A Note Concerning Criticisms of Ayer's Revised Definition of

Verifiability

by J.D. Watson

Summary: Alonzo Church's criticism of A.J. Ayer's revised definition of verifiability is reviewed and
logically analyzed. Deficiencies in Church's reasoning are exposed, resulting in its rejection as a valid
criticism. Other criticisms of Ayer's definition, specifically Scheffler's, are also examined and rejected.

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Copyright © J.D. Watson, 2002-2008.

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§ 1 - Introduction
¶1 Begin with a brief summary of Ayer's revised definition of significance and Church's criticism of this
definition. Ayer was concerned with the question of determining if a sentence "expresses a genuine proposition
about a matter of fact," 1 i.e., if it is significant. To this end, he initially proposed a criterion of weak verification,
viz.:
"Let us call a proposition which records an actual or possible observation an experiential
proposition. Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that it
should be equivalent to an experiential proposition, or any finite number of experiential
propositions, but simply that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in
conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises
alone." 2
As he admits in his introduction to the second edition, this definition is "... far too liberal, since it allows meaning to
any statement whatsoever. For given any statement "S" and an observation-statement "O", "O" follows from "S" and
"if S then O" without following from "if S then O" alone." 3 This result violates Scheffler's Third Condition of
Adequacy (C.A.III) for a criterion of significance, viz., "It is not the case that, for every sentence S, S is
significant." 4
¶2 To counter this criticism, Ayer proposed a revised definition in the introduction to the second edition,
consisting of two parts, involving what he termed direct and indirect verifiability:
1
Ayer, p. 35.
2
Ibid., pgs. 38-39.
3
Ibid., p. 11 (italics mine). Ayer continues (p. 12): "Furthermore, this would hold good for any other piece of nonsense that
one cared to put ... provided only that it had the grammatical form of an indicative sentence. But a criterion of meaning that
allows such latitude as this is evidently unacceptable." This admission is the result of criticism by Vide I. Berlin, "Verifiability
in Principle," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XXXIX, cited by Ayer in the footnote on p. 12.
4
Scheffler, p. 132.
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 1. "... a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or is such that in
conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is
not deducible from these other premises alone; and" (2.1)
2. "... a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions:"
a. "first, that in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable
statements which are not deducible from these other premises alone; and" (2.2a)
b. "secondly, that these other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic, 5 5 or
directly verifiable, or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable." 6 (2.2b)
Ayer then proceeds to "... reformulate the principle of verification as requiring of a literally meaningful statement,
which is not analytic, that it should be either directly or indirectly verifiable, in the foregoing sense." 7 This avoids the
defects of the original definition, for either S is an observation-statement or it is not, and:
y if S is an observation-statement, then both S and (S ⇒ O) are directly verifiable: S by assumption, since it is
an observation-statement, and (S ⇒ O), since S·(S ⇒ O) ⇒ O, satisfying definition (2.1); while
y if S is not an observation-statement, then (S ⇒ O) is certainly not an observation-statement. Then S can
not be directly verifiable using (2.1), since (S ⇒ O) is not an observation-statement. S will be indirectly
verifiable only if (S ⇒ O) is analytic, directly verifiable, or independently indirectly verifiable. But (S ⇒ O) can
not be shown directly verifiable, though S·(S ⇒ O) ⇒ O, since S is not an observation-statement, nor can it
be generally demonstrated to be independently indirectly verifiable since no general demonstration exists for
an arbitrary S.
Hence, S is directly verifiable only if an observation-statement and indirectly verifiable only if (S ⇒ O) is analytic or
somehow independently indirectly verifiable, and the class of verifiable statements is limited to these types of
statements only, avoiding the defect of the original definition.
¶3 Church8 criticized Ayer's revised definition, as follows. 9 Assume the existence of three observation-statements
O1 , O2 , and O3 , none of which implies either of the other two. Consider the statement:
X ≡ (¬O1·O3) ∨ (O2·¬S) (3.1)
where S is any arbitrary statement-formula. Now, it is easily verified (see, for instance, ¶ 7 below) that:
O1·X ⇒ O2 (3.2a)
and hence X is directly verifiable from definition (2.1) above, since it implies O2 when conjoined with O1, while by
assumption O1 does not directly imply O2. But from the definition of X, we also have (again, see ¶ 7 below):
S·X ⇒ O3 (3.2b)
and O3, being an observation-statement, is directly verifiable. If X itself does not imply O3, then S is indirectly verifiable
by definition (2.2a), the conditions of (2.2b) having been met. On the other hand, if X implies O3, it is also implied
by each of X's disjuncts, taken separately. 10 Then (O2·¬S) ⇒ O3, and by assumption O2 does not imply O3, so it
follows 11 that ¬S is directly verifiable by definition (2.1). But either X implies O3 or it does not, so either ¬S is directly
verifiable or S is indirectly verifiable respectively, for any arbitrary S. "Thus every statement-formula or its negation is
empirically significant, provided that O1, O2, and O3 are logically independent," 12 violating the spirit, if not the
exact letter, of Scheffler's C.A.III, since it accords some measure of significance to any statement. This concludes
the summary of Church's criticism, which is normally considered a fatal objection to Ayer's revised definition.

5
The term analytic is here to be taken in the conventional logical sense, i.e., a tautology, or a statement which is true under
any substitution for the variables and constants.
6
Ayer, p. 13 (italics mine), and equivalent to the paraphrase in Scheffler, p. 152; labels added by the author to facilitate the
subsequent discussion.
7
Ibid., (italics mine).
8
Alonzo Church, "Review of A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, Second Edition," Journal of Symbolic Logic, XIV
(1949), 52-53, cited by Scheffler in the footnote on p. 153.
9
This summary of Church's argument is a condensation of Scheffler, pgs. 153-154, with slight variations in notation
10
This follows from the tautology ((a ∨ b) ⇒ c) ≡ ((a ⇒ c) · (b ⇒ c)); see, for instance, Reichenbach, p. 39, 6f.
11
This follows from the tautology ((a·b) ⇒ c) ≡ ((a ⇒ c) ∨ (b ⇒ c)); see Reichenbach, p. 39, 6h.
12
Scheffler, p. 154.
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 § 2 - Analysis of Church's Criticism
¶4 Analysis of Church's criticism begins with the initial assumption, that none of the three
observation-statements O1 , O2 , and O3 , implies either of the other two. Transcribing the conjunction of the six
resultant statements into the logical algebra and simplifying: 13
¬(O1 ⇒ O2)· ¬(O1 ⇒ O3)· ¬(O2 ⇒ O1)· ¬(O2 ⇒ O3)· ¬(O3 ⇒ O1)· ¬(O3 ⇒ O2) =
[O1~O2 O1~O3 O2~O1 O2~O3 O3~O1 O3~O2]~ = [U]~ = U~ (4.1)
and it is clear that all these conditions can not be simultaneously satisfied, since they result in a contradiction.
This can also be seen by the traditional method of truth-table analysis in Table 4.1 below, where the last column
(10) is the conjunction of the statements in columns (4)-(9).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
O1 O2 O3 ¬(O1⇒O2) ¬(O1⇒O3) ¬(O2⇒O1) ¬(O2⇒O3) ¬(O3⇒O1) ¬(O3⇒O2) (4)·...·(9)
F F F F F F F F F F
F F T F F F F T T F
F T F F F T T F F F
F T T F F T F T F F
T F F T T F F F F F
T F T T F F F F T F
T T F F T F T F F F
T T T F F F F F F F

Table 4.1 - Independence of Observation-Statements

In Church's argument, this entire assumption is neither needed nor used; instead the two critical assumptions are
¬(O1 ⇒ O2) and ¬(O2 ⇒ O3), shown by the shaded columns in Table 4.1 -- but even in this limited case the
conjunction is false, as can be seen by the conjunction of the two columns in the table, and easily demonstrated in
the algebra by the calculation:
¬(O1 ⇒ O2)·¬(O2 ⇒ O3) = [O1~O2O2~O3]~ = [U]~ = U~ (4.2)
Thus, it appears that the fundamental assumptions necessary for Church's criticism can not be logically justified.
This observation, in itself, is sufficient to invalidate the remainder of Church's argument.
¶5 This, however, is not the only logical problem with Church's argument -- now turn attention to Church's
formula (3.1) for X. While this formula does not explicitly involve the assumptions (O1 ⇒ O2) or (O2 ⇒ O3), the
disjunctive form is deceptive, nor is it the standard form for a set of assumptions. By direct calculation in the
algebra:
(¬O1·O3)∨(O2·¬S) = (O1O3~)~(O2~S)~ = [ (S~[O1O3~]~)~ (O2[O1O3~]~)~ ]~ =
[(S~O1~)~(S~O3)~(O1~O2)~(O2O3)~]~ = (O1 ⇒ O2)·(S ⇒ O3)·¬(O1·S)·(O2 ∨ O3) (5.1)
Thus, X, when conventionally written as a conjunction of assumptions, is seen to implicitly involve both the
assumption (O1 ⇒ O2) and the assumption (S ⇒ O3). This equivalence is demonstrated by traditional truth-table
methods in Table 5.1 below, where the lightly-shaded columns representing X and Y are seen to be identical.

13
The logical algebra referred to (see Summary of Systema Logica <http://www.box.net/shared/6brhca4azu>) is a Boolean
equivalence algebra of a radically simple structure, having only two primitive operations, complementation and disjunction,
and equivalent to the propositional logic when values are restricted to the real formal constants. Its use facilitates logical
computation -- note the directness and simplicity of the calculations (4.1) and (4.2) compared to the truth-table analysis of
Table 4.1.
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 O1 O2 O3 S ¬O1·O3 O2·¬S X O1 ⇒ O 2 S ⇒ O3 ¬(O1·S) (O2∨O3) Y
F F F F F F F T T T F F
F F F T F F F T F T F F
F F T F T F T T T T T T
F F T T T F T T T T T T
F T F F F T T T T T T T
F T F T F F F T F T T F
F T T F T T T T T T T T
F T T T T F T T T T T T
T F F F F F F F T T F F
T F F T F F F F F F F F
T F T F F F F F T T T F
T F T T F F F F T F T F
T T F F F T T T T T T T
T T F T F F F T F F T F
T T T F F T T T T T T T
T T T T F F F T T F T F

Table 5.1 - Equivalence of X ≡ (¬O1·O3)∨(O2·¬S) and Y ≡ (O1 ⇒ O2)·(S ⇒ O3)·¬(O1·S)·(O2 ∨ O3)

Since it is explicitly assumed that O1 does not imply O2, then (O1 ⇒ O2) must be false, and the equivalent form
(5.1) shows that X is then always false (this conclusion is confirmed by the dark shaded areas in Table 5.1), a result
further discussed in ¶ 7 below.
¶6 Moreover, Church's formula (3.1) is not the minimal form necessary for his argument. This can be easily
shown in the algebra using the methods from the Theory of Equations. We desire some function, Z, satisfying the
relations:
O1·Z ⇒ O2 and (6.1a)
S·Z ⇒ O3 (6.1b)
~ ~ ~ ~
These two relations can be represented in the algebra by the equations O1 Z O2 = U and S Z O3 = U, and the
two combined as:
([O1~Z~O2]~[S~Z~O3]~)~ = [U~U~]~ = U hence Z~([O1~O2]~[S~O3]~)~ = U (6.1c)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Then from the Theory of Equations there exists some parameter P such that: Z = [O1 O2] [S O3] P , and
therefore Z = ([O1~O2]~[S~O3]~P~)~. In conventional notation this becomes:
Z ≡ (O1 ⇒ O2) · (S ⇒ O3) · P (6.2)
Church's formula is but one of a class of functions satisfying (6.1a) and (6.1b), but they all must share the two core
implications of (6.2). The additional terms, ¬(O1·S) and (O2∨O3), in Church's formula and its representation as
the disjunction (3.1) only serve to obscure the essential functional form of X.
¶7 With these logically preliminaries out of the way, we are now in a position to re-examine Church's argument.
Taking X as defined in (3.1) with its equivalence to (5.1), i.e., X ≡ (¬O1·O3)∨(O2·¬S) ≡
(O1 ⇒ O2)·(S ⇒ O3)·¬(O1·S)·(O2∨O3), we agree that its conjunction with O1 implies O2 (3.2a), and that the
conjunction of S and X implies O3 (3.2b), since by algebraic calculation:
[O1·X ⇒ O2] = O1~(O1~O2)~(S~O3)~(S~O1~)~(O2O3)~O2 = O1~O2~SO2 = U (3.2a/7.1a)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
[S·X ⇒ O3] = S (O1 O2) (S O3) (S O1 ) (O2O3) O3 = S O3 O1O3 = U (3.2b/7.1b)
Now either O1 implies O2 or it does not, and:
1. In the first case (i.e., O1 ⇒ O2), we can not conclude that X is directly verifiable from (3.2a) because the
conditions of definition (2.1) are not met; nor can we conclude that X is indirectly verifiable from (3.2a)
because the conditions of definition (2.2a) are not met. So, no conclusion concerning the verifiability of S
can be drawn from (3.2b), since X is neither directly nor indirectly verifiable nor analytic.
2. In the second case (i.e., ¬(O1 ⇒ O2) ), X, though now directly verifiable by (3.2a) and definition (2.1), is
always false by the equivalence (5.1), and hence the implication (3.2a), though true, does not allow any
conclusion to be drawn concerning any occurrence of the observation-statement O2. Since X is false, then

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 (X ⇒ O3), and as a result we can not conclude that S is indirectly verifiable employing (3.2b), due to the
conditions of definition (2.2a).
In both cases, no conclusion concerning the verifiability of S can be made, and there are no other cases. Church's
argument, when completely and properly analyzed, fails in its intended purpose of demonstrating that any
statement or its negation is verifiable; in fact, it does not allow us to draw any conclusion concerning the
verifiability of arbitrary statements. Church (and Scheffler) apparently failed to realize that O1 not implying O2
necessarily makes X false, symbolically, ¬[O1 ⇒ O2] ⇒ ¬X, shown by the shaded area in Table 5.1 and easily
demonstrated in the algebra by the calculation:
(¬[O1 ⇒ O2] ⇒ ¬X) = O1~O2(O1~O2)~(S~O3)~(S~O1~)~(O2O3)~ = U (7.2)
This failure was undoubtedly due to the form chosen to represent X (i.e., formula (3.1)), the lack of analysis of its
equivalent forms, and the neglect of the full consequences of the assumed independence of the
observation-statements. The specific fallacies in Church's reasoning are that, as discussed above, we can not
conclude that S is indirectly verifiable, since (X ⇒ O3), and that, although (O2·¬S) ⇒ O3, the assumption that O1
does not imply O2 requires that O2 be false (see Table 5.1); hence, it is not true that O2 does not imply O3, and no
conclusion can be drawn concerning ¬S.

§ 3 - Other Criticisms
¶8 Scheffler discusses another criticism of Ayer's definition similar to Church's, in response to a proposal by
Nidditch. 14 Consider the statement:
X* ≡ ((S·O1) ∨ ¬O2)) = (S ~O1 ~)~O2 ~[(SO2 ~)~(O1O2 ~)~]~ = [(O2 ⇒ S)·(O2 ⇒ O1)] (8.1)
Then we have the following relations:
O2·X* ⇒ O1 = O2 ~(SO2 ~)~(O1O2 ~)~O1 = O2 ~S ~O1 ~O1 = U (8.2a)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
O1·S ⇒ X* = O1 S (S O1 ) O2 = U (8.2b)
By (8.2a) and definition (2.1), X* is directly verifiable, assuming ¬(O2 ⇒ O1), and then S is indirectly verifiable by (8.2b)
and definition (2.2a), so again any arbitrary statement, S, is verifiable, violating C.A.III. The defects in this
reasoning are similar to those in Church's argument: the assumption that ¬(O2 ⇒ O1) means that X* is false, by
the equivalence (8.1), and also that O1 is false, since:
¬(O2 ⇒ O1) ⇒ ¬O1 = O2~O1O1~ = U (8.3)
is a tautology, and since a false statement implies any statement, i.e., ¬O1 ⇒ [O1 ⇒ X*] is also a tautology, then it
follows that (O1 ⇒ X*). Therefore, we can not conclude that S is indirectly verifiable from (8.2b) because the
conditions of definition (2.2a) are not met.
¶9 Finally, Scheffler mentions yet another criticism of Ayer's revised definition. 15 The statement (O1 ⇒ O2) is
directly verifiable by definition (2.1), since it implies O2 when conjoined with O1, i.e., [O1·(O1 ⇒ O2)] ⇒ O2
(Scheffler mentions, in passing, the condition that O1 does not yield O2 by itself, but then ignores any further
consequences flowing from this assumption). Form the conjunction S·(O1 ⇒ O2), where S is any arbitrary
statement; this conjunction also implies O2 when conjoined with O1, and hence the conjunction is directly verifiable
and significant, no matter what the nature of S. Scheffler then asserts that this result violates his First Condition
of Adequacy "C.A.I: For every sentence S, S is true or false if, and only if, S is significant." 16 It is difficult to
take this criticism seriously, since the statement (O1 ⇒ O2) is directly verifiable from the relation
[O1·(O1 ⇒ O2)] ⇒ O2 only if ¬(O1 ⇒ O2) by the conditions of definition (2.1), or it is directly verifiable only if false,
and then its conjunction with S is likewise false. There is no difficulty with Ayer's definition when it attributes
significance to false statements, however they might be constructed — Scheffler's criticism only makes sense if he is

14
Scheffler, p. 154, footnote 3.
15
Ibid., p. 153.
16
Ibid., p. 129.
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asserting that the conjunction S·(O1 ⇒ O2), though significant, is not necessarily true or false for arbitrary S when
(O1 ⇒ O2) is false, e.g., that the conjunction of a meaningless statement and a false statement is meaningless
(something he does not explicitly state, 17 raising unanswered questions about the type of propositional logic he is
employing). But perhaps I have totally misconstrued Scheffler's argument.

§ 4 - Conclusion
¶10 This concludes the analysis of the extant criticisms of Ayer's revised definition of significance, and in all cases
considered the reasoning employed was found to be logically flawed and therefore invalid. The defects were all
related to the assumption of independence of the observation-statements and its logical consequences, and, in
some cases, to the disjunctive form chosen for the auxiliary premise, concealing its true form. The real question
arising from this analysis is simply this: how is it possible for Ayer's definition to supply significance to any
statement except a contradiction? For, given some relation O1·S ⇒ O2 and the assumption of independence of
the observation-statements involved, i.e., ¬(O1 ⇒ O2) ≡ (O1·¬O2), then O1 must be true and O2 false, and the
only way the relation can hold is if S is false; hence the only statements which are directly verifiable are
contradictions. This is a very limiting result, not including many statements which Ayer wished to consider
significant. Now, it might be suggested that the independence requirement, ¬(O1 ⇒ O2), is some type of unified
whole which can not be broken down to conclude that O2 is necessarily always false, or that the implication
operation used is not the proper one to represent the assumed independence. Either of these suggestions would
perhaps also rehabilitate Church's and Scheffler's criticisms, but there are serious difficulties with these proposals.
If the independence relation is a unified whole or the result of a different operation, then the various steps
employed in the arguments, based on the methods and tautologies of the propositional logic involving implication,
are no longer valid. Furthermore, how are expressions like ¬(O1·O3) or (O2·¬S) in Church's formula, for
instance, then to be interpreted?
¶11 So, while it seems that the criticisms considered here are invalid, it also appears that there are fundamental
and serious difficulties with Ayer's definition, making it too restrictive to be generally useful. Ayer's revised
definition, in an effort to deny significance to all statements, as a result only endows significance to a very limited
class of statements.

17
In fact, Scheffler seems to contradict this when he quotes Hempel: "... the conjunction of a falsifiable S with nonsensical
N is likewise falsifiable," p. 142, in connection with Popper's Theory of Falsifiability.
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 Bibliography
Ayer, Alfred Jules, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Edition, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952,
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 52-860.

Reichenbach, Hans, Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York: The Free Press, 1966.

Scheffler, Israel, The Anatomy of Inquiry: Philosophical Studies in the Theory of Science, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Fourth Printing, August 1970, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-11049.

Watson, J.D., Systema Logica: Complex Logic with Applications, manuscript in progress. A summary of
the definitions, axioms, initials, theorems, and consequences of the Systema Logica is available at
<http://www.box.net/shared/6brhca4azu>

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