowardice
like the
antagonists

and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II
a whole or

141
unity

in the

royal

family,

and

like
pp.

man

himself,

composed of opposites.

Shakespeare, like Machiavelli (ch. 18,

nature not with

68-71),

recommends a

double

to remedy the fundamental political problem. He associates himself here the lion and the

fox, but

with

the lion and the lamb (Il.i. 73-74. See

Henry V, IILi. 1-16), reflecting his

prince's

greater preoccupation

throughout

with

the

justice than his distinct

with

stone of

grandeur.

his grandeur, or, rather, making his justice the key Richard and Bolingbroke ultimately represent two types
the soul that must be amalgamated in a single
counterpoint.

of souls or

aspects of

man, achieving the soul's

of opposites

harmony by
whose

Like the

other natural pairs

in the play

salutary rivalry has been disrupted

of

by

injus for

tice

male-female, youth-age, the works of war and the recreations of peace

their natural dialectic

the benefit
points

of

insures that each may check the excesses both. The foundation for political wisdom to
moderation.

the

other

which

the play

is

lesson in

Shakespeare does

agree with

Machiavelli

on

the importance of the prince's

knowing
one

how to

avoid

being

deceived degree

by
of

nature's own must

design,
fail to

a certain

not

recognize

either

making clear that, by is cunning necessary to know nature: the flesh-and-blood man beneath the in the flesh-and-blood
on

appearances,10

golden crown or the godlike royal spirit encased

man.

The

goods of the soul

supply the indispensable check

to be their peculiar

the tendency,
to

which

is

so prominent appearances

in

exalted men as

liability

be deceived

by

(Measure for Measure, II. ii. 1 10-23). Shakespeare himself deals

goods.

entirely in these
realm of

by

His airy nothings, so much like dreams, point to a surpassing beauty that need not be unlocked, as it is in Richard's case, sorrow, a realm which, once glimpsed, arouses longings to transcend the
of

plane

justice altogether,
and

wherein

human limits

must

invariably

manifest

themselves,
human
soul:

to

seek satisfaction

instead in
within

a godlike contemplation of

the

the name Man is contained

the

wondrous name

Miranda.

NOTES

from The Riverside Shakespeare. The original version of this essay was hosted by the NEH-sponsored conference, "On the Role of Spiritedness in Olin Center of the University of Chicago in May 1986, honoring the work of Joseph Cropsey. I am indebted to Fred Baumann, Kenneth Jensen, and Catherine Zuckert for their editorial and substan
1. All
citations are
Politics,"

delivered

at an

tive suggestions.

2. Compare Gaunt
and
and

and

York

at

I. iii. 241-46

York

experience a
another.

wrenching

conflict of

tongues

Loyalty

to the

and V.ii. 89, 94. Throughout the play both Gaunt loyalties, pulling their hearts one way and their hands apparent king or king in name makes Gaunt, mimicking Rich

tendencies, an excessively hardhearted defender of Bolingbroke, once he has the name of king. Since their hearts cannot be in their assertions, however, their loyalties are worth less than it even to espouse in speech the positions seems. Both men must use sophistry and "false
ard's
hypocrisy"

142
they
and

Interpretation
take

in defense
p.

of the two

kings (I.ii. 36-40; V.iii. 100-110). Cf. Kantorowicz.,

pp.

19, 39^t0,
of

Campbell,

197.

ard's

3. It is important to note, however, that Shakespeare actually ameliorates the accounts crimes found in his major source, Holinshed's Chronicles. The play does bear
ascription of

Rich Ho

out

linshed's his
hart."

Richard's

excesses rather to

"the frailtie

of wanton youth

than the malice of

See Bullough, pp. 402, 395, 409. Indicating that the attempt to reach Richard is fraught for the counselor, Shakespeare plants hints that Gloucester, "plain, well-meaning is killed for his pains (Il.i. 1 15-31). Richard is orphaned as a young boy because of England's war with France, raising an interesting speculation about Shakespeare's wider judgment on English
with peril

soul"

affairs.

See York (Il.i. 179-82) and Northumberland (11.252- 55); cf. Churchill, 4. See, e.g., I.ii. 54-55, 73-74; II. ii. 141-49; V.i. 71-73; cf. II. iii. 49-50. 5. See II.ii.ll 1-16. By contrast to their male counterparts, the Duchesse s
are prepared

pp.

383-84.

of

Gloucester

and

York

in the

"own"

name of

their

to let kings suffer wrong (I.ii. 36; V.ii. 98- 100).

6. Richard's
essential point well

ritual

of purification as

he descends the throne is into his

I.ii. 213-17).

knowingly
he

by

the

new

Henry V,

whose conversion

opposite as

ascends the

imitated in every throne is

change of

known

(Henry V,

I.i. 25-37; /

Henry IV,
see

7. For Richard

a negative view of the

importance 2

commons'

of the

judgement in the

kings

and the clergy's

feelings toward them,

plundered

the church and that the

p.

Henry IV, I. iii. 86- 100. Holinshed reports both that Archbishop of Canterbury sided with Bolingbroke in the
portrait, the role of religion

usurpation

(see Bullough,

403). In Shakespeare's
no

in

politics

in the

new court remains as

pronounced, but is

longer

conservative,
of

of the problem presented to

his

pious

father. Instead
name

fering

wrong, religion now

lends its

to treason,

being helping

posing for Bolingbroke the inverse adduced, if weakly, to justify suf

to change its color. Religion be

comes, then, the useful instrument of sincere and

insincere
the

adherents alike.

8. Gaunt
kings,"

compares
of

England's fame

as

the source of royal

of

life,
of

"this

teeming
and

womb of royal

"sepulchre"

to that

the empty tomb or

king

kings

the source of

life

"the world's ransom, blessed Mary's (Il.i. 5 1-56). everlasting 9. There is an intentional connection in the play between the preponderance
and

son"

of negative words

the prominence of

"hands"

"arms."

and

Even the

gardener's proper work

defoliating, being "like an IV. iv. 95-97; Nathaniel Hawthorne, "The 10. Machiavelli, The Prince, chs. 6, 8, pp. 21-25, 34-38; Montaigne, "Of "Of the in Essays, pp. 150-59, 189-96. As both Oliverotto of Fermo and Alex inequality Among ander VI illustrate in Machiavelli, the protean arts of deceiving by appearance, which might also be
tive:

hacking down,

executioner.

pruning,

is essentially nega See A Winter's Tale,

Birthmark."

canniba

us,"

necessary to the prince, and the art of avoiding deception are two distinct arts, not necessarily found in the same men. See Machiavelli. ch. 18, fourth paragraph, p. 70; Guicciardini, bk. 6, pp.

171-74; Henry V, II. iv. 36-40; IV. vii.

REFERENCES
II."

Bloom, Allan. "Richard

and

In Shakespeare as Political Thinker, edited by John Alvis Thomas G. West, 51-61. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1981. Bullough, Geoffrey. Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare's Plays. Vol. 3. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.

Campbell, Lily B. Shakespeare's "Histories": Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy. San Ma rino, CA: Huntington Library, 1947. Churchill, Winston. A History of the English-Speaking Peoples. New York: Dodd, Mead& Co., 1956. Figgis, John N. The Divine Right of Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984.

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and

Courage in

Shakespeare'

Richard II

143
Alex

Guicciardini, Francesco. The History of Italy. Translated

ander.

and edited

by Sidney

Princeton: Princeton

University Press,

1969.

Kantorowicz, Ernst H. The King's Two Bodies. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1957.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Translated by Harvey Mansfield, Jr. Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1985. Melville, Herman. Billy Budd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. "Of the Inequality Among In The Com Montaigne, Michel de. "Of plete Essays of Montaigne, translated by Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford Uni versity Press, 1958.
Cannibals,"
Us."

Oman, Charles. The Political History of England. Vol 4. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1906. Ornstein, Robert. A Kingdom for a Stage. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. Ribner, Irving. The English History Plays in the Age of Shakespeare. Princeton: Prince ton University Press, 1957. 'Richard and the Realities of Shakespeare Survey Schoenbaum, S.
" II' Power."

28(1975):12-13.

Sen Gupta, S.C.

1964.

Shakespeare'

Historical Plays. London: Oxford

University Press,

Shakespeare, William. The Riverside Shakespeare. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974. s History Plays. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1946. Tillyard, E.M.W.
Shakespeare'

Traversi, Derek. Shakespeare from Richard II to Henry V. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. Wilson, John Dover, editor. King Richard II. London: Cambridge University Press,
1939.

Reason

and

Revelation in the Thought

of

Leo Strauss

Christopher A. Colmo

Rosary

College

While Leo Strauss

politics

presented

himself

as

thinker on politics,

he

came to
pp.

through what

he

called

the "theological-political

problem"

PPH,

1-

3. See

also

Preface,
it does

p.

means, but
things to

prepare us

1). It is certainly not clear at the outset for the fact that Strauss had

what

exactly this

some

interesting
find it

say

about religion and

its

relation

to both politics and philosophy. It

also prepares us

for the fact that those in his

work

who write about

Strauss

often

necessary to

try

to understand Strauss's theological

recent

position. as

Stanley Rosen,
because,
as

book Hermeneutics

Politics,

tells us in the

introduction to that
Rosen

that Strauss was an atheist (p. 17). This

is surprising
claims,

points

out, Strauss explicitly argues that

with

reason cannot refute stated

revelation.

Equally

surprising, because it conflicts

Strauss's

is Rosen's

revelation

that,

since

Strauss's

atheism

is

not a reasoned

conclusion,
as

then Strauss must understand his own position, which

reasoned or which

he

presents

being

philosophic,

as

there is
p.

no rational

being, in fact, an act of the will, i.e., a choice for ground (HP, pp. 110-11, 122-23, 127, 137. cf.
Strauss
the
moves

Preface,
rooted

30). Rosen's

view of

from the

question

Strauss's theological
in
a practical

position to

the

question will.

whether reason or

regarding theory is not

In this way Rosen raises the ques tion of the proper relationship between theory and practice. The following es say will address both of Rosen's points; in so doing, it will move from the question about God as the basis for human knowledge and action to the ques
act,
an act of

tion whether it is at all possible to

coherent view of the

formulate,

on

formulate
it
would

relationship between theory and human view of this issue would have obvious implications, strictly for a return to a theological position. Indeed, the question of seem,
a

merely human basis, a practice. The inability to

God's
of

existence and

his

relation

to

humanity

is

urgent

in the

extreme

because

its

bearing

upon

the

practical question of

the right or best way of life. In to the

p.
question of

deed,

the viability

of

philosophy

as an alternative answer

the

best way of life is very much at issue here (see Strauss, MI, Strauss cannot be a reasoned atheist, we are told, for a reason that Strauss

1 13).

himself

makes clear.

Rosen succinctly
religion

summarizes and

ing

that since

wisdom

is impossible, reason,

to reason, can never refute Strauss's

(HP,

p.

by say the life devoted philosophy 110). Let us assume for the moargument

Strauss's

as

and

Rosen's

writings are cited

by

abbreviations noted

in the

reference

list.

interpretation, Fall 1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

146
ment

Interpretation
that
wisdom

is

impossible.1

What is the

significance of

this fact for the

debate between philosophy and religion? Any attempt by philosophy to refute revelation is based on the assumption that rational arguments are true. But the believer
need as

not, and in fact does not, grant the validity of this assumption.
of

Wisdom,
reason

the perfectly intelligible account

would

the world and of the place of

in the world,
and

provide

proof

that rational argument,

based

on

logic, is valid, i.e., does lead to truth. Philosophy needs to become wisdom because, in the absence of wisdom, the believer is free to begin with faith rather than with rational argument. For faith, all things are
experience
possible.

But if

revelation

is possible,

then philosophy, as the

life

of

inquiry

human reason, cannot be known to be the right or best way of life. If the decision in favor of philosophy is not based on knowledge, then that decision becomes another kind of faith or belief. The fact that philosophy
through
unassisted

cannot refute religion undermines

the fundamental claim of philosophy to be

other

based

on

reason

or

knowledge. On the

hand,

the believer cannot get

beyond the

assumption

that reason is misleading or, at

cannot prove that assumption without

himself insists that

the object of

using his belief is not

reason.

least, incomplete; he Indeed, since the believer rational but is mysterious, i.e.,
cannot claim

beyond human reason, it follows that he himself

to

understand

fully
of

what

it

means

to believe. (Kierkegaard might serve as an example of a the unintelligible or even irrational character
p.

believer
the

who

fully

acknowledges

truly

mysterious.

See

also

HP,

112.) Hence,

the

rational point of view

cannot

be rationally
since

religion,

that religion is

intelligibly refuted. But this situation is not damaging to the inability of revelation to refute philosophy merely confirms based on faith. In this crucial respect, then, the believing way of
or

life

seems
p.

more

consistent,

more

rational, than the

philosophic

way

of

life

(NRH,

75).

Philosophy

can receive

only

cold comfort

from the

observation

that the apparent victory of revelation has been achieved

soned argument.

by

means of a rea

Philosophy
its

as

the quest

for

actual wisdom

here

and now con

tains the seed

of

own negation.

Philosophy

thus understood

self-destructs.

Since Strauss
life

was an atheist who could not

by

his

own admission

know that

the claims of religion are

of reason was makes

false, Rosen
on an

concludes

that Strauss's dedication to the

choice or an act of the will.
as

itself based

irrational
He is

Rosen
that

it

clear

that he does not see

not recognize.

himself
not

drawing

out

implications
"Strauss's
as an

Strauss himself did

will"

bound, however, by
conception of

reluctance to make too explicit

act of

his Nietzschean
own

philosophy
see p.

the

(HP,

p.

137. For Rosen's

Nietzschean views,

126,

top).

While Rosen's Strauss is

a willful or

sented as a philosophical skeptic.

Rosen

quotes

dogmatic atheist, Strauss is also pre him to the effect that "philoso

phy is knowledge that one does not (NRH, p. 32, quoted at HP, p. 118). At the same time, Rosen recognizes that to assert or will the superiority of the philosophic way of life over the believing or orthodox way of life is an instance
know"

Reason
of

and

Revelation in
[the

the

Thought of Leo Strauss

know"

147
p.

"claiming
The

to know

what

philosopherjdoes not and cannot

(HP,

111).

of

understanding philosophy as skeptical inquiry is the product of Rosen's assumption that Strauss is an atheist. Thomas Pangle, in his introduction to Studies in Platonic
not make this assumption.
mains

apparent contradiction

between Strauss's

atheism and the

Political Philosophy, does

true to the vision of

will never

have. Pangle

presents

philosophy as the lifelong Strauss as an agnostic

the

For Pangle, Strauss re quest for a wisdom one

through Pangle

does

not use

this word

whose

philosophizing
with

consists above all

in thoughtful dia

logue

with

the believer or
rejects

believing
red

point of view

(Pangle,

p.

22,

bottom). Rosen interest in

goes

this modest or moderate conclusion. He sees

Strauss's

religious authors as a question

deliberate
even

herring (HP,
not

p.

1 12). But Rosen

beyond this, to

the possibility
one

zetetic point of view.

Knowledge that

does

of a strictly skeptical or know is not simply igno

rance.

(Strauss, by
as

the way, would agree with this.

WIPP,

p.

38, bottom.) If

philosophy
to

the never-to-be-completed quest for wisdom is to make a claim

being

the best or

made

then

knowledge

highest way of life for man a claim Strauss surely of ignorance must be knowledge of the irresolvable important
or

character of the most

highest questions,

of what

Strauss

called
p.

"the fundamental

problems"

and permanent

(WIPP,

p. of

39

quoted at

HP,

any know that they are either fundamental or permanent? If we cannot know this, "it reduces our knowledge of the fundamental problems themselves to the level of Once again we are in the presence of "an act of the
can we
opinion."

119). But if it is impossible to

achieve answers to

these problems, how

will,"

this time of one that

interprets

or creates

the world in a way that supports one's

own view of philosophy.

Strauss

must create the eternal problems

in

order

for

philosophy to be the purposeful yet never-to-be-completed quest for their an swers. In Rosen's hands, Pangle's open, ever-questioning Strauss turns into the
willful creator of

his

own zetetic world. cannot

(Rosen leaves it
against

open whether

Strauss

sanctions this view

"or

defend himself
that

sanct

being

taken to

it. HP, pp. 121-22.) It is difficult to accept Pangle's

on

issues
p.

of religion. or on

(HP,

112)

Strauss simply had an open mind We need not rely here on Rosen's personal testimony the publication of Strauss's private correspondence in The
view
.

Independent Journal of Philosophy In 1945, Strauss published an "Farabi's in which he makes quite clear both the views
Plato,"

article called of

Farabi

on

religion and

his

endorsement of those views.

of

Philosophy

is incompatible

with

religion,

and

the choice

philosophy
an

as

the best way of life is based on

relative status of

knowledge,
and religion

not

belief (FP,
not

pp. as

372-73, 389). The (PW), but

there

is

treated

unanswered question.

come more

discreet in later
mind.
seems

years

is

no

philosophy Strauss may have be reason to think that he know

changed

his

Even so, Rosen

to agree with Pangle that

Strauss did

not

or

148
claim

Interpretation
to know the
says
ultimate

superiority

of

repeat,

that Strauss

countenanced an atheism

philosophy to religion. Rosen, to based on an act of the will.

He further
published

claims

that if Strauss's

private views cannot

be inferred from his

works, then those views are irrelevant. "I must rest my case on the

evidence"

(HP,

p.

act of the will, this

record.

123). But if Strauss did consciously base philosophy on an was surely a private view that left no trace in the published
makes

Whenever Strauss publicly

the

argument

that reason cannot re

reason and phi

fute religion, his

own explicit conclusion

is that, in this case,

pp.

losophy leading to

self-destruct

(Preface,

pp.

29-30; MI,

117-18). The assumption

not on reason

this

conclusion

on an act of the will

is obviously that philosophy based is no longer philosophy.

but

Rosen is tacitly asking us to consider the possibility that the conclusion Strauss draws in public is in a way the opposite of the one he drew in private. Esoteric writing, on which Strauss was clearly the foremost expert of our time,
often works
conceal a valid

in exactly this but unstated

that in

way:

publicly

stated

false

conclusion

is

used

to

conclusion of a

publicly

stated argument.

Since the

reasoning
ment

of such an argument
at

leads

logically

to the unstated conclusion, the

author can assume

rather

least

some cases

the reader

will

follow the
of

argu
meta

(Descartes'

than the words on the page.

analysis

the

morphosis of wax

in the

second of
of

his Meditations is
writing

an example of such an

esoteric

presentation.) This kind

assumes the

intention to
the

communi

cate a rational conclusion.

The

reader must

be

able to see

logical,

though

unstated, implication. But the conclusion Rosen wants to draw from Strauss's argument and actions is that philosophy should be pursued as an act of the will.

To

pursue philosophy as an act of the will, however, is to take a leap into the irrational. It is hard to see how this could be the rational conclusion of any argument.

David
tion to
conflict

Lowenthal, in his
rejects and

review of

Strauss's last book

as a man

and

Pangle's introduc
an

it,

the view of

Strauss

between head
the will. In

heart,

reason and

struggling with faith. But, at least

irresolvable

by implication,
Strauss's theo

Lowenthal
an act of

also rejects the view

an odd

that Strauss's philosophic position is at bottom

way, Lowenthal's

interpretation

of

logical

position

is the

most

comforting, because it
of

provides the greatest cer or

tainty. It

provides

the austere comfort

we are alone with our

thoughts.

knowing, beyond hope In contrast to Pangle and Rosen,

that,
refute armed with experience and

fear,

that

Lowenthal's
the
principle
pp.

argument rests on the assumption

of

contradiction,

we can p.

indeed

the claims

of religion

(Lowenthal,
is the human

315-17. Cf. Preface,

28). The all-powerful, all-knowing

deity
all

abso

lutely
ence.

mysterious, the absolutely other,

totally transcending
on

experi

The believer
other.

absolutely duce the absolutely Whatever is

not only But it is a other

admits

these facts but insists

them. God

is

the

violation of the principle of contradiction to

our experience under

intro

into
the

the guise of
and

revelation. principle

revealed

is

not

absolutely

other.

Experience

the

Reason

and

Revelation in the Thought of Leo Strauss

to prove that
revelation revelation

149

of contradiction are sufficient

divinity
joking.

that can

be known only through

says

is impossible. Hence, the can also be known to be

seems

impossible. When Strauss

the opposite, Lowenthal

to assume he is

Certainly
of

one might

very

much wish

to

have

a rational and conclusive proof

Perhaps my own imagination is too full of sinners in the hands of an angry God to be able to grasp a proof that is obvious to calmer and clearer heads. At any rate, proof by experience seems to require God's
existence or nonexistence.

that our experience

experience of
ment

be

complete.

To know that there is

no

God,

we must

have

everything,

an obvious

from the

principle of

impossibility. Further, Lowenthal's argu contradiction is correct only if the principle is true. is
not

As for the bound

as

principle

itself,

the best one can say is that an omnipotent God

by

the principles of human understanding. The believer need not admit,

claims

Lowenthal

he must, that God

cannot

be both God

and

non-God

(Christianity
is bound to God is
not

asserts

just this

conjunction about

the

God-man, Christ). However

self-evident the principle of contradiction view

the principle as

may seem to most of us, the believer founded upon and limited by God's power;

limited

by

the principle. Lowenthal's premise seems to

be the

neces
might

sity

of

asserting

that

God
word

must either exist or not

"exist"

exist, but the believer

the same

deny

even

this. The

applied to

God

rather

than other

simply does things. In the language

not mean

of

thing when Maimonides, "exist

ence"

is

an equivocal

term (Guide of the

Perplexed, I 56).

The

worst one might

prove that there

is

no

say is that if we use the principle of contradiction to God, then we have proved that there can be nothing that

is simply different from our ordinary experience; there can be no absolutely other. But the proof that there can be no absolutely other known to us may well involve everything that can be known
order we

know in contradiction, since it assumes that every other knower.2 must be also somehow the same as the Thus, in

to be

known

at all a

thing

must violate

the principle of
must

contradiction

by
the

being

both

same and other.

The thing known

be both like

and unlike can

knower. The
disproved

principle of contradiction experience. response

cannot

be proved, because it

be

by

The traditional may be the

same

to the preceding line

in

some ways and

reasoning is that a thing different in others; it cannot be the same

of

and not the same

in the

same respect at

the same time. In the

above

example,

then,
it is

the knower could be

like the known in

is both

some ways and unlike

not another of

in

others

without

any

contradiction occurring.

But is this

not the same

thing

which

same and other?

saying that way For example, a stick

appears to
of

be both

long

and short.
stick

contradiction, is that the

some one

The explanation, according to the principle is short compared to a second stick but longer has disappeared. It has
"itself"
"itself"

than

third

stick.

The first
"itself."

stick

now

become two in
relation

sticks,
to

in

relation

to a stick longer than

and yet another and

a stick shorter than

The

"itself"

short

the

long

are

two

150

Interpretation
stick as short
one

different identities. The

ence

is

self-identical

only in its

absolute

differ
now

from

"itself"

as

long. The

thing

with

contradictory

properties

has

become two (or more) things

principle

with consistent properties.

This defense

of

the

of contradiction

tries to explain away the underlying unity that al

lowed itself
the

us

to

notice a contradiction

in the first

place.

Is

not such an explanation

an example of

contradiction

closing the gate after the horse is before we begin to explain it away?

out?

Have

we not seen

Moreover, is

not

daily

life full

of

instances

of things

that are in

fact

contra

dictory? To take the example of the runaway horse, is it not self-contradictory to close the gate now, when what I really want is to get the horse back in? Yet do
we

not

have

plentiful

experience of people more

doing

just

such

things?
vidual seems
of

Or,

to turn to something

important than the

that the
political

inconsistency
problem

contradictory of indi is insoluble

in the
nature

actions, to hinge

Strauss's
on

own

thesis

the existence of an ineradicable contradication

p.

things

(Preface,

6). One

might

say that

from Strauss's

point of view

the

Marx was not in announcing in but thinking that there could ever be a world ety While Lowenthal wishes to refute religion on the basis
mistake of principle of

the existence of contradictions

without

in

soci

contradiction.
and'

of experience

the

contradiction, the believer

might point out

that in

fact

we com

monly It is

use the principle of contradiction to refute our own

manifold contradictions.

experience,

by

inter
that a

preting away the

nevertheless

true that the principle of time

contradiction and

the

premise

thing

cannot

be its

own opposite at one

aspect

is the necessary
and religion.

premise

for the
presents

confrontation

in any one particular way or Strauss creates between

and religion as

philosophy way
must of

Strauss

philosophy
truth

providing

two mutually exclusive answers to the same question, namely, What is the best

life? Since there

one or the

can

only be
either

one

(Lowenthal,
reason or

p.

316),

the answer
either/or an

be

"either/or"

other,
the

in Kierkegaard's

words.

This

makes plain that

even

implicit in

faith in

the faith in God is

deeper faith, dubbed Good and Evil, No. 2)

It is probably
regarded
correct

by

Nietzsche "the faith in

values"

opposite

(Beyond

to assume,

as

Rosen does, that Strauss

and

Nietzsche

share one or more common

assumptions, though the possibility that Strauss

the will

philosophy

as an act of

is the

most remote.

(HP,

pp.

123,

137). It

seems

to me much more

likely

that Strauss shared Nietzsche's assump

tion that a

healthy

human life

requires a closed

horizon and, hence, possibility

faith in

opposite values.

Opposite

values present us with the

of a meaningful no

choice of goals and standards.

They
our

allow us

to say yes to some things and

to others. In this way we

know

where we stand and what we stand

for. We

can

distinguish
values as a

our

friends from
in terms

enemies.

Nietzsche

sees

faith in

opposite

necessary
speaks not

condition

for life.
of the conditions

Strauss

for life but

rather

in terms
to

of

practice or practical

life in

contrast to

the theoretical life. We can

try

under-

Reason
stand what

and

Revelation in the Thought of Leo Strauss

-151

Strauss

means

by

practice

through

looking
p.

at

his interpretation

of

the Platonic cave

political,

metaphor

(WIPP,

p.

32; CM,

125). The city,

i.e.,

the

is necessarily the cave because the political man, the citizen, needs something to believe in, a steady horizon by which to take his bearings. The highest practical need is the need for a closed horizon, and practice is the
attempt

to satisfy this need. The political man,

i.e.,
life

almost all of us always and

everywhere, cannot

lead

healthy,

purposeful

either

in

a world of universal

flux

ing
and

nothing has any permanent value or under the influence of a unify dialectic for which everything is at bottom the same (Kierkegaard, Fear
where

Trembling,

p.

67). Without
we

opposite

values

without

differences that be

make a

difference

lose the
take

sense of our own

identity,

of who we are and

where we are going.

This, I

it, is

the

issue

of nihilism.

Nihilism

might

defined succinctly as the failure of practice. With Nietzsche, Strauss recognizes the need for
the city
must

opposite values of of

the kind

have, but he does

is

not think

that

it is the business

provide these values.

Philosophy

as

the

never-to-be-completed

philosophy to quest for the

truth about the whole tion

it

might

discover.

for this
even

reason

or transcending any posi is Any only a partial truth. It is that the Athenian Stranger indicates that he would not remain in always at work

overcoming
truth

possible political

the best possible city that he himself might found (Laws 753a). In Strauss's view, if philosophy itself has an opposite, then it is opposed, in the first place, to the political need for a closed horizon that affirms specific
values while

rejecting their
that

opposites

(CM,

p.

29). As for the

attempt

to de

velop

a secular wisdom

would provide a closed

horizon

by

somehow en

compassing all opposite values in one comprehensive, circular speech, he seems to have thought this to be impossible. Philosophy has a skeptical or
zetetic character

for Strauss because it

rejects all choice or

wisdom

decision between
that would super

opposite values without ever

sede

claiming to become the comprehending

provided

the

need

for

choice

by

all values
p.

in
to

one system.

Philoso
a closed
a secular

phy is the "gentle, if firm, horizon whether that horizon is

wisdom.

refusal"

(WIPP,

40)

live

within

by

a religious either/or or

by

As

we will

try

to show,

Strauss

assumes

that

while secular wisdom

tries to encompass

all

closed

horizons, it in fact becomes simply

us of

one more

horizon among others, luring posite values. The rejection

into
all

yet another closed

between op horizons becomes the basis for

irrational
choice and nonphilosophic practice.

Strauss's distinction between

Practice
must always choose

philosophic

theory

between

opposite

values; the choice is too urgent to make such a

use of the
Strauss'

to permit

delay. Religion

and politics share the common need

choice; this I take it is the justification for the hyphen in

phrase

"theological-political
on

problem."3

While

practice

demands

urgent

choice,

theory,

the

other

hand,

can and must

delay. Fortunately, there is

no neces

sary connection between practical questions and theoretical ones (CM, p. 106). Practical decisions can be made without waiting for theoretical answers. This

152

Interpretation
of

separation

theory from

practice

becomes Strauss's way

of

bypassing

the

choice

between the

opposite values represented

by

two closed

horizons,

revela

tion and
reject

philosophic wisdom.

As Strauss

points

out, to pass

by

in this way is to
revelation
of ra not

(Preface,

p.

12). In
sees

bypassing
himself

the choice or decision

between

and wisdom,

Strauss does

as

rediscovering

a premodern

form

tionalism that

not claim

wisdom about

the whole and,

hence, does
(MI,
p.

become involved in Strauss's

sistency. without

a self-destructive competition with religion

114).

position as presented can

here may
requiring

seem

to
as

contain an obvious

incon

How

philosophy

understand

itself

an

alternative

to politics

seeing these
of

alternatives as

a choice

between

opposite values? might offer

My
own

own speculation

it is

no more than

that

is

that
as

Strauss

his

analogy to the philosophic choice. A choice excludes some alternative, but choices can be exclusive in different ways. The need to choose between two partial or incom
make

description

the choice that lovers

a playful

plete alternatives will show

itself

as

much

in

anger at or rejection of

the de

feated

alternative as

it

will

in

satisfaction with

the one chosen. On the other

hand,
or

when one's choice

is

fully

satisfying, it can be made without rejection of

with

victory

over another.
of

I think it is

this in

mind

that Strauss can write of

the exclusivity
opposition

lovers that they seclude themselves from the world without to the world or hatred of it (CM, p. 111). By analogy, the choice of

the

way of life is not for Strauss a choice between opposite values; nothing rejected is of value. Whether anything human can be as satisfying or complete as Strauss seems to claim philosophy is, is another question.
philosophic

We
the

are now of

in

a position to reconsider

Rosen's

observation

that for Strauss

unsuc

inability

philosophy to refute religion stems from philosophy's

to become wisdom

cessful attempt

(HP,

p.

1 10). If philosophy

were

to

become

wisdom, that

is,

the complete and comprehensive account of the whole, then

religion could no

longer

claim a place of refuge give so

of

beyond final

reason and experience.

Wisdom

would

by definition
Indeed, in

the true

and

account of

everything,

including
ing

religion.

far

as religion

has

always

tried to provide man

with answers

to the mysteries

life,

wisdom would refute religion

religion.

How

might such wisdom

be

possible?

Since

we can
wisdom

by replac fully know

is
possible

only

what we ourselves man

have

made

(HP,

pp.

51, 148, 152),

Wisdom
can

only if if it is

is himself the

creator of the world.

be

completed

only
prac

united with practice: as

"man has to

tically

the master of the world and

himself theoretically and the master of his life; the merely

show

given

world must
tically"

be

replaced
p.

by

the world created

by

man

theoretically

and prac

(Preface,

29). Here but

practice continues
now

to be

viewed as the attempt

to

provide a closed

horizon,

this aim

is to be

reached through a compre

hensive

wisdom rather

than through a faith in one set of values that implies the

rejection of their opposites. possible the wisdom

that

must

As Rosen correctly notes, Strauss be the intended outcome of

as

regarded as such a

im

project.

Strauss

speaks of

the Hegelian system

the completion

of

reason,

while at

the

Reason
same time

and

Revelation in the Thought of Leo Strauss

limitations
of of the

153
p.

he

speaks of

the

Hegelian

system

(Preface,

9).
is

Strauss

gives

the impression
wisdom simply.

thinking

that the failure of Hegel's

wisdom

the failure of

We have asked, Does the

ure of

impossibility
faith among

of wisdom

indicate the

ultimate

fail

philosophy to give a rational self-justification? If so, then the philosophic

way

of

life is

reduced

to one

many.

Like

other

faiths, philosophy
that we reach this

would

then

be based

upon an act of the will.

would suggest

conclusion

Does the

by asking impossibility
itself
a mistake

the wrong question. For

of wisdom show

Strauss,

the right question was,

that the attempt to turn

wisdom was

a mistake?

An

affirmative answer to this question

philosophy into implies

that it

was

wisdom.

for philosophy to try to replace religion But for Strauss this is another way of saying that it was

by becoming
a mistake

for

philosophy to try to become practical, i.e., to try to provide a closed horizon in the form of wisdom. Wisdom becomes possible through the conquest of nature

because that ory in the

wisdom

conquest

turns nature

service

of practice

can

into something man himself has made. The become wisdom. The attempt to achieve
and practice

through the union of

theory
sees

is the
pp.

distinguishing

feature

of

modern attempt

philosophy failed. Philosophy

and now.

as

Strauss
as

it (Preface,

2, 12, 15, 29). But

life that

this

the never-to-be-completed quest for the truth can

are needed so sake of

not provide

the practical answers to the mysteries of

urgently here
then it stands

It

cannot create a world out of chaos promises to

for the

the

relief of man's estate. refuted

When philosophy in its own eyes.

do these things but fails,

What Rosen takes to be Strauss's

to its own
view of gion.

philosophy due inability to refute religion successfully is in fact Strauss's bird's-eye the confusion of modern philosophy in even attempting to refute reli
account of

the downfall of

Philosophy

or philosophers guaranteed their own

defeat

when

they

sought

to put philosophy in the service of practice or to unite

put

this another way, modern philosophy set out to give

theory and practice. To theoretically correct

which religion

answers to the

pressing

questions of

life,

questions

to

had

al

ways given prophetic or could not compete at as

imaginative
while

answers.

this level

being
the

In Strauss's view, philosophy true to its own fundamental calling

with

the

search

for truth.
to this

According
Rosen's
an

interpretation,
based

confrontation

religion

that

in

view exposes

the willful character of philosophy

on a

is, in Strauss's
of the

view,
of

unnecessary

confrontation

misunderstanding

nature

philosophy.

The misunderstanding because it is

stems

from the failure

to recognize philoso
cannot

phy

as a theoretical rather than a practical enterprise.

Philosophy

be

an

act of the will

not an action or a practical act of

situation

phy is the

recognition

of a

in

which

all

any kind. Philoso attempts at action end in

to comedy than to
not refute

contradiction,

tragedy
religion

(cf.

failure, CM, p. 61,

or tragedy. with

Philosophy

is

more akin

Republic 388e5-7).

Philosophy does

by

attempting to achieve a

secular wisdom.

Rather philosophy is the

154

Interpretation
but incorruptible judge
Above all,
other

sympathetic

of

the failure of
not choose

all

attempts

at

wisdom,
of

sacred or profane.

one of

does

the

philosophic

way

life
of

as over against

any

where we are whether we

way know it

life.

or not.

Philosophy Philosophy is

is the

recognition

by

few

not an act of

the will

because nothing we can will would alter the fundamental situation. (Anastaplo, p. 273, n. 33 end. The philosophic life is in a way necessary. But are there not practical as well as theoretical necessities? Consider Republic 458d.) How does the interpretation Strauss? Perhaps
not at all. presented

here differ from Pangle's

both

agnostic

His Strauss

rejects

rational and prophetic wis

dom in favor Strauss is

of

continuing inquiry.

Yet Pangle

gives

the

impression that

an agnostic

in

the sense
make

that he wishes to hold himself open to the

possibility of faith. I would Strauss is an agnostic because

out,

it

more

clear

than Pangle seems to that

of

atheism

is itself

form

faith. As Rosen
the
will.

points

atheistic wisdom cannot avoid exposure as an act of assert what

Because he is
as

forced to
may be
would.

he

cannot

know,
As I

the

atheist

is

as much a

believer

is the

orthodox adherent of a creed.

called

understand

it, Strauss's

agnosticism, if it
of atheism

that,

puts

him further from belief than any form

Strauss in it

presents an account of the conflict

between philosophy
But the
argument as

and religion

which religion

triumphs over

philosophy.

Strauss

pre

sents

applies

only to philosophy that attempts to become It

applies

practical wisdom

by

giving

rational answers

to the questions that religion answers only in a myste

rious or prophetic way.

only to those
as own

philosophies that

try

to unite

theory
ble
of

and practice

in

such a

refuting

orthodox

way belief. Strauss's

to achieve a comprehensive

wisdom capa

philosophy is

unaffected

by

the

triumph of orthodoxy over a failed wisdom, because Strauss steadfastly refuses to adhere to the wisdom offered by the union of theory and practice. Rosen's that Strauss wants to will philosophy is wrong. At least in his own view, the separation of theory and practice delivers Strauss as philosopher
conclusion

from the
We

need to will

can agree with

anything at all. Strauss that philosophy

we

cannot

become

wisdom.

But if

this is the case, why should

answers

resist

the temptation to find solace in the

pointed our
not as

revelation? If philosophy has disap deepest hopes, then why not find support where it is in fact offered, knowledge but as faith? Is the refusal to succumb to the security of faith

to the human mystery provided

by

itself

a mere act of

the will? Is Rosen right after all? If Strauss has an answer, it

seems to

be this.

Revelation is

always so uncertain to unassisted reason that

it

can never compel the

assent of unassisted

reason, and man is so built that he the riddle of

bliss, in free investigation, in articulating One

man

find his satisfaction, his being.

can
"

cannot

but

wonder

by

whom

"man is

built?"

so

Is there

builder? Or is
there are

built in

a certain

way

"by

nature?"

Strauss certainly thinks that

Reason
intelligent
men

and

Revelation in the Thought of Leo Strauss

and

155

Averroes
would

Dante

who

found the justification for

(Strauss
and

philoso pp.

phy in

they 267-68). Does Strauss, too, rely

what

have

called natural science

on nature natural

Cropsey,

to

provide natural

kinds, for
reason

exam p.

ple, the human

kind,

that have
surfaces

ends, discoverable

by

(HP,

130;

cf. p.

133)? Nature

explicitly in Strauss's

observation

that philos

ophy "could appear as Sisyphean or ugly, when one contrasts its achievement with its goal. Yet it is necessarily accompanied, sustained and elevated by eros. It is
to
grace"

graced

by

nature's given without

(WIPP,

p.

40). Here Strauss

appeals

to nature,

what

is simply

for

the goodness of philosophy.

any human choosing or making, as the support As what is simply given, nature is the proper
to claim to good, not

object of

theoretical contemplation, not of practical knowledge or deliberation.

seems

Nevertheless, Strauss only

quoted, that philosophy
as

theory is
what

know, in both of the passages in itself, but only for us. Theo
we are

retical contemplation satisfies our eros given

is

good not

because the truth is

the way it is but because

built.

Philosophy
The

we are what we are.

truth is good because we

asked whether
whether

the gods

love

love it. (Consider Plato's Euthyphro, where we are what is pious because it is pious, or alternatively,
only because the
gods

something is

pious

love it.)
philosophy depend is

It
upon

seems to me that this argument makes the goodness of

the philosopher's self-knowledge of his own self-interest. While there

with such an argument

(Republic 580d-583a), it is not clear that an appeal to one's own self-interest, however natural, is properly or To be sure, philoso necessarily described as theoretical rather than certainly nothing wrong
practical.5

phy

cannot

a closed

reasons
put our

if practice is limited to the business of willfully creating but horizon, why think of practice only in this way? There are other as well for questioning the separation of theory and practice. We must
practical

be

the question whether self-interest or

desire

or

eros, as the

natural

basis
of

of

philosophizing, does

not

categories of our theoretical

understanding.

necessarily play If so, then the

satisfaction of our eros.

a role

in the formation
categories

the

them

selves
clear
need

have

a practical order

basis in the

that in

to find satisfaction, or even

Moreover, it is not in philosophic inquiry, one bliss,

reassuring.

only have theoretical insight. Some truths might not be comforting or If this is in fact the case, then a man who is fearless, who does not sense the danger, has simply for the moment forgotten himself and where he is.

(Strauss, of course, has no intention of forgetting human finitude. See RCPR, p. 27.) Perhaps human beings are built in such a way that the courage we must
have if
we are

to overcome our

fear

and take pleasure

in the truth is just

as

much a potential of our nature as

is the intelligence to

perceive

the truth. Such

courage would
man's would

highest be

end

be ancillary to knowledge and desire; while being necessary to it could not be said to create or will that end. Still, there
reason.6

a philosophic courage, a spiritedness compatible with

Along
does

the same
not

lines, philosophy

as

the

refusal

to think that

one

knows

what one

know

requires a certain

kind

moderation.7

of

Philosophy

as a

way

of

life,

the

practice of philosophy,

requires

theoretical as well as other virtues. The

156

Interpretation
this
combination of virtues

achievement of

in any

particular case

is

not

given
man

by

nature;

it is

the practical achievement of a

end

thinking

and

desiring

simply hu

being. Man's highest

is the
it

practice of

philosophy, which requires a

a correct

combination of

theoretical and other virtues.

If this is

description

of

the

philosophic

way

of

life,

then

seems correct also

to say that that way of

life

requires

to the highest degree the

union or cooperation of

theoretical and

practical

virtues.

That Strauss
rejects

activity
and
with

and

explicitly
seems

practical,

to be a

purely theoretical an understanding of philosophy as both theoretical consequence of his identification of the practical
understands

philosophy

as a

decision"

"an

act of

the

will or a

(Preface,

p.

12).

While Strauss clearly distinguishes between the ancient and modern views of theory, he seems to take practice as meaning essentially the same thing for the ancients as it means for the moderns. For example, the end or perfection of
man

as understood

rather

"ideal"

by the moderns is not something imposed by nature but figured out by man, a project designed and willed by man, an something (Preface, p. 16). But this is exactly what Strauss says about the practi
best
regime an

cal or political reflections on the

in

classical political philosophy.

The best is
what p.

regime of

Plato

and

Aristotle is

"ideal,"

Strauss

means p.

by

saying that the

best

regime exists

something figured out; this only "in

or

speech

(CM,

44;

cf.

121). It does
regime p.

not come

into

being
life
at

have its

being by
a

nature. created

Even the best

is

still
. .

the cave; it is still a closed

horizon to be

by

man

(CM,

125: ".

even political

its best is like life in

cave, so

much so

into

being

that the city can be identified (were this possible), the best regime

with

the Cave."). To

bring

it

would

have to be

willed.

But de
the

this is true of anything that is figured out

pends on a

by

man;

its coming into

reader

being

human decision. Strauss

at

least leads the

to

consider

possibility that he is being asked to conclude that since practice always involves something figured out, a human project, it therefore always involves an act of
the
will.

Ancient

practice seems to

have the

same status as modern practice.

Strauss distinguishes
latter

the pure

theory

of the ancients

from

modern

theory, the distinguish

being

ancient

essentially united practice from modem

to practice,
practice.

but he does
"ideal,"

not seem to

for Strauss, not a dictate of essentially dependent on man's

hence, something is arbitrary, groundless, prac tice lacks the dignity of theory. But is every human project an act of the will? We may, indeed, ask whether any human project is an act of the will in the sense of a free or arbitrary decision. Is this kind of freedom, pure spontaneity,
and,
will.

Practice, it nature, but an

Since
will

would

seem,

always means

intelligible

or possible?

If not, then

practice restricted to acts of the will either

or accident.

evaporates altogether or else

becomes indistinguishable from fate

Certainly
but it is Our

theory with practice rooted in arbitrary wilfulness, merely tendentious to ask whether Plato had a conception of prac tice different from the modern one with which Strauss works.
not unite
not

Plato did

reservations

and practice can

be

concerning Strauss's view of the relation between theory stated from the perspective of the difference between
phi-

Reason

and

Revelation in the Thought of Leo Strauss

earlier, in Strauss's
we can
will would view

157

losophy

and religion.

As

suggested

an act of
situation.

the

will

because nothing
seems

philosophy is not alter the fundamental

can alter

Religion

to

assume

that man,

by

his faith,

his funda is

mental situation.

Strauss

causes us

to

wonder whether modern

philosophy does
the ground

not share with religion

the assumption

and

the hope that fundamental change

assumption

possible, albeit

by

means other

than faith. Is this

upon

which one must stand

in

order

to pose the question of a life and death choice

between philosophy and religion? Does this question assume that man can, by his choice, alter his fundamental situation? In making this assumption, does the
question presuppose

the religious point of

question

view so

that the triumph of religion

way?

becomes inevitable if the

is

asked

in this
assumes

We

can

agree

with

Strauss in thinking that be made but only the

what we are.

classical

philosophy

that there

is

no choice to

never-to-be-completed effort such

to understand where and

and practical.

Contra Strauss,

knowledge is both theoretical

the fundamental

It is theoretical because it does

practical

not alter

the fundamental situation, but it is

situation to

because it

cannot avoid

taking

be

what

is

fundamental for
situation.

us.

The fundamental
of

situation

thus understood

is the human

As knowledge

the human situation, philosophy is self-knowledge.

As

a never-to-be-completed

situation, the human

situation cannot

help being

changed

in

some ways,

including, among
the

others, the change from

ignorance to

self-knowledge.

It is

of

highest

practical

importance to know
and practical or

which changes neces of

are

impossible.

Philosophy
not

is both theoretical
of

because it is
also

sarily knowledge

only

the unchanging
possible

impossible but

the

always-being-completed as

the highest

human desire.

As the preceding remarks make clear, in our interpretation Strauss's argu ment depends, at least in part, on his ability to separate theory and practice. We
would

seem

to

have

come

full

circle

from Rosen's interpretation,

since

if

Strauss bases philosophy on an act of the will, then his argument depends on his ability to achieve the unity of theory and practice in will. Oddly enough, Rosen also criticizes Strauss for separating theory and practice. Strauss, we are

told, "did

not

fully

appreciate the
not clear as

deep

connection

(HP,

p.

140). It is

how this

criticism

between theory and can be reconciled with

even

practi

an

inter

pretation of

Strauss

the philosopher for

whom

the

questions

theory
could

raises and explores are themselves self-conscious acts of the will.

How

the union of
phy?

theory
least

and practice

be

closer

than in such a
that a

conception of philoso attempt

It is

at

logically

possible,

however,
of

failed

to make
will.

theory
tical

self-sufficient might end

in fact

as an unintentional act of

the

If

knowledge knowledge
will.

that philosophy is the best way

life is necessarily
as

somehow prac
practical

knowledge,
might
were

then the attempt to separate philosophy from this

indeed
the case

reduce
with

philosophy

If this

Strauss,

way then, Rosen notwithstanding, the

of

life to

an act of

the

result

would

clearly be contrary to Strauss's own intention. As we have seen, much in fact does depend on Strauss's hence free theory from the
concerns of practice.

effort

to

separate

and

One

conclusion we

have

158

Interpretation
is that Strauss
rejects

reached

both

religious and secular claims

to wisdom
also clear

claims

to knowledge

no

finite knower

could

in fact have. It is be

that

Strauss ties this from human

rejection

to the separation of practice or practical

demands
this as a

pure theory. claim

It is

not clear whether

it

would not

possible

to reject the

to

wisdom without also

following
alone.

Strauss in
as

interpreting

rejection of practice

in favor

of

theory
of

Be that

it may, Strauss does in

interpret the first

other

rejection attempt

in terms

the second. The second rejection

and practice raises

words, his

to separate

theory

some ques

tions. For example, what

edge indifferent to the human

does theory mean for Strauss? Is theoretical knowl good? Is it concerned with the idea of the good

but

not with

the human good

(CM,

p.

29)? While

an affirmative answer

to the
would

last two

questions would support

the

separation of

theory

and

practice, it

also seem
will.

to

confirm other

that the human good is

of

inevitably
arbitrary

choice, an act of the

On the

hand, if knowledge
that good

the human

good

is theoretical knowl

edge, then the

pursuit of

is

not an

act; the pursuit of one's

own good would

an

seem,

however,
of

eminently

practical

kind

edge, knowledge
cal and

of one's own

to be an eminently practical pursuit based on knowledge. This very important kind of knowl good or of the best way of life, might be practi

have

practical consequences without

being

the product of arbitrary or

groundless will. preference of

In this case, is it

not

misleading to speak of pure

theory in
separation

to a combination or

union of

theory

and practice?

Is the

theory

and practice

tenable? Is there in fact a

deep

connection

between the

ory
that

and practice that

is

eschewed

by

Strauss? This

question
Plato."

is

explored most article

openly

by

Strauss himself in

the article on "Farabi's

It is to that

we must

turn in order to continue our

inquiry

with respect

to Leo Strauss

and, therewith, into the relationship between

theory

and practice.

NOTES

1. An

argument on whether

this

point

is

presented

in

Rosen, N.
of

pp.

228-29. It is

not clear

to me,

however,
natively,

Rosen

proves the

impossibility

the complete speech

wisdom) or, alter

were

states

the problem of the complete speech. In other words, if the complete speech
contradictions
provide
of

to

be possible, it would of necessity explain the speech. Rosen assumes that no speech could
the

Rosen finds in the idea

so

of

the complete

this explanation, but in

doing

he

assumes

the conclusion he wishes to prove. The existence

inadequacy

of

incomplete

speech and

the contradictions Rosen develops proves only not, as Rosen thinks, the impossibility of the complete

speech.
not the principle of contradiction (as per Lowenthal) but rather the alleged overcoming of that principle leads to the death of God, i.e., the final and certain atheism. God cannot be the absolutely other because the absolute is not other; I take this to be Hegel's view. A more Platonic position might be that there can be for us no absolutely other because nothing absolute is known to us. This interpretation of Plato is supported two views of those absolutes

2. In this light,

called p.

by

2,

n.

Socrates "the 1). Strauss writes

and

ideas."

by

Farabi "writes
given

of

Socrates'

fantastic,"

has
n.

Plato as if Plato had no doctrine doctrine of ideas that it is "utterly

of

ideas"

of

(Pangle,

incredible,"

"appears to be

never

been

"a satisfactory

account"

or clear

(HP),

p.

205,

77,

(CM, p

119) Cf Rosen

with p.

130 bottom.

Reason

and

Revelation in

the Thought of Leo Strauss

159

Strauss'

3. The necessary limits to the horizons of politics and religion alike indicate that in view the attempt, which is at the core of liberalism, to separate politics and religion can be only partially or superficially successful (Preface, pp. 6, 20-21). Does Strauss wish to transform the
modern

project

by

replacing the

separation of religion

from

politics

with the

separation of

the

theological-political sphere

4. NRH,

p.

from the strictly private domain of philosophy or 75. While revelation is uncertain, Strauss would agree that

theory?
revelation seeks

both

certainty and security (Preface, p. 10). Is it Strauss's view that philosophy is superior to revelation because philosophy is more certain than revelation? Or does he mean to say that philosophy is
superior

to

revelation

because it

eschews

the certainty and security of revelation?

self-knowledge

5. Strauss describes the

of

philosopher s

(i.e., his knowledge

or

of

the

dignity

or

superiority in Platonic Political Philosophy,

years

the philosophic way of

pp.

life)

as theoretical

knowledge

"rigorous

science"

in Studies

36-37. On the

other

hand, in

"Farabi's

Plato,"

written

thirty

of

earlier, Strauss treats the philosopher's self-knowledge as practical, not theoretical. A review attempts to this article is necessary if we are to gain a more complete assessment of
Strauss'

interpret the

relation

6. Cf. CM,

pp.

thumos would seem

between theory and practice. 110-11 with Rosen, (HP), p. 140, and to be the closest Platonic equivalent to
to be a tool of the will; will is
reason.

with

Republic 440b. Spiritedness

or

will.

At least

after

Hume

and

Kant,

however,
admit

reason seems

fundamental.

By

contrast, Plato seems to

the possibility of thumos in the service of

7. This is another way of saying that a certain kind of courage and moderation is always necessary because nothing human is fully satisfying or truly complete. There is no unassisted human bliss. On the unfinished character of human nature, see Rosen, (HP), p. 146. For Strauss,
moderation

is

not a virtue of

thought,

and

fearlessness takes the

place of

the need

for

courage

(see

WIPP,

p.

32).

REFERENCES

Anastaplo, George. Human Being and Citizen. Chicago: Swallow Press, 1975. Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death. Translated by W. Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Lowenthal, David. "Leo Strauss's Studies in Platonic Political Interpreta
Philosophy."

tion

13(1985): 297-320.
in Platonic Political Philosophy.

Pangle, Thomas. Introduction. In Leo Strauss, Studies

1-26. Chicago:
of

Chicago Press, 1983. University Rosen, Stanley. Hermeneutics as Politics. Oxford: Oxford

Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1987 (HP) University Press, 1969. (N)

(CM)

Strauss, Leo.

The

City

and

Man. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. In Louis

"Farabi's

Plato."

Ginzberg
and

Jubilee Volume. 357-93. New York:

Philosophy."

American Academy for Jewish Research, 1945. (FP)

."The

Mutual Influence

of

Theology

The Independent Journal

of Philosophy 3(1979): 111-18. (MI) Natural Right and History. Chicago:

..

University

of

Preface

and

Introduction. In Persecution

and the

Chicago Press, 1953. (NRH) Art of Writing. Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press, 1973.

Originally

published

Preface to the German

original of

in 1952. (PW) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Trans

lated in Interpretation 8(1979): 1-3. (PPH) The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. Edited
cago:

by

Thomas Pangle. Chi

University

of

Chicago Press, 1989.

(RCPR)

160

Interpretation
"Preface."

In Spinoza's Critique of Religion.

1-31. New York: Schocken

Books, 1965. (Preface)

What Is Political Philosophy?
and

Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959. (WIPP)

of Political Philosophy. 2d
ed.

Joseph

Cropsey,

eds.

History

Chicago:

Rand McNally, 1972.

Discussion

Comment On Colmo
David Lowenthal
Boston College

Reasoned thought
contradict

and

discourse
we could

would

be impossible

were we allowed

to

ourselves, for if

both he

affirm and

deny

the

same

thing,

our a

assertions would cancel man

themselves out and

we would get nowhere.

Show

he has

contradicted

himself
of

and

must

This

renowned

"principle

contradiction"

turn based not on arbitrary human choice or things. Perhaps the most

willingly up his position. the very basis of logic is in convention but on the nature of
give grasped

fundamental distinction

by

the human mind is

between existing
quality,

and not

condition either

existing, between something and nothing. A thing, exists or does not exist, but it cannot do both. This
methods:

distinction is known

by

the clearest and most certain of all

immediate

intuition. Thus, the principle of contradiction follows from what we might call a principle of being. We cannot both assert and deny the same thing because a

thing

cannot

both be

and not

be in the

same way, at the same

make

time,

etc.

Following
that nothing

an argument

by

Strauss, Colmo tries to

of religion over

mysterious, thus assuring the victory

can

God completely philosophy. He maintains

"exist"

be known

about

God. God does

not even

in the

same

way

other

beings do: He

can

both

exist and not exist.

Nor is God

subject

to the
and

principle of contradiction, which would non-God at one and the same time.

keep

Him from

being

both God

Colmo

sums

up this unintelligibility
assertions about

by

calling God the "absolutely Now if the principle of contradiction does

it
would

other."

not

apply to

God,
asser

be

possible or

for Colmo to

add

immediately

that God is also the "rela

would cancel out

other,"

tively

the absolutely non-other. But these

the

tion that God is the absolutely

not compelled

other and make nonsense of all other

it. Are

we therefore

to admit that

God, like

beings, is

subject

to the absolute

and

inherent necessity

of either

being
not

or not

being? The Supreme

Being is

the

highest

and greatest of the

beings,

beyond

being

or superior

to being.

Not only is God intelligible as a being, but if His nature is eternally fixed it in principle perfectly intelligible, though must be inherently more intelligible
not of course to us call

than that of all the finite and transient beings.

other,"

God the "absolutely

as

Colmo does, is to say that His

nature

Thus, to is, and

INTERPRETATION, Fall 1990, Vol.

18, No. 1

162

Interpretation

always must

be,

such.

With

it, Colmo
nature

registers
which

his

hardly

modest attempt

to

grasp

and assert

God's

eternal

would

be impossible if God's
is

nature were

utterly

unknown and unknowable

to us.
clear and sound

Whether this

characterization

is itself

inherently

a ques

tion we cannot pursue

here, partly because Colmo has furnished

neither

his

reasons for stating his view nor the explication of terms necessary to under standing and judging it. It is obvious, however, that with this characterization Colmo has left the Bible far behind. Where is the God whose anger at sinners

he himself fears

fear

confessed

to with such engaging candor? For the

Bible
moral

tells of God's relation to mankind and reveals a

concerns and ends of men.

being

who shares

the

In it God's

ways

does

not mean

He Himself is

inherently
He has

and

indeed mysterious, but this totally mysterious, for if He were,

are

men could not relate

understand neither

to Him. God is
paths

mysterious

the

chosen

primarily because to effect ends He shares

men can with

us,

nor

the

miraculous

techniques He employs. But He could not

other"

be the

object of out

worship and prayer if he were the "absolutely be. The God of the Bible is a God men trust, has
made

Colmo

makes

Him

to

and

they

trust Him because He

a good

them

in His image
both

and revealed

himself to be

God.

By

want

ing
one

to

maintain

views of

God

that God is the absolutely other and that

He is

also mankind's provider-judge

or

Colmo

contradicts

himself. He

must go

way

the other

or

does he
is

wish

to be allowed this contradiction on the

ground

that God's

nature

not governed

by

the principle of contradiction?

No

one

has

given us a

better

picture of

the stakes involved in the argument

between philosophy and religion than Leo Strauss. Strauss knew that philoso phy is akin to religion in seeking to understand the universe. He knew that philosophy might even conclude, with religion, that the universe is governed by a cause higher than blind material necessity and chance. But philosophy, rely

ing

on

nothing but

natural

evidence

and

reasoning,

cannot

follow

religion's

attempt to succor mankind

directly
human

through
of

divine

providence. seems

By
his

settling the

argument

in favor

religion, Strauss

to have given
placed a

support to

the cause of
of

consolation.

He has certainly

huge

obstacle

in the way
The

those seeking to enter philosophy, while at the same time to engage in

compelling

men of religion

philosophy

and experience

its human
the
an

izing

power.

argument
and

itself

each must settle

for himself,

following
as

example of
"authority,"

Strauss
whether

his Socrates in refusing to treat even Strauss in arguing for philosophy or against it.

Book Review

Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. (New York: The Free Press, 1989) 358 pp., $24.95.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming

the

Will Morrisey

In his Message to Congress in Special Session

Abraham Lincoln asked, "Is there, in
ness?

on

Independence Day, 1861,

all

republics, this

inherent, fatal
These

weak own

Must
or

government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of

weak

its

people,

too

to

maintain mildly.

its

own

existence?"1

questions

have
them

remained urgent,

to put it

'History'

most

likely

will not silence

and

thereby conveniently put an end to itself. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., reminds his readers
modest,

that "until
and

America,
so.

the

history
of re

spotted"

of modern republics was

publican

inglorious,

(xvi). Much

history

since

the American

founding

has

remained

While the

Founders law but

provided

their country with an executive strong enough to enforce the

not

other republican

strong enough to contravene it flagrantly without ill consequences, founders mired their countries in parliamentarism. Parliamen

tarism reacts too strongly to the monarchic or even

despotic

strain

in

modern

ity,

the line that runs, in political thought,

and

from Machiavelli's Prince to Hobbes

with a

to Hegel

then,

democratizing
is
an rather

itself

vengeance, to Marx. "[T]he

of

constitutional executive and

invention

of

liberalism,

Locke, Montesquieu,
Hobbes"

the American
"ambivalence"

founders,

than of Machiavelli and

(xviii).
to law
and

The

of the executive of modem

liberalism,

and also

its

"beauty,"

inheres in its
and with with consent

combination of weakness and

where

strength, its

subordination

its ability to "reach

if the
executive

law

cannot"

(xvi), doing
itself
out

so

prudently

knows his business.

The
as a

ambivalence of the modern executive plays

of

in

political

theory
em

bifurcation

liberalism into two branches:

'teleological'

'deontological'

liberalism,

liberalism, which emphasizes util phasizing rights and rules, and ity. Deontological liberalism tends toward parliamentarism and, recently in

America,

toward collaboration of the legislature

with

the bureaucracy.

To

counterbalance this
utilitarianism

tendency, and to give voice to prudence if not to outright (which also has its legislative spokesmen), one must reconsider
origins of

the

Machiavellian

the modern

executive. quotes

In his book Lefil de I'epee Charles de Gaulle

Goethe's Faust: "In the

act!"

beginning

was

the Word? No! In the

their

beginning

was

the

Both Goethe

and

de Gaulle know
ativeness of

Machiavelli,

and

de Gaulle

contrasts

the excessive talk

French

parliamentarians with

the forceful actions needed to defend

interpretation, Fall

1990, Vol. 18, No. 1

164

Interpretation

republicanism.

Mansfield,

Machiavelli,
same

observes

know his may be said with confidence also to that "the doctrine of executive power originates in Ma
who
words"

chiavelli's proclamation of the

sovereignty

of

deeds

over

(xxii). At the
are

time,

unjustified

deeds
power or

cause resentment among those

they

done to.

Therefore, "executive
something this in the
else

is

power exercised
law"

in the

name of someone or

God

the people or the

lawlessness,"

(xxiii). Mansfield expresses

oxymoron

"legalized

anticipation performed

that "would be

illegal"

perhaps under

meaning acts of retaliation and "if they were not even immoral

by
(4),

police"

the

the direction of a legitimate executive

are

(3).

Because "laws that

the
deaf"

are mere

demonstrations to the intellect

rational appeal to

like

prayers to
with

and

because "the
engender

interest is

much

diluted

out a

capacity to

fear"

(6),

and

any

government

bring
a

more must

danger

and

because "the necessary exactions of dishonor to free governments than to

enable

tyrannies"

(14),

way

be found to

the executive to act

firmly, in

good

conscience,

If

"tyranny"

while saving (so to speak) the for unreason, is the "human

name"

pardonable pride of the ruled. and a

degree

of unreason will

always

be

required

to rule unreasoning men (most notably

by

ambition or pride of

the few who want most of all to rule and

ruled)2

exploiting the the fear of the

then "law can only be executed tyran only not to be (18-19). Whereas Machiavelli openly recognizes the necessity of tyr anny, even invites the prince to it, Aristotle "transforms the tyrant from the destroyer of law into a king, the guardian of (19). Both philosophers find

many

who want

nically"

law"

ways

to tame

tyranny, to
or

use

it. Mansfield

proceeds

to explore the differences

in their
VI

ways and

their purposes.
say"

Aristotle has "little

of the

nothing to
that,"

about executive power

(23). In Book

Politics he

briefly

mentions executive or punitive

powers, suggesting

that

they be divided "so

discredit"

the

for the

perceived

whole

history

of executive

in Mansfield's words, "no one person takes all injustice of punitive actions (24, 29). "The power depends on understanding why it is absent in

Aristotle"

(25). Aristotelian

tion,

a contrast

Machiavelli"

rule contrasts sharply with Machiavellian execu "a different attitude toward nature in Aristotle and reflecting (28). For Aristotle, politics is neither simply natural nor simply
beings'

unnatural.

Politics involves human

to choose,

speak,

and

intending

benefit. Rule (arche) also means root is the same as for 'prince') directed toward an end "made visible to the public in a certain order that Aristotle calls its form (eidos (32). In politics this form is the politeia or regime, and forms have a truth-content; there
1276b2)"

natural capacity to deliberate, to least claiming to intend the common beginning; it is a principle (again, the Latin or at

is

no

"mere
were

regimes"

relativism of

(33). If

regimes

had

no

truth-content, if

tyranny

only monarchy misliked, then "all politics is tyranny, and justifia (33). The end toward which bly so, because necessarily choiceworthy polit ical forms direct us is fully developed human nature. "To begin with
so"

nature

leaves human freedom

directly

and choice out of

account; but to fail to

return to

Book Review
nature would

1 65

leave freedom
man

guide"

an

arbitrary
own.

quirk and without a means

will

(33). When
man

Aristotle
free"

calls

a political
as

animal, he

both

words.

The best

"wills nature's

kingship
man

his

Thus his because

is

neither

arbitrary

nor un

(42). is rare,
or of

Because the best

sent

and

even

the rule of the

best,

anyone, laws

are needed

ordinarily spirited men re in order to win their

consent.

These laws

are relative to the regime and need a statesman's prudence

to remedy their generality, their

stance

inability

to address themselves to each circum

in

all

its

particulars.

The

strictly reverencing the laws

with

even order

his

own

judgment

in

give every appearance of he (especially) quietly supplements them to protect himself and others from tyranny. prudent man will as

The best

man

also chooses as

custom, were
which

chooses according to nature as if nature were his own will. He if human choice, especially past human choices bound up in nature's (1287b 5-8). This assumption of nature, law, and custom, part

is

part

deference,

presumption, is
principle

what

it

means

for

men to rule;

they
This

make themselves the

beginning

(arche)
in

of themselves and of things.

is the very brute

opposite of executive power,

which

the ruler presents himself as an

agent of some other power

necessity.

(human

or

not),

or as one who

is forced into

action rule

by

We

see

the distinction in the very

words used:

in Greek to

means what

to

begin; but

to execute, from the Latin exsequor, means to 'follow

out'

has been begun

by

someone else.

(43)

There is, then, a certain relation between Christianity and modernity. A philosopher is sometimes a prudent man. Perhaps "out of philanthropy, but
also

for the

sake of

his

own
it,"

understanding
political

about

human

resistance

to

reform and political

how to

overcome
and share

the philosopher

will consider and recommend

institutions

in

deliberation (46). He discovers that it

men"

is in the

spirited nature of men

to resist rule, even beneficial rule; more, he

discovers

that nature itself is "more ornery than the most ornery of

(49)

Human excellence, which alone "can rescue human freedom from the willful ness which disguises the submission of freedom to lower seems tyran
nical

nature,"

because it "looks like

willfulness

to

willful

men,

as

they

attribute

the

nature,"

principle of their own conduct to the government of

reality"

running "from the

the mixed

appearance of regime or

tyranny

to the

(49). Aristotle

recommends

combining democracy and oligarchy, natural necessity and human choice, lot and choice. The three parts of this regime correspond to the three parts of the human soul: deliberating, ruling (based on the spirited defense
of

"polity"

the

body),
in

and

judging.

Only
of

through the soul

"can

we

understand

how

reform must

politics

is

stubborn possible."

"[Hjuman

which resists
arbitration

reform,

"sophisms"

be

made the

foundation divisions
rational

reform, through

and

(50-51). The
cial) "do
not

modern

of government of

(legislative,
soul"

executive, and
refer

judi

describe
or

functions

the

but instead to
made

to law

(divine,

natural,

conventional)

regardless of

how it is

(53). In

modern-

166

Interpretation
calculation"

ity "wary
ation proviso and

tends to replace deliberation. While for Aristotle

moderns

deliber

is sovereign, for

legislation is sovereign, in fact if formally.

with

the significant

that the executive may need to do more than simply

sovereign not

"execute"

laws,
the

may thereby become

Aristotelian deliberation

"join[s]

the human good that

must

[men]

choose with

nonhuman necessities or good must

they

accept"; to learn to

deliberate,

"we

be

abstracted

from

concerns,"

our own

relax our spiritedness

"inspire"

(56). (In

modernity,

prudent men often vigorously).

defend the laws

maintain

find they must encourage or citizens to Aristotle commends a plural magistrate in order to

dialogue

or

the sovereignty of deliberation. "Men are not under the

rule of nature or god such that their own rule

them"

merely

reflects a grander principle single natural

ruling
law"

(59). To

establish a regime on partisan

the foundation of "a

would

lead to passionate,
teaches

misinterpretation of

that law. Aristo

standard of

tle's way, requiring a

judgment,"

"momentary

separation of

judging

from the it

moderation

(62-63). John Locke's

assertion of

the individ

ual's natural power risks

to execute the law of nature

whenever

seems threatened

ill-judging
of

of one's own case.

Nor

would

Aristotle

countenance the reli

no court

gious persecution cases

Locke intended to (64). Both the

make

impossible: "There is
want

for

humans"

impiety by humans

because Aristotle does

not

divine

anger executed on

religious regimes and some of

the modern

liberal

regimes

that overthrew them take an oversimple approach to

law, di

rectly applying it to political life and thereby making it prey to passion, instead of filtering it through prudential judgment. This is as important for the rulers as it is for the
The
ruled:

offices

do

not govern men as

if they

were external powers or

laws from

nature

guaranteeing
activity.

the

regularity if

not

the perfection of human behavior.

Rather,

men

must assume the offices and make the potentialities actual

in their

own virtuous

(68)
can

Because "justice
and
and pied

be

ignoble, especially in

the execution of

penalties"

(66),

because he
in

wants

to preserve the political man's sense of

the nobility of political life in order to moderate

wholesome or at

least

activity,"

constructive

nobility them, keep them "occu Aristotle lists only one in the Poli

his

own

executive office

among the its

seventeen magistral offices mentioned

tics. "He

does

not expand

the office

into the it

awesome modern executive

efficient"

by

taking

advantage of

odium to make

more powerful and

(69). On

the contrary,
version of

he divides it, assigning its function to several courts his own separation of powers. He seeks "to awaken virtue rather than stimu desire for gain,
as

late fear

and the

Machiavelli
all offices

was

to

do"

(69), attracting base

jailer"

souls to office and

comprehending

"in the

office of

(70).

Nature
pels

understood as

human

government to

unfriendly to man gives human justice no support and com imitate angry gods, to rely on fear as the motive for

ob-

Book Review
edience, and to loose hatred against its
not
enemies.

167

This

was

Machiavelli's way but

Aristotle's. (70)

Thus does Paul's Letter to the Romans

remnants of

anticipate

Machiavelli's

"letters"

to the

the Romans. the

Rome

and

Holy

Roman Empire

are said

to feature purely
after

executive of selective

fices, but
the

that illusion comes from viewing them

Machiavelli's

unveilings.

Rome
tension

substituted the tension

between

republic and

monarchy for
was

Greek

between

democracy
there

and

oligarchy.

This

substitution

practical,

not

theoretical.

Aristotle
and

regards monarchs as

ideal rulers,

not real

istically
caution.

to be hoped
Polybius'

for,

is

much

in Roman
reason,

history

to

confirm

his

mixed regime relies

less

on

more on

fear,

than Aris

totle's does. But Polybius would also correct Rome nature, and less to

by

"fear,

imperialism"

superstition, and

referring Romans to (82). The office of

and

dictator in the Roman

the Romans themselves, notably

Bodin; Cicero, minimized its role. The Holy Roman Empire presents a somewhat different, but still premodern, aspect of the executive. The pope rules by the grace of God, not natural right,
constitution was magnified

by

Machiavelli

Livy

and

and

the

Holy
are

Roman Emperor "was

end all

not a modern a

executive,

whose effectual

actions

designed to
to grace
of

dispute, but

theologico-political executive,

whose claim and

Marsilius

is essentially Padua are the great

contestable"

(89). Thomas Aquinas, Dante,

executive, "attempt
which men

commentators on that

ing
"as

to restore and adjust the Aristotelian argument for ruling, in

take responsibility
guided

by

for governing God's commands but

and

themselves"

(91). Aquinas

conceived politics

them"

not

merely executing

(92). Aquinas

combines

Scripture

philosophy
natural

by

rives human law from

respect to

law,

which

emphasizing natural law. Prudence de does not imitate divine law. With

human spiritedness, Aquinas arranges "a tween Aristotle's effort to ennoble it and the Bible's

compro

friendly
attempt

be

to humble it (95). to

Dante

claims

that the secular prince owes his authority

made

directly

God,

not

the Church. (In this he

himself

resemble

Paul.)

His

prince aims at

human

happiness, leaving
eign,
can

spiritual

instruction to the
unlike

clergy.

This is

no modern sover

although

Dante does suppose,

Aristotle, "that Aristotle's kingship

whole

be actualized, that one prince might be made ruler of the (97). However, his proofs "seem more physical or metaphysical

world"

politi

than
understand

(97), raising
argument.

questions about

how Dante

means some readers

to

his

Mansfield takes
tion'

particular care

with

Marsilius. "For the first time 'execu

science"

'executive'

and

become

theme

in

political

(100). Yet Marsilius

almost come

does

not

take Machiavelli's final

steps.

"Why
as

does Marsilius

to

executive?"

the modern

Marsilius does rians

and

rely upon nature, philosophers do. He does not

not

Aristotle

and even

the Roman histo

nature

seem

to say that human

is

politi-

168
cal.

Interpretation
He
emphasizes prudence and

human law founded

upon popular

consent,

curious combination.

"Marsilius is the first to (103). "[T]o

prevent

conceive

the

ruler

entirely

as an

executive revised

for the

people"

the pope from

ruling,"

Marsilius

as executing by distin (103). Marsilius function of the guishing ruling from legislating, the stops short of Machiavellianism because he wants to keep the executive "within

Aristotle in

order

to save

him, "redefining ruling

people"

the orbit of

law,

or

when

that is

not

possible, thanks to the defects

executive

of

law
the

virtue"

under the control of

popular will

(106). His

is weak,

an executor of

"that

city,"

creates

the ruling part of the

the regime (108). Mar

silius

thus democratizes politics, weakening the claims of monarchs, aristo

and oligarchs to rule.

crats,
the

He locates the form

we

of

the city in the

what we

law,

not

in

regime.

"The result, if
to
separate

compare

Marsilius to

have

seen

in
to

Aristotle, is
prevent

the city from the soul

Marsilius 's

purpose

being

the ordering of the soul [the aim of priests] from

offices"

determining
aim at

the order

ing

of

the

(109). The

order of

the offices

will

protecting the

body. To
retain of

the rule

of

prudence, Marsilius assigns it not to some dubious

"wisdom
archy,

people"

the

but to the

executive.

He

advocates an elective mon

not a representative more

democracy, in
right"

an attempt

to

make

the rule of pru

metamorphoses

dence

likely. As

guidance

for his executive, Marsilius

Christian doctrine into "natural

sect"

(111), teaching

political men

"to

respect

Christianity without yielding to its from "simultaneously prizing

rule,"

claims to and

and

"sav[ing]
honor"

the

Christian

from claiming title to rule while retains something like Aristotelian virtue, sity and Christian charity. Judges may be

despising worldly despising worldly power.

as against ministers of

(1 13), that

is,

In this Marsilius
neces

both Machiavellian God's

wrath

(just ones,

if they are prudent), but priests are not. And, in a most noteworthy formula tion, Marsilius has his executive act almost like a philosopher: "As knowers,

they
only
not

renounce rule over others: since rule requires executive

force,

which can

come entitle

from the
one

consent of
rule"

the legislator

[i.e.,

the people], knowledge does

claim

to

(114). A knower has "a

to rule

on

natural

grounds"; the
pope

flaw in Aristotelian

kingship
they

is that it has been

"the

claimed

by

the

(114). For both Aristotle in

need of
it"

and

Marsilius,
use

difficulty
they

is that
are

political
of

men are

philosophy; but if

philosophy,

in danger

surrendering to
the
modern

(115). A

still greater practical

danger is the

one opened resistance and

by
to

call

to applaud

uncritically

man's

natural,

spirited

being
right sent.

ruled.

This "leaves
realm of

no accommodation

between

knowing

freedom,

between the

silius

(116). Marsilean natural necessity and that of is an accommodation between philosophic knowledge and political con His executive is "Aristotle's kingship in a different (117). Mar shares Aristotle's regard for prudential adaptation to circumstances
guise"

choice"

by

statesmen and political philosophers alike.

orders"

He

commends no

"new

modes and

for

systematic

introduction

and perpetual use.

Mansfield devotes his

central chapter to

Machiavelli. Machiavelli

appropri-

Book Review
ates

1 69

Christian

modes and

orders, artfully perverting them.

revelation

Observing

"that the

central event politicizes a

in Christian

is

execution

an act of

(124), Machiavelli

cruelty of Christianity is Machiavelli Execution will now retains the imperialism. right; cruelty, the be guided by "the decrees of natural instead of divine commands
sacrifice of

father's

his

son.

The

pious

half

necessity"

(127). Natural necessity differs from Aristotelian natural right in being below, not beyond or above, conventional law. Therefore good arms, not good souls,
"good"

yield

laws. Nature is "the necessity

that

forces
or

us

to
of

seek

nutriment,

safety, and glory"; virtue is "the habit or

necessity"

faculty

quality

anticipating that

threefold

(129),

and will strive to conquer nature virtue

by

nature's own necessity.

"Your

is both strong
(130).

and weak:

making use of strong because

you

have

chosen you

to do what you would eventually have

been forced to do,

weak

because

had

choice"

no other

To

accomplish

this ambition the modern executive needs seven characteris

tics: He must use punishment politically, and therefore needs broad powers;
must put war and

he

foreign policy above peace and domestic affairs; he must govern indirectly; he must employ techniques applicable in all regimes, and does not much worry about differences among regimes; he must act suddenly and decisively; he must act secretly, surprising all the others; there must be
one of

only

him. It

should

be

needless

to say that conventional law

will

be

supplemented

by

selected

illegalities,

made easier as

by

the lack of any indepen

dent judiciary. "[F]ear

replaces

justice

the

ground

for

politics"

(136);

princely ambition replaces divine providence as the sky. No more cyclical his tory, and no more consideration of the best regime: Machiavelli considers only and survival, expansion, and glory. "[Necessity is stronger than
executions
"Consent"

princi

loose the "primal

means

fear"

that is "the first

politics"

mover of

(140).

involving
prince

the people
not

in crimes, making

accomplices out of

mere citizens.

The

deliberately
understood

godlike

He creates (a merely Aristotelian public for term) necessity others, eschewing

react to necessity.

does

deliberation for

conspiratorial

planning

and

sudden

action.

Rulership rightly
(modern)
science,
exe

is tyranny.
attempts to reduce
"power"

Thomas Hobbes

Machiavellianism to
physics.

borrowing
cution

the concept of

from

He

makes

Machiavellian

"legal"

by

natural

law. This
natural

classifying it as an expression of a natural necessity termed a enables him to publicize his executions. The science that

discerns
nature,

but, in
not

law/necessity is perfect reason. Science conquers fortune or keeping with the more public character of the Hobbesian execu
fear
more

tive, it

assuages popular

than

it

satisfies

the

spiritedness of princes.

Peace,

glory, is
union of

the Hobbesian objective. There

is

a problem

with

this:

"The very

legislative

and executive power weakens

the

executive

by

leaving
laws
racy. of

the impression that

justice"

in passing laws that obey the (177-78). Despotism issues, theoretically at least, in democ
government consists

The

potential

instability

of

the

modern project

(seen in the

history

of

seven-

170

Interpretation
of

teenth-century England,

France from 1789 to 1958, how the

"Locke's

and

of

Russia

since given

1907) has

made philosophers consider

new executive might

be

some constitutional restraints.

constitution and
cal"

political science shows

that the modern

the modern executive are mutually

dependent

and yet antitheti

guide"

(181). Unlike James

who

Harrington,
figure
out

that "eager

but incompetent

to

Machiavelli

"could

not

how to

combine

the state of nature with

a rule of

constitutional

(183-84), Locke formulated

legislative
power

law that is

"the

rule of a

that each

nature"

state of

(186). The

state of

[individual] has constituted out of the nature is a state of scarcity; constitutional

self-preservation,

law governing
vation of

civil

society
own

will aim at

including
each

the preser

the property

needed

to

preserve oneself.

Because

individual is

the best judge of his

tyranny"

needs, Locke "constitutionalizes the necessity of

on an

(187) by putting necessity

tion.

individualistic

and egalitarian

founda
and

Natural

liberty

and

equality issue in

constitutional or civil

liberty

equality, reconciling

self-preservation with government

by

consent.

Locke there
recognition

fore limits the

of

executive

by dividing

and

separating its powers, in

the

potential

threat to self-preservation posed

by

tyrannical executives.
no

Consistent
chiavelli
and

with

this

democratization, Locke is
more

less

atheistic

than

Ma

Hobbes, but far

discreet

about

it. Atheism

can

comport

easily with egalitarianism because it denies the existence of the Creator-created hierarchy. 'The are seldom atheistic themselves, however. Locke first
people'

claims that all

man

human beings
own
with

are

God's property; he later

asserts

that

"every
"doc (195).

and

has property in his divine, replacing it

requires

person,"

thereby attacking
the

patriarchalism natural

strange"

trine that we establish

"very governments by the

give

but

also

execution of a

very law of

useful

nature"

This

Locke to

the people a somewhat more them to

resist

spirited character

than
of

does Hobbes. To
nature a

encourage

of touch, making it a place not of war de scarcity (more amenable to planned remedies that may be thoughtfully fended). "Freedom as the foundation makes government by consent; reason as

tyranny he moralizes the state (which maximizes necessity) but

the ground denies the

to"

legitimacy
have to

to governments wrongly consented

were

(198).

Lockean
use of

reason can make

would

mistakes, for "[i]f Locke

to insist on the correct

reason, he
does,"

give government over

to the best reasoners, as

Aristotle
In

or to

"one reasoner, freedom.

following

Hobbes"

(198). "Tacit

conse

combines reason with civil

society, Locke advises, the

legislative

and executive powers should

be

separated

but

not

formally

balanced. Executive
power

the legislative
be"

will.

"Executive

may

not

(201);

that person enjoys

power will apparently follow is subordinate, but the executive person the "tacit of the people, partic
consent"

ularly in

matters

of criminals

concerning their preservation, such as war and the punishment (203). "By gradually introducing his readers to the scope of execu
uses reason

tive power, Locke

which

to

help

them appreciate that element in

humanity
and

reason"

is

not amenable

to

(204). The tension between legislative

Book Review
executive powers will constitute
ime"

'111

"a

structure

for

self-criticism within

the reg

(204-5). This tension

and a rhetoric of

will

be

expressed

in the

struggle

between

a rhetoric

of

rights

interests, foreshadowing
and

the

debate between deon

will
interest"

tological and utilitarian

liberals today. Prudence itself

right"

lines

of

"claiming
divided

one's

"following
It

one's

divide along the (209). Locke

mind

"builds

mind

into

government"

constitutional
sense.

(210). A divided

cannot rule

in the Aristotelian
who would

give scope

to individual

liberty

but is

prey to ideologues
mind's natural

dialectically

overcome

the division to satisfy the

craving for
virtue of

together
swered

by by the

the convention of

the right of everyone

else"

"For Locke, right and necessity were held Property, in which the need to work was an industry, and in which the right of each depends upon (210). Predictably, attack property as
unity.
"totalitarians"

vehemently as they attack the divided mind. Mansfield rightly describes Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws as "the most comprehensive modern book on politics, exceeding in range and complex
(215). Mon any that appears before or since, excepting Aristotle's tesquieu does not lay down the law, natural or conventional. He considers
Politics"

ity

regimes

in

"spirit"

order

to

bring

out

the

of each.

This

procedure enables

Mon

tesquieu to move away from spiritedness toward moderation, albeit a modera tion quite different

its

natural

from any found in Aristotle. Montesquieu's moderation has foundation in a mean between two vices, Hobbesian domination and
moderation

Hobbesian fear. Montesquieu's

tion in civil society

is timidity. Moderation's founda

"disposition"

is

"reason,"

that

is,

a people's

(219). Consent

is

no

longer longer

so

necessary, because
not opinion as

natural

freedom is

not an

issue. Opinion

replaces

it, but

Aristotle

conceived

it. Opinion for Montesquieu

ex
"moderation"

is

no

an

indirect
fear

reflection of

presses emotions

or confidence.

rationally knowable truth. Opinion is not a passion;

"Virtue"

is dilute passion, possible only in All of this leads Montesquieu

civil society.

to recommend a new

kind

of executive.

"If

liberty
ble
and

need not

the executive

need not

be asserted, free government need not be based on fear, and (222). An independent judiciary becomes possi
terrify"

desirable. A

version of classical virtue

politicized or conventionalized.

Liberty

may be retained, but it is strictly is not in nature. It is in England, an

England thoughtfully reformed by Montesquieu to enjoy separation of powers. Political liberty is the feeling-opinion of security. Commerce brings both politi
cal

liberty

and

moderation; it dilutes partisan ambitions

spectacular punishments

potent, making Machiavelli's

san representative
executive

rendering them im unnecessary. "The parti

by

is both

more

reliably
not

self-executing than the natural prerogative Machiavelli's

prince"

perfectly constitutional and more held by Locke's executive embodying many of the princi But there was no mere discinecessity
without

to

mention

(246).

The American Founders

ples elaborated

established a regime

by

modern political philosophers.

pleship

at work.

The Founders

recognized natural

"draw[ing]

172

Interpretation

the Machiavellian

(252).

They

constitutionalized

necessity,

design

ing

a republican or representative government and a new republican

executive

as part of
choice.

it. This

executive

represents

the public while exercising

deliberate
"Madison

No Machiavellian prince,

neither

is he

a philosopher-king.

specifies

the reason of the public, not of philosopher-kings, as that which ought

prevail"

to

(256). Whereas Aristotle distinguishes deliberation (choosing, tak responsibility for actions) from

ing
in

political

judging ("disengaging
men are not

from

politics

order

to call these choices

into

account"

[261]), Publius,
and

with other

modems,

doubts that this distinction is real, because

required

reliably

capable of

"the

detachment from their

the best.
as

own

interests

necessities"

(262). Institu

tional

structures are needed

to control popular passions and to engage the vir

tues

and abilities of

from
moral

physics

(even

Energy and stability are terms Hamilton borrows Hobbes borrows "power"); however, they do have a
public virtues actions and

effect, namely, the

that can

develop

when political men

take responsibility for their

have in its

scope

for their better but

under

ambitions.

"In the Constitution,

qualifications

virtue appears not

own name

the rubric of

for

encourages and goes so

(274). The very limits is "an incitement to

office"

struggle

for

office the

Constitution

excel"

(278). Mansfield edifyingly

and over

far

as

to contend that the Constitution encourages public virtue so

effectively that America can

totelian regime

become, in
founders

formalized in
"moralist,"

writing"

time, "an Aris (276). The American regime has moral

practice
who wanted

foundations
of

well concealed

by

to escape the

opprobrium

the epithet
who

and even more wanted epithet. with some

to escape the exactions of

those

deserve that

Mansfield

concludes
now

observations

on

the

modern not

executive. worst

"[W]e know

that Machiavelli was wrong: religion is

atheists who execute

liberty's
the

enemy"

(280). Avowed

in the

name of

people and

with

the ready

compliance of

bureaucrats

who

only follow

orders are

liberty's cunning
and

worst enemies.

Or

perhaps

the philosopher

who replaces prudence with

is liberty's

worst enemy.
mere

Even

regimes

that retain a republican shape have

tended to become
charismatic

democracies,
same

complete with passive

demicitizens
end"

leaders. "[T]he

tendency

to sacrifice form to

that charac

terizes totalitarian regimes may be seen in contemporary

democracies, for
an

tunately in much less virulent form, for now (291). "[W]e need a political science capable of discerning
Aristotelian"

responsibility,"

"es

sentially
ture
and choice

political science

that "seeks

a reconciliation

between

na

(or

end and

form),

not

turns out to

be

submission

to

necessity"

Machiavellian mastery of nature that (291-92). Contemporary philosophers

fail to

provide

any

such and

freedom
will

realism

reconciliation, alternating instead "between not enough idealism" too much (293). A reconceived executive

understand

repress"

attempts

to

its "natural law basis in monarchy which it both reflects and (295). In thus reconceiving the executive we shall begin to

rediscover
soul"

that philosophic

monarchy that

strives

for "the

perfection

of

the

(297).

Book Review
NOTES

1 73

1. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, University Press, 1953), 4: 426. 2. The journalist CL. Sulzberger
asked

Roy

P. Basler,

ed.

(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers

ing
real

men

in their

actions?"

"One

must

draw

Charles de Gaulle, "What is the primary force govern de Gaulle replied, "between the individ
distinction,'

ual and the collective masses.

For the individual it is

ambition and a

taste for

adventure.

think the

motivating force for the individual is ambition, but for the masses it is fear. And this applies to masses of all (CL. Sulzberger, An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries, 1963countries."

1972 [New York:

Macmillan, 1973], 189.)

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The Philosophical Review

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