LUNA VS COMELEC FACTS: Joy Chrisma Luna filed her certificate of Candidacy as a substitute candidate for Hans Roger

for the 2004 elections a vice mayor of Lagayan Abra. However, Tomas Layao together with several others filed a disqualification petition against her since she was a registered voter of Bangued and not Lagayan Abra. Furthermore there can be no valid substitution since Hans Roger the candidate sought to be substituted was only 20 years old on the day of the election. COMELEC ruled in favor of the disqualification case. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger. Held: There was a valid substitution . The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC AMORA VS COMELEC Facts: Amora was a candidate for mayor of Candijay, Bohol. Olandria, respondent, was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC of the same municipality. Olandria filed a petition for dq against Amora on the ground that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the OEC. Amora argued that the petition for dq is actually a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC and as such, Olandrias petition is filed out of time and that the COC is valid and effective because he is personally known to the notary public before whom he took his oath in filing the document and as such, Amora sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under

oath. The Comelec disqualified Amora. Amora meanwhile won the election. RULING: The SC ruled that an improperly sworn COC is not a ground for disqualifications, citing Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC and the petition of Olandria not being based on any of the grounds under the OEC and the LGC, it should not prosper. The court went on to say that a petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal requirement that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate. VILLABER VS COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CAs Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for

the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution. On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution. ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be

As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In In re Vinzon,the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.We further pronounced therein that: in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.

Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information: That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours) The elements of the offense under the above provision are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19] The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes

his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. LOPEZ VS COMELEC FACTS: Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution and (2) Omnibus Order of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman. Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to the Philippinesand resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities . Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added) Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. "Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point: While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took hisoath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225 Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to

run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines. While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity BLANCO VS COMELEC FACTS: Blanco and Alarilla were candidates for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Blanco won against Alarilla by 6,000 votes. Alarilla filed a petition for disqualification on the ground of vote buying which resulted in the suspension of Blancos proclamation. The COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying Blanco for such violation. On the next election, Blanco again ran as mayor and one voter sought to disqualify him on the basis of the ruling in the vote-buying case, but the Comelec dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner was disqualified because his previous disqualification attached only to that particular election and that no criminal action was instituted against Blanco in order for the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to attach. On the 2001 elections, Blanco again ran

against Alarilla but Alarilla sought his disqualification, again on the ground of his previous disqualification. This time, the comelec disqualified Blanco from running for mayor under the Local Government Code for having been removed from office through an administrative case. In the 2004 elections, petitioner again ran for mayor but respondent again sought to disqualify him based on the first disqualification judgment. Blanco withdrew his COC, but worrying that he would encounter another petition for disqualification, he filed a petition for declaratory relief for the issuance of a judgment declaring him eligible to run for public office. The RTC declared petitioner eligible to run. On the may 2007 elections, petitioner ran for mayor but respondent again sought his disqualification based on the previous DQ judgment and the comelec disqualified petitioner based on that.

on the ground that she was not guilty of premature election campaigning, for participating in a motorcade before the campaign period. The main issue in the case is whether or not Penera may be considered as a candidate for purposes of determining her guilt or liability for premature campaigning. RULING: The SC held that for violation of Section 80 of the OEC, a person who files a COC is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, in Lanot vs COMELEC, it was held that the essential elements for violation of section 80 are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. The SC further stated that it is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. Congress laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. The SC stated that it has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any person who files his certificate of candidacy within the filing period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. VILLANUEVA VS COMELEC FACTS: Narciso Mendoza filed on the last day of filing of COCs his COC for the office of vice mayor in Dolores, Quezon. However, on the same day, Mendoza withdrew his COC for personal reasons. Villanueva then filed his COC in substitution of Mendoza for the office of vice mayor. Villanueva eventually won as vice mayor but the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of Villanueva on the ground that his name did not appear in the

RULING: the records did not show that a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for the election offense of vote buying under the OEC. There was no evidence that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office was imposed on petitioner by the court as a consequence of conviction for an election offense. Since there is no proof that Blanco was convicted of an election offense under the OEC, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in pronouncing that Blanco is disqualified to hold public office.

PENERA VS COMELEC FACTS: the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Penera from running for the office of mayor in Sta. Monica Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice Mayor should succeed Penera. Penera contests such decision

COMELECs certified list of candidates for that municipality, hence it was presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the comelec. The canvassers then declared Lirio, his opponent, as the winner. The COMELEc denied the petition of Villanueva on the ground that Mendoza has not withdrawn his COC because Mendoza failed to file with the COMELEC a sworn statement of withdrawal. The Comelec said that Mendozas supposed withdrawal produces no legal effect because it was not done under oath. RULING: The SC held that the Comelecs first ground for denying due course to the substitute COC should be rejected. The fact that Mendozas withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the peoples will in favor of the substitute candidate. The will of the people can not be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy has not been properly sworn to. Mendozas withdrawal of his COC right on the very same day that he filed his COC shows that he was no serious about his COC but this could not be done to would-be bona fide candidates, like petitioner who had not filed his candidacy in deference to mendozas candidacy who was one of his co-planners with some concerned citizens. The COMELECs post-election act of denying the substitute candidacy does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703) Facts: Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United

States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. Issue: Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship. Held: YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963. The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does

not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen. NAVAROSA VS COMELEC FACTS: navarosa and Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 2001 elections. The MBC proclaimed Navarosa as the winner with only 3-vote margin. Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts, Esto filed an election protest in the RTC. Navarosa filed a counter protest. After a revision of the contested ballots, the RTC ruled in favor of Esto, thus Esto was proclaimed winner and annulled the proclamation of Navarosa. The decision was appealed to the RTC while Esto filed a motion for execution with the RTC. The RTC ruled that Esto is entitled to execution but he must file a supersedeas bond of 300,000 while also saying that Navarosa could stay the execution by also filing a bond double the amount granted to Esto. Navarosa then in the petition for certiorari raised the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC because Esto failed to pay the Comelec filing fee. RULING: The SC held that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case. Navarosa claims that although the receipts issued by the trial court show that respondent paid 515 as filing and other fees, only 100 was credited to the general fund of the court. As such, Esto only filed 100 as Comelec filing fee. The SC held that an election protest is not dismissible if the protestant, relying on the courts assessment, pays only a portion of the Comelec filing fee. It should also be noted that navarosa never raised that issue during the fullblown trial of the election protest. Navarosa actively participated in the proceedings below by filing her answer, presenting evidence and seeking a stay of execution by filing a bond. Thus, estoppel has set in precluding

petitioner from questioning the incomplete payment of the comelec filing fee. On Navarosas questioning of the execution pending appeal, the SC held that good reasons exist to grant execution pending appeal. To grant execution pending appeal in an election protest case, the ff requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal and; (3) the order grandting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons. In one case, the SC held that good reasons are constituted by: (1)public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2)shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office (2001 elections---2003 decision); (3) length of time that the election contest has been pending.