Guns, Weapons & Ammunition Safety Manual (2000)

Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
0 To our Foreign Reader
1 Introduction
2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 3 Methodology
Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual
4 Weapons
5 Ammunition
6 Denitions
7 References
Stock name: H VAS-E Stock number: M7762-000242 Approved: FMV:Inspectorate Edition: 2000 Central storage: Armed Forces book and form store
8 Checklists
Foreword This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual supersedes previous editions of the Ammunition Safety Manual (FMV Amskhandbok 1990). The Ammunition Safety Manual contained a chapter on ammunition safety methods. As such methodology is a core feature and shall be applied to all safety work concerning materiel and systems this chapter has been excluded from the current manual as it was found to be more appropriate to incorporate a methodology chapter in the Armed Forces System Safety Manual (H SystSkE). Both manuals are co-ordinated and are designed to be used together. This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual should thus be used as a complement to the System Safety Manual. Comments on the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual will be gratefully received and should be submitted to FMV: Inspectorate, SE-115 88 Stockholm, Sweden.
Content
0 To our Foreign Reader ........................................................................... 15 0.1 Purpose of this chapter ................................................................... 15 0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ....................................... 15 0.3 About the manual ........................................................................... 15 1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 17 1.1 General ............................................................................................. 17 1.2 Instructions for use ......................................................................... 20 1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety .................................................. 21 1.3.1 General .................................................................................. 21 1.3.2 Concepts ................................................................................ 23 1.4 Objectives for safety activities ....................................................... 25 1.4.1 General .................................................................................. 25 1.4.2 Peacetime and wartime .......................................................... 25 1.4.3 Integration of safety work with other activities ..................... 25 1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV .................... 25 1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities ........................................................................................ 26 1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ... 26 2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ................. 27 2.1 General ............................................................................................. 27 2.2 Safety activity requirements .......................................................... 28 2.3 Requirements common to all materiel .......................................... 32 2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ....................................................................................... 34 3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 35 3.1 General ............................................................................................. 35 3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO ........................ 35 3.2.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 35 3.2.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 36 3.2.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 36 3.2.4 Activity description ............................................................... 36 3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ..... 37 3.3.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 37 3.3.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 37 3.3.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 37 3.3.4 Activity description ............................................................... 38 3.4 Supplement to manufacturers Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ............................................................................... 39 3.4.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 39 3.4.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 39
7
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.4.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 40 3.4.4 Activity description ............................................................... 40 3.4.4.1 Manufacturers internal safety requirements .......... 40 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ........................... 41 3.5.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 41 3.5.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 41 3.5.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 41 3.5.4 Activity description ............................................................... 42 Obtaining advice from advisory groups ....................................... 43 3.6.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 43 3.6.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 43 3.6.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 43 3.6.4 Activity description ............................................................... 44 3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and checklists for reviews ....................................... 44 3.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems .... 45 3.6.4.1.2 Advisory Group for Explosives ........... 46 3.6.4.1.3 Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices .............................. 48 Safety testing ................................................................................... 50 3.7.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 50 3.7.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 50 3.7.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 50 3.7.4 Activity description ............................................................... 50 Test directives for safety surveillance ........................................... 52 3.8.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 52 3.8.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 52 3.8.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 53 3.8.4 Activity description ............................................................... 53 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) ............................................................................................. 53 3.9.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 53 3.9.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 54 3.9.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 54 3.9.4 Activity description ............................................................... 54 3.9.4.1 Background ............................................................. 54 3.9.4.2 Subdivision of materiel publications ....................... 55
4 Weapons .................................................................................................... 57 4.1 General ............................................................................................. 57 4.1.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 57 4.1.2 Structure of chapter ............................................................... 57 4.1.3 Purpose of the requirements .................................................. 57
4.2
4.3
4.1.4 Risks and system safety ......................................................... 58 Common requirements ................................................................... 60 4.2.1 Requirements of International Law ....................................... 60 4.2.2 General requirements ............................................................ 60 4.2.2.1 Danger area ............................................................. 61 4.2.2.2 Safety of friendly forces .......................................... 62 4.2.3 Toxic substances .................................................................... 64 4.2.4 Electrical and magnetic fields ............................................... 66 4.2.5 Water and moisture resistance ............................................... 67 4.2.6 Extreme climatic conditions .................................................. 67 4.2.7 Fire ......................................................................................... 68 4.2.8 Blast pressure ........................................................................ 69 4.2.9 Backblast ............................................................................... 69 4.2.10 Vibration dose ....................................................................... 70 4.2.11 Pressure ................................................................................. 70 4.2.12 Forces .................................................................................... 70 4.2.12.1 General .................................................................... 70 4.2.12.2 Requirements .......................................................... 71 4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical) ................. 71 4.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics .................. 72 4.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces ........................................ 72 4.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements ...................... 73 4.2.13 Lasers ..................................................................................... 74 4.2.14 Stability mechanical ........................................................... 74 4.2.15 Transport ............................................................................... 75 4.2.15.1 General .................................................................... 75 4.2.15.2 Requirements .......................................................... 76 4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back ....... 76 4.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects ............................... 76 System requirements ...................................................................... 77 4.3.1 Launchers .............................................................................. 77 4.3.1.1 Weapon installation ................................................ 77 4.3.1.2 Recoil systems ........................................................ 78 4.3.1.2.1 General ................................................. 78 4.3.1.2.2 Breech mechanisms ............................. 79 4.3.1.2.3 Firing mechanisms ............................... 79 4.3.1.2.4 Breech ring ........................................... 81 4.3.1.2.5 Obturation ............................................ 81 4.3.1.2.6 Backflash ............................................. 81 4.3.1.2.7 Barrels and sub-calibre barrels ............ 82 4.3.1.2.8 Fume extractors .................................... 84 4.3.1.2.9 Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers ................................... 84
9
4.4
4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash ......................................... 85 4.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters ................................................ 85 4.3.1.2.12 Ramming .............................................. 86 4.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers ....................................... 86 4.3.1.3 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems ................... 87 4.3.1.3.1 General ................................................. 87 4.3.1.3.2 Requirements ....................................... 88 4.3.1.4 Composite and compound barrels ........................... 89 4.3.1.5 Other weapon systems ............................................ 90 4.3.1.5.1 Minelayers for landmines ..................... 90 4.3.1.5.2 Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges ........................................ 91 4.3.1.5.3 Launch tubes for torpedoes .................. 91 4.3.2 Pylons and dispensers ............................................................ 93 4.3.3 Weapon platforms ................................................................. 94 4.3.4 Hatches and doors .................................................................. 95 4.3.5 Sighting and laying systems .................................................. 96 4.3.5.1 General .................................................................... 96 4.3.5.2 Requirements .......................................................... 96 4.3.5.2.1 System accuracy ................................... 96 4.3.5.2.2 Sight tests and adjustments .................. 96 4.3.5.2.3 Firing .................................................... 97 4.3.5.2.4 Aiming and firing limitations ............... 97 4.3.6 Guidance systems .................................................................. 97 4.3.7 Miscellaneous requirements ................................................ 100 4.3.7.1 Pressure vessels ..................................................... 100 4.3.7.2 Lifting devices ....................................................... 100 4.3.7.3 Fire-fighting equipment ........................................ 100 Requirement checklist for weapons ............................................ 102
5 Ammunition ............................................................................................ 113 5.1 Joint ammunition requirements .................................................. 113 5.1.1 General ................................................................................ 113 5.1.2 Requirements of International Law ..................................... 114 5.1.3 Materiel specific requirements ............................................ 114 5.1.4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements ...................... 116 5.2 Warheads ....................................................................................... 118 5.2.1 General ................................................................................ 118 5.2.1.1 Description ............................................................ 118 5.2.1.2 Materiel environment ............................................ 119 5.2.1.3 Requirements ........................................................ 120 5.2.2 Warheads containing high explosive (HE) .......................... 122
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5.3
5.4
5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition ....... 122 5.2.2.2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles ...... 124 5.2.2.3 HE warheads for bombs ........................................ 125 5.2.2.4 HE warheads for landmines .................................. 126 5.2.2.5 HE warheads for large underwater ammunition ... 127 5.2.2.6 HE warheads for other ammunition ...................... 129 5.2.3 Pyrotechnic warheads .......................................................... 130 5.2.3.1 General .................................................................. 130 5.2.3.2 Requirements ........................................................ 132 5.2.3.3 Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition ........................................................... 132 5.2.3.4 Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs ....... 134 5.2.3.5 Other pyrotechnic warheads ................................. 134 5.2.4 Other warheads .................................................................... 135 5.2.5 Requirement checklist for warheads ................................... 136 Propulsion systems ........................................................................ 138 5.3.1 General ................................................................................ 138 5.3.1.1 Description of function ......................................... 139 5.3.1.2 Safety aspects ........................................................ 139 5.3.1.3 Materiel environment ............................................ 140 5.3.1.4 Joint requirements ................................................. 141 5.3.2 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition ............... 142 5.3.2.1 General .................................................................. 142 5.3.2.1.1 Safety aspects ..................................... 144 5.3.2.1.2 Requirements ..................................... 145 5.3.3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets, guided missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), torpedoes, etc. ...................................................................... 145 5.3.3.1 General .................................................................. 145 5.3.3.2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators .............................................................. 146 5.3.3.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators .............................................................. 149 5.3.3.4 Jet engines ............................................................. 150 5.3.3.4.1 General ............................................... 150 5.3.3.4.2 Requirements ..................................... 151 5.3.3.5 Ram rocket engines ............................................... 152 5.3.3.5.1 General ............................................... 152 5.3.3.6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes .......................... 153 5.3.3.6.1 Requirements ..................................... 154 5.3.4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices .................... 154 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ............... 157 5.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 157
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5.4.2
5.4.3
5.4.4 5.4.5
5.4.6
12
5.4.1.1 General .................................................................. 157 5.4.1.2 Materiel environment ............................................ 162 5.4.1.2.1 Mechanical stress ............................... 162 5.4.1.2.2 Physical and chemical stress .............. 163 5.4.1.3 Technical solutions ............................................... 164 5.4.1.3.1 Electrical subsystems ......................... 164 5.4.1.4 Other fuzing systems ............................................. 167 5.4.1.4.1 Fuzing systems for explosives etc. ..... 167 5.4.1.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives, demolition sticks, Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges) ............. 167 5.4.1.4.3 Signal and spotting agents .................. 167 5.4.1.4.4 Hand-grenades ................................... 168 5.4.1.4.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters ................................. 168 5.4.1.4.6 Self-destruction .................................. 168 5.4.1.4.7 Submunitions ..................................... 168 5.4.1.4.8 Multi-purpose ammunition ................ 169 5.4.1.4.9 Tandem systems ................................. 169 5.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices ............................. 169 General requirements ........................................................... 170 5.4.2.1 Common requirements .......................................... 170 5.4.2.2 Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) ....................... 172 5.4.2.3 The arming process ............................................... 173 5.4.2.4 Arming safety features including semiconductor switches ................................................................. 174 5.4.2.5 Application specific requirements ........................ 174 5.4.2.6 Testing ................................................................... 176 5.4.2.7 Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal .................................................................. 177 5.4.2.8 Requirements of International Law ....................... 177 Requirements for systems with interrupters ........................ 178 5.4.3.1 Design requirements ............................................. 178 5.4.3.2 Testing interrupters ............................................... 178 Requirements for systems without interrupters ................... 179 Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions .............................................................................. 180 5.4.5.1 Fuzing systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are not available ................ 180 5.4.5.2 Signal and spotting agents ..................................... 180 5.4.5.3 Initiation devices and demolition charges ............. 181 5.4.5.4 Propulsion devices ................................................ 182 Requirement checklist for fuzing systems ........................... 182
5.5
Packaging for ammunition ........................................................... 188 5.5.1 General ................................................................................ 188 5.5.2 Environmental factors ......................................................... 189 5.5.3 Consequences of environmental stress ................................ 189 5.5.3.1 Mechanical environmental stress .......................... 189 5.5.3.2 Electrical environmental stress ............................. 190 5.5.3.3 Chemical environmental stress ............................. 190 5.5.3.4 Climatic environmental stress ............................... 190 5.5.3.5 Other environmental stress ................................... 190 5.5.4 Requirements ....................................................................... 190 5.5.5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings ............ 192
6 Definitions ............................................................................................... 193 6.1 Terminology .................................................................................. 193 6.2 Key to abbreviations ..................................................................... 218 7 References ............................................................................................... 223 7.1 Documents governing safety ........................................................ 225 7.2 Standards relating to design and testing .................................... 226 7.3 Design principles and experience ................................................ 230 7.4 Textbooks ....................................................................................... 233 7.5 Documents relating to the environment ..................................... 235 7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition ................................................................................... 237 7.6.1 System specific specifications ............................................. 237 7.6.2 Environment specific specifications .................................... 237 7.6.2.1 Mechanical testing ................................................ 237 7.6.2.2 Climatic testing ..................................................... 238 7.6.2.3 Chemical testing .................................................... 238 7.6.2.4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing .................. 238 7.6.2.5 Fire and explosion testing ..................................... 239 7.6.2.6 Combined testing .................................................. 239 7.7 Accident investigations ................................................................. 239 8 Checklists ................................................................................................ 241 8.1 Checklist example 1 ...................................................................... 241 8.2 Checklist example 2 ...................................................................... 242 Index ........................................................................................................ 243
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To our Foreign Reader 0
0
0.1
TO OUR FOREIGN READER 1

Purpose of this chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to inform our Foreign Reader on some facts about the role-play in Sweden concerning Weapons and Ammunition procurement.
0.2
Defence Materiel Systems Procurement
The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) is a separate agency for procurement of materiel for the Armed Forces on assignment from the Head Quarters (HQ). FMV has no funding of its own, everything is nanced through the assignments. An assignment is formulated as an agreement between the HQ and FMV in each case, dening the scope of work and reached after a dialogue regarding technical, nancial and time aspects. To dene the task, HQ issues a tactical, technical, nancial objective (TTFO), which could be compared with a specication in a business agreement. The responsibility for the defence procurement extends to the technical processing (e.g. producing technical specications), negotiating contracts, purchasing, testing and inspection of equipment. But as a governmental authority, FMV does neither manufacture nor sell anything, nor has it basically any resources for design (but quite a lot for testing). FMV contracts the industry, mostly in competition and strictly obeying the public procurement act, based on EU directives. After contracting a supplier, FMV monitors and controls the safety work performed by the supplier.
0.3
About the manual
During the late sixties and early seventies, a number of ammunition related accidents occurred in Sweden. As a result of the investigation of the accidents, an Ammunition Safety Manual was issued. The purpose of the manual was to pre-
1. This chapter is added to the English edition only and does not exist in the Swedish edition.
15
0 To our Foreign Reader
scribe a procedure that would ensure an acceptable level of safety throughout the life of the ammunition and to lay down basic safety requirements for ammunition.
The manual was based on a record of experience gained over the years. It contained a list of technical requirements, some mandatory and some desired. Many of the requirements were of the prohibiting type. The manual has been updated regularly and also been issued in English versions. A couple of years ago we had reports on some failing artillery pieces. We also carried out safety investigations on some older artillery systems. Reecting the obvious advantages of the ammunition safety methodology Sweden had until then, the natural question was Why only ammunition?. We were also aware of the growing complexity of modern systems and also the impact from the use of software. This manual hence includes requirements and experiences from both ammunition and weapons.
16
Introduction 1
1
1.1
INTRODUCTION
General
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual (H VAS-E) is a record of the experience accumulated over the years relating to weapons and ammunition safety, particularly during the development stages of projects. This manual complements the Swedish Armed Forces System Safety Manual, 1996 English edition (H SystSkE) M7740-784851. The System Safety Manual shall always be applied. If the defence materiel system contains weapons and/or ammunition this manual, H VAS-E, shall also be applied. As a result of a proposal in the nal report dated 1970-09-28 from the Ammunition Safety Working Group (ASWG) with representatives from the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), the Defence Research Establishment (FOA) and the Swedish defence companies concerned, a manual was compiled of experience accumulated from the ammunition sector. This has now been extended to include a weapons section. This is a natural progression as the boundary between weapons and ammunition is becoming increasingly fuzzy. It can even be difcult to categorize certain types of defence materiel as either weapons or ammunition. If there is any doubt use both Chapter 4 and 5. The purpose of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is: to complement the System Safety Manual in respect of weapons and ammunition, to state appropriate activities for providing weapons and ammunition with the required level of safety throughout their service life, to state basic requirements concerning weapons and ammunition, to constitute a guide and checklist for personnel in the Armed Forces, FMV, FOA and the defence industry in matters concerning weapons and ammunition safety during development, acquisition, manufacture, use and disposal.
This manual states both the requirements for operations in the form of activities that are necessary primarily during development/acquisition of weapons and ammunition, and the materiel specic requirements for weapons and ammunition.
17
1 Introduction
Safety requirements in this manual are subdivided into mandatory (SHALL) and desired (SHOULD) requirements. The requirement specication in the order/ contract shall state which requirements, and the type of requirement (mandatory or desired), shall apply for specic weapons and/or specic ammunition. Figure 1.1 illustrates schematically how the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual interrelates with other documents etc. that govern and affect weapons and ammunition safety activities.
The System Safety Manual states how system safety activities can be appropriately conducted and contains certain materiel specic requirements. The REQDOC Technical Specication Manual (H Kravdok) states how requirements shall be formulated in the work undertaking (V) and technical (materiel related) requirements in a technical specication (TS). The Software Safety Manual (H ProgSk) states directives relating to the programming of safety critical software. The Vehicle Safety Manual (H FordonSk) states the design principles for, and experience accumulated from, the development of vehicles as well as regulations governing road worthiness. The Submarine Safety Manual (H UbtSk) states the design principles for, and experience accumulated from, the development of submarines. These manuals are used as a complement to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual when formulating technical requirements and requirements for operational undertakings. For example, if a weapon contains safety critical software the Software Safety Manual shall be applied in addition to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual.
18
Introduction 1
H VAS
Requirements Documentation Manual
Software Safety Manual
System Safety Manual

Vehicles Safety Manual Submarine Safety Manual
Figure 1.1 The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual relative to other documents. Weapons and ammunition safety activities are governed within FMV by FMV Service Regulations (TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated via TjF-FMV 1999:46). These state that the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual shall be applied during the acquisition of weapons and ammunition. Safety work in a defence industry is often governed by internal company documents that relate to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual. These documents often specify the entire materiel development process with safety work as an integral part. This approach is also supported inter alia in ISO 9000-1:1994 and AQAP 110. When a defence materiel system is to be acquired the contract stipulates that a System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) shall be established. The SSPP then governs other safety-related activities. The System Safety Manual and the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual provide support concerning which activities and overall requirements should/shall apply. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Chapters 2 and 3.
19
1 Introduction
1.2
Instructions for use
This manual comprises both descriptive and requirement based chapters as described below. Chapter 1, Introduction describes the background, preconditions and objective of the manual. Chapter 2, Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel species weapon and ammunition related safety activities as well as the common materiel requirements for the project. Chapter 3, Methodology describes how the activities specied in Chapter 2 can be managed. Chapter 4, Weapons species materiel specic requirements for weapons of which the main parts are Common requirements and System requirements. Chapter 5, Ammunition species materiel specic requirements for ammunition. With regard to ammunition the specic subsystem requirements also apply that are specied under the respective headings Warheads, Propulsion systems, Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges and Packaging for ammunition. Chapter 6, Denitions denes certain materiel specic terminology and lists a key to the abbreviations and acronyms used in the manual. Chapter 7, References lists references to literature relating to defence materiel. Chapter 8, Checklists contains examples of how checklists of requirements can be formulated for inter alia issuing reports to FMV advisory groups. In all the chapters where safety requirements are specied (chapters 2, 4 and 5) checklists are provided that can be used to check that each requirement is observed. Other chapters (1, 3, 6, 7 and 8) are of a descriptive nature. For some defence materiel systems it may be difcult to determine the boundary between weapons and ammunition. In such cases both Chapter 4, Weapons and Chapter 5, Ammunition must be applied.
20
Introduction 1
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is based on and is a complement to the System Safety Manual. It can mainly be read and applied independently but certain sections in the text, however, refer directly to the System Safety Manual.
1.3 1.3.1
Weapons and ammunition safety General
All activities with technical systems involve risk. Complete freedom from risk is thus an unattainable ideal condition which is why the goal of risk reducing activities and measures in general can only be to reduce the risks to a so-called tolerable risk level, which means a real acceptable level of safety. The purpose of the weapons and ammunition in the Armed Forces is to inict the maximum possible damage on the enemy in wartime. Consequently, weapons and ammunition often constitute a potential major hazard even to the user. The requirements specied for performance and reliability can be mutually exclusive to requirements stipulated for safety since complex safety devices can entail a lower level of reliability and operational availability. When designing weapons and ammunition it shall always be assured that they have a tolerable level of risk throughout their service life. The Armed Forces, FMV, and the defence industry are enjoined to conduct active safety work through legislation such as the Work Environment Act, Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act, and Transport of Dangerous Goods Act. As accidents with weapons and ammunition often have serious consequences for personnel, materiel and the environment, the requirements governing safety shall be stringent. Accidents with weapons and ammunition, moreover, also tend to erode condence in military materiel in general. Consequently, the materiel must be acceptable safe to handle throughout its life, which includes storage, transport, handling, use, maintenance and disposal. The Armed Forces stipulate requirements in the TTFO for the achievement of a tolerable level of risk. The National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SI) examines and approves all explosive goods developed and manufactured by the industry for military or civil use. In addition, the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables examines and approves all explosives, determines transport codes, and establishes storage codes in consultation with FMV.
21
1 Introduction
The following prerequisites are necessary to meet the requirements pertaining to a tolerable level of risk: Relevant materiel specific safety requirements and requirements for safety activities are formulated by the Armed Forces in the form of Tactical Technical Financial Objectives (TTFO) or equivalent. FMV formulates the requirements of the Armed Forces into technical requirements with the aid of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and other applicable specifications. All the safety requirements are specified by FMV in the Request for Proposal (RFP). FMV ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements specified in the RFP or equivalent as well as those specified in this manual, and ensures that safety activities stated in the SSPP are performed in a satisfactory manner and that documentation for Armed Forces activities are produced. The supplier ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements stated in requirement specifications and that the activities agreed in the SSPP are properly performed. The Armed Forces ensure that training materiel and training plans, safety regulations, and restrictions on the use of the materiel are available so that military units can use the materiel in a safe manner. Military units provide users with sufficient training and ensure that conditions during usage are such that weapons and ammunition do not cause accidents or ill-health. The user complies with the instructions given during training and with safety regulations when handling the weapon and ammunition. The Armed Forces assign to FMV the task of disposal of weapons and ammunition.
It is essential that all parties involved are aware of their responsibility for ensuring that weapons and ammunition are acceptably safe to handle throughout their service life. In the weapon and ammunition sectors the system safety activities consist of a number of risk reducing activities that are to be performed during development, production, transport, storage, use, maintenance and disposal. These specic weapon and ammunition activities are described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, while the general activities are described in the System Safety Manual.
22
Introduction 1
1.3.2
Concepts
The term accident is used in the Work Environment Act. A hazardous event shall result in someone being injured or something being damaged for it to be deemed an accident. (Example: If a shell detonates at an undesired point in time it is a hazardous event, but if no person is injured and no materiel/property or the environment is damaged by the detonation the event is not designated as an accident but as an incident.)
1
Accident
&
Hazardous Event
Person injured or object damaged
Figure 1.2 The accident concept Weapons and ammunition safety is the property of materiel to be handled under specied conditions without a hazardous event occurring or parts incorporated in the materiel being affected in such a way that a hazardous event may occur during subsequent handling. Examples of such stated conditions (preconditions) for materiel safety are: that the safety of devices for handling weapons and ammunition are satisfactory, that users have undergone the specified training, that the specified environmental severities are not exceeded,
23
1 Introduction
that the materiel is used and operated in the intended manner, i.e. that instructions for use have been complied with, that safety inspections and status checks are performed as required.
Handling refers to handling during all phases throughout the life of the product, e.g. storage, transport, use, maintenance and disposal. Weapons and ammunition safety is only one of many safety concepts. An explanation of how this safety concept can be related to other safety concepts is given below. The concepts below may constitute parts within a major system such as a naval vessel. In such a case seaworthiness, ammunition safety, and weapons safety are constituent parts of the wider system safety concept for the vessel. System safety may also encompass further concepts such as software safety, resistance to environmental conditions, and activities for the protection of the environment. Equivalent concepts apply to vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, self-propelled artillery guns and missile launchers for example.
System safety
Ammunition safety
Weapons safety
Seaworthiness
Figure 1.3 System safety exemplified by a naval vessel system Seaworthiness in this example is directly affected by weapons and ammunition safety insofar as defects and deciencies in these could impact on seaworthiness. For example, if it was possible to re a gun onboard a vessel towards the deck resulting in holes in the hull, or if ammunition stored in the ammunition hold was unable to withstand environmental stresses (e.g. vibration) resulting in hazard detonation.
24
Introduction 1
1.4 1.4.1
Objectives for safety activities General
Weapons and ammunition safety activities shall be performed to an extent that: applicable legislation and requirements governing the materiel are complied with and provide adequate safety against ill-health and accidents during handling and that the materiel is provided with instructions for use, safety regulations and marking, requirements specified in the Armed Forces TTFO are met, system safety will not be degraded by the use of new technology or new system solutions.
1.4.2
Peacetime and wartime
It is of decisive importance for combat morale that the user has full condence from the safety aspect in the materiel that is used. Safety requirements for newly developed weapons and newly developed ammunition should specify that the materiel can be used with the same restrictions in peacetime and in wartime alike.
1.4.3
Integration of safety work with other activities
Safety cannot be managed independently but only in combination with the other activities involved during the life of the materiel. Neither can responsibility for safety be removed from the line organization at the Armed Forces, FMV or manufacturer level.
1.5
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV
Responsibility for weapons and ammunition safety devolves upon the function at FMV which is: responsible for acquisition or modification of the weapon or ammunition in question, responsible for integration of the weapon or ammunition into existing materiel or system.
25
1 Introduction
After completion of weapons and ammunition safety work or system safety work a Safety Statement (SS) shall be issued as specied in the Armed Forces System Safety Manual. Advice concerning weapons and ammunition safety can be obtained from the Inspectorate advisory groups (and such advice shall be procured in cases where explosive goods require transport and storage classication). Advice obtained does not alter the line organization responsibility stipulated above.
Regulations governing ammunition safety activities within FMV are disclosed in TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated 1999-12-27 via TjF-FMV 1996:46.
1.6
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities
This manual does not govern delegations and responsibility for weapon and ammunition safety activities within the Defence Research Establishment or other supporting authorities.
1.7
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers
The application of this manual by manufacturers shall be governed by the provisions stipulated in the relevant order contract.
26
Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2
SAFETY ACTIVITIES AND REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL MATERIEL

General
2.1
This chapter species the safety activities and materiel requirements that are specic to weapons and ammunition. It is necessary to carry out a selection of these activities in order to achieve the required level of safety. Section 2.2 species safety activity requirements and Section 2.3 the requirements common to all materiel. Requirements and activities are subdivided into three different project types according to whether they deal with: P1: Development. P2: Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems. P3: Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems.
These project types are henceforth referred to as P1, P2 and P3: Project type P1, Development, here refers both to development of new weapon and ammunition systems and to modification or renovation of existing systems. Project type P2, Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems, here refers to purchase of off-the-shelf goods. Within the framework of a large-scale type P2 acquisition the adaptation of subsystems may be necessary. Such an adaptation is carried out as a P1 project type. Project type P3, Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems, here refers to an investigation of the status of materiel in existence within the Armed Forces with the objective of creating the basis for a decision regarding the most appropriate measures to be taken with the system, e.g. modification, renovation or disposal.
Activities that are specic to weapons and ammunition shall be integrated with overall materiel system activities. It is appropriate that this integration be carried out by incorporating the specic activities in the System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) of the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual. Some of the weapon and ammunition specic activities form a natural basis for the overall activities. For example, only weapon and ammunition specic materiel requirements are stated in this manual while the overall requirements are stated in the System Safety Manual.
27
2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel
While drafting this manual consideration was given to the procedures and standards that are in use internationally, and consequently the manual is applicable in its entirety even for international use. When a development project is assigned to a foreign manufacturer the safety activities shall be performed in the same way as they would be during development by a Swedish manufacturer. It may, however, be necessary to take into consideration procedures in use in the country in which development is taking place. When purchasing fully developed materiel from abroad it shall always be ensured that information/documentation is obtained to enable an evaluation of safety to be performed. In some cases such documentation can be obtained via the authorities of a country with whom a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been established. Prior to each decision on an acquisition a thorough evaluation of the safety of the product shall be performed. Pertinent documentation must be available to form a basis for making a decision on acquisition.
2.2
Safety activity requirements
The principles for weapon and ammunition safety activities are illustrated in Figure 2.1. With regard to their nature and purpose, weapons and ammunition often contain hazards that are essential for their objectives to be achieved. It is for reasons such as this that it is impossible to create completely safe systems. However, the risks pertaining to a weapon and ammunition system during its various phases can partially be eliminated or limited. During design and manufacture most risks are limited by the design measures taken and by good production control. Certain hazards may remain after manufacture such as blast pressure, thermal radiation during ring, and fragments from detonation. Such hazards can be limited through restriction on use, and by providing users with training in the handling and operation of systems etc.
28
Materiel system
Possible hazards
Defence industries activities FMV activities Armed Force activities
Figure 2.1 System safety activities Figure 2.2 shows the safety activities that can be performed during the various phases in the life of the system for the various types of project (P1, P2 or P3). The activities selected and the interow between them varies depending on the specic project. This is stipulated in the SSPP for the materiel system. The substance of the activities often denoted in this manual by abbreviations are explained in more detail in the System Safety Manual. Abbreviations are derived from English language expressions. The objective of these activities is to obtain an acceptable level of safety for personnel, equipment, property and the surrounding environment.
29
Phase Activity
Studies Study/ Development
Planning and procurement Verification/ Testing
Operation Manufacture Transport/ Storage Use/Consumption Maintenance
Disposal Disposal
Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Supplement to PHL Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Safety Testing Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST
Figure 2.2 Safety activities during the various phases Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the information ow between the Armed Forces, FMV, and the manufacturer involved in the P1, P2 and P3 programs. Requirements for the safety activities to be performed in the various programs (P1, P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. Each requirement is assigned a unique number to facilitate references. Furthermore, each mandatory (SHALL) requirement is written in bold type on a dark yellow background and each desired (SHOULD) requirement is written in normal typeface on a light yellow background. Requirements for the safety activities to be performed for the various programs (P1, P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. The words shall and should are used in the running text as explanations. Cases where the text does not have a requirement number shall not be interpreted as strict requirements but as a general guideline and explanation. In the activity ows below the circles with A indicate who bears the main responsibility for performance of the activity, while an empty circle denotes participation in the activity or that a document/activity moves, and the arrows indicate the intended direction of the information ow.
30
Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Supplement to PHL Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Safety Testing Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST
FM
FMV
Industry
A A A A A A A A
Figure 2.3 Example of activity flow forP1: Development

Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to SRP Advising Group Check (Advisory Group) Directives for safety inspection Directives for PHST FM FMV Industry
A A A A A A
Figure 2.4 Example of activity flow for P2: Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Materiel
Activity Supplement to TTFO Supplement to RFP Supplement to PHL Safety Testing FM FMV
A A A A
Figure 2.5 Example of activity flow for P3: Review of Existing Materiel How, when, and by whom the activities stated below shall be performed in each program (P1, P2 and P3) is described in Chapter 3, Methodology. Most activities conclude with a clearly identiable documentation. 1.22001 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as specified in Section 3.2. Supplement to safety requirements in the RFP shall be performed as specified in Section 3.3.
1.22002
31
1.22003 1.22004 1.22005 1.22006
Supplement to suppliers Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) performed as specified in Section 3.4. Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) performed as specified in Section 3.5. For explosive goods advice shall be obtained from FMVs Advisory Group for Explosives. Refer also to Section 3.6. Advice from FMVs Advisory Groups should be obtained as per the instructions issued by the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety. Refer also to Section 3.6. Safety testing shall be performed by the manufacturer as part of safety verification. Refer also to Section 3.7. Test directives for safety inspections (part of the In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition) shall be produced by FMV in conjunction with ammunition development. Refer also to Section 3.8. Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) should be established as specified in Section 3.9.
1.22007 1.22008
2
1.22009
2.3
Requirements common to all materiel
Requirements that apply to all weapons and ammunition have been collated in this section to avoid the need for repetition in Chapter 4 and 5. Further requirements are stated in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. These requirements shall be incorporated into requirement specications together with other applicable weapon and ammunition requirements. It is the aim of weapons and ammunition development to create a design that satises safety requirements. During the development phases safety requirements are veried by means of audits, analyses and tests. As the failure probability values to be veried are very low it is not sufcient to use only testing instead, several methods of verication must be used in parallel. 1.23001 Weapons shall not be designed so that they violate the applicable Rules of International Law. Thus it is forbidden to design weapons with non-discriminatory effect that cause unnecessary suffering or excessive injury. Comment: Refer also to requirements in Section 4.2.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 5.4.2.8.
32
1.23002
Each project concerning new acquisition or modification of weaponry or conventional weapons mainly for use against personnel shall be reported to the Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects. Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be approved by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SI). Comment: Approval is based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables statute book (SIFS 1986:2). SI determines transport and storage codes in consultation with FMV and establishes UN codes. Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be qualied in accordance with FSD 0214. Comment: Appraisals of the scope of qualification are performed by the Advisory Group for Explosives, see Section 3.6. Materials incorporated shall be compatible so that the product remains safe during its lifetime. Comment: Incompatible materials are to be avoided even if their reaction products are harmless. Compatibility testing often tests all organic materials with the explosives incorporated and with other safety critical components. This applies to materials that are in direct contact with each other or that can be affected via an interchange of gasses. The product shall retain its safety properties for at least as long as its specified service life. Testing of chemical life should be performed as specified in FSD 0223.
1.23003
1.23004
1.23005
1.23006 1.23007
33
2.4
Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel
The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. Examples of checklists for more specic reports are given in Chapter 8, Checklists.
Table 2:1 Checklist of requirements for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel
Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content Comment
Activities 1.22001 1.22002 1.22003 1.22004 1.22005 1.22006 1.22007 1.22008 1.22009
SHALL SHALL
a) a)
Requirements in TTFO Requirements in RFP Requirements in SRP PHL Advisory Group for Explosives Advice Safety testing Safety inspections PHST
SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHOULD
Requirements common to all materiel 1.23001 SHALL Non-discriminatory effect 1.23002 SHALL Scrutiny by Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Projects 1.23003 SHALL Explosives approved by SI 1.23004 SHALL Explosives qualied 1.23005 SHALL Compatibility 1.23006 SHALL Service life 1.23007 SHOULD Chemical life
a) Becomes mandatory (SHALL) requirement if specied in the SSPP.
34
Methodology 3
3
3.1
METHODOLOGY
General
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide for the implementation of the activities described in Chapter 2. The activities do not have to be carried out in the manner stated in this chapter, but if other methods are used they must be described, preferably in the System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) as specied in the System Safety Manual. It is appropriate to produce the draft SSPP at the same time as the draft requirement specication. Each section in this chapter embraces the following areas: Purpose: Gives a brief description of what the activity intends to achieve for each project type: P1, P2 and P3. Determines which authority FMV or the manufacturer bears prime responsibility for ensuring that the activity is carried out. To state in which phase during the life of the system that the activity shall be started or carried out. Describes the way in which the activity can most suitably be carried out.
Responsibility:
Time frame:
Description of activity:
3.2 3.2.1
Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO Purpose
The Armed Forces are responsible for ensuring that all requirements stipulated for the weapon system are disclosed in the TTFO. FMV participates in a dialogue with the Armed Forces to generate proposals for supplementary requirements concerning system safety aspects for weapons and ammunition for a specic materiel system. To these are appended selected requirements from the System Safety Manual.
35
3 Methodology
3.2.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO. P2: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO. P3: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO.
3.2.3
Time frame
P1: At project start, study phase. P2: When acquisition is necessary.
P3: In conjunction with review of existing materiel.
3.2.4
Activity description
The safety requirements are specied in the DTTFO (Draft version of Tactical, Technical and Financial Objectives), PTTFO (Preliminary Tactical, Technical and Financial Objectives), and nally in the TTFO (Tactical, Technical and Financial Objectives). In the DTTFO and PTTFO the requirements are divided into mandatory (SHALL) requirements and desired (SHOULD) requirements. The safety requirements are used by FMV as the basis for the formulation of requirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the manufacturer. Changes in the general operative conditions, operative focus, or operative capability and tactical guidelines, etc. may create the need for revisions to established requirements. This leads to a new TTFO process. Requirements for weapons and ammunition safety may comprise inter alia the following: Maximum restrictions during use such as the maximum size of the danger area in peacetime and wartime. Restrictions concerning firing conditions such as rate of fire, permitted charges for artillery, permitted safety distances when firing.
36
Methodology 3
Maximum restrictions concerning storage such as compatibility groups for ammunition. Insensitive munition (IM) requirements. Regarding policy and testing refer to FSD 0060.
Safety requirements can be stated qualitatively or quantitatively. They must comprise all phases of use throughout the life of the system. More information is available in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
3.3
Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) Purpose
3.3.1
To formulate the specic safety requirements that shall apply during the RFP process on the basis of the weapon and ammunition related requirements in the TTFO. FMV also formulates the safety requirements necessary for FMVs own work such as for review of existing materiel.
3.3.2
P1: FMV. P2: FMV. P3: FMV.
Responsibility
3.3.3
Time frame
P1: During RFP for each phase. P2: During RFP. P3: Before review of existing materiel.
37
3 Methodology
3.3.4
Safety requirements for the materiel are stated in the requirement specication to be included in the RFP. The format for the requirement specication is specied in the REQDOC Technical Specication Manual and in the REQDOC Statement of Work Undertakings Manual. Safety requirements stated in the TTFO are given a more industry-friendly wording, e.g. with reference to the concrete requirements specied in Chapter 2, Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel, Chapter 4, Weapons and Chapter 5, Ammunition. Environmental design and test requirements for extreme environments shall be formulated as per the applicable military or other standards. There must, however, be a balance between live ammunition with catastrophic consequences in the case of a hazardous event, and less complex training ammunition.
The Armed Forces safety requirements for a complete system may need to be broken down to subsystem level, at which the various manufacturers/suppliers of subsystems must share responsibility for the overall safety requirements. In addition to the materiel specic safety requirements further safety activities shall be stipulated, preferably as specied in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 2 Safety activities and materiel requirements, Section 2.2, and from other manuals such as the Software Safety Manual and the Vehicle Safety Manual. These shall be stated in the RFP. Proposals from the manufacturer regarding the activities that should be included in the system safety program shall be stated in the SSPP for the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual, Chapters 2 and 3. Examples of safety requirements: Safety margins for structural strength such as compressive strength for launchers. Criteria for qualification when insensitive munition is required. Prohibited materials and combinations of materials. Danger areas for ammunition. Approved classes of laser (e.g. laser class as per IEC 60825-1, so-called eyesafe lasers).
38
Methodology 3
SSPP
- Activities
Requirement Specification - Performance req
System Safety Manual
- Activities - Performance req
H VAS
- Activities
- Performance req
Software Safety Manual Vehicle Safety Manual
Figure 3.1 Allocation of requirements
3.4
Supplement to manufacturers Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) Purpose
3.4.1
To formulate weapon and ammunition safety requirements in a requirement specication that shall apply to the materiel and whose fullment shall be veried. For the purchase of off-the-shelf goods this means the specication requirements that apply to the purchase of the goods.
3.4.2
Responsibility
P1: The manufacturer. P2: The manufacturer.
39
3 Methodology
3.4.3
Time frame
P1: During the tender stage and product denition phase. P2: During the tender stage.
3.4.4
The supplier shall respond to the requirements in the RFP in a way that enables FMV to evaluate the planned system safety program and compare the tenders received from the various suppliers. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.7 Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP). Each requirement shall be described in such a way that it is possible to follow up the requirement, and so that it is easy to understand how the requirement is to be veried. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.16 Safety Verication (SV).
This activity also includes reformulating environmental design and test prerequisites into specied environmental design and test requirements. The operating environment is specied in the RFP, and the planned verication is stated in the verication specication, environmental design and test specication or equivalent. 3.4.4.1 Manufacturers internal safety requirements
System requirements for a development project must be allocated to subsystems and components before the actual design work starts. This is often a process that is internal to the manufacturer since the manufacturer has overall responsibility for the safety of the complete system. The safety requirements in the overall requirement specication shall preferably be reformulated into more concrete requirements to facilitate the task of the administrator in incorporating them into subsystem specications. This involves two things: Allocation of safety requirements stipulated at overall level (complete weapon systems) to weapon and ammunition safety requirements at subsystem level (barrel, platform, ammunition, fuze, cast charge, artillery primer, etc.).
40
Methodology 3
A re-formulation of an overall requirement to more concrete characteristics for the subsystems. Example: System requirement: copper azide must not be formed. Subsystem requirement for fuze: copper alloy and lead azide igniter must not be used simultaneously.
3.5 3.5.1
Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) Purpose
A Preliminary Hazard List shall be compiled early in the operation (and be continuously updated) to identify hazards and their potential hazardous events. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Section 3.8. This section states certain hazards based on experience that can result in hazardous events.
3.5.2
Responsibility
P1: The manufacturer. P3: FMV.
3.5.3
Time frame
P1: At Product Denition Phase. P3: Prior to start of review of existing materiel.
41
3 Methodology
3.5.4
To identify hazards one should analyze equivalent materiel, accident and incident reports, previous experience and the checklist below. This can never be complete, however, but must be supplemented over time.
Table 3:1
HAZARD
Example of hazards
FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE
Aiming system High barrel pressure Firing system Moving parts Laser transmitter High explosives in warheads
Chemical substances in illuminating, smoke and incendiary ammunition High explosives in explosive trains Primary explosives
Propellants (propellant charges for tube-launched ammunition, solid or liquid Excessive pressure resultrocket fuel, powder ing in rupture of combuscharges for actuator cartion chamber tridges) Escape of gas rearwards from gun
Impact or fragments outside danger area Barrel rupture or fragmen- Blast injuries tation Inadvertent ring Impact or fragments outside danger area Inadvertent movement Personnel injured by crushing Crushing Inadvertent transmission Eye injuries to personnel Premature burst: in depot Blast, fragmentation or holstore, during transport, dur- low-charge effect ing handling or loading, in Open re the bore or in trajectory Premature initiation/effect Blast or fragmentation effect Open re Emission of corrosive agents or toxic gases Premature initiation Initiation of warhead Blast or fragmentation effect Open re Premature initiation Initiation of warhead Open re Premature initiation Open re, shatter effect Blast and fragmentation effect when chamber ruptures
Incorrect direction of re
Facial injuries to gunner
Excessive forward or rear- Gunner injured ward recoil in recoilless weapons
42
Methodology 3
Table 3:1
HAZARD
Example of hazards
FAULT MODE CONSEQUENCE
Projectiles, rockets or missiles at launch, release or in ight High electric voltage High electric current Hydraulic pressure Rotating parts Vibration Electromagnetic radiation
Body ruptures, guidance failure, or ns etc. detach in ight Flash-over Short-circuit Leakage Parts detach Inherent resonance Inadvertent radiation
Shatter or fragmentation effect Electric shock Fire in cables Injuries caused by release of pressure Impact injuries Internal injuries to driver Injuries to internal organs
3.6 3.6.1
Obtaining advice from advisory groups Purpose
To obtain advice from advisory groups with technical expertise and experience in the weapons and ammunition sectors. The objective of advisory operations is to provide advice and recommendations to project managers, line managers and administrators within FMV, based on the technical expertise and experience of the relevant advisory group.
3.6.2
P1: FMV. P2: FMV.
Responsibility
3.6.3
Time frame
P1: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the SSPP or equivalent. P2: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the SSPP or equivalent.
43
3 Methodology
3.6.4
The preliminary number of reviews in which the participation of the manufacturer is required shall be specied in the SSPP and in the contractual undertaking. The aim is to obtain advice relating to the project from the advisory groups as early as possible. The Advisory Group for System Safety can state which other advisory groups ought to review the project. More reviews than those originally planned may be needed. Separate reviews may be necessary prior to special tests. The current advisory groups are listed below: Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T) Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl) Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) Advisory Group for System Safety (Rg SystSk) Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering (Rg M).
The advisory groups written in italics are described in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4. In practical terms advice is given in the form of responses to concrete questions submitted in respect of a specic project. It shall be possible to use the responses as a basis for the project or line organization decisions in the project. This advice also includes the safety principles (norms for ensuring ammunition safety) that the project or line organization intends to use as a basis for its work with concrete objects, plans, regulations, etc. When requesting advice the checklist issued by the relevant advisory group shall be adhered to. 3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and checklists for reviews
Section 3.6.4.1.1 through 3.6.4.1.3 state the tasks for each advisory group and the data required for review by each advisory group.
44
Methodology 3
If it is unclear as to which groups should review a project the question can be submitted to the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety. 3.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems
3.6.4.1.1.1 Tasks
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of fuzing systems The advisory group operates in the following areas: fuzing systems for warheads, fuzing systems for propulsion devices, design and production methods for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, compatibility. Advice may inter alia concern: action to be taken with existing fuzing systems and fuzing systems undergoing development, project specifications and technical documentation. To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for fuzing systems (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above. To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning fuzing systems to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies.
3.6.4.1.1.2 Procedure
Section 5.4 in the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisory group assessments. Scope of report: Brief general information about the object: field of application, weapon platform, weapon (or equivalent), ammunition, danger areas. Description of the object or functional description: drawings or diagrams, wiring diagram / block diagram / printed circuit board assembly layout,
45
3 Methodology
model or hardware, safety critical software, function of fuzing system, arming conditions, initiation conditions, explosive trains or transmitters including characteristics, safety devices.
Statement disclosing materials and components: type, composition, treatment (e.g. surface treatment, heat treatment), compatibility. Statement disclosing requirement verification for Section 5.4 performed in accordance with Chapter 8, Checklists. Statement disclosing safety verifications performed: safety analyses, environmental analyses, tests (as specified in FSD 0112, 0212, 0213 and 0214). Statement disclosing the quality plan for the object. Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of the relevant documentation shall be submitted. Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three weeks prior to review of the object. Advisory Group for Explosives
3.6.4.1.2
3.6.4.1.2.1 Tasks
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of explosives. The advisory group operates in the following areas: selection of explosive, testing of explosive, classification of explosive (UN code and Transport and Storage codes), production methods for the explosive, compatibility. Advice may inter alia concern: action to be taken with existing explosives and explosives undergoing development, project specifications and technical documentation.
46
Methodology 3
To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for explosives (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above. To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning explosives to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies.
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and FSD 0214 shall constitute the basis for advisory group assessments. When presenting a submission to the Advisory Group for Explosives concerning the recommendation of Transport and Storage codes and UN code the special aspects that are of importance to transport and storage shall be elucidated. Scope of report: Brief general information about the object: field of application, weapon platform, weapon (or equivalent), Description of the object concerning: design (drawings, diagrams and possible model), function, data on all explosives, pyrotechnic compositions, and other active substances incorporated in the object. Weights and compositions shall be disclosed and adequate denominations shall be used, i.e. not so-called brand names. If new explosives are used they shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214, compatibility analyses performed concerning the compatibility of the various components incorporated with the explosives or pyrotechnic compositions, as well as the compatibility of the various explosives and pyrotechnic compositions with each other and with the surrounding fabrication material, fuzing system with safety devices and arming conditions (advice from submission to the Advisory Group for Fuzes, including an account of the risk for copper azide formation resulting from the presence of materials with copper content and lead azide), anti-humidity protection, electrical screening.
47
3 Methodology
Packaging: design, location of the object in the packaging, total quantities of explosives etc., total weight, anti-humidity protection. Testing of ammunition: mandatory testing must always be performed as specified in FSD 0060 and shall be disclosed, provided no comparison can be made with a similar object that has undergone such testing, all informative testing performed that can provide information concerning the sensitivity of the ammunition shall be disclosed, such as: fragment impact (FSD 0121), small arms bullet attack (FSD 0117), bump (FSD 0113), shock (FSD 0114), cook-off (FSD 0166). Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices
3.6.4.1.3
3.6.4.1.3.1 Tasks
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of launchers, propulsion devices and warheads. The advisory group shall be able to operate in the following areas: launchers and propulsion devices, structural strength, wear in launchers, materials, design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices, compatibility. Advice can inter alia relate to: action to be taken concerning existing weapons, launchers and warheads or suchlike that are undergoing development, project specifications and technical documentation. To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for launchers, propulsion devices and warheads (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above.
48
Methodology 3
To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience acquired concerning launchers, propulsion devices and warheads to FMV departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies.
Members present in the advisory group may vary according to which of the groups sectors of expertise is relevant to the advice sought. The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisory group assessments. Scope of report: Brief general information about the object: field of application, weapon platform, weapon (or equivalent). A detailed review of the launchers or propulsion devices and warheads: Launchers or propulsion devices, structural strength, wear in launchers, materials, design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices. compatibility. Statement disclosing safety analyses performed. Statement disclosing safety testing, design type testing and other safety testing performed (as specified in FSD 0060). Statement disclosing verification of requirements for Section 5.2 and 5.3 performed in accordance with Chapter 8, Checklists. Review of proposals for technical requirement specifications. Review of the quality plan for the object. Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of relevant documentation shall be submitted. Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three weeks prior to review of the object.
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3 Methodology
3.7 3.7.1
Safety testing Purpose
In combination with the safety analysis to constitute a verication of the safety requirements for the product.
3.7.2
Responsibility
P1: The manufacturer. P3: FMV.
3.7.3
Time frame
P1: During verication. P3: During review of existing materiel.
3.7.4
Safety testing is a comprehensive and extensive activity, see Figure 3.2. The purpose of safety testing embraces three areas: It is one of several methods for verifying that safety requirements are met (analysis, inspection, etc. are others). Example: 3-metre drop test to demonstrate resistance to an environmental condition. It is a method of generating input data for the safety analyses that are used to verify other safety requirements. Example: Testing to find out what happens with an incorrectly fitted spring in a fuzing system when that system falls from a truck platform, so-called FMEA testing.
50
Methodology 3
It is a method for providing the authorities with decision data for qualification/classification. Example: Fuel fire test and 12-metre drop test to provide data for classification of ammunition according to UN and Transport and Storage coding by the Advisory Group for Explosives / SI.
Verification
Testing:
5 m drop arming
FMEA-testing
Testing of defective units
Qualification
Classification:
12 m drop fuel fire test
distance Analysis Inspection
FSD 0060 FSD 0213
Figure 3.2 Example of scope of safety testing Safety testing as specied in FSD 0060 shall always be performed. FSD 0060 contains a section that denes extreme environments, how high and low temperature sequences shall be dimensioned, and a section on the testing of insensitive munitions (IM), as well as testing in accordance with UN regulations for the classication of explosive goods. If ammunition incorporates a fuzing system, FSD 0213 shall also be applied. If ammunition incorporates an electric igniter, FSD 0112 and FSD 0212 shall be applied. Since all ammunition contains explosive in some form, FSD 0214 shall also be applied.
51
3 Methodology
Environmental resistance
Env Engineering Manual Separate testing -FSD -FSD Sequential testing
UNAbnormal environment classification IMHot sequential testing Cold sequential
FSD 0060
FSD 0213
Fuze systems
FSD 0212
EED in systems
FSD 0214
FSD 0112
EEDs
3
3.8 3.8.1
Explosives
Figure 3.3 Safety testing for qualification
Test directives for safety surveillance Purpose
To produce test directives for safety surveillance. This is the documentation that enables surveillance of ammunition in depot storage to obtain data to decide whether the ammunition is still safe to use. Safety surveillance constitutes part of the overall in-service surveillance of ammunition.
3.8.2
P1: FMV. P2: FMV.
Responsibility
52
Methodology 3
3.8.3
Time frame
P1: During the development phase. P2: When acquisition is necessary.
3.8.4
The basis for test directives should contain the following parts: description of the product, applicable documents (references), product requirements, method of implementation, criteria for assessment of results, formulation of the results in the documentation, allocation of undertakings between FMV and possible suppliers.
The method for safety inspection is based on the concept that assessment is a comparison between the characteristics of ageing ammunition and the equivalent characteristics of newly manufactured, safety approved or newly developed ammunition. The need for comparative data for newly developed ammunition thus places an equivalent requirement on development operations to generate zero values by such means as so-called shelf life testing. For further information refer to the FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition.
3.9
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) Purpose
3.9.1
To provide a basis for the handling and storage regulations that contribute to reducing the remaining risks of the weapon system to a tolerable level.
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3 Methodology
3.9.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV and the Armed Forces. P2: FMV and the Armed Forces.
3.9.3
Time frame
P1: During the development phase. P2: When acquisition is necessary.
3.9.4
3.9.4.1
Background
A basis for handling and storage regulations shall be produced at an early stage in the materiel development process. An integral part of development together with representatives from the Armed Forces shall be to develop a product that meets the requirements stipulated by the Armed Forces concerning handling in peacetime and wartime. The handling and storage regulations produced by FMV in collaboration with the Armed Forces during development subsequently constitute the basis for the item headed Restrictions in the FMV Safety Statement (SS). The restrictions in Section 4 of the Safety Statement are issued by the Armed Forces and FMV in accordance with the regulations stated in the Manual Governing Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids (H PubL), and is regulated under Chapter 6 Co-ordination with other authorities etc..
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Methodology 3
3.9.4.2
Subdivision of materiel publications
The following table is reproduced from the Manual for Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids, 1996, where it is published as Table 6:1. It illustrates the co-ordination between publications from Armed Forces headquarters and materiel publications from FMV regarding content and denomination.
Table 3:2 Publications overview
Content Armed Forces HQ publications Materiel publications from FMV
Solely directives = compulsory Diverse directives, guidelines, etc. = compulsory or advisory Solely information / elucidation
- Instructions - Manuals - Regulations - Manuals - Regulations
- Technical orders - Materiel instructions - Technical orders (some) - Materiel manuals - Materiel charts - Technical orders (some) - Materiel manuals - Materiel charts
The work of producing and allocating information between the various publications should always be co-ordinated between FMV and the Armed Forces.
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4
4.1 4.1.1
WEAPONS
General Purpose
In addition to pure ammunition safety and the safety of weapons and launchers, safety also encompasses the interaction between weapons and ammunition. If any of these constituent parts is modied or developed further, or a completely new weapon system is developed or acquired, the interfaces must be given careful consideration. The purpose of this chapter is to: identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered and verified when developing and acquiring a weapon system, identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered during development of ammunition, make proposals for the specification of such interfaces between weapons and ammunition.
4.1.2
Structure of chapter
This chapter is subdivided into two main parts. One part deals with common requirements that apply independent of the type of weapon, and the second part called system requirements also includes a number of other requirements. The system requirements part is subdivided as follows: launchers, pylons and dispensers, weapon platforms, hatches and doors, sighting and laying systems, guidance systems and miscellaneous. Ammunition specic requirements concerning warheads, propulsion devices, fuzing systems and packagings are not discussed in this chapter but are dealt with in Chapter 5, Ammunition.
4.1.3
Purpose of the requirements
Where safety to personnel, property and the environment is concerned, the purpose throughout of the requirements formulated is to ensure: safe handling during transport and deployment,
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safety inside and around the weapon during loading or taking onboard, unloading of the weapon, while the unit is loaded and during firing or weapon release, safety outside the specified danger area, safety during training, exercises, repair and maintenance, safety during disposal.
4.1.4
Risks and system safety
Besides freedom from malfunction in the weapon and ammunition, safety is also dependent on the interface between them and the interfaces between the system and the environment and the application (use) for which it is intended. For example, a gun may be part of a battery with other guns that have different re missions and thus different natures of ammunition that should preferably not require different safety instructions concerning use. There may also be requirements for several natures of ammunition to be usable in the same launcher without any necessity for changes such as barrel replacement. One type of launcher and one nature of ammunition can also be intended for different weapon platforms such as vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels. It is therefore crucial that ammunition is developed with due consideration given to all the applicable applications, and that the characteristics that are decisive for safety in a specic application are documented. As more specialized functions are incorporated in ammunition such as proximity fuzes, terminal guidance, and the various advanced guidance systems used in guided weapons increasingly comprehensive safety programs and documentation will be needed.
58
Hazard overview
Arming range(delay)
Safety distance(times)
Transport and loading safety Safe separation distance Mask safety
In-flight safety
rain safety resistance to electromagnetic bush safety
Bore and muzzle safety
Exempel p riskfaktorer
Figure 4.1 Overview of weapon phases and risk factors

Fragmentation Sabots/driving band function Base bleed container Mussle brake Muzzle flash
Examples of hazards factors
Mechanical ammunition handling Loading Unloading Flare-back (propellant combustion) Abnormal handling
Sound pressure Pressure Recoil Max impulse (gun strength) Wear Cook-off Sub-calibre barrel Hazardous initiation Backblast Dynamic interaction Rocket flare
Trajectory instability Fragmentation
Fuze setting Aiming and firing limitation
Weapons 4
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4 Weapons
Figure 4.1 shows which risks may need to be evaluated for various types of weapons and in which phase damage/injury may arise. The gure does not claim to be exhaustive for all applications.
4.2
Common requirements
Requirements that are independent of weapon type or are similar for several types of weapons are discussed below. For information concerning requirements that are common to all materiel refer to Chapter 2, Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel.
4.2.1
Requirements of International Law
The weapons related requirements specied below are stated for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the requirements of International Law. For references refer to Chapter 7, References. 1.42001 1.42002 Booby traps that look like civilian utility goods, or are marked with internationally recognized safety emblems, shall not be fabricated. Laser weapons mainly for use against people (anti-personnel laser weapons) shall not be fabricated. Weapons that have deliberately been made toxic in order to harm people shall not be fabricated. Incendiary weapons that have a non-discriminatory effect, or are mainly intended for anti-personnel use, shall not be fabricated. Weapons that are difcult to aim at a specific target shall not be fabricated. Comment: This requirement applies mainly to carpet bombs. Weapons that may cause extensive, long-term, severe damage to the natural environment shall not be fabricated.
1.42003 1.42004 1.42005
1.42006
4.2.2
General requirements
The handling of an uncocked weapon unit shall be tolerably safe both when the unit is separated from, and is mounted on, the weapon platform. This condition shall also apply during transport in all operational environments.
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During an exercise a loaded weapon shall be safe for the personnel operating it and for its surroundings. It shall not be possible for the weapon to be inadvertently red during a simulated attack and thereby cause damage to the weapon platform or its surroundings including simulated targets (which may be living or articial targets). During combat the weapon shall be tolerably safe for personnel operating it. Arming of the ammunition should occur at a safe distance from the weapon platform, but also sufciently early to enable effect in target at short ranges. In certain cases the shell (missile) shall self-destruct. 4.2.2.1 Danger area
When ring or testing involves explosive materiel the danger area must be calculated and closed off to prevent damage to property and injury to personnel. Consideration must be given to the type of trials to be performed. Firing with sub-calibre anti-armour projectiles may result in a projectile ying several kilometres. Guided ammunition, if a malfunction occurs, may deviate considerably from its intended ight path, etc. Even damage/injury caused by fragmentation, toxic gases, backblast and blast pressure must be taken into consideration. The danger area near the weapon, arising from movement of the weapon for example, must also be considered. Figure 4.2 shows an example of the danger areas around a weapon and in the ring zone. The size of danger areas is affected inter alia by the characteristics of the ammunition.
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Danger area boundary
Firing zone
Figure 4.2 Example of danger areas 1.42007 On the basis of analysis and testing an assessment of the danger area for all current combinations of weapons, ammunition, and firing procedures shall be performed. Comment: Refer also to the relevant hazard factor, e.g. blast pressure, fragmentation, toxic substances. Safety of friendly forces
4.2.2.2
Before a Safety Release is issued the weapon system must be evaluated to ensure that it can be operated without risk of injury to personnel or damage to materiel, and without risk to the general public as a result of inadequate safety instructions concerning malfunctions when ring. The prociency required to operate the weapon, and the methods for stowage of ammunition and other
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equipment, constitute a vital part of the requirements. In general terms, the risk of a major failure or accident owing to human error can be minimized by good ergonomic design and appropriate training. For safety in extreme climates refer to Section 4.2.6 Extreme climatic conditions. 1.42008 There shall be an emergency stop for laying and firing when the ordinary stop function is not sufficient to prevent injury or damage to property. Comment: Cf. standard SS-EN 418 also. The emergency stop for laying and firing should operate in such a way that the energy source is disconnected. The emergency stop for laying and firing should be located as close to the energy source as possible. Comment: When testing the weapon it should be possible for an observer to operate the emergency stop manually. It shall be possible to unload a propelling charge that has not functioned. It shall be possible to remove empty cartridge cases, missile launch tubes, etc. It should be possible to manually override automatic functions. It shall be possible to mount and remove equipment at the incline angles specified for the weapon platform. It shall be possible for a member of the crew to wear specied equipment while at his operator station. Comment: Such equipment may comprise personal protective clothing such as gloves, helmet, eye protectors (e.g. protective mask, anti-laser goggles) and NBC protective clothing. Monitors/VDUs shall be adapted to enable them to be read with existing illumination, even outdoors in direct sunlight or in darkness, if the application so demands. Symbols/texts on switches and other controls shall be legible and unambiguous in accordance with applicable standards. In weapon systems where several operators can fire the weapon it shall be possible for each operator to disarm the weapon independently.
1.42009 1.42010
1.42011 1.42012 1.42013 1.42014 1.42015
1.42016
1.42017 1.42018
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1.42019 1.42020
Where necessary footholds shall be fitted with appropriate anti-slip surfaces. Locking devices shall be incorporated to secure heavy hatches and doors in open position (see also requirements under the heading Weapon platforms). A ventilation, heating and air conditioning system should be incorporated if applicable. The safe separation distance shall be determined for all relevant ammunition in the most unfavourable firing conditions. Any protective features on the weapon shall be taken into consideration, cf. requirement 1.51024. Comment: Refer also to other hazard factors and hazards such as blast pressure, fragmentation and toxic substances.
1.42021 1.42022
4.2.3
Toxic substances
Substances produced by propelling charges during ring are classied as toxic when their concentration in the air exceeds certain levels. These toxic substances include inter alia metals, ammonia, carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen. Propelling charge cases may emit toxic substances even after ring.
Carbon monoxide (CO) commonly occurs and is dangerous since it is odourless and colourless, and can cause death. Typical symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning are headache, nausea, blurred vision, giddiness, extreme lethargy and unconsciousness. Normally, oxygen from the lungs is transported through the body by the haemoglobin in the blood. Carbon monoxide binds with the haemoglobin and thereby reduces the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. The bonding capability of carbon monoxide to the blood can be 300 times greater than that of oxygen. Carbon monoxide is removed solely through the lungs. The rate at which carbon monoxide is eliminated from the blood declines exponentially and relatively slowly. The half-life time of carbon monoxide in the blood can be as high as 4 hours for a healthy person in an environment free from contaminants. Ammonia (NH3) is generated by the combustion of ammunition propellants. Exposure to ammonia primarily affects the respiratory tract and the eyes. At concentrations of 50100 ppm most people experience a moderate degree of eye, nose and throat irritation.
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Nitrogen oxides are also generated during ring. The predominant components are nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Nitric oxide has been reported to cause unconsciousness in laboratory animals exposed to concentrations greater than 2 500 ppm. Nitric oxide itself has no irritant properties but is frequently oxidised in air to form nitrogen dioxide. At concentrations below 50 ppm the conversion of nitrogen oxide to nitrogen dioxide is slow. Nitrogen dioxide is more dangerous than nitrogen oxide, and causes irritation of the eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Short exposures to 5 ppm may cause coughing and shortness of breath. Exposure to concentrations of 50100 ppm may cause death or chronic respiratory problems. Lead (Pb) can be absorbed into the body from inhaling nely divided particles. Propelling charges and small calibre ammunition contain certain quantities of lead. The lead is vaporised as the charge burns. Combustion gases containing lead either escape via the barrel or enter the crew compartment, and also occur when small calibre ammunition hits the target. The permissible exposure limit to lead has been set at 0.05 mg per cubic metre of air as a mean average over an 8hour exposure. Despite ventilation systems, toxic gases and particles can be a major threat to personnel working in the enclosed connes of a combat vehicle for example. Neither shall toxic gases be ignored in the case of towed or other materiel. Toxic substances, even in small concentrations, can affect or degenerate personnel capability. A number of factors affect the level of concentration of toxic substances at the crew stations, such as: the rate of fire, the chemical composition of the propellant, the efficiency of the fume extractor if fitted, the internal ballistics, nature and weight of the propelling charge. (The fume extractor, if fitted, is usually less efficient with low charges), materials used in the ammunition (e.g. beryllium alloys), the efficiency of the ventilation system such as the NBC ventilation system, leakage in the breech mechanism, the volume of the cartridge case, wind velocity and direction, whether firing takes place with hatches open or closed, which of the weapons is fired, overpressure in the crew compartment.
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Comment: Limit values are specied in AFS 1996:2, Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health. Ozone depleting substances as specied in the Montreal protocol must not be used. The parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer shall be mindful of their obligation under that convention to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against activities that may affect the ozone layer. 1.42023 1.42024 The concentration of toxic substances shall be less than the permissible values stated in AFS 1996:2. Requirement 1.42023 shall be veried in the most unfavourable firing conditions and in field conditions.
4.2.4
Electrical and magnetic fields
An electrical ring circuit may be subjected to radiated or conducted electrical interference generated by the weapon system in which it is incorporated, and to radiated interference generated by external sources, especially radio and radar transmitters. Firing and fuzing systems containing electric igniters may be particularly susceptible to such interference. Communication with the ammunition is also a sensitive function. Angle sensors, conditions for arming, and control of status are other functions that can be affected and lead to a hazardous event. If the interference level exceeds the specied test level, inadvertent ring may occur. Fuzing systems employing percussion caps and a striker actuated by a heavy-duty solenoid are less likely to be adversely affected, and probably do not need to be tested in this respect. However, if the solenoid is controlled by any form of electronics or sensitive relays, such a concept may be just as susceptible as an electrical ring circuit and consequently needs to be analysed and tested. Electrical switching operations may cause transient interference in the weapon system. Onboard radio transmitters and other electrical equipment may constitute an internal source of interference, particularly if electromagnetic screening is inadequate. External interference may emanate from airborne or groundbased radar and radio transmitters operating in the vicinity. Special measures may need to be taken to protect the weapon system against electrostatic discharge (ESD), high-power microwave radiation (HPM), and against the electromagnetic pulse that arises in conjunction with lightning (LEMP) or when a nuclear charge detonates (NEMP).
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1.42025 1.42026 1.42027
The susceptibility of electrical circuits to interference shall be analysed with regard to safety. The susceptibility of safety critical electrical circuits to electrical interference shall be determined. The levels of electrical and magnetic elds to which the crew and equipment are subjected shall be determined.
Refer also to Section 4.3.1.2.3 Firing mechanisms.
4.2.5
Water and moisture resistance
Water and moisture affect mechanical, optical and electrical functions. Drainage of electrical and optical boxes, for example, is often necessary. Changes in temperature during storage can cause condensation on surfaces with a subsequent risk of moisture damage and corrosion, for example. 1.42028 1.42029 The weapon system should not incorporate undrainable channels. The weapon system should be tested while subjected to water spraying and during fording through water.
4.2.6
Extreme climatic conditions
The safety of the overall system with all its functions shall be veried at the extremes of temperature stated in the specication for the system. It is also necessary to verify that the crew can operate the weapon system at these temperatures. It is not sufcient solely to test the system at extreme temperatures. Tests must be conducted in the eld where extreme temperatures combined with the terrain provide adverse conditions including combinations of sand, dust, mud, snow, rain, humidity and ice. To ensure that the crew can full their duties in extreme high and low temperatures in eld conditions, the following requirements shall be met: 1.42030 The weapon should be designed so that personal protective clothing and other equipment worn by operators does not affect their operation of the weapon. The system should be equipped with facilities that provide a good work environment even in extreme temperature conditions.
1.42031
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4.2.7
Fire
All constituent parts of a weapon system and natures of ammunition may be subjected to re owing to accidents or combat action. For this reason it is essential that the materiel is resistant to re to a certain degree. Because of the various types of materiel, range of applications, and variations in other circumstances at the time of re, it is difcult to standardize a comprehensive re test. Any re of major scale generates temperatures in excess of 800C. Fire-resistant materiel must thus resist such a temperature for a certain prescribed time without inadvertent initiation of propelling charges or warheads, and in some cases the materiel shall still be usable after the specied re exposure time. Even with res at lower temperatures, large quantities of toxic gases can be formed. Fire tests can be subdivided and dened as follows: The purpose of material tests is to determine the properties of materials when exposed to fire. System tests often consist of operational tests in which the weapon system or ammunition are subjected to a fire scenario determined by the authorities. The purpose of safety tests is to determine the characteristics of the weapon and ammunition when exposed to fire or an explosive atmosphere from the point of view of the crew and materiel safety. The following characteristics are pertinent: resistance to fire with retained function, the risk for explosion or ignition during fire, the occurrence of toxic or corrosive gases during fire, hazards in an explosive atmosphere.
For information concerning re-ghting refer to Section 4.3.7.3 Fire-ghting equipment. Additional requirements concerning the resistance of ammunition to re are stated in Chapter 5, Ammunition. The requirements shall ensure the safety of the crew during re in the weapon or ammunition, and during re in the crew compartments and ammunition stowage compartment. Testing can be performed as specied in FSD 0165. 1.42032 In the event of fire in a weapon platform or in materiel (ammunition or other materiel) stowed in a confined space the crew should be protected by specific material design measures and/or escape routes.
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4.2.8
Blast pressure
The impact pressure of the air set in motion by an explosion called blast pressure that arises when a gun is red can impair hearing and also injure other organs in the body. Very high pressure, such as close to the muzzle of a highenergy weapon, can be immediately fatal. The blast pressure pattern inside and outside the troop transport compartment can be complex and necessitates trials under eld conditions. Blast pressure levels should also be measured around the vehicle/materiel to enable an assessment of the hazard to troops operating in the immediate vicinity of the materiel. 1.42033 The blast pressure level shall be determined for the personnel concerned. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Bow-wave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account. Comment: Recoilless systems shall be designed so that there is no harmful interference between the blast pressure in the muzzle and venturi. The effect of the terrain (the surroundings) shall also be taken into account. When verifying blast pressure characteristics, the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 should be used. The number of impulse blasts (rounds fired) to which the crew may be exposed during a given period of time shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions for the system. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Bowwave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account. Any protective devices and the location of the crew relative to the launcher shall be stated in the Safety Restrictions.
1.42034 1.42035
1.42036
4.2.9
Backblast
The backblast is a rearwards directed jet of (hot) propellant gas that exits a recoil weapon via the muzzle brake and from a recoilless weapon via the rear opening during ring. Backblast can contain fragments and particles from the ground. 1.43037 The backblast (propellant gases) from the muzzle brake or equivalent shall not have such high particle and energy content that it can cause injury to personnel or damage to materiel outside the specified danger area. Requirement 1.43037 shall be veried by calculation and testing.
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1.43038
4 Weapons
4.2.10
Vibration dose
During ring each individual crew member is subjected to a dose of vibration. By establishing a vibration dose value (VDV) a limit can be set for each individual crew member. VDV is a measurement of the total vibration to which a crew member may be exposed during a specic period of time. The value gives a general indication of the associated discomfort and risk of injury. VDV is calculated from data obtained from trials. From these results the number of rounds that may be red before the VDV level is reached is calculated for various angles of elevation and traverse. 1.42039 Crew members shall not be exposed to a harmful vibration dose. Comment: A common requirement for exposure to body vibration is stated in ISO 2631, ISO 5349 and SEN 580110.
4.2.11
Pressure
When projectiles are red the launcher and projectile are subjected to an internal ballistic gas pressure. If this pressure in any section of the barrel exceeds the structural strength of the structure, there is a risk that the barrel may rupture and cause serious injury. During the design phase it must also be ensured that other components than the barrel that are subjected to pressure, such as the breech block and mechanism, can also withstand the loads involved. If the internal ballistic gas pressure exceeds the structural strength of the projectile there is a risk of barrel rupture, which is why the projectile must also withstand the internal ballistic pressure. 1.42040 When determining dimensions and design of the barrel, breech mechanism and other parts exposed to pressure, the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 or equivalent standard shall be applied.
4.2.12
4.2.12.1
Forces
General
This section contains general guidelines for forces in the form of springs, hydraulic pressure or similar that in the event of a failure/malfunction can be released and cause injury (e.g. from impact and/or crushing by moving parts).
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In many cases it is impossible to determine whether a spring, hydraulic system, etc. contains stored energy. This should be taken into account during service, maintenance and disposal. 4.2.12.2 Requirements
4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical) Many constructions contain spring forces such as: drive springs in loading trays, drive springs in ammunition magazines, brake parts (like parking brakes, etc.), balance springs, operating springs in breech mechanisms.
During recoil in a recoil system, drive springs for the ramming motion of the loading tray, for example, can be cocked. The energy stored constitutes a hazard which, when inadvertently released, can result in death or serious injury. When personnel must be present inside a danger area, for unloading or cocking the breech block before the rst round for example, the personnel entering the danger area shall ensure that the designated safety devices are engaged. It is important that the analysis gives special consideration to the status of springs incorporated with regard to stored energy in the event that ring is interrupted. Springs in a breech mechanism shall be given particular consideration during the safety analysis, since failure modes in these design elements can have critical consequences. When the attachment elements of a spring may constitute a more frequent hazard than the spring itself, such attachment elements shall be integrated into the safety analysis. 1.42041 1.42042 Spring forces that alone, or in combination with other hazards, can result in an accident shall be analysed. Spring forces that can cause an accident shall either be provided with double locking devices or anti-handling devices that prevent inadvertent release of the spring forces.
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1.42043
Any spring that constitutes a component in a locking device which, in the event of malfunction, can cause injury shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterized. Fastening elements shall be analysed with regard to failure modes and shall be characterised together with the spring. The characteristics as specified in requirements 1.42043 and 1.42044 shall not be modified between inspection intervals for preventive maintenance such that safety is degraded. Springs and their attachment elements that can affect safety shall be located in a protected position in such a way that inadvertent contact by personnel or the environment around the system does not degrade their safety. Springs and their attachment elements that can cause a serious injury in the event of a malfunction should have a duplicate (redundancy) function or have a fail-safe function.
1.42044 1.42045
1.42046
1.42047
4.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics Hydraulic pressure (and even pneumatic pressure) during operation, or accumulated hydraulic pressure after operation, can result in hazardous events. Hydraulic pressure can also constitute a hazard via its consumers (hydraulic cylinders, motors, hoses, etc.).
1.42048
Accumulated pressure shall be monitored and equipped with a device for pressure equalization if inadvertent actuation of any consumer in the system can lead to injury during operation, unloading and/or maintenance. Monitoring as specified in requirement 1.42048 should be duplicated (instrument and control lamp) or have a fail-safe function. Hydraulic hoses and hydraulic components should be located outside crew compartments in confined spaces. Hydraulic uid should be prevented from penetrating into crew compartments.
1.42049 1.42050 1.42051
4.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces Recoil forces exist both in recoilless and recoil systems. The term recoilless system is a qualied truth there is no absolutely recoilless system. Instead, the recoil is generally so small that it does not entail any potential risk for accidents.
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Recoilless systems exist inter alia as manportable anti-armour weapons (such as the Carl-Gustaf system) or as anti-armour guns of various types. In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the gas ow through the open rear end of the barrel which is equipped with a nozzle/venturi. The recoil forces can be inuenced by variations in the geometry of the nozzle/venturi. In manportable recoilless systems the recoil could result in excessive recoil forces on the gunners shoulder and/or cause the sight to hit his eye. In cases where a recoilless system is red from the shoulder, the recoil can be experienced differently by different gunners even though the recoil is of equal magnitude (i.e. the same energy). 1.42052 The danger area around the recoil system shall be determined and stated in the Safety Restrictions. Comment: The actions of the gun crew in all situations (emergency firing, unloading, etc.) shall be taken into account. If it is conceivable that overpressure can arise in the recoil buffer and recuperator and constitute a hazard, they shall be equipped with a device for relieving the pressure before disassembly. The recoil forces in a recoilless system shall be established by calculation and testing.
1.42053
1.42054
4.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements Some examples of parts in a weapon system that can cause serious injuries are: loading trays during ramming, empty cartridge cases that are ejected, axles/shafts and other rotating parts. Rotating and other moving parts shall be located so as to minimise the risk of injury. Comment: This requirement can be satisfied by the provision of guards or by preventing the presence of personnel inside the danger area. It shall not be possible for loading devices to be controlled by anyone other than the person performing the loading. Personnel shall be protected against the ejection of empty cartridge cases.
1.42055
1.42056 1.42057
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4.2.13
Lasers
Laser beams can cause burns and total or partial blindness. A laser beam directed at the skin can cause burns and is also considered to be able to cause small blood clots. Lasers can even cause injuries at long distances from the laser source depending on the type of laser, power density and the frequency of repetition. It is particularly dangerous if binoculars or optical sighting devices etc. are being used. Occupational activities involving the use of a laser are subject to employer liability in accordance with current legislation and regulations. The overall publication applying to the use of lasers is the Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Board for Occupational Safety and Health (AFS). Lasers are subdivided into a number of classes according to type and output power. Regulations governing classication are stated in IEC 60825-1. 1.42058 It should not be possible to activate lasers of range-finder type in an arbitrary direction. Comment: This requirement can be satisfied by linking the laser to the barrel or equivalent. Lasers should be equipped with safety circuits for use in training mode. Lasers should be equipped with safety covers and locking devices. It should not be possible to look into the laser outlet optic when used in the normal way. Lasers shall be equipped with warning signs. Sights, prism windows etc. should either have built-in laser protection lters or be designed in a way that allows the operator to wear anti-laser goggles.
1.42059
1.42060 1.42061 1.42062 1.42063
4.2.14
Stability mechanical
The stability of a weapon system during ring is affected by the following main factors: trunnion forces and height above the trunnion, the angle of elevation, the weight and the location of the centre of mass of the weapon system,
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the longitudinal axis of the weapon system relative to the direction of fire, the incline and type of surface that the system stands on, the effectiveness of brakes and suspension, whether or not spades are fitted to restrain motion during firing.
Stability during ring shall be veried. The safety of the crew shall also be analysed. 1.42064 Motion of the chassis, platform, controls, eye-piece or launcher shall be so minimal that no danger to personnel nor damage to ammunition or materiel occurs. Open (or closed) doors or hatches shall remain secured. The weapon or weapon platform shall retain ammunition and stowed materiel in their designated places during operational use.
1.42065 1.42066
4.2.15
4.2.15.1
Transport
General
Despite comprehensive testing in simulated environments it has long been recognized that it is necessary to transport ammunition stowed in combat vehicles and self-propelled guns for long distances in a manner specied by regulations, and then subsequently to test re the ammunition to verify its function. Although simulation methods have been improved the need for practical trials remains. In the case of a combat vehicle that uses separated ammunition that is rammed into the barrel, vehicle motion may cause a projectile to fall back against the propelling charge. If this should happen, damage may be caused to the barrel when the gun is red. The risk of projectile fall-back should be evaluated through transport resistance testing. In addition, transport resistance testing should be performed whenever: new ammunition is introduced into an existing weapon system, ammunition stowage arrangements are altered, the vehicle is equipped with newly modified tyres, tracks or suspension system, the vehicle is used in a new environment involving more severe environmental stresses for the ammunition.
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4.2.15.2
Requirements
4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back If the weapon is designed to re separated ammunition (separate propelling charges) and is required to be kept loaded during transport mode, requirements to ensure that the projectile does not fall back from rammed position shall be stated. 1.42067 During driving in terrain in accordance with specified conditions the ammunition should not fall back from the rammed position. Comment: This requirement should be verified by testing with a barrel that has 50% or less of its service life remaining in respect of wear. The system should withstand rounds being fired with ammunition that is not rammed in a correct manner (i.e. in fall-back position). Comment: Gas leakage around the ammunition can damage both the ammunition and the barrel.
1.42068
4.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects 1.42069 The method for stowing ammunition in racks and bins in various stowage locations shall be dimensioned so that the ammunition after transport and redeployment does not constitute a hazard to the crew.
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4.3 4.3.1
System requirements Launchers
Figure 4.3 Examples of launchers 4.3.1.1 Weapon installation
During development it is necessary to verify the structural strength and integrity of the weapon installation. Verication can be by means of calculation and/or testing. In the case of testing an initial functional inspection shall be performed without ring. Next, strain gauges are tted at critical locations to measure the stresses and inner ballistic
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pressures during ring. A number of rounds are then red to produce the stresses and internal ballistic pressures. Finally, the fatigue limits for the installation are estimated through calculations and rings or laboratory trials. Preparation systems and guidance systems must not render the weapon dangerous in the event of any malfunction. Incorrect ring data must not occur during temporary malfunctions in the weapon system computers, electrical or hydraulic systems, or guidance systems, that could enable a hazard ring. 1.43001 Launchers controlled by electronics shall have such an interface with safety functions that malfunctions, or bugs in software for example, do not affect safety in any crucial way. Comment: By differentiating in the design between electronics designed to control safety functions and electronics designed for other functions, a better interface is obtained. Clearance between the elevating mass and other parts at maximum recoil within the entire laying range in traverse and elevation shall be sufficient to prevent damage to the system. Safety devices should be fitted to prevent crew members from inserting limbs into spaces containing moving system parts (range of movement of the recoil system, etc.). Comment: The minimum requirement is that the danger zone must be marked out. Recoil systems General
1.43002
1.43003
4
4.3.1.2 4.3.1.2.1
Besides the movement of recoil, recoil systems are characterised inter alia by high internal ballistic gas pressures and high combustion temperatures. The often high rate of re rapidly results in a high temperature on the inside of the barrel. Automatic handling of ammunition and automatic ramming are common. Often several natures of ammunition shall be red in one and the same gun system. Most modern weapons of large calibre have hydro-pneumatic or hydro-mechanical mechanisms to assimilate recoil forces and to return the system to initial position. Ried guns also generate a torque acting on the gun when spin is imparted to the projectile. Many weapon systems have a muzzle brake tted to the barrel to reduce the force of recoil. For any given design of weapon and type of ammunition, the forces acting on the elevating mass vary according to angle
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Weapons 4
of elevation, the temperature of the propellant, and the temperature of the recoil system. Consequently, during trials the recoil system shall be red at the extremes of temperature and pressure that are expected in the eld and at maximum laying angles. Large calibre weapons that have semi-automatic breech mechanisms can utilize the recoil energy to open the breech on run-out. Under certain conditions the recoil energy becomes so reduced that it is insufcient to open the breech. The worst situation with the recoil system often occurs when ring the lowest propelling charge (or when ring the ammunition that produces the lowest trunnion force) at the lowest ring temperature. Semi-automatic systems must be tested by ring under various combinations of these conditions. 4.3.1.2.2 Breech mechanisms
There are several types of breech mechanism such as screw type with sectored threads, a wedge-shaped transverse block or back-piece. 1.43004 It shall be possible to operate the breech mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system to prevent injury to crew members by crushing. When the breech mechanism is fully closed it shall be locked in the closed position. The breech mechanism shall not open as a result of vibration caused by firing or motion/transport. It should not be possible to assemble any component of the breech assembly in an incorrect manner that could cause injury/damage. When the breech mechanism is operated automatically the ring mechanism shall automatically become inactive before the breech mechanism is released from its locked position. It shall be possible to indicate or observe the status of the breech mechanism. It shall not be possible to re the weapon if the breech mechanism is not fully closed. Firing mechanisms
1.43005 1.43006 1.43007 1.43008
1.43009 1.43010 4.3.1.2.3
The ring mechanism initiates the propelling charge via a cannon primer or cartridge. This is either an integral part of the cartridge case or a separate cartridge. The ring mechanism is also the means by which the ring of the weapon is controlled, and is therefore of crucial importance for the interface between the crew and the weapon. There are several types of ring mechanism:
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Percussion. In this type a metal firing pin strikes the primer of the cannon primer or cartridge causing it to produce a flash which ignites the propelling charge. The firing pin is actuated by the release of a spring mechanism, either manually or by a mechanical or electrical device. Electric. In this type the primer is located in the artillery primer. The electroexplosive device (EED) in the artillery primer contains a priming composition. Laser. This type uses a laser whose output power is dimensioned to initiate the propelling charge. It shall be possible to safe the ring mechanism from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system. The weapon shall be red by an active operation from outside the zone of motion of the recoil system If an electromechanical device is used it shall be protected from the effects of radiated or conducted interference that could cause inadvertent initiation. If a ring button, pedal, lever or similar is employed it shall be provided with protection against inadvertent operation such as by a trigger guard. If a ring mechanism is employed to release a firing pin it shall be designed to withstand vibration and shocks. The ring mechanism shall be resistant to shock from other weapons mounted in the vicinity. Electrical firing systems shall be resistant to radiated or conducted interference generated by other electrical installations on the weapon, or from moderate external sources of interference (radio, radar, etc.) without resulting in hazard initiation. The electrical connector of the firing mechanism should not come into contact with the base connector of the artillery primer until the breech block/screw is closed and locked. There should be at least two mechanical safety devices (which do not constitute any part of the firing linkage) that directly actuate the striker or the capability of the striker to fire. There shall be a separate manually operated safety interrupter that can break the electrical firing circuit. The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be located outside the zone of operation of the recoil system.
1.43011 1.43012 1.43013
1.43014
1.43015
1.43016 1.43017
1.43018
1.43019
1.43020 1.43021
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1.43022
The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be marked with actual position/mode such as S for unarmed, O for armed, and A for automatic fire. Breech ring
4.3.1.2.4
The breech ring is one of the parts in a ring system that is subjected to very high stresses. In the same way as the barrel etc. the breech ring can become fatigued. The safety analysis of the breech ring shall be based on calculation and testing. 1.43023 4.3.1.2.5 For a given load prole the life of the breech ring shall be established by calculation and material testing. Obturation
The breech mechanism shall prevent leakage of propellant gases. The choice of obturation system is dependent on design requirements such as rate of re and the size of ammunition. From the safety aspect the obturation system must function with all types of relevant charges over the entire temperature range. Leakage of hot propellant gases could severely burn members of the crew. A minor leakage could cause a rise in the concentration of toxic fumes, especially in conned spaces. It should be noted that initiation systems employing an igniter also necessitate a gas-tight solution. The same requirement should apply to any future initiation system such as laser ignition or an equivalent system. 1.43024 4.3.1.2.6 Obturation shall be designed to ensure that the crew is not exposed to either hot gases or harmful concentrations of toxic fumes. Backflash
Backash sometimes occurs in recoil systems when the breech is opened after ring. It occurs when combustion has not been completed when the breech is opened, or when combustible propellant gases are released and ignited by the supply of oxygen. The resultant ash can cause burns to crew members and constitutes a hazard for propellant charges and equipment inside the turret of a combat vehicle, for example. Backash may occur when the breech block/screw is opened during run-out. Firing into a head wind also tends to exacerbate backash. The efciency of the fume extractor, if tted, can be another contributing factor. Backash is not always detected during development trials of the propelling charge since the breech is not always opened immediately after ring in such trials. Special trials should be performed to determine whether backash might be a problem. If the problem is serious, Safety Restrictions may have to be placed on the use of certain charges or the fume extractor may need to be modied.
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1.43025 4.3.1.2.7
Backflash that can cause injury shall not occur during automatic re into a maximum head wind. Barrels and sub-calibre barrels
4.3.1.2.7.1 Barrel wear
Barrel wear is primarily caused by hot propellant gases eroding the inside of the barrel. Normally barrel wear is dened as the increase in bore diameter at a specic point in the barrel (usually at the commencement of riing). Wear reduces the efciency of obturation since it allows hot gases to pass the projectile. This leakage of hot gases can accelerate barrel wear. As wear increases the hot gases may begin to erode material from the driving band of the projectile. Eventually a level of wear is reached that results in insufcient spin being imparted to the projectile. The resultant instability of the projectile then constitutes a hazard, both in the bore and in trajectory. In a worn barrel the projectile may accelerate unguided until it engages with the riing. The resultant load may then cause the driving band to be damaged while in the barrel. 1.43026 The barrel shall not constitute any enhanced hazard (such as by imparting extra stress on ammunition or incorrect trajectory) when the ammunition in question is fired in either a new or worn barrel. Comment: A worn barrel can normally be defined as a barrel that has less than 25% of its total wear life remaining. Requirement 1.43026 shall be veried by testing.
4
1.43027
4.3.1.2.7.2 Fatigue
In most modern weapon systems the use of surface coated barrels, wear reducing material (such as titanium dioxide), and non-metallic obturating material has decreased the rate of barrel wear and has thus extended barrel life considerably. Consequently, metal fatigue rather than wear can be the determining factor when calculating the service life of a barrel as fatigue failure may occur before wear life has expired. To establish the fatigue life it is necessary to perform theoretical calculations. On the basis of this data the safe limit for fatigue failure can subsequently be established. 1.43028 1.43029 Fatigue, and the inherent risk of barrel rupture, shall not occur during firing within the established barrel life. Requirement 1.43028 shall be veried; theoretical calculations may be employed.
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4.3.1.2.7.3 Fragmentation
Under extreme conditions, for example when there is soil, sand, a forgotten barrel telescope, or snow in the barrel, the barrel may rupture. Ammunition driving bands, sabots, obturators, jackets, etc. can also cause fragmentation during ring. To ensure the safety of the crew the requirements below shall be satised. 1.43030 Attachment of external parts on the outside of the barrel or subcalibre barrel shall be in a way that precludes detachment during firing. The muzzle brake should prevent rearward ricochets of driving bands, sabots, obturators, etc. During modification in the design or new development of ammunition or weapons relating to driving bands, sabots, obturators, jackets etc., or in the event of a new commencement of rifling in the barrel or a new muzzle brake, testing shall be performed to determine the occurrence of fragmentation. The barrel shall not rupture when firing the highest charge with a specified amount of snow, sand or gravel in the barrel. Practical trials to simulate barrel rupture as per requirement 1.43033 shall be performed. Comment: Testing may be performed by filling the barrel with various quantities of sand and gravel to determine the ruggedness of the weapon.
1.43031 1.43032
1.43033 1.43034
4.3.1.2.7.4 Cook-off
Where barrel cooling systems are not employed, a sustained high rate of re will make the barrel extremely hot. Spontaneous initiation of ammunition (cook-off) can occur in a hot barrel when, for example, ring is interrupted while a round is rammed. Usually it is the propelling charge that is initiated, but initiation of the warhead can also occur. It is also conceivable that a projectile detaches from the cartridge case during ramming thus enabling propellant to come into direct contact with the hot surface of the barrel and result in ignition. When a warhead heated in this way is red, melted explosive may be subject to hazard initiation caused by the acceleration stresses generated during ring. Testing and calculations are necessary to establish at which temperature cookoff occurs, as well as how many rounds and which rate of re are necessary to attain this temperature.
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1.43035
Cook-off shall not occur during the maximum specied re engagement in combination with interrupted re with rammed ammunition. Comment: Refer also to requirements 1.52011 and 1.53019. To determine the risk of cook-off the temperature and heat ux etc. for a hot barrel shall be established. Comment: The Safety Restrictions shall state the permitted rate of fire, the permitted number of rounds per salvo, and/or the permitted duration for fire. Fume extractors
1.43036
4.3.1.2.8
A fume extractor is a cylinder attached around the mid-section of the barrel. It is pressure fed by the propellant gases produced during ring and vents them forwards in the barrel, thereby extracting residual gases out through the muzzle. The fume extractor also helps to prevent the occurrence of backash. The fume extractor is subjected to a certain load during ring, and must be dimensioned to withstand such stresses.
Figure 4.4 Example of a fume extractor 1.43037 1.43038 4.3.1.2.9 The fume extractor shall be tted to the barrel in a way that prevents detachment during ring. The fume extractor shall be so dimensioned that it is not subjected to fatigue and inherent risk of rupture during ring. Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers
Weapon systems are provided with muzzle brakes to reduce recoil forces. The muzzle brake is subjected to powerful forces by the high gas velocity, high velocity particles and high pressure.
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In some cases it may, however, be necessary to increase recoil forces because of functional requirements. This can be achieved by mounting an expansion nozzle (venturi) on the muzzle. A ame guard is employed to reduce the signature from the weapon when ring.
Figure 4.5 Example of a muzzle brake 1.43039 1.43040 1.43041 It shall not be possible for any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil amplifier tted to detach during ring. Any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil amplifier shall be dimensioned so that it does not rupture during ring. Requirements 1.43039 and 1.43040 shall be veried by firing tests using the highest charge.
4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash Muzzle ash can occur when the projectile passes the muzzle and unburnt propellant gases are combusted. Muzzle ash can also occur when the driving band or sabot does not obturate properly against the internal surface of the barrel. Besides danger to the crew, muzzle ash may also damage sight equipment (e.g. image amplier). 1.43042 When fitting external equipment onto the weapon or weapon platform consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle ash. Crew stations shall be located such that the crew are not subjected to muzzle ash.
1.43043
4.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters A sub-calibre barrel/adapter is often used in large calibre barrels to enable lowcost ammunition to be used, primarily for exercise purposes. By using a sub-calibre barrel the weapon system can largely be used in the same way as with a standard barrel and effective training is thus achieved. 1.43044 Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7 above shall apply.
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1.43045 1.43046 1.43047
It shall not be possible for a correctly tted sub-calibre barrel or sub-calibre adapter to detach during ring. It shall be possible to inspect a sub-calibre barrel/adapter for cracks and other defects. A sub-calibre barrel/adapter shall not produce higher stresses on the ammunition than a standard barrel. Comment: If, for example, a sub-calibre barrel is longer than a standard barrel, other acceleration and spin stresses may arise. It must be determined whether the ammunition is dimensioned for such stresses. Requirements 1.43045 and 1.43047 shall be veried by test firing using the actual propelling charges and natures of ammunition. A system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently tted in an exercise weapon or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition.
1.43048 1.43049
4.3.1.2.12 Ramming Ammunition can be rammed in the barrel in a number of different ways. When a high ramming velocity is used, such as with a high rate of re, the high explosive or fuzing system in the projectile may be damaged. Ammunition containing submunitions, electronics, or rocket motors may be particularly vulnerable in this respect. 1.43050 1.43051 The rammer shall be provided with safety devices that prevent physical contact by the crew during the ramming operation. The physical ramming environment for the weapon in question shall be verified by testing, which shall be performed at the extreme temperatures specified.
4.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers Recoil buffers are employed to create forces to enable the cyclical function of the recoil system. Recoil forces are usually accumulated in a pressure chamber for gas/uid or by springs. The system contains substantial forces which is why care must be taken during maintenance and repair. Before and after ring the following requirements shall be satised: 1.43052 1.43053 1.43054
86
The system shall be designed so that the static pressure of the recoil buffer is retained. Leakage of recoil buffer uid and gas should be minimized. Maximum recoil stresses shall be verified.
Weapons 4
1.43055 4.3.1.3 4.3.1.3.1
Forced recoil equipment shall withstand recoil forces with a safety margin. Recoilless weapon and rocket systems General
Minimal recoil systems and rocket systems are characterised by relatively little recoil and gas ow rearwards, among other things. Ammunition handling is often performed manually. Different types of ammunition can be used in the same weapon system. Recoilless weapons and rocket systems employ various solutions for ammunition handling: weapons for repeated use, weapons for limited repeated use, disposable weapons (for firing once only), fixed launch and aiming unit with replaceable, disposable barrel or launch tube.
Such systems usually have muzzle velocities below sonic speed and relatively short ranges. These systems often have large danger areas rearwards compared with recoil weapons. Some systems, such as missiles, can be guided while in ight and this affects the danger area. In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the escape of gas through the open rear end of the launch tube which has a nozzle or recoil rocket. The force of recoil can be inuenced by the geometry of the nozzle and the design of the recoil rocket. The mass of gas escaping to the rear can be replaced by solid or liquid substances, known as countermass, which results in a lower blast pressure around the weapon. In rocket systems the projectile is equipped with a rocket motor in which propellant combustion takes place. The pressure in the launch tube is determined by the static pressure of the escaping gases, which is usually much lower than in recoil systems.
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There are variations to both these systems. For recoilless systems there is the rocket-assisted projectile (RAP) which maintains or increases velocity in ight by means of a rocket motor, and for rocket systems a gas generator located in the launch tube provides the initial acceleration for the rocket in the launcher. During loading there is a risk of inadvertent ring, and during ring muzzle ash and backblast present hazards. 4.3.1.3.2 Requirements
4.3.1.3.2.1 Firing mechanism
1.43056 1.43057 1.43058 1.43059
Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3 above shall apply. The ring mechanism shall have a transport safety device. The firing system shall have a safety device for the operating and system ready-to-fire phases. It shall be possible to deactivate the system to prevent hazard initiation during loading/unloading and during transport of the system.
4.3.1.3.2.2 Recoil
1.43060
The direction of recoil for recoilless launch tubes and rocket systems should be to the rear in the event of any resultant recoil. Recoil forces shall be established by testing.
1.43061
4.3.1.3.2.3 Hazards around the weapon
1.43062
The necessity for using a specific ring stance when firing a weapon shall be documented in the Safety Restrictions. Comment: For example, fin-stabilized rounds with wide-span fins cannot be fired from the prone position. Safety Restrictions governing operation must be formulated on the basis of the documentation specified above.
4.3.1.3.2.4 Backblast
1.43063
Outside the danger area for materiel and friendly forces the backblast shall not have a high enough energy content to cause injury. Comment: Energy and particle content shall be determined. Requirement 1.43063 shall be veried by testing.
1.43064
4.3.1.3.2.5 Muzzle flash
1.43065
When fitting external equipment onto the weapon consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle ash.
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1.43066
Muzzle ash shall be limited so that personnel are not subjected to higher levels of thermal radiation than the prescribed personal protective equipment can withstand. The weapon should not produce such a muzzle flash that personal protective equipment is required by personnel.
1.43067
4.3.1.3.2.6 Pressure
1.43068
There shall be a safety margin for structural strength and fatigue. The risk for barrel rupture shall be established for the specified operational profile. Requirement 1.43068 shall be veried by theoretical calculations and testing. Comment: For requirements concerning pressure refer to STANAG 4110 or equivalent.
1.43069
4.3.1.3.2.7 Sub-calibre barrel
1.43070
A recoilless system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently tted in an exercise weapon, or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition. Composite and compound barrels
4.3.1.4
Materials in the form of non-metallic composites, plastics, compounds (mixtures of metal and composite), etc. are used to an increasing extent in weapon applications. These materials have different properties compared with metallic materials. Elongation and expansion in barrels and rocket/missile launch tubes can be signicant factors. Such properties shall be taken into account in the design and calculations for weapon systems. 1.43071 In the design of non-metallic and compound barrels, consideration shall be given to dimensioning with regard to expected material properties when these change over time. In the design and fastening of external parts onto non-metallic barrels, consideration should be given to the influence of fixtures that are permanently attached by winding for example, so that elongation properties are not negatively affected.
1.43072
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4.3.1.5 4.3.1.5.1
Other weapon systems Minelayers for landmines
In some cases landmines can be laid mechanically, which means that hundreds of mines can be laid every hour by each minelayer. Usually the mines are fed into the minelayer from the towing truck so that only a small number of mines are in the minelayer at any one time. A plough-like device, for example, designed for the type of ground in question prepares space beneath the surface in which the mines are laid. Refer also to the requirements stated in Section 5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges.
4
Figure 4.6 Example of a minelayer 1.43073 1.43074 If the minelayer arms the mine via a mechanical device it shall be equipped with an automatic monitoring system. A monitoring system as specified in requirement 1.43073 shall emit both a light and sound signal when a mine becomes jammed in the minelayer. The alarm shall be reset manually. A minelayer that mechanically arms the mine shall enable access to a mine that becomes jammed without the necessity for the use of any tools. It shall be possible to decouple a minelayer that mechanically arms the mine from the towing vehicle to enable personnel and the towing vehicle to be moved outside the danger area of the mine within the duration of the safety delay including a safety margin. Comment: If the above safety delay is 5+1 minutes it should be possible to de-
1.43075
1.43076
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couple the minelayer from the towing vehicle and to move the personnel (with vehicle) outside the mines danger area within 2 minutes. 1.43077 The minelayer should be designed so as to minimise the risk of a mine becoming jammed during laying. Comment: The configuration of the mine should also be taken into account. Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges
4.3.1.5.2
Naval mines are normally laid from a vessel under way (within a certain speed range). The mines can either be launched by rails over the side of the vessel from where they fall freely into the water, or by a minelaying device specially designed for one or more types of mine. Naval mines are often heavy (several hundred kilograms) and thus require special lifting devices during handling. The fuzing system is generally separate from the mine and is installed before laying. Depth charges can be dropped from a launcher (from a vessel or helicopter) to form a carpet, i.e. with a certain distance between each depth charge to cover a specic area. 1.43078 1.43079 The minelayer shall not arm the mine before the mine leaves the minelaying device. The minelayer shall be designed so that the mine cannot become jammed during launch. Comment: The configuration of the mine shall also be taken into account. Launch tubes for torpedoes
4.3.1.5.3
Torpedoes are used as armament (weapon system) on submarines, surface vessels and helicopters. In a submarine, combat-ready torpedoes are stowed in the launch tubes and/or in stowage (standby mode) close to the launch tubes. Onboard surface vessels the torpedoes are normally stowed only in the launch tubes. Torpedoes are loaded into the launch tubes at the naval base.
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In peacetime torpedoes are used as exercise torpedoes with the warhead replaced by a special exercise head. After a practice run the torpedo is recovered and reused for other practice runs. It can also be reused as a combat torpedo after being retted with a warhead. There are two types of energy platforms for propulsion of torpedoes: Thermal system for generating propulsion gas for a thermal motor. Currently Swedish torpedoes use high-test peroxide as oxidation agent and alcohol or paraffin is used as fuel. Electric energy stored in rechargeable or thermal batteries and an electric motor for propulsion.
Torpedoes are heavy (250 - 1 800 kg) and require lifting tackle to facilitate handling. The safety, arming and ignition unit (SAI) is normally stored separate from the torpedo, and the SAI is also provided with a transport safety device. The SAI is installed in the torpedo when the latter is loaded into the launch tube. Two types of system are currently used to launch torpedoes from a submarine: Compressed air that actuates a piston located aft of the torpedo that forces both the torpedo and the water out of the launch tube (push-out). Start of the torpedo motor in a water-filled launch tube whereby the torpedo swims out of the launch tube under its own power (swim-out).
Torpedo launch from a surface vessel is performed by an overpressure in the launch tube aft of the torpedo. This overpressure is generated either by combustion of a propelling charge or by compressed air. The warhead is armed when the barrier lock in the SAI is cancelled. 1.43080 1.43081 Launch tubes shall be equipped with sensors that indicate that the torpedo has left the tube. Launch tubes shall be so designed that the torpedo cannot become jammed on its way out of the tube or in the forepeak of submarines. Comment: The configuration of the torpedo shall also be taken into account.
1.430821
1) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.

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1.43083
It shall not be possible for the testing of a launcher to cause hazard initiation. Comment: The test system shall normally be separate from the launch system. For torpedoes incorporating hydrogen peroxide the launch tubes when in standby mode shall be equipped with a draining system connected to the hydrogen peroxide system of the torpedo.
1.43084
4.3.2
Pylons and dispensers
Pylons and dispensers are attachment elements for weapon systems such as bombs, bomblets (multiple weapons), rockets, missiles and torpedoes. The functions that are built into the pylon or ammunition vary according to the application. A specic function requirement in the following requirements does not mean that the function must be built into the weapon itself.
Figure 4.7 Example of a weapon launcher 1.43085 A pylon/dispenser shall enable a transport safety device in the form of an indicator or equivalent to be clearly visible while the ammunition is in transport safety mode. A pylon/dispenser as specified in requirement 1.43085 should enable the transport safety device to be carried adjacent to the ammunition. Comment: This enables deactivation if the aircraft lands at a different site from the ammunition preparation site.
1.43086
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1.43087
Pylons/dispensers shall enable separation of the weapon system or ammunition in such a way that there is no collision with weapon platforms. Comment: This includes incorrect manoeuvring of the ammunition.
4.3.3
Weapon platforms
This section will be transferred when separate manuals for different platforms have been compiled. There are numerous types of platform (aircraft, naval vessels, vehicles, etc.) for a weapon system, which means that requirements vary according to the type of platform in question. Generally, each type of platform shall comply with applicable legislation and regulations, although in some cases supplementary requirements may be necessary. For instance, a vehicle that is mainly designed for civil use (such as a construction vehicle), when used in a military application may need additional requirements to be stipulated depending on the particular military application.
An articulated truck, for example, usually has only a driver (in some cases also a passenger) in the cab. When such a vehicle is modied for military use four to ve persons may be transported in the cab. This means that several persons may be entering the cab (from different directions) while the driver is seated at his station, which could lead to an (inadvertent) movement of the steering wheel resulting in injuries from crushing. Furthermore, several persons are often in the vicinity of the platform while the driver is still at his station, which could entail a risk of injury by crushing around the platform (in the vicinity of the wheels, in front of or behind the platform, or at the articulation pivot point).
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4
Figure 4.8 Examples of weapon platforms 1.43088 The weapon platform for the system shall satisfy applicable traffic regulations for civil and military use. Comment: Dispensation may be given. Blast pressure during firing shall be acceptable for crew mounted in the platform. Comment: When verifying blast pressure characteristics the test methods and criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 can be used.
1.43089
4.3.4
Hatches and doors
Hatches and doors shall meet certain specic requirements. They shall be sufciently stable to withstand shockwaves close to a detonation and subsequently be openable. Specic safety requirements concerning manoeuvrability, locking, opening, etc. must be met.
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1.43090 1.43091 1.43092
The locking mechanism shall be dimensioned to withstand the stresses arising during operational use. The locking mechanism should be accessible and manoeuvrable from both inside and outside. Locks on hatches and doors should be manoeuvrable by crew wearing regulation personal protective equipment at all extreme temperatures. Comment: This is not a general requirement. It does not apply, for example, to turret guns.
4.3.5
4.3.5.1
Sighting and laying systems

General
It is obvious that a serious accident may occur if the weapon is red in the wrong direction. Such an event can be caused by a fault in the sighting system, or a fault in the laying and ring function caused by human error, or a combination of these. The possibility of user error makes it essential to stipulate requirements to ensure that the system is designed according to sound ergonomic principles and that it is easy to operate. Scales and displays must be unambiguous and legible in all conceivable situations. Controls must be conveniently located for the crew and facilitate the performance of their tasks. Generally it can be stated that serious accidents can be minimized by good ergonomic design combined with carefully prepared appropriate training. 4.3.5.2 4.3.5.2.1 1.43093 Requirements System accuracy The relationship between the axis of bore, and the optical axis in the sight and the values presented on displays/instruments shall coincide, both when the system stands on a level surface and when it is on a maximum incline during operation. A stabilised weapon shall retain the direction laid until a new direction is specified/commanded. Sight tests and adjustments The setting of the sight should not change owing to transport etc.
1.43094 4.3.5.2.2 1.43095
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4.3.5.2.3
Firing
To ensure that the sighting and laying system can withstand the stresses that occur during ring, the following requirement shall be met: 1.43096 When ring with natures of ammunition and charges designed for the weapon the sighting and laying systems shall retain specified settings and attain specified performance. Aiming and firing limitations There shall be devices to prevent the armament being aimed or red in prohibited zones. Comment: In maintenance mode aiming in a prohibited zone is permitted.
4.3.5.2.4 1.43097
4.3.6
Guidance systems
For a guided weapon/ammunition the ight path is determined after separation from the weapon platform by the following criteria: the condition of the weapon platform at separation, the characteristics of the propelling charge/motor, the pre-determined ring data, and the design and characteristics of the guidance system. The level of complexity of a guidance system can vary. It generally incorporates guidance controls, servomotors, and some type of processor to generate guidance signals which can emanate from the weapon platform as well as from the missile itself. Signals from the weapon platform can be transmitted via a link such as electromagnetic waves of suitable frequency such as radar, thermal or light, or electrically/optically by wire during part or all of the ight path. Guided weapons/ammunition often employ search and re control devices that register target data via active sensors based on active target acquisition (e.g. radar, laser) with potentially harmful effects. Furthermore, there is often a turntable or mobile platform and, for example, even a ground installation that also involve hazards. Search and re control devices are dealt with in Section 4.2.4, 4.2.13 and 4.3.5 of this manual. Guidance systems contain sensors, guidance electronics/software, guidance controls, and possibly additional functions such as communication links, guidance beams or indication equipment (e.g. radar beacon or tracer). All this equipment requires power electric, pneumatic, hydraulic, for example in addition to the power normally required for an unguided system.
97
4 Weapons
Self-destruction and control of the warhead function may be incorporated. Elementary examples of this are arming when there is a specic remaining ight time to target, or proximity fuze delay, based on approach velocity. Subsystems in weapons/ammunition affect guidance in one way or another. For example, if the propulsion motor stops/expires the guidance performance is changed dramatically, and the same applies to the energy supply. A true guidance system incorporates an automatic guidance function with associated rudder system, sensor unit and target seeker. These units, together with computers and geometry, form a closed guidance system that must be precisely dimensioned for optimal functioning and performance. An attack can be subdivided into several stages depending on the general design and functional method of the weapon. Search often precedes an attack. Thereafter comes the approach ight (or equivalent) possibly involving variations in altitude and/or changes of course. Target search and the locking of the target seeker onto the target may occur fairly early in an attack or rather late (terminal guidance) in the case of certain weapons. A successful result in the latter case is entirely dependent on the preceding guidance to the target zone. Prior to launch and separation of the weapon from the weapon platform, all subsystems are prepared with initial values while essential functional checks are performed simultaneously so that the separation conditions are satised. The separation sequence may involve constraints on guidance signals and rudder deection to prevent any risk of the projectile colliding with the weapon platform, or any risk of the projectile acquiring excessive angular acceleration with regard to the equipment and subsystems incorporated. Different guidance methods can be applied during the various stages of the ight path such as control of attitude, proportional navigation with lead bias, inertial navigation and SemiActive Command by Line Of Sight (SACLOS), depending on the design and performance requirements for the weapon. The purpose of the requirements is to ensure: safe handling during transport and deployment, safety in and around the fire unit during loading, unloading, loaded fire unit and launch, safety outside the designated danger areas, safety during training, loading exercises, and operation of the fire unit. Sources of radiation (e.g. laser) directed at the fire unit from the guided weapon/ammunition should be so designed that they do not require any danger zones at the fire unit.
1.43098
98
Weapons 4
1.43099
Sources of radiation for guidance that can have a dangerous effect shall be indicated to the operator when radiation transmission is in progress. During exercises the indication specified in requirement 1.43099 should also be visible to anyone anywhere in the vicinity. It shall not be possible for guidance signals to the weapon/ammunition to initiate motor or warhead igniters. The guided weapon/ammunition should incorporate a function which, in the event of a target miss or if a malfunction is detected, definitively precludes effect in the target by disarming the weapon. This can be achieved, for example, by self-neutralisation, self-destruction or disarming. There should be a system for function monitoring and failure detection for the guidance system. This may result in self-neutralisation or disarming of the weapon, etc. The guidance system shall be designed and documented in a way that enables a safety analysis to be performed. The safety analysis shall be performed or audited by an instance that is independent of the designer. Comment: Another department or special safety function within the same department may be considered as an independent party. All materials incorporated shall be selected and combined in such a way that effects detrimental to safety do not arise during the life of the guidance system, for example as a result of corrosion, ageing, chemical change or short-circuiting. Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, should conform to standardized communication protocols. Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and after launch, shall be subject to function monitoring. Comment: Function monitoring can, for example, be by means of parity checking or a watch-dog function.
1.43100 1.43101 1.43102
1.43103
1.43104 1.43105
1.43106
1.43107
1.43108
99
4 Weapons
4.3.7
4.3.7.1
Miscellaneous requirements
Pressure vessels
There are a number of types of pressure vessel for numerous applications. Structural strength calculations and hydrostatic testing shall always be carried out to provide the basis for type approval. 1.43109 4.3.7.2 Pressure vessels shall be type approved in accordance with the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health directives. Lifting devices
Lifting devices are used to lift parts of, or complete, systems during production or in the eld. An assurance of compliance with the regulations governing lifting devices shall be submitted in writing by the manufacturer. This means that applicable standards have been adhered to, structural strength calculations have been performed, hazard analyses have been performed, an instruction book has been compiled, test certicates have been issued, material certicates are available, and that the lifting device has been CE marked. 1.43110 1.43111 Lifting devices shall be CE marked. The danger area for a lifting device shall be established and taken into consideration when formulating Safety Restrictions. Comment: The danger area is greater than the area immediately beneath a hanging load, for example. Fire-fighting equipment
4
4.3.7.3
Fire, especially in ammunition stowed in conned spaces, can become catastrophic in a very short time. Even re in other materiel can quickly lead to major health hazards to the crew, especially in a combat vehicle. It is therefore vital that a re can be extinguished as quickly as possible before the crew is injured by the re itself, or by toxic substances released during certain types of re. Fire-ghting equipment comes in the form of xed equipment and hand-carried extinguishers. Fixed re-ghting equipment can usually be activated automatically as well as manually.
100
Weapons 4
Fixed sensors that react to smoke and/or temperature, for example, are in general use. The primary purpose of the requirements is to ensure the safety of the crew, and secondarily to preserve weaponry. 1.43112 1.43113 Fire-fighting systems in crew compartments shall not contain halon. Fire-fighting systems for engine, crew, and ammunition compartments shall be automatically activated, but also be possible to activate manually. Confined spaces that have automatic re-ghting systems shall be equipped with an evacuation fan to enable rapid ventilation after a fire is extinguished. In addition to automatic fire-fighting systems, manual re extinguishers shall be within the reach of the armament crew. This also applies onboard combat vehicles where all compartments shall have a re extinguisher. The equipment shall have sufficient capacity for the most severe fire possible in a defined application. Conned spaces that are not crew compartments should have automatic fire alarm systems. A single failure in fixed fire-fighting equipment should not result in non-function. Fixed fire-fighting equipment shall have duplicate containers containing fire-fighting materials. If a rubber hose or equivalent is employed in fixed fire-fighting equipment, its function shall not be exposed to any hazard before or during the actual fire-fighting. If the actuating device in fixed fire-fighting equipment comprises any form of accumulated pressure there should be duplicate pressure vessels. The type of re extinguisher (powder, water, foam, etc.) should be selected so as to preclude any other danger arising during the firefighting.
1.43114
1.43115
1.43116 1.43117 1.43118 1.43119 1.43120
1.43121
1.43122
101
4 Weapons
4.4
Requirement checklist for weapons
Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons
Requirements of International Law 1.42001 SHALL Booby traps 1.42002 SHALL Laser weapons 1.42003 SHALL Toxic weapons 1.42004 SHALL Incendiary weapons 1.42005 SHALL Weapons difcult to aim 1.42006 SHALL Severe damage to environment General requirements 1.42007 SHALL 1.42008 SHOULD 1.42009 SHOULD Danger area Emergency stop Energy stop & energy source disconnection Emergency stop close to energy source Unload propelling charge Empty cartridge cases & expended launch tubes Manual override of automatic functions Mount & remove equipment Specied equipment Monitors/VDUs Symbols/texts Disarm the weapon independently Footholds & anti-slip surfaces Locking devices on hatches & doors
1.42010 1.42011 1.42012 1.42013 1.42014 1.42015 1.42016 1.42017 1.42018 1.42019 1.42020
SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL
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Weapons 4
Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons, continued

1.42021 1.42022
SHOULD SHALL
Ventilation, heating & air conditioning system Safe separation distance Concentration of toxic substances Verication of requirement 1.42023
Toxic substances 1.42023 SHALL 1.42024 SHALL
Electrical and magnetic elds 1.42025 SHALL Susceptibility of electrical circuits 1.42026 SHALL Safety critical electrical circuits 1.42027 SHALL Electrical & magnetic elds Water and moisture resistance 1.42028 SHOULD Drainability 1.42029 SHOULD Water spraying & fording Extreme climatic conditions 1.42030 SHOULD Protective clothing & equipment 1.42031 SHOULD Good work environment Fire 1.42032 SHOULD Crew protection Blast pressure level Verication of requirement 1.42033 Number of rounds red Protection & location of crew Backblast Verication of requirement 1.42037 Vibration dose
Blast pressure 1.42033 SHALL 1.42034 SHOULD 1.42035 1.42036 SHALL SHALL
Backblast 1.42037 SHALL 1.42038 SHALL Vibration dose 1.42039 SHALL
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4 Weapons

Pressure 1.42040 Forces 1.42041 1.42042 1.42043 1.42044 1.42045 1.42046 1.42047 1.42048 1.42049 1.42050 1.42051 1.42052 1.42053 1.42054 1.42055 1.42056 1.42057 Lasers 1.42058 1.42059 1.42060 1.42061 1.42062 1.42063 1.42058 1.42059 1.42060
SHALL
Determining dimensions relative to pressure Spring forces & hazards Spring forces & double locking devices Springs & analysis Fastening elements Fastening elements, characteristics Springs to be located in a protected position Springs duplicated Accumulated pressure Monitoring duplicated Location of hydraulic hoses Hydraulic uid Danger area Recoil buffer, recuperator, overpressure Recoil forces Rotating & moving parts Loading devices Cartridge case ejection Activation of lasers Safety circuits Safety covers & locking devices Laser outlet optic Warning signs Laser protection lters & goggles Activation of lasers Safety circuits Safety covers & locking devices
SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD
104
Weapons 4

1.42061 1.42062 1.42063
SHOULD SHALL SHOULD
Laser outlet optic Warning signs Laser protection lters & goggles Chassis or platform motion Open (or closed) doors or hatches Retention of ammunition etc. Fall-back Firing in fall-back position Method for stowage
Stability mechanical 1.42064 SHALL 1.42065 SHALL 1.42066 SHALL
Transport 1.42067 SHOULD 1.42068 SHOULD 1.42069 SHALL
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS Launchers Weapon installation 1.43001 SHALL Interface with safety functions 1.43002 SHALL Clearance 1.43003 SHOULD Safety devices for moving system parts Recoil systems Breech mechanisms 1.43004 SHALL 1.43005 1.43006 1.43007 1.43008 1.43009 1.43010 SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL
Operation of breech mechanism Locking Breech mechanism: vibration resistance Incorrect assembly Firing mechanism inactive Indication of breech mechanism status Firing with breech mechanism not fully closed
105
4 Weapons

Firing mechanisms 1.43011 SHALL 1.43012 SHALL 1.43013 SHALL 1.43014 1.43015 1.43016 1.43017 1.43018 1.43019 1.43020 1.43021 1.43022 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL
Firing mechanism, sang Firing by active operation Protection for electromechanical device Firing button guard etc. Firing mechanism to withstand vibration & shocks Firing mechanism, shock resistant Radiated or conducted interference Electrical connector, sang Mechanical safety devices Manually operated safety interrupter Location of safety interrupter Safety interrupter marking Breech ring life Obturation Automatic re into maximum head wind
Breech ring 1.43023 SHALL Obturation 1.43024 SHALL Backash 1.43025 SHALL
Barrels and sub-calibre barrels 1.43026 SHALL Firing with new or worn barrel 1.43027 SHALL Verication of requirement 1.43026 1.43028 SHALL Fatigue & barrel rupture 1.43029 SHALL Verication & calculation of requirement 1.43028 1.43030 SHALL Attachment of external parts 1.43031 SHOULD Driving bands, sabots, obturators 1.43032 SHALL Testing for fragmentation
106
Weapons 4

1.43033 1.43034 1.43035 1.43036
SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL
Snow, sand or gravel in barrel Barrel rupture trials Cook-off at maximum re engagement Determination of temperature & heat ux Attachment of fume extractor Dimensioning of fume extractor
Fume extractors 1.43037 SHALL 1.43038 SHALL
Muzzle brakes, ame guards and recoil ampliers 1.43039 SHALL Attachment of muzzle brake etc. 1.43040 SHALL Dimensioning of muzzle brake etc. 1.43041 SHALL Verication of requirements 1.43039 & 1.43040 Muzzle ash 1.43042 SHALL 1.43043 SHALL External equipment & effect of muzzle ash Crew stations muzzle ash
Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters 1.43044 SHALL Applicable requirements as stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7 1.43045 SHALL Fitting of sub-calibre barrel etc. 1.43046 SHALL Inspection of sub-calibre barrel etc. 1.43047 SHALL Stresses on ammunition 1.43048 SHALL Verication of requirements 1.43045 & 1.43047 1.43049 SHOULD Permanently tted sub-calibre barrel Ramming 1.43050 SHALL 1.43051 SHALL Rammer Ramming environment
107
4 Weapons

Recoil buffers 1.43052 SHALL 1.43053 1.43054 1.43055 SHOULD SHALL SHALL
Static pressure of recoil buffer Leakage of recoil buffer uid & gas Maximum recoil stresses Forced recoil equipment
Recoilless weapon and rocket systems 1.43056 SHALL Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3 1.43057 SHALL Firing mechanism, transport safety 1.43058 SHALL Firing system, safety device 1.43059 SHALL Deactivation, loading/ unloading 1.43060 SHALL Direction of recoil 1.43061 SHALL Recoil forces, testing 1.43062 SHALL Firing stance 1.43063 SHALL Backblast, energy content 1.43064 SHALL Verication of requirement 1.43067 1.43065 SHALL External equipment & effect of muzzle ash 1.43066 SHALL Limitation of muzzle ash 1.43067 SHOULD Personal protective equipment 1.43068 SHALL Structural strength for pressure 1.43069 SHALL Verication of requirement 1.43068 1.43070 SHOULD Permanently tted sub-calibre barrel 1.43071 SHALL Material properties 1.43072 SHOULD Fixtures permanently attached by winding
108
Weapons 4

Other weapon systems Minelayers for landmines 1.43073 SHALL Arming the mine 1.43074 SHALL Monitoring system 1.43075 SHALL Mechanical arming 1.43076 SHALL Decoupling minelayer 1.43077 SHOULD Risk of mine becoming jammed Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges 1.43078 SHALL Arming 1.43079 SHALL Mine cannot become jammed Launch tubes for torpedoes 1.43080 SHALL Sensors 1.43081 SHALL Torpedo cannot become jammed a) 1.43082 1.43083 1.43084 SHALL SHALL Testing Draining system Transport safety device indicator Transport safety device to be carried No collision of ammunition with weapon platform Weapon platform Blast pressure Locking mechanism Locking mechanism accessibility Manoeuvrable when wearing personal protective equipment
Pylons and dispensers 1.43085 SHALL 1.43086 1.43087 SHOULD SHALL
Weapon platforms 1.43088 SHALL 1.43089 SHALL Hatches and doors 1.43090 SHALL 1.43091 SHOULD 1.43092 SHOULD
109
4 Weapons

Sighting and laying systems 1.43093 SHALL Axis of bore & optical axis 1.43094 SHALL Direction laid 1.43095 SHOULD No change of setting during transport 1.43096 SHALL Firing & retention of settings etc. 1.43097 SHALL Firing in prohibited zones Guidance systems 1.43098 SHOULD 1.43099 1.43100 1.43101 1.43102 1.43103 1.43104 1.43105 1.43106 1.43107 1.43108 SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL Sources of radiation & danger zones Sources of radiation & indication Indication during exercises Guidance signals to warhead system Design of self-destruction Function monitoring Safety analysis Auditing by independent instance Materials incorporated Data transfer Function monitoring of data transfer
Miscellaneous requirements Pressure vessels 1.43109 SHALL Pressure vessels, type approval Lifting devices 1.43110 SHALL 1.43111 SHALL CE marking of lifting devices Danger area for lifting devices
Fire-ghting equipment 1.43112 SHALL Halon systems 1.43113 SHALL Automatic activation 1.43114 SHALL Evacuation fan
110
Weapons 4

1.43115 1.43116 1.43117 1.43118 1.43119 1.43120 1.43121 1.43122
SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD
Manual re extinguishers Capacity of equipment Conned spaces Single failures Duplicate containers Rubber hoses Actuating device Type of re extinguisher
a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.
111
Ammunition 5
AMMUNITION
The term ammunition denotes materiel that is designed to achieve damage in the widest sense (often through explosion), produce smoke, illuminate the battleeld, or achieve electromagnetic jamming. Ammunition also comprises practice materiel for the above purposes. Packagings can also be included in the ammunition concept as they have a unique marking to denote the characteristic of the ammunition therein. This chapter species the requirements that are unique for ammunition and its constituent parts: warheads, propulsion units, fuzing systems and packagings. Where a weapon part such as a barrel, dispenser, pylon, etc. is a constituent part of the materiel system, Chapter 4, Weapons also applies. Certain materiel specic requirements that are not naturally related to any of the other sections in this chapter are thus stated in this section. With regard to guidance systems for ammunition that affect the ammunition after it has left the launcher, refer to Chapter 4 Weapons, Section 4.3. For all ammunition the activity and materiel related requirements stated in Chapter 2, Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel shall always be taken into consideration. Thereafter the requirements specied in Section 5.1 shall apply, after which the materiel specic requirements for the various parts of the ammunition shall apply as stated in the respective subsystem section: 5.2 Warheads, 5.3 Propulsion systems, 5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges, and 5.5 Packaging for ammunition.
5
5.1 5.1.1 Joint ammunition requirements General
This section species the requirements that are applicable for complete ammunition. These requirements together with the other applicable weapon and ammunition safety requirements shall be incorporated in the requirement specications.
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5 Ammunition
5.1.2
Requirements of International Law
These requirements, originating from international agreements, must always be met and can thus never be disregarded through any other agreement. 1.51001 1.51002 High explosive shells designed primarily for anti-personnel purposes shall have a minimum weight of 400 grams. Mines shall not be designed to be of similar appearance to civil utility goods, neither may they be marked with internationally recognised safety emblems. Bullets shall not be easily expanded or attened in the human body. Bullets shall be fully jacketed and shall not incorporate any notches (cf. dumdum bullets).
1.51003 1.51004
5.1.3
Materiel specific requirements
When developing ammunition it is necessary, amongst other needs, to achieve a design that satises the safety requirements in the requirement specications. During the development phases the safety requirements are veried through audits, analyses and testing. The requirements stated herein are largely based on experience accumulated over the years. 1.51005 Analysis and testing shall be performed to provide data for assessment of the danger area for all combinations of launchers and ammunition. Comment: Danger areas for lasers, fragmentation, thermal radiation, blast pressure, etc. The projectile and propelling charge should be designed so that the projectile remains in rammed position with the gun at maximum elevation without any special devices for this being needed on the gun. This is particularly important when the projectile and propelling charge are separate and an interspace can arise with certain charges. Comment: The above applies for ammunition where ramming is desirable. Refer also to Section 4.2.15.2.1. The function stated in requirement 1.51006 shall be tested using a worn barrel. Comment: Refer to the definition of a worn barrel.
5
1.51006
1.51007
114
Ammunition 5
1.51008
Ammunition should be designed so that unloading can be performed in a safe manner by the weapon crew. Comment: This also applies to unloading after an ammunition misfire. Verification of requirement 1.51008 shall include testing to determine the forces that can be permitted for the unloading tool in question. Comment: Testing also includes the force required to achieve unloading. Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading as a reverse process of loading. Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading to be performed with the aid of tools if the ammunition becomes jammed either during ramming or in the barrel. To establish the risk of cook-off for the ammunition, the temperature/heat ux etc. for a barrel at its maximum operating temperature and for the shell shall be determined. Driving bands/sabots/obturators/casings etc. should be dimensioned and designed so that no fragments are formed that can impact with the muzzle brake (if such is fitted) and ricochet rearwards. When modifying or newly developing ammunition, driving bands/ sabots/obturators/casings etc. shall be tested regarding the occurrence of fragments. Driving bands, casings or equivalent shall be designed so that they do not inadvertently disintegrate outside the barrel when firing with the maximum stress level. Sabots shall be designed to ensure safe separation. Comment: Consideration shall be given to the hazards of sabot fragments and to any change in projectile trajectory. The projectile shall be designed to achieve external ballistic stability in all permitted types of firing provided that the barrel has not reached its maximum permitted wear so that the specified danger area is still valid. Comment: Worn barrels, driving bands, fins, tail units, etc. can affect external ballistics.
1.51009
1.51010 1.51011
1.51012
1.51013
1.51014
1.51015
1.51016
1.51017
115
5 Ammunition
1.51018
Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualied by the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SI). Comment: Approval shall be based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Code of Statutes, edition 1986:2 (SIFS 1986:2). Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualied in accordance with FSD 0214. Comment: Assessments concerning the scope of qualification shall be made by the advisory group for explosives, see Chapter 3, Methodology, Section 3.6 and 3.8. The ammunition should be resistant to extreme environments such as accidents or the effect of enemy weapons so that the ammunition does not increase the vulnerability of the system to which it is integral. Comment: The above shall be based on the resistance of the ammunition and the protection level of the materiel system. Cf. FSD 0060. Mines shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079. Torpedoes shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in launch tubes. Cf. requirement 1.43081. Underwater mines/depth charges shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079. The safe separation distance/time shall be determined for the severest case of operational use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022, 1.52022, 1.53007 and 1.54013. The design and the materials used in the ammunition shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation. Comment: When dimensioning and designing ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures specified in STANAG 4110 shall be applied.
1.51019
1.51020
1.51021 1.51022 1.51023
1.51024
5
1.51025
5.1.4
Checklist for joint ammunition requirements
116
Ammunition 5
Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements

Requirements of International Law 1.51001 SHALL Minimum weight of HE shells 1.51002 SHALL Mines shall not be similar to utility goods 1.51003 SHALL Bullets shall not be easily expanded 1.51004 SHALL Bullets shall be fully jacketed Materiel specic requirements 1.51005 SHALL Analysis and testing for danger area 1.51006 SHOULD Projectile in rammed position 1.51007 SHALL Testing for requirement 1.51006 in worn barrel 1.51008 SHOULD Unloading safely 1.51009 1.510010 1.51011 1.51012 1.51013 1.51014 1.51015 1.51016 1.51017 1.51018 1.51019 1.51020 1.51021 SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHALL Verication of unloading tool forces Unloading via loading route Unloading using tools Exposure to high temperature Fragments from driving bands, sabots, casings, etc. Testing newly developed driving bands, etc. Driving bands etc. shall withstand maximum stress Safe separation of sabot External ballistic stability Explosives approved by SI Qualication of explosives Resistance to extreme environments Mines not become jammed
117
5 Ammunition
Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements, continued

1.51022 1.51023 1.51024 1.51025
SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL
Torpedoes not become jammed Underwater mines not become jammed Safe separation distance Casing to withstand all stresses
5.2 5.2.1
Warheads General
This section is a summary of the joint requirements for warheads. For each type of warhead there are additional object specic requirements that apply which are stated in the relevant subsections of this chapter. 5.2.1.1 Description
The term warhead refers to that component of the ammunition which, at a predetermined time or place (e.g. impact in target, actuation in immediate proximity of target, etc.) is intended to provide effect by, for example, pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary, or any combination of these, or any other effect of tactical importance to the user. In certain circumstances effect is achieved after entry or penetration of armour or other protection element, for example. A warhead that is not loaded with explosive is exemplied by an anti-armour projectile which penetrates armour by means of high kinetic energy. Furthermore, there are pyrotechnic warheads (illuminating, incendiary, smoke). Most combat warheads have practice counterparts which on impact provide some kind of visual signal, such as a ash or smoke, to indicate point of impact and which have a lower explosive effect. There is also practice ammunition whose warheads contain little or no explosive (such as inert ammunition that has no explosive content at all). Several countries are developing more insensitive ammunition designated IM (Insensitive Munition). Technically, the lower sensitivity is achieved by using plastic as a binding agent and nitramine-based products for the energy producing substance (PBX = plastic bonded high explosive).
118
Ammunition 5
For multiple warheads, each submunition is treated as an individual warhead. In the case of guided and trajectory correctable warheads the warheads are dealt with as described in this chapter, while the guidance and trajectory correction motors are dealt with in Section 5.3 with consideration given to the actual launch environment. When initiating such motors, the same requirements are specied as for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, see Section 5.4, if it is not proven that hazard initiation does not incur injury to personnel nor damage to property or the environment. 5.2.1.2 Materiel environment
Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the mechanical effects of the environment: leakage can occur in joints, cracks can occur in warhead casings, explosive dust or similar can be created and be moved to a more shock sensitive position, e.g. threaded joints and gaps where there may be a risk of initiation due to vibration or shock (e.g. during firing).
Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the physical and chemical effects of the environment: high explosives can be heated to a temperature at which they become plastically deformed or melt. This can lead to cavities, or the high explosive migrating into threaded joints, between separating surfaces, or into cracks where it can be compressed and thus involve a risk of initiation, air may be pumped in and out through leaks in the warhead casing which can lead to accumulations of water. The high explosive or equivalent may be affected and gaseous products may form, for example in the case of high explosives with an aluminium content, brittle fractures can occur in the casing, especially at extremely low temperatures, a significant difference between the coefficients of expansion of the charge and the casing can occur which may result in the formation of cracks or cavities at low temperature, or high internal overpressure can result at high temperature, reactions between incompatible materials can change the properties of explosives.
119
5 Ammunition
5.2.1.3 1.52001 1.52002
Requirements NBC warheads (nuclear charges, biological weapons, chemical weapons) shall not be fabricated. FAE (Fuel-Air Explosives) warheads, in which a fuel is sprayed into the air and detonates owing to the oxygen in the air and where the main purpose is anti-personnel, shall not be fabricated. Warhead casings whose main effect is fragmentation shall be fabricated from material that can be easily detected by X-ray. Multiple weapons and guided weapons shall be treated as having several warheads and propulsion devices. Separation charges and guidance or trajectory correction motors shall be treated as propulsion devices. The design and the materials used in the body of the warhead shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation. Comment: Examples of detailed requirements that can be stipulated: safety margin for deformation, freedom from cracks, overlaps, pores or incorrect heat treatment that can lead to hazardous events. Concerning pressure in the barrel, refer to Chapter 4, Weapons. When tempered steel is used in the casing the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that hydrogen embrittlement or other dangerous corrosion does not occur. The internal surface of the casing shall be smooth and clean. Comment: The warhead shall be protected against moisture until filled with explosive. The design and composition of the HE charge and the pyrotechnic charge shall be such that they can withstand all stresses arising without any risk of a hazardous event occurring. Comment: Testing shall be performed in accordance with FSD 0060. The warhead shall be designed to preclude the presence of high explosive or pyrotechnic composition in threads and joints in such a quantity as to create a risk of hazard initiation when screwing components on or off or during launch or release. Requirements 1.52008 and 1.52009 shall be veried by testing. Comment: The parts in the warhead can be examined prior to testing by using X-ray, radiography, ultrasonic testing or other methods.
1.52003 1.52004
1.52005
1.52006
1.52007
5
1.52008
1.52009
1.52010
120
Ammunition 5
1.52011
The warhead shall not be susceptible to cook-off in the event of a misfire or interruption in firing when the barrel is at its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question. Comment: Refer also to requirements 1.43035 and 1.53019. The melting point of the high explosive should be higher than the temperature reached by the ammunition in a barrel heated to its maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question. The warhead in its application should not detonate in the event of fire. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060. Requirement 1.52013 should be verified by testing. The warhead in its application should not detonate from bullet attack from small arms ammunition. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060. Requirement 1.52015 should be verified by testing. The design of the warhead should facilitate upgrading, in-service surveillance and disposal. The possible destruction of any duds (unexploded ammunition) should be taken into account during the design of the warhead. Toxicity arising from manufacture, use, clearance of duds, recovery of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into account. The blast pressure from a detonating warhead should be determined. Comment: The danger areas for blast pressure and fragmentation shall be determined. The environmental aspects of manufacture, use, clearance of duds, recovery of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into account. The safe separation distance shall be determined for all warheads. Refer also to requirement 1.51024.
1.52012
1.52013
1.52014 1.52015
1.52016 1.52017 1.52018 1.52019 1.52020
1.52021
1.52022
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5 Ammunition
5.2.2
5.2.2.1
Warheads containing high explosive (HE)

HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition
This section contains object specic instructions for warheads for tube-launched ammunition. In addition, common instructions as stated in Chapter 2, Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel shall apply. HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition for cannons, howitzers, mortars, and recoilless launch tube weapons are dealt with herein. HE shells primarily consist of a shell body lled with high explosive which may be compressed or cast. The design is dimensioned to withstand high pressure and high acceleration and, where relevant, spin. Practice shells with a reduced charge are similar to HE shells but have a greatly reduced charge or spotting charge. On burst the spotting charge produces a ash and smoke to facilitate observation of the impact point. The quantity of high explosive is reduced to such an extent that no injury to the gun crew nor damage to the gun shall occur in the event of premature detonation in the barrel. If this condition cannot be met in the design, the practice shells shall be treated in the same way as HE shells from the safety aspect.
Fuze
Booster
Auxiliary booster
Auxiliary booster casing Auxiliary booster charge
HE Shell
Auxiliary booster Main charge
Shell body
Driving band Pipe disc
Figure 5.1 Example of an HE shell containing a booster and fuze

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A characteristic of tube-launched ammunition is that the projectile is subjected to high pressure, high temperature and acceleration, and often spin in the barrel, as well as aerodynamic heating while in ight. This means that the safety of the design must be examined carefully with regard to material load etc. Material defects can have a critical effect if leakage occurs allowing hot propellant gases to enter and ignite the HE charge. Shell bodies may exhibit leaks in the base (so-called pipes), which is why the base is usually tted with a metal base plate or other sealing device. A coarse inner surface in the shell body may increase the risk of a hazardous event owing to increased friction. The sensitivity of the warhead in question is signicantly dependent on the quality of the high explosive, its freedom from foreign particles and its application. Pipes, cavities, and cracks (especially close to the base) may cause settling of the high explosive during ring, which in turn can lead to premature ignition by adiabatic compression (detonation in the barrel). If ring is interrupted, an HE charge in a shell may be initiated if it remains in the rammed position in a hot barrel (so-called cook-off). In the case of rocket assisted projectiles it is important to consider the effects of thermal conductivity and erosion on the wall separating the rocket engine from the high explosive charge. The driving band usually made of copper, a copper alloy, plastic or sintered iron can be a safety critical item. Defects in the material or in the manufacture of the driving band may lead to disintegration in the barrel, which in turn may cause a hazardous event. 1.52023 If it is conceivable that the material from which the shell body is fabricated may contain pipes a base plate or equivalent shall be employed and shall be attached in a satisfactory manner. When filling a shell body with high explosive it shall be ensured that unacceptable pipes, cavities or cracks do not occur and that the required adhesion is achieved. Requirement 1.52024 shall be verified by X-ray inspection, sawing in half the shell bodies, or by the use of bisectable shell bodies. Pressed shell bodies shall be free from explosive composition dust. Pressed shell bodies shall meet stipulated requirements concerning freedom from cracks and other defects. Any separations in the shell body shall be satisfactorily sealed to prevent the ingress of high explosive into joints.
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1.52024
1.52025 1.52026 1.52027 1.52028
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1.52029 1.52030 1.52031
When installing an auxiliary booster it shall be ensured that no cavity occurs that could cause hazard initiation. In shells equipped with an end screw or base fuze, the HE charge in the shell shall be well lled against the base of the shell. It shall be ensured that any uncontrolled base bleed combustion cannot lead to deagration/detonation of the warhead via gas flow or gas erosion when firing base bleed ammunition. HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles
5.2.2.2
This section covers HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles. Such warheads consist mainly of a casing (sleeve, nose cone) and an HE charge. Designs differ to achieve optimum effect in the intended target. The casing is also dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. The HE charge may be cast or compressed. Most rockets and guided missiles have practice warheads for training purposes. They have a reduced HE charge, combined with a spotting agent that produces smoke and/or a ash when they burst. There are also practice warheads that produce smoke on impact without employing any high explosive (or fuze), (e.g. an ampoule of titanium tetrachloride which is crushed on impact).
Figure 5.2 Rocket with warhead
A characteristic feature of rocket and missile warheads is that they are usually located adjacent to a rocket engine. Consequently, the safety review must take into account inter alia the likelihood of initiation of the explosive by heat from the burning propellant or by the direct ingress of propellant gases owing to their erosive effect, or because of material defects. Some projectiles, such as those employing impulse rocket engines, are subjected to high acceleration when all the propellant has burnt out in the launch tube. In this type of ammunition the requirements concerning absence of pipes etc. in the HE charge and warhead casing are the same as for tube-launched ammunition as specied in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition, to avoid any possibility of settling of the high explosive that could cause premature initiation. Most rocket and missile warheads, however, are not subjected to such an accel-
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eration, which is why the same stringent safety requirements do not need to be applied in respect of the casing, surface texture, and the freedom from pipes and cracks of the HE charge. Airborne ammunition can be subjected to aerodynamic heating of the warhead during normal ight or during the approach phase. It is important that the quantity of high explosive in practice warheads is reduced to a small enough quantity to ensure that hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury. If this is not feasible, the practice warhead in question shall be considered to be an HE warhead from the safety aspect. 1.52032 1.52033 5.2.2.3 The warhead casing should not consist of separate parts within the zone adjacent to the rocket engine in order to avoid gas leakage. The HE charge in the warhead should be protected from heat-generating components. HE warheads for bombs
This section addresses HE warheads for bombs which herein refer mainly to those that are equipped with ns or equivalent, and are dropped from aircraft to subsequently follow a ballistic trajectory. For bombs that contain devices to guide the bomb to the target or to correct the nal phase of the trajectory, the applicable parts of Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition and 5.2.2.2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles apply. Bomb warheads mainly consist of a casing and an HE charge. The casing is sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing is also dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. The bomb casing is equipped with a suspension device and ns, and is usually completely lled with high explosive. This may be cast or compressed, or consist of liquid high explosive. The casing may also contain the bomb fuzing system. For this item the requirements specied in Section 5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges apply. A feature of warheads in HE bombs is that they usually contain large quantities of high explosive which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage. In the case of practice bombs containing explosive spotting charges it is vital that the quantity of explosive contained is small enough so that any hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage.
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Bombs are usually not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated regarding the structural strength, homogeneity, etc. of the explosive charge. Environmental stress factors such as vibration and aerodynamic heating occur in high speed ight. 1.52034 If the casing consists of separate parts, there shall be sufficient sealing to ensure that ingress of moisture or leakage of explosive does not occur. Where separate charges are used the intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate ller material. HE warheads for landmines
1.52035 5.2.2.4
This section contains materiel specic requirements for landmine warheads. The joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition also apply. The text below addresses HE warheads for landmines, which herein mainly denotes those that are laid manually and those laid by a mechanical minelayer. For warheads that are ejected or transported to the target zone by some kind of carrier, the relevant parts of previous sections of this chapter apply. In the case of landmines designed for possible deployment in peacetime, the design shall take into account the possible risk of hazard initiation caused by the weather, radio/light signals, minor earth tremors or equivalent, road works even after a long period of deployment. Landmine warheads mainly consist of a casing and HE charge. The casing is sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing also has to be dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. In some cases the warhead has no casing, but the HE charge is then reinforced with berglass, either homogeneous or surface-reinforced. The casing is usually completely lled by the HE charge, which may be cast or compressed. The casing may also contain the mine fuzing system, for which the requirements stated in Section 5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges apply.
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Figure 5.3 Example of a landmine warhead In terms of safety, warheads for HE landmines are usually characterised by containing relatively large quantities of high explosive, which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage. Landmines are normally not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning their structural strength, homogeneity, etc. It is vital that practice landmines containing an explosive spotting charge contain a quantity of explosive that is small enough so that any hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury during normal use. 1.52036 1.52037 5.2.2.5 If the casing consists of separate parts there shall be sealing to prevent the ingress of moisture. The metal casing shall be protected against corrosion. HE warheads for large underwater ammunition
This section contains object specic requirements for warheads used in underwater mines, depth charges and torpedoes. For small underwater weapons, such as anti-submarine shells, refer to Section 5.2.2.6 HE warheads for other ammunition. In addition, the joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition also apply. The text below addresses HE warheads for underwater use in such weapons as underwater mines, depth charges and torpedoes. Underwater mines that are intended for deployment in peacetime should be designed to take into account the possible risk for hazard initiation owing to gas formation in the warhead or collision with a vessel or submarine even after a long period of deployment.
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Warheads for underwater mines, depth charges, and torpedoes are designed to provide overpressure effect and consist mainly of an explosive charge, the casing and a location for the fuzing system. The casing is dimensioned for the calculated stresses during handling and the actual launch stresses, but great importance must also be attached to corrosion resistance and being proof against the ingress of water/moisture, both in salt water and in a salt water atmosphere.
Figure 5.4 Example of an underwater mine
Figure 5.5 Example of a torpedo
A characteristic feature of HE warheads for underwater mines, depth charges, and torpedoes is that they usually contain extremely large quantities of high explosive which is why an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury or damage. The high explosive may contain aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate to increase the pressure effect. This generally means that stringent requirements must be stipulated concerning water-tightness since ingress of moisture may cause gas to form. In certain cases ventilation must be enabled. These warheads are subjected to lower rates of acceleration than tube-launched ammunition which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning the structural strength of the high explosive, its adhesion, and its freedom from cavities and cracks. However, there is enhanced risk when there are through-cracks in large charges contained in elastic casings or in casings with low structural strength.
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High explosive should be avoided in practice warheads. If the pedagogical nature of the training does not enable total exclusion of high explosive, it is vital that the quantity of any explosive used shall be small enough so that a hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage to materiel. Instead, other types of indication should be employed such as buoys or pyrotechnic spotting charges for smoke or light signals. 1.52038 If there is a risk of overpressure in the warhead it shall be possible to remove plugs or other seals without risk of injury to personnel, such as during in-service surveillance of ammunition. Fuzes shall form a seal with the casing or have a sealed seat/location. Metal casings shall be protected against corrosion internally and externally. Where separate charges are used, any intervening space shall be filled with an appropriate ller material. HE warheads for other ammunition
1.52039 1.52040 1.52041 5.2.2.6
This section states materiel specic requirements for natures of ammunition containing HE charges other than those dealt with elsewhere in this chapter. In addition, the joint specications stated in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition also apply. This section addresses HE ammunition that is not readily categorised as having HE warheads designed for tube-launched ammunition, bombs, rockets, guided missiles, landmines, underwater mines or torpedoes. Ammunition denoted by the title to this section is normally used statically with the exception of hand-grenades and rocket-projected line charges, for example, the former being thrown by hand and the latter being deployed by means of a rocket. Initiation is either delayed (e.g. safety fuze with detonator or delay detonator) or remotely controlled (e.g. pull-string with percussion cap, rapid or PETN fuze, or electrically).
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Examples of such ammunition are hand grenades, mine clearing ammunition, PETN fuzes, cylindrical or prismatic hollow-charges, and demolition charges in the form of Bangalore torpedoes and linear/hose charges. A characteristic feature of such HE ammunition is that it often incorporates high explosive in containers of elementary design or without a casing, and that if a hazardous event occurs can deagrate or detonate to cause incendiary, fragmentation and pressure effects. Safety during use is mainly based on directives, regulations, and instructions for use. Figure 5.6 Example of a hand-grenade 1.52042 Ammunition and packaging should be such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and joint loading in accordance with the UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods can be permitted.
5.2.3
Pyrotechnic warheads
The section headed General is a compilation of general requirements. In addition, the general requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition also apply. Moreover, each type of warhead also has object specic requirements that are disclosed in other sections of this chapter.
5.2.3.1
General
This section addresses warheads whose main effect derives from pyrotechnic charges. Other warheads incorporating pyrotechnics (e.g. as tracers or as components in priming devices) are addressed in the relevant subsection. The same applies to warheads with comparable effect achieved by agents other than pyrotechnic (e.g. instantaneous smoke by ejection of substances that are themselves not explosives). Incendiary warheads containing a charge of high explosive incendiary composition shall be considered as HE warheads from the safety aspect.
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Pyrotechnic charges contain pyrotechnic compositions that can be in powder form, granulated to a particular shape, or compressed (with or without a binding agent) to form pellets. They are usually encased in moisture-proof containers. Where appropriate, the warhead casing is resistant and sealed, e.g. warheads for tube-launched ammunition, rockets and bombs. Pyrotechnic warheads can be incorporated in: illuminating ammunition used for illuminating the battlefield, smoke ammunition for degrading enemy visibility, incendiary ammunition, signal ammunition, utilising light and/or smoke, spotting agents and practice ammunition simulating real weapon effect.
A characteristic feature of most types of pyrotechnic ammunition is that it often contains ammable pyrotechnic composition which, when ignited, emits hot combustion products that can cause re. Depending on the connement, such pressure may arise that rapid deagration, or even detonation, occurs in which case the casing can burst with subsequent fragmentation effect. Pyrotechnic compositions can be sensitive to shock, especially if composition dust is present or can occur. There is a risk of friction ignition if such composition dust migrates to, or during manufacture becomes present in, threads or joint surfaces where it may initiate when the fuze is screwed on or off or when subjected to equivalent stress such as bump, shock or vibration. It is vital that pyrotechnic charges are adequately conned to prevent risks of this type. Even cracks in compressed pellets can entail a risk of friction initiation or violent burning sequence if subjected to environmental stress. Some parts of inadequately mixed compositions may be more sensitive to percussion than normal. Pyrotechnic compositions that are hygroscopic may change their properties as a result of moisture ingress. Gas may form and create such an increase in pressure that the casing can burst. Escaping gas (such as hydrogen) can form an explosive mixture with air. Ingress of moisture can also entail a risk of spontaneous combustion (e.g. for smoke compositions containing zinc). Generally, smoke compositions contain inert zinc which shall not involve a risk of spontaneous combustion. Smoke ammunition is TS classied with a 3 as the second digit, i.e. there is no risk of inadvertent ignition.
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Pyrotechnic compositions or their combustion products can be toxic, especially smoke compositions. Care must also be taken to ensure compatibility between the various compositions and the other components in a pyrotechnic warhead. The stability of the compositions used when subjected to various environmental conditions shall also be assured. 5.2.3.2 1.52043 Requirements Pyrotechnic ammunition should be designed and the compositions selected such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and the UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods can be permitted. The charge shall meet the prescribed moisture content. The charge shall meet the prescribed purity from foreign particles. The pyrotechnic composition used should have good storage stability. Compressed pellets shall meet the prescribed structural strength. Insulation adhesion shall meet the prescribed value. Requirement 1.52048 shall be veried by testing, and if necessary by destructive testing. Insulation shall be free from cracks and cavities. The charge casing shall be sealed. Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition
1.52044 1.52045 1.52046 1.52047 1.52048 1.52049 1.52050 1.52051 5.2.3.3
This section contains object specic requirements for pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition. In addition, the applicable parts of the joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition also apply. This section addresses pyrotechnic warheads for illuminating, smoke or incendiary effect (or a combination thereof) used in guns (including signal pistols). Such warheads mainly consist of a shell body (cargo shell) which is dimensioned to withstand the high pressure and subsequent high acceleration and, where appropriate, spin and spin acceleration for the weapon specied, together with a pyrotechnic charge (or charges). Additionally, in most cases there are one or more parachutes, spin brakes and support segments. Effect is achieved in the form of illumination, smoke screen, setting the target on re, or by signal effect.
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Smoke shell
Illuminating shell Fuze with igniting device
Separation charge in bag or cartridge Smoke charges with igniting charge
Illuminating charge with igniting charge
Spin brake Spin brake Shell body Driving band Support sleeve Parachute with central and shroud lines
Base plate
Figure 5.7 Example of a shell for smoke and illuminating effect A characteristic feature of pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition is that the propelling charge subjects them to high pressure and high temperature during the bore phase. In most cases the shell body is provided with an expellable base, which is expelled together with the pyrotechnic charge at a pre-determined point in the trajectory. Unsatisfactory sealing of the base or material defects that may allow the ingress of hot propellant gas can cause a hazardous event if the charge is ignited in the barrel. Furthermore, the structural strength of the charge and the charge casing is vital from the safety aspect, because if the charge disintegrates during acceleration, or if there is loose composition dust present, friction initiation and an uncontrollable burning sequence may occur. 1.52052 1.52053 The base of the shell shall be completely sealed against hot propellant gases, moisture etc. and against composition dust. At final assembly the charge shall have the correct moisture content. Comment: If necessary the charge may need to be dried before final assembly.
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Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued

1.52022
SHALL
Safe separation distance
HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition 1.52023 SHALL Base plate against pipes 1.52024 SHALL Unacceptable pipes 1.52025 SHALL X-ray inspection 1.52026 SHALL Explosive composition dust 1.52027 SHALL Freedom from cracks 1.52028 SHALL Separations sealed 1.52029 SHALL Auxiliary booster, no cavity 1.52030 SHALL HE charge well lled 1.52031 SHALL Uncontrolled base bleed combustion HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles 1.52032 SHOULD Mono-casing 1.52033 SHOULD HE charge protected HE warheads for bombs 1.52034 SHALL Casing in separate parts 1.52035 SHALL Separate charges, ller material HE warheads for landmines 1.52036 SHALL Casing in separate parts 1.52037 SHALL Corrosion protection for casing HE warheads for large underwater ammunition 1.52038 SHALL Plugs for overpressure 1.52039 SHALL Fuzes sealed 1.52040 SHALL Corrosion protection for casing 1.52041 SHALL Separate charges, ller material HE warheads for other ammunition 1.52042 SHOULD Co-storage Pyrotechnic warheads 1.52043 SHOULD 1.52044 SHALL 1.52045 SHALL Co-storage Moisture content of charge Purity of charge
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Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued

1.52046 1.52047 1.52048 1.52049 1.52050 1.52051
SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL
Storage stability of pyrotechnic composition Structural strength of compressed pellets Insulation adhesion Verication of requirement 1.52048 Insulation free from cracks Charge casing sealed
Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition 1.52052 SHALL Base of shell sealed 1.52053 SHALL Moisture content of charge a) 1.52054 1.52055
a)
Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs 1.52056 SHALL Dividing wall sealed 1.52057 SHALL Moisture content of charge Other pyrotechnic warheads The applicable parts of the requirements specied for pyrotechnic warheads apply to other pyrotechnic warheads Other warheads 1.52058 SHALL Requirements as per Section 5.2.3
a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank
5.3 5.3.1
Propulsion systems General
This section species the joint requirements for propulsion devices. In addition, the materiel specic requirements stated in the relevant subsection for the various types of propulsion system also apply.
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5.3.1.1
Description of function
The purpose of propulsion devices in ammunition is to impart sufcient impulse to the warhead to transport the ammunition to the target. The term propulsion devices herein denotes charges in gun systems that impart the correct muzzle velocity to projectiles, and includes reaction motors of various types that provide propulsion in the launch or trajectory phase such as in a rocket assisted projectile or in both phases. Gas generators are designed to produce gas ow under pressure and are used for various purposes in ammunition, such as to pressurise fuel and oxidiser tanks in liquid fuel rocket engines etc., as power sources for subsystems in guided missiles and torpedoes, or as devices in projectiles for reducing air resistance socalled base-bleed units. Propulsion agents are used in propulsion devices and gas generators, but can also be taken from the medium through which the projectile travels, i.e. air or water (torpedo propulsion). Gun systems use propellants only, though in the future this may possibly be combined with electricity. Rocket engines use propellant as well as single, double or triple base liquid propulsion agents. Airbreathing engines use low-oxidiser propellants (in ram rocket engines and turbo-rocket engines), solid fuels without oxidizer (ramjets, SFRJ Solid Fuel RamJet), and liquid fuels (ordinary ramjet and turbojet engines). Gas generators use propellants or liquid propulsion agents. Propellants, like other types of explosives, are characterised by a very rapid generation of energy irrespective of their surroundings. On the other hand, heat generation per unit weight is low, for example only about 10% of the heat generated by burning the corresponding quantity of petrol (gasoline) in air. Ignition of propulsion agents is achieved by using various types of priming devices containing an initiator that is initiated mechanically or electrically, or by some other type of energy supply. The priming device usually contains a pyrotechnic booster charge adjacent to the initiator (e.g. percussion cap, electric primer) to ensure rapid, reproducible ignition of the propulsion agent. Artillery primers, base-bleed initiators, and rocket engine initiators are examples of such priming devices. 5.3.1.2 Safety aspects
From a safety point of view it should be noted that propulsion agents can be inammable, highly reactive, toxic and explosive. The rate of combustion usually increases with pressure, i.e. connement ratio. If the rise in pressure is
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uncontrolled there is a risk of a hazardous event. Inadvertent initiation can occur through friction, discharge of static electricity, heating to ignition temperature, or by inadvertent actuation of the priming device (by impact, shock, heat or electric elds). Additionally, propulsion agents can be susceptible to deterioration through ageing so that the ignition temperature becomes lower or the agent becomes unstable, for example. Several countries are developing ammunition that is less sensitive to re and bullet attack. This ammunition is known as IM (insensitive munition). The designation LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) is also used. Technically, the propulsion agent is made less sensitive by the use of plastic as a binding agent while the energy-producing agent is a nitramine, and/or by conning the propulsion agent in such a way that sensitivity is reduced. 5.3.1.3 Materiel environment
The following are examples of the consequences of mechanical stress from the environment: Cracks, debonding, formation of propellant dust, damage to propellant insulation or other defects that considerably increase the burning surface, may occur in propelling charges causing the pressure during combustion to be higher than that for which the ammunition casing is designed.
The following are examples of the consequences of physical and chemical stress from the environment: If stored at high temperature and/or in high humidity there is a risk that the rate of burn of the propelling charge may be affected so that an excessive pressure arises. This applies particularly to unbonded charges and can, in unfavourable cases for example, result in blockage of the exhaust nozzle in rocket engines or base bleed units by charge particles that have debonded. When using a case bonded charge a permanent deformation may be induced because of differences in the coefficients of expansion between the casing and the charge. This can in some cases after a long duration result in cracks in the charge (relaxation until fracture) or cause debonding between the charge and its insulation. The risks are enhanced when the casing is subjected to pressure at ignition. Risks can also arise owing to variations in temperature (temperature cycles). Reactions in the propulsion agent, or between the agent and other materials, can change the properties of the agent itself (i.e. ageing). An example of this is a decay in the rheological properties which can lead to the formation of cracks in the propulsion agent when used at low temperature. Another example is degraded stability which, in severe cases, can lead to self-ignition of the propulsion agent. A further example involves changes in internal bal-
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listic properties, which can cause the combustion process to differ from what is intended, particularly at high or low temperatures. Furthermore, the propulsion agent can affect other materials, such as the igniter cup, causing the material to embrittle and rupture. Liquid fuel propulsion agents with a higher thermal cubic expansion rate than the surrounding fuel tank casing can, when overheated, rupture the casing or the integral bursting discs, whereby the propulsion agent can be expelled into the reaction chamber and/or the surroundings. Propellant motors with non-electrically conducting casings, and propellants containing metallic powders such as aluminium, can be subject to hazard initiation caused by electrostatic discharge. Electrical charging of the motor casing can occur during use. This applies particularly in a dry, cold atmosphere. The electric field from the charge can be intensified in the propellant and create a flash-over between the metallic grains thus causing hazard initiation. A number of accidents caused by ESD (electrostatic discharge) have occurred in the USA. All have occurred in systems containing large charges (Pershing, Peacekeeper). Joint requirements The design of, and materials in, a propelling charge casing shall be selected so as to ensure that the casing resists all specified loads without exceeding the permissible deformation or stress. Adjacent materials, and materials in the propelling charge, shall be compatible. These materials may comprise internal protective paint, sealing agents, insulation materials, combustion catalysts, wear protectants, etc. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006 and 1.23007. When using hardened steel the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that no hydrogen brittleness nor detrimental corrosion occurs. The propelling charge shall be of a type, quality, and size to ensure that the required safety margin for permissible maximum pressure in all specified environments is not exceeded. The propulsion force process and pressuretime curves shall be reproducible within the stated requirement specification. The propelling charge should be designed to minimise fragments propelled rearwards from the base plate or nozzle plug, for example. The safe separation distance/time shall be established for all propulsion systems during the most unfavourable operating conditions. Refer also to requirement 1.51024.
5.3.1.4 1.53001
1.53002
1.53003
1.53004
1.53005 1.53006
1.53007
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1.53008 1.53009 1.53010 1.53011
Metal additives, if any, shall not be able to block the exhaust nozzle. The propulsion agent casing shall be sealed as required. The propulsion agent casing shall withstand handling throughout its service life. The composition of the propulsion agent should be such that the agent, its components and its combustion products are of minimal toxicity and have as little environmental impact as possible. This applies to manufacture, use, clearance of duds and disposal. The design should facilitate disassembly (e.g. for upgrading, inservice surveillance and disposal). The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate when subjected to the specified bullet attack. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060. Bullet attack testing of the propulsion device as specified in requirement 1.53013 should be performed. The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate if subjected to re. Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060. A fuel re test should be performed as specified in requirement 1.53015.
1.53012 1.53013
1.53014 1.53015
1.53016
5.3.2
5.3.2.1
Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition

General
This section contains materiel specic requirements for propulsion agents in the form of solid propellant for tube-launched ammunition. In addition, the joint requirements specied in Section 5.1 also apply. Nitrocellulose-based propellants are normally used as propulsion agents in tubelaunched ammunition. The following factors must be taken into account when dimensioning a propelling charge: the size of the combustion chamber, length of the barrel, dynamic strength of the barrel (elasticity), mass of the projectile, driving band force, method of ignition, and the temperature. The pressure process is dependent on these factors as well as on the type of propellant and the
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size and shape of the burn surface. Propellant dimensions are usually such that the propellant has burnt out before the projectile travels through the muzzle of the barrel, since the aim is to achieve low dispersion of velocity and to minimise the ame. Propellant is normally encased either in fabric (i.e. bag charge), or in a cartridge case or separate case to form a propelling charge of designated type and dimensions. Bag charges are used where an incremental/modular charge system is required, such as for howitzers and mortars. Bag charges can then be used in combination with separate charge cases, made of metal or plastic, to facilitate simultaneous loading of the shell and propelling charge. Small arms and automatic weapons, for example, use unitary ammunition with a single propelling charge in a metal cartridge case. Combustible cartridge cases are also available, consisting mainly of nitro-cellulose. The combustible case burns together with the propellant, and is integral to the propelling charge to a greater or lesser extent. Propellants in liquid fuel propellant ammunition employ other suitable mixtures of explosives rather than nitro-cellulose and nitro-glycerine, to enable a lower sensitivity resulting from a higher ignition temperature for the composition. Priming devices normally consist of an artillery primer (electrically or mechanically actuated), and usually screwed into the base of the cartridge case. The artillery primer can be short or can extend through a large section of the loading chamber. Bag charges (modular charges) often have a booster charge of black powder or nely granulated porous propellant attached. This enables simultaneous initiation of the entire propelling charge. Cannon primers are used as priming devices in howitzers and other gun systems that use bag charges. The cannon primer is inserted into the breech mechanism of the weapon. The propulsion agent for small arms ammunition is ignited by a percussion cap or equivalent. Liquid fuel propellant may be introduced into future weapon systems. The high pressure in the ejection mechanism requires steel with very good mechanical and chemical properties. Oscillations during combustion can affect the electronics in the ammunition, for example. ETC (electro-thermal-chemical launching) is being studied and developed for possible introduction into future weapon systems. This technology provides the prerequisites for increased range and higher reproducibility in the weapon.
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More stringent requirements will thereby be prescribed for heat resistance and structural strength in the combustion chamber and barrel. Considerably higher combustion temperatures and pressures will be achieved. The rapid discharge of large quantities of stored energy in the capacitor bank of the weapon increases risks in the form of high electric and magnetic elds and currents.
Figure 5.9 Examples of propelling charges
5.3.2.1.1
Safety aspects
A characteristic feature of propelling charges is that they combust without any supply of air, and that their rate of combustion depends inter alia upon the pressure, which in turn is dependent on the connement conditions of the propellant. Some propellants, under certain circumstances, can be made to detonate. Factors that tend to increase their proneness to detonation are severe connement, small particle size, high porosity, high nitro-glycerine content and large charge quantities. In addition to the hazard initiation stated in Section 5.3.1.2, accidents can occur if the incorrect charge (incorrect type of propellant, incorrect dimension or quantity) is used, or if an incorrect or defective projectile is used.
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5.3.2.1.2 1.53017
Requirements Within the permitted temperature range the propelling charge shall produce a pressure (MOP) that is lower than the permitted maximum value for the barrel and shell. Comment: In the dimensioning and design of the ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 shall be applied. For recoil barrels the combustion of the propelling charge should be designed not to cause backflash. The propelling charge shall be resistant to cook-off in the event of a misfire or an interruption in firing when the barrel is at maximum temperature for the operational profile in question. Refer also to requirement 1.43035. The cartridge case shall seal against the chamber seat so that there is no gas leakage. When using percussion caps in artillery primers etc., the impact surface shall be countersunk so that the risk for inadvertent initiation during use is minimal. The propelling charge should be designed such that the propellant is burnt out before the projectile exits the muzzle.
1.53018 1.53019
1.53020 1.53021
1.53022
5.3.3
Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets, guided missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), torpedoes, etc.
General
5.3.3.1
This section contains materiel specic requirements for propulsion devices and gas generators used in rockets, guided missiles, UAVs, torpedoes, etc. A common factor of these devices is that they all contain propulsion agents that constitute hazard factors (re, explosion or toxic hazards). These devices are incorporated in various types of propulsion systems, and can be subdivided into the following three groups: reaction engines (see Figure 5.10), gas generators, propulsion devices for torpedoes.
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5 Ammunition
Reaction engines
Rocket engines
Contain oxidants and fuel
Jet rocket engines

Contain a gas generator that generates gaseous fuel that is combusted by air taken in form the atmosphere
Jet engines
Use fuel (solid or liquid) that is combusted by air taken in form the atmosphere
Propellant rocket engines

Contain solid propellant
Hybrid rocket engines

Contain a solid and a liquid propulsion agent
Liquid fuel rocket engines

Contain liquid oxidant and liquid fuel. In certain cases, a singel component propulsion agent
Ram rocket engines
Turbojet engines
Air taken in from the atmosphere is compressed by a turbine driven compressor
Ram rocket engines

Air inducated from the atmosphere is compressed by the ram effect
Figure 5.10 Subdivision of reaction engines 5.3.3.2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators
Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators use propellant conned in a casing (sleeve) incorporating one or more jets (nozzles) and the necessary priming devices. As the propellant burns, hot gases are formed that vent out through the exhaust nozzle(s).
Because the rate of combustion is dependent on the temperature of the propellant, the pressure is usually higher in a hot engine than in a cold one. In a propellant gas generator the pressure is regulated by releasing the gas ow that is not consumed for the designed purpose through one or more valves.
146
Ammunition 5
Exhaust jets
Filter Insulation Casing Booster charges Main charge Electric priming device
Figure 5.11 Example of a propellant gas generator The charge(s) in a propellant rocket engine is/are usually designed according to one of two main principles: unbonded in the engine casing in the form of tubes or rods, for example, see Figure 5.12, case bonded by casting propellant directly into the engine casing which is provided with an internal layer of cementing and insulating material, see Figure 5.13.
Sections of the inner walls of the engine casing that are subjected to hot combustion gases during combustion are usually protected by insulation.
Figure 5.12 Unbonded tubular propellant. All-round combustion

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5 Ammunition
Propellant charge
Liner
Insulation
Figure 5.13 Case bonded charge. Combustion in the propellant channel The malfunction of a propellant rocket engine or propellant gas generator as a result of enlargement of the surface, such as by cracks in the propelling charge(s) and/or debonding between the charge and its insulation, may create such high pressure levels that the casing ruptures. High pressure can also result from the unstable combustion of propellant owing to high frequency pressure oscillations in the engine. Rupture or leakage at normal operating pressure can also occur owing to degradation in the strength of the casing material, or because of corrosion or defects in the internal heat insulation.
Usually the propellant is extinguished if the casing ruptures, but it can be reignited if it comes into contact with hot surfaces. 1.53023 Propulsion devices should be designed such that the pressure vessel does not burst or detonate as a result of the impact of shrapnel from fragment-forming ammunition (or equivalent). Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD 0060. Propulsion devices should be designed such that if the pressure vessel bursts a minimum number of dangerous fragments are formed. Propulsion devices should be designed such that fuel fire does not cause uncontrolled ight. Propulsion devices containing propellant with metallic powder shall be analysed with regard to risks in the event of electrostatic charging.
1.53024
1.53025 1.53026
148
Ammunition 5
5.3.3.3
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators are based on propulsion agents usually in hermetically sealed containers (tanks). Propulsion agents can be of mono- or multi-component type where each component is stored in a separate tank. The main parts of the system are: tank system, feed system, reaction chamber (combustion usually occurs spontaneously), exhaust nozzle.
1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9
1. Fuel pipe 2. Fuel tank 3. Oxidant tank
4. Piston 5. Gas generator 6. Priming agent
7. Over-pressure valve 8. Combustion chamber 9. Exhaust nozzle
Figure 5.14 Example of a liquid fuel rocket engine of off-the-shelf, factory-sealed type with double base propulsion agent (spontaneously reacting fuel and oxidiser) including propellant gas generator Propulsion agents are often highly reactive and toxic. Liquid fuel rocket engines usually contain propellant gas generators with relevant priming devices. The following hazardous events can occur: poisoning or injury to skin upon contact with propulsion agent that has leaked out during the liquid or gaseous phase, fire in the event of contact between propulsion agent that has leaked out and combustible or catalytic substances, spontaneous or delayed reaction in the event of contact between propulsion agents. Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024 and 1.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections. The tank system shall be designed such that direct contact between propulsion agents cannot occur inadvertently. Tanks for propulsion agents shall have adequate space for the expansion of the liquids.
149
1.53027
1.53028 1.53029
5 Ammunition
1.53030 1.53031 5.3.3.4 5.3.3.4.1
Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the engine to start. Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the pressure vessel to burst. Jet engines General
Turbojet and ramjet engines usually use liquid fuel, but ramjet engines can also use a solid fuel charge located in the combustion chamber of the engine. Missiles that have liquid fuel engines are usually kept in storage with their fuel tanks full.
5.3.3.4.1.1 Turbojet engines
Vehicles powered by turbojet engines can be air or ground launched (or launched from ships). In the latter case one or more booster rocket engines are used that are discarded after burnout. Turbojet engines are normally started after the weapon is released or launched.
5.3.3.4.1.2 Ramjet engines
Vehicles powered by ramjet engines are normally accelerated to approximately twice the speed of sound to achieve satisfactory ramjet engine function. This is generally achieved by using a propelling charge in the combustion chamber of the ramjet engine (i.e. an integrated booster). The rocket engine nozzle located in the ramjet engine exhaust nozzle is discarded after burnout, and either the front end of the combustion chamber is opened or special sealing elements are ejected to enable air to enter for the ramjet engine to start. The rocket engine exhaust nozzle can be eliminated in certain cases by designing the propelling charge in a specic way (a so-called nozzleless booster).
Liquid fuel
Priming agent
Figure 5.15 Example of a turbojet engine

150
Ammunition 5
Air intake with centre cone
Diffuser
Combustion chamber
Propellant charge
Afterburner chamber
Exhaust nozzle
Figure 5.16 SFRJ Solid Fuel RamJet engine A special safety aspect concerning turbojet engines is that the liquid propulsion agent can cause fuel re through leakage or inadvertent fuel feed. From the safety aspect an integrated ramjet engine is characterised apart from the risk of fuel re by the same hazards as those inherent in propellant rocket engines owing to the propelling charge located in the combustion chamber. Other hazards that must also be taken into account with both types of engine are those that arise when engine parts such as intake and exhaust covers, rocket engine exhaust nozzles, and separate burnt-out booster rocket engines are discarded after launch. For an SFRJ to function it is necessary for it to reach a high velocity. This velocity can be achieved with the aid of a booster rocket or by ring from a gun. The fuel for the ramjet phase is a solid fuel propellant, generally with no or very low oxidiser content. The safety requirements are therefore less stringent than requirements stated for booster rockets and propulsion devices in gun barrels. 5.3.3.4.2 1.53032 Requirements Requirements 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023 and 1.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections for integrated boosters. The quantity and size of discarded parts (debris) at the start of ramjet function should be minimised. The number of components containing pyrotechnic or explosive compositions should be minimised.
1.53033 1.53034
151
5 Ammunition
5.3.3.5 5.3.3.5.1
Ram rocket engines General
A ram rocket engine consists of a gas generator in which a gaseous fuel is generated, and an afterburner chamber where the fuel is burnt after mixing with air from the atmosphere. The gaseous fuel is generated through combustion or pyrolysis of a solid propulsion agent. A ram rocket engine usually has a propellant rocket charge located in the afterburner to achieve the required ight velocity in the same way as an integrated ramjet engine. It has a similar system of sealing elements in the front end near the air intake, and a propellant rocket nozzle aft that is discarded when the propellant has burnt out. The solid fuel (i.e. propellant with a large excess of fuel) in the gas generator can be ignited and be already burning during the rocket engine phase, thus contributing in a minor way to the mass ow and thereby to the thrust. However, it is more usual to have the airway between the gas generator and afterburner chamber closed during this phase. At transition (i.e. end of propellant phase) the airway is opened while simultaneously the seal closing the air intake is also opened. The gas generator is started by its own igniter and begins to produce gas in the afterburner chamber where it mixes with incoming air to be subsequently ignited by the afterburner igniter.
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Ammunition 5
Booster phase Solid fuel
Propellant
Propellant igniter
Transition phase
Priming agent
Ram rocket phase
Priming agent
Figure 5.17 Ram rocket engine phases From the safety aspect, ram rocket engines are equivalent to propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators, as well as ramjet engines (see relevant subsections). 1.53035 Requirements 1.53005, 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53025, 1.53033 and 1.53034 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections. Propulsion devices for torpedoes
5.3.3.6
Propulsion devices for torpedoes are based on piston engines that are driven by high-pressure steam from a steam generator. A propellant gas generator can be used to start the engine. Battery-driven electric motors are also used. The steam generator is in principle a combustion chamber in which fuel and an oxidiser react while heat is generated. At the same time an appropriate quantity of water is injected so that the propellant gas for the engine consists of dry highpressure steam mixed with combustion products, usually carbon dioxide, as well as nitrogen in the case of air propulsion.
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5 Ammunition
The following combinations of fuel and oxidiser are used: ethyl alcohol and air, parafn (kerosene) and air, ethyl alcohol and hydrogen peroxide (HP), and parafn (kerosene) and high test peroxide (HTP). Propulsion agents are stored in separate tanks. Compressed air is used as an oxidiser as well as for pressurising the other propulsion agent tanks. The hazard factors that apply to propulsion devices with the propulsion agent combinations of ethyl alcohol/air and parafn (kerosene)/air are the same as those that apply to liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators (see above in this section). The instability and powerful oxidising effect of hydrogen peroxide constitutes the most signicant hazard factor in systems where HP is used as propulsion agent. HP that accidentally leaks out and comes into contact with combustible or catalysing substances can cause spontaneous combustion. 5.3.3.6.1 1.53036 Requirements Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024, 1.53028 and 1.53029 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections. HP shall be provided with a stabilizer. HP tanks shall be provided with adequate load relieving and draining devices.
1.53037 1.53038
5.3.4
Requirement checklist for propulsion devices
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Ammunition 5
Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices

Propulsion devices and gas generators in ammunition 1.53001 SHALL Deformation of casing 1.53002 SHALL Compatibility 1.53003 SHALL Heat treatment 1.53004 SHALL Permissible maximum pressure of propelling charge 1.53005 SHALL Reproducibility of propulsion force process 1.53006 SHOULD Fragments propelled rearwards 1.53007 SHALL Safe separation distance 1.53008 SHALL Locking of exhaust nozzle 1.53009 SHALL Propulsion agent casing sealed 1.53010 SHALL Propulsion agent casing, handling throughout service life 1.53011 SHOULD Toxicity of propulsion agent 1.53012 SHOULD Disassembly 1.53013 SHOULD Bullet attack of propulsion device 1.53014 SHOULD Bullet attack test 1.53015 SHOULD Propulsion device resistant to re 1.53016 SHOULD Fuel re test for propulsion devices Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition 1.53017 SHALL MOP of propelling charge 1.53018 SHOULD Backash 1.53019 SHALL Cook-off 1.53020 SHALL Cartridge case sealed 1.53021 SHALL Percussion caps countersunk 1.53022 SHOULD Propelling charge burnt out Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets etc. 1.53023 SHOULD Pressure vessel burst caused by shrapnel 1.53024 SHOULD Fragments from pressure vessel burst
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5 Ammunition
Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices, continued

1.53025 1.53026
SHALL SHALL
Uncontrolled ight Electrostatic charging
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators 1.53027 SHALL Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024 and 1.53025 apply 1.53028 SHALL Direct contact between propulsion agents 1.53029 SHALL Propulsion agent tanks, space for expansion 1.53030 SHALL Motor not started by leakage of propulsion agents 1.53031 SHALL Pressure vessel not to burst by leakage of propulsion agents Jet engines 1.53032 SHALL Requirements 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023 and 1.53025 apply Discarded parts to be minimised Explosive compositions to be minimised Requirements 1.53005, 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53025, 1.53033 and 1.53034 apply
1.53033 1.53034
SHOULD SHOULD
Ram rocket engines 1.53035 SHALL
Propulsion devices for torpedoes 1.53036 SHALL Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024, 1.53028 and 1.53029 apply 1.53037 SHALL Stabiliser for HP 1.53038 SHALL Draining devices for HP tanks
156
Ammunition 5
5.4
Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges Introduction

General
5.4.1
5.4.1.1
The following sections apply to all fuzing systems that are designed to initiate warheads or propelling charges. The requirements specied in Section 5.4.2 through 5.4.5 shall as far as possible be met, even by fuzing systems with non-conforming functions (e.g. fuzing systems that do not use environmental forces for arming) in Section 5.4.6. Warheads and propulsion devices must be initiated by a fuzing system if they are to function as intended. It thus follows that the safety of the fuzing system is a decisive factor in the safety of the entire weapon system. The fuzing system therefore has its own safety system whose task is to prevent hazard initiation throughout all phases in the life of the ammunition with the necessary degree of safety. The integral safety system of a fuze may contain one or more mutually independent safety devices. Each safety device is subject to one or more arming conditions, each of which must be satised for the safety device to arm. It is necessary for all the safety devices to be armed to enable the warhead to be initiated. The more safety devices that prevent initiation or transmission in an explosive train at any given stage, the greater is the degree of safety against hazard initiation at that stage. On the other hand, a large number of safety devices can degrade the reliability of the fuzing system with regard to its intended function. The principal element of a fuzing system consists of one or more transmission safety devices, the design and location of which are dependent on the method of initiation.
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5 Ammunition
There are two groups of transmission safety devices (see Figure 5.18 and 5.19): 1. Transmission safety devices for systems with an out-of-line explosive train (safety device). The explosive components in the explosive train are separated by a mechanical interrupter. 2. Transmission safety devices for systems with an in-line explosive train. There is no mechanical interrupter between the explosive components of the explosive train.
The transmission safety device can be electrical (circuit breaker) or optical, for example. The explosive train is initiated by an initiator when the initiator receives the signal to initiate. Sensor(-s)
Signal processor
Initiator Interrupter Booster
Explosive train
Initiator Transmission safety device

Safety features
Interrupter
Arming conditions
Booster
Warhead charge Figure 5.18 A fuzing system with out-of-line explosive train
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Ammunition 5
Sensor(-s)
Signal processor
Initiator Booster Circuit breaker
Transmission Circuit breaker safety device
Safety features
Arming conditions
Explosive train
Initiator
Booster
Warhead charge Figure 5.19 A fuzing system with in-line explosive train When all requirements for the arming process cannot be met, such as when environmental conditions dependent on use are lacking, the safety level can be accepted in certain cases by enabling the fuzing system or an essential part thereof to be assembled/installed immediately before use. The most sensitive part of the initiator can be a primary explosive, an explosive or a priming composition. Of these the primary explosive is most easily initiated, and therefore demands the most stringent requirements for the safety system. The use of electric SAI units has become increasingly common in pace with the use of electronics for sensors and signal processing. These initiators are generally more sensitive to initiation (by radiated interference, for example, that can cause hazard initiation) than mechanical initiators. However, there are exceptions such as EFI systems. Moreover, it is often difcult to predict the presence and extent of electric energy.
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5 Ammunition
Total safety when using a fuzing system is based on two factors rstly, very carefully considered technical solutions and, secondly, instructions on how to use the system. Together these two factors shall enable a tolerable safety level. As many as possible of the safety features shall be designed into the technical solution, and shall rely on operating instructions no more than is necessary. Requirements governing the need for safety devices in a fuzing system must, to a large extent, be related to the consequences of a hazardous event. A thorough consideration of this interrelationship is vital to system safety.
160
Hazard overview
Arming range(delay)
Figure 5.20 Safety concepts

Safety distance(times) In-flight safety
rain safety resistance to electromagnetic bush safety
Transport and loading safety
Bore and muzzle safety Mask safety
Safe separation distance
Exempel p riskfaktorer
Ammunition 5
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5 Ammunition
5.4.1.2
Materiel environment
Certain typical defects can be detected by subjecting the fuzing system to special testing during development. Such testing shall simulate the predicted environment to which the fuze will be exposed during its life. Defects discovered at this stage can often be remedied by relatively elementary actions. Examples of defects and events that can result from environmental stress and that can adversely affect safety are listed in the subsections below. The list should not be considered as comprehensive. New designs and materials may entail new hazard factors. Additional information may lead to the discovery of further hazard factors. 5.4.1.2.1 Mechanical stress
Examples of the effects of mechanical stress: Leakage. Cracks in materials Pulverization of explosives that can subsequently migrate to a position where initiation can occur through shock or vibration. Localized heating caused by friction between moving parts. Mechanical parts of fuzing systems can be damaged or broken so that initiation occurs during transportation, or prematurely during loading or firing. Electric power cuts or short-circuits can occur through damage to leads or connections. Extraneous circuits can also be created by the ingress of foreign bodies. The risk of complex short-circuits on printed circuit boards and in connectors, for example, should be particularly considered. Cracks in micro-electronic circuits can result in failure effects that are difficult to evaluate. Batteries and electrolytic capacitors can be damaged causing leakage of electrolyte that may cause spontaneous ignition of explosives or make them more sensitive. During transportation, loading and firing, warheads are subjected to acceleration levels that can disable safety features temporarily or permanently.
162
Ammunition 5
5.4.1.2.2
Physical and chemical stress
Examples of the effects of physical and chemical stress: Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they melt or flow plastically. This can result in explosives fastening in screw threads or cavities where they may later be actuated leading to hazard initiation. Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they are initiated (cook-off). Air can be pumped in and out through leaks whereby water vapour enters the fuzing system. Most explosives are adversely affected by water and become either more sensitive or more inert. Gaseous products can be formed from the reaction that can cause damage to constituent parts, and sometimes may also react with them to form more sensitive compounds (such as copper azide). The structural strength, elasticity, and dimensions of the materials from which the fuze is fabricated are affected by temperature so that damage from shocks and vibrations at low temperature, for example, is more likely to occur. Extreme variations in pressure can occur that can damage confined parts and thereby affect their function. Where there are great differences between the coefficients of linear expansion of explosives and their encasing material, leaks and ruptures can be caused in the casing or cracks may be formed in the explosive. Materials containing moisture may swell or shrink when the moisture content changes. Gases or fluids (desirable or undesirable) in the construction can cause corrosion or other physical changes to constituent materials in the fuzing system. Reactions between incompatible materials. Condensation and coating on electrical components and leads can result in extraneous lead-over current and changed electrical characteristics. Corrosion can occur where there is galvanic contact between different metals. An inadvertent flow of energy to electric or laser initiators, possibly caused by some environmental factor, can cause initiation. An inadvertent supply of electric energy, such as discharge of static electricity, can result in electronic components being damaged in such a way that safety is affected. Electrostatic discharge can, in unfavourable cases (in inappropriate designs), directly or indirectly initiate the initiator in the fuzing system.
163
5 Ammunition
An electric potential difference can occur between the ammunition and nearby objects or earth/ground. The risks are greatest when the potential difference is equalized in conjunction with a connection mechanical or electrical to the weapon platform or test equipment. When connecting and disconnecting electrical equipment, high transient currents can occur inadvertently such as when disconnecting the power source after testing. Technical solutions Electrical subsystems
5.4.1.3 5.4.1.3.1
5.4.1.3.1.1 General
Consideration shall be given to the following factors inter alia when designing fuzing systems to achieve protection against inadvertent function: Selection of components: The relay for the armed and unarmed modes shall be selected such that an electric current maintains the relay in armed mode, and any break in voltage results in the relay returning to unarmed mode. Mechanical initiators for thermal batteries shall be selected such that they do not activate the batteries in the event of a defect. When selecting components all the environmental factors to which the system can be subjected shall be taken into account. Static electricity: Any uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can cause hazard initiation of the fuzing system. The design shall ensure that the electrostatic discharge can occur via a resistor or in some other way. Electromagnetic energy: The design must provide the best possible protection from electromagnetic influences including lightning, EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and HPM (high power microwaves). Protection can be achieved in the following ways: Metallic shielding of sensitive components. Storage containers can give considerable protection against electromagnetic energy. HF shielding of openings where there are controls and connectors. Filtration. Circuit insulating relays and connectors that are insensitive to HF energy shall be located as close as possible to protected elements to preclude use of long cables that assimilate energy. Shield connections shall be of low resistance and shall be fully sheathed at all connection points.
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Ammunition 5
Earth/ground currents: The design shall not incorporate earth/ground loops. Each design shall ensure that earth/ground currents are restricted to a safe level during operation, loading and testing. Connectors and cables: Connectors and cables shall be designed and located to achieve maximum protection against short-circuiting resulting from ingress of moisture and foreign matter, e.g. lead connections can have insulating combs between connection points. Connectors shall be designed such that they cannot be assembled incorrectly nor be incorrectly identified.
5.4.1.3.1.2 Electronics
Experience has shown that our present fuzing systems are very safe. When developing new products the aim must be to maintain, or even improve, on this standard of safety. Current developments involve the replacement of mechanical and electromagnetic designs with electronic circuits. This trend is driven by the major advantages afforded by electronics such as high performance, low weight, great exibility and low price. The application of electronics in fuzing systems is, however, far from self-evident. Often any defect in the electronics will affect not only function but also safety. Consequently, there are excellent reasons for exercising great caution. In fuzing systems with an out-of-line explosive train transmission in the explosive train is certainly prevented, but if the interrupting function as such is controlled by electronics the system should be considered as an electronic fuzing system from the safety aspect.
5.4.1.3.1.3 Subsystems with wave-borne signals
If an arming system uses a signal transmitted via a carrier wave the system will be open to all signals intentional and inadvertent that reach its input port. It must thus be ensured that only the correct signal can result in arming, and that the probability of an unauthorized signal reaching the arming object is made sufciently low. This can be achieved, for example, by: Using a sufficient number of combinations and a sufficiently narrow bandwidth.
165
5 Ammunition
Limiting the strength of the signal in range and dispersion to that which is necessary for the specific application. Selecting codes so that only a limited number of objects can be armed by the same code. Changing the signal before the next operating occasion. Varying the signal when repeating commands to the same object. Being able to vary codes or data for signal configuration when deploying the object. Ensuring the code cannot be deciphered despite wide knowledge of the safety system. Incorporating a time-dependent parameter in the signal in cases where arming will take place at a later occasion after deployment.
5.4.1.3.1.4 Programmable subsystems
The increasing use of software in safety critical applications creates a need for rules and guidelines concerning the development of such systems. Those used for the design of electronics are not directly applicable. Conventional safety analysis studies the consequences when various components malfunction or are missing. The behavior of the system in various failure modes can be predicted. Component defects do not usually occur in software after the system has been developed. Instead, the risk is that the system does not behave as intended in all respects. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove subsequently that an existing software program is free from bugs in all respects. Manufacturing defects can also arise during coding, for example. Instead, safety must be designed into the application. This is achieved by systematic procedure throughout design, development, testing, conguration management and documentation. Software can be a good aid for enhancing test efciency but should be avoided as a circuit safety feature in fuzing systems.
5.4.1.3.1.5 Laser fuzing systems
A laser fuzing system in its most elementary form consists of a laser, optical bre, and a detonator (primer). It is also possible to transmit laser energy directly to the detonator without any optical bre. For a system without an interrupter in the explosive train, the laser must be prevented from releasing initiation energy to the detonator before the safe separation distance has been reached. This can be prevented by:
166
Ammunition 5
Separating the laser from the detonator by a barrier introduced into the part of the beam, or by blocking the laser cavity. The requirements for the barrier/blocking then become the same as for an interrupter. Safety features to prevent the electronics from activating the laser.
For laser systems with an interrupter in the explosive train, the standard requirements for an interrupter apply. 5.4.1.4 5.4.1.4.1 Other fuzing systems Fuzing systems for explosives etc.
Fuzing systems with an in-line explosive train have been traditionally accepted for use in demolition devices, signal and spotting agents, hand-grenades, and minesweeping ammunition such as mine counter-blasting charges, explosive cutters and acoustic explosive sweeps, even though sensitivity requirements are not met for such fuzing systems. The initiator usually consists of a primer or detonator that is initiated by electrical or mechanical energy. Safety is mainly based on the observance of regulations governing use. For newly developed ammunition, however, the requirements in this section should also be applied. 5.4.1.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives, demolition sticks, Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges)
Demolition devices are initiated by fuzing systems consisting of, for example, a safety fuze, PETN fuze, non-electric fuze, or solely a detonator with electrical or mechanical initiation. It is vital that fault-free materiel and only the prescribed initiation device are used to prevent hazard initiation. 5.4.1.4.3 Signal and spotting agents
Signal and spotting agents are ignited by igniting devices such as a primer in combination with a safety fuze, or percussion primer with wire actuation. Signal rounds for underwater use can have explosives which, in the event of hazard initiation in air, can cause great damage. For this reason they should have a safety system to which the requirements in this section are applied to the greatest possible extent.
167
5 Ammunition
5.4.1.4.4
Hand-grenades
There are different kinds of hand-grenades such as smoke or HE grenades of which the latter are the most dangerous, having on many occasions caused injury during practice throwing. The most common type of hand-grenade has a fuzing system containing a priming device (i.e. hand-grenade fuze). The fuzing system is armed by the release of a lever on throwing. The hand-grenade fuze is stored separately and is installed only when the grenade is to be used. For newly developed hand-grenades, however, the requirements in this section should be applied to the greatest possible extent. 5.4.1.4.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters
Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters are initiated by a fuzing system consisting of a mechanically initiated detonator. In addition to a transport safety device they incorporate a safety device that requires them to be submerged in water (water pressure). An acoustic explosive sweep consists of detonator clusters and TNT bodies that are initiated by electric detonators. The detonators are red by an electric initiation device with the charges located in special launch tubes. 5.4.1.4.6 Self-destruction
If the fuzing system contains an integrated self-destruction or anti-handling device etc., this function shall have the same degree of safety against hazard initiation as the remainder of the system. 5.4.1.4.7 Submunitions
Fuzing systems in submunitions are subject to the same basic requirements as other fuzing systems. Submunitions can have special functions and characteristics for which it is important to observe the following: That the safety features are disabled in the proper sequence. This can be crucial, for example, for a submunition in an artillery shell in which the first safety feature is disabled when the shell is fired, the second safety feature is disabled when the submunition is ejected. That the safety features are disabled as late as possible with regard to available environmental requirements. For an airborne pod system it could, for example, be inappropriate to disable the first safety feature when the pod is
168
Ammunition 5
released from the aircraft since the aircraft is often close to the pod for a long time after separation. Instead, the separation of submunitions from the pod and the drag force from the parachute etc. should be used as conditions for disabling. Separation from the aircraft may, however, be used as an extra safety condition and as a prerequisite for disabling the other safety features. For submunitions containing high explosive it is often important to incorporate a self-destruction facility owing to the risk of difficulty in detecting unexploded ammunition. Multi-purpose ammunition
5.4.1.4.8
Multi-purpose ammunition is a special type of tube-launched ammunition that exists mainly in the 12.7 - 40 mm calibre range. A characteristic feature of this type of ammunition is that it lacks a conventional fuzing system, and that the explosive reaction consists rather of deagration instead of detonation. The explosive in the warhead is initiated solely by the transfer of energy that occurs when the shell hits the target. Safety against inadvertent initiation can thus only be regulated to a certain extent by applicable requirements in this section. Instead, safety must be veried by testing dedicated to the operational environment of the object. A safety margin can be achieved by increasing the level of severity during testing contra the operational environment. In addition, FMEA testing should be performed with regard to the conceivable malfunctions that can cause safety hazards. 5.4.1.4.9 Tandem systems
The requirements stated in this section shall apply to the initiation of each warhead in systems containing several warheads (i.e. tandem systems). The warheads can have separate or common fuzing systems. 5.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices Existing fuzing systems for propulsion devices often lack a transmission safety device despite the fact that the fuzing system contains explosives that are not approved for use after interrupters, and that the propulsion device itself in the event of a hazard initiation can cause great damage, and even in some cases can activate the fuzing system for the warhead. For newly designed fuzing systems for propulsion devices, however, it is desirable that the requirements stated in this section be applied.
169
5 Ammunition
5.4.2
5.4.2.1 1.54001 1.54002
General requirements
Common requirements Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable safety analysis to be performed. The safety analysis shall be performed by at least one independent party. Comment: In some cases the special system safety function in the same company that designed the system can be considered to be an independent party. The safety level of the fuzing system should be specied numerically as a probability and should be verified by analysis. Single failures that can lead to inadvertent arming or initiation of explosives after the interrupter or circuit safety device within the safe separation distance/time shall not occur. Consequences to the system of single failures shall be verified by theoretical analysis and/or FMEA testing throughout the environmental/applicational range. Comment: This requirement does not apply to the failure mode self-initiation of explosive. For some applications the requirement for redundancy to prevent inadvertent arming can be resolved by, for example, a fail-safe function or by an interrupter between the energy source and the initiator so that activation of the sensor does not lead to initiation. Explosive trains containing sensitive explosives (not approved for use after an interrupter as specified in FSD 0214) shall have at least one mechanical interrupter. No sensitive explosive is permitted after that interrupter. Comment: Refer also to requirements1.54113, 1.54114 and 1.54115. The interrupter in an explosive train should, before arming, segregate the sensitive explosive (out-of-line) from the explosive train. Explosives approved for use after the interrupter or for use in systems without an interrupter shall be qualied for such use as specified in FSD 0214. The probability of inadvertent initiation of an explosive after the interrupter or circuit safety device shall not be higher than the probability against inadvertent arming.
1.54003 1.54004
1.54005
1.54006 1.54007
1.54008
170
Ammunition 5
Comment: A failure must thus not lead to initiation unless all the steps normally required for arming have been completed. 1.54009 Fuzing systems shall be designed and documented in such a manner as to facilitate an effective production control and quality inspection. All constituent materials shall be selected and combined such that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system, e.g. as a result of corrosion, mechanical fatigue, mutual interference, or insufficient chemical stability resulting in the formation of copper azide for example. All explosives shall be conned and/or be xed so that they remain intact when subjected to specified environmental severities. It shall not be possible for external environmental stress such as electromagnetic, electrostatic or laser to be able to inadvertently initiate the initiator in a fuzing system. The safe separation distance/time shall always be established with regard to warhead effect and intended tactical use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022 and 1.51024. Comment: Three different cases can be distinguished: 1. The safe separation distance is so great that there is no risk to friendly forces in the event of a burst when that distance has been reached. No evasive action is assumed. 2. The safe separation distance is shorter than in item 1 above owing to tactical reasons. Evasive action or taking cover is assumed. 3. The safe separation time enables friendly forces to exit the danger area. 1.54014 Fuzing systems should be designed so that a failure in the system results in a fail-safe state. Comment: This requirement can lead to a degradation of any deactivation or self-destruction function. Fuzing systems should not be capable of accumulating sufficient energy to initiate the warhead within the safe separation distance/ time. Fuzing systems should be designed such that incorrect assembly of safety critical parts is not possible.
1.54010
1.54011 1.54012
1.54013
1.54015
1.54016
171
5 Ammunition
1.54017
It shall not be possible to install an armed SAI/SAU in the ammunition if signals to the target sensor can be expected to occur during transport and storage, or during firing before the safe separation distance has been reached. Comment: Arming may have occurred without being detected as a result of incorrect assembly during manufacture or maintenance, or because the SAI/SAU was not deactivated after final testing. Fuzing systems should be equipped with indication for vital safety devices/functions such as arming. Comment: This requirement applies to all phases including manufacture. If there is a requirement for system testing after manufacture (AUR testing), functions for a reliable test shall be built into the fuzing system from the beginning. Fuzing systems should be designed to enable maintenance, upgrading, in-service surveillance, disposal, destruction and destruction of duds, to be carried out safely. The composition and integration of the booster should be such that it does not detonate or deflagrate before the main charge is subjected to heating (e.g. by fire). Integrated circuits should be avoided in safety critical applications. Well proven components should be used. Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) Connector pins in external connectors connected by an EED should be semi-enclosed. The sleeve of an external connector should make contact and provide electromagnetic shielding before the pins engage. The shielding of ignition cables should be connected to the casing of the connector around the complete circumference of the cable. Comment: This is particularly important with the casing of an EED to obtain good high frequency protection. The connection pins in a connector should not be used to connect shields. The switch that finally connects an EED to the electric supply should be located as close to the initiator as possible. The lead/leads between the switch and the EED shall be shielded from external electromagnetic fields and be protected against static electricity.
1.54018
1.54019
1.54020
1.54021
1.54022 1.54023 5.4.2.2
1.54024 1.54025 1.54026
1.54027 1.54028
172
Ammunition 5
1.54029 1.54030 1.54031 1.54032 1.54033 1.54034 5.4.2.3 1.54035 1.54036 1.54037
The capacitance across the switch should be kept sufficiently low to prevent initiation by electrostatic discharge. Twin conductors should be twined. If one pole is earthed/grounded to an EED the earthing/grounding should take the shortest route to a shield surrounding the igniter. Ignition cables shall not be located in the same shield as other conductors. An EED shall have documented electrical characteristics as specified in FSD 0112 or equivalent. Fuzing systems containing EEDs shall be system tested in accordance with FSD 0212 or equivalent. The arming process The arming process should be as elementary as possible. The arming process should be functionally and physically separated from other processes in the system. If a fuzing system requires human intervention to start the arming process, there shall be a device that provides unambiguous indication of whether the system is unarmed. Arming shall not occur until the safe separation distance/time has been reached at the earliest. When two electric signals are used for arming at least one of them shall be dependent on a continuous current supply. If the current supply ceases before arming is completed the fuzing system shall be neutralized or deactivated. In a system where the arming process is controlled by electrical safety features, at least two of them shall be in the form of an interrupter from the current supply. Fuzing systems in which arming is performed by connecting the circuit to earth/ground (single conductor system) should be avoided. Arming shall not be enabled as a result of plausible short-circuits such as short-circuits between adjacent leads in harnesses, in connectors, on PC assemblies and in integrated circuits. Arming shall not be enabled as a result of a plausible power cut caused by, for example, soldering defects, oxidised connector surfaces, or cracks in PCBs or substrates.
1.54038 1.54039 1.54040 1.54041
1.54042
1.54043
1.54044
173
5 Ammunition
1.54045
In systems with wave-borne signals the probability of unauthorized arming/actuation shall be sufficiently low with regard to the field of application. If a signal outside the ammunition is used for arming, the fuzing system shall verify the signal before arming takes place. Arming safety features including semiconductor switches Hazard arming shall be prevented by at least two mutually independent safety features. Comment: The safety features can be: mechanical safety features in an interrupter, mechanically operated electric switches, relays, semiconductor switches.
1.54046 5.4.2.4 1.54047
1.54048 1.54049 1.54050
If a system with only two safety features is used, both shall be mechanical. There shall be at least one mechanical safety feature before the point of launch/deployment. For systems with only semiconductors as safety features, at least three independent closings shall be required at system blocking level for arming. Comment: The closings are best actuated by different signal levels. A system containing only semiconductors shall not be able to arm as a result of static failures in the safety features (failure mode either closed or open), which can mean that at least one of the safety features requires a dynamic signal. Comment: The dynamic signal must be of such a nature that it cannot reasonably occur inadvertently. The safety analysis of system solutions containing only semiconductors as safety features should be performed by at least two independent parties. Application specific requirements Fuzing systems should be designed so that safety is not dependent upon operating procedures.
1.54051
1.54052
5.4.2.5 1.54053
174
Ammunition 5
1.54054
Arming shall only be enabled during use. Comment: The lower limit for arming shall exceed by a good margin the maximum stress level experienced during operation, transport and other relevant environmental conditions. Arming shall only be enabled if two mutually independent, application specific, environmental conditions are satisfied, provided that reasonable such conditions are available. Comment: Examples are stated below of environmental factors that can be used to activate arming and/or as sources for arming energy. All of them shall be considered before the most suitable is selected: acceleration, angular acceleration, spin, launch/deployment device. Sensing of these devices (such as a barrel) is not considered to be a particularly good method but can be accepted, dynamic pressure, drag (via a turbine or parachute for example), hydrodynamic and hydrostatic pressure, arming wires, back pressure.
1.54055
1.54056
If only one realistic environmental condition is available, or two dependent conditions, there shall be at least one manual operation (such as removal of a safety pin) required for arming prior to loading/deployment. Comment: When safety relies entirely on one environmental condition after the manual operation has been performed, a major effort must be made to verify practically and theoretically that this condition cannot occur inadvertently after the manual operation, such as if a shell is dropped during loading. A manual operation or safety pin shall also block the function produced by the only available environmental condition During mechanical deployment of ammunition (such as when laying mines with a minelayer) the arming shall take place at the earliest when the mine leaves the laying device.
1.54057 1.54058
175
5 Ammunition
5.4.2.6 1.54059
Testing Constituent components and subsystems that are vital to the safety of the fuzing system shall undergo separate safety qualification (type testing). Fuzing systems shall undergo complete safety qualication as specified in FSD 0213 or equivalent. Safety critical functions should be monitored during testing and be inspected after testing. Testing shall be performed at a safety limit at which arming is not permitted. Comment: Safety limit in this case denotes the stress level which exceeds by an acceptable margin the most severe level reached during transport, operation, ramming or the firing/launch process. Testing is designed to verify requirement 1.54054. Refer also to the comment after requirement 1.54056. The choice of materials in a fuzing system shall if it is considered necessary be veried by testing that demonstrates with acceptable probability that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing system. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006 and 1.23007. Testing shall be performed to demonstrate whether the design used for connement of the explosives meets the stipulated requirements. Comment: For this testing, dimensions, compacting pressure and other properties shall be selected within their respective tolerance range such that the probability for failures is considered to be greatest. Testing shall be performed in the environment (within the operating range of the fuzing system) that is considered to be the most unfavourable from the safety aspect. Testing shall be performed to establish the distance or time from launch or equivalent at which the transmission safety device arms. If there are other safety devices in the explosive train, they shall be neutralised prior to testing. Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate within the safe separation distance/time owing to passage through mask, impact with the ground, contact with the seabed, somersault, or collision with obstacles. Comment: The concept of inherent safety is used for torpedoes.
1.54060
1.54061
1.54062
1.54063
5
1.54064
1.54065
176
Ammunition 5
1.54066
Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not initiate in flight or after deployment after the arming process is completed as a result of the environmental stress stipulated in the requirement specification for the object. Comment: This requirement applies in the first instance to ammunition for which there is a continuous (undivided) danger area. Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable the required functional testing to be performed safely. Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal Ignition capacitors shall be equipped with duplicate discharge circuits. At least one of these circuits shall be physically located as close to the capacitor as possible. The leakage resistance of ignition capacitors, or for earthing/ grounding in twin conductor systems, shall have as low earth/ ground resistance as the system permits. If the fuzing system contains an integrated anti-handling or anticlearance device or a booby trap charge, the same safety requirements shall apply as for a normal fuzing system. Fuzing systems incorporating a deactivating function shall contain a device that indicates in an unambiguous way whether the system is deactivated. Deactivation shall provide at least the same level of safety as when the system was initially in unarmed mode. Deactivation should not require special tools. Deactivation should remove all initiation energy. The fuzing system should be designed such that deactivation/neutralisation is not prevented by a malfunction in any part of the fuzing system that is not used for deactivation/neutralisation. If it is intended to enable clearance or disposal or recycling the fuzing system shall be designed for subsequent safe handling. Requirements of International Law Landmines shall have a self-destruction, neutralisation or deactivation facility that renders the mine harmless after a certain time. This facility can be automatically or remotely controlled. Drift mines shall have a fuzing system that ensures that the mine is harmless one hour after deployment at the latest.
1.54067 5.4.2.7 1.54068
1.54069
1.54070
1.54071
1.54072 1.54073 1.54074 1.54075
1.54076 5.4.2.8 1.54077
1.54078
177
5 Ammunition
1.54079 1.54080
Anchored mines shall be neutralised as soon as the mine has slipped its mooring. Torpedoes shall be neutralised if they do not hit the target.
5.4.3
5.4.3.1 1.54081
Requirements for systems with interrupters

Design requirements The interrupter shall prevent the booster charge in the fuzing system from initiating in the event of a hazard initiation in the explosive train before the interrupter. Each of the safety features shall individually retain the interrupter in unarmed mode. Safety features in an interrupter should lock directly into the interrupter, not via any linkage or similar device. In systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are available, at least one of the safety features shall lock the interrupter during the arming phase until the ammunition has left the launcher/release device. Fuzing systems should not contain stored energy such as mechanical, pyrotechnical or electrical for removing the interrupter in an explosive train. Comment: Energy for removing an interrupter can best be provided by some unique environmental factor after launch/release. Stored energy shall not be used for both disabling safety features and removing interrupters. Confinement of the explosive train shall be designed such that hazard initiation of the explosive train before the interrupter while the interrupter is in unarmed mode does not provide ejection of fragments that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment. Testing interrupters Testing shall be performed to establish that an interrupter remains locked in unarmed mode with sufficient margin when subjected to the most severe load (cf. the environmental specification) when only one safety feature is installed. The function of each safety feature shall be tested individually.
1.54082 1.54083 1.54084
1.54085
1.54086
1.54087
5.4.3.2 1.54088
178
Ammunition 5
1.54089
Testing shall be performed to establish that explosives located after the interrupter are not initiated by the detonator while the safety device is in unarmed mode. Comment: The following shall be taken into consideration: the critical thickness of a mechanical barrier, the critical charge quantity and compacting pressure of a detonator located before the interrupter, the critical play and dimensions etc. of gas passages through or around the interrupter. The term critical denotes the value when transmission in some form takes place. Testing can be supplemented by calculations.
1.54090
Testing shall be performed to determine at which point transmission is achieved when the interrupter is gradually moved from unarmed to armed position. Dimensions shall be chosen within each tolerance range so as to facilitate transmission. Between unarmed position and the boundary limit for transmission, any ejection of fragments, deformation or fragmentation shall not entail a risk of injury. Comment: For interrupters with an instantaneous arming motion, testing can be performed in fewer positions (at least one) between unarmed and armed position.
5.4.4
1.54091
Requirements for systems without interrupters

A fuzing system with an in-line explosive train shall be initiated only by a signal that is unique and which cannot be emulated by any undesired internal or external signal. Comment: Usually only high power systems (such as EFI) are used in systems containing only circuit fuzes. Charging of an ignition capacitor or equivalent should only be started after the safe separation distance/time has been reached. The voltage in an ignition capacitor or equivalent shall be below the lower ignition voltage (maximum-no-fire) until the safe separation distance/time is reached. Comment: This is analogous to the conventional case with one interrupter that moves slowly and enables transmission in the explosive train at
1.54092 1.54093
179
5 Ammunition
some point before final position. Full arming is achieved when the voltage of the ignition capacitor reaches the minimum-all-fire level of the electric igniter. 1.54094 In systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are available, at least one of the safety features shall be disabled by an environmental factor after the ammunition has left the launcher.
5.4.5
5.4.5.1 1.54095
Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions

Fuzing systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are not available Fuzing systems shall be designed such that the packaged ammunition and fuzing systems remain safe during storage, transport, handling and use. This applies until the point in time when the ammunition is issued, or when the fuzing system or initiator is installed and arming or priming is performed in accordance with the specified operating instructions. Fuzing systems should be set/installed as late as is permissible by the requirements of the tactical application. Incorrect installation of a fuzing system should not be possible. At least two different and almost simultaneous manual operations shall be required for arming to take place. Comment: These manual operations should be sequential, i.e. a specific sequence is required. Electric ignition energy shall not be enabled in the firing circuit until after the specified arming delay or safe separation time has elapsed. Fuzing systems shall be equipped with a device which after arming provides sufficient safety time for the operator to leave the danger zone. Signal and spotting agents The risk of incorrect connection of fuzing systems to explosives, signal and spotting agents owing to a mistake, clumsiness or carelessness shall be taken into account. In cases where safety is based on operation, operating instructions shall accompany the packaging or the ammunition.
1.54096 1.54097 1.54098
5
1.54099 1.54100
5.4.5.2 1.54101
1.54102
180
Ammunition 5
1.54103
The fuzing system and components for the fuzing system shall be designed such that assembly of the priming device can be performed as the final operation in the readiness procedure. An intentional manual operation, such as removing a safety pin, shall be necessary before initiation of the warhead can take place. Comment: The safety pin shall be designed so that it is not inadvertently removed during normal handling of the ammunition. Initiation devices and demolition charges Fuzing systems for demolition charges shall be designed to enable them to be disassembled safely after connection so that they can be re-used if so stipulated. When the application permits, fuzing systems for demolition charges should incorporate an interrupter that is remotely controlled from the initiation device. Time fuzes should incorporate an interrupter that arms after the fuze is set and after personnel have taken cover. The initiation device is armed when the interrupter is removed from the explosive train. Comment: Where application specific environmental factors are available (such as hydrostatic pressure for underwater time fuzes) they shall be used. For other time fuzes manual time-delayed arming, for example, can be used. Ignition leads shall be long enough to enable connection of the initiation device without it being necessary for personnel to be inside the danger area of the warhead. If requirement 1.54108 cannot be met, the initiation device shall incorporate a time function that provides a delay in arming of sufficient duration to enable the operator to leave the danger area or take cover. Initiation devices should be designed so that the risk of ignition failure is minimised. Comment: Consequently, it should be equipped with a conductor tester and an indicator to show that it can deliver sufficient ignition energy. To minimise the risk of inadvertent initiation, initiation devices shall be designed so that at least two manual operations are required to enable firing.
1.54104
5.4.5.3 1.54105
1.54106
1.54107
1.54108
1.54109
1.54110
1.54111
181
5 Ammunition
1.54112
There shall be at least one mechanical/galvanic interrupter in the firing circuits of initiation devices. Comment: The output on the initiation device can also be short-circuited up to the moment of firing (e.g. by one or more electromechanical interrupters). Propulsion devices There shall be a transmission safety device in the explosive train of propulsion devices if hazard initiation of the propelling charge leads to activation of the fuzing system in the warhead. Comment: This requirement also applies if the propelling charge itself can cause major damage. Electric igniters in propulsion devices that do not contain a transmission safety device shall be as insensitive as possible. Comment: The aim shall be that an electric igniter can be subjected to a current intensity of 1 A and an output of 1 W for a minimum duration of 5 minutes. The explosive in an igniter composition after an interrupter, or in an igniter in a system without an interrupter, should not be more sensitive than the explosive in the propelling charge. It should be possible to install the fuzing system into a propulsion device as late as possible before operation. It should be possible to check easily whether the fuzing system is installed in a propulsion device. The fuzing system should be easily accessible for replacement. The fuzing system shall be designed so that normal firing takes place within the specified timeframe (i.e. abnormal delay, socalled hangfire, is prevented).
5.4.5.4 1.54113
1.54114
1.54115
1.54116 1.54117 1.54118
1.54119
5.4.6
Requirement checklist for fuzing systems
182
Ammunition 5
Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems

General requirements 1.54001 SHALL 1.54002 SHALL 1.54003 SHOULD 1.54004 SHALL 1.54005 1.54006 1.54007 1.54008 1.54009 1.54010 1.54011 1.54012 1.54013 1.54014 1.54015 1.54016 1.54017 1.54018 1.54019 1.54020 1.54021 1.54022 1.54023 SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD
Fuzing system design Safety analysis Specication of safety level Single failures, safety analysis Mechanical interrupter in explosive trains Interrupter in an explosive train Qualication of explosives Probability of inadvertent initiation Quality inspection of fuzing systems Selection of constituent materials Connement and/or xing No initiation by environmental stress Safe separation distance Fuzing system design Accumulated energy in fuzing systems Incorrect assembly of fuzing systems Assembly of SAI/SAU Indication in fuzing systems Integral test in fuzing systems Upgrading Booster design Integrated circuits Proven components
183
5 Ammunition
Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems, continued

EEDs 1.54024 1.54025 1.54026 1.54027 1.54028 1.54029 1.54030 1.54031 1.54032 1.54033 1.54034
SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL
Connector pins semienclosed Shielding of connector sleeve Shielding of ignition cables Location of switch Shielding of leads Capacitance across switch Twin conductors twined Earthing/grounding Location of ignition cables Documented characteristics of EEDs System testing Elementary arming process Separated arming process Unarmed indication Point in time for arming Electric signals for arming Neutralisation/deactivation Interrupter for current supply Arming by earthing/grounding Arming by short-circuiting Arming by power cut Probability of unauthorized arming Verication of arming signal
Arming process 1.54035 SHOULD 1.54036 SHOULD 1.54037 SHALL 1.54038 SHALL 1.54039 SHALL 1.54040 SHALL 1.54041 SHALL
1.54042 1.54043 1.54044 1.54045 1.54046
SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL
Arming safety features including semi-conductor switches 1.54047 SHALL Hazard arming 1.54048 SHALL Mechanical safety features 1.54049 SHALL Mechanical safety feature 1.54050 SHALL Independent closings
184
Ammunition 5

1.54051 1.54052
SHALL SHOULD
Arming by semiconductors only Safety analysis
Application specic requirements 1.54053 SHOULD Safety 1.54054 SHALL Arming 1.54055 SHALL Arming, environmental conditions 1.54056 SHALL Manual operation 1.54057 SHALL Manual operation, block 1.54058 SHALL Point in time for arming Testing 1.54059 1.54060 1.54061 1.54062 1.54063 1.54064 1.54065 1.54066 1.54067 SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL SHALL Type testing of components Complete safety qualication Testing at safety limit Verication of choice of materials Testing for connement Testing for distance/time Testing for safe separation distance/time Testing for environmental stress Design to enable functional testing
Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal 1.54068 SHALL Discharge of ignition capacitors 1.54069 SHALL Low leakage resistance of capacitors 1.54070 SHALL Anti-handling or anti-clearance device 1.54071 SHALL Indication of deactivation 1.54072 SHALL Safety level of deactivation 1.54073 SHOULD No special tools for deactivation
185
5 Ammunition

1.54074 1.54075 1.54076
SHOULD SHOULD SHALL
Deactivation to remove initiation energy Design and deactivation Clearance or disposal, etc.
Requirements of International Law 1.54077 SHALL Self-destruction/neutralisation of landmines 1.54078 SHALL Fuzing system for drift mines 1.54079 SHALL Neutralisation of anchored mines 1.54080 SHALL Neutralisation of torpedoes Requirements for systems with interrupters Design requirements 1.54081 SHALL Interrupters, basic requirement 1.54082 SHALL Individual safety features 1.54083 SHOULD No linkage in safety features 1.54084 SHALL Safety feature before separation 1.54085 SHOULD Stored energy for interrupter 1.54086 SHALL Stored energy for interrupter or safety feature 1.54087 SHALL Ejection of fragments
Testing interrupters 1.54088 SHALL 1.54089 SHALL 1.54090 SHALL
Test of locking Initiation in unarmed mode Interrupter transmission status
Requirements for systems without interrupters 1.54091 SHALL Initiation 1.54092 SHOULD Charging and ignition capacitor 1.54093 SHALL Maximum-no-re 1.54094 SHALL Safety feature disabled by environmental factor after launch
186
Ammunition 5

Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions Fuzing systems where unique, application specic, environmental factors are not available 1.54095 SHALL Fuzing system design 1.54096 SHOULD Setting/installing fuzing system 1.54097 SHOULD Incorrect installation 1.54098 SHALL Manual operations 1.54099 SHALL Ignition energy 1.54100 SHALL Safety time Signal and spotting agents 1.54101 SHALL Incorrect connection 1.54102 SHALL Operating instructions 1.54103 SHALL Assembly of priming device 1.54104 SHALL Intentional manual operation Initiation devices and demolition charges 1.54105 SHALL Fuzing system design 1.54106 SHOULD Remotely controlled interrupter 1.54107 SHOULD Interrupter in time fuzes 1.54108 SHALL Length of ignition leads 1.54109 SHALL Time function 1.54110 SHOULD Initiation device design 1.54111 SHALL Manual operations for initiation devices 1.54112 SHALL Mechanical interrupter Propulsion devices 1.54113 SHALL 1.54114 SHOULD 1.54115 1.54116 1.54117 1.54118 1.54119 SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHOULD SHALL Transmission safety device Electric igniters to be insensitive Sensitivity of explosive in igniter composition Point in time for installation of fuzing system Check of installation Fuzing system accessible for replacement Abnormal delay
187
5 Ammunition
5.5 5.5.1
Packaging for ammunition General
To ensure that the safety characteristics of ammunition are maintained during handling and storage it is essential that ammunition be protected by appropriately designed packaging whose task is: to protect its contents against the adverse effects of the relevant environmental factors, to protect the surrounding environment.
There are two distinct environmental concepts for packaged goods: the external environment where environmental factors affect the goods from the outside, and the internal environment (sometimes called the micro-environment) which denotes the environmental factors present inside the packaging. It is essential that packages be clearly marked to enable rapid and safe identication (even under stressful conditions) to prevent dangerous mix-ups during handling. It is important to consider the question of packaging at the earliest possible stage during development of ammunition to enable the specied safety level to be achieved in the most appropriate way. Comprehensive data must be prepared for the study of environmental factors, properties of materials, and resistance to various environments etc. The required safety level can be achieved by choosing the packaging design and materials to enable the critical environmental factors in the internal environment to be constrained to a low level of severity. Packagings consist of a collective part that surrounds one or more units as protection against prevalent environmental stresses. Components like shock absorbers, barriers (against humidity, gases, etc.), and protection against electrical interference etc. are included herein. There are various types of packaging for once-only (i.e. disposable) or repeated use. In some cases the packaging is designed to have a secondary function such as a launcher or other type of launch device. In the case of IM and LSM the packaging can contribute to reducing the sensitivity of the packaged ammunition.
188
Ammunition 5
5.5.2
Environmental factors
The risks of damage to packaged ammunition are determined by mechanical, electrical, chemical, climatic and biological environmental factors. The risks may exist during all phases of the life of the ammunition. If the packaging is damaged it may result in unpredictable impact on the environment. Mechanical environmental factors comprise, for example, dynamic stresses from shock or vibration, or stresses caused by static load (such as when stacking). Electrical environmental factors comprise, for example, electromagnetic radiation (e.g. from radio or radar transmitters), static electricity (e.g. thunderstorms or hovering helicopters), or electromagnetic pulse in conjunction with a nuclear weapon engagement, and high power pulsed microwave radiation. Chemical environmental factors such as the effect of gases, vapours, uids or particles in the external or internal environment can cause damage or hazardous events. Climatic environmental factors such as extreme high or low temperatures, changes in barometric pressure, thermal shock, relative humidity, rain, hail, etc. can cause damage or hazardous events. Biological environmental factors such as other life forms (such as rodents, insects, fungi and bacteria) can cause damage or hazardous events.
5.5.3
5.5.3.1
Consequences of environmental stress

Mechanical environmental stress
Examples of the consequences of mechanical stress: Leaks in joints can occur through fatigue, shock or other mechanical stress. Cracks, debonding, explosive dust, damage to surface treatment, indications of ruptures or other degradation of material strength can occur as a result of mechanical stress or fatigue. Initiation of initiators containing impact-sensitive pyrotechnic compositions can occur through inadvertent impacts.
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5.5.3.2
Electrical environmental stress
Examples of the consequences of electrical environmental stress: Electric igniters can be initiated inadvertently if the electrical and electromagnetic environment is more severe than the test level. This also applies in the case of electrostatic discharge. Chemical environmental stress
5.5.3.3
Examples of the consequences of chemical environmental stress: Corrosion can occur through the effect of incompatible substances in combination with moisture, either by direct contact or through any gases or fluids generated. Climatic environmental stress
5.5.3.4
Examples of the consequences of climatic environmental stress: Variations in temperature during storage can cause condensation on the surfaces of materials with high thermal capacity incurring a risk of moisture damage and corrosion, for example. Variations in temperature of high amplitude can cause such high stresses in materials or joints that ruptures occur. Air can be pumped in or out through leaks in packaging enabling moisture to be transported into the internal environment where it causes damage to the ammunition such as corrosion. Other environmental stress
5.5.3.5
Example of the consequences of other environmental stress: Explosives can be initiated by inadvertent heating (e.g. in the event of a fire).
5.5.4
1.55001
Requirements
Provided no special reason for non-compliance exists, the packaging shall withstand the testing specified in the UN recommendations for the explosive goods in question. The packaging shall protect the ammunition against the environments to which it is predicted that the system will be subjected throughout its life. These environments are stated in the environmental specification.
1.55002
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Comment: Requirements governing the protective properties of the packaging can be related to the inherent resistance of the ammunition. Furthermore, the packaging must not create an environment that the ammunition cannot withstand. 1.55003 Constituent materials in the packaging shall be selected and combined so that effects detrimental to safety do not occur. Comment: Such effects can, for example, be caused by corrosion, incompatibility or instability. Further, there are certain constraints regarding materials in international regulations (e.g. ADR, RID, IMDG code and the UN Recommendation for the Packaging of Dangerous Goods). Packagings should be designed to prevent mass detonation. Comment: This requirement can be achieved by adequate separation between the units. Packagings should be designed such that the consequences of a hazard initiation of the constituent explosive is limited. Comment: In the event of a fire a propulsion device, for example, can give a gun effect if the packaging is in the form of a metallic tube. The design of, and materials for, packagings shall be selected to prevent detrimental effects from handling and storage environments. Packagings and their contents shall be TS classied in accordance with IFTEX. Packagings and their contents shall be classified in accordance with UN coding. Packagings and their ammunition shall be provided with distinct and durable marking in accordance with applicable regulations governing transport and storage to enable rapid and safe identification of the contents. Re-usable packagings shall be checked to ensure that they are equivalent to new ones from the safety aspect. When selecting materials for packagings, consideration shall be given to the applicable regulations for recycling. The prescribed material recycling symbols shall be marked on constituent components.
1.55004
1.55005
1.55006 1.55007 1.55008 1.55009
1.55010 1.55011 1.55012
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5.5.5
Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings
Table 5:5 Checklist of requirements for ammunition packagings
General requirements 1.55001 SHALL 1.55002 SHALL 1.55003 SHALL 1.55004 SHOULD 1.55005 SHOULD 1.55006 SHALL 1.55007 SHALL 1.55008 SHALL 1.55009 SHALL 1.55010 SHALL 1.55011 SHALL 1.55012 SHALL
UN recommendations Protection of ammunition Constituent materials Mass detonation Hazard initiation Storage environment TS coding UN coding Marking Re-usable Selection of materials for recycling Material recycling symbols
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Definitions 6
DEFINITIONS
This section lists the nomenclature and abbreviations used in this manual.
6.1
Terminology
Ablation Evaporation of surface material by the action of (hot) gases (owing over it). Comment: Ablation is a method for protecting objects against aerodynamic heating (e.g. space vehicles on re-entry into the atmosphere). Accident An undesired event, or series of events, that causes unacceptable injury or damage to property or the environment. Acquisition program for off-the-shelf (OTS) materiel This program relating to system safety shall be applied when acquiring OTS materiel systems. Ageing The ageing of materials involves a continuous change through time of properties (chemical and physical such as sensitivity, rate of combustion and mechanical strength). Aiming and ring limitation Aiming and ring limitation is a system integrated into the weapon to prevent aiming in certain sectors (so as not to collide with nearby obstacles for example), and to prevent ring in other specic sectors (to prevent hitting weapon platforms or friendly forces for example). Ammunition Materiel designed for inicting damage, producing smoke or illumination, blasting, mining, mine clearance, and certain types of signalling, as well as exercise materiel used to replace the above during training. The materiel may contain explosives or other chemicals. The term also comprises packaging for ammunition and manufactured parts for ammunition.
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Ammunition safety Ammunition safety is the property of ammunition that enables the ammunition under specied conditions to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, and disposed of without a hazardous event taking place, and without constituent parts in the ammunition being affected in such a way that a hazardous event occurs. Arm To remove safety constraints in safety device(s) to enable initiation to take place. Comment: In a system with an out-of-line explosive train arming occurs when the interrupter has been removed and an initiation can result in fuzing system function. In an in-line system arming occurs when the minimum level for ignition energy has been reached and only the initiation signal remains for initiation to take place. Arming device Refer also to the entry for Transmission safety device. Arming range/distance/time The range (distance/time) from the launcher (or release device) until the point (in time) where/when the fuzing system is armed. Artillery primer An igniting device of the same design and function as a cannon primer. An artillery primer is usually threaded and is used to ignite a propulsion agent conned in a cartridge case or separate case, in the rear plane of which there is a seat for the artillery primer. Comment: In cases where the priming device is xed by means of compressing it is often incorrectly referred to as a cannon primer.
Assemble, install (a fuze) To assemble/install individually manufactured ammunition components containing explosive, including assembly/installation of fuzes in ammunition. AUR (All Up Round) testing Testing of a complete weapon or ammunition while in storage. Auxiliary booster A booster afxed to a main charge (e.g. by cementing, casting or screw attachment). The auxiliary booster consists of compressed high explosive designed to ensure initiation of the main charge.
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Backblast The rearward blast of (hot) propulsion gases which, when a weapon is red, escape from the muzzle brake of recoil weapons and from the aft opening (venturi) of recoilless weapons. The blast may contain fragments and particles swept up from the ground. Barrel fatigue life This is the number of rounds a barrel can be red with an acceptable risk of fatigue rupture. The barrel fatigue life is calculated using mechanical rupture methods based on crack propagation data for the material of the barrel. The calculation shall be made for a pressure level corresponding to an upper operational temperature for the ammunition, and an established safety factor for barrel life shall be applied. Base bleed An auxiliary device in a shell consisting of propellant in a combustion chamber. The propellant gases ow out into the wake behind the shell, enhancing the pressure and thereby reducing drag. Black powder Refer to the entry for Propellant. Blast pressure Air shock waves created around the weapon as a result of ring. The shock waves normally emanate from the muzzle in recoil systems, and in recoilless systems from the aft end of the launcher as well as the muzzle. Comment: Severe blast pressure may cause impairment of hearing. High levels may cause injury to the larynx. Extreme levels may even cause fatal injury (collapse of the lungs, etc.). Booster (1) A launch rocket engine. Refer also to the entries for Booster (2) and Booster charge or booster. Booster (2) 1. An amplifying charge in a fuze usually comprised of compressed explosive. 2. A charge, usually comprised of compressed explosive, in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the HE charge.
Comment: The booster is normally also used as a connector device for combinations of certain fuzes and shells.
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Booster charge or booster A link in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the priming device. The booster charge may also be referred to in various contexts as booster, auxiliary booster or auxiliary charge. Booster motor or booster A motor that accelerates a vehicle in the launch phase. Bore safety The property that enables ammunition and its constituent parts to withstand the environment during the bore phase of ring with the required level of safety. Bridge primer, bridge wire igniter An electric initiator in which the initiation current passes through a wire or thin layer of metal that becomes heated, thereby initiating a priming composition or primary explosive. Bullet attack safety The capability of the ammunition to withstand bullet attack without initiating/ igniting. Burst The explosion phenomenon of a detonating warhead and its corresponding practice ammunition. Cannon primer An igniting device in the form of a cartridge containing an initiator such as a percussion primer and booster charge. A cannon primer is mainly used in guns where the propulsion agent is not conned in a cartridge case, such as in certain howitzers. A cannon primer is inserted (fed into) the breech mechanism. Cartridge case A case, usually made of metal or plastic, incorporating an igniting device and containing propellant. Comment: Cartridge cases are used in: fixed rounds (permanently attached to the projectile) semi-fixed rounds (attached to the projectile, such as by a bayonet coupling, so as to be separable) separated rounds (separated from the projectile but united before loading). Cf. the entry for Separate case.
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Case bonded charge Refer to the entry for Rocket propellant charge. Circuit interrupter Refer to the entry for Transmission safety device. Combustion catalyst An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to increase the rate of combustion. Combustion chamber The space in which propulsion agents burn, in some cases after mixing. Composite propellant Refer to the entry for Propellant. Compatibility A property of materials used in a product which means that they do not affect one another chemically when subjected to the specied environmental conditions. Comment: TNT, for example, is affected by polyamides but not by olen plastics. Polycarbonate resin is embrittled by double-base propellant. Lead azide forms highly sensitive copper azide on contact with copper. Certain combinations of metals may cause galvanic corrosion that may involve a safety hazard. Control system, guidance system Functions and related subsystems that can change the path of a guided missile, torpedo or other guided ammunition. Cook-off Inadvertent initiation of an explosive as a result of abnormal heating. Comment: Cook-off can occur, for example, after a misre in a hot barrel. Danger area The area around a proving/ring site inside which there is a risk of injury. Deactivate To return an armed fuzing system to unarmed mode. No special action is normally required before the fuzing system can be used again.
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Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarization Disassembly of ammunition for an in-service surveillance inspection, for example, or to render harmless components of ammunition that can/will no longer be used (e.g. defective, exceeded the established service life, etc.). Delay A device that provides the desired delay in a fuzing system. The delay may be achieved pyrotechnically, electrically, mechanically or chemically. Deagration Deagration is characterised by a combustion wave, sustained by the generation of heat in the decomposition zone, that spreads through the explosive or explosive mixture at subsonic velocity. Comment: During normal use of propellants in rockets, barrels, gas generators, etc., the combustion rate (deagration rate) which is dependent on the pressure is much lower than sonic velocity (in the magnitude of cm/s at l0 MPa). In the event of incorrect operation or malfunctions of various types, such as a blockage in the exhaust nozzle of a rocket engine or excessive charge density in guns, the combustion rate may increase uncontrollably so that the combustion chamber ruptures. This may even progress to detonation. Design criteria and test plan The part of an item specication that contains requirements specifying resistance to environmental conditions and the environmental factor list for testing. Desired (SHOULD) requirements Refer to the entry for Requirements. Destruction Refer to entry for Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarization.
Detonation Detonation is characterised by a shock wave, sustained by a chemical reaction in the shock wave zone, that propagates at supersonic velocity. Comment: Detonation gives maximum blast effect in explosives, and is normally started by a primary explosive which, even in small quantities, can transmit a sufciently powerful shock wave impulse to initiate a detonation process.
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Detonator An initiator that is initiated by a stab, percussion, friction, ame or break sensitive primary explosive designed to initiate the detonation in an explosive. Dud High explosive ammunition that has not burst despite expected function. Dynamic analysis Verication of test of the ow in a computer program to discover how the program behaves in different situations. The following items inter alia are of particular interest: determination of which segments of the program are executed most frequently, time studies for certain operations, tracing of variable values, inspection of invariant conditions, code that is not executed, inspection to verify that the test comprises all elements of the program.
Dynamic interaction The interaction between projectile and barrel during the launch process. Comment: Incorrect interaction can cause damage to the bore and/or greater dispersion and/or ammunition malfunction (e.g. failure to initiate). EBW (exploding bridge wire) igniter An electric initiator without priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding wire in contact with a low-density explosive, usually PETN. Comment: The wire is made to explode by a very high power input (MW). EED (electro-explosive device) A priming device that is initiated electrically. Electric igniters, electric primers, electric artillery primers, electric detonators, electric blasting caps and electric priming detonators are examples of EEDs.
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EFI (exploding foil initiator) igniter An electric initiator without a priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding metal foil accelerating a plastic disc against the high density explosive. Comment: The metal foil is made to explode by very high power input (MW). The term Slapper is also used for EFIs. Electric primer An electrically initiated igniting device containing an initiator and booster, all conned in a casing. Electric detonator An initiator that is electrically initiated and which contains primary explosive for a detonating explosive train. Electro-explosive cartridge Refer to the entry for Electric detonator. Electric gap detonator An electric initiator that is very fast and easily initiated. There are three main types of gap detonator: Electrically conducting composition, consisting of primary explosive and graphite or metallic powder. Graphite bridge, in contact with primary explosive. Spark gap, adjacent to primary explosive.
Thus there is no hot wire, and the initiating function in all three types is based on energy concentration in hot spots.
Electric igniter, EED An initiator that is initiated electrically. Electric primer An initiator that is initiated electrically and which contains priming composition for a deagrating explosive train. Electric primer-detonator An electric initiator used for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and explosive cutters. Cf. the entry for Electric detonator.
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Definitions 6
EMP (electromagnetic pulse) An electromagnetic pulse that can arise, for example, when a nuclear charge detonates. Environment The cumulative effect of all the natural and induced environmental factors to which an item is subjected at a specic moment. Environmental factor A factor or group of factors that alone affects certain failure mechanisms and can thus usually be isolated when testing. Environmental severity The value of the physical and chemical magnitudes that is characterised by the environment or an environmental factor. Erosion The removal of material from a surface by the action of another medium owing over the surface. Exhaust nozzle That part of a reaction engine through which the combustion gases of the propulsion agent escape at high velocity. An exhaust nozzle consists of an inlet, a constricting section, and in most cases an expansion section. The thermal energy released is converted into kinetic energy in the exhaust nozzle. Explosive Explosives are dened in the Law Governing Inammable and Explosive Goods as solid or liquid substances or mixtures thereof that can undergo a rapid chemical reaction whereby energy is released in the form of pressure-volume work or heat. Explosive plunger An explosive charge used in explosive cutters. Explosive train A combination of various elements (explosives, channels, etc.) designed to initiate a charge. The explosive train may contain conditional interrupters or barrier locks (safety devices). Extreme environment Environmental factors of such a severity that arise in conjunction with accidents or enemy attack (e.g. re, bullet attack).
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6 Definitions
FAE (fuel air explosives) A warhead based on fuel that is dispersed in the air in an appropriate ratio prior to initiation. Flame safety device An interrupter in an explosive train that prevents the transmission of ignition to a deagrating main charge. Cf. the entry for Transmission safety device. Fuel The propulsion agent that is combusted (oxidated) to generate energy. Full form gauging An inspection method for the loadability of ammunition. Fuze A fuze is a type of initiation system in which the sensors, safety system, initiator and booster are integrated into the same assembly unit generally for artillery ammunition. Comment: Fuzes are classied according to: mode of initiation, e.g. impact, time or proximity, location, e.g. in nose, mid-section or base, sensitivity, e.g. sensitive or supersensitive, time of action, e.g. instantaneous or delay, safety devices in fuze categories, connection dimensions in fuzing systems. Fuzing system A generic term for a device designed to initiate charges in ammunition at a specic time or location.
Comment: A fuzing system also contains a safety system that shall prevent inadvertent initiation that can cause injury or damage to equipment or serious malfunctions. A fuzing system consists of (a) sensor(s), a safety system (often referred to as an SAD/SAU) and a priming device. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks controlled by arming conditions. There are two different principles for the design of a fuzing system: an out-of-line explosive train in which the SAD/SAU contains a mechanical interrupter which, in unarmed mode, prevents transmission in the explosive train,
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Definitions 6
an in-line explosive train containing no interrupter. In this case the safety and arming functions are allocated to the electric circuits preceding the explosive train. The explosive train contains no primary explosive. In out-of-line systems the interrupter often incorporates a detonator or primer which, when in unarmed mode, is geometrically located in such a way that its detonation or deagration cannot be transmitted to subsequent charges. This arrangement is the reason for the term out-of-line. The interrupter may consist of a rotor, slide or equivalent. Fuzing systems are often named according to the method of functioning of their sensor(s), such as impact or proximity sensing, or delay systems. Gas generator A device for producing a gas ow under pressure by combustion of a propulsion agent. Comment: There are two types of gas generator: propellant and liquid gas. Guided missile An unmanned object that is launched, projected or dropped/released, and which is designed to move in a ight path totally or partially above the surface of the earth guided by external signals or by integrated devices. Gun PMP (permissible individual maximum pressure) The pressure which, for reasons of safety, must not be exceeded at any point in the weapon by more than 13 rounds in every 10,000 statistically. Handling In the Law Governing Inammable and Explosive Goods handling denotes all handling from manufacture to nal use and destruction. This comprises inter alia storage, transport, handling, use and disposal/demilitarization. Hazard Something that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment. Hazardous event An event that occurs by accident, i.e. unintentionally, and which may result in an accident/mishap or damage/injury.
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6 Definitions
Hazard initiation Inadvertent initiation of a propelling charge or warhead. High explosive (HE) An explosive whose decomposition normally occurs through detonation. Comment: To start a detonation in a high explosive usually requires initiation with high energy and shock wave effect provided by, for example, a primary explosive. HPM (high power microwaves) High-energy pulsed microwave radiation. Hybrid rocket engine Refer to the entry for Rocket engine. Hypergolic propulsion agent combination A combination of propulsion agents (fueloxidizer) that react spontaneously with one another. Igniferous burst The explosion phenomenon of a deagrating warhead. Cf. the entry for Burst. Ignite To make an explosive deagrate. Igniting device A device whose purpose is to ignite deagrating explosive charges. It consists of an initiator and a booster charge. Comment: An igniting device in its most elementary form may consist of only the initiator (e.g. a primer in small arms ammunition).
IM (insensitive munition) Ammunition with a lower sensitivity than current normal ammunition. This is achieved by using a lower sensitivity propellant and explosive, or by enclosing the propulsion agent in such a way that its sensitivity is reduced. Impulse (rocket) motor A motor of very short burning duration used to provide guidance impulses etc. Independent safety device A safety device is independent if its status is not affected by the status of any other safety device in the system.
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Definitions 6
In-ight safety The property of ammunition and parts thereof not to detonate or burst in ight from the point at which the fuzing system is armed until the point at which it is designated to function. Inherent safety The safety property of a torpedo and its constituent parts that enables it to make contact with the seabed, or to somersault, or collide with objects in the water, without detonation of the main charge within the safe separation distance. Initiate To ignite or initiate an explosive. Initiate To cause an explosive to detonate. Initiating device A device designed to initiate detonating explosive charges. It comprises an initiator (mechanical or electric) and a booster. Initiator A device, such as a primer or detonator, that receives initiation signal(s) and subsequently initiates an explosive train In-line explosive train An explosive train whitout interrupter, i.e. if one element in the explosive train is initiated then the booster in the fuzing system will also be initiated. In-service surveillance inspection An activity designed to establish whether the status of ammunition has changed so as to jeopardise safety during storage, transport, operation or other handling. Integrated fuzing system (or initiator) A fuzing system that is built into the ammunition in such a way that it is not possible to remove it completely or partially. Intelligent ammunition Ammunition with built-in logics, target seeker, target sensor or equivalent to enhance hit probability. Interrupter A mechanical component that effects a designated interruption in an explosive train. It may consist of a rotor, slide or similar device.
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6 Definitions
Item or specimen Any piece of defence materiel or software being dealt with at a specic moment. An item may, for example, be a complete guided missile, an electronic component or a computer program. Cf. the entry for Test item or test specimen. Launch phase The period from when the ammunition has irrevocably started to move in the launcher until it has left the launcher.LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) Propellant with low sensitivity properties. Liner A binding layer between the propelling charge and the cartridge case, usually consisting of the same material as the fuel polymer in the propellant. Loading safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables the ammunition to be loaded into a weapon with the required level of safety. LSM (less sensitive munition) Ammunition for which action has been taken to reduce sensitivity to extreme environments such as re. Main charge The largest charge in a high explosive warhead or propulsion device. Mask safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enable ring through vegetation (mask) close to the weapon without a burst or igniferous burst resulting. Mission prole A part of the operational prole that denes conditions to which an item can be subjected when used in a specic way, such as an airborne missile suspended from an aircraft and carried on a mission, which in turn is dened in the form of ight velocities, altitudes and durations. Cf. the entry for Operational prole. Monopropellant A propulsion agent that decomposes in a reaction chamber to form propellant gas. Decomposition can be by catalysis or be started by the application of heat.
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Definitions 6
MOP (maximum operating pressure) The pressure that a specic charge provides under the most extreme conditions, such as in terms of propellant temperature, and which purely statistically must not be exceeded by more than 13 cases out of 10,000. Multiple warhead A warhead which in turn consists of several warheads. Muzzle safety The property of the ammunition and its constituent parts that enables it to pass through a xed obstacle close to the muzzle of the weapon with the required level of safety. Neutralization Prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated, for example by discharging ignition capacitors or by interrupters returning to unarmed state. Obturator A sealing element attached to the projectile used to achieve a satisfactory seal during the launch phase. Out-of-line (interrupted) explosive train The explosive train that contains an interrupter that in unarmed position prevents transmission in the explosive train. Operational prole The part of the life cycle comprising use of the product. The operational prole is dened in terms of various methods of application and their respective durations. Oxidizer A propulsion agent that oxidizes fuel while generating energy. PBX (plastic-bonded explosive) Plastic-bonded explosive. Pendulum pressure Pressure perturbation in barrels and rocket engines. Barrels Pressure oscillations that can occur in long chambers not completely filled by the propelling charge. Pressure in the chamber may thus increase locally to such an extent that deformation occurs.
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6 Definitions
Rocket engines
Pressure oscillations that can occur in propellant-driven as well as liquid fuel rocket engines as a result of resonance between acoustic perturbation and pressure-dependent combustion. The geometry of the engine and the charge, together with other factors, contribute to this. The pressure oscillations may be of such an amplitude that the engine ruptures.
Polymer A chemical compound formed by the interlinking of small units to large molecules. Polymers can be subdivided into plastics (such as polyethylene, PVC and phenolic plastics) and elastomers or rubber materials (such as natural rubber, polybutadiene rubber and styrene-butadiene rubber). Premature burst A burst that occurs inadvertently in the trajectory before the designated point or time. Primary explosive An explosive that decomposes through detonation and which requires little initiation energy, for example in the form of heat (friction, percussion, ame or hot wire), and is used to initiate detonation in high explosives (such as TNT). A primary explosive detonates even in very small quantities when there is little or no connement. Primer An initiator consisting of a case (capsule) containing a stab, percussion, ame or other heat sensitive priming composition designed to initiate deagration in an explosive train. Priming composition A pyrotechnic composition that is initiated by heat (friction, percussion, ame, spark, hot wire).
Priming detonator An initiator for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and explosive cutters. Cf. the entry for Detonator. Priming device A device containing an initiator (mechanical or electrical) and a booster whose purpose is to initiate or ignite an explosive charge. In its most elementary form a priming device may comprise only an initiator (such as a primer as an igniting device in small arms ammunition).
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Definitions 6
Projectile General A body projected (launched) by an external force and which subsequently continues in motion under its own inertia.
Applied to ammunition A warhead without an integral propelling force, and which does not contain explosive with the exception of illuminating compositions in tracers and incendiary substances in small incendiary compositions (spotting charges), fired from tube-launched weapons. Comment: The term projectile is also used as a generic name for all types of warheads in tube-launched ammunition. Propellant An explosive in solid form that normally decomposes by deagration. The most common types of propellant are: Nitro-cellulose based propellant such as single-base propellant, the main constituent of which is nitro-cellulose, double-base propellant containing nitro-cellulose gelatinized with nitro-glycerine, triple-base propellant containing nitro-cellulose, nitro-glycerine and a nitro compound such as nitroguanadine, and nitramine propellant with a binding agent of plastic. Mechanically mixed propellants in which the various components in finegrained powder form are granulated or compressed to the desired shape and size. An example of such a propellant is black powder which, however, can also be denoted as a pyrotechnic composition. Composite propellant consisting of a finely distributed oxidiser, usually ammonium perchlorate dispersed in a fuel binding agent usually a polymer such as polybutadiene. Energy enhancing additives, such as metallic powder, are sometimes used. The mixture can be cast into the desired shape. Composite propellant usually contains softeners and combustion catalysts. Anew type of propellant known as LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) where reduced sensitivity is achieved by using a binding agent consisting of a polymer and where the energizer is a nitramine (such as RDX or HNX).
Propulsion device The part of the ammunition that provides the necessary impulse to transport the warhead from its launcher to the target.
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6 Definitions
Propulsion agent A substance that functions as a fuel or oxidiser or both, and which contains the energy necessary for propulsion. Propulsion agents can be in solid, liquid or gas form. They can be mixed with each other like propellants, or be separated as in liquid-fuel rocket engines and air-breathing engines. Propulsion cartridge A cartridge containing a propelling charge and igniting device, used in mortar ammunition and rie grenades for example. Pyrolysis The decomposition of solid or liquid substances caused by the effect of heat into smaller, usually gaseous, molecules. Pyrotechnic composition An explosive that consists of a mixture of fuel and oxidiser, usually in solid form, which normally are not themselves explosives. The components can react with each other in the form of deagration involving heat generation. Pyrotechnic compositions are usually used for: functions in explosive trains in the form of ignition, delay, initiation effect in warheads in the form of light, fire, smoke, noise.
RAP (rocket assisted projectile) A shell with a (propellant) rocket engine that provides thrust in ight, thereby increasing range. Reaction chamber A chamber into which propulsion agents are injected and made to react in order to generate propelling gas. Reaction motor or jet engine A motor in which the thrust is generated by the momentum of an escaping working medium (combustion gases, reaction products, air, etc.). Recoil Recoil is the phenomenon that occurs when a weapon reacts to the effect of the propellant gases and acceleration of the projectile. There are different ways of measuring recoil such as impulse, force and energy.
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Definitions 6
Relaxation to rupture The delayed forming of cracks in a deformed material. Requirements Mandatory requirements (often expressed by SHALL in tables) are requirements that are of decisive signicance to the achievement of the necessary safety level in a system. Desired requirements (often expressed by SHOULD in tables) are requirements that are important to system safety and shall thus be satised whenever possible. Requirement specication A specication issued by the purchaser to provide a basis for tendering prior to a procurement, or issued as a requirement document when placing an order. Resistance to environmental conditions The capability of an item to withstand a specic severity for a specic duration. Rheological properties The deformation properties of a material subjected to external forces. In viscoelastic materials the properties are time-dependent. Risk A combination of frequency or probability and the consequence of a specied hazardous event or accident. Rocket An unmanned, unguided self-propelled object incorporating a warhead and rocket engine(s). Rocket engine A type of reaction engine that carries its own fuel and oxidiser, and is thus independent of the surrounding atmosphere for combustion. There are three types of rocket engines: Propellant rocket engines. The propulsion agent is a solid propellant. Liquid fuel rocket engines. The propulsion agents are liquid mono-propellant or bi-propellant in the latter case an oxidiser and fuel. Tri-propellant may also be used. Hybrid rocket engines. The propulsion agents consist of a solid and a liquid propulsion agent.
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Rocket engine igniter The igniting device for a rocket engine. Rocket propellant charge A solid propulsion agent charge for propellant rocket engines. The propellant charge is determined inter alia by the type of propellant, charge geometry, and the method of xing it inside the rocket casing. An unbonded charge is free from the rocket casing but is supported against it or against special support. A case bonded charge is wholly or partially bonded to the rocket casing by means of an intermediate layer (liner). The charge may also be bonded to an internal support tube. SAD (safety and arming device), SAU (safety and arming unit) A device that arms a fuzing system at the correct time, and which also prevents inadvertent initiation of the explosive train. Safe separation distance The minimum distance between the launcher (or drop/release device) and the ammunition beyond which a burst is judged to give an acceptable level of safety for personnel and equipment located at the launcher or drop/release device. Reasonable evasive action by the weapon platform is assumed. Safety assessment of existing materiel A system safety program that shall be applied during overhaul of existing defence materiel systems in storage that have not been examined previously with regard to modern system safety requirements. Safety device Refer to the entry for Transmission safety device. Safety analysis A generic term describing the parts of the safety program that involve a systematic analysis of hazardous events and their causes, as well as the qualitative or quantitative evaluation of the safety level achieved. Safety device A part or combination of parts designed to prevent inadvertent initiation of the main charge in ammunition.
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Definitions 6
Safety distance The distance from the launcher (drop/release device) to the point in the trajectory or ight path at which a safety device is cancelled. Comment: Each individual safety device has its safety distance. Safety system The generic term used to denote the combination of all the safety devices in a fuzing system. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks that are controlled by arming conditions. Sealing ring Refer to the entry for Obturator. Service life The period during which the ammunition can be transported and stored in the prescribed packaging under the stipulated storage conditions (temperature and relative humidity) without changes occurring that can result in hazardous events or an unacceptable degradation of performance. Safety feature A device that locks a transmission safety device. A mechanical component that locks the interrupter in unarmed or armed mode or a component/function that breaks an electric circuit. SAI (safety, arming and ignition) unit An SAD/SAU with ignition function. Secondary armament This term refers to additional weaponry that can be mounted on a combat vehicle to provide secondary or supporting functions. The following types of weapon are considered to belong to this category: machine gun or cannon for covering fire, parallel machine gun for use together with the main armament, mortars, flare launchers.
Secondary charge Refer to the entry for Booster charge or booster.
213
6 Definitions
Self-destruction Automatic initiation of an HE charge in ammunition that has missed the target, for example, or was not initiated within the designated time after arming. Sensor The part of a fuzing system that senses the target and emits initiation signal(s) to the initiator when function is expected. Separate case A case, normally made of metal (e.g. brass) with an igniting device and containing a propelling charge. It is kept separate from the projectile during transport and loading. Comment: A separate case requires two operations when loading the weapon. Cf. the entry for Cartridge case. Set a fuze The act of setting the fuze to the desired initiation mode (e.g. impact or proximity mode) or time. SHALL requirement Refer to entry for Requirements. Shelf life testing Testing to verify the performance, reliability, and safety of a product after simulated depot storage. Shell A projectile with a cavity lled with explosive, smoke or illuminating composition, submunitions or equivalent. Similar to operational conditions The realization of hardware, software (in co-ordinating functional parts outside the tested software) or environment in the system, being as close to the nal design or system environment as possible with regard to function and behavior. Example: If the requirement is that the software shall be veried using an electricity supply similar to that used in operational conditions, the power unit of the series design shall be used. Squib An initiator that is initiated electrically and which comprises electricity supply leads with a heating hot wire between them surrounded by priming composition.
214
Definitions 6
ST fuze A shock-tube fuze consists of a plastic tube coated on the inside with a thin layer of high explosive or lled with a combustible gas mixture. The initiation impulse is transmitted through the tube as a shock wave. Stabilizer An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to keep decomposition at a low level and thereby safeguard storage capability. Stability The property that enables a material not to change in the environment in which it exists. Sterilization The prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated by permanently damaging some part of the safety system (Cf. the entries for Neutralisation and Deactivate.) Storage, logistical The long-term storage of items in depots, usually under controlled relative humidity conditions. Storage, tactical The storage of an item for a limited period of time under eld conditions. It denotes storage in ammunition depots or at readying sites located adjacent to bases, naval vessels, or deployment areas, usually without any kind of controlled environment. Sub-calibre barrel A small calibre barrel inserted inside the standard barrel, and used either for aligning the standard barrel or for practice ring. Also known as sub-calibre adapter. Sustainer, sustainer motor A motor designed to provide thrust in ight. Terminally corrected projectile A shell that is corrected in the nal path of its trajectory by intermittent lateral forces triggered by guidance signals.
215
6 Definitions
Terminally guided projectile A shell that is guided in the nal part of its trajectory by continuous lateral forces controlled by guidance signals. Terminal guidance device A device that by its inuence makes a projectile, for example, y in a specic direction. Test An investigation to determine one or more properties of an item/specimen. Test item or test specimen An object, such as a component or subsystem, that is to be tested. Transmission safety device This denotes an interrupter in an explosive train including associate safety components. The synonyms for this concept are detonator safety device, arming device, and flame safety device (out-of-line explosive train). A switch in the electric circuit(s) of a fuzing system including associate safety components. Also known as a circuit breaker (in-line explosive train).
Transport, logistical Transport of items to and between storage depots, and from storage depots to and from maintenance workshops. Transport, tactical Transport of items in eld conditions from depot storage to bases, naval vessels, deployment areas, etc. The concept includes short transport of items within and between these sites. Transport safety The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables transport, operation and storage with the required level of safety. Unbonded charge Refer to the entry for Rocket propellant charge. Unguided weapon A weapon whose ight path is determined at launch.
216
Definitions 6
Validation This is a method of verifying that requirements are correct, i.e. that the product functions as intended in its operational environment. Wad A at or cupped unit, often made of cardboard, that is inserted into the cartridge case to secure the propelling charge in position and to reduce the risk of cookoff. Wake The area immediately behind a projectile in motion. Cf. the entry for Base bleed. Warhead The part of ammunition which at a predetermined time or place provides the intended effect by means of pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary effect, or any combination of these effects; other forms may be smoke or illuminating effects or sensor jamming. Weapon A device for ring, launching, dropping or deploying ammunition. Weapon safety Weapon safety is the property of the weapon that enables the weapon under specied conditions to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, maintained and demilitarized without any hazardous event occurring, or any constituent parts of the weapon being affected in such a way that a hazardous event could occur. Wear (in barrel) The mechanical, thermal, and chemical inuences on the internal surface of the barrel. There are two wear effects: barrel wear through the mechanical effect of the round, and erosion of the barrel caused by the mechanical and chemical inuences of hot, fast owing propellant gases. As a rule, the commencement of riing is most exposed to wear. Worn barrel A worn barrel has less than 25% of its total barrel life left. The wear life is usually established with reference to decreased muzzle velocity, dispersion, and wear at commencement of the riing. Comment: A worn barrel is a prerequisite for some compatibility tests.
217
6 Definitions
6.2
AFS
Key to abbreviations
Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Swedish Board for Occupational Safety and Health Ammunition Safety Working Group Swedish Armed Forces joint regulations for the prevention of re and explosion hazards, water contamination, chemical health hazards from ammable goods etc. Compare EC mark of conformity Draft version of TTFO Electro-Explosive Device Exploding Foil Initiator ElectroMagnetic Pulse ElectroStatic Discharge Fuel-Air Explosives Swedish Armed Forces Fault Modes and Effects Analysis Swedish Defence Materiel Administration Swedish Defence Research Establishment Swedish Defence Standard High frequency Headquarters Hydrogen peroxide
ASWG BVKF
Cf. CE DTTFO EED EFI EMP ESD FAE FM FMEA FMV
FOA FSD HF HQ HP
218
Definitions 6
HPM HTP IEC IFTEX
High power microwaves High test peroxide International Electrotechnical Commission Instruction governing storage and transport of Swedish Armed Forces explosive goods Insensitive Munition Infrared Lightning ElectroMagnetic Pulse Less Sensitive Munition Military Standard (USA) Maximum Operating Pressure Memorandum of Understanding MegaPascal Not applicable Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse Development Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems Plastic-bonded Explosives Printed circuit board Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
IM IR LEMP LSM MIL-STD MOP MOU MPa NA NBC NEMP P1 P2 P3 PBX PCB PETN
219
6 Definitions
PHA PHL PHST PMP ppm PTTFO RFP Rg RSV SAI SACLOS SFS SFRJ SRP SSPP SV
Preliminary Hazard Analysis Preliminary Hazard List Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations Permissible Individual Maximum Pressure Parts per million Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Request for Proposal Advisory Group (at FMV) Hollow charge Safety, Arming and Ignition unit Semi-Active Command by Line-Of-Sight Swedish Code of Statutes Solid Fuel Ram Jet Safety Requirement Proposed System Safety Program Plan Safety Verication Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Safety Instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces Transport and storage Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Unmanned Aerial Vehicle United Nations
SI SkI TS TTFO UAV UN

220
Definitions 6
PTTFO VDU VDV
Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives Video Display Unit Vibration Dose Value
221
References 7
REFERENCES
Owing to constraints on the space available in this manual it has been necessary to severely restrict the number of references. To nd complete information in MIL-STD and STANAG documents, for example, the reader is referred to the special search systems that are available on the market. At FMV there is a subscription system so that MIL-STD is available on CDROM. The documents referenced are grouped as follows: 7.1 7.2 7.3 Documents governing safety Standards relating to design and testing (e.g. MIL-STD, STANAG) Design principles and experience (e.g. manuals, magazine articles, studies) Textbooks Documents relating to the environment (fundamental studies, measurement methods, etc.) Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition Accident investigations.
7.4 7.5
7.6 7.7
The following acronyms and abbreviations have been used for the standards referenced herein: AOC Proc. AOP Australian Ordnance Council, Proceeding, AUS Allied Ordnance Publication, NATO
DEF (AUST) Australian Defence Standard, AUS DEF STAN DOE Defence Standard, UK Department of Explosives, USA
223
7 References
DOD-STD FSD GAM IEC ITOP
Department of Defense Standard, USA Swedish Defence Standard Delegation General Pour lArmement, FR International Electrotechnical Commission International Test Operation Procedure, USA, BRD
MIL-HDBK Military Handbook, USA MIL-STD NAVORD OB Proc. SFS SS SSI FS Military Standard, USA US Naval Ordnance Laboratory, USA Ordnance Board Proceeding, UK Swedish Code of Statutes Swedish Standard National Swedish Institute of Radiation Protection Code of Statutes Standardization Agreement, NATO National Swedish Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables Code of Statutes Technische Dienstvorschrift, BRD Test and Evaluation Command, USA Test Operation Procedure, USA
STANAG SI FS
TDv TECOM TOP
224
References 7
7.1
Documents governing safety
Table 7:1 Documents governing safety

Designation Title
AFS 1996:2
AFS 1994:8 AOP-15 DEF STAN 13-131 DGA/AQ 4112 H SystSk M7740-784851 IEC 60825-1 MIL-STD 882 TjF-FMV 97:12 SFS 1977:11601171 SFS 1982:821 SFS 1988:220 SFS 1988:868 SFS 1988:1145 SFS 1994:536 SSI FS 1980:2 SSI FS 1993:1 SIFS 1986:2 SIFS 1999:2
Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health Lasers Guidance for the Assessment of the Safety and Suitability for Service of Munitions for NATO Armed Forces Ordnance Board Safety Guidelines for Weapons and Munitions Guide pour la construction de la securit System Safety Manual Laser Classication and Safety System Safety Program, Requirements Regulations governing weapon and ammunition safety activities within FMV Work Environment Act (AML) and directives Transport of Dangerous Goods Act Radiation Protection Act Explosive and Flammable Goods Act Directive on Explosive and Flammable Goods Directive on International Supervision of Weapon Projects Classication of lasers Directives on lasers General advisory statements concerning SI directives on sensitivity testing of explosives Directive on the handling of hydrogen peroxide
225
7 References
7.2
Standards relating to design and testing
Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing

Designation Title
ADA-086259 Vol. 4
Joint Services Safety and Performance Manual for Qualication of Explosives for Military Use AOC 218.93 The Qualication of Explosives for Service Use AOC 223.93 Assessment of Munition Related Safety Critical Computing Systems AOC 236.94 Guidelines for the Preclusion of Electro-Explosive Hazards in the Electromagnetic Environment AOP-22 Design Criteria for and Test Methods for Inductive Setting of Electromagnetic fuzes DEF (AUST) 5168 The Climatic Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Military Materiel DEF (AUST) 5247 Environmental Testing of Service Materiel DEF STAN 00 35 Environmental Handbook for Defence Material DEF STAN 00 36 Test Methods (draft) DEF STAN 00 55 Requirements for the Procurement of Safety Critical Software in Defence Equipment DEF STAN 00 56 Requirements for the Analysis of Safety Critical Hazards DEF STAN 59-41/1 Electromagnetic Compatibility DEF STAN 59-41/2 Electromagnetic Compatibility Management and Planning Procedures DEF STAN 59-41/3 Electromagnetic Compatibility Technical Requirements Test Methods and Limits DOD-STD-2168 Software Quality Evaluation DOE/EV/06194-3- REV2 DF DOE Explosives Safety Manual 86 OV1154 GAM-EG-13 Essais Generaux en Environment des Materiels ITOP 3-2-829 Cannon Safety Test ITOP 4-2-504/1 Safety Testing of Field Artillery Ammunition ITOP 4-2-504/2 Safety Testing of Tank Ammunition ITOP 5-2-619 Safety Testing of Missile and Rocket Systems Employing Manual Launch Stations IFTEX Instruction governing the storage and transport of Part 1 M7762-000082 Armed Forces explosive goods IFTEX Part 2 M7762-000220
226
References 7
Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing, continued

Designation Title
M7762-000220 MIL-STD-210 MIL-HDBK-217 MIL-STD-322 MIL-STD-331 MIL-HDBK-338-1 MIL-STD-461 MIL-STD-462 MIL-STD-498 MIL-STD-810 MIL-STD-1316 MIL-STD-1385 MIL-STD-1455 MIL-STD-1466 MIL-STD-1472 MIL-STD-1474 MIL-STD-1512 MIL-STD-1521 MIL-STD-1629 MIL-STD-1670 MIL-STD 1901 MIL-STD 1911
FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition Climatic Information to Determine Design and Test Requirements for Military Systems and Equipment Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment Explosive Components, Electrically Initiated, Basic Qualication Tests for Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and Performance Tests for Electronic Reliability Design Handbook Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Measurement of Software Development and Documentation Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines Fuze Design, Safety Criteria for Preclusion of Ordnance Hazards in Electromagnetic Fields, General Requirements for Dispenser and Sub-munition, Air Delivered, Safety Design and Safety Qualication, Criteria for Safety Criteria and Qualication Requirements for Pyrotechnic Initiated Explosive (PIE) ammunition Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems Equipment and Facilities Noise Limits for Army Materiel Electroexplosive Subsystems, Electrically Initiated, Design Requirements and Test Methods Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments and Computer Software Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analyses Environmental Criteria and Guidelines for Air-launched Weapons Munition Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition System Design, Safety Criteria for Hand-Emplaced Ordnance Design, Safety Criteria For
227
7 References

Designation Title
MIL-STD-2105 OB Proc 41 849 OB Proc 42 202 OB Proc 42 240 OB Proc 42 242 OB Proc 42 351 OB Proc 42 413 OB Proc 42 491 OB Proc 42 496 OB Proc 42 610 OB Proc P114(1) SS 49 90 701 SS-EN 418 STANAG 3441 STANAG 3525 STANAG 4110
STANAG 4157 STANAG 4170 STANAG 4187 STANAG 4224
Hazard Assessment Tests for Navy Non-Nuclear Munition Climatic Environmental Conditions Safety of Fuzing Systems Safety of Fuzing Systems, Mines Environmental Testing of Armament Stores Assessment of Gun Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above Principles of Design and Use for Electrical Circuits Incorporating Explosive Components Solid Propellants for Rocket Motors Life Assessment of Munitions Assessment of Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and Above Assessment of Land Service Weapons Installations excluding Rocket Systems and GW, Pillar Proceeding Electric detonators, general requirements and testing Machine safety emergency stopping, functional aspects design principles Design of Aircraft Stores for Fixed Wing Aircraft and Helicopters Design Safety Principles and General Design Criteria for Weapon Fuzing and Safety and Arming Systems Denition of pressure terms and their interrelationship for use in the design and proof of cannons and ammunition Development Safety Test Methods and Procedures for Fuzes for Unguided Tube-launched Projectiles Principles and Methodology for the Qualication of Explosive Materials for Military Use Fuzing Systems Safety Design Requirement Safety and Suitability Testing of Artillery and Naval Gun Ammunition 76 mm and Greater Safety Evaluation of Mortar Bombs Assessment of Safety and Suitability for Services of Underwater Naval Mines Safety Testing of Airborne Dispenser Weapons Gun Munition of Caliber 20 to 40 mm, Safety Evaluation
228
References 7

Designation Title
STANAG 4234
STANAG 4325 STANAG 4326 STANAG 4327
STANAG 4337 STANAG 4338 STANAG 4370 STANAG 4404 STANAG 4423 STANAG 4452 TECOM Pam 310-4 AD No A204333 TDv 018 TOP 2-2-614 UN ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.11
Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) 200kHz to 40 GHz Environment - Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Electrostatic Environment Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Lightning Environmental Conditions Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces Design Principles for Safety Circuits Containing EED Electrostatic Discharge Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems Munitions and Weapon Systems Liquid Fuel Fire Test for Munition Bullet Attack Test for Munition Implementing Document for AOP-15 Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) Test Information to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of Electro-Explosive Devices and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems Air-launched Munitions, Safety Evaluation Implementing STANAG for AOP-8 Lightning Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems Surface Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation Underwater-Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation Environmental Test Planning for NATO Material Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines for Munition-Related Safety Critical Computing Systems Aircraft Guns & Ammunition, Safety Evaluation Safety Assessment of Munition-Related Computing Systems Index of Test Operations Procedures and International Test Operations Procedures Bewerten von Waffenrohren kal 5,6 mm bis 20,3 cm Toxic Hazard Tests for Vehicles and Other Equipment Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations
229
7 References

Designation Title
UN ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.2
Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Test and Criteria
7.3
Design principles and experience
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience

Designation Title
R N Gottron National Defence May/June l975, 464-466 Kurt Nygaard AB Bofors FKP-2 l978 Reynolds Industries Inc, San Ramon, Ca US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l29 US Army Material Command Pamphlet No 706-114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-177, 1971 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l79 January l974 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-2l0 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-235 US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l86
The Army and Fluidics
Characterizing of Electric Ignitors Electronic Firing Systems Engineering Design Handbook, Electromagnetic Compatibility Engineering Design Handbook, Environmental Series
Engineering Design Handbook, Explosive Series Properties of Explosives of Military Interest
Engineering Design Handbook, Explosive Trains
Engineering Design Handbook, Fuzes Engineering Design Handbook, Hardening Weapon Systems against RF Energy Engineering Design Handbook, Military Pyrotechnics, Part Two, Safety Procedures and Glossary
230
References 7
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued

Designation Title
US Army Material Command Pamphlet 706-l80, April 1972 US Army Material Command EMA-89-RR-22
Engineering Design Handbook, Principles of Explosive Behavior
Reynolds Industries Inc, San Ramon, Ca Reynolds Industries Inc, San Ramon, Ca SIFS 1989:15 K O Brauer Chemical Publishing Co Inc, New York l974 NAVWEPS OP 3199 Vol 1 0609 319 9100, l965 Ove Bring UD 1989:5 W C Schumb, C N Sattereld, R L Wentworth Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, N Y, 1955 FFV FT 102-04:79 M Gunnerhed FOA 3 C 30420-E M A Barron National Defence September/October l974, l46-l48 G Hall, S Jahnberg, M Ohlin, B Spiridon FOA C 20649-2.7 FMV-Vapen A 761:62/85
Engineering Design Handbook, Part Four, Design of Ammunition for Pyrotechnic Effects ESD. Solid Full Propellant Hazards with Special Application to Manufacture and Handling Operation in Sweden Exploding Bridgewire Ordnance Exploding Foil Initiator Ordnance List of directives and general advisory statements within SIs eld of operations Handbook of Pyrotechnics
The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants
Humanitarian rights and weapons control Hydrogen Peroxide
Long-term storage ZP81 Microelectronics in safety critical applications Multi-Option Fuzing
Software in safety critical applications
Risks involved in the use of glass bre reinforced plastic as reinforcement material for explosives
231
7 References
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued

Designation Title
M E Anderson Ordnance, July/August l972, 59-62 NAVWEPS OP 2943 (First Revision) l965 Report FFV MT 225/72 l972
Safety/Arming Devices
Safety Precautions for Prepackaged Liquid Propellants Safety inspection of 105 mm light HE shell m/34 60 units, 105 mm HE shell m/60Z 120 units, 105 mm HE shell m/61A 25 units Safety eld trials with ammunition l960l965
Olof Nordzell FMV-A:VAB2 Order no. 28-3600-0l FMV, Stockholm l97l Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics RTCA/DO-178 FMV-A:A A761: 3/82 1982 H Almstrm FOA Report Franklin Institute, l969 S Lamnevik FOA C 20302-D1 FMV-Vapen A761: 342 83/86 TRC 829/l03 TRC 829/072
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certication
Final report of cavity group Study of risks associated with cavities in high explosive shells Summary of Test Data for 75 Hot-Wire Bridge or EBW Initiators Tested at the FIRL Explosive trains for detonation transmission UK Qualication Programme for Introduction of PBX into Service Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma metric analysis Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the smallest detectable cavity using gamma radiography with Co60 Investigation of electric igniters for ammunition. Data for igniters in Swedish ammunition and knowledge status concerning testing Instantaneous point detonation supersensitive m/484D investigation of certain risks for inadvertent arming and initiation of composition dust
Ola Listh FOA report C 20457-Dl(D4) Part l: Ola Listh FOA report C 20228-D1 (D4) March 1978
232
References 7
7.4
Textbooks
Table 7:4 Textbooks

Designation Title
Roy L Grant Bureau of Mines, Dept of the Interior, Washington D.C., l967 FMV-A M77:21/79 AB Bofors Wezta, Gteborg, l960 W Ficket & W C Davis Univ California Press Berkeley, l979 Johansson C H and Persson P A Academic Press, London (l970) B T Fedoroff m Picatinny Arsenal, Dover New Jersey, USA S Lamnevik l983 Rudolf Meyer Verlag Chemie, GmbH D-6940 Weinheim, l993 ISBN 3-527-28506-7 G Blomqvist FOA report A l577-Dl l973 S Lamnevik m l983 Ingvar Seilitz Nobelkoncernservice A A Shidlovsky Report FTD II-63-758 (trans DDC AD 602 687) Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson AFB, l964
A Combination Statistical Design for Sensitivity Testing IC-8324
Ammunition doctrine for the Army Analytical Methods for Powders and Explosives Detonation
Detonics of High Explosives
Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items
Explosive processes Fundamentals for consequence and risk analysis. Compendium FOA Inst 24 Explosives
Explosives and their sensitivity properties. Fundamentals for future sensitivity research Chemistry of explosives. Revised extract from MHS compendium in chemistry l972-ll-06 Knowledge of explosives Foundations of Pyrotechnics (translation from the Russian original Osnovy Pirotekhniki)
233
7 References
Table 7:4 Textbooks, continued

Designation Title
D W Culbertson, V F De Vost U S Navy NAVORD OD448ll Naval Weapons Center, China Lake Ca (l97l) Military Ofce of the Swedish Ministry of Defence ISBN 91-38-31004-X (M 7740-804001) B M Dobratz Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report UCRL-52997, l98l NASA-AP-8076
Instrumentation Techniques and the Application of Spectral Analysis and Laboratory Simulation to Gun Shock Problems, The Shock and Vibration Bulletin, Jan l972, Bulletin 42 Joint Services Evaluation Plan for Preferred and Alternative Explosive Fills for Principal Munitions Vol IV International rules of warfare, conventions of international law applicable during wartime, neutrality and occupation LLNL Explosives Handbook Properties of Chemical Explosives and Explosives and Explosive Simulants
NASA-SP-8039
C L Mader Univ of California Press Berkeley, l979 J M Mc Lain The Franklin Institute Press Philadelphia, l980 RARDE, Fort Halstead, Kent, GB (l988) E Lidn, L Holmberg I Mellgard, L Westerling FOA-R-94-00035-2.3-SE October 1994 ISSN 1104-9154 P F Mohrbach, R F Wood Franklin Institute Monograph APL-69-l, 1968 M7742-108001 US Navy NAVORD OD 44 492
NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Propellant Grain Design and Internal Ballistics. March l972 NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Rocket Motor Performance Analysis and Prediction. May l97l Numerical Modeling of Detonations
Pyrotechnics
Sensitiveness Collaboration Committee, Manual of Tests Warheads, interaction protection
Systems and Techniques Employed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories to Determine the Responses of Electro-explosive Devices to Radio Frequency Energy Weapons doctrine for the Army Weapon System Safety Guidelines Handbook
234
References 7
7.5
Documents relating to the environment
Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment

Designation Title
Saab-Scania AB TCP-37-7.76:R2, June 1979 SAAB SAAB TCP-0-72.33:Rl Ren Renstrm FOA report C 2525-D3,1972 ITT Research Institute (For Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington) Teleplan E3-MPA-0236, Dec l978 ITT Research Institute (For Naval Surface Weapon Center USA) Report NSWC/WOL/TR 75-l93 FOA 2 Reg. no. 2l330-Xl6 August l977 S Almroth FOA C 23204-41 1969 S Lamnevik FOA 1 report A146l143 (40, 4l) January l969 Bofors KL-R6775 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 200l5-Dl March l976 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 2003l-Dl February l979 S Lamnevik FOA A-1510-41(40) 1970 Kller, N-E FMV A:A m/4/l4:85/75
30 mm automatic cannon m/75 Fuze accelerations with forced driving band Acceleration measurement in fuze. Analysis of measuring methodology Acceleration stresses in projectile-borne rocket propellant DNA EMP Awareness Course Notes, August l973
Electric interference EMP Design Guidelines for Naval Ship Systems, l975
Fourier analysis of water shock waves from underwater charges Casting properties and sensitivity for octol Copper acid corrosion
Sensitivity of octol NSV10 and octonal NSB 9030 Methods for testing rocket propellant. I Double-base propellant Methods for testing rocket propellant. II Composite propellant HMX. Basic data for technical specications Plan for analysis of ammunition environment
235
7 References
Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment, continued

Designation Title
A Magnusson FOA 2 report A 2l48-242 October l96l AB Bofors KL-R-5696, Dec l976 Institute for water & air purication research IVL no. 02:0464, June l977 H J Pasman DREV Report 707/75 DREV Qubec, Canada, 1975 J Hansson, G qvist FOA report A 20027-Dl May l978 A D Randolph and K O Simpsson, Univ. Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 1974 AB Bofors KL-R 7742, Nov l982 US Army TECOM Pamphlet No 3l0-4 AB Bofors KL-R-5776, Dec l976 S Lamnevik FOA report C 20l68-Dl (D4) April l977 FOA 2 Reg. no. 2l840-Xl6 October l976 FOA 2 Reg. no. 2278-Xl5 Anders Schwartz FOA report A 200l6-Dl (D3) 1976 T Liljegren FOA 2 report A 2234-242 October l963
Rheological properties of viscoelastic materials
Risk for self-initiation of round rammed in a hot barrel Collocation of the presence, content levels, and properties of gaseous air pollutants Shell Prematures by Compression Ignition and their Laboratory Simulation
Study of organic substances present in ammunition surroundings that have a harmful effect on ammunition and packaging Study of Accidental Ignition of Encased High Explosive Charges by Gas Compression Mechanisms Safety testing of ammunition with regard to resistance to cook-off Test Operations Procedures Pressure and temperature in the air cushion in front of a projectile in a barrel Investigations concerning composition dust in fuzes
Investigation concerning water shock wave severity at various distances from a detonating underwater mine Some shock wave parameters for warheads detonating above ground The inuence of age on the adhesion of insulation on gas generator charges Ageing testing of rocket propellant
236
References 7
7.6
Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition System specific specifications
7.6.1
Table 7:6 System specic specications

Designation Title
FSD 0060 FSD 0112 FSD 0168 FSD 0212 FSD 0213 FSD 0214 FSD 0223
Safety testing of ammunition Testing of electric igniters with regard to electrical properties Environment types Testing of systems containing electric igniters Testing of fuze systems Qualication of explosives for military use Shelf-life engineering
7.6.2
7.6.2.1
Environment specific specifications

Mechanical testing
Table 7:7 Mechanical testing

Designation Title
FSD 0098 FSD 0099 FSD 0102 FSD 0103 FSD 0104 FSD 0105 FSD 0107 FSD 0113 FSD 0114 FSD 0115 FSD 0116 FSD 0117 FSD 0118 FSD 0120 FSD 0121 FSD 0122
Constant acceleration Shock ring Sinusoidal vibration Jumbling Broadband random vibration Free-fall drop from maximum 12 m Free-fall drop from high altitude or equivalent Bump Shock Shock with high peak value and short duration High-frequency transient vibration Small arms bullet attack Loose cargo Static load Fragment attack Shock waves in water
237
7 References
Table 7:7 Mechanical testing, continued

Designation Title
FSD 0123 FSD 0234 FSD 0124
Acoustic noise Sand and dust Recommended severity of mechanical testing
7.6.2.2
Climatic testing
Table 7:8 Climatic testing

Designation Title
FSD 0044 FSD 0045 FSD 0059 FSD 0072 FSD 0073 FSD 0125 FSD 0126 FSD 0127 FSD 0128 FSD 0129
Low barometric pressure and during change of air pressure Humidity, methods A and B Thermal shock and temperature change Low temperature, methods A, B and C High temperature, methods A, B and C Salt mist Water spraying Simulated solar radiation High water pressure Recommended severity of climatic testing
7.6.2.3
Chemical testing
Table 7:9 Chemical testing

Designation Title
FSD 0130 FSD 0224
Gaseous air pollutants and ozone Testing with contaminants
7.6.2.4
Electrical and electromagnetic testing
Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing

Designation Title
FSD 0046 FSD 0047 FSD 0058 FSD 0100 FSD 0101
Lightning Static electricity, methods A and B Transient over voltages when current is interrupted Electromagnetic fields relevant to radar and radio radiation Inductive interference of wiring
238
References 7
Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing, continued

Designation Title
Electromagnetic pulse, EMP Electric igniter tests: electrical properties (excluding EBW and EFI) Testing of semiconductor components with regard to ionizing radiation High Power Microwaves Recommended severity of electrical and electromagnetic testing
7.6.2.5
Fire and explosion testing
Table 7:11 Fire and explosion testing

Designation Title
FSD 0159 FSD 0165 FSD 0166 FSD 0167
Gas pressure shock (explosive atmosphere) Fire Cook-off Recommended severity of re and explosion testing
7.6.2.6
Combined testing
Table 7:12 Combined testing

Designation Title
High temperature vibration Low temperature vibration High temperature low barometric pressure Low temperature low barometric pressure Recommended severity of combined testing
7.7
Accident investigations
Table 7:13 Accident investigations

Designation Title
A:VA 036577:9l/70 FOA-report A l520-40, l970 A:VA A684/24/7l l97l-l0-ll
Expert group for Ravlunda accident 1969. Final report Analysis of m/5l fuze clockwork as a result of the ring accident at Ravlunda Expert group for the Grytan accident l969
239
7 References
Table 7:13 Accident investigations, continued

Designation Title
A:V A684:75/74 l974-l002 A:VA A684:80/73 l973-l009 A:A M4808/4:6/78
Expert group for the Vdd accident l970 Expert group for the Kungsngen accident l97l
Final report regarding accident when ring with 84 mm Carl Gustaf at InfSS in January l978 The committee (KN 1981:02) Firing accident at Stockholm coastal artillery defence for investigation of serious force on 17 May 1984 accidents. Investigation report no. 2:1985 Initiation of Explosive in Shell Threads S D Stein, S J Lowell Picatinny Arsenal l957, PB l28 979 Ordnance Corps (USA) Report on Investigation of Premature Occurrence with Report No. DPS-220 Cavitated Composition B Shell, HE, l20-MM, Tl5 E3 R L Huddleston Diagnostic Signicance of Macro- and Microscopic Aberdeen Proving Ground Features of Catastrophic Gun-tube Failures ADA 026 046
240
Checklists 8
CHECKLISTS
This chapter provides some examples of how checklists can be designed. To provide a clear overview of the requirements that apply to a weapon and/or ammunition system some form of checklist is advisable. Chapter 2, 4 and 5, which dene requirements, contain basic checklists of all requirements. These lists provide a good overview but have limited use for monitoring purposes in the various advisory groups, for example. More detailed information is often required for the advisory groups and when monitoring projects which is why more specic checklists are necessary. A number of examples of specic checklists have been compiled in this chapter. Some advisory groups require specic checklists to be submitted. Refer also to Chapter 3, Section 3.6.
8.1
Checklist example 1
CHECKLIST FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SAFETY MANUAL Compiled by: N.N. Date 2000-02-07 Page 2 (30)
Item: Project phase: Requirement no.: Content: Requirement met:
Flame thrower Product denition phase 1.22003 Requirement type: Desired (SHOULD)
Supplement to suppliers SRP in accordance with Section 3.4 Yes No Not applicable A technical requirement specication was established (Ref. No. 08 222 221) in which all requirements from the RFP have been formulated with regard to the concept in question. In addition, the requirements from the RFP have been broken down into the relevant subsystems.
Comment:
8
241
8 Checklists
8.2
Checklist example 2
Comment Yes No NA a) Description/ repor
Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content
Activities 1.22001
SHALL
Supplement to safety requirements in TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as per Section 3.2
A list of weapon related safety requirements are stated in report FMV:Armament Directorate: 123/00
a) NA = Not applicable
8
242
Index
INDEX
A
Abnormal delay 182 Accident 23 Accumulated pressure 72 Advisory Group 4344 Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering 44 Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl) 32, 44, 46 Advisory Group for explosives (Rg Expl) 116 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T) 4445 Advisory Group for System Safety 44 Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) 44, 48 Ageing 140 Aiming and firing limitations 97 Air conditioning system 64 Air-breathing engines 139 Alcohol 92, 154 Ammonia 64 Ammunition 113 Anti-laser goggles 74 Anti-slip surfaces 64 Arming carrier wave 165 conditions 157 delay 180 enabled 175 failure 171 full 180 hazard 174 inadvertent 170 indication 172 mechanical deployment 175 phase 178 power cut 173 process 159, 173, 177 safe separation 173 safety features 174 safety limit 176 short-circuits 173 signal outside 174 single conductor 173 time-dependent 166 unauthorized 174 Artillery primers 139, 145 Axis of bore 96
B
Backblast 69, 88 Backflash 8182, 145 Bag charge 143 Bangalore torpedoes 130, 167 Barrel 82 rupture 82, 89 Barrier 188 Base of the shell 124, 133 Base plate 123, 141 Base-bleed 139 initiator 139 Blast pressure 62, 69, 121 Body vibration 70 Bomb 93 Bomblets 93 Booby traps 60 Booster 158159 charge 143 Breech mechanism 79 Breech ring 81 Bullet attack 121, 142 Bullet attack test 142 Bump 131 Burst simulators 135 Bursting discs 141
C
Cannon primers 143 Carbon monoxide 64 Carrier wave 165 Cartridge case 143, 145 Casing 115, 120, 125 Casting propellant directly 147 Cavity 124 CE marking 100 Changes in barometric pressure 189 Charge casing 132 Chassis 75 Checklist for safety activities and requirements 34 Circuit breaker 158159 Classification 51
243
Index
Clearance 78 Clearly marked 188 Climatic conditions 67 Combustible cartridge case 143 Combustion catalysts 141 Commencement of rifling 82 Compatibility 33 Composite barrels 89 Compound barrels 89 Compressed pellets 132 Conducted interference 80 Confined spaces 101 Consequence 42 Constituent materials 191 Contact with the seabed 176 Cook-off 83, 121, 145, 163 Copper azide 41, 163, 171 Copper content 47 Corrosion 67, 99, 127, 129, 141, 148, 163, 171, 190191 resistance 128 Co-storage 130, 132 Countersunk 145 Cracks 123, 162
system 93 Driving bands 83, 115 Drop test 50 DTTFO 36
E
EED 172 EFI systems 159 Ejection of empty cartridge cases 73 Electric primer 139 Electrical fields 66 subsystems 164 Electromagnetic pulse 189 radiation 189 Electromechanical device 80 Electron incendiary bomb 135 Electronics 165 Electrostatic charging 148 Emergency stop 63 EMP 164 Empty cartridge cases 63 Environment extreme 116 severe damage 60 Environmental aspects 121 factors 178, 189 ESD 66 Ethyl alcohol 154 Evacuation fan 101 Explosive 33, 46 composition dust 123 cutters 167168 train 170 External ballistic stability 115 External environment 188 Extraneous circuits 162
D
Danger area 6162, 73 zones 98 Data transfer 99 Deactivation 93, 171, 177 Debris 151 Deflagration 124, 172 Deformation 120, 141 Delegation for International Supervision of Weapon Project 33 Demolition charge 130 Description of function 139 Desired requirement 18 Destruction 121 Detonation 124 Direction of recoil 88 Disassembly 142 Dispensers 93 Dividing wall (partition) 134 Doors 64, 95 Draining devices 154
244
F
FAE 120 Fall-back 76 Fastening element 72 Fatigue 82, 89 Fault mode 42 Filler material 126, 129 Fire 68
Index
Fire extinguisher 101 Fire-fighting equipment 100 systems 101 Firing 97 button 80 circuit 182 mechanism 79, 88 stance 88 Flame guard 84 Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act 21 FMEA testing 170 FMV Manual of Regulations for InService Surveillance of Ammunition 53 Footholds 64 Forced recoil 87 Forces 70 Fording 67 Fragmentation 62, 83 Fragments 115 Friction initiation 131 FSD 0060 37, 4849, 51, 116, 120121, 142, 148 0112 46, 51, 173 0113 48 0114 48 0117 48 0121 48 0165 68 0166 48 0212 46, 51, 173 0213 46, 51, 176 0214 4647, 51, 116, 170 FSD 0214 47, 170 Fume extractor 84 Fuzing system 45, 113, 119, 125126, 128, 157160, 162174, 176182 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges 157
H
Hail 189 Hand-grenades 168 Hatches 64, 95 Hazard firing 78 Hazard initiation 93, 119120, 124 127, 129, 141, 144, 157, 159, 163 164, 167169, 178, 182, 191 Hazardous event 23 Hazards 28 HE charge 120 Heat flux 84, 115 treatment 141 Heating 64 High test peroxide 154 Hollow-charges 130 Hose charges 130 HPM 66, 164 Hydraulic systems 71, 78 Hydraulics 72 Hydrogen peroxide 93, 154
I
IEC 60825-1 74 IFTEX 130, 132, 191 Igniter cup 141 Ignition cables 172173 capacitor 177, 179 composition 134 energy 180 friction 131 inadvertent 131 leads 181 of propulsion agents 139 premature 123 pyrotechnic composition 134 self 140 spontaneous 162 spontaneous contact 135 temperature 140 voltage 179 Illuminating ammunition 131 IM 118 Impact of shrapnel 148
245
G
Gas pressure 70 Guidance signals 99 Guidance systems 97 Guided weapons 120
Index
with the ground 176 Impulse 139 blasts 69 Inadvertent initiation 140, 170 Incendiary ammunition 131 weapon 60 Incorrect assembly 171 Inherent safety 176 Initiate 157 Initiation designed 181 devices 181 Initiator 158159 In-line explosive train 158, 179 Insensitive munition 37 Inspection X-ray 123 Installation 76 Insulation adhesion 132 material 141 Internal protective paint 141 Interrupted fire 84 Interrupter 158, 178179, 181 ISO 2631 70 5349 70
Lifting devices 100 Linear charges 130, 167 Liquid fuel rocket engines 149 gas generators 149 Loading devices 73 Locking devices 64, 74 mechanism 96 LOVA 140
M
Magnetic fields 66 Mandatory requirements 18 Marking 191 Mass detonation 191 Material recycling symbols 191 Materiel environment 119, 140, 162 publications 55 Mechanical barrier 179 interrupter 182 Melting point 121 Memorandum of Understanding 28 Micro-electronic circuits 162 Micro-environment 188 MIL-STD-1474 69, 95 Mine counter-blasting charge 168 Minelayers depth charges 91 landmines 90 naval mines 91 Mines 116 Missile launch tubes 63 Missiles 93 Moisture content 132134 resistance 67 Monitor 63 Monitoring system 90 Montreal protocol 66 MOU 28 Moving parts 73 system parts 78 Multiple weapons 120
J
Jackets 83 Jet engines 150 Joint surface 131
L
Laser 74 fuzing systems 166 protection filters 74 weapons 60 Launch tubes 92 torpedoes 91 Launchers 77 Laying systems 96 Lead 65 azide 41, 47 Leakage 162 of propulsion agents 150 LEMP 66
246
Index
Multi-purpose ammunition 169 Muzzle brake 84 flash 85, 88
N
National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SI) 21 NBC 120 NEMP 66 Neutralized 173 Nitric oxide 65 Nitrogen dioxide 65 oxide 65 Non-discriminatory effect 32 Nozzle plug 141
O
Obturation 81 Obturators 83, 115 Optical axis 96 Out-of-line explosive train 158 Overpressure 73
P
P1 Development 27 P2 Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems 27 P3 Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems 27 Packaging 113, 188 Paraffin kerosene 92, 154 PBX 118 Peacetime 25 Percussion caps 129, 139, 143, 145 Peroxide 92 PHL 41 PHST 53 Pipe 123 Plugs 129 Pneumatics 72 Potential difference 164 Preliminary Hazard List 32, 41 Pressure 70, 89 MOP 145 time curves 141 vessels 100
Pressure vessels 100 Production control 171 Programmable subsystems 166 Propellant gas generators 146, 153 rocket engines 146 Propelling charge 141 charge casing 141 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) 32, 53 Propulsion agents 149 device 139, 169 devices for torpedoes 153 force process 141 systems 138 unit 113 Protective clothing 63, 67 PTTFO 36 Publications from Armed Forces headquarters 55 Pulverization 162 Purity 132 Push-out 92 Pylon 93 Pyrotechnic warheads 130
Q
Quality inspection 171
R
Radiated interference 80 Radiography 120 Rain 189 Ram rocket engines 139, 152 Ramjet engines 150 Rammer 86 Ramming 86 Reading instructions 2 Recoil 88 amplifiers 84 buffer 73, 86 forces 73, 88 systems 78 Recoilless weapon systems 87 Recuperator 73 Recycling 191
247
Index
REQDOC Technical Specification Manual 38 Request for Proposal 37 Requirements of International Law 60, 114 RFP 31, 37 Rocket assisted projectile 139 engine initiators 139 systems 87 Rotating parts 73 Rupture 83
S
Sabots 83, 115 SACLOS 98 Safe separation distance 64, 121, 171 separation time 171 Safety circuits 74 covers 74 devices 78, 158 interrupter 8081 surveillance 52 system 157 testing 50 Safety Requirements Proposed 39 SAI units 159 Sealed 123 Sealing 126 agents 141 Self-destruction 99, 168, 177 Semiconductor switches 174 SEN 580110 70 Separate case 143 charges 126, 129 Separating surface 119 Separation 98, 115, 123 Service life 33 Shock 131 absorbers 188 Sighting systems 96 Signal agents 167, 180 ammunition 131 Single conductor system 173
248
Single failure 101, 170 Smoke ammunition 131 candles 135 hand-grenades 135 Smoke ammunition 131 Soldering defects 173 Solid Fuel RamJet engine (SFRJ) 151 Somersault 176 Sources of radiation 9899 Spotting agents 131, 167, 180 rounds 135 Spring 7172 forces 71 SRP 39 Stability 74 Stabilizer 154 STANAG 4110 70, 89, 116, 145 Static electricity 189 load 189 Steam generator 153 Storage stability 132 Stowage 76 Stress chemical 163 chemical environmental 190 climatic environmental 190 dynamic 189 electrical environmental 190 mechanical 162 mechanical environmental 189 physical 163 Structural strength 89, 100, 132 Sub-calibre adapters 85 barrel 8586, 89 Sub-calibre barrel 86 Submunitions 168 Suppliers Safety Requirements Proposed 32 Swim-out 92 Symbols 63 System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) 19, 22, 27
Index
T
Tactical Technical Financial Objectives 22, 31 Tandem systems 169 Temperature cycles 140 Terminal guidance 98 Thermal shock 189 Threads 120, 131, 134 Thunder flashes 135 Time fuzes 181 Tolerable level of safety 21 Tolerance range 179 Torpedo propulsion 139 Torpedoes 116, 178 Toxic substances 62 toxicity 121 weapons 60 Transient currents 164 Transmission safety device electrical 158 optical 158 Transport 75 safety device 88, 93 Transport and storage classification 26 Transport of Dangerous Goods Act 21 TS classified 191 TTFO 21, 31, 3536 Tube-launched ammunition 142 Turbojet engines 150 Turbo-rocket engines 139 Type testing 176
VDU 63 VDV 70 Ventilation 64, 101 Verification 40, 50 Verify other safety requirements 50 Vibration 131, 189 Vibration dose 70
W
Warheads 113, 118 Warning signs 74 Wartime 25 Water resistance 67 spraying 67 Weapon platforms 94 Weapons difficult to aim 60 Wear protectants 141 Work environment 67 Work Environment Act 21
X
X-ray 120, 123
U
UAV 145 Ultrasonic testing 120 UN coding 191 recommendations 190 Uncontrolled base bleed combustion 124 Underwater ammunition 127 mines 116, 128 Unloading 115 Unloading tool 115
V
Variations in temperature 140
249
Notes
NOTES
Notes
Abbreviated list of contents

0 To our Foreign Reader .............................. 15 0.1 Purpose of this chapter ..................... 15 0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ..................................... 15 0.3 About the manual ............................. 15 1 Introduction ................................................ 17 1.1 General ............................................. 17 1.2 Instructions for use .......................... 20 1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety ..... 21 1.4 Objectives for safety activities ......... 25 1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV ............................. 25 1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities ... 26 1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ............... 26 2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ............................................. 27 2.1 General ............................................. 27 2.2 Safety activity requirements ............ 28 2.3 Requirements common to all materiel ....................................... 32 2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ....................................... 34 3 Methodology .............................................. 35 3.1 General ............................................. 35 3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO .................................... 35 3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ............. 37 3.4 Supplement to manufacturers Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) ........ 39 3.5 Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ........................... 41 3.6 Obtaining advice from advisory groups .............................................. 43 3.7 Safety testing ................................... 50 3.8 Test directives for safety surveillance ...................................... 52 3.9 Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST) ........ 53 4 Weapons .....................................................57 4.1 General .............................................57 4.2 Common requirements .....................60 4.3 System requirements ........................77 4.4 Requirement checklist for weapons 102 5 Ammunition ..............................................113 5.1 Joint ammunition requirements ......113 5.2 Warheads ........................................118 5.3 Propulsion systems .........................138 5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ..........................157 5.5 Packaging for ammunition .............188 6 Definitions ................................................193 6.1 Terminology ...................................193 6.2 Key to abbreviations .......................218 7 References ................................................223 7.1 Documents governing safety ..........225 7.2 Standards relating to design and testing .............................................226 7.3 Design principles and experience ...230 7.4 Textbooks .......................................233 7.5 Documents relating to the environment ....................................235 7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition .........237 7.7 Accident investigations ..................239 8 Checklists ..................................................241 8.1 Checklist example 1 .......................241 8.2 Checklist example 2 .......................242 Index .........................................................243

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0 To our Foreign Reader

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 3 Methodology

Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual

To our Foreign Reader 0

TO OUR FOREIGN READER 1

Defence Materiel Systems Procurement

About the manual

0 To our Foreign Reader

Software Safety Manual

System Safety Manual

Instructions for use

Weapons and ammunition safety General

Person injured or object damaged

Objectives for safety activities General

Peacetime and wartime

Integration of safety work with other activities

Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV

Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities

Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers

Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2

SAFETY ACTIVITIES AND REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL MATERIEL

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

Safety activity requirements

Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2

Defence industries activities FMV activities Armed Force activities

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

Studies Study/ Development

Planning and procurement Verification/ Testing

Operation Manufacture Transport/ Storage Use/Consumption Maintenance

Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2

Figure 2.3 Example of activity flow forP1: Development

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

1.22003 1.22004 1.22005 1.22006

Requirements common to all materiel

Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2

2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to all materiel

SHALL SHOULD SHALL SHALL SHOULD

a) Becomes mandatory (SHALL) requirement if specied in the SSPP.

Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO Purpose

P1: At project start, study phase. P2: When acquisition is necessary.

P3: In conjunction with review of existing materiel.

Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) Purpose

Requirement Specification - Performance req

System Safety Manual

- Activities - Performance req

Figure 3.1 Allocation of requirements

Supplement to manufacturers Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP) Purpose

P1: The manufacturer. P2: The manufacturer.

Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) Purpose

P1: The manufacturer. P3: FMV.

Facial injuries to gunner

Excessive forward or rear- Gunner injured ward recoil in recoilless weapons

Obtaining advice from advisory groups Purpose

Safety testing Purpose

P1: The manufacturer. P3: FMV.

P1: During verication. P3: During review of existing materiel.

distance Analysis Inspection

FSD 0060 FSD 0213

UNAbnormal environment classification IMHot sequential testing Cold sequential

Figure 3.3 Safety testing for qualification

Test directives for safety surveillance Purpose

Guns, Weapons & Ammunition Safety Manual (2000)

Guns, Weapons & Ammunition Safety Manual (2000)