SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL FIVE (revised 1/26/04)

Aviation Security on 9/11: The Regulators

Designated Commissioners: Slade Gorton and Tim Roemer

For Ms. Garvey:

PRE9-11

1. At the May 2003 Commission hearing, you testified that "perhaps the greatest
lesson of September 11th is that the terrorist threat is just as real here at home as it
is for our embassies in East Africa, A naval Destroyer in Yemen or the Marine
Barracks in Beirut?" Wasn't that lesson shown in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing? Can you confirm that the FAA understood that terrorists were present
in the United States, and that many terrorist groups had long been interested in
aviation?

2. Were you aware that FAA's Intelligence Office believed that they weren't
receiving much in the way of domestic intelligence, that they were blind about
what terrorists we knew were in the United States were up to and the threat they
posed? If so, what did you and the FAA do to improve the situation?

3. Can you tell us how often you received intelligence briefings?

4. Do you recall reviewing the following documents in which an FAA document

submitted to the Joint Inquiry indicated that "suicide hijacking as a terrorist tactic
was mentioned:"

a. March 1998 FAA assessment entitled "Usama Bin Laden/World Islamic Front
Threat to US Civil Aviation"
b. July 1999 FAA assessment with the same title
c. 2000 Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment (prepared by
FAA's Office of Intelligence) entitled "Prospects for Aircraft Hijackings to
Free Incarcerated Terrorists"

5. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers?

a. To the extent you recall this and the previous documents, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist
threat?
b. In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have
done with respect to this information?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

6. How did you receive reporting on the performance of the civil aviation security
system, including the results from the FAA's regular compliance testing and from
your Special Assessments Office's clandestine testing?

—How did such information influence policy-making, including the rule-making

process?

—In retrospect, is there anything additional you now wish you had done or had
asked for to improve your access to such information?

7. With the threat information you received from the FAA intelligence unit, and the
vulnerability data you received from FAA testing and evaluation units, what
consequence assessment and risk management techniques did you use in
allocating FAA's security resources?

8. You indicated in the last hearing that the FAA fought hard to make changes in the
aviation security baseline. Can you describe what those were, not only in the late
1990's but were any efforts undertaken specifically to respond to the increased
terrorist threat perceived in the summer of 2001?

9. Please answer the following question submitted by the 9/11 Families to the
Commission: Why did screening contractors pay 10 cents on the dollar for fines
imposed on them for violations? Why were the fines lowered?

9-11

At the May hearing we did not have the opportunity to hear detailed testimony on
your responsibilities and actions on the day of 9/11/01 in response to the terrorist
hijackings.

a. Please include what steps you took, or required to be taken, to learn what was
occurring.
b. Also, please provide us with your understanding of the roles of other FAA
personnel, and other federal agencies, with respect to a hijacking within the
United States.

Once the national ground stop was ordered, what was your and the FAA's role in
dealing with the screening of grounded aircraft and passengers in the event there
was some other element to the plot?

a. Did you issue any guidance to the Air Traffic Control System, to the FAA
filed offices, or to any other government personnel with respect to these
flights, such as cockpit warnings?

b. Did you then or subsequently receive any credible information about other
hijacking plots on 9/11?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 c. In retrospect, do you believe that you or FAA could or should have taken
additional action with respect to ensuring that flight manifests were examined and
each flight was screened?

We have received testimony that you and your Deputy Monte Belger were in
contact with airline CEO's during the morning of September 11. Is this accurate?

a. If so, what did you convey to the airlines?

b. What did you ask them to do?
c. For example, did you make any request that they contact their other
9/11 flights with respect to warning against cockpit intrusion?
d. If you didn't make such a request, in retrospect, do you wish that you had?

We have received testimony that you were presented a draft Security Directive on
the afternoon of September 11, 2001 which would have imposed security
measures beyond those which you subsequently ordered? If not, please tell us
your recollection with respect to the process for developing and issuing new
security measures in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

Why didn't the FAA conduct a formal and in depth after action about what
happened on 9-11 to learn lessons and establish facts? We received testimony
that one individual was tasked with trying to bring such an effort together well
after 9-11 but there was little interest from fellow employees and the coordination
of this wasn't a priority.

In summary, were you surprised by the 9/11 hijackings? If so, what was the
source of your surprise: the lack of intelligence on the specific threat; the weapons
they used; the tactics they employed; or something else? What could or should
have been done that could have prevented the hijackings?

Post 9-11

You testified at the May 2003 Commission hearing that for the future we need to
increase the layering of the aviation security system, and make security measures
more unpredictable to the enemy. Would you care to elaborate on your
recommendations for accomplishing these objectives?

Now that you are out of government what advice do you have about how to
address the systemic issues, challenges and problems of operating an aviation
system that is safe, secure and efficient to the maximum?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 For Mr. Flynn:

Systemic Issues

1. Some critics charge that under the FAA, security was entirely reactive in nature,
with the agency unable to move proactively to deal with emerging threats. How
do you respond?

2. We have received much testimony that the Aviation Security system prior to 9-11
was built to stop "crazies and criminals" but not the committed terrorists. Can
you describe your reaction to that?

Intelligence and the Terrorist Threat

1. What was your understanding of the terrorist threat overseas and domestically
during your tenure at FAA security? How did it change?

2. Why did the FAA focus so much on the threat overseas rather than here at home?
The FAA itself said that terrorists were present in the United States and would
find the U.S. civil aviation system an attractive target. Please describe your
experiences in dealing with the FBI and the CIA on FAA intelligence
requirements.

3. Did you share the view of some at FAA that you were somewhat blind about what
was taking place domestically? What was the cause of that blindness?

4. We understand you made some effort to improve the amount and quality of
intelligence FAA received from the Intelligence Community. Can you describe
those efforts and what the response was to your requests?

5. What was your understanding of "suicide hijacking" and the use of aircraft as a
weapon?

6. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers in which the possibility of a suicide
hijacking in the United States was considered but essentially discounted? To the
extent you recall this and other related documents on this subject, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist threat?
In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have done
with respect to this information?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

r
Checkpoint Screening & Standards

1. What was your response to the many reports of poorly performing checkpoints?
What was the root cause of this problem and why was the problem so tenacious?

2. The law requires screening to "detect or deter." What do you see as the
difference? It seems perhaps "detect" is for the regulatory to hang their hat on,
and "deter" is for the air carriers to hang their hat on.

3. You just heard our Staff Statement with respect to the status of various potential
weapons at the security checkpoints. Would you care to comment on the
Checkpoint Operations Guide with respect to box cutters and small knives?
When the FAA approved this guideline, what was your expectation as to how the
screeners were to differentiate between these two items? How was the four-inch
standard established?

4. Knife policy: Do you recall if the FAA considered a "no knife" policy pre 9-11?
Please give us the details.

5. Do you believe it was important to have continuous hand searches of carry-on

going at checkpoints as a means of adding randomness and of helping better
identify dangerous and deadly weapons? Was there a policy to have that done?
Do you recall if and when that policy was changed ?

Pre-Screening

1. Please give us your best recollection of how the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System evolved in the late 1990s. Do you think it was wise to ease
the consequences of CAPPS when the prescreening system was automated in the
late 1990's?

2. Given the increased terrorists threat in the 1990's, their known presence in the
United States, the continuing occurrence of hijacking overseas and the known
vulnerabilities of the checkpoint screening process, how could we have possibly
believed that hijacking was not a very good possibility in the United States? (If
FAA knew it was a concern why didn't we require the pre-screening of
selectees—those we thought as more than a minimal threat to the aircraft to have
additional screening of their person and carry-on baggage?)

Constructing the security system

1. With the threat information you received from your intelligence unit, and the
vulnerability data you received from FAA's testing and evaluation units, what

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 consequence assessment and risk management techniques did you use in
allocating your security resources?

2. What were the priorities of the security agenda, and how did you determine them?

3. Department of Transportation Inspector General Mead testified to the

Commission that the aviation security rulemaking process was one which the
Commission should take a close look at. Over the years, critics have called it
cumbersome, increasingly adversarial and, above all, slow. To take just one
example, the FAA's attempted rulemaking on the certification of screening
companies, which was mandated by 1996 legislation and which you testified on
before Congress on several occasions, including in 2000 before the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee, was still not complete as of 9/11. From your
perspective, how did the rulemaking process impact on your, and the agency's
ability, to make and implement security policy?

4. How would you describe the role of the airlines in the making and enforcement of
aviation security policy during your time at the FA A? Please describe FAA's
relationship with the airlines.

5. Please describe the process you utilized in seeking budgetary and policy
adjustments for civil aviation security. More specifically, what major budget,
manpower and policy adjustments did you seek while you were in charge of civil
aviation security? What was your assessment of the FAA's implementation of the
recommendations of both the Pan Am 103 and Gore Commissions?

6. In your written testimony, you highlighted the creation of the Baseline Working
Group and highlighted some of its differences with the subsequent Gore
Commission. Please comment on the specific following recommendations of the
BWG which were dropped in the final Gore Commission recommendations, and
include your assessment as to why they were dropped, and the consequences from
that action:

• 10-year implementation costs to the Treasury of $9.9 billion (versus an

additional $100 million a year in the Gore Commission recommendations)
• a requirement that an FAA-approved passenger profile "be used to identify
selectees, whose persons and property (checked baggage and carry-on
bags/items) will be subjected to additional security scrutiny."
• expansion of the FBI role in civil aviation security
• development of "a comprehensive 'team' approach to security that treats
aviation industry employees as team members with a stake in promoting
aviation security , emphasizing that employees are the first line of defense."

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

9-11

The Common Strategy made no provision for what to do if the pilots were
incapacitated or the cockpit was taken over. Why did we perceive pilots in an
easily accessible cockpit as invulnerable in an age of both sophisticated terrorist
tactics and of increasing air rage, including cockpit intrusions?

Please give us your assessment of the Federal Air Marshal program, and its status
and utility on 9/11.

Please tell us why you believe the system failed and the terrorists succeeded on
September 11,2001.

Please comment on the effectiveness of FAA's enforcement tools in place on

9/11, particularly with respect to civil fines.

Post 9-11

We shouldn't be telling those who would attack us what our vulnerabilities may
be, yet we know that without public scrutiny problems rarely get fixed. How do
we reconcile or balance those two competing objectives that's best for the nation?

What principles do you believe should drive aviation security policy?

For Mr. Manno:

1. I know you are fully aware of your oath. The first question we would have is this.
To your knowledge did the FAA possess any information regarding a terrorist plot
to hijack aircraft and use them as weapons on targets in the United States, or any
other plot that resembled such an operation?

2. What was your assessment of the threat to civil aviation security posed by
terrorists, at home and abroad? By UBL and al Qaeda? About hijacking? About
the use of aircraft as weapons?

3. What was the FBI's assessment of the risk to civil aviation domestically? How
did they communicate their position?

4. We perceived that threat to civil aviation was overseas, not at home. Is this
because that's where the threat really was or because we had eyes and ears
focused abroad and not at home?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

5. In the book "After" by Stephen Brill, on page 30, he says that the FAA "had a list
of about 300 people who the airlines were told were considered dangerous by the
FBI, the CIA or the FAA." Brill goes on to say that the FAA had this list on
September 10th but did not distribute it to the airlines until September 12th.
Was there such a list in the possession of the FAA prior to 9-11?

6. What was your access to the State Department's Tipoff list.

7. Do you recall reviewing the pre 9/11 2001 Terrorism Threat Presentation
prepared by Pat McDonnell and his office for presentation to aviation security
personnel at airports and with air carriers in which the possibility of a suicide
hijacking in the United States was considered but essentially discounted? To the
extent you recall this and other related documents on this subject, how did they
influence your thinking, and the system's policy response to the terrorist threat?
In retrospect, do you believe there was more the FAA could or should have done
with respect to this information?

8. One of the key factors in threat assessment is terrorists' "capabilities or skills?"

Can you describe your understanding prior to 9-11 of the existence of individuals
with terrorist affiliations who were pilot training in the United States?

9. Did FAA have any concerns about some of the people coming from overseas, not
just pilot training but aviation training? Did you task the 1C to address this issue
in any way?

10. Were you aware of whether efforts were made by the FBI to look into pilot
training in the late 1990's?

11. Phoenix EC: You have testified that FAA never received the FBI internal memo
from a special agent in Phoenix citing his concerns about student pilots.

a. Is that correct?

b. The FAA had a liaison to the FBI. Shouldn't the liaison have been apprised or
known about these concerns.

c. Did FAA endeavor to inquire why this information wasn't passed along? What
was the outcome of that inquiry.

d. What would FAA have done with the information had you received it?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

12. Can you tell us about the differences in the volume and quality of intelligence
FAA received from the Intelligence Community on the overseas versus the
domestic threat?

13. Please describe the role of the FAA liaison officers to the CIA and FBI in the
period up to and including 9/11. Do you believe they were able to fulfill the
mission as defined by the Pan Am 102/Lockerbie Commission? Were there any
limitations on their ability to represent the interests of civil aviation security in the
collection and analysis of information by their host agencies? Why did the FAA
not have comparable liaisons present at DIA and, especially, NSA?

14. Were you aware that the FAA's liaisons to the Intelligence Community were
required to spend a significant portion of their time working on non-FAA related
matters? Was this wise given the importance of intelligence to FAA's security
system?

15. Do you play any role in helping determine whether security measures matched
what the intelligence was telling you? How did that work?

16. Terrorists had increasingly used motor vehicles for suicide attack, why do you
think it was so unimaginable that they would use other modes of transportation—
principally aviation?

Suggested Questions for Panel Five

 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL SIX Revised 1/26/04
Aviation Security on 9/11: The Airlines

Designated Commissioner: Bob Kerrey

For Mr. Soliday:

1. We understand that you participated in the 1996 Baseline Working Group (BWG)
when it was first conceived to increase the baseline of security for civil aviation
security in the United States. Can you describe the threat perceived by the BWG and
the need to increase the baseline?

2. Please comment on the specific following recommendations of the BWG which were
dropped in the final Gore Commission recommendations, and include your
assessment as to why they were dropped, and the consequences from that action:

a. 10-year implementation costs to the Treasury of $9.9 billion (versus an

additional $100 million a year in the Gore Commission recommendations)
b. a requirement that an FAA-approved passenger profile "be used to identify
selectees, whose persons and property (checked baggage and carry-on
bags/items) will be subjected to additional security scrutiny"
c. expansion of the FBI role in civil aviation security
d. development of "a comprehensive 'team' approach to security that treats
aviation industry employees as team members with a stake in promoting
aviation security , emphasizing that employees are the first line of defense."

3. Please give us your best recollection of how the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System evolved in the late 1990s. Do you think it was wise to ease the
consequences of CAPPS when the prescreening system was automated in the late
1990's?

4. You earlier heard our Staff Statement with respect to the status of various potential
weapons at the security checkpoints. Would you care to comment on the Checkpoint
Operations Guide with respect to box cutters and small knives? When you approved
this guideline for your screening contractors, what was your expectation as to how the
screeners were to differentiate between these two items?

5. In recalling the events of 9/11, please indicate when and how you became aware of
first the hijacking and then the crash of each of the four flights.

6. How would you characterize the quality and quantity of civil aviation security related
intelligence you received pre-9/11 from the FAA? The FBI? The CIA? Other
sources? Did you ever take any action to seek enhancements in such information? If
so, what did you do, and when?

Suggested Questions for Panel Six

7. How would you characterize the airlines' role in security as of 9/11, and their
performance of that role? What about at United specifically?

For Mr. Studdert:

1. Who had the authority to order UAL's flights to land and to ground stop the system?

2. At what time and for what areas did United issue ground stops on 9/11? Did this
come before the FAA's order to shut down the system or after?

3. On 9-11 did you hear anything about the weapons or tactics used by the hijackers? If
so, what did you hear? Did you hear any mention of a gun or a shooting aboard any
of the flights?

4. Was there any discussion on 9/11 and in the immediate aftermath about the
ramifications to the company if illegal weapons were used aboard the hijacked
aircraft? Did you or any other members of United management or anyone else for
that matter counsel in anyway witnesses to the phone calls from the flight attendants
aboard the 9/11 flights about what they did or did not hear, or what to tell law
enforcement or other authorities about what they did or didn't hear?

5. In recalling the events of 9/11, please indicate when and how you became aware of
first the hijacking and the crash of each of the four flights.

6. How would you characterize the airlines' role in security as of 9/11, and their
performance of that role? What about at United specifically?

7. Please characterize the 9/11 communications between your airline and the following
entities: FAA headquarters, the Air Traffic Control System, and other airlines. Was
such communication timely and in keeping with your established procedures and
expectations? If not, how not?

For Mr. Arpey:

1. Tell us from your perspective what happened in the corporate suite and the
company's Operations Center on 9-11.

2. As the Operations Chief at American you were an Executive Vice President serving
on the Executive Committee. Mr. Ahern was American's Vice President of Safety,
Security and Environmental who was not a member of the executive committee.
Who represented the interests of safety, security and environmental issues within the
executive committee organization?

Suggested Questions for Panel Six

3. What time did you issue the ground stop for the Northeast? How about the time of
American's nationwide ground stop? Did this come before the FAA's order to shut
down the system or after?

4. On 9/11 did you hear anything about the weapons or tactics used by the hijackers? If
so, what did you hear? Did you hear any mention of a gun or a shooting aboard any
of the flights, but particularly aboard AA #11?

5. Was there any discussion on 9/11 and in the immediate aftermath about the
ramifications to the company if illegal weapons were used aboard the hijacked
aircraft? Did you or any other members of American management or anyone else for
that matter counsel in anyway witnesses to the phone calls from the flight attendants
aboard the 9/11 flights about what they did or did not hear, or what to tell law
enforcement or other authorities about what they did or didn't hear?

6. In recalling the events of 9/11, please indicate when and how you became aware of
first the hijacking and then the crash of each of the four flights.

7. How would you characterize the airlines' role in security as of 9/11, and their
performance of that role? What about at American specifically?

8. Please characterize the 9/11 communications between your airline and the following
entities: FAA headquarters, the Air Traffic Control System, and other airlines. Was
such communication timely and in keeping with your established procedures and
expectations? If not, how not?

For Mr. Ahern:

1. Would you provide your assessment of the performance of screening operations for
which American was responsible?

2. How would you characterize the quality and quantity of civil aviation security related
intelligence you received pre-9/11 from the FAA? The FBI? The CIA? Other
sources? Did you ever take any action to seek enhancements in such information? If
so, what did you do, and when?

3. We understand that American obtained intelligence information from private sources.

Can you tell us about why you contracted to receive this information and how the
data was factored into your security decision making?

4. You have said that your goal for checkpoint screening was focused on 100%
"deterrence" rather than "prevention" or "detection." What do you see as the
difference? What does that difference mean to the traveling public?

Suggested Questions for Panel Six

5. The Air Carrier Standard Security Program seems to lean on the air carriers and their
screening contractors to use "common sense" in determining what items should be
prohibited, even suggesting that the same item might be allowed in one instance, but
prohibited in another, depending on the circumstances. Did the air carriers and the
screening contractors exercise such discretion? If not, how does that comport with the
ACSSP? If so, how did you train people to exercise that discretion?

6. You earlier heard our Staff Statement with respect to the status of various potential
weapons at the security checkpoints. Would you care to comment on the Checkpoint
Operations Guide with respect to box cutters and small knives? When you approved
this guideline for your screening contractors, what was your expectation as to how the
screeners were to differentiate between these two items?

7. In recalling the events of 9/11, please indicate when and how you became aware of
first the hijacking and then the crash of each of the four flights.

8. How would you characterize the airlines' role in security as of 9/11, and their
performance of that role? What about at American specifically?

Suggested Questions for Panel Six

 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL SEVEN REVISED 1/26/04
Acts of Courage in the Sky

For Ms. Gonzalez:

1. Please describe your assessment of Betty Ong's performance, and that of her
fellow flight attendants under such trying circumstances.

2. Did you hear anything during your conversation about the use of any violence
aboard the aircraft other than stabbing?

3. Please tell us why the recording of Ms. Ong's call cut off after 4 !/2 minutes.

4. We understand that when Ms. Ong first called, someone else in the Reservations
Office answered the phone. Would you please walk us through how the call was
processed, and how you came to be on the line?
 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL EIGHT Revised 1/26/04
Risk Management after September 11

Designated Commissioner: Fred Fielding

For Admiral Loy, on transportation:

1. Given that many of the security measures of the future, including a new CAPPS II
program, depend on proper identification, are we doing enough to tighten the
process for acquiring government-issued ID, including breeder documents such as
birth certificates, social security cards etc.? Should there be a standard state
driver's license?

2. We have heard testimony that the Aviation Security system pre 9/11 was built for
"crazies" and "criminals" and not committed terrorists. What do you think is the
most important thing we can do to orient ourselves to stopping the committed
terrorist?

3. Can you tell us where TSA's efforts stand with respect to addressing the threat to
civilian aircraft from surface-to-air missiles?

4. Can you tell us where TSA's efforts stand with respect to implementing the
passenger pre-screening system CAPPS II? What is your timeline?

a. Do you have any plans to make additional upgrades in the existing system
while CAPPS II is under development?
b. Do you have any plans to use TSA's expedited rulemaking authority in
implementing CAPPS II? If not, why not?
c. As you know, some privacy advocates complain that CAPPS II will
contain no judicially enforceable right for individuals to access
information about them, nor to seek correction of inaccurate information.
Please respond.
d. Some CAPPS critics also complain that there is considerable danger of
"mission creep," especially in view of the CAPPS II Interim Final Privacy
Act Notice that stated, "After the CAPPS II system becomes operational,
it is contemplated that information regarding persons with outstanding
state or federal arrest warrants for crimes of violence may also be analyzed
in the context of this system." Please respond, and tell us very clearly
what the mission of CAPPS II is, and how does this comport with the plan
to analyze non-terrorist criminal data?
e. Other critics of CAPPS II, including the Reason Foundation, believe that a
"trusted traveler" program, which seeks to identify "good guys," would be
more effective than the CAPPS approach of trying to identify "bad guys,"
especially, they say, given what they believe is the plan for CAPPS II to
produce far fewer "selectees" than its predecessor. Please comment, and,
to the extent you can in open session, provide us with your thoughts on the

Suggested Questions for Panel Eight

 strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. Is there any way the two
can be combined?
f. Do you agree with the following statement: A trusted traveler program
only works if we can "trust" that people are who they say they are. How
do we accomplish that?
g. Under either CAPPS II or a trusted traveler approach, wouldn't identity
theft or a sleeper with roots in the community, be able to compromise the
system?

5. Last May, you testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee that TSA and
DHS are committed to a "threat-based risk management plan."

a. What is the status of that plan and what are its principles?
b. Please tell us how TSA integrates threat, vulnerability and consequence
assessments into your risk management evaluations. From what sources
do you obtain the information on each of these components, and how do
you weight them in relationship to each other?
c. How are you currently setting budget and other policy priorities while
your risk management plan is being developed?

6. Sitting before us here today, what are your top three or four priorities which need
further attention, either legislatively or administratively?

7. To the extent you can comment in open session, what steps have DHS and TSA
taken to improve the timeliness and comprehensiveness of the "no-fly" lists for
civil aviation?

a. How is, or will this list be coordinated with the work of the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the National Targeting Center, the
Terrorist Screening Center at the FBI, and any other relevant entities?
b. In your opinion, what more could or should be done to improve the "no-
fly" lists?

8. Current law requires TSA to remain intact for two years but allows the agency to
be restructured after that time. What, if any, restructuring options are currently
being considered, and why?

9. The 2002 National Research Council report, Making the Nation Safer, declared,
"The most critical need in the transportation sector is a systematic approach to
security." More specifically, it called for development of "coherent, layered
security systems for all transportation modes, particularly shipping containers and
vehicles that contain large quantities of toxic or flammable materials." Finally,
the NRC recommended that TSA "establish a strategic research and planning
office - attuned to but distinct from the agency's operational and enforcement
responsibilities." What is your evaluation of these findings and

Suggested Questions for Panel Eight

 recommendations, and what is TSA currently doing to address them? What more
needs to be done?

10. A psychological study of the aftermath of September 11 performed by researchers

at Carnegie Mellon University found that Americans vastly overestimated the risk
of terrorism during that period, with people estimating that there was a 20 percent
chance that they themselves were at risk and that the "average American" faced a
48 percent risk. Professor Jennifer Lerner said that, "There was an overwhelming
overestimation of risk.. .For even the 20 percent estimate to be accurate, we
would have had to have September 11 every day and then some." She went on to
indicate that the government and media can unwittingly alter risk perception by
making people either fearful or angry, and that, if used responsibly, that
information could be used to better communicate the actual degree of risk.

a. Given that the primary goal of terrorists is, after, to create terror, could the
government have done a better job in communicating with the public
about terrorist threats before, during and after September 11, 2001?
b. What has DHS done in trying to balance the need to promote continued
vigilance, with the need to combat the "terror" of terrorism?
c. What more could or should be done in this respect?

11. Personal identification integrity is vital to our security. I believe there are press
accounts that some states don't even regard the licenses they issue as definitive
proof of identity. First I'd like your general comments on this issue? More
specifically, what is your position on proposals such as a national ID; common
standards for state licenses, or other alternatives? Also, what is the status of
efforts to improve the integrity of breeder documents?

12. DHS has its own intelligence centers and participates in TTIC, and I'm sure other
centers. Who sees to it that all these centers work together? What's your general
philosophy on this question? Do we want more intelligence centers to increase
coverage and promote specialized analysis, such as with transportation modes,
and/or redundancy; or, do we need to consolidate intelligence functions and
centers to avoid duplication or stovepiping?

13. How is DHS addressing the problem of alternative spellings and misidentification
as we consolidate and utilize watchlists?

For Admiral Loy, on borders:

14. Homeland Security Council. What is the role of the Homeland Security Council
in the day to day life of DHS? What is the contribution of the Homeland Security
Council to the work of DHS? Who do you work with at HSC?

Suggested Questions for Panel Eight

15. Command and Control at the border in case of national emergency. Is there a
command and control strategy is in place for a fully integrated and seamless
border and transportation agency response in the event of another national
emergency? What happens at DHS in the event of a national emergency? Who is
in charge and what steps take place?

16. DHS Organization for borders. Right now, border security is within DHS, but
sprinkled throughout DHS, with the Coast Guard and Citizenship and
Immigration Services reporting directly to the Secretary, and others under
Undersecretary Hutchinson, (Transportation Security Administration, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

a. DHS pulls several elements into one Cabinet Department, but it seems that
you have a formidable challenge in integrating all these elements into policy:
How do you make that happen?

b. What about the integration of information and information analysis across

DHS, in such areas as intelligence, fraud, visa policy enforcement, and the
application of US VISIT biometrics?

11. Risk Assessment. You referred in your May 2003 testimony before Senate
Appropriations a DHS (and TSA) to a "threat-based risk management plan". Is
there a risk management plan incorporating immigration-related security issues?
What is the current status of the plan? Does it incorporate immigration-related
border security (ie the flow of people)? We would like to obtain a copy.

12. Recommendations. What recommendations do you have for making DHS a

stronger institution in the area of border management? Information acquisition
and analysis?

13. CIA Contributions. Numerous senior management officials at DHS have been
briefed on some critical new CIA tools that focus on terrorist travel documents.
Their findings and formulas have been significantly incorporated into computer
models, but to our knowledge are not incorporated into any DHS system. What is
your plan for incorporating innovative counter-terrorism tools from other agencies
into a high priority action plan at DHS?

Suggested Questions for Panel Eight