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In the 2005 presidential election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated

former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a prominent flgure of the conservative establishment. Ahmadinejad was the first la5,'rnan since earlv in the revolutionary era to win the presidency of Iran. However, Ahmadinejad may have been even more conservative on theological issues than RafSanjani. This is part of what has made Iranian politics so difficult to comprehend. tlltimately, Ahmadinejad won because he appealed to young and poor lranians who felt they had been neglected by the theocracy. President Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2009 presidential election was no less controversial due to allegations of election fraud. The true nature of Iranian democracy is very unclear, since real power within the country appears to remain predominantly in the hands of the supreme leader and other prominent, unelected clerics throughout the country.

Krv Trnrras
Assembly of Religious Experts ayatollahs bazaaris bonyads Guardianship of the Jurists (velayat-e faqih)
imam

Islamicists

Majlis
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) rentier state
rents
shah

Constitution of 1906 Constitution of 1979

Expediency Council fundamentalism Guardian Council

Shi'ism Shi'ites
Sunnis

supreme leader

White Revolution

Key ColcEprs

*i The overwhelming majority of Iranian citizens are Shi'ite

Sunni.

Muslims even though the majority of Muslims in the world are

Republic of Iran remains the only theocratic regime currently in power throughout the world. -6:r A quarter of the Iranian population is under the age of 15; the median age is 26. ;i!: Iran maintains a dual executive system, in which both the supreme Ieader and the president play a role in governing Iran. lii-{ Authoritarian rule was emphasized by Iranian shahs and reinforced by shi'ism, which allots a great deal of respect to the most learned scholars and clerics Iii. oil is the primary export commodity for Iran. In the course of the twentieth century, Iran became dependent upon oil, which provides about B0 percent ofits annual budget and finances 90 percent of its imports. iI Most Iranians are persians, not Arabs. They have a different cultural history and ethnic heritage than that of other Middle Eastern cultural groups. Iranians have also maintained a strong affinity for their own language, Farsi.

the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, "t with the Islamic

Structures and Choices, Chapters 2,3,4, i,6,2, g,^g, tO, 11, 12, 13; Hauss, comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global chaltenges, 7th editiory chapter 13; and Kesselman et al., rntroduction to comparative Politics,5fr edition, Ap edition, Chapter 7.

For a full discussion on Iran, see Barringrton, comparative politics:

modern-day Iran. Persians cornprise about 50 percent of the population of Iran, and another quarter of the population are Azeris, people from the region of Azerbaijan. The rest of Iran's population .o.rer from a variety of ethnicities, including the Arab and Kurd populations, none of which -make up more than B percent of the overall total. Geogrraphically, Iran has two key features: a lack of arable land and a location at crossroads of other regions. The great majority of Iran,s

Iran, which was known as persia until 1935, is one of the world,s oldest countries. It has existed, in one form or another, under the name of either Persia or lran for over 2,500 years. The name persia comes from the region's primary linguistic group who speak Farsi, the national language of Iran. In 1935, Reza Shah, ihe first-of the pahlavi rulers, changed the name of the country to lran, whose origin is based on the term Aryan, the central-Asian people who settled what is now

territory is inhospitable to agriculture, which has been a majop obstacle to its economic development. Thus, 67 percent of the total

population of 68 million is concentrated on less than 30 percent of the land. Despite Iran's lack of economic diversity, however, it has one enormous resource: oil. oil revenues averaged $15 billion a year through the 1980s and 1990s and totaled as much as $30 billion in
2008.

Iran is the second-largest producer of oil in the Middle East and the fourth-largest in the world. Oil revenues are the reason that Iran is now an urbanized and partially industrialized country. More than twothirds of Iran's population lives in urban centers, and 70 percent of the labor force is employed in industry and services. Eighty percent of adults are literate, life expectancy is about 70 years of age, and the majority of Iranians enjoy a standard of living well above those found in Africa and many parts of Asia. Iran lies at the crossroads between central Asia and Turkey and between the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. Its location made Iran vulnerable Lo invaders, such as the Indo-Europeans who gave it the name Iran or "Land of the Aryans," Arab tribes in the seventh century who introduced Islam, and finally Turkic invaders during the Middle Ages. Iran is bordered by Iraq on the west and Afghanistan on the east.

EnnlY HrsroRY Iran's origins are both religious and political in nature. Its religious origins began with the prophet zoroaster, who lived in what is now modern-day Iran sometime between the ninth and seventh'century B.C. He created one of the world's flrst monotheistic religions.

Zoroastrianism took root among most of the people of the region and implemented a culture in which religion would be a key component of social and political life. In the sixth century B.c., cyrus the Great ascended to the Persian throne. Cyrus and his successors, Darius and Xerxes, drew on Zoroastrian traditions that required just rulers to establish a positive working relationship with the people that they governed. Since the Persians could not rule through force alone, they needed some legitimate means to govern the region. In the period between the Persian Empire of Xerxes and the introduction of Islam in Iran in the seventh century A.D., the region was controlled by the Parthian and Sassanian dynasties. The Parthians and Sassanians adopted most of the characteristics of Persian culture and style of rule. However, one of their key advances was to begin calling the ruler shah'in-shah, or king of kingq. Incorporating Islam into Persian culture was not very difficult, given the Zoroastrian belief in a single God who led the struggle of good against evil. After the Arab invasion, Persians had difficulty accepting that they were now less powerful in comparison to the temporai and spiritual leaders of Islam. The Islamic world split between Sunnis and Shi'ites following the Prophet Mohammad's death; however, it would be 800 years before the Persians became the first people to adopt Shi'ism en masse. During the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, some Iranians created the Sufi mystical tradition in which

holy men whipped up a religious frenzy throughout the region, promising that the faithful would reach communion with God. one of the sufi orders, the safavids, came to power under the leader "runavd, who turned it into a political as well as a religious movement. Ii is under the Safavids'rule that the term shah, or ]eader, which was flrst used by the Sassanians, was reintroduced to denote the ruler of the region. To maintain their rule, for the next 400 years the Safavid and eajar d5masties combined the traditional persian commitments with Shi,ite beliefs in faith and obedience. Throughout this period, the persian kings emphasized the authoritarian nature of their rure. They continued to build a regime in which monarchs with absolute powei dominated a hierarchical society in which religion was centrallo the social structure. Social and economic reform from below was all but impossible to achieve; reform could only be initiated by the shah. Authoritarian rule was further reinforced by Shi'ism, which gave tremendous respect to religious scholars. The combination of traditional persian kingship and Shi,ite Islam produced a culture that calls for charismatic ieadership from a king whose rule must be just and who upholds religious and traditional beliels.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, foreign involvement and western influence led to a push for secularizition and politicar reform. opposition to the Qajar regime grew throughout lran. orthodox Shi'ites objected to secularization. rhe bazaaris, or small businessmen who owned shops in the country's marketplaces, wanted the opportunity to make more money while reducing outside, foreign competition. The growing seculir middle class wanted political reforms and the rule of law, and eventually democracy. These p.ot".i, and opposition movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the period of constitutional Revolution from 1905 through 1909. The constitution of 1g06 introduced essential features of modern government to Iran: elections, separation of powers, Iaws made by a legislative assembly, and the concepts of popular sovereigrrty and the nation. The new constitution retained the-monarchy, but centered political power in the Majtis, the national assembly thai remains Iran,s official legislative body to this day. The seculariied and westernized portion of the Iranian population was the most pleased with the constitutional reforms. By 7goz, proclerical fo..er--*".e already attacking the constitution in the Majlis, insisting, among other things, that a council of clerics get the right to review att teglstailon passed by
Lhe

parliament.

I, Reza Shah, a Cossack officer, seized Tehran and took control of the country by bringing order to the tribal conflict that had characterized the last eajar i*gi-". By 1925, Reza Shah had crowned himself shah-in-shah and take"n the dynastic name Pahlavi, after the language spoken before persia was deieated by the Arabs. The flrst Pahlavi shah took power in the name of nationalism and Shi'ism. However, he soon turned his back on fundamentalism and

Following World War

focused his attention on modernizing Iran. He built the flrst national railroad system and modern factories and expropriated land from rural elites. The shah also turned on the clerics, taking steps that proved to be of great s5rmbolic importance to orthodox Muslims: women were no Ionger allowed to wear a veil and men had to shave their beards. He closed religious schools, called madrasahs, and replaced them with free, state-run institutions that focused on' modernization. He also officially changed the name of the country from Persia to [ran. Although Reza Shah brought much needed social and economic change to ttre country, he lost touch with his people and provoked

wideipread anger by failing to govdrn under the principle of tust

rule."

During world war II,'Reza Shah was forced by the British and Soviets to abdicatd the throne to his son Muhammad Reza Shah in order to allow the Atiies to fortiflu Iran',s defenses and prevent the Nazis from securing the oil fields in Iran. After the war, the new shah faced several challenges to his, rule, including an assassination attempt, the communist movement led by the Tudeh Party, and the nationalist movement led by Mohammad Mossadeq, who was prime
minister between 1951 and 1953. western intervention in Iran during the early 1950s, particularly in the oil industry, led to the emergence of Mossadeq as the nationalist Ieader in Iran. Mossadeq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC), of which the British had ornmed 51 percent. The AIOC was a visible sSrmbol of foreign intervention and control over Iranian wealth. Mossadeq ordered all British employees of AIOC out of the country. In JuIy 1952, the Mailis grranted Mossadeq emergency powers, but he ultimately lost the support of the clerics, Tudeh, and other nationalist forces when he dissolved the upper house of parliament, suspended the supreme court, confiscated royal property, and expanded martial law. FinaIIy, a ClA-sponsored coup deposed Mossadeq in 1953'and returned the exiled Shah Pahlavi to power' The coup against Mossadeq contributed to the anti-Western sentiments that boiled over during the revolution of the 1970s and in the early years of the Islamic Republic. The return of the shah set the stage for his defeat 25 years later. The shah interpreted his restoration as confirmation of his "divine right" to rule, and his lack of trust led to his use of oppressive tactics to retain strict conftol over lran's political system. The shah used the Savak, the Iranian secret police, against his enemies. The shah alienated Shi'ite clerics when he instituted the \A/hite Revolutio4 which began in 1963 and was a revolution only in name. It was another attempt both to modernize the country and to increase the shah's power. The shah targeted the ciergy as an important part of his reforms. He gave the peasants land that belonged to the clergy and in general reduced the clerical impact on daily life. women's rights were expanded, and the training and equipment provided for the military were upgraded. The most important changes in the 1960s and 1970s came from the religious community, in particular the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had long been one of the leading clerics in the spiritual center of Qom. Khomeini had built a reputation as a charismatic religious Ieader

who was above politics and extremely learned in the legal aspects of

Ied to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

white Revolution proved to be the catalyst Khomeini needed to inspire political change. Given the pahlavi iegime,s opposition to Islam, Khomeini argued that one could no longer .epu.atl state and religion, and the clerics had an obligation to see to it that Islamic principles were upheld in Iran. In the process, Khomeini shifted the impetus for opposition to the shah from the secular left to the followers of orthodox Shi'ite Islam. The followers of orthodox Shi,ite Islam opposed the shah's rule. Many of the rural reforms initiated by the shah led to high debt for rural peasants and failed farms. Mosi people immigrrated to the cities, and by the late 1970s, Tehran,s population doubled. urban dwellers made up half the total population of the country in 1979. The urban unrest that resulted from this demographic shift propelled the country into a political revolution and
IRANI

Islam. The

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increased political pressure on the-shah, and by Febiuary 197g he was forced into exile. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from his extended exile in Paris following the shah's exit from power. There are generally four specific periods recognized during the history of the Islamic Republic coinciding with the influence of tne four men who have dominated political rife in Iran since the revolution. The filst period was characterized by Khomeini's reign as the driving force behind Iranian politics. Khomeini emerged ai a leader following the Iranian Revolution and the forced exile of the shah for two main reasons. Firs! he developed the idea that senior clerics had both the right and obligation to rule in order to maintain the Islamic nature of Iran. Second, he became one of the leaders of the opposition to the shah following his forced exile to France by the shah;j regime during the 1960s. Khomeini's power was reinforced by three significant events during his decade as supreme leader, a senior cleric who is named for life b! other senior clerics as the head of state of Iran. The first was thl occupation of the u.S. embassy in Iran by a group of Islamic militants that began in November 79zg and lasted untii January 1g81. The occupation increased tensions between the United States and Iran and made it easier for Khomeini and his allies to remove more moderate and secular leaders from power. The second event was the long and costly war Iran fought with Iraq from 1980 to 1988. The war iolidified the Islamic Republic's hostility toward America because of the

The Islamic Republic began first and foremost with the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s. A decrease in the price of oil, coinciding with inflationary pressures in Iran, created an atmosphere of political tension surrounding the shah's regime. rn 7g78, the united Stites put pressure on the shah to loosen restrictions on civil society, in particular on political opposition groups. Students, teacheri, oil workers, and others began to publicly protest against the shah,s regime and openly called for a regime change. uaarmed demonstrators were killed in Tehran, and oil workers aroirnd the country went on strike. Political rallies organized and led by religious clericl

weapons and support given to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq to be used to fight against Iran. The third trend was the increase in the levels of oppression that occurred in Iran as a result of the wal against Iraq. The regime imprisoned and executed thousands of people in an attempt to solidify support for the regime and its fight with Iraq. It also Ied to the introduction of new institutions, such as the Revolutionary Guard, which were used specifically for oppressive purposes. The second period coincides with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the election of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani as president. \AIhiIe Ayatollah Ali Khamenei replaced Ktiomeini as supreme leader, the balance of power in Iranian politics shifted to the more moderate Rafsanjani, one of the clerics who led the Islamic Revolution to its consolidation of power in the early 1980s. There was very littie political reform under Rafsanjani. some changes were made to ihe Constitution of 1979 in 19Bg after Khomeini's death that slightly shifted the balance of political power away from the clerics. The 1989 constitutional amendments eliminated the need for the supreme leader to be a maria, or Grand Ayatollah, and removed the requirement that he be chosen by popular acclaim. The amendments increased the size of the Assembly of Religious Experts and eliminated the post of prime minister. The Assembly of Religious Experts was given the authority to convene at least once a year to determine whether the supreme leader was "mentally and physically capable of carrying out his duties." significant reform came only under Rafsanjani's successor, Mohammed Khatami, who was elected in 1997 when Rafsanjani was constitutionally prohibited from running for a third term. Although a cleric himself, Khatami was a moderate who had fought against censorship when he was the editor of an Iranian newspaper. His attempt at'political and social reform dominated what could be identified as the third maior political period of the Islamic Republic. During his election campaign, he supported more rights for women and members of religious and ethnic minority groups and stressed the importance of deveioping a strong civil society The election was a landslide as Khatami won more than two-thirds of the vote. Reformists did weII in the 2000 legislative elections as well, winning 189 of the 200 seats. When Khatami ran for reelection in 2007, he won 78 percent of the vote against what amounted to only token opposition from nine other candidates, only two of wlich won more than 1 percent ol the vote. Khatami introduced a number of reforms. It became easier to organize political groups, there was less censorship of the press, and some open protests were permitted. The Khatami government also attempted to improve relations with the United States and allowed inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The fourth period began in 2003 when Supreme Leader Kharnenei and the conservative clerics in Iran began to reassert their influence and to focus on the goals and values originally instituted during the early years of the Islamic Republic following the Iranian Revolution. This was exemplified in the 2004 Majlis elections when clerics in the Guardian Councrl, the leading theglogical body in Iran created to oversee the Majlis, barred nearly 2,500 moderate and reformist

candidates from running in the election, thereby guaranteeing a conservative landslide in the legislative elections. The conservative movement continued in the 2005 presidential election when a little-known conservative, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former mayor of rehrary secured an electoral victory over the popular former president, Rafsanjani. Although not a cleric, Ahmadinejad is more conservative than many of his political counterparts from the clergy. He has also renewed a charismatic aspect to the presidency that many in Iran felt had been missing since Khomeini,s death. Ahmadinejad has also taken a more hostile approach to dipIomatic relations with the united states, in contraii to trre .more amicable period under Khatami.

Iran is an Islamic Republic that is governed according to Muslim principles implemented primarily by clerics. It is one of the few theocracies left in the world today. In Iran, shar'ia, or Muslim law, is more influential than in other countries,,such as Nigeria, where it is
has been divided into rivar sects over its history. Most Muslims throughout the world are Sunnis; however, Iran is dominated by Shi'ites who are often mistakenly viewed as the more fanatical and militant believers of the faith. The

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Shi'ite-Sunni split dates back to the early years of Islam. Shi'ite beliefs differ from the more widely practiced Sunni version of Islam in two specific ways. Firsf Shi'ites have an established clergy and emphasize the importance of theological training for those who reach the top of shi'ite hierarchy, the ayatollahs. The ayatollahs, which translate as sigms of God, have lhe authority to interpret sharia. Second, Shi'ites have tolerated and even encouraged debate over the interpretation of key principles from the euran, Hadith, and, shar'ia. shi'ites are also known as Twelvers, since thev follow the Twelve Imams; an imam is a religious teacher or preacher within Islam. Shi'ites refer to the Twelfth Imam as Mahdi, the Hidden Imam, and believe him to be the messiah whose reappearance will signal the end of the world. Many conventional interpretations of Shi'ism overstate its fundamentarism, or strict and radical adherence to literal interpretation of religious scripture. In fact, the Shi'ite community has actively encouraged debate between leading clerics about the true meaning of the faith, which has made the Shi'ite community as intellectually open as any major religious group in the world. The term fundamentalismwas flrst used to describe American protestants who adopted a literal interpretation of the Bible in the nineteenth century. Many of the early leaders of the Islamic Revolution could be viewed as fundamentalists based upon this definition; conversely, others in Iran, including the majority of the reformers, are usually referred to as Islamicists, meanirlg they are attempting to blend the tenets of Islam with the needs and complexities of a modern, industrialized, and'globalizing world. Iran is the only major Islamic country in which shi'ites constitute an overwhelming majority of the population. until 2005, Iran was the only

Islamic country to be governed by Shi'ites. Then, with the assistance of the U.S. military, Shi'ites began to also secure control of the government of lraq.

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Iran does not have a homogenous political culture; like most Middle Eastern countries, the political culture leans toward the collective as opposed to the individual Both its long history as an independent country and its troubles in the last century have given Iranians a stronger sense of national identity than most people in the lessdeveioped world have. The division into subcultures within Iranian society is even true of religion. Atthough most Iranians are Shi'ites, they approach Islam in different ways. Many people support the conservative, fundamentalist version of Islam adopted by the clerics who led the Islamic Revolution. Others support the Islamic lefl, which is best represented by the reformist factions that exist within Iranian

political culture. Orthodox Shi'ites are'found most commonly in rural and poor areas. The bazaaris have mostly aligned themselves with clerics such as Rafsanjani who have supported them against foreign investment. well-educated and wealthy Iranians are most likely to embrace westernization and secularism. Currently, the most sigmificant political development within Iranian society is the coming of age of Iran's younger generation of citizens. Three in 10 Iranians are under the age of 20, and almost two-thirds of all Iranians are under 30. Their most significant political concerns center on labor and employment. By the mid-1990s, significant protest movements had begun to arise in Iran: specifically, two separate incidents in 1999 and 2003. Both were brutally repressed by the regime, which arrested thousands of young people. A smaller protest occurred in 2007, resulting in the same response from authorities. The government often used t|,e basij, a group of modern-day vigilantes created during the Iran-Iraq War, to suppress protest and opposition movements. The separate protest movements were often led by students, and universities have become a hotbed of protest activity in Iran. In 2003, working-class youth frustrated by unemplo),T nent and poverty joined the protests as well' Moreover, in 2003, the protest movements garnered significant international attention, in particular from television and radio stations set up by the Iranian exile community in California where nearly half a million Iranian exiles are located. The Bush administration also paid a great deal of attention to the social movements in Iran. The 2009 presidential election between incumbent president Ahmadinejad_ and former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi resulted in a highly contested result and public protests. Although public polls showed a tight race between the candidates, official results gave Ahmadinejad over 60 percent of the vote. Mousavi appealed the decision and urged his supporters to peacefully protest the election results. There was a recount, but Iran's electoral board concluded that Ahmadinejad won the election. The inauguration of Ahmadinejad was held in early August, while protests were held outside of Parliament. In the aftermath of the election, protestors were arrested and Mousavi was

accused of plofiing with foreign interests to overthrow the regime. The election and antigovernment protests resulted in the biggest political confrontation in Iran since 1g79. Although the protests riniily calmed, allegations of election fraud challenged the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and the authority of the supreme leader in a manner never experienced under theocratic rule.

Iranian Political Participation

ment's recent crackdown on protestors and arrests of dissidents following the highly contested 2009 presidential election may signal a return to a more repressive regime. The fairness o[ lranian elections has varied over the tast ZS years. The legitimacy of Iranian elections was also brought into question by the fact that prior to Z0OZ, the voting ige was 15. In early 2007, the voting age was changed to 18. In recent years/ the AP Exam has had multiple-choice, shortanswer/ and free-response questions that address the legitimacy of Iranian elections and require knowledge on
electoral policies and procedures in Iran.

For a predominantly Muslim country, Iran is surprisingly Iiberal regarding certain social issues such as sex education and birth control. These liberal policies were embraced to help Iran regain control of its booming population during the 1990s. Political liberalism, to a greater extent, has been guarded by the ruling clerics. Although some dissent in Iran is allowed against the secular leaders and Iranians have voted in regular and competitive elections, the govern-

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Iran's political system, with its mlxture of democracy and theocracy, is unique in the modern world. It is a theocracy since clergy hotd the most powerful political positions. It is a system of dual rule, resulting in an authoritariah system with democratic elements. Clerical rule ii authoritarian and cannot be challenged. However, it can also be described as at least a partial democracy in that some high-ranking political of,ficials, including the president, are elected by the people.

Tnr CorusrrruloN
The Assembly of Religious Experts, an elected body that nominates and can remove the supreme leader, drew up the Islamic constitution of 1979 immediately following the revolution. It was.amended in 1gB9 during the last few months of Khomeini's life by the council for the Revision of the constitution. Several key amendments were added during this revisionary period, such as the abolishment of the prime minister's office and modification of the selection process for the supreme leader. The flnal document was ratified by a nationwide

referendum in Julv 1989, The constitution itself is an intricate mixture of theocracy and democracy. The preamble affirms full belief in God, Muhammad, the Twelve Imams, and various religious principles, and it declares full faith in Khomeini's doctrine of Guardianship of the Jurists (velayat-e faqih). Guardianship of the Jurists endows the senior religious clerics with ultimate authority in guiding the whole nation. The supreme leader is assumed to be the highest-ranking cleric within Iranian society, On the other hand, by allowing elections using universal suffrage to elect the Majlis and the president, this constitution is by far the most democratic one that Iran has ever had.

Supnrur Lenorn
The supreme leader is appointed by the Assembly of Religious Experts, a body of senior clerics who are elected by the people. The supreme leader then serves for life and has veto power over almost everything elected officials in Iran can do. Based upon the principles of faqih, the supreme leader is the leading Islamic jurist in terms of
interpreting sharla and other religious doctrines. 'The supreme leader serves as a link between the three branches of government, and he can mediate between the legislature, the executive, and the iudicial branch. The supreme leader can "determine the interests of Islam" and supervise the implementation of policy as well as other government actions. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces: he can mobilize the armed forces, declare war and peace, and appoint and dismiss commanders of the military and those of the Revolulionary Guard. The supreme leader has several other responsibilities, including the power to appoint the six members of the Guardian Council; to eliminate presidential candidates; to dismiss the president; and to appoint and dismiss judges, administrators, and nongovernmental directors, such as the heads of television, radio, and semipublic "foundations" known as bonyads. Tii,e honyads are a form of Islamic charity controlled by clerics. The most powerful of these endowments is the Foundation of the Oppressed. Funded by the wealth of the former shah, these charitable organizations have the reputation of being corrupt and ineptly managed. Since the revolution, there have only been two supreme leaders: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who died in 1989, and Ayatollah AIi Khamenei, the current supreme leader.

Tur GunnDAN CouNCrL

The Guardian Council is the most powerful theological body in Iran. lt consists of six senior clerics appointed by the supreme leader and six judges named by the Majlis from a list compiled by the Supreme Judicial Council the members of which are appointed by the supreme Ieader. The Guardian Council is composed'primarily of men who support the conservative and theocratic elements of the regime. The Guardian Council has the authority to approve all candidates for the presidency and the Majlis, and they have disqualified thousands of potential candidates for both over the last ten years.

The Guardian council has to approve all legislation and has blocked reform proposals on numerous oiiasions. The Council also reviews all bills passed by the Majtis to ensure that they conform to shar,ia. Disagreement and conflict between the Majiis and the Guardian council led to the creation of the Expedienry council in lgBB to mediate between the two institutions.

Tnr ExprDrENCy Couruct

The Expediency council was created bv Khomeini to mediate and resolve differences between the Guardian council and the Majtis. rt also has the power to initiate laws. The Expediency council meets with the leaders of the other two appointed bodies, the Assembly of Religious Experts and the Guardian council, to try and anticipate potential procedural and other problems not foreseen by the

Guardian council. Today, the Expediency council consists of 32 members who serve five-year terms and are collectively the most powerful men in Iran.

Constitution. The Expediency council members are appointed by the supreme leader. originally, there were 13 members, including the president, the chief justice, the speaker of the Majlis, and six jurists from the

Tnr JuorcrRRy
The judiciary is the last of the unelected institutions that play a significant role in Iranian politics. In addition to civil and criminal courts, Iran also has clerical courts with vast powers to adjudicate and prosecute cases involving Islam. The constitution adopied a highly restrictive version of sharla and passed a penal code, the Retribution Law, based on it. This code divided the population into male and female, Muslims and non-Musrims: It made-ofienses such as adultery, homosexuality, drug trafficking, and alcoholism punishable by death. These Islamic codes also prevented banks from chirging interest. Eventually, the narrow interpretation of shar'k wis broadened, modern methods of punishment and imprisonment were adopted, and banks were permitted to charge interest. The revolutionary regime also retained the appeals system, the hierarchy of state courts, and the power to appoint and dismiss judges that had existed under the shah.

Tnr AssrMBLy oF REltctous ExpERTS

The 1989 constitutional amendments elevated the Assembly of Religious Experts into what effectively has become a senate, or upper house of the legislature, composed of only clerics. The 1989 a.rrenaments expanded the Assembly to 86 members, instituted ten-year terms, and determined that its members, who are elected by the people, had to have seminar5z degrees and pass special theology exams drafted by the Guardian councit. Revisions added in 1998 allow for nonclerics to stand for the Assembly, although they still must be approved by the Guardian council. The amendmenti also gave the Assembly of Religious Experts the power to dismiss the iupreme leader if they .found him "incapable of fulfilling his duties.,, Furthermore, the Assembly also has the responsibitiqr to oversee issues involving constitutional interpretation.

PnrsrorNT

AND

lHr CRgtNrr

The president is described as the chief executive and highest official after the supreme leader. The president is elected every four years through a national election and cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. The constitution states that the president must be of Iranian origin, betWeen the ages of 15 and 75, and a Shi'ite. He must also promise to uphold the principles of Islam. Presidential elections are held over two rounds, with the first round narrowing the field to the top two vote-getting candidates. In the 2005 election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad only received lg,percent of the votes in the initial round, but he was one of the top two candidates to advance to the second round. In the runoff election, he won the presidency when he received a surprising 62 percent ofthe votes. The president has the authority to carry out the country's internal and external policies and sign international treaties and agreements. The president also heads the National Security Council, oversees the annual budget and economic issues, and proposes legislation to the Majlis. The president is responsible for appointing cabinet ministers, senior officials, provincial governors, and the dinectors of the National oil company, the National Bank, and the National Electric Board. The president's cabinet carries out the day-to-day activities of government and develops most new laws. The details of the national budget are initiated bnd devised by the cabinet as well. The president, as the chief of the executive branch, heads a large bureaucracv. The bureaucracy has expanded immensely since the early days of the revolution and provides employment opportunities for college and high school grraduates. The largest bureaucracies in the Iranian government include the Ministries of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which control the media and enforce public conducl the Ministry of Intelligence, which is the chief security agency; and the Ministry of Reconstruction, which is responsible for expanding social services and developing infrastructure. The clergy dominate the bureaucracy much as they dominate the rest of the Iranian political structure. Most bureaucratic agencies are headed by clerics.

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The Constitution of 1906 established the Mailis, a unicameral legislature that has seen its authority diminished by the Constitution of 1979 and amendments of 1989, but it still exists to "represent the nation" according to these constitutions. The Majlis consists of 290 mefnbers; 285 seats are determined through single-member district elections with universal suffrage for aII citizens over the age of 18 (which waS changed from 15 in 2007)' Five seats are reserved for religious minority groups within Iran. Elections are officially held on a nonpartisan basis. Voters see a ballot with a Iong list of names without any partisan identification, and the official election campaign is only one week long. Candidates are not allowed to. use campaign literature, but are allowed to circulate Iists of colleagues they support to help voters make a decision' Voting occurs in two rounds: in the first round of voting, a candidate must clear a threshold of 25 percent to win a seat. If more candidates clear this

threshold than the number of seats, the top vote getters receive the seats. If not enough cairdidates clear the threshold to fill a district,s seats, a second (runoffl round of voting takes place to fill the remaining seats. Twice as many candidates as open seats compete in the second round, with the candidates getting the most votes in the first round being the ones who face off in the second round. The Majlis has the authority to enact or change statutory laws (qanun) with the approval of the Guardian council; investigate and supervise all affairs of state; and approve cabinet appointments, treaties, loan agreements, and the budget . The Majlis can choose six of the 12 Guardian council members from a list approved by the chief judge. it can investigate cabinet ministers and pursue public complaints against the executive and the judiciary. The Majlis can remove cabinet members, except for the presidenf through a parliamentary vote of no confidence. The Majlis plays a key role in Iran's national politics, and at times, it has changed government budgets, criticized cabinet policies, modified developmeni initiatives, and forced the president to replace ministers in his administration.

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Elections in Iran

Iranians have voted in eight presidential elections, eight separate Majlis elections, and two local council elections constituencies that are allocated parliamentary seats on the basis of their population. Iran is a unitary political sysLem and maintains a unicameral legislal.ure. A_U citizens over the age of 18 can participate in elections. The AP exam often asks questions that require you to compare the electoral systems of the core countries.'Iran operates on a single-member district/multi-member dis_ trict design with multi-round voting for both the Majlis and presidential elections. Russia is the only other core country that operates a two-round voting system, albeit only for the presidential elections.

since the revolution. The country

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Pueuc Pollcv lt\ IRAI{

Policymaking in Iran is complex because of the burdensome constitution and the factionalism that exists even among Iran's ruling clerics. Laws can originate in diverse places, and they can be modifled or blocked by numerous state institutions and political bodies. The polic5rmaking process is highly fluid and diffuse, often reflecting the regime's lactional divisions.

Ecouolrtc Pot-lcv AND THE Oll EcorlovtY

Greater integration into the world system began in the early twentieth century. The main component of that process was orl, which was first discovered in Iran by British prospectors and businessmen. Oil became Iran's golden ticket to economic success. It finances 90 percent of imports and B0 percent of the annual budget, far surpassing tax revenue. Oil revenues created in Iran what is knornm as a rentier state, a country that obtains a lucrative income (rents) by exporting raw materials or leasing out natural resources to foreign interests. Iran received enough revenue from oil that it was able to disregard its domestic tax base. When citizens do not pay taxes, they have less of a voice in government. Such a state has no responsibility to its citizens, but is totally reliant on one commodity and the international market for that product. The oil boom of the 1970s gave the shah an opportunity to play a signiflcant role in regional politics. As the second-most important member, after Saudi Arabia, of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (oPEC), Iran could cast crucial votes for raising or lowering oil prices. The shah used his power in OPEC to garner favors among Western countries. The increasing oil revenues had major consequences for Iran's political economy, all of which paved the way for the Iranian Revolution. Iran became an oil-addicted state dependent on oil prices and imported products, making it highly r,'ulnerable to the world market. One of the major focuses of the Iranian Revolution was to end Iran',s economic dependence on oil and the world market. Despite great efforts to change their economic circumstances, however, the ayatollahs remained just as dependent on oil as the shah. The most important issue for the long-term future of the Islamic Republic is the weak state of the economy. Iran is not a poor country; its per-capita income is close to $9,000 a year in purchasing power parity, which is similar to that of Mexico and Russia. Although Iran has'7 percent of the world's oil reserves and has become a major oil exporter, it stilt has to ration gasoline sales to its or.tryr citizens because of its inabilitv to refine oil. The oil bopm has not helped address the poverty, inflation, and youth unemployment that plagues the country. To find work for all of its young people, Iran needs to create 800,000 jobs a year, a figure it has never come close to meeting. The inflation rate in Iran consistently hits 20 percent, and even oil production is only about two-thirds of what it was under the shah. The Iranian economy has struggled to overcome the costs of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and the economic sanctions that have been imposed by the United States off and on for over a decade.

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The state owns or controls about B0 percent of the Iranian economy. After 7979, the leaders of the revolution confiscated property of the shah's family and other leaders of society who had cooperated with the shah. These resources were turned into bonyads. Unfortunately, the bonyads have generally been nothing more than corrupt and nontransparent institutions that have lost a great deal of money. The ultimate responsillility for how these institutions operate rests with the supreme leader, not the marketplace. Following the conservatives' recent electoral victories, the Majtis initiated legisfition that made it harder for foreign firms to invest in Iranian entdrprises. Ahmadinejad has also done nothing to diversify or improve Iran,s economy/ once stating that he knew nothing about economics. So far under Ahmadinejad's regime, the success of Iran's economy has been dependent upon the demand and price for oil on the global market.

Socnl Polrcy
The most controversial sociar policies in Iran involve religion and gender. Iranian policies involving the. treatment of women have received the most international scrutiny. women are ,excluded from attending soccer games, may receive the death penalty for committing adultery, will lose custody of their children as i resuli of divorce, and must adhere to strict dress codes. However, the status of women is much more complicated than one would imagine in a traditionally male-dominated society. women make up only 10 percent of the workforce, but that is a higher percentage than found in most Middle Eastern countries. As of 2001, female students outnumbered men in Iranian universities. Literacy rates for men and women are practically the same in Iran. women make up half of all positions in universities. The clerics attempted to establish a parallel health system (one for women and one for men) increasing the demand for female doctors, oBGYNs in particular. And, as part of a broader package of reform, women's clothing requirements have been relaxed. Trrose who violate social norms may be attacked by the basij, religious vigilante groups that operate with impunity. Population control and family planning policy became an important feature of Iranian social poricy during ttie tggos. After the hurnan losses incumed during the Iran-Iraq war, the government encouraged Iranians to have large families. The resulting population boom began to place a strain on society and social services. The government reversed the policies regarding larger families and took measures to restrict population growth. Today, families with more than three children may lose state subsidies, and all couples must undergo mandatory birth control classes supervised by a cleric prior to getting married.

Fonrrcru Poucy: lMN, THE UNITED STATES,

AND NUCLEAR POLICY

The diplomatic relationship between Iran and the united States has been strained since the clA-assisted. overthrow of Iranian prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. Tensions between the two nations continued to increase following the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1g7g-1g80. D;uring the clinton administration,-relations between the united states and Iran actually improved despite a

law passed by the united States in 1995 prohibiting American companies and their subsicliaries from doing business with Iran' Following the September 1.7, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Bush administration sought to connect the regime in Iran with A]-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. The Iranian government views the presence of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan with suspicion. The "axis of evil" speech and Iran's burgeoning nuclear program intensified the spotlight on the relationship between the two countries' There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding Iran's support of terrorism and its nuclear energy prograrn. There is no doubt that Iran has long been working to enhance its nuclear capabilities, including developing the ability Io produce the enriched plutonium that would be needed for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Despite the imposition

of international sanctions and repeated warnings, the Irdnian government has managed to steer clear of any serious retribution from the global community, even as it has managed to delay weapons inspeciiorrs at well as freeze and restart its nuclear progrram several times. There is perhaps. more uncertainty about politics in Iran than any other country in the AP Comparative Government and Politics course' The majorityof that uncertainty is the result of the domestic climate in Iran at the current time. The 2009 presidential election was shrouded in turmoil and violence. Although Ahmadinejad secured a reelection victory, there is every indication that the power struggle between conservative and moderate factions will continue. The reformers dre too numerous and international pressure is too high for the conservatives in Iran to grow complacent regarding their recent political success.