Why Israel Fears A Nuclear Iran

Why Israel Fears a Nuclear Iran: Realism, Constructivism & Iran's Dual National Identity
Whyte, C. (2011) 'Why Israel Fears a Nuclear Iran: Realism, Constructivism & Iran's Dual National Identity' Central European Journal of International & Security Studies Online] 5,141-162. Available from <http://http://cejiss.org/category/issue/2011-volume-5issue-3> [Accessed 12 June 2012].
Overview of the Papers Main Argument The topic of Whyte's article is nuclear proliferation in Iran and the dilemma this poses to the international system generally, and to Israel in particular (Whyte, 2009). 1 Iran insists that its nuclear program is peaceful, but Western powers suspect that Iran is masking attempts to manufacture nuclear weapons. Whyte states that the aim of his paper is to "contribute to the understanding of the rationales behind past and future policy actions by Iran and its neighbors." He also says his work "aims to critically examine nuclear proliferation by comparing facets of both the realist (particularly neorealist) and constructivist paradigms." (Whyte, 2011, p142). Whyte warns that, "A future Iranian nuclear capability may lead to regional instability not observed in previous cases of nuclear proliferation." He concludes that although attempts to engage with Iran could possibly be fruitful, there is enough uncertainty that "states like Israel may be forced to act" (Whyte, 2011, p159). It may be that action in the
1 Whyte, C. (2011) 'Why Israel Fears a Nuclear Iran: Realism, Constructivism & Iran's Dual National Identity' Central European Journal of International & Security Studies Online] 5,141162. Available from <http://http://cejiss.org/category/issue/2011-volume-5-issue-3> [Accessed 12 June 2012]
Page 1 of 12
form of a pre-emptive strike by Israel will be made, perhaps soon after the US presidential election in November.
2.Summary of the Premises/Assumptions that Support Whyte's Conclusions. In his introduction, Whyte says the possession of nuclear weaponry leads to relative stability. The downside is that the balance of power between states changes when a new player acquires nuclear arms. The consequences of the realignment are unpredictable (Whyte, 2009, pp141-142). Whyte assumes that world opinion is on the side of the Israelis and against Iran (p158, main paragraph). He notes that many states have developed nuclear weapons programmes under the guise of civilian nuclear energy projects, a right guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whyte acknowledges that nuclear weaponry was a major factor in stabilizing relations between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, and has also worked for relative peace in the Indian subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula. But, he asserts that the dynamics on the Indian subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula are very different from those in the Middle East. Whyte does not mention Iran's right to develop nuclear weapons to balance those secretly developed and held by Israel.
3. Analysis of the Argument / Situating the Authors Perspective As an American judge once said of pornography, 'We may not be able to define it, but we know what it is when we see it.' The same may be said of realism. One of the better definitions is by Jack Donnelly, who says, "Realists are unanimous in holding that
Page 2 of 12
human nature contains an ineradicable core of egoistic passions; that those passions define the central problem of politics; and that statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature." (Donnelly, J.,2000) 2 . Whyte notes that, "Realists focus on the state as the primary arbiter of power ... viewing all other examinations of international affairs below the level of the state as unnecessary...". As a result, realists focus on the condition of anarchy in the international system. Whyte says that states approach international affairs from a 'power political' 3perspective, aiming to secure their own survival and relative prosperity. The bulk of Whyte's paper - pages 146 to 159 - is in the section titled 'Realism, Constructivism and the Normative Geopolitik of the Middle East', which is followed by two subsections: 'Realism and Brinkmanship in the Middle East', and 'Constructing the Israeli-Iranian Relationship'. Though both subsections run to the same length, Whyte makes it clear he believes the constructivist approach to be more relevant here, not least because the Israelis may be unwilling to rely on purely material guarantors of security (p155). Whyte says that in the early 1960s the West actively encouraged the Iranians to develop civilian nuclear energy production projects. [Albright & Stricker 4 state that this happened not in the early 1960s but in 1957.] Whyte notes that after the Shah was
2 Donnelly, J. (2000) Realism in International Relations[Online]. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. Available From <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99053676.pdf> [Accessed 14 June 2012] 3 power political: definition: diplomacy in which nations threaten to use force in order to obtain their objectives, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/ 4 Albright,D. and Stricker,A.,(2009) The Iran Primer: Power, Politics and U.S. Policy.1st ed.Washington DC:United States Insttitute of Peace (USIP).
Page 3 of 12
ousted in 1979, Western states withdrew their support for nuclear programmes, but he doesn't tell us why the West encouraged Iran to have nuclear projects in the A place. Whyte stresses that Irans involvement in the intra-regional politics of the Middle East has changed dramatically since 1979. He claims that Hamas and Hezbollah receive militant training from Iran. Citing remarks by Iranian leaders to the effect that Israel is an 'abomination' and 'an affront' to Islam and that the holocaust never happened, Whyte says it is easy to see why Israel is concerned for its security. He does not say why it is just as easy to see why Iran and other Arab states are opposed to the ever-expanding Zionist settlements and continuing occupation of large tracts of Palestine by the Israelis since 1967. Whyte says that since the early-2000s, the international intelligence community has consistently released reports suggesting that Iran is pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme. He does not question the veracity of Western intelligence - the same intelligence that mislead the whole world over Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - or the interest of Western governments in stoking up fear among their populations, as outlined by Adam Curtis in The Power of Nightmares (Curtis/BBC, 2004.)5 In the context of Iran, Whyte argues that an understanding of the contrast between realist and constructivist perspectives on the areas of power, communication and cooperation are crucial. Deferring to Mearsheimer, he acknowledges that Iran may not be thinking of nuclear forces as necessary for fighting; rather it may be interested in the
5 Adam Curtis / BBC.(2004).The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear.[Online Video]. 29 November. Available From <http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtFyuuWlWQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [Accessed 20 June 2012].
Page 4 of 12
potential of nuclear weapons to stabilise relations. Whyte reminds us that a nuclear arsenal legitimises state authority, and implies that the possessor is a world player. He outlines the elements of Gaventa's argument that power is three-dimensional - the power to make others do what they otherwise would not; the power to control access to decision-making structures; and the power to actively shape the wants and interests of other states. For realist literature on cooperation Whyte cites Robert Jervis in proposing that through its military and geopolitical position, a state can have an advantage over other actors in either offensive or defensive capabilities. Using Jerviss model of cooperation under the conditions of anarchy, Whyte says that if Iran were to test and deploy nuclear weapons there are two possible outcomes - a doubly stable environment in which Iran and Israel deter each other successfully or a doubly unstable environment in which regional parties communicate ineffectively, making an offensive posture indistinguishable from a defensive one. Whyte argues that a realist would say that any declaration of nuclear capabilities on the part of Iran should be answered by an Israeli acknowledgement of its own nuclear deterrent. In this way, Israel raises the uncertainty involved in engaging in conflict so high that Iran is unlikely to attack the Jewish state. Therefore, a nuclear Iran could be successfully contained, precluding the need for America or Israel to make a preemptive strike. Expounding his argument from the constructivist perspective, Whyte says the potential nuclear standoff between Iran and Israel lacks a number of the similarities of
Page 5 of 12
mindset that have dominated nuclear balances of power in the past, and lends itself well to analysis by constructivist methodologies. He outlines Alexander Wendt's argument that self-help, anarchy and the balance of power come from the natural construction of interests and identities in international affairs, rather than being preset factors. The construction of this political reality comes from shifting identities and perceived group interests. Whyte implies that as a socially-based construct that acts as a focal point for power, Iran is itself subject to ongoing revision. He argues that a major cause of intra-system conflict is the contradictory pursuit of nationalist policies. This could be described as competition between conventional nationalism and the hegemonic nationalism that occurs when identities shift sufficiently to induce the desire to alter a nation's political presence in the international system. Whyte says the unique characteristics of the local system could help shed light on the reasons for Israel's historically-hardline stance on any level of neighbourly aggression. Whyte suggests that his critique of the realist position makes it clear why Israel is unwilling to rely on purely material guarantors of security. He recommends applying the constructivist method to identify the norms and national groups that identify with different power dynamics in the Middle East and says Israel is the easiest to identify because the Zionist movement and Judaism are the unique, primary defining characteristics of the Israeli nation. In contrast, Irans myriad of different cultural and national concerns make it difficult for a realist examination. While Iran does have a singular central state authority ruling over an ethnically homogenous group of people, there are other factors to consider, notably that the revolution
Page 6 of 12
introduced a political system that intentionally stratified the country on political, economic and religious grounds. Whyte points out that Iran has two nodes of political power. The presidency directly represents the popular electoral opinions of the Islamic Republic, while the Supreme Leader - a position that has a significantly greater say in the appointment and policy of the government -, acts as a jurist for Islam and the Iranian system. The Supreme Leader takes a hard line against non-Shia states and has taken a strong anti-Israeli position. Though the Supreme Leader is only one part of the regime, he directly controls the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a paramilitary organisation that is separate from the army and which provides aid and training to Hamas and Hezbollah. The IRGC also controls key facets of Irans military establishment, including the ballistic missile corps. Whyte says it is important to recognize this division of authority and power at the sub-state level in Iran because the stratification of power structures allows individual parts of the state to engage in actions not representative of the whole. "The ceding of unbalanced political powers to different imagined nations within the state... will ultimately lead to unpredictable and uncoordinated action in international affairs." Whyte predicts, adding that in the case of nuclear proliferation, this is an especially worrying dynamic. If one assumes there is an equilibrium point that can be achieved through a well-informed mutual deterrent posture, then it follows that an inability to achieve certainty about the behaviour of different actors upsets that balance. It would have to be assumed that different segments of Iran are inclined to pursue different sets
Page 7 of 12
of interests. For example, while the general population may support a nascent nuclear programme, elements of the religious leadership may seek to actively use such weapons against Israel. Even if desires that extreme were not to be the case, the connections that exist between certain parts of Irans political establishment may imply that nuclear weapons could be used as leverage on behalf of those groups. "The result of this level of uncertainty... could suggest that nations (particularly Israel) should act to prevent the development of a full nuclear weapons capability." says Whyte. The preemptive aggressor would act to ensure that Iran's volatile nationalist segments could not use nuclear weapons directly, could not easily supply other actors likely to use nuclear weapons, and could not use those weapons as leverage in negotiation. Whyte believes that the presence of pro-Israeli international norms, from international protectiveness of small nations to the universal memory of the Holocaust, "would surely provide backing and act to legitimize Israel in its right to exist, even if not in its right to attack others." Iran's "unbalanced centrality of power and the factionalised control of important national military and economic capabilities introduce a level of uncertainty... that cannot be ignored," says Whyte. This imbalance also provides a route to be taken in the pursuit of non-aggressive preemptive action. In other words, engagement with Iran could focus on nurturing prosperous relationships that would influence public sentiment and increase the receptiveness of the government to international negotiation. This could
Page 8 of 12
alleviate fears of the bomb, and help usher in a more balanced, secure environment in regional dealings with Iran.
4.The good points and bad points about the authors argument. In advocating a pre-emptive strike against Iran, Whyte omits to make any reference to the U.N. Charter on the subject of intervention6, particularly Article 2 (4) which prohibits the interference by one state in the internal affairs of another. He also makes no mention of the UN's nuclear watchdog body, the International Atomic Energy Authority, and its repeated failures to find hard evidence of WMD. He omits to mention the source of Iranian antagonism towards Israel and the West and makes no mention of the Six-Day War of 1967, the de facto annexation of Israeli occupied territory, or the "iron-fist" policy of Israel towards Palestinians at the time of the first Intifada 7. Whyte would have made a more rounded argument had he acknowledged Israel's record of aggression in the region since its founding in 1948. By comparison, Iran's record is relatively clean. For example, during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988 it was Iraq, not Iran, that resorted to the use of chemical weapons. (Robinson, 1984) 8. A good point is that Whyte declines to name Iran as an element in George Bush's "axis of evil"
6 United Nations (1945) The Charter of the United Nations [Online] Available from <http://http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> [Accessed 03 June 2012] 7 Lockman,Z. and Beinin,J.,(1989) Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation . 1st ed. United States, Cambridge MA: South End Press. 8 Robinson,J.(1984) 'Chemical Warfare In The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988' SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) [Online]. Available from <http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php> [Accessed 22 June 2012]
Page 9 of 12
speech (You Tube/George Bush Jnr., 2002).9 Another good point is that Whyte acknowledges it was the West that initially got Iran's nuclear programme under way. Whyte gave his own definition of constructivism, but I would have liked to see him quote Zehfuss who says it is impossible to do a critique without defining it (Zehfuss, 2002.) Much is made of North Korea's nuclear programme, but Whyte makes no mention of South Korea's own long-running secretive nuclear programme which has broken many if not most of the rules and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
11 10
In accusing Iran over its secretive development of nuclear weaponry, Whyte omits to refer to the secrecy of Israel's own nuclear programme, and he never refers to the horror of nuclear war. He should. Today, just one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead possesses the equivalent of the explosive power used in all of WWII. A. 2009). Whyte is perhaps too ready to consider warfare and not ready enough to examine the strategy of escalation in the context of Iran (Goldstein, 2001, p73). 13 Whyte might have referred to Tony Blair's speech at Chicago (Blair, 1999)14 in which the former British prime minister flatters the U.S. in an unseemly manner. Whyte seems not to question
9 You Tube / George Bush Jnr..(2002).Axis of Evil.[Online Video].29 January 2002.Available From <Http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DqHyIcsO8E&feature=youtube_gdata_player> [Accessed 23 June 2012]. 10 Zehfuss, M (2002) Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. 1st ed. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. 11 Kang, J.(2005)'South Korea's Nuclear Surprise'. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61,40-49. 12 Ross, A.L.(2009)The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Relations. Foreign Policy Research Institute, [Blog]29 March 2009. Available from:<http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1405.200905.ross.nuclearweaponsintlpolitics.html> 13 Goldstein, J.S. (2001) International Relations. 4th ed. United States: Longman. 14 Blair,A (1999) 'The Blair Doctrine'.Global Policy Forum.22 April 1999,3. Available from:<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026.html>
Page 10 of 12
12
(Ross,
the real motives of the U.S. in the Middle East. He seems to assume that U.S. policies are benign, evenhanded and universally welcome. This flies in the face of the evidence. One only has to read John Perkins book Confessions of an Economic Hitman (Perkins, 2005)15 to know that regime change has been an integral part of U.S. behaviour since 1945. The idea that the U.S. is seeking regime change in Iran as part of its overarching policy for the Middle East is reinforced by Vladimir Putin's remarks quoted in The Guardian earlier this year16. Whyte seems to be ignoring world opinion, confusing American opinion with international consensus. This is dangerous, as Marc Lynch points out (Lynch, 2005, p182)17 in his description of critical theory. Lynch also refers to Andrew Linklater in saying that violence, "Tends to foreclose dialogue and to harden group identities, which makes it the instrument of choice for extremists determined to prevent negotiated peace agreements." There are those who believe that the tenets of Zionism are somewhat extremist in nature. Perhaps Whyte's biggest omission is that he does not draw a distinction between expansionary Zionism and the much more widely accepted middle-of-the-road policies of many Israelis who are opposed to the current policy on new settlements.
5. Summary Conclusion about Whyte's Contribution to IR Scholarship.
15 Perkins,J (2005) Confessions of an Economic Hitman.1st ed. New York NY: Berrett-Koehler. 16 Borger,J (2012) 'UN Report Heightens Iran Nuclear Fears'.The Guardian. 24 February: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/24/iran-nuclear-fears-un-report> 17 Lynch, M. (2005)'Critical Theory: Dialogue, Legitimacy, and Justifications for War'. (in: Folker, J. (ed.), Making Sense of International Relations Theory ch. 6.3,182-197.
Page 11 of 12
Although Whyte makes an interesting analysis of the realist and constructivist perspectives, he does so from a non-objective stance. Indeed it would be surprising if a young academic living and working in the U.S., where being objective about Israel is tantamount to anti-semitism, were to write a paper damning the U.S. position on Israel. Furthermore, it should be noted that the main source of funds for the George Mason University (GMU) to which Whyte is affiliated, is the neocon Koch Family Charitable Foundation (Hoggan, 2011)18 founded by the controversial Zionist billionaire brothers Charles and David Koch. Interestingly, Koch Industries features prominently in the Greenpeace list of leading opponents of established and universally accepted climate science.19 Although Whyte's paper was published in a peer-reviewed journal, the author's affiliation to GMU lowers his credibility. In my estimation, his paper does not contribute to IR scholarship.
18 Hoggan,J.(2011)Koch and George Mason University. DeSmogBlog,[Blog]2011. Available from:<http://www.desmogblog.com/koch-and-george-mason-university> [Accessed 22 June 2012]. 19 Author undeclared,anonymous.(2010)Koch Industries Climate Denial Front Group.Greenpeace,[Blog]2010.Available from:<http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/global-warming-andenergy/polluterwatch/koch-industries/american-legislative-exchange/> [Accessed 23 June 2012].
Page 12 of 12

Why Israel Fears A Nuclear Iran

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Why Israel Fears A Nuclear Iran

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Why Israel Fears a Nuclear Iran: Realism, Constructivism & Iran's Dual National Identity

5. Summary Conclusion about Whyte's Contribution to IR Scholarship.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen