,96*5°

mm
H
4#fu/'ai *s ilm
STRATEGIC BOMBING

OF

AXIS EUROPE

JANUARY 1943 SEPTEMBER 1944

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

Office of the
-* *
i~ Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Analysis Division, European Branch

Washington, D.C.

15 November 1944

- - - ?0.}55009-y
29 JAN . f p| '^-j^^Gr-B*
"^

mi
.» J[. :V i­

?.^ijJngtom „ t c

MEMC.UAHDU?i FOR Command and General Staff School, Att: Library

Subject: Koport- »
''Strategic Boinbiaf; ;
oi A^iy Europt)'*

I Thors is .J'orwardyd herowith ocpy of the' eubjeot report.

vhic;., revi(vwfi ros;lbs nT bonib duaia^e to strti^egic fcßrget ayat*>m«
in •\u25a0]:.'.rcpo.

c : TKia raoort is; oroaoatod &s a rac'-url record of the

effect of tho Coabi nad Borabor Offensive uurinj:; 1940 :;nci the i'irst
dine' months of 1944- -'•­ coapreher.;Sive liol- of : T?portant damaged
pltmr,s,. with the racorcl of attacks on them.., in irio^udsaU

'6,- It ia felt that the roport will be \f value £or back­

sr.round. \nforrsatioaal and research purposes
/ V

j i\ajo;. Concra);, o\, ii, Amy

¥1

/ /• >&lBtant ChioX' of Air ot&.i'f,

•-* Intel ligasice

jiarHIBUTTOM

i; oa-s'i'.. of subj rpt

V
f* -»

V,,

\
*^r

STRATEGIC BOMBING

OF

AXIS LUROFE

JANUARY 1943
- SEPTEMBER 194-4

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

Office of the

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Analysis Division, European Branch

Washington, D. C,

1 December 1944

*%
b •
r .^ («.***
:-^cm «v^
It /*;
ll \u0084 \ *'*•\u25a0* ./:«5-52^8,AF
 1 ?1 ft $4^ f *fp 5%

INTRODUCTION

This study is presented as a factual record of the effect

of the Combined Bomber Offensive during 1943 and the first nine

months of 1944- . It is considered that this report will be of

value to the offices of the Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and

other interested agencies for background, informational and

research purposes.

In general, the Combined Bomber Offensive directives assign­

ed to the R.A.F. Bomber Command the task of destroying German

• cities, dispossessing
man morale.

destroying key industries

the working population and breaking Ger­

To the U.S. Strategic Air Forces

in the German War Economy.

The results of this combined program of precision and area

fell the task of

bombardment of Germany is the subject of this report. An over­

all evaluation of bombing and statements of results achieved in

each major target system are presented in the following sections.

A comprehensive list of important damaged plants also is included

in the attached Appendix.

#
\u25a0-I I'

rip I*
**
C5-52^8, AF

 TABLE OF cbrWf ITO '& i* MSm EJ

# -
Page

I Introduction

II Summary
-— — — ~
*- i
• \u25a0 \u25a0
' ' 1

ITI

IV Aircraft
—
Bombing Operations ard Target Pattern
<
.

13
6

Anti-Friction Bearings.-. , -^-­

19
VI Oil /
>-~

—— 22

— ——
VT I Submarine ards
yardsv
"
r—» ~— *~ ,^-,
25
VITI Rubber and Tires „.—\u25a0 „ , , r-.—
— 26
Tanks and Motor Transport ,—^,
IX -.„ ,-»•
27

XI
X Armaments and Miscellaneous

Machine Tools and Precision

Engireering

Instruments
— P
,_ 30

31
XII Electrical Equipment -, w-,^-p-,«,w-,^-p-,«, „-,-,,
— — „»­
31
# XITIMetals
- Steel and Non-Ferrous ,--, , 32
XIV Chemicals and Explosives ,„—^-^^.^ ,
33
XV General Level of Industrial Output--, ,, — ._
34.
JJJ J Transportation ~ -.*., ,-t~­
— 39
XVII Military Installations «^,
, . —^ r—^. 42
Appendix A Bomb Damage to Axis Industries^ 43

C \u25a05268,AF
 ii.SUMMARY

A. Bombing Operations and Target Pattern

+
At the end of September 1944 the weight of bombs dropped by-
Allied Air Forces in Europe since the beginning of the war reached
a total of 1,704,470 tons. The RAF Bomber Command accounted for 40
percent of this total, U.S. Strategic Air Forces 33 percent, U.S.
Tactical Forces 17 percent and RAF Tactical Forces 10 percent.
The growth of both U.S. and 3ritish strategic bombing has been in­
creasingly rapid in the last two years. US3TAF tonnages averaging
73,160 tons per month in the summer of 1944 were sixteen times
\u25a0greater than in 1943. RAF tonnages of 65,700 per month in the
summer of 1944 were more than three times as great as in 1943 •

The target pattern for U.S. Strategic Air Force attacks has in­
volved successive priorities for several target systems. These in­
cluded submarine installations in earl}' 1943, aircraft and anti-
friction bearing factories in late 1943 and early 1944, and oil
installations, tank factories and motor transport plants in mid-1944.
During the first nine months of 1944 these high-priority industries
absorbed 27.4 percent of the USSTAF bombing effort. Railway instal­
lations absorbed an equivalent amount, while airfields, other tacti­
cal targets and area attacks accounted for the remaining 45 percent,
of the tonnage. Bomb- tonnages dropped on targets in Germany have
steadily increased, and in the third quarter of 1944 amounted to 60
percent of the USSTA.F total effort.

'•
RAF Bomber Command attacks in 1943 were directed mainly against
German cities. During 1944, on the other hand, such attacks were
limited to about 25 percent of the total RAF effort. Attacks against
railway installations in occupied countries, counter measures against
flying borab installations on the Channel Coast and bombing of troop
concentrations absorbed more than half of this 1944 RAF effort. Oil

.
about 20 percent of 1944 t,onnages .
installations and miscellaneous targets accounted for the balance of

B. Aircraft

Between late July 1943, when attacks upon the German aircraft
industry were launched, and 30 September 1944, a large number of
attacks were made on Gernan assembly, component, repair and aero-
engine factories. Plants damaged by bombing totalled 58 in 1943,
and 146 in 1944. Single-engine fighter aircraft factories bore the
brunt of attacks, but production of twin-engine fighters, bombers
and miscellaneous types also was materially reduced. Practically
all the important aero-engine producers likewise suffered bomb
damage.
As a result of bombing attacks it is estimated that up to 30
September 1944 the GAF had been deprived of 10,000 aircraft that
would hava been produced in the absence of aerial attacks. Bombing
prevented a large planned increase of single-engine fighter output,
and until the summer of 1944 held production below the level prevail­
ing in mid-1943. From T'arch to September 1944 aircraft output rose

#
sharply from a low of 1320 to 1950 combat aircraft, most of which
were single-engine fighters. This rise in production, in spite of
greatly increased bombing of aircraft factories, reflects a success­
ful dispersion and expansion of the German aircraft industry follow­
ing the vury successful 1943 attacks. Although this expansion pro-

C5-5268.AF
 gram was in considerable measure successful, the increased output
came too late to build up a successful aerial defense of Germany,

Combat losses of German aircraft during the period August 1943­

m
Soptember 1944 are estimated at about twice the losses of factory
production. A sizeable part of this combat wastage, however, was
<
accounted for by the strategic bombers and their fighter escorts. i\ \u25a0

Bombing and strafing attacks on GAF repair depots and airfields also
destroyed aircraft and in addition lowered serviceability of remain­
ing aircraft through destruction of hangars, repair facilities, c.
c-> J
supplies, etc. The reduction of fuel supplies following successful (
bombing of Axis oil installations also contributed to lowered
activity of the GAF.

Attacks against GAF factories and operational installations

can be credited with (l) holding down production of the latest type
German aircraft, (2) reducing GAF resistence to a point where wide­
spread strategic bombing of Axis target systems became feasible,
(3) forcing a concentration of GAF fighters in Western Europe at the
expense of Italian and Russian fronts and (4) aiding greatly in the
landings and subsequent invasion operations in Western Surope.

C. Anti-Friction Bearings

Attacks on anti-friction bearing targets resulted in damage to

14 Axis factories. The resulting production loss, together with

*
the period August 1943
-
loss of imports, averaged 20 percent of pre-attack supply during
February 1944, and 50 percent during the
following 7 month period. The cumulative loss of bearings in the
14-month period ending 30 September 1944 is estimated at the equiva­
lent of 5 months normal supply.

The effects of these bearing shortages were cushioned to a con­

siderable extent by a reduction of requirements resulting from direct
damage to user industries producing aircraft, tanks, etc., and by .. .'.
redesign of equipment. Effects were also postponed to some extent by
reduction of industrial allocations, use of pipe-line stocks and inten­
sified salvage t Nevertheless it is estimated that only 90 percent of
sive and about two-thirds in the period March
-
vital requirements were covered in the first seven months of this offen­
September 19Uu These
shortages are believed to have resulted 'in reduced assemblies of tanks,
trucks, machine tools, etc., in addition to the losses caused by direct
bomb damage to these industries.

D. Oil
The heavy aerial offensive against Axis oil installations, launched
in April 19hk, caused widespread damage and a rapid drop in production.
Up to 30 September 2k synthetic plants, 6° refineries, numerous storage
installations and a number of miscellaneous liquid fuel plants were
damaged by aerial attack. Production dropped to 50 percent of pre-
attack 1; output
in July and to a low of 23 percent in September following
occupation of the remaining refineries in Ploesti, Cumulative losses of
oil products by 30 September are estimated at 3*660,000 tons, or the
equivalent of 23 A months pre-attack output.

<\u2666
Reduced production of oil has forced the enemy to lower military
and industrial consumption and to draw upon accumulated stocks. Local
shortages of fuel have frequently appeared and have been an important

C5-52f8,AF
 factor in limiting vehicular traffic and restricting German panzer
and air force operations. In view of Germany's critical oil stock
position, continued attacks against the industry will further re­
strict mobility of German ground and air forces.
\u2666
E. Submarines

During the early part of 19ii3 v/hen U-boat installations were top
priority targets, 12 German shipyards assembling submarines and the 5
large operational bases in France were damaged by bombing, These
attacks v/ere only moderately successful and were abandoned following
spectacular successes of anti-submarine operations at sea f Attacks
were resumed in 19hh 9 however, when damage was inflicted on 17 German
shipyards and several important operational bases. These attacks may
have reduced serviceability of the remaining German submarine fleet.

F, Rubber and Tires

Synthetic rubber plants at Kuls, Ludwigshafen and Oswiecim and

several tire factories have been damaged during Allied bombing missions.
In view of Germany's relatively large synthetic output and excess pro­
cessing capacity it is not believed that damage to these factories
materially hampered the German war effort.

G, Tanks and Motor Transport

Bombing attacks on this industry, though limited in 19h3 resulted *
in widespread damage during the spring and summer of 19hhj Damage to 6

»
of the 9 known major tank assembly factories combined with damage to
important producers of engines, gear assemblies and other components
reduced tank production by an estimated 20 to 25 percent during the
summer and early fall of 19U* f

Production of trucks and other motor transport also suffered in

19hh as a result of damage to 23 producers of motorized equipment,
and several ordnance depots .
including the 5> main truck assembly plants, numerous components plants
Production of trucks half tracks and
miscellaneous vehicles in mid-l^Ui was reduced an estimated 15 to 20
, 4

percent below the former rate of lit,ooo monthly. Occupation of im­

portant French and Belgian plants in August 19 hh increased this loss
of trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment to at least 140 percent of
previous production levels f

The effect of these losses on German military operations is diffi­

cult to evaluate since shortages of fuel have already restricted use of
available motorized equipment. However, if fuel output is increased
during the winter months, losses of tanks and trucks as a result of bomb

.
damage v/ill constitute serious blows to German forces already operating
with inadequate equipment

H. Armaments and Miscellaneous Engineering

•
Production of artillery, shells and various other armament and
engineering products has suffered considerably from bombing. At
least hh factories in this category were damaged in 19h3, and 89 in
19J414, including such. large plants as Krupp at Essen and Rheinmetall
Borsig at Dusseldorf t Losses of engineering equipment 'and armaments
components have supplemented specific losses of aircraft, bearings,
oil, etc, and have contributed to the overall reduction of German
fighting strength,

C5-5268,AF
-
w&L£%&'\u25a0.
?3 £kl !j«.. (»\u25a0-<•\u25a0 • *?•
.* --i

3­
 /

•
I.Machine - --,Tools
n ,
-_.
and Precision
i.ii.i .i . Instruments
.
.r . j i n \u25a0_\u25a0..-.

The production losses in these industries resulting from damage

to 15 plants in*l°li3 and 21 plants in 19hh has intensified recon­
struction problems in bomb damaged industries f Lowered machine tool
production has also limited normal reequipment of plants and prevented
the use of former excess capacity for direct armaments production
Ul
lu£. «% is*§»
i-sBta/JJ,
\u25a0
wife* d$T 11
II I
--'
mm i^t

.
\u25a0

j^ Ka^m

J # Electrical Equipment

Damage to 25 plants in 1910 and 30 plants in 19hh is estimated

to have reduced output of the electrical equipment industry by at
least 10 to 15 percent. It is possible that certain equipment bottle­
necks were created, particularly by the heavy damage inflicted on large
and important plants in Berlin,

X , Metals
-
Steel and Non-ferrous
\u26 6

Damage to 16 steel plants in 19h3 and 17 plants in 19hh is be­

lieved to have reduced ortput, but only in- moderate degree because
of the existence of excess capacity in the industry and the general
invulnerability of steel plants. The loss of industrial plants in
'western Europe and loss of imports of iron ore from Sweden and other
sources has far overshadowed losses from bomb damage, and must soon

lower Gorman steel production to a fraction of former levels. Non­

ferrous metal producers also neve been damaged by Allied bombings,
but it is doubtful if German war production has thereby been materi­
'
ally damaged, 1

L, Chemicals and Explosives

Fairly widespread damage has been inflicted on German chemical

factories. Included in the list of 37 plants damaged in 19hh were
6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rockets and robot air­
craft. Five large explosives plants in France also were knocked out
by RAF attacks. Other bomb damage contributed somewhat to the over­
all decline of Axis industrial output.

M, General Level of Industrial Output

Damage to German industries ,

as outlined in preceding sections,
combined with damage to residential property, public utilities and
administrative agencies, has reduced overall industrial output in Ger­
many by an estimated average of 12/15 percent during the period under
review. Factories damaged by bombing in 19h3 included 252 of the more
important plants in Axis Europe, In 19hh such damaged plants totalled
536, In addition, hundreds of small factories, mostly unidentified,
'
were damaged or destroyed by bombing. Damage to housing by 30 Septem­
ber I9IUI is estimated at a total of 2,600,000 units destroyed or ren­
dered uninhabitable.

German industrial output has been greatly enhanced during the

war by the impressment of foreign labor into service in Germany, by
acquisition of strategic resources in conquered territory, and by
receipt, of contributions from occupied and satellite countries.
Foreign workers have comprised about 20. percent of Germany's labor
force, and contributions from occupied countries, in financial terms,
have amounted to as rcuch as 30 percent of the total Axis outlays for
war purposes. The recent losses of European territory have deprived
Germany of most of these contributions and practically all of certain

C5-52^8,AF

Jlly &«£ *^; :: - -' '\u25a0*'•' v:u *-'

 '
strategic materials vital production.
war production.
al to war The combined efTect" »-*aoJ
of heavy bomb damage and the even more important loss of raw materials
and industrial contributions from occupied countries is rapidly in­
creasing Allied superiority in production and must seriously weaken
# German military resistance in corning months.

N. Transportation

In addition to the strategic bombing of industrial objectives,

the strategic air forces have devoted a large percentage of their
efforts to the bombing of rail centers, road and rail bridges and
port facilities. This bombing has supplemented tactical air force
'
missions in several programs of interdiction. In Italy, the .Bal­
kans, Southern France and "Western Europe the bombing of transport
facilities has slowed the movement of German supplies and reinforce­
ments and materially aided in the success of Allied ground operations.

Air action and mining operations by British Air Forces have des­
troyed or damaged shipping, port facilities and inland waterways.
This has cost the Axis valuable cargoes, disrupted his industrial
plans and slowed military traffic. As the weight of tactical and
strategic air force attacks against transport shift into German
territory, the enemy's industrial power and economic system,, as
well as bis military strength and mobility, will be increasingly
impaired by bombing,

0, MilitaryInstallations

During amphibious landing operations and subsequent advances

# in Italy, Southern France and Normandy, heavy bombers operating
with medium and fighter bomber forces have contributed materially
to the success oi ground operations. Co inter action against launch­
ing and supply sites for flying bombs required diversion of a- size­
able portion of the strategic air forces efforts but aided in res­
tricting robot bombing attacks against England.

C5~5268,AF

—5—
111. BOKBING OPERATIONS AND TARGET PATTERN

A. Weight of Attack

Bombs dropped by Allied Air Forces

ning of the war reached ? total of 1,70k,k70 tons on 30 Sept'mber

19kk« For detailed data see table 1. This total effort was divided

almost equally between U.S. and British forces,

U.S. Strategic Air Forces

U.S. Tactical Air Forces
U.S. Total

RAF Bomber Command

RAP Tactical Air Forces

RAF Total

Total

Strategic bomber forces accounted for

percent. A considerable part of t lnis

however, was devoted to tactical bombirg,

ing sections

The monthly weight of attack by t he

showed an impressive increase in 19UU

dropped on Axis Europe by British and

3>0,570 tons in 19U5, an average of 108,990 tons

ped in the first half of 19141+, and 177,930 tons

of I9UU. The spectacular incrcrse in weight of

revealed by tie fact that 70 percent of the tot

dropped in 19kU, compared with 21 percent

prior years.

U.S. Strategic Air Forces. Although p.ttecks

bombers committed to strategic bombardment were on

minor scale until late in 19U^, these

percent of Allied strategic air force

tons on 30 September 19UU- Attacks by the U.S.

(USSTAF ] increased sharply in 19hh, e.s shown in T

 TABLE 1 \u25a0'*'ii'uj jjf'"".'<" '"'if !!

i
8

BOMB TONNAGE , JJ
"

ALLIED AIR FORCES IN EUROPE JJ

U. S. Air Forces R. A. F.

\u2666
v ; n *Tacti-;
:
Bomber, cal
.
kJ x \
:
Period Bth AFilsth AF :l2th AF: 9th AF: Total \u26 6 ;Command: A F Med. Total
1939-40: 14,632: 2,828: 17,460
1941 : 35,508: 14,317: 49,825
1942 :' 1,713: 4,410:* 6,123-::' 51,028: 249: 25,258^ 76,535
1943
Jan. : 739;
—
— : 1,983: —
— : 2,722:: 4,868: : 1,368:
— 6,236
Feb. : 705: —— : 1,773: —— : 2,478:: 12,274:-— : 832: 13,106
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
;

j
1,530:
: 1,130:
: 2,677:
2,468:
: 4,103:
——
—
~-
~­
: 2,773:
: 5,042:
: 7,436:
: 8,409;
: 13,850:
— : 4,303:: 11,858: -.- : 2,752:
: 6,172:: 12,843:
11: 10,134:: 14,460:
: 10,877;: 17,101:
83: 3,332:
52: 2,978: 17,490
282: 2,938: 20,321
263: 18,216:: 18,852: 491: 4,688: 24,031
14,610
16,258

Aug.
Sept.
: 3,779:
:. : 5,743:
—— .
: 02, 460:
: 13,941:
1,292: 17,531:: 22,569: 531: 5,429; 28,529
2,777: 22,4-61:: 16,642: 1,239: 4,786: 22,667
Oct. : 5,132: : 8,915: 882: 14,929:: 15,428: 363: 2,829; 18,620
Nov. : 6,868: 3,171: 4,087: 1,444: 15,570:; 16,236: 1,370: 2,350: 19,956
Dec. : 12,577: 4,368: 5.815: 1,541: 24,301: t 13.221: 1,054: 1,001: 15,276

«
Total

Jan.
Feb.
: 47,451:

: 12,397: 11,051:
: 19,146; 6,747:
7,539:' 86,484:

8,0-46;
4,848:
8,210 i
149,684: -176, 352

1,618: 33,1125: 20,639: 1,696:

\ 5,465: 35,283:217,100
. m

2,279: 24,614
3,420: 34,161:: 13,500: 1,781: 1,819: 17,100
Mar. : 21,346: 10,376: 7,064: 5,193: 43,979:: 31,021: 1,173: 3,240: 35,434
Apr. 27,576: 21,253: 8,603: 10,964: 68,396:: 37,515: 1,961: 4,465:. 43,941
May 38,029: 30,355: 15,720: 18,845:102,949:: 41,722: 5,174: 7,150: 54,046
June 59,625: 24,465: 11,821: 26,023:121,934: : 64,139: 5,703: 4,451: 74,293
6 Mo. :178,119: 104,247: 56,102: 66,063:404,531: :208,536:17,485: 23,404:249,428
July : 46,605: 32,183: 9,586 : 16,457:104,831:: 64,528: 5,124: 7,584: 77,236
Aug. : 49,305: 28,230: 12,441: 18,272:108,248:: 73,760: 6,561: 8,796: 89,117
Sept, : 42,162: 20,971: 8,394:" 8,946: 80,473: : 58>89&: ~3,9OO: 11,082.: 73,880
.9 Mo, ;316, 191; 185,631: 86, 523; 109, 738; 698 ,083:; 405, 722; 33, 073: 50,866:4-89,661
'
1939-Sept. 1944 * : : i •
:
• •
890; :683,242;'38, 787:*128,552i850,581
s
—
Total :365, 355:193,170:177,417:117,948:853,
1 , L. : : * ;; • ;

1/ Data from Statistical Control Division, Office of Management Control

2/ Includes 9th Air Force when in Mediterranean Theater
2/ Includes Air Support Command of Bth Air Force in early 1943

•
4/ Includes Mediterranean Strategic Air Force.

"*"'*"
iI^IPI sir ji
C5-5268,AF

7
 i

*&- afc _»
5J jj^j|
percent of the total for these air forces was concentrated in the

third quarter of 19hh, 50 percent in the first half of I9kh, and only

73 »160
# 10 percent in the preceding 17 months. The monthly average of

tons of bombs dropped in the summer of 19UU was sixteen times greater

than in 19U3 <­

RAF Bomber Command. Attacks b;/ British heavy bombers f account

ing for 55 percent of the total Allied strategic effort, up to

30 September 19UU, also increased greatly in 19W4, as- shown in Table 1.

Nearly 30 percent of the RA.F 5-year total was dropped in the third

quarter of 19UU» 30 percent in the first half of the year, 26 percent

in 19U3, a^d 15 percent in preceding years. The monthly average of

65,700 tons reached in the sumner of 19Uil- was more than three times

as great as in 19U3»

U.S. Tactical Air Forces. . Attacks by t c U.S. 9th and 12th Mr

Forces have accounted for nearly two-thirds of the tonnage dropped

by Allied tactical air forces in Europe during the war. Although

U.S. tactical air force operations were not begun until late in 19U2,

the growth of these forces has rapidly overshadowed RAF operations,

particularly in 1914i|-» U.S. tactical forces in the Mediterranean area

dropped about the same tonnage in Vshh as in 19U3» "but the 9"th Air

Force based in Britain showed large increases to a peak effort of

26,020 tons in the invasion month of June 1914J4. About 25 percent of

the^ total U.S. tactical effort was dropped in the third quarter of

19141+, I+l percent in the first he. lf of 19W+, p.nd 3U percent in the pre

ceding fourteen months.

British Tactical Air Forces. British forces operating from

• Britain and the Mediterranean

naval forces) have accounted

tical air force tonnages.

area (excluding Coastal Command and

for somewhat more than one-third of tac­

The long participation of these British

air forces in the war is shown- by the fact that only 26 percent of a

C5-5268,AF
H Jsl £w 'ilifi If k^ k L^ v 'i'^ I t \ Tj| &J SB
 U. S. ,STRATEGIC AIR FORChS ila|Jf
\u25a0
\u25a0*\u25a0 "W W 'O' *.i

' ' (Bth and 15th)

15th)

HEIGHT OF ATTACK BY TYPE OF TARGET

TARGET

# f:

1943
1943 1944
Type of Target
Target
°
T_-_

:• Jan-Mar :Apr-
;an-Mar:i
*«\u25a0_\u25a0_

June iJuly-
ne ;
apr-jui
apr-jui c juiy-Sept
a

: Jan- Sept
Tons :Percent:
Percent: Tons j Tons Tons Tons; Percent

A/C Construction : 2,419 4.4 y - 9,542 19,431 19,323^ 48,796 9.7

" " Repair
Repair : 3,208 5.8 : 1,512 2,273
— : 3,785 0.8
." Airfields s 5,135 9.4 ; 8,623 28,767 20,038. 57,428 11.4
Total ! 10,762 19.6 ! 19,677 50,471 39,86i;i10,009 21.9

Oil
Oil '! 424 0.8 ! 150 20,436 44,018* 64,604 12.9
Bearings
Bearings : 2,235 4.1 : 1,906 1,080 1,311* 4,297 0.9
I-ST-AFV-Rubber : 1,223 \u25a02.2 : 130 756 13,366: 14,252 2.8
Total • 3,832 7.1 \ 2,186 22,272 58,695 \ 53,153 16.6
•.

* RR Installations :
«,
8,440 15.3 : 22,342 64,408 52,003:138,753
4,576: 9,665
27.7

• 3,467 1,622
Sub Yds-Naval Bases : 20,490 37.3 : 1.9
• 8,402 16,337 9,104: 33,843 6.7
Flying Bomb Sites : 2,274 4.1
Defenses
- Troops
Troops 9,131 20,832: 29,963 6.0
• 31,204
Total 56.7 ; 34,211 91,498 86,515.!212,224
212,224 42.3

Area
- T.O. - Misc. : 9,142 16.6 : 24,989 37,062 — —-— -— —. .
34,385: 96,436 19.2
\u25a0\u25a0! \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0' \u2666 \u25a0 \u25a0 I }l \u25a0

All Targets . : 54,990 100,0 : 81,063 ,201,303 219,456.501,822 100.0

Source of data; Statistical Control Division,

Office of I4magement Control

Prepared by

• Office of the Assistant Chief

of Air Staff, Intelligence
Analysis Division,
European Branch, Target Section

C5-5268,AF

9
 TABLE 3 r<

1
RAF BOMBER COMMAND
COMMAND
**:—: —
•
Type' of Target
UVEIGHT OB .ATTACK BY TYPE 1OF TARGET

1943
. ; Jan-Mar: Apr- June
1944
July—Sept
July—Sept r
-L, *

Jan-Sept
i

Tons :Percent: Tons • Tons Tons sj Tons :Percent

Precision Attacks
«

A/c Repair 1,234 3,374*: 509 5,U7 1.3

Airfields 197 0.1 3,715: 10,285 14,000 3.5
Oil 4,253. 21,735 25,993 6.4
-
RR Installations 2,676 .1.5 6,608 54,641 : 17,639 78,558 19,4
Sub Bases Ports 10,966 6.2 3,236 3,236 0.8
- Troops
p/A/C Installations 506 0.3 1,634 20,020: 48,111 69,765
*.
17.2
Defenses : 24,351: 50,277 : 74,628 18 r4
ither Industry
ither 2.0 t 238 1,3X5: 2,681 : 4,234 1^
Total 17,869 10.1 \ 9,714 111,6741 154,473 :275,86l 68.
.
Major City Attacks

Rhine land
Ruhr
: 37,094
: 29,322
21.0 :
16.7. : 3,042
11,339:
6,228:
—
7,010 : 18,349
: 9,270
4.5
2.3

« Berlin
Hamburg, Kiel, Wil­

Emden
Stettin, Rostock,
:
: 21,952

helmshafen, Bremen-, "s 14,495

; 1,006
12.5 :16,435
8.2
0.6 : 1,252
11,824
4,067
: 16,435*

\u25a0:

: 5,319
U,824
4.1
2.9
1.3
Konigsberg : :

Hanover-Kassel 12-\»339 7.0 :

Brunswick- Magdeburg :"4,513 1,498: 917j-: 6,928 1.7

Frankfurt-Nuremberg :: 10,806 6.1 : 7,711 . .-- •.: 1,712 : 9,423 . 2,3
-
Gtuttgart-Leipzig-
Munich
:
\u25a0:

Source of data: Statistical Control Division,

• Office of Management Control

*- rwpa,
Prepared

Office
uiiiue of
by

ox the
one Assistant
as sis baa 0 Chief
'
oniei

ifj S-*"
g<\ "'-
'\l
\^ *'J
of Air Staff Intelligence
Analysis Division,
¥*> V-'T
llh
J
" ­ European Branch, Target Section

10
 ***$'&%$<r i
5-year total was dropped during the third quarter of 19UU snet!^ « •* Ljs
£*ar J^ff

percent in the first half of 19141+, compared with 50 percent in pre

# vious years .
8., Target Pattern

U.S. Strategic Air Forces. The industrial pattern of U.S

Strategic Air Force attacks during 191+3 and 19JJ+ is shown in Table 2.

Submarine building yards and naval bases were the chief targets of

these forces during early 19U3* In "the crucial battle against the

U-bost more than 37 percent of total 19U3 USSTAF tonnages was drop­

ped on naval installations . Of next iirroortance in the 19^3 program

were airfields and aircraft repair depots , accounting for 15 percent,

and railway installations also accounting for 15 percent of the 19U3

total bomb tonnage.

The emphasis of USSTAF attacks in I9WI was shifted to railway

+ installations, synthetic oil plants and refineries, airfields and

repair depots and aircraft factories. As shown in Table 2, these

target systems accounted for 63 percsnt of the total effort in the

first nine months of 1914J1. The balance of the tonnage w*.s directed

at pilotless aircraft installations, troops and coastal defenses,

area and miscellaneous targets.

The geographical pattern of USSTAF attacks in I9UU showed an

increasing concentration of attacks on Germany. In the third quarter

of 19UU about 60 percent of the total tonnage was dropped in the

greater Reich, compared with considerably less than UO percent in

the first he. lf of 19141+ and 55 percent in 19U3.

RAF Bomber Command. The industrial pattern of Bomber

• in 19U3 arid 19UU 3° Lprge indus­

.it
Command attacks is shown in Trble

trial cities in Germany bore the brunt of 19U3 attacks, cities in

the Rhineland and Ruhr, Berlin and various other large industrial

centers accounting for more then three-fourths of the total 19U3

tonnage. Submarine bases and various miscellaneous targets accounted

for the remaining

-- r
"
W^ W\
05^5268, AF
 -

v
.-v

181 « v k, ,„ 'ffl
In the first 9 months of 1944, major city attacks involve*!* less J

tonnage than in 1943 and accounted for only one— fourth of the total

# RAF effort. Bombing of railway installations and defenses in sup­

port of the invasion of -France represented 38 percent of the total

RAF tonnage. Counter action against pilotless aircraft installa­

tions forced the diversion of 17 percent of the RAF total* More

than 6 percent of RAF tonnage was aimed at oil installations in

a program supplementing the heavy USSTAF offensive against oil

installations* The remaining 14 percent was dropped on miscell-

aneous targe ts\

The geographical pattern of RAF Bomber Command attacks in 1943

showed a heavy concentration of attacks on Germany

- more than

three-fourths of the total tonnage. In 1944* however f when support

of the invasion and counter action against flying bombs took first

priority-, attacks on Germany decreased. Only 40-percent of RAF

W tonnage was dropped on German targets in the first half of 1944
and only 23 percent in the third quarter.

The effects of these Allied bombing operations upon the out­

put of various German war industries are described in following

sections. A list of the priority factories damaged by aerial

attack in 1943 and 1944 also is given, in Appendix A..

•
VJ 11 *\u25a0 ' \u25a0" w
C5~526g,AF

12
 tm

"/Ts*/5*/
IV AIRCRAFT

A» Attacks on Aircraft Factories

Since the middle of 194-3 factories producing German fighter air­

craft have been high priority targets for tJSTAAF attacks whenever
weather and operational conditions permitted* Up to 30 September

194-4 U.S» Strategic Air Forces had made 254 attacks upon the Axis
aircraft industry, including 177 attacks against assembly and compon­

ents factories , 50 against aero-engine plants and 27 against repair

factories . On 53 occasions the RAF damaged aircraft factories in the

course of area and precision bombing attacks. In addition to these

factories a large number of engineering industries producing minor

components such as spark plugs, oil filters, propellors, metal cast­

ings, etc., also were attacked.

By 30 September a total of 56,450 tons had been dropped by U.S.

bombers on GAF factories; large RAF tonnages also had been dropped

on French plants and German aircraft centers. The weight of USTAAF

attacks against the German aircraft industry averaged only 400 tons

monthly in the second half of 1943 but increased to 6,500 tons per

month in 1944. Th^ maximum weight of U.S. attacks occurred In April

1944 when 9,850 tons were dropped on German aircraft plants.

As a result of this offensive against aircraft production a

total of 58 aircraft plants were damaged in 1943 and 146 plants in

1944. A list of these damaged factories is given in Appendix A.

Single-engine fighter aircraft have borne the brunt of USTAAF

attacks against the Axis aircraft industry. Seven SEF plants damaged

by US bombing in 1943 were increased to 38 plants during the first

9 months of 1944. These included twenty-one factories producing com­

ponents for or assembling ?!e 109s and seventeen producing FW 190s.

All the important known SEF aircraft factories were attacked from

one to seven times and production materially reduced at all locations.

m "m G5-5 26&,AF

 - ->J
damage list be-"" **
Twin-engine fighter factories wfirfi addfiri tn
were added the damage
to the list be-" *aBaß *<*& 1 I

ginning in January 1944. By 30 September 16 TEF factories had been

attacked from one to five times each. Seven long-range bomber plants
# producing He 177 and He 111 aircraft were damaged during 194-4 attacks.

Production of transports, dive bombers and Italian fighters and bom­

bers also yras curtailed as a result of a number of attacks on plants

producing these aircraft. In early 1944 aero-engine factories also

became priority targets for USSTAF attacks. In the following months

21 of 22 factories producing BI.IW, Daimler Benz and Jumo engines were

damaged, and supplies of this major A/C component restricted for both

installation in new aircraft .and replacement in older aircraft.

B, Results of Attacks- on Aircraft Factories

• Attacks upon German aircraft production have prevented

planned increase

below the level prevailing in mid-1943 when attacks

It is estimated that up to 30 September

prived of 10,000 new planes that would otherwise have been produced
a large

in output and until the summer of 1944 held production

were initiated.

1944 the G.A.F. has been de­

in the absence of aerial attacks. Most of the aircraft thus lost to

the GAF have been single-engine fighters. Output of twin-engine

fighters also has been cut, however, and bomber output likewise mat­
erially reduced both through direct damage to plants and through con­

version of facilities to sorely needed fighter production.

Tilhen strategic attacks were launched against the German aircraft

industry in July 1943, German production of operational types had in­

creased to about 1740 monthly, including 910 single-engine fighters.

Having recognized the threat of Allied strategic bombing, the GAF had

launched a program of expansion that called for a monthly output

rising to nearly 3,000 operational planes in late 1944, including

# about 1,700 single-engine fighters.

*• :; .;\u25a0. -' 'M

i

C5-5268,AF

14
 This schedule did not reckon on thp
rT'r-.knn nn the suocpss
success of precision
of bnmbi n? .
nvprisinn bombing,

however. As a result of aerial attacks output of combat types was re­

duced below the July level to a low of 1,320 planes in I
larch 1944.
- 24

#
percent below July output and less than half of planned production.

From !'arch 1944 onwards production of operational planes rose sharply

to 1950 aircraft in September, of which 1400 were single-engine fighters.

The weight of aircraft produced was no greater than in July 943,

i how­

ever, for the gain in fighter production was offset by a reduction of

heavy bomber output. The estimated output of combat types by months

is shown in the following table;

Month All Combat Types Single-engine Fighters

: Est. Outputl./: %of Planned :

:
Est. Output i6s of Planned
Output
: » Output t

1943

July
Aug.
.
:
1740
1530
100
85
910
675
100

70

Sept. . 1520 81
• 630 63

Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
.-.
:
1540
1550
1480
79
77
71
645
690
740
61

63

65

1944
Jan.
Feb.
.
:
M5O
1430
67
64
805
785
68

63

Mar. j 1320 58 680 53

Apr. :
• 1385 59 705 50

May 1480 61 790

49
June : 1665 67 : 925 51

July : 1740 68 1100 55

Aug. j 1930 73 1375 63

Sept. t 1945 72 uoo 58

Oct. : 2015 72 1500 59

Total 25,720 71 14,355 60

1/ Based on British Air Ministry Figures.

- in spite
•
The rise in aircraft production since "'arch 1944

large increase in weight of Allied bombing attacks

cessful reorganization of the German aircraft industry,

- reflects

were initiated in 1943, the German aircraft industry was organized

of a

a suc­

"i/hen attacks

C5-5268,AF
 &m .fri**en )-'i . '";' - ' :"\
into a relatively few highly integrated complexes of assNs&hly jand coispJ/M

ponents plants utilizing mass production methods . The 194-3 precision

attacks, involving a total of only 2,420 tons, resulted in very con­

#
siderable damage and large production losses. These attacks proved

the vulnerability of the existing industrial plan, and compelled a

wholesale reorganization of the German aircraft industry. In an ef­

fort to expand single-engine fighter output, production of components

was dispersed to many small plants, including unused textile mills.

GAF airfields were pressed into use for assembly. New facilities were

developed underground. Bomber plants were converted to production of

fighter aircraft. New plans raised production goals for single-engine

fighters to more than 2,000 per month in late 194-4 •

Expansion of German SEF production, however, came too late to

save the German war effort from heavy Allied bombing. The reduction

of output of defensive fighter planes forced upon the GAF a policy of

«
conservation

sistance
to retain an air force in being.

in turn made possible successful

Lack of adequate

strategic bombing of Axis

industries producing oil, bearings and other vital war materials.

re­

C. Factory Losses in Relation to Combat Losses

The loss of aircraft production at bombed factories

- estimated
at 10,000 planes between 1 August 1943 and 30 September 1944
- was
roughly half of the somewhat more than 20,000 aircraft lost to the

GAF in combat in this period. The bomber offensive accounted for a

considerable part of these combat losses, however. Heavy wastage

was inflicted on the GAF by Allied bombers and by escorting fighters

during bombing missions. Allied bombing of GAF airfields and re­

pair depots accounted for additional sizeable losses of German air­

•
craft, as well as a lowering of serviceability. The remainder of the

GAF wastage resulted largely from aerial combat with tactical air

forces, strafing of airfields and capture of GAF airfields with im­

mobilized aircraft.

C5-52^8,AF
 MSat OB iA NJt,^ ,
!tyl
_ . w&0 i£sf&
The damage to aircraft factories was qualitatively of greater
importance than the 1:2 ratio of "lost" production to combat losses

indicates.. Factory attacks in conjunction with other counter .air

m force -action (l) reduced German defensive resistance to a point where

strategic attacks on Axis target systems could be made without undue

losses, (2) forced the GAF to concentrate fighter aircraft in Western

Germany at the expense of German military capabilities on land fronts

in Russia and the Mediterranean, (3) aided in whittling down the GAF

to a point where it could not combat Allied land invasions, and (4)

assured unhampered Allied lines of communications and minimum losses

of men and material atf the vast military depots built up in Britain

for continental invasion.

D. Attacks on GAF Bases and Repair Depots

Since the early part of 1943 , 34 factories repairing aircraft

and producing spare parts have been damaged by USAAF and RAF aerial

<J attacks involving a total of 12,100 tons of bombs.

factories, most of which were French or Belgian, has slowed the re­
Damage to these

turn of repaired aircraft to front-line units and has reduced GAF

strength thru loss of planes and parts.

Attacks upon airfields up to 30 September 194-4- have accounted

for a material part of the Allied bombing effort
- 76,700 tons.
Since the first of 1944 U. S. Strategic and RAF bombers made 531
attacks on

" "
135 airfields in i1i ranee and the Low Countries
1

75
47
"
H
tt

!I
Germany and Austria
Italy and the Balkans

257
"
it
Total

These attacks have destroyed aircraft, and by damaging or destroy­

• ing repair facilities, hangars

maining to the GAF. Numerous

and other airfield installations

have seriously lowered the' combat serviceability of aircraft re­

strafing attacks, in addition, have
been made on airfields, with resultant claims of several thousand air
craft destroyed.

»­ v*-% a % I*®} * C5-52£8,AF

 E. xecx. of .Bombing
Effect oj. Attacks Upon
jpomping .avoacKs upon GAF
uax 1 s£ren|;ftr j^s *
DurengwH' «&% &'£E\u25a0"ir,- \ '
«
HL>
>

. .\
.''
Tff.'
rf H
,*» r

As a result of the Allied Bomber Offensive since July 1943 "***\u25a0»\u25a0

the GAF has been decisively weakened. This has been accomplished

# through the combined effect of (1) bomb damage to aircraft fac­

tories, (2) bomb damage to repair factories and airfields, (3)

combat losses imposed on the GAF during strategic bombing and

strafing attacks, and (4) reduction of aviation fuel supplies

through bombing of synthetic oil plants and refineries .

' The inferiority of the GAF has become increasingly evident in

its reduced resistence to Allied air and ground forces. In the

summer of 1944 fighter aircraft strength of the GAF was great enough

to permit an estimated 1,200 sorties per day, but actual sorties

flown were far below this level. The inability of the GAF to fly

the sorties permitted by available numbers of German aircraft may

be traced to a forced policy of conservation, low serviceability of

planes, and shortages of fuel and suitable pilots. The overwhelm­

% ing superiority of Allied air power and the disorganization caused

by abandonment of airfields during rapid Allied ground advances also

contributed to the decline of the once great GAF.

It may be concluded that the Allied bomber offensive has ac­

complished the task of reducing the GAF to a state where it has

been unable to oppose effectively either the amphibious and ground

operations of land forces or the increasingly heavy bombing of

German industry.

• 1

C5-5268,AF

7 J&>jsr
 P-
< '\u25a0' t
'" \u25a0 • n»

[TI-FRICTIJNI BEAfiINGS
ANTI-FRICTION BEAJTOGS

A. Attacks on Bearing factories

na
On 17 .August 194-3 Bth Air iorce bombers opened an offensive

against the: Axis anti-friction bearing industry by bombing Schwein-r

furt, center of European bearing production. Between this date and

30 September 1944 a total of 26 attacks on bearing factories was

made by U.S. air forces. Bombs dropped totalled 6^530 tons., or 1.2

percent of the total U.S. Strategic Air Force effort in this fourteen-

month period. RAF attacks also were made on Schweinfurt and Stuttgart

and two French -factories.

This offensive against the bearing industry inflicted considerable

damage on 14 factories which before damage accounted for about 84 per­

cent of total Axis bearing supplies. U.S. Strategic Air Force at­

tacks accounted for all or most of the damage suffered by 12 of these

plants .
B. Pre-Attack Bearing Position

In the building and maintenance of a war machine Germany used

large numbers of ball arid roller bearings. Every type of mobile

military equipment and the industrial machinery needed for the pro­

duction and distribution of war materials and civilian goods utilized

anti- friction bearings. Prior to attacks on this industry Germany's

bearing supply position was a comfortable one according to available

evidence. Bearings were widely used in military equipment and there

was no apparent attempt to economize through substitution or elimi­

nation of bearings. The considerable time* lag between production and

use of bearings in finished equipment indicated an easy stock posi­

tion. Available sources of imports were not fully utilized as would

have been the case with inadequate production.

The anti-friction bearing industry was nevertheless selected as

a high-priority target system because of several outstanding character

istics :

£5-5268,AF

- 19 -
 UliiilLiriw»w-- nd^ll
1. Attacks on bearing plants offered possibilities of cutting

• across German industry and, with the limited forces

available, affecting output ol items not easily reached

by direct aerial attacks. /

2. Production was concentrated in a relatively small number of

plants readily accessible to Allied bombers, ror example,

Schweinfurt plants alone accounted for approximately 40

percent of Axis supplies. f/ .

3- The industry used a great deal of highly specialized machinery

difficult of replacement and vulnerable to fire and high

explosives.

C. Results of Aerial Attacks

Bombing attacks on the Axis bearing industry

- combined with the

gradual loss of imports that had accounted, for 9 percent of Germany 1 s

pre-attack supply
- reduced Axis bearing supplies as shown in column

# 2 of the following, table. >

Supply as Per-
Month Requirements"* cent of Requirements
(1) \u25a0
(2) (3) • (4) .
(in percent of pre-attack level)
1943
August 93 97
September 95 99
October 92 87
November 89 80
December 35 91
1944
January 85 87
February 85 84
Average 89 90
March 79 73
April 79 59
May 74 64
June 73 67

• July
August
September
Average
78
81
84
78
59
_62
63

v
1/ Requirements reduced through attacks on user industries such
as aircraft, etc., and lower civil-industrial allocations.

C5-5268,AF
 As shown in this table, supplies during the first seven months of the

campaign against the bearing industry averaged about SO percent of

former levels. Following a heavier scale of attack beginning in

#
February 1944 supplies dropped still further to less than half of
pre-attack levels, in spite of dispersal oi plants and strenuous

efforts to restore output. The cumulative loss of bearings in the

fourteen month period ending 30 September 1944 is estimated at the

equivalent of five months pre-attack production.

The effects of bearing shortages on assembly of aircraft, trucks,

tanks and other end-products apparently were minor until well into

1944. Several factors contributed to this r^elay. These included a

reduction of requirements following bomb damage to aircraft, tank

and other industries, reduced allocations for civil-industrial uses

and the redesign of equipment to curtail use oi bearings. The

extent to which requirements were thus reduced is indicated in

column 3 of the above table. In addition, the normal time la? be­

tween production and iinal use oi bearings, the utilization of pipe­

line and reserve stocks and intensified salvage further delayed the
effects of bearing losses.

Although effects. were thus postponed, significant shortages of

bearings ultimately appeared since supplies of bearings declined con­

siderably more than reouirements . As indicated in column 4of the

table above, only 90 percent of requirements were covered between

August 1943 and February 1944, and 64 percent in the period March-

September 1944. These shortages are believed to have resulted in

reduced assemblies oi tanks, trucks and other equipment in addition

to losses of these items caused by direct bomb damage. 'While the

•
highest priority itetas, such as aircraft, have undoubtedly

tected, it is doubtful if any major item of military equipment could

have been completely shielded in view oi the extensive damage to the

been pro-*

more important bearing factories producing a id.de range oi precision

1
types. Bearing shortages thus have undoubtedly contributed somewhat
to the decline oi German industrial output.

Ilil^ih^Z*¥ls^lW^^Bß C5-5268,aF
 W' '-iJ r* M l&iiHft lH »tl l«li i?iF it'll
VI OIL

A. Attacks Upon, the Industry

19U^ Attacks
- Prior to Aprii IQU'-t. attacks upon the Axis oil

industry/ were small scale or sporadic. Ir, the early years of the

war British bombers made numerous but re.lativelv ineffective attacks

upon oil storage and refining; installations in Western \u25a0

Europe . Dur­

ing 19U3 damage was confined to two of the smaller synthetic oil

plants, six refineries in Western Europe, end refining installations

at Ploesti. These latter refineries in Romania were targets for a

spectacular low-level attack on 1 August 19U-3? during which an esti­

mated k,000, 000 tons of refining capacity was knocked out for varying

periods. The chief result of the damage inflicted by this attack

\u25a0was to eliminate temporarily a large cushion of excess refining ca­

pacity. Except for an estimated 7 0,000 tons of oil and refined pro­

ducts destroyed by fire, output was not materially affected.

191411- Attacks
- In Aprii19LJ4 allied bomber Forces launched a

smashing aerial offensive against Axis sources of oil products.

Following initial bombing of refir.ery and railway installations at

Ploesti, the pattern of attacks spread over li/urone to include other

"Balkan refineries and oil stores, German synthetic; plants, refineries

in Germany, and storage installations in France. During the ensuing

five month period, a total of 9?, 780 tons of bombs were dropped on

Axis oil installations. U.S* Strategic A? r Forces dropped 6h$U5Q

tons, or 1?«3 percent of their total bombing effort in the lay-

September period. RAF bombers dropped 2r,3 02r ,33O tons, chiefly in at­

tacks against Ruhr synthetic plahts and French oil stores.

As a result of 270 attacks on oil-producing installations, a

total of 2)4 synthetic oil plants and 69 crude oil refineries have

been damaged. In addition, numerous storage depots in western and

southern 'France, Romania erd Germany, and a number of coal tar and
vegetable oil plants have sustained' damage from aerial attacks.

C5-5268,AF
- 22
-
 B. Results of Attacks on 4xis Oil Industries

Pre-Attack Position
- In the first quarter of 19UU Axis pro-

du-ction of synthetic fuels and refined petroleum products reached a

# level estimated at 1,3U4-,000 tons monthly, made up as follows:

Synthetic Oil
Oil 1+30,000 •tons 35 »7 percent
Refined. Crude 698,000 51.9
Benzol, Alcohol, Etc.
Etc. 166,000 12 .k
"" "
1,31^,000 . 100.0

This production was sufficient to meet ; Germany's nee^s for military

and civilian purposes a.nd still permit , accumulation of oil reserves.

These reserves, variously estimated at; 3 to U million tons on 1 Apri

19^4
- including quantities tied up ini the distribution system
- wer
distributed throughout Europe in accordance with anticipated military

and industrial needs. While oil was never plentiful for German

armed forces and industrial users, supplies were sufficient to' support

heavy fighting and a high level of industrial production.

Post-Attack Position
-
The offensive against oil, mounted at a

time when Allied air strength permitted heavy, concentrated and re­

peated attacks, cut deeply into Axis oil output. During I9hh, pro­

duction is estimated as follows:

I'onth Production Consumption Difference

-* 55
(percent of pre-attack production)
Farch 100 95
April
!<ay
June
85
76
5U
90
82
82
. 6
-28
July 50 69 -19
August 39 52 -13
September 23 U5 -22
October
November
30
3U
ko
ko
- 6

-10

Aye . April-Fov. U9 63 -11+

• Output of gasoline

for GAF and Panzer

these averages
and lubricating oils, of particular importance

operations,

for all products.

was reduced to a greater extert than

C5-5268,AF
 s*f?
_ . . . ._
_ . . ._> , ** "
19UU
\u0084

Cumulative losses of oil products by 30 September are

estimated at 3»660 > 000 tons, or the equivaleht of 2 3 A- months

normal output. This reduction of oil production has forced the
m
enemy to restrict consumption by all possible means, ar^ to d^sW
upor stocks to meet minimum requirements. It is estimated that by

30 September stocks were thus drawn upon to the extent of at least

1,200,000 tons. Local fuel shortages have frequently appeared and

have been a most important factor in limiting, German vehicular traf

fie in France and other war theaters and in restricting* operations

of the GA.F . Continued shortages of oil as a result of sustained

aerial attacks will force depletion of repairing stocks and will

further limit mobile warfare on the part of the Herman army.

.. - '•>
r ft*^^^^PV C5-5268,AF
 By ''tS 7 I'^f "'i JP^^i ißi mi 1W
fil E? l' *% F% ly &3^l im.

-I

VII SUBMARINE YA.RDS

During the early part of 19U3> when the German U-boat menace was

at its peak, submarine building yards and operating bases became top-

priority targets for Allied borbing attacks. Twelve German ship­

yards assembling submarines were subsequently damaged, mainly by Bth

Air Force bombing. Allied air forces also directed a heavy weight

of attacks against the orircipal submarine bases at Brest, Lorient,

St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux in Western France. These ef­

forts against naval installations absorbed nearly two-fifths of U.S.

Strategic f ir Force tonnages in 19U5, and nearly one-fifth of RAF

bomb tonnages.

Bombing of submarine installations was abandoned as a primary

objective in the summer of 19U3, parti/ because of the relrtive in­

effectiveness of such attacks but mainly because of the spectacular

success of anti-submarine warfare at sea. Attacks were resumed in

the summer of 19UU, however, and considerable additional damage in­

flicted on submarine installations during both U.S. precision and

RAF area attacks. In the first nine months of 19^4 Allied bomber
forces damaged 17 shipyards in G rmnny and 2 operational bases in

the Mediterranean area, as well s the French bases which the Allies

stormed during the invasion of W stern EuroD e.

Since the enemy had already greatly reduced construction of TJ-

boats prior to these 19^1- attacks it is doubtful if U-boat building

was materially hampered by the recent bombing. Naval operations

may have been restricted somewhat through the destruction of U-boats

and the lowering of serviceability of that part of the underseas

fleet which the Nazis shifted from the lost Fremch ports to safer

German North Sea bases . <

C5-5268,AF

o
 VIII RUBBER AT D TIRES

During, a period in 19Uj> when rubber factories constituted a

* high priority target system, an especially successful attack was

made on Germany's second largest synthetic rubber producer at Huls.

Several other processing plants were damaged in varyirg degree. Dur­

ing V^\\h, damage was corfir.ed to h, Axis tire plants and synthetic

rubber plants at Ludwigsnafen and Osweicim.

Attacks on the rubber industry apparently have had little ef­

fect on German military operations. P- large excess of tire making

capacity has been available in Germany and France. Though lack­

ing natural crude rubber, supplies of synthetic and. reclaimed rubber

apparently have been adequate for all military needs, particularly

in view of the reduction of requirements following bomb damage to

aircraft and motor vehicle industries.

>

C5-5268,AF
- 26 -
wKF^^^^^^^^^^^
 i
m mM ft M

IX TANKS AND MOTOR TRANSPORT -i*si

The German AW industry did not become a hig^-priority target

system until the sumirer of 19UU when a number of successful attacks

cut sharply into enemy production of mechanized equipment. Prior to

this time bomber forces were insufficient to permit concentrated at­

tacks or the industry. Productive capacity was large, plants were

widely dispersed ard the existence of large pools of trucks, tanks,

etc. necessitated large-scale attacks to materially reduce output

and affect military operations.

A. Tanks

During the course of RAF attacks in 19U3 damage was inflicted

on three tank assembly plants and a number of components producers.

This damage is believed to have curtailed an expansion of the indus­

try but probably had relatively little effect on German fighting

strength .
Attacks in 19hJk included a successful bombirg of Friedrichs­

hafen in April during which the principal plants producing tank

engines and gear assemblies were severely damaged. in succeeding

months six of the nine known tank assembly factories were damaged.

Additional producers of principal components such as engines and

hulls, ordnance depots used for storage and ropair, and miscel­

laneous engineering and steel plants also suffered varying degrees

of damage. As a result of these attacks it is estimated that tank

assemblies in the third quarter of 19UU dropped 20 to 25 percent

below the rate of about 600 tanks monthly that would otherwise have

prevailed. Monthly losses in percentages of potential output are

estimated as follows:

C5-5268,AF
- 27
-
 JV.

5^ *£*!)
m
>

19U3 Percent 19Uh Percent

September 7 March 2U
2U

October 5 April 21
21

'
November 11 May 19
December lU 17
# June
July
July

January- 13 August 2k

2k
February 15 September 23
23

Average 11 Average 20

B. Trucks ard Miscellaneous AFVs

Production of trucks, armored cars, half-tracks , and tractors

was cut somewhat during 19U3 by damage to 11 assembly factories

'and various plants producing; minor components . This dsra^e was

considerably amplified in 19' 'L when 25 of the 55 principal producers

of motor transport were damaged, including the 5 main plants. As a

result of damage to these t>larts and to various corroorerts producers

and ordnance depots, output in the third quarter of 19UL was reduced

to 20 percent

# an estimated 15
about l[;,000 trucks and miscellaneous
below tV e previous monthly rate of

AFV equipment. Production of

personnel cars was reduced an estimated 20 percent below former levels

of about 3*500 monthly.

Losses through bomb damage were overshadowed during August 19^*U

by Allied occupation of French ard "Belgian plants. A number of impor­

tant factories in these countries formerly accounting for more than

U0 percent of Axis light trucks, 25 percent of medium trucks and 20

percent of heavy trucks were lost to Germany during Allied advances.

As a combined result of territorial losses and bomb damage to Herman

factories,, output of Axis trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment dur­

ing the summer and early fall of 19^U was reduced more than J.iO per­

• cent below former production levels.

The effects

equipment
of these losses

on German military operations

of tanks, trucks and other AFV

is somewhat difficult to
 evaluate in view of the restrictions already^niosecr ay shortages of

fuel following attacks upon the Axis oil industry. Losses of mech­

anized equipment through aerial attack may in fact have but little

\u2666 effect on the duration of German defense if fuel shortages prevent

the full use of the equipment that is already available. However,

should production of fuel recover during the winter mortbs, the loss

of badly needed tanks and the depletion of the Axis truck dool must

constitute serious blows to German military forces already operat­

ing with inadequate AFV equipment.

C5-5268,aF
- 29 -
X ARMAMEHTS AND ICISCELLANEOUS ENG TIBERTNG |J|lfSff j§4 ll~'
'
\ 38* I §
Xk
Production of armaments and various engineering products has

suffered heavily from bobbing, particularly as a result of RIF area

attacks. Forty-four factories in this category, most of them rated

as priority targets by the MEW, suffered bomb damage in 19U3 • I?1

19141+ at least 89 important factories were damaged. Included in this

category were plants such as the large armament works of TfruDp at

Essen and Rheinmetall Borsig at Dusseldorf, steel fabrication plants

producing guns, shells, etc., heavy engineering plants producing loco­

motives and railway equipment, boilers, diesel engines, etc., and

light engineering plants manufacturing motor transport components,

small arms and various other engineering products. Many of these

plants could be considered part of specific industries such as air­

craft and motor transport, were itnot for the fact that several

products are usually produced and that definite information on output

is usually lacking.

Losses of output of these engineering industries have supple-

Pmented the specific damage to industries producing aircraft, oil,

bearings, tanks, etc. Practically all branches of German war produc­

tion have been affected. although no critical shortages of armaments

and military equipment have appeared, the fighting strength of German

armed forces has been impaired and the task of Allied ground forces

thus made easier.

**\u25a0
:np
C5~5268,AF
- 30 -
 lEMs%m —
mnl*lf« a B A '^ *
XI.I ACFIIB TOCLS MD PHEC7SIOTST INSTRUMENTS ijiu'gf /I % % ff*f^
Fifteen factories producing rachine tools, abras^ ye
S^^'Tahe^^ jP
and various precision instruments yore damaged in 1,9^3 during RfiF
attacks, Twenty one plants, including; several of those damaged in
191|3» suffered bomb damage in the first nine months of 19 4--.
The resulting loss of production in this industry ha.t intensi­

fied the difficulties of r<3pla6in£ irachine tools and equipment in

factories damaged by aerial attacks. It is estimated that sirce early

IPJ+3 mo-re than half of the machine tool industry's output has been

used to replace bomb -damaged equipment. The lowering of" machine tool

production es s r: suit of direct damage to the industry has not only

restricted such re-equipment of de.maged slants but hag also limited

normal replacement of tools and removed any surplus industrial capa­

city that might have boon used for direct production of armaments.

XII* ELECTRICAL EQU TPI^NT

Plant? producing various types of electrical equipment have been

frequently damaged during tic course of air attacks, particularly ir.

Berlin, Twenty-five important plants in this industry i?'ere damaged

in 19U5 a n--l about 30 plants in the first nine months of l^l+'-i.

Between 1 I/arch 19U3 &&d 30 June I9LLI it is estimrted by the

British Ministry of Fome Security that about 20 percent of the plan

rea. of German electrical equipment factories was seriously damaged

by bombing. Output of the industry over this period was reduced 10­

15 percent below tht Iqv©l that probably would have prevailed in the

absence of bombing. The production of particular item? has suffered

more than this average, particularly in the Berlin area, and may have

led to bottlenecks in the production of certain military equipment.

C5-5268,AF
- 31
-

R Pi m

XIII.METALS
- STEEL AND NOM^'gRROUS UllUg
1111 v

During RAF attacks on the Ruhr area in 1943, a total of 16

steel plants were damaged by bombing. In 194-4- a total of 17

steel plants, including some of those hit in 194-3, were damaged.

Non-ferrous metal plants also have suffered, 8 important plants

being damaged in 1943 and 9 plants in 194-4.

Damage to German steel plants in conjunction with the ex­

tensive area damage caused by RAF attacks reduced German steel

output in 1943 by an estimated 10 percent. Existence of a

large amount of excess capacity in the steel industry, combined

with only moderate vulnerability to damage, in considerable

measure cushioned the effects of attacks and mins_mized losses.

In 1944 production was also lost as a result of bombing, but

reduction of output from this cause was far overshadowed by the

loss of industrial plants in France, Luxembourg and Belgium

and by the loss of imported ores from Sweden and other sources.

The consequent decline in German steel production, already

well under way by 30 September 194-4, must soon critically re­

strict output of shells, mechanized equipment and other war

materials .
Damage to German plants refining copper, zinc, aluminum

or other non-ferrous metals has been on a relatively small

scale. In view of the large output of aluminum and the exist­

ence of excess capacity in the non-ferrous metal industry, it

is doubtful if German war production has been materially

affected by this damage.

r. HI

C5-5268,AF

_ _
09
 /^
"
\u25a0
t *3a
XIV CHEMICALS AMD EXPLOSIVES
\u25a0
wmju# 9 Ll
The German chemical industry, though not a priority target

system, has suffered considerable damage, mainly through RAF

aerial attacks. A total of 14- rated or important chemical

plants were damaged in 194-3 compared with 37 plants, two-thirds

of which have MEW ratings, in 1944. Included in this latter

group were 6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rocket

and robot aircraft. Five large explosives plants in France,

taken over by the Germans for propellant manufacture, also were

knocked out by devastating RAF attacks .

It is doubtful if damage to the chemical industry has

created any significant bottlenecks in German war production.

Bomb damage to chemical plants has contributed, however, to

the overall decline of German industrial output.

C5-5268,AF
- - 33 -
 rm
XV GENERAL LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
II X
I
Allied strategic bombing of Germany has seriously impaired her

war making potential. Attacks have resulted in enormous industrial

damage, widespread devastation of residential and commercial property

in an ever increasing list of German cities, and the loss of millions

of man hours of productive effort. In addition to creating shortages

of aircraft, oil and other specific items, every branch of Germany's

war effort has been affected, and the level of total war production

reduced. The reduction of general industrial output may be attri­

buted in large measure to RAF attacks against the larger German

cities.

A, Industrial Damage

Damaged industrial installations in Axis Europe include 252

relatively important factories damaged in 1943 and 53& n 1944.

i

Most of these plants have been "rated" as priority targets by the

British Ministry of Economic Warfare. A classified list of these

plants and a statement of the extent of damage appear in Appendix A

according to the following categories:

- 34
-
 T
l ail^^*^ ®^ I

lll^^l
In addition to these factories, hundreds of small plants, mostly

• I
unidentified, have been damaged

damage,
or destroyed during area attacks.

In 1943 at least 1,200 such plants sustained varying degrees of

and in 1944 it is believed that comparable damage has been

inflicted. In view of the total gearing of the German economy to

war production, damage to almost any plant would affect her war ef­

fort in some degree.

B. Residential and Commercial Damage

The destruction of civic and residential property in German

cities has steadily spread under the impact of growing Allied at­

tacks. Damage in the more heavily damaged cities on 30 June 1944

(in terms of the percentages of buildings destroyed or rendered un­

inhabitable) was as follows:

• City

Kassel
Remscheid
Hamburg
Percent of Property
Seriously Damaged

54
53 1
y/
5i 1/
Population
(Pre-war )
216,000
107,000
1,800,000

Aachen 49 164,000
Cologne 46 906,000
Dusseldorf 44 530,000
Hannover 44 . 450,000
Frankfurt 42 y 570,000

570,000 \

Augsburg 40 186,000
186,000

Munchen Gladbach 37 130,000

Ludwigshafen 37 430,000
Friedrichshafen 36 25,000
Wuppertal 33 411,000
Schweinfurt 32 60,000
Leipzig 28 720,000
Dortmund 25 550,000
Krefeld 25 170,000
Essen 24 1,139,000
Berlin 23 4,400,000
136,000

•
Mulheim 23
y/
20 1
1/ 380,000
-
Stettin
Total 21 cities 33 13,480,000

18 additional cities 10 (est.) 5,336,000

354 additional cities 2 (est.) 13.957.000
Total 393 German cities 16 32,773,000

Total German Reich 9 69.622,000

1/ Attacked by RAF between 1 JuLy^a|K| 3D September 1944

 kfi msi

Destruction of housing, estimated at 1,500,000 dwelling units

at the end of 194-3 s is believed to have reached a total of nearly

2,000,000 units by 30 September 1944, and to have forced a -total of

#
6,000,000 persons from their original living quarters.

The increasing weight of aerial attack on Germany combined with

military defeats and loss of territory have reduced industrial out­

put but have not broken German morale, in large part because of Nazi

controls and propaganda. Strategic bombing has helped destroy

Germany's faith in victory, however, and by intensifying war weari-*

ness and difficulties of production have cut deeply into Germany's

industrial war effort.

C. Effect of Bombing on Production

As a result of aerial attacks on factories and cities, it is

estimated that German industrial production since April 1943 has

averaged from 12 to 15 percent below the level that would have pre­
vailed in the absence of bombing. This: loss -resulted from a number
of causes including:

1. Loss of industrial man hours in destroyed and damaged factor­

ies, and loss of time, and efficiency of workers as a result
of repeated air raid warnings.

2. Shortages of materials, equipment, power, transport, etc.

resulting from damage to raw material and component pro­

ducers, public utilities and administrative agencies.

3- Diversion of manpower to repair of bomb damaged industrial,

residential and other property, and replacement of machin­

ery and materials destroyed by bombing.

4. Evacuation of civilians and dispersal of industrial plants.

The industrial output lost through area attacks has included

vital armaments and military equipment,

#
as well as civilian and

industrial supplies. Overall losses of production have been dis­

tributed over many types of industry, and have thereby supplemented

C5-5268,AF
?6
—
36

am 1^
 the specific shortages of aircraft, oil and bearings. Although no

industry has been damaged to a critical degree by area attacks, the

general losses of industrial output have weakened the Wehrmacht and

# contributed thereby to military successes of the Allies.

D. Non-German Contributions

The industrial might of Germany has been enormously enhanced

during the course of the war by the acquisition of satellites and

occupied territories.- foreign labor impressed into service in

Germany has accounted for an estimated 20 percent of the total gain­

fully employed in Germany. . Occupied countries have exported large

amounts of goods to Germany, supported German forces of occupation

and satellite military forces, and provided labor for tasks such as

building coastal defenses. These contributions, in financial terms,

•
have amounted to as much as 30 percent of the Axis outlay for war

production, as shown below (data from FEA):

y.

Expenditures (Billion R. !,'!.) Other Europe as

German Other Europe Total % of Total
70.0 22.6 92.6 : 24.4
75.0 30.5 105.5 28.9
93.0 40,0 133.0 ; 30.1
95.0 19.0 114.0 : 16.6

While contributions from occupied countries qualitatively were

of somewhat less importance than indicated in financial terms, the

assistance exacted by Germany was nevertheless very considerable.

The loss of most of the occupied territories and of the strategic

materials essential to German industry consequently constitute a

body blow to German war production. These losses of strategic sup­

plies as of 30 September 1944 include:

C5-5268,AF

$S « k}l&aF%.%3%$ £ , I'i-&* \L$

 35 percent of Axis
ft it
35
tt ft it
80
60 ti it it manganese
70 n it nickel
it
75
# 60
20
ft
M
M
't
ft
ft
II
ft
chrome
copper
aluminum
50 II tt tt bauxite
'
It
35 ft tt wood pulp
30
10
ft
It
It
ft
tt
It bearings .
motor vehicles

The combined effect of bomb damage and the even greater losses
of raw materials and industrial Contributions from other countries

is steadily and rapidly increasing Allied superiority in production

and must seriously weaken German military resistance during the corn­
ing winter months.

• f

• llMfl^ P-^^'^^l

C5-526a,AF

38
 XVI TRANSPORTATION

A. Rail and Road Installations

Attacks on transportation objectives, though primarily the

task of tactical air forces, have accounted for more of the

bomb tonnage of the Strategic Air Forces than any other target

system. The 217,000 tons dropped on rail and road transpor­

tation targets in the first nine months of 194-4- represented

28 percent of the U.S. Bth and 15th Air Forces effort and 20
percent of RAF bombing attpcks. The main targets in this offen­

sive against transportation were rail centers and rail and road

bridges in France, Belgium, Italy and the Balkans. Up to 30

September 194-4- * the transport system in Germany had not been

heavily attacked, although some damage had been inflicted on

transport installations, mainly by area attacks. These affected

the German transport situation chiefly by increasing transport

\ requirements for relief, reconstruction and evacuation of devas­

tated areas.

As a result of damage to rail, shipping installations and

motor vehicles, the transport system supplying Axis fighting

fronts has been unable to carry adequate military supplies for

even defensive fighting. Damage to transport, including bridge

interdiction v/hich is acknov/ledged to be the most effective

form of attack on enemy transport, has been most effectively

accomplished by medium and fighter bombers. The strategic air

forces, however, have done effective work in attacking rail

centers, port facilities, bridges at extreme operational ranges

and heavily defended objectives.

In Italy the strategic air forces have supplemented tacti­

cal air force interdiction by attacking ports and rail instal­

lations beyond the primary interdiction zone. In the Balkans,

C5r5268.,AF
 - IJllv
where the Mediterranean Strategic Air Forces have been respon­

• sible for all operations

rail installations
except in Yugoslavia, the bombing of

and mining of the Danube disrupted the flow

of German supplies to the Russian front and slowed the movement

of oil and other vital raw materials to central Europe. In

Western France and Belgium the Allied Air Forces, including

strategic bombers, were assigned the task of slowing enemy rein­

forcements to the beachhead and battle area by attacking his

transport and transportation facilities . Prior to t)-day the

principal contribution of the Strategic Air Forces to the accom­

plishment of these objectives was a series of attacks which

rendered 37 selected rail centers unusuable and heavily damaged

23 more. After D-day,- the restriction of enemy movement in

the battle zone was largely the work of the tactical air forces,

while the heavy bombers combined with tactical bombers to

# attack rail centers and bridges in order to seal off the battle

zone from supply and reinforcement. The bombing of rail centers

and bridges in Southern France, most of which was done by stra*

tegic air forces, denied freedom of movement to the Nazi forces

and thereby greatly aided in the occupation of this part of the

continent.

Following the Allied advance to the frontiers of .the Reich

the major weight of attacks against transportation targets falls

for the first time on German rail centers, bridges and inland

waterways. Attacks on the German transport system affects both

the enemy's military strength and deployment, and the output of

.
•
his war industries Whereas the first impacts of previous air
attacks fell upon the economic traffic of occupied or satellite

countries, or in some cases upon a cushion of excess transport

capacity, any reduction of traffic in the Reich affects vital

war production or the health and morale of the German homeland.

40 C5-S26B,AF
 09 ttf

B. Ports and Naval Bases

Attacks against port cities such as Smden, Hamburg^

Hamburg, w'jpjkii
naval bases at Kiel, Toulon, etc., and inland waterway ports and

# canals have constituted a significant part of the bombing offen­

sive against Axis transport. Although the bomb tonnages directed

against docks and shipping have been relatively small, the loss
of ships and harbor facilities and the interruption of water­

borne traffic have affected both industrial output and military

movements .
C, Minelaying

I'ines laid by RAF Bomber Command since the beginning of the

war totalled nearly 4-0,000 on 30 September 1944. Known casual­

ties from this effort included more than 450 ships sunk 'and

nearly 400 damaged. Other casualties were inflicted on Axis

transport by mining operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the

# Danube River, and by surface

mand and other air forces.

operations

The loss of vessels

of the RAF Coastal Com­

by mining and by

air action has cost the Axis valuable cargoes and shipping, slowed

the movement of other industrial cargoes and disrupted the enemy's

military transport.

- 41 _

C5-5268,riF
XVII

Heavy ftomber forces operating in conjunction with medium and

fighter bombers have played a vital role in amphibious landing

operations in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. The

breakthrough in Normandy found heavy bombers contributing to the

success of Allied ground advances. In such operations Allied

Strategic Air Forces dropped 101j.,600 tons of bombs in the four

month period 1 June-30 September 19i-|i4-« About 6 percent of USSTAF

efforts and 19 percent of RAF efforts in the first nine months of

191+U were devoted to the task of ground support.

B. Pilotless Aircraft Installations

Defensive operations against launching and supply sites used

for flying bomb attacks ag?inst England required the diversion of

a considerable part of the strategic bombing effort. About

106,14.00 tons of "feombs ""/ere dropped by Allied Strategic Forces in

this campaign. During the first nine months of 19hh> about 7 per­

cent of USSTAF tonrages and 17 percent of WAF tonnages were dropped

on such installations. As a result of these attacks construction

was delayed and numerous sites rendered unusable, including four

very large installations intended for heavy rockets. Robot bomb­

ing attacks on England were restricted although not eliminated by

these Allied bombing operations.

Pi%
S

C5-5268,AF
- U2
-
 APPENDIX A
il
ky ,
wll %& §m il J» -^I i
BA Ullil 1 Ll#
wt \u25a0

\u25a0
3

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS INDUSTRIES

The following table lists important Axis plants that have been sig­

nificantly damaged by Allied aerial attacks in 19U3 an<3- the first 9 months
n
of 19^1-* and indicates the relative importance and the damage suffered by
'
The "MEW ratings shown for most industrial plants
I
each of these plants.

are defined as follows;

Class 1
- Plants of primary importance in Germany's war effort

- and possessing bottleneck characteristics

Class 1
Class 2
- Major factories in industries of major importance.

Minor factories in industries of major importance,

Class 3
- or major factories in minor industries.

Subsidiary factories of small output.

Not included in the list of damaged plants are very large numbers of

unrated and unidentified factories. At least 1,200 of these small plants

sustained varying degrees of damage in 19U3 during the course of R^F area

attacks; hundreds of similar plants were damaged or destroyed in 19^4-N

Though individually small, these plants in the aggregate account for a

significant part of German industrial output.

Damaged plants in the following tables are listed as follows:

IAircraft
A. GAF Single^Engine Fighters
B. GAP Twin-Engine Fighters
C. GAF Jet-Propelled Fighters
D. Bombers, Transport, Misc.
E. Italian Aircraft
F. Repair
G. Aero-Engines
H. Minor Aircraft Components
II Anti-Friction Bearings

111 Oil

A. Synthetic Plants
B. Refineries
C. Miscellaneous

IV Rubber and Tires

V Submarine Yards and Bases

VI Tanks and Motor Transport

VII Armaments and Misc. Engineering

VIII Machine Tools and Precision Instruments

X Metals
-
IX Electrical Equipment

Steel and Non-ferrous

XI Chemicals and Explosives

05-5268, AF
- 43 -