Interpretation

A JOURNAL
Fall 1991 Elliott

A OF

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Number 1

Volume 19
Marx

Bartky

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the

Gods

29

Thomas S. Engeman

William Dean

Howells'

"Poor Real Life":

The Royal Road to the American Character

43

Laurence Berns
Discussion

The Relation Between

Philosophy

and

Religion

61

Stanley

C. Brubaker

The

Tempting

of America,: The Political

Matthew J. Franck Ken Masugi

Seduction of the Law,

by

Robert H. Bork

Book Reviews

95

Will

Morrisey

Winston S. Churchill

on

Empire, by Kirk

Emmert 101 105

Patrick

Coby

Socrates in the Apology,

Natural Right
and

by

C.D.C. Reeve

Diana Schaub

the

American Imagination,

by
111

Catherine H. Zuckert
the

Frank Schalow

Kant

Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger

and

by

Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief

Hilail Gildin

General Editors

Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974)
Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss

Consulting

Editors

(d. Editors

1973)

Kenneth W. Thompson

Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Michael Blaustein Mark Blitz Patrick Coby Christopher A. Colmo Edward J. Erler Maureen Joseph E. Goldberg Pamela K. Feder-Marcus : Jensen Grant B. Mindle James W. Morris Will Aryeh L. Motzkin Gerald Proietti Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Bradford P. Wilson Hossein Ziai Michael Zuckert Catherine

Morrisey

Zuckert Manuscript Editor Subscriptions

Lucia B. Prochnow
Subscription rates per volume (3 issues):

individuals $21 libraries

students

and all other

institutions $34

(five-year

limit) $12

Single

copies available. outside

Postage

U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; $5.40 extra by surface mail (8 or longer) or $1 1 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by
elsewhere
.00

weeks

financial institution located (or the U.S. Postal Service).

within

the U.S.A.

contributors should

of Style, 13th

follow The Chicago Manual based on it; doublereferences in the text, place their space manuscripts; in endnotes or follow current journal style in judgment of printing references. To ensure impartial
ed. or manuals

their manuscripts,
of their other

contributors should omit mention

work; put, on the title

page

only, their

name, any
code
copies.

affiliation

desired,

address with

postal/zip

in full,

and telephone.

Please

send three clear

Composition by Eastern Graphics, Binghamton, N.Y. 13901 Printed and bound by Wickersham Printing Co., Lancaster, PA 17603
Inquiries: Patricia D'Allura, Assistant to the Editor, interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y.

11367-0904, U.S.A. (718)520-7099

Interpretation
Fall 1991

Volume 19

Number 1

Elliot

Bartky

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,
Howells'

the

City

and

the

Gods Thomas S. Engeman

William Dean "Poor Real Life":

The Royal Road to the American Character

29
43

Laurence Berns
Discussion

The Relation Between

Philosophy

and

Religion

Stanley

C. Brubaker

The

Tempting

Matthew J. Franck Ken Masugi Book Reviews

Seduction of the Law,

of America: The Political by Robert H. Bork

61

Will

Morrisey

Winston S. Churchill

on

Empire, by Kirk
95

Emmert Patrick

Coby

Socrates in the Apology,

Natural Right
and the

by

C.D.C. Reeve

101

Diana Schaub

American Imagination,

by
Frank Schalow
Kant

Catherine H. Zuckert
and

105

the Problem of Metaphysics,

by
111

Martin Heidegger

Copyright 1991

interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

Marx
the

on

Self-Consciousness,
the Gods

City

and

Elliot Bartky
Indiana Purdue

University University at Fort

Wayne

In his doctoral thesis

curean

on

the Difference Between the Democritean

sought of

and

Epi
most

Philosophy
physics

of Nature Marx

to

demonstrate that

Epicurus'

significant contribution to the atomistic

praised

history
of

into

critique

philosophy was his transformation of Greek theology and philosophy. Marx

servitude to

Epicurus for from fear

to free
city.

freeing
the

philosophy from its

ataraxia

theology,

and on

for

showing that the highest human good,

(tranquility), depended
Epicurus for his

free
that

ing
in

man

of

gods.1

Marx further

praised

claim

order

man

from fear

of

the gods, self-consciousness must be liberated

from the

preparation

reading of the dissertation and the notebooks written in for it leads me to suggest that the motivation for Marx's interest in

My

attempt to free man from the city and the gods may be explicating found in his belief that critique of Greek philosophy established the foundation for the critique of the philosophy of transcendence in the modern
Epicurus'

Epicurus'

state.

By

provided

exposing the political-religious myths of Greek philosophy Epicurus the basis for an alternative to the political-religious myths developed
and

by Christianity
The free
man

Hegel.

significance of

Marx's

explication and

defense

Epicurus'

of

attempt

to

from the city

and the gods

his doctoral thesis

cast

may be him into the midst

somewhat of a war

doubtful, however,

since

that seemed to

have been
the

long

over.

Epicureanism, having launched

Plato
and

the most

devastating
new

attack on

teachings
teenth-

of

Aristotle in antiquity, found

of

vitality in the

seven

and

eighteenth-century

attacks on an orthodox with

tradition which sought to

combine

the teachings

Christianity
in the

those of Plato and Aristotle. Cer

and

tainly,

as one scholar were

recently observed, Epicurus

read

Lucretius, his

greatest

exponent,

"widely

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and

were a source of
enterprise"

inspiration in many ways for the new philosophic-scientific (Nichols, 181-82). Yet by the close of the eighteenth century the
seemed

Enlightenment
nistic spirit of

to have

assured

the place of the

materialist and mecha

Epicureanism

and

the consequent view that humans are naturally

draft

I
this

would

like to thank Professor Walter Nicgorski for his helpful

comments on an earlier

of

paper.

interpretation, Fall

1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

Interpretation
come

individual beings. Most significantly, the Enlightenment had

the Epicurean teachings that humans are not
religion rekindle

to

accept

by

nature political animals and

that

has
the

no place

in the

political

order.

Why
war

then did Marx choose to to be

flames

of

battle

when

there was no

fought,
with

no

victory to

be

won?

Marx, knowing
full
significance of

that his contemporaries were familiar

Epicureanism,
lost to them.

sought to resurrect the political-theological teachings of

Epicurus because the

was

his

critique of

theology

and

philosophy
cited

Their
more

readings were

biased

by

the commentaries of Cicero and

Plutarch,

and

recently,

by

Gassendi.2

Gassendi

was

often

by

Enlightenment
with a

thinkers
new

for his seventeenth-century

of

attempt to supplant

Aristotelianism

reading
of

Epicurus.
the

According

to

Marx, however, Gassendi only had

Epicurus'

the effect

furthering

servitude of

issued from this misunderstanding of Greek thought, and thereby a complete understanding

philosophy to theology. Two problems critique of Epicurus. First,

of

that

thought, had been

critique of

lost. Second,
thought
meant

incomplete understanding of that Marx's contemporaries were unable to

an
of

Epicurus'

Greek

reach a proper under

standing "highest

of

the place

philosophy

and

continued subordination of
divinity,"

philosophy to both

theology in the modem state. The theology and the city kept the

human self-consciousness, in chains. Marx's interest in the relationship of philosophy to the city and the gods has been neglected in favor of three other issues which address the place of religion in Marx's thought. The
question of whether most general

issue
as

which

has been

addressed

is the

Marx's thought

is,

Tucker contends,

religious-mythical

or,

Bottomore argues, devoid 1964, xii). Whether Marx relies,

as

any religious albeit in secular

or rejects

of

overtones

(Tucker; Marx
any
remnant of new

form,

on

traditional political-theological

ideas,

them in

favor

of a

radically

philosophy is a longstanding controversy (Wessel). Another controversy has developed over the allegation that Marx abandoned an early interest in religion only in his later work. Sidney Hook argues that the concept of alienation in the but in the later early writings "is originally and primarily religious in fantasy" writings Marx constructed an economic approach freed of "poetic
nature,"

(Hook, 5). Lobkowitz

seriously
gins of and

argues, to the contrary, that Marx

on religion and atheism
a

never

took religion the years

that

his "view

did

not change as

passed"

(Lobkowitz, 306). Still

radical

third area of

disagreement

concerns

the ori

Marx's

break
was

with

Hegelian

"theology."

assumed
with

that Feuerbach

the

determining

For many years it was influence on Marx's early break

Hegel. More recently it has become fashionable to see Bauer as the pri mary influence (Lobkowitz; McLellan; Rosen). The relative significance of the

Young

Hegelians is

assumed to

be

crucial

for the development

of

Marx's

politi

theology is different from that of Feuer and the bach, distinction, the argument goes, is essential to grasp the develop ment of Marx's thought properly.
cal philosophy. rejection of

Bauer's

Marx
The
question of

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the

Gods

whether with

the alleged religiosity or religious slant in Marx's thought, found in his early work or throughout his writings, must come to terms the fact that even his earliest effort clearly rejects any semblance of reli

gious

imagery

or

theology. One may even

go a

Marx's

rejection of religion

may

not even

be

an

step further issue of any

and suggest
particular

that

impor

tance since it is

a commonplace of

cause religious matters are

nineteenth-century thought. Moreover, be irrelevant in Marx's later work, except insofar as is

a reflection of

he

continued to maintain that religion

the alienation

which

masks

the material contradictions of the modern state, there is some justifica

tion for

concluding
or

that religion

is

of

little importance in both his early

and

later

writings.

To trivialize
religion and

ignore Marx's early struggle with the relationship between politics is as problematic as the attempt to find a religious dimen

sions to
of

the modern state

his writings, however. Marx sought to expose the mythical foundation precisely because he appreciated the importance of religion.
religion

He believed that

is

false

consciousness which expresses

man.

the separa
truth. Marx

tion and withdrawal of man

rejected

from

Yet

religion

has its

own

Kant's

critique of religion

for merely

denying

the existence of God

because Marx
"All

gods,"

existence"

recognized the significance of the multiplicity of religious belief. he wrote, "the pagan as well as the Christian ones, have a real (1976a, 104). On the one hand, Marx did not doubt that "religion is

only the illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolve about himself (1970, 132). On the other hand, he considered religion, given
that
man

has

yet

to revolve

around

himself,

the most crucial

development
"of the

of

human

consciousness.

The

existence of religious

belief is

proof

exist

ence of essential

human

self-consciousness"

(1976a, 104).

The
what

above

statement

typifies both Bauer's and

Feuerbach's inversion but

of

had

long

been

accepted as proof of not

the existence of God: the multiplicity

of

of religious

belief demonstrates

the presence of God in the world,

men who create gods

in their

own

Bauer

and

Feuerbach

we run

the risk of

image. In admitting Marx's indebtedness to being directed away from Marx's limited truth, how recognizing that the critique of religion is For Marx, it was not enough to point
religion remained a

argument.

Whatever truth he found in beyond his teachers

critique of

ever, he

went

by

the prerequisite to the to the

politics.3

falsity
of a

of religious

doctrine. The limits

of

the religious mind revealed the

wholly freed from the bonds of the state. The political-theological question, that is, is it both possible and desirable to free man from the city and the gods, is so significant to the history of political philosophy that I consider it to be the most significant religious issue which

limits

human

consciousness not

Marx

raises.
motivation

as

of

for Marx's study of Epicurus was not an interest in antiquity desire to expose the mythic origins of the modern philosophy his but such, transcendence. In returning to Epicurus, Marx sought to expose the root of The

Interpretation
which culminated

the tradition

in

Hegel,

the philosopher and theologian of the

with

modern state.

Accordingly,
a

this study begins

Marx's understanding

of

the

theological-mythical character of Hegel's philosophy.

Following
of so

discussion

of

Marx's

confrontation with the modern

Epicurus'

transcendence, I shall return to the subject of much interested in Marx's defense of Epicurus

attack. as

philosophy Here I am not

argument

am

in Marx's

with

the originators of the philosophy of transcendence. In part, this

is

an

attack on phy.

Aristotle, but

even more

it is

an assault on

Platonic
each

political philoso own

Marx

well understood

that Plato and

Aristotle,

for his

reasons,

failed to free philosophy from the gods and the city. In discussing the note books and the dissertation itself, I shall address two issues which Marx raised
in his discussion
of

the limits of Platonic political philosophy. Marx thought

that he had uncovered the

question
myth.

limits

of

Plato's

approach

to the political-theological

both in his

account of

the life

and

death

of

Socrates
to

and

in his

use of

In both
with

matters

shall compare

Marx's

approach

Plato's
to

account of much

Socrates

that of Hegel. Marx's treatment of

Socrates borrows
better
able

from
the

Hegel,

yet where

significance of

he turns from Hegel, we Marx's approach to both the from the city
and

are

appreciate

ancient and modern struggle with

religion and politics.

In Hegel's view, the Platonic

at

Socrates, in seeking

to

free

self-consciousness

the same time as confronting the city, was

the first to pose the problem of self-consciousness correctly.

also

However, Hegel

insisted that

Socrates'

Plato's understanding
posed

of self-consciousness was

limited

by

their denial that philosophy could lead to absolute

world.

knowledge,

or

wisdom, in this

Whereas Socrates had

the right

question

by

intro

ducing
state.

the quest for self-consciousness, it was

to show that self-consciousness could be

fully

left to himself, Hegel thought, realized by mortal men in the

same point as

Marx thought that Hegel had he

supposed

started

from the

Socrates

when

that self-consciousness necessarily "tends to extend

the whole

itself,

to

ex

pand, to

spread through

domain

of

the reality given to man and in

man"

(Kojeve, 82). Yet Marx denied

that philosophy had in

that Hegel had gone beyond Plato in

demonstrating
totality
made

theory,

and

in

fact,

extended self-con

sciousness to the point of absolute

of

wisdom,

a wisdom

that comprehended the

of

being. Marx denied, in

other

words, that Hegel's restatement

the

Platonic

problem of self-consciousness clear

led to its

successful resolution.

Marx

it

that Hegel had only repeated, albeit in a more sophisticated man

mistake made

ner, the same

by

Plato. For

similar reasons

Marx

returned to

Aristotle. Hegel had Socratic

state. quest

recognized

Aristotle

as

the first to offer

a solution

to the

by

suggesting that self-consciousness could be realized in the

this as a step toward the realization of self-consciousness, albeit a step within the Platonic mold. Marx, however, saw in Aristotle only
saw

Hegel

the development of the

Platonic doctrine

which was

later to

emerge

in Hegel.
of

shall conclude

my discussion

with a presentation of

Marx's account

the

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and the

Gods

relationship between Epicurean physics and the Epicurean attempt to free losophy from its dependence on the gods and the city. I shall consider that
of

phi part

Marx's detailed discussion

critique of

of

the distinction between Epicurean

and De-

mocritean physics which allows us to reach the more significant matter,

curus'

Epi

Greek theology ded the basic distinction between

and philosophy.

science and

Epicurean philosophy foun theology, Marx argued, in order (Marx

to establish the principles for the "natural

self-consciousnes

science of

1976a, 73). In
tions
of

the concluding chapter

of

the

dissertation, Marx

argued

that

the natural science

of self-consciousness

did

more

than overcome the

limita

Democritean

physics.

from the city

and the gods

Most significantly, Epicurus rescued philosophy to which it had been chained by his predecessors. In
that he had successfully answered the polit

defending Epicurus,
ical-theological
assumed ological

Marx

assumed

questions which were raised

provided

by

Aristotle

and

Plato. He further

that that answer

the basis for understanding the political-the

issue

of

the modern age.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRANSCENDENCE

In his study
of

of

Epicurus Marx

sought

to expose the origin of the myth of the

and one

free consciousness from the city philosophy religion. In the foreword to his doctoral thesis Marx identified his task as
order

transcendence in

to

with

that

of

servant of this rock

Prometheus who, in reply to the gods, / Than faithful boy to Father

said:

"Better to be the
other

Zeus."

Better, in

words,

to

suffer

ing

for shattering the omniscience of the gods in bring forth the truth to mankind, than to be like "those poor March hares who
the
consequences

philosop

rejoice over the

breaking
fight

apparently worsened civil position of the hold of the state and religion over philosophy
"all

For Marx,

was

against

heavenly

and

earthly

gods who

do

not acknowledge

necessary in the human

self-consciousness as

the highest

divinity."

The

inability

of modern was

philosophy to

recognize self-consciousness as the

"highest

divinity"

nowhere

more evident

to Marx than in

its failure

to

recognize the

great paradox posed

by

the place of religion

in the

modern state.

As the
to

modem state

place as significant
understand

became free from the grip of religion, religion assumed a as any it had achieved in the past. The failure of philosophy importance. Philosophy,
rather

the

practical significance of religion was associated with another

issue

of even greater

than recognize the true

significance of religion

in the

modern

state, abandoned the critique of the state

entrenched

and religion and

instead

remained

firmly

in the transcendent tradi

and

tion phy,

which rather

derived from Platonic

than

political

philosophy
to

Christianity. Philoso
on

having freed

man,

continued

justify

his dependence

the

city Hegel,

and

the

gods.
greatest philosopher of

the

transcendence,

provided a

justification for

8
the

Interpretation
illusions
which continued man's

dependence
his

on politics and religion.

Feuer

bach

confirmed

Marx's

view

that "the

secret of speculative

philosophy is theol

ogy."

Indeed, Hegel

was

limited

by

inability

to break

fully

with

the very

tradition which he sought to supplant. Hegel only turned theological demonstra tions upside down in order to justify them (Marx 1976a, 103).

In characterizing Hegel's
solution

"theological,"

method as

Marx knew that Hegel's

traditional

to the

problem of wisdom could

hardly
the
and

be
in

associated with

religious concepts.

Hegel

could not accept

earlier systems since so

they

re

quired the existence of a transcendent of self-consciousness to return

God,

doing

denied the ability

fully

to itself. What
method

was

the reason,

then, for

Marx

having

characterized

Hegel's
the

as

theological? Hegel's idea that

self-consciousness could
ment

only be

realized

by

a mortal man at a particular mo modem state who

in history, that is,

by

philosopher

in the

knows that

he is

fully self-conscious, had distinguished his from earlier theological sys tems. Yet Hegel's belief that self-consciousness was, in fact, realized in the
modem state

did

no more

to solve the problem of self-consciousness than the

Platonic idea that

and the effected rejected

wisdom or self-consciousness could not of

be

realized

by

man

Christian idea that the "synthesis only in

and

the Particular and the

death"

by

the

beyond,
had

after man's

Universal, is (Kojeve, 67). Marx

"theologians"

Hegel, then, for he

held that the
fact.

committed

the same mistake as the

past

by having
theory
society
and

state

solved

problem of self-consciousness

in

Marx

called

Hegel's idea that the

state overcame

the particularity of civil

the "theological notion of the political

state"

(1970,

119).4

As Chris "in

tians are equal the heaven

of

in heaven

and unequal on

earth,

so

too individuals

are equal

their political world yet unequal in the

earthly

existence of civil

society"

between

(1970, 80). Christianity mystified reality by inverting the relationship man and God; man created God, not God man. So, too, Hegel mysti
state; the
constitution was a creation of

fied the God

modem

people,

not as

Hegel

argued, the
as

people a creation of

the

constitution.

Just

as religion established so

the creator

in

order

to escape the pain and suffering of existence,

too,

the constitution, in order to overcome the conflict within civil society,

established

the

modem state.

The idea

of

unity in the

modem state

belied the

independent

existence and alienation of

the private sphere. Marx argued that

the content of civil society

(property,
is the

contract, marriage)
man,"

lay

outside

the consti

tution. As "the actual man

plished principle of

individualism"

the

individuality

of civil society.

society "is the accom (1970, 81-82). The state did not overcome Political life was, for Hegel, only in the air,
private

civil

the ethereal region of civil society. Hegel's state was thus the spirit; it transcen

ded the
world.

conflict rooted

in

civil

society just

as

Christ transcends the flesh

of

this

Marx

rejected

Hegel for

following
a

in the tradition initiated

of

by

Plato

and

transformed

by Christianity

into

philosophy

transcendence. In the disserta-

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,

the
with

City

and

the

Gods

tion Marx suggested that Hegel's failure to break

scendence

the philosophy of tran

derived from his failure to grasp the significance of myth in Platonic Although Hegel understood that Christianity, "the consummate of bore a profound resemblance to Platonic philos philosophy
philosophy.
transcendence,"

ophy, "the heartbeat

establish

of the

transcendence,"

philosophy

of

he

was unable

to

properly relationship between the respective transcend ent doctrines (Marx 1976b, 498). Certainly Hegel distinguished Platonic philos from ophy Christianity in the following way: the Platonic method begins with dialectic turning man inward toward his own consciousness, while Christianity
the cause of and
proceeds
with

Christ

as the

beginning

of

consciousness, for

where grace

is

bestowed the
aware that sin required

subject

is brought to

consciousness of sin.

Moreover, Hegel
grace,
and

was

the distinction between consciousness

of self and consciousness of and

distinguishing

between Socratic

irony

that neither

the Platonic nor the Christian ideal solved the

problem of self-consciousness.

The last Hegel

nated

great philosopher of

modernity,

as well as

its last

great

remained

firmly

entrenched

in the

speculative tradition which

theologian, had origi

in

Greece, however. Having failed

continued

to realize the significance of Platonic

myth, he

down the
blazed.

path of

transcendence which Plato had opened

and which

Christianity

root of

In arguing that Marx's struggle with Hegel led him to attack the Platonic Hegelian philosophy, I may draw support from Sidney Hook's claim
tradition"

that "in repudiating

tonic
tonic

Hegel, Marx is also repudiating Plato and the (1971, 35). Hook insisted that Marx, in opposition
significant problem
and

whole

Pla

to the Pla

tradition,

returned

to Aristotle's naturalism for the basis of his dialectical

There is, however, a Marx's relationship to Hegel, Plato

materialism.

in Hook's reading of Aristotle. We may assume that Marx

depth"

knew that Hegel himself had clearly accepted the superiority of Aristotle, (Hegel 1983, 2:119). whom he considered "excels Plato in speculative Indeed, Marx had considered that Aristotle, even as he had turned from his

teacher,
obtained

was

firmly

planted

in the tradition
of

which

Plato had

originated.

The

significant stmggle

for the
and

history by

between Plato
and

Aristotle Plato

as

philosophy the one between the tradition founded

Aristotle
and

was not so much

that

which

by by

Socrates

developed

and

the tradition

developed
was,
as

Epicurus. Perhaps it is
sought

more correct

to say that the

critical struggle

Hegel had

between philosophy and theology. demonstrate, Epicurus directed Marx back to Plato's account of Socrates, which
to
one
Socrates'

war

ranted

designation

as

the founder

sciousness rates

and

the philosophy of the

both the philosophy of self-con transcendence. In Platonic philosophy Soc

of with

is

presented as man

first to break

the teachings of the city and the gods

by turning
suggest

to himself. Because he was the first to show that the tme source
was neither

of self-consciousness

the city

nor

the gods, he

was

the

first to
to

the philosophy

of self-consciousness. and

Yet because he

was unable

break entirely from the city

the gods,

he

sought refuge

in

myth and

laid the

10

Interpretation

foundation for the philosophy of transcendence. Marx, holding that it was Pla tonic philosophy itself which, in turning man away from the city and the gods, sowed the seeds for the destruction of the philosophy of transcendence, recog
nized

Epicurus

as

the

first to

expose

the

myth of transcendence

in Platonic

philosophy.

In the
argued

notebooks prepared

for his study

men are

of

Epicurus Marx,

following Hegel,
knowl

that "the first Greek wise

substance"

the real spirit, the embodied

edge of were

(1976b, 436). Marx

meant

by

this that these first wise men

preonly capable of mimicking the laws and moral life of the city. These Socratic wise men "are only the vessels, the Pythia, from which the substance resounds in general, single precepts, their language is as yet only that of the

substance

become vocal, the

state

simple

forces

of moral

life

revealed."

which are

The first

wise men were unable

to take

a critical stance against wise men

the city because

they "extol
therefore

life

reason."

as real since

For these first

philosophy

was

impossible,

their consciousness was merely a reflection of the

existing moral and political climate obtaining in Greece at that time. Marx attributed the fall of the first sophos, and thus the rise of philosophy,
to the teachings "embodied

in Socrates

as

its

demiurge"

and

in Platonic

philos

ophy (1976a, 36). He wrote that the "the reason why Socrates is so important is that the relation of Greek philosophy to the Greek spirit, and therefore its inner

limit, is

expressed

in

him"

(1976b, 438-39). With Socrates

the relationship

between the

sophos and

the city is forever changed. The principle of philoso the sophos, the subjective spirit of

phy becomes, in the consciousness. The

embodiment of

his

own

subjective

spirit

is

now

the vessel of substance which

concept."

"knows that it has the

Socrates,
a

the subjective

In ideality in itself, is the judgment of the spirit of consciousness is bom of the city, but it takes a
subjective spirit
wisdom

subjective

striving,
to

force internal

leap, a falling away from the city. The spirit itself, it is daemon.
a
Socrates'

is

Socrates'

is his

consciousness

"that he

carries of

the daemon in
good"

himself."

"abstract determination
separates

the

which

brings

man

His philosophy is the to himself, just as it

him from the his

own of

Socrates'

city.

philosophy is therefore

"essentially

his

goodness"

own wisdom,

(1976b, 439).

Yet the daemon him toward the

man"

city.

his relationship with (1976b, 436). individual spirits,

teach about the
method was a

Socrates'

it detached him from the city, directed Socrates did not withdraw from the city, nor did he wrap the city in mystery; he was not a seer, "but a sociable purpose was "in practice the determination of the

Socrates,

even as

teaching"

education

and

(1976b, 438). His calling

was

to

Marx, citing Hegel as his authority, wrote that "dialectic trap through which human common sense is
world.
. . .

Socrates'

precipi

tated out
common

its motley ossification sense itself (1976b, 494).

of

into the tmth immanent in human

Socrates'

teaching is

a practical

activity

"by
to

which

he leads

single

individuals
Thus

out of
while

the determination of

substantiality

determination in

themselves."

Socrates leads

men

away from the

Marx
city, he
vide the

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the

Gods

11

never abandons

city he

with a new

it. Instead, he foundation.

confronted citizens

in

an effort

to pro

Socrates, Marx
sisted that
owed

argued,

remained rooted

in the life

of

the state, as
state

he in
he

"his right to

exist

belongs,
refusal

to its

religion,"

which appeared

only to the laws of the to him as his own

the city
was

to

which

Socrates'

nature.

to break with the laws

and religion of

the cause of

his

death. Thus in the

cannot cease

Apology Socrates himself is

practice of

presented

as

from the

philosophy,

even god and

though it may

saying that he mean his

death,

since

he

was attached owed

to the city

by

the

(30b-e). Because Socrates

the god he was unable, in
and

insisted that he both thought

In Marx's

his

existence to the

city

and

action, to free

consciousness
of

from the city

provided

its

myths.

estimation the

death

Socrates

the evidence

of

the

limits

Socrates'

of

teaching. The true free spirit, contrary to

.
.

Socrates, "endures
any
natural condi

and overcomes all contradictions and

such"

need not recognize

tions as
who will act

(1976b, 438). The

own

tme

free

spirit

is

a self-determined

individual,
the

the

city.

according Socrates, by his

to his own consciousness, unencumbered

by

laws

of

admission,

owed

too much to Athens to separate

Socrates'

himself radically from the city and thereby survive. death proved the of his daemon and thus the of limits his self-consciousness. deficiency
Marx
recognized which
rates'

love

Socratic dialectic was, in part, turned him toward the city. Yet at the
that
collide with
Socrates'

an expression of same time

Soc

the "practi

motion"

cal

of

dialectic led him to

the city, and

and

this, in turn, led to

his death. Embodied in

life

are

both love

destruction,
city. cause

which return man was

to himself at the same time as

death, creativity and tying him to the

Even though he

the judge of his state he

must perish

"precisely be
influence
self-

he is bom

substantial"

of

the

from

which

he

could not escape.

attributed

Marx's
of

approach

to the death
on

of

Socrates may be
the

to the

Bauer's insistence

the necessity of radically separating self-consciousness

from

all material concerns.

would

However, if

point was

Bauer's

radical

consciousness, example,

Marx have ignored

another possible seen

interpretation, for
death
a radical

a promethean one which would

have
other

in

Socrates'

separation

from Athenian life? Marx, in

a radical

words,

could of

have

seen

in the

death

of

Socrates

step toward the fulfillment

the

the

idea

of self-con

sciousness and a

turning away from

laws

and religion of

the

city.

This

is, in
op in

fact, what Hegel said in regard to Marx, contrary to Hegel, was posed to his life, any resemblance
Socrates'

the death of Socrates.

unwilling to
to

see

in

Socrates'

death,
little

as

a promethean act.

Marx

saw

more

death than his failure to break from the city and fully express his selfconsciousness. Socrates offered a critique of the city, but a critique which was necessarily limited inasmuch as it was bound to the city. Socrates must die, and Plato can do no more than create an Ideal, never comprehending the limits of
the city or his
philosophy.

Plato,

according to

Marx,

used myth

to

justify

Socrates'

commitment

to a

12
life

Interpretation
of

philosophy because he
account of

was unable

to give an

adequate

justification for

Socrates'

the philosophical life

presented

as a preparation

for death (Phaedo

as

64a). Socrates himself is

that his
tated
account of

in the Platonic dialogues

of

having

admitted

by

philosophy's

or salvation

for it

immortality inability to demonstrate that "there is no escape (the soul) except by becoming as good and wise as
more

the

the soul is no

than a myth necessi

from

evil

possi

(Phaedo 107d; Republic 614b-21d). Platonic myth, a literary way out of the dilemma posed by

as

Marx

understood

it,

was

Socrates'

philosophical

life

neces

sarily

having

culminated

in his

being

put

to death

by

the

city.

Platonic

philoso

phy required that Socrates provide a mythic account because it was unable to overcome the fact that city The
and

of

the

philosophic

life
the

Socrates'

dependence

on

the gods

led to his death.

should ask when

reading Plato is, according to Marx: "why is this mythologizing to be found in those dialogues which mainly ex pound moral and religious (1976b, 497)? Consider the fact, Marx
question one
truths"

wrote, that the Parmenides is free from

than an admission
and was
of

myth.

Plato's

use of myth was no more

his

inability

to

free

self-consciousness

from the city

to myth

the gods. On the one

an admission of

hand,

this demonstrated that Plato's

recourse

the limits of his philosophy. On the other

hand, Marx
sociable and

recognized attainable.

this as further proof that tme knowledge

is human,

In turning the life of Socrates into a "comprehensive, world embracing phi Plato had been accused of creating a philosophy with the character of religion. Marx, in opposition to this, considered Plato's literary use of myth.
losophy"

By insisting that myth is no more than a Platonic inability of the dialectic form to account for
rescue

device

necessitated

by

the

him from the Christian

written

cast to which

death, Marx sought to he had been reduced. In the note

compared

Socrates'

books

in

preparation

for the dissertation Marx

Platonic philosophy,
or

Christianity,

or

"personified

religion,"

with

"personified

philosophy,"

and concluded
pher

"that the

philosopher

Socrates is (the

related

to Christ as

a philoso

religion"

to a teacher of

(1976b, 493). The

philosopher and teacher of

religion are

both

concerned with psyche

soul).

The relationship between

Platonic philosophy and Christianity may be found in the "relationship of Pla tonic ideas to the Christian logos, the relationship of the Platonic recollection to
the Christian
restoration of man

to his original

image"

(1976b, 495). In recog

sought to transform

nizing that both Platonic philosophy and

Christianity
intend to

the

human

psyche myth

through myth, Marx did not

of recollection was an

equate the

doctrines. The

Platonic
cal

attempt

to overcome the

inability

of

Socratic dialectic to

provide a reasoned argument

for choosing the

philosophi

life

over

any
to

other world

life. The

mythical presentation of

the rewards and pun

ishments in the
rates'

to come was an educational device to supplement

was good

Soc

inability
believed that
atheism of

demonstrate that the just life

understanding
of

for its

own sake.

Marx

a proper

Platonic

myth

revealed

the

implicit

the Platonic philosophy.

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the Gods

13

Christianity
account of

went

mythological claims

further than Platonic philosophy because it took about life after death and transformed them, through
of

Socrates'

an

the death and resurrection

as

Christ,

into

philosophy

of transcen
an

dence. Just

Christianity
myth

turned the Platonic quest for self-knowledge into

answer, Platonic
stood

it,

adopted

became the Christian tmth. Christianity, as Marx under the myth of life after death because it denied the possibility
image"

that a psyche could be directed to its "original

in this
to lead

world.

Chris
con

tianity,

having

abandoned this world

altogether,

sought

men

by

vincing them of the tmth of the immortality of souls. In rescuing Plato from the weight of the Christian tradition Marx
about

was not

to abandon the Platonic origins

of

Christianity. In
of

distinguishing
to

Plato's
to

recourse to myth expose

from the Christian doctrine

and

transcendence Marx

was able

the

origin of

the philosophy of transcendence.

According

Marx, how

ever much

Platonic
of

Christian teachings differed, they both

sought recourse

to myth

because
city

their

inability

to overcome the attachment of self-conscious

significance of
of

ness to the

and god(s). of

The tme

discovering

the origin of

the philosophy

transcendence was,

course, that it enabled Marx to un

"theology"

cover the origin of

Hegel's

"theology."

It

seems

ironic that Marx found the

the

origin of
was

Hegel's

in Plato's
view

use of myth.

I say this because Hegel

originator of

the source
man

of

Marx's

that

Socrates
both the

was

the principle "that the

end of

has to find from himself

end of

his

actions and

the world, and must attain to tmth

other

through himself (Hegel words, that Socrates

was

1983, 1:386). Marx learned from Hegel, in

the first to return
also
man

to himself as the originating

point of consciousness.

Marx
men

followed Hegel in
was

holding

that

Socrates'

method,
ence,"

even as

it drew

into themselves,

"no

withdrawal

from
5

exist

since

his

philosophical

wisdom, according to both Hegel and

teaching Marx,

required social
was

intercourse.

Socrates'

human

and sociable.

Why,

then, did Marx begin

sciousness?
will

to abandon Hegel's approach to the problem

of con

Perhaps

further

consideration

of

Hegel's treatment

of

Socrates

be

of some

cuss that side of consciousness

help. Hegel, contrary to Marx, considered it important to dis Socratic irony which taught the limits of consciousness; that is,
surprised when

is

it is led to doubt.

Socrates'

own wisdom

is that

"he knew nothing and therefore taught versation with Socrates one comes to the
itself."

nothing"

(Hegel 1983, 1:404). In con conclusion "that what we knew has

which

refuted

Hegel

considered

the

limits

were

implied
of

by

the

daemonic irony.
I

urge to self-consciousness as

fundamental to the teaching

Socratic

cannot attempt

to explicate the Socratic teaching.

However, it is important

to raise the

question of

why Marx
as
never

tenet of Socratic

irony

Socrates'

him in

what not

to do and
with

seriously even so basic a insistence that his daemon only instructed told him what action to take (Apology 3 Id).
refused

to

consider

Because Marx broke

aware of

Hegel

on

this matter, we must assume that

whose significance

he

was

that side of the Socratic

teaching

he denied. Why,

14

Interpretation

then, did he reject that side of the Socratic teaching which insisted on the necessary limits of human wisdom? Perhaps we may begin to understand the
reason

for Marx's

position

by

Hegel. Hegel

recognized that

pairing it with another issue where he broke with it was precisely attachment to the city
Socrates'

which enabled

him to begin to free

self-consciousness

from the
pointed

city.

By

refus

ing

to escape from the city and save his

life, Socrates

to the depend

ence of consciousness on the

city, but

at

the same time he pointed to that which

whole

is beyond the life

of which

of

any

particular city.
were

the self and the city

self-consciousness

In pointing to the nature of the only parts, Socrates suggested the

wisdom even

possi

bility

for

to attain absolute

though, in the end,

he held that human

wisdom was

limited

by

nature.

Hegel,
not

of

course, in his

critique of

the limits of the Socratic

teaching,

stands

as a modem

thinker in opposition to Socrates. For

Hegel,

Socrates'

genius

"is

Socrates himself, not his opinions and conviction, but an oracle which, however, is not external, but is subjective, his (1983, 1:422). Hegel considered this a historical leap toward self-consciousness but limited in that
oracle"

Socrates'

genius

remained, in part,

unconscious rather

than a pure expression

of self-consciousness. must

know,

Socrates knew, as Kojeve points out all philosophers that "that man is Wise who is capable of answering in a compre

hensible

or satisfactory manner all questions that can be asked him concerning his acts, and capable of answering in such fashion that the entirety of his an swers form a coherent (Kojeve, 75). Hegel, who thought he had
discourse"

proved

that

possibility that philosophy

recognize

he had demonstrated this wisdom, rejected Socrates for denying the could result in this wisdom. Hegel was willing to
of

the limit that this

human knowledge

as

Socrates

presented rather

it,

yet

he

still

maintained

was a

limit

conditioned

in

man's nature. of

Hegel

attributed
project

Plato's

by history, inability to

than one inherent

see the

diversity

the speculative

to his historical situation.

unity amid the Only in the mod

em world can absolute

independence
of

Hegel's discussion

ularly interesting, given "suppression of the principle

private

return into the unity of the idea. Plato's limited understanding of freedom is partic Marx's later perspective, when he reviewed Plato's
individuality"

of

in considering the

abolition of

property in the Republic. Hegel

private
idea"

argued

that we may see in Plato's aboli

tion of

to emerge as an property "the very limit of the Platonic Idea 2:113). he also meant that Plato was not (1983, By abstract, idealistic enough in his onesided presentation of individual freedom. Plato was
abstract
capable of

only
state.

seeing the

opposition

between

individuality
or

and

the unity of the

Concrete

sion and stands such comes

individuality in a living relation

persons, only

in

private

property,

the

family,
"in

as

it is

a posses

with

the person

into existence, into

Philosophy,"

reality"

my person as is destroyed in Plato's Republic.

which

There
"But
the

are no private

man as

the universal individual

in the

state.

Being

to
and

universal

Hegel objected, "is no abstraction, but the unity of or its Instead of destroying the individual reality,
content."

Marx
conscience,
with

on

Self-Consciousness,
sees that

the

City

and

the Gods

15

as

Plato

does, philosophy
a position

the individual "connects itself

fact"

the whole, chooses

for

(1983, 2:109). Hegel, in

he
considered

opposition

itself, and thus makes itself a moral to Plato, chose to side with Aristotle,
in Plato.
subjective
Greece"

who

had
also

recognized the same mistake

Yet Hegel
cause

held that Plato "sometimes

what wrought

ignored"

freedom "be

it

proved

itself to be

the min of

(1983, 2:109).

Hegel understood, for example, that Plato's abolition of private property is evidence that he knew and taught that the unfolding of self-consciousness threatened to undermine the city. The abstract idea of the city is not, as Marx
would

have

it, only
from

an admission of an

inability

to elevate
as

self-consciousness

beyond the

confines of

the polis. The abstract

idea is,

elevate men

particular

to universal understanding.

is myth, a means to Hegel warned against Platonic

the mistaken belief

which sees

in the

myth

itself

a simple presentation of what

of myth

is

most excellent

in Platonic
simple as

not revealed

in the

The tme meaning representations in the dialogues.

philosophy. was

is

Hegel did hold, mortality

of which permitted

Marx

to hold
a

later,
no

that Plato's doctrine of the im

more than popular philosophy Socrates in heroic form (1983, 2:1-48; 1:443). Yet, as we have seen, Hegel observed in Plato and Socrates a deeper teaching which Marx either denied or ignored. Plato's use of myth is, for Hegel, a

the psyche was,

in

sense,

him to

present

device to
must

teach that "the tmth

lies

within us and the spiritual content within us

be brought into
myth of

consciousness"

Plato's

the

immortality

of of

(Hegel 1984, 413). He did not believe that the psyche should be understood in a theo

logical sense, that is, in terms death. Hegel's view of Platonic

popular answer

the soul's existence before birth and after

myth

is thus

neither what

Marx took it to
theologians took

be,

to a wrong question,

nor what

Christian

it to
that

be,

tme answer to the fundamental

myth of recollection and reason

question.

Hegel, instead,

argued

Plato's

immortality
and that this

is Plato's tmth that "consciousness

in the individual is in
recognizes

the divine reality and

life;

that

man perceives and

it in

pure

thought,

knowledge is itself the

was

heavenly
suppos
at

movement"

abode and

(1983, 2:41). Although Socrates

be
obtained

ing

that self-consciousness could not

by

wrong in mortal man, he

least
self-

posed

the right

question

by directing
death

man

to all that

which constituted

consciousness.

Plato's

Socrates'

account of

is, for Hegel,

a contribution to the

history

of consciousness.

The

mythic view of

immortality

provided, as did

Socrates'

death itself, for the

return of consciousness

pointed consciusness

away from the Aristophanes

city.

to the city at the same time that it Hegel took the judgment of Socrates
Socrates'

by

Athens

Aristophanes'

and

account

of

teaching

to have shown

Plato's

contribution.

understood of

that Socratic philosophy posed a

shaken"

threat to the city,

since

"the idea

law had been

(1983, 1:426).
Soc-

Having

summarized

the exaggerated and humorous account of that Aristophanes

was

Socrates in the

Clouds, Hegel

observed

correct

in suggesting that

16

Interpretation
reflecting
consciousness was
a

rates'

threat to the
and

city.

In considering the
city's

Socrates'

account of

trial

in Plato's he led the

Apology

Xenophon's Memorabilia,

Hegel

concluded on

that the charges were tme.

Socrates both denied the

The justice
of

teaching

the gods and

youth astray.

both

charges

followed from his placing "the contingency of judgment in himself, since he had his Daemon in his own consciousness, (and) thereby abolished the external
universal

Daemon from
that

which

the

Greeks

judgments."

obtained their

Hegel

Socrates'

was not persuaded

Hegel
city.

argued that

apology Socrates in his very trial

verdict and

was

intended

as a

defense. Instead,
the laws
of

still refused to accept

the
au

By
of

refusing to
the guilty

recommend a punishment

thority

thus the

for himself, he denied the authority of the laws. Indeed,

about

Socrates'

stmggle

for

self-conscious spirit cause of

brought

his

death, but by forcing his

view.

death,

he furthered the
we

self-consciousness, in Hegel's
Socrates'

may assume that Marx knew, both from his own reading of Plato's dialogues and from Hegel's commentary, that insistence on the neces Now sary limits of his wisdom was a considerable element estingly, Marx chose not to comment on this aspect
considered
of of

Socratic irony. Inter dialectic

and

instead

only that part of Socratic

of self-consciousness

irony

which

taught the positive side of

other

self-consciousness. positive pressed side

Marx's failure to discuss anything

than the power or

unim

leads

us

to conclude that he was

by

whatever purpose

Socrates

might

have had in confronting

us with

the

limits

of
of

human knowledge.
course,
could not accept

Marx,
whole

that there

was a nature which ordered

the

any

more

than

he

could accept

that human knowledge was subject to

never

anything
sidered

other

than

material and

thus temporal limits. He

of

Socrates'

discussion

of

the limits

human

wisdom

seriously con because he rejected in

which

both the dependence

of consciousness on
of

the city and the

natural order of

human then,
the

wisdom was capable

saw

only sharing in a glimpse in Plato's account of Socrates only an implicit

not of

the

parts.

Marx,

acknowledgment of

limits,
I

nature, but
the

of

the Socratic teaching.

of

shall not consider our purpose

adequacy

Marx's

account of

Socratic dialectic.

For

it is

enough

to recognize that what Marx takes to be the essen

itself,"

tial element of

man to himself by recognizing "the tmth may rightly be considered only one part of Socratic irony. In crediting Socrates with making a significant contribution to the development of self-consciousness, Marx only valued daemon for

dialectic,

that it returns

immanent in

common sense

Socrates'

showing that self-consciousness was an activity emanating from the individual. wisdom as human and Having identified sociable, Marx held that that part of the Socratic teaching which taught the limits of human wisdom
Socrates'
Socrates'

reflected

inability

to

free

merely

consciousness

from the

gods and

the city.

Plato's
of

metaphysical

doctrines,

such as

the transmigration

of souls and

theory

rates'

forms were, in Marx's view, merely attempts to overcome, in speech, Soc inability to free consciousness from the gods and the city. As such, Plato

Marx
Socrates'

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the Gods

17

mystified neither

teaching because he
pursuit of

could provide a
nor

for

Socrates'

philosophy
of

satisfactory for his death.

attributed

account

Marx's

onesided approach on

to Socrates has been

to the influence of

Feuerbach's insistence
ness,
or

the

divinity

man, Bauer's
certain

power of self-conscious

the thought of both. It seems

was not

that

during

the writing of his

dissertation, Marx

fully

exposed to
regard

thus be difficult to make the case in

Feuerbach's position, and it would to his thought (see McLellan, 85-

116). We may accept the notion that Marx was, to a certain extent, influenced by Bauer's thought. But this position, even if correct, does not explain the
significance of

Marx's

position.

The

most

interesting

question about this posi

tion concerns

his

refusal to consider that part of the

Socratic teaching regarding

not

the limits
of

of wisdom.

The

answer

does, in

part, point to the influence

only

any Enlightenment in
to Epicurus
sought

Bauer,

or

particular

thinker, but

also to

Marx's

stand on

the side of the

attraction

opposition

to Platonic philosophy.

Indeed, Marx's
of called

is in itself to be expected, as many children to return to his teachings. Jefferson, for example,
to whom we may return to save philosophy the mysteries of Platonism

the Enlightenment

him "our

mas

ter

Epicurus,"

(including

the teach

ings

of

Jesus) from

(Jefferson, 14:386, 15:219).

Marx, in
was

common with

late

eighteenth-

in large

part attracted to
which

and early nineteenth-century thinkers, Epicums because he taught that that portion of the

Platonic teaching disregarded.

addressed

the limits of man's wisdom ought to

be for

his denial

There is, however, of Hegel's

another reason account of

for Marx's

approach

to Socrates and

Socrates'

contribution
Socrates'

to the

history

of

self-

consciousness.

In rejecting the significance of self-knowledge, he sought to lay bare the origin Hegel's
assertion

view of of

the limits of

Hegel's

mistaken

assump

tion that he had answered the

problem of self-consciousness.

Marx

agreed with

in supposing that man's quest for knowledge must always remain just that, a quest. Marx accepted, in principle, Hegel's proposition that self-consciousness could be fully realized by mortal
that Plato was wrong
men.

Let

us put

it this

way:

Marx

understood what was

at stake

in Hegel's in his
of

assertion

that it

was

both necessary that

asserted that

self-consciousness

be

attained

tory,
the
stract

and

that

he, Hegel, had

attained self-consciousness

in his philosophy
show

modem state.

Having

Hegel had failed to

not

that the ab

Idea had become Concrete (that the idea had

returned

been

realized with

the

state), Marx

to the root of transcendence in order to expose Hegel's the reason for Plato's recourse to myth, and
"theology,"

failure.

Having
as

shown

having

identified it

the origin of Hegel's the case

which

Epicums,
I have

to
not

reopen

Marx sought, in returning to Hegel thought he had closed.

Epicums'

developed Marx's understanding

stated

of

break

with

Platonic

philosophy.

I have only

Marx's

contention

that Epicums

established an

alternative

to the philosophy of transcendence

which originated

in Platonic

phi

losophy,

and

I have

sought

to show that Marx returned to Plato as the

begin-

18
ning

Interpretation
point of

his

critique of the

philosophy

of transcendence. philosophy?

How had Epi

order

cums, according to

Marx,
first

undermined

Platonic

In

to

answer

this question we must

recognize that

Epicums'

critique of

Platonic

philoso

phy is not confined to Plato. In fact, Marx's observations on bution to the critique of the philosophy of transcendence which

Epicums'

contri
originated with

Plato

are

most

explicit
of

when

directed toward Aristotle. Before addressing

critique of

Marx's discussion

Epicums'

Aristotle, I

shall

turn

briefly

to

Hegel. Like Marx, he

ulative was

considered

that

Aristotle had

remained within

the spec

tradition

which

Plato had

originated.

Hegel, for

example, thought that

it

particularly significant that we understand "how far Aristotle carried out what in the Platonic principle had been (1983, 2:117). But there is
begun"

for examining Hegel's approach to Aristotle. What Hegel took to be Aristotle's contribution to political philosophy was exactly what Marx had
another reason

identified

as

the reason

for

Epicums'

rejection of

Aristotle in

particular and

Platonic philosophy in general. In considering the difference between Marx's and Hegel's understanding of Aristotle, we are better prepared to appreciate for returning to Epicums. In returning to critique of Marx was able to of expose the limits the philosopher closest to Aristotle, Hegel and thereby to criticize Hegel himself.
purpose

Marx's

Epicums'

First, I
out what

shall consider

the grounds for Hegel's assertion that Aristotle carried

warned against

Plato had begun. Hegel had

committing the kind

speculative

of

error which

Hook

committed

in

distinguishing

Plato's

philosophy

from Aristotle's
make
ism."

naturalism.

Yet Hegel

also suggested that

it

was quite

the

mistaken

distinction between Aristotle's

"realism"

and

easy to Plato's "ideal

to have

Aristotle's

method encouraged

the error, since he "always seems to have

particular"

philosophized

only respecting the individual

principle
which

and

and seems

had

no

unifying

accounted of

(1983, 2:1 17, 137, 229). The form

ance of

for the Absolute in its totality Aristotle's philosophy gave it the appear

denying
rejected

the

totality

of speculative philosophy.

Moreover,
the
man

since

Aristo
of

tle

had

both

abstract

Platonic ideas

souls),

and

the principle that

see

wisdom cannot

be

achieved

(including by
method

immortality

it

was

easy to

his turning from Plato

the
subjects of since
philosophy,"

as a radical

in this world, departure from his Platonic "still form

a

origins.

Nevertheless,

Aristotle's

totality

of

truly
able

speculative

through contemplation the philosopher is

to absorb all particular subjects of philosophical

understood

inquiry (1983, 2:118,

destruction
of

228). Aristotle ble

and

in thought,
of

at

least,

that absolute wisdom was possi to the to

that its comprehension

and particular.

totality

was opposed

the

know that totality comprised the individuality of substances which, in their self-determination, ultimately pointed to the universal end, or to the one Absolute, the idea of God. It is interesting to note here that Hegel concluded the Encyclopedia of Philoso
one was able

individual

In contemplation

phy
of a

with a quotation

from Aristotle's Metaphysics in

no

God who,

having

which he involvement in the world, is the

set

forth his idea

essence of pure

Marx
contemplation.
with

on

Self-Consciousness,
it
would

the

City

and

the

Gods
of

19
God

Now
or

while

be wrong to

equate

Hegel's idea

that of Plato
"theology"

tle's

Aristotle, it is revealing that Hegel had thought that Aristo had gone a long way toward developing the proper understand
method was

ing

of

the Absolute. Although Aristotle's

to

limited insofar

as

he

was

unable

develop

conceptions of

"unifying knowledge, he went further

a

principle"

which made concrete

the particular
man

than Plato

in recognizing that
we

could attain self-consciousness

through divine
political

contemplation.

In Hegel's treatment
of

of
of

Aristotle's Aristotle's
of

philosophy

find

discussion
self-

the extent

and

limit

contribution

to the development of

consciousness.
approach

Aristotle's speculative power could be seen in his individual freedom. Although Aristotle recognized, as Plato had not, that individuality was not destroyed in the concept of the state, he was unable to conceive of the freedom of individuals in its highest sense. In com
to
could

The limits

menting on Aristotle's Politics, Hegel observed that Aristotle knowledge of natural right, since "the idea of abstract man
actual relation to
others"

have

no

could not yet

characterization of man as a

"political

animal"

any be known (1983, 2:208). Aristotle's prevented him from understand

not

outside of

ing

that the whole

of which

the individuals were parts did

lessen the inde

to see the

pendence of each particular complete which

individual. Because Aristotle

was unable

independence
whole

of the parts

he, too,

was unable

to see the nature of that

bound the

together.

Yet Hegel did

superior to that of

admit

many thinkers

that, in part, Aristotle's treatment of the citizen was of his own era who were unable to see beyond
which

the isolated individual to the spirit

holds the

parts

together

(1983,
poten

2:209). Aristotle knew that the individual

and state

shared,

at

least in

tiality, end for

a common end
man

(Ethics, 1094b 1-10). In the Ethics Aristotle said that the is eudaimonia (happiness), and that in its highest form eudaimonia

(contemplation) (Ethics, 1 178b3 1 179a). In the Politics Aris totle, according to Hegel, recognized that the perfection of the individual is
is divine
theoria
obtained

in the

state as a

whole,
the

and

that the object of the science of politics

is

therefore the

eudaimonia of

individual brought to its

of

greatest perfection.

Aristotle,

even

though he was
relation

incapable

seeing the abstract

independence
or

of

the individual in

to the state, realized that divine

theoria,

the individ
state.

ual's attainment of so

self-consciousness, was potentially

to the extent that

realized

in the

In

doing Aristotle,
Marx
accepted

it

was

historically
of

possible,

prefigured
state.6

Hegel's

own realization

that self-consciousness

was realized

in the

good

deal

of as

Hegel's

account

Aristotle, but

unlike

Hegel,

who

had

praised

Aristotle

the first to realize that self-consciousness

was made absolute

Aristotle only
and the gods.
philosophy. sciousness

in the state, Marx turned to Epicums to demonstrate that to the dependence of self-consciousness on the city I shall turn now to Marx's account of critique of Greek
contributed
Epicums'

As Marx

understood

it, Epicums

took the

first step in

freeing

con

from the

chains of

Platonic philosophy in his

critique of

Aristotle.

20

Interpretation
EPICURUS AND THE CRITIQUE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In the first

part of of

the

dissertation Marx
was

sought to establish that a proper

understanding necessary if philosophy was to comprehend its origins in Greek philosophy. The first part is, in large measure, an attempt to refute the accepted opinion that Epicums had little to contribute to the history
Epicums
of

philosophy

other than

that

which was

he took from Democritus. Here Marx's

goal was to show that cause

Epicums

diametrically

opposed

to Democritus be

he,

and theology.

idea
he

of

Democritus, went beyond physics to a critique of philosophy When Epicums denied any relevance to the gods, abolished the immortality and saw in the heavens no more than accident and chance,
unlike

exposed the myth of

the city and the gods (Epicums

and

1926a, 58-81).
Democritus
was

The

most

important distinction between Epicums

respective

to

be

found,

Marx observed, in their

atom

treatments of the "contradiction in

existence."

the concept of the the dissertation

between

essence and

The

greatest part of

is, in fact,
form

an analysis of

their respective approaches to the con

tradiction between tion

and matter

in

atomistic physics.

That Marx's disserta

is

meant

to be more than a defense of the superiority of Epicurean physics

becomes

more

apparent,

however,

when we consider chapters

the argument of the sec

ond part of the

chapter on

dissertation. The four

Meteors"

leading

up to the concluding
the contradiction

"The

show that

Democritus'

reduction of

between the Below I

I

existence and essence of

the

atom

to a

matter of

necessity denied

the possibility of science while

shall

holding

to abstract theological explanations.

which

discuss two

of

the four topics

Marx

considered

in

order

to clarify the distinction between the Epicurean and Democritean philosophies

of nature.
Epicums'

shall then consider of

the concluding chapter,

Meteors"

where

Marx

argued

that to

discussion

"The

is the

culmination of

his

attempt

overturn

Greek theology and philosophy. In the first chapter of the second part of the dissertation Marx drew

distinc

tion between Epicums and Democritus

by

considering their accounts of motion.

Marx
atoms

argued

that Democritus was aware that the

straight

first

principle of

motion, that

fall in

lines,

contradicted

the second principle of motion, that

atoms are repulsed.

If

atoms

fall in Yet

straight

lines, they

will never collide and of atoms

thus will
never

never

be

repulsed.

without

the repulsion

they

would

meet,

and the world would never

have been

created.

In

order

to escape
collide

from this

contradiction

Democritus
force

argued that atoms are

forced to

by

necessity, that

is, by

external

to the concept of the atom.

Democritus'

recourse to necessity,

Marx argued, leaves the

ples of motion and the world of appearance

contradiction between the princi intact. Democritus simply ignored

the contradiction

by

positing
to

an external principle of necessity. posited a

Epicums, contrary
allowed
not

Democritus,

third principle of motion which

him to

argue that the cause of repulsion

is

within

the atom

due to

external necessity.

According

to

Epicums,

the atom

itself and deviates from

Marx
the straight line

on

Self-Consciousness,
internal
principle of

the

City

and

the

Gods

21

due to

an

the straight line frees the atom from the determination

concept of stracts

declination. This swerving from of the line and allows the

it"

the atom to be completed in repulsion. In repulsion the atom "ab from the opposing being and withdraws itself from (1976a, 51). Because the principle of repulsion is within the atom itself, it is the "soul of the
atom."

Epicums, in
primary

contrast to

Democritus,

transformed necessity into

self-

determination.
Epicums'

motive

for resolving the

contradiction
establish

between the

es

sence and existence of the atom was not

simply to

the self-determina

tion

of

the atom.

Rather,
pain not

the purpose was to

reach

the concept of abstract

independence"

individuality

which

"appears in its highest freedom

and

and ataraxia

in

swerving away from Marx apparently did

claim
cums'

confusion, in attaining
was

(1976a, 51).
Epicums'

believe that it
was

necessary to
no need

criticize

that the pursuit of ataraxia

the motivating principle behind both Epi

physical and ethical philosophy.

Marx had

to offer such a cri

Epicums'

tique, since the very purpose of his dissertation was to show that dogmatic insistence on the unity of the ends of physical and ethical philosophy
created

the possibility for the

critique of

Greek philosophy

and theology.

This

seems to explain motion

vations.

why Marx may

Epicums'

conclude a chapter on

principles of

by

commenting He asks that we "consider the

atom."

on what would otherwise seem consequence

to be

misplaced obser

that follows

directly

from

the declination

of

the

The

realization of

the atom in

Epicums'

highest
with

beings,
gods. gods.

the gods, who swerve away from the

world and

do

not

bother

it,

also meant that the chief

Epicums'

human good, ataraxia, is to be pursued without the doctrine is also more than an attempt to free man from the
realized

Just

as

the concept of the atom is

of

in repulsion,

so

too, "repulsion
meet

is the first form

self-consciousne

Human desire leads to the initial

ing
that

and then repulsion of men which,

they

are not

abstractly Man first comes to consciousness, then, in recognizing his alienation from the gods and other men. In recognizing abstract individual consciousness, Epicums
was

sciousness

merely products "conceives of itself as

of

in turn, culminates in their recognition beings.7 This con nature, but conscious
individual."

immediate-being,

as

the first to

recognize natural right.

Marx, having
and

Epicums'

assumed

that

doctrine

culminated

in

an attack on

both Platonic

Aristotelian philosophy,
of

concluded

the

chapter with

the

remark

that the declination

and

the atoms be
domain"

comes

in the "political

domain"

the covenant, to

in the "social
Epicurean Epicurean

friendship (1976a,
shall return

53). What

seemed

be

extraneous

comments, or perhaps
physics.
physics

afterthoughts, are, for Marx, the necessary

to the

outcome of

political-theological question raised

by

in

my discussion of the last chapter of the dissertation. and In the second chapter Marx considered
Epicums'

Democritus'

respective

treatments of the contradiction

between the immutable

essence of

the atom and

existence.

the necessarily

variable material properties which atoms acquire

in

If

22
in

Interpretation
essence

the

atom

is unchangeable, how
which

can

it be

possess qualities

size,

shape

and weight other

which are subject can

to change in the world

unchangeable

of appearance?
change?

How, in

words,

that

is

subject to

According
nature."

to

Marx, Democritus simply ignored

concept of an

Instead,

unchanging atom and Democritus considered the properties

of

the necessary contradiction between the the changing atom of "concrete

of

the

atom

"only in

relation

to

the formation

the

world

of

appearances,

and not

in

relation

to the atom

itself (1976a, 55). By limiting his investigation to the world of appearances, Democritus was forced to conclude that the material qualities of the atom were
attributable

only to

Democritus'

necessity.

inability

to explain the contradiction

between the
for

essence and existence of

the atom led him to abandon philosophy

empiricism.

necessity.

He was thus left to conclude that everything which is, is of In attributing everything to necessity Democritus was unable to offer
the atom were, for Epicums, "differences which (1976a, 55). Epicums did not doubt that the idea

a critique of existence.

The

material properties of

the atom in itself

possesses"

that atoms possess size, shape and weight contradicted the very concept of the
atom.

Moreover, according

to

Marx, Epicums
it

recognized

that the qualities of

the

atom were

themselves negated in their very existence. Epicums accepted

the contradiction, because to

deny

would mean and/or

abandoning the

abstract

indi

viduality in the in the world of Instead

concept of
appearance.

the atom,

the self-determination of the atom

of a simple resolution of the contradiction

material

Epicums

gave new mean

world of alienated

ing

to the

appearance emerge

of

the

atom atom

appearance can

only

from the
heralds

asserting that "the which is complete and

by

from its his

concept."

Epicums'

attention

to the world of appearance followed from

of

position

that "all

senses are

the

tme."

Here, too, Marx

that

argued

that Epicums

surpassed

Democritus, for

although

he

maintained

knowledge

is derived from the senses, he insisted that the subjectivity of knowledge does not reduce "sensuous qualities to things of mere The sensuous world
opinion."

is "objective
ation of

appearance."

Because Epicums "takes

as

dogmatic,

not a skeptical

position,"

he "was the first to grasp appearance the essence, activating itself in reality
rather

appearance, that

is,

as alien

alienation"

as such an

(1976a,

39, 64). Epicums,

recourse to

than seek to overcome the alienation either through

its

willingness

necessity or the gods, preserves self-consciousness to live with the contradiction.

chosen not

by

maintaining
of

Although I have
part of the

to discuss the third and fourth chapters

this

dissertation, they

too are

intended to

prove that

Epicurean

philoso

phy is
ness

superior to

Democritean philosophy because

Marx clearly
established

by

refusing to

attribute all

contradiction to

necessity, the precondition for the

science of

self-conscious

is

established.

the relationship between atomistic that "what appears

physics and self-consciousness when

he

stated

in the

theoretically
Wise

account given of

matter, appears practically in the definition of the

Marx
man"

on

Self-Consciousness,

the

City

and

the Gods

23

(1976b, 432). This may be observed in the second part of the dissertation in considering the resemblance of Marx's account of atomistic physics to his Socrates' discussion of role in freeing self-consciousness. The first wise men
were similar to

the Democritean account

of

matter, that

is,

their appearance

seemed to
atoms are

necessary like Socrates in that their

is the

be

reflection of the substance of

principle
after

Greek life. Epicurean

collision.

is developed in

Just
so

as

the atom comes to reflect upon itself

Socrates'

colliding
colliding

with other

atoms,

too

self-consciousness

result of

with men.

Yet
than

self-consciousness was no more completed

by

the collision of atoms

Meteors"

Marx by Socratic dialectic. In the concluding chapter on "The completed his argument that dogmatism allowed him to take a critical stance toward Greek religion and philosophy and that in so doing he established
Epicums'

the

natural science of self-consciousness. of

Here Marx

Epicums'

considered

doc

trine that the theological account

the heavens prevented access to the tme

knowledge

of causes

denying

the

heavens may
"more than

by attributing the movement of the heavens to the gods. In immortality of the heavenly bodies Epicums argued that the be explained by a multiplicity of causes. Epicums thus argued
observation of

that the proper

the heavens and earth demonstrates that there

is

one account of their nature which

harmonizes

sensations

with our

(1926a, 59). Single

dict

explanations,

such as

that

which religion

teaches,

contra

our sensations and

thus disturb

our peace of mind. and unable

By disturbing

our peace

of mind religion makes men

goal.

fearful

to achieve the

highest human
clear

The importance
Epicums'

in light
of

of
of

primary statement that "if

of the

goal of ataraxia we were not

...

becomes especially

troubled

by

our suspicions
no need of

the phenomena

the sky and about death

we should

have

science"

natural

(1926b, 97).
attempts to attribute

In rejecting

all

immortality
and, in
so

to the heavens Epicums

carried atomistics

to its final

conclusion

doing, founded

the

natural

science of self-consciousness.

Marx

considered

this of no small moment, since

in establishing the principle of absolute individual self-consciousness Epicums was forced to deny not only popular belief in the gods but the account offered

by
his

the

philosophers.

Moreover, he

was

forced to
He

reject

the conclusion which

own method seemed

to suggest. Epicums had admitted that the

heavenly

bodies
of the

were atoms which

atom

had become

real.

also admitted

that if the essence

bodies (had

assumed

(which is unchangeable) had become concrete in the heavenly the qualities apparent in existence), those bodies were
was

necessarily immortal. Yet if this

problem arose. overcome

so, if the

contradiction

between the form

then another the atom is

and matter of the atom was resolved

in immortal

heavenly bodies,

If the The

contradiction

between the form

and matter of

in

the

heavenly bodies,

then abstract

individuality

was negated

by

the

universal atom. stract

existence of the universal required and

the destruction

of ab

individual self-consciousness,

and confusion.

this, in turn, resulted in man's anxiety Because Epicums believed that anxiety and confusion result

24
from

Interpretation
a

belief in the universal, he was forced to deny, against the normal method of his theory, the immortality of the heavens. Marx argued that Epi dogmatic insistence on abstract individual self-consciousness was "the
cums'

soul of

the Epicurean philosophy of

nature"

(1976a,

72). It

was

the soul of the

Epicurean doctrine because here Epicums

stract self-consciousness at all costs.

maintained the

commitment

to

ab

The
cal

natural science of which constituted

Epicums spoke,

a science

devoid

of

theologi

obfuscations,

tme theoria. This contemplation to overcome the fears

was not

necessary
religion
no

in

and of

itself, but only in

Just
as

order

perpetuated

by

and philosophy.

there are no gods guiding the

heavens,

there is

divine theoria (a
emulate.

contemplation good served

in

and of

itself)

which men should seek

to

Theoria

only to further the possibility that ataraxia could

and

be

achieved when men were

freed from the city Aristotle is the immediate object of

observed that
Epicums'

the gods.
critique of

Epicums'

Greek theology.

Marx Greek

opposition to

the idea that the

heavenly

bodies
the

are gods

led him to hold Aristotle in the

teachings the

same contempt as

he held traditional life from he

religious

(1976a, 67). Certainly Aristotle had distinguished

gods which are useful

mythic teachings on

for law

and

what

took to be tme

knowledge, derived from

bodies
are gods and

principles of motion which show

encompasses all

only

"that the

heavenly

that the divine

nature"

(Metaphysics. 12:1074a-b34; On the Heavens. 1:270). Aristotle correctly as serted that the opinion of the many, that the gods intervene in human affairs,
serves
correct

only a political purpose (1976a, 67). Yet he also denied access to the knowledge of causes because, rather than rejecting popular judgment on
accepted

the gods, he

the opinion of the many to the extent that

it

comported

with his physics. Aristotle was not willing to separate the philosopher from the city and the gods. He had tied self-consciousness to the city and its gods when he suggested that the best eudamonia was one with divine theoria, and that that

divine theoria
ered

was perfected

in the best

city.

Moreover,

since

Aristotle

consid

dikaiosyne (justice) and philia (friendship) both necessary and good for the city, dikaiosyne and philia were essential to the life of the philosopher. Aristo
tle's

teaching

was

therefore no better than the religious beliefs of the many,

because in accepting the interdependence of philosophy, theology and politics, in accepting the dependence of self-consciousness on the city and gods, men were left confused and fearful. Epicums furthered the cause of self-conscious
ness and

because he
the city

was

(1976a,

willing to blame those 68).

who

believe that

man needs

heaven

city

was both possible and necessary to free man from the the gods. Just as the chief human good, ataraxia, is to be pursued without the gods who swerve away from the world and do not bother with and

Epicums held that it

it,

so, too, the philosopher

was most

happy

when

he

withdrew

from
at

politics.

Poli

tics was nothing more than a social contract

conditions

which

could,

best,

provide the

for the

pursuit of ataraxia.

For Epicums "there is

no profit

in

secur-

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,
men, if things

the

City

and

the

Gods

25
earth

ing
and

protection

in

relation to

above and

things beneath the

suspicion"

indeed

all

in the boundless
exists

universe remain matters of

(1926b,

99). Dikaiosyne
more

in

order to

free

man of suspicion and

than "a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men them

is thus nothing from harming one

pursue natural as

another and save

from

being

harmed"

so

that

they may
103). And

science,

a science whose goal was ataraxia

(1926b,

dikaiosyne
to a

was reduced

to a covenant which creates the condition

pursuit of

for

men

to retire from

the

world

in the

ataraxia,

so

too,

philia

(friendship)

was reduced

private matter.

For

Epicums,

philia was

necessary

to the education of the phi

losopher
philia

and thus

to the complete life. the

for the

education of

Aristotle, too, had urged the necessity of philosopher (Ethics, 1 1 55a3 1 1 63b 1 8) But for
.

Aristotle

philia was also of

the destruction
and education

necessary for the life of the city. Epicums completed Aristotelian political philosophy, because in reducing philia
to a covenant, he taught that
self-

in

private matters and politics

consciousness must not

depend

on

the

city.

Aristotle

was no more able

than

Plato to free

man

from the city

gods.

and

the gods.

Therefore,

he had only developed

self-conscious

the mythological character of Platonic

ness

philosophy

by

chaining

to the city and the

CONCLUSION

Epicums philosophy

was

the first to expose the

was

political-theological myth of

Platonic

by

showing that it

both

possible and

desirable to free

man

from

the city and the gods. In considering the political-theological question

Marx,

the most
means

like many Enlightenment thinkers, was drawn to Epicums because Epicums, formidable opponent of Plato and Aristotle in antiquity, provided the
Marx

for attacking their intellectual heirs in later political thought. recognized that Epicums was closer to Aristotle and Plato than to
was attracted

himself, however. While he

fear
which

to

Epicums'

attempt

to overcome the

led

alienated men

to believe in the gods, he recognized that Epi

cums

only

resolved

the alienation in theoria. For

Epicums,

the tme knowledge

of causes produced ataraxia. come through theoria alone.

For Marx, fear and alienation could not be over Regardless of Marx's fascination with Epicums,
a modem stance

the

least

one

may say is that he takes

as a

in

opposition

to the
criti

ancients. cal

Marx,

modem,

considered

Epicums only

one

step, albeit a
no

one, in the march of progress. Epicums, by contrast, had future, for he was not fearful of death (Marx 1976b, 444).

interest in the

In seeking to free
that he
understood

consciousness

from the city

and

the

gods

Marx

assumed

Plato,

the originator of the philosophy of transcendence,

better than Plato

who assume
without

understood

himself. Marx differs from

modem social scientists

that

they may grasp

the essential political-theological questions

arguments which

seriously attending to those

they have

rejected be-

26

Interpretation

cause

he,

at

least,

understood

the significance

of

Platonic

philosophy.

Nev
and pre

ertheless, he the
gods

arrived at

the conclusion that

man must

be freed from the city

arguments

without

having

attended to the complexities of the

was so

sented

in the Platonic dialogues. Perhaps this

because Marx

was more

interested in overcoming the perplexity which Platonic philosophy induced than he was in the problem of philosophy as Plato understood it. If Marx's willing
ness

to pass

on

to what

he

perceived and

to be the greater
modem

issue, unmasking

the

material

basis

of religious

belief

the

state, leaves the Platonic

ques

tions unanswered, it is because his

motive

Epicums. This

seems

plausible,

since

may be, after all, similar to that of Marx admitted that his admiration for

Epicums

was

due in

no small part to the

fact Epicums

considered

philosophy

means to ataraxia.

NOTES

1
pher

Ataraxia, according
attain when argues that

to

Epicurus, is

a state of

tranquility

or peace of mind which

the philoso

may 2. Brundell

he is freed from fear

Gassendi
to Christianity.
comments on

and confusion.

sought

to replace Aristotelianism

with

Epicureanism, but
and

an

Epicureanism

acceptable

3. See Marx's early

the Collected

the difference

state and religion and the state

in 'The

Leading

in the relationship between philosophy Article in No. 179 of the Kolnische

where

the

Zeitung,"

in

Works, 1:184-202.
he
used religious analogies

criticize

4. See Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Hegel's idea that the conflicts between the state
monarchy ("the
state")
with monarch as

to
a

and

civil and

society

are overcome

in

constitutional

the actual

'God'

man")

through bureaucrats ("Jesuits

and theologians of the

(1970, 24, 46).

assertion

5. Compare this 6. Hegel's

meant

Rosen's

(1977)
to

that Marx's

view of

Socrates,
all clear

as

does the

whole

dissertation, derives from Bauer's

view of

approach

self-consciousness.

Aristotle is

highly

problematic, since it is not at

and

that Aristotle really

that

eudaimonia

for the individual

the state

were at all

the same. In the Nicomachean

greatest eu

Ethics (177all-1179a32) Aristotle

appears to argue that

divine theoria brings the

daimonia,

and

that this eudaimonia,

necessarily as such for man. tion between what is best and

may be Aristotle's
sake of

its divine quality, was best in itself, but not Elsewhere in the Ethics and the Politics Aristotle collapses the distinc

by

virtue of

what

is best for

man.

One

possible explanation

for this

contradiction

recognition of

the tension between the philosopher who contemplates

for

the

theoria

and

the citizen who serves the city.

Because the

eudaimonia of the philosopher and

the eudaimonia of the city are the same only in the best city, the divine city, it does not seem likely that Aristotle is so facile in reaching the point which Hegel attributes to him. In fact, Aristotle may

be

even closer

to Plato than Hegel knew in admitting

of

the tension between philosophy and the the

city.

7. The background for Marx's presentation of the initial state battleground of human desire seems to be Hegel's Phenomenology.

of self-consciousness

as

REFERENCES
Aristotle. 1985. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Marx

on

Self-Consciousness,
Co.

the

City

and

the Gods

27

Brundell, Barry, 1987. Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism

ophy.

to a New Natural Philos

Boston: D. Reidel

Publishing
Pythocles."

Epicurus. 1926a. "Letter to

In Epicurus: The Extant Remains. Translated Cyril Bailey. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Epicurus. 1926a. "Principal Doctrines." In Epicurus: The Extant Remains.

by

Hegel,

G.W.F. 1961. The

Phenomenology
History

of the Mind. Translated

by

J.B. Baillie. New

York: The Macmillan Company. 1983. Lectures

on the

of Philosophy. Translated of Religion. Edited

by

E.S. Haldane

and

Frances H. Simson. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. 1984. Lectures

Berkeley:
on the of

Philosophy
to

by

Peter C. Hodgson.

University

California Press.
Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of
of

Hook, Sidney. 1971. From Hegel

Karl Marx. Ann Arbor:

University

Michigan Press.

Jefferson, Thomas. 1904. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh. Washington, D.C.: Jefferson Memorial Associa
tion.

Kojeve, Alexandre. 1969. Introduction

to the

Reading

of Hegel: Lectures
Religion."

on the

Phe

nomenology of Spirit. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lobkowicz, Nicholas. 1967. "Marx's Attitude Toward

In Marx

and

the

Western World. Edited Dame Press.

by

Nicholas Lobkowicz. South Bend:

University

of

Notre

Marx, Karl. 1964. Early Writings. Edited by T.B. Bottomore. New York:
Hill.

McGraw-

1967. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: International Pub

lishers. 1970. Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973. Grundrisse. Translated
..

by

Joseph O'Malley.

by

Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage Books.

and

1976a. Difference Between In Karl Marx

Publishers.
and

the

Democritean

Epicurean
.

Philosophy

of Na

ture.

Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 1

New York: Inter

national

1976b. Notebooks. In Collected Works.

McLellan, David. 1969. The Young Hegelians

millan

and

Karl Marx. New York: The Mac

Company.
Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De Rerum Natura of

Nichols, James H., Jr. 1976.

Lucretius. Ithaca: Cornell Plato. Books.

University

Press.

1968. The Republic of Plato. Translated

by

Allan Bloom. New York: Basic

1988. Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Translated

by

G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett.

1977. Bruno Bauer
and

Rosen, Zvi.

Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer

on

Marx's Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Tucker, Robert C. 1964. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wessel, Leonard P., Jr. 1984. Prometheus Bound: The Mythic Structure of Karl Marx's
Scientific Thinking. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

University

Press.

William Dean

Howells'

"Poor Real Life":

The Royal Road to the American Character

Thomas S. Engeman
Loyola

University Chicago

Alexis de Tocqueville forecast the danger

warned of

of modem

individualism

when

he

the American withdrawing

from society

self-concerned.

"They

form the habit

of

thinking

of

he became, simply, themselves in isolation and

until
....

imagine that their up in the

whole
on

destiny

is in their

own

hands

Each

man

is

forever thrown back

solitude of

himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut his own (p. 508). In the extended Tocquevillean
heart"

sociology of Habits of the Heart, this apparent isolation of American has been elaborately chronicled (Bellah, pp. vii-viii, 306, 353).
How
accurate

existence

is this

view?

ity? The
life"

abstract nature of modem political

What life is actually lived in the American pol thought which equates the "good

with

degrees

of

freedom,
equality,

per capita seems

income,

popular

consent,

worker par

ticipation,
one

or social

less

able even than a Tocquevillean-inmuch

spired social science such as

Robert Bellah 's

to characterize American ethics properly.

suggest

American divorces

the end of the

family
the

less a merely quantitative For example, the numerous or of its influence, although, little basis
of social experi

looking
ence,

at

American society, there

social

appears

to be

and

Confronting
new

ideal, particularly Hector St. John de Crevecoeur's

absent

family.1

original

question, "Who is this

association

man, this

American?",
theory
in
and

one recognizes again the

longstanding

between

political

literature. Literature in
characters produced

most cases realizes classi

cal political ethics

depicting

cal regimes or principles of contrast

the human good.

by different types of politi Especially in the modem era, the

aristocratic gentleman and

is

most

frequently

drawn between the

the

middle-class or

"mass

man."

Literature, however, may be ory politically by transcending

nexus of

"complete"

said to
classical

classical ethical regime

the

typology

to root characters in recog the most

nizable political or social situations.

If in the

modem era

important

being an inextricably

the reality of human experience (next to the regime) is the nation American, a Frenchman, or a Russian where speech and deed are

interwoven to

make

the

fabric

of

life,

then the nation is the

signifi-

INTERPRETATION,

Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

30
cant

Interpretation
historical
variable

and the nation exist generations.

shaping human together, its

character.

Thus

as

long

as the regime over

citizens'

characters remain

recognizable

This study will concentrate on the writings of William Dean Howells (1837 1920), an American author who attempted with a uniquely intelligent serious
ness

to present realistic American characters

within a realistic

American frame

work.

Howells

was

the founder and chief supporter (as the

editor of

The Atlan

tic

Monthly

and

later Harper's

Magazine)
picture and

of

the

literary
as

movement

known

as

American

realism.

He

sought

"to

life just

as we witness

it in

living

people,

to record

it is, to deal with character the incidents that grow out of

traits of indi

character."

He

was concerned with

the

most general and minute

viduals shaped problem of

modem new

by

the American regime. Howells confronts, perceptively, the thought and politics. How are the various

both

modem political principles

theoretical
as

translated into practice? In particular, in the "first

called

nation,"

Tocqueville

the United

States, how
of

are

the principles

of

modem rationalism related

to personal and social experience?

In Section II I
novels

will

outline

the

difficulty

Howells'

crusted.

resulting from the Since Howells is

of

accretion of opinions
now a

seriously studying in which we find them

author, I
will also

en

the relevant parts tenor

of

relatively his theoretical understanding to his fiction. In Section III I propose to look
categories and social

obscure

discuss

help
at

clarify the overall Howells as a social in his

on major novels

commentator, using
as

topics

as

clearly

present

they

are

in ordinary

theory. I

will

concentrate

the

fragility

of

individual

and

family

existence and

the maintenance of social morality, espe

cially the importance

of religious practice.
contribution

In the final part, Section IV, I

Austen."

will

try

to summarize

Howells'

through a brief comparison of his

work

with

that

of

his "dear, honored

prime

favorite, Jane

II

Studying
and

Howells'

American

novels one

first
who

encounters
see

H.L. Mencken
a

many

others

of

the Progressive era

in Howells

hopelessly
American

sentimental, moralistic,

and cautious writer: the

Howells'

Norman Rockwell

of

Victorianism. "A study of more original ideas than so many

contagious
udices

work will show a

Ladies'

long

row of

titles with no
more

copies of

feeling

than so many reports of the

"Dean"

autopsies,"

Home Journal, and no Mencken wrote in

the

Prej

(1916),
of

while

was still alive.

However,

briefest

encoun

ter with

Howells'

work

is

sufficient to reveal

his intricate
in many

reflections on the

"solitude
character.

the

heart"

and was

the host of other questions

a rootless man

surrounding American
respects and

Howells he

himself

knew
talism

personally
critic,
sentimen-

whereof

wrote.

Moreover, George Carrington,

a major recent
Howells'

categorically

opposes the common view.

Carrington finds

totally ironic.

William Dean
Life [for 1984
and

Howells'

"Poor Real
a

Life"

31

Howells] is

seen

largely

as

"unrelieved

bondage,"

hell

on

earth, as in

In the Penal Colony. There is

no possible end

to this hell for man in

man

general, and no possible end (except for

lucky

accident) for

in

particular.

(P.23)

Characteristically
reader eye.

too extreme, Carrington 's interpretation does

Howells'

alert

the

that there is more to

more

bonhomie than he

meets

H. L. Mencken's

Carrington is

nearly
of

correct when

writes:

Certainly, Howells had little

second generation and

Fitzgerald's

after),

or of

artistic feeling for the very rich (the Dreiser's for the very shabby, but he he
"felt"

knew the

central

men; he knew the central

attempt

American group, the middle-class administrators and professional modem American situation: the endlessly renewed
world.

ever

to plug along with honor in a chaotic done this so well as Howells. (P. 228)
Howells'

No

other

American

author

has

It is only necessary to add that world is only apparently chaotic. I think sentimentalism is indeed a facade, although not an ironic
Howells'

in the way Carrington suggests. Guided by reason, sentimentalism dimin ishes the harshness of what Tocqueville called the "antipoetic daily life of the
one
American."

self-destructive.

Impmdent sentimentalism, contrarily, is obfuscating reason is the core of the Indeed,

Howells'

and

ultimately
war with

"realists'"

literary
both it

romanticism.

Reason is the
stand or

essence of modem

society,

upon which

and

literary

realism

fall. As

with

his "dear, honored

people

prime

favorite, Jane
selves pride

Austen,"

Howells

sought

to contribute to the tme sentimental

was

education of modem society.

"[I] hoped I
of their

making my
and
average."2

know them

in the delicate

beauty
of an

everyday lives,

to find a cause

for

in the loveliness
the

by

reason

apparently homely is indefinable, precisely. While clearly

What Howells

meant

sympathetic

to the scientific
mat as a

reason of

Enlightenment, he

was quick social

to see the limits of science in

morality,
and political

ters

related

to individual character,

life

whole.

"No man, unless he puts Howells the will behind

it,"

on

the

mask of

fiction,
science.

can show

his

real

face

or

wrote.

What

permits

the

separation of opinion or

nomos

from reality
standard

or

nature

is
able

modem

While creating

an

epis

temological

critically

to judge religious, political, or traditional

opinions,
opinions.

science could not expect

fully

or

finally

to refute or replace those

Therefore the human

condition could never

be

reduced

to theoretical

propositions,

even those produced

by

modem science.

The

dichotomy
as

between
moder

human

opinion and partial

(scientific) knowledge
view,
not
partial

should

be interpreted

ately and Nietzsche

humanely
suggested.

in

Howells'

Caught between "a

radically and cruelly knowledge of

Friedrich
and a

parts"

number of absolute spectly.

opinions,

a writer should proceed

It is this

self-conscious pmdence and

cautiously Platonic insight into the

and circum
omnipre

sence of opinion which gives

Howells

a classical sophistication.

But Howells had

32

Interpretation
major authors of

learned from the

principle of

the English Enlightenment that there is no

benevolence

accessible to man other than the moderating effect of

on a nature neither

human reason, operating

naturally

virtuous nor comes

saved, al
realism.

though reasonably amenable to reason. From this persuasion

his

While
opinion.

never

losing

sight of the realistic studied

American
tme

world of

the

middle-class

professional

men, Howells
sought to use

the

entire range of

American

social

life

and

He

his

"sentimentalism"

rationalism and

to support

those institutions

and opinions

which, in his opinion, appeared natural, like the

family,
cal

or at

least

supportive of a rational and moral society.

Even in his

radi

period, from roughly 1887 to

was

1905,

when

he

espoused a

Christian

social

ism, Howells
his own,

free from the

conceit

that socialism in any

form, including
came

was a serious political

During
reformed

those years

possibility for the middle class. the radicalized "Dean of American

the

letters"

to be

lieve that the American

viction

social and economic problems of

Gilded Age
institutions

could not

be

using the

political principles or political

of

the original

natural-rights consensus.

Howells

was

certainly

not alone

in the

con

that the Social Darwinist reading of

modem natural

right had

so emas

culated economic and political

form

was

necessary.

With

one of

institutions that major, if not revolutionary, re his literary heroes, Leo Tolstoy, Howells
socialism.

embraced a

nonviolent, agrarian, Christian

socialism served as a

If

immediately
of

impracti
to

cable, Christian
the

materialism of

humane ideal, the Gilded Age. But with the success

a moral counterweight

Theodore Roose

presidency, Howells appears to have regained his lost republican faith: popular consent based on the founding principles was a sufficient basis of
velt's

American

political

life. (See Crider. No longer left

and the right

radical, Howells

sought

to

incorporate both

the

realistically in his

fiction,
about

while remain

ing

liberal Republican.) Within his work, Howells does

a
morality.
of

not

American
the effects

For the

purposes of

openly speculate his realism it is

the source of

sufficient

to

observe

that morality on the characters

living

in American American

society.

How in the
of

ever, he

was

certainly

aware of of

the basic source

of

attitudes

natural-rights

philosophy

the Declaration of
and

Independence,

and

the habits

political and economic years of

liberty

equality that characterized the first seventy

"Jeffersonian"

the Republic. Howells spoke warmly of the rural egali tarianism of the southern Ohio of his youth, when his father, William Cooper

Howells,

worked as

Whig Party

newspaper editor and

later held
son's

several consul

ships under

Republican

presidents
wrote

(secured through his Abraham Lincoln's in Venice.

influence). Wil

liam Dean Howells himself

campaign

biography

in

lSoO^and
m

served as

American

consul

Probably

the clearest example of

"Judge"

Howells'

found in The Kentons.

or

"Colonel"

insight into American society is Kenton is an American hero.

William Dean

Howells'

"Poor Real
of

Life"

33

Nevertheless, his happiness is

environment.

threatened

by

the

instabity
named

his family's

social

Kenton is

Civil War veteran,

having

been

by

the Ohio

recruits as

their regimental commander. After the war, Colonel Kenton

career and was elected a

pursued a

legal

county judge. At the time

of

the novel, Kenton is

retired, slowly writing his regiment's tion of his three youngest children.

history,

and

trying

to complete the educa

Of these three, the She has been an alter tion, her

affection

one nearest
ego

Kenton's heart is his

and personal

eldest

daughter, Ellen.
also atten

in his
a

literary
his

pursuits, but she is

the shyest and most unworldly

original suitor

of

children.

Despite Kenton's caring

who wishes advancement.

for him
of

as a

young parvenu, Bittridge, stepping stone for his own social

is

to use her

Because

considerable

Ellen's continuing attachment, Kenton cannot use the family's influence in their little town of Tuskingum, Ohio, to thwart the
as good

courtship.
a

Moreover,

Americans, both
which

parents

believe that is the

marriage

is

gevity.

voluntary contract between equals in In order to cool the relationship,

spend

free

choice

key

to lon

and with

Ellen's consent, the Kentons

decide to The

the

winter

in New York (p. 3). is thwarted

when

planned separation

Bittridge,

now with

his

mother

in

tow, follows them there. Kenton sees has been even further eroded in the

that his protection against Bittridge's suk

anonymous

New York

world where

the

family
ized
as

have themselves become

estranged.

Kenton finds his

worst

fears

real

he

surveys

"the

crowd"

in the hotel lobby.

were

He knew from their dress him in

a

and

bearing they
they

tender place to realize that

and a respect which or

they had

each

country people, and it wounded left behind him in his town an

authority
them

could not
or

enjoy in New York.

Nobody

called
what

judge,

general, or

doctor,

squire; nobody cared who

they

were, or

they thought; Kenton did not care himself; but when he missed one of them he envied him, for then he knew that he had gone back to the soft, warm keeping
his
own neighborhood, and resumed grown

of

the intelligent regard of a community he had

up

with.

(P.

18)

Like many Americans in a similar position, Kenton is convinced he is "val To the extent his family can be ued merely for the profit that was in identified as upper middle class and midwestern, they will be easy marks for
him."

the

various sharpers and pranksters

Kentons'

they

encounter.

If

commerce

favors

clever

ness, the

simple

decency

makes them objects of

prey,

not of praise. extreme

Finally, Ellen is persuaded by her family, behavior, to reject his suit. Exasperated by this
unwillingness

and

Bitteridge's

mis

rum of events and

by

Kenton's

to

accept

his apology, Bittridge abruptly humiliates the elderly

"exiles"

judge.

Witnessing

this outrage, the anonymous and passive

on and

and

the

mercenary hotel staff ally dismissed from the hotel,

arrest.3

Kenton's behalf. Bittridge only Kenton's forbearance

and

his

mother are

prevents

Bittridge's

34

Interpretation
This

"gathering
his

of the neighborhood about

angers

Kenton,

where

he had felt him

not

unfriended,"

self so

George Carrington. In his judgment, Howells is

to foresee

tme to

experience of alienation or able

crowd-society"

the "modem fragmented

and vulgarized urban

(p. 50).
Carrington 's in
ac

Tocqueville

sometimes experiences a problem similar to

counting for the preservation of virtue in a nation dedicated to the principles of modem individualism. What prevents the degeneration of American society

into

mass egoism

is

a question

haunting

his

reflections

(Tocqueville,

pp. 671

74). Tocqueville
religious

suggests

that

a combination of

individual

utilitarianism and

doctrine helps
can

create

the opinions which influence

individual behav in

ior. But it

be

argued

that he never identifies the most prominent manner transmitted in

and a

which opinions about virtue are rational

images

of

respectability,
of

American life. Through general, continuing skeptical determination to

the people
maintain a general social

leam the truth

morality,

or

leaving

reality for a greater

these

images,

This is the positive, and of "the tyranny of the

agement

familiarity the appraisal of more refined virtues. largely unexplored (even by Tocqueville), dimension
guests are

majority."4

The judge's belief that his fellow

ton believes

indifferent to him

and the man

only mercenary virtue is recognized

stems

from

an antique view of moral cognition.

Ken

within a small

community

capable of

judging

virtuous actions minutely,

thus enabling the community to adequately

praise or character a suspect

blame the
apparent

actor.

to

an observer

Although there may be indications of a virtuous in a mass society, mere appearance is always
of a

basis for judgment independent

Until

knowledge

of

the individual involved.

one has lived in a community for some time, he is essentially invisible, Kenton believes. He does not realize that even among the in New York he is still within the purview of the larger American community.
"exiles"

Rooted in his

mral

community, Kenton fails to perceive the significance of

a mass society.

images
calculus

or symbols

in

More perceptive, his

creator

Howells

recognizes

that social consciousness is

determined
images
The

by

more than a utilitarian

(described

by Tocqueville)
from the

or a personal experience of others sought of virtue and vice within

by ing

Kenton. It

results

rational

the

consciousness of

the intelligent population.

a small

qualities of

Kenton's life

mak

him

leader in

Ohio community

are

easily recognizable,

even

in

New York. His conscientiousness, his fine family, his (not to mention his age, in comparison with Bittridge),

comportment and attire,

identify
because

the

judge,

mak

ing

him

a character

worthy

of admiration and respect

of what

he is

what

he has
of

accomplished.

Based

on

his

own experience of the competitive

nature attain

American society, the intelligent observer knows what it takes to Kenton's condition. Insofar as these images represent standards of human

and the populace maintains its commonsense realism (inherited enlightened, scientific rationalism) in judging them, the citizens act responsibly and morally toward one another.

perfection,

from

an

William Dean
The
substitution of appearance of

Howells'

"Poor Real

Life"

35

respectability for knowledge of character, the mass by society, may threaten to produce both conformity and confidence men, although, as long as the standard is a decent one, it is reason
necessitated

to believe these images will contribute to a benevolent result. Thus, while judge may not be able to replace the depth of human feeling possible in his Ohio community, the true basis of a moral society remains even in New York,
able

the

"exiles,"

among
standards of

as

long

as

the opinions

of

the majority

are

based

on

decent

behavior.
once more after the

Kenton is tested
on a voyage

family

continues

its

self-imposed exile

to Europe. When the Reverand Breckton emerges as a shipboard

suitor,
mould:

all of

Kenton's doubts

are revived.

Breckton

appears of the

Bittridge

witty,

light,

and

jesting. Moreover, he is

accompanied

by

a woman and

her daughter, not themselves the souls of modesty. Once again, the in the hotel lobby, Kenton considers them strangers
"crowd"

as

he had

with

and

thus prob

is.5 ably hostile. However, Breckton is friendly to Kenton: he sees who Kenton By the end of the novel Breckton and Ellen are married and living in New

York. This
short encapsulation of a part of
most

The Kentons illustrates

what an

is

perhaps

Howells'

familiar theme. Even though the Kentons

are

unusually

strong
of

family

and

"certainly
they

richer than the

average

in the

pleasant county-town

the Middle

West,"

cannot escape the constant

turmoil of American life.

Of course, the turmoil of that life, and its rationality, are of a piece. The openness produced by free political institutions operating in a large country re quires and produces competition in all forms: in economic, educational, social,
as well

as political
an

ages

disguises

inner

institutions. However, the turmoil that openness encour core of rational expectations. For example, a compara into
a prominent

tive stranger may marry

family

or

be hired

by

distinguished
ob

company, but if the bright

and well-educated stranger

"chance"

fails to fulfill the

ligations he has sought, his those who attempt to live in the

may be more than withdrawn. Therefore space defined by that openness, such as Bitt

ridge,
results

are

eventually controlled by those rational expectations. The society that from these various competitive and rational economic, political, and is fair, in most instances, even if it enforces a certain degree of But for those like Kenton who are persevering, if unperceptive, the
and

social situations

conformity.
overall

stability
aspect.6

rationality

of

American society

have, Howells

once

said,

view may further elaborate and clarify of the individual's relation to society. In The Son of Royal Langbrith (1904), the son of the title after graduating from Harvard returns to the town which has other examples

smiling Perhaps two

Howells'

reaped the generous rewards of and a

should

his late father's beneficence. Out

home,"

desire to

assert

himself in his "ancestral

filial piety, he decides the town

of

do

more

to honor the memory of Royal Langbrith. After meeting unac to his plan to erect a commemorative plaque to his

countable resistance

father,

36

Interpretation
secret and unpleasant

he discovers the
successful man

truth. Although Langbrith

was

the most

brith defrauded
his
own a second mother.

and

in his community, he was the least liked broke his partner, his boyhood friend; he similarly

or respected.

Lang

cheated

brother.

However,
over

the

crowning is
visited

act was

his bigamous decision to

keep

family

the futile objections of his first wife, the protagonist's

son

Royal Langbrith's less

by

the sins of the fathers. Through the the next generation, his

harm Langbrith inflicted

success appears

on

his own,

and now

financial

magnificent

than it apparently once did.

even

The American

experience

remains, for Howells

social

in its

most

individualistic period, the

seen

Gilded Age
Landlord

in

character.
Howells'

The farthest
at

point of

experiment with

individualism is

in The

Lion's Head (1897). Here the protagonist, Jeff Durgin, makes himself into a successful hotel owner and succeeds in marrying a
"grand" "respectability."

woman of

All this he

accomplishes

through a determined and

consideration of

entirely

pmdent pursuit of general social

his

economic

interests, ignoring any

the

family,
wished

obligation,

or the opinion of

woman

to

marry.

The

price of success on

his terms is

near-perfect social

he originally isola

tion, which Durgin seems to accept with entire equanimity. What will become of his young daughter raised in such perfect isolation is another matter, unless

highly unlikely event, she is able to imitate her father's self-absorption. If the reality of the American experience is the economically and socially competitive middle class, founded politically on modem natural right and eco
nomically connecting merely
with on

in the

the new science of nature, Howells

was

persuaded the nexus

was more

modem natural right and economics with

sociability

than

a rational consciousness.

It

was also constituted

by

an almost universal

religious ethic.

Perhaps
Gaul"

a greater rationalist

than

Tocqueville, Howells believed

troubled.7

"the

lively

that the almost universal social presence of religion

prevented

American

moeurs

from

In his last

major work of

massively fiction, The Leatherwood God, Howells

themes. Here he
proclaim
gives a

becoming

experi

mented with one of

portrayal of

his

several millenarian

fictional
and

Joseph

Dylks,

a man who

did, indeed,

himself God

attempt to call

Ohio,
was

down the New Jerusalem in the little town of in the 1820s. However, unlike his contemporary Joseph

Leatherwood, Smith, Dylks

unwilling to organize a militia to protect the faithful, and this reluctance to Howells' shed blood led to his eventual downfall, in view (p. 157).
Howells'

who can see or decipher the falsity of blind. Braile is an Enlightenment figure, a lawyer who has been elected justice of the peace despite his sarcastic skepti cism about the intemperate spiritualism of his neighbors. They ignore his rea
Dylks'

foil is Matthew

Braile,

godhead where others are

soned appeals
Ohio,"

to morality, to

"Blackstone,"

and so

Braile is

unable to

and to the "statutes of the state of drive the faithful from the new and more

potent threat presented

by

Dylks.

Dylks

under

arrest, Braile releases

Moreover, having the opportunity to keep him, arguing that although Dylks is a source

William Dean
of

Howells'

"Poor Real
God
of and

Life"

37

evil, he has broken

are not

no

law.

Proclaiming
offenses

oneself

announcing the
the mle of law

New Jerusalem legislated

indictable
is

in the State
natural

Ohio.
and

Justice Braile 's defense

of modem

reason,

right,

Dylks drowns himself attempting a miracle. This pmdent outcome be said to indicate awareness may that the regime had a permanent character capable of sustaining itself even
citizens vindicated when
Howells'

by free

against

the powerful spiritual challenges of the Second Great Awakening.

unsympathetic
or

While Dylks
156).

to the millenarian

Christianity
with

represented

by

Joseph
the

Joseph

Smith, Howells described

characteristic
of religious

realism

American

social conditions

encouraging this kind

fervor (pp. 3,

Howells'

interest in the American

and

religious question was

extensive, embrac

black Protestantism, among others (A Foregone ing Conclusion, 1874; Suburban Sketches, 1870; An Imperative Duty, 1891). For his own reasons, Howells was deeply attracted to anabaptist utopianism, while
recognizing the inevitable social influence of liberal Protestantism. We will discuss these latter two religious-social experiences as part of our guide to
Howells'

Roman Catholicism

view of social morality.

For

a major part of socialism.

his life Howells

was

fascinated

by

the

Shakers'

radical
Shakers'

Christian
strict

Although embodying his idealistic principles, the

Utopian,
unrealistic aspect of

celibacy

confirmed the

their existence. Nev

ertheless, Howells

was captivated

by

their spirituality and their

benevolence,

both among themselves and toward their neighbors. Indeed, in his most ex tended treatment in The Undiscovered Country (1880), Howells portrays the life
of an
salvation

elderly Shaker community as one of for the protagonist and his daughter.

great

harmony

and as a

kind

of

of

The primary or original theme of The Undiscovered Country is the spiritism the late nineteenth century. The essential problem is the protagonist, Dr.
to accept the childbirth-related death of his wife, resulting
reestablish contact with
with

Boynton's, inability
in for
a

determination to In his

her. This

motivation

Boynton basis

masks, even from

spiritism.

himself,

his

stated

desire to

develop
is

a scientific

pursuit of

the "undiscovered
remarkable

country,"

he

chooses as

his

his only child, Egeria. This doctor's eyes because he exercises an

medium

"method"

scientific

in the her.

absolute and predictable control over

"recapture"

However,

the

greater

the

doctor'

determination to
greater

his

wife and

create a new science of spiritism

grows, the

the strain placed on

Egeria,

bringing

about

her

collapse. neighborhood of a
Shakers'

Her breakdown occurring in the

ther and daughter
are

taken there. Under the

their spiritism

Shaker community, fa care and instruction, Dr.

Boynton is
ety,
an
while

persuaded

is

a truer alternative to

his

scientific vari

Egeria is

nursed

back to health

by

the

old

Shakers

and reunited with

early love.
Influenced

by

Tolstoy's Christian socialism, The Undiscovered

Country

is

38

Interpretation
skeptical of

profoundly
odied
ual novella

the psychological theories of its time (which are par

context see

to some extent in Howells's hands. In this

his

great

homosex

The Shadow of

Dream, 1890.). Conversely, The Undiscovered

Shakers'

Country

equally sympathetic treatment of the in a realistic, American setting. A perhaps more approach to the "religious
presents an
"Tocquevillean"

Christianity
question"

in is

America

can

be

seen

in the

several novels

featuring

the Reverend Sewell. He

the protagonist in The Minister's Charge (1886), and appears in The Rise of Silas Lapham (1885). A Congregationalist minister, Sewell is the embodiment of the ethical Christian, one who wishes to use Christian love both charitably
and rationally.

If Sewell desires to heal the

shows

wounds of

society

and

self, The

Minister's Charge
the
novel

the limits of his charity in

a real social situation.

In

Sewell finds it difficult to

of a poor and

undo the evils produced

by

his

well-inten

inexperienced young poet. In The Rise of Silas Lapham, contrarily, Sewell is used to defend realism against the sensational romanticism of a popular novel, Tears, Idle Tears, and at the conclusion he
tioned

flattery

helps Silas

appreciate his ethical rise, enabling Lapham to accept the nearimpoverishment resulting from it. More than any other religious character, Minister Sewell embodies recognition that within the modem demo
Howells'

cratic experience religion could promote

individual happiness
revelation.

and

defend the right

di

rights So
and a

of man as pervasive

the earthly task

of

God's

is this

association

in America between

modem natural

"Christianity"

universalized,

ethical

that any theoretical

movement

vorced

from them, whether spiritism, a socialist materialism, or anarchism, is sufficiently foreign that a serious adherent courts social ostracism or worse.
suggests that

Howells
cal

Christianity, if not simply subordinating itself to

society, thus
a civil

the ethi

demands direct

of modem

avoid

confrontation with

religion, will becoming simply it. The Reverend Peck in Annie Kilburn (1888)
same

is

a socialist taken

seriously,

awaits the anarchist

who loses his position and his life. The Lindau in A Hazard of New Fortunes (1890).

fate

IV

If many

Howells'

of

observations seem

Tocquevillean in character,
was guided as a

this sim

ilarity

appears

to result

from their
no

similar subject.

Although Howells knew

Tocqueville's work, there is

hint that he

Indeed,

even

though Howells might be understood

to the

"fictional

guide"

by it in "literary

respect.8

any
or

companion"

American regime, Tocqueville thought such an effort futile. Because "nothing is more petty, insipid, crowded with paltry interests American," in one word, antipoetic than the daily life of an Americans are uninterested in their social life except in the form of caricature or
melodrama,
where

the reader's

innermost

and strongest

longings

and aversions can

be

viv-

William Dean

Howells'

"Poor Real

Life"

39

idly

represented

(Tocqueville,

p.

485). Given the

Howells'

salience of
career

Tocqueville's
milieu other

view, it is impossible to imagine

than that of

literary

in any
a

American Victorianism,
Howells'

when

the existence of

large, leisured,
provides

feminine readership
All in all, the best mirror for
near-total

encouraged the serious examination of social conventions.

"dear, honored
art.

prime

favorite, Jane

Austen"

Howells'

Although the American

but
serious

professionals

lack the

leisure,

and some of

the refinement, of the country squirearchy peop

playful of

Jane Austen's novels, the carried on apace in the works

ling

inquiry

into domestic life is

Howells'

epitomize

significantly broader, carried as in this paper. For both authors, however, the family hearth provides the setting where personality and social reality can be disentangled and exam ined so that the inquisitive are able "to know themselves better in the delicate,
(or
not so

If anything, work is it is to the range of social issues I have tried to

authors.

both

delicate), beauty

of

their everyday

lives"

(My

Mark Twain). Pre

sumably,

as

long

as the

democratic American

regime

survives, this knowledge

will remain green.

ence

If this is the case, those searching for a realistic view of the human experi in the great continental republic should seek beyond the theoretical deduc
critical

tions of
the

Marxism
and
not

"lonely

crowd"

liberal orthodoxy the "one-dimensional or look at the work of the most serious of the American
or
man"

realists.

Although

free from
our

certain peculiarities and

anachronisms, How

ells continues

to attract

interest for the

reason an earlier commentator gave. what

"In the

years

to come he

who would our social

know

American life
can

like,
give

and would peer

into

complexities,
of

was [is] really do nothing better than to

Howells."9

his days

and nights

to the study

William Dean

NOTES

but it tightens
together"

1. This is Tocqueville's understanding, e.g., natural ones. At the same time (p. 589). William Dean Howells

pp.
as

507, 587-89. "Democracy loosens

it
separates

social

ties,
in A
the

citizens, it brings kindred

and the
"ideal"

closer

wrote about

divorce

of

the

family
last

Modern Instance (1882). 2. William Dean Howells, English

n.22). novelists

My

Mark Twain,

p.

15. "Jane Austen

was

the first

and

of

truthfulness"

to treat

material with entire

"We

are still

only

beginning

to realize how fine she

(WDH to Brander Matthews, p. 168, was; to perceive after a hundred years

that in the form of the imagined

fiction."

fact, in

the expression of personality, in the conduct of the

narrative, and the subordination of incident to character, she is still unapproached in the

English

branch

of

Anglo-Saxon
good

Her fiction is

characterized

by

"its

lovely humor,

its delicate

(Heroines of Fiction, I, 32). Cited in its kindness, its truth to work is the best currently available. Bennett, whose introduction to 3. Kenton's forbearance is not shared by everyone in his family. When Bittridge returns to
satire, its
sense,
Howells'

nature''

Tuskingum, he is
overcoat

met at

the station

by

the

Kentons'

eldest

son, Richard.

"Bittridge,

with

his

his arm, advanced towards him with the rest, and continued to advance, in a sort of fascination, after his neighbors, with the instinct that something was about to happen, parted on either side of Richard, and left the two men confronted. Richard did not speak, but deliberately

hanging

on

reached out

his left hand,

which

he

caught

securely into Bittridge's collar; then he began to beat

40
him

Interpretation
with the cowhide wherever

word,

and except of

body
loose
pull

which

they
and

his writhing and twisting shape. in the air, and the rasping sound of its arrest upon the Bittridge, the thing was done in perfect silence. The witnesses stood back in a daze, from recovered when Richard released Bittridge with a twist of the hand that tore his collar
could strike

he

Neither

uttered a

for the

whir of the cowhide

left his

cravat

dangling,

and

tossed the frayed cowhide away,

and set

and turned and walked and others

homeward. Then his

collar

one of them picked

Bittridge's hat

it

aslant on

his head,

helped

together and tie his

moments

cravat.

"For the few

ent enough

that Richard Kenton remained in sight

they scarcely found

words coher

the

effect

for question, and when they did, Bittridge had nothing but confused answers to give to that he did not know what it meant, but would find out. He got into a hack and had

himself driven to his hotel, but he never made the 4. General opinion in Tocqueville is always

inquiry

which

he had

threatened"

(pp. 69-70).

negatively because it is necessarily "mass" opinion and hence inferior to aristocratic sensibility and learning. For this reason, he does not explore sufficiently the commonsense rationalism which is neither a purely self-interested cal
presented culus of utilitarian advantage nor rooted

in

religious opinion.

In On Liberty, Tocqueville's friend

to protect the

John Stuart Mill

radical

captured

his

suspicion of middle-class or mass opinion and sought genius

individualism
remark of

of

the

(aristocratic)

through an absolute liberty.

5. Breckton's clarifying
good

recognition and

the question of

images

or symbols are

brought together in

the author's: "In the mean time he had seen that these Kentons were sweet,
.

date

would

He did not know, as a man of an earlier people, as he phrased their quality to himself. have known, all that the little button in the judge's lapel meant; but he knew that it in the
civil

meant service

war, a struggle

which

he vaguely
or

and

impersonally
of a

revered, though its

1812"

details

were of much the same

dimness for him

as

those of the Revolution and War of

(pp.

85-86). Since Breckton does is

not a

not meet the

expectation,

image,

"good

person,"

and

the

judge

very

perceptive

man, it takes longer for him to

gain confidence members of

one might

expect, through Breckton's acceptance

by

those

his
the

in Breckton. He does so, as family in whom he does

reflections suggested

have

confidence.
a review of

6. In false
out

Dostoevsky, Howells
. . .

commented:

"It is

one of

by

Dostoevsky's book that

and mistaken or

whoever struck a note so

thing.

profoundly tragic in American fiction would do a Whatever their deserts, very few American novelists have been led
to the rigors of a winter in Duluth.
. . .

to be shot,

finally

expelled

We invite
the

our

novelists,

therefore,
can,
and

to concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of

universal

life,

which are

more

Ameri
to

to seek the

in the individual

rather

than the social interests. It is worthwhile even

actualities."

at the

be

a plea

own

of being called commonplace, to be true to our well-to-do for realism, but as Gore Vidal points out, "He [Howells] reputation for the next (p. 45).
century"

risk

This

was meant

rather

absently dynamited his

7. The effectively

following examples

Howells'

show

belief that rational,

middle-class opinion can survive

without constant reference

to religious opinions. Middle-class opinion is nourished

by

political and social education

and political
"consensus"

resulting from the American founding and experience. At the personal extremes, however, at those periods and for those individuals for whom an American does not exist or is not adequate, religious opinion is a necessary (if dangerous)
"Americanism."

handmaiden to

Nevertheless, because

modern reason

is both instrumental

and

progressive, it constantly requires a theoretical grounding it finds difficult to articulate or recover. Dr. Boynton's turn to spiritism, to be discussed below, demonstrates a typical instance of scientific
"progress,"

as

do the

various

professional, psychological theories

of

Howells'

time. The theoretical

Christianity provide a bulwark against this kind of scientific theorizing. 8. "A lively Gaul, who travelled among us some thirty years ago, found that, in the absence of political control, we gratified the human instinct of obedience by submitting to small tyrannies unknown abroad, and were subject to the steamboat-captain, the hotel-clerk, the stage-driver, and the waiter, who all bullied us fearlessly; but though some vestiges of this bondage remain, it is
tenets of

probably passing away. The abusive Frenchman's assertation ing the horse-car conductors, who, in spite of a lingering passengers for their fare instead of asking for it, are
and

would not at

preference

least hold good concern for touching or punching good-tempered,

one of them a mark of

commonly

mild-mannered and

disposed to

molest us as

little

as possible.

I have

even received

from

William Dean
such

Howells'

"Poor Real

Life"

41

kindly familiarity
give

as

the

offer of a check which

face to

me, both his hands

being

otherwise

occupied;

he held between his lips, and thrust out his and their lives are in nowise such

luxurious
scope

careers as we should expect

of

Howells is thinking

to arbitary power fear from it. It can even be the duration of office

in public (Suburban Sketches, p. 109). Democracy, Volume I, Part II, 5. "Nowhere has the law left greater than in democratic republics, because there they feel they have nothing to
said that magistrates

despots"

become freer as voting rights are wider spread and (p. 206). Tocqueville is speaking here of public officeholders, but I don't think Howells distorts his meaning by extending it to quasi-public officials like the horsecar
shortened"

conductors.

looking
mental

9. Schwartz, p. 232. In for a truly American

search

an earlier passage

novelist and the great

carried on

pally because the

has been

by

Schwartz says, "For years the world has been American Novel. It has found neither, princi aid of preconceptions which overlook the funda

Whatever European critics may say, we native born quality of our American life. Americans ought to know that in Mr. William Dean Howells we have had a great American novelist with us for more than eighty years, and that in the long list of books he has written we

have,

not
we

one, but many great American

novels"

(p. 266).

"If

imagine Howells

and

Henry James,

as

they
art,'

paced

the Cambridge streets, to be compet that James

won the race.

in setting forth 'the true principles of literary titles thrive in paperback; in the orotund oddity of his

ing

we must admit sentences and

His look

the passion of his

increasingly
as we

abstract

pattern-making, he looms as the first

we not
Life'

great

American

modernist

Yet,
.

about, could
Howells'

whereas say that James has many academic idolaters but few imitators faith in 'poor Real is everywhere put to the test, and banished to the
'effectism'
.

drugstore
mentation

racks and

the best-seller

lists

Today's fiction, the interested Howells.

Howells'

modernist vein of

formal

experi

exhausted, has turned, with an informal

politics which of

a minimalist

morality and sexual American life that so much

mestic

bluntness, It is, after

to the areas of do

all, the triumph

of

it

should

be

middling.

agenda remains our agenda:

for the

American

In 'everything brought 1903, I know not why, Charles Eliot Norton showed Howells some letters that Henry James had written him, likening Howells, with his fine style, to 'a poor man holding a diamond and wonder response was patient, brave, and defiant: he wrote Norton, 'I am not ing how to use sorry for having wrought in common, crude material so much; that is the right American stuff.
writer

to live in America and to mirror it in writing, with

out.'

it.'

Howells'

was

always,

as

still

am,

trying

to fashion

a piece of

literature

out of

the life next at

hand.'

It is

(Updike [1987], p. 88). One hard to see, more than eight decades later, what else can be concern with the moral character of modern society as well as wishes that Updike shared in quite the same way as his Howells never sought to have "everything brought
Howells'

done"

"agenda."

out"

John Updike has

achieved

in the four

novels

featuring

"Rabbit"

Angstrom.

Caricaturing

American

life in bringing, or hanging, everything out, Updike does not aid, in fact destroys, sentiment Howells saw in the American life next at hand. Cf. Updike (1990).

the realistic

REFERENCES

Bennett, George N. The Realism of William Dean Howells, 1889-1920. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1973. Bellah, Robert, et al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. New York: Harper and Row, 1985. Reprinted 1986. Carrington, George C, Jr. The Immense Complex Drama: The World and Art of the Howells Novel. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Crider, Gregory I. "William Dean Howells and the Antiurban Tradition: A Reconsidera
tion."

American Studies, 19(1978): 55-64.

of Fiction. 2
vols.

Howells, William Dean. Heroines

1901.

New York: Harper

and

Brothers,

42

Interpretation

University Press, 1971. The Leatherwood God. 1916. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Letter to Brander Matthews, 3 August 1902. In Life in Letters of William Dean Howells, ed. Mildred Howells. 2 vols. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1928.
The Kentons. 1902. Bloomington: Indiana

2:161.

My
,

Mark Twain. 1910. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

of

Review

Dostoevsky.

Harper'

Suburban Sketches. 1870.

University Press, 1967. s Magazine September, 1886. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1967.
,

Schwartz, Henry B. The Methodist Review March 1918, 232. Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Reprinted 1988. The New Yorker, 13 July Updike, John. "A Critic at Large: Howells as 1987, 78-88.
,
Anti-novelist.'

"Rereading

Indian

Summer.''

The New York Review of Books. 1

Stamp."

February

1990, 13-14. Vidal, Gore. "The Peculiar American October 1983, 45.

The New York Review of Books, 27

The Relation Between

Reflections
and on of

Philosophy

and

Religion:
the Source

Leo Strauss's Suggestion

Concerning

Sources

Modern

Philosophy

Laurence Berns
St. John's College, Annapolis

The

problem

from

fairly

straightforward way:

arating itself off within itself what

these reflections begin can be formulated in a Although philosophy came into the world by sep from religion, in modern times it seems to be incorporating
which more which takes

have in
phy
and

mind

is that its
I

properly belongs to religion. The modern philosophy I its relation to the tradition of Western Philoso
I
am

as part of

own self-definition.

thinking primarily
the

of

Nietzsche
of

and

Heidegger.1

The incorporation
will

of religious

ideas into the thought

Nietzsche

Heidegger,

argue, fulfills one

of

deepest tendencies

of modern

philosophy
of

as a whole.

The

aim of

this paper is to understand how and, more

importantly,
the
religion.

why this

change

has

come about

it. It

will require a general sketch

history
The

of the relation sketch will

between philosophy ("Western Philosophy") and culminate with Hegel, whose attempted integration of
seems

religion within
most

philosophy is, it
here is
not

to me,

most

clear,

most explicit and

thoroughgoing.
contrast

The

discourse

about god or gods

between philosophy and theology: natural theology, based on natural reason and naturally acquired It is traditionally
and

evidence, is

a part of philosophy.

correctly, I

believe,

distinguished from

however,
called

are not

supernaturally revealed theology of religion. The two, always kept apart, as the famous saying of Heraclitus illus
the

trates: "That

which alone

is
be

wise

by

the name of

Zeus"

is one, it does (Diels10, 32).

useful.

not wish and

it does

wish

to be

An illustration

might

The Declaration

of

Independence

of

the

United States
ness.

asserts that

the laws

of nature and of

Nature's God
and

entitle all men

to certain natural rights, among which are

life, liberty

the pursuit of happi

What is the basis in

I

nature of

these natural rights? The traditional and

the natural superiority of the rational animal, man, beasts. But that may be only half the story. We notice animals, that God is referred to in the Declaration at least four times in the following
correct answer,

believe, is

to

nonrational

order,

once as

legislator

of

the laws

of

nature, once

as

Creator,2

again as Su-

This is

a revised version of a

lecture delivered

at

St. John's College October 28, 1988.

interpretation, Fall

1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

44

Interpretation
Judge
of

preme

the World and

of

the divine Governor

united.

the

finally as the executor of Divine Providence. In world, legislative, executive and judicial powers are
United

The Founders
about

of the

States, like intelligent

men of all

times,

disagreed
seemed

many things, but if there is anything about which they all to agree, it is the necessity to separate the powers of government.
speaking, the uniting
of

Humanly
the
same

legislative,

executive and

judicial

powers

in

hands, they declared, is the very definition

goodness,
with no

of tyranny.

Only

divine

being

with supreme wisdom and

truth-obscuring

and exces

sively self-regarding passions could rightly possess such powers. The natural theology of the Declaration is then an extrapolation from the idea of good
government to

the idea of perfect government, and the perfect governor. No

human

being

can measure

up to

such a standard.

No human

being

is

suffi

ciently beings. The

godlike

to be entrusted

with such

despotic

power over other

human

natural rights of

the Declaration then stem from human superiority

with relation

to the beasts

and

human defect

with relation

to

God. All

men are

equal might

in that they are neither beasts nor gods. Does such a God exist? That require faith to believe. But the natural theology of the Declaration, the

idea

of such a a

God,
as

clarifies what

it is

meant

to clarify whether one conceives

of such

God

Providence, however,
bines its
natural

existing or not. By its reference to the Creator and His the Declaration brings both traditions together, it com theology with the revealed theology of the Biblical
tradition.3

I. THE SEPARATION OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY FROM

RELIGION THE

INCORPORATION OF RELIGION INTO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Both the lovers

the first

of myth and

the philosophers, Aristotle says,

wonder about

things,

the things

whose characters and actions govern all

the

rest.

The
no

first

philosophers
of

longer speaking

distinguished themselves from the lovers of the first things as gods, but as nature. Science

myth

by

and philoso
of nature.

phy come into the world, Aristotle suggests, with the There were and still are people who have no distinct idea
nature and natural

discovery
of nature.

The

words

do

not occur

in the Hebrew Bible

or

in the

Gospels.4

The
or

prephilosophic equivalents of the word nature seem to

"custom."

be the

"way"

words

the gods ordering discovery commanding things to go in their customary ways. The way or custom of fire is to go up and burn, for the earth to forth plants, for human beings to
of nature men spoke about and

Before the

bring

speak, for

one

a curious and

its dead, for another to bum its dead. At thoughtful person must have noticed that some ways
tribe to

bury

some point are always

the same
to

vary from time time, and still others would vary from time to time more if men did not make them happen the same way. Such a person begins to become aware of the distinctions between the necessary and the accidental or the neceswhile others

no matter what anyone

does

about

them,

contingent,

The Relation Between

Philosophy

and

Religion

45

sary and the customary and the necessary and the artificial. The ways that vary from place to place, from city to city, from tribe to tribe, must have been most

striking at first because they most horror-struck Greeks and Indians

burial The
customs
nature of

contradict
were on

"our

way."

Herodotus tells how

other's

learning
extend

of each

diverse

(III. 38). These divergencies

to differences about the

the gods themselves.

suspicion

begins to
are

arise

that the ways that are everywhere the same are

and

primary, permanent and

and

fundamental,

those that differ

and

from

town to town
manmade

from tribe to tribe

secondary, transient

derivative. The

things owe their existence to

same seem

forethought;

the ways which are

everywhere

the

to occur

by

themselves automatically

inside the things

characterized

by
or

them.

Way

or custom splits
other.5

law,

on the

up into nature, on the one hand, and convention That human beings can speak is natural, that this tribe
that tribe

speaks

its

particular

language,

its for

particular

language, is
life is
no

conventional.

Impersonal
mined

nature replaces

divine

ordination.

The

good

longer deter In Plato's

the

by

divine law but

race

by

the quest

what

is

right

by

nature.

Republic the torch

were supposed

in honor

of the

goddess,
of

which all

the interlocutors
quest of

to watch, is forgotten in favor

the

discussion in

life that is
world

good

according to

nature.

Philosophy

and science come

into the

separating themselves from religion. To see the other pole of our initial problem, the incorporation

by

of religion
or what

into philosophy,
society, from the

we turn to

Heidegger. For
cannot

Heidegger,

philosophy,

he

would rather call

Thinking,

be

academic or

isolated from the

spirit of

times, from history. The deepest sense of what things are, he argues, depends on History, and History, in German Ge schichte, he connects with the word Geschick, that which has been sent. The
spirit of one's own

sender, this

mysterious ground of of

existence,

or ground of

the relation between

being

and

human thought,
danger

human fate (Schicksal), he

sometimes calls

gods,

sometimes god.

The

great

of our

time, Heidegger argues, is that

as

we

are so over

whelmed we

by

the power of scientific, mathematical, technological

of

thinking

that

have begun to think

human beings

just

one more product of scientific

laws to be serviced,
on

used and

conveniently disposed

of.

In

contrast

to the focus

the depersonalized, the dehumanized, the cybernetic, he argues that the deepest truths about the world reveal themselves to thought and to thinkers that
"mine"

are

caring, committed,

concerned with what

they

regard as

and

ours,

with ment word

home
for

and

homeland.
virtue,

Authenticity,
no

the

standard

that

he

erects as a replace

ethical

emphasizes

the personal and particular. The German

Eigentlichkeit has

direct English equivalent, its literal meaning is

analytic,"

"one's deeper
That

ownness."

In his "existential

which

allegedly

exposes

the

"fallenness"

grounds of

any ethics, conscience, anxiety,

guilt and

be
the

come central.
your and

my

being here,

our

particularity, our

individuality,

even

46
fall

Interpretation
of a

sparrow, should have

ultimate significance would make

sense,

if

we

and our world are

the creations of a
religious

loving, caring
ideas

omnipotent

God. Heidegger
with

has incorporated Christian

out

and sentiments

into his thinking

that he

articulating the theological premises

they

presuppose.

In fairness to
rejects

Heidegger, however, it
prejudice.

should

be

said

emphatically

the account of the origin of philosophy

out of religion and myth as a

Platonic-Aristotelian
one and

"The fall

of

thinking into

the sciences, on the

Being."6

Reli is the evil, fateful sending of hand, faith, gious mythos and philosophic logos "became separated and opposed only there where neither mythos nor logos could maintain their original essential presence.
on

the other,

He denies that logos could destroy mythos. This happened already with ever destroyed religious is by logic; it is destroyed only by the god's "Nothing
himself."7

Plato."

withdrawing

II. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

For
and

our purposes, a sketch of the

usual

religion, the

quate.

They

are

history of the relation between philosophy distinctions ancient, medieval and modern seem ade distinguished here not according to the times of their origin and
of what each

predominance, but in terms

meaningfulness

takes to be the ultimate source of

(physiophilos

in the

world:

ancient

centric);

medieval

ophy

as man

philosophy as (human)-centered (anthropocentric). Although the later

earlier,

philosophy as nature-centered God-centered (theocentric) and modern

positions as

presuppose the existence of the

they

are not considered

here

time

bound.

They

are presented as much as possible

in their

own

terms as permanent

alternatives.

The way

representatives or

of each

position

account can

for the
serve

appearance

of

purposiveness

end-directed

activity in

nature

to

illustrate the

differences.
The primary
or

prescientific or prephilosophic
which

nature, physis, is growth,

meaning of the Greek word for includes that into which a thing grows, the end

term of growth, the state in which the

as we

thing is

most capable of

doing

the

work, or,

say, the

activity is

most characteristic of

function, living

characteristic of that thing.

End-directed
as

things. The acorn becomes intelligible

a possible oak.

The

structure of the eye

becomes intelligible
cause.

with a view

to

its

function
the
the most

of seeing.

Aristotle

speaks of such an end as a

cause, the

cause

"for
on

which,"

sake of

in its latinate

form, final

(We

concentrate

here

influential

part of ancient

philosophy,

Platonic- Aristotelian

Philoso in that

phy.) Aristotle defines

nature as a principle or cause of motion and rest

The Relation Between

to which it belongs
a

Philosophy

and

Religion

47

primarily and not by accident. The end of natural growth is potentiality inherent in the living thing from the beginning, in its constitution, so to speak, in its very matter. He frequently compares natural end-directed
activity to the end-directed activity of human making. The crucial differences are that in artifacts the final form of the work of art exists primarily in the mind
of

the artisan; both the end and the formative

produced

action

have their

source

in

thing Metaphysics, 1032a 12 ff). The unapprehended ends respiration, metabolism, animal instinct, etc., do not

the artisan, external to the

(Nicomachean Ethics, 1140al-23;

of natural activities

like

require an external mind natural

intending

them as purposes.

They

are

simply inherent in

things as

potentialities.

For Thomas Aquinas

end or

as representative of

the theocentric view there

some

is

no

final

cause that

is

not

intended

as such

intends the
actualized

completed work of art. not of

If the

by being

intelligence,
which

as

the

artist

in

the end

is

does

have the intelligence to instinct:

apprehend of

it, it is

apprehended quote

being by

the

intelligence

another, namely the intelligence

God. We

from his

discussion

of natural

the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the

natural appetite of

insensible things

result
.

from the
. .

apprehension of an

the intellectual nature

called the will.

But there is

intellect, just as the appetite of a difference, in that the will

subject;
whereas

is

moved

by

an apprehension of the

intellect in the

same

the

movement of the natural appetite results

from the
as

apprehension of the separate

Intellect, Who is
animals who act

the Author of

Nature;

does
.

also
.

the sensitive appetite of dumb

from

a certain natural

instinct

in the

actions of

irrational
similar to
. . .

animals and of other natural things

we observe a procedure which

is

the

actions of

art.8

According
centric

to Immanuel Kant the necessary

and

as

representative

of

the modern anthropo

constitute
objective

view,

universal

laws

which

knowledge
to
nature

of nature are not

by

found in the things themselves, but are prescribed understanding. When we come across phenomena like human the

the

phenomena of

living

organized

beings for

which

the laws of
of

mechanical

cause and effect

do

not seem

adequate, the reflective

judgment

the investiga
them

tor
as

should

supply the in

phenomena with purposive

laws that

make sense of

if

some

intelligent cause,
nature

God, had

produced

them. Like

Thomas, Kant

argues that ends

only

make sense when

they

are

thought of as in

intelligence, namely God. Teleology, he argues, finds its con by summation in theology. But this God cannot be assumed to have objective reality. We produce and supply the idea of such a being to ourselves in order to our cognitive faculties (Kritik der Urteilskraft, satisfy the subjective needs of 76). and 75 sections Einleitung and
tended
some

The

ultimate source of

the

appearance of end-directed

activity in irrational

48

Interpretation
for the
ancients

nature

is the inherent

nature of

things in themselves, for the

medievals

the mind of

God, for

the moderns the human understanding itself.

HI. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The

Platonic-

Aristotelian,
of

or

Socratic, way
are nature

of

seeking the primary,

other

perma

nent and

fundamental things that

(among

human speech) culminates truly fundamental is the intelligible. For Plato it seems to be the eternal ideas, or forms, or species; for Aristotle the thinking, or active intellection that is the
through the implications

things, by thinking in a doctrine that the

life

or

energy

constitutive of

them,

the universals. If there

ideas, or as he sometimes calls is to be genuine knowledge, or even true opinion,

those forms or

of things

same time

in themselves, these intelligibles must be able to exist at one and the both in the things they characterize and in the mind knowing them,
as

in the things
beings to

enmattered, in the

mind as

thought

(Plato, Meno, 72c6-dl).

rational

Corresponding
There is

to the

intelligibility
the power

apprehend another

it,

in things, then, is the power in all called nous, intellectual intuition.

for the
classical philosophers

way to
the

put this:

the

intellig

ible is the divine,

sufficiency of life; in this respect there is

for the truly divine is philosophy. The selfthe intelligible is the standard for both theoretical and practical
and concern

harmony

between theory

and practice.

But the
say,

intelligible is
in
general one's own.

manifested and

in

universal or general practical action

principles,

or as we often

laws,

every

is

a particular

action,

an action of

intelligible,
physics,

It is true that every human action is more or less permeated by the by understanding, but it is always a particular action mixed with
and

the accidental

the contingent, the

inherently

unintelligible

(Aristotle,

Meta

1072al4, 1036a9). According

to this philosophy then, it is impossible

seems

for any particular or contingent event to be absolutely sacred. There be a tension in our souls between the love of the good recognized

to

by

intel

ligence
that

and the

love

of one's own

that

guides our spirited part.

It is the

natural

favoritism

of parents

for their

own children and

its

conflict with pure

justice

leads to the

unnatural

family

arrangements of
own
our

Plato's Republic.
our

Since both, the love of one's love of the good stemming from
about

stemming from

intelligence,

are rooted

particularity and the in human nature,

the tension between them can assume tragic proportions. We

have

no choice

family and country ancestry is barely sup portable for most individuals, families and societies. Virtue is not virtue, knowledge is not knowledge, until it becomes one's own. The love of own's own and the love of the good are both equally primordial or ineradicable. But
in
which we are

the

genetic

makeup born. Yet to be deprived

with which we are

endowed, the

of pride of

both are equally primordial is not to say that both are of equal dignity. As Leo Strauss put it, classical "idealism" held that "the form is higher
to say that

The Relation Between

in
to

Philosophy

and

Religion

49

dignity
is
of

than the matter.

The

practical
.
.

good

higher

dignity

than

one's own.

Socrates in the Symposium, the love

in the

of

meaning of this idealism is that the On the highest level, according one's own and the love of the good
of

are reconciled one's own

beautiful,

the true object

love is "to have the

good

be

forever"

(206a).
the time the
words of

But for

most of us most of

Plato's Athenian Stranger

seem appropriate:

In truth the
excessive

cause of

love

of oneself.

every failure For the

comes to each person each time through one who

loves is blinded

that he judges the just and the good and the noble things

bound

always to

honor

what

is his

own

before the truth

about the beloved, so badly, believing that he is (Laws, 731e-732a).

This

consequence of our particular

needs, this

tendency

to sacrifice the truth

virtue

to the love of one's own, points to

political

moderation as a

key

in

moral and

life,

even the moderation of our

highest hopes.

The

sublime

Alenu

prayer

sung

at

the close of almost every Jewish religious

service calls out:

We therefore hope in thee, O Lord

of

our

God,
be

that

we

thy

might,

when

the abominations

will

removed

may speedily behold the glory when the from the earth
. .

world will

be

perfected under the

kingdom

of

the

Almighty,

and all the children of

will

flesh

will call upon

thy

name and all

the wicked of the earth

be turned to thee.

Compare this
odorus:

Socrates'

with

"But it is

not possible
always

is necessary that there

ate

Thereply in the Theaetetus to an enthusiastic for evils to be done away with, Theodorus, for it The moder be something contrary to the
good."

Socrates, however, does

of course evils cannot

not silence

that

be

established

evils

"to haunt

mortal nature and

his heart; he goes on to add among gods, but necessity forces the Flight from these evils, he this region
the
voice of
here."

says,

partial assimilation

to the

divine

as

far

as possible

intelligence, may be possible for whole {Theaetetus, 176a-b).

That
moderation

some

individuals but

in justice, holiness and not for society as a

action, but
not

is the

virtue

of

the

philosopher's

his

thoughts is exhibited

by

this

statement of

the

tenth-century Arabic

philosopher

Alfarabi
There
to be

on

the relation of classical philosophy to religion.

are two ways of

perceived

making

thing

comprehensible:

by

the

the similitude that imitates it.

either

intellect, by Assent, too, is brought

and second
.

first, by causing its essence it to be imagined through causing

about

by

one of two methods,

....

the

method of

demonstration

or the method of persuasion

when

one acquires
perceives

knowledge

of
.

the beings or receives instruction in them, if he

their

ideas

with

his intellect,

and

his

assent

...

is

by

means of

demonstration,
if they
are

then the science that comprises these cognitions

known

by imagining

them through similitudes

is philosophy that imitate them, and

....

50

Interpretation
assent

to

what

is imagined
these
an

...

is

caused

by

persuasive methods then the ancients

. . .

call what comprises

cognitions religion

Therefore, according
Religion
sets

to the

ancients,

religion

is

imitation

of

philosophy
. . .

forth images [of

the ultimate principles]

by

similitudes

taken

from
. .

corporeal principles and

imitates them

by

their

likenesses among

political offices

Further,
and

to enable us to overcome the passions bred

of one's

by

radical selfishness

the

love

own, counteracting
order

lawabiding

passions must

be bred

by

the

sanctification of

norms, in

to enable us to live

decently

in society

with

a modicum of

freedom. Such

sanctifications require

divinities that

can address

us

passionately,

individually

and

phy never considered itself able If Aristotle's treatment of religion is to be found anywhere, I believe it is Poetics," most of all in his and in scattered remarks in the Ethics, Politics, Rhetoric
and

collectively, here and now. Classical philoso to become a substitute for public religion.

Metaphysics. For Thomas

Aquinas,
which

on

the other

hand, it is
and paid to

much

clearer: religion

is

classified

in the Summa Theologica

as a part of the moral

virtue of

justice,

religion

is the worship

is properly due

God.

IV. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Medieval philosophy is philosophy with revealed and the Koran. For the
world,
as

characterized

by

the attempt to reconcile classical

with

or scriptural most

religion,

the religions of the Bible

philosophers

influential

medieval

the natural

far

as natural reason unaided

by

supernatural revelation could com

prehend

it,

was

to be

understood

through the philosophy of Aristotle. The

fun

damental

presupposition

revealed word and entails

for medieval philosophy is belief in the truth of the in the God that is its supernatural source. This assumption
of and

important

modifications

deviations from Aristotelian doctrine.

at

Aristotle evidently held that the visible universe is eternal, that its intelligible underpinnings, the forms, are eternal.
All
philosophers seem to

least,

with

Plato,

have

accepted what

has been

called the principle of

causality, namely, that nothing comes into

consequence of the principle
thing.12

It is

rather

that:

being out of nothing. The positive Everything comes into being out of some Everything that comes into being comes into being out
is
not:
which"

of something.

Those "somethings have

not come

out of

have

either themselves come

into

being

or

scientific and philosophic

into being, that is, are unchanging. The task for knowledge then is to discover the permanent or un
change.13

changing somethings, or principles, underlying says, "that the world did not always exist is held
proved

As Thomas Aquinas
and cannot

by

faith alone,

be
the

by

demonstration."14

The Bible tells

earth.

us

that in the

beginning

God
or

created the

heaven

and

If the

ultimate principles are

there

was no ultimate

eternal, philosophy tells us, unchanging beginning. To meet the challenge of ancient philosophy,

The Relation Between

religious or scriptural philosophers

Philosophy
Almighty

and

Religion

51

declare that
in

miraculously,

created

everything

out of nothing. mind

The Platonic

God supernaturally, and Aristotelian

He
creates

forms

are

thoughts in the divine

accordance with which

the

laws
will.

of nature. of

limitations

any human making, it is not bound by the its materials, for all material limits too are grounded in God's
unlike

Creation is

There is, therefore, no eternal order independent of divine will, no source of principles for human guidance apart from that will. If the God of the Bible is
omnipotent, He is
creatures escapes
also omniscient. notice.

Not the least

action of

the least

of

his

his
a

In

practice

conflict

caring God, a just and loving God. There is no necessary between the love of one's own and the good, if the love of one's own

He is

is

sanctified

by

the ultimate principle

of

the universe.
reveals

Particularity

is

not

dispar
to

aged: the ultimate principle of particular souls are

the universe
and

itself in

personal address

men,

particular

families

nations,
of

on particular occasions.

If their

immortal,

each

individual is

fully
139).

at

home in the

world when

the world is one's Father's

everlasting importance. One can be house (Psalms,

gulf

On the

other

hand,

one might

say that the

between

man and

the God of

the Bible is unbridgeable. In the Hebrew Bible the mutuality of the Covenant and the gift of the Law bridge the gulf. In Christianity the gulf itself, one is tempted to say, is overcome man,

by

the mystery of God's

becoming
Jesus'

a particular

by

the very notion that full

divinity

can exist

in

a particular man.

The

pain of the moral gulf of

between
all

man and

God is justified

relieved

the world's sin, for

those who are

by by believing

assumption

in that

sacrifice.

Morality for the

and perversion

Bible

as a whole

takes on heightened importance to the

when error

become sin,

an ungrateful personal affront

loving

all-

powerful source of all goodness. addition to natural and

In explaining why divine law was needed in human law Thomas Aquinas says that because "of the
...

uncertainty
that
man

of

human judgment
without

on contingent and particular matters

may know
was

doubt

what

he

ought to
...

do

and what

he

ought

to

avoid, it
.
. .

by

necessary for man to be directed by a law given by God, for law cannot err (ST, I II, Q. 91, A. 4). This, however, is moderated the arguments of philosophers like Thomas that the great bulk of morality is
such a

given to men through the natural

perfect natural powers

law,

the law of

reason.

Virtues

are

habits that

in

a world so

designed
classical

as

to allow reason to discover

ends

implicit in

nature.

Something
is kingdom

like

moderation, the moderating of

medieval

unreasonable expectations,

also preserved of

in the
the

distinction be
"other"

tween this
world.

world and the

heaven,

world

to come, the

How

can classical and medieval

Thomas'

mental assumptions?

philosophy deal with each other's funda harmonizing formula is that revelation goes be Because
revelation

yond, but

cannot

contradict,

reason.

is superior, philosophy
philos-

is the handmaid

of

theology. That

is

not acceptable

to Alfarabi's ancient

52

Interpretation is
an

opher: religion

imitation

of and

therefore

subordinate

to

philosophy.

The
that

possibility of Creation, Revelation that God is omnipotent and his will is unfathomable. Can assumption? Is it self-contradictory? Can revelation refute
and miracles seem

to

rest on

the

assumption

reason refute reason?

Can they
until

both
tute
all

even agree about what would constitute a

evidence?

refutation,

what would consti

rational proof

demands
claims

suspension of

belief,
be

or

doubt,

the

evidence

is in. Revelation

that its truth requires

accepted and

faith in the

re

vealed and

revealing God in
can refute

order

to be

to

understood.

From

the

point of view of rational

philosophy,

faith

knowledge. Each
presupposing its irrefutable.

the other only

by

belief is simply insufficient begging the question in dispute,

or

own canons

for

understanding.

They

appear

to be mutually

Faith, Thomas Aquinas

is
moved

tells us,

is

an act of

the intellect

wherein

the intellect

to assent, not

by

the clarity and evidence of the intellect's proper

object,

but

by

the

command of

the will, the

practical

faculty.15

This

subordina

tion of the theoretical to the

practical

faculty

is

another

fundamental difference

between

ancient and medieval philosophy.

V. MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The

mutual

irrefutability

gested, has
ern

created a

philosophy and revelation, Leo Strauss has sug tension that is perhaps the secret of the vitality of West
of

of

Civilization, a civilization that will not allow the mind the heart, nor the heart to drown out the voice of the
philosophy Revelation and
more

to silence the voice

mind.

This tension

must trouble

than faith. If faith in the

omnipotent

God

of

Creation,
on
opinion?16

miracles cannot

indemonstrable premises, just To free itself from this

different kind

be refuted, does philosophy itself rest of faith, or at best, disputable

unresolvable

tension and uncertainty, Strauss sug

gests,

a new

kind

of

philosophy,

modern

philosophy,

comes

into the world,

rejecting both the idea of nature of classical philosophy and the omnipotent a new philosophy with a new basis, that is, man: God of medieval philosophy
ultimate source of meaning for humanity's understanding human understanding itself.

the

of

the world is the

If

one wished to refute

Orthodoxy,
life

no other are

way

remained than to attempt

to

demonstrate that the

of an unfathomable

world and

fully

understandable without the assumption

God. That

means

that the refutation of

Orthodoxy
and

depended

on

the success of a system. Man had to prove himself

theoretically

practically the

lord

of the world and

the lord of his life. The world he created had to make the
"given"

world

that was merely

was

to him disappear. Then

Orthodoxy

was more than

refuted, it

"outlived."17

The

medievals

vealed religion

in their very efforts to harmonize classical philosophy with re face and articulate the essential tension between them. Modern

The Relation Between

philosophy incorporates the
tension
and religious

Philosophy

and

Religion
that

53

motive, but

"supersedes"

essential

by rationalizing secularizing revealed religion's sanctification of individuality. This, I believe, is behind Leo Strauss's remark at the end of Natural Right and History: "The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns
concerns
viduality."

would

beginning, the status of indi Strauss meant, the sources of modern philosophy be the idea of philosophy and science first articulated by classical philos
eventually,

and perhaps even what

from the

If this is

ophy and, negatively, the Guarantor of the significance of individuality, the omnipotent God of revealed religion. The source then would be the wish to
supersede the tension

tion to his

Logic, Kant

divisions

of

arising from their mutual irrefutability. In the introduc says that the basic questions determining the basic What can I know? philosophy, (Nature), What ought I to do?
can
all

(Morality), What may I hope? (Religion),

question, What is
man?

be

referred

to the single

The
"the

classical

conquest of

understanding of nature is opposed nature and its practical goal, in

nature."

by

the

modern

idea

of

the

Descartes'

words,

of

making

men

masters and possessors of seen as natural

The

classical and medieval standard

of natural

for

morality, virtue,

fulfillment
determinate

powers, is
our

replaced

by

freedom,
of

or

more

precisely,

autonomy.

And last in

sketch

of modem

thought, the idea

of

history

as a

process rather than a certain

kind

study, becomes

a secular substitute

for Divine Providence.

A.

Nature, Bacon declares,

nature to nature to

cannot

be

conquered except

by being
be

obeyed.'8

The The

be be

conquered must conquered with

be different from the

nature to

obeyed.

is

nature as

it

presents
and

experience,

its

apparent

purposivity
which

itself to ordinary prescientific unpredictability due to chance.

The

nature

to be obeyed, through

the conquest is to take place, is the

nature

to be discovered
and

by

methodical experimentation

keyed to be

(following
from
or a

Galileo

Descartes)
prepare

mathematical

laws. Final
new

causes are to

excluded

physics.

To

the way for the

science, the

classical reliance

on,

"idolization"

of,

natural experience and natural speech

is to be

refuted

by

critique or refutation of nates

the natural human understanding. This critique

culmi

in Kant's

assumption that

there is no intellectual intuition that permits us

to gain access to the nature of things in themselves. There is no natural har

mony between the natural human understanding and the natural world. Nature is not a kind mother, she must be tortured by methodical experimentation and

forced to

reveal

her

secrets.

Furthermore,

the ideas of chance or fortune and the

subordination of art

to nature must be rejected as

breeding

"premature despair

in human

enterprises"

(De Augmentis
matter,

Scientiarum,
pure

Book

2, Chap. 2). The

notion of

Aristotelian

notion of unstable

potency, underlying the

54

Interpretation
altogether

acting in accordance with fixed and unwavering laws. Above all, Bacon insisted in op position to medieval philosophy, physics must be separated from theology in fortune is
to be rejected. Matter

is to be

understood as

order

to avoid

Descartes'

the way,
thought that

fabulous philosophy and heretical religion. With Bacon clearing becomes the exemplar of finding a beginning for "I
think"

in

no

way depends

upon

anything

outside of man.

B.
to find a new moral standard that would

The

new

philosophy

was obliged

be

compatible with a nonteleological physics.

self-legislation.19

autonomy,
world we

Just

as

the "intelligible
constructed,20

That standard, again, is freedom, is world, a

world"

"our"

so part of the reverence or have construed, that is, respect we feel for the moral law of autonomy, Kant suggests, is a love for what we have produced ourselves (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,

footnote to IV, 401). Rousseau was the first to define freedom as self-legisla tion, but it is already implicit in Hobbes's theory of sovereignty and the social contract. According to Hobbes, we must obey the sovereign because each of us
through the social contract
wills.

has

agreed

to allow his will to represent each of our

own

legislation, because of the social contract, is, legally considered, our self-legislation. He is our representative. Hobbes also formulated the more
His
principle
which ariseth not

fundamental
any man, This is
will.

underlying this conception: there is "no Obligation on from some Act of his (Leviathan, chap. 21).
own"

all made even more explicit

in Rousseau's doctrine

of

the

general

general will that

Freedom in society consists in uniting oneself with all the rest under the declares the law, while at the same time remaining free in so has
contributed to the

far

as one

making

of

that law. The process that

makes

the

will general also makes

it

moral.

Being
law,

compelled to express one's will so

in

such

form that it
all

can

become

a general

that it can coincide

with

the

wills of

the others,

moralizes

the will. If I generalize my desire not to pay taxes in a

law that
public

no one ought

to pay

taxes, I
on,

am compelled would

to

see

that then the police,

schools, courts,

and so

disappear,

the

irrationality

of

my

original

desire becomes

manifest. as a moral principle

The idea is
categorical

fully

developed

in Kant's doctrine

of the
a

imperative:

so act that the

or moral

maxim of your action can

become

universal

law. The truly free

person, according to

Kant, bows only

to

the

ard

him or her self, and not to any stand imposed from without, either by nature or by God. Hegel extends the notion of freedom as self-legislation beyond politics and
moral will or practical reason within

morality to make it a logical and metaphysical cept, the life of that Spirit or Mind that forms human

principle.
and

The life

of the con

History

and

the objects of

informs the human mind, prohuman knowledge the mind of God

The Relation Between

ceeds

Philosophy
words:

and

Religion

55

in

accordance with the principle of

of

freedom,

self-legislation.

Hegel be
prin

gins

his "Doctrine

the

Concept"

with

these

"The Concept is the And later:

are

ciple of

freedom,

the power

self-realized."

of substance

...

the concept is the genuine

first;

and

things are what

they

through the

action of the concept

consciousness

dwelling
other

in them

and

this comes forth in such a

revealing itself in them. In our religious way that we say God created the world
religion recognizes or the

out of

nothing, or, in
of the
more

words, the world and finite things have issued from the
and

fullness
thought, activity

divine thoughts

divine decrees. Thus

the

exactly the concept, to be the infinite itself

without

form,

free

creative
it.21

which can realize

help

of a matter that exists outside

At the
Classical

same

time

modem ethical and

especially

political

thought is
of

said

to be

characterized

by

a certain

Realism

associated with

the name

Machiavelli.

and medieval

they

aimed too

notions of

political thought, the modems argue, failed because high. Because they based their political doctrines on exalted virtue and societies devoted to the formation of virtue, they made

themselves ineffective. As Bacon put

it,

their discourses are beautiful like the

are so

stars,

which give

little light because they

one's

high. Effectiveness

can

be

secured

by lowering

goals,

by

accepting

and

exploiting those lower

mo

tives that move most men most of the time: pleasure, comfort, acquisitiveness,

especially that all powerful negative motive fear, fear for the loss life and fear for the possible loss of what one already
and
possesses.22

of one's

C.

History,
the first
conflicts

the meeting

place of modem

morality

with modem

realism,

seems

to have been

conceived as

the

secular substitute

for divine

providence.

One

of

signposts on the way to the idea was Machiavelli's observation that the

between

nobles and plebeians

in Rome, the

vicious civil strife univer

sally deplored by the philosophers, actually led to the greater good of Rome as a whole. Adam Smith extends the notion of private vice, public benefit, to the
economic sphere.

Merchants
of

intending
as

income
promote

and

well-being beneficial ends

society
that

only their own gain increase the annual a whole; led by an invisible hand they
their intentions.
antagonism of men

which are no part of will show

Kant

calls

for

history

how the

in

soci

ety, their ambition, lust for and, consequently, their

power and greed cause

them to

develop

their talents

moral

discrimination

so as

to

prepare

them for citizen

zu einer
allge-

ship in the perfectly free

meinen with

and moral societies of

the future (Idee

a

Geschichte in

weltburgerlicher

Absicht, Idea of

Universal

History

it were, takes up Kant's call, finding linked freedom and Kantian reason, up with his own doctrine of logical oppo invisible hand visible as sites, operative everywhere in History, making Smith's
Cosmopolitan Intent).

Hegel,

as

56

Interpretation
and

the self-unfolding of the human spirit

culminates

Spirit in

general.

This self-unfolding

in the

self-consciousness

that

all spiritual goods are produced not

by

any external source, but by Spirit itself. The idea of History and the modem idea of freedom seem to be inextricably linked, history allegedly showing that
man's

freedom is

basically

limited only
on

by

the ideas of those limits that

human

consciousness of

has imposed

itself;

man's

freedom is limited

by

his

earlier use

that inchoate
creation.23

freedom,

and not

by

his

nature or

by

the

whole order of nature

and

VI. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Modem

philosophy's world of natural science and

its

moral world of auton

omy have been

sense we make rooted

some decisive peculiarly them. If it is permitted to interpret this development as, in part, spoken of

here

"ours"

as

because in

in

desire to be
world

fully

at

home in

the world, and to want to

appropriate

be

fully

at

home in the
erned

is

a religious

motive, perfectly
and

for

a world gov

by

an

omnipotent, beneficent

loving God,

then perhaps we can speak

permeating modem philosophy from its beginning, even If this is correct, one can say that this motive begins to become explicit with the formal acceptance of philosophy of religion
of a religious motive

in its

antitheological stances.

as an accepted

branch

of philosophy.

The

modem scientific conception of

nature, according to

Kant, is incapable
a source

of supplying ethical and political standards. pendent of of

Morality
The

is traced to

inde
realm

nature, namely,
or

practical reason.

realm of nature and

the

freedom

like

parallel

a special

morality, according to Kant, do not contradict one another, but lines simply do not meet. This thoroughgoing separation becomes problem for Kantian philosophy. How can natural man and moral man
one and

coexist

in

the same

man?

How

can

the two realms be brought together

in

systematic unity?

Kant

experimented with a
of religion. we

philosophy

of

history, but finally

settled on a

philosophy

The Critique of Pure Reason established, according to

Kant,
tence

that
of

have

no

knowledge,
within we

positive or

negative, concerning the

order

exis

God. Religion

the limits of reason alone establishes what in the

absence of capacities

knowledge

are obliged to

believe in

to strengthen

our

to obey the
moral reason:

moral

law. Religion is unambiguously

moral

subordinated to

morality,

"pure

is primordially
all
gion."

engraved

legislation, through which the will of God in our hearts, is not only the unavoidable condition of
affair."24

is also that which really constitutes such reli Tme religion, he argues, "is a purely rational His position is brought out dramatically by his interpretation of what he calls
tme religion whatsoever, but
myth of

the

Abraham's
voice

sacrifice:

Abraham

should

have

replied

to this sup
you

posedly divine

that even if your voice

rings down from heaven, if

The Relation Between

order me voice of

Philosophy

and

Religion

57

God.25

to kill my good son, contrary to the moral law, you cannot be the Some might regard this as superficially rational; but would the
sacrifice

story

of

Abraham's
Isaac?

have had the influence it has had if he had indeed

It
aims not at

sacrificed

Hegel's thought comprehending

and

aims at absolute comprehensiveness.

only

superseding all previous philosophies and theories, but also the tmth not only about but also within practical life and reality as a whole. Its all-comprehensiveness will allow it to supersede all finite standpoints. One most important part of that The reality is religious life and religious
thought.26

incorporation

of religion

into philosophy

reaches

its

culmination

in Hegel.

"Culture
raised

has,"

he declares:

this latest era so far above the ancient antithesis of reason and
and positive

faith,

of

philosophy

religion, that this

sense and

opposition of

faith

and

knowledge has
of

acquired quite a

different

has

now

been transferred into the field

philosophy itself. In earlier times philosophy was said to be the handmaid of faith. Ideas and expressions of this sort have vanished and philosophy has irresistibly
affirmed

its

absolute

autonomy.27

Kant, too, he
has its
yearns

argues, tried to

accomplish

this synthesis, but his notion of rea

son was too narrow.

sublime aspect as

Alongside the narrowly intellectual and rational, "religion it feeling, the love filled with eternal longing
...

for

eternal

beauty
und

and

bliss

...

it

seeks

...

the Absolute

and

the

eternal"

(Glauben

Wissen, 290-91; Faith

the

and

philosophy Jesus was a

tion."

must encompass

full

range of religious experience. of

Knowledge, 58). Hegel's For Kant,

in its full
moral perfec universal

representation of was

"the Idea

Humanity

For Hegel, Jesus

the epoch-making

revelation

that the

divine Spirit, God, that permeates and enlivens the universe dwells in and comes to full self-consciousness in man, in the human spirit. This conscious ness goes through stages, the highest of which is the conceptual. "Every philos
ophy
sets

sins of

forth nothing else but the construction of highest bliss as him who lies against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven, Spirit is that he is
sanctification of subject not a universal. universal must
.
.

Idea."

"The

and

the lie

against the

But this
tion
of

the

be

combined with

the

sanctifica-

the individual

for Hegel. He
race

rephrases

the Platonic statement

power"

that evils

will not cease

for the human

not

till "state

and

philosophy

come together

by

arguing that

only

state power and

philosophy, but "state

philosophy"

power religion and the principles of

must come together.

"Plato,

he [Hegel] asserts, did not know the idea of freedom, an outgrowth of the Christian doctrine that 'the individual as such has an infinite value'; according to Plato man is free only in so far as he is a Plato, in opposition
philosopher."29

to the

religion of

Idea in its
tive

most general and abstract

side of

the

righteousness in the Idea, but the form, he did not do justice to the subjec Idea, its being for itself, its life in concrete individual

his

time

found the

ground of

subjec-

58

Interpretation

tivity, in feeling, intuition and pictorial representation. In religion (Protestant religion) only is the holiness of subjective individuality adequately expressed.
And consequently, in the
the
state modem constitutional order

only,

where

the spirit of

is

permeated

by

the spirit of such religion, will there come to

be

adequate recognition of and protection

for

subjective

freedom, for individual

liberty

(Enzyklopddie 482
,

and

552).

The

expected on

transformation of human

life, Hegel's

rational

kingdom

of

heaven
volted

by

earth, is long overdue, according to his schedule. Kierkegaard, re Hegelian rationalism, turned to revelation as intrinsically irrational.
continued the modem project of

Nietzsche
rather

finding
what

the source of meaning

as will.

in,

than outside of, man, no longer as reason, to be resolute without clarifying

however, but
the

Heideg

ger urges us are

ends of

that resolution

to be. The classical and medieval dependence of morality on nature and

natural

law is
of

replaced

by

an

exaltation of

human have

"creativity"

coupled with

despair

finding
even

a rational source of ends

to guide that creativity.

proved an

However,

if

modem

thought should

inadequate

candi

date for articulating the meaning of human life, there is one area in which its success seems indubitable. I refer to the natural sciences. The question for
those
who

lean toward the

classical or medieval alternatives

is: Can

modem

natural science works?

be integrated into those allegedly

more comprehensive

frame

indication, certainly no proof, of this possibility is Werner Heisen 's berg turning to Aristotle's concept of potency and Plato's Timaeus when he
tries to make philosophic sense out of quantum
theory.30

One

The

unanswered questions raised

seem

by

this broad survey might seem over

whelming, but it does

to be clear that we are

faced

by

three fundamental
ancient and

alternatives,

and

that the attempt to

dispense

with or

transcend the

medieval alternatives

is

highly
such

questionable.

If,

as

Heidegger says, to
other.

question

is the piety

of

thought,

piety

requires of

both philosophy
the

and religion

that

each remain open to

the claims

and questions of

NOTES

Heidegger has been discussed in

philosophy

greater

detail

with a

brief discussion

of the relation of

(Husserl) to religion in my "The Prescientific World and Historicism: Some Reflections on Strauss, Heidegger and forthcoming in Leo Strauss's Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, edited by Alan Udoff (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991), pp. 169-81 The religious character of Nietzsche's thought is exhibited most conspicu ously by his Zarathustra, less conspicuously in his extensive critiques of other religions.
modern scientific
Husserl,"
.

God as Creator follows closely on the reference to "the laws of nature and suggesting that the Creation is carried on in accordance with those natural laws. 3. Cf. Harry V. Jaffa, "What is Equality? The Declaration of Independence in The Conditions of Freedom: Essays in Political Philosophy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
reference to
God,"

2. The

of nature's

Revisited,"

University

The Relation Between

Philosophy

and

Religion

59

St. Louis Uni Press, 1975), 149-60; and George Anastaplo, "The Declaration of versity Law Journal (Spring, 1965), 390. 4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981b27-29, 982bll-983all, 983b7-984a2, 1014bl6-1015al9, 1074bl-14, 1091a29-1091b20. In Homer the word nature occurs only once, in the Odyssey. (X. 303). The first and only man to use the word is Odysseus, who had seen the cities and learned the
minds of

Independence,"

many men,
uses

who

had learned how

men's

thoughts differ from

place

to place and from tribe to

magic of a goddess.

tribe.

He

the

divinely

given gift of natural

knowledge to defeat the baneful

5. Aristotle, Physics, II; Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chi cago Press, 1953), 78-97; John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam and Charles

Black, 1892), Introduction.

6. Holzwege (Frankfurt
am

Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), 325.

way.

7. Was Heisst Denkenl (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1954), 6-7. 8. Summa Theologiae, I II, Q. 40, A3. Cf. also Q. 1, A. 2 and I, Q. 2, A.3; the fifth 9. What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), 36. 10. Alfarabi,
(Ithaca: Cornell

Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, translated and edited by Muhsin Mahdi University Press, 1969), Part I, sec. 55. Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1252b 24-27.
Poetics,'

in Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition 11. Laurence Berns, "Aristotle's of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, edited by Joseph Cropsey (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 74-78, and 81. The last section, p. 82, should be marked
"Epilogue."

12. See David Bohm,

Causality

and

Chance in Modern Physics (Philadelphia: Robbins that only

University
definition

of

Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 1. 13. Cf. the argument of Courant

and

by

(Cauchy's)

static

of

limit is it

possible

to have "a precise mathematical analysis of continuous motion in

and

time."

What is
with

Mathematics? (London, New York Plato, Republic, 508a-511e.

Toronto: Oxford

University Press, 1941), 303-7,

14. Aristotle, De caelo, 298bl4-25; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 46, A. 2. 15. Ibid., II- n, Q. 1, AA.4 and 5; Q. 2, AA.l, 2 and 9; Q. 4, AA.l and 8. The will, in rum, is moved by hope and charity: hope of attaining the ultimate happiness of a supernatural vision of

God,

and charity (friendship for God) in the desire to honor God by the acceptance of his authority. Ibid. Q. 2, A.3, A.9 ad 2, A. 10; Q. 4, AA.3 and 7; Q. 23, AA.l and 6. 16. Aristotle, Topics, 100a30-100b23 and especially 101a36-101b4. Leo Strauss, "Progress

Modern Judaism I (Baltimore: Johns Contemporary Crisis in Western The Hopkins University Press, 1981), 17-45; "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Independent Journal of Philosophy, edited by George Elliott Tucker (Vienna: 1979), 111-18. This
or

Return? The

Civilization,"

Philosophy,"

present

attention

essay is the latest version of my in those lectures of 1952.

und

attempt

to come to grips

with what was

first brought to my
und

17. Leo Strauss, Philosophie

Gesetz: Beitrage
and

zum

Verstdndnis Maimunis

Seiner

Vor-

especially 21; translated by Fred Baumann, Philos ophy and Law: Essays Toward the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors (Phila delphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1987), Introduction and especially 13 (corrected version

laufer (Berlin: Schocken, 1935),

Einleitung

here); Spinoza's Critique of Religion (New York: Schocken, 1965), Preface to the English Social Research, Translation, 28-31; "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political 13, No. 3 (Sept. 1946), 338-39; History of Political Philosophy edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 296 and 297. It is worth noting that in this modern political philosophy. relatively late writing, on p. 297, Strauss does not say as "commanded."); 18. Novum Organum, I, aphorism 3 (Spedding mistranslates
used
Philosophy," ,
"conquered"

Descartes,

Discourse

on

Method, Part VI.

19. Cf. Sophocles, Antigone, 1. 821.

A12520. L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 172-75; I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, chap. 46, beginning; De Corpore, chap. 1.2, T. B740 Leviathan, Hobbes, ff.; B294-315, 28, Moles and chap. 25.1; "Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematics chap.

6.1.6.7.13;

worth, editor, English Works, vii, Edition; "On the Quadrature of

p.

Curves,"

Principia Preface to the First 212; I. Newton, beginning. Hobbes, Newton and Kant all, in contrast to
.,

Euclid,

define the

geometric

elements operationally,

or

in terms

of

their generation.

Cf.

as an

60

Interpretation
the

introduction to his book, Greek Mathematics and and the Jacob Klein: Lectures
'Natural'
World,"

and

Origin of Algebra, "The World of Physics Essays, edited by R. Williamson and E.

Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity (New York 21. Enzyklopddie, I, sections 160 and 163; translated (Oxford: 1892), Sections 160 and 163.
erns on

Zuckerman (Annapolis: St. John's College Press, 1985), 1-34; and David R. Lachterman, The and London: Routledge, 1989).

by

W. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel

22. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, 178-83; Laurence Berns, "Aristotle and the Mod Equality," Freedom and The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective, edited
and

by
51.

Kenneth L. Deutsch

Walter Softer. Corrected Edition (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987),

148-

23. Leo Strauss, "Progress or Return?", n. 16, above, 32-33. For a discussion of the most from this sketch, see Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion; for Spin oza and German Idealism, see ibid., the Preface, 15-17; and Persecution and the Art of Writing
conspicuous omission

5; Richard Kennington, editor, The Philosophy of of America Press, 1980); Harry A. Wolf son, The Philosophy of Spinoza. 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934). 24. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Akademie-Textausgabe, VI, 104; Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 95; Der Streit der Fakultaten, Akademie-Textausgabe, VII, 67; The Conflict of the Faculties, translated by Mary J. Gregor (dual language) (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), 123. 25. Ibid., note, 63 (German); 115 (English). Cf. Emil L. Fackenheim, Encounters between Judaism and Modern Philosophy (New York: Schocken, 1980), chap. 2, "Abraham and the Kanchap.

(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952),

Baruch Spinoza (Washington: The Catholic

University

tians: Moral

Duties

and

Divine

Commandments.''

26. Cf. Emil L. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1970), 15-23.

27. Glauben Faith 55. Faith 28. Der Streit der Fakultaten, 39; The Conflict of the Faculties, 67; Glauben und Wissen, 292; and Knowledge, 59, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main:
Philosophy,"

und

Wissen (Jenaer
translated

Schriften) (Frankfurt
Walter Cerf
and

am

Main:

and

Knowledge,

by

H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY

Suhrkamp, 1970), beginning; Press, 1977),

Suhrkamp, 1971), I, 95; The History of Philosophy, Introduction; Matthew, 12:31-32. 29. Leo Strauss, "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political 358.
30. "Planck's

Discovery

and

the Philosophical Problems of Atomic

Physics,"

Lecture, Septem

ber 4, 1958, in W. Heisenberg, M. Bom, E. York: Collier Books, 1962).

Schrodinger,

and

P. Auger, On Modern Physics (New

Discussion

Robert H.

Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: The Free Press, 1990), xiv & 432 pp. $22.50; $10.95 paper.

Piety

and

Temptation

Stanley C. Brubaker

Colgate

University

In the beginning, the Founders

tells us, "when one
apple

created

the Constitution

and

the

Supreme
the

Court to interpret it. But these institutions Justice

of the cause

were

"barely

in

place,"

Robert Bork

Supreme Court
the
fall."

cast covetous glances at

that

would

eventually

Compared to the
the

work of

creating
and

the

political

universe,

tending

the legal garden was a

make

mundane not

labor,

this

justice

wished

to be like his creators, to

law,

just discover it. into the

apple

Succumbing
and

to the seduction of politics, Samuel

memorable pronouncement:

Chase

chomped

delivered his

"An ACT

of

the Legislature (for the

social

cannot call

it law) contrary to the from the

great first principles of

compact,

cannot

be

considered a rightful exercise of original).

the legislative

authority"

(typo

graphic curiosities

So,

even

expressly forbade such act, the Court would That was 1798, and though the words of Justice Chase
"heresy"

if nothing in the Constitution be obliged to declare it void.

were mere obiter

dictum in this case, he gave voice to what Bork describes (switching the meta phor but maintaining its genre) as the "the denial that judges are
bound

by

law"1

that

would

"orthodoxy."

constitutional

continually haunt and eventually overwhelm our In Part I, Bork describes how this occurred on the remarkably penetrating analysis law from 1798 to the present. As one "substantive due
the
of

Supreme Court through

a concise and

the

development
expect, the

of constitutional

would

process,"

account gives central attention to

with special care the origin of the concept as a

noting device for protecting slavery in

nineteenth

the Dred Scott case, its

century until its death in 1937 as a tool for protecting laissez-faire capitalism (most noto riously in Lochner v. New York), and its subsequent revitalization since the
gradual re-emergence over

1965

contraceptive case

Griswold

v.

Connecticut

as a cover under which a

motley

assortment of claims

labeled

"privacy"

have been

indulgently

attended

and as a utensil

by

which portions of

the Bill of Rights have been ladled

into

interpretation,

Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

62

Interpretation

the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.

Having

text, intentions, or understandings, "substantive due vious heresy, but Bork reveals with similar verve that
as well

process"

nothing to do with is the most ob

heresy

has

accompanied

the

cases

equal protection clause

protection)

and

text, notably the (since any law can be challenged as a denial of equal the first amendment (which he observes has been transformed
claimed most

that have at

least

to rely on the

from

a protection of
examines

ideas to

a protection of exhibitionism).

Part II

the intellectual currents that support the triumph of

attacks after

heresy.

Although Bork
main

impartially
One

heresy

on

the right as well as the

on

left, his

target is the left.

another, he takes

"The

Theorists"

of consti

tutional law

Thomas

John Hart Ely, Laurence Tribe, Paul Brest, Frank Michelman, Grey, David Richards, Mark Tushnet, Michael Perry and Ronald Dworkin, to start the list showing the intellectual shallowness of their attacks
on original

understanding
a moralistic

and

the

scant relation

that their own theories

have to

constitutional orthodoxy.

These theorists

manage

Constitution

demand for

redistribution on of

consistently to read into the the one hand and on the

(pp. 241-50). Bork

other a relativistic

demand for "privatization

morality"

cautiously but insightfully advances the thesis that the underlying unity in these apparently inconsistent positions lies in a sort of egalitarianism that is ruth less in its

battle, "The
As
with a

hostility to Bloody

Crossroads,"

hierarchy. Part III tells the story of his where his orthodoxy met the
and

confirmation wrath of

this

new egalitarianism.

critic, Bork is brilliant in rooting out, exposing,

mordant wit.

impaling heresy
no person
of and

his

But

of course

he

wishes

to

do

more

than criticize. He

wishes should

to re-establish the orthodoxy, and

"persuade Americans that

not

be

nominated or confirmed who

does

display

both

grasp

devotion to the philosophy of original portion of his Part II is devoted to a explanation

To
assess

understanding"

(p. 9). Thus

of

a significant

and

defense

this philosophy.

Bork's solution, we need to consider more carefully the problem as he defines it. And as he defines it, the principal problem for American constitu
tionalism is how to confine the
use of

judicial

review.
of

One

should not underestimate

the importance

this problem. On the

other

hand,
idea
citadel

one cannot overstate the radical nature of the

intellectual
voiced

assault on within

the the

of

law,
in the

and

the

Constitution

as

law,

that is

being

from

name of postmodern

philosophy,

and

to this problem Bork's solu

is only partially responsive. Consider this comment by Sanford Levinson, McCormick Professor of Law at the University of Texas: "[Tjhose of us who
tion
are classified as nihilists

have drunk

deeply

at

the

well of
....

those branches of

modem thought most skeptical of concepts

like tmth

'Truth'

to

be

a word within modernist

culture, but only

as a synonym

may continue for culturally

shared conventions.

evident,
truths of

immutable,

At the very least there are, from this perspective, no selfor eternal truths. And the more local, socially constituted everyday lives are, in important ways, up for
grabs."

our cultures and

The
With
such

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

"text"

63

anything.

in the world, the of the Constitution can mean The interpreter, he approvingly quotes Richard Rorty, "simply beats

indeterminacy

the text

into

a shape which will serve

his

purpose."

own

Having

accepted

the

triumph of modem philosophy, Levinson thus announces the "death of constitu

tionalism."2

Given

such nihilistic

assaults,

by
I

no means will argue

atypical, Bork's focus

on

judicial
cannot

review

may

seem

narrow,
of

which

is in fact the case, for

he

define

the

authority

the courts without addressing the authority of

the Constitution.

To

return to

Bork's
that

statement of the problem:

He defines it

as

the "Madison
claims of

ian

Dilemma,"

is,

the problem faced

by

courts

in adjudicating the
as

the people in their varied names of self-government

state and

they

are represented

in

against

federal governments, Congress, these various bodies in the name

and of

the

Presidency by

and their claims

individual rights. Unless there

'correct,'"

ex

ists
the

some
work

definite standard, "that can be called of the courts, their decisions will simply

which

to

assess

amount

to a

form

of

judicial limit

tyranny. In the name of judicial review courts

claims of the people as
government.

would

arbitrarily

expand or

they

are expressed either must

through government or against

"neutral"

For

a court

to be a court, it
not

sessing these claims, that is, it must follow that standard (pp. 139-41).
these needs
original

in as be thoroughly impose any will of its own, but simply

Original meaning, he maintains, is the only standard that will answer to and allow the Constitution to fulfill its claim to be law, for only
meaning
will allow of

the

courts

to be neutral in three important senses:

First, derivation
from the
that the
will of

the principle to be applied in the case, that

is, making
instead
If

certain that the principle

is distinct from the level

court's

will, that it comes

of

those

who made

the law. Second, definition

of abstraction the principle

this principle,
operate.

is, determining
principle

at what

is to

is equality, should it mean something very specific, such as pre discrimination against blacks in the exercise of a defined body of venting rights? Or should it mean something much broader, say equality of race, na

tionality, gender, level intended by

the principle, that the judge's

wealth, and so forth. Original meaning says to the

define it

at

the

framers, is, applying it

likes
or

not at what suits

the judge.

Third,

application of

according to its
of

rationale and not

personal

dislikes

the parties

according to involved. Here again, it

rationale of

seems, neutrality can be framers (pp. 144-53).

preserved

only is

by

accepting the

the

Original

understanding, of course,
pointed

not an unambiguous a

term. As Ronald
one

Dworkin has

out, in

developing
as

theory

of original

understanding

must answer such questions

credit their

who counts as a

framer,

whether we

should

hopes

or their expectations

stood,

whether we should

look

at

concerning how a term will be under concrete or abstract intentions or both or the

64

Interpretation
as well as several other
questions.3

dominant one,
tions may
point of

Some

of

Dworkin's distinc

seem precious or

their

his

argument

is

sound.

importance exaggerated, but the more general That is, we must have some reason, perhaps
our choice

even a political

theory,

to

justify

among these
people

options.

Bork does

answer several of

these questions. On

who and what of

tells us that it is not the understanding the

the

counts, for instance, he most actively involved in

the ratify "what the public of that time would have understood the but ing convention, That could be further illuminated in "secondary materials, words to
of

framing

the

Constitution,

nor even understandings reached at

mean."

such as

debates

at

the conventions, public

discussion,

newspaper a public

articles, dic

tionaries in use at the

reservations or

time,

and

the

like."

As law is

act, "secret

barrassed

by

(p. 144). Thus the theory is unem the fact that Madison kept secret his notes from the federal con intentions
nothing"

count

for

vention; these
public would

are merely useful, and not crucial, in allowing have understood these words to mean.

us

to see what the

But

what about

Dworkin's

tions the

theory

of original

that Bork had sought

more general point, that in answering these ques meaning requires a judge to make the sort of choice to avoid? Bork responds that his approach does involve

choice, "but the

made

political content of that choice

is

not made

by

the

judge; it

was

long

ago

by
a

those

who

designed

and enacted the a

Constitution. It

was a

choice a

between

judicial branch that is

policymaking

arm of government and

judicial branch that implements the does

policies made

by

others"

(p. 177). The

call

an

swer

ers and

group simply (or abstract) intentions count? Isn't that rather like saying that the majority should mle, because that is what the majority wants (Dworkin, p. 54)? In fact, Bork seems to admit the point that some part

not seem altogether satisfactory. specific

Can

itself fram

declare that its

of

his theory
Even if

must

lie

outside of

the

framers'

intent
about

or original understanding:

evidence of what the

we would

founders thought

the judicial role were

must stick

unavailable,

have to

adopt the rule that

judges

to the original

meaning
common

of

the Constitution's words. If that method of interpretation were not

endorsed

in the law, if James Madison and Justice Joseph Story had never it, if Chief Justice John Marshall had rejected it, we would have to invent
approach of original

the

understanding in

order

to save the constitutional design. No

other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to a

of

defined

sphere

thus prevent them from assuming powers whose exercise alters, perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic. The of original

authority

and

philosophy

understanding is thus a necessary inference from the apparent on the face of the Constitution. (P. 155)

structure of government

because it eliminates choice. It is judicial subjectivity in adjudicating the various claims involved in resolving the Madisonian dilemma; it is the only approach that can prevent the judges from imposing their personal moral phi
original

Thus

understanding is
that

"chosen"

the only

approach

will eliminate

losophy

on

the citizenry.

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

things
should

65
the

At the outset,
we might call a

a couple of

be
the

noted about

this

statement of

problem and the solution.

First,

the very

statement of

the problem takes that

what

"juridico-centric"

view of

Constitution,

is, it

assumes

that the
courts.

lens for viewing the Constitution is that exclusively Constitutional interpretation is synonymous with the judicial
correct

of

the

review

(pp.

78, 139, 147). Second, from

subsumed

this perspective, the question of authority

we

is

nearly
nate

by

that of meaning, for once the problem

of

have

sufficiently determi
this
problem of
personal values on

meaning,

we

solve

authority, or

rather

authority, preventing the the

nal

judges from

imposing

their own

body

politic.

Three

questions are suggested:

(1) To
of

what extent

does

origi

cause

(2) understanding distortion? (3) Can Bork define the authority dressing the authority of the Constitution?
eliminate choice?

Does the demand for certainty itself

the
courts without ad

1. To

what extent

does

original

understanding

eliminate choice?

To be

fair,

this question must be a comparative one,

clear answers and

for

no

theory
have

will provide crystal

to all questions. If one

did,

we would

no need

for judges,

certainly Bork does not profess to eliminate his profession (pp. 161-67). But let's compare original understanding with contemporary understanding. Are courts given a far more definite answer if they ask what a provision of the Constitution
public now?
meant

to the public then than

if they

ask what

it

means

to the

For

some

provisions, original understanding would

understanding. rather

provide a more

ready

answer

than in contemporary

Most

people
would

today
be
"the

would

find "letters
the uptake tion
or

reprisal"

of marque and

quaint,

and

they

slower on

of such phrases as a

"person held to
now

labor"

service or

or

migra

importation

as

any
at

of

the states

existing

shall think proper

to ad

mit."

Also, it is probably
generation,
state

tme that for

most clauses

the meaning was richer

for
and

the

founding

least for its literate

members.

As

Philip

Kurland

Ralph Lemer
a world of

in their introduction to The

Founders'

Constitution: "It

was

the

printed

word,

and a

leisurely essay, the hour-long sermon, a great hunger discerning appreciation for good argument. People
they
most

for the
are apt

to savor slowly what

great

enjoy,

and the generation of

the Founders had a

taste for

political

discourse."4

Yet if
ness or

we are concerned with record

the

range of

meaning, as

opposed

to

its rich
the due

readiness, the clause, the

is

mixed.

For

some

provisions,

such as

process

original

be limited been

to procedural

understanding probably is more definite; it would questions of justice and it could not conceivably have

understood to encompass an unfettered

sodomy.

right to have
has

an abortion or engage

in homosexual
similar

For

other provisions subject matter

the range of meaning

shifted markedly.

in scope,

although

its

is probably While the

would en

original generation compass

debated
libel"

such questions as whether words were

"free

speech"

"seditious
we

if the it

tme or expressed

with good mo

tives, today

debate

whether

encompasses

flag

burning. The

subject matter

differs,
yet

but the range of possible meaning does not, at

provisions,

least

not markedly.

For

other

the

original

understanding

seems

far less definite.

66

Interpretation
enumerated powers of

Whether the

Article One, Section 8, generally,

and

the

necessary
sive as

and proper clause

that of

but it

would

incorporating a national hardly stir a soul today.

officer,

in particular, authorize the use of powers as expan bank was a question hotly debated then, Or
whether

the

president needs

Senate

approval to remove a cabinet

a major question

in the

original under

standing of the executive power, would not raise a doubt So the gain in certainty is not obvious when we look to original over con temporary understanding, at least with this simple sense of the term. If the
problem

today.5

is simply preventing judicial tyranny,

one could perhaps

decrease the

danger

adopting a more restricted sense of original understanding. One might for instance count only that meaning which had the support of a constitu tional majority. In places Bork seems to suggest that this is what he has in

by

mind.

Consider for
even of

example yield

his

response

to Paul Brest's comment that original

intent,

if it does

the principle the court

example

is to apply, does

not

define Given

its level

abstraction.6

Brest's

is the

equal protection clause.

of equality in the context of the Bakke case, does it mean specifi or more generally "racial Bork replies as fol cally "black lows: "Without meaning to suggest what the historical evidence in fact shows, let us assume we find that the ratifiers intended to guarantee that blacks should

the principle

equality"

equality."

be treated
were

by

law

no worse

than whites, but that it is

unclear whether whites

intended to be

protected

from discrimination in favor

of

blacks. On

such

evidence, the judge should protect only

Bakke

would not

have had

a case.

blacks from discrimination, and Alan The reason is that the next higher level of
is
racial

generality

above

black equality,
and

which

equality, is

not shown

to be a

constitutional

principle,

therefore there is nothing to be set against a current

choice must

legislative
cepted

majority's

decision to favor blacks. Democratic

be

ac

by

the judge where the Constitution

is

silent"

(pp. 149-50).

Successful in safeguarding against judicial tyranny, this sort of certainty, however, is obtained at some cost. On the surface, the principal cost would be the crabbed interpretation it gives to individual rights, but that is not perhaps
the biggest problem
proach an
or even

the necessary result if we think through this ap

to original understanding. In the sort of case to the constitutional question:

where one claim versus of

identified there
choice

seems

to be

answer

democratic

prevails.7

What

about

those instances
where

another,

it is

state

authority

federal,

democratic authority clashes with or Congress versus the Presi

did
not

dency? What if
tions about

a constitutional

majority

of

the people

have

clear

inten

whether a president needs to get

an executive

officer,

or about whether

approval before removing Congress may employ such expansive

Senate

powers as that of

incorporation
of

to pursue the enumerated powers of Article

assumes governmental
would

One, Section 8? The image

competing
claims of claims.

"clash"

Often "gulf

be

more appropriate.

authority for the For if the federal

the states, the the people

government

has only that

power

delegated from the

people of

authority become far

more restricted.

By

this

logic,

unless

The
of

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

67

the states clearly the federal

intended

to give a power to the federal government, that to the question of individual

power should

be denied.

Returning

rights,
emerge

at

least

at

level,

the excess
not what

would

be towards anarchy
or anyone

rather than oppres

sion.

This obviously is
of original

Bork,

else,

wishes

to

from

theory
brings

understanding,
of meaning.

and most of

his

examples

indicate

far

more

expansive

theory

But

honestly

applied,

a more expansive

meaning

greater uncertainty.

2. Does this demand for certainty cause distortion? As already indicated above, and especially when the demand for certainty is coupled with a juridicocentric view of

the
as

Constitution,
a material

I think the

answer and

is

yes.

Bork

wishes

to

portray the law

are

with

hard

edges

sharp boundaries.

Thus,
as

conservative revisionism and

liberal
Roe"

illegitimate,"

revisionism are

"equally

"Dred Scott, Lochner,

"activist"

and

Similarly, upholding legislation

just
as

when

(pp. 131, 32; see also pp. it exceeds constitutional

20, 93, 118). boundaries is

s voiding it when it does not (pp. 56, 129, 140). Once you are over the edge, you have fallen, so whether you were one inch or twenty feet over does not matter. Thus, where the Constitution does not allow for such

as

definite decisions, Bork is reluctant to call it part of the Constitution, instead, as in the case of the privileges and immunities clauses and the Ninth Amend
ment,
we

have "ink
could

blots"

(p. 166). Bork's

concern

for

what an

interested
general

judiciary
reverence
with

do

with

these clauses the

is
of

quite

understandable, but his

for the

work of

framers

the Constitution seems

hard to

square

this simple dismissal of this

aspect of

their work. Also two routes avoid

the danger of judicial tyranny. One acknowledges that these provisions are part
of the Constitution, but not of sufficient certainty to allow for judicial review. This may sound strange to one tutored in the tradition of judicial exclusivity, but as Robert Nagel has pointed out, perhaps the greater part of the Constitu

tion has found its meaning in

second route allows

political practice rather give

than in

court

litigation.9

the Court to
akin

meaning to them

deferential standard, laws

or

to that

employed

by

but only under a very Cardozo in interpreting the due

process clause of the

liberty,"

ordered

Fourteenth Amendment; that is, the Court should void when actions, only they violate a principle "implicit in the concept of one "so rooted in the tradition and conscience of the people as
fundamental"

to be ranked
concept of

(Palko

v.

"ordered

liberty"

in fact is

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]). This what Charles Fairman, probably the most
of

best understanding framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in of thing that the because of its imprecision, Bork finds this approach intolerable. Far
eminent scholar of the period, concluded was the

the sort

mind.10

Yet

more pref

erable, according to him, is the approach of Justice Hugo Black, who claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment had been intended to incorporate the first eight
amendments of

the bill of rights and nothing more (pp.

is

a perfect case of

while some ratifiers

certainty purchased at the price of intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the bill

60, 94, and 118). This distortion, however, for

68
of

Interpretation

rights,
of

there

is
as

no evidence

that any

ratifier understood

it to

"only"

mean

the

bill

rights,

Justice Black

claimed.

Those

who

claimed the amendment

would encompass mental

the bill of rights claimed it

would encompass other

funda
cer

rights,

or privileges and
original

immunities,

as well.

Thus,

the quest

for

tainty

even

defeats

understanding."

3. Can Bork define the authority of the courts without addressing the author ity of the Constitution? If nearly as much uncertainty attends original under
standings as

ings
more

must

contemporary ones, the preference for be one of authority rather than meaning

old over new understand

or rather

authority in

fundamental sense than providing the sort of determinate meaning neces for judicial review. But since Bork's concern with authority, as we have sary is seen, largely confined to the prevention of judicial tyranny, it is virtually the same as his concern for finding definite meaning, and he gives scant attention
to it as
an

independent factor. That is, he

wishes address

assumes

the authority

of

the Constitu

tion and merely

extent

to confine the action of the courts under it. To the

that he does

the

question of

authority, he

endorses a

theory

of

positivism:

It is

of course true that no not

The Constitution did

statute

document can become law merely by its own assertion. become law merely by its own assertion. Neither does any become law merely because near the beginning of the text it says something
. .

therefore enacted that. Neither does any judgment of a court become law merely because the court states: "It is therefore ordered that. All these writings become law because they are made in ways that the people of this
. .

like, "Be it

nation assume

to be ways of making law.

Why

should that assumption produce

law? I do

not

know

of

system cannot operate political obligation practical

any ultimate philosophic reason why it should. A legal if we must rethink the perplexed issue of the nature of

every time somebody cites a statute or a case. Law is a very instrument for organizing a society into a polity, and it is necessary to any polity that there be ground rules or assumptions that identify certain propositions as laws if they are produced in certain ways. It is clear that this nation has always treated the Constitution as law. (P. 174)

This statement, echoing H.L.A. Hart's theory of a "mle of hardly explain why the Court should stick to original meaning temporary ones, for this theory ultimately depends on a habit

recognition,"

can

rather of

than

con

the people

of

recognizing that law is made in a certain way. But the entire first third of Bork's book demonstrates that the Court has been ignoring original intent from the very beginning, and as he acknowledges, the people have even grown in the habit of accepting this. he writes, "used to worry that the Court would damage its authority if it acted politically. I have written a few such naive lines myself. The fact is quite the contrary. The Court is virtually invul nerable, and Brown proved it. The Court can do what it wishes, and there is almost no way to stop it, provided its result has a significant political constitu (p. 77). If we put this statement together with his Haitian mle of recogni
"Scholars,"
ency"

tion,

we get

the

following: "this

nation

[has almost]

always

treated [the

pro-

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

69
not

nouncements of the
original

Court]

law."

as

And the

conclusion that
of

follows is

understanding, but the "unwritten

constitution"

Bork's

adversaries.

That is, the fundamental law is what the Court thinks is right, the boundaries of political pmdence.

confined

only

by

In short, it seems that Bork cannot solve his problem, preventing arbitrary decisions of the judiciary, unless he addresses the more fundamental problem
of at

justifying
it,

the

Constitution. And here

with which

we see

that the Biblical

argument on

allusions noted

the outset of this essay

Bork laces his

do

not

merely
void.

decorate

but

reveal

the stmcture

of

his thought and,

seem

the question of

authority, its

insufficiency. God
and
we can attach

creates ex nihilo and gives

form to the

The founders
only meaning
gave we

ratifiers, in his argument,

to do likewise.

Therefore,
which

the

to the words of the Constitution is that

seems

they
that

to them; outside of this meaning, there is nothing. Bork

words of

to

ask

interpret the

the

Constitution in terms

of

the the Lockean formula

tion that "[w]ords

in their primary or immediate signification, stand for noth In a curious way, then, ing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses as a matter of constitutional interpretation, he would appear to accept the postthem."

modem

assumption, that there is

no

inherent

nature on

to

things.12

If in the final

analysis we rest

the authority of the

Constitution

the fact alone of its habit

ual acceptance
"

by

the people, we must ask how

far this is from Levinson's

observation:

only This is

as a synonym
not

may continue to be a word within modernist culture, but for culturally shared the place to launch an alternative theory of constitutional inter
conventions."

'Tmth'

pretation, but let

adequate

me suggest what might

be

a more

approach.13

promising
"postmodern"

An

theory

of

the Constitution

must affirm what

philosophy
of

rejects, that there is

a nature to the world and our

world

have

some access

to this

understanding through the forms in which we

the

it,

that

we

apprehend

it,

that these are not arbitrary

assertions of moral and

ordering

of

the

world

includes

interpretative will, and that this political phenomena. The Constitution

as
of

makes a number of

fundamental law,
speech, religion,

extraordinary claims: to bind the people of America to it to extend this law to future generations, to protect freedom
with

and

property, to demand that its citizens risk their lives for the

sake of the nation, to enforce

ultimately

its

own violence

the laws that

it

makes,

and much more.

To

support such

claims, the document

needs an anchor

in

moral and political

reality if it is
"divide"

not to

drift

as

"culturally
into
of

shared conven

tions"

shift,

or more

likely,
is the

as our culture splits

multiculturalism.

Whether
nism, I

this anchor

natural

rights

of the

Declaration
to be

Independence,
as

neo-Kantian

theory

of equal concern and

respect,

a version of communitaria

cannot explore

here, but if the Constitution is

law,

it

claims to

be, it

needs not just the certainty that Bork seeks (and perhaps not
seeks

in the degree

that he

it), but

authority.

If then,

as the

Constitution

seems

to presuppose, there is a nature to

things,

70

Interpretation
words we use to name some

it follows that the

this world

can

have

objective mean

ing,
have

and

that

if there is

conventional things we name objective meaning.

direction to human purpose, that even the more can have enough stability of form that they too
we accept

And if

this

"realist"

account of

the relation

of words

to the world, and

as a

interpreted but
neither original

if we see the Constitution not simply as a text to be deed to be justified, then it makes some sense to seek meaning nor current meaning, but what we might call "real
that combines interpretation with

meaning,"

in

an approach

justification. (I

am

obviously not displeased with the rhetorical advantages such a name provides, but my main intention is to indicate a meaning the ground of which is not merely conventional or derived from philosophic idealism.) The opinions of our forebears should carry great weight in part because they are our forebears; they

define

who we are and

how

we understand

the world. The Constitution seems

"people,"

to presuppose a corporatism of this sort

being
as

ratified

by

states,

and

in

individuals
as

and as a

contemporary

having body

in acting in the name of a states later join it. We are impoverished

by

if

we cannot

look back

and

forefathers

defining

much of who we are.

Yet

we

demean them if

we

up to our look to

their opinions only because of their age. These opinions

merit our respect most

decisively

because the framers

by

and

large

were more

deeply

learned
we

about

the

nature of politics and

law than

are we.
of

It

also

follows that

should

pay

greatest attention to the

understanding

those uncommon

individuals

we call

the Founders

their understandings over more shallow common understand

not

ings. These individuals deserve to be honored

just because they

are

old,

or

because they are representative, but because they were wise. In fact, this search for "real seems close to the
meaning"

original

intent

of

the

Founders, for

part of their wisdom was to understand the

nature of

Constitution if this

by

understanding the
putting ple Madison's

the things that it

names and

to

interpret these in
meant

terms of the ground

aside their or

on which

the Constitution

is justified,

even

the public's original

understanding.14

Consider for

exam
of

opposition

to the Alien and Sedition Act as an

infringement

the First Amendment. As Leonard

Levy

has

demonstrated,
common

the original under

standing

of

freedom

of

the press, to the extent that the subject was given much

attention,
restraints.

was almost

certainly limited to the

law

notion of no prior

Following
adopted

the separation from

England,

twelve

of

the thirteen states

England."

"expressly
And "[n]o

the common-law system after the common

state abolished or altered

separating from law of criminal defamation in

general or seditious press clause of

libel in particular,

and no state court mled that the

free

its

state constitution rendered void the prosecution of a opposition to

libel."'5

Yet in Virginia's

the Alien and Sedition

States."

law, Madison
.

argued

forcefully
not

that the
of

freedom

of

the press "under the common law

cannot

be

the standard

its freedom in the United

His

argument

here

was

based,
on

the original public

understanding

of

the term

free

speech or

press, but

the place of a

free

press

in the American form

of republican government.

For

The
system of

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

71

parliamentary supremacy, he argued, the common law principle was appropriate; there "an exemption of the press from previous restraint, by licen

sors appointed

by

the

King, is

all

the

freedom that

can

be

secured

to

it."

In the United States the

case

is

altogether

Government,

possess the absolute sovereignty.

different. The People, not the Hence, in the United States the
. .

great and essential rights of the people are secured against against executive ambition.

legislative
paramount

as well as

They

are secured, not

by laws

to

prerogative, but

by

constitutions paramount to

the press requires that

it

should

be

exempt not

laws. This security of the freedom of only from previous restraint by the

in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws.16

Executive,

as

Similarly,

on

the power

of removal of an executive

officer, the
number

founding
40, Ham

generation reversed

its

original understanding.

In Federalist

ilton has simply

assumed that the

Senate

would

have to

approve

moval and went on

to speak

of

the virtues of such a plan.

expected

any such re "[I]t has been men

co-operation of

tioned as one of the advantages to be

from the

the

senate, in the business

of the administration. as well as

of

appointments, that it
consent of
of

would contribute would

The

that

body

stability be necessary to displace

would not

to the

to appoint. A change

the chief magistrate therefore

occasion so violent or so general a revolution as might

in the

officers of the
of

government,

be

expected

if he

were

the sole

disposer

offices."

Joseph

Story

reports that this

ency to

quiet

understanding of the removal power "had a most material tend the just alarms of the overwhelming influence, and arbitrary exer
executive."

cise of this prerogative of the reflection on

Yet

with

thorough deliberation and

con

the

principles of separation of

powers, the First Congress

cluded that the

ported to

President

should

have the

power of removal.

As Madison

re

the House decided in favor of executive authority as the principle "most consonant to the text of the Constitution, to the policy of mix

Jefferson,

ing

the Legislative and Executive Departments as little as possible,

and

to the

requisite

these

responsibility instances what we

what

and

harmony
the

in the Executive
mean.

Department."17

In sum, in

see

framers seeking, is
members of

not

their original under

standing, but

the concepts

"really"

We

also

see, as in these examples,

this

founding

generation, in

their political capacities,

pretation and not
a place
"realistic"

taking primary responsibility for

off

constitutional

inter has
and

sloughing

responsibility to the
required

courts.

Judicial
a

review

in

approach to

the constitution, but it is

secondary

restrained role.

More is clearly

to support this point than I can

develop
them,"

here, but if

we accept

(a)

that the words of the Constitution indicate real things

(using this word broadly), not just "Ideas in the Mind of him that uses (b) that no one has a complete understanding of these things, including
framers,
and

the

(c)

that

whatever

the authority of the

Constitution, it

must

encom-

72

Interpretation

strong claim for representative government, then it would seem to follow democratic republican institutions have a primary responsibility to in terpret the Constitution authoritatively. The claim of the court to overrule these
pass a

that

our

determinations
which

of constitutional

meaning
clear

should

be limited to those instances in

the lawmakers have made a

mistake.18

On

one subject

Bork does

seem

to embrace a the

"realist"

rather

than an

"origi

nalist"

approach, the
and courts must

nature and relation of

courts and
mean

law. Law is
that can
as

enacted

be bound
means

by

it: "What does it

to say that a judge is

bound

by

the

law? It

that he is bound
whether

by the

only

thing

be

called

law,

the

principles of

the

enactment"

understood at the

fulcmm. Indeed, as we drives his originalist theory

text, statute, generally (p. 5, emphasis added). This is his metaphysical have seen, it is this realist account of the judiciary that
or
of

Constitution

the Constitution. Regardless

needed

of what

the framers

intended, he maintains, a theory of originalism is to be law and judicial review a judicial rather than
I think that this fulcmm
sons.
must

if the Constitution is function (p. 155).

a political

fail to be

support

the Constitution for two rea

First,

although

it

attempts

count of courts of

law, it is nonenacted, common law the

were courts as

not

in offering an essentialist ac for we have always accorded very realistic, status of law and have never doubted that courts
to

"realistic"

they
as

adjudicated cases

according to it. Thus, if

we

use our

judicial heritage

offering
...

some guide as to the nature of courts and

law, "the

principles of the text

as

"only thing
ently
shape reflected

that can be called

are not the generally understood at the And it follows that there is nothing inher
law."

enactment"

nonjudicial about

in

a nation's

adjudicating cases according to principles of right as historical usages and customs and as given more definite
are to avoid

by

earlier court

decisions. If Courts

extratextual,

nonoriginal

approaches to constitutional

adjudication, the

reason must

lie elsewhere,

not

in

this

theory

of the

judiciary.

Second,
supposed against

and more

fundamentally, Bork
agree,

seems

to assume that this fulcmm is

a point on which all will

including

his

opponents.
a

It functions

as

his

firm

ground

from

which

he deploys

sort

of

intellectual jujitsu
them.

Note, for

that, after this much time and under such different conditions, we cannot possibly discern what the origi nal generation had in mind for our situation. Bork responds: "If the meaning of the Constitution is unknowable, if, so far as we can tell, it is written in unde
claim

his opponents, turning the full strength instance, his response to those who

of their arguments against

cipherable own
rent

hieroglyphics,
majorities

the conclusion is not that the

judge may
superior to
of

write

his
cur

Constitution. The

conclusion

is that judges
that the

must stand aside and

no

let

democratic
over

mle, because there is

law

theirs"

(p.
no

167). Similarly, to those

who respond

intentions

dead

men

have

authority

us

today, Bork

observes

that the complaint taken

seriously

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

of

13
the

should annul the

institution

judicial

review

itself

as well as

the

whole of

Constitution.
His
responses are effective against those who share
of

his

view

of

judicial

supremacy (and
this task of
notice

democratic

mle).

But Bork

seems so

enjoyably

absorbed

in

hurling his traditional opponents against the ropes that he does when he is being attacked from a more radical angle. Many on the

not

left

in fact willing to relinquish judicial supremacy, a loss they find easier to bear as the courts are filled with conservative appointees. For example, to San
are

ford Levinson, whom I replies: "Levinson does

law does
imacy"

Constitution,"

quote above on the not explain

"death

of

the

Bork
non-

not

why his view of the Constitution as lead to the conclusion that judicial supremacy is without legit

(p.

count.

But

218), expecting thereby, one supposes, to leave him stunned for the Levinson, as it turns out, like many devotees of critical legal studies
little
reason

(CLS),
About CLS
cal

sees a

for

"privileging"

judicial

opinions over those of others.

comrade

decade ago, when asked for guidance on constitutional interpretation, Mark Tushnet replied that one should "make an explicitly politi
which result

judgment:

is, in

the

circumstances now

existing,

likely
those

to ad

vance the cause of

socialism."19

Increasingly,

these scholars have taken note

that the interpretations advancing the

given

cause of socialism are not

being

by

the courts;

thus,

courts might well

be

abandoned

in favor

of more

"advanced"

organizations.

In

most

instances

of constitutional

adjudication, I doubt that the

"realist"

approach

I have

sketched

here

would

differ

dramatically

from the

"originalist"

theory
attacks

advocated

by

Bork. But if the Constitution is to be defended

we need

against

the

it is

now

weathering, I think

to address more

forthrightly

than

does this

version of originalism

the philosophical
makes

foundations for the

such

claims of more

authority

that the Constitution

for itself. With

foundations

than with filial piety

we can guard ourselves against political temptation.

NOTES

1. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: The Free Press, 1990) p. 4. Further citations are placed in the text. 2. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)
pp.

175-77, 6-7, 52.

3. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 33-71.
4.

University Press, 1985),

University

pp.

Philip

Kurland

and

Ralph Lemer, editors, The

Founders'

Constitution (Chicago:

of

Chicago Press, 1987). 5. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) 6. Paul Brest, 'The Misconceived Quest for
7. Not
on all questions,
of

suggests

that I

might overstate

the

case.

the

Original

Understanding,"

60 Boston University
the claim

Law Review 204, 234 (1980).

course,
since

on

many individual rights

as

cases

is

not

pressed against a

legislative majority but

against police or courts. on

abstraction

8. Bork is not entirely unambiguous in his response to Paul Brest.

this,

indicated

by

the above discussion of level of

74

Interpretation
9. Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences for Judicial University of California Press, 1989). See especially pp. 13-17. 10. "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of

Review (Berkeley:
ing,"

Rights? The Original Understand behind it to be

2 Stanford Law Review 5, 139 (1949). 1 1 Bork finds the concept of "ordered
.

liberty"

and the argument

we must

"pretty

va

porous stuff compared with

the Bill

of

Rights (omitting,

assume, the Ninth Amendment).

v.

Yet

one

must wonder where

how he

would

decide

cases such as conviction

Rochin
of

California, 342 U.S. 165

by which incriminating evidence was obtained. These procedures included pummeling Rochin in the stomach and then forcing an emetic solution down his throat to obtain the narcotics that he had swallowed. Recognizing that there was nothing specific in the Constitution barring the conviction, the Court employed the standard of ordered liberty and overturned the conviction, saying that these were
(1952),
overturned

the Court

Rochin's

because

the brutal procedures

"methods too
much

close to the rack and screw to admit of constitutional

differentiation."

Black, very
be

in the

spirit of

Bork,

retorted:

"I believe that faithful

adherence

to the specific guarantees in

than that which can

the Bill of Rights insures a

afforded

more permanent protection of

individual So

liberty

by

the nebulous standards stated

by

majority."

the

what was

the specific provision?

of

The fifth

amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

This interpretation,

course, equates

vomitus with

speech, and in principle would block any of the standard methods of criminal pro the "self to obtain
a conviction

cedure,
the

use of other aspects of

fingerprints,
in his
quest

urine,

blood,

even

defendant himself for

advocated an

purposes of

identification.
of

Similarly

for certainty Black

which all expres

famously
sion

"absolutist"

interpretation

the First Amendment

by

libel, obscenity would be protected. Conduct on the other hand would not be; wearing a black armband, however, turned out to be conduct, as did wearing an offensive message on one's back. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 12. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an introduction by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), Bk. ID, chap, ii, par. 2. I say "as a
subversive advocacy,
matter of constitutional
law"

interpretation,"

since

Bork

states that

he is "far from

denying
the

that there is a

natural

(p.

66); he instead denies

fuller 1990

that

it has any

relevance

to constitutional adjudication.
Constitution?"

13. I Paper

give a somewhat

account of such a
of

theory in "What Constitutes

given at the

Meeting

the American Political Science Association. Portions of this

essay are drawn from this paper. 14. As I have argued elsewhere,
close resemblance to

what

Christopher Wolfe describes

C.

as the

traditional approach
Constitution,"

Books, 1986) bears 1987 Brubaker, "Conserving the American Bar Foundation Research Journal 261-80. Even the Federalist Papers, perhaps the most commonly cited document to elucidate original intent, did not claim authority by virtue of its
"real
meaning.

to judicial review in The Rise of Modern Judicial Review (New York: Basic

See

Stanley

privileged access but by the force of its arguments, voiced by a friend of the people. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, "The Original Understanding of Original Intent," 98 Harvard Law Review 885 (1985); Charles A. Lofgren, "The Original Understanding of Original 5 Constitutional
Intent,"

authors'

Commentary
183.

11 (1988).

15. Leonard 16. James

pp.

Levy, Emergence of a Free Press

on

(New York: Oxford

University Press, 1985),

1800. See
also

p.

Madison, Report
was

the

Virginia Resolutions,
points

January

Levy,

supra

315-25,
and

n.

79. As Walter Berns in the

rightly

out, the major thrust

not

of the opposition

to the

Alien
and

Sedition laws

name of state

rights,

individual rights. The First Amendment

the Future of American

Democracy

(New York: Basic

sufficient to

regarded

the states rights argument as

entirely

Sedition Acts, it is perhaps all the more principle of free press that ran contrary to the rather shallow public understanding of the term at the time of ratification. As Berns points out, Alexander Hamilton made a similar argument for a broadened understanding of free speech in the name of American republicanism in
and argument

Alien

chap. 3. Since Madison determine the unconstitutionality of the remarkable that he would make an additional

Books, 1976),

for the

his

argument as counsel

for the defense in People

v.

Croswell (pp. 128-46).

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

Founders'

75

17. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, vol 3: sec. 1533 (1833). James Madison Constitution, vol. 4., p. 105. Madison Jefferson, 30 June 1789, in The reported the arguments against a Senate role as follows: "[I]t was said that the Senate, being a Legislative body, could not be considered in an Executive light farther than was expressly declared;
to Thomas
that such a construction would transfer the trust of seeing the laws duly executed from the Presi dent, the most responsible, to the Senate, the least responsible branch of the Government; that
a party in the Senate, bid defiance to the President, and discord into the Executive Department; that the Senate were to be Judges in case of impeachment, and ought not, therefore, to be previously called on for a summary opinion on questions of removal; that in their Legislative character they ought to be kept as cool and
officers would

intrench themselves behind

and

introduce anarchy

unbiased as

possible, as the constitutional check

reason

on

the

passions and parties of

the other

House,

and

should, for that

the great source of

also, be factious

as

little

concerned as possible

in those

personal

matters, which are

animosities."

18. I
ism,"

made

make this argument in more detail in "Reconsidering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activ 4 Journal of Politics 503-19 (1984). The classic case for the rule of the clear mistake is Constitutional by James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of

Law,"

19. "The Dilemmas

7 Harvard Law Review 129 (1883). of Liberal

Constitutionalism,"

42 Ohio State Law Journal 411 (1981).

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: The Free Press, 1990), xiv + 432 pp. $22.50; $10.95 paper.

Matthew J. Franck
Radford

University

revered

teacher of mine has

written

that Felix Frankfurter "was the best of

enough."

the twentieth

century justices, but

still not good

That

remark came

to

mind more than once while

1987,
ate

when

reading Robert Bork's The Tempting of America. In Ronald Reagan nominated him to replace Lewis Powell as Associ
the U.S. Supreme

Justice

on

Court, few if any

possible candidates or

to that

office compared to
perament

Bork in scholarly quality, intellectual rigor

cast no aspersions on

judicial tem

(which is to

the eventual choice, Justice An

a combina removes

thony Kennedy). If any doubt remained that that was so, this book, tion of judicial history, constitutional theory and personal memoir,

it.

It is Bork's vindication, and it is much more than that. In it are revealed the considerable virtues Bork would have brought to the bench of the high court
and some

disturbing
purpose

shortcomings as well. neither

All

could

see, three

years

ago, that

here

was no

Earl Warren;

is he the Great Chief Justice

reincarnate.

Bork's

is to

call

America

back, if it is

brink

of a very deep abyss, one in which independent status as law and become merely the "highest
of a

already too late, from the the Constitution will have lost all its
not
prize"

to be

won

by

the victors

"larger

war

in

culture"

our

over questions of goes the

morality
argues

and of

democratic

procedure

(pp.

3,

10). As
and

Constitution, he
it
as

force

fully,

so go

the very idea

of

law

any

obligation to treat
opposition chapters

legitimate. The

moral terrorism

displayed

by

the organized

to Bork's

Supreme Court

nomination

(amply

documented in the final

here)

demonstrates that

intellectual honesty, simple civility and sober public discourse are already casu alties in this cultural war. The recent nomination hearings on Justice David
Souter
witnessed

just

as much silliness

no revival of

those

qualities sacrificed

but far less shrillness, but this marked three years earlier. It only meant that the high

stakes were not perceived as quite so against author's

by

the

opposition

that

mobilized

Bork,

and

that President Bush had learned

one of

the lessons of the

experience, that

"[a]

president who

wants

to

avoid a

battle
and

is

likely

to

nominate men and women who could

have

not written

much,

certainly
and

nothing that
groups"

be

regarded

as

controversial

by left-leaning
a tale

senators

(p. 347).
we come

How did

to this

pass?

The

answer

is

Bork tells in three

parts.

interpretation,

Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

78

Interpretation
and the

Part I, "The Supreme Court

chapters

Temptations
since

Politics,"

of

consists of

five

charging that the

succumbed

Justices,

the Court's first

decade, have
basis

occa

sionally
ples not account vice

to the urge to

"strike down
an occasional with

statutes on the

of princi

to be found in the

Constitution"

is that

what was at nineteenth

first

(p. 15). More accurately, Bork's indulgence became a habitual

in the late
of

century
and

the

rise

of property-rights activism

in

the name

"due

process,"

then

metamorphosed and

into

full-blown

patho

logical

addiction

with

the

late New Deal

Warren

courts'

embrace of a

an addiction that still afflicted constitutionally rootless egalitarian liberalism the Burger Court and afflicts today's Rehnquist Court in an only slightly less feverish condition. The increasing detachment of constitutional law from the

Constitution
potent

by

the Supreme Court

itself thus forms the first ingredient in the

public

brew that hooked American

second

life

on political
Theorists"

judging.
considers

The

ingredient is

provided

by

"The

Bork

in Part

II. As it became
the Court
was

increasingly

difficult in the last thirty-five

years

to pretend that

enforcing the terms of the actual Constitution, a cottage industry in the academic community, particularly in the law schools, devoted sprang up to manufacturing mythical constitutions that could be called upon to justify the

Court's decisions. Some but

the
original

not

many

of

the new constitutional theorists honor

understanding

of

the Constitution in the

breach,

as

they hammer its

of

terms into

shapes

that will lead to the results

they

prefer.

More

them openly

question or attack the

cal constructs

very

notion of original

the document
with
with

keep increasingly irrelevant.

will

that

understanding, spinning theoreti the document in tune with the times by making

If

we

may borrow

a phrase

that originated

Walter
the

Bems, Bork
ably

Constitution,"

ground and assaults.

sets himself the task of "keeping the times in tune by confronting a number of these theories on their own defending the doctrine of original understanding against their

Bork's

musings on the

influence
or

of

these abstruse theories provide some of

on

the best passages in the book. No one in the general public, the press or

Capitol Hill has the time

philosophy"

inclination to

read the

torrent

of

"[l]aw

school

moral

that pours from the pens of

with

Thomas
selves

Grey

et

al.,

frightening
with

Laurence Tribe, John Hart Ely, regularity. Lawyers and judges them
quantitative terms

have only slight contact dents get a bit more, of their arly
manufacturers must

it, in

(hapless law its

stu

professors'

favorite variety),
up

and even

schol

have trouble
of

keeping

with one another's

inventions.
for judicial

How, then, does

opinions?

the

flood

theory find its way into

of

what pass

Its very

inaccessibility

may, paradoxically, be a source

its influence. Because

the public at large and the legal profession as a whole are unaware of what is taught and written, the reaction of ridicule and that might have been

being

hostility

expected

has

not

been forthcoming. But judges

are aware that there

is

an enormous

The
literature
bound
it

Tempting
and

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

79

that it is almost entirely

disapproving

of the

idea

that courts are

where

by

the original

understanding

of

the Constitution. The message arrives

counts.

(P.

135)

Once it

arrives

pleasant to a

there, it is a short step from judicial decisions with results half-educated elite (the decisions, like the books and articles, read

by

relatively
the

few),

to a common contempt among that elite for anyone who

questions

"reasoning"

that led to the

results.

It

is,

after

all,

results and not

the mle of law that matter to this

highly

politicized audience.
"attitude"

Thus

shoddy

philosophy that almost no one reads becomes

adopts at

an abreast of

that almost

everyone

least,

everyone who

fancies himself

the latest in intellec

tual fashion and moral rectitude.

It is that elite,
necessarily
which confronted

which

Bork

calls

the "intellectual

class"

(though it "is

not

composed of people who are good at

intellectual

him

on

the path to the Supreme Court and

[p. 8]), turned it into the

work"

"The

Bloody

Crossroads"

described in Part III

name of

of

the book. Coddled

their

by

Court

that had

legislated,

in the

the

Constitution,

agenda of moral relativism and moral coercion cadre of academic

peculiarly (see Chapter 11), bolstered

elite

egalitarian

by

theorists that

claimed

to provide a constitutional underpin

ning for their agenda and for the Court's decisions, this the press, in the academy, in the "civil rights
movement") swung into
could not afford to action against a

(in the

Senate, in
perceived

community,"

in the "women's

judicial

nominee

they rightly

to be a threat to their continued dominance of America's legal culture.

They

describe openly the

culture

for

which

they fought, however,

it
outright and em about

for
his

most

ordinary

citizens of common sense would reject

brace the

nominee.

Instead,
his

not acts

to put too

fine

a point on

it, they lied

of

writings and about

in

official capacities.

One

the admirable

qualities of this

lodged

against

him

book is the civility Bork brings to the refutation of the charges during the nomination ordeal. But since, as he argues, the

politicization of the

law has been

accompanied

by

the sacrifice of exactly this

virtue, his civility is less surprising than it is

admirable. and

The

core of

The

Tempting

of

America, literally

otherwise,

is Bork's

defense

of the

doctrine

of original

tion. These

chapters are at once

understanding in constitutional interpreta brilliant and simple in their argumentation (and

recalling,
ments"

as

Bork

does,

that Joseph

Story

warned against

"metaphysical

refine

and prized

the Constitution's accessibility to the

go together).

common

citizen, those

any species of runs afoul of that it is liberal or conservative, "constitutional what Bork's late friend Alexander Bickel called the "counter-majoritarian diffi
qualities
essential problem with
revisionism,"

do indeed

The

culty": on what grounds can the of

judge in

democratic

republic override

the

will con

the

people's elected representatives?

With

a note of wistfulness,
answer original

Bork

cludes that

his friend

never settled on a

Bickel

chose grounds other

satisfactory than the Constitution's

to that question, for

understanding, and

80

Interpretation

thus attempted the

impossible, trying

to

"accommodate]

value-choosing

Court to the theory and practice of (p. 193). The dilemma is that plain, and that easily resolved: either the for every constitutional case is supplied by the "text, stmcture,
the
Constitution"

democracy"

major premise

and

history

of

called

(p. 162), "the trackless fields latter hom may

or

it

emerges

from

trek through what James Kent

of

[the

judge's]

imagination."

The

academics who

seize the

on occasion write

interesting

moral

philosophy, but
to nothing but a

every

attempt

to make of it a judicial philosophy comes

pleasant

finally

preference

for the

ukase

over

the

democratic

will.

Authoritative

choices

regarding the

areas of public

life

where

the people shall not mle, at

are made

least

not

by

simple majorities of nation or

state,

by

the

Constitution;

where

it

permits majoritarianism

(or is silent,

which amounts

to the same), the

people need

only

express their will through

the forms

and processes of constitu

tional self-government. The latter is the case on most matters of public

even on

life,

and

many Chapter 8, which

matters of public

judgment

as

to private behavior.

contains a series of refutations of as good a

"Objections to Original

Understanding,"

is probably

job

of

this as has yet been done. Bork

replies most

an

cogently to the claim that recapturing the original understanding is intractable historical problem. This claim manifests itself variously: that the
of

intentions

the Framers are simply unknowable (an unusual assertion, given

the historical record); that the sources show the Framers to

agreement on some

have been in dis

that

interpretive issues (to the

for

extent

that this assertion rests on

the
can

richness

of

the historical record, it

useless

contradicts the

first);

and

what we

discover is

specific application

to modem cases entailing cir

cumstances unknown and unforeseen

two hundred years ago.

with

Bork

cuts

through these arguments

sound common sense.

As to the

first, "[t]he
foolishness"

case

for

general

incomprehension because
equally
obviate

of the passage of time of

is

(p.

166),

and would

of

literary,

philosophical and religious

historical study texts. As to the second, Bork reminds us

intention"

every kind

of this or that member elsewhere, "[t]he search is not for a subjective of the Philadelphia Convention, or of all them together (p. 144). The Constitu

tion's authority derives from the consent

of

the ratifiers, and

its meaning "must

be taken to be
mean"

what

the public of that time would

have

understood the words to

(ibid.).

"original
arose

understanding,"

in the

(This, incidentally, is why Bork wisely insists on writing of the not of "original intent.") If subsequent disagreements same generation, as they did, it cannot be because the words are
any
construction one cares to put on them
of

susceptible to ants of that

surely the

combat

day

thought

their

disputes

as

being
of

carried on within an accepta

ble

range of

meaning,

even

if in the heat
above, it

debate they

sometimes accused

each other of

bad faith.
argument

As to the final
telephones did
whether

amounts to the caricature that because in 1787, we cannot decide from original understanding to apply the Fourth Amendment to wiretapping. In substance, just such
not exist

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

called

81

an assault on what

David Souter has

"specific
holds"

intentionalism"

was made

by his predecessor, William Brennan; the problem, tice Brennan demolished a position no one
judge is to

as

Bork notes, is that "Jus (p. 162). The task of the

reflect on the Constitution's principles, not merely to research their historical foundations; through this reflection he derives the major premise of a constitutional decision, not its minor premise or conclusion. Will such reflec

tion have political results?

tions"

Certainly; but it
and most

"should

never

have

political

inten (p.

(p. 177). That

will

have to be "regarded

as good enough of

or we must
review

abandon

the enterprise of law

especially, that

judicial

163).

Because he
ural

criticizes

the importation of

extraconstitutional standards of nat

law into judicial decisions (whether

protection), Bork has been
to
supposed

under

the contract clause, due process

some readers whom one would

or equal

attacked

by

have
nize

be his

natural allies.

The

argument

that the irreducible foundations of the Constitution's

is that he fails to recog legitimacy as law are

of

the

principles of natural of

right

expressed

in the Declaration

Independence.

Perhaps Bork is guilty

on

this failure: while

he he

rests

the Constitution's authority

the philosophical

the

consent of of

the people, nowhere does

explore

basis,

or

limits,
of

that consent. To that extent he plumbs none of the depths of

limited

government's

first

principles.

But this is

an

theory
It is

judging. To

account

fully

for the

scope of

empty indictment of his the judicial power under

the Constitution
one

requires no such enterprise.

thing

to say that the Constitution derives its moral worth, its good

ness as a system of government

founded
of

on enlightened

consent, from its foun

dation in transcendent
should

principles

equality

and natural

law. Perhaps Bork in the

of

have

said

this. It is also tme that a number of specific provisions

certain principles of

text are attempts to codify in positive law

God"

the "laws

nature and of nature's sophical roots of at times served

(see,

e.g., John Marshall's

reflections on

the philo

the contract

clause

in Ogden

v.

to reflect on those underlying

certain provisions. quite another

principles a

Saunders). Judges may need in order to grasp the purposes

not address.

by

This too is
to

possibility Bork does

context, the judge

But it is law is

posited

thing say in the Constitution's text

in
what

that where no specific principle of natural

or should

defect

by filling

the Constitution should

have

said

but did

not.

supply the It is a

mde surprise to

my

undergraduates of conservative

bent to discover that the

founding
most

generation,

so mindful of

the natural right to property, provided al

nothing in the way of substantive protection for that right, but protected it only procedurally from the taxing power, the federal commerce power, and the state police power. Equally surprised are my liberal students to find that no
general not

"right to

privacy"

is

secured

by

the Constitution. The sovereign people,

their judicial servants,

with

are responsible

for the
amend

constitutional order's consis

tency

the laws

of nature.

They

may

the document if the Framers

natural

wrought not so

well,

or

they

are

free to codify in legislation any

rights

82

Interpretation
protected.

they find inadequately

tempts

They
judge

may

also make mistakes

in their

at

at such measures.

The

good

reminds them that this

is their

respon

sibility; he does

not assume

If this

smacks of

it for them, however pure the motive. positivism, it is well to remember that the judicial
not

positivist

(unlike the legal positivist) is

notes,
where the

necessarily

a moral relativist.

As Bork

rightly

Constitution does

not

apply, the

judge,

while

in his robes,

must adopt a

posture of moral abstention

(which is very different from

personal moral

relativism), but he
when

and the rest of us need not and should not adopt such a posture

entering the voting booth. (P.

259)

It

needs

to be said that we can do (and have

positivists on

done)

lot

worse

than

have

even

thoroughgoing legal
tional

the bench. Such a jurist may be unable to

we of

articulate the tme ground of the

questions arid and

regime;

may find his

opinions on constitu

lic

requires.

unenlightening But better he than the judicial

the public spirit that a viable repub that

moralist confident

he

can

the justice the Constitution does

than the former in the
matter.

not promise. no

We

are

better
the

off with the

supply latter

legislature,

doubt; but in
anger at

judiciary

is

another

In

one respect

only, Bork's righteous

the improper introduction

cases

of

extratextual
astray:

natural

law into the decision

of constitutional

leads him
Fall,"

Bork it isn't. In his first chapter, "Creation and claims that early justices such as Samuel Chase, John Marshall and William Johnson succumbed to the temptation to make the Constitution say what it does
sees where

he

it

not

in defense
and

of natural can

law. be

Only

in Johnson's

case

is this

even

arguably so;

Chase

Marshall

read

this way only

by taking

their words out of

context.

Bork's

excuse

Roscoe Pound has lodged the

other antebellum

is that in this he is utterly conventional; everyone since accusation against Chase and Marshall, among
repetition

justices. Unfortunately, brings

us

has

replaced

investigation

for

most scholars.

This
not a

example

to the only serious weakness of the book. Bork is

very

good constitutional

provide most of

his
a

opportunities to

historian. Worse, since the historical chapters display his interpretive skills at work, they
of

reveal

that he is

better defender

the

doctrine

of original

he is

a practitioner of was
an

it. Aside from the

activist

unsupported and
v.

understanding than insupportable claim

(also

that Marshall

in

Marbury
in

Madison

and other cases

of

utterly judicial history. A few

With
no substantial

conventional and

wrong), there are a number of other curious readings

examples are order.

asserts that Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), in which Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase declared unconstitu tional an act of Congress making paper money legal tender, "may well have been correct, though Chase's opinion does not persuade one of (p. 34; see
that"

argument, for

instance, Bork

Bork's throwaway line

on

alternative

grounds,

p.

36). An

apparent animus

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law leads him to

condemn

83

toward centralized federal power

Wickard

v.

Fillburn
surplus

(1942, upholding
for
"a
market).

wheat quotas even when a on

farmer did

not

intend his

Based

"[s]ound

doubt,"

economics without

it

was nevertheless

manifestation of judicial

activism."

Why? Because

of

the Tenth Amendment

and

the supposed principle that "a regulation of commerce had to be done for
regulation"

commercial reasons and not as a means of social or moral

(p. 56).

One

wonders whether of

Bork is familiar

with

Marshall's

statements on

the

non-

justiciability
on

the Tenth Amendment in McCulloch

the commerce
power

v.

Maryland

(1819)

and

the

breadth

of

in Gibbons

v.

Ogden (1824). Wickard in

of

fact

marked a welcome end

to the activist
more

doctrine

dual federalism in
warrants

com

merce cases. more

"Protecting

federalism"

than the Constitution

is

no

legitimate than protecting natural rights the Constitution does not And it is decidedly strange, given his treatment here, that Bork has
nothing to say in ism (and judicial
governments. criticism of

codify. next

to

this century's

most egregious assault on

federal

power grab):

the application of the Bill of Rights to state

The treatments
suggest area.

of two

interpretive issues

under

the Fourteenth Amendment

that Bork
while

is

unfamiliar with

the seminal

work of

Raoul Berger in this

First,

rightly praising the mling

butchers'

holding

a state-mandated

in the Slaughterhouse Cases up monopoly in New Orleans, he too readily

of

leaps to the
166). If the

statement that

the meaning

the amendment's privileges land im

an

munities clause

"is

unknown"

largely
is effectively
a

clause

(p. 39; later it becomes dead letter today, that has

"ink

blot,"

p.

more

to do with

Justice Miller's mystery

about

evisceration of
meaning.

it in Slaughterhouse than

with

any intrinsic

its

scholarly voices that the desegregation mling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) "was supported by a very weak (p. 75). This is tme, and he is right to point out that the Court's

Secondly, Bork joins

a choms of

opinion"

departure from liberal

originalist

constitutional revisionism

reasoning in that case helped seeking better alternative

sociology.

spawn much of

the
ml

grounds

for that

ing

than the Court's

foray

into

But

after

conceding the "inescapable

fact"

that "those

who ratified

the amendment did not think

it

outlawed segre

(ibid.), Bork then spends several pages attempting the impos sible, namely searching for a way to say that what the original understanding did not mean then it does mean now. The attempt is valiant, but he cannot
education"

gated

manage

this

without

violating his

own canons of
reasoned

interpretation. For better

and

or

worse, Brown was not only poorly

much as

but incorrect

incorrectible,

that

observation

These
permitted

and other

has become taboo among polite academics. disputations over particular cases require more space than is
detract from the
to praise and
merits of

here

and should not

The

Tempting
in be
made.

ica. The

rulings

Bork

chooses

blame

would not

all cases

of Amer have

been my choices. But one final and out the book Bork uses "judicial

disturbing

point should

Through
re-

supremacy"

as a synonym

for "judicial

84

Interpretation
What
can

view."

be inferred from this

makes

about

the separation of powers

is bad

enough, but Bork [T]he only

which we

his meaning
have in the
advance
....

explicit:

safeguard we

long

run against

the abuse of judicial power,

have

agreed

in

to obey, is the formation of a consensus about

emphasis

how judges

should

behave

(P. 55;

added.)

Such
might

a consensus

is desirable, and a Court stocked by Borks and Bork-readers just be good enough. But the Framers did not contemplate judicial su
over constitutional questions and

premacy

thought

long
they

and

hard

about

the in
we no event

stitutional means

to check overweening power wherever

it

appeared.

Do

longer have
of a

precautions"

a sense of the
of

"auxiliary
as well

prescribed

in the

"defect

better

motives,"

in those

who govern as

in those

who are

governed?

Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: The Free Press, 1990), xiv + 432 pp. $22.50; $10.95 paper.

Ken Masugi The Claremont Institute

Those
their

who made and endorsed our rather

Constitution knew

man's

nature, and it is to

ideas,

than to the temptations of utopia, that we must ask that our

judges

adhere.1

Robert Bork

Judge Bork's book

which

elaborates on

his jurisprudence [of legal

of original

understanding,

he

regards as

"the only

method

interpretation]
the

that can preserve

people"

the

Constitution,
can

the separation of powers, and the liberties of the

(p.

159). But

these noble aims

be

secured

by

judge's focus

version of

"original
on

understanding"?

Bork
on

claims to

have

produced a

jurisprudential discourse
a on

method, reflecting
of substantive

Supreme Court

history

(with

the development

due process), current trends in constitutional law, and his own hearings.2 His defense of demonization during his Supreme Court confirmation freedom focuses
on

legal

and political

institutions, for
structure of our

[t]he foundation
major

of

American freedom is in the

Republic. The
national

features

of that structure are

the separation of powers of the

power

government and

the limitation of national

states.

to preserve a

large degree

of

autonomy in the

(P.

4)
much

Today
but

the threat to freedom comes not so nonelected, life-tenured

from tyrannical

majorities

rather a

judiciary,
an

which seeks

to "remake the his

toric Constitution from

prophetic vision, the

such materials as natural

understanding of

ideal

law, conventional morality, democracy, or what have

...

you"

(p.

6,

emphases added).

These doctrinaire "theorists.

new constitutional

all wind

up in the

same and

place, prescribing a
permissive

law that is

much more egalitarian or

socially

than either the

actual

Constitution

the legislative

opinion of of the

the American

public."

This

subversion of

the original understanding

mistaken

Constitution
cites

comes as

about when

judicial interpretation is

for

justice. Bork
Holmes's

the contrary

"American

orthodoxy

Oliver Wendell

contention

that "[j]ustice in a larger sense,

and

ity, is for Congress

creation of a new natural

law"

justice according to moral the President to administer, if they see fit, through the (p. 6). But here, along with Holmes's animus against
a quite unorthodox
and

law, Bork imports

that
undermines

doctrine

leading

to legal pos

itivism

him

his friends in their fight

against nihilism and

interpretation,

Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

86

Interpretation
defense
Bork
of
freedom.3

their patriotic
citizens

Moreover,

Bork's

approach

distracts

good

from

more comprehensive and

of reminds us of

politically

persuasive arguments.
significance

crit

ical reading
principles, in
ral

the political

of philosophic

other

words, the

political and philosophic sides of classical natu of

right

an

enduring theme
standard about

American

politics.

(That Bork invites

produced a

judg

ment
.
.

by

this

high

is implicit in his

claim to

have

book "not

ultimately

legal theory. It is

about who we are and

how

we

live; it is

about who governs us and choices

. .

how,

about our

freedom to

make our own moral

[p.

11].)
method of original

In articulating his sively

on

understanding, Bork focuses

exclu

the text

and

its

interpreters,

the judges. "All

.

serious constitutional place of

theory

centers upon

the duties of judges.

(p. 155). The

the

Court is

thus to assure neutrality, and "original

understanding"

trality in deriving, defining,

nal

understanding,
would

what

and applying principle interpreters look at is "how the understood at the

time,"

intends to supply neu (p. 146). In deriving origi

words used

in the

Constitution

have been

by

the public,

in their

ratifying conventions (p. 144). Original understanding calls for the best judges can be expected to do; it is an imperative. For example, judges cannot interpret
an

"ink

blot"

clause.

(".

(p. 16) like the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or

immunities

of citizens of or

the United

States;
due

nor shall

any State

deprive any

person of

life, liberty,

property,

without

process of

deny
Bork

to any person
summarizes:

within

its jurisdiction the

equal protection of

the

law; nor laws.")

In short, all that a judge committed to original understanding requires is that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise. That major premise is a principle or stated value that the
ratifiers wanted to protect against

hostile legislation

or executive action.

The judge his

must then see whether that principle or value challenged

is threatened

by

the statute or action

minor

in the

case

before him. The

answer to that question provides

premise,

and

the conclusion follows. (Pp.

162-63)
a

This it

neat procedure not

only

provides

for
of

disciplined,

apolitical

judiciary, but
play"

encouraging democratic self-govern ment. A judge must exercise "abstinence from giving his own desires free jurist" and self-consciously renounce power, for this is "the (p. morality of the 178). In America's present circumstances this would have the politi neutrality
also great political cal

has the

benefit

combatting the left-wing assault on politics, cul ture, morality (pp. 241-50). But this jurisprudence is not mechanical, Bork argues; politics, in the form
observes,
of

benefit, Bork
and

of

making

political

judgments, does intrude

he
would on

on

the courts. For Bork might

well

respect a precedent which

standing grounds,

by

relying

have disputed purely on what he calls "the pmdence

original-under
court."

of a

The
prior

Tempting
"may
of

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law be clearly incorrect but

the nation, so accepted
of
now"

87

decision

nevertheless

have become

so em

bedded in the life

by

the society, so fundamental to

and

the private and public expectations

sult should not
ing"

individuals

institutions,
"original

that the

re

be

changed

(p. 158). Thus

a strict

understand

of the commerce clause

the principal constitutional justification

might overturn

for the
pro

expansion of

federal

power

New Deal

and
of

Great

Society
it"

grams and

"plunge

us

into

chaos.

No judge

would

dream

doing

(p. 158).

Though Bork

appears to call

about when and of

how

for judicial statesmanship, he leaves judge knows when he need be more than
"original-understanding"

us

in the dark interpreter

an

the laws and applier of the

text.

Closely
positivism.

related

to this narrow view of the Court's function is Bork's legal

"moralism"

While attacking leftist Bork regards law as an expression

and of

its

concomitant

relativism,

the community's morality (pp.

241-50,

infra.). Like Max Weber, who propounded the fact-value distinction to fight Marxist corruption of the universities, Bork would use "original
to rein in nihilism and prevent the corruption of the law and hence of politics
and morality.

understandin

advises against

Needless to say, the collapse of Weber's Weimar democracy Bork's tactic here. Bork makes impossible demands on judges
on citizens as well:

and, In

implicitly,
order

to gain the assent of the public, the

judges'

explanation of

entitled to

displace

our moral choices with theirs would require

why they are that the judges be

able to articulate a system of adequate

morality
.

upon which all persons of good will and

intelligence

must agree.

I do

not mean moral

only that

that commands

that moral philosophy is a failed or useless philosophy has never succeeded in providing general assent. (P. 253)

enterprise. an

mean system

overarching

He

continues

Adopting
forms
have its

in this radically skeptical vein in other places as well (p. 255). the language of earlier work, he argues that ". unless we can rank
. .

of gratification way.

[of the

parties

in

case] , the judge

must

let the majority

the necessary

There

is, however,
of

no principled

way to

make

distinctions"

between types

"gratifications"

(p.

258; Bork

relies on

his

earlier

provisional

essay, "Neutral Principles

and p.

Some First Amendment

Problems,"

Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 47 [1971],

this
attitude as resembles

"moral

abstention,"

not end of

1.). Astoundingly, Bork characterizes moral relativism. (Bork's assumption

thesis,"

oddly

that of "the
the end of

forms indicates
Of
major

history history/philosophy

that a consensus on political

and

the

discovery
create political

of

the

tmth.)
not

course

premises"

it is tme that "moral philosophy cannot for a judge (p. 254), for American but
rather

primary mles, or morality is

and revealed reli

"created"

gion.

something Yet Bork's

would

derived from
at

natural

rights

positivistic

blasts

those

who attack

"traditional

views of

morality"

backfire

and

destroy

the morality of the Constitution he so

neither argued as positivists nor

passionately

seeks

to defend. For the Founders

88

Interpretation
law as primarily a matter for judges, but they did in the natural-rights, higher-law tradition. These differences place Bork closer to the dangerous tendencies in contem
and act
system,"

conceived of constitutional

think

porary jurisprudence he criticizes than to the Founders, whose views he dis torts. Founded as "a Madisonian the United States, Bork contends,
contains two principle entitled

opposing principles that must be continually reconciled. The first is self-government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities. The second is that
which

there are nonetheless some things majorities must not do to minorities, some areas
of

life in

the

individual

must

be free

neither majorities nor minorities can

of majority mle. The dilemma is that be trusted to define the proper spheres of place

democratic authority
would risk either placed the power and

and

individual liberty. To
the

that power in one or the other the minority.

. .

tyranny by
of

majority

or

tyranny by

We have
majority (P. 139)

function
minority

defining

the otherwise

irreconcilable

principles of

freedom!,]

ultimately, in the Supreme Court.

"dilemma"

...

The Court's
mle

obligation of a need

resolving the
theory"

of about

"impose[s]

for

constitutional

majority versus minority the Court his theory of

too quickly from his Madison himself never

original

understanding (p. 140). But Bork has rushed too quickly to the Court
which are

and

principles,

themselves problematic.
"dilemma"

Certainly

formulated the democratic

number

in the way Bork does. In The Federalist, 10, for example, Madison notes the necessity for modem republics to
the effects of

deal

with

faction, majority
for

or

minority,

while with

pointing (as he does

in

paper number

14)

to the need

republics to

deal

the causes of

faction,
all

through a civic education that teaches citizens to their

happiness,"

be "the

mutual guardians of

mutual

"public

happiness."

Bork's jurisprudence is democratic

means, purporting to take

missive of

account of

basic

political

principles, but in fact dis

give and

higher

political ends other

than the

process of

By contrast, Madison makes the question of democratic self-government depend not on numbers, large or small, but on legitimacy, a quality rather than
take.
a

quantity, majority

or

minority.4

Compare Bork's later

comment that

a person who understands

these issues [viz. original understanding] and

constitutional

nevertheless continues to
results

judge

philosophy

by

sympathy

with

its

must, if he is candid, also admit that he is prepared to sacrifice

democracy
of the

in

order that

his

moral views

may

prevail.

...

He believes in the triumph

will.

(P.

265)
assumes

Here Bork

that the crisis

of our

times ("the

tempting
and

of

America") is

not on a par with

the great regime crises of the

separation of powers

Founding

the

Civil War. As

Bork stresses, the

is

cmcial to

American freedom, but

today Congress administers,

the executive makes speeches, and the

legislates. Ideological jurisprudence

judiciary
rights

exhibits the willfulness that natural

The
and

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

89

the classical

portrayal of

tended to overcome.

law embodying reason without passion were in The willfulness of former Mr. Justice Brennan is seen in

his inventive opinions, and the willfulness of some conservatives occurs in their faith in majorities but majorities evidently unrestrained by natural law or right
reason.

proceeding according to enlightened consent. (See John Marini, "The Political Conditions of Legislative-Bureaucratic Su The Claremont Review of Books [Spring 1988], pp. 7-9.) In light of
not government
premacy,"

This is

opposition, why now demand such an original-understanding jurispru dence for the Court, with its excessive deference to a Congress far gone from
such

the

understanding of deliberation? Had the judge forgotten Mad ison's query in number 10, "what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many judicial determinations. What should we make of
. ."?

Founders'

Madison's
tions

reference

to the separation of powers as one of

a pattern of

"inven

of pmdence"? of consent

Finally,

can one understand

any decent

regime

in terms

(and the institutions

which produce

it),

while

exclusively neglecting the

the nature of

role of wisdom?

By
the

confronting

such

questions, Bork

would at

have

approached

original understanding.

He

comes

close,

times, to recovering this hori

as

zon, but he is ultimately

themselves. For example,
which the

worlds apart

from the Founders

they

understood

he

once refers

to "[t]he orthodoxy of our civil reli

called
. .

gion,

Constitution has aptly been

transcendent
even civil

(p. 153). But how

Behind the

Constitution
the
of
of
status of

lacking

principles of

God

and nature could

deserve

religion,

religion, is

unexplained.

principles

majority

versus

minority tyrannies
which

is

another set of

principles, namely those

the American

Founding

including

natural

rights,
over

equality,

liberty,
mle.5

and con

sent of the governed

inform the debate

democratic

In sum, Bork slights the significance of the Declaration of Independence for the "stmcture of our that is, of fundamental principles Nothing
could

republi

better illustrate his

of

aversion

to

natural

ellipses,
thousand

the Constitution's
on

reference

right than his omission, marked by to the Declaration in its closing lines
of our

(completed

"the Seventeenth hundred

and

Day

of

September in the Year

and of

Lord

one

seven

eighty

seven

the Independence of the

of

United States
stitution.6

of

America the

Twelfth") from

the book's reprinting

the

Con

Bork is determined to battle the

the
original
enemies'

enemies of

the regime without the

such an effort

resources of

document that inspired the regime;

will,

to quote Bork on his

doctrines,

"wind up in the

place"

same

as theirs.

That this is
Bork focuses

on

be seen in his sketch of Supreme Court history. possibility the rise of the dubious concepts of substantive due process and
can

substantive equal protection,

judgments

under

the
at

guise

doctrines enabling the Court to make of interpreting the Constitution. Here

seem surprising.

willful moral

we see some

accusations

which

first
for

For example,

even

Chief Justice
reasoning in

John Marshall does

some of

not escape criticism

for

favoring

natural-law

his

cases and

having

reached a

"few

conclusions

that could not

be

90

Interpretation

justified
an

by

the

Constitution"

(p. 27).

Moreover,

Bork

concedes

that there was

overriding
It
would

political purpose

to Marshall's jurisprudence:

the entire enterprise that

performance.
. . .

be wrong for those of us who have never faced the possible failure of is the United States to be too easily critical of Marshall's

[B]y

the same token

all

it

would

be

a mistake

for

us

to take
that the

Marshall's performance, in
structure and

its aspects,

as a model accepted.

for judges
(P.

now

basic

unity

of our nation

have been

28)

But, if
And the

the

Founding
to

is

one exception another?

would not

the Civil War be

preserve

requiring judicial statesmanship, why And what about the Great Depression?
today?
that the natural-law reasoning of Jus
v.

stmggle

free

government and western civilization argues

To the contrary,

Hadley

Arkes

tice Wilson and Chief Justice

should serve as models

Jay

in Chisholm

Georgia (2 Dallas

419, 1793)
pp.

for Supreme Court

Rabkin's

opinion

writing (First Things,

ix-x). Note

as well

Jeremy
of the
law"

remarks:

Early
justice"

decisions
"natural

Supreme Court
But the

could

invoke "the first

principles of

or

to condemn government interference

. . .

with contractual

rights

of private persons.

moral

authority

of courts was still

sharply

limited

by

the

modest pretensions of

this "higher

law."

Judges did

not claim

responsibility for promoting virtue or for securing the common good. In form, the judicial obligation, even in cases invoking the higher law of the Constitution, was simply
an obligation

to determine whether individuals had been subject to unlawful

coercion.

(Judicial Compulsions [New York: Basic

Books, 1989],

p.

119)

Today,

when

individual

rights are under attack

the notion of limited government

derived from the "higher

cases such as
v.

from diverse ideologies, is not indispensable?

law"

But for Bork the

common

thread in

Dred Scott

v.

Sandford (60

U.S. [19 down

Howard] 393), Lochner

law

a state

limiting

bakers'

New York (198 U.S. 45 [1905], striking work hours), and Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113

that they all equally distort the meaning of the Constitution's Fifth Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses, that government may not de prive a person of "life, liberty, or For property without due process of
and
law."

[1973]) is

Bork,

the

courts'

using these
and abortion

procedural clauses to strike

slavery,

labor,

is the
says

negative proof of
must

down laws concerning his positive defense of

Scott"

original understanding:

"Who

This
ciple

aversion to explain

involving

say Lochner and the Court in matters of fundamental

principal

Roe

(p.

32).7

political prin

may

Bork's puzzling

comments on policies of abortion and race

moral questions facing our polity to day. In criticizing Laurence Tribe for citing Lincoln on Dred Scott in support of a constitutional right of abortion, Bork makes the assertion that

and gender

preference, the two

astounding

"[t]he

the nation, and Lincoln certainly never suggested that the cure for a nation half slave and half free was Amendment" for the Supreme Court to end slavery by inventing the Thirteenth
of

abortion

issue does

not

threaten the survival

The

Tempting

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

91

(p. 203). While Tribe certainly is preposterous, as Bork's well-taken observa tion about Lincoln indicates, Bork misses the point of Lincoln's "crisis of the house
divided"

speech.

He

was

referring

even more war.

to the survival of the char

would

acter of a soul.

free

nation

than to an

impending

Slavery

kill the

nation's

Thus, Lincoln's arguments against slavery are the pro-life movement's jeopardy.8 best resource, as it too argues that America's spiritual survival is in
But the oddest,
understanding
the
and most

revealing,

result of

Bork's doctrine Here

of original

occurs

in the his

area of racial preference.

we see most

consequences of attacks

dichotomy

between the Constitution

Brown
v.

and natural

vividly right.

He

the

federal

companion case to

Board of Education (347

U.S. 483 [1954]), Boiling v. Sharpe (347 U.S. 497 [1954]), for using the Fifth Amendment due process clause to strike down racially segregated schools in
the District of Columbia. (The Fifth Amendment due process clause reads: "No
person of
. . .

shall
.")

be deprived

of

life, liberty,

or

property,

without

due

process

law.

requirement

Bork is certainly correct in noting that the Fifth Amendment restraining the federal government cannot be facilely equated with
which restricts state

the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause,

leg

islation. (Consider the

in
which

Japanese- American relocation cases

from World War II,

military-

the Supreme Court rejected such challenges and accepted the

arguments of

necessity

the elected

branches.) Yet,
innovation,
the

[i]ronically [sic],

given

the motives for this

Court's fifth

amendment equal protection clause

is the

main

Boiling's

legislation compelling affirmative action or invention, it is not easy to think of how

basis for attacking federal reverse racial discrimination. Without

a constitutional challenge to such

laws

could

be

mounted.

(P.

84)
racial preference
supremacy.

This shocking legitimation of belief in legislative-executive Bork's

and

laws indicates the

extent of

his

This is the
process.

reductio ad absurdum of

peculiar attack on substantive an appeal

due

Particularly in

Dred Scott

Boiling

to the origins of American

constitutional government

in

the Declaration of Independence's reliance on human equality the Constitution as a document protecting individual
rights.

would confirm was

This

indeed the
and all

failure
the

of

the Court's reasoning (as opposed to its

decisions) in

Brown

revival of the overlooking the Civil War jurisprudence is unable to Bork's Thus Founding. American principles of the politics. American of deal satisfactorily with today's leading moral issues race-related cases:

amendm

Good citizenship
tion through these
common

requires recognition of

the nation's birth in and

not exempt

perpetua

principles.

A Supreme Court justice is

obligations.

from this
character

understanding

of

and

legal talents in
would add

public

citizenship life, Americans

Deprived
that

of

his

can

hope

in his

good

fight the

judge
much

to his armory the

enemies of

weapon of natural government.

right, for he has been

too kind to the

free

92

Interpretation
NOTES

1. P. 355. All further

acknowledge

references

to The

the aid of John Marini in

Tempting of America developing my argument, as

occur

in the text. I Bork

wish

to

we watched the

contro

versy
the

unfold when we worked in Washington together, and of Dennis Teti and Jeffrey Wallin and challenging commentaries of various members of the Federalist Society. 2. A faithful insider account of the Bork nomination struggle can be found in Patrick B.

McGuigan

and

Educational Foundation, 1990). Bork's singular vote a demand for senatorial responsibility. 3. For Holmes's
contempt

Dawn M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice (Washington, DC: Free Congress Research and act of statesmanship was to insist on a full Senate for reason,
see

"Natural

Law"

in The Political Thought of American

Statesmen, Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens, 1973), pp. 263-67. Note Walter Berns's reflections:
Holmes
and

eds.

(Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Publishers,

was a man of the

law, but

the Supreme Court of the United States is not simply,

in

one sense not even

primarily,

a court of

law;
in

and

this explains his

failure
role

as a

justice.

The Supreme Court is primarily governing

of

a court of constitutional

law in the

sense

that its power to

enforce constitutional principle gives

it

a role

one sense

the decisive

in the
made

Americans.

[B]ut

no

judge in the

history

of

the Supreme Court

less

of an effort

to learn what was

regarded as expedient man with

for the United States, or what the Constitution for the United States. And contrary to the Holmesian iconographers,
expedient

no

anything approaching his length of service on the Court, contributed so little in the development of the constitutional law that defines the rights, privileges and immunities of Americans The
even as

it imposes limits

on

the government.

cause of

his failure in this

respect

is

not

hard to find. The Constitution

occupied no

in his thoughts, because the idea of natural principles of justice which the Founders understood to be embodied in the Constitution was wholly alien to his thought.
special place

("Oliver Wendell

in William F. Holmes, Jr., and the Question of Judicial Buckley, Jr., and Charles R. Kesler, eds., Saving the Tablets (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 302, emphasis added, footnotes omitted.) Of course, Bork and his allies have seen natural law typically used to justify left-wing positions. 4. Hence Bork criticizes his late friend and colleague Alexander Bickel for his emphasis on the

Activism,"

"legitimating

function"

of

the Supreme

decisions (pp. 190-91). Bickel argues, ".

concretize the symbol of the

Constitution"

Court through the making and articulation of principled [I]t has in large part been left to the Supreme Court to (The Least Dangerous Branch [Indianapolis: Bobbs.

Merrill, 1962], p. 31). For reflections on reconciling principle and expediency in American poli tics, Bickel (pp. 65-72) relies on Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959; reprinted, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 5. For secondary sources that point to some of the most interesting primary sources for recover ing original understanding in its fuller sense, see, e.g., George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Hadley Arkes, First Things (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Herman Belz, "Abraham Lincoln and Constitutionalism," American The Review of Politics (Spring, 1988), pp. 169-97; Clor,
Regime in The Constitution, the Courts, and the Quest for Justice, Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Ameri can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990), pp. 115-35; Edward J. Erler, "Natural Right in the American and Thomas G. West, "The Classical Spirit of the Founding," in The American Founding, J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy, and Ken eds.
and
Founding,"

"Constitutional Interpretation

Principles,"

Harry

Masugi,

CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 195-223, pp. 1-56; Charles R. Kesler, ed., tion: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (New York: Free

(Westport,
Revolu

Saving

the

Zuckert, "Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth Amendment," vol. 4 (Summer, 1987), pp. 259-83. Unfortunately this review could

Press, 1987); Michael Constitutional Commentary,

not

take account of Arkes's

The
Beyond the
completed.

Tempting
Constitution,

of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

which was

93
being

just

being

published

by

Princeton

as

the

review was

6. This portion of the Constitution, not to be mistaken for a mere flourish, is frequently omit ted; e.g., Garry Wills's edition of The Federalist (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 462. Presidential proclamations end with this formulation. See The American Founding,
"Introduction,"

pp. xii-iv.

7. See Abraham Lincoln's

great speech on

the

Dred Scott case, June

26, 1857 (Complete

Writings [Camden, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956], vol. 2, pp. 398-410). For a critical analysis of Bork's few pages on Dred Scott see Harry V. Jaffa, National Review (July 9, 1990), pp.
40-43. Note
as well
of

Professor Jaffa's "What Were the 'Original

States?"

Intentions'

of the

Framers

of the

Constitution
pp.

the United

University

ofPuget

Sound Law Review,

vol.

10 (Spring, 1987),

351-448.

Regarding

the Lochner case, the question arises the extent of

economic regulation a

the socialist countries

of

especially given the experience of liberal democracy can tolerate before

control, steriliza

it is

transformed.
on another method of population
v.

8. For understanding the Court's early cases tion, see Walter Berns's classic article, "Buck

Bell: Due Process

Law?"

of

Western Political intellectual

question, he

Quarterly,
patrimony
observes: whom

vol.

6 (December, 1953),
procedural

pp.

762-75. Professor Berns

the Nazi
party.

notes the common

of

the

eugenicist movement and

Regarding the constitutional

"In the end,

injustice is

done"

edges natural right see

due process is a substantive right which is denied everyone to (p. 775). For thoughtful commentary on the abortion issue which acknowl Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge:
1987).

Harvard

University Press,

Book Reviews

Kirk Emmert, Winston S. Churchill on Empire (Durham: Carolina Academic Press and the Claremont Institute for the of and Political

Study

Statesmanship

Philosophy, 1989).
Will Morrisey

xx

+ 157 pp.,

$18.95.

Winston Churchill claimed, "There is no halfway house for Britain between (p. 3). In fact there is; its proprietor is Margaret Thatcher. Britain has lost and gained: markets replaced colonies; Englishness replaced
min"

greatness and

'civilization';
nomics

corporations replaced viceroys.

If household

management or eco

has

not quite replaced no

politics, the

mold

that shaped Churchill has bro

greatness and min.

ken. There is

halfway house
of

for

Churchill between
ally

Americans think
peacetime

Churchill

as a wartime

against

rightist tyranny

and a

ally honored in his

against native

leftist tyranny, as a courageous prophet of liberty land. Churchill's defense of the British Empire

finally
strikes

Americans

contradictory to this spirit, something to be deplored or at best apologized for. Professor Emmert's study has the merit of recognizing that Churchill's "commitment to empire was to his political career (p. xi).
as
central"

Emmert
or even

shows

that Churchill's commitment arose

not

from

mere

traditionalism
under

from ambition, simply, but from an "aristocratic or standing of the demands and responsibilities of political life (p.
"Tme"

Aristotelian"

xvi).

imperialism develops both

"manhood"

and commerce

in the imperial

By renouncing its continental ambitions and building the stron in the world, Britain increased its own security and encouraged lim navy ited government in England while freeing the army for overseas conquests.
nation
gest

(p. 1).

Continental

nations expended substantial public revenues on

self-defense; the

British navy defended the island nation inexpensively, leaving money available for private investment and international commerce. The navy protected British shipping
national
and

forcibly opened

new markets.

Military

'necessity'

refocused, from expansion,

as

defense to imperial defense. Imperial defense

requires

increased territory increases

not peace and

the scope of security needs. "[W]ar and change,

empire"

permanence,

are

the constant companions of

(p. 8). A

moderate,
guish

civilized empire must of an

"pursue

policy

which

is difficult to distin
nation."

from that
empire

aggressive,

intentionally

expansive
tyrant"

Even

a civi

lized

"must

act

in

much

the same manner as a

(p. 9). Nor did

that the
"re-

Churchill try to hide natural desire "to be

under

the

cloak of

'necessity'; he freely
ambitions.

observed

predominant"

fans imperialist

Civilization

INTERPRETATION,

Fall 1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

96

Interpretation
instincts into
(p. 10).
caprice"

strains and rechannels these eliminate or

more pacific

activities, but

it

cannot

fully

them"

control

from Machiavelli in upholding an "eternal standard of right and wrong independent of and superior to climate, custom, and (p. between a standard citizens to honor. Honor mean "narrow is a 11), beckoning (p. 12). "Churchill proposed civilizing em self interest and moralistic
parted
excess"

Churchill

pire as

the cure to the disease of

empire"

tyrannizing
of

(p. 13),
of

of which

he

saw

three kinds

during

his

career:

the "scientific

barbarism"

the Kaiser's Ger

many; the "animal form

barbarism"

of

barism

of

Nazi
kill"

Germany
"all

(p. 15). Barbarism begins

all"

Bolshevik Russia; and the racist bar with human life itself. A

prepolitical war of

against

reflects mankind's

"strong

aboriginal pro

(p. 16). Primitive peoples indignation, pensity to engage in treachery and violence, and cannot reason. They emerge from the most primitive barbarism when, tiring of perpetual insecurity, they establish
shame and moral

lack

tyrannies. In their credulity, primitive

way to "religious fanati cism grounded in a claim of prophetic revelation"; this religion impedes civili zation's development by encouraging "degraded and by retarding
men also give
sensualism"

the mental

faculties (p. 17). As

civilization

develops, however, intelligence

or

usually outmns morality, leading once again to barbarism. Churchill considered courage to be the foundation of civilized
man

fully

hu
all

life. Courage is "the first

(p. 19). The
rash

of all

human

qualities"

because it "guarantees
"wild

others"

the

courage of

barbarians is

courage"

reckless or

passionate, unruly,

(p. 20). Civilized

civilized

mastery
the

and endurance.

"In the

is calm, a sign of man, Churchill suggests, reason

courage

self-

mles

bodily

desires

and man's spiritedness.

Thus,

under

stress, the civilized man

is persevering, serene, deliberate, self-controlled and proudly (p. 22). Habituation forms civilized courage; the force of discipline
circumstances supplements

self-sufficie

and of

habit. Habit

should

be

reinforced

by

vanity, the

desire to

reputation, but this must not be overemphasized, as it will promote in the face of public disapproval. The sentiment of no timidity bility, whereby "vanity is transformed into justifiable (p. 25), best an chors habitual courage.
establish a good
pride"

Churchill
his
or order as

recognized that the

increasing
virtues.

egalitarianism of modem civiliza

tion threatened these

Aristotelian
(p. 25).

He therefore "stressed

increasingly

in

speeches and more popular writings

self-government"

the

kinship

of civilization and

freedom

Attempting
Rome"

to preserve as much of the older moral

possible, he traced British

guards to pire

"ancient Greece
as

and

in Britain

"a

golden age and

themselves benefited morally

rights, liberties, and constitutional safe (p. 26); he represented the Roman Em for (p. 9), a time when the British politically from mle by civilized imperialists.
Britain"

The
or

virtues of

justice,
most of

pmdence, moderation
courage, these

or

self-government,

and goodwill

toleration, along

with civilized

make

individual

and political

free
place

dom possible;

are classical virtues.

Christianity

too

has its

Book Reviews
because
bullet"
"philosophy"

97
the the

these

are and

Churchill's belief in

words

"cannot
may
man

convince

(p.

129,

n.81).

Prayer

providence

not convince

bullet,
rest of

either, but

they

serve as

helps to steady the

guided

facing

the bullet.
and

"Churchill

understood that

the morality that

the

[British] Empire
roots"

the
al

the civilized West had both classical and

Christian
as

(p.

29);

though the statesman will conduct himself according to the classical standard of

gentlemanly honor, he

will

also nourish

Christianity

"the

salutary
that has

religion available

to modem civilized
even more

statesmen"

most politically (p. 30). Modem sci

ence also needs

cultivation;

it

needs restraint.

"The first

civilization

indissolvably

married

human

excellence and physical power rather than

chance"

leaving
tues,
and

them to come together occasionally and by (p.31) must take care that scientific or intellectual development does not overwhelm moral vir

destroying

the conditions

of

its

own existence.

Emmert discusses Churchill's

the mled. "[A]ll

view of

civilizing

empire's effect on mlers

human beings have

an obligation

to

improve themselves
to

which

takes precedence over any rights

they

might claim no more

liberty

or

self-

government"

(p. 33). Primitive

and

contentment

is

fully

human than is

primitive

strife,

both

prevent or retard natural

the development of civilization.

"The

precariousness of
might

the likelihood it
native

to imperial

mle"

way to civilization, its long duration, and led Churchill to reject it in principle as an alter miscarry (p. 34). Empire as it were assists nature by "rapidly

[the]

increasing

capital wealth and small

encouraging

same time modem

(p. 36), first by expanding human entrepreneurs, then larger scale commercial projects. At the civilization's technology goes beyond assistance to the sub

by

desires"

jugation
avoid

of nature

for

use

by

man.

Capital investment

should

be limited to

exploitation; Churchill preferred a limited state socialism, limited be

cause an

ulation and

excessively powerful local government would overawe the native pop demand independence from the Empire, breaking the civilizational
alone

bonds that

justify

empire.

Christian
them

missionaries posed an

especially dif
where

ficult problem; Churchill

applauded

only in

such places as

Uganda,

they

cooperated

fully

with

the imperial government.

mlers.

philanthropy should not move imperial ishness. "At its best, empire is not a burden to be Altruism
and exploited

Nor

should self

endured"

or a

tyranny

to be

opportunity for individual and national (p. 53). Barbarians have no intrinsic rights; rather, civilized "but
an

self-improvement"

nations owe

it to

themselves to treat barbarians justly. In this Churchill found himself

opposed

by
cal

the democrats

and state socialists who gained power after

the First World

politi

War. Democrats
animal"

reduced politics

to economics, "denied that man was a

(p. 55). Socialists

sought

to politicize the private. Churchill defined

action effort

politics

satisfy the individual's

realize the

in two distinct, complementary ways: as a means of collective need for security and well-being and as an

to to

distinctively

human

potential

Imperialism

satisfied man's political

for reasoning and reasoned speech. nature in both senses, immediately for the

98

Interpretation
to
'low'

mlers and mled with respect

politics,
'high'

and

immediately for mlers,

Empire "calls forth

even

tually for

the mled, with respect to

politics.

certain

(p. 63). Its ordinary citizens virtues, strengthen their self-respect; its extraordinary citizens fulfill their magnanimity, their greatness of soul in the Aristotelian sense. Empire counterbalanced the
and

thus a specific type

of

human

being"

leveling
nation's

effects

of mass

democracy. "[SJince the

greater

maintenance

[of

Empire]
from the

necessitated a

looking up to these leaders the British citi (p. 64). zenry was taught to admire the considerable virtue they afforded the For the foremost citizens themselves, "mling chance to achieve the fullest humanity by engagement in "the fully civilizing
imperially"
activity"

considerably foremost citizens, in

degree

of moral and political virtue

embodied"

(p. 64).

"By

the late

1920s, Churchill had

and and

concluded

that the

coming

of mass

de

mocracy had transformed ism replaced deliberation

undermined

degraded British
consent,
and

politics"

(p. 70). Majoritarian

"the

advent of political

[the]
more

conventional acknowledgments of political

the best

cases were

indications

of natural preeminence and

equality authority which in in most cases made

serviceable"

mediocrity politics itself became

classes

(p. 71). As technology

purveyed mass
middle and

tastes,
lower

'technical'

more
standard of

or technocratic as

improved their
pmdence,
and

living

but declined in the

political

exercise of civic

liberty,
ebb and a

initiative. The British

system

liquefied (in

Churchill's bulwark

metaphor).

Institutions, hierarchy,
Churchill

structure weakened against the

flow

of public passions.

attempted

to use imperialism as

tide, but as the spirit of party triumphed over the spirit of Parliament, the Empire itself became a bone of political contention. A poli tics of individual rights and self-interest overcame the politics of honor and
against this

"noble

self-regard"

(p. 81). "[I]t

at

was not possible

for

long

to 'new

principles'

home but 'old

a

principles' abroad"

to mle according (p. 85). Churchill

a

gradually
(p.

came to

hope for

British Empire

of

self-governing dominions,

"voluntary
99)

association of
a

like-minded

nations"

peoples"

or

"English-speaking
Demosthenes'

less

political

than a cultural empire modeled on

pan-Hellenism.

ity"

The tension in Churchill's thought between "his acceptance of human and "his admiration for excellence and for the accomplishments
few"

equal of

the

unequal

would

have disappeared had he

would not

"fully

embraced one principle or

the

other."

"This Churchill
reflected

do, probably because he

nature"

thought that

neither

in itself
of

the full tmth about human

(p. 107). The lim

itations

imperial

mle reflect

the contradictions of politics

and contradictions not of

suggesting that political life is not the human For Churchill this tmth led to

itself, limitations life, at least

an appreciation

simply

or comprehensively.

the powers of observation and memory called for

a certain of

by

painting.

He

also

"noted

37), both

similarity between a philosopher and the whom enjoy their leisure and want few things. He

uncivilized"

man

(p.

called the

Book Reviews
uncivilized man an

99

"unconscious
and as

philosopher"

(p. 37). Philosophers

might well

be

grateful to

Churchill

tyranny masquerading
protected even

way return his admiration. In opposing final knowledge about the human things, Churchill
own

in their

philosophy from lapsing into a state of unconsciousness, perhaps from a death that would have killed the soul instead of liberating it from

the body. And there may be more. Professor

an

Harry

V. Jaffa,

who contributes

illuminating Foreword to this volume, has spoken of the way the example of Churchill's statesmanship could inspirit a philosopher's soul in dark times,
leading
from him to
reconsider

the

classical philosophers who

distinguish
Emmert'

political

philosophic so

life

without

segregating them. Professor

view, not vividly

s thoughtful

scholarship,

profoundly
or

at odds with current academic passions and preju and

dices, brings Churchill's writings did, but wholly

of

example to

partially
partisan

as

his

own

essentially, delivered from the

distortions

his time

and ours.

C.D.C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato's Apology of Soc rates (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989), xv + 207 pp., $29.50, $12.95
paper.

Patrick Coby Smith College

Reeve

states

in his Introduction that the

of

Apology
can

is

a place where charac

explored.

teristic paradoxes about the person

considers six such paradoxes: problem of
rates'

Socrates

be profitably

He
the

(1) Socrates

as an elenctic philosopher and

claim

using refutation to convince to ignorance coupled with

of virtue on

someone to care affirmations of

for his soul; (2) Soc

things

known; (3)

the

dependence
tuous

knowledge

and

the

puzzle of an a

ignorant

and yet vir

Socrates; (4)
of

Socrates'

denial that he is

teacher contrasted with the

judgment

history
(6)
the

that he is the paradigmatic teacher;

(5)

Socrates'

anti

democratic

politics and

his

personal

demos;
mission

and

compatibility

of

interest in conversing with members of the famed irony with his gadfly's
Socrates'

to

improve

the souls of others and the

imperative

of

mounting

a sensi

ble defense. Also in the Introduction Reeve lemmas

noted: supplies quick solutions

to each of the di

(1) The Socratic elenchus results in psychic caring by disabusing people of the conceit of knowledge; it is service to the god Apollo who wants human beings to recognize their limitations. (2) Socrates has many superior
opinions

informed

by

elenctic

examination, but he lacks

"craft-knowledge"

of

virtue and of politics.

he is

never

(3) Socrates does not claim that he is virtuous, only that voluntarily vicious. (4) Socrates does not teach in the sense of
extracts

imparting
ready
well

present.

knowledge to students; rather, midwife-fashion, he (5) The examination of one's opinions is the

ideas

al

essence of a and
not

life

led;

since everyone should examine

examined are all

himself,
a

everyone

is equal,

Soc

by promoting the because his disclaimers

rates,

life, is

democrat.

(6) Socrates is (e.g.,

ironic

tme and his defense is strategically sound.

Some

of

Reeve's

solutions are

scholarly

commonplaces

the explana

tion of Socratic

teaching); democratic). The final product is

and

some are not

(e.g.,

the

thesis partially

discovery supported by

that Socrates

is

the scholarship
what

partially
of

peculiar

to

its

author:

namely, that Socrates says

he

means

and means what

innocence
an elenctic

he says, that he is sincerely interested in demonstrating his legal the charges, and that he is a pious follower of Apollo (albeit
and acts

philosopher)

in

a manner consistent with

his

religious

duty.

The

key

then to Reeve's interpretation

is the belief

that

Socrates is

literalist

interpretation, Fall

1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

102

Interpretation
ironist
and

and not an

that his actions,

both

at

the trial

and

before,

are

directed

by

a god.

In my judgment Reeve is unable to establish any of these points. He begins with the proem, reading it so as to show that Socrates is not ironic and that he

is
of

not out to condemn

himself. The fact that Socrates denies

having knowledge

forensic rhetoric, says Reeve citing Hackforth, means only that he has never before used it, not that he has never before heard it (p. 6). Reeve notes that Socrates Maybe
the
admits

to

having

heard the

rhetoric

many times before

(35a4-7); he
when

even accepts

the judgment that Socrates is using the rhetoric now (pp. 7-8).

so.

But then Socrates is

make allowances

jury

to

that he

is

asking for his ignorance (17d2-18a2). For Socrates to say foreigner when he is not, and for him to say it to an audience
case and sabotage

not

the foreigner

he

claims to

be

alerted to

his cleverness, is irony in the first Reeve argues, rightly I believe, that

in the

second.

Socrates'

"foreign
of

dialect"

refers

to the

elenchus

(cross-examination) 24a),
and

and not

to the street talk

the

vulgar populace.

Socrates knows that the him

(20c-

elenchus

is

part of

the cause of the prejudice against that the use of

he

mentions

in the

proem

it

will quite

likely

provoke against

the

jury

(17c7-dl).

Why

then

does he employ

cross-examination

Meletus,

unless

it be that he does
will prove

not purpose an acquittal?

Moreover,
a clever a capital

Socrates boasts that he

speaker

his

accusers

(17bl-3). Now the

measure of clever

wrong in calling him speech before a jury in

trial is not that posterity judge it a masterpiece of rhetoric, as Reeve seems to think (p.
that

5), but

that it

succeed

Socrates
not

can make good

in winning an acquittal. Thus the one sure way his boast, prove himself unclever and his accusers

liars, is

to win an acquittal

"by

what

[he]

do[es]"

(ergoi; 17b2).
the possibility that "the

Reeve
elenchus

charges
might

Socrates
a

with

failure to

reflect upon

be

technique capable of

stronger"

(p. 165). It is "the

unexamined part of

making his

the weaker argument the

so

thoroughly

examined

life,"

complains

Reeve. But Reeve is

strays

mistaken about this.

Early

in his defense
with

speech

Socrates

from the
or

official

indictment to
or

charge
under

himself

three

offenses: natural

science,

"investigating
rhetoric, these same

the things

the earth and the

speech

heavenly
stronger";

things";
and

sophistic

"making
things"

the

weaker

the

"teaching

others of

(19b5-cl). Because Soc

and

rates responds supposes that

to only two

the three charges (the first

the third), Reeve

and

there are only two charges, or that the

first

the second

charges are regarded

by

Socrates

as one
even

as the combined subject matter of

his

putative

teaching

which

he denies

knowing. In

point of

fact (and
He

as noted

by

Socrates'

others),

disclaimer

applies

only to

natural science.

offers no

defense

against the second charge of sophistic rhetoric.

which

By leaving

unanswered

a charge

he

ironic. He
others

resorts

brings up, Socrates, it to irony because he knows full

alone

seems
well

fair to say, is being that in cross-examining

the stronger. In
a

he is
when

sometimes

guilty

of

making the

weaker speech

deed,

he

cross-examines

Meletus, he

gives

the

jury

threefold demon-

Book Reviews
stration of

103

how it is done. To take just

gods and

Socrates'

one

example,

"proof that he
chil

believes in dren
of

is

not an atheist

is that he believes in daimons, the

gods; since there cannot be

without gods so

children without

parents, there cannot be

daimons
mon

the argument goes. But then Socrates likens a dai

not

to a mule, perhaps the only animal whose parents (a horse and an ass) are inferable from the offspring (although the Greek word for means "half-ass"). Reeve, of course, disputes that there is anything amiss in
"mule"

Socrates'

interrogation
obliged not

of

Meletus.

Having

opted

for the literalist

interpretation, he is

only to impute obtuseness to Socrates (his belief that the elenchus is but to find sense in nonsense. unproblematic), morally On the question of piety, Reeve must wrestle with the fact that
Socrates'

Socrates
that

sets out

to

"refute"

the oracle. Reeve's answer is at first convincing, those reputed wise, intends only to determine the

Socrates, by questioning
meaning,
not effect

oracle's

to refute

it

as such.

But Reeve

quotes

Herodotus

about

Croesus to the

that when a person

is

presented with an enigmatic predic

tion, the proper inquiry. After a

if his
prove original

course

is to inquire

a second

time. Socrates

makes no second

long

period of

thought

and with great reluctance

(21b7-9)

as

belief in divine veracity is losing its hold he undertakes to the oracle wrong. And when he imagines himself confronting the oracle
as

with the results of

clarification,
of error

Reeve

his investigation, he is described not as a suppliant seeking contends (p. 23), but as an antagonist accusing the god

(21cl-2).
more

A far
of

important point,

Apollo. Socrates

of course says

however, is the claim that Socrates is a servant that he is, at least that he serves the god; but
be taken
oracle

for

one simple reason

he

cannot

at

his

word

again,

irony
to

must

be

granted

him. Socrates interprets the

understands

to mean that that man is wisest who

with respect

like himself limitation

that he is "worth nothing

wisdo

(23b3-4). Reeve
of

offers some pertinent remarks about

message.

would quite appropriately deliver this But Reeve fails to notice that Socrates attributes to the
wisdom

Apollo, who as the god deflationary, antihubristic

god the pre
nothing"

ceding judgment that "human

human
wisdom which

is

worth

little

or

(23a7). It is

Socrates

claims

to possess (20d8-9). He has acquired it

made

by leading
god

an examined

life (he has thus

the oracle tme). He asserts that

agree with
and

an examined

life is the only life worth living (38a5-6). He may that human beings are "worth nothing with respect to
moderation

the
that

wisdom"

intellectual is

becomes them. He does

not

agree,

however,

that the

pursuit of wisdom

called

also worth nothing.

human wisdom, the examined life, or philosophy If Socrates was ever a disciple of Apollo, his life as

philosopher

has be

caused
said

him to
later

sever

the tie.

It

cannot

that Reeve is
a

unaware of alterations

in

Socrates'

service
of

to

the god, for he devotes

chosen

chapter

to the

rational

foundations

Socrates'

life: "On the

god

one

hand, Socrates has

a religious reason

to live the exam

ined life: the

has

ordered

him to do it (29b6-7). On the

other

hand, he has

104

Interpretation
live the do
examined

a pmdential reason to

life: it is the best life for

human

being,

and a person must

(28d6-10)"

(p. 71). Reeve

leads the

examined

Apollonian
zens

missionary"

he thinks best, even at the risk of death that both reasons "explain why Socrates life. But only his religious reason explains why he is an (p. 72) meaning that Socrates exhorts his fellow citi
what concludes souls

to care

for their

by

sumption

is that Apollo
closer

wants

examining their opinions about virtue. The as human beings to become philosophical. But the
conjectures

opposite

is

to the tmth.
and

Socrates

that the god ordered

him "to
as

live philosophizing
enian generals

examining [him]self and stationed him at Potidaea, Amphipolis, is

a

others"

(28e5-6), just

Ath

and

Delium. Philosophi

cal conversation one's

fear
the

of

death

life-threatening duty, the purpose of which is to overcome by recognizing that one does not know death to be a fearful
there

thing.

Admittedly,
god.

is here

some endorsement of

human deeds

wisdom on

the

part of

But the Full

emphasis

is

upon

death-defying
that

as evidence of

self-knowledge.
"teaching,"

compliance would require

Socrates

go public with

his

that he use political office as a means of courting

his destmction.

But

when such a

daimon

and reports that

possibility is raised (hypothetically), Socrates brings forth his it warns him to be cautious and private in order better Socrates
to

to preserve himself (31c-32a). The daimon contradicts and overrules the god
who

is

somewhat careless of

and who seems

have little interest in

philosophy
skeptical

as a process or a progression with

toward wisdom.

Philosophy,
its

rather, is

humility by

fearless

obedience

to

one's superiors as

main result.

As the

god of

intmsions
phy

limitation (Reeve's point), Apollo defends the divine against the human. Apollo, it seems almost tme to say, is against philoso

and means to waste

Socrates,

whereas

the daimon provides the pmdent

protector.

self-regard needed

Unless

one

for philosophy has been persuaded

and

is

Socrates'

by

Reeve that Socrates

speaks

only the literal

tmth, that he aims for an acquittal, and that he is a devotee of Apollo, it is difficult to feel that Reeve's fascinating argumentation is ever entirely on the mark. Some readers, no doubt, will be persuaded, for the book is intelligent,
scholarly,
technique
and well written. of

And those in

who are

may

also

find helpful Reeve's

extracting

a proposition

from

each section of the

Apology for com

in
point

parison with similar propositions

rates'

other

dialogues. A
wealth
.

case
. .

is Soc
man"

contention that

"it is

virtue

that

makes

good

for

(usually
comes

translated

money"

"Not from money does virtue come, but from virtue [30b2-4]) a statement which is the occasion for a twenty-page
as

excursus on

knowledge,

virtue, and

happiness. Because Reeve

much of

gives so much and

space to matters outside the

ness go unremarked.

Apology,

the

dialogue's detail

rich

This, too, is

regrettable.

Catherine H.

Philosophy
Inc. 1990).

in Novel Form
xi

Zuckert, Natural Right and the American Imagination: Political (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
+ 271 pp.;

$40.75.

Diana Schaub

University
In that equality

of Michigan

Dearborn

portion of

Democracy

in America

concerned with the

influence

of

on

the action

and productions of

the mind, Alexis de Tocqueville spec

and poetry:

ulates on

the connection between politics

Among

democratic

people

memorials of old traditions.

poetry will not be fed with legends or the The poet will not attempt to people the universe his
readers and

with

supernatural
nor will own

beings, in

whom

his

own

fancy

have

ceased to

believe;

he coldly personify virtues and vices, which are better received under their features. All these resources fail him; but Man remains, and the poet needs no The destinies

of mankind, man himself taken aloof from his country and his standing in the presence of Nature and of God, with his passions, his doubts, his rare prosperities and inconceivable wretchedness, will become the chief, if not the sole, theme of poetry among these nations.

more.

age and

Writing
have,
is
.
.

at a
.

time when, according to

no

him, "the inhabitants

of

the United States

nonetheless

literature,"

properly speaking,

Alexis de Tocqueville

ventured
also

to predict the

character of

America's
of

literary

future. Catherine Zuckert

authors a

interested in the

peculiar genius

American

genius no

longer merely prospective. Although she does not mention Tocqueville's as sessment, her book, Natural Right and the American Imagination, might be read as an elaboration, and at the same time a refinement and correction, of his
hypothesis.

Zuckert's literature

exploration of

the links

between

our political constitution and our

proceeds

by

chain

reading

of six
and

American

novelists

(Cooper,

Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, Hemingway,

a common

format: the hero

the frontiersman

Natty

employ from society to live in nature. From Bumppo to his latter-day descendants, Nick Adams and
who withdraws

Faulkner)

whose works

Isaac McCaslin, from the seagoing Ishmael to the mnaway Mississippi rafter Huck Finn, from the rebel and outcast Hester Prynne to the Blithedale Utopians,

they

all, in

one

form

or

another, "light out for the

Territory."

Zuckert

argues

that this
ment of

"characteristically
thought in the
of

American

motif

parallels and recasts

the move

'classic'

statement of

American

political principles

in the
the
the

Declaration
appeal

Independence."

The dissolution

of social and political

bonds,

to the laws

of nature and nature's

God, followed (if

possible)

by

interpretation, Fall

1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

106

Interpretation
just basis
are chief

reconstitution of government on a more

ingredients

of

both been

the Declaration
prescient when

and

these classic American novels. Tocqueville may have

of man

he identified the theme

without a

Nature

God,"

and of
of

country; but in

"standing in the presence of keeping with his general down

Founding, he did
origin of

playing

the theoretical and practical significance of the

not

connect this stance with the state-of-nature can regime.

reasoning

at

the

the Ameri

Whereas Tocqueville strongly suggests that it is politics according to Zuckert the American writer's engagement

which guides
with

art,

the nation's
creative and

founding
critical.

principles

has

not

been determined
of

or

subordinate, but

The imaginative
undertaken

re-presentation novelists

the

founding

argument

has been

deliberately

by

in democratic

myth-making.

from Cooper onward, as a sort of exercise Far from being apologetic in intention, their mythoriginal

making often exposes the ambiguities and deficiencies of the formulation of the doctrine of natural rights. As presented

Lockean

Leatherstocking
"Rousseauian"

tales of
correction

by Zuckert, the James Fenimore Cooper, for instance, embody a of Locke, forwarding a moral rather than an eco
Although Cooper's
reputation

nomic

understanding

of

the American regime, grounding

compassion as well as calculation.

human community in has been in

eclipse

for
of

tization

time, Zuckert stresses his importance. By means of his drama natural goodness in the figure of Natty Bumppo, Cooper "initiated a
some of sorts not

literary
of

debate

only

about the character of

the human

psyche and

its

political

implications,
to

but

also about

the basis

and wisdom of

the whole notion

and

nature."

returning to

Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, Hemingway,

Faulk

ner are all shown

ring

changes on this

theme.

Zuckert places Melville and Hemingway closest to Cooper, for despite great differences among them, all three believed that "the most important function of the literary artist is to provide a fictional illustration of the essential and rational
goodness of

human

unproblematically.

theology
self

cannot

Cooper, of course, does this most emphatically and Moreover, while Natty Bumppo's natural justice and natural be transposed directly to social life, any more than Natty him
civic equivalents.

life."

can,

they do have
at

Natty 's

moral sentiments provide a

natural standard capable of

informing

political

life.

Solitary

communion with

nature
no

is likewise

the heart of
of social

such

"Big

possibility Two-hearted
a

Hemingway's fiction; there, however, it offers redemption. What Nick Adams experiences in
wonder, but the
good
pure sentiment of

River"

is

not religious

existence,

momentary fleeting passion, itself, albeit devoid of human content. Cooper and Hemingway's common desideratum specifically "To live according to is susceptible of radically different constructions.
and

in

nature"

Nonetheless, both
ville,

authors show a certain

unity

of

by

contrast, grounds "the value,

of an

beauty,
nature.

and

humanity and dignity of

at

nature.

Mel
in its

humanity"

solidarity in the face especially

at

indifferent

Even

the extreme,

or perhaps

the extreme,

men recognize

the goodness of life.

Ishmael

goes to

Book Reviews
sea to

107

find

a reason

for both himself

and

his fellows to live. Despite their

to human endeavor,
encounter to or

different
whether

assessments of the and

friendliness
each

of the cosmos

Cooper, Melville,
it be
or

Hemingway

finds the

be beneficial,

productive of natural and political

and camaraderie.

right,

individual happiness,

human understanding

Hawthorne, Twain,

and

believing
return

that "such idealized depictions

effects."

Faulkner form something of a dissenting tradition, of human life in the state of nature
In their novels, the
comically,
protagonists'

have dangerous
to nature
no real

political
are

attempts

to

misguided,
to

sometimes

sometimes

tragically

so.

There is

freedom

be found in the flight from

convention.

Whatever

lessons the
reader

protagonists

take (or fail to take) from their misadventures, the

is

likely

to come

away chastened,

reconciled afresh

to

family, law,
of

and

tradition. That is not to say,

however,

that the stance of these authors toward their work re

of

the American regime is simply defensive. The critical thrust

sides

in their

reinterpretations of the old staples of sexual

morality, the mle

law, and the bearing of history (respectively the specialties of Hawthorne, Twain, and Faulkner). Hawthorne's anti-utopianism manifests itself in his cri tiques of both Puritanism (The Scarlet Letter) and Fourierist communism (The
Blithedale Romance). In
their antithetical ways,

Puritans
or

and

Blithedalers
the

abso

lutize community
to live

and undervalue

(whether

blithely
As the

deliberately)

impor
be

tance of passion, particularly

sexual passion.

source of

the human desire

passion must

together,

as well as a source of

division

and

quarrel,

scope, but also some regularity. Hawthorne, accordingly, en dorses the liberal solution: the establishment of a private realm (constituted by
accorded some

family

and

property)

and a public realm and extension

that respects that privacy.

However, he
the order of a
commitment

assigns a new

primacy

to the affectional aspect of the liberal

understood more on an

solution,

such

that the social contract

itself is

marriage contract than a

business

contract.

It becomes
the

enduring

that reaches beyond

participants'

mutual profit

to

encompass

need

for

sym

pathy Twain
can

and support. and

Faulkner, like Hawthorne,

seek

to dampen the ingrained Ameri

institutions"

fondness for starting over. Yielding to the call to "come-out from corrupt (as the nineteenth-century abolitionists put it) is not seen by them
route

as

the best

to the

abolition or reform of

those institutions. After all, in

Huckleberry
the last

Finn it is for
a

not

flight that

secures

Jim's freedom (downriver

being

mnaway slave), but the allied action of religion and law (Miss Watson's conscience as expressed in her will). Similarly, in Go Down,
place expresses reservations about

Moses Faulkner
renunciation of

the wisdom of Isaac

McCaslin's
of

his tainted patrimony,

the

an act which

forfeits the possibility

and

effective public action on purity.

race question

for the

private satisfaction of moral

Of the

novelists

discussed

by Zuckert,
slavery.

Twain

Faulkner deal

most

directly with in the longing

the theme of American

to return to nature a

It may be part of why they discern dangerous inability to leam the tmth about

108

Interpretation

oneself and others.

Historic injustice renders the innocence of natural equality illusion. Civic equality is the product of stmggle, the stmggle of black and white alike to attain full humanity, to accept, understand, and transform the bitter legacy of mastery and slavery.
an unattainable

Through their
of natural

consideration of

the respective meaning and choiceworthiness this select

liberty

and civil

liberty,

group

of

American
of

novelists con

stitutes a microcosm of modernity.

and and

With the triumvirate

the

Hemingway
Faulkner
within on

on one side and

countertradition of

Cooper, Melville, Hawthorne, Twain,

major

the other,

they

reproduce, Zuckert argues, the two

strands

Rousseau's

own

thought (as represented

by

the Second Dis

more

course and

On the Social Contract).

They

also anticipate

and,

impor

tantly,

offer responses

to certain developments

in

modem

philosophy,

including

the most potent: historicism and nihilism.

As the

subtitle

has

it,

this is Political

Philosophy
for their

in Novel Form. Of course,

teachings. In the

it

was

the philosophers themselves who first experimented with the novel as a

more popular and

democratic

conveyance

political

Persian Letters, Montesquieu has one of his and "subtle against "abstract
reasoning"

characters on

philosophy"

defend storytelling as the grounds that "there

sufficient;

are certain tmths with respect to which persuasion

is

not

they

must

be felt
quieu's

well."

as

literary

Rousseau, in La Nouvelle Heloise, was to follow Montes lead. Zuckert, however, suggests that the natural-bom novelists

may be better than their irrepressibly intellectual predecessors at appealing to the passions of readers. Cooper for instance, even though he is the most visibly didactic, and therefore arguably the least novelistically accomplished, of the American writers, is more accessible than Rousseau. These fictional explorations of the central issue
nature versus convention not

philosophy qualify only peculiarly democratic genre of political thought, but as political deeds. Stated most boldly, as Zuckert does not shy from doing, they are "attempts to re-found the American polity on a tmer, more adequate view of nature including preeminently human Although ultimately dubious about the extent of their influence on the selfas a new and

of political

nature."

understanding of Americans, Zuckert demonstrates that these novels provide, for those who are interested, reflections otherwise lacking on the idea-poor

American

scene.

American

political

discourse

proper manifests a remarkable of civil gov

degree

of

theoretical consensus about the origin, extent, and end

Not surprisingly, our most sterling instances of political thought, the Federalist Papers and the Lincoln-Douglas debates appearing in the lowly guises of journalism and electioneering to periods in which consensus belong
ernment.
on

fundamental
of

questions was still at

and

issue,

namely,
the

during

the fight for rat

ification

the

Constitution

the

fight

over

future

of slavery.

Absent for

the most part

mulation of

life, the serious questioning and refor our principles took place instead in the realm of make believe.
nation's political

from the

The

most

likely
she

objection

to Zuckert's enterprise
a philosophic

that her reading is too

of

schematic, that

has simply laid

template over the course

Book Reviews
American literature
proach much on

109

is, I believe,
of

unwarranted.

The

vindication of novel

lies in the richness its

own

her individual One

readings.

Each

her ap is interpreted
of

very

terms. There is

no mthless and

distorting
idea for

imposition

philosophic

language
out of
was not

and concepts. and

senses that the

such a

thematic

study grew framework array

as of

long

different novels; the but built from the ground up. Despite the prefabricated,
acquaintance with the

faithful

heady references (Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Burke, Heidegger,

and

Bergson,
of those poet's

especially in

Rousseau), Zuckert does

not

treat these novels simply

she avoids

dramatic

simulacmms of some philosophic

treatise;

the

tendency

steeped

handling

of

philosophy his materials. Zuckert

political

to denigrate the uniqueness of the

regards

these

works not as adapta

tions, but
In

as originals.

perhaps

the

most

fascinating

of

her readings, Zuckert holds

the

out

the possi

bility

that in Go

Down, Moses

and

its sequel, Intruder in

Dust, Faulkner

philosophically adequate reconciliation of nature and history (via a Bergsonian theory of time), and in doing so provides an American answer to the crisis of natural right provoked by Continental, and especially German,
achieves a

historicism, from Hegel

effective reproof
nection'

to Heidegger.

Buried in the footnotes is

"has
made much of
but,"

a quiet

but

to Allan

Bloom,

who

this 'German con

not

in The

Closing

seem to

have

noticed

of the American Mind; the American literary

the battlefield can

she

remarks, "he does

response."

Bloom's book in the heart

shows
of

how

an

idea defeated
abyss"

on

rise

phoenixlike

the

conquerors.
without

According

to

Bloom, it is

Nietzscheanized leftism

"Nietzsche

the

that threatens the university, philosophy, and America. the healthiness of the American ability to
shallow.
render

Bloom

perhaps undervalues pernicious

profoundly has far more

depth. In

doctrines

admirable self-preservative

Zuckert establishes, America resources than its philistinism. In the

But,

as

productions of

its

literary

artists, America

can match philosophic

depth
to

with

the mindlessness of
mindedness of

Moby Dick, that "metaphysical Pip as he plunges into

Ahab
as

masterpiece,"

we are witness

both
But

the abyss and the inhuman

seeks to conquer the

single-

he

confronts

and

abyss.

Melville both

also portrays an alternative outcome: and perched on and

Ishmael, fortified by his "genial

has found
and

desperado
a

philosophy"

Queequeg's

metaphysical

a real

source of

friendly coffin, buoyancy amidst flux

indif

ference. While the

source of

the

buoyancy

that these American

novelists offer

is variously located (in religion, family, friendship, law, nature itself), all seek to render human life more livable, individually and (with the exception of

Hemingway)

collectively. explications

Should the textual Zuckert's

not

convince

one

of

the

"fundamentally
literature,"

philosophic character and the political

readings are

function

of classic

American

buttressed

by

exterior evidence.

Cooper

and

Faulkner,

for instance, explicitly Cooper describing himself force the

acknowledged

the novelist's role as public teacher

who wished

as

"an American

to illustrate and en

peculiar principles of

his

own

country

by

the agency of polite litera-

110
hire."

Interpretation
Zuckert looks
at

by

Cooper

during
She

hiatus from fiction documents

both The American Democrat, a political treatise written when he thought his message was being

misunderstood,
ambassador.

and speeches given also

by Faulkner during his briefly the six American

stint as a cultural

novelists'

familiarity
European

with philosophic writings.

More important than this

evidence of a

tutelage, however, is the

ert's reconstruction of

evidence of an

intra-American dialogue. It is Zuck

her to
move so

that dialogue

which allows

gracefully

from
of

one author

to the next. Disagreements existed not only over the character

human

and cosmic

nature, but
a

over

the best way to embody and express that

audience.

character

in

a novel

directed to

democratic

In tracing the

rhetorical

development from Cooper to Faulkner, Zuckert adds another richly strand of interpretation to the weave of her book. Hawthorne and his logical
alizing.
romances are

colored psycho mor

introduced in

contradistinction to
Offenses,"

Cooper's forthright

In "Fenimore Cooper's

Literary

Twain

even more emphat

ically

rejected

alternative.

Cooper's approach; in Huckleberry Finn, he crafted a comic Zuckert claims that Twain's ironic presentation of Huck and Jim's
nature"

adventures

downriver displaced the

their own

return to the state of

ture."

By
mony.

Leatherstocking saga as "the depiction of a and "marked a new beginning in American litera testimony, both Hemingway and Faulkner are Twain's
they
make

descendants

though of course

very different

use of their patri

All told, Zuckert

makes a

compelling

case

that the canon of American

fic

tion has a specific philosophic bearing. English novels of the same period are

heavy
also out

with convention.

Austen, Eliot, Dickens, Thackeray,

of convention.

inquire into the

proper articulation

stripping the patina sense. We don't get our

Trollope may of political order, but they do so with They are not foundational in the same
and

novels of manners until

of

James

and

Wharton. As Zuck
is in
no sense a possess a wild and

ert

demonstrates,
of

the prevalence

the retum-to-nature

motif

function

American backwardness. America did indeed

magnificent natural

frontier; but

more

importantly America had open

as well.

before it
put

pristine political and philosophic

frontier

As Alexander Hamilton

it

in the first Federalist:

[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of whether and

they

are

establishing good government from reflection and choice, or forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on

accident and

force.
the philosophic basis
of

Novel
of

meditations on

the American polity form a part

that ongoing experiment in self-government. Through her

investigation

of

the peculiar genius of the

account, both

sound and

American writer, Catherine Zuckert has given an original, of the Founding's meaning for literature and,

in turn, literature's meaning for the Founding.

Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Fourth Edition (En larged). Translated by Richard Taft. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1990). 224 pp.; $35.00.

Frank Schalow
Loyola

University, New Orleans

More than

physics continues works.

its publication, Kant and the Problem of Meta most important and extraordinary Richard Taft's welcome new translation, which is adopted from the

fifty

years after

to be one of Heidegger's

expanded

vitality

of

fourth German edition, brings forth even further the unmistakable Heidegger's classic albeit controversial exchange with Kant's tran
transcenden

scendental philosophy.

There is little doubt that Heidegger's innovative dialogue

tal philosophy, as

with

cally
pact

changed

by James C. Churchill in 1962, has dramati the English-speaking audience's view of Kant. Indeed, the im
greater almost

first translated

for

American

contribution

scholarship may be even in rediscovering Nietzsche. Yet in the

than

Heidegger's
that have
we
book,"

thirty

years

elapsed until the appearance of stand on the threshold of a

the second translation of the "Kant

corresponding shift in how to interpret the entirety Heidegger's thought. Traditionally, he has been viewed as one of the most esoteric thinkers because of his preoccupation with the perennial question of
of

Being,

the stalwart of a "meditative

thinking"

which seems rather

distant from

some of the more

politically involved

concerns of

human

existence.

opportunity has arisen to address Heidegger's meditative thought in terms of its possible interfacement with explicitly ethical concerns

Recently,

the

and pathways of political engagement. In spirit, this revolutionary move bears a distinct affinity with Heidegger's attempt in the Kant book to expand the breadth of Kant's celebrated Copernican revolution (pp. 8-12). The continual effort to think the unthought and to

bring

what

is

"unsaid"

into

speech

defines
a

the trademark of Heidegger's appropriation of the entire Western tradition, task which the Kant book
us exemplifies

(p. 138).
own own

Correlatively,

the challenge to

today lies in redirecting Heidegger's

see what marginal aspects of
of

itself to

his

hermeneutical strategy back upon inquiry into Being can be brought

to the fore. The development

much of

this way of reinterpreting Heidegger receives

its impetus from, but is certainly not reducible to, the continued reve lation of the autobiographical fact of his adherence to National Socialism. But
even more significantly, the

dawn

of a new

ontology thought, particularly

interpretation, Fall

arises

from

a positive appreciation of with

reading of Heidegger's fundamental his affinity with Greek political

Aristotle's

notion of phronesis.

Of

equal

importance

1991, Vol. 19, No. 1

112

Interpretation
effort

is the deliberate his

ontological

to

discover the

germ

for

an ethic

in the

vast reservoir of

meditations, despite his remarks to the contrary in the now famous "Letter on (1944). In what way does Heidegger's radical
Humanism" "retrieval"

reinterpretation or

(Wiederholung)

of

Kant,

to which this new trans

lation unequivocally directs

ward

appreciating

anew

attention, bespeak the revolutionary move to the inclusion of ethics and politics within meditative
our

thinking?

the Kant book in its

almost

Before addressing this question, it is important to place Heidegger's task in proper context. In terms of pages, Heidegger devotes

the whole of that study to a radical re-examination of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. From the start, Heidegger emphasizes that his basic intent is to recast the first Critique as a preliminary inquiry into the understanding of Being
constitutive of

human nature,
to a

as a

"laying

of

the

ground which

for

metaphysics"

(pp.

9-12), in
focus for
Time
scendental
and

contrast

"theory

knowledge,"

of

has been the primary

(p. 172). Thus, Heidegger shifts his own study of tran from the direction of the task undertaken in Being and philosophy develops the issue of finitude or temporal transcendence as the central
neo-Kantians

consideration to

be

recovered revolution

through Kant's effort to delimit human reason.

Kant's Copernican

thereby becomes less

an attempt

to establish the

possibility

of an object

more a recognition

that

the controversy whereby he displaces the priority of reason in both its theoretical and practical guises in favor of the synthetic power
of
of

nary understanding of Kant's forms the heart

according to antecedent conditions of knowledge and any comportment toward things hinges upon a prelimi Being. Heidegger's interweaving of his own task with

the imagination (Einbildungskraft). "This

and pure

[root] is indicated by

the

fact that imagina

pure

tion
and

sensibility not only thus, but to theoretical and practical reason in their separateness their (p. 171). When transposed within the context of Being and
power of
unity"

understanding lead back to the

the power of imagination becomes the corollary to the of concern (Sorge) through which the manifestness of beings (including human

Time,

"openness"

hence the possibility of understanding Being, first arise. In this way, Heidegger brings forth his own version of human existence as in its radical finitude as oriented toward futurity and death as the preliminary
existence),
and
"Dasein"

theme

of

investigation
critics

on which

the broader project

of

ontology
of

rests.

As Heidegger
Kant book,

observes

in the

preface to the second edition

(1950)

of

the

have

often questioned

the

"violence"

his interpretation in

emphasizing the priority of imagination over reason. Yet the real focus of con troversy hinges on the implications that this approach has for reinterpreting the Critique of Practical Reason, to which he devotes only three pages in his entire
In the second Critique Kant seemingly roots moral reason in the domain freedom divorced from sensibility, experience, and temporality, in a manner completely contrary to Heidegger's inquiry into Dasein's finitude. It was Ernst Cassirer who called attention to this paradox, first in a famous discussion with
of
study.'

Book Reviews
Heidegger
at

'113

book,
of cents novel

Academy (1929), which provided the spark for the Kant subsequently in his review of that work in 1930. The new translation the Kant book, which includes the Davos Disputation as an appendix, ac
and

Davos

Heidegger's
reading
of with

exchange with

Cassirer

as

the point of clarification for his

transcendental

philosophy.

But

what

is only
edition

now

the surface
years

Heidegger's

preparation of the

fourth

coming to in 1973 (three

becomes to providing
tion of
Kant.2

before his death) is how pivotal the unraveling of the above paradox a fuller appreciation of the scope of his own reinterpreta
the

Thus,
take up
a

issuance

of

the new translation

of

the Kant book becomes a call to

forgotten thread in Heidegger's

we a

critical exchange with transcendental

moral

philosophy;
praxis cal

leads to

discover the opportunity to show how the finitude of deeper concern for the underpinnings of all ethical and
stated

politi

involvement. As Heidegger
I believe that
we proceed

in his dialogue

with

Cassirer
Kantian

at

Davos:
if
we

mistakenly in the interpretation law itself for Dasein. We if

we

of

ethics

first
little

orient ourselves

to that to which ethical action conforms and if

of the cannot

we see

too

of the

inner function finitude

discuss the for Dasein

problem of the

of the ethical creature

do

not pose

the question: what

and

does law

mean

here,

and

how is

the

lawfulness itself

constitutive

for the

personality?

(P.

175)
Kantian ethics, Heidegger
maintains

Taking

his

cue

from

a retrieval of

that all

moral comportment

begins from

individual's include his

concern shifts or

finite transcendence whereby an narrowness of immediate interest to from the away

a
of

fulcmm

her commonality with the other. According to Heidegger, the perennially Kantian doctrine of respect for persons and of treating human be ings as ends in themselves rather than as mere means becomes possible through
the very finitude
possibilities.
which enables me

to discover the limited

scope of

my

own

of my own being as care, I experience the of other human beings and myself. between the welfare corresponding affinity When seen in this light, praxis is never simply an isolated event; instead it

Through the disclosure

arises with

the

self's response

to the

challenge of

addressing its

own nature and

within

relocating its place broader social

mental

(along

with

an expanded sense of

the good)

the

community.3

The

prospective projection of of of

Heidegger's funda
to a way of

ontology upon the hidden premises rescuing the Enlightenment political view
world"

Kantian

ethics points

the human

being
of

as a

"citizen
ethics

of

the

(weltburgerlicher). This

creative retrieval of

Kantian

may

very well hold the key which linkage of Heidegger's thought

the
1930's.4

points with

beyond the impasse

affirmation of

the regrettable

his

National Socialism in

For Heidegger, the Hannah Arendt,

laying

of

the
an

ground

for

metaphysics expands

into the

concrete arena of praxis.

This is

pioneered

his foremost students, in Human Condition in The suggesting that the finite insight
which one of

114

Interpretation
"world-making"

capacity for
not good

allows

human beings to take up

motivated, e.g., the
a

concerns

that are the

fixated, self-serving contemporary context, the power of imagination becomes a vehicle of ethical and political judgment (Urteilskraft) which discriminates various alter
way.

instrumentally merely in an encompassing rather than in

reactive or

administration of

Within this

more

natives

for

action

in

pursuit of

the

good.

Arising

on

the furthest frontier of

well provide

moral and political authentic measure

philosophy, this development may very

of

the

for the validity

Heidegger's

retrieval of

Kant.

The

new

translation of Kant

and the

painstakingly faithful to the original able for anyone interested in Heidegger's thought

Problem of Metaphysics fluent, while German will ultimately prove indispens

as well as

in

current trends

in

hermeneutics,
tant volume
annotation and

ethics,

and political philosophy.

collected works

The

publication of

this impor

of

Heidegger's

includes insightful
even

and valuable

Yet

even

ing

spirit

scholarship beyond this scholarship the patient reader will rediscover the animat of much of Heidegger's thought, which rarely occurs so powerfully as
to probe the depths of Kant's transcendental philos

which will

benefit

the more erudite of readers.

in his
ophy.

venturesome attempt

NOTES

fashion

1. Heidegger takes up the issues of freedom and practical reason in a much more detailed a year later in his 1930 Freiburg lectures, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesam

tausgabe 31 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio

tures

Klostermann, 1982). Also see Heidegger's earlier lec from 1927-28, Phdnomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Ges amtausgabe 25 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977).
Lectures
2. Cf. my article "Toward a Concrete Ontology on Human Journal of the British 1986), 155-65.
Freedom,"

of

Practical Reason in Light

of

Heidegger's No. 2

Society for Phenomenology, 17,

(May

Sherover, Time, Freedom, and the Common Good: An Essay in Public Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989). Also see my exploration of his Research in Phenomenology, 20 (1990), 188 thesis, "Imagining the Good: Politics in
Transition,"

3. Cf. Charles M.

94.
tics, Art (Bloomington: Indiana

4. Cf. Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation University Press, 1990).

with

Modernity: Technology, Poli

Interpretation
A JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Editor-in-Chief

Hilail Gildin

General Editors

Seth G. Benardete

Charles E. Butterworth

Hilail Gildin

Robert Horwitz (d. 1987)

Howard B. White (d.

1974)

Consulting

Editors

Christopher Bruell Ernest L. Fortin

Joseph

Cropsey
Wilhelm Hennis

John Hallo well

Muhsin Mahdi Harry Momigliano Amaldo Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott Ellis Sandoz V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson
(3 issues):

Subscriptions

Subscription libraries
students

rates per volume

individuals $21
and all other

institutions $34

(five-year

limit) $12
elsewhere or
mail

Postage

outside

U.S.: Canada $^50 extra;

S^Sextra by surface $1100 by air.

a

(8

weeks or

longer)

Payments: in U.S. dollars

and payable

by
U.S.A.

financial institution located

within the

(or the U.S. Postal Service).

Single

copies available

interpretation, Queens

College, Flushing, N.Y.

11367-0904, U.S.A. (718)520-7099

Please

print or

type

Order Form for New Subscribers

(Not for
I
wish

Renewals Current

Subscribers

will

be Billed)

to subscribe to INTERPRETATION.
me name

? ? ?

bill

?
ZIP/postcode

student

payment enclosed

address

air mail

country (if

outside

U.S.)

WAYNE'S'

UNRMHtif
Edition

Now in A

New, Expanded

An Introduction to Political Philosophy

TEN ESSAYS BY

Edited

and with an

Introduction

by

Hilail Gildin

Four essays supplement the original 1975 edition to present a clear introduction to the views of Leo Strauss regarding the nature of political philosophy, its chief contemporary antagonists, its classical Strauss' thoughts forms, and its modern version. Readers discover
on what political

philosophy has been

and should

be

again.

389

pages

ISBN 0-8143-1901-7, cloth, $29.95 ISBN 0-8143-1902-5, paper, $15.95

Contents
Introduction
PART THREE

PART ONE What is Political Philosophy? On Classical Political

Philosophy
The Three Waves of Modernity Natural Right and the Historical Approach An Epilogue
PART TWO Introduction to History of Political Philosophy

Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization What is Liberal Education? Liberal Education and
or

Progress

Responsibility Bibliography
Index

V^

Plato

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS Leonard N. Simons Building 5959 Woodward Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48202 (313) 577-6120

Forthcoming
Joseph

Cropsey

Virtue

and

Knowledge: On Plato's Protagoras Constraints in Prometheus Bound

Kenneth Dorter
Review

Freedom

and

Essay

Marie A. Martin

Misunderstanding Philosophy

and

Understanding

Hume's Moral

ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation, Inc.
Queens College

Flushing

N.Y. 11367-0904
U.S.A.