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=
=
t
N
i
i t
Y Z
1
(3.2)
Here } {
t
N is a Poisson process with mean rate c, where c is the downward jump rate, and
,...., , ,
3 2 1
Y Y Y is independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
function ( ) H , with mean ( )
1
Y E m = and variance ( )
1
2
Y Var = . Note that the moments of
t
Z can be
Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010) 10
determined from the random sums formulas, and are ( ) cmt Z E
t
= and ( ) ( )t m c Z Var
t
2 2
+ = , (cf.
Taylor and Karlin (1984), pp. 55, 201).
Note that the most genuine economic role is only satisfied if the bank monitors its assets with
fixed monitoring cost per unit of time which is equivalent to a continuous monetary outflow rb (in case
of variable monitoring cost it can also subtracted from
G
) where b is the present value of the cost of
monitoring the bank's assets forever.
Now consider the case of "Bad" technology, abbreviated byB , in case of the absence of
monitoring, the cash-flows diffusion model of bank's assets in equation (3.1) is then can be rewritten in
the form:
t B t B t t t
t
dX X dt X dW X dZ
= + (3.3)
where the diffusion coefficient
G
and the drift coefficient
G
are given by:
2 2 2 2
B G B B
+ and
B G G G
. Also for technical reasons, we assume that ( )
2
/ 2
G G G
= + .
Suppose that the bank is closed. This means that the bank's assets are liquidated for a value
proportional to the current cash flows
t
X where is the coefficient of liquidation and is assumed to
satisfy
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2 2
2
2 2
2 1 2 1
G
G
B
B
r
m m c
r
r
m m c
r
+
+
< <
+
+
(3.4)
As a result the "Bad" technology is always dominated by closure given that
0 0
x X = :
( )
( )
0
2
0
2 2
0
0
2
y technolog Bad" "
0
x
r
x m m c
r
x
dt X e E
B
B
t
rt
X
<
+
+
=
(
Also, the net present of value of a bank who continuously monitors its assets, the "Good"
technology, is
( )
( )
( )
b
r
x m m c
r
x
dt rb X e E
G
G
t
rt
X
+
+
=
(
2
0
2 2
0
0
2
y technolog Good" "
0
so the "Good" technology dominates closure whenever is not too small assuming
1
G
G
r
n
m
=
-
and
1
B
B
r
n
m
=
-
:
( )
2 2 2
0 0
2
G G
x c m m b x
(
+ + >
(3.5)
or equivalently;
( )
0
2 2 2
2
G G
b
x
c m m
>
+ +
(3.6)
where
( )
2 2 2
2
G G
c m m + + > (3.7)
while we denote by analogy
( )
2 2 2
2
B B
c m m + + < (3.8)
11 Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010)
Note that since 0 c > then (3.7) is satisfied if and only if
2
1
1 1
2
m k + - or
2
1
1 1
2
m k - - for all
2
2 k . But if
2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2
m k k - - < < + - is satisfied for all
2
2 k
then
2 2
2 0 m m k + - < in (3.7).
Now assuming the banks continue forever, then the economic surpluses generated by the good
technology is positive when x is larger than the net present value NPV threshold
( )
2 2 2
2
G G
b
NPV
c m m
=
+ +
this means that
( )
2 2 2
2 0
G G
c m m x b
(
+ + >
(3.9)
when (3.7) is satisfied, while the economic surpluses generated by the bad technology is always
negative. Regarding the above discussion (3.9) could be negative for some downward jump rate c ,
actually for all
2
2 k < and m between
2
1
1 1
2
k - - and
2
1
1 1
2
k + - . More specifically,
( )
2 2 2
2 0
G G
c m m x b
(
+ + <
(3.10)
occurs if and only if
( )
( )
2 2 2
2
G
G
b x
c
m m
>
+
(3.11)
which implies that this case of good technology will be a bad technology if c in equation (3.11)
is satisfied. On other word, the economic surpluses becomes negative.
Note that the following figure 3.1 represent the above cases of the surpluses generated by the
good (G) and the bad (B) technologies.
Figure 3.1: Economic surpluses generated by the good (G) and the bad (B) technologies.
G
x
B
Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010) 12
Now assume the bank always monitors the value of its assets ( )
G
V x with good technology
using the liquidation threshold
L
x which below
L
x the bank is closed is then given by
( ) ( )
0
L
L
r rt
G x t L
V x E e x rb dt e x
(
= +
(
(
(3.12)
where
L
is a random variable represent the stopping time at
t L
x x = given that
0
x x = . Using Karlin
and Taylor (1981) equation (3.12) can be written as
( ) ( )
( ) { }
2 2 2
1
2 2 2
2
2
G
G G G
a
G G L
L
V x c m m x b
x
b c m m x
x
(
= + +
| |
(
+ + +
|
\
(3.13)
where
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 2
1
2 2
G G
G
G G G G G
c m m c m m
r
a
| | (
+ +
| ( = + + + >
|
(
\
(3.14)
Thus the continuation value of the bank is equal to the net present value perpetual continuation
( )
( )
2 2 2
2
G G
c m m x b
(
+ +
plus the option value associated to the irreversible closure decision at
threshold
L
x . Therefore, the first-best closure threshold of the bank is the value of the cash flow
L
x that maximizes the option value associated to the irreversible closure decision is given by
( )
2 2 2
1
2
G
FB
G G G
a b
x
a c m m
=
+ +
(3.15)
Note that the first-best closure threshold
FB
x is smaller than the NPV threshold.
The main feature of commercial banking is deposit finance which mostly according to banks
liabilities consists of insure deposits with a volume normalized to one. Now in the absence of public
intervention which always consists of either liquidity assistant by the Central Bank or the closure by
the banking supervision authorities, liquidation of the bank occurs when the cash flows x received
from its assets are insufficient to repay the interest r on deposits. Then in this case the liquidation
threshold is given by
L
x r = (3.16)
As a consequence, the book value of the bank equity which equals to the book value of assets
minus the nominal value of deposits is positive. i.e.
( )
2 2 2
2 1
G G
c m m r
(
+ + >
(3.17)
but liquidation does not permit payment of all deposits:
1 r < (3.18)
Note that equation (3.17) captures the fact that, in the absence of liquidity assistance by the
central bank which will be discussed later in section 6, the solvent banks may be liquid which
guarantees that optimal capital requirements are positive. Also, equation (3.18) ensures that deposits
are risky.
Consequently, the present value PV of deposits is then given by
( ) ( )
1
1 1
G
a
G L
L
x
D x x
x
| |
=
|
\
(3.19)
which leads to the market equity ( ) ( ) ( )
G G G
E x V x D x = - or equivalently
13 Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010)
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
1
2 2 2
2 1
1 2
G
G G G
a
G G L
L
E x c m m x b
x
b c m m x
x
(
= + +
| |
(
+ + + +
|
\
(3.20)
Note that deposits are risky because 1
L
x l < which implies that the value PV of deposits
( )
G
D x is less than their nominal value 1, the difference corresponding to the liability of the Deposit
Insurance Fund which is covered by an insurance premium ( )
0
1 D x - paid initially by the bank. But if
the bank ceases to monitor its assets, then the value of equity becomes
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
1
2 2 2
2 1
1 2
B
B B B
a
B B L
L
E x c m m x
x
c m m x
x
(
= + +
| |
(
+ + +
|
\
(3.21)
where
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 2
2 2
B B
B
B B B B B
c m m c m m
r
a
| | (
+ +
| ( = + + +
|
(
\
(3.22)
Note that comparing the two equities of bad and good technologies in the above two formulas
equations (3.20) and (3.21). we conclude that ( ) ( )
B G
E x E x > for some values of x in some open
interval ( ) ,
L S
x x where
S
x is the point of intersection where ( )
B
E x becomes smaller than that of
( )
G
E x .
4. The Solvency Requirements
Note that the basic reason for imposing a capital requirement in our model when
( ) ( )
G L B L
E x E x < there exist a region [ ] ,
L S
x x where the bank chooses the bad technology (shirks) in
the absence of external intervention which reduces social welfare and ultimately provokes failure, the
cost being borne by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). To avoid shirking, banking authorities which
sometimes represented by the Central Bank, a Financial Services Authority or by the DIF itself set a
regulatory closure threshold
R
x below the bank is closed. Practically, this closure threshold can be
implemented by a minimal capital requirement. Thus the book value of equity is equal to the book
value of assets
( )
2 2 2
2
G G
c m m x
(
+ +
minus the nominal value of deposits, which normalized to
1. Therefore, the solvency ratio r of the bank is given by
( )
( )
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 1
2
G G
G G
c m m x
c m m x
(
+ +
=
(
+ +
(4.1)
Note that is an increasing function of x . If we denote the minimum capital ratio by
R
then
for every
R
x x implies that
R
which
R
finally defined by
( )
( )
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 1
2
G G R
R
G G R
c m m x
c m m x
(
+ +
=
(
+ +
(4.2)
Assume the monitoring cost b is not too small. Thus a solvency regulation is needed to prevent
insufficiently capitalized banks from shirking. Now following the same lines in the proof of
Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010) 14
Proposition 2 in appendix A of Decamps et al. (2004), it is easily shown that the second best closure
threshold associated with the optimal ratio is the smallest value
R
x of the liquidation threshold with
absence of shirking is given by
( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
1
2 2
G G B
R
G G G B B B
a b a a
x
a c m m a c m m
+
=
( (
+ + + +
(4.3)
Regulation is needed whenever
R
x r > which is equivalent to
*
b b > where
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 2
1
G G G B B B G B
G
r a c m m a c m m a a
b
a
( (
+ + + + +
=
(4.4)
Note that, when regulation is needed
R L
x x r > = , then the implied solvency ratio
R
r is
positive because it has assumed that
( )
2 2 2
2 1
G G
c m m r
(
+ + >
which means that banks become
illiquid before they become insolvent especially in the absence of public intervention. Also, note that
for very large values of b , the liquidation value of the bank
R
x l becomes greater than the nominal
value of deposits normalized to 1 and then deposit becomes riskless. In this case the incentives of
banks stockholders are not distorted by the limited liability option, they optimally decide to close the
bank when x hits the first best threshold
FB
x and the moral hazard constraint does not bind.
5. Market Disciplines
Market discipline can be useful because of its possibility to produce additional information that the
regulator can exploit which is usually referred to indirect market discipline. For example, consider a
setup of Merton (1978) or Bhattacharya et al. (2002) where
t
x is only observed through costly and
imperfect auditing. As a result there is a positive probability that the bank will continue to operate in
the region [ ] ,
L R
x x because of undetected by banking supervisors. If shirking is to be deterred more
stringent capital requirement or higher
R
x has to be imposed to account for imperfect auditing. Note
that requiring the bank to issue a security such as subordinated debt whose payoff is conditional on
t
x and is traded on financial markets would indirectly reveal to the value of
t
x and dispense the
regulator from costly auditing.
When
t
x is publicly observed, the supervisors can have recourse to a second form of market
discipline which sometimes known as direct market discipline which works by modifying structure of
banks. This is the idea behind the subordinated debt proposal which our model allows us to analyze
formally (cf. Calomiris (1998), Evanoff and Wall (2000)). In this case the banks are required to issue a
certain volume s of subordinated debt renewed with a certain frequency p . Note that both s and p are
policy variables of the regulator. Now keeping constant the total volume of outside finance, then the
volume of insured deposits becomes 1 d s = - . We assume as in Ericsson (2000) that the subordinated
debt has an infinite maturity and is renewed according to a Poisson distribution with intensity p . Thus
the average time to maturity of subordinated debt is given by
0
1
pt
pte dt
p
.
Now we will consider the situation in which the regulator can commit to a closure threshold
R
x . We focus on the where
R
x d < , so that deposits are risky while sub-debt holders and
stockholders are expropriated in case of closure. Now if we denote ( )
G
V x and ( )
B
V x are the value of
banks assets for Good and Bad technologies, ( )
G
D x and ( )
B
D x are the present value PV of insured
deposits for Good and Bad technologies, ( )
G
E x and ( )
B
E x are the value of equity for Good and Bad
15 Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010)
technologies, and ( )
G
S x and ( )
B
S x are the market value of subordinated debt for Good and Bad
technologies.
For the case when the bank monitors its assets, then using the same adaptation used in the
previous section 3, it is easily shown that
( ) ( )
( ) { }
2 2 2
1
2 2 2
2
2
G
G G G
a
G G R
R
V x c m m x b
x
b c m m x
x
(
= + +
| |
(
+ + +
|
\
(5.1)
and
( ) ( )
1
G
a
G R
R
x
D x d d x
x
| |
=
|
\
(5.2)
where
G
a is defined in equation (3.14).
Let p be the instantaneous probability that the subordinated debt is rapid at face value s , and it
has to be refinanced at price ( )
G
S x . i.e. ( )
G
S x is the solution of the following partial differential
equation
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1
2
G G G G G G
rS x sr p s S x xS x x S x = + + + (5.3)
Note that ( ) 0
G R
S x = . Thus ( )
G
S x is then given by
( )
( ) 1
1
G
a p
G
R
x
S x s
x
| |
| |
|
=
|
|
\
\
(5.4)
where
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1
2
2 2
G G
G
G G G G G
c m m c m m
r p
a p
| | (
+ +
+
| ( = + + +
|
(
\
(5.5)
Therefore, the first effect of direct market discipline is noticed from the exponent ( ) 1
G
a p -
which decreases when p increases. Thus ( )
G
S x increases in p . The value of the market equity
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
G G G G
E x V x D x S x = - - becomes
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2
2 1
2 +
G G
G G G
a a
G G R
R R
E x c m m x b
x x
b d c m m x s
x x
(
= + +
| | | |
(
+ + + +
| |
\ \
(5.6)
In case of no market discipline when 0 p = , the liability of the DIF is reduced when a fraction
s of insured deposits is replaced by subordinated debt. But this is exactly offset by the default premium
demanded by subordinated debtholders. Also, the value of the equity is reduced when s is increased
while keeping 1 s d + = because ( )
G G
a p a . Thus the bank will only issue subordinated debt if it is
imposed by the regulator or if it reduces the capital requirement.
Now if the bank shirking, the case of bad technology, the value of the equity ( )
B
E x using the
same adaptation as in section 3 too, it is easily shown
Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010) 16
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2
2 1
2 +
B G
B B B
a a p
B B R
R R
E x c m m x
x x
d c m m x s
x x
(
= + +
| | | |
(
+ + +
| |
\ \
(5.7)
where
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 1
2
2 2
B B
B
B B B B B
c m m c m m
r p
a p
| | (
+ +
+
| ( = + + +
|
(
\
(5.8)
The necessary condition for shirking to be eliminated is 0 where
( ) ( )
R G R B R
x E x E x ( =
. A simple computation gives:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 1 1
R G R G G G R G G
x E x a c m m x a d b s a p
(
( = + + +
and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 1 1
R B R B B B R B B
x E x a c m m x a d s a p
(
( = + +
Thus
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
2
1
G G B B R G B R
G B G G B
a a x c m m x
a a d a b s a p a p
= + +
( ( + +
(5.9)
Let ( )
R
x p be the minimum value
R
x that satisfies the inequality ( ) 0
R
x . Thus, the
minimum solvency ratio ( )
R
x p that prevents bank shirking becomes
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
1
2
G B G G B
R
G G B B G B
a a d a b s a p a p
x p
a a c m m
( ( + +
=
+ +
(5.10)
or equivalently;
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
0
2
G B G B
R R
G G B B G B
a p a p a a
x p x s
a a c m m
(
= +
+ +
(5.11)
Note that if the difference between the variances of the bad and good technologies is positive,
then the minimum solvency ratio
R
x is a concave function of p which has a minimum value at * p ,
where
1
p
is the average time to maturity of subordinated debt. But, if the difference between the
variances of the bad and good technologies is zero, then the minimum solvency ratio
R
x is a
decreasing function of p . Also, the market discipline reduces the need for regulatory bank closures for
small values of p and the difference between the variances of the bad and good technologies.
Consequently, the increase in the frequency of renewal of subordinated debt will affect the shirking to
become more costly for bankers. Also, for fixed values of assets and deposits, the changes in the value
of equity come from changes of subordinated debt. But, for large difference between the variances of
the bad and good technologies, * p will be negative, then the introduction to subordinated debt is
counterproductive since it forces the regulator to increase the minimum capital requirement.
6. Supervisory Action
In this section we will study how the efficiency of market discipline is affected by the attitude of
supervisory authorities. Note that the second pillar of Basel 2 is the supervisory review. The committee
views supervisory review as a critical compliment to minimum capital requirements and market
17 Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010)
discipline (cf. Basel Committee, 2001, p. 30). Indeed, banking authorities are very often subject to
political pressure for supporting banks in disasters. In our model means providing public funds to the
banks who hit the threshold
R
x . Under the irreversibility assumptions, it is always suboptimal to let
banks go below this threshold. When net fiscal costs are not too high, the closure can be dominated by
continuation. Note that whenever the bank hits the boundary
R
x x = the governments intervene and
considers the possibility of recapitalizing the bank up to
R
x x + with public funds. Thus the new assets
value
, g BO
V reflects that future government intervention is anticipated. Note that BO refers to the Bail-
Out operation and { } , g G B for technology. Thus,
( ) ( ) { }
, ,
0
max
g BO R g BO R
x
V x V x x x
= + (6.1)
In general, ( )
, g BO
V x can be written in the form
( ) ( )
1
2 2 2
,
2 +
g
a
g BO g g g g
V x c m m x b x
(
= + +
(6.2)
Note that
;
0 ;
g
b g B
b
g G
=
=
=
.
This means that the government injects the minimum amount needed to stay above the critical
shirking level
R
x which can be interpreted as liquidity assistance. Note that
R
x becomes a reflecting
barrier with boundary condition: ( )
, g BO R
V x = . Following the same proof in Appendix B of Decamps
et al. (2004), then ( )
, g BO
V x for good technology G can be written as
( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2
1 2 2 2
,
2
2
1
G G
G G
a a
G BO G G R
G
c m m
V x c m m x b x x
a
| |
+
( |
= + +
|
\
(6.3)
The liquidity assistant implies that ( )
, G BO R
V x is different than zero. If ( )
G R
V x < then the
cost of public funds is so high that the government prefers to close the banks. But for positive
( )
, G BO R
V x and ( )
G R
V x > , then it guarantees that the bailout is socially preferable to close.
In case of sub-debtholders and equityholders are wiped out, the decision to rescue the bank only
affects the deposit insurance fund which becomes the residual claimant of the assets value of the bank.
Note that the differential equation and boundary conditions that characterize the value of sub-debt and
equity are the same as before and thus
g
S and
g
E where { } , g G B are unchanged. Therefore, market
discipline is compatible with public liquidity assistance, provided that subordinated debtholders lose
their stake if the bank is rescued. But in case of sub-debtholders and equityholders are fully insured
when the bank hits the critical threshold
R
x such that ( )
g R
S x s = where { } , g G B , the sub-debt
becomes riskless and its values equal to s . Also, the sub-debt term vanishes from the differential
equation that characterizes the equity
g
E where { } , g G B , which implies that market discipline
becomes completely ineffective. This finally illustrates that the market discipline is indeed a useful
complement to the two other pillars of Basel II, the supervision and capital requirements.
Suppose now the bank has issued at least one security such as equity, certificates of deposits, or
subordinated debt, that are traded on a secondary market. Thus the price of security in our model is a
one to one function of the state variable x and inverting this function, the value of the banks cash
flows to condition its intervention policy can be inferred by the regulator. Therefore, the role bank
supervisors have to be re-examined their adoption of a gradual intervention policy instead of a constant
intensity of audit across all banks. For example, the regulator can set two thresholds
R
x and
I
x (with
R I
x x < ) which refers to closure and inspection thresholds respectively. Note that if
I
x x < the bank
Journal of Money, Investment and Banking - Issue 19 (2010) 18
is inspected, the technology chosen by the bank is revealed, and it is closed if the bank has chosen the
bad technology, g B = .
Under this regulatory policy, the value of equity when the technology is good is given by
( ) ( )
1 2 2 2
2 1
G
a
G G G G
E x c m m x b g x
(
= + + +
(6.4)
where
( )
( )
1 2 2 2
1 2
G
a
G G G R R
g b c m m x x
(
= + + +
But the value of equity when the bank is shirking becomes
( )
( )
1 2 2 2
2 1 for
0 otherwise
B
a
B B B I
B
c m m x g x x x
E x
(
+ + +
(6.5)
where
( )
( )
1 2 2 2
1 2
B
a
B B B I I
g c m m x x
(
= + +
Note that
G
a and
B
a are both defined in equations (3.14) and (3.22) respectively. Also, note that
for a given value of
I
x and a function
B
E there is a minimum value of
R
x such that
G
E remains above
the value of
B
E which is known as the value of tangent of two curves.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper developed a cash-flows diffusion model with jumps of commercial banks'
behavior, where the three pillars of Basel II: capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision
and market discipline, can be analyzed. More specifically, the pillar 1 of capital adequacy requirement
is interpreted as a closure threshold rather than an indirect mean of influencing banks asset allocation,
the pillar 2 of centralized supervision is re-examined the traditional view of on the supervisory role,
and the pillar 3 of market discipline is showed that it can be used to reduce this closure threshold when
there is a risk of regulatory forbearance.
It suggests that according to reliable signals given by market prices of the securities issued by
banks which are known as the indirect market disciplines, the supervisors can modulate the intensity of
their interventions from a simple audit to the closure of the bank. But the direct market discipline can
be effective if banking supervisors are protected from political interference. Also, indirect market
discipline cannot be used under all circumstances since market prices become erratic during crises
periods.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by Kuwait University, Research Grant No. [IQ 02/07].
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