Winter 1990-91 111

Volume 18

Number 2

Chaninah Maschler
David Roochnik

Some Observations About Plato's Plaedo

The Serious Plato's Euthydemus

Play
of

of

Charles Salman
Roger M. Barrus

The Wisdom

Plato's Aristophanes Liberation

David Hume's

Theology

of

Greg

Russell

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

Daryl McGowan Tress Discussion

Feminist

Theory

and

Its Discontents

313

Christopher A. Colmo
Book Review

Reply

to Lowenthal

317

Maureen Feder-Marcus

Time, Freedom,

and the

Common Good: An
,

Essay

in Public

Philosophy by Charles

Sherover

Interpretation
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Interpretation
Winter 1990-91

Volume 18

Number 2

Chaninah Maschler David Roochnik

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

The Serious The Wisdom

177 211

Play
of

of

Plato's Euthydemus

Charles Salman
Roger M. Barrus

Plato's Aristophanes
of

233
251

David Hume's

Theology

Liberation

Greg

Russell

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

273 293

Daryl McGowan Tress

Feminist

Theory

and

Its Discontents

Discussion

Christopher A. Colmo
Book Review Maureen Feder-Marcus

Reply

to Lowenthal

313

Time, Freedom,

and the

Common Good: An
,

Essay

in Public

Philosophy by

Charles

Sherover

317

Copyright 1991

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

Chaninah Maschler
St. John's College

The essay below falls into four unequal parts: 1 An introduction that places the Phaedo among the
.

other

dialogues

con

cerning the last days of Socrates, 2. A section analyzing and appraising the first arguments for the soul's not dying,
3. A
some
section

of

the dialogue's four

major

in

which

the similes of the cloak and the lyre are studied in

detail,
section about

4. A concluding

Platonic Forms.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Apology, Crito,

accused man's

and

Phaedo,

all

three,

purport

to

be

"apologies,"

(an

formal reply to
that

a plaintiff's charge against

him),

albeit

before

different

audiences.1

In the dialogue
mal charge against

bears the

name

Apology, Socrates is in

court.

The for
this

him is

impiety
were

and corruption of the young.

Roughly,
he

seems

to

mean

that

by

questioning the authority of those who shape public

the poets, craftsmen, and politicians
un

opinion

in Athens these
civic

solidarity to such a degree as to have harmed the The jurymen who hear and judge him represent the city of Athens

dermined

body

politic.

entire.

Here,

in court, it is his life

as a public personage

that he is explaining and, in that

sense, defending. He is

also exhibiting it. In the Crito Socrates is in jail. The accusation, brought

by

the

friend

and

dialogue is named, is that Socrates, in accepting the Athenian jurymen's verdict and staying in jail to await execution, is acting
agemate after whom the

irresponsibly
acceptance of

toward

his

family

and

intimates. It is his death,

that

or

rather, his
and

death

at the city's

instance,
to

Socrates is explaining
an

justi how

fying

to Crito.
we are

In the Phaedo

eyewitnes

made

overhear

account of

Socrates

conducted

himself the

day

he drank the hemlock. Phaedo is the friends

name

of that eyewitness.

Phaedo

reports

that even on

his last day, in the

own grief and

midst of

who might
Socrates'

be

expected

decently

to still their

to

try

to support

interpretation,

Winter 1990-1991. Vol. 18, No. 2

178

Interpretation
of

equanimity in the face

against

"accusation"

the
at

interest. Or
Cebes'

least,

Socrates'

as

this time is "defending that in choosing death he is acting against his own young Theban friend Cebes puts it, that a man

himself,"

death, Socrates

still

of sense ought

to be troubled at

dying (62,63),

as

Socrates

appears not

to be.

remark, to be

wondering how the

Socrates'

various

of fair to the young man, actually takes the mild things said by Socrates hang together. He feels

form

strange dictum that, while it would be wrong for a man to stung by do violence to himself because he is not his own, but the god's property, nev

ertheless, if he is a philosopher, he
Socrates'

will

die

gladly. meant

saying

would not

be

strange

if it

that philosophers
or

do

cheer

willy-nilly, that, groaning clearly that death must soon come because he has made certain choices (98e), he becomes resigned to the outcome and, if he is the type of human being who derives pleasure from seeing why things are and must be as

fully

and without

what we all

must

if it

meant

once a man sees

they

are, he

will not

be bitter in his
at
Socrates'

resignation.

He may even, intermittently,

career with such utter clarity.

experience a

fierce
"

joy

seeing the curve of his

who

But,

as we all

know,

words are much

harsher

and

darker than this.

He declares that

those
nought

pursue

philosophy

aright

keep

rehearsing

else"

dying

and

being dead,
he
mean?

(64a,

epiteedeuousin).

What

can

A first

and

moderately

clear answer

is.given

at

64c-69e. In the

eyes of

those

whose sense of

life derives from do

such pleasures as

eating, drinking, sex, goods,

fancy

clothes,

people who

not exert themselves to obtain such

selves

who even

despise their momentary good as dead

I
or

(and others) for taking them seriously, look "as

time
or

already."

am not at all sure that people who spend much

money

on

fine food,

try

the role of Don

Juan,

or

devote their

holiday
of

time off to shopping sprees,

experience

the goods on which

they

gorge themselves as mere pleasures of the

body,

since even

in the

case of
other

the pleasures

eating

and

drinking,

and mani

festly
their

in the

other

cases,

people, their look of approval or envy, and thus

normally involved. Frequently some modicum of skill and connoisseurship enter as well. Still, it is probably fair to say that to a Spinoza or a Newton the majority of human beings look as though their lives were

fellowship,

are

oriented

toward

second

finding opportunity for indulging their body. interpretation of the philosophic life's being a regimen
"acquire"

of

dying

is

given at

66d. Philosophers do not, according to Socrates, lack all acquisitive impulses. They want to wisdom and knowledge. But they find, so he

reports, that
access

fellowship

with their

body

and what their

body

gives

them direct

obtaining what they are after. So, as much as possible, they dissociate themselves from its lusts and passions; they despise and sit in judgment on the deliveries of eyes and ears, allying themselves in stead to reasoning and calculating and all such powers of the soul as transcend the bodily.
with

to

interferes

their

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

179

One may (and should) protest that philosopher-scientists are hardly the only ones who, when they find their concentration broken by a headache or hunger
pangs or

too great

heat

or

cold,

resent

their embodied condition. The same

holds for generals, poets, painters, businessmen. And isn't it absurd to reserve reasoning and calculating strictly for philosopher-scientists? Why is it the phi
losopher
more than other men

that gets singled out as a despiser to the purposes of the

of

the body?
except

The
the

question might not seem relevant

not as yet

Phaedo,

that we do
and and

know exactly

what

the dialogue's objectives are. Now we,

immediate,

named audience

his fellow

citizens

for Phaedo's narrative, namely Echecrates from Phlius (cf. Diogenes Laertius viii. 46), are ex

pressly told desire

erastai and

Philosophers,
einai).

Phaedo that philosophy is the dialogue's theme (59a). says Socrates, differ from other men in terms of what they what they say they are lovers of (hou epithoumen te kai phamen

by

They

are

not

men

who

lack

passion no

but

men

mastered

by

different

passion

than are the majority.

a

Now

matter

how devoted to his how hard he drives

enterprise a

general,

poet, a businessman
Socrates'

is,
for

no matter

himself, he cannot, in
cause

the things that are

real

to

separation from the body, be terms, long him the troops, terrain, supplies, the risk of

defeat,
ness of

the hope for victory; the

lyric,

the ode, the play; the

or

factory,

the busi

partnership, the money owed to

him

by

him

though I believe not one

what

them is simply
all

bodily

(here I

want

to quarrel

with

Socrates

says at

66d), do

involve things that for

can

these enterprises, even if engaged

be touched, seen, heard. What is more, in by people who believe in plain living and love
and respect

high thinking,

call

some sort of

for the bodily. (66

At least according to the ff.), the philosopher, intent for his

own

section of the
upon

Phaedo

now under examination

truth, has
and of

no such

love

and

respect,

whether

body, bodily desires,

accessible

sensory

perceptually friends
.

features

things

faculties, or for the bodily and other than himself, including his

"When, then, does

anything
then,
thinks
with the

the

soul encounter

truth?

Because

when

it tries to

consider

body

it

is of

if at
best

all, something
when none of

evidently deceived by what genuinely is becomes

it.

In thought
manifest

or reasoning,
. .

to

it.

But it
nor

these

[bodily]
"

things troubles

it,

neither

hearing

sight,

nor pain nor and

any pleasure, when the soul takes leave of the body. (65b)
of

is,

to the extent possible, alone

by

itself

Since the opening thesis dead can be defined as the

another,
each we

the

present section of

the dialogue was that

being
one

state

in

which

having

reached a condition

body of being

and soul are severed alone and

from

by

itself (auto kath

hauto),

have,
"does
the

verbally, justified
what

Socrates'

dark saying that in

dying

the

philosopher

he

wishes,"

obtains a good arranges

long

sought

Fortunately,
the

dialogue
he

for Cebes to
put

protest

(67d, 68a). in our behalf. Being

well-bred youth

is, he doesn't

the question quite so rudely.

Still, he

180
in

Interpretation
asks
what

all along we have been muttering to ourselves: Doesn't definition of death the very thing that we least be suppose opening that as people lieve, namely, when, say, the soul leaves a man's body, it con tinues to be something independent and coherent that has power and intel

effect

Socrates'

ligence (dunamis kai

he
reminds

phronesis)!

The form
"model"

Cebes'

which

protest takes

is that

for the soul, namely, that it is what we, today, would call a gas, like air, which, when it is released from the bodily container that held it in, becomes an unidentifiable part of the atmosphere. The Socrates
of a

familiar

word

Cebes

uses

to express this thought is the Greek stand-in

for

our

Latinate

"spirit,"

word

viz. pneuma

(70a).
to
what

Here is how Socrates

mon

responds soul

the dialogue describes as the com

over upon

fear that

no

integral

will

be left

death, only

an

integral

body,

the corpse: to many folk traditions, the souls of grandparents in Hades for rebirth in their descendants (Jews and
or great grand ancient

According
parents wait

Greeks funda

both

often name

their sons after deceased grandparents). Socrates is no

mentalist about

these old stories.

Still, if it

could

be

established

that the

living
the

have nothing folk tradition

else

to come from except what has and, in turn,

died,

then (says

Socrates)

might gain support

give support

to the philosopher's

hope that death brings, not extinction, but consummation of his deepest de sire an interval at least of complete independence from the body. We have
argument set

the stage for the first argument for the soul's

opposites"

immortality,

the

"from

(70c-72e).
of

Opposites, or contrariety, have, (58e, 60b). Notice also that we are

his friends
assembled

course, been

with us

from the

beginning
and
sun was

told

by Phaedo,
and

our

eyewitness, that he

in jail
e).

at

daybreak

that Socrates died as the

going down (61e, 116b,

2. ARGUMENTS

Isn't it the case,

says

Socrates,

that change and generation always

proceed

from the shameful, the just from the injust, the greater from the smaller, the weaker from the stronger, the slower from the quicker, the worse from the better? If this holds true universally, then it holds also for life, at least, if to live (zcn) has an opposite, as being awake
opposite

from

to opposite, the noble

has the

opposite

being

asleep.

Manifestly

there is an opposite to life (whether the adjective of the

word

we consider

the

infinitive,

the participle,

or

root), the

very thing Now in

linked

we are all all

waiting for, death.

the enumerated

instances

of paired opposites

the extremes are the

by

a genesis

between

them:

Between the

greater and

lesser thing

(pragma)

there

is increase

verbal substitution of

diminution which, as they go on (there is a infinitive for noun), amount to being-on-the-increase or

and

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

being-on-the-decrease. That is
are also opposite processes of

-181

tion of motion as

not only are there opposite poles, there between the poles, (cf. Aristotle's defini moving "the actuality of the potential qua potential.) The person now

to say,

asleep

wakes

up

and continues state.

in

a wakeful

state;

next

tinues in a

sleeping
we

And

we

have

seen this cycle repeat

falls asleep itself.

as we

and con

Admittedly,
served

have

not

actually

observed

returning to life
make

have

ob

dying. But don't

there

is

such a process of

And
comes

if, just

as

symmetry returning from Hades plausible? the man awake comes from the man asleep, the

considerations of

the inference that

man

alive

from the

man

dead,

then we seem to have demonstrated what we wanted

to establish, namely, that dead men's souls do not after separation

from

their

bodies disintegrate but

abide somewhere.

Moreover,
try:

consider

the consequences of

denying

the

inference from

symme

"If

generation

did

not proceed

from

opposite

to

opposite and

back

again,

going
without

round, as it

were or

in

a circle,

but

always went

forward in

a straight

line,

turning back
shape and

curving,

then,

you

know, in
stop

the end all things

would

have the

same

be in the

generated.

same condition and

being

(72b)

How

good an argument

I find these
the dialogue

questions much

is this? How seriously is it being offered? harder to answer than do some other readers
1 have heard
or read.

of

whose comments

My

difficulties

are of

four

kinds
1
.

at

least:
one settles
what

Unless

premises claims

and

precisely what conclusion is to be established by what degree and kind of cogency the author of the argument

for it, how can one decide the goodness or badness of the argument? What I mean becomes evident if one considers that if one disregards the fabric
of

the given
seen

premises and

conclusion, a Democritean
various

materialist argument can

be

in

or culled

from the

things

Socrates says,
with

e.g. that round

soul-

atoms must abide

to be

available

for

reintegration

other atoms so as

to

constitute some new

living

being.
of

2. Mustn't

one clear

up the ambiguity
Socrates'

my

phrase

being
3. it

one go about

by disentangling doing this? Supposing that one has articulated

to have
and one

offered"

"offering"

"how seriously is it from Plato's? How does

what with

the argument

is

and what strength

purports

finds fault

it,

can one now

safely infer that

that

Socrates

and/or

Plato knew that the

argument was weak?

somehow

4. Again, and/or Plato

supposing that one has

were

satisfied oneself

Socrates
immor

knowingly

tality, what do they stand True enough, where I

offering to gain? What is the

poor arguments point?

for the

soul's

humorlessly

insist

on

premises, conclusion, logical

cogency, and all that sort of

thing, the dialogue has Socrates talk gaily of

being

182

Interpretation
as to the outcome of arguments

far from impartial

for the

soul's

immortality,

thus not a kosher witness. And I would

cuses me of obtuseness

immediately
account

join the
Socrates'

reader who ac

in

not

taking into

that

friends (both in

the dialogue

the ones with

him in jail

as well as the ones who assemble with and outside

Phaedo
are

to call

Socrates to

mind after

his death;

it

ourselves,

who

reading

what

Plato wrote)

need consolation and might receive

it

even

from

poor

arguments.

Moreover,

when

Plato, later in
(or

the dialogue

(85d),
of

makes

Cebes'

friend Simmias
as

speak of arguments

speeches or

accounts)

the soul

and

its fate

mathematical

trayed as

life rafts, we are told in so many words that anything like cogency is foresworn. Still, the fact remains that Socrates is por spending his last day amidst his friends laying out very elaborate his
soul will

arguments to prove that

live

on.

To treat these
to state

as mere

divertisse
with

ment,
them.

cannot

be

right.

Therefore I feel

obliged

what

fault I find
learn from

My

chief

difficulty
rather

with

the reasoning so far

means

is

this:

As

we

later

section of the

dialogue (103), Socrates

to be speaking

of opposite

things

(pragmata)

than of opposite qualities (auto to enantion) when he refers

to the poles between which the processes that carry

other stretch.

from

one extreme

to the

(60e),
cycles ple

told

his friends

We know that the waking Socrates, who, early in the dialogue of a recurring dream that commanded him to make mu
while

sic, dreamt this dream

the arcs of
watch

in

a condition of sleeping.

Our lives

on earth are

which are

living

wakefully

and
we

living

sleepingly.

Other

peo

who

us

and,

more

mysteriously,

ourselves, through memory,

arcs. will

know that the

same

individual traverses these two

whether

The

question

under

discussion,

namely,
Socrates'

the state of

being

dead

be

a state of

the soul's

gaining the independence from the body and the purity for which, ac report, some human beings long, requires that we consider cording to

finally
how

much or

how little
and

an

individual's life

on

earth,

as

consisting

of

these two
we are

arcs of

inquiring
This

sleeping into.

waking, is like another cycle,

whose

existence

other cycle would consist of the

two arcs

(a) life

on

earth, from

being
under

born,

through acme (the stretch around the meridian), to

death; (b) life

the earth, in

Hades,

the

invisible

realm.

Now in

addition

to the

difficulty

that I have

in

(the waking-sleeping circle ought to be cle, but can it?), I find it hard to know

part of

the

fitting the two circles together being alive-being dead cir

is the thing (pragma) that
arc. of soul and

who or what

traverses now the life-on-earth arc, now the

life-under-the-earth

If this thing is, for example, Socrates, who is a composite what reason is there to hope that in Hades the soul will be
task of ruling over and
wisdom?

body,
the

released

from

caring for its body, free

at

last

to

devote itself entirely to

much of the argu
re-

Both the

astral paradigm

which, I am confident,
and the

inspired

ment now under examination,

sleeping-waking

paradigm seem to

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

quire

183
or

that the

thing

over and under the earth

and

be Socrates

as ensouled

body

embodied soul:

Sleeping

waking

as well as

being

now

above,

now

below

the

horizon

are attributes of animated

bodies. Bear in

mind

that the stars are

living
If,
the

beings for Plato,

on

the other
that

hypothesis
soul of

and Aristotle; for Ptolemy as well. hand, throwing away the just-mentioned the thing which traverses the life-on-earth whereas

analogies,
arc

we

try

is the

embod

ied

Socrates,
we

the

thing

that traverses the Hades arc is exclu

visible world as a

Socrates'

sively
then aren't
with

soul, his

body having

been left in the

corpse,

talking

about

two different things

rather

than about one

thing

contrary attributes? Of course, the opening definition is the

process of

of

death, according
from

to

which

the process

of

dying
be

loosening

soul

body

and

the state of

being

dead

is the
could

state of

each,

soul and

body, existing "itself by

Mightn't

itself"

(auto kath hauto),

taken to amount to a denial of what was perhaps too

sentence:

confidently
Socrates'

asserted

in the last

being

Socrates

consist one

in

being

soul, so that his

present

incarnated

existence would

be

among many

adven

tures of this same thing, the

soul of

Socrates?

Many
well

passages
x.

(Republic

in the Phaedo (1 15d, 1 1 lc, 107c), and in other dialogues as 608 ff. Phaedrus 245, Meno 86, Symposium 212, Timaeus
,

41, Laws x, xii), play

migration

with

Pythagorean-Empedoclean-Indian ideas
moral

of

trans

to point a moral, the

being

that

how

we conduct ourselves

in

our present

life

matters as though

for

all eternity. as a soul with

According
individual
whether

to these passages, the soul of Socrates continues

its

past

life

at

least in the

sense

that this soul's

next

life episode,
of the choices

incarnate

or sans

body, is

chosen or

bestowed because preceding life.

that

were made

in the

course of the

immediately
such

One is tempted to demythologize

talk

about transmigration not

by

combin

ing

it

with

the folk belief that

as we shall

our ancestors

do

die but

are reincarnated

in

urging something like what is said in the Old Testament, that the evil which we do lives beyond us till the third or fourth generation, in grandchildren and great
ourselves,
grandchildren.

be in future

generations.

That

would amount to

Whether

Socrates'

one ought to take

words

in this rationalizing way is the

thing I find hard to determine. On a rationalized reading, the story of the man in the myth of Er, who chooses a next life of evil because his previous life of
virtue was

based solely

on

habit

unenlightened

by

reflection,

would

be taken to

apply, say, to Polemarchus/Cephalus

and

their descendants.

The

reader

question of what minded and

may lack sympathy for my laboring over and exactly Plato's Socrates and Plato intended.
on this question of what

belaboring of the Why be so literal

Plato
meant

humorless, precisely
and what

to be

taken
said

literally

metaphorically, what was said seriously and what was

jokingly?
confess

So I had better

that,

whether

reading

or

listening, I feel guilty

when

184
I
am

Interpretation
caught,
or catch

myself, plugging in
at, the other fellow's read,

a sense that suits

sense.

me, instead of

straining

for, guessing

It

seems to me

that, both in

conversation and when we

we are often much too quick or trivial.

to

rule out mean

ings

which we

believe to be obviously wrong

up in
pride

Sometimes
read

we even

puff ourselves

that we sophisticates know how to

between the

lines, know
is
as not

that this or that is said solely to pacify the vulgar, or again, that it

to be taken straight but obliquely (ironically). We conceive of ourselves

humbly

obvious

embracing the sane exegetic principle that wise men cannot err in ways. But don't we sometimes make this exegetic principle axiomatic
our we

because
readers,

vanity is

gratified that the wise author picked us to

be his
what

elect

being

the ones who have what

it takes to determine in
were pronounced?
of

tone of

voice a wise author's

falsehoods

or

fallacies

It
made

seems

to me that the
we

delicate business
what

hearing

another person out

is

impossible if

disallow that

would not want to mean.

To

put

is something we it paradoxically, I believe it is a mark of

or she means

he

disrespect to

eliminate the possibility that an author's argument or imagery or be wanting, in clarity or cogency or both. What I am attending to is theory may the difference between "reverend (as the scholastics called it) of
interpretation"

a canonical such as

legal

or other or

community-building
myths

and

community-sustaining text,

the Bible
of

the

used
an

by

the Greek

tragedians,

and reverend

interpretation in

the text left us

by

individual

designing

author.

As already said, I do find the

argument

from

opposites

wanting,

yet

interesting identity of the

an

way, since what the argument

clearly leaves

unclear

wanting is the

"thing,"

Socrates.
.

The two 1
.

"middle"

arguments

The

argument

according to

which

the

learning
and

soul

has

a richer store of

mental possessions

to draw on than it could have accumulated over any one

span

of

life from birth to death (73a-77c)

argument are

must, therefore, have

pre

existed;

2. The
so

according to
simple and

which

the mind has the attributes of

its

objects

that, if they
though,
as

thereby indissoluble,

it

must

be (78b-84b)

even

with which

I believe, they too fail, do nevertheless address the question the first argument left us, namely, who or what Socrates is. They
where

will
what

be taken up in the context of Part 4 of this essay, the Phaedo tells us about Platonic Forms.

I try to

examine

judging
to his

I repeat, it looks to me as though the dialogue sets its readers the task of whether Socrates has acquitted himself of the charge of acting contrary
own good

in
sits

leaving life,
easily
"defense,"

thus,

by his

own

standards, irrationally.

Whether this fact

with us or

not, the arguments for the soul's immor to take them seriously. If
of

tality
in

purport

to be his

so we are obliged present

nevertheless order

I turn for the

to another

topic, in Part 3

this essay, it is

to prepare for

taking

the arguments seriously.

Some Observations About

3. RECOLLECTION, CLOAKS, AND LYRES

Plato'

Phaedo

185

Toga
and

and

lyre,

characteristic
and

belongings
speeches
and

of an

late in

our

dialogue far
is

in

by

Socrates

Athenian youth, turn up early as well as in speeches by

"models"

the two Theban

which we

friends Simmias
encountered

Cebes. To the two is

for

soul

have

so

That the

soul

a sort of ether which

expelled

from the

body

at

death

(77e)

and which

then either rises separately to a place above the atmosphere or

immediately
(Cebes);

after

leaving

the

body

gets

dispersed in the surrounding

air

soul is something like a star (rising above the horizon when the hero is born, culminating when he is fully mature and active, slipping below the horizon when he dies) (Socrates). (Cf. Ptolemy, Almagest 1.3, p. 7, man or

2. That the

Great Books Simmias

and of a

of

the Western World edition.)

add two other models

Cebes lyre

that the soul

and

harmony My

(Simmias'

contribution),
contribution).

that the soul'is something

is something like the like a

weaver of

togas

(Cebes'

self-assigned

task in the present section of this essay is to

uses

comment on

some of the

surprising

to

which

the last two

images

are

put

by

Plato.

Socrates

says:

"When someone,

upon

seeing

or

hearing

or

in

some other

way perceiving
aware of

something, not only

recognizes/identifies/knows

that thing, but becomes

same of

(ennoesei) another, the knowledge of which is not the (alle), do we not rightly say that he is being reminded
mindful

(aute) but different

he is
made of a man

that of which

(hou ten

ennoian elahen)!

For example, the knowledge

lyre. But
you

is

different from the knowledge

when

of a

know very

well

that

lovers,
te

they

see a

lyre

or

toga or

something

else that their

darling
notice of

uses

habitually,
of

tend to have the

ten

following

experience

(paschousi):
mind

They

the
the

lyre (egnosan form (eidos) like

these.

lyran)

and also seize

hold in their
which

(en tei

dianoiai)
So too lots

the

boy

whose

lyre it is

is

being

reminded. are

someone who sees

. . .

Simmias is happens to

often reminded of

Cebes. And there variety

of examples

Isn't this type

of experience some

of

remembering,
were

someone

in

connection with

things which

especially when it forgotten because for

long

he

neither saw

them nor meditated on them?

Can
when

a person who sees a

drawn horse
can

or a

drawn lyre be

reminded of a

man, or

he

sees a

drawn Simmias, for

he be

reminded of

Cebes?
and

But it is
of

also possible

someone

to see a drawn
all

Simmias

to

be

reminded

Simmias himself, isn't it? Now don't dissimilars both It became

that

these examples go to show that similars

and

can prompt remembrance?

through
of

when perceiving a thing visually or it some other sense, to become aware from it apprehending by hearing which had been forgotten but which consorted/was associated something else, apparent or

it is possible,

186

Interpretation
the other

with

thing;

and this

may happen

whether

the two things

are similar or

dissimilar."

(73c

ff.)
from the

Allow

me

to present you with a

slightly doctored

extract

notebook

in

which

recorded

my first
not

observations and reflections on the passage

just

translated:

1. Socrates does 2.

distinguish

reminded"

"being
that

from "deliberate
"likes"

recall."2

Only

examples of the

former,
pointing

is, "being
"unlikes"

are given. and

3. The
come

emphasis

falls

on

out that

indifferently
conjuring
resemblance were

in trains. But more,

unlike are

and more

elaborate, examples of unlikes

up an associated held to be more

power of

given, as though association

by

plausible prima

facie

and

the fact that unlikes too have this

evoking 4. While it would be misleading to likes to mere Humean "association by

the cloak and lyre than "spatio-temporal

each other needed special pleading. assimilate

the pairing of

Socrates'

un
and

contiguity"

(since Simmias

Cebes

are friends and relation each

belong

to the

beloved,
made

so that a more

intimate

propinquity"

is

supposed

to tie the unlikes to

other), the

contrast that would

normally be

between "association
applies:

by

resemblance" contiguity"

and

"association

by

nevertheless

Resem

blance is

an

internal#contiguity

an external relation.

call

the relation between

give

the toga and its owner

another without either

"external"

in that the beloved may

his toga to

thereby undergoing alteration; hence their coupling for the mind may become undone. Contrarywise, the rela tion between a portrait of Socrates and Socrates, or a drawing of horses and

the beloved dr the toga

horses, is
the

"internal"

in that,

when one

tries the thought experiment of removing

relation

between the

associated terms while alikes

keeping
and

the terms the same, one

fails: The look-alikes stay

The

for

as

long

as each

is itself. Cebes
seems to me

example of the relation

not

between Simmias
whether

inter

esting because it is
still

easy to decide
when

himself,

still

the same,

(as

seems

it is strictly external: Is Simmias conceivable) he is no longer

Cebes'

friend?
To learn
noted,
what to make of

the features of

Socrates'

address to

Simmias just

we must place notice

the passage in immediate and

wider context.

We then

that not

Socrates but Cebes

was

the one who

first brought up

the theme of
effort
of

"recollection"

proving the

(anamnesis, 126), in order to assist Socrates in his soul's immortality. Cebes, however, unlike Socrates,
much as

speaks of recollection

pretty

though he

were

quoting from the Meno:

"Cebes, interrupting,
of

said

'That

also

holds if it is true,

as

you,

Socrates,

are

fond

saying, that

our

learning (mathesis)
we

is nothing

else

than recollection (anamnesis).

According
previous our soul

to that argument

time the things that

we now call

necessarily knew (perfect of manthanein) at some to mind. But that would be impossible if before it
was

did

not exist somewhere

born in this human form

(eidos)."

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

When
Cebes'

187
that

friend Simmias begs for

"proof"

of

the Socratic
asked

"thesis"

learning
that
so

is nothing other than recollection (where Meno it is), Cebes obliges. He says:

to be

"taught"

"Here is the best

questions well,

argument:

When

people are questioned,

if

someone puts

the

they say everything

be
able

themselves

(autoi),

the way

it is. And yet, if

there weren't knowledge

and right reason/correct speech

(orthos

logos)

within

them

(autois),

they

would not

to do

this."

Cebes making
not

seems to

be talking

about recollection as

deliberate calling to mind, consistency

and

an effort

to answer a question, which in the circumstances supposed, of

studying,

e.g.

mathematics,

involves checking for

of

truth and

is

the sort of automatic

about

triggering

the mind that Socrates seems to be talk

ing

in the

passage with which

I began.

Self-control (soophrosune) is (cf. 114e).

one of

Socrates's

most

striking

characteristics

Upon reading the Meno one is led to believe that this poise and sanity of Socrates is due to his unusually highly developed capacity to or "call to (cf. Leibniz's New Essays bk ii, ch.21, pp. 186ff.). But one is
"recollect"
mind"

also

led to believe that Socrates held that

"natively"

this ability belongs to all their

human beings; that making things, their

mutual and

antecedents and consequences and

"natural"

connections,

clear and vivid

to oneself is

though strenuous,

that avoiding the strain, "not making the

effort,"

is

some sort of

distortion

of our nature.

Given these

facts,

it

seemed odd

to

me

that

in the Phaedo So free

associating.

crates should talk about recollection as though

it

were mere

Moreover,
is to
was prize

later

portion of the

Phaedo

(97ff.)

confirms that to

be Socrates

deliberateness: Socrates there

as a

explains

to his friends how thrilled he

when,

which

young man Simmias and Cebes

name of
or

going through the same stage of life at are now) he heard that a certain philosopher by the Anaxagoras had written a book propounding the thesis that Intelligence

(presumably

Mind is

what arranged and caused each and all

things.

Socrates

couldn't wait

to read the book but found himself sorely disappointed. Anaxagoras did not come through on his promise. Whatever Anaxagoras might have meant in say

ing

that Mind

is the

world's

Ruler,

the detailed working out of his cosmogony

showed that
earth are

he did

not mean

that the way each and all things in heaven and on

so arranged.

is due to their

being deliberately

So Socrates

gave

up

on

Anaxagoras.

Not only Anaxagoras, but also Simmias I Socrates (93ff.) because their
"theories,"

and

Cebes
their

are

found fault

with

by

"models"

mean

for the

rela

tions

of soul

to

body, being strictly biological, pay

room

no attention to and perhaps

don't

even

leave

for

distinctively

moral and

intellectual agency (initiative,

self-rule).

So, I

repeat, at second and third meditation on the piece of the

dialogue

with

188

Interpretation
I began Part 3
the
"lines"

which

of

this essay, it struck me as

curious

that Plato should to Socrates

mind.

have

given

about recollection as mere

"lines"

free

association

and given

Cebes the

about recollection as

deliberate calling to
a sort of reversal of

Being

mildly

surprised

by

what

looked to

me

like

roles, I

thought to myself that I should explain this

anomaly.3

Of

course

to experience
settled

the anomaly as an anomaly one would have to be pretty

conviction that the

firmly

in the

Platonic dialogues

are artifacts made

by

the dramatist

Plato,

not stenographic records of overheard conversations.

prior conviction

Well, then,

this was the

in

me.

"sophisticated"

was a

reader. myself as

Here had

are some of

the questions I asked

I tried to

account

for

what

struck me as a minor anomaly: overboard with

which

1. Wasn't I going
"befits"

or argument

dramatic

my fastidious sorting out of which speech personage? Aren't Platonic dialogues pri

marily invitations to investigation, and doesn't that mean that the things that are being investigated and the arguments, analogies, and experiences brought in for
this purpose are
more

important than
the
mind of
to"

whom

they "belong

to"? In

"real

life,"

mean, the

real

life

of

and proposals that

"belong

human beings, our opponents in

each of us argument.

is full

of questions

Why

shouldn't

the

dialogues

mime

this fact?

2. Had I, perhaps, been careless of differences between the things later (85e ff.and 87b ff.) said by the two Theban friends about body and soul and their
relation?

Though the two

offering),
and

men's

theories

that the soul

is the body's

(Simmias'

that it

is the

weaver and reweaver of

harmony bodily tissue

soul.

(Cebes'

contribution)
soul's
Simmias'

are alike

in that both

are offered to argue against the

immortality, image, on

Cebes'

image does

give some sort of

agency to the

the other

hand,

though capable of the most

fascinating
oc

elaboration, is offered as though,

mess of gut and curred

when

the ratios happen to fall out right, a

harder

stuff

becomes

living (empsuchon)

being. It then

probably be understood as assigning a sort of Aristotelian artisan-role to the soul. The soul, like any craftsman working within a set craft-tradition, executes a "weaving that it did not itself
should
plan"

to me that Cebes

contrive remarks

but inherited.
about

the person who is

"uttered"

Conceivably this is also the spirit in which his quoted doing the recollecting having "knowledge
under

within"

that
preted.

becomes

favorable

circumstances should

be inter

3. As the
me when more

example of the association couple stock of

Simmias-Cebes itself had

which

shown

I took

the fact that the way in

friends

are connected

is

intimate then the way in which a cloak and its owner above), I had been simpleminded in considering only the

are connected

(see

"extremes"

of

being
that

involuntarily
prompting
got me
on
when

prompted

to

find

some

"out

mind"

of

thing

"in

mind"

and of
"anomaly"

oneself

to

gain access

to some "in

mind"

thing. The

going

was a

kind

of artifact of

the microscope of my too-willful

"extremes"

fixing

without

intermediate
Cebes'

cases.

This self-correction

was confirmed

I looked

again at

speech

the

fact that

another person's questions

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

and

189
is

diagrams figure in his

explanation to

Simmias

of

the

notion

that

learning

recollection shows that there are gradations

between

automatic and

deliberate

recollection

(Plato's thought,
conversational

spelled
a

out

in Sophist

263d,

that even solitary

thinking is
I

has

bearing

here).
seems and

exhibit this

tiny

the quickest way of

about

intellectual autobiography because it insinuating that what the speeches of Cebes

slice of might

to

me

Socrates

recollection, taken together,

the

be

"about"

is thinking

or

investigat

ing, i.e.,

finding

and

making

of connections and the

subsequent critical

examination of the strength and nature of these connections.

There is simply
undertake with

no alternative to

starting
the

on

any investigation

one

happens to

the opinions one happens to

are

have, for instance

the opinion that

Platonic dialogues

dramas,

or

opinion

that recollection means, in the

Meno, deliberate calling to mind rather than free association, or the opinion that these two free association and self-critical recall of relevant instances
"opposites."

are

When

one

brings these convictions,

"in"

which

are

already

oneself, to bear on some present question, one tries to make them

with what

hang

together

is

now

being

investigated

and with each other. or even

As

one

keeps going,

one

finds

out that one must

nuance, rearrange,

drop

some of these

convictions

(cf. Phaedo 100).

matter

So it doesn't
association"

if I

was

misguided

when,

initially, I felt

that "free

is

not what we at

from the
be

Odyssey

normally associate with Socrates (cf. the quotation 94d). What matters is that thinking can be self-corrective

because there
woven

are constraints upon what conviction or observation or

theory

can

together or made to harmonize with what other conviction, observa

tion, feeling, or theory. (Cf. 100 and 92c; cf. also how the weaving image is used in the Sophist and Statesman, the weaver's shuttle in the Cratylus.) The
second

thing

that matters

is that

one can make a

fresh

start.

Let's do that. Here is my

the

new question about

the same old thing, namely,

passage about recollection with which purposes that

important for the

Part 3 of this essay began. Why is it Plato had in writing the Phaedo that unlikes too

may function as mutual I answer three ways 1. In terms

reminders?

of writing's relation of

to speaking,

2. In terms 3. In terms To
state

body's

relation

to soul,
to Platonic

of speech's relation

forms.

my hypothesis compactly, I believe that the Phaedo shows that Plato thinks (or wants us to think) (1) of writing as a sign of speaking, (2) of

body
a.

as a sign of

soul,

and

(3)

of

speaking

as a sign of

informed things,

b. informed minds, c. forms themselves.

I
select

for

elaboration

just the

second of

these suggestions, viz. that

body

is

a sign of

soul.4

By

examining in

some

detail how

cloak and

lyre illustrate the body-soul

190

Interpretation
can, I think,
explain

relation we

why Socrates is
than

made

to

dwell

on the and

fact that

things

which are unlike each other nevertheless

form

"couples"

why he is
recol

portrayed as

paying

more attention

is

usual with

him to

involuntary
the same

lection. Isn't it
remarkable that

Socrates illustrates
the two

recollection

by

toga and lyre the

(73),
and

which

young

men

from Thebes
to

use as similes

things, for
toga

body

(87b

86a)?

It looks to has the

owner

me as though

Socrates lover

was made

speak of

how the

mere

power of

reminding the
mere

of

the absent

beloved,
gone

the toga's user and

order

(as does the

lyre

when

the

beloved has

elsewhere) in
as an

to

both

acknowledge and wean

individual. The

Grieving

is to be limited
Socrates'

himself away from love of himself and desire reoriented.

of the emotional
"reminders"

incarnate

most

compendious

description

effect

intended be

by

Plato's arranging for examples of the human

Lovers'

examples of

to turn out to

also

body is,

I think, this:

yearning to see the uncloaked

form

of their

beloved is to be thought

of as

capable of

becoming

through the model of a

::

wholly transferred to the beloved's invisible self "continued garment : bodily form (eidos)
proportion"

bodily eidos : self. And this "continued ing until it reaches (haptetai, 65b) "beauty's
Charmides 154c ff.
,

is
self and

conceived as continu

beauty's

giver"

(cf.

Symposium 211b).

When,
as on
an

on

the other
on

hand, Simmias is
as make a musical

made

to

wonder whether

the soul isn't

dependent bent

the

body
to

is the harmonia

of

the

lyre
this

on

the gut strung

other

tautly

wood so as
on

instrument,
loss
of

is, among

things,

insisting
loss. In

the right to grieve over the

Socrates

as a real and perma

nent

Socrates'

"convince"

speech

to

Simmias that Socrates is

"learning is nothing but

they "belong
to
speak of

recollection,"

toga and

lyre

are

only

loosely

connected with what

to";

that

is, in

retrospect we realize

that

made

body

and

separable, Aristotle, in the third book of the De Anima (see also 403a 10, 404a 26, 405a 14, 408b 19f., 410b 15), deems the mortal indi vidual human being to be separable from immortal Mind.
soul as much as

In the two
tightly:

Thebans'

speeches,

body
also

and

soul

fit

each

other

much

more

The toga that

covers the old weaver

word

is

a product of

his craft,
"in"

and

the

lyre-specific harmonia (the

though not only in its

means also

dovetailing) is
"in"

its build,
as

build,

since

it is

its

sounds

(86c). Thus,
"of"

Simmias
pretty
"from"

and

Cebes

much as

come to employ images, soul is in the De Anima Book II definition of the soul,
actuality"

Socrates'

its

body
is

where soul

or

"first

of a

body
its

that is

"organized."

So it looks
the soul

to me as though the

dialogue

"contrary"

presents

us

with

ac

counts of the soul's nature and

relation

to the body:

According

to the

first,

cloak or a

is something that has or wears a body as the beloved wears or owns a lyre. According to the second, the body is something that has or lyre has
"harmony"

owns a soul as a

when

its

strings'

tensions are

just

right.

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

The fact that Socrates
things"

191

and

the two Thebans are portrayed as using "the same

(toga

and

lyre)

to speak so

differently

of the

body-soul

relation

may be
not re

telling
solve.

perplexity Needless to say, neither can I. The fact that Plato makes the arguments "from

us about a

which

Plato himself

could articulate

but

recollec

and

"from the

soul's

kinship

with

the

forms"

look like
"from

"inner"

"wrapping"

arguments

by

them

in the two different

opposites"

arguments

confirms one's

impression that
to

he "leans

toward"

identifying

self and soul with mind.

(Cf.

how, according
interlocutors,

Hesiod,
luscious

men

deceived Zeus

by

"wrapping"

their offerings of bare bones in

slices of

fat!) Moreover, Plato

"frame"

arranges

for

all

the

even

those who

figure in the

of Phaedo's report of what was said that

last

day

argument

in jail, e.g. Echecrates of Phlius, to band together in their adherence to the for the soul's pre-existing because of its capacity to recollect (87a, 91ef.).

4. EIDE

Perhaps the
section of

quickest

way

of

conveying
which

where

want

to go in the concluding

this essay is to cite two poems, one the other, of

by

the German poet Hans Chris

a

tian

Morgenstern,

select

just

part,

by

the English poet

Gerard

Manley

Hopkins.
fence from hence to thence

Once there
with space

was a picket

between,

to gaze this

An

architect who saw

sight

approached removed

it suddenly

one night

the spaces from the

fence

and

built

of them a residence.

The

picket

fence

stood

there dumbfounded

with pickets

wholly unsurrounded,

a view so naked and obscene,

the senate had to intervene.

As for the
to
Afri- or

architect,

he flew
Max Knight. Berkeley:

Americoo.
edition

H. C. Morgenstern, Galgenlieder (bilingual

by

University

of

California Press, 1966). The translation has been slightly corrected.)

How to

keep is there any any, is there none such nowhere known some, bow or brooch or braid or brace, lace latch
catch or

or

Back beauty,
away?

keep key keep it, beauty, beauty, beauty,

to

from vanishing

O is

there no

frowning

of these wrinkles, ranked wrinkles

deep,

Down?

192
No Do

Interpretation
there's none, there's none,
can you
what you wisdom

no there's

none,

Nor

long be,
may

what you now

are,

called

fair,

do,

what,

do

what you

may,

And

is early to despair:
can

Be beginning; since, no, nothing

be done

To Be

keep

at

bay

Age

and age's evils.

to despair, to despair, Despair, despair, despair, despair

beginning

Spare!

There is one,

yes

I have

one

(Hush there!)

Only
Not

not within

seeing

of of

the sun, the strong sun.

.

within

the singeing
elsewhere can

Somewhere

there

is

ah well where!

one, place,

One. Yes, I
Where
.

tell such a

key, I do know

such a

whatever'

s prized and passes of us

is kept
What high
yes

Yonder

as that!

We

follow,

now we

follow.

Yonder,
Yonder.

yonder, yonder,

From "The Leaden

and

the

Golden

Echo"

To say it
world's

with absurd

brevity: The Phaedo

"betweens"

seems

to me to be about how the

spaces

beauty, in the form

abides
air"

of sun's

that are

like the

between the

pickets,

"beyond the tall (Hopkins).

of

tingeing,

or treacherous

the

tainting

of

the

earth's

Though the
ment, I
want

density

poetry

gratifies
well as

the desire for compactness of state

to be intelligible as

tory
A

prose will come your

story:

brief. So nothing but plodding exposi way for the rest of this essay. No. I do still have to
told "because there
child

tell a

child asked

why it

must eat and was

hungry."

is

little
to

stom

ach-man

inside

you

that gets

So the

fell to,
not

anxious

nurture

the little person that lived in

occurred

its

stomach.

But it did

take

long

before it

to the child to wonder why the little stomach man should get hungry. In preceding parts of this essay I wanted to minister to readers of the dia logue (including my former self) who feel as cheated by it as was the child by
grownup's answer.

the

I tried to show, through

argument

moderately detailed
and

Socrates'

analysis of

first for

for the

soul's

immortality
his

by

sketching the

counterarguments

the soul's mortality

which

partners or

in

conversation

propose, that the

reason

attaching the predicate mortal from/to the subject soul (or self or he or Socrates) turns in every instance on claiming that the soul is like some other thing and that it must, therefore, like that other thing

ing

which culminates

in

detaching

about which

we

suppose ourselves

to know

whether

it is

mortal or

not, be

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

mortal or not.
soul

193

to
a

air

(which

This meant, for instance, that Socrates argued against likening gets dispersed when it leaves its container) and for its being

like
I

star,

which

temporarily disappears from

sight, but

will reappear after a

sufficient

interval.
to hold on both to the
"assignment"

was at pains

is in fulfillment
"better"

of the

fact that everything said in the dialogue that Socrates prove that it is better for him
made

to die than to live (cf.

as

95c)
were

and

to the fact that Socrates is

with

to interpret this

though

it
it

connected

death's

not

really

being

what

to

bereaved
effort to

survivors

appears to

dialogue looks, to
(cf. 107c).

quote a

be, annihilation of the one they love. So the friend, like a "passionate, frighteningly relentless
immortality"

hammer into the

the

reader's mind a conviction of the soul's

Yet

since

means of of

tion, the examining

much of or

establishing this conviction are, with but one excep already available images or models for the soul, it seems
what

to me an allowable refocusing of attention to contend that

the dialogue the soul,

the time does is look at answers to the question who

or what

the soul of

Socrates,

be

coquettish or cute:

Socrates himself, is. In saying this I am not trying to Socrates consistently maintains in other dialogues (cf.
or

Meno 71, 100) that to establish what predicate belongs to a subject one must first know precisely what the subject is. In the case at hand, this means that to establish whether soul is mortal or immortal one must know what it is.
I
call

the models

for the soul,

or

for its

relation

to the

body,

which

are

in the Phaedo "already fallen star, that it is a weaver, that it is

proposed
sumphuton pneuma
=

available"

because the

notions

that it is a

a special sort of pneuma

(cf. Aristotle's

quintessence
other

ether) resembling but

some of

not

identical

with

fire have

come

my way in

books,

them predating Plato or be

of these

longing
poets

to traditions distinct from the Hellenic.

came to the

Many
do

images

seem

to

be folk beliefs. Whether they simply know.

folk through the

not

poets or whether

the

preserved and elaborated on them we

(and

perhaps

cannot)

However,

the Phaedo's two middle arguments

for the

soul's

immortality
sort.

the argument "from

recollection"

(73a-77c)
(78b-84b)
it is in
one cannot

and

the argument "from the soul's

of a

kinship
as

to Platonic

forms"

seem to

be

different

If they involve is shown by the fact that

"models,"

some murkier

way than so
as one could

far encountered, draw the

others.5

draw them

And if these

middle arguments
and consequent

the argument

from
the

recollection

and

that

from the simplicity

poets,
as

indissolubility

of

Forms

owe a

debt to impor Plato

seems

to be suggested in the Meno

(80b)

through the reference to to be more

Pindar,
drew.
Both

the Platonic distance from that

possible

poetic source seems

tant than the

fact that there is

such a poetic

fund from

which

of the middle arguments

depend, for
a

their meaning as well as their

a

cogency, on the thesis that there is

"fine

itself,"

"large

itself,"

"healthy

194

Interpretation
an

itself,"

"equal

itself"

apart

from

such

things as a

fine-looking baby,

large
argu pres

house,
ments

healthy Pausanias,
which and postexist what

etc.

(76e).

Therefore,

according to

the soul

must pre-exist

outlining the two the partnership with its

after
meant

ent

body

this partnership, I shall dwell at some, though not suffi

cient, length on
"themselves,"

Socrates-Plato

could

conceivably have

by

these

the Platonic Forms. not, I the

There essay

will

fear, be

entire at

end.

a pleasing roundup of the dispersed pieces of the The best I can come up with is an appreciative critique meant.

of what

I believe Plato sincerely

The heart

of

this

critique

is that,

while

there is every reason to be grateful to Plato for his

discovering

the realm of
"beyond"

logic have

as the realm

of rational necessity
also

and

sense and

beyond passion, there is

for recognizing that it lies reason to try the hypothesis that he may

misrepresented

his

own

insight.6

What I
as

call

the misrepresentation of his own insight

notion that

is

sometimes

diagnosed

consisting in the mistaken pointing beyond themselves,

"pieces

language,"

of
names.

to do their job of
not

must one and all

be

I do

think that this

is the happiest description, because (for

one

thing) it

slights

Plato's hard-won

discovery
when you
"takes"

(see Sophist) that true consider how what is he is

"given"

and said

false talk is heard

comes

what

by

the speaker as

by having

in sentences, at least the listener: The listener

subject-predicate

format,

both referring and describing. A more nearly just description is, to that in spite of what we hear Socrates say in the Phaedo (99d, e ff.) mind, my about doing his own investigating by way of speeches/arguments rather than by
that

is,

as

way of direct inspection of things, Plato seems to be unwilling to let knowing be anything else, ultimately, than a knowing of, acquaintance with, contact (cf. Meno 71b, Cratylus, Phaedrus, Symposium, Seventh Letter).
(cf.

And I take the outrageously risky step of wondering whether it "keep / Back beauty") that made him downgrade
Hopkins'

was passion skill

(savoir

faire),
we

and

knowledge

of matters of

fact

(savoir)

and

led him to

suppose that
as when

the true goal of

inquiry

is direct

contact with

divine forms (connaitre

know

a person

evidence

for the

landscape) because it seems to me dialogue's asceticism being sincere is simply

or a

that the textual too strong. One

has to do
Socrates'

violence

to the text to overlook or

discount it.
to his

By its being
because
whom
we

sincere

mean

that the Phaedo seems to me to ask of us, as of that we

companions accept

in

jail,

become is

resigned

detachment

not

that

Socrates is
be full

attached

to the Athenian community, for out,

nor

he deems it better if the

execution
of

carried

because he

antici

pates an old age that might

indignity

and pain and expects

death

by

hemlock to be

easy death, but because there is something finer than any human thing contact with which waits for Socrates on the nether side of the horizon.
an

The

moral message of

the

Phaedo is, I believe, that

we ought

to cultivate

the superhuman temperance of willingly giving Socrates up to a

beloved

we

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

deem
worthier

195

than ourselves, namely, the crystalline purities called Platonic

on.

Forms that supposedly draw him become attached (cf. 68a, b).

To them,

not

him,

we ought ourselves

to

It is probably fairly obvious that I believe this invitation to asceticism to be misguided. That is, insofar as the hypothesis that there are Forms and
"above"

"apart

from"

mortal

things

(including human

speeches) is
substitute
when

motivated

by

the

longing for something to know and love that could and that an individual could become intimate with
self and

for

mortal

things

he

concentrates

him

is

have

great

longer bonded to his fellows, I believe it to be a mistake. Yet I sympathy for the feeling and thought that underlie it.
no

Isn't Einstein speaking

of such

feelings
lead

and

thoughts

when

he

writes:

one of the strongest motives that

men

to art and science is flight from

everyday life with its painful harshness fetters of one's own shifting desires. A
escape

and wretched

dreariness,

and

from the
(Schauen-

person with a

finer sensibility is driven to

from

personal existence and

to the

world of objective

observing

theooreiri)

and understanding. pulls the

This

motive can

be

compared with the

longing

that

irresistably

town-dweller away from his noisy, cramped quarters and

where

toward the silent, high mountains,

the eye

ranges

freely

through the still,

pure air and traces the calm contours that seem made negative motive there goes a positive one: simplified and

for

eternity.

With this
...

Man

seeks to

form for himself

lucid image

of the world

(Bild der Welt),

and so to overcome the

image."

world of experience

and

(Ideas striving to replace it to some extent by this Opinions, [New York: Crown, 1954], pp. 224 f., my italics; cf. Phaedo 79d).

by

Nor is it only feelings. Picture

giants of

the intellect like Einstein or Plato who know such

classroom where

the

first-grade

the teacher is checking the

children's arithmetic exercises and she comes to

Johnnie's desk

and

turns to
at

him,
That
right

ever so

pleased, and says,

and

"Very

Johnnie."

good,
you mean

And he looks
good'

her

with great child

irritation

says, "What do
things are

'very
degree

? It's

perfect."

knows that
some

some

not matters of

and not

true or

human authority declares them to be so! So if Platonic asceticism is a it is one of immense importance.
"mistake,"

because

This, indeed, is
Phaedo.

the prime

reason

for the writing

out

of

this essay on the

Well, then, back

existence of

to the arguments for

soul.

immortality, in

particular, for the

pre-

the

learning
Cebes'

understand

quotation

from the Meno to be to this

effect:

1. If studying or learning with the help of a teacher is something that the learner himself does, not something that is done to him by his then teacher, studying or learning is in an important respect no different from
student or
recollection.

Recollection is

an active

one could

lay

hold

oneself,"

of

"by
taken

seeking for something that one believes the reason for one's self-confidence being,
that
one

in the

case of recollection

literally,

knows

one

previously knew

196
the

Interpretation

thing

not now

at

hand

and one

has had

experience

of

fishing

for

some

submerged pretation

thing in the of the famous

mind and

metaphor of

actually catching Socrates that learning is nothing but

active-passive.

one's

fish. This first inter

recol

lection
To

puts all

the emphasis on the polarity

Socrates'

appreciate

that one ought to give a good deal of weight to this

metaphor

first
call

interpretation
to
mind

of

for learning, it is probably helpful to Greek tragedy being done to.

are

two things:

a.)that

Platonic dialogues
active-passive,

as well as
and an

continually

ruminat

ing

about

doing

b.)that Platonic dialogues pay

grammar,

inordinate
that it so

amount of attention

to matters of
you

diction,
was

and

syntax,

and

happens that in Greek

with object.

don't

say

"Ptolemy

teaching

astronomy to

Syrus,"

the

rect object and

the person taught the

indirect direct

thing Rather, both

This
mere

taught the di the

thing

taught and the person who gets taught are

you

objects.

accident, if

like,

of

the Greek language

makes

it important for

someone

like Plato (who

is

always

scrutinizing how
versa) to
a pull

what people

think and do is affected

other

by

what people

say
the
wax

and vice

resolutely the
the teacher.

way, to

make a great

fuss

over

fact that in
When

that gets imprinted

learning by
get the

situation

the recipient

is active, is

not a mere piece of

you put what was

you

just

said

together

with other passages

in the dia
not

logue (98d)
"cause"

result

that the teacher the

"cause"

is only

"condition"

of

the

student's

learning;

of

the student's

learning

is his

love

of

the activity of investigation and/or of the things investigated (cf. Au

gustine's

On the Teacher). This first interpretation

Socrates'

of soul

metaphor seems

to have no

bearing

on

the

question whether

the
a

learning

is

mortal or

im

mortal. Rather, it bears on learning's motion, to use Aristotelian language. 2.) A second interpretation, which
with

being

"natural"

"violent"

rather

than a

one anticipates might

become

connected

the result wanted,

namely
on prior

the pre-existence of the

Any learning
means

is based

knowing

or prior

learner's soul, is this: believing, because to learn is

oriented

to seek. And you cannot seek unless your search

to

some

thing

which

to some extent you trust yourself to know already, sufficiently, at

"it,"

least,
it

to recognize it as
it.7

the very

thing
way

you were and are

looking for,
least
step taken

when

you come upon

as a riddle.

Nor

can you guess at a riddle unless you at

recognize

Moreover,
you

there

is

no

of

ruling

against a

on

the

way to

a wouldbe solution to a riddle or the wouldbe conclusion of a search

unless, again,

trust that there are constraints whether "gentle

or

forces
rely

that

prevail"

commonly
though
you

"imperative

prohibitions."

These too

you must

on as

knew them.
shall we

Now

what

say

about

the very
about

beginning
how

of

learning,
to

guessing,
con

investigating? And
straints upon another?

what shall we

say

we came

know these

interweavings

of subjects and

predicates,

or of one sentence with

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

It
seems as

197
that that

though there

are

just two

alternatives:

Either

we must

everything there is an

that we

know

we came

to know

by learning it,

or we must

deny deny

absolute

beginning
ch.

of

learning

/guessing.
will

These two hypotheses Leibniz's (New Essays bk i

are not

the same. The first

be

recognized

as

2, pp 52, 78f., 87). It amounts to the claim that even if it is nearly true that nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses, still, the intellect itself is "in and its activity and structure
there,"

are not the result of

when we

but the

condition

for

sense experience's

leading

anywhere

investigate.
like Socrates in the Phaedo, treats the
"mortal"-"immortal,"

To
sory"-

someone who,
"nonsensory"

pigeonholes

"sen

as exclusive and exhaustive, and who, moreover,

with

identifies
some

these two

the

pigeonholes

the thesis that

knowledge is
to the claim

learned but innate, being constitutive of the intellect, amounts that the soul is immortal if by soul we mean the intellect.
not at

Let's look

the second hypothesis.

According

to

it, every

premise

is itself

conclusion, that
and there

is,

the outcome of some sort of guessing, reasoning, seeking,

is

no

"reasoning"

in

such a

reasoning that doesn't have premises. I am using the word way that deductive reasoning is only one variety of rea

soning,
called

so

that

"reasoning

from

analogy,"

seeking
Socrates'

and

finding

and

using

what

"models,"

rank as reasoning. most of us

Now
gan"

believe that

and

and, pace right-to-lifers, the

going

opinion

any man's or woman's life "be in Athens seems to have been

womb.

that a human life begins when the child exits from the

But if, because

every

premise

guessings

is itself conclusion, there is though one believes that there is

and

no a

first in the

series of

learnings

or

first in the

series of

drawing

life's

breath in the body,

that prove that the

if, further, learning

learning

only be done by souls, doesn't that looks like the first learning which a child does
can or

really first but relies upon a prior believing child's soul from a prior phase of that soul's life?
not

is

knowing

deposited in the

As
pre-

was said

in

a previous portion of

this essay, Platonic arguments for the

soul often

and postexistence of the

individual
sketch

lend themselves to
interpretation I illustrated it

social of

interpretations. In Part 1 I tried to is

how be

such a social

the

notion of the soul's postexistence might

understood.

plying is solely

what

said

in the Republic's

myth of

Er

about

the man whose

by ap decency

a matter of

habit,
I
am

unenlightened

by

reflection, to the grandchildren of

portion of

Cephalus. At into the

present

talking
A

about

the

the Phaedo that goes

soul's pre-existence.

social

interpretation

of this notion

would, for

instance,
the

go

like this: is

relies on pre-existent person who

Any human being's investigating, studying, guessing knowledge and opinion in the community within which
the

doing

investigating
child, gains

was

raised

and of which

he is

member. an

But I hope

you agree with me that a

individual, in
be in

particular

it is really extremely puzzling how access to this communal fund. It

child must

seems to

some ways quite

strictly true that the

itself actively

198

Interpretation fund
of

guess at the contents of the communal

knowledge (human beings learn

to speak, but

taught); likely that the child's intelligence in is not has it, purely chance, there guessing is genuine guessing, fore has something like premises and/or knows constraints. So although what I interpretation of the argument from recollection is tempting, called the
not

by being

and

it

also seems

"social"

believe it to be strictly true, either to the facts of human learning or to the dialogue. It is not faithful to the dialogue because, for one thing, it fails to I do
not

pay

attention

to the

prominence given metaphor

to mathematical

inquiry

in the

passages

Socrates'

explaining Way back I

proposed was

learning is nothing but recollection. that perhaps recollection is thinking and vice
that
on analysis and

versa.

This

suggestion

based

of the two rather

different

speeches

about recollection given

what

by

Cebes

by

Socrates

and on

the observation that

Socrates

says about recollection what

the

linkages between

brings to the foreground how very diverse is "present to the and what is but
mind"

"absent"

vicariously "made
the
and
mix of

present"

"recalled"

or and

are.

And I

remarked on

how

curious

involuntary, voluntary Cebes's two speeches together.

active and passive

is if

you

take

Socrates'

Yet in urging this very broad interpretation of metaphor that learn is I slighted the fact that the favored ing, studying, investigating recollection,
examples of recollection given
matical

Socrates'

in the Phaedo

and

Meno

are examples of mathe

thinking.

Any adequate account of the import of this fact would the finding of demonstrations for mathematical truths and
mathematical

have to
the

go

into both
of go

demonstrating
have to

truths. Nor would this be sufficient; one would also

of mathematical

into the

finding

truths that might be understood to be explana this topic for another

occasion.

tory

of phenomena.

reserve an exploration of

In the

context of the present

essay I merely
whole of

note that one effect of

selecting

mathematical which

thinking from the

thought is that the kind of

thinking

characteristically encounters logical musts and cannots is, so to say, shoved to the foreground. Thereby what is already identified as nonmortal be cause it is nonsensory (viz. thinking) is moved still closer to the Divine by giving
us experience of

inexorability
poem

(cf. Iliad

"

and

the

will of

Zeus

was

accomplished,"

Parmenides'

On Truth, Fr. 8, 1. 32, Republic

and x

passages

on noncontradiction at

iv 436b-40

Just
Forms"

one more

step is needed,

which

602d ff., Sophist 230b). is taken in the argument for the

soul's

soul's

immortality

that I dubbed "the argument from the

(78d ff. [p. 273 Loeb]). This last step is that assimilated to becoming like that which is known. Were this
assumption

kinship with the knowing is a becoming

tion, because
Forms

perhaps all

true, and were it shown that all scientific investiga investigation scientific or not, depends on the soul's
and
"simple"

knowing

foreknowing

are

recollecting Forms, and were it established that these immortal (because and thus indissoluble), then the immor

tality

of

the soul insofar as this soul was,

is,

comes to

be "in touch

with"

Forms

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

might

199

be

said

to have been demonstrated. To the Forms

passages

we

must, therefore,
about

turn,

or

rather, to

in the Phaedo,
a

and a a

few

other

places,

Forms.

These

are:

65, 74-77, 78b-84, 92a-bff., 100

I
are shall

f.,
to

103e.
are:

The

questions

pay

little

attention

(a)Of

what

are

there

Forms? (b)What

My
are

answers, to

Forms (in the

Forms?(c)Why suppose that there are Forms? them baldly in a preliminary way, are these: (a)There sense of eide chooristaf of qualities that are inherently rela
state
somethings

tional. (b)The Forms are the relationships, I mean the

to

which we

in English tend to

refer

by

what are called abstract nouns

equality,

justice,
and
and

beauty, magnitude, health. (c)It is Forms if one takes words to be

holds that names, to do their job indeed
even
must refer

irresistibly
names

plausible

to

suppose

that there are

for their
up"

senses

(logical
must

depths)
"refer"

of

"calling
name of

the named,

to some one

thing if the
be

is

not

to be

ambiguous.

And

if

one

has
of

a more complicated

theory

like

theory

Forms

would still

plausible.

discourse than this, something What is not plausible, to me at

not

least, is the
Let

rank that

is

given to

the

Forms, by Plato, but

evidence
"good,"

me now

try

to explain and furnish textual

"just,"

only by Plato. for these answers.

"strong"

What is it Socrates
must

"fine,"

"large,"

"healthy,"

about

that

should single them out and of

be "in
or

themselves,"

from among other qualities and claim that they beyond just men or cities, apart from fine
men and

horses

young women,

healthy

children, strong

carts and

boxers?

(65d, e), in

Since roughly the same set of examples occurs the Republic (479), in the Meno (72d), in the Parmenides (131a), why Socrates
seems to

repeatedly, in the Phaedo

we must ask

believe that something is left out,

over

looked, lias,
are

were

it

said that

the

enumerated words or names

(onomata)

are mean

ingful in that they

and so

name such

beings (onto)

as

on, or, if you

men.
attention

like,

the particular

healthy Pausanias, strong Cal health, strength, beauty etc. that

adjectives

in these

In calling

to the fact that

on

certain

(in

neuter

singular)
that

recur whenever

Socrates touches
am are:

the theme of eide choorista

with one

(Platonic,
as

is, independent, Forms), I question what such Forms

tle sometimes

quarreling If they were any

e.g.

fairly

standard answer

to the

"universals,"

and all
xiii

Aristo

leads

us

to believe (see

Metaphysics
"snow"

1078b33),
as

nouns as

well as adjectives should

figure in the list.

"fire"

Aren't

"man"

"animal"

and
"just"

and

and

just

"predicable

of

many"

as are of

and

"beautiful"?

Why, then,
whether

are

they

not parade

instances
"man"

independent Forms? The Parmenides

puts

the

question

for kind-words like

"wood"

or

"horse"

"gold"

"fire"

and mass-words such as

or
prototypical

or

to be

meaningful

one must suppose

itself"

that there is a

"man

himself,"

"fire

itself,"

"wa

ter

(Cf. Philebus 15b

and

dialogue believe that the

answer

Timaeus 49, 51b, 30). Most readers of the is in the affirmative. They base this conclusion
portrayed

largely

on

the fact that Socrates

is in this dialogue

( 1 30c)

as

rejecting

200

Interpretation
the domain of Forms only because he is
"dirt"

such an expansion of

embarrassed

at

the thought that the same reasoning that generates a "water

"hair,"
"mud,"

itself"

would also
Socrates'

generate a

per se.

Parmenides diagnoses

intel

lectual This

condition as one of youthful excessive respect

for high-low distinctions. As

we see

seems are

to

imply

that the

Socrates'

young
and worthless

exclamation
things"

them,

so

they

spoken of

"mean

like hair

and

mud, things

that are, so to say, too base to be "called

them,"

after"

any totemic
Socrates'

ancestor

"beyond

is

mere prejudice.

exclamation is virtually a I am, however, struck by the fact that quotation of the famous passage about fingers in the Republic (523). According

to these
names.

texts,
(See

men and

fingers

and sticks and stones

directly
is

"deserve"

their

also

Alcibiades

I,

st.

111c.)

Their to ti

"in"

en einai

them.

enumerated is that according to the do not call for Forms which exist apart majority of the dialogues, "thing from the things that illustrate them. (I leave unsettled whether they ought to be

The

conclusion

I draw from the facts just

words"

"early"

"middle"

called aeus as

and

over against

the Parmenides

and

Philebus

and

Tim

"late.")
adjectival character alone sufficed

If, however,
there
must

for Socrates to believe that

the things

be

Form

"patron"

as a sort of

after whom all ought

bearing

the

adjective as a patronymic are ancestral

called, there

to be a Form "the hot to my

itself"

to all hot things. But "the hot

"eponym"

itself"

nowhere

knowledge func

tions as an

(see Parmenides

131a,

where

that word and notion are

employed) "shared

out"

among participating hot things.

enumerated adjectives name good

Is it, then, because the

desire,

that

they

are

treated as somehow special?

makes of the

telic or

luring

character of one must

things, objects of but whatever one Perhaps, the qualities for which Socrates claims
tell a story that takes into account that
with

that there are

equal

separate

Forms,

is the Platonic Form

of

the idea

elaborately dealt (and inequality) is at least as equality

most one

in the

Phaedo9

and

that

"foundational"

much

for the
poli con

supposedly "value-neutral", desire-muting tics: Euclid's Common Notions have just

mathematical

sciences as

for

theme

equality

and

its

traries, I could imagine that Gestalt

greater

than, less than.

psychologists and phenomenologists would pro

as

pose that we think of

ization"

Platonic Forms

the

"limits"

to some process of "ideal

(whether

postulated or

acknowledged)

which

realizes, recognizes, that

the cognitive and moral and aesthetic demand

is for
of

perfection

perfect

justice,

perfect

(need, or even lust, that is, eros) health, perfect equality, perfect any
is
it?"

the things about which Socrates asks "What

what

although,

or

rather,

because
I

the world supplies never quite comes through

by fully

meeting

the standards of the given desire (cf. Phaedo

would accept

74d,

e).

their proposal, though I

a

would add

the rider that the aspira

tion toward perfection might be

demand for

incomplexity

that deserves tam

and

ing: I've

always

liked Whitehead's reminder, "seek simplicity,

distrust

it."

Some Observations About

I
would

Plato'

Phaedo

201
("the
of

further
or

add

that the Gestalt

square

theorists'

perfect geometric shapes

not

circle

itself") do independent Forms that I have cited.

So far my
an adjective

itself"

"the

figure in any

of

the Socratic lists

claim

is that

being

a normative adjective/attribute

(I mean,

being

the sense of

which

involves

the thought that there are standards to

"good."

live up to, as in the case of 7; Phaedrus 263; Laches 192)

condition

"healthy,"

"beautiful,"

Cf. Euthyphro 5e,

may, on

for implicit

reference to a

Platonic principles, be a necessary Platonic Form. It is not a sufficient condi

tion.

Just

one

way

of

not give occurs to me:

making sense of the examples that Socrates gives and does There are Platonic Forms for those qualities that belong

to things only insofar as

they

are ranged under a condition or

in

so

far

as

they

are vis-a-vis some correlative and/or

in

some context.

What Plato discovered is,

mathematics and politics.

believe,

the reality of relations and their primacy

in

By

"reality"

I mean,

not

figments that depend

on

some

individual's

having

originated

dream

by

them, as one might say Hamlet was originated by Shakespeare or a its dreamer. By their primacy I mean that right reasoning and percep
and

tion is due to recognizing this relational character

perception

wrong reasoning

and

is chiefly due to

failing

to recognize
recognized

it.
something about relativity that I call it our
"gappiness"

But I bears

mean more than this.

Plato

on our entire emotional and

intellectual

nature.

(Ungesdttigtkeit). Plato is

ever

talking

about this:

for instance, in Republic ii

neediness and

(369b), Socrates identifies

of self-sufficiency.

the origin of cities as

individual

lack

be

entailed

by

In the Symposium (202b), the nondivinity of love is said to to be divine is to be selfthe very meaning of the words
greed proves

sufficient.

But love's
of

that

it is

not and

has

not what

it longs for.

This

dependency

love

on what

it is

of marks

its

nature through and through.

Not only is love relative rather than absolute, it is multiply relative according to alia tes genneseoos kai tou tokou en tool Diotima ou tou kalou ho eroos

kalooi (206e). Knowledge too is

inherently
knows,

relative, and in several respects,

being

of the

known,
notion

of

the one who

and of or

among

other

knowledges.

The Theaetetus Once the has

makes quite a point of

this relativity.

that Plato

entered on the scene, one no

is interested in studying relativity and its kinds longer stumbles over previously weird pas
where

sages, like the

long

stretch

in Republic i

Socrates
gaps

seems

to be pestering

Polemarchus

with the question

"

how to fill in the

how

in the formulas "justice is

the craft of giving

to
show each and

It

would not

be difficult to
kind
of

about one or another

"to"
"from."

being

relative:

every Platonic dialogue is Speech is or as well

"of"

"about"

as

and always of

(cf. Sophist 244, 263c). So

else that

are

knowledge,

rule, part,

whole,
case.

something

is in the

possessive or some other oblique

The

men who

do the speaking, teaching, loving, ruling may think that they,

202

Interpretation in the naming case,

rather active rather

who are

than passive, giving rather than re

"substantial"

"independent,"

ceiving, commanding
whereas whom

than obeying, are address, the pupils

and
whom

and

the

crowd which command are

they

they teach,

the slaves

they

insubstantial

dependent. Yet for the

what

performance

of

any of these imposing roles they depend on I believe that one of the reasons for Plato's

they deem beneath

them.

never quite

losing

his

charm

is

the depth

he

gave

to this insight.

Is there then

no one and

Platonic Forms,

nothing absolute, self-determined, self-sufficient? like the divine Nous of Aristotle's Metaphysics book
meant

Lambda,
relative use

are, I think,

to be the absolutes to
relative to

which

mortal

things

are

but

which are not

in turn

these

mortal

things.

T.S. Eliot's word, the "objective

what

correlatives"

for the human

They longing

are, to
to
of

stoop before
worship.

by

its very indifference to

adoration shows

itself worthy
absolutes
not

To

savor

the strangeness of this thought that the the project, to be satisfied

longing for
and

is, if I
things
"just,"

understand

by

relationships

themselves,

that are related,

"healthy,"

I turn

now

to the topic of

equality

try

to show how
what

"strong,"

"excellent."

(I

mean

the qualities

on

called the

recurrent

list

of

Form-demanding
a

names) might, from

"large,"

a certain point of

view,
un

be deemed to have
problematic

logical

structure analogous

to that of the seemingly

"equal."

because

value-free qualities

Clearly,
relative out

the quality of

being
it is

equal

belongs to

thing only insofar

though this this stone

as

it is be

to another, of

which

an equal.

Observe,

is

not pointed

by

the

dialogue,

that the other

thing

whose equal

is

need not

in many Notice, too, here, another dialogue, remarks on our getting into intellectual muddles because we speak (and perhaps even think and feel) inarticulately, fail to notice or to say
stone a stick.

but may be

that although Socrates

and

that "this stone is both equal and

unequal"

relative

to that stick on the one

hand, this other stone on the other, we are, even after becoming explicit to this degree, still speaking elliptically. This stone can obviously be one and the same
stick's equal and unequal

its

equal

in length but its

unequal

in

weight.

The (in

Greek) inherently oblique-case-needing

and
not seem worth

character of

being-an-equal-

stick-or-stone,
stone

the multiply-relative character of

being-an-equal-stick-or-

may

belaboring. But

you will,

imagine,
in
and

agree with me
moral or politi

that these logical truths become more than a

cal context.

little

interesting
equality

(Cf. Aristotle's treatment 97c

on

of claims to

inequality

in the

Politics,
health

also

"best for

each and

best for

all").

concerning relativity bear on such qualities as justice, excellence, and beauty)? The Meno gives, or at least suggests, an answer. But, since it is an answer supplied by Meno, who has a bad reputation, many readers do not appreciate
observations
or strength

But how do these

(or

what

he

says. a

Wouldn't it, from

Greek

physician's point of

view, be true that the health

Some Observations About

of an old man

Plato'

Phaedo

203

is different from that

of

of a man at mid-career

in that, say, the

androgen

level

the one is
androgen

healthy
level,
we

for him but,

sort of
want

should

the other have the

or unhealthiness

numerically
would exist

same

some

imbalance for

in him? And do in

really

to say that the same degree of

required
us

muscular strength

a man and a woman

we expect a

is

to call either of

them strong? Or that

same

boy

of six who

is

spoken of as

tall to be the

height

as

tall teenager? And are we entirely confident that Socrates

would and should reject

Meno's

notion that a woman's

way

of

being

excellent

is different from Meno is

not

a man's? of excellence as relative

simply wrong in speaking

to station in

life,

and

the same

mentioned.

holds, according to my argument, for the other qualities Throughout, inexplicitness about the condition under which the
spoken of

quality that is

belongs to
In this

what

it

qualifies

tends to generate misap strong, splen

prehension and misreasoning.

respect

equal,

healthy, tall,
wrong,

did, just,

and good are alike.

For example, it

seems abhorrent

that for vultures

until

to feed on the corpses of

heroes is both
Persian
or

right and

one

makes

explicit whether the corpses are

crates

Hellenic. Well
said

and

good. But So
about why.

finds fault
with

with

Meno's

answer.

So far I have
(71e

nothing

Compare

Meno's

invention
"There

about what are

litany being equal

about virtue

f.)

this statement of my own

is:

or of volume. show

many kinds of equality, as of weight, or of length, or of speed, A balance will prove things equal weight. A stopwatch will help

their equal speed. Perfect coverage

by

each of each will show

their equal that

length.

Pouring

the liquid that fills one container into another and

will establish

finding

there is no overflow

volum

that the two containers are

of equal

Would
said

we not side with

Socrates in

feeling

that although everything that was

is true

and relevant and perhaps even

"rejected"

indispensable,

(cf. the indispensable

the opening

and nevertheless of the

examples of

knowhow

and science at

Theaetetus),
reach

the tenor of our question is not

being

appreciated.
ways

We

wanted to

greater

clarity
equal.

about

how

all

these different

of

being

equal are ways of

being

When Aristotle, in the Physics, defines

tential
qua about

motion as

"the actuality (viz. in

of the po

potential"

he is

defining

"motion

whole,"

as a

because he is saying

respect of place, something in respect of size, in respect of quality) are akin. Thus he is giving the type of answer Socrates is ever seeking. He is defining the genus.

how the different

species of motion

In the Meno, Socrates himself illustrates in

to consider
excellence

what spirit

he

would

like Meno

Being
how

a rectilinear and
"opposite."

by being

answering the

"what-is-it?"

question

about shape.
some

a curvilinear comes

figure are, for Socrates, in

with an answer

manner

Nevertheless he
and

being

circular

being

triangular

up both

to the question

are ways of

being

figures (cf.

Aristotle, De Anima ii 414b-415a end; see also Charmides and Theaetetus). What motivates this Socratic hunt for the generic? How is it connected with

204

Interpretation
apart of

the postulating of Forms

from the
claim

above

the things "called

or are

after"

the

Forms? And
of relativity?

what

became

my

that

Forms are,

primarily, patrons

The

example

from the Meno just given,

which shows

how the
ways of

genus

figure

manages

to hold the round's and the straight's

gives us a clue:
ascent

conflicting
a

being

figures

together,

Intellectual
antagonistic

to the genus

is

frequently

way

of

rising

above

mutually
a

ways

of

being

and seeing their togetherness, under

their

forming

"community"

whole, a

(koinonia)

the generic totem.

mean

A many
used

homely by
the

way

of

of us about

Nixon's

illustrating what "enemy

is

to meditate on what troubled

list."

When

we

heard that this

was

the label

that Nixon

they
each

were

of the President, many of us felt his camp had thereby become scoundrels (panourgoi), because denying that American political parties, even if they contend against
and are parties of

Committee for the Re-Election

other,

the American people, that there is a genus that

holds

together the different ways of

being
or

American

citizens.

As this

example

shows,
also

reminding conflicting
"akin"

social

political can

parties

that and how

they

are

or of one genus make a

(sungenos)

be

of great practical

importance,

that

is,

difference in deliberations steering toward action. For me the most vivid instance of what I am talking about is the speech whereby the brothers of Joseph, in the concluding chapter of the book of Gene
sis

(50:16-21),

seek

to move Joseph to mildness towards them.

servants of

They

say:
your

"Your father
father."

said

before his death, forgive the

of your attention.

the God of

It is the indirectness
am

that speech's rationale for

reconciliation

to

which as

calling

there is something that is regarded as to theion,

rule and

The indirectness betokens that only insofar divine, inasmuch as it is of a

all are

kind to
serve,

can not

hold sway whereas the rival mortals mortal rivalry be stilled (Phaedo 80a). every is
ascent

to be

ruled and

to

But

to

(recollecting
for
an

of?) the

genus

that contains diverse and

even rival species

has

such practical effects

for the

community.

Sometimes

all

that

is

gained

peace of mind

individual. Thus it

appears

to me that

people who

skip the

earlier sections of the

"vulgar"

overlook among the the different and apparently competing ways of being (empsuchon) by desire for goods that are of diverse species (cf. Aristotle, Nichomachaean counted
"animated"

Phaedo because they don't like to be the fact that the Phaedo acknowledges

Ethics i.6),

yet of one genus

in

being

good.

To

recognize

that,

as

Pythagoras
sell,

put

it, life

or at

least human life is like

festival,
sellers,

where some go to

some to win

honor

by

proving through their

watch

victory that they

and

outrank their

rivals,

and some

just to

the game, the

the watchers, is to be on the way to

of

becoming
and

reconciled to the

fact

that each way

ents

life

claims

that it is the true way,

conflict with

to itself

will

come
of

into

the others.

in trying to win adher My brief and perhaps

one sees the spe

slightly
cies of

unusual way human life as

expressing this

recognition

is to say

species of one genus.

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

205

Sometimes, however,
equality
comes to the

and

here the so-to-say

privileged status of

the Form
satis

fore,

ascent to the genus gives

immense theoretical

faction.
Euclid's Elements
idea
of postdate

the Platonic

dialogues, but 1 imagine

as

that the
the sci

recognizing truths

about

equality-inequality
probably
existed

"common

to"

ences

arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music,

science of weight

and whatever predecessor of was

Archimedes'

already
come

on

the scene

when

Plato

wrote

his dialogues.
we

To
truth?

what are

the Common Notions true? How do

to know their

The Socrates But the

of

the Phaedo answers: We learned them via mortal and

per

ceptible things that sign of our

happened to be

equal

to one another in this or that

respect.

only being being directly informed by these things is that the very things from which we learned about being equal are (a)only approximately equal and (b)only equals as re
reminded of

"the

itself"

equal

instead

of

garded name

in terms

of one rather than another of

their attributes, and (c)deserve the

only The truths that Euclid

truths in that

vis-a-vis a correlative. collects under

the
all

heading

Common Notions

outrank

other

they

are

Common to

the sciences, rendering arithmetic,

weights, music
akin

plane and solid well as

geometry, astronomy, the

science of

theory,
seems

as

the subject matters of these

power of

several

sciences,

(sungenos). More in

over, the demonstrative

these diverse

species

of science

large

measure

to

hinge
when

on

the Common Notions.

of genus earlier through

Now

whereas

I tried to illustrate the idea

the

political and social examples,

diverse

species that

belonged to the

genus

were

"contained

in"

their genus,

edo the genus of equal

it is my best guess that according to the Pha things to which Euclid's Common Notions are strictly heard
musical

applicable are not equal sticks or stones or equal equal observed angles made

intervals

or

by heavenly
them
as.

bodies. Rather, these

and

common notions

hold strictly true

tion

of equals that are

purely
"the

perfectly

and without qualifica

what their name proclaims

And beyond them, higher

of mutual equals

yet than

there is the
and

source

having
it,

mutuality.

This One is the Form "apart

above"

the
broth-

things

called after

whence mutual equals

have their mutuality, their

these terms
are

"perfect"

erliness.

It

outranks

the terms

related even when

in

"mathematicals"

the way that

To "the ultimately

itself"

equal
"look"

in this

when we

It is the relationship equality. the word Socrates would say that we pronounce such truths as that equality is transitive
are.

sense of

and symmetrical. over

To this

same

Form the things here

with

on earth

(and

even

those

the

earth

that can be seen

"look"

the body's eyes) that are yoked together as

aspire

each other's equals

short"

when

they

to be true to their name but "fall

"inferior"

and remain

(Phaedo 74d).
answer

Let

what's

been

said

be my tentative

to the three questions I prom

ised to

take up:

206
1
.

Interpretation

Of

what

are

there

forms? Of
also

relational

qualities

such

as

figure in the

mathematical sciences

but

in

politics and morals.

"fathers"
"patrons"

2. What
able

are

the forms?

They

are

the

or

of

the

innumer

couples, triples, quadruples, bonded to each other

by

the

relation

they bear

toward each other.

3.

Why

suppose

that there are forms? Because the relation-words, which are

the very words on which much of our reasoning their

meaningfulness cannot
"towards"

turns,

are

meaningful,

and

be

explained

by treating

them as the names of the

things that are

each other

by

virtue of

their relation, not even if one

primar

takes these things

in groups,

small or

ily

it signifies, secondarily of Now this entire excursion into the region

name of what of our obligation

large. The word, if name it is, is what it denotes.

of

the Platonic Forms

self-defense

was

for the

sake

meeting friends. And that

to appraise the

Socrates'

before his

self-defense was given

form

of attempts

to

demonstrate

the soul's immortality.

We must, therefore,
the dialogue his

return

to the question whether, when toward the end of

corpse stretched out and would

friends

Socrates'

see

Crito has

closed

its

rightly hope that Socrates now associ ates with beings better than themselves, namely, the Platonic Forms. I hope, however, that I have My own belief is that the answer is
mouth and
"no."

eyes, these friends

somewhat succeeded

Socrates has
true self
will

not

in conveying that if one says if one contends that established that it is better for him to die because at death his
"accretions"

"no,"

become disencumbered

of
rather

and will gain

full

intimacy

with associates over and under

long divined,
the sun.

one

has to think

carefully

about

everything

One
find

of

the things one learns

from Platonic dialogues is that

an assumption.
succeeded,10

one should

try

to

out what

follows from
Socrates's

denying
have

If the "middle
ways good

arguments"

not

then I can see only three

what

in

which

drinking

of the

hemlock is

"doing

he

for him. Two

of these you will

Socrates is using the

a

verdict of

probably not like. the Athenians as

a permissible mode of

suicide, anticipating
p.352).

troubled old age (cf. Memorabilia IV. viii, Loeb ed.

2. Socrates is
will remember

"making a name for him, by dying for Athens

in
spite of

himself,"

and philosophy.

shaping how future generations Despite the fact that way as this in the for fame plays so immense
such

Socrates is

made and

to speak of other heroes in some the fact that the

some
passion

Symposium,
a role

in human life, I have because he is so profoundly

difficulty

aware of

ascribing this motive to Socrates how the passion for fame makes one
the

dependent on those who bestow fame. And I was under Einstein passage, which towards the end speaks of
for the lived world, shows that becoming beings is one of the prime motives of the man
whom

impression that the

substituting the intellectual independent of one's fellow human

Plato

portrays

in the

guise

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

of

207
neou

Socrates (cf. Epistle ii 314c, legomena

3. Socrates judges that the
good of

sookratous

kalou kai

gegotos).

Athens is his

good and regards the exe

cution of a

procedurally for this last way, that seems to show that human being, or at least certain human beings are is
If
you opt were there

correct

judicial

verdict as a public good. what a

thing,

or at

least It

a matter of relations.

may,

but

argument enough and

time,

show

that relationships

derive

from facts of

being

related.

NOTES

1. Apologeomai is the

correlative of p.

kateegoroo (Liddell

and

Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon

expression

[Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968],

when,
own want spent with a

207). At Phaedo 63e the latter is the

Socrates

uses

reminding contrast between the city's representative little band of friends, he says, "Never mind about him. To you,
to explain
philosophy."

("him,''

viz. the

who are

jailer) and his now my judges, I

(logon apodounai) why a man is of good courage when he is to die if he has his life genuinely in The Meno's logon didonai is likewise a political expres

sion

logon didonai is

what a magistrate

does

at the conclusion of

his term

of office.

Memory and Recollection, ch. 2, especially 453a7, where these are expressly distinguished, recollection being a kind of searching; cf. also Nichomachean Ethics 1 1 12b20.
3. A
in
reader to whom

2. Aristotle, On

showed a

draft

of

this essay considered my use of the word "deliberate-

ness"

connection with nous

grossly

misleading.

The issue is too important for this essay (which

is,

after

all, primarily intent on gaining some clarity about relations between thought and
query.

desire,

not

to repond to his

But it is too large really to tackle. So I compromise with a note. Disregard for the moment passages in the Republic which contrast dianoia with noesis. Disre
what

gard also

Aristotle

says

in Metaphysics Lambda. Nous is,

after

all,

not

an

invention

of

philosophers.

To judge
writings

more

by the entries from Herodotus, Homer, Xenophon, Platonic dialogues and Aristotelian broadly that are recorded by Liddell-Scott, the range of meaning stretches over
("this is the
sense of

houtos ho
effect"),

noos tou rematos

the word"),

pros ton auton noun

("to the ("to

same

en noun echein plus

future infinitive ("to intend"),

poiein ti epi noon tini

put

into

someone's mind to

do"),

agathooi nooi

("kindly"),

ek pantos noou

("with

all

his

soul/heart/mind").

nor that

A survey of these entries leads me to believe that neither the contrast between heart and head between will and understanding is in or associated with the word nous. As far as I can see,
root of

the overall sense of the

yourself

is something like "paying

the soul or of the

attention,''

with
heart?"

the question "What part of

unasked.

is

attentive?

Eye

body, head,

or

left

The

questions

"Why
Or do have

are you
you

paying attention? Do you mean to do something as a result of what you've noticed? mean to demonstrate something? Or are you just absorbed in what you are attending
the the
scene. passage now

to?"

not come on

Consider

in the Phaedo

on which

I drew

when

characterized

Socrates (97c

ff. ), Socrates says that when he heard that it is nous which diakosmoon te kai pantoon aitios ("nous is what arranges and is responsible for all things"), this seemed somehow right to him. He imme diately adds: "If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything (panta) and each thing In a sentence a little later, this emphasis on "best for each and (hekaston) in such a way as is
best."

best for

all"

is

reiterated.

That is, Socrates

where

never

talks about a nonarranging nous!

Purely
seemed

contemplative

nous, as in Metaphysics

Lambda, is

never given entry.

Rather, it looks

as

though the later passage,

Socrates

speaks of what seemed

best to the Athenians

and what

best to him, is already

nooi

being

prepared

for

action rather than causes of events and as

for. Thus I take Socrates to be talking about reasons maintaining that when someone does something, or

does everything

he does

what

he does

out of/from a/because of a regard

for

what

is the best

of

208
each

Interpretation (including himself)

and

for

all

(including

his family,
something

and the

city,

and

the little band repre

sented

by

those with
a

him in

prison on

his last day).

deliberately"

I have

very hard time

distinguishing "doing

from

doing

it

after and as

a result of attending to the good of each and all. Doesn't deliberation (even about how the various pieces of a lock fit together) consist in trying to figure out what, under the given circumstances, is

fit for

each and

for

all?
people other

I certainly agree that ations (what they "saw

on

than Socrates get distracted

from the

outcome of

their deliber their eye

not

clearly"

when

they

were so

lucky
say,

as

to reach clarity), don't

keep

the ball (viz. the good of each and all).

other of

So if I

am

to make sense of the

fact that Socrates is

like

people, I shall have to listen to those

and

who

"Ah, but
"insight"

there

cup
my

seeing clearly
people

the

lip

of

doing

in

saw."

accord with what you

is many a slip between the I therefore appreciate what But I

and

"will"

"action.'

tempts

to postulate

as

own

tendency is

to work rather

and mediating between with the idea of concentration (see 83a

confess that
on
ath-

80e-end

roizesthai), substituting it for will, or identifying the two. Consequently I often wonder in the most literal-minded way about Meno's opening question, because it seems as though human excellence
consists so

largely

in this ability to concentrate,

very
much to
vii would

which seems

to be helped along talent

or grace.

education, but

nevertheless seems

be
to

a matter of

by regimen and Examining Aristo

speech

tle's Nicomachean Ethics

greatly
so?

help

clarify the issue.

4. Allow
reminds.

me

to outline what
manage to

would want

to say under headings

readers of
of"

(1)

and

(3). Audible

How does it

do

Many
to"

Plato answer,

turn his or her mind to the eide "referred

spoken.

or

"partaken
and of what

by

prompting the hearer to the individual words he hears

by

On this interpretation
eidos

of what

speaking is

Plato's Socrates
this

means

by

eide,

there ought to be an
such a

for every

"significance."

significant word, the eidos

being

I hold that
substitutes as well as

theory
and

of

for things
even

language, one which refuses to make do with an account of words as insists, instead, that words have logical depth as well as breadth, Sinn
as well as

Bedeutung, intension
believe that it
argued

extension, is
whom

more

nearly like the truth than

most of

its rivals. I
as will

was

Plato to

we, in some complicated way, owe it.

depth,"

But,

be

below,

the evidence of the dialogues is against this general identification of eide

expression

with

logical depths. For the To fasten

on

"logical

see

writing

and urge that reflection on

its astounding

C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol.2, ch. 5. powers is among the Phaedo's

themes might seem merely modish. Yet consider, the

Phaedo,

more even

than the rest

of

the

dialogues, is
to Socrates.

a memorial to

Socrates.

Obviously

the marks on wax or papyrus bear no resemblance

They are letters not drawings. The only respects in which they seem to be like Socrates is that they are visible (have shape and perhaps color) and mean something (albeit only to those snubwho have learned to read). So, except for being corporeal they utterly fail to resemble the
Phaedo
and

nosed man whom men wise

his

companions

deemed wisest,

most

just,

and altogether

best

of

the

in their

acquaintance.

Nevertheless,

uncannily,

they

call

be forgotten, since "for long he has not been seen nor Now the entire corpus of Platonic dialogue is overrun
marks,
grammata

Socrates to mind, been meditated

with

who would other

on."

remarks about or references to

Hippias Major 285, Republic 11.368, Phaedrus 244, 274, Statesman 277e, Theaetetus 202, Protagoras 312, 326, Cratylus 423-34, Philebus 17 ff. Sophist 253. True, letters and the learning or using of letters are frequently used as examples of something else, looked
written

through rather than

at.

But it is hard to

mind."

deny

that Plato has writing "on his

Grammata
Socrates'

are not mentioned or spoken of

speech

to

Simmias

at

73c,

the sentence about a drawn horse or

in the Phaedo. Diagrams, however, are. And in lyre, in Greek

gegram-

menon, is bound to remind

of a written

horse

or man.

The
says

"diagram'

word

is in the dialogue's text

"When

you

lead

people to

diagrams

or

Cebes in the
not.

speech to

Simmias

which

something of that sort it becomes particularly intends to explain in what way learning or studying is
section of

recollection.

The thing is
ematics

There

are no pictures or

diagrams in the divided-line

the Republic or the

professors of math

double-square

section of the

Meno

either.

Moreover,

like Apollonius may have left the

judge by Sophist 240a, supplying of illustrative diagrams to

to

the reader himself.

Some Observations About Plato's Phaedo

Now
that
one

209
the fact

way

of

vividly experiencing the potency

of

writing is to stop

and think about

letters, merely conventional and otherwise arbitrary scratches, though they are not diagrams, yield diagrams, if the reader cooperates with the text (Eucli by executing the required "setting
out"

dean ekthesis) of the author's enunciation. The Euclidean pattern of a reader's coming to

assent to an author's

drawing
them,

"cases"

which meet

the author's general specifications,

which

and

finding

that the particular cases

the

reader was

declarations by inspecting and experimenting on at liberty to conjure up bear out the

"I

say"

author's claim

But
Ethics

mustn't

is particularly clear and vivid. we always do something like this

reading
a script?

when we read?

Don't
xiii

we otherwise

the words like

vii

an actor

(Cf. Aristotle Metaphvsics

1087al7

and

merely mouth Nicomachean

1047a20 f.)
well

You may

agree, yet

wonder

why I

should

do my ruminating in

about

how

one goes about

realizing
listens

what

is

claimed

by

a sentence

through

meditation on written sentences.

Isn't it just

as true

that to grasp the sense and test the truth of

must conjure

what someone says

a spoken sentence

the person who

up something to

which

to apply what

is heard

said, something which

is

not

supplied prompted

in full
me to

by

the speaker? I believe the answer is

"yes."

Remember, however,
to

that what

think about the

thinking

that is stirred up when one is on the receiving end,

interpreting

someone else's words, was that

was

trying

interpret

what

the Phaedo says about

recollection, cloaks, and

lyres.

dialogue Phaedo

The scholarly justification for the hypothesis that one of the things that these passages in the are about is writing is the resemblance between Aristotle's On Interpretation 16a and
what

Phaedo 73. But

about

is important

about

this hypothesis is the

following: The

passages

in the for

recollection, cloaks, and lyres and the dialogue entire, are about

thinking

and

only Socrates', Simmias', and Cebes', and ours, but also Plato's, the author's. What I mean in saying this is that we ought to try the notion that what the Sophist tells us about thought, viz., that it is the dialogue of the soul with itself, so that in thinking the one who does it is both
thinking,
not speaker and

hearer, I
is the for

and

You,

applies

to writing too: The

author

is both

writer and reader. we compose a written

Clearly this piece. Why opt

If the

experience which the

likes

of ourselves

have

when

radical

discontinuity

between Plato
what

and us?
major authors

supposition

of

continuity between

motivates

to write and

what

prompts ourselves

some slave

in the Meno. Yes, it is in measure more plausible to see continuity between Meno, the Thessalian nobleman, and his than between Plato and ourselves. Yet reconsider Isn't the long-run question of the dialogue

to write sounds like

hubris,

think again about the slave

about the excellence that consists

in

being

oneself

both Socrates

and slave, teacher and

learner,

that

is,
of

self-ruled

investigator? And in

respect

to certain kinds of

investigation, in

particular, the

finding

the geometry that transforms Hesiodic stellar lore into mathematical astronomy, isn't there, on Plato's part, as much need for someone who played the role of teacher vis-a-vis him as there was a 989e)'.' need for Socrates in the slave's case (cf. Epinomis

Now
to

once one allows oneself

the thought that

Plato

resorts

to writing not only to teach but also

learn,

the riddling character of the dialogues acquires a different ethos.

They

are no

longer Zen

master's

koans.
said

The things I
of that process.

in

Cebes'

Socrates'

connection with

and

rather

different

ways of

speaking

about recollection will now

apply to the process of writing the dialogues as well as to the outcomes

The

author

himself, looking back

on what
are

he has

written, will

questions which connections that were written

down

strong

and which are weak and why. will

have to study the And doub

answers to

if he is anything like the Socrates whom he depicts, the his questions have a rationale (as is certainly the ling an area calls for doubling the sides which contain it).
Therefore he
will

author

trust that even erroneous

case when the slave thinks that

not throw mistakes

away

even when

he has

convinced

himself that they

"save"

are

mistakes. vated

He

will,

having

had

previous experiences of

finding

the true in the interstices of moti

Socrates'

falsehood,
as

which was

the slave's experience under

tutelage,
guess at

mistakes that

look

promising.

But

for

which mistakes are

promising,

he

will

have to

that.

Being

a reader as well as

210

Interpretation
his
own

a writer of

text, he too

will

in

some measure

have to

guess at

"what

is

which

is,

of

truth about the course, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

subject

at

hand. (Is it

at

hand? )
5.

Try

picturing the

weaver

sitting

at

his loom

and

fabricating

the life-cloth

by
lyre

passing horizon

tal weft threads through the vertical warp threads, over and under, over and under, thus
"emerge" "lines."

making

strings'

surface

from
"potential"

Or for

again, picture the musician who gets the

noise

tension

just

right so that

the

becomes the
mind or

"potential'

for

music.

But isn't it hopeless to

item? And, if anything, memory for an try picturing still more hopeless to try picturing anything which is utterly mono-eides, one-aspected, simple, and indissoluble? Say you mean to picture the color yellow, just yellow by itself. You will have to do it
a man within

"reaching"

his

"absent"

picturing surface and shape, but can you? claiming that in discovering the "noetic cosmos, he discovered precisely that the "space of
without also

6. I

am

and

distinguishing

it from the
of

visible
or

is different from that

writings of

"causes,"

that the

semiotic

is

"order."

other

than the causal

Question?"

Cf. the

Wilfrid Sellars.

7. Cf. Felix Cohen, "What is Also

notice

how Euclidean

proofs circle

back

on

their opening enunciations out, is

in The Legal Conscience (Archon Books, 1970). at the end, in the q.e.d.
not a words

or q.e.f. statement.

8. The
used,

word eidos, as

has

frequently

been
as

pointed

Platonic Wesen

coinage. and

It

seems to
e.g.

be

by

authors other

than

Plato, roughly
words

in German the
"Welch

Gestalt are,

in

the sentences "Sie hat ein angenehmes

emphasized

Wesen."

Gestalt."

eine

entzuckende
overall

What

gets

by

these

German
he

in the "duo

given sentences

is the global,
so

impression left

by
in

someone or something.

Sometimes, indeed, Plato himself

speaks of

uses

the Greek word eidos, for

stance,

at

79a f.

when

eidee toon ontoon, to men

horaton.

to

de

aeides.

"To

this use eidos in the Timaeus roughly corresponds. As I understand the passage in the Meno
"bee"

(72)

about

in the Cratylus (389)

"separate"

"shuttle,"

about

passages are not

except

for the contriving

reminds of

in the Republic (596) about mind. The same holds for the
absent one whose

"bed,"

eide eidos or

in these Gestalt

of the

beloved

whose

toga or

lyre

the

property these

are: these are

eide,

but

not eide choorista, para tauta panta

"similar,"
"multitude,"
"rest"

heteron ti.
their opposites in the
at
"double,"

9. Cf.
"big,"

and
"contraries"

Parmenides,
in

and

"heavy"

and their

in the list

Republic v, 479,
that the
or

all the words

quotation marks

being

fundamental to

what will

become

our physics.
will agree

10. I take for

granted

that the reader

final

argument

(102e

ff.) leaves

unde

"withdraws"

cided whether, when

death comes, the

soul

has already "ceased to

exist."

The Serious

Play

of

Plato's Euthydemus

David Roochnik
Iowa State University

Plato's Euthydemus is
"eristic"

a strange

dialogue.'

In it two old, but

not

very

experi

enced, sophists, the brothers Euthydemus and

abilities.

Dionysodorus,

show

off their

They bombard
your

their audience with

of them quite absurd.

(Example: that

dog

is

fallacy after fallacy, many father; that dog is yours; there

fore,

that

play, and

father (see 298e].) The dialogue is loaded with word throughout Socrates is transparently ironic in his praise of his sophis

dog

is

tic competitors. When

could praise

they finish
joy"

their show, he says, "no one of those present

highly

enough the argument and the

with

two men,

and

they nearly died

con
even show

laughing
As
a
strained

and

result

clapping of its

(303b).

almost

to begin their work

farcical quality, commentators often feel on the Euthydemus by asking whether it is

The task
of

serious enough to merit

analysis.2

the commentator is then to

that

enough serious material can

be

extracted to

justify

the commentary.

Typ

ically

the

sophistical

fallacies,

which

represent about

half

of

the work, have the intro

been taken duction

with the

as the most significant portion of the

dialogue.

(Including

and conclusion

the dialogue has seven parts, three of

which are

filled

sophists'

eristic).

Even if they
or

are

occasionally absurd, it is
or the
of

obvious

that arguments concerning the nature of

of the should verb

learning (275d-77d)
claims and

ambiguity

"to

be"

(283b-e)

the issue

self-predication

(300e-301c)
is
an

be seriously analyzed. Kuelen, for example, important relationship between the learning fallacies
argues a

that there

the doctrines
and

of the

Meno; Peck
of

Sprague interprets Forms

similar

similarly about the "to passage from the Euthydemus

be"

arguments

the

Sophist;
theory

as an objection

to the

to one articulated

in the Parmenides (see Keulen, Peck,

a

Sprague [1967], and also Mohr). The fallacies have also been examined from

historical Aristotle

perspective. uses

Since

they

are

phistical

closely Refutation

related

to many of the the

examples

in his On So
asked:

(SE)

following

sorts

of questions

have been

What is the relationship between Aristotle's treatment of the fallacies and Plato's? (Keulen asks this question, as does Praechter.) Was there an original
source

that

supplied

both the Euthydemus

and the

SE

with

its

eristic arguments?

Was there, for example, a historical figure named Euthydemus who actually compiled a handbook of fallacies (as is perhaps suggested at SE 177M2 and Rhetoric 1401a26)? (This is the
A
similar main question

in

Praechter'

essay.)

historical

question

is

this:

What is the relationship between Plato's

interpretation,

Winter 1990-1991, Vol. 18, No. 2

212

Interpretation
and the

dialogue

"Dissoi

Logoi"

manual, possibly written at the end of the

fifth century (see Sprague [1968], pp. 160-61)? Whatever the answer, it is clear that the Euthydemus provides valuable information about the state of
Greek logic

during
in

this period, and

and was
suggest

it is

is both

reflected

inspired
an

likely that a great deal of serious work by the sophistical arguments of the dia
"It is
probable

logue. The Kneales Megarians took

putes as we
part

example:

then that the

in,

and were stimulated

to logical

discovery by,

such

early dis

find

satirized no

in Plato's

Euthydemus"

(p. 15).
attention

There is thus
rians of

doubt that the fallacies deserve

concerned with

from both histo

logic

and philosophers
propose a

Plato's development. In this

essay,

however, I
of

different
on

approach

to the serious side of the

Euthy

demus. Instead

focusing

its three

eristic sections

(275d-77d, 283b-88b,
"protreptic"

speeches 293b-303b), I shall concentrate largely on (278e-83a, 288d-93a). Commentators (e.g., Stewart, Friedlander, and Praech ter) frequently dismiss, simply paraphrase, or ignore these arguments. M. A.

Socrates'

Stewart describes the

P. Friedlander

argument as

"an

induction"

"equivocal."

extravagant

and

says almost

nothing

about these arguments.

Praechter describes
Socrates'

the philosophical side of the dialogue as essentially negative and

guments as
analyzed

ar show

"unmittelbar

frucht"

ohne speeches

(p. 9).

By

contrast, I hope to
of

that if
crucial

carefully,

these

employ

some

Plato's

most

terms

techne and arete are the prime examples

and

they

raise philosophical

questions of the

highest

order.

The two indeed is

also

protreptic speeches together

form

a continuous argument which

is

However, precisely because it is protreptic, the argument problematic. Protreptic, as explained by Socrates, is a form intrinsically
quite serious.

of argument

designed to

persuade

its

audience

that "one ought to philosophize

arete"

and care about

(275a6. For

a comparison see and

Isocrates To Nicocles 57. 1, Aristotle's Rhetoric 1358b

Evagoras 11. 1

Antitdosis
audience

60.4, 84.2,
into the

86.2,
will

and

ff.)

It invites its
or

project of

implicitly

explicitly, that such a quest

and

philosophy and promises, either be rewarding. But protreptic is

next."

incomplete: it only promises This phrase, "what comes

a

does

not

itself deliver "what

comes

comes

next"

(to

meta

touto)

from Cleitophon 408d7,

commented on this

dialogue devoted to the but does

a

question of

of protreptic.

I have

work at

length in "The Riddle

not

Plato's

Cleitophon."

It

urges

its

audience

to

love

wisdom

wisdom.

As

itself provide, or clearly articulate the nature of, that result, protreptic forces the reader to consider some of the most
raised

pressing questions ing? Can

by

the dialogues: Do

"positive"

they

contain a a

teach

Socrates'

promise of wisdom
or

be fulfilled? Is there

theoretical doc
or

trine,

an

protreptic

locutors,

techne, that actually does "come merely promissory? Does Socrates only refute or does he actually teach them?
episteme such questions would

is Socratic
his inter inter

and exhort

Answering

pretation of the

ultimately require dialogues. This the essay to follow will

a comprehensive

hardly

supply.

Instead,

The Serious
I
shall argue

Play

of Plato's Euthydemus

-213

only for the following thesis: The protreptic arguments offered by Socrates fail to demonstrate conclusively that one ought to philosophize. If this

is correct, does it follow that Socratic

arguments riddled with

protreptic undermines

itself? After all, if

purporting to show that one ought to philosophize are themselves

problems, then why ought one to philosophize?
conclusion

While its
the
are

is

not

protreptic

does

not undermine

universally or necessarily true, I itself. As we shall see,

shall argue

that

Socrates'

arguments

compelling only to those who are predisposed to agree with their conclu Such a diagnosis sounds entirely damning; it is not, however. A thorough examination of the protreptic will disclose that these peculiar arguments are
sion.

uniquely instructive. While they

are

not powerful enough

to

persuade

every

body
man

to philosophize

(i.e.,
be

to demonstrate that philosophy is an

unconditional

good),

they

can yet

effective

in urging
can

someone

like Kleinias, the young

Socrates'

who

(along

with

the reader) is the real target of

teach

speeches, to
so.

pursue philosophy.

Furthermore, they
On the
one

him how to do

In sum, then, the protreptic, like the Euthydemus itself, is

seriousness and play. of

a strange

blend

of

hand,

the protreptic arguments for the

pursuit

philosophy fail to attain their stated purpose; "we were entirely says Socrates as he nears their conclusion (291b). Nevertheless, the
succeeds pursued
Socrates'

ridicu

protreptic must

in performing a most serious task: outlining the questions that exhortation to philosophize is to be heeded. if

be

In the

prologue

the

two sophists

make

mighty boast for themselves:

"Arete, Socrates, is
than anybody
sponse

what we

think we can transmit more

finely

and

quickly

else"

(273d8-9). The

first question that Socrates poses in re

is

this:

Are

you only able to make learn from you, or can you

a man good who

also teach that man who

general arete

is already is is

convinced that

he

should

not yet convinced either

because he does

not

believe that in

teachable or that you two are

man

teachers of it? Come on, is it the

that arete

work of

the same techne to persuade such a

is teachable is

and that you are the ones

from

whom someone could

best

leam,

or

that the work of some other techne?

(274d7-e5)
that does these two jobs.
of all
others men you

Dionysodorus

answers

that it

is the

same techne

Socrates

then reformulates:

"Therefore, Dionysodorus,
protrepsaite ,

most

finely encourage (or losophy and to be concerned

Examination
of

'protrepticize,'

275al)

to pursue phi

arete?"

about

(274a8-75a2). The

sophist agrees.

this passage raises general questions about the possibility of

teaching teaching

arete

which,

I suggest,
other,

can

best be illuminated
subjects

of arete with

more

typical,

comparing the (or technai). The passage

by

214

Interpretation
requires at

implies that instruction in the latter

Before

least four

separate phases.

(1)

beginning

a specific

study

a student must

first be

persuaded

that the

subject can

be taught. In

a typical subject

prospective student can

the

simply knew nothing of the subject, can prove a host of theorems by the spring. (2) The student must be persuaded that the prospective teacher can actually teach the subject. Evidence of this is also easy to obtain. It can be determined that Dr. Jones received a degree in mathematics and taught the

observe that those who

like geometry this is easily done. A took Geometry 101 in

fall,

and

students who took

Geometry
of

101 last

year.

(3) A

third preparatory phase (one

student must

only
that

suggested

by

the passage)

is

also required:

The

be

persuaded

putting in the hours

the teacher

must persuade

As a result, study geometry demands is "worth the student that geometry is valuable. A good teacher

it."

of a typical subject material

thus requires two separate capacities:

and

fluency

in the

actual and

to be taught,

the

ability to

students'

arouse

the

interest

commitment

to the subject. It is obvious that the former need

stage of

not

imply

the

latter. (4) The final

material.

instruction is

communication of the actual course

This

schema seems applicable subject whose can

to any ordinary techne.

will

Arete, however, is
for the is

an

extraordinary
reasons.

teaching

disrupt the

schema

following
an of

First, it

be

quite

difficult to

persuade a student that arete

actual

subject.

As Socrates

often points

out, there

is

no

obvious version

Arete 101 and its teachers are not easily identified (see, e.g., Meno 89e ff. and Protogoras 319e ff.). How, then, does one persuade a student that arete can be
taught? The student must be
"protrepticized,"

exhorted

to

attempt an extraordi

nary institutions distinct familiar

student

subject.

For

of

people, instruction in arete is left to the basic customs or the community: imitation of the elders, obedience to civil law,
most

and religious traditions are examples. subject

therefore

requires

activities

and opinions.

to study arete as a into question the calling authority of such To be a candidate for such instruction, the
persuade someone
question

To

thus has to be willing, at the outset, to

the nature of arete. But

this is equivalent to commencing the study of arete itself. In other words, the

initial
actual

protreptic

phase,

(1)

and

(2) from

above, collapses into phase

(4),

the

study

of the subject.

similar collapse occurs with phase

(3). How does

a teacher persuade a

student that

ing

arete, assuming it can be taught, is worth studying? Only that knowledge of arete is valuable. This would require employing
of this

by

argu

and then

explaining some standard by which to measure the value But arete itself is precisely the standard that measures the

knowledge.

value of activities.

Therefore, it itself would need to be invoked to prove the value of knowledge of itself. In other words, should a teacher try to persuade a student that arete is
worth

studying,

she would

have to

explain the value of the subject.

arete.

But this

explanation

would

be

an

actual

lesson in

Again,

there is no division

between the

protreptic preliminaries and the actual

study itself.

The Serious
The dilemma
paradox. of

Play

of Plato's Euthydemus

-215

student cannot

commencing the study of arete thus echoes Meno's famous learn arete unless he can be convinced that it is both

teachable and worth studying.

open

But only the

student

terms,

being being convinced that arete is teachable and worth studying is itself a component of being good, only somebody already good can be made good. This issue, which admittedly is only suggested by the passage, will become more explicit as the dialogue progresses. As we shall see in Sections III and V,
to the possibility of
since so persuaded.

already convinced of both is Put into somewhat exaggerated

it

will prove

to be critical

for understanding
and

the

intrinsic limitations

of

Socratic

protreptic.

Dionysodorus
student

states

that it is one

the

same

techne that
can

persuades

that

arete

is

teachable and that he

answer:

and

his brother
of

teach

it (274e6).
the various

In

a sense,

this is the right

phases

Because

the

collapse of

instructional

just discussed, it has to be

student

one and the same

both

persuades

the

to

study
clear

and engages

in the is
the

actual

activity that instruction. In

of a

another

sense,

however, it is
concerns

that the

sophist

unaware word

lurking
used

problem.

This

"techne,"

the very notion of a

commonly

by Socrates to label ordinary forms of knowledge such as medicine, carpentry, geometry, etc. As has just been argued, the study of arete is extraordinary. The question should therefore be raised, Can there be a techne of arete? If so, who
possesses

it?

Certainly

not the

two

sophists.3

old

If not, does this

imply

there
of

is

no

knowledge

of arete at

all,

or can arete

be

comprehended we shall see

Socrates'

by

some

form

"nontechnical"

knowledge (see Woodruff)? As

in Section IV be
second protreptic

low,

these are precisely the issues taken up in

speech.

II

The fallacies

of

the first

eristical scene commence when

Euthydemus
entire

asks

Kleinias,
(273a-c
those

the
and

highly

promising

youth who

is the

occasion

for the

dialogue

who

275a), "of the following two groups, who are the ones who learn, are wise (sophoi) or those who are ignorant (amatheis)T (275d).
answers

When Kleinias
swering "the

"the
and

wise"

he is quickly

refuted.

He

responds

by

an

ignorant,"

is

refuted once again.

As Socrates later
of

explains

(277e-78a),
mean either

the sophist

here

plays on

the ambiguity

manthanein, which can

new."

understand"

"to
can refer to

(sunienai:

278a4)

or

"to learn something

Manthanein

dent

who

acquiring them). As such, the question can receive two different, of the verb, the sive, answers. Given the first meaning
given the second,

possessed (a stu expanding upon knowledge presently grammar understand a will lesson) or to already knows his letters new knowledge (a student who does not know his letters can learn

and

answer

seemingly exclu is "the wise";

it is "the

ignorant."

Kleinias is befuddled.

216

Interpretation
argument

This exactly
theis

has

occasioned

much

debate. It is

not

clear, for example,

where

the force

of

the ambiguity falls. "Does the sophism depend upon

.

an equivocation on manthanein
('knowledgeable/ignorant'

or on an equivocation on sophoi and

'clever/stupid')?"

ama-

and

(Hawtrey,

pp.

58 ff.). It

is

also possible that rather than equivocation one

the

fallacy

known traditionally as a dicto secundum quid This fallacy consists in taking absolutely what should be taken only to simply dentally, e.g., to go from 'knowing one's (Sprague [1962], p. 6). "the
. . .

is better described as, ad dictum simpliciter.

acci
'knowing'"

letters'

Since the focus

ments, I
shall

of this

essay is

on

Socrates',

and not

the sophists', argu

simply is that, whatever the exact status of the argument, its consequences, if taken seriously, would call into question the very possibility of learning. If "the cannot be identified, then the process of learning itself cannot one who

assert

that some form of equivocation is going on. What

is

clear

learns"

be rationally explained,
possible.

and

it becomes legitimate to

ask whether

it is

even para

Clearly

the sophistic arguments echo

Meno's famous

learning

dox. (Again, Keulen makes this a major issue.) After explaining that the fallacy rests on an equivocation, Socrates dismiss the
These
sophists'

seems to

arguments as

follows:
I tell
you that these

are student games

with you

(paidia)
and

and thus

fellows
even

are

playing

(prospaizein)
should more

call

this play

(paidian) because

if

someone

other

many or all of such things as they teach, he would have no how things really are, but he would only be able to play with men, tripping up and overturning them, by his use of the difference of

leam

either

knowledge

of

names.

They

are

like boys
down

who

take pleasure

in pulling
see

a chair

away from

people

who are about to sit

and

laugh

when

they
as

them sprawled upside down.

You

should

think

of what

these

fellows do

play (278bl-c2).
sophists should

Socrates

proposes

that

instead

of such

play, the

fulfil their A in

promise to engage

in the

serious work

(ta

spoudaia:

278c3)
is the

of protreptic.

series of

dichotomies thus
concerned

suggests

itself:

Sophistry

mere

playing

with

words; it is
struction

only

with appearances and

refutation, and not

with

in how things really are; it is superficial, manipulative, and bad. By contrast, philosophy uses words to understand things; it is serious, protreptic (or "dialectical") and good. is Sprague's word in Plato's Use of
("Dialectical"

Fallacy,
about.

p.

3,

and

her interpretation is

a good example of what

I'm talking
an

The relationship between dialectic and protreptic would constitute issue in itself, and I shall not broach it here. See also Szlezak, p. 81.)

While
not as

such comfortable

dichotomies
a

are

attractive, I
to think.

suggest that

they

are

easily

sustained as commentators

wish

Despite

their lack of
quite serious.
no

perspicacity, the sophists have

position which

is potentially

Whatever the

exact

status of the argument

paradox

doubt that overcoming Meno's

is

not easy.

concerning learning, there is Let us assume for a

mo-

The Serious
ment

Play

of Plato's Euthydemus

-217

that the process

should

of

learning

cannot

its possibility
only to

therefore be

called

in fact be rationally articulated and that into question. If that were the case,
manipulation of words whose goal

then the verbal combat of sophistry, the

achieve

is

seriously.

victory in any given contest of speeches, should be taken very Since the use of language could promise no higher goal, i.e., knowl
would

edge, there

be

no reason not

to become a sophist.
sophists

This
alent to

position

that I here propose attributing to the

that often ascribed to

Helen"

Gorgias. In his "On

form

Nature"

and

is roughly Section 1 1

equiv

of the

"Praise

of

he

presents a

of scepticism.

This in turn

provides

him

with a warrant
ment"

for his
of

commitment to rhetoric, wherein truth

"logos."

(kosmos)

first

word of

the "Praise of

Helen."

is only an "adorn the It is extremely difficult to translate See Diels, pp. 288 ff. for the Greek text.
"kosmos,"

The

key

point

is this: The
not

sophists who oppose

Socrates

are no
should

doubt

comic

figures. This does

as a

imply, however,

that their position

p.

be dismissed

farcical

"Gegenbild"

(Szlezak's word,

81)

to the

serious work of

Socra
playful

tic

philosophy.

It is
result which

possible

to abstract the sophistic view

and perhaps

from its
Socrates'

context and

the

is troubling,
the

formidable.
will we shall

The

sense

in

the sophistic view can seriously oppose

be

made clear as we examine

first

protreptic argument.

As

see, the

conclusion

Socrates
be

purports

to establish

is,
the

at the

least,

precarious.

In

other

words, it

will not

clear that good reasons are provided as to

should accept

why Kleinias,
that
at

the target of the protreptic,

Socrates'

invitation to
in the does

philosophize rather section

than join the sophistic camp.

Indeed,

we shall see

following
not

argument requires prior agreement with, and

itself certify,

least

one of

its premises;

and

scepticism

concerning

learning

it is precisely this premise that the would call into question.

sophistic

Ill

The

following

is

an outline of the argument

extract

from

Socrates'

ques

tions and tic:

Kleinias'

answers,

and which

Socrates describes

as genuine

protrep
to be

1. All human beings

wish

to do well (eu

prattein:

278e6), i.e.,
is
required
physical

wish

happy
2. In

(eudaimonein: 280b6).
to do well, the
sample possession of good

order

things

(279a3 ff.).

2A. A

list

of good

things: wealth,
one's

health,

beauty,

good

family,
wisdom

power and

honor in

community,

temperance, justice, courage,

addition

(279a7-c3).
a subsequent

2B. Good fortune (eutuchia: 279c7) is However, because "wisdom is good ally listed 3. To bring happiness,
twice.
good things must

to the list.

fortune"

(279d6)

the same

item is

actu

benefit their

possessor

(280b7-8).

218-

Interpretation
good good

4. To benefit, 5. To benefit,

things must

be

used

(280c l-d7).

things must be used correctly (280e3-4).

6. Knowledge (episteme: 281b2) leads to correct use. 7. All items on the sample list (2A) are actually neutral (281e3-4). Knowledge
"wisdom"

(or "good
ligence"

sense:

[phronesis:

281b6[

or

\sophia:

281b6]
be

or

"intel any do less in

[nous:

281b7|) is the only intrinsic

which argues

good and should

sought at

cost.

(I

omit

that portion

that those with

little

sense should

in

order

to err less [281b

a classical

ff. ).)
argument, traces of which
p.

This is
to love

protreptic

probably
would

appear

Aristotle's Protrepticus (see During,

(philosophein:
total

19). Its conclusion, "that it is necessary

accepted,

282dl), if seriously
"necessary"

demand

commitment on

the part of anyone who agrees.

Indeed,

the conclusion
so

is

so serious and, with

unconditional

its

use of the word

(anagkaion),

apparently

in its admonition, that the

are,
as we shall

premises

deserve the

closest scrutiny.

Unfortunately, they
describe this
ness

see, quite vague. (This has led Stewart to

argument as an example of

"Plato's sophistry.") A
were

similar vague

is found in

the conclusion

itself: Even if Kleinias

uses several words

to agree that

he

ought to

love wisdom, Socrates

which

to describe the knowledge questions, What exactly

towards

the

argument

directs him. Two

might

related

is this knowledge
open. come

and

How

Kleinias
It is

attain

it?

are thus

left

distressingly
wisdom

Finally,

the

principal examples used

technai."

to illustrate knowledge or clear,

from "the typical

not

however,

whether of

these can

actually

provide an adequate theoretical model

for the type

knowledge the
"eu

argument encourages

Kleinias to

seek. phrase
or

The first
Does it

premise contains a

famous ambiguity in the

sense of

pratte

mean

"to do

well,"

in the

being
"eu

virtuous,

"to

in

the sense of achieving one's goal, whatever that may

be? Both

Hawtrey

and

Gifford its

prattein."

comment on
acceptation

the

pointed would

ambiguity

of

The latter says, "In

usual

it

well"

well'"

rather mean

"faring
only

than

(p. 20). The

never quite

"eudaimonein,"

reformulation

the phrase receives,

as

"acting typically but

virtuous.

adequately translated lem. It does not seem to be the

all wish

"to be

happy,"

recapitulates the prob

case that all people wish

attain what we

to be

We Eu

may

to succeed, that

is,

deem to be

worth attaining. not

prattein

covers

both

situations.
well

Its ambiguity, however, may

be entirely
and

vicious; the first (as

as

the second) premise expresses a

basic,

typ
what

ically Socratic,
move

opinion about

human behavior: All human beings desire

make value

seems to them to

be

good.

We

judgments,

pursue

goals,

attempt to

from here to there

if

with an eye

towards
e.g.,

even

inarticulately,
and

to be good

(see,

attaining what we want and deem, Symposium 206a). The argument

whose rational

assumes,

does

not

prove, that human beings are free agents

choice of what

is

good

determines

their action. It
observation.
action

is

vague and

undefended, but

not without some

basis in ordinary Premise (2) implies that human

is inspired

by

epithumia, the desire

The Serious
for
and consequent pursuit of objects.

Play

of Plato's Euthydemus
although

-219

Again,
they

the

premise

is is

vague

it

reflects a

broad

and

(to some) compelling

want, and
what of good

perception of want

human behavior: Peo

ple go after what

they
it

is

what

they

think

good.

I describe the list

specific

things Socrates proposes as

"sample"

because the

items
can

on

are not

in themselves that important. The

be drawn. The items
causes
and on

point

is only that

such a

list
of

in

principle

this list (which have been

accused

fluctuating
23])
it

"between the

succe

the constituents of

[Stewart,
is
us

p.

cover a

justice. Nevertheless, in
plausible:

very broad spectrum, ranging from bodily beauty to keeping with the kind of analysis made so far, the list something basic
about
a

signifies again

has To

a set of goals

that energize our

desires,

ordinary behavior. Each of sample list of good things we

think are worth pursuing.

summarize:

The

assumptions

initiating
free

Socrates'

argument are vague and about

questionable.

Nevertheless, they

express a plausible conviction

human
serious

action, namely that it is caused

problems with

by

and

rational

choices.

More

the argument are yet to come.

of sample
out

states that good

After placing wisdom on the list he and Kleinias have left

goods, Socrates digresses. He things

. . .

"the

greatest of the good

fortune (eutuchia:
would repeat an

279c7)."

He cannot, however,

add eutuchia to the

list

for it
of

item already there, namely sophia. By means of a examples, Socrates argues that good fortune and wisdom are really the
matter of

series same.

flute playing skilled flautists have the best fortune; in reading writing letters, it is the writing masters; in warfare it is the wise generals; in times of sickness one would always prefer to try one's luck with the wise
In the
and

doctor. (About
of

eutuchia

Gifford

says

it

means

both "an

accidental concurrence

favourable circumstances, and success resulting from the agent's judicious choice of [p. 22]. Note that at 279el the word used is eupragia. So
means"

crates generalizes:
tune"

"Wisdom

everywhere makes

human beings have

techne

good

for
Hip-

[280a6]. This
pocratic

same point

is

made about eutuchia and

in the

writing, "Peri

Technes,"

section go off on

IV.)
and

Why
hia
this

does Socrates
really

this tangent,
as

is this identification

of eutuc

"disastrous"

and sophia

as

Stewart thinks (p. 23)? The

purpose of

digression, I
often

suggest, is to focus

attention on

the character of techne. As

has

been stated, techne is the its

possessor

mode of

knowledge that best overcomes,

and enables

to control, tuche, luck

well when

(see,

e.g.,

Nussbaum,
of

95-

100). The pilot, for example, fares

sea.

facing

the contingencies

the

In this
soon

passage

Socrates

relies

exclusively
of

on techne

for his

model of wis
neutral

dom,
which

to be defined as that knowledge

possessor noted

the correct use of

items

brings its
we

happiness. But is

wisdom

best

modeled

by

techne?

In Section I

the features of arete that would

distinguish its

being

taught from instruction in the ordinary technai. For Socrates arete is equivalent to sophia; therefore, this digression should be read
with

an eye

towards the
of

possibility

of

irony. In

other

words, despite its

superficial

identification

220

Interpretation

sophia with

techne, the real purpose of this passage may well be to call that identification into question. Is techne in fact the best model for sophia? If not,

what

is the

nature of that sophia which

items

on the sample

list

and

thus

bring

correctly the neutral happiness to its possessor? These ques

use

knows how to

tions will be

returned

to shortly.

Premise
to their

(3)

states

that the

good

things on the sample

and so adds

list

must

bring benefit
argument.

possessor.

This is true
add

by

definition
new:

little to the

Premise
good

(4)
eat

does

something

It

states

that

benefit

requires

that the

things

be

used.

I may

possess an

apple, but it brings

no nutritional

benefit

unless

it. A

woman

may, for example, have a great

nor made

deal

of

money, but

she would neither

be benefited

happy by

it

unless she used

(spent) it

(280d).

"Use"

becomes the

crucial

term because it refers to the process of

bringing

into the human sphere, i.e., of applying them. Premise (5) elaborates the concept of use. Benefit requires, not only that (orthos: 280e3). If the good things be used, but that they be used
possessions
"correctly"

item is
the
are

used

incorrectly

the

result

is

"bad"

(kakon: 280e6). This, I propose, is

that the

pivotal premise of

the argument.

It

assumes

items for

of the sample good or

list

in fact

not good at

all;

they

are neutral and can

be

used

ill. Most

important, it assumes that incorrect, good or bad.

and

the use of an item can be understood as correct or

This assumption, I suggest, is

problematic

in

way that is both

similar

to

different from the

problems

surrounding the first four. None of the prem

ises is self-evidently true; they are neither defended nor is their meaning en tirely clear. In order for the conclusion to be compelling, therefore, the target
must already be predisposed to agree with them. for Premises (1) (2), example, assume that human beings are free agents whose selection of what is good can determine their actions. This may not be true. Its truth, however, is not here the issue; the point is that in order for the audience of

the

protreptic

and

audience to

be

protrepticized

they

must

believe it is true.
complicated, dilemma. Is

Premise

(5)

poses a case

similar, but

more serious and

that, (1) things like wealth and health are not good but their use can be rationally evaluated as correct and for the good, or neutral; (2) incorrect and for the bad; (3) what the correct/good use is can be learned? It is it in fact the
possible to accept

the earlier premises but still

deny
and

Premise (5). Indeed, this is

would

precisely

what sophists such as maintain

Dionysodorus

Euthydemus
agents

do.

They

surely determined

would

that

human beings

are

free

whose

actions are

by some conception of what is good, e.g., attaining political power in the Assembly. Without this assumption, their sophistry would become mean ingless: they would have no reason to seduce an audience. They would not,
agree
with

however,

Premise (5). Their

prohibits them

scepticism

as

disclosed in the first

eristic scene

suggested in Section II above, the entire case for sophistry rests on the denial that objective knowl Socrates' edge is possible. Premise (5) of first protreptic argument assumes the

(275d

ff.)

from

doing

so.

As

The Serious
opposite, namely objective knowledge
attainable. should we of

Play
the

of Plato's Euthydemus

221
is

correct or good use of an object

"practical"

In

other our

words, Socrates assumes that the

question, How

live

lives he
If

and

apply

or use our possessions? can

be

answered.

From this To

assumption

concludes that such answers should

premises are

be

sought.

Socrates'

reformulate: of

granted,

then
most

it follows that
posses

knowledge
sion which

how to

use one's possessions would

be the

desirable
wishes use

is

needed

in

order to

be

Everyone, therefore, items. It is, in other

ought

to seek

happy (which everybody knowledge of the correct

to

to be).

of neutral

philosop

words,

"necessary

But Premise (5), I

propose, is question-begging.

According
be

to

Socrates,

an

item like health is

neither good nor

weak

bad, for it
or

can

used well or

badly. A strong
This

body

can

beat up innocent begs the

and

bodies

build
and

hospitals. Socrates
can use

assumes that one of these applications of the

assumption

body
If

is

be known is
a

as correct.

crucial question.

correct

property

belonging

to neutral

items,

if

neutral

items

span the

broad

range that the sample required such a

list indicates, then knowledge of correct use would be for happiness. The conclusion is thus built into the premise: If there is
as correct

thing

use, then knowledge

assumption

of

it

should

be

sought.4

But

on the

basis

of what should

this

be

granted? use

It is

not self-evident:

What if

there is no such

thing

as correct use,

if

holder? What force

a good

would

the protreptic

is simply in the eyes of the be argument then have? Can the living of
so.

life be directed

by

knowledge? Perhaps
show,
the

This, however, is precisely

with

what the argument should

and not assume.

As if to
terms:

signal

distress,
(281b2).

conclusion

is

stated

flurry

of

different
"nous"

"episteme"

"phronesis"

"sophia"

(281b6),
which should with

(281d6),

and

(281b7)
ment:

are all used to

label that

be

sought.

This terminological
Socrates'

flux helps
Just

to raise a
what

decisive

problem

the conclusion of

argu

exhorted sophia and

is this knowledge, assuming it exists, that Kleinias is being to seek? Throughout the discussion, most clearly in the eutuchia/
such

digression (279c-80b), typical technai

a

as

flute playing, reading

writing, piloting

ship,

being

a general, and medicine are cited as exam

ples of

correct
matter

knowledge. Furthermore, it is carpentry that provides the example of use in Premise (5) (281a). Is it a typical techne, then, one whose subject

is

the good use of neutral

"technical"

items,

that Kleinias should seek?

would seem

The be

mere

presence of so

many

examples

to suggest that it

is.

Such
clear

conclusion,

however, is difficult
Socrates'

to

maintain.

Exactly

why

can

made

use of the example of the carpenter. further examining A typical techne has a determinate subject matter. The carpenter's subject is the production of furniture from wood (281a5). He knows, says Socrates, how

by

to use tools
penter and wood

and wood

(280c8-9). Socrates

makes an

his

tools and a man with money.

and

The

carpenter uses

analogy between the his tools

car

and

knowledgeably (or "technically")

is therefore benefited his

wealth

Correspondingly,

the man with money should use

by them. knowledgeably in

222

Interpretation
be benefited
and

order to

be

made

happy by

it (280d). "In the working

and use

concerned with

wood, is there anything other than the episteme of carpentry that effects the right (281a2-4). The answer is no. Analogously, says Socrates, it is episteme that should direct the possessor of the items on the
use?"

sample

list,

such as

wealth, towards the

correct and therefore

beneficial

use of

his possessions; towards, in other words, happiness. There is a problem with this analogy which only becomes
crates'

explicit

in So

second protreptic speech.

There

are

two

senses of

the word

"use."

First,

the

carpenter

knows how to

use

his tools

and wood.

With them he knows how

to build furniture. But he does

not

know how to

use the

furniture The
.

carpenter

knows how to build

chair; but to

what end will

the

chair

be

put?

Will it be
"use"

used to seat someone

comfortably at a symposium, or will it be used as an instrument for torturing a political prisoner? It is this second sense of that would be required for the neutral items on the sample list correctly and
"using"

for the

good.

The first

sense

is technical

and value neutral:

the carpenter uses

value

the tool correctly to produce the chair. The second sense is

chair

laden: the

is

used

correctly

and

for the

good

in

order to

achieve

happiness. The knowledge

carpenter, qua

possessor of a

techne, knows nothing

of

this.
type of

This be

problem

discloses the

difficulty

it is that the target ordinary knowledge. Then up this issue.

an

audience of the

identifying protreptic is being

of

what

urged

to seek. It cannot

techne.
what

But technai have been the

is it? The
second part of

sole supplier of examples of

the

protreptic

explicitly takes

IV

Socrates begins this

protreptic:

section

be restating the

conclusion of

the first

part of

the

Human beings

should seek

wisdom,

i.e.,

philosophize

(288d6-7).
answer, he
other
pro

But

what

knowledge
as

should we seek

(see 289d9-10)? To
gold

elicit an

suggests

possibilities

the ability to discover

wealth

(or alchemy), in

words the

ability to produce

(288e6-89a5);

medicine; the ability to

duce

of these epistemai, however, can really bring immortality is happiness, for they do not understand how to use their results. Plato's word at 288d8, d9, 289al, a4, bl and b4. returns at 289c4. As is often the case, the two are synonymous.) An immortal life, even one
("Episteme" "Techne"

(289b 1). None

supplied with

indefinite
of

wealth, can still be wretched.

which

The type

of

knowledge
combined

that is needed is one in

with

the

knowledge
is

of

how to

produce

is

knowledge

how to

use what

produced

(289b4-7), in
not

which

the mak the

ing

is

united with the

using techne (289c2. See

"use"

Republic 601c for

technical

more on

using techne.). Clearly, the tral, but value laden.

sense of

here is

and value neu

Ordinary

technai,

exemplified next

by instrument

making, fail this test. So-

The Serious
crates then rather

Play

Plato'

of

Euthydemus
if
we should

223
learn

enthusiastically
speeches

asks,

"By
no,

the gods, what

what

the techne
happy"

us

making (289c6-9)? Kleinias

of

(logopoiikeri)! Is this
answers
and

is

required

to make

he

offers as evidence the

fact

that this techne can

speechmakers not

easily suffer the same split as any other: It is possible for to know how to use the speeches they make (289d).
some

Socrates indicates
techne.

disappointment

at

the failure of the speechmaking

On the

one

hand, he is surely being ironic, for "speech

making

imme

like the very sophists with whom he is argu diately 304-6. I (see for think, example, of Lysias. See Phaedrus 257c. Also, the ing
connotes the work of men close of

the Euthydemus ,

304d-306b,
at

returns to this

issue.)

On the

other

hand,
is is

his disappointment hints

the right answer
required

"Logos"

something more positive: to the question, What knowledge should be

of

is surely sought? for

part of what

is

logos

how to

use

all

objects of

desire. What is

required

sophia, understood not as an ordinary

of what referred

techne, but

as a comprehensive account
what

is

good

in the human

sphere.

(Szlezak believes that

the Phaedrus [p.

is

being
as

to here is the see,

scientific rhetoric of of

86].) However,

we shall now

account

is

identifying the sort intrinsically problematic.

offers

knowledge that

can provide such an

Socrates his

the "general's

techne"

(290bl;

mentioned earlier at

279e)

as

next proposal.

He does

so

apparently because the general,

who

knows how

to command other human use, the various

beings, knows how to organize, and in this sense technicians under his sway. Kleinias, however, immediately
The
general's
as

counters with an objection:

(290b5). Therefore, just

so cal

the hunter of game

techne, he says, is a kind of hands over his catch to hands

know how to

hunting
a

cook,

the general hunts and acquires cities and "then men,

them over to the politi

use

for [the generals] themselves do

not

that which
of

they

hunt"

of

(290d2-3). In fact, Kleinias knowledge:

No
part of

gives a quite

detailed description

this type

hunting

itself

covers more than

chasing

and overcoming.

And

when

the

hunter

overcomes what

he is chasing he is
also are since

not able to use

it. Instead, hunters

and

fishermen hand

over their catch to cooks.

Analogously,

geometers and astronomers

and mathematicians

for these
what

hunters

since none of them make their

use

diagrams, they discover

accomplished
ered
at

is

these things, but only how to catch them,

they themselves do not know how to they hand them over to those men
hunters have discov
that are not
of their

in dialectic

so that

they

can use what these

least they

can use

however many

discoveries

entirely

senseless (290b7-c6).

This is in

an

impressive little speech, for it succinctly

presents an entire con

ception of techne. speech an

As if to

signal

its

remarkable

character, Plato

places

this

tion and ask

extraordinary dramatic context: He has Krito interrupt the narra whether young Kleinias was actually its author (290el). This is a

good question:

How did

a mere

boy

learn

about

dialectic? Socrates

responds

by

224

Interpretation TECHNE

Productive"

^Acquisitive^

Living
(Hunting)

Nonliving
(Mathematics)

Animals

Human

Dia! ectic

t
Cooks
Political Men

saying that he does not remember who the author was; perhaps it was the older Ktessipus. The situation is then made even more mysterious when he adds,
"Good Krito,
things"

perhaps one of

the higher beings

was present and uttered

these

What is the

(291a3-4). Such mystery is, I believe, unparalled in the dialogues. point of such dramatic tension? I suggest it is to highlight the
of this succinct epistemological

fecundity
diagram

proposal,

which

the accompanying

schematizes. somewhat
conception

Although
temological

awkward, this diagram

which

schematizes an several other

important

epis

finds

parallels

in

dialogues. (For

parallels,

see

Charmides

165c-166b, Gorgias 450b-d, Philebus 55d-58a,

awkward

Sophist 281e-219d, Statesman 258b-260b. The diagram is

some

because

branches

give genus and species and others

do not.) First, it

represents

techne, the productive and the acquisi tive. The former are the most ordinary of all forms of knowledge, e.g., carpen try, pottery, medicine, etc.; the latter is itself divided into two parts, the second
of

the fact that there are two basic

forms

of

which, I propose, is metaphorical; the acquisition of nonliving beings

repre

sents what

Aristotle

calls

"theoretical

knowledge."

(That this is
of

so

is

made clear

in the Sophist, 291cl-7. See Rosen, pp. 91-92.) This type not produce its object, which it only studies and does not
being. Aristotle's Plato the A
single examples are

knowledge does

alter or

bring

into

mathematics, physics, and first philosophy; for

best

example

is

mathematics

(see Aristotle's Metaphysics

over"

1026a8-22).

techne, such as geometry, "hands dialectician. Dialectic in this passage refers to some form
mathematical

its

"catch"

to the

of meta-mathematical

The Serious
reflection, e.g., the
mention of stated

Plato'

Play

of

Euthydemus

225

It is not possible, given the single study of "number to determine what Plato here had in mind. It can only be dialectic,
(Of course. Republic VII discusses dialectic
an

itself."

that the passage posits the existence of some theoretical discipline that is
mathematics. at

higher than ordinary

in these terms

and

length. For

interesting

discussion

of this

issue

see

Klein,
hunter

pp.

21-49.)

Analogous to the
of

handing

over of theoretical entities to the

who

dialectician is the
to the pos them. As the cause

men, the

i.e.,

the general,

hands

over

his

acquisitions

sessor of

political

techne,

who

such, the
of correct

political

techne seems

presumably knows how to to be "the one we were seeking

use
and

would sit at

thing
29 1 d 1

and
.

acting in the city. And just (atechnos) as Aeschylus says, it alone the helm of the city, steering everything and commanding every (291cl0-d3). Atechnos again appears at making everything
useful"

See

n.

3.

This knowledge, the

named

putative goal towards which

techne"

the

pro

treptic urges,
art"

is then

"the

kingly (basilike)
and
now

(291d7). On the

"kingly
The

see
serious

Statesman 305c ff.

work of protreptic

Xenophon's Memorabilia IV. 2. 2 ff.).

seems

over,

for

the

knowledge that

Socrates has been exhorting Kleinias to seek appears to have been identified. Unfortunately, this hopeful appearance is soon shattered. When he and his
mysterious

interlocutor

reconsidered the

basilike techne, Socrates tells Krito,

birds"

"we

were

totally

ridiculous, just like children running after

attempt

(29 1 b I

2).

Why? Because the

type of knowledge

to

identify

the structure and specific object of this

leads to

an aporia.

First it is

agreed that the

basilike

and the politike techne are the same and

that to it "the general's techne

and all rule on

the rest

hand

over their results of which

they
use

are the producers

for it to

the grounds that

it

alone

knows how to
the
a

them"

(291c7-9). But

a question then arises:

What

result

(ergon) does

basilike

techne itself produce

and

( 29 1 e I ) ? The

assumption

here is that it has

determinate

identifiable result, i.e., that it is analogous to an ordinary techne. But the assumption is faulty. A spokesman for medicine (291e5) or farming (291e8), for example, can identify that which results from
therefore

his knowledge (health

analogous, then its

or

food from the

be

earth).

spokesman should

able

If the basilike techne is truly to do the same. But this Krito at

least

cannot

do (292a6).
good?"

Because they agreed that the basilike techne is beneficial, Socrates next (292al 1). Since the asks, "Isn't it necessary that it supply us with some

first

protreptic argument established that

"nothing

else

is

good except

knowl

edge"

(292b 1-2),
politike

all the results that one would

typically
bad."

point

to

when consid and

ering the

techne,

such

as

wealth

for the citizens, freedom,

the

absence of

factionalism,
(or
good or

are

"neither

good nor

Only
be
of

if it

can

make the

citizens wise

happy)

can this techne

considered

truly beneficial
it
make men

(292b4-cl). Once again, however, this description

to satisfy, for
as

the basilike techne fails

Socrates

next asks.

In

what specific sense will

226
good?

Interpretation
Will it
will

make

all

men

good of

in

all

things?

Since knowledge is the

sole

good,

it

provide all

forms

knowledge, including
and

shoemaking, carpentry,

and the rest

(292c6-9)?
point

The basic
cified

is this: No determinate
helpful terms,

identifiable

ergon can

be

spe

for the basilike techne. (Orwin discusses this issue in the

quite and

context of

the
of

Cleitophon in

Blits has

an

interesting

treatment

similar questions.) As shown by the first protreptic argument, it an ordinary result; if it did, it would end up being classified as

cannot

issue in
item.

a neutral

The only knowledge, therefore, that it can provide is "of itself (292d3-4). This obscure formulation is not explained further. I shall return to it shortly.
A final
good

effort at

describing
asks

the

basilike techne is
be

made:

It

makes other men

(292d5-6). But,

Socrates,

those men who are made good will

will good

be

good with respect men good. with respect

to what? The answer:

Of

course,

they only in making other this just postpones the answer, for the question Good
is the
same of

to what? would surface again. The basic problem here

described above, namely that The search for such an object is

as that

determining
the

the object of this techne.

"labyrinthine"

thinks he has found a way

out

(it

makes

(291b7); every time Socrates citizens wise, it makes them good)

(wise in what?,
good at what?)

he discovers
amazes

that the demand

again.

for

specification

him

This extraordinary

section closes with

Socrates saying, "Corinthus, Son

of

Zeus, the situation is exactly (atechnos) as I was describing it: we were still far, if not further, from knowing what that knowledge is which would make
happy"

as
us

(292e3-5).
confession of a serious

This

theoretical aporia

(292e6) is

couched

in

playful

terms. "The Scholiast on the passage relates that when

sadors to

Corinth had

sent ambas

Megara to

complain of their
son of

revolt, one argument advanced was that

Zeus'

the

mythical

founder 'Corinthus
punishment.
story."

would

be

aggrieved
used of

if they failed
repeti

to exact condign tions of the same

The

proverb came

to be

boastful

So

says

Gifford. Unfortunately,

neither

he be

nor Haw-

trey

takes

notice of

the use of atechnos at 292e3. The

issue

of techne

is the

here; therefore,
in the third
phists to save relief.

the pun seems unavoidable. Socrates

the argument

professes

to

key drowning

wave of

(293a3)

and

he

calls upon the two old so

him. This is ludicrous, for

of all men

they surely

can provide no

Serious

problems

Socrates'

plague

protreptic.

In his first argument, the

premises are questionable.

necessary
Just
what

to philosophize

Even if they are granted, his conclusion, that it is in order to be happy, is jeopardized by its obscurity. love? This obscurity is
amplified

is the

wisdom we are told to

by

The Serious
Socrates'

Plato'

Play

of

Euthydemus

227

second speech:

there are intrinsic difficulties in the very

can a

notion of a exhorted

basilike techne. How, then,

pursue wisdom even

target audience

which

is

being

to

begin its

quest?

Are

we

forced to

conclude

that the

pro

treptic undermines
as

itself? If

so. then the

Euthydemus

would

have to be

counted

truly bizarre: The Socratic

protreptic would

turn people

away from the pursuit of wisdom. tle's Rhetoric 1358b for his use of apotrope.) On this reading, Socrates the serious protrepticizer who accuses the sophists of only playing with words, fails
to give good reasons why we should pursue

really be "apotreptic"; it would (I coin See Aristo

"apotreptic."

philosophy
in

rather

than sophistry.

shall conclude

this paper

by

showing why the

arguments end equivalent to

protreptic

does

not under which

mine

itself. It is true that

Socrates'

an aporia

from

he

needs rescue.
provide

This is not, however,

failure because the

arguments

direction in how to
we

perform

the

rescue operation. upon

Kleinias,

and more

importantly
Socrates has The

readers, are

being
We
are

called

to

respond

to the aporia that

created

for

us.

most serious question raised

being called upon to philosophize. by Socrates in the Euthydemus is, Is

reformulated:

there a

techne of arete? This can be twice

techne,"

First,

can

there be a

"using

o.ie whose subject matter

neutral

is the

correct and

beneficial

application of

items in

the human domain? The second refers back to the

were

diagram in

Section IV
quisitive)

There the technai

the
productive.

divided into two kinds: the theoretical (ac is

the "political
?s

and

The diagram, I propose, invites the question, Is

"practical,"

there a third
men"

kind,

namely the
throughout the

which

possessed

by

to

whom

the hunters of human animals hand

over

their catch

Given the

basic
model

assumption operative

dialogue, namely

that techne is the

for knowledge,
epistemological

and

the problems sketched in the previous section, the

answer would seem to

be

no.

The

lesson that the Euthydemus teaches is this: Knowledge

be completely analogous to an ordinary techne. This is because the latter has a determinate object or result (ergon). Medicine studies health,
of arete cannot

farming
putative

studies the production of crops.

There is

no analogous object of subject

the

basilike techne.

Apparently

this

is because its

matter, arete or

the good use of neutral

argument

items, is indeterminate. Socrates

presents no explicit

here (292c-e) as to why this is the case. It can be inferred, however, the items on the sample list, namely the objects typically deemed good by human beings, are themselves indeterminate. It would follow,
that it

is because

then, that the Socrates

object
and

question of

their correct use would not allow

for

determinate
This is why

answer and so would not constitute a stable epistemological entity.

his

mysterious

for the basilike be

no

techne.6

interlocutor repeatedly fail to identify a specific If techne is the only form of knowledge, then

there

can

knowledge

of arete and

Socratic

protreptic cannot

be distin

guished

from

sophistry.

There is, however,

nontechnical

a thread to

lead I

us out of

this maze: a conception of a

knowledge.7

mode

of

suggest

two approaches to

articulating

228
what

Interpretation it is. First, let

us return

to the obscure formulation that

describes the

basilike techne. It has, says Socrates, itself as an object. Second, let us con sider somewhat further the very nature of protreptic. search for the object of the basilike techne is The salient feature of
Socrates'

its

circularity:

When

we reached

the

basilike techne

and were

examining
the end,

it,

to see
as

if this techne
we

was the one that supplied and produced

eudaimonia, it
reached

was

just
we

if

had fallen in

into

labyrinth:
to

when we

thought

we

had

twisted around again

and appeared

be

again at

need as we were when we

the very beginning of our search began searching (291b4-c2).

and

just

as much

Why
the

is this

search circular?

Given the
good.

premises of
what good

the argument, the

basilike

techne must supply something

But

is this? Given the

results of of

first

protreptic

argument, the

answer must

be knowledge. But knowledge

what?

Of that

which

is

good.

But the

The basilike techne,

which we now

is knowledge: hence, the circularity. know is no ordinary techne at all, is then

good

described

as

follows:

It is necessary that it be a producer of no result, either good or bad; instead, it must transmit no knowledge other than that of itself (292dl-4).

Possessors
object that

of typical technai study and then teach about (or produce) an is distinct from the technai themselves: The doctor teaches about the

workings of

the human

body,

the carpenter about the production of

episteme

furniture
tinos).

from

wood

(see Charmides 165c: But this is

Socrates'

[or technelis

episteme

Is

there an analogous object of the

Yes, it is

arete.

not quite

basilike techne? One is tempted to answer, right, for at least insofar as we pertain to

the conclusion of

that knowledge

of arete ought

first protreptic, what this knowledge knows is only to be sought. When this knowledge that knowl is transmitted to students, they
who

edge of arete ought to

be

sought

are equipped

only This is

to exhort others to seek

quite peculiar:

it. learn their Socratic lessons know nothing to love Their wisdom is manifested
"wisdom."

Those

other than

how to

exhort others

only in their knowledge that wisdom is lovable. Protreptic teaches the student only how to protrepticize; like the labryinthine aporia, it is circular. Or, in other words, it has no object distinct from itself.

Socrates
suggested

exhorts

his listeners to

pursue

arete, that

is,

to

philosophize.

As

only already persuaded that the traditional purveyors of arete are insufficient and that knowledge is therefore worth seeking. In this sense, Socrates does not teach his audience anything new; his protreptic "goes for it is able to speak
nowhere"

in Section I, however,

such

an

exhortation appeals

to those

only to those already ises of his argument

"protrepticized."

As

explicated
are

in Section III, the

prem

that human beings

free

and rational agents and

that

The Serious

Play

of Plato's Euthydemus
are undefended.

229
Ac

the use of neutral items can be known as correct/good

ceptance of

the conclusion, that it is necessary to philosophize, therefore re quires that the audience be predisposed to accept the premises. In other words,
the audience must

already be

predisposed to commence the search

for

objective

knowledge, i.e.,
determinate
itself. To
reiterate

to philosophize. I propose that this

is why the

search

for the

object of

the basilike techne falters and why it is said to teach only

the basic question, Does the

accomplish
present

circularity

of

the protreptic render it

vacuous?

No. Socrates does

a
Socrates'

and

explicates

desire that is

something significant: He reinforces in his audience. To clarify, imagine

first protreptic argument. Its conclusion takes the form of presenting an imperative (which I paraphrase): Turn away from your typical concerns,
care about arete and
ways.

love

wisdom.

The

audience can respond

in

at

least three

(1) They
reasons

can reject such exhortation and

are, for example, Christians

don't

need

demand

argument's

why they imperative.

should

follow

by dogmatically asserting that they help. (2) They can object to it and such advice. (3) They can heed the

Options (2) and (3) are similar: Those who ask for reasons are philosophiz ing. (This is reminiscent of the protreptical argument attributed to Aristotle:
those who argue against philosophy are philosophizing. See the
collected and
'Testimonia"

by During,
are

p.

44.) Furthermore, both

provide

groups, those

represented

by (2)
other

similarly the argument itself fails to

in the target

(3),

predisposed

to philosophize.

As discussed in Section III,

to philosophize. In

satisfying

reasons

words, it cannot be said to produce

phize
audience.

(rationally)

a new

disposition to

philoso

In this

sense protreptic

is only

effective with those

"protrepticized."

who are

already What then does

protreptic accomplish? philosophize.

It

provides an

occasion, as

well

as

guidance

someone, like young Kleinias, who already is impelled to discover knowledge and encourages him to consum mate that desire. Furthermore, the argument teaches him how to do so. In

in how, to

It

addresses

particular, it
the

points

him in the direction

the

of nontechnical

knowledge. Techne is
a comprehensive

pivot around which

protreptic revolves.

Understood in

sense, it

provides a conceptual

framework,

such as

that diagrammed in Section

IV,

within which

someone

ordinary knowledge can be classified. This framework allows like Kleinias to understand what is required to consummate his desire
of

for knowledge
arete. goal.

how to

use

neutral

items correctly, i.e., for knowledge

of

him that the ordinary technai are insufficient to accomplish his form of knowledge, one that is non What he really wants is a It
shows
"higher"

technical

and somehow able not

to

understand

how to

use as
a

the items

on

the sample
as

list. Socrates does himself

The Socratic
nontrivial

identify
is

this

knowledge;

result, and

Socrates

admits, the Euthydemus

protreptic

is

aporetic

even maddening.
and of

not vacuous

because in

itself it

represents a

form

of

knowledge. If its

premises are

granted, then it

follows

that

230

Interpretation

the typical things we normally desire (those on the sample

not good. possible

list)

are neutral and

It

shows

that

if knowledge

of

the correct use of these neutral

items is

then it is also desirable as the condition for it may not be happiness. It should be remembered, however, that the target audience of the
which protreptic

already desires
possible.

such
a

knowledge. Therefore,

at

least

implicitly, they
latent in the
and pur

assume

it is

As

result, the protreptic directs the desires

target audience; it
sue wisdom.

urges

them to turn

away from

more

typical

desires

It

shows

how

a most untraditional and

therefore potentially alien

ating desire, for wisdom, produce a happier life.

To
good.
reformulate:

can

be transformed into

a coherent

activity that

can

Socrates fails to

prove

that philosophy is

an unconditional

to philosophize

The necessity found in the conclusion of the protreptic It is necessary does not bind everybody. In particular, the injunction is not

binding

for those

who would

join Euthydemus

and

Dionysodorus in rejecting

Premises (5) and (6) (that correct use is an objective property of neutral things and can be learned). Philosophy, then, is only conditionally good, and the necessity
posed

expressed

in the in

protreptic conclusion

is hypothetical, //one is lesson for

as

predis

to philosophize and to question the traditional purveyors of arete, then

order to
other

one must philosophize one

be happy. This is
associates
of

a crucial

some

like Kleinias. Unlike

and

Socrates

such

Charmides,
to

Critias,
call phy.

Alcibiades,

whose criminal

behavior discloses their

willingness

into
He

question the

traditional sense of arete, Kleinias should pursue philoso

should seek the provided with a

higher,

the nontechnical form of

knowledge,

and

he

has been

framework to begin
teaches a

doing
of

so.

In sum, the Socratic

of

protreptic

kind

self-knowledge, knowledge

the nature and consequences of those desires that

belong

to the student open

to the protreptic. It to which

invites the

student

into the

project of

philosophy, an activity

eudaimonia.

he is already predisposed, and thereby teaches him how to attain Protreptic itself thus manifests a kind of nontechnical knowledge: have
a

It does

not

determinate

object other than

wishes

itself. Its

object

is itself; that is,

technai make

it is the study of the desire that discernible progress: one can

with a master.

to know

about arete.

Other

move from ignorance of carpentry to skill by This is studying why the ordinary technai are easily recognized and usually admired. There is no analogous progress in the study of arete. Only one who already knows can be taught. But knows what? That knowledge of

arete

is desirable.

NOTES

1.

My
the

text

is Burnet's Oxford
and

edition.

Joyce Foundation, this project. Professor David

an earlier

Iowa,

the

Translations are my Northwest Area Foundation

I
am grateful.

own.

Support from the State

of

allowed me the time to work on

Sedley
for

and an anonymous reader made

many

valuable comments on

draft

of

this paper

which

The Serious
2. An
example
comes

Play

Plato'

of
himself lautet

Euthydemus
Meridier,
der
vielen
who

231
wrote:

from H. Keulen,
als ein

who

contrasts

with

"L'Euthydeme est une comedie. avec son decor et ses

aceurs,'

einers

Urteile, die
(pp. 4-5).
and

den

platonischen

Euthydem

Ergenis

spielerischer

Laune Platons betrachtet "bantering,

sehen wollen.

Dass der

dialog jedoch

sehr ernest zu nehmen who

ist,

lange"

weiss man allerdings ebenso

Or

consider

farcical"

Leo Strauss, (p. 1) but then goes

the
mention of

describes the Euthydemus

as

not

to say frivolous

on to explain

because

Socrates'

of

why he thinks the dialogue is extremely serious. In fact, daimonion at 272e, Strauss says of the dialogue: "No other high
origin"

conversation presented

by
do

Plato has

so

an

(p. 3).

3. That the
uses

sophists

not possess such a

techne is playfully indicated

atechnos; that

with

the phrase

Socrates

to describe them:

where

(1987,

pp.

they are, he says, "passophoi 255-63), Plato consistently puns with

atechnos"

(271c6). As I have

argued else

is, he

uses

it to

mean

techne."

"without

R.S.W.

Hawtrey

comments

to

mention

the pun with atechnos.

statement

The

same

extensively on passophoi in this passage but is true in E.H. Gifford's edition.

the problems normally associated with the

neglects

4. This
tic fallacy.

does

not mention

any

of

naturalis

5. This discussion is informed

physics

by

Aristotle's tripartite division

of the epistemai.

See Meta

1026a8-22.

6. The little joke

key

question

this paper
which

raises

is, Is

arete, is the human good, determinate? There is

race

at

Statesman 266b

the diagonal of the unit

understand

indicates my own position: the nature of the human square, i.e., indeterminate. I would argue that this holds for

is like
but I

arete

that a

lengthy

discussion is
other

required.

7. There

are at

least two

threads to

lead

us out of

the labyrinth. As numerous commenta

can

tors have proposed, there

sense.

might

be

a techne of

arete, if this

be
She

understood
argues

in

"second-order"

R. Sprague (1976)

most

clearly
which

expresses this position.

"directs"

that the basilike techne

made"

represents a
"arts"

"second-order

art"

or

"knows how to

use the things

by

other

(p. 55). On her reading, even though the Euthydemus actually express this higher or second-order knowledge.

ends

in

an

aporia, later dialogues

I think Sprague's
I
suggest

position

is the

critical problem:
"second-order"

is seriously flawed. Her In what sense can the

solution sounds plausible,

"first-order"

but it ignores

what as

(or ordinary) technai function

an object of a

techne? What exact kind of object would

it be

and

why

wouldn't

it

simply recapitulate the same problems discussed here? Furthermore, if this is really the type of knowledge that Plato has in mind, then why did he only describe or allude to it in the early dialogues and never clearly explain or illustrate il in the later ones? Sprague is extremely vague
about such questions.

This is is

damaging

for her

argument

knowledge I

whose object

clear and

determinate

and should

because techne is precisely that mode of therefore be readily explained. As a

aporia can

result, her solution,

mention

while

inviting, simply

postulates a
of all

hope that the

be

resolved.

Sprague in

particular

here because

the many commentators who

a mountain of see

hold

a similar

thesis,

she

is the

most systematic and clear.

There is
to

literature

on

this subject.

For
and

representative views,

all of which are similar

Sprague's,

Kato (1988), Kube (1967),

Irwin (1977).
Another thread

leading

out of

the

labyrinth here is that

of

K. Gaiser (1959).

Simply

put, his

thesis is that the dialogues

was esoteric.

are exoteric exhortations

towards wisdom, while the positive

teaching

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"Socratic

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Interpretation 13(1985):

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Friedlander, P. Plato. 3
vols.

1959.

Princeton: Princeton

University Press,

1958-69.

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The Wisdom

of

Plato's Aristophanes

Charles Salman
Trinity University

Even

if, like

so much ancient

biography,

something truthful
Aristophanes'

is

nonetheless captured were

the story is not factually reliable, in the tale that Olympiodorus tells,
under

that

comedies

found tucked away

and

the

pillow

of

Plato's deathbed (2.66-72). To Nietzsche the

something of Plato's secret in the Symposium Plato's
openly, in
nature

ancients conveyed

in

this story
although

(Beyond Good

Evil,
to

sec.

28),

fondness for Aristophanes

he
grants

appears

rather

more

Aristophanes'

the almost triumphant power that that "Aristophanes

love"

speech.

It is

an age-old sentiment

is

second p.

his grasp

of the

mysteries

of

(Brentlinger,
prefigured

12),

only to Socrates in and Freud himself

mythical

willingly saw his own speech (esp. pp. 51-52;

one

erotic cf.

theory
and

in

Aristophanes'

below

Santas,

pp.

155, 157, 160-62). Indeed

best-remembered
of all the

frequently

finds

Aristophanes'

myth and even a

to be the

speeches

in the Symposium,
often assign

those who see

it

transcended

by

Pla

tonic account

it

key

propaedeutic

place.1

How

are we to understand this

we might point

Platonic

admiration

for Aristophanes? As
least in
written

preparatory step
tic way, as we

to the sense in which the poet and the philoso

a world evoked concerns

pher shared a picture of their

recall

world,

for us,

at

"political"

the

that

Plato has

synop into the

background
The

of

the Symposium.
of

significance

logue

could

for philosophy be said to be broadly

the moment in time depicted

by

the

dia

circumscribed

by

two historical events. In

deed in the dramatic

imagery

of

the

dialogue,

the

philosopher

is

surrounded

by
the the

them: on the one side, the recent crowning

of

Agathon
to

as poet
under

laureate

of

day

and on

the other, the imminent

expedition

Sicily

Alcibiades,
as

turning
logue

point

in

Athens'

precipitous a

fall in the Peloponnesian War. If the dia

between the two

even

intimates

kind

of genetic connection

if the

advent of more
we

sophistry were the prelude to systematically still to recreate the stages leading up to that final fall. As move from the heroic life of the Phaedrean battlefield, to the more "com
complete and utter ruin

it

would seem

plex"

(poikilos) legal
of all

Pausanias'

codifications of

cities, to

Eryximachus'

intro

duction
bear

of the technai

that proliferate within them

and as we

finally

move on to the creative arts and the exquisite civilities of

we of
witness

Agathonian

poiesis
"ascent"

to a kind of

symbolic structural analysis of

the rise or the internal

Athenian

culture.

But Plato If only

at the same
most

time

casts aspersions on

dynamic

of this ascent:

explicitly

by

the character of this culture's

interpretation, Winter

1990-1991, Vol. 18, No. 2

234

Interpretation
man"

and by the portentous acclaim (213a) for the archon of its reigning "wise disastrous end (Alcibiades), Plato evokes our recognition that this ascent has

been

ambiguous

at

best,

that this

increasing
of

"sophistication"

on
"softening"

the part of

culture plete

is

at the same time a

kind

degenerate

en route

to com
s

decline. It is thus

no accident that apalos and

speech.

its

cognates cross

Agathon

lips

some

fourteen times in his

moment when

imaginary
Gorgias,
brates

Athens

finally

The victory of Agathon stands at that identifies wisdom with the offspring of
of

or

(taking

our cue

from the meaning

Agathon's name) openly

cultural

cele

a sophistical

"good."2

At least in background

certain

of

its broadest features, the

was shared

assessment

in the in

of the

Symposium

by

the historical Aristophanes. The

of

focusing
the
are

of our attention on the

dimsightedness
of

the

war we

find

above all

the Lysistrata. The dubious character

new scientific

the

new

learning

(and in

particular of

technai and the crowning product of their ethos, sophistry)

of the

the

central

concerns of

paradoxically Platonic though

of

anti-Socratic

Clouds. Eryximachus,

course, is one locus

this
of

shared reflection

in the in

Symposium,
(on behalf
the Clouds

Aristophanes'

and

facetious derision

his

reductive physicalism

of the old
on

"gods") has been

discourse

frequently
of

pointed out.

If the

attack

Athenian legalism is to be located in the Symposium,

of all of the

we must

surely think first

addition to

Pausanias,

the

other

symposiast, in

Eryximachus,

to

(189c). Even the

symbolic

Aristophanes specifically addresses himself centrality of Agathon in the Symposium has its ana
whom
"softness"

logue in Aristophanes, in the

represents
n.

comic motif of

the

the young tragedian

in the Thesmophoriazusae (cf.

esp.

140ff., 191-92, 200, 206,

philosopher

and

4 below).

The basic

kinship

between the

comic and

the

that is

grounded

in

these shared concerns seems reflected in the

the workings of the Symposium.
culture
man

role

Plato

gives

to Aristophanes in

From the is thus

ambiguous

subtextually
level he

chronicled

in the

symposiasts'

collective made

unfolding of Athenian logos about hu

most

Aristophanes'

striving,
stands apart as

speech

to stand apart. On the

concrete

outside of

his culture,

in the way that the comedian stands apart from or one who reflects back and ridicules, rather than un
cynic,"

consciously adopts, the prevailing conventions of the times. So it is that right away we perceive in Aristophanes something of the "wisened standing ironically aloof from the others while mocking, and in that sense critiquing them. As Aristophanes played the critic in historical Athens so Plato seems to grant him a similar honor here, allowing Aristophanes to claim for himself, in
the dialectic of the

Symposium, something
precisely is the
claim? nature

of a special of

role.3

But

what more

the special role to

which

Aris

tophanes here lays

Curiously

enough,

we can

bring

it to light

by

attend

ing

to

something he has in
Aristophanes'

common with

the other speakers, to the sense in

of

which

encomium, like those

a still

the others, the

is covertly

a praise of

the speaker

himself. In

intriguing

paper on

Symposium,

Helen Bacon

identified

this basic

"principle"

that governs the various speeches on eros:

The Wisdom of
There is that
is,

Plato'

Aristophanes

235

however,

kind

of principle
of see

behind the his

manner of

their praising, and that

and

each man sees

love in terms

own profession.
as a

Phaedrus

Pausanias,
in
of virtue.

the rhetorician and the sociologist,

Eros

kind

of supersophist, engaged

what the sophists considered one of their main occupations, the

teaching
and

Characteristically, Phaedrus bases his

poets, Pausanias
on

speech on

Homer

and

Hesiod

the tragic

the evidence of actual practice in religious

universal

cult and social pre

institutions;
sents

to

Eryximachus Eros is the

And
them

doctor;

to Aristophanes he

himself

as the explanation of man's comic predicament; to

all of are

Agathon he is the

greatest of poets.

happily

unconscious of the

fact that it is

not

love that they

are

praising but themselves (p. 429).

From this

point of view at

least

one major and

feature

of

the encomia

is

what we

might call their self-referential

their interpretation comes

self-gratifying character, and one clue to from attending to the lives of the individuals who are

their veiled, though perhaps all the more

immediate

and add

determining,
the
a

referents.

To Professor Bacon's

sketch we might thus of

briefly

following

particu
god,"

lars: To young Phaedrus, the beloved

the source of virtue and

Eryximachus, Eros is
and

"great

noble,"

"anything

great and

really
moved great

resides

in the beloved
and
valor

youth or eromenos

who
even

its elevating power inspires all manner of

a

courageousness

in his lover. In battle

"low

man"

can

be

by

the

power of

love to be "like those

power of

who are

best

nature,"

is the inspirational
beloveds."

the beloved that lovers are

by "willing

and so

to die for

their

Phaedrus'

narcissistic

phantasy

about

the power of the beloved

whom we can

reaches a

kind

of peroration

in his

celebration of

Achilles (with
who put

by

now

imagine that Phaedrus identifies himself),

"more
glorious
. .

young

and

beardless

(180a)
As

was

than all the heroes

together."

an older erastes
view.

Pausanias takes

exception to this simplistic what

(cf. 180c4:
action,"

haplos)

Though Eros is indeed

to "show great
concern

"urges

us toward

noble

compelling not in the ligent

us

for

virtue,"

our noble

it

shows
of

"pandemic"

older

young boy lover. Indeed, simply left to its

errant

but in the

natural

pedagogy devices

the

itself properly more intel

is
an

eros

ambig

uous and

potentially
elders.

phenomenon, and it is only turned to the good

"complex"

by
the

virtue of sophisticated

institutions

and

the

(poikilos)
of eros

nomoi of

Athenian

While preserving
machus, the
approach.

Pausanias'

sense of the
rather more

duplicity

(186a), Eryxi
scientific sees eros as a

"universal"

doctor,

ascends

to a

and
view"

indeed

Beginning

"from the
all of

medical point of and so at work

(186b) he

principle

operating in
and

nature,

in the

spheres of all

the

various arts and sciences:

medicine, gymnastic, agriculture, music, physics,

all these

astronomy,
of

divination. In

domains accomplishing
one who

good

is

a matter

reconciling
.

ments

balancing friendly and

or
physis

opposites, of making "the most antagonistic ele

loving"

(186d). The

has knowledge
and

(episteme)
a
poly-

of

these love forces is

able

to impose

order"

"harmony
so

upon

morphously baneful

(cf. 188a6

ff.),

that through the contrivances of

236
mortal

Interpretation
techne the man of science

becomes likened to

a veritable cosmic

"demi

urge"

(cf. 186d4, 187d4).

metaphysical

This

conceit and autoeroticism

mination

in the

speech of

Agathon,

the beloved of
of

finally reaches "thirty

not

a sort of cul

thousand"

(175e)

at

the festival of Dionysus and poet laureate

most

Athens. Thus

"gifted

poets"

of

(196e)

and so the creator

by

virtue of

only is Eros the which "all living

things come into

are all

being
the

develop"

and

(197a2-3), but his

those
of
"soft"

various other attributes

conspicuously

recognizable as
"youngest"

Agathon himself: He is the "most

beautiful"

(195a6),
all

ple"

(196a2:

hugros).4

(195dl: hapalos), and "sup Indeed the beautiful poiesis that issues from Eros has

(195bl),

"brought forth

good things

that exist for gods and

peace"

men"

(197b8)
put an end

and

in

engendering
rule of

time of "affection and

(195c5) has

to the harsh

Necessity (195c,

197b). The

self-referential principle that

has been

at

work throughout

thus becomes virtually explicit in Agathon's speech, and Plato

seems to underscore the

importance

of

this

feature
end:

of

the encomium

by having
finished,
god"

Apollodorus break into the Aristodemus said, the

was so

narrative at

its

"When Agathon had

people who were present applauded

man

the speech which

becoming
what are

to the young

who

had

given

it,

as well as the

(198a).

But

we

to

say here

about

self-praise

in

Aristophanes'

mythical

speech?

Is there likewise

a principle of self-reference at work

in the

comedian's

Professor Bacon surely captures something promising here in saying that Aristophanic eros serves as "the explanation of man's comic predic since it explains why we are so hopelessly and obsessively preoccupied
account of eros?
ament,"

with

joining

"melding"

and
erotic pathos

our

bodies

with

that of another. So archaic and

other aspects of possible

almighty is this
subordinated to
prior

its

end

(cf. 189d5) that all (191b), and indeed are

life

are

finally
its
appre

only
one

by

virtue of

satisfaction, in
"power"

periods of satiation and respite.

As

only really

ciates the

of eros when one sees

this comical human situation, so this

of the wisdom

logos

on eros makes a claim

perspective.5

for the

"power"

finally

inherent in

the comical

In this

Aristophanes'

sense

exposition

doubtless does

aim at a praise of

"his

profession."

own surface of

But this is indeed only the

the speech's self-referential dimension.

Aristophanes'

As

we

now

reflect more
will

speech,

we

closely on the particulars of begin to see just how much he would

comical

claim

for himself in his

praise of
rec-

giving
eros

us

this exposition and the internal specificity

with which

turns out to be

implicitly

Aristophanes'

self-referential.

According

to

ollective myth, the original circle-people mounted an assault against

Olympus.
(cf.

In

order to

"stop

their

licentiousness"

(190dl:

akolasias).

Zeus

contrived

190c7: mekhanen) the plan of cutting them in two, and after he sent in Apollo and "he told him to heal (190e4: iasthai) them
sewed

split them

he

up."

So Apollo

up their bodies,
out

leaving

the navel at the middle of the stomach and

smoothing

the wrinkles the way shoemakers do on

lasts. The

operation

The Wisdom of
would

Plato'

Aristophanes

237
men

make

them "more
off so

orderly"

(190e4: kosmioteros). All the same,

each a

began
other

dying
half),

in this

condition

(since

Zeus himself in front

performed
them"

longed only to reunite kind of second operation,

metatithesin auton

with

its

"setting

their genitals around

to prosthen) that

of

(191b5:

ta aidoia eis

they
bear

might propagate with one another. a

These

events

Like the very progressing

contrivance

striking similarity to the of Zeus himself,

"demiurge"

events of

the Symposium itself.

Aristophanes'

hiccups halve the

send

circle.

This splitting, in effect,

of

causes

him to

in the doctor
the

Eryximachus,
harmonization

technician and
of physis

the

body,

whose speech about

indeed

"heal"

tries to

things up. That the surgery

is

intended to imachus

make men "more

whom

orderly"

(cf.

only underscores the reference to Eryx Aristophanes has recently detected in his predilection for "the 189a: to kosmion) and the language of whose speech clearly
particular partisan.

orderly"

makes

him its

Then

comes the

discourse

of

Aristophanes.
that is

On its deepest level it tries to implicit in the yearning of their himself now tries to "set their

"power"

recall

the symposiasts to the

sexuality. genitals

Like Zeus in the

around

myth

Aristophanes With the

the true

in front

them."

of

discovery
praise of claims to

of this

level

of self-reference self-image

in his
and

speech we

begin to

see

Aristophanes'

grandeur of

indeed just how

far-reaching
Zeus.6

is his

profession"

"his

own

since with

his

comic exposition

Aristophanes

be

bringing

to bear the very wisdom and justice of

That Zeus
with no

should serve as symbol surprise.

for the

object of wisdom should greet us of

overwhelming
being"

At the

beginning
the

his description

of

the ce

lestial

procession which

leads to the "hyperouranian

of which

region,"

the place where

that "true

dwells in terms

realm of genesis

is

to

be

under

stood, Socrates announces: "And behold, there in the heaven Zeus, mighty leader, drives his winged team, first of the host to proceed, ordering all things
and

caring therefore

"

(Phaedrus 246e: ho

men

de

megas

hegemon
panta

en

ouranoi

Zeus,

elaynon ptenon
. . .).

harma,

protos

poreuetai,

diakosmon
as
.

kai
the

epimeloumenos earliest

To Hackforth this
the
central

passage of

is "noteworthy
.

being
"

intimation

of

doctrine

Plato's theology
us

(p. 71).

Whether the

presence of

Zeus in the Symposium leads

follow those

to see this central

doctrine intimated
the Phaedrus is

still earlier or whether we

who would argue that

earlier

than the Symposium need not concern us here (see

Moore). What
"central

we

need

is to

understand

something

of

the substance of that

doctrine."

Socrates'

Hackforth is surely in the Philebus

about

in connecting the present passage to the nous that is basileus hemin ouranou te kai
right

talk
ges

(28c).
cause

This

"intelligence"

that is

"king

of

heaven

earth,"

and

this

"presiding

(aitia)
clearly

that

orders and arranges

seasons,

and the months, and

(kosmousa te kai suntattousa) the years, the is justly called sophia kai (30c) Socrates
nous"

connects with
"sort"

the figure of Zeus at 30d. In making a fuller investigation

of what

this

nous

is, Socrates

asks

Protarchus:

238

Interpretation
we to

"Are

say,

Protarchus,
governed
and so

that the sum

of

things

(sumpanta)

or what we call

the

whole

(holon) is

kai

mere chance (etukhen), or on the contrary to follow in saying that it is steered through by intelligence and a wondrous diakubergoverning wisdom (noun kai phronesin tina thaumasten suntattousan eikei

dunamin),

by by

a power that

is

senseless and without purpose

(alogou

our predecessors

nan)V

(28d)

As the

"nous"

which
,

"orders

therefore"

all

things and cares

(diakosmon

panta

kai epimeloumenos) Zeus is the personification of that law which governs over the necessity which regulates the movements of "the "heaven and
months"

years, the seasons and the

arranges measures and order

or

finally,
and

the

"power"

mindful

which

for life, growth,

healing

(cf. Phil.

30a9-b8)

in the
of

cosmos.
or

genesis,

Zeus is thus the overseeing principle which animates the realm in language perhaps more appropriate to the mythical image, the
Aristophanes'

Will behind human

all of physis. claim

claim

to

introducing

the wisdom of
or

Zeus is thus tantamount to the

of nomos
itself.7

to seeing beyond opinion

the strictures

to the divine law or truth which resides in and animates nature

How

are we now to evaluate

Aristophanes'

claim, in the dramatic

of

metaphor of

the

dialogue,
be
role

implicit self-praise, his to bringing to bear the in

assigned
we are

sublime
wisdom

Zeus? The answer, I think, is

we reflect on

not to

sought

a simple condemnation and

dismissal. When in the in

context of

the critical

Plato has

Aristophanes

the speeches of his fellow symposiasts,

moved, rather,

to adopt an attitude
which

Aristophanes'

considerably more ambivalent, and to appreciate the sense Olympian self-image does have a kind of legitimacy
analysis, Aristophanes fails to
Aristophanes'

even

if, in Plato's last

how Pausanias

make good on

his

claim.

What then is the

sees

substance of
and

comical critique?
while

Aristophanes

Eryximachus,

appearing to
of

praise

Eros, really

praise

the controls that the human artifices of nomos and techne can have over

it,

and so

honor

not so much

the divine power

sense

Eros

as the all-too-human

powers of reason and

logos. In this

he

recognizes

precisely
of

their claim to

having

transcended the power of physis: the self-praise

of which

the symposiasts is
are the

thus mirrored in the self-praise of the culture

they

Platonic
With
and of sexual

icons. Aristophanes his

"melding"

"contrives,"

as

it were, to

"stop

their

licentiousness."

recollective tale of the power

with one

another, he

by decisively

with which eros moves us to

"joining"

recalls us to the

"power"

desire,

and

in this

sense compels our recognition

of that

erotic

Necessity

which

transcends mortal

dominion. hiccups had already anticipated the substance of his project begins with a proposal by Eryximachus, that

Indeed
attack.
rather

Aristophanes'

The
than

symposiasts'

Moving
pressed

giving of speeches about eros. dismiss the flute girl (who might they ordinarily have been into sexual service at the drunken conclusion of the party), he suggests
next

drinking
that

the party be devoted to the

The Wisdom of
that on this occasion

Plato'

Aristophanes

239

they "consort
allelois

speeche

with one another through

instead
sexual

(cf.

176e7: dia logon

suneinai).

In

view

of

the

circumspect project

sense of sunousia

the meaning of the scene is

clear :

In the
of

thus

being
logoi

symbolically inaugurated
place of or supersede

by

the symposiasts, the sobriety

as

logos is to take the

procession of order on

the errancy of eros. Just

the orderly

at

the party caricature the claims of culture to have imposed

Aristophanes'

unruly
to

nature, so
show man versive and

disruptive hiccups
to

anticipate what

he

will attempt

by

his

critique :

that for all its apparent

establishment of
"power,"

dominion, hu

"order"

is

still subordinate

a yet stronger

the potentially sub

intractable

will of natural necessity. satiric wisdom

Both in
the

ergoi and

in logoi Aristophanes thus incarnates his

a

in

Symposium, opposing
rule

kind

of

hybris

on us

the

part of culture with a recollec

"power"

tion of the

of

Necessity.

Recalling
or

to the

by

which

we

are

inextricably

tethered to our mortal nature,

he

would reorient our

thinking

to

ward a remembrance of

"the

gods"

the transcendence within physis. In thus

rebellion

recalling the rule of Necessity and undoing the injustice of the mortal against it, Aristophanes indeed acts to forestall an "assault against
and

Olympus,"

rule of on

his comedy becomes likened to Zeus. In this sense

claim. of

a contrivance

for the

preservation of

the

Aristophanes'

comical wisdom seems

to

make good

its Olympian

But the drama

mate of

the Symposium alone

claim :

is

enough

to cast doubt on the ulti

pronounced

legitimacy

Aristophanes'

of

Despite the

the comic

Aristophanes,
Agathon
against

the reigning poet

antisophistry is the Gorgian Agathon. With the

ascension of

comes

the final phase of the assault

by

mortal

hybris,
over

and
:

the

rebellion

Necessity

here becomes

most

explicit

and

complete

Agathon
truth (cf.
since

finally

openly declares that the

now

ancient reign of

Ananke is

if
the

indeed those
"what

earlier writers who once told of

its dominion

were even

telling

195c, 197b). Justice is

one person

to be located in agreement among

men

willingly
the

agrees on with another

right."

is just

and the

saying

'the
of can

city'

nomoi are

king

of

is

(Agathon

quotes

Alcidamas,
such

a rhetor

Gorgias'

school.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1406a 17-23.) As

"agreement"

seemingly be secured through the persuasive techniques of mortal speech, the students of Gorgias thus lay claim to having discovered the hegemony of
mortal will and to

having

supplanted

the archaic rule of physis

by

the

kingship
of

of conventional consensus.

The

nomoi of

Pausanias

and

the technai

Eryx

imachus

are

in

this sense wedded and raised to their

highest

potential.

At the

culmination of the speech the powers of the gods are subordinated to the cre
"young"
"Zeus'

ative power of this

ernance of gods and esis thus points

new

Eros, including,

at of

the

last,

even
sophistical

gov
poi-

(197b3). The victory

Agathon's

his
in

ultimate

failure to

back to something lacking bring to bear the "will

even

in the Aristophanic contrivance, to

Zeus"
"power"

of

or the

inherent

physis.

Does Plato

perhaps

intimate

dramatically

something

of

the ground of

240

Interpretation
failure ? Though Aristophanes
than
contrives

Aristophanes'

to gain a higher position

in the

order of speakers

Eryximachus (and in

that sense appears at

first to Eryx

subordinate
imachus'

the technician), he is himself only

able

to

speak

by
that

virtue of

cure

(cf. 185c, 189a). Does Plato here

"different"

Aristophanes'

suggest

logos is ultimately dependent on that of Eryximachus ? Does the wise Aris (18c2-3) logos on eros, perhaps tophanes, in giving us his allegedly work in the logos of Eryximachus transcend the sense of fail to physis at finally (cf. Rosen, On missing
or
pp.

120, 133)?
interpretation
of

Aristophanes'

eros,

eros

is

our eternal search

for

our

animated

precisely

"matching by

half (sumbolon),
our

a search

he thus
the

characterizes as

being
holou

"desire

whole"

and pursuit of

(193al

: tou

oun tei epithumiai

kai didxei). Since the

reason

(192e9
can

aition) for this is that

is

was

in

our original nature

to be whole, eros

finally

be

understood still

another original
would

way,

as what would return us to or

be "the

restorer of our archaic or

nature"

(191dl

tes arkhaias phuseos sunago geus).

As "everyone

melding"

openly (192e7

acknowledge that this : sunelthon

is the

desire,"

age old

the

"joining

and

must acknowledge
Aristophanes'

that a

kai suntakeis) into a whole with one they love, we logos on eros is first of all a logos about sexuality.
present

sexual

frankness is thus

from the

beginning
is

of

his

speech :

The
of

archaic state

to

which eros would

have

us return

presented

in the image Ephialtes

the rolling and

tumbling

circle-men, of

whom

Aristophanes

names

and

Otus for

as a

if

a representative couple :

(190b). The

meanings of

their names

make

wry Platonic touch

Since

ephialtes was

"popularly
leaps

connected with

ephallomai

(LSJ),

"Otus"

and since

seems to

derive from the

verb

othed,

they
who

represent pushes

the coupling

of none other

than "he who

upon"

and

"he

back."

But Aristophanes
theorist. If a

resists

being

characterized as a
of all of

crudely

reductive erotic

logos

on eros must

first

be

logos

of sexual

desire, it

must

at the same time

which

be

an

interpretation

desire

as a

whole, an interpretation in

sexuality has, so to speak, its psychical analogue. Of this Aristophanes himself would seem to be well aware, since he claims his account of
archaic goal pertains to more

eros'

than just the

body's desire

But

no one would

believe that purely

sexual union

(aphrodision

sunousia)

is

what

is wanted,
great zeal.
which

as

if for the

sake of this alone

they enjoy coming

together with such

it is

But clearly there is something else that the psyche of each desires, unable to articulate, but it does divine what it wants and hints in
manteuetai

disguises (alia

ho bouletai kai

ainittetai).

(192d2)

The

soul

too thus shares in the

perpetual
such

longing
"desire
that

to return to our archaic state and partici

and pursuit of

pates

in the body's

the

whole."

Indeed the

participation of

the soul is

it

even seems to underlie

the

body's desire,

so

that sexual union

simpliciter cannot

be

understood as the archaic "whole-

The Wisdom of Plato's Aristophanes

that eros pursues.
else"

241

Beyond

the aphrodision

sunousia

itself there is "some

thing
perhaps

that eros is after, an archaic

a
token."

wholeness of which sexual union

is,

as

it were, only
the

most

But sexuality is indeed a bona fide token of the type proximal of the phenomena in which desire as such appears
"hint"

and so provides us a

as to

the broader

sense of

the "archaic

that eros as as a whole pursues. Thus there is a

can

sense

in

which

Aristophanes
:

be

said

to have given an account of

what

it is that the psyche, too, desires

The blissful

melding"

"merging
a

and

of erotic union acheives a

temporary

re

lease from sorrows, kind

of

forgetfulness
ordinary

of

the

strivings of mortal

existence, and a
oneself

dissipation

of

consciousness.

As

one

"loses

in the

enravishment of eros

the world seems to

careworn

disappear,

and one escapes

for
to

a while

in

ecstatic

freedom from the

labors

of the creatures of genesis.

In the

blissfulness

and eudaimonia of this moment mortal nature

is

given

feel ful

filled,

and

the

vicissitudes of of

life

give
still.

time, the
strifeless

wheel

Ixion

stands

way to stillness, ease, and peace; for a In this time of world-forgetful ness and
pursues

existence

the psyche

indeed
is thus

kind
as

of-

return

to its archaic

situation, to the original nature it had

consciousness.

"prior,"

it

were,

to the genesis of
of
state"

The

psyche too
womb

marked

by

the "desire and the "archaic

pursuit

wholeness,
which

the blissful

of unconsciousness,
eros'

from

it

came.

That he

so envisages

archaic goal

Aristophanes
"divine"

now

muse-

fully

reveals with

his

next words, where

he

finally

does

the nature

of

wholeness that eros as such

is

after:

Now Suppose Hephaestus

way,

were

to

stand over said :

them as

they
you

were

lying
you

together this

having

his tools ready,

one

and

he

"What is it

want,

human
them
again :

beings,
"Is this

to get from
what you

another?"

And if in their perplexity he

what you

asked

desire, to

come together as much as possible, and not

have to
melt
as

leave

one

another, night and

day? If this is

desire, I

am

you and weld you

(suntexai kai sumphusesai) into

one

being. You

willing to would be

two

become one,
common.

and you can when you

live

as

one,

with

the two of you sharing a life in

of

And

die,

there

in Hades, too, instead if

them,

two there

will

be

one,

sharing death. But see if this is should We know that

happen."

what you want and not a single one of

you would

be

satisfied

if this

hearing

this,

would refuse

such an offer.

They

would seem

to desire nothing else.

(192d2-e7)
of our

What does Hephaestus

offer

which

would

seem

the very

satisfaction

eros'

longing
one, to

and the attainment of

archaic goal?

he

proposes to make two

into

create a state of wholeness or eternal union out of what

apart.

been held
than a

Such

wholeness or permanent union

seems

had previously to be nothing less image

what

Aristophanes'

state of uninterupted

fulfillment,

a state where, as

captures so unambiguously, there is no longer any separation between

desires
shows
erotic

and

its

object.

Since it is just

such a separation, as

Socrates first

of all

(199c-201b),
fulfillment

which

is
a

presupposed

by

the presence of eros, this state of

eros'

would

be

state

characterized

precisely

by

absence.

242
Plato

Interpretation

deftly

captures

this character of

eros'

archaic goal
Hephaestus'

in the

particulars of

Aristophanes'

divination. The

presence of
together"

tools

(organa)

and

his into

suggestion

that we be "welded
:

(sumphusesai)

evoke a sense of Arisus

tophanic

"wholeness"

Hephaestus'

work metal or

appropriately transfigures
offer of wholeness
Aristophanes'

something inanimate, like

cisely to put an desire "nothing termination,
end
else"

stone, since his

is

pre

to the yearning of eros.

amounts to

claim what eros

that we would
own

the suggestion that

desires is its
on eros

an end

to the striving telos in

of consciousness.

This logos

thus

properly has its

"Hades."

mythical

Freud has therefore divined

some

thing
as

of

the truth

in seeking his
"ancient

own erotic

theory
life is

prefigured

in

Aristophanes,
and

he too

goal"

conceives the

to be "the

inanimate
death'
.

state,"

finally

feels "compelled
Aristophanes'

to say that 'the aim of all

comical

logos

on eros thus of the

harbors

somber pathos.

At the bottom

human

situation

profoundly plaintive and lies a contradiction in

heart

of

life itself. The

them

creatures of physis are animated at odds with

by

an erotic

Necessity

which puts

pelled

to strive

fundamentally by what would

release can

themselves, since they are com find its fulfillment only in the release from

striving.

Since

such

is only

finally
of

attainable

by

virtue of an end

to

erotic

animation, there

be

no genuine

well-being

or eudaimonia

for

animate

creation.

Life is

animated

by

the ideal

death,

the strivings of consciousness

by

the

ideal

of quiescence.
wheel of

meantime, the

Physis is fulfilled only Ixion rolls on. The eros which

by

self-negation; in the

moves mortal creation

is

the affect of a futile

striving.

The Aristophanic

cosmos

is in this

sense

fundamentally
a

anous or

"mind

less",

and

the whole of nature governed

eikei

by

"power

senseless

and without

purpose"

(alogou kai

dunamin) (cf. discussion

on wisdom of

Zeus

above).

The overseeing
"in
vain"

principle which animates genesis compels

its

creatures to strive

(eikei),

thus condemning them to a life of perpetual frustration and

Aristophanes'

suffering.

In this way

hiccups themselves

caricature

his inter only

pretation of eros : a recurrent and

wish respite and surcease.

intractable demand from

which we could

From this

point of view one might represent

and even

the Will
aspira

behind
tions

all of physis as

uncaring for

ill-disposed towards the it itself

nonetheless

of

its

resident creatures

aspirations which pictures

demands
strivings

of and evokes

in them. So Aristophanes Zeus

refuses to wipe

Zeus: Hostile to the

of the circle-men,

lose

their

them out completely, being unwilling to worship (190 cd); he decides instead to debilitate them. He thus their
"upward"

creates a situation where men retain

of

orientation

but

are

deprived

the means of

fulfilling

it.
one who so perceives the
"moral" "power"

The

pathos generated

in the

behind
us

erotic

Necessity
the

thus emerges in the

Aristophanes

would

have do

draw from
us

wisdom of

his

exposition :

This logos

on eros shows

that it
to

behooves
what

to

be

obedient to the gods and

now :

"in the

circumstances"

present

"is best
:

for

that is to fall in with one of like mind to oneself

(193c9

touto

The Wisdom of Plato's Aristophanes

d'esti
paidikon tukhein

243
anous

kata

noun autoi pephukoton).

The

cosmos

that

is

and alogos

is

also

by

nature

left for

whatever good

befalls to

fortuitous

and

promiscuous

pointedly
pelled

carries

fate: tukhein (from tugkhano, "to fall in or "hit upon") thus the sense of "to meet by Human existence is com
with" chance."

by

an eros

that allows it

only

surrogate and

fugitive

satisfaction and

for

this exiguous solace it is

fundamentally

"chance"

abandoned to

(cf.

also

193b2,
get

193cl, 193c4).
"In the
circumstances,"

present

then, the best

we can

have

comes

from

ting

together with one of "like mind to oneself (kata

mythical

noun autoi pephukoton).

In the

ideal this beloved is less precisely

"complement"

(cf. Dover
as

[1980],
opa

p.

113)

than a reaffirmation of the self-same: These

lovers,

Aris
pros-

tophanes would
.

have it, have "two faces, exactly (189e7-al: kai In homoia pante). his beloved the Aristophanic lover thus pursues

alike"

not

what

takes a different form from the lover

himself, but

rather

only,

as

it were,
"best"

kind

of permanent reconciliation with what

thus the absence of

who

striving that

comes

he already is like. What is from being with one of "like

is
to

mind

oneself,"

in reflecting the countenance of nothing beyond what one al is induces a kind of stillness and peace. In this sense in "sharing their ready lives in these two share a kind of mutual quiescence. Since the
common"

cosmos

that

is

animated

by

eros

is is

fundamentally
not
can

alogos

and

contradictory,
rather

here

again what
rest

is "best for
technique

to awaken or incite

it, but

to lull

it into
where mous

by

whatever

it

be

quieted or
agein
.

"kept
. .).

still."

(cf. 190d5

Zeus logos

warns :

kai

me thelosin

hesukhian

Aristophanes'

fa

"conservatism"

is thus

profound and pervasive :

The

wisdom at

the telos

of this

on eros counsels a

kind
"best"

of retreat

from the

agitations and move

might now poiesis of

ments of genesis.

As the

assuasive effects of

the techne of comedy

finally

be held up to attest, the

are we

we can

have

comes

from the

what might allow us to release ourselves and take respite

from life. from Plato's

Here
we

Where

here to locate

Aristophanes'

failure

and see what

perspective

is wanting in his

"power"

perception of

the

behind

eros?

might root ourselves once again and

in the

"principle"

which guided us earlier on

bring

to light one final

self-referential

feature

Aristophanes'

of

speech.

As

Aristophanes

tells the story, after their original nature had been severed men
together,"

"yearned to be
off

enmeshed and general

and
inactivity"

from "hunger

caring only for this they began to die (191b). For this reason Zeus moved
"
. .

their genitals

around

propagate with one

and through this got them to them, another, the male inside the female. This way, if a man

in front

of

happened
In

to meet (191c5

: entukhoi) a

woman, while

they

were

embracing they

continue"

would generate and the race would

Aristophanes'

(191c).

story, the

procreation

that results from

erotic union

is thus im

incidental
"melding"

to its true motive, namely, the

"enmeshed."

desire to
again

return

to the

archaic state of

and

being

Here

Aristophanes'

logos

proves

plicitly

self-referential

precisely insofar

as

the generation of offspring is

some-

244

Interpretation
Aristophanes'

thing incidental in

interpretation

"power"

of the

behind

eros and

inessential to understanding the archaic goal that eros ultimately pursues. But what does it mean for procreation to be incidental to an interpretation
eros,
or

of

conversely, to understand eros in terms of

an essential orientation

to

offspring?
eros'

Only

archaic

in this latter way, one might say here, do we truly recover goal, and so begin to see the nature of the Necessity behind
eros'

intractable
humans

"power."

So Diotima
beautiful"

warns

Socrates
and

He

must understand

that all

are

fundamentally
in the
reaches

pregnant

(206c 1)

that eros is for

"giving birth

and procreation

(206e). For

as what so

beyond the

of what
appear

brings it into being,

this way : as
a

is to be born lives on, eros, viewed from this is

subject to

perspective, begins to
vicissitudes of genesis more

longing

of what

the

for

what endures

beyond these

vicissitudes

strongly and with greater vitality within the that way better constituted for what befalls mortal
will of genesis.

stream of
nature

becoming

standing and in
is

though the

intractable
which

It is this
of

mortal's perception of

"immortal"

behind the
erotic

"power"

sexuality
breast
:

and what

something is implicit in the

adamantine will of

Necessity. In this

sense eros

is the

affective presence of

scendent

in the

mortal

In

erotic

longing

the child

who

something tran would be born is interpretation

already daimonically From this point of

eros

present.10

view what

is wanting in

Aristophanes'

of

is precisely what is
see :

recollection of

the transcendence within physis, and as this is

"behind"

That

what

tal"

of what mortal process.

eros, we might say that this is what he fails to is unconsciously animated by a vision of the "immor is divined to be in some way delivered from the infirmities of the

the

power of

is

erotic

and so of what

in its transcendence is immanent

understand :

as what orients

the

In this way we can reference back to Aristophanes

who seek

the meaning of
a person might

Diotima's

oracular

"Whereas

tell a story that those

account

after

the other half

of

themselves are

lovers, my
it
view eros

describes

love

as

being
to

neither of

the half nor of the whole, unless

good"

should

happen, my
ori

friend,
ented

be something

(205de). On this
or even
"power"

is archaically

less

by

the other

("half)
the

the sunousia of the two (the

of what might

"whole")
virtue of

than

by

a prior perception of

be

created

by

their union, a

hidden

promise within physis of what

"instinctively"

they

thus

divine

as

making

good on of

their mortal

lacking.

This understanding
analogue or provides a

the power of eros,

has,

so to

speak, its

psychical

"hint"

through
of eros

which one might

likewise

understand

the

"desires have its

pursuits"

and

as whole.

Here too the

"immortal,"

longing

of eros would

arche

in

a perception of

something

and would

be

animated

by

a glimpse of the power of

which of

itself (208b 12), but

The
"mantic"

something it might produce, "something new, like it divines to be delivered from its own infirmities.
the psyche
:

character

is thus
of

an

elaboration of the general

not the archaic affect

metaphor of mortal

pregnancy

The

longing

the soul is

of what would return to

the stillness of the

inanimate, but

rather of what

al-

The Wisdom of
ready
not

Plato'

Aristophanes
like the
too eros

245

nurtures
of

within

it

still

greater

vitality,

speaking,
soul

prophetic

"pregnancy"

the

body,

of a

future

animation. mortal what

In the

would

thus

find its fulfillment in

"death,"

release

from

cence of existence and

but

rather

in

bearing
in

striving and the is better constituted for this

peaceful quies

mortal

in

bringing

something

new

to life.
animated

In this way the

soul would share

being

by

what stands

beyond is

the vicissitudes of genesis,

having

stronger, and makes good on

always already divined, as it its lacking. In its transcendence this

were, what

would always
"power"

be immanent
compels

as what orients the soul and

in its desire, the

of erotic

arche of

the

that
animated

it to longing, is indeed

the source

Necessity. In

being
Will,

by
is

this the soul

what, of

subject

to the demands of a higher

since this

Necessity,
flight."

compels the mortal soul to

its pathos, to the inspired

awak

ening of forgetful
eros as

a resolute pursuit or the

hypnogogic inveiglement

of a plaintive and

As the

affective presence of what transcends the mortal

soul,

divines precisely that with respect to which this mortal's life lacking, and so is the revelation of what points up its infirmities
affect of

now appears and

failings.

The rity

Necessity
of

thus undoes and

debilitates the language

completeness and

integ

of a

way

life,

or

in the

more

imposing

of the mythic metaphor,

sunders

the hybristic

whole.

In this way
overcome

erotic

ings it

and sorrows and

what

is the

archaic affect of a

Necessity brings with it suffer hard and demanding Will, since

genesis

shows

must

first be
and

and undergo erotic

in

order that

its

promise

be delivered

fulfilled. Here

Necessity

might evoke

the pa
give

thos of mortal

flight,

and

generating, as it were, in

mortal

forgetfulness,

way to a timorous delusion. But just insofar as erotic necessity points up our mortal divining that in view of which this way of life now appears

debility by
as

first

itself the
might

revelation of

how

one could yet stand more strongly, and

lacking, it is dwell, one

"cosmos,"

here say, in

a cosmos

that is

"beyond"

this one and

horizon"

which

transcends it.

In revealing
eros

what thus stands "beyond the

of

the present
"hyperouranian"

is, in

the language of the

Phaedrus,

an

intimation

of the

Erotic necessity thus brings into view something captivating and beauti since in pointing up our mortal lacking it divines the very way in which ful, what is lacking could be made good. The hard Will of intractable necessity
place. could

here

mortals'

awaken

resolute affection and power and

be the inspiration infirm

mortal

of a

cos-

mogonic

pursuit, the daimonic

by

which an

soul can see where

.

the way

it

could

be "nourished

prosper"

(cf. Phaedrus 247c ff.

by
.).

the

vision of

the hyperouranian

place the soul

is

trephetai

kai

eupathei

The

plaintive pathos of mortal

flight is thus
"chance."

not

itself demanded

Will, since in the matter of the affect not fundamentally abandoned to

logos
more of all
on eros

generated

in the face

of

by Necessity

this divine
we are

In this way Plato's

philosophical

just

and

harbors an encouraging and inspiring pathos, and an altogether divine image of the nature of the will of Zeus, since it sees first
"power"

hidden

within

the

of eros

the promise of a better cosmos.

246

Interpretation
cosmos

The

in this way

animated
a

by

eros would not

be

"mindless,"

anous or

and not governed over

by

"power

purpose

senseless and without

The

crea are

tures of

physis

would what

not

be

compelled

to strive "in

vain,"

since

they

moved not what would

by

finds its fulfillment only in the release of death, but by be fulfilled here, in the regeneration of life. In this sense the Will is
"ill-disposed"

behind

physis

not

towards mortal nature,

having
life is
not

animated

it

with an eros which at

its

arche

holds the but

measures

by

which

replenished

and goes on.

less,"

The

"power"

which animates genesis

"inarticulate,"

is thus

alogos, "sense
of

or even

wholly

rather speaks nourished

daimonically

the very
affective

way in

which a mortal's

lacking

could

be

into strength, its

presence

harboring
While

the

hidden logos

of a cosmos

transfigured, its infirmities

overcome.
dered"

mortal nature

by

what prevents

may thus be subject to genesis and being "sun it from remaining the same, it is animated by an eros

that

can

heal this In this

by

revealing how
"power"

Necessity

has

arranged

change. with

sense

the

that rules over physis

and while

for a way it can has filled its creatures

something
and

divinely

promising,
are not

its

adamantine

demanding
Will that

hard they

deprived

of

the means

Necessity of fulfilling
creation

may be it. The

governs

the cosmos thus does not

abandon

mortal

for its in the in the in

eudaimonia and whatever good

befalls to the fortuitous

order
for"

"chance,"

workings of
and

but

rather

arrange

measures sense

and

for life,

growth

healing

cosmos,

and

in that

"cares

the mortal creatures which dwell

realm of genesis.

From this
terms
of

point of

view, our "archaic

substance of

nature"

would what

never

be

though'

the

inanimate
is

physis, since it is

in its transcendence Here

one might

animates this that

at the arche of our erotic coming-to-life.

speak of a cosmic nous

that steers through all that

myth, the "first to proceed,

drus 246e:

protos

ordering all poreuetai, diakosmon

is inanimate, like Zeus in the things and caring therefore (Phae

"

panto

kai

epimeloumenos

.).

Thus Plato's logos

would not move

in the imaginal direction

of

the

mythologiz-

ing

of

Hades but

rather

towards
sense

a recollection of

the psyche's

divine

or

"hyper

ouranian"

origins.

In this

Plato brings to bear

a sense of physis

different

from that
of a

which

Aristophanes is

and

"mindless"

fundamentally
cosmos that
now"

Eryximachus both share, and desacralized cosmos.

nature

the "archaic

Since the
the "best

animated

by

eros

is

at

its

arche

divinely

promising,

for

could not

still,"

but

rather

to pursue

possibly be to lull it into quietness or "keeping the good that is promised mortal nature which honors

the Will behind genesis. In this way the

"Diotima."

initiate Socrates

proceeds

in the

coun

sel of

The

wisdom at and

the telos of this logos on eros

poeisis of what

would thus not

issue in

the

"conservative"

""soft"

delivers

us respite

from

life, but bids

a mutual

us suffer

the sacred rites of genesis

which

promise

its

renewal share

and rejuvenation.

Two lovers
since

"sharing
again

their

quiescence,

here

in this way would not in their love what they share is

transcends them (Phaedrus

lives"

some

third thing, which makes

good on and still

250b,

The Wisdom of
252e). Thus in the
consists

Plato'

Aristophanes
Aristophanes'

247

end

it

would

be better

not

to say that

failure

in

"making

tonic love it
consist

failure does not as much in his thinking that the "psyche is defined by and depends on the p. as in his not seeing how both the body and the psyche are (Rosen, 140) "defined by and depend their animation by something divine.
on"

fundamentally fundamentally is that.

eros

sexual."

Even for the initiate into Pla

body"

Aristophanes'

Thus the
a

wise

Aristophanes

could us

be
a

said

to

have
to

reminded us of we

the

rule of

higher Necessity, recalling

transcends mortal

to

"power"

which

are

subject

and

which

dominion. His

comic recollection of

intractable first

erotic

compulsion

in this way

would mitigate mortal

hybris,
in is

and at

sight

lays

claim

to

being

a poiesis that recalls us to wisdom about the power of

Zeus. But

just

Aristophanes'

as

hiccups ironic

are an anticipation caricature of what

ergoi of

the substance of his

critique, so
of

they

are an

still

Aristophanes'

failure to himself rightly

perceive

the

wanting in his wisdom, implicit in

"power"

eros.

Recalling

erotic

Necessity

without

the nous and cosmic

divinity
on

behind it,
more

he
a

might

be likened to

one who presents

the will of Zeus as nothing

than

hiccup, making
Aristophanes.

Aristophanes'

hiccups themselves Plato's joke

the wisdom

of

NOTES

Thus in his

inspiring

paper

"Platonic

Love"

L.A. Kosman finds Plato's already

present
myth

view

that the "proper

speech :

object of erotic

love is

to oikeion

kai

endees"

in

Aristophanes'

"Central to Plato's
about to

vision as articulated

comically in

Aristophanes'

is that the

self which

am

become, my "ecstatic
nature

self,

is

ideally

no mere projection of

my fantasies

or

desires, but is
act of the

my true
gods,

from

which

am

only in

some accidental sense,

by

a willful and

jealous

alienated"

(pp. 60-61).

2. Agathon's
response to

representative connection

to sophistry is indicated

Socrates'

by
Bury,

his

speech

(198c

"The

speech reminded me of

Gorgias

opening "). On the

words of

"abundant"

Gorgias'

"machinery"

presence of

rhetorical

in Agathon's

speech cf.

pp. xxxxv-vi and note

to 194e.

That Phaedrus brings

number of ways : not

us

back to

the

Homeric beginnings

of

this culture Plato indicates in a

Phaedrus'

conceptualization of only is warfare the existential context for virtue, and not only is Achilles finally named as the one who lives out his ethical ideal (179e ff.), but Phaedrus quite openly identifies virtue with the archaic Homeric menos (179b).

For

a somewhat

fuller

"anthropogony"

account of

the subtextual
and

in the first five

of

speeches of

the

Symposium,

cf. the author's

"Anthropogony

Theogony
prologue.

in Plato's Symposium''.
"wisdom"

The centrality of the Symposium of Plato's symbolically indicated already in the

quarrel over the

Agathon is 175c-e.

of course

dialogues'

Cf.

esp.

174b-d

and

3. Thus Brentlinger aptly says of Aristophanes that "he dramatically fulfills a role in relation to the first three speeches which in other dialogues belongs peculiarly to the Socratic art of question It is essential in understanding the Symposium to grasp this and answer that of a wise critic.
(p. 12). Cf. also dialectician. point, namely the similarity between the comic poet and the Friedlander: "It is apparent, to begin with the human or social content, that the four other speakers form two pairs of friends, Phaidros an Eryximachos, Pausanias and Agathon. Even as Aristophanes
.

is

alone

among the

guests

in this human
.

situation, so

his

speech
.

is the furthest
"

removed

from

the

speeches of the others.

Aristophanes is the

sharpest critic

(p. 18).

248

Interpretation
Aristophanes"

ing

in recogniz In the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche speaks of "the profound instinct of (cf. sections 13 and 17). To the extent that the drama of the "the signs of degenerate
culture"

Symposium lends
principal

kind

of approval

to the Aristophanic
extent

"instinct,"

we are

led to

wonder about a

and

complex

issue-about the

to

which

Nietzsche's

critique of what

he deems

"Socratic"

culture

is really Platonic in
Phaedrus the

origin.

4.

Along
and

with

youngest at

the party, Agathon was renowned

Phaedrus'

for his
most
Socrates'

physical

beauty,
tagoras

Alcibiades only
man at

gives voice

to the general sentiment

(213c: toi kallisto)

the banquet. (Cf. also

calling him "the remark at 194d and His for

,

beautiful"

at

Pro
close

315d.) According

to Aristophanes (Thesmophoriazusae
youth.

191-92), he kept his beard

'"softness"

shaven, presumably to heighten the appearance of early

unconnected.

predilection

is

not

On the basis

Aristophanes'

of

portrait

in the Thesmophoriazusae
role as a passive merciless :

it

appears that

Agathon

was

ff., 191-92, 200, 206). If

can

widely known for his effeminacy we are to believe in

the
attribution

and

for his

homosexual (cf. 140 any rate,

we a

Aristophanes'

portrayal, at
"pliant,"

"suppleness"

also

understand

of

hugros

("supple,"

"easy") has

circumspect sexual

sense,

and

the sexual

an apt characterization

(cf.

e.g.

hint

of

Agathon's

promiscuity.

accessibility Aristophanes attributes to Agathon makes it Th. 35, 56 ff., 200). But we need not turn to Aristophanes for a Of all the lovers in the Symposium, it is Agathon who displays a

by his open flirtation (175d) with Socrates (this in spite of the presence propensity for of his lover Pausanias). Cf. also 222c ff. On Agathon's effeminacy cf. Dover (1978), pp. 139-44. 5. Cf. Nussbaum, p. 172 : "As we hear distant myth of this passionate groping
Aristophanes'

"looseness"

and

grasping, we are

and projections ambitious and

invited to think how odd, after all, it is that bodies should have these holes odd that the insertion of a projection into an opening should be thought, by intelligent beings, a matter of the deepest
in them,
concern."

It is

"power"

of course

precisely the
seems to me

of eros which

Aristophanes

claims

his

predecessors

have
.

failed to
will

see :

"It

that

men

do

not perceive the power

(dunamin)

of eros at all.

try

to show you its power, and you, in turn, will be the teachers of

others"

(189cd). For

an

extremely Clay.

interesting

discussion

of the

centrality

of

the theme

of comic and

tragic wisdom, see

6. On the
Dover takes Cf.

circular arrangement of

the couches

at

epi

dexia

at

177d3 to indicate that the

speakers

Agathon's symposium, are moving in

see
an

Dover,

p.

11.

'"anti-clockwise

sequence."

also

For Eryximachus
the scene at
order

Friedlander, vol. 1, p. 161. cf. 187d5, 187d6, 188a3, 188c3

revelers

and

Bury's his

note and

to 189a. Consider here also

223b

When the

finally

take over the party

make exit.

"the

slightest semblance of

(kosmoi)"

disappears, Plato has Eryximachus

For the claims of Aristophanic comedy to critical sophia, cf. the parabasis of the Clouds esp. 518-48. In making the claim to wisdom implicit in giving a logos of Zeus, Aristophanes here seems to take what he deems his rightful place in the "contest over that Agathon had

wisdom"

initiated
perhaps

at the

dialogues'

outset provoked

(175e). We
who

should note too characterized

how he
as

better,
and

by

Socrates

him

implicitly solicited "devoting himself entirely

was

or

to

Dionysus

Aphrodite"

(177e).
:

7. Thus Aristophanes begins

pathemata autes

dei de

proton

humas

mathein

ter anthropinen phusin

nature"

kai ta
gener

(189d4-6). (On
connection

Aristophanes'

conflation of wisdom and

"human

"nature"

and

ally

cf.

191a5.) The

between

the figure of Zeus should of course

also recall

to us the passage

at

Phaedrus 250b
of

where the

philosophers are said more

to be the ones who have

present context power

followed in the train

though

Zeus. (Cf.

also

is

a passage

in the Critias
mortal

where

252e.) Perhaps even "Zeus, the god of

(121b).

important in the
is the
one who

gods"

has the

by

which such

things as
we can

decline
see

are seen cannot

8. Thus

already

how it

tally

sexual, Aristophanes illustrates two

be wholly right to say : "By making Eros fundamen inseparable principles of his teaching. Human striving,
and

body"

for truth or fame, is essentially physical : the psyche is defined by (Rosen, p. 140). Cf. however Rosen's fascinating reading of (pp. 120-58) with which what follows might be compared.
whether

depends

on

the

Aristophanes'

entire speech

has

9. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 51, 32. On so little to tell us about the origin of sexuality that

p.

51 Freud

says:

"Apart from this,

science

we can

liken the

problem

to a darkness into

The Wisdom of
which not so much as a

Plato'

Aristophanes

249
we

ray

of a

hypothesis has

penetrated.

In
a

quite a
a

different region, it is true,

myth rather

do

meet with such a

hypothesis; but it is
we

of so

fantastic

kind
it

than a

scientific

explanation

that

would not venture

to produce it

here,

were

not that

it fulfills precisely the

conflated

one

condition whose
earlier state

fulfillment
erotic

desire. For it traces the

context of a

origin of an

instinct to Freud

a need to restore an
Aristophanes'

things'

speech with

of Plato's

In the

discussion
that a
are

of whether

theory Santas

says

major

"novel

element

in Beyond

the Pleasure
at of

Principle

was

Freud's

notion

that the instincts

affairs."

restoring an earlier state of a death instinct or for the instincts

tophanes'

essentially 'conservative': they aim Freud "surveys the findings of biology for positive evidence

being

conservative,"

but

finding

none,

he

refers some

us

to Aris
years

myth

which as

Santas

points out

Freud had
remarks

recited to

his betrothed
of

forty
and

before (pp. 160-62). On

tophanes'

p.

181 (n. II) Santas

that the "aims

Freud's Eros

Aris

eros would seem to coincide seems of

to

wonder as

both

Hephaestus'

in general, in both aiming at to whether they would "coincide more smith art and his mention of Hades seem to

an earlier state of

but

specifically."

The

symbolic significance

make

the coincidence deep-

running indeed. Some version of the intuition that Aristophanic fulfillment culminates in death goes back at least as far as Aristotle (Politics II 4 1262b 9-17), as Friedlander (vol. 3, p. 20) points out.
10.
who

"power"

Schopenhauer. Here, strangely enough, we can seek help from the eccentric describes how only the presence of something can account for the overwhelming of eros : this longing and this pain of love cannot draw their material from the needs
"immortal"

"Platonist"

"

of an ephemeral

individual. On the contrary they are the sighs of the spirit of the species, which sees here, to be won or lost, an irreplaceable means to its ends, and therefore groans deeply. The species alone has infinite life, and is therefore capable of infinite desire, infinite satisfaction, and infinite
sufferings.

But these breast

are

here imprisoned in the

to

narrow

breast
p.

of a

mortal; no wonder,

sexual attraction ready something like the unconscious "meditation of the genius of the species (p. 549). "Its new life, indeed, is concerning the individual possible through these two Eros is thus the archaic (p. already kindled in the meeting of their longing glances

therefore,

when such a

seems

burst

"

(vol.
"

2,

551). Behind

Schopenhauer thus

sees

"

536)."

affect

in the breast
what

of the mortal of what

has

life."

a more

"infinite

But

as we will suggest

shortly

below,
ena.

for Schopenhauer is the

sexual

substratum

to which all love is to be privatively

across

reduced,

for Plato is the

prototype of what

holds analogically

the spectrum of erotic phenom

1 1

On the centrality

of

the notions

of affective presence and pathos

"truth"

to Plato's conception of

the relation in

which mortals stand

to the

cf.

the author's

forthcoming

"Platonic

Rhetoric."

REFERENCES
Crowned."

Bacon, Helen. "Socrates

translated

The Virginia
the

Quarterly
of

Review 35( 1959):4 1530.

Brentlinger, J. "The Cycle

of

Becoming in

Symposium."

by Suzy

Q. Groden. Amherst:

University

In The Symposium of Plato, Massachusetts Press, 1970.

and

Bury, R. G. The Symposium of Plato. 2d

1932.

ed.

Cambridge, Eng.: W. Heffer

Symposium."

Sons,

Clay, Diskin. "The Tragic

Greek Philosophy,

and

Comic Poet J. P
Anton

of the
and

In Essays in Ancient

edited

by

A. Preus. Albany: State

University

of

New York Press, 1983. Vol. 2.

pp.

186-202.

Dover, K. J. Greek Edelstein, L. "The

Homosexuality. New York: Vintage

Books, 1978.
1980.
American Philological

Plato: Symposium. Cambridge: Cambridge

role of

University Press,

Eryximachus in Plato's
and

Symposium."

Association Transactions

Proceedings 76(1945): 85-103.

Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Translated York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1951.

by

James Strachey. New

250

Interpretation

Friedlander, Paul. Plato. Translated

by

Hans Meyerhoff. Princeton: Princeton Univer

sity Press, 1958-1969. Hackforth, R. Plato's Phaedrus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. In Facets of Plato's Philosophy, edited by W. H. Kosman, L. A. "Platonic
Love."

Werkmeister. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976.

Moore, J. D. "The Relation Between Plato's Symposium

Plato's Thought,
edited

Phaedrus."

and

In Patterns in

by

J. M. E. Moravcsik. Dordrecht: D. Reidel

Publishing
University by

Co., 1973. Pp. 52-71.

Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge

Press, 1986.
Olympiodorus.

Commentary

on

the

L. G. Westerink. Amsterdam: North-Holland

First Alcibiades of Plato. Edited and translated Publishing Co., 1956.

Symposium."

Rosen, Stanley. Plato's Symposium. 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. The Classical Salman, Charles. "Anthropogony and Theogony in Plato's
Journal. Forthcoming.
"Platonic
Rhetoric."

In Rhetoric

and

Ethics: Historical

and

Theoretical Essavs.

New York: Edwin Mellen Press, forthcoming.

Santas, G. Plato

and

Freud. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

as

Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World

Will

and

Representation. Translated

by

E. F. J.

Payne. New York: Dover Publications. 1969.

David Hume's

Theology

of

Liberation

Roger M. Barrus

Hampden-Sydney College

Liberal

political

separating

religion

philosophy attempts to reform government and society by from politics, accomplishing this by curbing the moral pre
conception of

tensions of politics. Liberalism rejects the traditional

of government as

the

purpose

the

achievement of

the complete good life.

the rights of

government to the purpose of

securing

Instead, it limits life, liberty, and property,

means what

the

necessary but
as

by

no means sufficient conditions of the good

government
attainment

to securing the prerequisites of the good life

a matter of

Limiting leaving its final

is left to
each

life.

individual

effort.

Included in

be the very definition of what it means to be a good human being. The distinction between the conditions and the fullness of the complete individual life
must

good vate.

more or

less defines the distinction between the its

concern

public and within

the pri

Religion,

with

for

ultimate

purposes, falls

the sphere of
as

private

right, outside the

sphere of public authority.

It has for its object,

Hegel explains, "the highest,

truth
itself."

the absolute, that

region

which

is absolutely true

or the

This is to be found in "the

in

which all

the riddles of the

world,

all contradictions of

thought,

are

resolved,

and all griefs are

healed,
of

the

region of eternal truth and eternal peace,

self.'"

of absolute

satisfaction,

truth

it
de

Religion belongs in the

context within which

sphere of the private

because it

attempts to

fine the life

can

the question of the nature of the complete good

be

resolved.

The

separation

between

religion and politics

in liberal

political

philosophy
rejects the

involves, along
traditionalist

with

the innovations in politics,

a

a transformation of religion.

Implicit in liberalism is
social

hostility

towards traditional religion.

which religion

It

and political

order, in

is

at

the center of

society,

defining

traditionalist social
ordained.

its purposes, giving it shape, and setting it in motion. The order is founded on the opinion that society is divinely

This opinion, in turn, is based on the view, characteristic of tradi tionalist religious belief, that there is a divine superintendence of human af

fairs. At the

same

time, there is implicit in liberalism

practice

kind

of religious teach

ing
life,

of

its

own.

what

If only indirectly, it affirms it intends to achieve in political

a conception of the complete good

through the there

separation

of
a

religion and politics. conception of

This

means

that at least
which of

tacitly
the

is in liberalism
good

the divine according to

religious

complete

life

can

be

determined. The

implications

liberalism's

new political science are

interpretation, Winter

1990-1991, Vol. 18, No. 2

252

Interpretation

elaborated
nored

by

the liberal philosophers in a

number of

works, now

largely ig
works are

if

not

neglected

entirely forgotten, on the subject of because the issues with which they deal
liberal
private

religion.2

These

are no

longer

alive politi

philosophers'

cally,

a measure of the

success

that religion is an essentially

affair,

having

in convincing the world nothing to do with politics.

most

Probably
religion

the most artistic, if not necessarily the

political

artful, treatment of

in liberal
Religion.*

Natural

philosophy is David Hume's Dialogues Concerning For Hume, the Dialogues was an extremely important work. for
over

He labored

on

it

off and on

twenty

years, from first draft in 1751 to

was occupied

final
last

revision a short time weeks of

before his death in 1776. He

during the

considered

his life in arranging for its publication. Hume apparently also the Dialogues to be an extremely dangerous work. Not only did he
his death, but he failed
published

delay

its

publication until after

even

to

mention

it in the
all

short autobiographical sketch

that he
was

just before he died. This is

the more

interesting

because he

willing to publish

in his

own name works of religious scepticism

during including the Inquiry

of Religion,
and

his lifetime his

and

Concern
essays on and

ing

"Superstition "The

Human Understanding, the Natural "The and

Enthusiasm,"

History

Sceptic,"

"Miracles,"

"Suicide,"

Immortality
explicitly

Soul."

of

the

Further, many

of the most provocative argu

other works.

ments of where

the Dialogues are drawn from these

states

While Hume
his

no

his intention in writing the Dialogues, it is clearly in

more

tended to be something
religion.

than
and

mere

catalogue

of

arguments

on

The book has

unity

integrity

of

its

own.

It is this that

accounts

for the

Dialogues'

importance,

rity of the Dialogues are liberalism's theology of liberation.

its danger, for Hume. The unity and to be found in its development of what might be
and

integ
called

The
of

separation of religion and politics

political

is

crucial to

the success of the project

liberal

philosophy, the realization of

what

it

conceives

as man's

natural

freedom through the liberation

of mankind

from its

traditional
and

bond

ages.
one

Human beings from the This is

a

beginning

have

sought

to subjugate

dominate
the

another.

nasty

consequence

of

their subjection to

nature:

narrowness of their natural endowment compels them

other to at

to

make use of one an

press what

down

on

least partially relieve themselves of the cruel necessities that them. The enjoyment of human beings of their natural freedom,
articulates as

liberalism
threatened

their natural rights of

life, liberty,

and

property, is

by the malevolence of man and the enmity of nature, the former represented by war, and especially civil war, the latter by famine, plague,
pestilence,
and the other cataclysms
either of nature.

Liberalism

attempts to solve

both these problems,

political system of

directly

or

indirectly,

through its

invention

of the

nonpartisan,

representative government.

David Hume's

Theology

of Liberation

253

reflected

The traditional understanding of man's thralldom to man and to nature is in Aristotle's teaching in the Politics. Aristotle begins his teaching on
the claim that the ultimate moving force in human life is a
"Everyone,"

politics with

longing

for the

good.

held to be

good."

he asserts, "does everything for the sake of what is It is this desire for the good that leads human beings into The
most comprehensive

association with one another.

form

of association

is

the political community, which aims at the

complete good association.

most comprehensive of

goods, the

life. It
are

contains within subordinate

itself,

and perfects,

all

other

forms

of

These

to the political

community because they

have

as

their objects

achievement of

only the various partial goods that contribute to the the good life. There is an order to the elements that make up
While
perhaps all make contributions that are neces

the political

community.

sary for the

accomplishment of sufficient

the common purpose, some make contributions

a claim

that are more nearly

for it. The latter have

political

to

political prece

dence

over the
whole

former. The
made

structured

up

of

community is, then, an hierarchically heterogeneous parts, organized in the light of

life.4

some conception of

the

complete good

Government, for Aristotle, is inherently

society life. For
the
over

partisan, the rule of some part of the good

the whole, on behalf

of some particular conception of refers

analytical purposes, and the many.

Aristotle

to the groups in society as the one,

commu
calls

few,

nity

gives

Whichever group comes to predominate in a that community its tone, shape, or order, what Aristotle
not

its

regime.

Regimes differ

with respect to the purposes

only for which

with

respect rule

to who rules in them, but also

is

exercised.

Every

conceives of the common good

in the light

of

its

own specific

group in society interests. Again

which rule

for

analytical

purposes, Aristotle distinguishes between regimes in

is

for the

good of

both the

rulers and

the ruled, and regimes

are good regimes,

in

which rule

is for

the good of only the

rulers.

The former

the latter bad. There

six

are, then, many different

regime

forms. Aristotle includes

in his theoretical
and

taxonomy: monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, polity,

democracy.

Even the good, however, exhibit something of the particular interest of the ruling part, just as even the bad exhibit something of the universal aspiration for the
good

life (see Bk. Ill,

esp.

1278b6-

1281al 1).

It is the partisanship of government that is, for Aristotle, the cause of the fundamental problem of politics. All the groups in society want to be treated

justly,
all

to have their

special contributions recognized and

their specific needs

filled. While disagree

taken

all agree

that justice

is giving

equal

things to equal people,

they
must

about

the

equalities and

inequalities

of people and

things that

be

into

account

in

doing

justice.

Every

part of

assert

its

own right practice

to rule, on behalf of its own

society is led, then, to conception of the good life.

the various parts of society
which

Political for the

is defined
over

by

the

competition of

right

to rule

the

whole.

This competition,

Aristotle

calls

faction,
totle

can, if it
a

gets out of
number

suggests

of

strategies

hand, become extremely destructive. While Aris to contain the problem of faction, he

254

Interpretation
that

understands

it

can never

be

eliminated

from

politics.

Faction is inherent in
that there is no re to nature.

the very

nature of political society (see Bk. V). Aristotle's teaching on politics leads to the lease for mankind from the age-old bondages of

conclusion
man

to

man and man

At least there is

no

hope for

universal progress or a general

improvement in the

human

condition.

With its

aim of

an expression of perfection of

the yearning of

actualizing the complete good life, politics is human beings for the fullness, completion, or

their existence. This yearning shows itself in politics,

however,
of of

principally in the particular claims to rule that are raised by the various parts society. The assertion of these claims to rule leads to the disruptiveness

factional

struggle.

In politics,
that

efforts

to make things better are

inevitably

ac

companied

by

conflicts

might well make

them worse. The political struggle

leads to the
lar

replacement of of

the rule of one part of

society is

with

its

own particu

conception

the common good

by by

the rule of some other part with a

a marginal

similarly
over

partial view.

At best the

new government

improvement

the old. The domination of man

practice

man,

however,

continues unchanged.

Political

moves, then,

within more or

less fixed limits. These limits

represent the
make

forces that, from above, hold human beings in subjection. They manifest the domination of man by nature. Consideration of the problems leads to the
of
conclusion

of politics

that what

is

most needful existence.

for human beings is

reflec

an

understanding

the limits that define their

place of man

This involves

tion on the nature of man, the

power or powers

in the

order of

things,
the

and

the

that give man

his being. The highest

expression of

longing
There
of

for

completion

is, therefore,
a

to be found in the activity

transcendence of the

of contemplation.

is in this activity
man.

kind

of

limits that define the life

who

Only
and

the relatively

few individuals, however,

have the leisure, incli

nation,

ability necessary for the contemplative life can obtain this freedom. Liberalism's project for the emancipation of mankind from its traditional
receives

bondages
The

its

most comprehensive exposition

in Hobbes's Leviathan.

premise of

stood as point

being

Hobbes's teaching is his denial that human beings can be under moved by the longing for the good. This is the most important psychology that he elaborates in his first from his psychology that "there is no such Finis
as
chapters.5

of the

materialist

Hobbes

concludes

itltimis.

(utmost ayme,)

nor

Books

of

the old
of all

Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) Morall In its place, he

Philosophers."

is

spoken of

in the

proposes as

"a

generall

inclination

mankind,

perpetuall

and

restlesse of this

desire

of

Power

after

power, that ceaseth only in

power

Death."

The

cause

ceaseless

striving for

is that man "cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of (Ch. 1, pp. 160-61). Politics does not, then, grow out of the longing for completion, fullness, or perfection. Rather it grows out of the competition for power understood as not so much the
prerequisite as the substitute

for the

good.

This is

expressed

in the doctrine
tor
power

of

the state

of nature.

In the

natural condition the competition

is

unre-

David Hume's
strained.

Theology
men

of Liberation

255

As

result, there is

no

security for
to

in the

enjoyment of their

natural rights of man

to life

and what conduces

life, liberty,

and property.

The life

in the

natural condition political

is "solitary, poore,

Human beings form

complete good

society, according to
order to escape the

brutish, Hobbes, not to

nasty,
of

short."

and achieve

the

life but only in (see Chs. 13-14).

Government
when

horrors

the state of

nature

properly

organized-that

is, in

accordance with

Hobbes's

new science of politics-is nonpartisan.

The

exclusion

from the

public sphere of

the question of the

part of

the complete good life makes it impossible for any society to assert, on the basis of its special merits, a right to rule over the rest. Given that there is no publically accepted and enforced conception of the good, there is no foundation on which to rest such a claim to political
nature of

power.

More

importantly,

the

depoliticization

of the question of

the nature of
of politics

the good life has the effect of abolishing, at least for the purposes
and ety.

government, the qualitative distinctions among the different parts of soci

With

no public

definition

of

the good, there is nothing to make any indi

vidual or

group in any way

special

in the

political order.

This

least from the

equal.

point of view of politics and since there

government,

all

means that, at human beings are

This in turn implies that,

right

is

no one who enjoys

any

natural or

divine

to rule, all human beings are

by

nature

basis for

government

authority is the

consent of the governed.

free. The only legitimate The governed

presumably will give their consent to the formation of a government that will limit itself to the purpose of securing them against the dangers to life, liberty,
and

sentative
whole

property of the state of nature. All legitimate government is, then, in character, embodying both the consent and the interests
of society.

repre

of
of

the
the

According

to

Hobbes,

this

is the in

case

regardless

form

monarchic, aristocratic,

or

democratic

which

it is

organized

(see

Chs. 13, 17, and 19). Hobbes in his invention

of nonpartisan government attempts what

is,

accord

ing

to the traditional understanding, the impossible: not merely to the problem of factionalism. The cause
of

control

but to

solve

government.

The

political

system

of representative

faction is the partisanship of government attacks fac

partisan government of

tionalism at the level of its

causes

by

replacing the

traditional society, in

which a part rules over

the whole in the name of some

particular conception of the complete good

with an essentially nonpartisan over itself on behalf of goods whole rules which the in government, are that, while in themselves only partial, universally desired. It is impossible, under representative government, for human beings to raise in public the ques

life,

form

of

tion

of

the nature of the

good

life. It is therefore impossible for them to issues that

arise

come

into

conflict

politically

over the great

from this question, the

point of view of

issues

of who should rule and

all

for

what purposes.

From the

representative government,

opinions about

the good life are false because

right

they

all

imply

something

of a natural or

divine

to

rule.

It

would

be the

256
height

Interpretation
of

folly, then,
in the

to

fight in

politics over these opinions.

and what

Little is left to be
to engage

struggled over

public

sphere,

is left is

not such as

men's most powerful passions.

what of

Politics is

reduced to

the struggle over who gets

the essentially

instrumental
In this

goods of society.

It is almost, but
will retreat

not

quite,

subsumed private

by

economics.
which

situation

human beings

into their

affairs,

do

engage their

passions, and involve themselves in the

public arena

only

when moved

by

threats to or opportunities for the advance

of politics

ment of their special

will ever get out of

interests. There is little danger that this kind

and endanger the peace of society.

hand

This

would

be the

cerns,
new

last thing that its participants, animated primarily by essentially economic con would want to see happen. Prosperity accompanies peace. In Hobbes's
arrangement of political

society, the stirring but

frequently destructive

clash of great parties struggle of

is

replaced

by

the unexciting
and

interest

groups

(see Chs. 21
in

but generally nondisruptive 24. On the topic of great and small

parties,

see

Tocqueville, Democracy
the
problem of

America, Vol. I, Part II, Ch. 2, "Par

new science of

ties in the United States.).

The The

resolution of

factionalism in Hobbes's
of

politics prepares

the way for the general improvement

the human condition.

of

solution to the problem of

faction involves
achievement of

drastic narrowing
and property.

the pur

poses of

government, from the

the complete good

life to the
this

security

of the

instrumental

goods of

life, liberty,

Ironically,
in

narrowing Factionalism is
natural

opens

up hitherto

unimagined possibilities

for

progress

society.

rights,

thing because it threatens the both directly, in the violent conflict

an evil

enjoyment

by

men of

their

that it only too

with

frequently
relief

touches off, and

indirectly, in
in its One

the way that

it interferes

the progress of

modern natural science of man's estate. various or

effort

to conquer and

master nature

for the

aspect of the competition

a tension

for

political power

among the

factions in society is
and

between the few wise, the

nonphilosophers which makes

philosophers nonscientists.

scientists,

the

many unwise, the

or

Through his
either

system of nonpartisan

government,

it impossible for
to rule over

the few scientists or the many nonscientists to

claim a right

the other, Hobbes reconciles these two parts of society, guaranteeing to the few the freedom

from interference

by

the many that

they

require

for their investiga

tions,
as
an

while

account of the power that

end

assuaging the fears that the many might harbor towards the few on they have at their command. Peace is good not only
also as a
of mankind

in itself but

greater

end, the emancipation

the
conquest
of

necessary means for the achievement of a from the bondage of natural necessity
modern

through

nature

by

science. a means

On its deepest level,

Hobbes's
can

system of nonpartisan government

is

by

which

human beings

ally together to more effectually

conclusion of this

make war on nature.

The

alliance, according to liberal

political

philosophy,

requires the separation of religion and politics.

of nonpartisan government requires

The

establishment of the system

the exclusion from the public sphere of the

David Hume's
essentially
clusion

Theology

of Liberation

257

religious question of

the nature

of

the complete good life. This ex

absolutism.

takes the institutional

Its

more successful

form, in Hobbes's thought, of secular institutional form, however, is Locke's system

in the
question of organization of the

of religious

toleration. Involved

the nature of the complete good life are universe,

man's place
whole.

issues

of cosmic

dimensions: the

in

the order of creation, the power or powers weaving together the

Tradi
at

tional society, which places the question of the nature of the good
center of

life

the

its

submission

its politics, is profoundly religious. This is expressed in its fatalism, to the given. The religious character of traditional society is
even more

expressed

forcefully
It

in its

adherence

to the contemplative

ideal.
poli

Liberalism, by removing
tics,
secularizes society.

the question of the nature of the good

releases

life from

society from its traditional fatalism while its traditional admiration for the contemplative life with a taste for supplanting action. Liberalism not only unites but sets in motion traditional society.
separation of religion and politics change

Through the
a

liberalism intends to

bring

about

revolutionary

transformation of

in the way men are governed, the human condition. The political
the domination of
of man
man

and out of that a radical

system of representative

government abolishes abolition of the

by

man, and makes possible the

Liberalism is eminently sober in its politics; its sobriety, however, is in the service of a kind of madness, the domination

by

nature.

scientific conquest of nature.

the liberal

project.

There is something divine, at least Dionysian, in The works on religion of the liberal political philosophers,

including
onysian

Hume's Dialogues
of

Concerning

Natural Religion,

articulate this

Di

dimension

liberalism.

Hume's
Religion is
asserts that

adoption of the a

dialogue form in his Dialogues

Concerning

Natural
work

rarity in

modern philosophy.

One

of

the characters

in the

"though the
of

ancient philosophers conveyed most of their

instruction

in the form
it."

dialogue,

this method of composition has been little practiced in

later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted Modern philosophy aims at the development of comprehensive systems,

beginning

with

indubitable first

principles and at sure

moving

by

unbroken chains of

reasoning and evidence to arrive slip into a "methodical and

ophy is
nature:
systematic

final

conclusions.

It therefore tends to
philos

didactic"

mode of exposition

(p. 3). Modern

because

of

its intention

or purpose to master and conquer

it

reforms nature

tice. Its

principal

in theory in instrument in this

name,
explain

preparation

for its

reconstruction natural

in

prac

project

is

modern

science.

Hume

does not, in his

treatment of
a

own

his

choice

of the

dialogue form for his

natural religion. modern

He indicates
can

limit

to

how far

philosophy

his choice, however, that there is be made systematic. Natural religion

by

258
is the
of

Interpretation
set of

beliefs

about

God that supposedly

can

be derived,
being.

without

the

aid

divine revelation,

by

reasoning on the observation or experience of the uni

cause or ground of all

verse.

It concerns, then, the

present

Choosing

the dia

logue form to is
a problem

his teaching on natural religion, Hume implies that there in the metaphysical foundations of systematic modern philosophy.
a problem

This, in turn, implies

for the

conduct of

the modern project of the

scientific conquest of nature.

Hume's

to the extent possible, to resolve

modernity.

in the Dialogues is to define and, this problem in the theory and practice of
purpose

Hume
voice.

masks

his intentions in the Dialogues

this

He

accomplishes

by

adopting the

by never speaking in his literary device of a narrator

own who

introduces the discussion,

the
actions of

makes unobtrusive comments on

the arguments and

the

interlocutors,
youth

and concludes

by

debate.6

The narrator, the

Pamphilus,

records

rendering judgment on the for his friend Hermippus a

conversation that older men,

he recently

overheard on

the subject of religion among three

conversation

Cleanthes, Philo,

and

Demea. This

is

of

interest

not

only because of the topic with which it deals but also because of the extraordin ary differences in the characters of its participants. Pamphilus contrasts "the
Cleanthes"

accurate
Philo"

philosophical

turn

of

with

the

"careless

scepticism

of

and

the "rigid inflexible orthodoxy of

Demea"

(p. 4). At the

close of the

whole,"

conversation,

Pamphilus,

"upon

a serious review of the

decides that

"Philo's

principles are more probable than

truth"

Demea's, but

that those of

Cleanthes
obtuse.

approach still nearer

to the
or at

(p. 95). This

most

verdict seems

curiously

Philo is the dominant,

tion.

least the

vocal, participant in the conversa

Many

of

his

arguments are

left

unanswered. victor

He

states

the conclusions of

the discussion. If Cleanthes really is the

in the

confrontation with

Philo,

he

must win

by

stealth or even

fraud

rather

than

by force.

It is possible, how
young.

ever, that Pamphilus

to

is

not a

fit judge for the debate. He is

He is

likely

be

partial

towards

he

underrates

Cleanthes, his friend and teacher (see pp. 4-5). Perhaps the arguments of Demea and Philo while overlooking problems
arguments.

Cleanthes'

with

At the

same

Pamphilus'

markably
not

reserved character of
truth"

time, it is necessary to note the judgment: principles

Cleanthes'

re are

than Philo's. simply true, but "nearer to the Pamphilus takes up in his introduction the question of the purpose of writing dialogues. He claims that the dialogue form is appropriate whenever the issue is

only "so obvious that it scarcely that it cannot be too often

not

dispute,"

admits of

but

also

"so important
making

inculcated,"

the

freshness

of

the

presentation

up for the hackneyed character of the topic. The dialogue form is also appropri ate when the issue is "so obscure and uncertain that human reason can reach no

fixed
a

determination"

on
decision"

it. In this
"an

case the

play

of

"opposite sentiments,

even

without

amusement

any
of

offers of

agreeable and

The
with

reader enters

into

kind

way the

community dialogue "unites the two

interest

sympathy

the

interlocutors. In
human

this
life-

greatest and purest pleasures of

David Hume's
society"

Theology

of Liberation

259

study

and

(pp. 3-4). The

subject of natural religion combines all these

circumstances: there

is

no

topic

so obvious

but important

as the

being

of

God,

no topic so obscure and uncertain as

the

nature of
and

God (p. 4). How the dialogue is indicated in

a comment

form

might on

be

utilized

to "unite study

society"

Galileo's Dialogue of the Two Principal Systems of the World. In this book, Galileo has his characters discuss the common or received opinion

by

Philo

that terrestrial and celestial substances are

distinct in their force

of

nature and

behavior.

The dialogue form

his "arguments
on

allows

him to

meet

the "full

prejudic

by turning
meta

every side in order to render them popular and (p. 24). Galileo's intention in the Dialogue, of course, is to demolish the foundations
of

conv

physical

the Ptolemaic conception

new

of

the universe and to provide

conception.

the

metaphysical

foundations for the

Copernican

Galileo's

rev

olution
world

in astronomy contributed, however, to the demise of the traditional and the creation of the modern world. Galileo uses the dialogue form,
society"

then, to "unite study and by refounding society truths that he has discovered through study. Hume
veal

on

the basis of the

reveals

his intention in the Dialogues, to the

of

extent that

he does

re

it, in

the dramatic structure

the
and

work.

This involves, in

addition

to the

characters'

arguments, their actions

designs. The

arguments are so absorb

ing

that it is easy to
or at

overlook

the

other elements of

the drama. The characters

conceal,

least do

not

loudly

proclaim, their

intentions.

They

are subdued

expressions and tones of voice, commented on

philus. sation

in their actions, generally speaking showing themselves in nothing but facial apparently in passing by Pam
This is among
altogether appropriate a

for the

situation and

the setting: a conver

few

old

friends,

on

a topic of general rather than

immediate
of one of on

practical

interest,

carried on

in the

genial surroundings of

the

library

the participants. The discussion among

subject of natural religion,

Cleanthes, Philo,
no

and

Demea

the

however, is
soul

idle

chat

but

a rhetorical
victor.

contest, a
older men

kind

Pamphilus'

of

war,

with

as the prize

for the

The

debate the
as a

principles that ought to guide the

young

men's education.

It begins

dispute between

traditionalist

piety

and modernist activism.

It quickly be

comes a

dispute between two

fundamentally

different

conceptions of modernist

activism, however. Demea

proposes

to Cleanthes a plan, ultimately borrowed

from the
troubled

ancient moralist

Plutarch, for educating Pamphilus. Apparently he is

is

by
is

the way Cleanthes

elements of not action

handling

the youth's education,

imparting

to

him
"the

the

"useful"

the arts

and sciences.

For Demea, the

point of of

education

but

contemplation.

His

plan culminates

in the study

gods."

nature of

the

Before the

subject of

the mind of the student

must

be

well seasoned

theology is broached, however, with piety. This is accomplished

through

kind

of sceptical attack on
of

human reason,

by

continually pointing

out

during

the study

the other sciences the

failures

of man's natural powers of

thought.

Philo, complimenting Demea

on

his

plan of

education,

agrees

that religious

260
faith

Interpretation
must

be based

on

scepticism

about

the

capabilities

of all

human

reason.

little into study and to believe that nothing is beyond the reason
"Those
who enter a
fences,"

inquiry,"

he claims,

too often come

of

man; then,

"presumptuously
the tem
abilities when

breaking
ple."

through all
move

they

"profane the inmost

reach of their
particular

sanctuaries of

Human beings

beyond the

intellectual

they

speculate on religious

subjects, in

the creation of the universe.

The only defense against presumptuousness is to set before them the limits of human reason, including "the insuperable difficulties which attend first princi
ples

in

systems"

all

and

"the

contradictions which adhere

motion"

matter, cause and effect, extension, space,

are

time,
admits

to the very ideas of (p. 6). Human beings

better

off when

they

confine

their specualtions to

this-

worldly topics, in

cluding trade
cism

and politics

(p. 9). Cleanthes

the use

of a moderate scepti

apart,"

that considers "each

particular evidence
which

and proportions

its "assent

occurs."

to the precise

degree

of evidence

This is the basis for "all He insists that "theologi

science."

natural, mathematical, moral, and political

religious"

cal

and

reasoning.
of

be built up using this same kind of He follows Locke in affirming that "faith [is] nothing but a species
science can and must

reason,"

that "religion
theology"

[is] only

branch

philosoph

of chain of

and

that "all the

similar to

principles of

are established

by

"a

arguments"

those employed in
observation of
nature

physics"

"morals,

politics, or

(p.

11-13). Based

on

the
of

design in the universe, Cleanthes

to the
mind of

argues that the

"Author

is

man"

somewhat similar

(p. 17). Demea is

scandalized

and

Philo

somewhat amused
of

by

the comparison between the divine and the

human. All three

one sort or another. sions

in the conversation are, then, sceptics of derive They very different practical and theoretical conclu from their scepticisms, however. Demea is led to the piety and rationalist
the
participants

theorizing

of

traditionalist

religiosity.

Philo

comes to a

kind

of moderate mod and

ern scientific empiricism.

He distinguishes between

heavenly

earthly

mat

ters and restricts the quest for scientific understanding to the

latter,

while con

signing
to the

the

former

to

perpetual

doubt

and

uncertainty.

Cleanthes

is

thoroughgoing
study
spite of

scientific

empiricist,

who applies

the methods

of modern science

beings, both on the earth and in the heavens (see p. 26). In their differences, Demea and Philo are able to ally together to combat Cleanthes, with Philo bearing the heat of the battle, subjecting his arguments to
of all
a

barrage
Two

of sceptical criticisms.

separate conflicts

then,

shape

the

drama

of

Hume's Dialogues. The

rationalist

first,
and

of

course, is the confrontation between the traditional

Demea
the

the modern empiricist

Cleanthes. The second,

modern

and more

interesting, is
and

confrontation

between the two

empiricists, Cleanthes
as a result of

Philo. These
alliance con

separate conflicts are cluded

intermingled, however,
and

the

between Philo

Demea fall

against
of

Cleanthes. The drama has

the

as

its

cen

tral motif,
and

then,

the

rise and
of

the alliance between the

at

modernist sceptic

the representative

traditionalist orthodoxy. Formed

beginning

of

David Hume's
Part I, it
suffers stresses and strains

Theology

of Liberation
and

261
disin

throughout the
apart under
when

dialogue,
on

finally

tegrates at the end of

Part XL It falls

the pressure of Philo's relent the issue of

evil

less
the

sceptical
world

questioning, particularly
what

he touches

in

and

it

might or might

not

imply

for the benevolence

of

the

Deity. The

alliance's

fate is the

result of are

the fundamental differences between

the two allies. These

of

differences

its formation. He
approval of

smiles at what
approach

clearly recognized by Cleanthes at the time he perceives as satire when Philo proclaims

his

Demea's

to education (p. 7). Demea and Philo come

their mutual scepticism about the reach
over

together on the
of

basis

of what appears as

human

reason.

They

differ profoundly, however,

the

practical

use

to

which the theoretical critique of use of scepticism

dence"

human
mind

reason should

be

put.

For Demea, the

to the
mind given.

is to tame the

to "a proper submission and self-diffi

(p. 5). It

supports traditionalist scepticism

piety,
as

with

its

resignation

For Philo, however, be

cautious

is

useful

discipline for the

in its

struggle to understand and

ultimately to control the world. It leads the mind to

all of

in its reasonings, especially on the most abstruse topics, and to base its conclusions on the solid foundation of experience. It induces the mind its
speculations

to restrict

to the

sphere of common

experience,

leaving

alone

such transcentental questions as

things,"

"the two eternities, before

of

and after the present

and

state of

the "creation and formation

universe,

the

the "powers

and operations of one universal

Spirit existing
and
modern

without

beginning

and

end, om

nipotent, omniscient,

immutable, infinite,

incomprehensible"

(pp. 9-10).
and

Scepticism supports, then, the

conquest of nature.

project

of

the scientific mastery

The differences between Demea introduced

sceptics

and

Philo

are summed

up in

the

distinction
Vulgar

by

Cleanthes, between

scepticism.7

vulgar and philosophic

establish."

"reject every This sustains "traditional

principle which requires elaborate

reasoning to prove and

superstition"

vancement of scientific

knowledge. Vulgar
nor attend

sceptics

precluding the ad "firmly believe in witches,

while

though
clid."

they
from

will not

believe

to the

most simple proposition of

Eu

Philosophic

sceptics push their speculations

into

recondite evidence.

subjects

but
led

refrain

drawing

any

conclusions except

from hard

They

are

by

their theoretical scrupulousness,

particular theological

however,
are

to assume that the highest ques

tions, in
son.

questions,

beyond the

reach of

human

rea

For Cleanthes,
matters

men of

philosophy
to

or science should

be willing

when

in
(p.

vestigating judgments that they do

gious questions to

of religion

to make the same kind of empirically based

matters of a more mundane character

with respect

11). Philo, in contrast, compares "foreigners in a

and who are

philosophers or scientists strange

dealing

with reli must seem

land to

whom

everything

suspicious,

in danger every
people with arguments

moment of

transgressing

against

the

laws from

and customs of

the

whom

common

experience, all

they live and look equally reasonable,

remain

conver

So far
rather

or

equally

unreasonable.

"The

mind,"

Philo claims, "must

in

suspense

262

Interpretation
them,"

between
(p. 10).

and

this "suspense

balance'

scept

or

is "the

triumph of

Philo

and

Cleanthes

are

both

partisans of modernity, with agree on

its

project

for the is

scientific conquest of nature.

They
of

its superiority to the

pious reli

giosity

and rationalist

theorizing

traditionalism. This area of agreement

obscured

by

the

rhetorical concessions

that Philo makes to

Demea,

required

by

the alliance between the two. Philo and Cleanthes disagree powerfully, how ever, in their
understandings of

the theoretical foundations of

science

modern science.

They

differ

over

the question of whether modern

"earthly"
"heavenly"

pertains

to only

"earthly"

or to

both

and

matters

that

is,

whether

it

pre

supposes a specific

theology

or metaphysics.
conduct of of

This theoretical disagreement has

practical consequences ence

for the

the modern project. If modern sci

has

no

theology
is
at

or metaphysics

conflict

between it

and traditional

belief,

and traditionalism

least

possible.

necessary between modernity This is Philo's position. It is reflected in

and reconciliation
modern science

its own, then there is

no

the alliance he forms

own

with

Demea in Part I. If, however,

has its

theology or metaphysics, then conflict between it and traditional belief is inevitable, and there is no possibility of a reconciliation between modernity and
Cleanthes'

traditionalism. This is

position. a priori argument a

It is
on

reflected

in the withering

attack

he

makes

on

Demea's

the nature of God in Part IX.

assault on

Indicatively, Philo backs away from

criticizes

frontal

Demea in Part IX. He

It is
un

Demea's

a priori

argument, but only

on practical grounds.

likely, he claims, to
who
more

convince anyone except

"people

of a metaphysical

head

have

reasoning.

accustomed

themselves to abstract

intransigent

or radical

in his

modernism

than

Philo. It is Philo,
Cleanthes'

Cleanthes is, then, not Cle

because

anthes,
can

who attempts to compromise with

traditionalism.
own reserve and

radicalism

easily be overlooked, however, because of his Philo's argumentative pyrotechnics (see p. 44).

of

Hume's Dialogues
confrontation of two

Concerning

Natural Religion

presents

dramatically

the
the the

different

practical approaches

to the

modern project of conceptions of

scientific conquest of nature,

based

on

two very different

theoretical

foundations

of modern natural science.

The

crucial practical prob

lem is the relationship between modernity and tradition: can the modern project be pursued within the intellectual, social, and political framework of tradi

tionalism, or does it require the overthrow of traditionalism? The decisive theo retical issue is the place of theology or metaphysics in the structure of modern
natural science: can modern natural science

be

constructed on the
or

basis

of thor

oughgoing
tain

scepticism about the

or metaphysics?

highest questions,

does it

presuppose a cer answers

theology

In the Dialogues, Hume indicates his

orthodox"

to

these questions in the movement of the drama. The alliance between the ""care

less
of

sceptic"

Philo

and

the

"rigidly

Demea breaks down, despite

himself,"

all

Philo's

efforts to placate

Philo

as perhaps

"a

more

Demea (see, e.g., p. 19). Eventually Demea sees dangerous enemy than Cleanthes the result

David Hume's
of

Theology

of Liberation
infidels"

263

his

"running into
so

all

the topics of the greatest libertines and

(p. 80).
care

He is

deeply

offended that

he leaves

the conversation.

Perhaps Philo

lessly
(see,
to

allows

himself to be lured

or goaded on

e.g., pp.

44, 71). At any

cooperative

rate

it turns

out

in his questioning by Cleanthes to be simply impossible for him

sustain

his

relationship

with

recognize with

the distinction between

reconciled

"earth"

and

Demea. Science ultimately cannot In the end, Philo is left

"heaven."

Cleanthes,
out a

to him. And even though it is Philo thost'conclusions are essentially

who states

the

conclusions of

the

dialogue,
in the

Cleanthes'

Philo
cause

limns

theology
(p. 94;

or metaphysics
universe

based

on

the understanding that "the

or causes of order
intelligence"

compare p.

probably bear some remote analogy to human 17). Hume would undoubtedly agree with his
.

Pamphilus in
radical

judging
along

the outcome of the conversation

He is

as

intransigent

or

in his

modernism as

his

character

Cleanthes. The fact that Hume

writes

the Dialogues

with so

many

other works on religion

indicates that he in the Dialogues

a

agrees with the position espoused

by

Cleanthes. He

conveys

revolutionary teaching. It

Cleanthes

and

is disguised, however, by the reserve of his character the apparent radicalism of his character Philo. Hume adopts the

dialogue form in the Dialogues study foundations

and on

Concerning
of

Natural Religion in
conception

order to

"unite

society"

the basis

his

radical

of the theoretical

and practical consequences of the modern project of

the

scientific

conquest of nature.

Ill

Hume in the Dialogues been

mea,
called

Concerning

Natural Religion develops

what

has for

Philo,

his theology of liberation and Cleanthes. No one least

on occasion use

out of
of

the dialectal confrontation of De

these characters

simply

speaks

Hume. All
pp.

at

distinctively

Humean

arguments

(see e.g.,

20-21 [Philo]; 30-32 [Demea]; 58-59 [Cleanthes]). From Hume's point of view, however, they all err in important ways. Demea goes astray in his rejec tion of modern empirical science. Philo is wrong on the fundamental practical
and theoretical

to terms

with

issues pertaining to the modern project: modernity cannot come antitraditionalism because it presupposes its own profoundly
or metaphysics.

traditional
practical prospects

theology
for the

While Cleathes is
appears

right on

the fundamental

and theoretical

issues, he

modern project.

be overly optimistic about the The conclusions Cleanthes seems to want to

to
of order of

draw from the relationship between the human mind and the cause the universe, for example concerning the benevolence towards man
shows

in

the

first

cause, Philo by his questioning to be unwarranted (see, e.g., p. 55). If Hume has a spokesman, it is Pamphilus, who introduces the discussion, com ments on the characters and actions of the participants, and judges the outcome
of

the

debate.1*

Hume, however, does

what

he

can

to hide this

by

raising doubts

264
about

Interpretation
Pamphilus'

end of the

judgment, making him young and potentially biased. At the discussion, Philo sums up what seem to be its conclusions. "The
universe,"

he claims, "probably bear some of order in the This proposition, however, does not remote analogy to human intelligence The analogy allow for "extension, variation, or more particular
cause, or causes

explication."

between the
man's

mind of man and and

the cause of order in the universe applies

only to
of

intelligence

cannot

be transferred to "the

other

qualities

the

mind,"

by
no

which

he

means

its

moral attributes.

Finally
be the

this proposition
source of provides

"affords

inference that

affects

human

life,
even

or can

forbearance"

(p. 94). This cold,

frigid, theology

any action or the foundation

for the
The

project

in liberal

political

philosophy for the liberation

to
nature. plays a

of man

from his

traditional

bondages to

man and

pious traditionalist

Demea

crucial,

albeit

ironic,

role

in the de
of

Dialogues'

velopment of

the

theology. He of course

initiates the discussion

the

subject of religion.

cussion

portrayed

This is only the beginning of his influence on the dis in the dialogue, however. Demea time and time again
of the argument

changes the are

direction

by

raising

objections

to what he senses

its

unorthodox

implications. He
and

cuts off

the discussion at sensitive points.

apparently without a clear understanding of what he is doing, he turns it in new and fruitful directions. This first occurs at the begin At the
same

time,

ning

of

Part II,

when

Demea
of

rebukes

Cleanthes for the tenor

of

his

remarks on

the empirical foundations

religion,

defend the thesis

of

the existence of

taking him to imply that it is necessary to God. Asserting that the existence of God is

something that no man of common sense can doubt, he insists that the debate be about the nature rather than the being of God. This, he avers, is altogether

incomprehensible to the finite human

argument.
Cleanthes'

mind.

Cleanthes

responds with

his design

The

next

time Demea

gets stirred
much

design

argument

leaves too

up is at the beginning of Part VI. in doubt. It leads to a religion that

a

is

altogether useless

for the

purposes of

life, positing

Deity

who

is

no possible

object of

ture

of

trust, worship, God that allows human beings to

or obedience.

Demea demands

an account of

the

na

repose their confidence

in Him.

In Part IX Demea,
ments

having

seen some of the problems with a posteriori argu

concerning the nature of God, tries his hand at an a priori argument. To this Cleanthes delivers a devastating critique, demonstrating the impossibility
of a priori proof of

any

matter of

fact, including

not

just the

nature

but the very

of

existence of

God.

Rebounding
own

from this criticism, Demea

argument.

at the

beginning

Part X
religion

attempts

his

a posteriori

He

asserts that the truth of

is

established not

by

abstract

reasoning but
pain,

by
the

the sentiments. Human

woes

beings draws

are compelled

by
a

the

fear

of

death,

and

the rest of life's

to

seek protection out of

from

Supreme Being. Offended

by

inferences

which

Philo
with

the reality of human misery, suffering, and sorrow, Demea

conversation at the end of
on

draws from the

Part XI. After Demea departs, Philo

delivers his judgments

the questions

of the existence and nature of

God,

David
which are

Hume'

Theology

of Liberation

265

left

by

Cleanthes to

stand as the conclusions of

the whole discussion.

Demea's eruptions, then,

move

the argument through its

various

themes, giving
major

it

kind

of

hidden

order or structure.

They
to

divide it into three

perhaps accounts

sections,
peculiar

each

devoted to

a single
of

theme

or

topic. This
which

for the

plural

in the title

the

Dialogues,

all outward appearances portrays a while

single continuous conversation.

wander more or

Thanks to Demea,

the argument seems to

less aimlessly, it actually

reformulates

examines

the most important teach

and

ings

of

traditional or orthodox theism, the omniscience, omnipotence,

be

nevolence of

God. It

these teachings

in the light

of

the

empiricism

of modern

philosophy Demea

and science.

Its

reformulations of

the traditional teach

of modernity.

ings

on

the nature of God comprise a kind of

when

theology

The

absence of underscore

the conclusions of the argument are stated serves to

unorthodox or antitraditional character of

the profoundly

this new

theology.

The Part V

omniscience of of

God is the theme

He is

of

the first section the "supreme

Part II through
Mind,"

the Dialogues.
of

God, for Demea, is

but due to
mind

the infirmities
of man

human

reason

altogether

incomprehensible to the

(p. 15). Philo

agrees that the

assume must

about the
without a

Deity

is to

that He

only way for "reasonable is unknowable. Since nothing God.

to think
can exist

cause, there
be,"

be

a cause of the universe; the universe's cause,

call

"whatever it
perfection,

human beings
thought.

including

Since

what
what

to their own experience,

however,

piously impute to Him all they conceive as perfection is relative they say about the Divinity indicates

They

nothing about His real nature. Infinitely above the limited understanding of human beings, the Supreme Being is "more the object of worship in the temple
than
of

disputation in the

schools"

(p.

16).

Ignoring

what

he

calls

Philo's
can

"pious

declamations,"

Cleanthes

argues

that the nature of the

curious

Deity
to

be

ends,"

deduced from the

throughout the

evidence of

design, "the

universe.

The

resemblance of

adapting design in God's

the
rules of

of means world

to design in
that there

analogy,

man's works allows some

for the inference,

"by

all

is

nature"

similarity between the Demea objects to

mind of man and

argument

the "Author of
on

(p. 17).

Cleanthes'

because, based
not

experience

rather

than abstract reasoning,

it

gives

the existence and nature of God.

only a probable Philo objects

and not a

necessary proof of because the argument is

analogy, but because the
universe and man's

based

on experience, nor even appeals

because it

makes use of

analogy it
causes.

to

is

weak.

The differences between the

comparisons outrage

creations are too great

for any legitimate Philo's concessions to Cleanthes

to be made between their

and

Demea, however,
his
criticism.

in

order of

to placate his ally

argument

he

restates

and

strengthens

The

crux

his
No
the

is that

since there are

many "springs

and principles of the one of

it is impossible to

trace the origin of the universe to

conclusion about the cause of the whole can

causes of change

any be derived from

them.

observation of

in any

part.

It is

as unreasonable

for human beings to

make

266

Interpretation
for the
organization of

their own thought the model

the universe as
rule

it

would

be

for

a peasant

to

make

"his domestic economy the

of

for the

government of

kingdoms"

(p. 22).
rejects

Cleanthes

Philo's dissociation He

human

and

divine intelligence
disciples,"

as

fatal to the

progress of science.

reminds

Philo,

who

just before had been

Galileo's Dialogues, that "Copernicus and his first obvi compelled demonstrate "the were to to of the Galileo, similarity ously referring terrestrial and celestial matter, because several philosophers, blinded by old

discussing

systems
ilarity."

and

supported

by
is

some

sensible

appearances,

had denied this

of the without parts

sim

Philo's

argument

no

better than the "abstruse

a whole

cavils"

Eleatics,
(p. 26).

who

hold that the

argument

universe

is unchanging,
universe

Philo's

implies that the

is nothing but change,

the universe

parts without

a whole.

In

neither case

is

speech or reason about

possible.

Rea

involves connecting parts with the whole. This soning to require, for Cleanthes, assuming some kind of intention or purpose
about the universe

seems
as

the

first
The

cause of

the

whole.

It is necessary, in

order

to think about the behavior of

the beings that make up the universe, to impute to them some

purposiveness of the parts
will

kind

of purpose.

then be reflected

in the

structure of the

whole.

From

Cleanthes'

point of

view, human

beings,

to reason about the uni the "rule

verse, have

no choice

but to

economy

make

their "domestic

for the

government"

The analogy between the universe and the works of man is self-evident: they involve "the same and "a like He clinches his point with two illustrations, an intelligible voice from the clouds
of the whole.
matter"

form."

and a
allow

naturally propagating books. Both these circumstances would the inference of a superhuman reason or intelligence. There is more evi

library
of

of

dence

design in the

works of

nature,

however,

than in any speech or any

book. He demands, then, that Philo "assert

ever cavils

either that a rational volume

cause"

is

no

proof of a rational cause or admit of a similar

to the universe. "What

may be

urged,"

coherent, articulate speech,

Cleanthes affirms, "an orderly world, as well as a will still be received as an incontestable proof of

design

intention."

and

embarrassed and confounded

This argument, according to Pamphilus, leaves Philo (pp. 26-29).

Cleanthes'

Philo apparently
cussion after a
sation earlier

accepts
period of silence

argument. perhaps

When he

returns to the

dis

long

the longest in the

whole conver return

he

shifts,

decisively,

the point of his attack. He does not

to his

position, that

no conclusion

regarding the
accedes

cause of

the

universe can essential

be

derived from its

visible order.

He tacitly

to

Cleanthes'

point,

calls his "hypothesis of concerning the theoretical necessity of what design in the (p. 41; see also pp. 66, 70, 82). Philo is rescued from his embarrassment by his ally Demea, who picks up the argument with Cle
universe"

Cleanthes'

anthes.

God is incomprehensible

to man,

according

to

a compound

being

and

God is One. The

mind of

man, according to
ideas."

Demea, because man is Demea, is a

This is
incom-

"composition

of various

faculties,

passions, sentiments,

David Hume's
patible with admits

Theology

of Liberation

267

the "perfect

simplicity"

of

that a

perfectly
as

simple

being

(pp. 31-32). Cleanthes readily is incomprehensible. Those who conceive

the

Deity

of the

Deity
do

perfectly

simple are

"complete its

mystics"

(p. 32).

Mystics,
design

of

course,
ment

not reason about

the universe and

Cleanthes'

causes.
simple

argu

implies that the first

The

cause of all order of

things is not

but

compounded.

It

is

a whole with parts.

the beings in the universe is a

cause.

reflection of

the order of the elements

causes
causes returns

in the first itself the

makes

To

reason about

the universe and its

ultimately that displays

to the

means

to attempt to find

an account of

the hidden order of the

within

manifest order of the universe.

When Philo
Cleanthes'

discussion, he
restricts

this the point of his criticism of

"inconveniences"

argument.9

He

Cleanthes'

"anthropomorphism."

calls causes.

himself to pointing out the It leads to

with

of what a

he

There are, in

accordance

the "hypothesis

multiplicity of possible of design in the uni

verse,"

many Dieties, many

admits

possible orderings of
your

the first cause (p. 41). Philo

to Cleanthes that "a man who follows

to assert or conjecture that the universe sometime arose

hypothesis is able, perhaps, from something like

circumstance,

design"; beyond that, however, "he

and

cannot ascertain one single

is left
and

afterwards to
hypothesis"

fancy

fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of (p. 40). Cleanthes views Philo's arguments not with
(p. 41). There

"horror"

but

"pleasure"

with

to the universe; it is up to human

understand order

is, then, a rational design or order beings, however, as part of their effort to
what

scientifically the universe, to say just might be.

that rational design or

This

raises a question about the omnipotence of

major section of

God. This is the theme

of

the second

the

Dialogues, from Part VI through Part VIII. The

relationship between the themes of the omniscience and the omnipotence of the Deity is indicated in the structure of the dialogue in two ways. Philo takes up
the argument in the second section explicitly as
an extension of one of

his

most

important
on

points

in the first section, that

arise

Cleanthes'

design

argument

is based

the premise that "like effects

attempt

from like

causes"

(p. 42). More impor

the
nature of

tantly, Demea's

in Part IX

at an

a priori argument on

God,
"like

so out of place

in the dialogue Philo

as a whole,

effectively brackets together

Cleanthes'

the first

and second sections.

points out

that,

on

premise of

effects since

like

causes,"

it is

possible

to conceive of the universe as an

animal,

it has many
and actuated

of

the

properties of makes

animals,

including

the orderly

connection of parts to the whole.

This

the

Deity

the soul of the universe,

"actuating it,
gest

by

that the analogy is

even

Cleanthes demurs, but only slightly, to sug stronger to plants. Both animals and plants have inherent
Philo argues, then, that it is of order in the world, though

it."

their own internal principles

plausible to

of order and change. principle

"ascribe

an eternal

alteration

attended with great and continual revolutions and

This, he

claims,

embrace."

is "a theory that we must sooner or later have recourse to, whatever system we In the world of Philo's theory, there is no room for chance (pp. 42-

268

Interpretation
principles of motion

46). There are, however, many

reason,
man

in the universe,

including
of cos

instinct,

generation,
choose

and vegetation. one

of

It is possible, he asserts, for hu

a

beings to

any

these as the basis for

"system

mogony."

Any
causes.

account of the whole

point

involves

a choice about
and

first

principles or

He illustrates his

by

referring to Greek

Hindu
which

cosmologies

(pp. 49-51). This

argument conceals a

fallacy, however,
is in Philo's

Cleanthes

at

least
room
of

dimly
for

perceives

(see

p.

51). The

fallacy

claim

that there is no

chance

in the

first

principles as

by

Chance exists, if nowhere else, in the choice human beings. This is by no means an inconsequential
universe.

matter,

is indicated

by

the

examples of

the Greek and Hindu cosmologies. the cosmologies

Human beings

create great civilizations through

they

pose

for

themselves. These civilizations, in turn, shape the ways of life of their peoples.

This
of

means

that human beings in

effect create

themselves through their choices

first

principles.

The first

cause of all things

is, then,

some

kind

of combina

tion

of necessity and chance. These two together are perhaps omnipotent. While they are immutable, however, they allow for the mutability of human history, its movement reflecting the combination of the fundamental principles

of chance and necessity. ground of

The first

cause
and

is, then, essentially

its
power

the transhistorical
self-mak

history, expressing itself

particularly in the

ing, historical activity of human beings. The question of the benevolence of the
of

Deity

is taken up in the last

section

the

evil

Dialogues, in Parts X and XI. This issue arises out of in the world. Nature, according to Demea, has kindled
all

a consideration of
war"

a ""perpetual

among

living

creatures.

Human beings uniting in for them.

can protect themselves

from

at

least
that
are

some of nature's threats

by

society.

Philo

points

out,

however,

this only creates new evils

able to surmount all whole animal

By

coming

together

in society they for

their "real

enemies"

and make themselves masters of

"the

creation";

at the same
"demons"

time, however, they

of

raise
who

themselves
with

"imaginary
man

enemies,"

the
and

their

imagination,
life."

haunt them

"superstitious terrors beings

blast every

enjoyment of

Society

also sets

hu

against each other.

Afflicting

one another with

"oppression, injus
fraud,"

tice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny, treachery, they would quickly dissolve society if it were not for the evils that would
with
pomorphism"

come

separating (p. 63). Philo challenges Cleanthes to maintain his "anthro in the face of the reality of evil in the world. It is impossible, he argues, to claim that the "moral attributes of the including His benevo
Deity,"

lence,

are

"of the

same nature with these virtues

in human
would

(p. 66). be
no purpose

Cleanthes

admits the

importance

of

the
of

issue. There
Deity"

in

demonstrating
ness of

the "natural attributes

and

the

if His

moral attributes should

be left "doubtful Philo

uncertain."

He therefore denies the

"misery

and wicked

man."

The

good outweighs the

bad in human life (pp. 67-68).

stand on this

cautions

Cleanthes that

by taking his

line he is

"introduc-

David Hume's

Theology

of Liberation

269

ing

total scepticism into the most essential articles

of natural

and revealed

theology."

cient

Even assuming the preponderance of good over evil, this is insuffi to prove the benevolence of the Deity. If He is infinitely powerful, there be
no evil whatsoever of the

should

in the

world of

(pp. 68-69). Cleanthes

attempts

to

save the

benevolence

nature"

"Author

by by

positing that He is

finitely

powerful.

He is benevolent, but limited

that while the thesis of
as
an

however,

necessity (p. 71). Philo shows, the finitude of the Deity might save His it
as a

benevolence

hypothesis, it
of the

cannot establish

fact. No inference be drawn from is

the result of

concerning the benevolence

a number of circumstances
might not
well

first

cause of the universe can

the mixture of good and evil

in the in the

world.

The

presence of evil

organization of the universe that might or circumstances

be necessary to it. These

general

include the

use of

"pains,

as

as

to "excite all creatures to action"; the

"conducting

of the are

world

by

laws";

the

"frugality
being";

with which all powers and

faculties

distributed to every
his

particular

and the

the springs and principles of the great

consideration of the causes of

"inaccurate workmanship of all (pp. 73-77). From machine of

nature"

evil, Philo

concludes that

"the

original

Source

of all regard or to

things is

to good

entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture,
heavy"

light

above

(p. 79).

Recognizing
must

the

force

of

Philo's argument,

Cleanthes
cule"

comments to
of our vulgar

Demea that "it

be

confessed

that the
a

injudicious
of ridi

reasoning (p. 80).

The first

theology has
things,

given

him but too just

it

handle

cause of all

whatever

might

be deemed to be, has

observer of

no

particular concern and the

for

man.

The

Deity
a

is

disinterested

the universe

beings, including
be interpreted
to argue,
as

man, that compose

it. This disinterestedness, how

benevolence towards in the
man.

ever,

can

as at

least

kind

of negative

It is

possible

Philo hints, that the

at

causes of evil

universe are p. of

unavoidable,"

"necessary
73). At

and

least for the

sake of man's

development (see ills

faculty"

one point
life"

in his

argument, he claims that to "cure most of the

human
man's

application."

of it would be necessary to increase only one "power of business and or his "bent to and to his soul, industry "propensity For human beings to be induced to labor, they must feel both the
labor"

lash

of

fear

and

the lure of hope: the fear of

what

they

will suffer

if they do

not

stir themselves to action; the able to

hope that

by

their actions

they

will

actually be

improve

their situation. The disinterestedness of the

and

first

cause provides

the grounds for both hope

fear. It induces human beings to labor

or

by

not

revealing them both

their

whether

it is benevolent

hostile towards them. It distributes to

pleasures and pains

(p. 73). Because the first cause is indifferent

not

towards human
needs.

beings, it does
makes
life"

interfere in the

course of nature

to care for

It thus

it

possible

for

them to employ their powers of reason

a

"in the

conduct of

(p. 74). More like

"rigid

than an "indulgent

270

Interpretation
towards human

beings, it bestows

on

them no advantages except "rea

sagacity."

son and

It thus forces them to

(pp. 75-76).

use their reason

to gain

they

need or

want

Finally, by allowing
man application of

a certain

everything "disorder or

confusion"

in the

operations of reason and

nature, it leaves to

the opportunity,

by

the

employment of

his

course of nature

his industry, to manipulate the (p. 77). The disinterestedness of the first cause moves human
the
would

beings to labor.

They

have

no reason

to undertake the struggles to mas

ter, create, cultivate,

constructed

and

build

the arduous efforts

careful or

by

which civilization

is

if it
act

were either

forces them to

particularly actively hostile to them. It determine for leaves them free to themselves how to act. but
of all

Giving

them nothing but their wits, the first cause

things

literally

compels

them to make something of themselves.

The theology Natural Religion

or metaphysics
supports

developed in Hume's Dialogues What Cleanthes

Concerning
gov

both

elements of

the liberal project, nonpartisan

calls the

ernment and the scientific conquest of nature.

nature"

"Author

of

not

and control nature,

only does not oppose the endeavor by human beings to master it invites them and even compels them to undertake it. The
to become his
own

first

cause of all things constrains man

first

cause.

God in
can

effect
make

demands

of man

that he make himself into a god. Human

beings

the most of themselves

to organize

if they cooperate with the first cause and choose themselves in society in such a way as to expose themselves to the
and the

lash

of

fear

lure

of

hope. This

system of nonpartisan
cial place

government, in

in the

order of society.

only under the liberal political individual or group has a spe Nonpartisan government, in turn, requires the
occurs
which no

separation of religion
possible

from

politics.

The

secularization of politics

is

not

just

but absolutely necessary according to the theology elaborated by Cleanthes and Philo. The Deity revealed in the discussion does not-indeed
cannot-rule

directly

over

human beings. He
be
enforced on

gives no commandments to them.

either

He has

no will that must

them,

by

Himself

directly
to

or

by

His earthly
are

representatives.

He

cannot

right to rule over

the rest

of society.

be used, then, by any The political implications

"the
proper office

one

claim a

of this

theology
is to

reflected

in

Cleanthes'

comment that of men,

of religion

regulate the

heart

humanize

their conduct,

infuse the

spirit of toler

obedience."

ance, order, and

When it "acts

as a separate principle over

however,
to
of

"it has departed from its

and

proper sphere and of

has become only

a cover

faction
its

ambition"

(p. 88). The theology

the Dialogues

purges religion

political pretensions.

This
"the

contributes to the elimination of the evils of the

rule of man over man adumbrated rhetorical reconciliation of

by

Philo (see
and pp.

p.

63). As illustrated in Philo's

it
makes possible

theist"

"the

atheist,"

the

achievement of peace

in society (see for the

85-86). Hume's Dialogues Concern

ing Natural
of

Religion

articulates the theological or metaphysical presuppositions

scientific conquest of nature at

the

Dionysian

project

the same time

that it lays the political

foundations necessary for

the project's accomplishment.

David Hume's
CONCLUSION

Theology

of Liberation

211

Liberal

political

philosophy,

which seeks

in

practice

to separate

religion and

in theory in a kind of religious teaching of its own. This politics, religious teaching implies a more or less specific conception of the complete this good life for man. It is, of course, possible to question how
culminates
"complete"

conception of good answer

life really is. Unfortunately, liberalism cannot give a to this question. As is clear from Hume's elaboration of the theol
the good

ogy
cal

of

liberalism in his Dialogues

Concerning
both

Natural Religion, liberal

politi might

philosophy be What this

answered.

abolishes all standards might

natural and

divine

by

which

it

lead to is

reflected

in Philo's last

speech

in the

Dialogues:
But believe me,
will

Cleanthes,
is
at

the
a

most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind

feel

on this occasion

longing
and

desire

and expectation

that

Heaven

would

be

pleased

to

dissipate,

least alleviate, this

profound

ignorance

by

affording

some

particular revelation

to mankind,

and operations of the sense of the

Divine

object of our

making discoveries of the nature, attributes, faith. A person, seasoned with a just

imperfections

of natural reason, will

fly

to

revealed

truth with the

haughty dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid and rejects this adventitious instructor, (p. 94)
greatest avidity, while the

Man

might

imitate the God

of

the Bible and organize the world

by

the word of

his mouth; he cannot, however, like the Biblical God give the organized world meaning and value by simply calling it good. From Hume's other writings on
religion, in
particular the

Natural

History

of Religion, it is

clear

that

he

would

by

no means welcome

the flight to
political

revealed religion. after

It is

possible

to under

stand

the development of

philosophy
modern

liberalism,

and with

it the

course of political

development in the

world, as the

result of

this yearn

ing

for

a new revelation

from the

ground of all

Being.

NOTES

1. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures

on

the

Philosophy
California

Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley:

University

of

2. See, inter alia, Hobbes, Leviathan Parts III and Reasonableness of Christianity; Spinoza, Theological

of Religion, edited with an introduction by Press, 1984), p. 83. IV; Locke, First Treatise of Government and
and

Political Treatise.
edited with an

3. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1966). 4. See Aristotle, Politics,
of

introduction

by Henry

translated with an introduction

by

Carnes Lord (Chicago:

University

Chicago Press, 1984), Bk. I, esp. 1252al-23. 5. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical! and Civill, edited with an introduction by C B. MacPherson (Baltimore: Pelican

Books, 1968), Chs. 1-8.

272

Interpretation
structure of the

6. The
subject
and

Dialogues

perhaps

matter, relating it to three of the greatest

indicates something about the dimensions of its of Plato's dialogues, the Symposium, Theaetetus,

Parmenides. Appropriately, the Symposium is the only Platonic dialogue on a god, the god and Parmenides deal with what are now called epistemology and ontology. Commentators tend to associate the Dialogues with Cicero's De Natura Deorum. The resemblance Eros. The Theaetetus

is

not so

strong,

however,

as

to the Platonic dialogues. In De Natura

name recounts a conversation that

he heard. In the Symposium, Theaetetus,

Deorum, Cicero in his own and Parmenides, like

There
are a

Hume's Dialogues, the

number of references

conversation

is

recalled

by

one

of

the author's characters.

reference about a

to Plato in the Dialogues. There is also a clear

to

Parmenides.
in Plato's in the Dialogues.
arch-sceptic the

7.

"Demea"

means

Gorgias. There is The

most

much

something like that could be done

"common."

There is

joke

"Demea"

with

the names of the other characters

gave

interesting

question about names

in the Dialogues in why Hume

on

his

name of a

Jewish Platonist. judgment in the introduction

commentators

8.

Pamphilus'

the characters of the

spokesman

interlocutors

should a

be

carefully noted. Most take Cleanthes.

take Philo as

Hume's

in the Dialogues;

very few

9. See P. S. Wadia, "Philo

Confounded,"

in McGill Hume Studies,

edited

by David

Fate

Norton,
tion of
who

(San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979), pp. 283-87, for a rather different interpreta Philo's show of embarrassment. Wadia is one of the few commentators on the Dialogues
et al.

takes at all seriously the drama of the work.

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs:

John

Quincy

Adams

and the

Moral Sentiments

of a

Realist

Greg Russell
Northeast Louisiana University

Commemorating
tricably
tied to the
at a time when

the Jeffersonian

heritage in American diplomacy,

government, is certainly

one

inex
Eu

lawful

purposes of civil

appropriate

leading

officials salute

democratic

revolutions throughout

rope, South Africa, and Latin America. Recent political and ideological up heavals throughout the Soviet empire and Eastern bloc nations challenge anew the
national purpose as much as

need

to redefine the national

the national security interest "beyond

of the

United States. The

carries with

containme

it the

duty

to

reconsider

the historical basis of American

moral

and political

leader

ship in human
claim

a troubled world. rights

Since the

earliest

days

of

the republic, the struggle for

history"

has inspired

partisans

to invoke the "verdict

as
of

of

and pro
moral

the "inextinguishable human

union.

spirit"

inseparable from the

fiber

of

the American

"From the time

the Declaration of our

Independence,"

according to

Henry Kissinger, "Americans have believed

for the
world"

that this country

has in

a a

moral significance

(p. 59). The United States

was created

conscious act

by

a people

dedicated to

a set of political and ethical principles

they held to be of universal meaning. A new generation of American statesmen,

are called upon

looking

beyond Cold War rivalry,

self-evident:

to affirm certain truths to

be virtually
of

that the

United States is
will

a great power with a unique national

identity;

that what we
civilization and

do
as

affect not

only

our own

survival

but the fate

moved

Western

well; that men

fighting
ideals

for freedom

are

by

great

ideals;

that, for

these reasons, it is

urgent

that we see ourselves and that others see us as acting

in in

accord with

which are sharable and

worthy
of.

of respect.

Today, Jeffer
acceptance

son's common a wider

human faith in the

circle than

rights of man will

ever

certainly find

immediate

he

dreamed

Convinced

that the republican

is the only form

of government which of mankind,

is

not

eternally at open or secret war with the rights shall be cordially distributed to the support of It is
an

my
so

prayers and efforts

that we

have

happily

established.

animating thought, that

pointing

while we arc

securing the

rights of ourselves

and our posterity, we are us to emerge as

out

the

from
us,

their tyrannies also.

way to struggling nations, who wish like Heaven help their struggles, and lead them, in Koch,
p.

it has done

triumphantly

through them. (Quoted

151).

interpretation. Winter

1990-1991. Vol. 18, No. 2

274

Interpretation
great religious-moral traditions and

The two

that infused early American think

arrive at similar

ing

New England Calvinism

Virginian Jeffersonianism

conclusions about

the meaning of American national character and

Zion'

destiny. In
spoke and a

Wonder
of

s Saviour (1650), Edward Johnson Working Providence of Lord would create a new heaven place "where the New England as the

altogeth

new

earth,
honor"

new churches and a new commonwealth of

A century later
Israel."

Ezra Stiles
and son and

Yale

preached a sermon on

"The United States

elevated to

in

which

he defined the
called

nation as

"God's American

glory Jeffer
pure

John Adams

the

amalgam

"the dictates

of reason

and

Americanism"

(To Edward Rutledge, June

409. For

"Americanism"

in John Adams
p.

see

24, 1797, Jefferson [1903], IX, his letter to Benjamin Rush, July 7,
American

1805, in Schutz
nationhood

and

Adair,

30.)

The

self-interpretive symbols of

look in

two directions: "towards the truth of man's existence per

sonally, socially, and

historically,
The

on

the one

hand;

and

toward the persuasive

myth of

and evocative articulation of that truth

hand."

in the foundation
the center of

the

new com

munity,

on

the other

vision at

is

structured

by

insights into human reality "taken to be universally

American politics, then, valid for all

mankind, even as
at

they
in

are adapted to the concrete conditions of time and place

articulation
history"

the moment

of the

of the

new

nation

as

an

entity politically
14see

organized

for

action

(Sandoz,
of

15, and 123. For the Voegelin, Chs. 1-3.)

Jefferson's
informed

theories

35, 35-36, 38, 83-84, 105, 1 articulation and representation here,

pp.

conception of

the innocence and virtue of the new nation was not the New England tracts. His religious
passed

by

the Biblical
of

symbolism of which

faith

was a

form

Christianity
God"

had

through the rationalism of the

French Enlightenment. His

the power of "nature's
moved

moral

transcendence was expressed

of

in the belief

of

over the vicissitudes

history. Jefferson

was

to acknowledge that nature's God had a very special purpose in found

new community.

ing
and

this

America had

a political

mission

to

fulfill, for itself

and

before the fruits

eyes of the world: to prove that

of an educated people

reason, order,
themselves.

law

are

the

genuine

governing

the eyes of the virtuous all over the earth are turned with anxiety on us, as the only depositories of the sacred fire of liberty, and that our falling into anarchy would decide forever the destinies of mankind, and seal the political heresy that
man

is incapable

of self-government.

(To John Hollis, Esq.,

May 5, 1811,

Jefferson 11903], XIII,

58)
form be
These
Ameri
other
while

Every
can nations.

nation

has its

own

of spiritual pride.

examples of sentiments one

self-appreciation could

matched

by corresponding
and evil
p.

in

To know that

nations are subject to the moral

law is in the

thing,

to pretend to
nations

know

with

is

quite another

certainty what is good (Morgenthau [1973],

relations

11).

"Power,"

among John Adams

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

wrote, "always thinks
sion of
laws"

275

it has

a great soul and vast views

beyond the

comprehen

the weak: and that

it is

doing

God's

service when

it is violating

all

His

(quoted in

ibid.,

pp.

90-91). The tragic

conception of politics and

diplo

macy,

however,
in

need not recommend cynicism or

fundamental

moral choices. which

Indeed, it
as

will make

complacency with respect to a difference whether the par

of statesmen

ticular culture

the policies of nations

the actions

are

formed is only as deep and there is a dimension in the

human
achievements

high

as

the nation's highest

which

ideals,

or whether

culture

from

the element of vanity in all

is discerned. Jefferson's
republicans,

memorable assertion
federalists"

in his First less

Inaugural

"we
as a

are all

we are all a subtle

was perhaps

important
resources

conciliatory overture than as in American politics and statecraft.

national

intimation distinctive

of the moral

That the

unity

of all

Americans

carried a

message

for

mankind can

be

seen

by

Jefferson's

philosophy.

noting the relationship between power and morals in Of particular importance is how the natural and inalien
or connected
man on a
nature.1

able rights of man are

derived from,
to

with,

natural

law. For
moral

exam of

ple, Jefferson affirmed the rights of

preference and appropriateness

preponderantly

basis

human

Self-realization,

always

in the

interpersonal
cations of

context of other

selves, may be the

natural moral goal.

The impli

Jefferson's
one

concept of rights

for the

conduct of men and nations were

detailed

by

historian in the

following

terms:

Natural law
man

is the

system of

governing norms,
the

rules, and

duties that bind

claims.

the correlative, in short,

widest

of

natural rights which referred

he

Natural law

in its

legal

sense

(what Jefferson
plus

to

as

"the law

of nature and

nations") includes this meaning

other nations

the usages and customs

of nations

dealing

with

in the interest

of peace and under

the controlling

ideal

of more

humane

and civilized practice.

(Koch,

pp.

44-45)
every human being, equal in society, justice, and fraternity) society but invoke the vision of a
one

The enduring

moral principles

(e.g.,

the

worth of

ity
are

of consideration to which all are entitled

in

no

brotherhood
limit
on

way limited to a given time or of man. The important point is that

politics;
one condemns

hereby

asserts
an

a moral

power

force

and

violence

as

extensive,

wholesale

instrument if they
to

of national or

international battle
"that

policy.

Jefferson

urged

justice

upon nations

would

have the firm in the be

great

friendship

of other countries.

Of Great

Britain,
more

unable

win allies

with

Napoleonic France, Jeffer

son wrote that she was a

living
can

example

no nation

than any
an

individual,

unjust with

however powerful, any impunity. Sooner or later public

instrument merely moral in the beginning, will find occasion physi opinion, The lesson, he believed, was to inflict its sentence upon the cally (To James Madison, April 23, 1804, "useful to the weak as well as the
unjust." strong"

Jefferson [1892-99], VIII, 300).

276

Interpretation
of nature and

The law
son's

nations, then, becomes another illustration of

Jeffer

theory

of natural rights.

Each

nation

"forms

person"

a moral

and each

member of a nation

is

"personally

responsible

for his

society."

The

continental

tradition of

raison

Machiavelli to
pressed. state

d'etat, the historical debate about ethical Bismarck, is hardly compatible with a theory
summarized, the heritage of "reason of
of conduct

"dualism"

from

of rights so ex

state"

Briefly
subject

holds that the

is

to no rule

but the

one which

is dictated is

by

its

own

self-interest.

Salus

publica suprema

lex. When the

statesman

confronted with
which

a choice

between two actions, the

chance of acts

one

ethical, the other not, of

the

latter

has

better

bringing
a private

about

the desired result, he must choose the

latter. When he

in

capacity,

however, he, like any

while political

other private

individual,
ethical moral

must

choose the

former; "for,
is
subject

action

is free from
(Morgenthau

limitations,

private action political

to them. The individual as such is

nature"

by
p.

nature;

society is amoral,

also

by

[1946],
the

176).
rejected

Jefferson

any dual

ethical standard and argued

that the limits upon

moral conduct of

the nation are the same as those upon relations

between

man and man.

The

moral

duties

which exist

between individual

and

individual in

a state of nature, of all the

accompany them

into

a state of

society, and the aggregate of the

duties

individuals composing the society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other; so that between society and society the same moral duties exist as did between individuals composing them, while in an unassociated state, and their
maker not

having

released them on the

from those duties

France"

on their

forming

themselves
a

into

a nation.

("Opinion

Question Whether the United States Has

with

Right to

Intervene to Renounce Their Treaties

[1903], III, 227)

Jefferson's
acts, either
others.

counsel with

merely

points to the

fact that it is

always the

individual

who

reference

to his ends alone

or with reference

to the ends of
or

"I know but

one code of
of

collectively."

If the morality why

morality for men, whether acting singly a solitary individual "produces a just line
the morality of 100
men produce a

of

conduct

in him

should not

just line

of conduct

in them acting [1903], VII, 448-49). The identical

or

together?"

(To James Madison, August

28, 1789
who

action of a

society

or nation

has

no empirical exis

tence at all. What empirically exists are always the actions of individuals
perform

different

actions with reference

to a

common end.

The only
to

exception

to the laws of nature

and nations

is the

transcendent right

resist self-destruction.

As there

are circumstances which sometimes excuse

man and

the nonperformance of contracts between

man, so nations may

annul

their obligations "if performance becomes self-destructive to the

party."

Only

"the law ("Opinion

to see

of

self-preservation
"

overrules

the

laws its

of

obligations

in

others

[1903], III, 228). In

addition, Jefferson transcend

own

was enough of a realist

clearly that no nation can

fully

interests. "All know

the

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

influence
of

277

interest
that

on the mind of man, and

is

influence"

warped

by

("Autobiography,"

how unconsciously his judgment [ 1903] I, 120). In 1812, when

,

Napoleon

was at

the pinnacle of his power, Jefferson was

unprepared

to con
na

template moral principles apart

from the

political exigencies of

American

tional security. His was the hope that "the powers of

and counterpoised presence of all
undisturbed

Europe may be
security may
pp.

so poised

their

among themselves, that their forces at home, leaving the

own

require

the

other quarters of

the world

in

tranquility"

(quoted in Morgenthau [1951],

20-21).
and

This

was also a realism that made room

for

political

ideals

declarations

of rights.

The Thomas Jefferson before

who wrote

in 1809 that "1

am persuaded no

constitution was ever

so well calculated as ours

for

extensive empire and

role

self-governm

could also write

in 1817 that America's

whom

in the

world was compel

to "consecrate a sanctuary for those to

seek

the misrule of Europe may

was not

happiness in in
nature:

climes."

other

America's influence
known,"

to be military
produce

but

moral

"This

refuge

once

he declared, "will

happiness

even of

those who remain there,

by

another

Canaan is
p.

open where there subjects will also

warning their taskmasters that be received as

brothers"

(quoted in Bellah,
the struggle for

89. See

Germino.) The

moves and countermoves as

in

political

power must

be intelligible

dialectic

movement

toward the realization of

nition that nation
"
.

justice. Consider in this

nations are

connection

Jefferson's

admo

it is true, that
right

to be judges for themselves; since no

another, but the tribunal of our
world"

has the

to sit

in judgment

over

consciences remains, and that also of the opinion of the

("Opinion

"

[1903], III, 228).

Modern
sharpen ner perspectives of realism and

idealism in American in
such a

diplomacy

often
man

the power-morality

dichotomy

fashion

as

to ignore the

in

which a statesman's political

a moral witness to the actions of

responsibility is inseparable from his role as his nation. Implicit in the Jeffersonian world
as a native achieve
restraint and

view

is the

prescription that

America's dual importance,

ment and worldwide

example, must embody an element of

proper respect to the varieties of possible political experience elsewhere.

pay For

the

diplomatist,

the Jeffersonian
contribution

legacy

is

not a

doctrine

or mere

ideological

credo; rather, his

(although

not

alone

Fathers)
state.

underscores structures

the centrality
of

of political and

here among the Founding ethics for relating the national

parochial nation
a ground upon which

interest to
the

community
points

justice beyond the for

meeting

The issue is

one

that

to the need

philosopher and statesman can

momentarily

converge.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND AN ETHICS OF CIRCUMSPECTION

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,

contemporaries,
tion
as

refers

to John

Quincy Adams,
differences in

and several of

his

honest Jeffersonians (p. 313).

of several profound

Admittedly,

the categoriza
philo-

is

arguable

in light

political and

278

Interpretation

sophical orientation; reference

however, Schlesinger's
moral

paradox

is

not

to a common intellectual inclination on the part

entirely lost with of both leaders to

power and expan

affirm, however precariously, the

sion.

basis

of

American

Moreover, they
on
.

arrived at

this

conclusion

disagreeing
"We
are

the

origins

and merits

of

by divergent paths, even while republican and democratic politics.

said,
all

as

Mr. Jefferson

forty
no

years ago

federalists
Aristocrats

all republi or

cans, but

not all

Democrats,
p. support

more

that

we are

all

Monar

chists"

(Adams [1842],

States Senate to

30). Yet Adams, the only federalist in the United Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana territory, ac

knowledged in this transaction

Fortune
precise claims

to herself the lion's

share.

To

seize and to turn to profit the

instant

of the

turning tide, is itself among

elevated virtue

the eminent properties

of a

Statesman,
withstand

and

if requiring less

than the

firmness

and prudence

that

adversity, or the

moderation which adorns and

dignifies prosperity, it is
(Adams [1850],

not pp.

less

essential to the character of an accomplished ruler of men.

83-84)
with

Adams,
are

Jefferson, knew

too well that "the selfish and the social passions

of

intermingled in the do for his fellow

conduct

every

man

acting in

capacity"

public

(Memoirs, August 20, 1809, II, 13). Moreover,

can citizens

the good which an individual

"is

seldom proportioned
enlightened animated

to his dispositions and

the inclination to do good

guided

by

itself, unless discriminating judgment, and

of

by

clear
active

perception,
resolution,

by

evaporates

in the dreams

imagination

(Memoirs, March 4, 1820, V,

a compound of

13). The intellectual

universe of

John

Quincy Adams,

Christian

faith in the
would of
of

gospel of modern mold

help

liberal reason, discloses the unique resources that the diplomatic achievements of America's greatest Secretary

State in the American

nineteenth century.

What has been described Monroe

as

the Golden Age

diplomacy,
the

the 1814-1828 era, forms the

and

backdrop

for Adams's

diplomacy during
years, the

Madison
signed

administrations.

During
of

these

United States

the

treaty

of peace

ending the War

1812,

issued the Monroe Doctrine, and strengthened its maritime power through an agreement with Britain to clear the Great Lakes of warships and by obtaining
rights

to fish

off

the coast

of

Labrador

and

Newfoundland. Americans

extended

their continental reach through the annexation of

Florida, by removing

Russian

influence from the

ment of and

North America, through the establish the American-Canadian boundary from the Great Lakes to the Rockies,
southwestern coast of

staking their first claims to the Pacific coast (La Feber, p. 13). Adams was a central figure in all these transactions and, in each instance,

by

saw a

larger

moral message

for the

exercise of power

in defense

of the national

interest. Inasmuch

as the voluminous record of

Adams the diplomatist has been

and

treated at length elsewhere (see

Bemis, Graebner,

Lang

and

Russell),

this

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

essay looks
morality between the
parture

279

more towards

Adams the

ethicist and

his unfailing

regard

for the

of state

behavior. His

principles of ethics and

inability diplomacy
direct

to countenance an "irremediable
provides a useful point of
statesman.

de

to

rethink

the

moral prerogatives of

the American

Adams's

quality

as a

human He

being

has

and obvious relation

to

his

political and others

social thinking.
unassailable

viewed

the moral and intellectual qualities of

from

heights
of

whereon

he felt himself for the

self-analysis. of

most part secure, no

despite
ascetic

occasional

lapses
also

moralist; he

penetrating felt the promptings

He was, however,
success and place:

desire for

want

the seals

of power and

place,

The

ensigns of

command,

Charged To

by

the people's unbought grace

rule

my

native

land.

Nor crown,

nor sceptre would

ask

But from my

country's will,

By day, by
Her cup

night, to
of

ply the task bliss to fill. (Adams [1848],

p.

22)
his "Letters
of

Adams first
Publicola,"

entered

the political arena with the publication of

demolishing Thomas Paine's Rights of Man. These papers, which grew out of the controversy between Paine and Edmund Burke concerning the French Revolution, exemplify Adams's reliance on natural law to illumine the
foundations
Like the
and of the
of

liberty

and to

defend minority
seek
and yet

rights

in

republican government. extreme views of

writings of

his father, his

to oppose the
retain

Paine
of

French Revolution

to

faith in the American theory

tyranny."

Adams many times expresses his allegiance to the principle of It is natural rights, including the "unalienable right of resistance to not the basic premise of Paine's book to which he is opposed, but the conclu
natural rights.

sions

which

Paine infers from them. This

"commentary

upon

the rights of
princi

man,"

he says, draws "questionable deductions from

as

unquestionable

Paine,

the controversy

develops,
to

acknowledged

"that

which a whole

nation chooses

to

do, it has

do."

a right

Adams

responded with the

belief

that "it is of infinite consequence that the distinction between

should

power and right

be

fully

acknowledged,

and should

be

admitted as one

the fundamental

legislators."

principles of

This principle, that any

sense

a whole nation

has

a right to

do

whatever

it pleases,
of

cannot
and of

in

be

admitted as true.

The

eternal and

immutable laws

justice
those

morality certainly
a nation

are paramount to all

within

human legislation. The

not

violation of

laws is

the power,

but it is

is the
a

collected power of all are

the

among individuals

the rights of nations. The power of

which compose

it. have

If,
no other

therefore,
mle

majority

bound

by

no

law human

or

divine,

and

but their

sovereign will and pleasure

to direct them,

what possible

security

can

280
any

Interpretation
citizen
must still

have for the

protection of unalienable rights?

The

principles of of

liberty must lay

also

be the

sport of

arbitrary power, and the 11 June 1791,

hideous form

despotism

aside the

diadem

and the

scepter, only to assume the party-colored

garments of

democracy. (II
pp.

"Publicola,"

Writings, I, 69-71. See

Wright,

168-71.)
of public

The

half-century
and

life

as

diplomatic emissary,
the
southern

Secretary

of

State,

President,

Congressman

led him to defend the

and

tradition while opposing

slavery
no

property and interest. Between the two

"The True
that

rights of

commitments, Adams
Government,"

saw

essential

contradiction.

Theory

of

he

wrote

to George Bancroft in

1835, "is

which provides
("Letters,"

alike
pp.

for the

protection and

security both

property

of persons and

246-47). He died painfully

Adams'

conscious of

his failure to

accomplish

any

of

those high hopes for American

national character upon which

he had

expended
author

his life.
writes:

Judging
the fact
should

credentials
reproach remains

as

conservative

thinker,

one

"It is hard to

this

inspiring

man with

the collapse of
men

his

ideals; but

conservative

immeasurably
was

Adams'

any true expect, and he got from them less than many a leader moral inferior can (Kirk, pp. 257-58). Adams
obtain"

that he expected more

from

than

forever tormented

by

the thought of what

he

should

by

a nation and a

superintending Providence

unable or

have been, destroyed unwilling to heed his

vision of national grandeur.

If my intellectual powers had been such as have been sometimes committed by the Creator of men to single individuals of the species, my diary would have been,
next to the

Holy Scriptures,
I
should

the

most

valuable

book

ever written of

by

human

hands,

and

have been
the

one of the greatest power of

.

benefactors
.

mankind.
war and

I would,

by

irresistible

Almighty
I have

my country and of God, have banished improved the

slavery from the face His

gifts as

of the earth

forever. But the

and

conceptive power of not

mind was not conferred upon me

by

my Maker,

scanty

portion of

might and ought

to

have done. (Quoted in H.

Adams,
He

pp.

34-35)
his
a

sensed that
age

duty

was

the conservation of America's

moral

worth;

he

knew his

for

time of

transition; but how

to contend with this grim sphinx,

he

properly discovered. That Adams as thinker has been

never

largely

ignored

by

most standard works on

America's intellectual traditions may be explained, to some degree, by the manner in which his world view cut across conventional theoretical guideposts.

Henry Adams considered that his grandfather had been a political man, actu ated by ordinary feelings; whereas Brooks Adams judged him an "idealistic
philosopher who sought with absolute plane of civilization which would as all men must

disinterestedness
averted the

to put the Union

recent
.

upon a

have

War;

who

failed,

fail

who

harbor

such a

purpose,

and who

resigned

himself

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

and

28 1
p.

his

ambitions

to

fate"

(quoted in H. Adams,

p.

vii.

See

also

Nevins,

ix.). Adams's
own

social and political

philosophy derived in

great measure

from his

reading and converse with eighteenth-century thinkers, in particular John Locke, but it constituted as well a special synthesis of old ideas. He was also
obligated

to the
which

"long

tradition

of

medieval

political

thought, back to St.

of govern

Thomas, in
rulers ment

the reality of

moral restraints on

power, the responsibility

to the

communities which

they

ruled, and the subordination of

to law were

axiomatic."

His

combination of the

Lockean

position with an government

important
program

emphasis

upon

the vigorous role to be played

combination

by

in

of

internal improvements; his

of a

strong
upon

nationalism

based

upon

a sense of moral rectitude with

an

insistence
relations of

self-restraint,
combi

equality,

and a recognition of moral

religious

laws in the

nations; his
an

nation of a

faith in the

natural-law

concept

with

empirical

and

skeptical view ures of

in the

realm of science made

Adams
p.

unique

his in

day

in the United States (Lipsky,

as

328; Sabiiie,

among public p. 523).

of

fig

Adams has been aptly described

moralist
tion."

"the

classic

example

the political

thought and word, who cannot

help being
in the
part of

a political realist

in
in

ac

His international thought

and

was anchored

realist work

tradition of Wash

ington

Hamilton;
saturated

yet

he did the better

Jeffersonian
the

his

in

statecraft

an

atmosphere

with

principles.

Between Adams's
of

moral

principles and was

his

conception of

national

interest
as

the United States there

hardly

ever a conflict.

The

moral

gested, were nothing but political

versa

Hans J. Morgenthau sug interests formulated in moral terms, and vice

principles,
seminal contributions

([1951]),

pp.

19, 22).
freedom

Adams'

to the American
and

diplomatic tradition

of

the seas, the Monroe

Doctrine,

Manifest

Destiny
freedom

are evidence of this achievement.

of

For example, the legal

principle of

the seas was a weapon through which an inferior naval power tried

to safeguard its independence from Great Britain. trine's

moral postulates of nonintervention

Similarly,

the Monroe Doc

were negative

(and anti-imperialism)

conditions

for the security and prestige of the United States. Their fulfillment insulated the United States from the power struggles in Europe and, through it,
predominance of
was

ensured the

the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

Manifest

Destiny

the

moral and

ideological incentive for American inhabitants (ibid.,

pp.

conti

nental expansion and subjugation of native

22-23).

Morgenthau's analysis, however, speaks more to effect and less to cause. The clear implication of his commentary is that realism and idealism need not
always

be treated

as

judge

the words and

mutually exclusive categories or criteria from which to deeds of the statesman. Equally important in this connec desiderata
above

tion is

whether moral

the nation state

function only
virtue)

as

an

ideological apology for

an exercise

the powerful (the

homage that
weak.

vice pays to statesman

or as

in costly
It
must

self-deception

for the

Is the

ill-advised
felt

to

derive

norms of national conduct

from

some other source

than mundane politi

and

cal reality?

be

noted

that these questions are rarely, if at all,

282

Interpretation

confronted systematic

by

the statesman in a way that can be easily transformed

of

into the

analysis

hypothetical
he

possibilities.

While

Adams

may

have
the

avoided systematic expression, universe

evolved a conception of

life, God,

and

into

which

his

attitude on all could not

the problems of his political time may

be

fitted. Even if Adams heat ical his

disengage himself entirely from the

substantiates

singular

of political passions,

his

legacy

the normative and philosoph

core of all serious political thinking.

reflection on man's nature and

Of

no small significance

here is how

the moral tasks of governance relates to the

world affairs.

duties

of

American

national

interest in him

He found the
of

world about

confined and controlled

by

a paramount

law

nature,

superior

to the regulations of

humans,

law

which

the

logical

mind

could

discern

rejected

apply to the political fortunes of nations. For example, he the demand pressed on the Washington Administration that the United
and

States

support

France

against the combined powers of

Europe in 1793. America human legis wishing

was commanded

by

the "law of nature, which is paramount to all

lation,

or compact, to remain at peace, and to content ourselves with

sit upon

that laureled victory may

the sword of justice, and that smooth success

Freedom"

may always be strewed before the feet of virtuous August 24, 1793, Writings, I, 145-46). In this United States
announce
occupied a unique position,

(III

"Marcellus,"

philosophical

scheme

the

for it

was

the first nation in

of

history

to

foundation

principles embedded of

in the "law
announced

nature"

(see Adams,
assum

[1831]). The Declaration

Independence

"the

one

People,

ing

their station among the Powers of the

Earth,

as a

religious, civilized and

Christian People Nature's law

God."

acknowledging themselves bound

by

the obligations, and

claiming the rights to which The laws

they

were

entitled

by

the Laws of Nature and

of nature,

intercourse between
pean of nations.

sovereign

according to Adams, applied to the social communities and found expression in the Euro
are

These laws

"all derived from three

sources:

the

dictates

of

justice;

usages, sanctioned

by

custom;

and

treaties,

or national cove

nants."

In addition, Adams
with

acknowledged that

the "Christian nations, between

themselves, admit,

various
of

latitudes

of

interpretation,

and

little

consis

tency
dation

of practice, the
Christ"

laws

humanity

and mutual

benevolence taught in the

the

gospel of
of

(II

"Marcellus,"

Writings, I, 129). Americans "laid

the very
reason ensured

foun
it is

their government upon the eternal and unalterable principles of human

government's essential purpose secure the

rights."

That

for

which

instituted

is to

"natural

mankind"

rights of

that the

struc

tures of power would be "subordinate to the moral supremacy of the

People"

([1837],

pp.

20-22).
precepts of natural

Nor is Adams's devotion to the

law invalidated

by

point

ing

out

that,

on

occasion, he

could

ple, although the tion.

departure

was explained

specifically sanction departure from princi in terms of moral and legal obliga

Concerning

the acquisition of

Louisiana, Adams believed that,

have been gained, it
would

although

the consent of the

inhabitants

should

have been

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

283

of

impracticable to try to obtain it prior to the treaty and that "theoretic principles had to be modified to meet the "situations of human events and
government" concerns"

human

("Notes

on

Speech
used

Motion,"

on

Writings, III, 28-29). The

treaty-making
plebiscite

power

had been

might

have denied the

results of

constitutionally in acquiring the territory; a the treaty. Yet the United States

could not

be

relieved of

the obligation to procure the consent of the inhabitants

after the treaty.

And

as

principles which we

nothing but necessity can justify even a momentary departure from those hold as the most sacred laws of nature and of nations, so
of necessity.
all

nothing can justify extending the departure beyond the bounds the instant when that [necessity] ceases the principle returns in

From
and

its force,

every further

violation of

it is

error and crime,

(ibid.)
deviation that necessity may in his Memoirs that principles

The law
occasion should

of

nature, then, determines the

precepts.

extent of

from its

Adams

once wrote

be

adhered to of results

importance

strongly only to the degree of their importance and of the deriving from their application (December 22, 1833, IX,
nor results

58). Neither intentions

national

are,

by

themselves,

a moral guarantor of
of realism and

the

interest. Adams

would not accept our

dichotomy

ideal

ism; he
tell you

would, as Nathan Tarcov explains, emphasize the complementary rela

tion of principle and prudence. "Principles are not self-applying:

what

They

do

not

to do.

They

require prudence and

judgment for their for

application.

Prudence is
cov,
p.

not self-sufficient

either;

it

guidan

requires principles

(Tar

48).

The competing claims of power and principle to which Adams alluded were nowhere better exemplified than in his own defense of General Jackson's 1818

invasion
one

"defensive,"

Spanish territory in Florida and the storming of Pensacola. On the hand, Adams stood alone in the Cabinet in holding that the action had been neither an act of war nor in violation of the Constitution (Mem
of

oirs,
of a

July 17, 1818, IV, 111),

threat

that the capture of Pensacola was

in

anticipation

from the Spanish in

governor

to drive Jackson out of the province that

he had

entered on

pursuance of

his

orders.

He

cited chapter and verse

from

Martens he

international law in

support of

his

convictions.

On the

other

hand,
him

wrote of the

Administration's

"dilemma"

moral and political of power at

and was

self unable

to escape the judgment

hand.
it is impossible for them
If they
avow and

The Administration
to escape censure
approve

were placed

in

dilemma from
crimination

which

by

some,

and

factious

by

many.

Jackson's conduct, they incur the double responsibility of having commenced a war with Spain, and of warring in violation of the Constitution authority of Congress. If they disavow him, they must give offence to his friends, encounter the shock of popularity, and have the appearance of But the mischief of this determination lies deeper: 1. It is truckling to Spain.
without the
all

284

Interpretation
of power

weakness, and confession of weakness. 2. The disclaimer

in the
196

Executive is
to the officer

of

dangerous

example and of evil consequences.

3. There is injustice
pp.

in

disavowing

him

when

he is strictly justifiable. (Nevins,

200)
Adams's position, elaborated further in a momentous state paper to the Ameri Minister in Spain, won the enthusiastic endorsement of Jefferson. This was

can

"among

the ablest compositions [he

a vivid

had]
of

ever

seen, both
of

as

to logic and style

statecraft

and was

illustration

the level

American

(from

Jefferson to President Monroe, 502). Texas (the

January 18, 1819,

in Adams,

Writings, VI,

Intervening circumstances, particularly "apoplexy of the Constitution"), led

Mexico in 1846. Adams
proper continental viewed

slavery and the annexation of Adams some three decades later

"aggression"

to reverse his position and disclaim the power of President Polk's

against

the

war as an attempt

by

Polk to

move
of

beyond
slavery.

limits through the

use

of

force

and expansion

With

respect

to the first principles of philosophy and

was

science, Adams

father,

with whom

questioning he discussed the issue. John for the

"

less

given to

the reasons

theology, as apart from for things than his

Adams
spoke of never
mind was

Quincy

having

"much

relish

speculations of

the first philosophy"; his

not one

that took delight "in reasoning high upon 'Fix'd

absolute'

foreknowledge
111-12).

fate, free will, and (To John Adams, October 29, 1816, Writings, VI,
schisms within

Disavowing
. . .

the metaphysics of doctrinal that "the only

his

own

faith, Adams declared

in its influence in "the
genuine
happiness."

importance

of religion

to my mind counts

mankind"

upon the conduct of of

(VII, 90). Adams believed

doctrines

Christianity
of

in their

application

to the pursuit of

In addition, he

cited

the "Socratic and Ciceronian moral philosophy

as

the most exalted

system

human

world"

conduct ever presented

to the

(Memoirs, April 17, 1813, II, 462). This

dimensions is
Founders'

synthesis of classical and

Christian

broadly

compatible with

the moral-legal precepts shaping the

faith in
were

a constitution grounded

in

principles of

"higher

law."

Its tenets

beyond the ordinary level

made

of

human infirmity;

and so are

those of
and so made
.

Christianity. It

the essence of
gave out a

virtue

to consist in self-subjugation;

does Christianity. It
the
not endeavor

theory

of perfection

to the aim of man, and

perfect example

to

attain

it duty;

so

does Christianity. The

was

given, as

by Christ;

not even
.

Socrates. Yet he,

and

Cicero

did

attain an

eminence of practical virtue.

(ibid.)
statesman, Adams
moral

It

was

among the

obligations of

believed,

to "aim in so far

as their abilities extend

sins."

besetting

This

would

the example of private

country from be accomplished, in the first instance, "by setting morality"; and, second, "by promoting the cause in
purification of their

towards the

every way that they

can

lawfully

others"

act on

(To James

Lloyd, October 1,

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

1822, Writings, VII, 312-13). For Adams,
of a spontaneous

285

natural religion was not a product

ples

in the

understanding in the heart, but was a learned body of princi keeping of society and brought to each generation by the forces of
political

civic education.

In Adams's

theory, the Creator had

made man a

"social

being,"

had

blended his happiness essary

with

that of his fellow man, and government

effectuation of
which was

was a nec

instrumentality
spirit of

for the
his day,

this liaison. Yet he differed from

the general

manifested

in

either a conservative

desire for

a government

only strong
and

enough to

keep

the enemies of social order

in harness,
ment, tyranny.

or a more radical

Jacksonian
used

opposition to

strong

govern

except

insofar

as

it

must

be

to

keep

the economic

Seeing in any political order the hopes and ture, Adams looked upon reason as the foundation from which "we participate In his inaugural lecture as Harvard Professor of of the divine nature
itself."

oligarchy from aspirations of human na

Rhetoric in 1805, Adams

species enjoys

observed:

"It is

by

the gift of reason, that the human

the exclusive

privilege of progressive

able to avail

itself to the

advantages of

individual

discovery"

improvement, and is ([1962], pp. 13-

virtue

14). Civil society merely reflected the prevailing concepts of character and among its members. Government did represent "a restraint upon human
Liberty."

action, and as such, a restraint upon

The

constitutional

framers

were

"aware that to induce the People to impose

ments, motives
were not
. . .

upon themselves such

binding
of

liga

less

cogent than those

from

which

the

basis

human
A
at

necessary"

association were

([1850],
without

pp.

34-35). A theory

of rights, there

fore, is inconceivable
passage

corresponding conception from Adams's first State of the Union address is

of obligations. worth

quoting

length.
The
great object of the

institution

of civil government

is the improvement

of

the

condition of those who are parties to the social compact, and no government can accomplish the

lawful

ends of

its institution but in

established. assigned

proportion as

it improves the

condition of those over whom

it is

But

moral, political, and

of

intellectual improvement
social no are

are

duties
man.

by

the Author

Our Existence to

less than individual

with

For the fulfillment

of these
. .

duties

governments

invested

power, and

for the

attainment of the end

.

the exercise of

delegated

power

is

duty

as sacred

as the usurpation of powers not granted

is

criminal and odious.

([1966], I, 243-44)
was

By
than

no means,

however,

Adams's tribute
of

congratulation. an

He believed that the doctrine

application.

ceremony of national internal improvement had

a

self-

more

American
as

He was, for example, filled

with admiration

for

Peter the Great

nificent plan.
was suited

the genius who had built St.

applied

Petersburg

according to

mag

Peter

his
that

energies was

through government, and the capital

to the

leadership

Secretary

of

State,

reorienting Russia in a new direction. As Adams admonished the Columbians to think little of Colum-

286
bia

Interpretation
as a center of empire

but to
do

give

due

regard to the

bounties

of nature.

"God

to thee has done his

negative
suspicion

thine"

part

(National Archives,

IX, 297-98). No

of government

limited his

conception of what men could

accomplish through

its

agency.

He

enjoined men of all

skills through government to the task of

lands to apply their internal improvement.

admit of

Like Jefferson, Adams

uses of politics and

was

unwilling to

any dual morality in the

diplomacy

i.e., by

setting the

political sphere apart

from

the private

one

for

purposes of ethical evaluation.

In his Harvard
problem a

commence

ment address upon on

graduating in 1787, Adams took up the the "Importance of Public Faith to the Well-Being of

in

a speech

Community."

He

was troubled

by

the

suggestion

"that

nations are not subjected

to those

laws,
them

which regulate

the conduct of

individuals;

that

national

policy
of

commands
or of

to consult their

interest,

though at the expense of

more than one

foreigners,
kind

individual
that

citizens."

Could there, he asked, be

and

justice

and equity? nature

Could "honor

probity be

qualities of such an

accommodating August

they

will

like the
of

venal sycophant at court suit

party?"

themselves to all times to the

interests

the prevailing

(To

Jeremy Belknap,

6, 1787, Writ
in the

ings, I, 34-35). Adams thought

of nations.

of

the nation as a "moral

person"

family

This

moral

person, in view of the

of external
rights and

international law governing the

obligations

subject,
changed

was

possessed

that remained un

by

scribed as a

In this context, he de any "internal revolution of new maxim in the law of nations the principle, especially devised
government."2

by

the victors to apply to

Napoleon,
to

that a sovereign

by

the breach of a

treaty
on a

should

forfeit "all legal

of

existence."'

right

Adams was,

course, exposed to the

political temptation of

acting

felicitous
verity.

coincidence

between the best interests

of

the United States

and eternal

Nothing
of

that we could
with

do

would remove

this

impression

until the world shall

continent

be familiarized

the

idea

of

North America. From the time

of nature

considering we became

our proper

domain to be the
people

an

independent

it

was as much should

law

this should become

our pretension as

that the Mississippi

flow to

the sea.

(Memoirs, IV, 437-39)

Moreover, he
exchange, in

conceived of the

law

of nature and nature's

God

as

requiring the
to

"liberal"

eventual achievement of most particular

of

principles of commercial relations and

of

the commerce

resulting in the opening up the world and in relaxing imperial

the British to

South American

ports

commercial restrictions.

He

especially importuned
policy
sions.

of mutual exclusions upon

British

liberalize their system, and propounded a commerce in order to force conces United States
with regard

He described the policy based

upon the

of the

to South Amer
and
achieve-

ica

as

two principles

of

"entire

recipro

and unqualified

permanent most-favored-nation

treatment,

which were

necessary to the

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

ment of

287

Adams

South American independence (National Archives, VIII, 241. See also [1900], II, 288). In negotiating treaties of commerce, a nation should only to satisfy its own interests but should also be willing "to concede to that which is adapted to the interest of the ("Third Annual
other"

seek not

liberally

Message,"

p.

380). British
and

Regarding

Spanish

possessions upon the northern and southern

without

borders, Adams

thought it "impossible that centuries should elapse

States."

finding
would

them annexed to the United

so quick

Few

of

Adams's

contemporaries

be

to stake out the moral high ground

by
the

vigorously protesting
part."

that this did not

involve

"any

spirit of encroachment or ambition on our

Any
add

effort on the part of the

United States "to

reason

world out of a

belief

that we are ambitious will

have

no other effect

than to convince them that we

hypocrisy"

to our ambition
recognized

(Memoirs, IV, 439).

international
politics often entailed nation

Adams making may be

nature. ments

that the nature of

distinction between
person;

methods and purposes

in diplomacy. The
Their

a moral

however,

self-preservation was also

the first law of

govern
when

Nations

acknowledged no must

judge between them

on earth.

"from necessity,
of one

in their intercourse

with each other

decide

the

failure

other

from the

reciprocal

party to a contract to perform its obligations, absolves the fulfillment of its ([1839], p. 68). America had
own" errors"

"committed many

great

in

"confounding
in
and

the principles of

internal

gov

relations."

ernment with those of external

sanction

Adams

never extended normative

to the presence of self-interest

government
of

political

life. But there "must be in this

world

force for the

choose

mankind,
must

whoever

does

not

to fight for his

William Vans Murray,

"as

freedom, July 22, 1798, Writings, II, 344). Adams disclaimed

a

turn Quaker or look out

for

master"

(To

unsound all patriotism

incompatible

with

the principles of eternal

was not

justice."

Fiat justitia,
cable to the
were rooted

pareat coelum.

Yet this line

of

reasoning

precisely

appli

diplomatic craft, inasmuch in a prudent disposition to

as negotiation and political compromise reconcile

conflicting

values

in changing
of

situations.

Adams
matic

was

acutely
and

conscious of

the

significance and with

implication

diplo

maneuver,

his first

contacts

the British government provided

was

him

with

early

experience

in the

art.

Sir Charles Bagot

the

most successful

British
perhaps

minister

he had known. This fact impressed him because

success was

based on the minister's mediocre talents, and this possibility staggered Adams's "belief in the universality of the maxim that men of the greatest tal In a revealing profile, ents ought to be sought out for diplomatic Adams
noted

missions."

The

principal

feature

of

his

character

is discretion,

one of the most

indispensable He has
no

qualities of the

good negotiator.

His temper is serious, but

cheerful. when

depth

of

dissimulation,

though enough to suppress

his feelings

it is for his

288

Interpretation
conceal

interest to

them.

To

neutralize

fretful

passions and soothe

prejudices,
nearer

man of good

breeding, inoffensive
standard

manners,

and courteous

deportment is
the

to

the tme diplomatic

of

than one with the genius of

Shakespeare,
the wit of

learning

Bentley,

the philosophical penetration of

Berkeley,

or

Swift.

(Memoirs, April 14, 1819, IV, 339)

bestowing diplomatic confi reputation of being, I dences; "but, crafty bestowed give it as the result of my experience that confidence judiciously is one of the most powerful and efficacious instruments of (May 28, 1819, p. 377). Adams also knew that improper methods, or morally ques
Adams
understood

the

delicacy

and

danger in

and

fraudulent

as

the trade has the

negotiation"

tionable means, may exact a

high

price.

What is here done

with good

intentions

but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it vio lates the ethics of responsibility to which action affecting others, and political action par excellence, is subject (Morgenthau [1946], p. 186).

ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN MISSION: FINAL THOUGHTS

Adams joined
pass of rights

Jefferson in affirming natural rights as the moral com the union; he quoted Madison's "pride and boast of America, that the
with which she

for

contended,

were

the rights of human

nature"

([1850],

p.

22). His

world view was one

that could rarely decouple the expression of na

values of national purpose.
essential

tional interest

from underlying
was reluctant

From the horizon

of

ethics, Adams

to condone any
most

difference between
said

public

and private moral acts.

character of a

Perhaps the

that can

be

private, as over against a political, action

concerning the moral is that an individual

acting in one capacity may be more or less moral than when acting in the other. Adams's political and diplomatic career was conspicuous by his belief in a
vital connection

between America's
of

commitment to mankind and clear

power

limits to
America

the

moral

authority

the nation's

in

world affairs.

As
in

realist, he

understood would

the restraints

imposed

by

an anarchic world arena

which

only be a minor (but not always unimportant) player in the European balance. As an idealist, he exhorted his countrymen to uphold the public virtues of republican rule as a model for other nations to emulate. In other words, America's
national success

in the

world

for

which a prudent and

modestly
wrote

conceived

interest

spiritual stamina

"the
not

strongest of

necessary in its self-governance. America, Adams nation upon the globe for every purpose of
even

was

was a

function

of the nation's own moral and

in 1816, Yet he

was

justice."

could

"ask

heaven success,

in the
of

wrong."

He hoped America in

for my country, in a case where she would be might "be armed in thunder for the defense

right, and

self-shackled

eternal

impotence for the

accentuate the

wrong"

support of

(To

John Adams, August 1, 1816, Writings, VI, 60-62).

Adams
would even more

forcefully
oration

importance

of national

self-restraint

in his

July 4, 1821,

before the

citizens of

Washington. His

Jeffersonian Ethics in Foreign Affairs

address was

289

in

answer

to the question, What has America

done for the benefit

of mankind?

In the assembly of nations, the United States has "held forth to them the hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous

recipr

Furthermore, for
clings.

over a

half-century,

the nation "abstained

from interference in

the concerns of others, even when conflict

. .

has been for

principles to which she

Whenever the
will

standard of

freedom

and

independence has
prayers

or shall

be unfurled, there
abroad, in

her heart, her benedictions,

to
of all.

and

her

be. But

she goes not

search of monsters

destroy. She is the

well-wisher

to the freedom and

independence

She is the

champion and vindicator

only

of

her

own.

(Quoted

in LaFeber,

pp.

42-46)
for the
consequences of

Adams's
wars

remarks point to a concern and of

intervention in

individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which intrigue, assume the colors and usurp the standard of America's glory "is not Adams's concept dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of the
freedom."
mind."

"of interest

of

international

ethics

illustrates how

universal principles of right and obliga

tion in foreign policy take a direct

civil society.

bearing

from the

moral and political order of

NOTES

Jefferson's

convictions were with

We believed,

rights,

and with an

concisely stated in the following terms: them, that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and
moderate

protected in

right,

by

powers, confided to persons of his own choice, and

own will.

held to

their duties

by

dependence

on

his

To Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823, Writings, (1903), XV, 441. 2. National Archives, IX, 8. To Don Dionisio Vives, State Department,

May 8, 1820,
to ratify a

Writ
that
of a

ings, VII, 18: He

had been
signed sovereign whose

asserted that a

Spain

could not
even

be

relieved of an obligation

treaty

by

plenipotentiary,
was

though he

had
a

acted on unqualified

instructions

authority

subsequently limited

by

legislative

body

asserting
ever

a new constitu

tional power to

pass on

treaties.

ing

3. To Abigail Adams, April 22, 1815, Writings, V, 302. Adams, without with the point at length, distinguished between the sovereign "moral
incompatible
with sovereign

explicitly deal
the nation, sus
was a

person,"

ceptible of no act

the necessities of the moral system of which

it

part,

and

the physical

level

of a nation.

only in a fashion subordinate to the Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, 1st session, March 3, 1806, pp. 145-61.

in

a monarchy, who could

be

sovereign

REFERENCES

Adams, Charles Francis,

pincott, 1874-77.

ed.

Memoirs of John

Quincy

Adams. Philadelphia: J. B.

Lip-

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President of the United States, Samuel Colman, 1839.
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.

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the Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport at Sixty-first Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1837. Newburyport: Charles Whipple, 1837.

An Oration Delivered before

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Feminist

Theory

and

Its Discontents

Daryl McGowan Tress

Trinity College

In the wide-ranging work of his late career, Civilization and Its Discontents, Sigmund Freud speaks of the malaise bred in the individual and in culture by
the denial
sive and
and suppression of

the

forces

of

irrationality. These

instincts,

aggres

sexual,

are experienced as

dangerous

and so are repressed.

But, Freud

insists,

to

repress

these

forces is

not

to eliminate them. What is denied and

forgotten lurks beneath the

and

surface of conscious and cultural

life, constantly

undermining threatening destroy civilization (see especially Chs. 6 and 7). I would like to borrow in a limited way from Freud's lesson in Civilization
to
and

the glorious constructions of self and

Its Discontents

and consider what

perceive as

threatening

to its enterprise,
against.

it is that feminist theory has come to what it is that feminist theory believes

it

needs to not

defend itself

it is

the forces of

From the contemporary feminist point of view, irrationality that are threatening, but instead reason and

rationality are viewed as masculine and as the foes against which women must defend themselves. Increasingly, feminist theory fixes its attention on passion
and

power,

on

the nonrational, at the expense of

a major current

reason.

The

history

of

feminist

thought, along with two hundred years,

and value

ideas generally over the last history reveals a growing tendency to draw positive significance from the irrational while looking to expose the full negative and
of aspects of

in

threatening
reason can

"the

rational."

But,

as

I hope to show, the denial

of

be

no more successful than

the denial of the

as

leads to

contradictions and what

instability, especially
denies

irrational; it inevitably feminism requires for its

and

identity

it

condemns and

as oppressive.

The inconsistencies

the

discomfort they generate are signs of a serious failure in feminist theory's intel lectual ancestry, and this is what I will trace.

Feminism has
efforts of women

made some

very

valuable strides

for

women.

The

organized wide most

to

win

the vote,
and

variety worthy
even
on

of

forms forms

of

legal The

for example, and to put an end to a economic discrimination against women are

of respect.

exposure

by

feminists

of more private

but

nonetheless

pernicious

of

if

sometimes

maintaining disruptive and

sign of

women's painful.

has been beneficial, feminism has fallen though, Lately,

subordination reluctance of

hard

times.

One

this, surely, is the

many

women

today

This Lecture

paper was

at

Trinity

originally College.

presented

in April, 1989

as the

Blanchard William Means Memorial

interpretation, Winter

1990-1991, Vol. 18, No. 2

294
to
of

Interpretation
"feminists,"

identify

themselves as

even while or

they do
for

support

the promotion
generational
a movement

women's

interests. (See Chadwick

as presented

Fleming
general

differing

views of

feminist ideals

in the
And

media.) For

that sees itself necessarily as a popular, broad-based political one, lack of popu

feminist theory has attracted a good deal of attention in academic and publishing circles, it is currently in internal disarray, experiencing disputes, for example, over liberal, integrating lar
appeal

is

a most serious problem.

while

political strategies versus

radical, revolutionary ones, and over efforts to reev

traditional activities while

aluate

positively

women's

simultaneously calling for

work

radical reformations of social

life that

gave

those traditional activities meaning.

In

addition

to these

deep

differences regarding aims, the latest

skeptical

in feminist

theory
or,

adopts

the very

stance

characteristic

of some

contemporary
terms

European
with

philosophical

movements and

launches

"logocentrism,"

an attack on

its feminist twist,

to the

"phallogocentrism."

These

are the pejorative

applied

philosophical

tradition which claims the

superiority

of reason.

According
ing,

to feminist theorists, phallogocentrism, representing the reign of the

on

phallus, i.e. masculinity, is in its insistence

and violent.

Rationality
if
not

is

seen

from this

new

rationality repressive, dominat feminist point of view as the

modern

source of many, world

all, of the different forms of oppression in the

and

(e.g. sexism, racism,

women's

imperialism)

and so

is

viewed as a powerful

threat to

As

a philosopher
reason

safety I have been both troubled feminist theorizing,

work. and

and

happiness.'

and

towards

in

recent

the

by the hostility increasing erosion of the

puzzled

place of reason

in feminist

If, in trying

to understand this

development,

one examines the genesis and growth of

feminist theory, one discovers that this is not a new trend but is really the inevitable culmination of a long process. Feminist theory's current troubling state springs inexorably from its problem
atic origins.

What I

will

try

to show

is that the development

the intellectual

history

of the past

feminist theory reflects three centuries, i.e., feminist theory comes

of

into
of

being

as a modernist movement and the course of

its development
evident

mirrors

the vicissitudes of the modern

intellectual

era.

Especially

in the

history

feminist theory is the very unsteady

(See the

state of reason and

modernity.

differing
Lang.)

perspectives on

rationality in late this phenomenon of Strauss, Mac

lntyre, Cascardi
and

and

Two troubling
the reduction

general consequences of the elevation of passion and power

or elimination of reason can and political

be

noted at

the

start:

the

first is
and

that appropriate aims for desire these areas of life

action cannot

be determined

become

chaotic.

second

difficulty

is that the

categories one

looks

to

defend
and

or revitalize

inconsistent feminist Modernism

begin to unravel, that is, they become internally their explanatory power is weakened (for example, the basic
"gender"

concept of
makes era

intellectual

is currently coming undone. See "Editorial."). feminism both necessary and possible, that is, the modern provokes it into being and provides it with a set of intellectual

Feminist
tools to construct
all

Theory

and

its Discontents

295

itself. But in the

I

at the same

debts
Let

and problems of the modern

time, feminist theory is also heiress to intellectual era, and these have come to feminist theory.
(and point out parenthetically working with very broad historical are in fact very complex systems of

manifest

themselves

current confusion which riddles

me

what will soon

specify become

what

mean

by

"modernism"

obvious: that

am

categories, and so I

have

simplified what

ideas). I distinguish three

modernism, and
views

major movements within

modernism"

postmodernism.

"Early

it: early modernism, here designates the

anti-

world-

originating in the West in the seventeenth century and maturing in the Enlightenment era of the eighteenth century which expressly repudiated re liance on the earlier classical and medieval-theological traditions. These tradi
tions had been

based

on a

divinely
of

ordered cosmos and an

immaterial human
thought placed
subject conquer

essence or soul which

had its

own natural ends.

Early

modern

confidence not and

in the authority

tradition

but instead in the

can

knowing
and

in the

subject-as-knowable.

The

subject

know,
or as

grasp,
with

nature, and can come, as well, to

cause

know himself

herself

certainty be

the subject now

rather

is

regarded as

secular and

scientific

than divine laws.

"Antimodernism"

operating according to designates modernism's

preoccupation with

turn against

itself, its

rebellion against

the Enlightenment

reason and scientific

knowledge. The

spirit of antimodernism

is
and

expressed

in

nineteenth

century Romanticism's urging

period,

embrace of

the

imagination
superior

in the

revo

lutionary

political

of praxis

or

activity

as

to theory.

In the

antimodern

vidual efforts at control.

history and nature Finally

are regarded as

"postmodernism,"

the most recent

surpassing rational, indi intellectual

current, is

one that

Lacan, Foucault,
the values
of

and

consciously defies definition; its spokespersons, Derrida, Rorty, to name a few, set postmodernism in opposition to
modernism and

both early

antimodernism, in

particular

to the

confidence the previous modernisms of

display
a

the

subject.

For postmodernists, everything is

in the solidity and self-sufficiency fragmented subject moves in a de

naturalized world where

a construction of

language

or an opera are

tion of power, and the denaturalization of which

obligated to express
and promote on

intellectuals

and artists

in their

work. of

(Jardine's study is
and

partic on

ularly

illuminating

"denaturalization"

the

postmodernism

the

"postmodern"

sources of

feminist theory.)
points, certain features characteristic
rejection of of

At these three
the
modern
"new"

modernist pressure period can

intellectual

be detected: the

tradition and the

desire for

solutions, the overarching attitude of opposition and rebellion,

analysis of power and

the atmosphere of crisis, the priority given to

its

opera

tions, the
subject

emphasis

placed, on the one

hand,

on

the
or

defense
her
own

of

the autonomous
and on

independently
a preoccupation

willing
with

and

choosing his
a

ends,

the

other,

a political

and/or sociological

analysis of power

groups and their all

dynamics,
of

and

finally,

disillusionment
represent.

with and rejection of

these

categories and

the difficulties
modernist

they

These features

the

program, all of which mark

feminist theory,

296
can

Interpretation be
contrasted

with

the premodern,
notion of

classical

philosophical

outlook.

The

classical view
nature.

holds to the

human

essence which

is timeless in its
tradition
and

Because

some aspects of

human

nature are

timelessly true,

its thinking

are valuable

for us; the

problems we confront now are not so terri-

fyingly
insists
psyche,

new, nor, perhaps, do

upon.

and

they have the dramatic exigency that modernism Classical philosophy focuses its concern on the human essence or makes the object of its inquiry not discontent, power, needs, and
rather

preference what

but

virtue, that

is,

what makes a

person,

or

people, excellent,
as

is it

that we

do best to
structured

desire.'

Since

all

human beings
and

human beings
are possible

possess a

similarly
we

psyche, relationship

community
social

and

desirable;

are

neither atomistic

individuals

nor

constructions,
of real

according to this view. The classical outlook maintains that the ground ity is stable essence or form or substance, and hence is intelligible and

access

ible,

to some extent at

least, by
on

means of open
rather

dialogue

and

patient, rational

reflection.

It

places

priority

these

than on willing, acting,

changing
start.

the world.

Feminist theorists have been

"Central to
feminism,"

highly

wary

of essentialism

from the

Anne Donchin writes, "is the disavowal

tion of the essential self (p.

92). The

allegiance of

of the concep feminist theorists, almost women as constructed

exclusively, has been

social and

and continues

to be to a view of
a

by

historical

conditions.

Alison Jaggar,
allegiance:

feminist philosopher,
anti-feminists

suc

cinctly states the justified women's

(p.21). The idea
regarded

reason

for this

"Invariably,

have

subordination

in terms

of perceived
or

biological

differences"

of an

invariant feminine
the

human
the

nature or quo

essence, then, is
and

as

grounding
of

injustices

of

status

perpetuating
used against

women's subordination.

It is correct,
women.

course, that

essentialist

models

have been

But the alternative,

modernist model which

upon

is

deeply

problematic and will not yield a

feminist theory is founded coherent theory of women. I

versions are made plain, a
can

believe that
Let
the

once the

defects

of modernism

in

all

its

reconstruction of

feminist theory
of

on a classical

foundation
the three

begin. in

us now examine at greater

length

each of

modernist stages

development

feminist theory

and consider

its implications.

lived her relatively short life at the end of the eighteenth century, generally is placed at the beginning of the lineage of mod ern feminism. Writing her bold Vindication of the Rights of Woman in 1792,
who she

Mary Wollstonecraft,

faced

the challenge of

men and women

example,

by

opposing the popular Enlightenment-era view that have fundamentally different natures a view developed, for Rousseau in his best-seller, Emile and using Enlightenment prin

ciples and values to undercut the

Enlightenment

notion of a

basic

and thorough

going distinction between the

sexes.

Feminist
Wollstonecraft
saw

Theory

and

its Discontents

297

Rousseau

and others natures

differences in different
one and

male and

female

arguing on the basis of the apparent that different educational programs and
permissible

political entitlement were not

only

but beneficial to every

possessing
some mea

involved. What
Edmund Burke

seemed obvious

to Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau

and others was that and

women,

while

sure of and

intelligence

reason, are
men

nevertheless more

instinctual,
are

emotional,

imaginative

creatures than of

are, and that

men and

women

constituted

by

nature

for the domestic life

of

pleasing
as

caring for

children.

What

was

decisive,

course,

was women's

deficiency

with respect

to reason, since enti

tlement to

human full

rights

(such

autonomy, freedom of choice, privacy) de

pended upon

possession of rationality.

The

notion of

different

male and

female

natures posited

by
of

Rousseau

and

others can

be

seen as an expansion upon and

intensification
in the

the mind-body
century.

distinction
split within

elaborated

by

some philosophers
some

seventeenth

The

subjectivity that is basic to

to the masculinity,
while

is

externalized and applied

sexes: mind

early modern intellectual is more and more strongly

models

associ

ated with men and

determinant

of women and

body is consistently taken as the primary femininity (see Riley, Ch. 2). As this polarization
regard

becomes
the

more

vivid, and the superior

more

for

mind and

inferior

regard

for

body

become

boldly

prominent were

in the

writings of

the eighteenth cen to response. The the

tury,

some

intrepid

women at

least

bound to be

provoked

very easy,
time can be

confident seen as

expression of women's

subordination

so popular at

the provocation which necessarily gave rise to the modern

feminist

response.

Mary Wollstonecraft,
that, generally, eighteenth-century
expression of their and

agreeing

women appear

her fellow eighteenth-century thinkers to be deficient in reason, employed standard

with

arguments

even

Rousseauian
made

arguments

to

explain

that

appearance, namely that

women

have been

unequal, have been denied

institutions

by

rationality and consigned to the body debased interpersonal relationships. Her

rational agents provided

by

corrupt

public

reformist plan was

to restore women to their full status as

education which permit women to
men. would

by

means of a substantial
men.

be

equal

to that

for

The

aim was to

become free, autonomous,

assertive

individuals,

the equals of

The contemporary feminist theorist Carol C. Gould echoes and expands Wollstonecraft and the spirit of the eighteenth century when she writes her recommendation for feminism today:
I think the
preeminent value

that

ought

to underlie the

feminist

movement

is

freedom, that is, self-development. This arises through the exercise of agency, that is, through the exercise of the human capacity for free choice, in forms of activity undertaken to realize one's purposes and to satisfy one's needs. (P. 4)
In this contemporary
expansion of

the early

modernist

defense

of

women,

the emphasis on the self, on free choice, on action to fulfill one's own needs

298

Interpretation life
are all

and create one's own

in

evidence.

What the

self should

choose,

what

it

should

do,
to

who

it

should
and

be

would not

be

specified as part of

this paradigm;

values are

be

freely

subjectively
traits

chosen.

One can, to

quote

Gould

once

again, "appropriate any

on one's

for

one's own

self-development,

depending
limits
to

free

choice"

(p. 15). There are, in

other

words, no natural

one's choices.

Wollstonecraft

herself

wrote

women and women's cerned

women. women's

rights, and
of reason an

courageously and eloquently to it is important to add, she herself

as

vindicate
was con

about

equality
use
of

path

to equality of virtue
of

in

men

and

Her

Enlightenment

notion

human
want

nature

to establish

integrity

could not

succeed, however.

to suggest that Wollsplit of

stonecraft's

failure to it

persuade stemmed

in

part

from the fact that the

subjectivity along
teenth century that
within.

sexual

lines

was no

was already so deep by longer possible, strategically, to of

the close of the eigh

challenge

it from

The Enlightenment
required a

model

human

nature

and

its ideal

of political

equality
without

community

of

individuals

who could

think and

judge coolly

the

obstruction of prejudice or passion. such

It

served

the model

importantly

to displace
separate

human tendencies So
when and was

group.

both in theory and in practice onto a Wollstonecraft made her seemingly innocuous pro

posal, that

women

men

both

possess

minds so

both
of

require

education, I

believe
would

she

herself

aware, to some extent at

"Mind"

least,

how implausible this

sound

to her contemporaries.
ways

masculine, in

that the classical soul

strike

which

had already become evidently it replaced had not been, and

bizarre. A
clue to Wollstone-

her

proposal was

bound to

her

audience as of

craft's own awareness of the

sional

desperation

this situation

was

her

own occa

male

sliding away from her basic commitment to the fundamental equality of and female mind to the appeal in the Vindication that men, after all, will
with educated wives

be happier

than with the

delicate,

superficial

creatures

whom she saw as the

degraded feminine
about

product of

Rousseau's

unequal educa

tional

program.'

Doubtful

its

persuasive possibilities,

in

other words, she

let her

argument

become

a plea. not turn the modernist tide.

Mary

Wollstonecraft's Vindication did

own

Instead,
nine

due to its

internal dynamics,

modernism turned against

itself in the

teenth century, as it would again in the twentieth with the advent of

ernism.
which

postmod

An intellectual shifting
a wariness

of gears

took place in the nineteenth century

produced

about

Enlightenment ideals
with of

and

autonomy

and a

disillusionment

human rationality eighteenth-century political ideals of

of

self-interested
ment were

individualism. Some
as

the

important

values of the

Enlighten

preserved, such
means were

that radical

required

equality for their for

and progress,

but the

notion

developed

realization.

Other Enlightenment
and

values,

however,
of

were

rejected,

example the
a more

supremacy

independence

of scientific reason.

Could there be
of

striking

and appropriate symbol

in

this context

the souring

eighteenth-century

optimism about reason and the

Feminist
dream
of progress and

Theory

and

its Discontents

299

human

control of the natural world than this: the classic

monster

nineteenth-century tale of the soulless

created
written

lomaniacal scientist, the story

daughter
of

of

Frankenstein,

by the mad, by Mary Shelley,

mega-

the

Mary

Wollstonecraft'.'

Two

major

trends of great consequence

for feminism flourished in the

and

nine

teenth century: revolutionary politics,

especially Marxism,
other on

Romanticism.
on

These

movements

display
power,

the extremes of world-views

and on

dependent,

the one

hand,
ideal

on

political

the

emotional

subjectivity.

Both

oppose the

ideals

of the eighteenth

century

and

particularly

the early modern

of reason on

the

grounds

that a

hidden,

privileged process

(i.e.,

power or

"life"), inaccessible
ity.

to Enlightenment reason alone, is the true ground of real

radical

departure

made

by

Karl Marx is his

of

elimination of a natural sub

stratum

in human beings. Instead

and spoiled

having
are

basic

nature

which

has been
view

obscured

by

social

conditions

an

eighteenth-century
not and economic on

Marx's

proposal

is that human beings

thoroughly determined,
of

by

the

tangle of their

desires but

by

external

social, political,

forces. forces

The complete, thoroughgoing dependence means that their proper ordering is of the
current exploitative and
arrangement

human beings

these

utmost urgency.

Capitalism is the
to Marx

that shapes modern

life, according
overthrow.

Marxists; it is

a system which requires a

revolutionary

This
and

political model recommends

between the sexes; it

regards apparent

of

differing

material conditions.

equality among people differences in mentality as the effect Since there is no human nature prior to social
base in
which significant mental or

itself

as pledged to

influences in its view, there is

rational

no natural

differences between
in
mind of

women and men could women's

the

aim

establishing

ical

model might seem such as

promising, and

permanently inhere. With full humanity, this revolutionary polit a large number of contemporary femi
and

nists,

Nancy Hartsock, Juliet Mitchell, Evelyn Reed,

Engels'

others, have

followed the State. In this

classic application of

the Marxist approach to women's condition,

namely, Frederick
work

The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the he tells the story of the beginnings of the exploitation and

oppression of women as property.

coinciding

with

the beginnings

of capital and private

The

sources of all

made visible. male and

Thus

"sex,"

traits, according to this model, are external and can be the apparently inescapable biological determinant of
minimized

female, is greatly
concept

by

way

of

this model and separated

from

"gender,"

the social determination

of masculine and

feminine;

"gender"

becomes the
see the

basic to feminist discourse. And

sources
of

we can come not more

externally imposed
change

inequality but,

only to significantly, do

something to

the situation

of exploitation and subjugation.

The

principle

300

Interpretation
perfectly to
certain

(answering

Enlightenment

desires) is

that what

has been

humanly

produced can

be

humanly

grasped, altered, overthrown.

There are, however, a number of serious problems generated by the use of this political model for understanding women. The first is connected with the (see Mah). The divided self of the early modern Marxist concept of
"ideology"

period,

in Marxism, is

realigned and mind and

body

are assigned a new

hier

archy, namely, that mind and

its

output,

theory,

are effects of material causes.

The

in the world, according to Marx, produce ideas. Ideas and theory are not, in this view, autonomous and dependable guides for arrang ing human worldly affairs, but instead are necessarily saturated with class inter
material relations

est and

self-interest, as

well as a measure of

fantasy

and wishful aloof

thinking typ

ically
The

permitted

by

abstract

thought which

holds itself

from specific,

material conditions. concept of

ideology
allow

thus articulated in Marxist work is a volatile one,

claim

however. It does

feminists to

that the reigning set of ideals of the power elite and

female

inferiority

are

ideological, i.e., self-serving for

hence suspect, thereby challenging Enlightenment assumptions. But this "ideol kills the patient along with the disease. Ultimately, the implica ogy tion of the concept of ideology is that ideas and theory cannot be trustworthy; they are always contaminated by class interest, always pretending to be supe
therapy"

rior

to the world when

they

are, after all, only expressions of prior economic

and power relations. abandons

any full humanity. No

ogy.

expectation of set of

By borrowing this concept, then, feminist theory in effect firmly establishing its ideas regarding women's
ideas,
are no

theory is immune from

the charge of ideol

Ideas

as stated
world.

further disparaged in this model, since the aim, philosophy in Marx's overquoted epitaph, is not to understand but to change the
and

According

to this view, one must be able, above all, to do and act;

philosophy,
tion and

which regards as a

itself

as nonpartisan

inquiry, indulges in self-decep

lends itself

tool of the oppressors. This sentiment is echoed

by

the

contemporary feminist theorists such as Andrea Nye, who wonders resignedly whether feminist practice might have to be sufficient for feminism since theory has
a sexist

history

which

can

never

delson,

who chastises

feminists
not

who

be eliminated, and Kathryn Pyne have forgotten that feminist practice

Adpro

duces feminist theory,

one goal:

the other way around, and that

feminist

practice

has
be

to change the material conditions of women. Given these principles,

how

an adequate

theory

could ever

be

available or what

its

real value would

if

one could

develop

where power

it is extremely hard to see. Indeed, in this world-view is reality and takes the form of conflicting interests, any disin
bound to
at worst. attention appear useless at

terested

inquiry such as philosophy is blindly and dangerously manipulative

the very

best,
to
of

One other feature of the Marxist model deserves feminist theory. This is that Marx's is a social theory

in

relation

rather than a

theory

individuality. It is
basis
of

one which tells the

world"

the "real

story of class conflict, the story that the is the group dynamics of money and power, and that

Feminist
this is a

Theory

and

its Discontents
world-view

301
one of

dynamic

of conflict and exploitation.

Thus,

this

is

groups pitted against one another under

patterns of oppression calls oppressor.

capitalism; the

attention

to large social

tion and

to unite and rise up against a common from individual experience of subordina By shifting away unhappiness to the common features of oppression, the Marxist politi
women attention

for

cal outlook allows women a political

to unite against social injustice and or

"feminism"

as

force to be born. A
personal

problem with this political or sociological and

lens is
or

that it filters out

perceives

difference

the texture of individual

lives,

the personal and intimate according to the categories of

"investing"

economics

So, for example, Nancy Chodorow in her Reproduction of Mothering, talks of mothers
and politics.

widely-read work

The

in their children, (p.

the relations
one which

187),

and

Paula

between the
"involves

Rothenberg speaks sexes; by "political

for
control

"political"

of the

nature of

relationship"

Rothenberg
opposed

means

a struggle

between individuals
essentially

of unequal power and sta

interests"

tus,

who confront each other with

(p. 205. The

a

criticism of

Chodorow is

critique of

radical,

by Elshtain, p. 292; see also Ch. 5 for liberal, Marxist, and psychoanalytic feminisms.).
made

lengthy

Trouble
women
"Class"

also arises
"class,"

specifically
since

within

Marxism
members

when of

trying

to conceive of

as

women

are

is basic

identity
women

quately
nents.

identify

in this model, and that it within Marxism has been

might

class. every be impossible to ade

economic

disconcerting

for its

propo

(Eventually,

the notion of "the

patriarchy"

seemed to offer a
women's political

sufficiently
across all

generalized

antagonist

for generating

solidarity

classes.)

This

political

outlook, in
requires and

insisting
deepens

that power is
an

basic in

and

that class conflict

attitude

is everywhere,
and

adversarial

and oppositional general.

fosters

"conflict

consciousness"

of the world

Questions

can

certainly be
adversarial

raised about

how

comfortable most women are with a generalized

sensibility

and whether women

believe themselves sufficiently de

women

fined

by

the rhetoric oppression,

which allows

the narrow options of

being
here,

either

victims, victim-resisters,

or collaborators.

Finally,

we can notice

as we

did

with

the Marxist

concept of

ideology,
be

the corrosive effect this

political,

adversarial attitude
"cause"

has

an

open, philosophical questioning. Feminism

and can
not

becomes
utmost

that demands
aims

loyalty
all,

criticized

only

with

the

delicacy. One
air

here,

above

to understand

but to act, to

right

wrongs, to

grievances, to avenge, to punish, to defend the oppressed and to

of

deprive the
world.

oppressors

power, to promote the revolution, to change the effectiveness, the price

paid

In the bargain for capacity for

political

is

diminished

respect and

rational

thought which

is

reflective and reserved.

The
nist

other major

nineteenth-century intellectual trend

of

importance for femi

theory is Romanticism. Romanticism's rebellion took this general form: discursive thought and scientific reason were rejected and replaced by emotion

302
and

Interpretation imagination. Romanticism turned its

or attention

fully

to the self, the subject

in his

her

personal experience.

It

valued

achieving

one's true

home

or

iden

tity, recovering
neity.

oneself and

the world at

its

most genuine.

What

was regarded

"Life"

as most genuine was

or nature or passion

in its

wildness and on special

sponta

The

metaphor of

the

for the Romantics, the

remarkable

arduous

journey journey
or

or passage

inward took

meaning

which can who

be

undertaken

only
or

by

the

Romantic hero
and

heroine

is proud, smart, strong,

defiant,
heroine
superior

and

stands apart

emotionally from

imaginatively

sensitive.

The Romantic hero

as a result of

and above

others, but exactly

his

or

her

sensitivity is many
outlook the routine of

likely

to be a social outcast,
and envy.

misunderstood and mistreated

by

the

out of their

ignorance

(We
the

might

note, parenthetically,

in this

longing

to be "the
existence.

other,"

deep
of

desire to be

outside

the dull

ordinary

Yack's book is

interest here.) The

Jane Eyre, but
resentment

novels of

the Bronte sisters offer examples of the Romantic heroine. We may appreciate the adroitness of the
venerable

heroines

such

as

we

may

also

note, as others such as

and

Virginia Woolf have, the

in these

characters

the

sense of grievance

bred

by

their assurance of their own emotional and

imaginative superiority, particularly when it is not validated by others or when they perceive that its full development is hindered by material conditions which do
not match their natural entitlement

(Thurman).

The Romantic

attitude was absorbed

into feminism

as an alternative

way

of

answering the problems, persistent since the early modern period, regarding
male-female

difference

and

mind,

female-body. What I
of

inequality bred by identify as the Romantic

the

the associations of
solution to

male-

the

problem

is

the acceptance

these different associations, and the claim, unlike that of the

Enlightenment

and

Marxist approaches, that the masculine-mind,

feminine-

body
and

associations are

indeed

"natural."

reevaluate

positively the body,

the

and

The Romantic feminist strategy is to the domains of emotion and imagination,

reason.

to

assert

superiority

of

these to abstract, calculating, scientific

are

Women,

according to this narrative,

recommends

different, but better.

ways:

Romanticism

itself in

several

it

endorses

distinctly
and

feminine sensibility of intuition and sympathy, as the Enlightenment ist models did not and could not. It upholds the ideas of women's
experience,
of women's privileged access

Marx

subjective

to the natural, powerful wisdom of

which

sexuality

and

childbirth, of separate domains in

since women are so

feminine
men,

nature takes

precedence.

Furthermore,
women are

different from for

according to

this model,
experience.

in

a privileged position to speak

and about women's

Romantic feminism

also provides an explanation

for the rarity in

women's

history

of great public achievements and suppressed

by

women,

insisting
the

that

work

has been thwarted The Romantic

consistently

by

jealous,

coarse, and

ag

gressive nature of men.

view

of women as

superior, sensitive victims has strongly

victimization model

influenced contemporary feminism. The

has become very

Feminist

Theory

and

its Discontents

303

familiar in feminist writing over the past twenty years: Susan Brownmiller, for example, in her book Femininity, analyzes the feminine as a form of constric
tion and suppression, and the

feminist

philosopher

Sandra Lee
[sicj. To

Bartky

writes:

Feminist

consciousness

is

consciousness of victimization
aware of an alien
of women

apprehend

oneself as victim

is to be

force
to

which

is

responsible

for the

blatantly

unjust

treatment
no

and

be aware, too, that this

.

victimization,

[is] in

way

earned or

deserved.

(P

254)

There is
tural

branch

of

contemporary

romantic

feminism''

which maintains

that there

is

an essential woman.

feminist theorizing called "cul The nemesis

of the essential woman, as

or economic

institution

or a set of

biology"

some cases male

adversarial

Linda Alcoff writes, is "not merely a social system backward beliefs but masculinity itself and in (p. 408). Cultural feminists may be more or less
contrast, for example, the
the
gentle
goddess-

in

approach

one might

worship
nature

proposals of

Carol Christ
or

with

harder-hitting
who

and sometimes

hateful

positions of

defective. Despite differences in tone, what these feminists have in common is a vision of the future world deeply transformed
and made true somehow nine

is in itself

Mary Daly deeply

Adrienne Rich

hold (or have

held)

that male

by

the recovery and release of the power of the femi

(Alcoff,

p.

408).
criticized

Romantic feminism has been

by

representatives of the

liberal-En

lightenment, Marxist,
and a position as

for positing a female essence immutable feminine difference. The trouble with the Romantic static,
and postmodernist views

they

see

it is that it

appears to undercut political

"different"

drives for equality,

"inferior,"

particularly or that it is

when experience shows

that
own

so often means

intellectually

naive.

My

concern,

however, is

with

the

valori out

zation within

Romantic feminism
rationality.

of the nonrational and the

distrust this

look displays towards

address
an

It is

not uncommon

for feminists today to

an ordered progres

audience

which

has

come

to share their assumption that rational

thinking,
sion of

including

conceptual

categorization,

logic,

and

ideas is, in its severity, its demand for

particularity,

precision and control, and

its
is

feeling and inherently domineering and

subordination of
write about

a masculine

form

of thought and

destructive. Jessica Benjamin, for example,

which she and some other

can

"rational

violence,"

feminists believe has

(p. 42. Also
see

its

roots

in

masculine

gender

formation

of

early

childhood

Gilligan). The
tion

poet

Adrienne Rich
of thought:

expresses

the Romantic feminist denuncia

of masculine

forms

"His

mind

is too

simple, 1 cannot go on

sharing his

nightmares

(p. 156).

Carol Gilligan's
In
a

interesting
regards

and

influential

work on women's voice

in ethics,
expe-

Different Voice,

as

sufficient, and it seems, as preferable, the

or

immediate

living

and

the simple

telling

dramatizing

of one's

lived

304

Interpretation
rather

rience,

than the more

arduous and often

less

immediately
that

satisfying tasks
precludes

of analysis and explanation.

The is

serious

shortcoming

of

this position,

however, is
a

it

judg

ment and
an

full

assessment of oneself and one's situation.

What is

offered

instead
subjec

immersion in

an aestheticized

subjectivity,

supposedly feminine

tivity

of experience which and

is

sometimes

strikingly

sentimental or self-congrat

ulatory in conception, In this

presents, in its extreme

forms,

the danger of

solip-

sistic self-absorption which

model where subjective experience

feminists feared from technical, unfeeling reason. is primary, the means to reflect upon
of that experience are

and question the

limitations

denied.

fending

the validity

of one's experience

becomes

a substitute

Describing and de for inquiry into

the benefits

and shortcomings of one's

responsibility for
cept.

one's views and actions

way of experiencing. The result is that becomes difficult to assign and ac

Another

and not unrelated

liability

of

Romantic feminism is its

encourage

ment of a certain set of emotional and attitudinal responses as nist ones. superior

the correct femi

oneself as not

There is, for

one

but

deeply

wronged and

thing, self-righteousness, as one sees injured party. This attitude is

posture of

the

only fos

tered among women

voice.

but becomes the

feminism itself
is

as women's

Anger

and resentment

breed in this atmosphere; the tone becomes impe

"enemy-consciousness"

rious and punishing.

into

all

aspects stands

of

A smug life. The

generated which
romantic

filters

simplistic

and

reductive

categories

"woman"

for

"man"

goodness and
effect of

purity,

stands
or

for the envious, brutal

richer or more

aggressor

have the

precluding discussion

debate. A

complex

ries allow

understanding becomes impossible.

of women and men than

the one these simplistic catego

Finally,
social

the

there are problems in achieving the stated aims of feminism, such as transformation, within this paradigm. Because of the priority it grants to personal and because of its distrust of generalization, which it associates

with

dominating

reason, there is

no evident

way to

move

jective

experience to the

politically

unified activism which

effectively from sub feminism expects.

The

most recent modernist

alternative,

embraced

by

a number of contempor
feminism."

ary feminist theorists, takes the broad label "postmodern garded by some feminists as a corrective which is nevertheless

It is

re

still

faithful to

feminism's ancestry, but

ment.

other

feminists

see

it

as a

deep

threat to the move

modernist

Postmodernism, I

will

suggest, is just the

latest, decayed form

principles and values

problems
a new

vexing feminism

have taken. As such, it does not offer a solution to the since its modernist beginnings, nor does it represent

threat. Postmodernism, emerging fairly recently from some crosscurrents in European intellectual life, refuses a single definition, but what is notable is its denial that there is any essence, any persistent identity to be found beneath

Feminist
appearances or even

Theory

and

its Discontents
The

305

below layers

of social oppression.

social construction

of the self runs all the

posit a

true,

stable

identity
human
reason

the illusion of self

ates.

way down, according to this view, and any attempt to or authentic subject only has the effect of solidifying and the subjugation that this illusion permits and perpetu
subjects

Not only

are

fully

the byproduct of the forces of

more

history

and

language, but

too is seen as just one

social processes.
conceptual

Postmodern thinkers particularly

of

call

constricting offshoot of into serious question the

claim,
upon

structuring
good and
contain

rationality
self and

which

depends, they
judgments

binary
of

oppositions which power

bad,

other, reason and emotion, and so forth

value and

always

partially disguised
Alcoff)one of

hierarchies

(see Wilmore

and

Male-female

is,

of

course,

the many

items in the
is
adopted

table of
some

binary

oppositions, and the postmodern style of thought

by

feminist

theorists primarily as a way of

deconstructing

the problems about male and

female

natures

that

propel

modern

feminist theory. Postmodernism is

anti-essentialist and

skeptical, and so its approach differs

which preserves a

from Enlightenment feminist theory,

which women must mantic

deeply fundamentally both notion of humanity of

be

counted as

feminism

which

full members, and from all varieties of Ro universalize feminine traits. It also differs from nine
politics

teenth-century revolutionary
ticular relevance to

in that it
class.

abandons expectations

the permanent liberation of an oppressed

regarding Postmodernism's insight of par

feminism is this: merely turning the conceptual tables by, for example, regarding feminine traits as superior rather than inferior or by wresting power away from men and giving it to women, is to agree to play by

the same old

binary

rules.

Postmodernism demands the

highly

radical move of

dismantling

entirely the categories of male, female, masculine, and feminine. Postmodernism sets itself against the oppositional strategies of the nine
an

teenth century in

interesting

manner.

It looks

as

if the

postmodern

approach,

in this way,

might

oppressor and

be interested in eliminating the rigidly opposed categories of oppressed, insider and outsider, us and them. Such an aim has in
a postmodernist

led feminists

such as

others to engage

Jane Flax, Luce Irigaray, Jane Gallop, Denise Riley, and analysis in their feminist work. But in is
much more

reality,
of

postmodernism

deeply

oppositional

in its

outlook

than

any bilization
ethical

the earlier schools of

modernism.

Since deconstruction involves

no notions at all

a desta-

of all concepts and permitted

identities,

and no political or

category is
of

to stand. The postmodernist

program

is to

expose

the

instability any idea that is presented as natural, obvious, or authoritative. Feminist theory is now utterly cornered: it can neither affirm that women are
"women"

something (since nothing is in any common, identifiable way), nor can it elimi nate the category of (since, in that case, feminism would be meaning less). All that's left is
scent
raw

opposition, the intellectual

attitude evident

in

na

form in early modernism's rejection of the classical tradition that has, in postmodernism, become an end in itself. Julia Kristeva, speaking from this
position,
puts the matter succinctly:

306

Interpretation
a

It follows that
what

feminist

practice can

only be

negative
it"

[my

emphasis

|,

at odds with
it."

already

exists so

that we may

say "that's

not

and

"that's

still not

(P

137)
offers subverts

This feminism that Kristeva

the

self-assured positions

taken
and

by

some earlier

feminists, but does

so

necessarily

negative and oppositional.

only by developing But whereas the earlier

one that

is only

oppositional

fem

inisms
a

came

to rest somewhere

in the

vision of a realized communist state or

postmodernism

woman's

counterculture, for

example

proffers

permanent

instability
port

without

foundation
a

of

any kind. Postmodernism may

pluralistic

appear

to

sup
un

the desire

for

highly liberated,
of earlier

feminism,

one

that

is

bounded

by

the limits

theory. But the desire for

feminist theory to

take such a tion of

formless form itself

which still

represents certain values and a certain

within

freedom

fall

the compass of

modernism.

concep Unfortu

nately,

by

this point

in its

modernist

descent, feminist theory has

or affirmation of women

no positive

vision and no genuine

understanding

to offer.

only fails to step beyond modernism as it sees itself doing, but is modernism in the extreme, the nadir of modernism. Postmodernism's fragmentation of the self is the culmination of the early modern fracturing
Postmodernism
not

of the self
and

into

mind and of

body. Postmodernism's destabilization leaves

of

the world

knowledge

it is the

outcome of the gradual modern erosion of substance

which one unable
must

and essence.

Postmodern skepticism,

to

sustain

any
past

level

of

trust in the world as one meets

it,

so

that one

new world,

is

the exaggerated

fulfillment

of the modern
"play"

constantly desire to have the

create a

disappear. Postmodernism's
an extreme and

appeal to the

of

language

and of power

is

twisted appropriation of the emphasis placed on

freedom

by

earlier modern thinkers.

virtue of

In

all these respects, postmodernism seeks to make a

the internal collapse of the modern outlook.

But

as yet

one

more out of

version of modernism, postmodernism

is in

no position

to

help

feminism

its

modernist

difficulties.

I hope to have

shown

the pervasiveness of a modernist sensibility of opposi urgency,

and
and

tion, rebellion, crisis,

and

general

distrust
albeit

of reason

in the
the

ancestry
women.

of

feminist theory,

to

have indicated,

briefly,

some of

shortcomings of

this sensibility for

developing
stability

What

would serve

better than the

and

modernist such

satisfactory theory regarding approach, in my view, is a

as

commitment

to

intelligibility

is found in the

classical

philosophical approach.

Basic to

classical

philosophy is
the

an acknowledgment of stable

the

nature

of

things and

in particular, human nature, its

with an acceptance of

identity
of

and

ground of unification,

along

vulnerabilities

this

nature.

Only

with this

stability

as a premise can

there be a stability and truth to

meaningful

our speech, which

in turn

provides the

basis for the

discussion

of

Feminist
ethical and political

Theory

and

its Discontents

307

goods.

(This

argument

is developed

by Rosen.)
action
and

Classical is
one

philosophy lacks the

of patient reflection

exigent tone of modern

on

intellectual work; its

prior to

mode

and

discussion

of aims

change.

Unlike
without

modern

philosophy, which makes

able

being

to specify

what

human willing and choosing primary it is best to will and choose and what the
philosophy
recognizes

limits

of

human

choice must

be,

classical

human

nature

to have certain

basic

capacities

such as reason

with natural ends and excel

lences,
speak

and

that the achievement of these ends

is

either

helped

or
as

hindered
see

by
to

political circumstances.

The intent be the

of classical of

philosophizing,

it, is

about

what

would

harmony
and

freedom

and

natural

limitation,
restraint,

emotion and practice and

intelligence, equality
theory, the

necessary hierarchy, desire

which grounds

and

subject and

that

the subject, male and

female,
of

as all of

these manifest themselves

expanded and

in human

life.4

complete

theory
the

human nature,

fully
in

inclusive
such a

of women,

would ground

commonalities of men masculine or nent risk of

and women

way

as to permit

differences in
the

feminine from the

style or position to or

be

acknowledged without

immi
one

devaluing

overvaluing
the

one or the

other, and thus

dislodging

or the other

realm of

fully

human. A fuller

account of male and

female

commonalities would also subdue the antagonism

between the sexes,

ineliminable differences, there inevitably are elements of between women and men. tension and mystery Women cannot afford to accept the fashionable rejection of reason as simply
although,
some masculine and oppressive.

due to

Just

as

Freud held that the denial

of

the irrational led

to a generalized malaise, the attempt to suppress or eliminate reason

a morbid endeavor.

is similarly
undermines

Any

"theory"

which

moves

in this direction

itself,

and

any theory

which

tells

women

that the nonrational their status as

is their

special

province or exclusive obligation

denies

women

full human be
reha

ings. A

reconstruction of

bilitating

our

feminist theory, away from discontent, involves understanding of reason and human nature.

NOTES

1. For example, Diana Meyers indicates the opposing feminist

of

viewpoints

"the traditional
of

life,"

woman's

as either an oppressive, coerced state or a

points out

regarding the status freely chosen, desirable

materialism and
on
self-

way

life. Andrea Nye (1986)

"the

incompatibility between

assertion"

in

the

compatibility of The radical, thoroughgoing

feminists"

Simone deBeauvoir without, however, commenting these larger trends within feminist theory generally.

feminist

work of

the in

skepticism

and those women

influenced

by

them.

regarding reason is most evident in the "new French Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron write, "Many

who

refer

to themselves as radical the will to

Herrmann

are convinced that own analyses

And, "Their
womanhood

theory is the most pernicious of male [Cixous, Kristeva, Clement, Irigaray, and Herrmann] 'of
discourse'

Marguerite Duras, Christiane Rochefort, Claudine (p. xi). have led them to

activitie

the status of

in Western Theoretical
the
most

variety

of

among

which

frequently

shared and propagated

is that only

one sex

startling conclusions, has been represented,

308

Interpretation
language, capitalism,
both.

that the projection of male libidinal economy in all patriarchal systems

socialism, monotheism

has been total;

to

women

have been

absent"

(p.

xii).

Other feminist The

nist challenge

objections

reason are

based

on psychoanalysis or politics, or

to rationality based on psychoanalytical

theorists. The feminist interpretation of

theory has been widely it, briefly, is that rational thinking is

adopted

by femi

the outcome and

reflection of masculine gender

distinguishes himself
ent.

"boy"

as

development in early childhood, i.e., the process whereby the boy and separates from the mother who is perceived as sexually differ
this
view are

The basic feminist

statements of

Nancy
to the

Chodorow

and

Dorothy

Dinnerstein. This

approach

is

applied

to ethics in Carol
also

Gilligan's In A Different Voice

applied

Psychological

Women's Development. It

has been
from the
modern

history

of

philosophy, notably

Theory and by Susan

ideal
of reliance

Bordo. Without dependence

reason
on

on the psychoanalytic model,

Genevieve Lloyd

argues that the

has been

a masculine one a

beginning

of

the

Francis Bacon,

father

of

the

into focus is telling in the

A

context of the argument

own pervasive reliance on a modernist challenge to the notion of

work

intellectual era, developed in this paper, i.e., lens.

history of philosophy. to bring the masculine

of

Lloyd's

nature of reason

feminist theory's

Sandra Harding's
at the

differing heavily

objectivity and scientific reason is mounted on political grounds by in feminist philosophy of science. The political criticism of rationality looks interests that knowledge serves and differing class access to knowledge, asking

"whose
more

knowledge?"

Also

prominent

on the psychoanalytic

in feminist philosophy of science, Evelyn Fox Keller leans interpretation of gender development than on political argu

ments

temology
Look,"

for making her case. For a critique of the attempted feminist revision of science and epis see Alison Wylie and the less sympathetic, "Feminist Philosophy of Science: A Critical

by

Margaret Levin.
philosopher

The feminist

Iris Marion Young,

invoking

Theodor Adorno,
and as

offers a

politically-

unrelentingly reductive of difference, and dominating: see especially pp. 60-63. The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism
criticism of reason as

inspired

inherently

controlling

and

Philosophy

(March

1989)

takes

as

its

topic "gender and

rationality"

and contains several short articles as well as a

bibliogra

phy

on

the subject.
contrast
and

2. The

between the
Inquiry."

classical

focus

on virtue and the modern

focus

on needs,

desires,

preferences,

ultimately, effectiveness

is developed

by

Alasdair Maclntyre. See especially Ch.

made

5, "Plato

and

Rational

3. Her

argument about

equality
of

of reason and virtue

is

forcefully, but frequently in

29
and

the

text she asserts that her

examples.

proposals will make

for

more stable

marriages; see pp.

34-35 for
and

For further discussion

Wollstonecraft

see

Korsmeyer, Rogers (pp. 18 1-86),

Tong

(pp. 13-17). 4. Catherine H. Zuckert discusses the between

classical philosophical approach

to problems of politics
closes with a call to

and power with special attention to the situation of modernity. philosophical mediation extremes

Her discussion

(pp. 1-29).

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Discussion

Reply

to Lowenthal

Christopher A.Colomo

Rosary College

In his

comment on

my

recent article

in Interpretation, David Lowenthal

argues that

contradict myself.

The

alleged contradiction

is between my

asser

tion that God is the absolutely other and the biblical account, wherein God is the provider-judge, the God whose goodness
men

trust. I contradict myself,

other and

Lowenthal, because I try to combine the absolutely provider-judge, the biblical God, in one account of God.
according to
I
admit to

the

being
I

puzzled

by

the assumption that I treat God as the

provider-

judge (a

have thought that my remark about sinners in the hands of an angry God indicates only that imagination can ob scure one's reason [Interpretation 18 (1990): 149]. I believe I am perfectly
phrase never used).

would

in confessing that I would not want to be misled by my imagination. If my reference to an angry God is the only support for the claim that I treat God as the provider-judge, then I regret misleading my reader, but think myself
candid absolved of

the contradiction in question.

provider-judge cannot

Since the
acterized
revealed.

God

as

be simply hidden, perhaps Lowenthal char the provider-judge in order to explain why I speak of God as

other.

In any case, if God is revealed, then He cannot be the absolutely What is absolutely other cannot be revealed, since in the instant that it is

revealed

it

ceases to

be simply

contradict myself

by

readily
teristics

agree that an
would

completely other. According to Lowenthal, I treating God as both revealed and absolutely other. I account of God that ascribed to Him both these charac
or
respect

in this
p.

be

self-contradictory.

But this is

a contradiction

point out

(ibid.

148 bottom),

not one

I fall into.
contradiction see

Perhaps Lowenthal's judge

of
and

main point

is that the I

between

provider-

absolutely

other

whether or not

it

as a contradiction
contradiction

is is

one
not

my

own making.

More specifically, he
writes

claims

that this

traceable to the Bible. He

behind"

that I

leave the biblical

view

of

God "far

when

I treat God

as

the absolutely other. He recognizes that

refer

by

calling

God the absolutely other, I

to God's

utter

mysteriousness

or

unintel-

interpretation, Winter

1990-1991, Vol. 18, No. 2

314

Interpretation
claim

ligibility. The

that
not

I leave the Bible "far

mysterious and

behind"

is based

on

the view that

the biblical God

is

unintelligible.

(So far

as

can

see,

Lowenthal does
who

not attempt

to

show

that I am wrong about the

Christian

God,

is three in one, very God and very man.) Something is amiss here because in his review
that the Bible
extends of

of

Strauss's book, Lowenthal He

recognizes
with

writes

that the biblical God

and

God's mystery "'as far as power and mystery is in tension

possible.

the God of love

justice (the
must

provider-judge of

his comment),

since

the moral concerns of

the latter tal

be intelligible to

man.

Indeed, he
reads

calls
a

this tension "a

fundamen

psychological

difficulty
sees

within

the Bible as

whole"

[Interpretation, 13
is the
contra

(1985): 317].The

contradiction

Lowenthal

into my

position

diction that he himself Perhaps Lowenthal

a

in the Bible
difficulty"

as a whole. not a contradiction.

ways are

"fundamental

is

In his

comment.

indeed mysterious, but The prin this does not mean He Himself is inherently and totally ciple of contradiction is here brought into play in order to say that God is
suggests

that in the Bible "God's

mysterio

mysterious

in

one

God's ways, His

actions

way but not in in history,

another.

But is it

persuasive

to claim that

are mysterious and

and

miraculous, but that He

Himself is knowable (consider Exodus 33: 20

Hebrews 11: 1)? Maimonides

can

interprets the Bible in just the known but

cannot not

reverse

sense, suggesting that God's ways

be

His

essence

(Guide I 54). The insistence that God's

essence

be known
power.

infinite

necessary if God is to be perfect yet one and of That these characteristics belong to God seems to me to be a
seems

to

me

reasonable essence

interpretation

of what

the Bible says. On the assumption that

goes on

God's
thing"

is unknowable, Maimonides

to say that "One must likewise of

necessity deny, with reference to Him, His being similar to any existing (Guide I 55, Pines tr.). By implication God does not even exist in the

same

way

that other existing things

appears to reject).

This I

radical

do (an equivocality Lowenthal in his comment dissimilarity to any existing thing is what I tried
other."

to capture in the phrase

"absolutely
the same contradiction between the claim to be
and the claim
certain re

Lowenthal
vealed,

and

see

just,

and

loving
as

to be

hidden,
is the

unseen,

or mysterious.

We
a

disagree in fundamental

so

far

he is

that an argument is refuted if one that this

case with respect claims

finds

contradiction

in it. I

am not sure

to a

truly
he
what

argument

or

position.

When Socrates

to know that
must

knows nothing, he contradicts himself to the extent that he knowing is. But does this paradox refute him? A self-contradictory how Plato
to
seems to

know

statement could

contained a contradiction.

If

"reality"

be defended only if reality itself some is the world we see and touch, then
"ideas,"

justify

have thought that reality to be so obviously self-contradictory as him in positing another reality, the which, we are told, are
to

not

self-contradictory (though

many

readers

they

no

doubt

seem to

be

one of

the most

self-contradictory things in Plato). While Plato's surface

teaching in

Reply
itself
proves nothing, of

to

Lowenthal

-315

it does
world

raise

the question how

we would prove

that the
the prin

reality

the every

day

is

not self-contradictory.

Could

we use

ciple of contradiction
prove

in

our argument?

Or

would

the use of this principle to

that reality conforms to the principle be

reasoning?

an

instance

of circular

and,
argu

hence, invalid
ment

(Nowhere does Lowenthal

of

address the on pages

detailed 149-50

make about

the contradictory nature

reality

of

my

article.)

From Maimonides
who are order

and

Aquinas to Kierkegaard
stressed

and

Bultmann, believers
God in No

aware of

philosophy have

the mysterious aspect of

to clearly differentiate between faith and philosophic knowledge.

doubt, in so doing, they expose just the kind of fundamental difficulty Low enthal discusses (e.g., S. Th. I, q.4, a.3, reply 4). In so far as they continue to believe, they continue to live with or in contradiction. It is another question
whether

the

believing

mind

is the

one that can

not at

best

understand and accept this

situation or whether

the believer is

bottom

always

seeking

release

into be

the clear either/or of Kierkegaard's choice. that

Lowenthal,
Perhaps so,

at

least,
I

seems to

think

it is the

philosopher who must resolve contradiction; a man who would

other."

rational

"must

go

one

way

or

the

yet

puzzle over the

seemingly contrary

view expressed

Tyranny (Ithaca,
Philosophy
solution.

NY: Cornell

by Leo Strauss in his University Press, 1988), p.

genuine awareness of

reply to Kojeve [On 210|.

It is
a

as such

is nothing but
about

the problems.

impossible to think
Yet

these problems without

as

becoming
but only

inclined toward for

of

as

long

there

is

no wisdom smaller

quest

wisdom, the

evidence of all solutions

Therefore the
"subjective

philosopher ceases to of a solution

is necessarily be

than the evidence

the problems.

a philosopher at stronger

the moment at which the

certainty"

becomes

than

his

awareness of

the

problematic character of that solution.

At that

moment

the sectarian

is born.

Book Review

Charles Sherover, Time, Freedom,

Philosophy. (Albany: State
pp.; cloth

and

the
of

Common Good: An

Essay

in

Public-

University

New York Press, 1989).

xiii

+314

$59.50,

paper

$19.50

Maureen Feder-Marcus

State
Old

University Westbury

of New York

Contemporary
temporary tematically
enough

political

life,

requires clear normative

principles

philosophers outside worked

by conflicting claims to entitlement, for evaluating these claims. Yet few con the province of the Left have advanced a sys
marked view of our social

out,

comprehensive

being

rigorous

to function as

an ontological

framework for making

such evaluations.
and the

Professor Sherover Common Good is

a

goes

far in accomplishing this. Time, Freedom,

conceived and

carefully

tightly

argued work and

may

well

be foundational for

current political

debates.

Drawing
sents an

from the he

phenomenological and pragmatic

traditions, Sherover
social

pre cen

"authentic descriptive
what

understanding

of our actual principles of

being

tered on

calls the

"three

polity,"

i.e.,

the existential cate

gories of our actual social

of the

life. This descriptive task

comprises

the first

section

book. The

second part sets out some of the normative criteria which

Freedom,"

flow
takes to be

from these categories, and a last section, "The Discipline of up specific issues in contemporary public policy, including
discharged if
we are and an appropriate method to

an

agenda

be

used

for evaluating

social programs

genuinely to pursue a common good. Sherover puts forth three categories which he takes to be
being: membership, temporality,
and

constitutive of our are

social

freedom. These
our political

derived in

sev

eral ways: as a thoughtful appropriation

from

heritage

as grounded

in the Greeks, through

proach to

a phenomenological, and

i.e., rigorously descriptive, ap

as a transcendental analysis of
of social

ordinary experience,
notion of

dialectically

those

structures

grounding the very possibility

membership,

being

itself. Thus the

book founds the

tion of the

for example,

on an

polis

and

the primacy of the social, on the

and social

notion of

Aristotelian concep individual

and on

identity
Roycean

as

requiring linguistic community

membership,

notion of self-consciousness as an emergent

from the

social whole. and add

In
a

each case, these multiple perspectives are

carefully

elaborated notion of our social

mutually reinforcing being.

up to

interpretation. Winter 1990-1991, Vol.

18, No. 2

318-

Interpretation
the
moment that these categories are

Assuming for
exhaustive,

both

comprehensive and

they

provide

the basis

for

inferring

a clear set of normative guide

a

lines for
society.

deciding

questions of

power, organization, and procedure in

free

Sherover's reasoning
to the
political

moves

here from the

existential notion of mem

bership
control

one of citizenship,
and

time, i.e., governance,

these

from temporality to the power to from freedom to the activities flowing from
of the

it, primary among

political

being

livelihood. His discussion

first

of

these

concepts, citizenship,

is, in fact, very

various

rich, entailing a

whole series of used as a mea

substantive conclusions about sure

equality for weighing the legitimacy of Sherover argues for a Burkean notion

and rights which can

be

contemporary

political

claims.

rights,"

of

"prescriptive
that there

as emended

by
a

Thomas Hill Green, reminding the

rights,

reader

is

a tradition of positive

i.e.,

those enabling protections which provide the means

members

by

which

society takes its stands between the Lockean

as

citizens,

within

the conservative tradition which the centraliza

notion of abstract natural rights and

tion of power marking the paternalistic state.

Given the
the

second of
and

his three

principles of

polity, Sherover is able to infer

legitimacy

Machiavelli

and

necessity of republican government as it developed from Montesquieu through The Federalist. Since time, conceived fact
of experience and

both ontically
cial

as a

transcendental ly as the ground

for the

construction of all meaningful

being,

the

best
the

government
greatest

experience, is a constitutive element of our so is one which allows the greatest openness toward
of

the future

and

control

time to its

citizens.

Given

a realistic

conception of

power, the pluralization of centers of power is the

secure and protect such openness and what

men."

Madison

called

best way to the diverse "faculties

possibility
of

of

Indeed,

our

form

of pluralism which checks even the

which a can move

legislative dominance through

becomes virtually

a moral

majority imperative for political life.

to complete power,

Finally,

the three principles of polity generate a

means of the

defense
one

of a commercial

economy functioning by can interfere as the "guarantor

free

market

but

in

which government

of the general

interest"

by
of

Hamilton. The efficacy

capitalism
provides

of

the dispersion of

along the lines conceived property within the framework

the empirical
of

verification

for Sherover's

conceptual

view, reinforcing the notion

chapter on governance.

the primacy of pluralism already

made

in the

Given the assumption that the three principles of polity are sufficient for characterizing our social being, Sherover's arguments in the second section of his book are tight and well founded. It may be that these do not, by themselves, account for man's full socialness, however. If no other, the notion of social

labor

might

have to be

considered
social

labor life is

seen not

for individual

pursuit once

constituted

simply as an but labor

area as

left

over

essentially

constitutive of our social

being

itself.
individual activity

The fact that labor is

conceptualized as a residual and

Book Review
takes

319

its toll

on

the book's overall argument. For in the course

on a number of occasions

of

his work,
must of

Sherover

refers

to the fact that his

analysis actual

"faithfully"

speak
personal expected

to our actual social experience,

an organized

including

the

kinds

lives that

society

permits and encourages.

would

have

the book to undertake such a concrete analysis at some point, if in no

"Livelihood."

other

place, in the section on

"faithfully"

Unfortunately
As
a

this chapter

does in

not, I think, the direction

speak

to our actual experience. Rather it to free

enterprise.

veers off

of abstract exhortations

result, Sherover's

argument remains most starkest and

compelling

when

the threat to freedom is posited in its

terms, namely a planned society with a centralized monopoly of power authority. Sherover's initial categories allow this discrimination very well.
the more
subtle

However, they may be inadequate for catching

serious

but

nonetheless

freedom arising from, among other places, the free market itself. It would be essential then to offer or at least to refer to a physiog nomy of the contemporary soul, for the concrete historical instantiation of Sher
deformations
of over's categories

is, itself,

the

measure of

just how

well we

really

are nourish

ing
and

the

life

of

freedom

and the notion of a common good. eschews the tradition of atomistic

It is precisely because Sherover

takes the
notion of

liberalism

the

common good as

central, that some more concrete

analysis of speak as

the structures

which

form

and support

it is

warranted.

He

seems to

if these

structures are self-developing: provided

"A free

economic order

has,

indeed, increasingly
and

the

material

basis for

moral or virtuous

behavior

for

a social commitment

to individual happiness consonant

a

with responsible

life"

social

(p. 220). And in

footnote in his
we can

chapter on

livelihood, he

as

sumes,

with

Michael Novak, that

take as a given a moral-cultural sys

tem to restrain and check the economic

system without

noting how the

market

can erode the valuational systems counted on

for its

restraint.

Even if

we assume

the more optomistic picture, a society of

individuals

with

decent,
of

actively sympathetic impulses, we still must how these individual affects can be formed into a public
even

address
will

the question

to discharge the

political agenda

Sherover

sets out.

Thus there

seems

to be

an omission

in his

analysis, tive life

even

if

we assume

that the structures of consciousness and our affec

a substratum of even

are such that there

is

feeling

or virtue

to be

mobilized.

Certainly
of

the issue becomes

of

more problematic

if

we take to

heart Allan

Bloom's description
feelings
and

contemporary interiority, its insularity and trivialization ideas, summed up in his telling phrase, "the dreariness of the
landscape."

contemporary family's spiritual A similar point is raised by James Miller.

Commenting

on

Arendt's On

Revolution,
For

Miller

notes:

might not contentment with civil

slacken

liberties,

which protect

the private pursuit of

happiness,
the

the thirst

for

public

freedom? Might

not the

very

perfection of

governmental mechanism

breed

apathy, and create the conditions

for

a retreat

320

Interpretation
"happiness"

into those insular Have

not

concerns that

have become

the

image

of

in America?

the generous circumstances

helped
the

generate a

fatal

vacillation

attending the American experiment actually between an active commitment to freedom and
Has
not

passive enjoyment of prosperity?

America become the quoting from

the
few"?1

perfect

model of a

two-party plutocracy

where

(and

directly

Arendt) "public

happiness

and public

freedom have become the

privilege of

And from Arendt herself:

It
was

precisely because

of the enormous weight of the a new

Constitution
to

and of

the

experiences

in

founding

body

politic, that the

failure

incorporate the
activity in it may sound, it in this country
achievement

townships and the town-hall meetings, the original springs of all political the country, amounted to a
was under

death

sentence

for them. Paradoxical

as

the

impact

of the

began to
of the

wither

away, and

it

Revolution that the revolutionary spirit was the Constitution itself, this greatest

American people,

which

eventually

cheated

them of their proudest

possession.2

Certainly
as
we

an analogous point can

requires

be

made about
within

the common good. Political

life, in its highest sense,

Arendt
points

acting

the human community, an act,

out, of self-revelation requiring courage and

and more modest view of politics as and mutual

faith. Yet

even

if

take a less heroic

the institutionaliza
structures of

tion of procedures for persuasion

accomodation, the

individual
well.

consciousness and social

life

must exist

to make these possible as

are

What institutions, organs, rituals, even public spaces forming a public will dedicated to freedom and the common
that these structures exist
not
and

good?

necessary for To assume

to

lay

out a political

philosophy accordingly, may

proper or

be

sufficient.

Rather,

the question may be how to theorize the

gans of will

formation

consonant with a

free

society.

It is

all the more

timely
this

for believers in individual freedom to do this, since the attempt to question from the Left has been so resoundingly defeated.

answer

World,"

1. James Miller, "The Pathos of Novelty: Hannah Arendt's Image of Freedom in the Modem in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of The Public World, ed. Melvyn Hill (New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1979), p. 195. 2. On Revolution (New York: The

Viking Press, 1965),

as quoted

in Miller,

p.

201.

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INTERPRETATION, Queens College, Flushing, New York 11367-0904, U.S.A.

Forthcoming
Thomas Hobbes

Appendix (1668) to Latin edition of Leviathan-trans\ introd., and notes by George Wright

Discussion Michael Piatt Discussion J. Jackson Barlow

Souls Without

Longing

Timothy

Fuller

George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787

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