In late November of 1950, the fifth month of the Korean War, United Nations Command forces of the United

States, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom moving into the frozen, mountainous regions of northern Korea had reached the Ch' ngch'n River. There they were attacked by a large Chinese force which inflicted heavy casualties and forced the United Nations Command troops to withdraw. That battle was part of one campaign in a decades-long struggle between two global coalitions, but it was also one clash in a long struggle for the reunification of the Korean nation. Thirteen centuries earlier, Chinese and Korean forces had fought another battle along that same river, then called the Salsu. Like its twentieth-century counterpart, that ancient battle was part of a long series of campaigns between rival coalitions and part of a struggle for Korean unification. The 1950 battle of the Ch'ngch'n was a defining moment which demonstrated the limits of military power and helped lead to the post-World War II concept of limited war, while the battle which occurred in A.D. 612 at the same river was followed by more bloody campaigns that exemplified the perils of unlimited war and strategic overreach. The battle of the Salsu River, in which forces of the Korean kingdom of Kogury inflicted terrible losses on an invading Chinese army, is considered by many Korean scholars to be the most significant event of the seventh-century wars between the Korean kingdoms and the Chinese Sui and Tang dynasties for control and influence in northeast Asia. The immense cost of the battle fatally weakened the Sui Dynasty. The victorious Kogury kingdom was also sapped by the effort and eventually disappeared. But the campaigns of which the Salsu battle was a part provided time for the consolidation of the successor Silla kingdom, which unified Korea and ensured the survival of the Koreans as a separate and unique people.

STRATEGIC SETTING
The origins of the Korean people are still a matter of conjecture, but by the fourth century B.C. a distinctive Bronze Age culture extended throughout the Korean peninsula and into Manchuria, at least as far as the Liao and Sungari rivers. The archaeological evidence of immense tombs, bronze weapons, and the remains of rice cultivation tools all indicate control by leadership elites over large labor forces and considerable economic wealth. The key social-political groups were tribal states consisting of walled towns or fortresses and the surrounding agricultural lands. Because they controlled populations larger than just a single tribe, Korean historian Ki-baik Lee suggests the term walled-town states to describe these political entities. The Korean sans ng, or "mountain fortress" was often several square kilometers in area and took advantage of the mountainous

terrain of the Korean peninsula. Natural obstacles were reenforced with five- or six-foot-high dirt walls, while stone walls with wooden gates blocked avenues of approach. The larger and more strategically placed mountain fortresses would be used repeatedly over the centuries, and the remains of some can still be seen today.

During this same period two new cultures, a Chinese Iron Age culture and a Scytho-Siberian Bronze Age culture, entered Korea, mingled, and formed a new culture which was transmitted to Japan in the following century. The two most militarily significant technological elements of this new culture were the horse and sharp metal weapons, which gave the ruling elites even greater authority. Iron agricultural implements greatly increased productivity and the accumulation of wealth essential to the development of civilization. With these new weapons and implements, the rulers of some of the walled-town states expanded their domains by conquest and diplomacy into larger confederations which bordered the northeastern regions of China and the lands of the nomadic tribes of the Central Asian steppes. The Chinese chronicles of the time refer to larger Korean political entities based on these walled-town states.

During the Chinese Warring States period ( 464-221 B.C.), the region between the Liao and Taedong rivers became a contested area (Map 13.1). First, the Chinese state of Yan pushed across the Liao River and established a military colony (commandery) in the Liaodong Peninsula. Yan and its Liaodong territories subsequently became part of the unified Qin Empire at the end of the third century B.C. and in 206 B.C. came under the control of the Han emperor. Substantial numbers of refugees from China entered Korea during this turbulent period. Through the influence of these refugees and other contacts with China, Chinese political, economic, and cultural influence was overlaid upon the old power structure and culture throughout Korea. This Chinese influence intensified in 109-108 B.C., when Han armies invaded and established four Chinese commanderies (Lolang, Zhenfan, Lintun, and Xuandu) on the Korean peninsula. Lolang, ruled by a Chinese governor, administered by Chinese bureaucrats, guarded by Chinese soldiers, its economy in the hands of Chinese merchants, and a substantial part of its population made up of Chinese colonists (many of them retired from the hurly-burly of officialdom in China proper), was the core region of Chinese influence in Korea. The area to the south of the commanderies remained under the control of native Korean states, although they, as well as the other peoples on the Chinese periphery, absorbed Chinese culture and accepted Chinese offices, ranks, and

other tokens of submission while maintaining political independence. Beyond the borders of the commanderies these confederations of walled-town states grew in territory and political sophistication. Of these confederations, Kogury , which arose in the resource-poor mountains and narrow valleys of the upper reaches of the Yalu (Amnok) River, grew in power and territory until it was able to challenge China itself for influence in the border region.

Korean legends place the foundation of Kogury in 37 B.C., when a certain Chumong led his followers south into the upper Yalu basin. Other evidence indicates that Kogury may have been the successor to an older confederacy of walled-town states. Whatever the truth behind the legends, it seems clear that the Kogury leadership consisted of foreign elites who subjugated the indigenous peoples of the Yalu region. Because of this, and because the Kogury expansion brought clashes with the Chinese, Kogury 's survival, like that of eighteenth-century Prussia, depended upon its military prowess. By the first century A.D., Kogury had developed into a centralized state led by a ruler who had adopted the Chinese title of "king" (wang). By the middle of the fourth century Kogury had absorbed its northern neighboring Korean states and the Chinese commandery of Lolang. Frescoes from the tomb of Dongshou, the last governor of Lolang, provide a glimpse of the military forces of Kogury at that time. One of the frescoes shows a procession led by two files of foot soldiers (Figure 13.1). They wear peaked helmets covering their heads, necks, and ears, jackets of either plated armor or quilting, and loose, baggy trousers bloused into knee-high boots. They carry halberds over their right shoulders and narrow octagonal shields in their left hands. Behind them march two files of axe-bearing foot soldiers wearing soft caps, bloused trousers and boots, and soft, gown-like jackets. Also visible are similarly attired bowmen as well as men carrying cloth lanterns, some of whom appear to be wearing plate armor jerkins and carrying their shields under their arms. The flanks of the procession are guarded by eight cavalry troopers wearing helmets similar to those of the infantry, but with tall horsehair plumes, quilted or armored tunics, and baggy trousers falling to their feet. They carry long spears and their horses are adorned with armored helmets and covered with either quilting or plate armor reaching almost to the ground.

At this same time Kogury came into conflict with Paekche, a powerful kingdom to the south. By the middle of the fourth century Paekche, like Kogury, had become a strong, centralized kingdom and had absorbed the Chinese southern commandery of Daifang. In 371 Paekche forces

invaded Kogury, pushing north as far as P'yngyang and killing the Kogury king. Now in control of all of central Korea, Paekche opened diplomatic contact with the Chinese state of Eastern Jin and with the Japanese, known as "the Wa" to the Chinese and Koreans. In 384, the Paekche king adopted the Buddhist faith, which Paekche then transmitted to its neighboring kingdoms and to Japan, providing a powerful value system that enhanced Paekche's authority and international prestige. A third powerful kingdom, Silla, emerged in southern Korea in the region east of the Naktong River. During the eclipse of Kogury power, Paekche and Silla grappled for control of the peninsula. A fourth, substantially weaker state, Kaya, developed in the lower reaches of the Naktong. Kaya maintained a vigorous maritime trade, and had the support of the Japanese, who considered it to be their tributary. Paekche and Silla saw Japanese support as useful in their conflicts with each other, and so Japan, too, was drawn into the cauldron of political intrigue and combat on the Korean peninsula.

Faced with military defeat and continuing pressure from Paekche, Kogury began the revitalization of its institutions, adopting Buddhism, establishing a Confucian academy, promulgating an administrative legal code, and reinvigorating the military system. Building on this internal structure, the greatest of the Kogury kings, Kwanggaet'o (391-413), whose very name meant "expander of territory," began a campaign of conquest. At the head of his cavalry forces King Kwanggaet'o captured the Liaodong Peninsula, once again pressing against the frontiers of China. He subjugated the nomadic people to the northeast, expanding Kogury 's territory deep into Manchuria, and pushed the borders of Paekche far to the south, thereby incorporating into Kogury all of the Imjin and Han river basins. He then rode into the southern reaches of the Naktong River, defeating a Japanese force which was then attacking Silla. A memorial stone on the west bank of the Yalu River at the old Kogury capital of Kungaesng recounts Kwanggaet'o's deeds: the conquest of 64 walled cities and 1,400 villages. Exemplifying his belief that Kogury was the coequal of China, Kwanggaet'o arrogated to himself the Chinese imperial privilege of assigning an era title to his own reign: Yngnak, or "Eternal Rejoicing." His successor invaded Paekche in 475, seized the capital, and beheaded the king. At this point Kogury reached the zenith of its power and territorial sway, stretching from well south of the Han River to the Liao and Sungari rivers in Manchuria to the north (Map 13.2).

Korea now entered the "Three Kingdoms Period," in which Kogury, Silla, and Paekche vied

through war, diplomacy, and intrigue for control of Korea and fought, plotted, schemed, and colluded with Japan, the Chinese states, and the non-Chinese peoples of Manchuria and inner Asia for advantage and territorial gain along the borders. This was a time marked by shifting alliances, military threats and counterthreats, and the occasional short, sharp, brutal conflict. In the late sixth century the rough balance of power among the Three Kingdoms, the northern and southern Chinese regimes, and the non-Chinese peoples of Manchuria and the steppes was shaken by events on the peninsula and by the rise of a new player in China.

Following the dissolution of the great Han Empire, China endured nearly four centuries of fragmentation. Northern China was dominated by the Turko- Mongolian Xianbei people, who intermarried with the Chinese and adopted the trappings of Chinese civilization. A succession of regimes led by these partially Sinified Xianbei (the so-called "Northern Sixteen Kingdoms") grappled for control in the north, while in the South the successors to the Han Dynasty kept alive the Chinese cultural legacy in the Yangzi River basin through a succession of regimes known as the Six Dynasties. By 577 the north, after a series of civil wars and conflicts, was reunited by a Sinified Xianbei dynasty calling itself the Northern Zhou. A leading member of the Northern Zhou court was a certain Yangjian, Duke of Sui. Of mixed Chinese and Xianbei heritage, he rose through military merit and court intrigue to become by 581 commander in chief of the Northern Zhou military forces, left prime minister, grand state minister, and "supreme pillar of state." Shortly thereafter, allegedly at the urging of the eight- year-old Northern Zhou emperor, Yangjian was "persuaded" to take the final step and assume the imperial throne as Sui Wendi: Emperor Wen of the Sui Dynasty. The young former emperor of Zhou died shortly thereafter, as did fifty- eight other potential rivals for the imperial throne.

Sui Wendi was a man of extraordinary talents and passions, a product, in the words of historian Arthur F. Wright, of the "violent and predatory politics of a divided North China, riven by internecine feuds and racial hatred." The historical record reveals his skillful diplomacy and administrative skill as well as his towering rages and peremptory punishments. Those who protested usually met swift retribution, although on at least one occasion some brave senior advisers remonstrated that it was unseemly for the emperor to personally beat officials to death in the halls of the palace with bastinadoes and horsewhips. Whether the instrument of choice was the horsewhip, the diplomatic negotiation, the administrative decree, the Buddhist sutra, or the

military expedition, Sui Wendi succeeded in unifying the Chinese Empire once again. First he concentrated on broadening his political base, reinstituting the old Han Dynasty bureaucratic forms, offices, and rituals. He rebuilt the western capital of Changan, renaming it Daxingcheng, promulgated a new body of laws and ordinances, the Kaihuang Code, and, while paying due regard to the precepts of Confucius, committed the dynasty to Buddhism, thus restoring cultural hegemony throughout the north.

Once he had consolidated his rule in the north, Sui Wendi initiated a massive military operation to conquer the Chen, the last, and most feeble, of the southern dynasties. In 588, after years of logistical, diplomatic, and psychological preparations, Sui Wendi unleashed the Southern Expedition: an eight-pronged amphibious attack against the southern Chinese regime. Overall supreme command rested with the emperor's third son, Yang Guang, prince of Jin and future emperor, supported by able and experienced generals. By the end of the year, China was once again united and this new, energized Chinese Empire collided with the powerful Kogury kingdom in the long-contested basin of the Liao River.

Just as Sui Wendi was about to begin his rise to imperial glory in the mid- sixth century, the balance of power on the Korean peninsula began to shift as Kogury found itself under pressure from an ever more powerful Silla kingdom o the south (Map 13.3). In 551 Silla allied itself with Paekche and the two conducted a combined military campaign to force Kogury out of the strategic Han River basin. Two years later, Silla turned on its former ally and overran the Paekcheoccupied lower reaches of the Han. Silla now had control of a wealthy agricultural area with a substantial population base for taxes, labor, and military service as well as a link with China via the seaports on the west coast f Korea. In addition, the Han River valley was the heart of Korea's iron- working industry and was rich in arable land which could be distributed to royal relatives and supporters. Strategically, possession by Silla of the Han drainage basin meant that the only two states which could challenge Silla's power, Kogury and Paekche, were now separated by a wide band of Silla-controlled territory.

Outraged by Silla treachery, the Paekche king personally led his forces in an attack against Silla in 553 to try to regain his former territories in the Han River valley. He was killed in the unsuccessful

battle. Strengthened by these victories, Silla was able to move south, finally putting an end to the Kaya state. Silla armies then pushed to the northeast, further encroaching on territory that had been dominated by Kogury. Japan periodically organized "expeditions" to assist Paekche and punish Silla aggression against its client state. Although some of these expeditionary forces actually left Japan, none had any significant impact on Silla's growing power and control on the peninsula.

As Silla began to dominate Korea, Paekche and Kogury sought strength in a united front. In the last decade of the sixth century, the two former enemies attacked Silla in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the Han River basin and take control of Silla's communication link with China. When the attack to the south stalled, Kogury shifted its attention to the north and the growing power of a reunified China. Initially, relations between Sui China and Kogury were superficially cordial. Kogury had long offered tribute to whoever controlled the northern Chinese territories, and, in the year that he rose to power, Sui Wendi and the king of Kogury exchanged diplomatic missions. However, once Kogury realized it was faced with a strong, unified, and expanding Chinese Empire, it began to strengthen its defenses. Historian John C. Jamieson suggests that the actions of the Sui emperors toward Kogury seem to have been motivated by at least three concerns. They feared collusion between Kogury and the peoples of Manchuria and the steppes and possible attack from a traditional invasion route. They were wary of the possible rise of a separatist movement in the northeast supported by Kogury . And, they wanted to return to Chinese control the lost territories of the great Han Empire. With Kogury unwilling to play the role of submissive tributary to China, and with both powers vying for influence and strategic advantage among the peoples of the steppes and Manchuria, a clash was inevitable.

Just as Kogury faced threats on two fronts, from Silla in the south and China in the northwest, China also found itself threatened from two directions: from Kogury in the northeast and from the peoples of the steppes, especially the Turks, or Tuque (known to the Koreans as the Tolgwl), to the north. Kogury also began to send diplomatic missions to Paekche's distant and generally ineffective ally, Japan, presumably seeking to buttress its support in the face of potential threats from China and Silla. Thus two sets of potential belligerents began to coalesce in northeast Asia: a north-south connection of Turks, Kogury, aekche, and Japan and an east-west axis of Sui China and Silla. The line of confrontation lay along the Liao River valley (Map 13.4).

In 598 Kogury's King Yngyang ( 590-618), perhaps wanting to establish a secure buffer zone against China, attacked across the Liao River into Liaoxi, the region to the west of the river. Sui Wendi is reported to have mobilized a force of 300,000 (this, like all figures from the Chinese and Korean annals, is suspect, but indicates that the army, whatever its size, was very large) that counterattacked by land and sea. The expedition was unsuccessful and Sui Wendi withdrew his forces back across the Liao. Following this jab and counterjab, apparent tranquillity once again descended on the Sui-Kogury relationship. But their long-standing interests in the Liao River drainage basin and ontest for influence among the northern tribes inexorably propelled the two toward future clashes. Kogury maintained an uneasy lookout along the Liao River, periodically conducted forays, and maintained secret diplomatic contacts with the Turks.

Sui Wendi died in 604, possibly at the hand of his second son, Yang Guang, who had already usurped the position of crown prince and now succeeded to the throne as Sui Yangdi ( Emperor Yang of Sui). He is known to Chinese history as the archetypical licentious and profligate "bad last emperor," a reputation based largely on the annals written during the successor Tang Dynasty. While his true personal characteristics are difficult to discern across the centuries through a haze of partisan history and myth, it is clear that Sui Yangdi pursued a policy of strengthening the nation, expanding and defending the borders of the empire, and constructing great public works. Ultimately, he succumbed to the reaction against the high human cost of his building programs and his military campaigns, particularly his single-mindedly prosecution of the conflict with Kogury.

On the borders, Sui Yangdi continued projects begun by his father, dispatching military expeditions against northern Indochina, islands in the China Sea, and nomads on the northwest frontier. These military adventures met with mixed success and brought few lasting gains. With the Japanese, diplomacy was more effective than war. The Chinese were initially offended by the Japanese refusal to accept the idea that their emperor was subordinate to Sui Yangdi, but diplomatic relations were nonetheless established. During the subsequent Tang Dynasty, SinoJapanese relations flourished, with significant cultural impact on Japan.

Sui Yangdi's public works projects also followed the precedents set by his father. When he was still the prince of Jin commanding the Southern Expedition, Sui Yangdi had built a southern capital at Jiangdu on the Yangzi River. As emperor, Sui Yangdi built an eastern capital at Luoyang, the old capital of the Eastern Zhou and Later Han dynasties, a major water and land transportation hub and a natural location for the storage and transshipment of grain. In 584, Sui Wendi had begun the construction of a network of canals. Sui Yangdi built even larger and more impressive canals. Later writers castigated Sui Yangdi for the onerous cost of constructing these canals and suggested that they were built so that the emperor could travel in comfort and splendor. In fact, while Sui Yangdi was no stranger to comfort and splendor, and canal building certainly imposed a hardship on those mobilized for construction, the canals played an important political and economic role by tying the empire together and providing the means to transship food to grainpoor regions.

The third major category of costly and labor-intensive public works for which Sui Yangdi has been criticized by later generations was the repair and construction of walls as defense against the nomadic peoples of the steppes. From 607 to 609 Sui Yangdi mobilized perhaps as many as a million men to work on the walls along the southern edge of the Ordos, the strategic northwest quadrant of the loop of the Yellow River. Because the Ordos was one of the few places within the vast steppe lands which could support agriculture, it was of critical importance to the nomads who contended for power in Inner Asia. To the Chinese, the Ordos potentially provided a means of controlling the steppe nomads, and, even more important, it was the major avenue of approach into the Chinese heartland.

Wall building was one time-honored approach to the nomad threat. War, diplomacy, and treachery were the others, and Sui Yangdi used all four in dealing with the non-Chinese peoples along the northern borders. There were four major potential enemies: Kogury , the Turks, the Qidan (Korean: Khitan, a Mongol people who inhabited the lower reaches of the Liao River), and the Mo-ho (Korean: Malgal), a confederation of Tungusic tribes to the north of Kogury which had participated in the attack across the Liao River in 598. Of these, the two most dangerous to China were Kogury and the Turks. The Turks had risen in the steppe land of Central Asia, and by the mid-sixth century the two major Turkish political groups, or khanates, generally controlled the region from the Persian border in the west to the Liao River in the east. The western khanate drew

its strength from western Turkestan, while the eastern khanate was centered on the Orkhon River valley and occupied approximately the same area as modern Mongolia. Had the Turks remained united, it is unlikely that the Sui Dynasty could have stood against them. But by the time Sui Wendi had risen to power, the two khanates were divided and frequently at war with each other. Both khanates were riven with internal factionalism, providing an opportunity for Chinese political machinations.

Sui Yangdi's suspicions were heightened in 607 when he visited the tent capital of Qimin, khan of the Eastern Turks, and discovered the presence of an embassy from Kogury . Although Qimin tried to make the best of the situation by introducing the Kogury emissary to the emperor, it was clear that Kogury was in secret contact with the Eastern Turks. Pei Qu, the emperor's trusted strategic counselor, advised Sui Yangdi to demand that the king of Kogury present himself to pay homage at the imperial court or face chastisement by a Chinese-led Turkish army. King Yngyang refused to submit to this directive, and his flouting of the emperor's authority appears to have been the determining factor in Sui Yangdi's decision to invade Kogury and end the threat to his northeastern border. For the next few years Sui Yangdi's efforts were focused on the completion of the canal network. In 610, with the canals completed, Sui Yangdi levied war taxes and began to assemble a huge military force and logistical train. A disastrous flood of the Yellow River plain delayed the preparations, but by the first moon of the year 612, the emperor was ready to strike. Kogury by land and sea.

THE ANTAGONISTS
By the time of the confrontation with Kogury , the Chinese were the masters of centuries of military wisdom. The Southern Expedition, which had reunited China, provided a demonstration of Chinese expertise in the conduct of large-scale military operations and practical experience in the organization, equipment, transportation, and supply of large military forces in a theater campaign. Sui Yangdi himself, then prince of Jin, had served as the nominal commander in chief of the Southern Expedition, and, while much of the actual leadership and management of the operation was in the hands of senior generals, the campaign provided the emperor with priceless experience. The subsequent border campaigns provided additional practice for Sui Yangdi's military leaders and soldiers. Sui Yangdi now stood at the head of what the Sui History called the largest military

force ever assembled. The Korean Samguk Sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms) claims that the main force numbered 1,133,800. Whatever the actual number, it was a formidable host, consisting of imperial guards, a standing territorial militia (fubing), and conscripts.

The core element of the imperial guard was a cavalry-heavy, full-time professional force. The other guard detachments and regional forces were manned by the fubing. The fubing system developed during the Sui period from the old pattern of military service inherited by the Sui emperors from their Xianbei ancestors. The Xianbei fubing consisted of hereditary warriors of the tribal aristocracy. They paid no taxes, nor were they required to perform corve labor, but they were expec ted to provide their own weapons, horses, and rations. By the time of the Sui Dynasty, the fubing had become largely Sinified, and consisted of troops recruited from each region. Under this system, the capital garrison armies consisted of twelve units, four guards (wei), and eight army headquarters (fu), which constituted the central command structure. In addition, regional military commands (zongguan fu) were established in strategic locations. The fubing leadership came from the upper ranks of the Xianbei aristocracy and from Chinese military families. The soldiers were recruited locally, given land to farm, and between the ages of twenty and sixty had to perform service at the capital for some period each year (perhaps two months out of every eighteen). At any one time, the capital garrison consisted of some 50,000 fubing soldiers plus the professional mounted force. The fubing system provided a substantial number of trained, on-call soldiers divided into small units, no single detachment of which was powerful enough to threaten the central government. In preparation for the Kogury expedition, Sui Yangdi also conscripted large numbers of additional troops and laborers to supplement the fubing. Many of them came from Shandong, resulting in much hardship in that region, with consequent desertions, unrest, and banditry, none of which deterred the continued war preparations.

Early in 612, the ground force was concentrated at Zhuojun, near modern Beijing. It consisted of two army groups, each consisting of twelve armies. The theoretical army of the Sui and Tang dynasties numbered about 20,000, of which 6,000 or so guarded the logistical train, while the remaining 14,000 were divided into a heavy center division of archers, crossbowmen, skirmishers (light infantry), and heavy infantry organized in fifty-man platoons (the Chinese had practiced the "modern" concept of combined arms for as long as separate arms of service could be differentiated). The Sui organization set forth in the Samguk Sagi is generally consistent with this

description, but differs in detail. According to that source, each army consisted of four cavalry and four infantry divisions, and was commanded by a senior general (shangjiang) and a deputy general (yajiang). Each cavalry division was composed of ten squadrons of one hundred troopers each. The infantry divisions were divided into eighty battalions. Each division was commanded by a divisional general (pianjiang) and identified by differently colored armor, cap strings, and flags.

The infantry formations were made up of heavy infantry, archers, crossbowmen, and skirmishers. Heavy infantry weapons included the ji, a halberd-like weapon with a forked or double-headed blade, as well as spears, axes, and swords. Some troops probably still carried the ge, or dagger axe, a wooden haft with a knife-like blade mounted crosswise near the top of the shaft, which had been a standard weapon since the ancient Shang Dynasty. The better-equipped heavy infantrymen and crossbowmen probably wore at least some laminar armor, most likely tunics made of metal or leather plates, or laminae, laced together and covering the torso and shoulder. Archers and skirmishers probably wore only cloth tunics, with the skirmishers carrying light shields and wielding short thrusting spears and swords. The armored cavalry carried swords and either spears or ji. Light cavalry (many of them warriors from the north) were primarily archers, but may also have carried light spears and swords. The Sui army also included a contingent of Turkish cavalry commanded by Chule, former khan of the Western Turks, who had been maintained at the Sui court as a potential "anti-khan" in the event the current khan began to assert his independence. These Turkish forces were probably equipped in a manner similar to that of the Chinese light cavalry.

According to the Samguk Sagi, the Sui forces that were engaged at the Salsu River, a specially selected and equipped detached striking force, had been issued one hundred days' rations for each horse and man, as well as laminar armor, spears (written with a different set of characters from those which indicate "halberds," so these were probably spears with leaf-shaped metal tips), clothing, "military implements," and huomu (literally "fire screens"), which may have been tough leather shields for protection when attacking fortifications.

Since the expedition had to cross rivers and attack Kogury fortresses and walled cities, Sui Yangdi's host included large numbers of pioneers and sappers, bridging equipment, and a

substantial siege train. The siege train included various kinds of catapults, collapsible ladders called yunti (cloud ladders), wheeled covered bridges, and artificial tunnels that could be rolled up to the walls of fortresses to protect the soldiers from the fall of arrow shot, boiling liquid, and flaming detritus thrown down by the defenders. This may also have been where the huomu "fire screens" were intended for use. During the Han era, the Chinese developed elaborate systems for signaling along the walls which they had erected in defense against the northern tribes. These systems were still in use nd included beacon fires for long-range communication, trumpets, gongs, drums, bells, flags, and lanterns for tactical battlefield signaling.

A huge fleet of warships and merchantmen was mobilized to provide logistical support to the land force, and an amphibious force was deployed aboard transports and combat ships, presumably similar to those used in the Southern Expedition. The largest of these were warships of the "five-toothed" class that carried eight hundred sailors and marines, had five decks towering a hundred feet above the waterline, and mounted six fifty-foot booms to smash holes in enemy ships while the marines fired crossbows from ports along the five decks. Other large ships were of the "Azure Dragon" class, while smaller ships of the "Yellow Dragon" class carried one hundred marines each.

Since the records of Kogury were lost when a combined Tang/ Silla besieging force destroyed P'yngyang fifty-six years after the Salsu battle, little detailed information is available about the organization of Kogury military forces. Some information can be gleaned from the Silla, Paekche, Sui, and Japanese records, however. Since the mountains and valleys of northern Korea were inhospitable to agriculture, Kogury had traditionally depended more on the hunt and predatory warfare for economic sustenance. This bred a fierce, cohesive warrior class. Historian Ki-baik Lee uses the term aristocratic army to describe the military culture of the Three Kingdoms period. The king was commander in chief and frequently took to the field at the head of his forces. In addition to this "royal army" personally led by the king, other forces called tang could be raised to operate independently. The tang probably developed from the ancient tribal war bands, and a strong bond existed between the tangju (tang chief) and his soldiers. The commanders, officers, and many, but not all, of the other ranks were probably of the aristocratic warrior class, whose primary function was to prepare for and conduct war and who were supported by taxes on the population at large. By the time of the Sui invasion, decades of continuous warfare had produced

tough, experienced, cavalry-heavy, highly mobile legions.

In the kingdom of Silla, the aristocratic army may have been supplemented by an institution known as the hwarangdo (literally "Band of Flower Youths"), a fraternity of adolescent men, the cream of the aristocracy, who lived together, conducted pilgrimages, and cultivated the arts. While there is some disagreement as to whether the hwarangdo was primarily a religious or military institution, many historians believe that the hwarang had a military function, and, indeed, many of the hwarang later became famous military leaders. One passage in the Samguk Sagi suggests that leading hwarang led groups of young followers (nangdo: youth bands) who could be conscripted in time of crisis and otherwise became "active duty" officers and soldiers when they reached the age of twenty. A Kogury institution, the kyngdang, may have performed a similar function at the provincial level. Like the hwarang, the kyngdang cultivated both military skills and moral values, as well as Confucian studies. Like the hwarang, the institution of the ky ngdang appears to have been derived from earlier tribal customs involving communal bodies of unmarried youths. fter many centuries of contact, Kogury military equipment and some of its organization and fighting doctrine must have been generally similar to those of China, although there were certainly differences. Japanese sources indicate that the basic long weapon of the Korean foot soldier was the ch'ang, a spear with a leaf-shaped iron tip attached to a thirteen-foot wood or bamboo shaft. The ch'ang could be used by both cavalry and infantry as a stabbing instrument, or could be hurled at the enemy. Both infantry and cavalry could also be armed with bows. A sixth-century Kogury hunting scene shows mounted huntsmen using saddles and stirrups, wearing soft gown-like garments (probably trimmed in fur) and feathered headdresses. They are depicted firing compound laminated bows. Their quivers, worn on the right hip like those used by horsemen of the steppes and later Japanese warriors, are open at the side, with the arrowheads resting in a pocket at the bottom and the arrows kept in place by a thong or ribbon. Presumably, the arrows were drawn by pulling out and down. Kogury light cavalry troopers were probably similarly accoutered on campaign (Figure 13.2) and, in the words of historian William W. Farris, probably also "swung swords from their mounts as they swooped in on their prey." Korean armies are described as using drums, bells, and gongs as signaling devices. Although there were cases of Korean warriors (probably cavalry officers) engaging in individual combat, the armies fought as disciplined units. In battle, the infantry moved up in formation, planted shields, and fired arrows at their enemies. The infantry then opened gaps in their line so that the cavalry could ride out and attack with swords.

While the royal army and the tang provided a mobile striking force, the defense of the provinces and provincial fortresses was in the hands of regional units. Each district had at its center a fortress commanded by a sngiu ("castle lord") and garrisoned by locally recruited forces supplemented by the young members of the kyngdang. The larger provinces (pu) were governed by aristocratic officials appointed by the king who had both civil administrative and military leadership functions. The fortresses themselves were probably similar to the ancient sans ng and walled towns, although the larger fortresses, like those along the Liao River and the city of P'yngyang itself, had stone-faced walls and were of greater size and complexity than the earlier versions. These fortresses withstood the initial brunt of the Sui invasion, and their ability to withstand Sui Yangdi's siege shaped the ensuing battle.

THE BATTLE OF THE SALSU RIVER (A.D. 612)

The Sui campaigns against Korea are described in the Sui History, but the only source of information on the battle of the Salsu River is the Samguk Sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms), compiled from earlier sources in 1145 by Kim Pu-sik. The following account is based on that source. Also examined were a translation into modern Korean by Kim Chong-gwn ( Seoul, 1976) and an English-language version produced by Homer Hulbert in 1904 ( Hulbert apparently did not have access to the original document) and edited by Clarence N. Weems.

The campaign of 612 began in the first month of the eighth year of the reign of Sui Yangdi. The emperor had already carried out solemn preliminary ceremonies and sacrifices and promulgated a punitive decree condemning the duplicity, cunning, and aggression of the Kogury king and emphasizing the virtue of the Sui Dynasty and his own awesome responsibilities as the Son of Heaven and inheritor of the mantle of the ancient rulers of China. Now it was time to carry out the punishment. With a blaring of trumpets, ringing of bells, clanging of gongs, shouting of orders, clatter of hooves, and shriek of bullock cart wheels, Sui Yangdi's vast army began to move. Each day, one of the twenty-four armies shouldered arms and began its march, swinging out onto the road to Korea and taking up a thirteen-mile (forty-li) interval between the armies. From the fluttering pennons of the lead scouts to the brocade banners of the rear guard, the armored centipede stretched for 320 miles along the dusty road and through the mountain passes to the northeast. The Samguk Sagi reflects that forty days passed before the entire column, the huge

imperial headquarters, and the long ogistical train had cleared the cantonment area. In a closely guarded carriage at the center of the headquarters and imperial guard detachment rode Sui Yangdi himself, supreme commander of the mighty expedition. In his entourage were Pei Qu, his trusted adviser and chief of strategy; Yuwen Kai, his chief engineer; Yuwen Shu, his favorite general; and his staff of administrators, logisticians, and scribes.

Army by army, division by division, the long column slogged the ancient road to Manchuria and Korea, across the Luan River, through the gates of the northeastern Long Wall, up into the foothills through the ancient "Mountain Sea Barrier" of Shanhaiguan Pass, and down to the Bo Hai coast road that led into the Liao River valley (Map 13.5). In harbors and inlets all along the Shandong Peninsula and the Bo Hai coast, countless ships slipped their moorings, breasted the tidal chop, and nosed out into the Yellow Sea and Gulf of Bohai. Fat-bellied supply ships wallowed north toward the Gulf of Liaodong to feed the army, while the towering "five-toothed" men of war, the Azure and Yellow Dragon ships, and the bluff-bowed transports of the amphibious force set course for Korea Bay and the Kogury coast.

The slow, stately progress of the mighty force gave Kogury King Yngyang and his field commander, General lchi Mundk, time to prepare for the looming battle. Time to mobilize the royal army, the tang formations, and the fortress garrisons. Time to scour the countryside, strengthen the fortress line, and stockpile food and munitions. Time to discuss strategy with the tangiu and the provincial governors, who now took up their dual roles as battle leaders. Time to spy and infiltrate and reconnoiter. Eventually, Sui Yangdi's light cavalry, ranging far in front of the main force, made contact and skirmished with Kogury's Khitan and Malgal scouts as the Korean mounted outpost line was driven in by the Chinese advance.

By the second month the Chinese army had reached the Liao River. Engineer Yuwen Kai had constructed a three-span portable bridge, and this immense fabrication was now dragged up and assembled by his pioneers and sappers. Unfortunately, the final span was too short to reach the far shore, from which Kogury troops rained arrows on Yuwen Kai's combat engineers. A few Chinese soldiers leapt into the water but could not climb the steep bank. They died, their bodies pierced by Korean spears and their blood staining the river shallows. Finally, in an action

reminiscent of the Roman ensign who plunged into the British surf calling on his comrades to follow the eagle standard, one officer, Mai Tiezhang, jumped across the gap from the bridge to the east bank, clearing a path with his sword so that his guardsmen could swarm up the bank and force a lodgment on the far shore. Many Korean soldiers were killed in the ensuing melee, but this foray, too, was defeated, and the Sui forces pulled the three- span bridge back to the west bank of the Liao. Engineer officer He Zhou was tasked with lengthening the bridge and after two days it was once again pushed across the Liao. This time the main force was able to cross over onto the eastern bank of the Liao and engaged the Kogury defenders in a bloody battle. Sui Yangdi's intention appears to have been to strike for the Kogury capital in the belief that the capture of P'yngyang would bring an end to Kogury resistance and cause King Yngyang to bow to the imperial demands. But the Koreans continued to defend tenaciously, fighting delaying actions all along the Liao River line before withdrawing into the fortresses. By summer, with the rainy season beginning, Sui Yangdi had invested the fortifications but had been unable to overcome them. Now he pulled his army into camp west of Liaodong Fortress.

While the main force awaited the end of the heavy rains, the amphibious orce continued on to Korea. Sui Yangdi organized a detached force of nine armies (said to number 305,000) to strike directly at P'yngyang. These troops, consisting of several armies under the command of General Yuwen Shu and others, were issued heavy armor, weapons, equipment, fire screens, and a hundred days of rations. The total weight of all this paraphernalia was so great that, although they faced the death penalty if they discarded any of it, many soldiers secretly buried a large portion of the rations beneath their tents. As the detached force began its march to P'y ngyang, the naval transports of the amphibious force reached the mouth of the Taedong River and began to debark 20,000 marines and soldiers under the command of the senior general of the imperial left wing guard, Lai Huer. His lead elements scattered the Korean defenders and, encouraged by this success, General Lai decided to move immediately with 10,000 of his best troops to attack P'yngyang. His deputy tried to persuade him to wait until the entire force had landed, but Lai pressed ahead. Kogury troops fought briefly against the Chinese marines at the gates of P'yngyang, then fell back, pretending defeat and apparently leaving the city undefended. The Sui forces entered the city, where General Lai released them to plunder. As the Chinese troops spread out, their guard relaxed, Kogury commandos poured forth from hiding places and fell on their enemies. Taken by surprise, the Chinese fled, harried by the Kogury commandos all the way to the coast. Humiliated, General Lai reembarked his forces and sailed back to Liaodong without

trying to link up with the Chinese detached force approaching from the north.

The armies of the detached force continued southeast, across the Yalu River toward P'y ngyang. General lchi Mundk, rather than attempting to stand and fight the oncoming host, harassed the Chinese flanks and lured them on with false promises of conditional surrender, pursuing a yudo, or "drawing the enemy in deeply," strategy. Although the Chinese won many small victories, they failed to come to grips with General lchi's main forces. After crossing the Salsu River, the Chinese advanced to within ten miles (30 li) of P'y ngyang. Although close to their goal, the Sui troops were fatigued from the repeated clashes with the Koreans and, having buried much of their rations before beginning the advance, now suffered from hunger. Each mile brought them closer to the enemy capital, but also stretched their supply line that much further. Autumn and the end of the campaigning season loomed close. The Koreans now tendered an offer to submit to the Chinese demands. In a psychological ploy, General lchi praised the bravery and endurance of the Chinese generals and argued that, having penetrated so deeply into Korea and successfully withstood so many hostile onslaughts, they could hardly be faulted for considering their mission essentially accomplished. The Samguk Sagi reports that there was discord within the Chinese headquarters as the Sui generals pondered lchi Mundk's previous false surrender offers. Those who counseled that the force had achieved its objective of Kogury submission won the day, and the Chinese column turned and began to make its way back north.

Committed to withdrawal, the Chinese found that the surrender was yet an other ruse. Once again Kogury light cavalry began to harry their flanks. The Sui armies continued north, fighting a running battle with ever stronger Kogury detachments. While wearing down the enemy formation, lchi Mundk withheld his main force until the Sui column reached the Salsu River. The Koreans may have used some kind of portable barriers to dam up the Salsu tributaries. As the Chinese approached the river, they removed these barriers, flooding the river and making it more difficult for the Chinese to traverse. When half the Chinese had crossed the river and could not easily render support to the rear columns, General lchi unleashed his army. It fell on the dispirited Chinese troops with all the fury and blood lust of tough, cruel, mountain warriors. The rear of the Chinese column was cut to pieces, and the survivors fled northward under constant attack. According to the Samguk Sagi, only 2,700 of the 305,000 Chinese troops straggled back to Liaodong, leaving a trail of thousands of pieces of armor and military equipment in their wake.

Outraged, Sui Yangdi sent the surviving generals of the detached force home in chains. Realizing that he could not rebuild his army for another effort before the late autumn weather closed down the approaches to Kogury, he withdrew from Liaodong.

But "in war the result is never final," as the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote twelve centuries after the weary Chinese army trudged westward under the watchful gaze of the tired, battered, but victorious defenders of Kogury . The following year Sui Yangdi raised another army and again crossed the Liao River, only to receive word of a serious revolt near the eastern capital. He dispatched General Yuwen Shu and a substantial force to put down the rebellion. Disruption of the imperial recruiting and logistical system and widespread social unrest cut short the Korean campaign. By now, the exactions on behalf of public works and war had sparked rebellion at the heart of the empire. Sui Yangdi nonetheless made another foray into Korea in 614, this time penetrating to the outskirts of P'y ngyang. King Yngyang again offered submission, but failed to follow through, and Sui Yangdi announced yet a fourth expedition. But China, exhausted and seething with rebellion, was incapable of further large-scale military adventures. Although Sui Yangdi continued for a few years to hold the fabric of empire together, he had stretched his power and the strength of his nation too thin and lost the Mandate of Heaven. He was driven from his throne and, taking refuge in his southern capital, was murdered in 618 by the son of General Yuwen Shu.

Kogury, too, was sapped by the efforts of total war. Factionalism rent the political fabric, and in 642 King Yngyang's successor and much of the ruling aristocracy were slaughtered when a military strongman, Yn Kaesomun, took control. Kogury continued to withstand repeated assaults from the formidable Tang Dynasty that followed the Sui. Eventually, however, P'y ngyang fell to a combined Tang/Silla attack and, in 668, the kingdom of Kogury came to an end. Korean historians tend to see the half century of Kogury resistance against the Chinese as instrumental to the survival of Korea as a nation. Kogury purchased with blood the time needed for the kingdom of Silla to grow strong so that, by the time Kogury succumbed, Silla was able to unify the peninsula and, from a position of strength, establish a tributary relationship with China that ensured Korean autonomy and set the pattern for future Korean-Chinese relations.

LESSONS OF WAR
Strategy
Sui Yangdi's campaigns against Kogury appear with hindsight to be a clearcut case of strategic overreach. But what were the options for either side? Although King Y ngyang could have simply accepted tributary status, he must have believed that Sui Yangdi's ultimate goal was to reestablish the Chinese commanderies in Korea. Submission to China would have imposed far less sacrifice on the people of Korea, but meant the end of Kogury ; thus, the strategic leadership of Kogury fought for national survival. For the Chinese Empire, the elimination of Kogury was more than a personal fixation of Sui Yangdi, since the successor Tang Dynasty continued the campaigns at great cost until the destruction of Kogury was achieved.

"Strategic overreach" may exist, but the phrase does not help identify what great nations must do to achieve and support their national interests. There are no easy answers, but the questions, as always, involve the definition of national interests, the most appropriate instruments of national power to achieve those interests, and the ability of military professionals to transform the political goals of the state into attainable military objectives.

Of all the aphorisms quoted by the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, the one that is perhaps best-known in Korean military schools may be translated, "He who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be in peril in a hundred battles." Although there may have been many reasons for Sui Yangdi to be concerned about the role of Kogury on his northeast border, he seems initially to have been drawn into his disastrous series of campaigns by the advice of Pei Qu, who recommended the chastisement of King Yngyang. Arthur F. Wright, the premier American student of the Sui Dynasty said, in words that resonate today, "P'ei Ch [Pei Qu] was intelligent, steeped in the accepted values, deeply knowledgeable in some areas of tension and conflict, but totally uninformed about the area where he now promised a cheap and easy victory."

It is instructive to examine the campaign of 612 in light of current American operational doctrine, which also relates operational objectives to strategic goals. The U.S. Army field manual on military operations, influenced largely but not entirely by the theoretical structure of Carl von Clausewitz,

identifies "concepts of operational design" in the planning of military campaigns. These include: The center of gravity, which should properly be the focus of all military operations, is the "hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends," the source of strength or balance without which the enemy cannot continue to fight. Objectives at the operational level are chosen with the goal of imposing one's will over the enemy's strategic center of gravity. Theorists at the U.S. Army War College have proposed that the tests for validity of a center of gravity are: will imposing our will on this center of gravity cause a cascading, deteriorating effect that will prevent the enemy from achieving its aims and allow achievement of our own and do we have a feasible ability to impose our will over it?

The lines of operation define the "directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy." They may be single or multiple, interior or exterior.

Culminating points are those points in time and location at which "the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender." At this point, in the words of Clausewitz, the defender can make a "sudden powerful transition to the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance . . ."

The campaign of 612 in Korea provides a useful example for the study of these concepts, while these concepts, in turn, provide insights into the reasons for the repeated failure of the Chinese to defeat Kogury.

Sui Yangdi and his Tang Dynasty successors clearly believed that the Kogury strategic center of gravity was its national leadership. The political goal of the war was the subjugation of King Yngyang, who normally resided in P'yngyang with his advisers, and the political and administrative apparatus upon which his ability to control the kingdom rested. Further, an attack against the capital was the only way to force the highly mobile army of Kogury to battle in a decisive way. Thus the capture of P'yngyang became the operational objective of the campaign (the eventual destruction of P'yngyang in 668 did, in fact, bring an end to the kingdom of Kogury). But in attempting to achieve the operational objective so as to impose Chinese will on the Kogury strategic center of gravity, Sui Yangdi and his Tang successors faced formidable

obstacles.

The Kogury political/strategic goal was national survival. The only strategic center of gravity which they had the ability to influence was the will of the Chinese leadership to continue the attacks. The Kogury strategic concept for prosecuting this objective was attrition of Chinese human and material resources through a combination of tenacious defense along the Liao River line, defense of P'yngyang against attack by sea, and "drawing in deep" and punishing such forces as penetrated east of the Liao.

The line of operation for the main Chinese effort against P'y ngyang was long and arduous. From the capital of Daxingcheng to the Liao River was nearly 1,000 miles, with another 250 miles from the Liao to P'yngyang. Much of the route was through forests and mountains and across rivers. The campaigning season was only about three months long. The terrain channeled the invader and the weather constrained the time available, so the Kogury defenders could not be surprised by the Chinese attacks.

The successful defense of the Liao River line of fortifications was the second key to Kogury success. So long as the Korean fortresses lay astride the line of operation of their main effort, the Chinese could not bring their full force to bear against P'yngyang. Thus, this river line had to be taken if the strategic objective was to be obtained.

The Chinese could have neutralized the problems inherent in an extended and constrained line of operation, if they had used their control of the sea to operate on exterior lines. However, for all the glory of the five-toothed men- of-war and varicolored dragon ships, the Chinese were a land power, weak in the skills of navigation and unproficient in the handling of naval forces. General Lai's amphibious operation against P'yngyang is a study in ineptitude.

With the Liao River fortresses constraining their supply line and unable to use their command of the sea effectively, the Chinese could not put enough troops into the heart of Kogury to locate

and destroy the highly mobile Kogury army. Any attempt to do so risked defeat in detail by the agile Kogury combat teams operating autonomously yet capable of rapid concentration. Although they considered "chasing" lchi Mundk, the Chinese generals of the detached force appear to have concluded that their only feasible course of action was to press on to P'y ngyang on a narrow front, risking envelopment or constant attrition. By the time they had struggled over the 250 miles of mountains, streams, and forests to the outer precincts of P'yngyang, their force had been weakened through fatigue, constant battle, divided counsels, an ever-lengthening supply line, and diminished rations; their morale was exhausted and the force had clearly reached its culminating point. And so, on the banks of the Salsu River, General lchi Mundk was able to unleash his "flashing sword of vengeance."

Tactics
General Lai's debacle at P'yngyang reminds us of the dangers of hasty action without complete preparation and thorough reconnaissance, and yet great captains and lesser heroes have won by seizing opportunities and using surprise and shock to compensate for other weaknesses. Perhaps the real point is that commanders must develop their instincts in peacetime, through the study of history and the conduct of exercises, in order to be able to use their best judgment when faced with critical decisions in battle. The ability to take advantage of the opportunities presented will then depend on the training, discipline, cohesion, and fighting spirit of the soldiers The fate of General Lai's troops as they fled from P'y ngyang and the critical tactical lesson of the Salsu River battle remind us that a fighting withdrawal is one of the most difficult and potentially disastrous of military maneuvers, whether it be conducted in the Teutoburg Forest in the year 9, the vicinity of the Salsu River in 612, the Afghan hills in 1842, or northern Korea in 1950. Any force conducting a deep penetration in hostile territory should be prepared in advance to protect its flanks and maintain discipline and cohesion while conducting a withdrawal under fire.

Superficially, the lesson of the case of the buried rations seems simply to be: "Don't let your soldiers throw their food away, they might need it later." But the incident brings home an age-old military conundrum with which modern commanders still grapple. The best equipment is useless if it is too heavy for the troops to carry comfortably. Soldiers, faced with the prospect of carrying excessively heavy gear, will tend to discard items which appear to be of less importance to them

unless they are convinced of the survival value of the equipment and are well trained and disciplined. In the case of the Sui detached force, a breakdown in knowledge, understanding, information, and discipline appears to have occurred throughout the entire chain of command. This "simple" incident is worth pondering by leaders at all levels, from squad to national command.

Richard A. Gabriel/ Donald W. Boose Jr. <The Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide to Great Battles That Shaped the Development of War> (Greenwood Press. Westport, CT. 1994) Pgs 461-487