Beck&Grande 2ndModernity&Cosmopolitanism 10

The British Journal of Sociology 2010 Volume 61 Issue 3
Varieties of second modernity: the cosmopolitan turn in social and political theory and research1
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Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande
Abstract The theme of this special issue is the necessity of a cosmopolitan turn in social and political theory. The question at the heart of this introductory chapter takes the challenge of methodological cosmopolitanism, already addressed in a Special Issue on Cosmopolitan Sociology in this journal (Beck and Sznaider 2006), an important step further: How can social and political theory be opened up, theoretically as well as methodologically and normatively, to a historically new, entangled Modernity which threatens its own foundations? How can it account for the fundamental fragility, the mutability of societal dynamics (of unintended sideeffects, domination and power), shaped by the globalization of capital and risks at the beginning of the twenty-rst century? What theoretical and methodological problems arise and how can they be addressed in empirical research? In the following, we will develop this cosmopolitan turn in four steps: rstly, we present the major conceptual tools for a theory of cosmopolitan modernities; secondly, we de-construct Western modernity by using examples taken from research on individualization and risk; thirdly, we address the key problem of methodological cosmopolitanism, namely the problem of dening the appropriate unit of analysis; and nally, we discuss normative questions, perspectives, and dilemmas of a theory of cosmopolitan modernities, in particular problems of political agency and prospects of political realization. Keywords: Second Modernity; methodological cosmopolitanism; world risk society; individualization; cosmopolitization; political agency
I. Introduction When a world order collapses, thats the moment when reection should begin. Surprisingly, this has not been the case with the type of social theory dominant
Beck (Department of Sociology, Ludwig-Maximilian University and London School of Economics and Politial Science) and Grande (Geschwister-Scholl-Institut fur Politische Wissenschaft, Ludwig-Maxililians-Universitat Munchen) (Corresponding author email: u.beck@lmu.de) London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01320.x
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today. The mainstream of social theory still oats loftily above the lowlands of epochal transformations (climate change, nancial crisis, nation-states) in a condition of universalistic superiority and instinctive uncertainty. This universalistic social theory, whether structuralist, interactionist, Marxist or systemstheoretical, is now both out of date and provincial. Out of date because it excludes a priori what can be observed empirically: a fundamental transformation of society and politics within Modernity (from First to Second Modernity); provincial because it mistakenly absolutizes the trajectory, the historical experience and future expectation of Western, i.e. predominantly European or North American, modernization and thereby also fails to see its particularity. Consequently the main theme of this special issue is the necessity of a cosmopolitan turn in social and political theory. The question at the heart of this introductory chapter takes the challenge of methodological cosmopolitanism, already addressed in a Special Issue on Cosmopolitan Sociology in this Journal (Beck and Sznaider 2006a), an important step further: How can social and political theory be opened up, theoretically as well as methodologically and normatively, to a historically new, entangled Modernity which threatens its own foundations? How can it account for the fundamental fragility and, mutability of societal dynamics (of unintended side-effects, domination and power), shaped, as they are, by the globalization of capital and risks at the beginning of the twenty-rst century? What theoretical and methodological problems arise and how can they be addressed in empirical research? It has become a commonplace that national institutions alone are unable to cope with the challenges of regulating global capitalism and responding to new global risks (Beck 2009). It is no less obvious that there is no global state or international organization capable of regulating global capital and risk in a way comparable to the role played by the Keynesian welfare national state (Jessop 2002) in industrial society. Instead, we can observe a complex reconstitution of political authority, with which to organize the mechanisms of global economic regulation, risk management and control in ways characterized by new forms of political interdependence (Grande and Pauly 2005). At present, the politics of the world risk society (Beck 1999, 2009) is an extraordinarily intricate terrain, composed, among other things, of co-ordinated national mechanisms, bilateral and multilateral agreements, inter-, trans- and supranational institutions, transnational corporations, private charity foundations, and civil society groups. Despite this rapidly growing number of global organizations and transnational institutions, there is an increasing unease, nourished not least by the hesitant responses to the global nancial crisis, the European currency crisis, and the poor results of last global climate conference at Copenhagen that these institutions are proving unable to address the challenges they were created to meet. Similar developments can be observed at the national level, regarding, for example, democratic institutions, welfare systems, families, etc. Can the World Bank solve the global problem of poverty? Can the
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Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) solve a global food crisis? Can the World Trade Organisation effectively regulate global trade? It seems as if these institutions do not constitute a sufcient basis for managing or controlling the global risks and crises created by the global victory of industrial capitalism. This is exactly what the transformative dynamics of the Second, Cosmopolitan Modernity is about! Isnt there a gulf of centuries between the threats, opportunities and conict dynamics of bordertranscending, radicalized modernization in the twenty-rst century and the ideas, institutions and structures of industrial capitalism and national state authority rooted in the nineteenth century? And further: What does all that mean for conict dynamics, in and through which questions of social justice, international law and the building of transnational regimes and institutions are negotiated? Where and how do cosmopolitical situations, forms of action and activities arise? At the centre or the periphery? From above or below? Are they imposed or voluntary? Can we assume that the diversity of paths and (inter)dependent constellations of the Second Modernity will resist the integrative pressure emanating from the globalizing economy, from the global diffusion of human rights or the cosmopolitan imperative of world risk society? Must we co-operate or fail? How can imagined cosmopolitan risk communities be established across borders and divisions, opening up, indeed demanding new possibilities of communication and action? This introductory chapter will present some of the theoretical and methodological tools needed to answer such questions. It argues that it is impossible to talk meaningfully about methodological cosmopolitanism without pulling down the walls of Euro-centrism. We need to open up perspectives onto the world beyond Europe, onto the entanglements of histories of colonization and domination as well as onto border-transcending dynamics, dependencies, interdependencies and intermingling. How? Through a new conceptual architecture distinguishing two types of social theory: the singular and the plural. A theory of the society in the singular means: society neither national nor global but society absolutely understood in universal terms; whereas a theory of societies in the plural, refers to the very different paths and contexts of modernization processes. Sociological theory from its very beginning has been concerned to formulate a general theory of (modern) society in the singular (and to identify general concepts, principles, structures, systems, and modes of social action and change).This is no longer sufcient, if it ever was. It inevitably leads to the category error of implicitly applying conclusions drawn from one society to society (in general), which then becomes a universal frame of reference. This is exactly the case with most of the dominant theories in contemporary sociology (Bourdieu, Coleman, Foucault, Giddens, Goffman, Habermas, Luhmann, Meyer, Parsons, and even Becks Risk Society). Confusing a theory of one society (of many) with the theory of society as such is
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what we call the self-provincialization of social theory. The form of abstraction characteristic of this type of theory is not a sign of professional sophistication but of a failure to reect upon the transformative dynamics of modern societies in the twenty-rst century. The historical and cultural specicity of contemporary social theory can be demonstrated by examining two of its notable characteristics. First of all, methodological nationalism (Arnoldi 2010; Beck 1997, 2000, 2006; Wei 2010; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002): Until recently, social theory has taken the nation-state as its implicit unit of analysis; the terms society and culture implicitly referred to what have been perceived as discrete, self-contained and relatively homogenous entities bounded by national borders, institutions and legal frameworks. Accordingly, theory has operated with an unquestioned assumption of a neat correspondence between nation, territory, society and culture. Secondly, as is more generally the case with the humanities, many of the foundations of social and political theory were laid during the age of European empires. Political rule over non-Western territories, resources and populations, and the acquisition of economic control, formed the background against which Western authors came to grips with other societies (see Kurasawa 2007; Maharaj 2010). This frequently encouraged the denigration of such colonized societies, which were widely perceived as inferior and backward compared to their European and American counterparts (traditional). Many theories of modernity have consequently drawn on a very narrow range of national experiences (e.g. England/Britain in the economic realm, France in the political domain and Prussia/Germany in the eld of bureaucracy), which are presumed to be universally valid or, at the very least, a model to be replicated in other regions of the globe. We do not argue that a universal theory of modern society as such is impossible in principle. Rather, we criticize the hegemonic short-circuit from one society to society (in general). In the Second Modernity, social and political theory-building must go all the way through the plurality of modernization paths, of Western and non-Western experiences and projects, their dependencies, interdependencies and interactions. In essence, this is what we call methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006; Beck and Grande 2007): an approach which takes the varieties of modernity and their global interdependencies as a starting point for theoretical reection and empirical research. In the following, we will develop this cosmopolitan turn in four steps: rstly, we present the major conceptual tools for a theory of cosmopolitan modernities; secondly, we de-construct Western modernity by using examples from research on individualization and risk; thirdly, we address the key problem of methodological cosmopolitanism, namely the problem of dening the appropriate unit of analysis; and nally, we discuss normative questions of a theory of cosmopolitan modernities, in particular problems of political agency and prospects of political realization.
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II. Theory of cosmopolitan modernities: the theoretical tool box One of the basic premises of classical modernization theory is the fascinating idea of a kind of diffusion or a transfer of European theories to the periphery. All societies would in the long term surrender to modernitys classic distinction between tradition and modernity and produce Western modernitys typical institutional patterns, which are available as worldwide repertoire (Stichweh 2000: 256). The various countries and regions of the world are developed to differing degrees, but once a country or a region follows the path of modernization, it is heading, more or less, for the same goal. . . . All non-modern cultures and social structures must ultimately give way to modern ones. This is their unavoidable fate. (Berger 2006: 2024) There might be variations in modernity, but there is no plurality in the sense of autonomous modernities based on different criteria of modernization. The same play with a different cast is being performed everywhere (Berger 2006: 203). As a consequence of this diffusion process, empirical research concludes that we live in a world which is more and more growing together. There seems to be agreement that society in the twenty-rst century will be world society perceived as an entity across which a kind of meta-culture is stretched (Stichweh 2000: 22; Meyer 2005). Taken to its logical extreme, this would mean that with the completion of the universal project of modernity, the end of history (Fukuyama 1992) has arrived. But the opposite is true: we are facing the end of the end of history. This expectation of convergence of a homogeneous and universal model of (Western) modernity that will sooner or later be followed everywhere is the exact opposite of our theory of cosmopolitan modernities. The point of a cosmopolitan turn in social theory is to open it up to the possibility of a variety of different and autonomous interlinked modernities (plurality of modernities), on the one hand; and to new, global imperatives, pressures and constraints, on the other hand. These new cosmopolitan imperatives2 are not universal given, but accumulate (historically) at the beginning of the twenty-rst century and create new conict structures, conict dynamics and new processes of community building. Both assumptions need to be justied, and in this section we want to present the main building blocks of a theory of cosmopolitan modernities. The crucial question from which we start is how different types of modern societies3 can be theoretically accounted for at all? How can we break down the assumptions of a false universality and homogeneity characteristic of conventional social theory? What does plurality of modern societies and modernization paths mean? Where does this diversity come from and what consequences does it have? In order to answer these questions we will present three theoretical gures of thought and combine them systematically.
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1. Plurality of modernities and their entanglements The rst gure of thought can be introduced in a critical exchange with the idea of multiple modernities, as it has been developed, in particular by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2000, 2006) and Gran Therborn (1995).4 Eisenstadt argues that modern societies are characterized by structural antinomies, which may be politically articulated and socially institutionalized in quite different ways. Historical comparison shows that Western modernity does not represent a universal type of social modernization, but merely a specic combination of structural features. Outside Europe, for example in China and Japan, other forms of modernity may be found, which, and this is the point, do not merely display structural variations on European modernity but constitute independent, autonomous types of society. In the context of a theory of cosmopolitan modernities, however, the idea of multiple modernities has to be developed further in two directions. In Eisenstadts theory the mechanisms and processes responsible for the structural variations, are insufciently elaborated, as are the relationships of the individual types to one another. The respective types are conceived as relatively closed units and their formation appears as the product of internal mechanisms and processes. Neither, however, can be generalized. This is Gran Therborns starting point (Therborn 1995). He argues that the variations in modern societies are the product of different paths in and through modernity. In postcolonial theory (Conrad and Randeria 2002; Young 2001) and in Global and/or Atlantic History (Bayly 2004; Benjamin 2009; Osterhammel 2009) this aspect is systematically developed. These studies show convincingly that the various social modernization processes were interwoven from the outset, and that the individual societies were tied into complex relations of dependence. This is also true, as Maharajs contribution to this issue shows (Maharaj 2010), of Western, European modernity. The concept and history of the Atlantic world is a perfect illustration of this point. The focus (here) is on the connections, interactions and exchanges that crisscross the Atlantic Ocean from the fteenth century.These attachments and engagements transformed European, West African and Native American societies and also created new peoples, societies, cultures, economies and ideas throughout the Atlantic littoral. (Benjamin 2009: xxiii) 2. Discontinuous changes within modernity: distinguishing between rst and second modern conditions The idea of multiple modernities and their entanglements must, however, also be extended in a second direction: the possibility of discontinuous transformations within modernity. In the last twenty years this thought gure has
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been developed in particular within the framework of the theory of reexive modernization (Beck 1992, 1997, 2009: ch. 12; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; Beck, Bon and Lau 2003; Beck and Lau 2005; Beck and Mulsow 2011; Giddens 1990, 1991, 1994). This concept is based on the distinction between basic principles and basic institutions of modernity. The distinction opens up the theoretical possibility of a structural break, of discontinuous societal change within modern societies. Modern societies can be distinguished from traditional, pre-modern societies (but also from post-modern ones) by specic basic structural and organizational principles. These structural and organizational principles, however, can be institutionalized in very different ways. This allows us to distinguish different varieties of modernity in historical comparison, in particular between a First and a Second Modernity. Since the identication and exact denition of these principles and institutions is not only a theoretical question, but also a normative one, the relevant literature displays a certain degree of conceptual ambiguity. Nevertheless, the major publications clearly reveal what lies at the heart of the distinction. According to Beck, Bon and Lau (2003: 45), the premises of First Modernity societies include: the nation-state, a programmatic individualization bounded by collective structures and identities, gainful work and employment, a conception of nature founded on its exploitation, a concept of scientically dened rationality, and the principle of functional differentiation. Building on the distinction between basic principles and basic institutions, the theory of reexive modernization argues that the epochal break within contemporary (modern) societies is characterized by the transformation of the basic institutions of industrial society, while simultaneously preserving the basic principles of modernity. Thanks to the global victory of the principles of modernity (such as the market economy) and the side effects of industrial modernity (climate change, global nancial crisis), the basic social institutions of the First Modernity have become ineffective or dysfunctional for both society and individuals. Across the world, nation-states, political parties, trade unions, democracy, market economies, industrial enterprises, welfare systems, educational and occupational systems, families, gender roles, etc., increasingly display seemingly irreversible weaknesses in delivering social functions and individual utilities that used to be taken for granted. Individuals, for example, increasingly nd it necessary to design their biographies in terms of permanently individualized endeavours, pursuits and life courses (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001). This transition by no means takes place uniformly throughout the world, but breaks and reects itself in different contexts, paths, thresholds, etc. (for Japan see Suzuki et al. 2010: 514 39, for China see Yan 2010: 490513, for South Korea see Chang and Song 2010: 54065).
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The case studies on the processes of reexive modernization in extraEuropean societies (in particular on China, Japan and South Korea) show that different varieties of a Second Modernity arise and that the course of modernization processes can differ signicantly between individual regions or countries. For this reason, we suggest that the varieties of reexive modernization processes should themselves be considered a key variable in the analysis of transformative change in modern societies. More specically, we can identify several process variables, which allow us to distinguish different patterns of reexive modernization processes: the logic of transformative change: unintended vs. intended, active vs. reactive;5 the duration of the transformation process: stretched vs. compressed the result: successful vs. failed. On the basis of these process variables, we can distinguish in particular between: the Western path or model as the project of an unintended, temporally stretched and (more or less) successful modernization of modern societies; the project of an active, compressed modernization driven by a developmental state (Korea, China); post-colonialism as the project of a reactive, enforced modernization; and the path of a failed modernization where the establishment of the institutions of the First Modernity (like the nation-state) or the transformation into the Second Modernity ends in failure In its initial formulation (see, e.g., Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), the theory of reexive modernization was very much a theory of Western modernity itself. It shared a number of basic assumptions with traditional theories of modernity and modernization. Among others, it had the same universalist aspiration, i.e. it assumed that its norms, principles and institutions could (and should) be applied (sooner or later) throughout the globe. This idea must be revised and replaced by the idea of cosmopolitan modernities. We argue that the process of reexive modernization is indeed universal, i.e. that we cannot avoid the side-effects of industrial, nation-state modernization, which undermine the institutions of the First Modernity. We do not maintain, however, that the process of reexive modernization takes the same form everywhere. On the contrary, the form it takes depends very much on actual circumstances. It produces new varieties of modern societies, which do not simply arise because of changes in the varieties of modernity identied by Eisenstadt. The process of reexive modernization not only produces new cosmopolitan imperatives, it also reects the ways in which the pre-modern, rst and second modern constellations overlap. In order to be
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able to analyse adequately these cosmopolitan constellations sociologically, an expansion of the sociological horizon is required. In a nutshell, as long as we (continue to) see the Second Modernity isolated in a Western context, we shall misunderstand it. 3. Cosmopolitization: through this process national societies are internalizing each other Our third theoretical building block is the concept of cosmopolitization (Beck 2006): We do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism but in an age of cosmopolitization the global other is in our midst. This concept does not simply add to the rst two gures of thought; rather, it links them in such a way, that the weaknesses of each is compansated for. On the one hand, the theory of reexive modernization is opened up to the existence of multiple modernities; on the other, the theory of multiple modernities is itself opened to the possibility of discontinuous social change. The concept of cosmopolitanism has been the object of one of the most signicant debates in the Social Sciences and Humanities during the last decade6. In the process, cosmopolitanism has refashioned itself, moving beyond philosophy and political theory, its conventional home, to social theory and research, and ranging widely across anthropology, geography, cultural studies, literary criticism, legal studies, international relations, and social history. New, more or less reexive and critical cosmopolitanisms have since proliferated. They have been preoccupied, rst, with squaring the circle of abstract universalism by emphasizing respect for the particularity of human diversity. In the second place, they have sought to expand the circumference of the circle to include (if not to favour) those for whom cosmopolitanism is not a lifestyle choice, but the tragic involuntary condition of the refugee or otherwise dispossessed. The starting point of our analysis here is with the two dimensions of the concept of cosmopolitanism. In the rst, the vertical dimension, cosmopolitanism refers to individual or collective responsibilities towards mankind. In this context, the theory of reexive modernization argues that modern societies Western and non-Western alike are confronted with qualitatively new problems, which create cosmopolitan imperatives. These cosmopolitan imperatives arise because of global risks: nuclear risks, ecological risks, technological risks, economic risks created by insufciently regulated nancial markets, etc. These new global risks have at least two consequences: rstly, they mix the native with the foreign and create an everyday global awareness; and secondly therefore, they create chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens, which alter the nature and dynamics of territorially dened governance systems. These risks link the global North and the global South in ways that were unknown hitherto.
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However, the result of global interconnectedness is not a normative cosmopolitanism of a world without borders. Instead, these risks produce new cosmopolitan responsibilities, cosmopolitan imperatives, which no one can escape. What emerges, is the universal possibility of risk communities which spring up, establish themselves and become aware of their cosmopolitan composition imagined cosmopolitical communities which come into existence in the awareness that dangers or risks can no longer be socially delimited in space or time. In the light of these cosmopolitan imperatives a reformulated theory of reexive modernization must argue that nowadays we all live in a Second, Cosmopolitan Modernity regardless of whether we have experienced First Modernity or not. In its second dimension, cosmopolitanism is a theory of diversity, more precisely, of a specic way of interpreting and coping with diversity (Delanty 2009; Tyeld and Urry 2009). To speak of a cosmopolitan modernity in this context means broadening our horizon to include a variety of western and non-western modernities. The conceptual challenge for a theory of cosmopolitan modernization is to identify the patterns of variation, their origin and their consequences. In short, the idea of cosmopolitan modernity must be developed out of the variety of modernities, out of the inner wealth of variants of modernity. Cosmopolitan modernization, however, must not be equated with the concept of pluralization. It not only highlights the existence of a variety of different types of modern society, it also emphasizes the dynamic intermingling and interaction between societies. In this regard it takes up key concepts of the literature on post-colonialism, such as entanglement (Randeria 2004), and on globalization, such as interconnectedness (Held et al. 1999), and it takes them further by introducing the concept of dialogical imagination or the internalization of the other: the global other is in our midst. Cosmopolitization relates and connects individuals, groups and societies in new ways, thereby changing the very position and function of the self and the other. Such an internalization of the other can be the product of two entirely different processes. On the one hand, it can be the result of an active, deliberate and reexive opening of individuals, groups and societies to other ideas, preferences, rules and cultural practices; on the other hand, however, it can also be the outcome of passive and unintended processes enforcing the internalization of otherness. Hence, cosmopolitization is not, by denition, a symmetrical and autonomous process; it may well be the product of asymmetries, dependencies, power and force, and it may also create new asymmetries and dependencies within and between societies. In integrating these two dimensions of cosmopolitization, it becomes apparent that a cosmopolitan modernity differs signicantly from a Kantian world of perpetual peace. It is characterized, rather, by structural contradictions resulting from two conicting processes, which create what we call a cosmopolitan dialectic. On the one hand, there is a centripetal, unifying
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process, the formation of a world risk society (Beck 1999, 2009). At the same time, the Second Modernity is subject to powerful, centrifugal, diversifying processes resulting from the co-existence, and probably even the hegemonic competition between different types and visions of modernity; and from resistances to economic, political and cultural globalization within societies (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008): The more the world is brought together by global risks (climate change, nuclear threats, nancial crisis), the more it is also torn apart by global risks. How do these contradictory tendencies accommodate each other? This can be condensed into the argument that the coming world society of the Second Modernity is characterized by new forms of systemic competition between ways and visions of modernity and new types of cosmopolitical conict and violence. Global entanglement and interconnectedness are not only the preconditions for the establishment of new cosmopolitan communities of fate; they are at the same time the sources of the emergence of powerful counter-movements. In order to adequately observe and fully understand these processes and dynamics, sociological theory must, however, give up its nationalist perspective and its universalistic assumptions. Is there any mileage in this cosmopolitization to develop into a selfreexive, critical cosmopolitanism, actively and consciously trying to create new cosmopolitan institutions, as Craig Calhoun (2010: 595620) in his inspiring comment is supposing? No, this is not a Hegelian theory. We need to warn against this cosmopolitan fallacy (Beck 2006: 89). It seems more likely it could end up as a faade for national interests where cosmo-credentials mask or mix with anti-cosmopolitical mentality (Maharaj 2010). Cosmopolitization without cosmopolitanism is a reexive condition: the growing necessity for all sorts of actors Chinese stem scientists (Zhang 2010), climate scientists (Hulme 2010), migrants (Glick Schiller 2009), business, religious groups (Beck 2010; Levitt 2007), human rights groups (Levy 2010), workers, teachers, medical professions, distant lovers (Beck/Beck-Gernsheim 2011) or criminals and even neo-nationalists, Al Qaida terrorists to enlarge their frame of reference beyond borders, to actively compare, reect and accommodate diverse perspectives. But this reexivity must not be confused with normativity. Cosmopolitization does not have an answer to the question: What is human(ity)? But it does have an answer to the question, why the question what is human(ity)? is all over on the agenda inducing more a struggling than a learning process. III. De-constructing and redening western modernity: the examples of individualization and risk The cosmopolitan turn in sociological theory leads to the question, what can Western social sciences learn from the discourse on varieties of the Second
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Modernity, and especially from extra-European experiences and perspectives? In the following, we will show that basic concepts of the theory of the Second Modernity, like any other theory of society, cannot simply be applied in different contexts in different parts of the world; neither do they operate at the global level. These concepts have to be deconstructed and redened for different social and historical situations. Therefore, the cosmopolitan turn criticizes the universalistic assumptions and expectations of the early theory of reexive modernization. The theory itself has to be cosmopolitanized (i.e. we might speak of the de-provincialization of the theory of reexive modernization). The questions then are: How can basic concepts of individualization and risk be adapted to a multi-path prospect of modernity? What are the theoretical implications of the East Asian, South American etc. pathdependent varieties (of the Second Modernity) for the theory of the Second Modernity in general? 1. Redening the European model of individualization In the light of the entangled cases and contexts of the Chinese (Yan 2010), Japanese (Suzuki et al. 2010) and South Korean (Chang and Song 2010) paths to individualization, we nd ourselves conceptually and empirically in possession of rich resources for de-constructing and redening the European model of individualization. The individualization thesis (see Bauman 2001; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Giddens 1991) highlights four basic features of the individualization process: (1) detraditionalization; (2) institutionalized dis-embedding and re-embedding of the individual; (3) compulsory pursuit of a life of ones own and the lack of genuine individuality; (4) the biographical internalization of systemic risks. As Yan (2010) convincingly argues in his contribution to this issue, the individualization thesis likewise rests on two premises: Theoretically it claims to be an antithesis to neoliberalism and, implicitly, to liberalism and classic individualism as well; socially, it denes the individualization process under the conditions of cultural democracy, the welfare state and classic individualism. These premises, however, relate primarily to the history and reality of Western Europe. The emphasis on these two premises effectively locks the individualization thesis into the particular version of the Second Modernity in Europe, or a Western Europe box. If we decouple the two premises from the four basic features, we can see that individualization is actually a global trend of our time.While sharing the above-mentioned four features to various degrees, the global trend of individualization also displays some features that are not necessarily conditioned by the two premises. (Yan 2010: 508) The European model simply takes it for granted that, operating under the conditions of the post-welfare state, the instrumental relations of capitalist
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markets have produced an individualization in which the ideas of cultural democratization have been instilled. Manifestly this does not hold for Chinese individualization. In China there is neither a culturally embedded democracy nor a welfare state. Moreover, individualization in China, in contrast to Europe, has not been institutionally anchored in a system of basic rights (family law, labour law, etc.). This demonstrates that what is presented in the European context as the universal logic of individualization namely the concurrence of the institutionalized legal forms and the biographical patterns of individualization is in fact a historically and culturally limited special form, the result of a particular amalgamation of modernization and individualization in the West European context. As the Chinese example shows, these two developments legal forms and biographical patterns can also be uncoupled and re-combined, thus constituting different paths to individualization. There is, in principle, a close connection between individualization and the state in both the European and the Chinese contexts.This connection, however, can assume completely different forms, indeed it can lead in diametrically opposite directions. If in China, too, the individual is becoming increasingly important, then this is not occurring within an institutionally secured framework, nor is it based on the civil, political and social basic rights which in Europe were won through political struggles during the First Modernity. Instead these goals are still the objects of struggles whose outcome remains open. It is striking that, by comparison with the European path, the Chinese path towards individualization is unfolding in a characteristically different, indeed reverse sequence. In China, the neoliberal deregulation of the economy and the labour market, of everyday culture and consumption, is being initiated before and without the constitutional anchoring of individualization as we know it in Europe. As a result, political and social basic rights have to be gained on the basis of a neoliberal, depoliticizing, market-based individualization. One consequence of this inversion is that the authoritarian state, having revoked social guarantees along with the obligations to the collective, is trying to set limits to the claim to political participation, inherent in the process of individualization, by placing a tight network of controls around the individual. Individual rights are being granted as privileges, not as inviolable basic rights that everyone possesses as a citizen. The government is trying to restrict the individualization that it needs by linking it to ofcially celebrated national and family values. To sum up, one could say that whereas in Europe justice and law speak the language of individualization, in China a practice of tolerated, even enforced individualization is taking place, coupled with an ofcial ideological stigmatization of that same individualization (Yan 2009). These East Asian experiences and perspectives on the Second Modernity are conceptually enriching. This is what makes methodological
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cosmopolitanism so fruitful and creative. Chang and Song, to take another example, in their contribution to this special issue, introduce a set of different dimensions and forms of individualization defamiliarization, risk-averse individualization, reconstructive individualization, nomadist individualization, demographic individualization, and institutionalized individualization in order to understand the ambivalences of this process both in East Asia and in general. Most importantly, they argue, that some of these forms of individualization do not have to be preceded by positive individualism as a generic social culture (Chang and Song 2010: 54065). Therefore, it is more than possible to have individualization without individualism, something they nd empirically in the case of South Korean women. 2. Redening the European model of risk society The necessity of redening basic concepts of social theory can be demonstrated in the case of the risk concept as well.7 Examining various types of risks associated with East Asian compressed modernity, Han and Shim (2010: 46589) conclude that the concept of risk society is more relevant to East Asia than to Western societies but it has to be redened. They distinguish two modes of risk production in contemporary societies. On the one hand, new global risks produced by a radicalization of the First, industrial modernity, have been emerging. These so-called manufactured uncertainties (Beck 1996; Giddens 1994) are the dominant type of risk in Western, in particular West European societies. Examples are climate change, transnational terrorism and systemic economic risks. However, Han and Shim argue that it is wrong to conceptualize all risks along this way. On the other hand, certain types of risk are produced as consequences of the deciencies built into rush-to strategy of development in East Asia. (Han and Shim 2010: 471) Examples of these deciency risks are large-scale accidents of various kinds, violence, contamination of foods and tap water, fraudulent construction projects, dislocation of the family and so on. Han and Shim also distinguish two different modes of risk dispersion: transnational and regional. Risks may be called transnational if they can, in principle, happen everywhere in the world. In contrast, risks may be regional if they tend to occur not everywhere but in those specic countries that merge into a particular pathway to modernity. (Han and Shim 2010: 471) The deciency risks produced by the rush-to strategy of modernization in East Asia are mostly regional in scope. They affect East Asian countries in a specic way, although they materialize in a global context. As a result, risk society in East Asian countries takes a completely different shape than in
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Western Europe. It is constituted by different risks, different risk cultures and different risk conicts. Han and Shim conclude that by examining world risk society, we need to focus also on the concrete reality of East Asia. This is not because the Western view of global risks lacks validity, but because other types of risks, which originate from deciencies of rush-to modernization, call for attention that is no less urgent in East Asia (Han and Shim 2010: 46589). In order to develop further this distinction between modes of risk production by examining the successes and deciencies of modernization we propose distinguishing between self-induced and externally-induced dangers. This allows us to locate the problems of inequality and dominance within the concept of globalized risks itself. In this way, it is possible to grasp more precisely than before that there is a radical inequality in the situations of decision-makers and of those affected by risks and/or dangers. With the cosmopolitan turn it becomes evident that the distinction between self-induced risk and external risk is a cosmopolitan ash-point, in so far as the relation of whole regions of the world to one another can be analysed in terms of the externalization of self-produced dangers, i.e. by shifting them onto others. The powerful produce and prot from the risks, whereas the powerless are affected to the core of their being by the side effects of decisions taken by others. Even this very rough distinction between self-induced risks and external risks allows, indeed compels, a revision of the theory of risk society. The premise that all human beings and societies understand the world of risks, which threaten them existentially, as side effects of own decisions (and hence as risks in the narrow sense) has to be abandoned in favour of the assumption, that for large parts of the world population the consequences of modernization can be ascribed to dangers externally induced by other decisionmakers in other parts of the world, that is, the West. Such regions, however, are no longer disadvantaged in varying degrees by the consequences of their own failed dependent modernization alone (as for example dependency theorists suggest); they have suffered also from the catastrophic effects of the successful modernization processes of other (Western) societies. This problem can be located rst of all in the abstract nature of the concepts themselves: Capitalism and modernity are sufciently general to be linked to almost any social phenomenon. At this point the concept of world risk society offers a strategic research advantage. It provides a clear reference point to the intersection between conict and integration: the Janus face of global risks. On the one hand, new imagined cosmopolitical communities arise within the discursive spaces of global risks. These communities do not replace the national imagined communities so brilliantly analysed by Benedict Anderson (1991), but they can under the pressure of a cosmopolitan imperative open up to one another and network co-operatively. On the other, it is precisely around transnational risk inequalities measured by impact and social vulnerability that hegemonic risk conicts once again are up. And they do
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so in ways that persistently resist global standardization (see, for example, the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in 2009). At the same time, the resources and mechanisms that have been developed for civilizing class conicts are being exhausted. The new conicts of world risk society are concerned with anticipated future catastrophes in the present, which and this is the crucial point have been set in motion precisely by legal forms of action. If one sets aside the anticipatory policy of prevention then there are few resources and little leeway for redistributing expected legal future catastrophes. 3. Theoretical implications What are the more general theoretical implications of such exemplary de-construction and re-construction of basic sociological concepts? The rst insight is that the progression from Pre-modernity to the First Modernity and Second Modernity is not universal and cannot be generalized. On the contrary, this progression is a central feature of the particular European path to modernity. The false universalism implicit in sociological theories cannot be uncovered by looking at Europe from a European standpoint. It can only be seen by looking at Europe from a non-European perspective, that is with Asian eyes (or African eyes, etc.), in other words by practising methodological cosmopolitanism! Methodological cosmopolitanism not only includes the others experiences of and perspectives on modernization but corrects and redenes the self-understanding of European modernity. The question of how varieties of the Second Modernity can be constructed receives a systematic answer here in terms of different sequences, combinations and mixtures of Pre-modernity, First Modernity and Second Modernity. Most importantly, advanced capitalist societies may be characterized by the immanent, self-induced consequences of the process of reexive modernization, i.e. the transformation from the First to the Second Modernity, in which the basic institutions of the First Modernity are undermined. In this case, most of the driving forces of radicalized reexivity individualization, cosmopolitization and risk society originate as the side-effects of selfinduced risks. Late developing and rapidly developing capitalist societies (and socialist transition societies) may be characterized and distinguished precisely by different types of time-space differentiations, and by the combinations and conjunctions of Pre-modernity, First and Second Modernity. Two types of constellations may be distinguished theoretically: on the one hand, the opposite sequence (to the European one), in which the challenges of the Second Modernity come before the First Modernity, with the consequence that the latters institutional resources are absent. This could be called the victim-constellation of late developing countries. On the other
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hand, there is the constellation of compressed modernization (Chang 1999, 2010). This means that the development of the First Modernity (which in the European context has been stretched over 150 years) and the transition to the Second Modernity (i.e. processes of individualization, risk and cosmopolitization) take place almost simultaneously, i.e. within the very short period of one or two decades, as was the case in South Korea. Of course, stretched European and compressed East Asian modernization obey very different logics. First of all, the cumulative effects multiply; secondly, the political risks involved (arising from the cycle of public denial and hysteria) are very different in these two varieties of the Second Modernity; and, thirdly and as a consequence of the rst two, reexivity means quite different things in each context. All paths of modernization are confronted with the problem of what kind and quality of insurance can be provided to enable individuals, groups and classes to come to terms with the risks, insecurities, uncertainties and threats produced by social transformations. Basically three types of risk insurance can be distinguished in theory. There is a statist model, in which the state provides protection against risks; a societal model, in which risks are insured against by various social institutions (families, companies, etc.); and lastly, a neoliberal model, in which the individual has to cope with risks on his or her own. The statist model is exemplied in the European welfare state which emerged out of the class conicts of industrialization (Ewald 1986).8 By contrast, Japan represented the societal model of risk insurance. As Munenori Suzuki and her collaborators (2010) show in their contribution in this issue, In Japans rst modernity, the mechanism responsible for risk management of an integrated society, and stabilized social order was neither a welfarist redistribution policy, nor a sense of class solidarity between workers in contrast to Europe. The functional equivalents in Japan were, rst, private corporations that guaranteed long-term stability for employees and their families (so-called Japanese management/company-centrism) and, second, land development rapidly implemented under the guidance of bureaucrats (Keynesian macroeconomic policy/developmentalism). From the 1950s through to the 1980s, those two systems functioned as mechanisms to convert the improvements in productivity fueled by technological innovation into stability in the lives of individuals. (Suzuki et al. 2010: 516) The process of reexive modernization in particular individualization and globalization has eroded the basic institutions of both models, although in different ways. In the case of the West European welfare state, globalization increased the burden on social security systems while at the same producing strong cost pressures. In the Japanese case, the social institutions responsible
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for insuring social risks have collapsed due to economic globalization and the transnationalization of Japanese corporations since the 1990s. Private corporations abandoned the role of stabilizing their employees lives, while the government lost the rationale to develop national land. In this manner, individuals who had lost the protection of corporations and the state were thrown out into a global risk society exposed and unprotected. (Suzuki et al. 2010: 516) As we can learn from developments in China in the last two decades, such an exposure of the individual may well result in a new hybrid, combining a neoliberal type of insurance regime with a strong party-state. As Yan has put it, individualization in China is characterized by the management of the partystate and the absence of cultural democracy, the absence of the welfare state regime, and the absence of classic individualism and political liberalism. (Yan 2010: 511) The general point is that there is a global dynamic of reexive modernization which dissolves path-dependent functionalities of different First Modernity institutions in different contexts. Since the beginning of the twenty-rst century, many people in many countries around the world have found that the basic institutions of economic, social and political life have suddenly become ineffective, unreliable or have begun to self-destruct. Because of the different mixtures of deciencies as well as the successes and failures of national industrial capitalist modernization in different world regions, this has produced different modernization paths, patterns of risk society and types of Second Modernity. It is an open question, both theoretically and empirically, whether and how these different types of Second Modernity can nd ways to co-exist.
IV. Methodological cosmopolitanism: the problem of the unit of analysis Another question raised by the cosmopolitan turn in the social sciences refers to the unit of analysis: What is the most appropriate unit of analysis for social theory and empirical research? Or more precisely: How can research units beyond methodological nationalism be found and dened which allow us to understand processes of cosmopolitization and compare varieties in cosmopolitan modernity? What are the reference points of analysis if we wish to free it from the container of the nation-state, while refusing to take refuge in abstract concepts of world society (Beck 2006)? In the preceding sections we provided examples of a methodological
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cosmopolitanism. Instead of nation-states and/or national societies we proposed the use of thematic units derived from sociological theory individualization, cosmopolitization and risk society, all concepts derived from the theory of reexive modernization. This allowed us to de-construct and redene in historical and comparative analyses the path-dependency of these theorems and their societal specicity. This enables us to distinguish new forms of dependence, interdependence and interconnectedness relevant for social action, conict and integration. These examples already provide important clues to possible solutions to the problems of methodological nationalism. Empirical research in such diverse disciplines as sociology, anthropology, geography or political science has in recent years developed a multiplicity of concepts, all of which are designed to break down the supposedly natural equation of society/culture/nation/state. Paul Gilroys conceptualization of the Black Atlantic (1993), Saskia Sassens identication of the Global City (1991), Arjun Appadurais notion of scapes (1991), Martin Albrows concept of the Global Age (1996) and our own analysis of Cosmopolitan Europe (Beck and Grande 2007) are examples of this kind of research. This variety of concepts and approaches can be usefully systematized with the help of two distinctions. On the one hand, new units of research may be distinguished according to whether they refer to de-nationalized processes or structures. An example of the former would be transnational migration processes, an example of the latter are diasporic communities in which migrants create new forms of transnational (co-)existence. A second distinction relates to the scope and the level of cosmopolitization. Scope refers to the role of the national, i.e. the nation-state, national cultures, etc., in the global age. Moreover, cosmopolitization can take place at different levels of sociological analysis, above the national (world regions, world religions, etc.); as well as below the level of the national (local communities, the family, the individual, the company, the workplace, etc.). With the help of these distinctions, we can identify two ways of dealing with the national in methodological cosmopolitanism. The most far-reaching possibility is to replace the national as a unit of analysis by other foci, e.g. ships in motion or world religions. In this case, the national becomes obsolete or irrelevant.This is what we would call the replacing of the national.The second possibility, of course, is that the nation-state and the national continue to be relevant, but lose their epistemological monopoly position, for example, by becoming integrated in new forms of political organization and societal order. The methodological consequence would be that new units of analysis have to be found, which incorporate the national, but no longer coincide with it. We would describe this as embedding the national. It is important to emphasize here that the functional importance and political salience of the nation-state in a globalizing world does not justify a
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Table I: Units of analysis in methodological cosmopolitanism Processes Embedding the national Compressed modernization (Chang 1999, 2010); cosmopolitan Europeanization (Beck and Grande 2007); recursive cosmopolitization (Levy 2010) Ships in motion (Gilroy 1993); supply chain capitalism (Tsing 2009); cosmopolitan innovations (Tyeld and Urry 2009) Structures Transnational policy regimes (Grande 2004); global assemblages (Sassen 2006);world regions (Katzenstein 2005) World religions; transnational migrant networks (Glick Schiller 2009); border zones; global city; the local; the family; the individual
Replacing the national
methodological nationalism in sociological or political research. This would be a false equation of actor and observer perspective (Beck 2005: ch. 2). Even if the nation-state would gain in importance functionally, it must lose its epistemological monopoly position as the unit of research, because the empirical analysis of cosmopolitization processes can only succeed if other foci are moved centre stage (Grande 2006). Rather than being the pregiven framework of analysis, the nation-state has to be treated as an empirical variable in such a cosmopolitan research design (Zrn 2001). Table I sums up the four varieties of methodological cosmopolitanism which result from these distinctions. For each of these varieties, we have indicated selected examples from the literature on cosmopolitanism, transnationalism and globalization. This list of examples is far from exhaustive. Much more could have been added. In the following, we give some illustrations for the various possibilities of redening the unit of analysis in methodological cosmopolitanism. a) Ships in motion: replacing the national by transcontinental processes
One of the rst and most radical alternatives to methodological nationalism (though it wasnt described in this way) was introduced by Paul Gilroy. In his seminal study he did not take the national container but a transcontinental space, the Black Atlantic (1993), as the eld for his theoretical and empirical study. Gilroy convincingly argued that the ideas of nation, nationality and national allegiance do have epistemological consequences: they afrm a research programme and a practice of cultural insiderism, based on essentializing ethnic difference. Gilroys starting point therefore is not a xed entity, instead the image of ships in motion between Europe, America, Africa and the Caribbean is the central symbolic concept organizing his research. The image of the ship a living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion is especially important for historical and theoretical reasons. . . .
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Ships immediately focus attention on the middle passage, on the various projects for redemptive return to an African homeland, on the circulation of ideas and activists as well as the movement of key cultural artefacts: tracts, books, gramophone records, and choirs. (Gilroy 2008: 204) A similar approach, replacing the national as the basic unit of research by new transnational processes, was taken by Anna Tsing (2009) in her research on new forms of transnational supply chain capitalism. In contrast to theories of growing capitalist convergence and homogeneity, her analysis points to the fundamental role of difference in mobilizing capital, labour and other resources. The focus and unit of analysis in her research is again not a xed entity but a process: labour mobilization in supply chains, as it depends on the performance of gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and citizen status. Her analysis reveals that diversity is of central importance to global capitalism and not merely decorative.9
b) Transnational networks, border zones and empires: Replacing the national by new transnational structures In the last decade there has been a substantial amount of research in the eld of transnational studies (Khagram and Levitt 2008; Pries 2008a, 2008b). Irrespective of different research objects and academic disciplines they have in common that they replace the national as unit of analysis by new structures which can be observed at a multiplicity of levels. Most innovative here is research on transnational migration by Nina Glick Schiller (2009) and others (Khagram and Levitt 2008). They privilege a constructivist view of territorial spaces, in which transnational social formations such as transnational networks, kinship groups, migrant organizations and diaspora communities cross and overlap with the territories of nation-states without necessarily having a global reach. Another example are various concepts of empire, which have been presented in recent debates on the role of the USA in a new global order and on the results of the European integration process (see, e.g. Katzenstein 2005; Beck and Grande 2007).
c) Compressed modernization, global assemblages, transnational policy regimes: Embedding the national in new transnational structures and processes The cosmopolitization of modern societies does not, however, inevitably mean the end of the national. All predictions of the end of the nation-state in the age of globalization have so far proved premature. The nation-state does not dissolve in the process of reexive modernization; it is transformed in the most diverse ways (Sorensen 2004; Grande and Pauly 2005; Sassen 2006; Grande
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2008). This implies that the national, i.e. national borders, national monopolies of the legitimate use of physical force, national norms, institutions and cultures can still be powerful factors shaping societies. Consequently, a methodological cosmopolitanism cannot entirely neglect the national. It must not, however, accept it as an unquestioned premise; it must treat it as a conceptual variable, whose signicance must be empirically investigated. The embedding of the national in processes of cosmopolitization can take place in very different ways. The new units of analysis which have been developed in this variant of methodological cosmopolitanism are correspondingly diverse. A rst example is the concept of transnational policy regime (Grande 2004; Grande and Pauly 2005; Grande et al. 2007). This refers to new forms of transnational institution building which have established themselves in a number of global regulatory problems such as climate change, internet regulation or the taxation of transnational enterprises. These institutions organize transnational interactions whose boundaries are not dened by national jurisdictions, but by a specic regulatory problem; they include very different and extremely variable groups of actors (public and private) and extend to diverse territorial levels. For an empirical analysis of transnational politics, these policy regimes are the most appropriate unit of analysis. Crucial here is that these new institutions do not replace nation-states, but instead incorporate them. The nation-states are embedded in new transnational systems of regulation and one of the most important tasks of empirical analysis is to investigate the specic importance of nation-states in these institutions. Where the nationstate continues to dominate, as we can at present observe in the case of climate policies, there the transnational dimension threatens to become merely the showcase of the national. The work of Daniel Levy (2010) and Saskia Sassen (2006) provides further evidence of the need to choose the nation-state as the unit of analysis and nevertheless overcome the narrowness of methodological nationalism. They show that globalization processes derive from transformations within nationstates and gain their dynamic there, whether it is the rise of the global capital market or of networks of committed human rights activists (Kurasawa 2007). In short, the national space becomes a highly complex showcase of the global here. In this instance, national institutions and cultures, their path dependency and their particular history take on a new and not necessarily a lesser importance. Precisely because of the interconnectedness of the world, many things begin locally, even if on occasion in unlocalized proximity. The bordertranscending network of strategically decisive subnational actors, linked by intensive transactions and ows of experts, is an embodiment of de-nationalized spatiality and temporality. As such, it is neither national nor global, but cosmopolitan. The transnational spaces, processes and structures which constitute the units of analysis in a cosmopolitan methodology can be constructed in various ways.
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They can either be deduced from major theoretical concepts, as we have shown already in the case of individualization and risk; or they can be identied inductively on the basis of (1) historical, (2) functional, (3) social or (4) institutional criteria (Grande 2006). Empirical research on Reexive Modernization in the Munich research programme has provided examples of each of these possibilities (see, in particular, Beck and Bon 2001; Beck and Lau 2004; Beck and Mulsow 2011; Bon and Lau 2010). An example of historically dened units of analysis can be found in thetransnational spaces of remembrance identied by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider in their work on the Holocaust (Levy and Sznaider 2005). These transnational spaces of remembrance have been produced by common historical experiences constituted by the Holocaust. Although the Central European countries affected most directly have developed distinct practices and policies for coming to terms with the Holocaust, these can only be understood adequately if interpreted in the context of the transnational spaces of remembrance in which they are embedded. A second possibility is provided by functionally dened units of analysis, as we have seen them in connection with the transnational policy regimes mentioned above. In this case, the thematic core and boundaries of the unit of analysis are constituted by common regulatory problems, e.g. of nancial markets, corporate taxation or environmental policy (see, e.g., Drezner 2007). This is not to suggest a functionalist perspective on social problems, however. There is abundant empirical analysis showing that the problems at stake are constructed in the course of political conicts with varying forms and degrees of politicization; and the same holds good for the institutional frameworks established to deal with them. Since these conicts themselves are focused on specic regulatory problems, however, it makes sense to take these problems themselves as a starting point and frame of reference for empirical analysis. Thirdly, we can identify transnational spaces and units of analysis by taking social practices, in particular social conicts and conict structures, as a focal point of analysis. Examples are transnational political campaigns and debates (see Kriesi et al. 2010). While campaigns are constituted by political events and actors, debates are dened by a specic thematic core, e.g. immigration and European integration. Analysing transnational processes with the help of these concepts allows us to focus empirical analysis on two chief variables: variations in actor constellations (e.g. political parties, transnational organizations etc.), and variations in the territorial scope of political activities. Such an analytical framework enables us to group different forms of political mobilization and articulation under the same heading, and to provide an analysis of cross-border political conict. Finally, transnational units of analysis can be identied by new forms of transnational institution building. In this case, exemplied by research on Europe (Beck and Grande 2007; Delanty and Rumford 2005), it is the process
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of formal and informal regional integration and its outcomes which constitutes the frame of reference for social theory and empirical analysis. As Peter Katzenstein (2005) has shown in his work on the world of regions, this also opens up new possibilities for comparative research across world regions.
V. Perspectives of cosmopolitan sociology: normative questions, addressees, possibilities of realization The cosmopolitan turn in social theory and research would be incomplete, if methodological cosmopolitanism were to be understood exclusively in conceptual terms and if we failed to emphasize the centrality of the fusion, characteristic of the social sciences in general, of epistemological object and contexts of application and uses of research results. As Han and Shim argue, global risks are a push factor of reexive modernization. However, push factor alone is not enough. Pulling factor is as crucial for reexive modernization since it provides energy and meaning. If push factor is a blind force working behind individuals, pull factor invites them to come along to the suggested alternative institution. Reexive modernization may work well when these two factors are combined to produce synergy effects. (Han and Shim 2010: 478) This raises three questions: (1) the normative question: What are the cosmopolitical alternatives and visions? And under what conditions does cosmopolitization lead to reexive cosmopolitanisms and not to reexive fundamentalisms? (2) Who are the addressees of cosmopolitan social sciences? (3) How realistic are cosmopolitan ideas and alternatives in the face of the dominance of the national and of re-ethnicization tendencies everywhere in the world, as well as the plurality of risk perceptions and antagonisms? Is cosmopolitanism necessarily an idealist utopia? 1. Normative questions I speak to you not as a candidate for president, but as a citizen, a proud citizen of the United States and a fellow citizen of the world, announced Barack Obama to a crowd of cheering Berliners. Ever since Immanuel Kant there has been no shortage of normative ideas and proposals as to the meaning of fellow citizen of the world.The connection between cosmopolitanism, patriotism and nationalism was already a concern of the greatest and most creative minds in Europe in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Delanty 2009: ch. 1). By the twentieth century, however, cosmopolitanism had almost disappeared as a serious intellectual and political position. Only with the collapse of Soviet Communism did the Kantian dreams of perpetual peace once again stir the
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public imagination and regain currency within very different elds of science. The crucial question, however, which arises here, is: How cosmopolitan is the normative debate about cosmopolitanism or, rather, cosmopolitanisms (in the plural!)? Are there, for example, feminist visions of cosmopolitanism, which are not based on the male maximalism of the world citizen? Any cosmofeminism would have to create a critically engaged space that is not just a screen of globalization or an antidote to nationalism but is rather a focus on projects of the intimate sphere conceived as a part of the cosmopolitan. (Pollock et al. 2000: 584) Above all there arises the question: How radically can we rewrite the history of cosmopolitanism and how dramatically redraw its map once we are prepared to think outside the box of European intellectual history (Pollock et al. 2000: 586)? Our approach to conceptualizing this normative issue is to distinguish three future scenarios optimistic, realistic and pessimistic. The optimistic scenario suggests that there is a hidden link between climate change and Immanuel Kant. It does indeed require a decisive step, at least a part of the way towards perpetual peace in order to create an effective response to climate change. That is, concealed in the formula of the scientic and economic language of world risks is something normative, great, virtually unthinkable, the realism of which is part of the realism which is gaining in force with the looming ecological apocalypse. It is not sufcient (to adopt Max Webers famous distinction) merely to want good to adhere to a cosmopolitan ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik). A cosmopolitan ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik) is required too or, to formulate it even more ambitiously: what is required is the constitution of a political subject called humanity. The new normative imperative is: Individuals, neo-liberals and neo-nationalists, corporations, social groups and societies, the powerful and the weak of the world only if you sit down at the same table and negotiate the conditions of a global deal of a just balance that is, realize a bit of Kant in the world will you have a chance of surviving! This diabolic pact on the part of a civilization which threatens to destroy itself the pitilessness of the survival maxim: Kant or catastrophe! is also cause for hope. The realistic scenario goes as follows: It is the antagonism between producers and recipients of climate risks which both constitutes and blocks a cosmopolitics of climate change. There is no way to resolve this dilemma. Consequently the agnostics of climate change will prevail; there will be some kind of continuing eco-technological modernization moving towards a more or less green capitalism; the more the mainstream of the political parties agrees to keep the big tanker sailing straight head, the more absurd and unbelievable their staged differences will be. This corresponds to the classic position propagated by Niklas Luhmann (1995): Evolution is sufcient. There is neither room
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nor necessity for change. All that remains is the cynical maxim: minimize the damage of excitement! The negative scenario does not at all rule out the mainstream position, and may even be a consequence of it: Both the radically unequal impacts of climate change and climate politics itself function as the re accelerant of fundamentalist counter-movements. Or to put it differently: There is a deadly vicious circle of climate disasters, migration ows, fundamentalist nationalism and religious fundamentalism, leading to outbreaks of violence and even climate wars.10 Naturally within different modernization contexts these scenarios will take different forms and/or combine differently. Against this background the normative question can be formulated more precisely in social scientic terms: Firstly, under what conditions might the future of cosmopolitan modernity adopt the positive scenario, that is, creating imagined cosmopolitical communities of global risks? This includes, secondly, the question of the identity of the actors who will dominate the hegemonic struggles that might emerge and of the power strategies that will be available to them (Beck 2005). Normative cosmopolitanism, however, is not only the product of transnational and national conicts, but also requires a cosmopolitical civilizing of these struggles. Thirdly, there is the question, then, of how to bring about an ecological and social civilizing of capitalism beyond the outdated nation-states and a utopian world state. These questions open up theoretical, normative and political problem horizons, in which cosmopolitan social sciences can nd a creative, politically highly relevant function. This normative turn in cosmopolitan social theory and research must inevitably nd itself in opposition to the contemporary spirit of both liberalized capitalism and the implacability of the nation-state. Precisely, this would be its enlightening spur. 2. Who are the addressees of cosmopolitan social sciences? Methodological nationalism already included implicit assumptions which link categorical frames to a practicalpolitical relationship to addressees of the respective theories. In the container model the denition of the national society as research object is short-circuited with more or less exclusive references to national actors (governments, political parties, trade unions, classes, elites, social movements, etc.). These serve as the principal objects of social theory building and empirical research (even if unintentionally) and as addressees of practical recommendations and interventions. Here we can distinguish two kinds of value relevance (Wertbeziehungen; Max Weber) and partisanships: explicit and implicit. The values and partisanships explicitly bundled up in methodological nationalism were focused after the Second World War in the European context on the emerging democratic interventionist welfare state as the new representative of the common good and common
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will. The development and expansion of sociology and political sciences after the Second World War in Western Europe were closely linked to the twin tasks, on the one hand, of guarding against a relapse into Fascism and National Socialism and, on the other, of preventing the working class from going over to the Communist competitor. Moreover, it is easy to demonstrate in detail (even if it is not possible here) that the academic self-description dominant today, namely that social theory and research is value free and conducted with purely scholarly goals in mind is blatantly contradicted by implicit actual partisanships. These are the consequence of the adoption of the national actor perspective in the observer perspective of social sciences, for example by excluding the externalization of risks from consideration. In the case of new global risks, value freedom is not a sign of maturity, but a misunderstanding of the responsibility of the social sciences. In the age of globalization, methodological nationalism becomes antiquated not only as a conceptual framework but also in its addressee relationship. This is a fundamental reason why highly professionalized social science, on the one hand, loses itself in a nirvana of abstractions and, on the other, breaks down into an esoteric fragmentation of unrelated, highly detailed empirical research projects (Burawoy 2005). In other words, a de-provincialized and re-located post-universalistic social theory, which is re-discovering and reecting its European roots, nds itself looking for a new, historical value relevance. This new value relevance both possesses cultural (future) validity, and links the historicity of social scientic research problems with new addressees. As we have seen, in methodological nationalism the nation-state categorical frame of research coincides (behind the researchers back, so to speak) with specically national actor categories (for example, social classes, civil society movements, national governments, etc.). This denitely does not hold for the addressee relationship of cosmopolitan social science. On the contrary, with reference to the addressee relationship the cosmopolitan turn means: no specic actor categories, that is, neither governments, nor trade unions, employers associations, social classes, or social movements. Most importantly, a cosmopolitan social science does not follow a false analogy by searching for, and uniting with, new transnational classes, multitudes or elites. Rather, the subjects of cosmopolitan social theory are cosmopolitan coalitions of actors in all their diversity. They are to be found in these heterogeneous, permanently uctuating coalitions which include governments, national and international sub-politics, international organizations, informal gatherings of states (such as the G-8, G-20), etc. It is in such coalitions that hegemonic struggles are fought out between conicting projects, all claiming to represent the universal and to dene the symbolic parameters of social life. And in forging such coalitions across borders of all kinds, new spheres and spaces of political action open up, under conditions which still have to be researched. Confronted with a new quality of global dependencies and interdependencies, no single player
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can expect to win on his/her own; they are all dependent on coalitions, alliances and networks (Beck 2005). This is the way, then, in which the hazy power game of global domestic politics opens up its own immanent alternatives and oppositions and creates novel collective identities and political subjects. 3. Possibilities of realization Up to this point, our diagnosis is ambivalent, critics might even say: contradictory. Some theorists hold the all-purpose word dialectical in reserve for such cases. This, nally, raises the question: How can global risks be successfully dealt with under the conditions of multiple competing modernities with their different normative models, material interests and political power constellations? The key to answering this question is provided by the concept of cosmopolitical realpolitik. In order to understand and develop this concept it has to be distinguished in particular from normative-philosophical cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and idealistic utopian cosmopolitanism (Held 2004; Archibugi 2008) on the other. Cosmopolitical realpolitik does not appeal (at least not primarily) to shared ideas and identities, but to power and interests to be brought into play. If we adopt such a realist perspective, the crucial question is how the hegemonic meta-power games of global domestic politics (Weltinnenpolitik) can be shaped and interests pursued in such a way that they serve the realization of common cosmopolitan goals? In short (following Mandeville), how can private vices be transformed into public, cosmopolitan virtues? The concept of cosmopolitical realpolitik, which aims at answering this question, is based on four assumptions. Firstly, the new historical reality of world risk society is that no nation can master its problems alone. Those who play the national card will inevitably lose. Secondly, global problems produce new cosmopolitan imperatives which give rise to transnational communities of risk. Thirdly, international organizations are not merely the continuation of national politics by other means. They can transform national interests. Fourthly, cosmopolitan realism is also economic realism. It reduces and redistributes costs because costs rise exponentially with the loss of legitimacy. Cosmopolitanism thus understood implies a specic approach to ensuring that ones own (individual or collective) interests are promoted and made to prevail. Cosmopolitan realism calls for neither the sacrice of ones own interests, nor an exclusive bias towards higher ideas and ideals. On the contrary, it accepts that for the most part political action is interest-based. But it insists on an approach to the pursuit of ones own interests that is compatible with those of a larger community. Thus cosmopolitical realism basically means the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of ones own interests. In this process, interests become reexive national interests through repeated joint strategies of self-limitation; more
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precisely, empowerment arises from self-limitation. Ideally, individual and collective goals, both national and global, can be achieved simultaneously. In reality, however, there are often limits and dilemmas of cosmopolitan realpolitik. It is no panacea for all the worlds problems and it by no means always works. In particular, whether a problem has a cosmopolitan solution, depends on the normative and institutional framework, in which decisions have to be taken.11 Nevertheless, the basic message of cosmopolitan realpolitik is this: The future is open. It depends on decisions we make. The research we do and the conceptual frames we use make a difference. (Date accepted: June 2010)
Notes
1. The Research Centre on Reexive Modernization (Sonderforschungsbereich 536) at the University of Munich nanced by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for 10 years offered an excellent environment to develop this perspective on Extra-European Varieties of Second Modernity; we are very grateful for this opportunity to cooperatively research far beyond the original research programme into unknown territory. 2. For example, human rights regime (see Levy 2010; Levy and Sznaider 2010) or in relation to global risks cooperate or fail! (see later). 3. Our notion of modern societies is an open one, it must not be misunderstood in the sense of nation-state based and organized societies. 4. For a critical reection of this body of theory see, in particular, Arnason (2003); for comparative case studies based on Eisenstadts theory see among others Schwinn (2006). 5. Since the theory of reexive modernization assumes that at least in the case of the Western precursors of reexive modernization this process does not take place by design, we cannot work with Therborns distinction between voluntary or enforced modernization here (Therborn 1995). Instead, we need a more differentiated concept of the logics at work.
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6. Some of most important contributions to this debate include: Appiah 2006; Archibugi 2008; Baban 2006; Beck 2005, 2006, 2009; Beck and Grande 2007; Beck and Sznaider 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2010; Beitz 2005; Benhabib 2007; Berry 2008; Boon and Fine 2007; Braeckman 2008; Brassett and Smith 2007; Bray 2009; Breckenridge et al. 2002; Brock and Brighouse 2005; Brown 2008; Calcutt, Woodward and Skrbis 2009; Calhoun 2007a, 2007b; Cheah 2006; Delanty 2009; Delanty and He 2008; Dobson 2006; Edwards 2008; Eriksen 2009; Featherstone et al. 2002; Fine 2007; Garsten 2003; Holme 2010; Hannerz 2004; Held 2010; Inglis 2009; Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis 2009; Khagram and Levitt 2008; Kurasawa 2004; Levy, Heinlein and Breuer 2010; Mau, Mewes and Zimmermann 2008; MeckledGarcia 2008; Mendieta 2009; Nederveen Pieterse 2006; Nowicka and Rovisco 2009; Pichler 2008; Poferl and Sznaider 2004; Rapport 2007; Rumford 2007; Slaughter 2009; Todd 2007; Tyeld and Urry 2009; Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Werbner 2008; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Ypi 2008; see also Constellations 2003; Daedalus 2008, and The Hedgehog Review 2009. 7. For an excellent summary of the various sociological concepts of risk see Arnoldi (2009) and Wilkinson (2010). 8. The three worlds of welfare capitalism, identied by Esping-Andersen (1990),
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Europe have shown that globalization has produced a new cosmopolitanismnationalism-cleavage, which hitherto has been articulated most successfully by new radical right populist parties ghting for a re-nationalization of politics in the age of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008). 11. In our book on Cosmopolitan Europe we have identied some of these dilemmas of cosmopolitan realpolitik (see Beck and Grande 2007: ch. 8).
vary with regard to the scope and extent of public risk insurance and the specic ways of burden sharing between the state and the individual. However, these are only varieties of the statist model. 9. Another example is the cosmopolitan innovation regime (Tyeld and Urry 2009), a transnational process stimulating the international collaboration in innovation necessary for the development of various global goods. 10. Empirical analyses of the political consequences of globalization in Western
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The British Journal of Sociology 2010 Volume 61 Issue 3

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Replacing the national

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande

Varieties of second modernity

British Journal of Sociology 61(3)

London School of Economics and Political Science 2010

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Beck&Grande 2ndModernity&Cosmopolitanism 10

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