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The Ethics ofAq.

StephenJ. Pope, Editor

GeorgetownUniversity press Washington, D.C.

The Will and fts Acts (Ia ffae, qq. 6-17)

DavidM. Gallagher
4, t the heart of Aquinas'sethics lies the ing for the end." Hence, willed aaion, or the *iU.Moral actsare willed acts,for as person as the source of willed action. is the A teaches \Thomas at the very beginning subject of study in ethics.2 /v \-of his treatiseon the moral life, mo-ralacts It comesasno surprise,then, that Thomas areidenticalwith humanacts-acts which pro- should devote an extendeddiscussion to the ceedfrom intellect andwill (Ia IIae, q. l, ai. i, will and willed action (Ia IIae, qq. G-17).Nor 3).Where the will doesnor operate, aition has is it .surprising-qo _find the will appearing no moral qualitywhatsoever andfallsbackinto prominendy in all the other maior aipectsoT the category of mere natural activity (Ia IIae, his moral theory.In the treatiseon happiness, g. 6, ?.7, a'd3; fa [ae, q. 10,a. 3).And even in he maintains that rectitude of the witt-tt " moral actions,externalicts havea moral qual- proper ordination to God-is a prerequisite ity only because they have been commanded for beatitude;in fact, one might ionsider his by the will (Ia IIae,q.20, aa.l-3). Thus moral ethicsto be nothing more than an accountof goodness is located first and foremost in the how one achieves that rectitude (Ia IIae, q. 4, will.Indedd, for Thomas a personis saidto be 4). The moral significance of the passions _a. Bgodor-bad simply,i.e., mbrally, on the basis lies in their relatiorishipto the will, iith"t "t of his will, for it ii ihrough ttrewitt that every- inclining the will to a ceftain kind of choice or thing elsein the personls usedwell or badiy as being_the_mselves incited or repressedby (Ia, q. 48, a. 6). In sum,moral actionis willei the will (Ia IIae, q. 24,a. l). In the treatment actionand morally good actionarises from a of the virtues,Thomas explains that the moral goedwill (a IIae,q. 56,a. 3).t virtues are locatedonly in the will or in powThis centrality of the wiil is evident when ers whoseactscan be commandedby the will Thomas presenis his description of the sub- (Ia IIae, q. 56, a. 3). So too, sin occuri primarject matter of moral philoiophy at the be- ily in the will itselfandonly derivativelv in the gnning of his commentaryon Aristotleb Ni- acts of the other powersinsofar ,, th.y ,r. comacbean Etbics.In this work, he maintains commanded by the will; there is no sin where that every branch of philosophy ffeats a cer- thereis n9 will (Ia IIae,q.74, aa.l-3). Finally, tain order; logic, for ixampli, ieals with the Thomas treatrnent of law,claiming order which reasonputs into its own actsof that law,!.q"1his by definition, is a principle of human thinking. Moral phiiosophy, he says, treats acts, that is, actsthat proceed from the will (Ia the order.that is iound in ,rolrrnt"ry acrions, IIae,q. 90,a. l; SCG III, chap. ll4). ,,human andconsequently it considers operaFor a clearunderstandine of Thomas's ethuons lnsofaras they are orderedto one an_ ics, then, it is necessa.y tJ h"rr. an accurate other and to the end.,' By ,,humanopera- grasp of the will and its functions. In what tions," Thomas Efoes on to sav, are follows.I rvill nttenrpr ro rrchievc this by e.runderstood those actions ,,rvhich proceed amining Aquinas's undersranding uf dre will from the will accordingto the ordei of rea- in general;in what ways the will is free and son." He concludes thal ,,thesubjectof moral in what ways necessitatedin its action, a philosophyis human operation ordered to themeThomasdeals with ar greatlength;the the end, or evenman taken asvoluntarily act_ various acts of the will as they are de-scribed

i f j

lil ii{


David M. Gallagher sideredpreciselyasthe sourceof free or fully noluntary action (a, q. 83, 7a. -34)-a not Thomas presents the will, however,as fundamentally. more but as only free-will, rational apbetite.Hence, to understand his theory of the will, we must placeit within the largei context of his generaltheory of appetitioi. For Aquinas everybeing has-adeterminate appetift correspondingto the kind of this doctrine on the being that it is. He bases that each-kindof thing empirical observation has tvpical motions and rests along with the recos;ition that the sourceof thesemotions and iess is internal to the thing. To take the stonesgenerallyfall toward simplestexample, the'middle of th. earth,ind if they actually arrive at that point they will tend to-stay or rest there. Stonesor any heavybody havean of motiontowardsomedetermiintemalsource nate condition-in which, when it is achieved, thev will rest. Suchbodiesmay movein other dirictions, but only if they are moved from outside (violent motion); their motio! hom the internal source is toward some definite place.This internal sourceof motion, this iniernal tending or inclining, is exacdy what by aPPetite.' Thomas understands three levelsof appeThomas distinguishes optite. The first, of the sort just described, of part the on erateswithout any cognition Thomas inclination. the has which the beinE "natural apcalls this-"naturalinclination" or " oetite. This kind of appetite is found in all Leingsnot endowedwith cognition;. $. {irecti-onof the appetite is determinedby-the thins's natural form. The secondlevel of apoetiii is found in beingsendowedwith sense iognition. In such beings-the- brute animalls-there is a tending or inclination that follows upon cognitiott;-th" animalsrespond appetitively to stimuli received through the Aquinas (inciudingthe internalsenses). senses "sensitiveappetite'" callsthis kind oI appetite It is here at the level of the senseappetite a distinct appedrat Thornasfirst posrulates titive power of the soul, for the inclinatit'rnor tendency experiencedby th9 anin-ralis not simply the result of its natural form but rather of someobject the apprehension aris'es'upon (Ia, q. 8b, ea. l-2). Just how the appetiterein objectdepends, iponit to the apprehended instincts, th. ""t. of animals,on their natural "natural judgwhat Aquinas refers to as the ment" ( power" The t tite," th, son. fu internal nation, l at the lt univers: agent c: an app( Thomar while di Some
a natu don,: bodie


in Ia IIae, qq. 6-17; and finally, how love is the first affectionof the will and the implications of this point for understanding the moral life.

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In one way, the will may be understood simply as thai power or facuity of the-soul by whiili a human agent is in control of his ac(ons. For Aquinas, properly human- actions are those actions over which a person has connol (daminiam; lt llae, g. 1, a. l)' To have control means that when the person acts, it is possible to act otherwise or not to act at all. This mode of acting is contrasted to the mode of nature in whichln agent is determined to act in only one way a.tdc*not do otherwise than it dois, as occurs in the instinctual behav"the will is ior of animals. fu Thomas says, distinzuished from nature as one cause from anothEr; some things are done naturally and some voluntarily. The mode of causing of the will which is master (dominus) of its acts is other than that of nature which is determined to one" (Ia IIae, q. 10, a' 1, ad 1).1 The will here is taken, we might say, as the source of the voluntariness of all voluntary action. There are many voluntary actions, actions in the control of the agent, which are acts of powers other than the will. When a person walks or eats these are acts not of ttri witt but of the body; so too, if a person thinls, remembers, or imagines these are respectively acts of the intellect, of the memory or of the imagination, all powers distinct from the will. Nevertheless,such actions can be voluntary and these powers do not themselves account for the voluntariness of their own actions; the imagination, for example, not account for the fact that someone can control whether or not he will use his imagination nor do the bodily P!w91s alone account for the ability he has to decide to walk. One accounts fbr this control by ,ppealing to another power, a power whose either to imlgin:.or propei act it is to choose trot^to imagine, to walk or not to walk. This power is the will. Thomas often presents the will in this way, taking it as the source of voluntarinesr. To to u.r'derstand the will is to take it as free-will (liberurn arbitrium), the term he assigns to the will when it is con-

apPet ward sucht selfoJ good, sweet of thi cogtu thing tion t tio) ir intell towa, anotl whicl lar g, only theu caller The can be sensitir lar in t sion ar the so which Third, and n< against ers, T

every I appetir soundr truth, to Pos other

The Will and Ia Acts (Ia IIde, qq. 6-17) "estimative ment" (iad.iciamnaturale) of the Dower" 0a, q. 83, a. l).6 ^ "rationalappeThe third levelof appetiteis tite," that found in beingsendowed-with.rea,on. fu in the previousi*o levels,there is an internal ,oorce of motion, a tending or inclination, but here the good canbeapprghended at the level of intellect-grasped under some so the universal formality of goodness--and -the good by meansof agent can tend toward ai appetite distinct from sensitiveappetite' Thomas nicelv summarizesthe three levels the angelicwill: while discussing thegoodwithonly thingsinclinetoward Some to it andwithout cogma naturalrElationship


tion, as is t-hecasewith plants and inanimate "natural bodies.Such an inclination is called appetite." Some things, however,incline to*"td the good with a cenain cognition, not suchthat tf,ey know the intelligibiliry (ratrd itselfof the good,but they know someParucular knowsthe i*""i thitte *d th" white thing or something of this sortlThe inclinationwhich followsthis "sensitiveappetite."Some cognition is called thi'ngsincline toward the good ytth. L9og-nidon-bywhich they know the intelligibility (raab) itielf of the good, and this is proper to iniellea. And theiethingstendmostperfectly by towardthe good,not aJif merely-directed another toiard the good like those things which lackcognition,ior only towardpanicular soods likJ those things in which there is onlir.rrr" coqnition,but-asif inclinedtoward the'universal iood itself.And this inclinationis "will."' called fla, q. 59,a. l)

The nature of the will as a rational appetite can be clarified through comparison with. th.e sensitiveappetite. The two appentesare slrrular in that, first, both follow upon apprehension and, second, both are distinct powers of the soul as opposed to natural inclination which simply Tollo*s upon a natural form' Third, botit "re appetitei of the whole being and not sirnply ,ri one part' In an objection against positrng any distinct appetitive powers, Thomas entertains the argument that .rr.ry po*"t of the soul already has a.natural rpp"tii" for its own object: hearing for soonds. sisht for colors, the intellect for tmth, and io ott. Hence it seems superfluous to posit, over and above .these Pgwer:' alothlr appetitive power whose object is the

in cantdesirable taken generally (appetibile mun). fb this objection, Thomas -responds that while it is indeed tlre case that each Dower.beins a certain form or nature, has a tr.tot"t incli-nationto its own object, there is still the need for an appetite following upon by which the animal tends toapprehension #ard obiectsnoi iust assuitableto a particular simp\ or as Dower.but assuitable to theaninaal q. 3).8 1, ad a. 80, iwbok Oa, evidentthat both the sensiIt now becbmes tive appetiteand the rational appetite,as.distinct appetitivepowers' are Powersby which them tends toward the beiris that iossesses that whic'his good for that being assuch;these of the whole and not appetitesare-appetites p"tt. In the caseof the will, siriplv of any o^tt" this point impliei that whenever a person wills,^one wills that which is good (at least for oneselfasa whole. Even if the aoparently) sila *iltla is the obiect of anotherpower as' ior example,when someonewills-to acquire sometruth, that objectis willed asbeing good not iust for that otfier po*et but as good for the whole person. In willing to pursue this truth, the person is implicidy sayllg *."t.ol the *hole, he or shewili be better offwith this truth than without it. The will, then, fo itsaery is ordainedto the perfecnatureasan appetite, tion of the p"itott in which it is found, just as the sensitivl appetite is ordained to-the perfection of the animal in which it is found' In at all that fact, it is impossibleto will a-nything is not taken to be a part of or meansto the perfection of the willing Person. ^ apWhile similar.the will and the sensitive important in different nevertheless oetite are follow from the basic *avs. These differences Sense in the typesofapprehension' difierence stngulars ot is always for Aquinas, knowledge, - assuch.5n the other handit is proper to inteland to to graspuniver-sals Iectualknowledge of anvsinzuli'r thinE under the formality srasD "warm," "cat," "dog," as or oi as i uttiueti"l,ai "friendll'," ind so on. Thus, rvhile the or as sensitivc "pp.tit"t tend toward particular to be thitgt that aie perceived!y F. s.enses r.trtlbly pleasanior painful, the will tendsto*ard things insofar asthey are seenat the rational levil to be good; whateveris willed is asfal-lingunder the formality of takenasgood, suchandusuallyunder somemore the eood-as formality suchasthe honestgood,the spec"ific

David M. Gallagher pleasant good, or the usefulgood.e -the fu a result missionof the will (Ia, q. 81, a. 3). It is thereof this difference between apprehensive f95e.bythe will that a glven personintegrates personcanwill a goodwhich cannot all the partial human goodi into his o:verall pow_ers,,a be the -objectof a sense power,asfor example, good. good. It follows, follows. as as an an immediate imm"diate conseconsein willing to understand the pythrgor^.* quence, that the personasa whole is saidto be Theorem. It alsois possiblethat the saire ob- good or evil on the basisof the will; one is said ject, takenmaterially,be the objectof both the to be good simply (sinpticiterlmorally sense appetites and the will. But here the for- good-when one's will is properly oriented ' malityunderwhichitis desired is notthe same towardthe good fla, q. 48, i. O).to for the rwo appetites. For example, I may deThomas'sdoctrinethat the will always seeks sire to eat an apple at the senselevel simply the good or perfection of the willer *d int.because at the iense level it appears sensiLly gratesall partial goods into that larger good pleasant. But at the level ofrational appetite. i ryay lead to a certain misunderstanaing. As can will to eat the applebecause I understand discussed above, an appetitive power ii be he{thy or as a way to pleasea friend rectedto the goodor perfectionof the beingin who hasoffered it to me. In theJelatter cases. which it is found, and so one might infer irat I will to eatthe apple,but under someintellec- all beings, and especiallyhuman beings, are tually graspedformality such as "healthy" or naturallyegoisticandseekalways andin-everytheir own individual good.It fnleqing to my friend" (I", q. 80,a.2, ;d 2). thing exclusively For Thomas, as I will demonstrate, it is also may even seem that it is impossibleto tend this r"""s"nly universalaspectof the willed toward any good exceptone'sown good, and object that underlies the will,s freedom of that every good that is willed is willed as dichoice,a freedom not found in the sensitive rectedto one'sown individual good.But this is appettes. not, in fact, Thomas'sview, for he maintains This universalaspectof the will's object, that one'sgood is not limited to one'sindividespeciallythe univeisal good (bonum,nirrrual good but can include the good of other sale;bonumin commune),ilso enables the will beingsoutsideoneself. It is indeedtrue for him to be the appetiteof the whole person,what that eachthing seeks its own individualperfecwe might call a "personal appetite." Whatever tion, but it seekseven more the good of its the will wills, it wills asbeingsomehow good, species, and yet more rhe good ofthe whole in technicalterns, asfalling under the foimal- universe. For example, when the mother exity of good (sub ratione bori. Anvand all eoods poses herselftodangerfor the sake ofher offof the person,evenif they are first obie"cts of springasis commonamongthe animals, it is other powers,thus becomeobiectsof tire will. clearthat the preservation ofthe species takes The will, consequcndy, plays an integrative precedence over the good of the individual. role with r.spect to the acts of all the"other And since each speciei is for the sakeof the powers of the soul. All the soods that are universeas a whole, the individual seeksthe objects of the other powers(for example, common good of the universeaboveall else. truth, sensible pleasures, bodilymotions) nied Individual beingsare all parts of the larger .to be integratedinto the overall good of the whole thar is the universi and as such tfrev person. The will carries out thisinleqrationbv naturallyshouldfind their perfection ,ro, p.icommanding the actsof the other io*e.s. it marilyin their own individualgoodbut rather is by will that a persondecides whetheror nor in-theperfection of thatwhole(Ia,q.60, a.5, to ensage in those acts at all,andifso, to vuhat ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 109,a. 3). Thus, to sal,that extent. when.where,etc.(Ia IIae,q. q, a. l). necessarily directed to a being's perOf course,this conrol is not absolute:there ]ppetiteis tectiondoesnot meanat all that beings, espeare somepowers(for example,the vegetative ciallyhumanbeings, areself-seeking individupowers of growth and nutririon) outJide the alisti. This poini is crucial for"Thomas's will's control, and others, like the sensitive understandingof appetitein generaland the appetites, have motions of their own aDart will in particu-lar. from being commanded by the will. NeverIn sum, the will is rhe power by which a theless, evin the latter cannotbring about ac- rationalbeing tendstoward its proper good or tions ofthe personassuchexcept5y the per- perfection. In this sense,lhe will is iational appetite. Bu control over tite can alsoI can succincd capacity by son-freely, perfection. NATTIREA WILUS AC As I have precisely as calledfreeat possess the question thr length, since mans engagc wise or not c it is manife thing and rej closestThor enceoffree ' that is, to poi ing their exis in the power denying mor phy: "Ifther, moved necer deliberation, ishments,ar things with r What is mor of merit and logical point cal. Thomas amongthe " phy, opinion particular sci matter.l2Th, he dealswiti exist, but ral analyzesthe po appeonl'e is this analy' the' between Among th, ple one is cl that a person action or an( deliberation, yet the doin6 the executior



The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6-17) appetite.But insofar as rational beings have over their actions,the rational appec^ontrol tite canalsobe takenasfree choice.And so we can succincdydefine the will-as the power or . caoaciw bv which a rational being-a perron-fr."Iv directs his actionsto his good or periecflon.


act of choice itself does a person effectively determine himself to the pursuit of some particular good. But choicg for Aquinas, has a determi*nate structure. Following Aristode's analvsis,Thomas holds that choice is alwaysof -."it, io an end. In the light of an end to be achieved, a person chooses among at least two Thus reference to an end is oossible -.*t' lssential to the stnrcture of choice, since it is THE IN FREEDOM AND NATTIRE onlv in lieht of an end that one can choose WILL?S ACTS between fre possible means; the means chopromises better to fu I have shown, when the will is taken sen is that wfich somehow choice always given Hence, end. the achieve is it choices free nreciselv as the source of end to be a given calledfree-wl/.Whether or nothuman agents has these thiee elements: means to possible (at two least) and pott"tt the power to choosefreely is not a achieved may be means possible rwo The it. ouestion that Thomas treats at any great achieve chemoversus (r;diation acts different two huthat it obvious length, sincehe considers simply be may or a cancer), to treat therapy otherdo could mansengagein actionsthey in De aeritate, the options of acting versus not acting (q.""t wise or tioido at all. fu he says treating it at all; Ia it is manifest thae man freely choosesone ing the cancer lr.rsris not q . a . 3 ) . 1 3 , I I a e . The thing and rejectsanotfierQ^, q'?4, a. 1)' In tire act of choice, the person who chooses closJstThomas comesto proving the existchosen means and enceof free actsis to defendthem negatively, is actuallv willins both the it is chosen' fu ' that is, to point out the consequences which of of deny- the end for the Jake the willing of calls Thomas below, see To denyfree action,action we shall "intention.t' inE their existence. choice, con-of act Every end the to in-the power of the agent' is tantamount an act ot presupposes necessarily sequendy, philosomoral all denvinemoralitv itselflnd that a happen it does "tT phvi there is'nothing free in us but we are intLntion. How, then, he end particular the will to comes to will, then we destroy Derson -o"ed necessarily question thisis It choice? given a in intends -the deliberation, exhortation, preceptsand punwill's natural acts' It may be ishments, and praise and blame, the ver.y that leads to deals'"rr that the end now intended is being intended thines*ittt *ttiitt moral philosophy Someone may Wha't is more, we also removethe possibility because of a previous choice. train and the the between chooiing be of merit and demerit, so that from the theo- now to goto choice. previous ofa because airplane is heretisucha position point oFview logical had to be there ho*"lner, again, Here Chicaeo. action free of the denial .^i. Tho*tt classes "extraneous of..philoso- some ind that influenced the choice to go to opinions" amongthe -the possibilityof a Chicaeo. On what basis is that further end phv, Jpinions that deny but it by denlng its very subiect intenied? It may be a yet earlier choice, btiti"nlrt science cannot process this that clear becomes ouicklv when then, usualconcern, -atter.l2 Thomas'.s is not whetherthey so o.t infinitely. There must be some end that with freeactions, he deals result of any choice exist, but rather how they exist. That is, he i' o"rron wills, not as the (Ia IIae, q' l, aa' 4-6; choices all to prior but the structure of- the cognitive and analyzes l ) . a . 1 3 . It a . actions' ' tpp"titin. powersrequiredfor such rnd rrnderThe lct of thc ri'ill th.rt prccedes that leadsto dre distinction is ifrt analysis thc Thomas, tu choices is, accurding betweenthe will's free actsandits naturalacts' iies all "natural appetite" or "natural inclinaAmons the free acs of the will, the princi- will's for it is by choice tion." -murt Just as in the demonstrations of science ple one is choice(electio), ^th"t be some first principles to which th..e one himselfto " p.ttott actuallycommits so too among action'or another.B'eforethe choice,there is the intellect nanrrally assents' some act(s) be must there will deliberationabout what is to be done but not the acts of the and not in naturally moved is will the vet the doing of the act; after choice,thereis in which the wherein acts is, that of mode the free-will, Only in the

of the chosenact. the e*ec.ttio-n




David M. Gallagher some specific good but a general formality, sincethis fact providesthe ultimate basisfor the will's freedom.In this vein, Thomas raises an interestingobjection in the context of discussingthe will's natural inclination. According to the objection,the will cannothave any natural motion since nature-what occurs alryays or for the most part-is determined to one (dcterwintta od unurn), while the will is opento opposites (se babet ad opposita).Toh*e a natural motion, then, would seem to be againstthe very nature of the will. Thomas repliesthat natureis indeedalwap orderedto some one thing, but that that one thing is proportionateto the naturein question.Since the will is a rational appetite and reason is open to universalsor generalities,it follows that the one to which the will is determinedin its natural motion is also something general (aliquod anurncammune). This sometfii-ig general is nothing other than the good in general. But a universal of this sort can contain within it many particulars;there are many particular goodsthat fit within the good taken in general. And so, Thomas concludes,the will, while naturally determined to the good in general, is not determinedby nanre to any of the particular goods.With respectto them it remains free (q. 10,a. 1, ad 3). This is Thomas's most fundamentai explanationfor the will's freedom and its basisin the natural inclination. Because the will tends toward beatitudein generalor toward the perfectgood in genera-l, it remainsfree with respect to any specific form of beatitude or good. Each person must choose what specific good will be, for him, his ukimate end, and preciselythis choiceis the most fundamental of all moral choices (q. 89, a. 6). All subsequent choicesmade in light of the ultimateend havea similar str,r.trire;therefore, they too are free. In each casethe will (asrational appetite)is directed first to some generaliry and then, by deliberation,seels tie instantiationthat best fits that generality. In De mah, Thomas presentsthis reasoning in its clearestform:
anunderstood form is a universal underwhich manything;s canbe comprehended. And since acs takeplaceamongsingulars, in which there is nothingthatis adequate to a universal power, the inclination of the will remainsundeter-

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will has no power to act otherwise(Ia, q. 82, a. l, ad 3; Ia IIae, g. 1, a. 5; q. 10, a. l). . Moreover, as the aboveline of reisoning implies,the first object of the will, asfirst, must be the end to which the obiectsof all other actsof the will are directed'(Ia,q. 60, a. 2). This object is, accordingto Thomas, the last end (finis ubirnus) or beatitude (beatiwlo). Whateyer a person may choose,he or she necessarily chooses it as somehowcontributor perfection,and lng to his or her goodness beatitude is t}re name given to that state in which a personpossessei her or his good completely or perfectly,the statein whiJh no good due to her or his narure is lacking at d no inclination of the will is unsatisfied [a IIae, q. l, a. 6).13 That the object of the will's naturalappetite or inclination shouldbe the good that constitutes that person's perfectionis perfecdyconsistentwith the norion of the will asan appetitive power.It belongp, asI saidearlier,to lhe nature of appetiteto be directed to the good or perfection of the being in which it eiists. Accordingly,the most baslcinclination of the lPpetite is toward the completegood or perfection of that being.But the facithat the will is rationalappetiteaddsanotherdimensionto this natural inclination, viz.. that the inclination's object is not any specificform of beatitude, but simply beatitudein general(Ia IIae, g. l, a. 7; q. 5, a. 8). fu I pointedout earlier, the mark of rational cosnirion is that it can -as grasp universals,and, a natural conseq.uence, rational appetiteis directedto generalities,especiallythe good in generalind to particular goods as falling under the desired generality. In the caseat hand,the will's natural inclinationis direcred rowardthe ultimate "there is put into end or beatitude in general: man an appetitefoi his last end in'general (appetins ultimifnis sai in commun),that is, he naturally desires to be complete in goodncss."llllhether a personseeLs his beautude tn someparticular good suchas bodily pleasure, lnoiledge, or" God is " -"tt r'of fr.. choice. By his natural inclination a person wills.simplyto be fulfilled or happy:all people "wish to have their perfectionftithtted-wtrictr is the intelligibility (ratio) of the last end" (Ia IIae,q. l, a.7).ts here that the _It is important to emphasize object of the will's natural inclination is not

minedwith rr architect conc sally,underu arecontained. ing a square h house or a hor Thomas's exan representative There is some general formal selectedwhich the desiredgo wishesto trave. looks for a me: desires a gen( Chicago. Afte wa1n,that is, th universal,she r best to instant This good mal elements such: ers, but it rem: complexgood : by deliberatior best embodies gives clear expr willing when h will tends direr desirability (rar nessor utility ar or that thing ir reasonfor the c The only ob sarily intends ir true, however, cording to Tho rally toward Gc the influence ol visionof God's in seeing.God, perfectgood, tl ble goodness. S natural object c sentedwith it, q. 62,a.8).Unr ent life, howeve this fashion.It one's good is t therefore,it is z Cod (q. 82, a. . jects,beatitude i essence, all obj,

The Will and Its Acts (Ia trae, qq. 6-17)

mined with respect to many, just as' when an the form ofa houseuniverarchitect conceives of houses sally,under which different shapes are iontained. his will canincline toward making a squarehouseor toward making a round or a houseof anothershape.t6 ho:use Thomas's example can, it seems, be taken as representative of how choices are madeTfrere is some good that is desired under a general formality; a particular good is hen selected which best instantiates or embodres the desired good. So, for example, a woman wishes to tra:vel to Chicago, and consequendy looks for a means to do so. At this point, she good: a-way-to-travel-todesires a general "After inlestigating- the possible Chicago. *"yt, Ih"t is, the particulars that fit under this universal. she chooses that one which seems best to instantiate the good she is seeking. This good may be complex, including many elemens such as cost' ease,speed, among otlterr, bnt it remains the case that she wills this comolex eood first in general and then finds, bv d'elibe"ration, the p-atticular instance that blst embodies that comple* good' Thomas gives clear expression to this understandingof i"ittittg when-he says, in De oeritnte, that the wiil tJnds direcdy toward the reason for the desirability (ratio appetibilitatis) such as goodnessor utiiity and only secondarily toward ttris or that thing insofar'as it participates in the reason for the desirability.t' The only object, then, that the will n-ecessarily intends is beatitude in general. This is true, ho*eveg only in the present life' According to Thomas, the will also moves naturally toward God when, in the next life, under the'influence of grace, it is presented with the vision of God's eisence. His reasoning is tlat, in seeing God, the will is presented with the perfect good, the good that contains all possrbl" qood.t.ts. Since the universal good is the nanial obiect of the will, the will, when presented with it, moves toward it naturally Qa, q. 62, a.8). Under the condirionsof drc present lif'e, however, one does not grasp God in this fashion. It is possible then to think that one's good is to be found outside of God; therefore, it is also possible not to will (love) God (q. 82, a. 2). Other than these two objects, beatitude in general and God seen in His essence,all objects are willed freely, that is,


they must be chosen. Thomas refers to these "other" objects as particular goods, that is, soods that'do not iontain in themselves all Ioodness. He also refers to them as means to ihe end (ea quaerunt adfnem), becausea person wills any such good as a way or means to achieve his beatitude. Thus Thomas commonly states that the will necessarily wills the eood'in general or beatitude and has freedom 6f "hoi.I with respect to particular goodlor the means to the end (Ia IIae, q' 13, a. 6).'o The analysis of free action does not end with showine how the will's free acts are based on its natura-l act. Thomas goes a step further and within the free act describes rwo distinct ways in which necessity or lack of necessity "exercise" of the act and "rtt b" present: in the "specification." in its ^distinction "exercise" and between The "specification,t' one that Thomas used increasinelv over the course ofhis career, is not peculiai io the It actually applies to almost any power of the souf especially in rational beings, who possessother powers that can be exeriised by the will. Generally speaking, exercise refers io the fact that a power is actually eliciting an act; to take the power of sight, for exampli, to say the power is exercised is to say there^isan act of seeing. Specification,on the other hand, refers to the act'sbeing directed to one obiect or another. In the act ofseeing, the seeins'will be directed to this object or that "specification" is usedbecause Thomas objecl. of actions kind the are actions beiieves that they are-are specified-by the objects at which thev aim. This distinction betweenexercise and specification should not be understood as one between two different acts that could occur separatelyor even two acts that are always together; rathlr, they are two aspectsof a sinqle ict. The act of the power is at once and specified(Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 1). exercised Thomas in this distinction is interests What the difference in the sources or causes of an and of its specification.The speclact'sexercise of dre lct collles frorn the side o[ the ficad<.rn t-'f "ight, object. fb continue with the exa-ruple. what a person seesis determi""-d by the object in froni of him. Exercise, on the otler hand, has its source in the agent. Whether or not someone has an act ofseeing depends upon in be.ings that person. This is especially the ca-se endowed with a will. The obiect of the will, as


DavidM David M. Gallagher various w is consid, object th points of will that love, desi Thomr there is t causethe sess all th lacking n seenln al possible t rejoice ir possibler act in its I desireit. divine esr (aisioben that all g besides C and, that there.Tb good is t< and so d God. Ap: all object because 1 tainment other obj them eitlr ing the v toward ot act (ibid.; Before and natu another s describes certainol the good naurally tain necer ticular in the good seento h atitude. goods cor Thomas the will n This [w general just like

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we have seen,is the good in generalwhich is important for the question of whether contains, so to speak, all particulargoods.The Thomas's "intellectualist" understanding of actsof all powersare particular goodsand as the will falls into the trap of intellectual detersuchfall within the will's all-embracing object. minism. Precisely becausethe will can control Consequendy, the will hasthe capacity to exer- whether or not a possible act will be considciseor not exercise the actsof the otherpowers ered or even from which point of view it will (ibid.).This is the basis for the will's intesrative be considered, the presentation of the intelfunction. lectually understood object to the will beOne will also find this distinction between comes iself a volunarymaner (Ia IIae, q. 6, a. exerciseand specificationlocated in the will 7 , a d 3 ; q . 1 0 ,a a . 2 - 3 ) . itself. The will's act is specifiedby its object. I will return now to the question of freedom And since the urill is a raional appetite, its and necessity in the will's acs. Thomas disobject is supplied to it by reason. Conse- cussesthis question both in terms of the will quendy, Thomas sap that the will's act is exercising its act and in terms of the specificaspecifiedby the intellect. In this way,by pro- tion of that act. What sort of necessity is tlere, viding it with its object,the intellect is saidto then, with respect to the exercise of the will's movethe will. This "movement"occursin the act? Is there any act that the will must necesorder of formal causality (ibid.). On the other sarily exercise? fb this, Thomas says no. It hand,in the line of exercise-efficient causal- may seem that for a given object, there must ity-the will movesitself.Apart from the will's necessarily be some act either toward or away first natural act, which comesfrom God, the from it, and, in this sense,the will must exerwill exercises its own act,iust asit exercises the cise its act. But since the will's act depends acts of the other powers. Whether or not upon the intellect's presentation of the object, there will be an act of the will with respectro and becausethe will can command the act of any particularobjectlies with the will iself (Ia the intellect, it is possible, for any given proIIae, q. 9, aa.3-6). This power of the will to posed act, simply to will to cease thinking move itself is crucial to Thomas'saccountof about the object and so to obviate all acts in is the will's freedom,for it providesthe basisfor regard.2zThis can occur, saysThomas, even if a person's capacityto refuseto will any good. the obiect is beatitude itself. Since the act of It is now possible to describe Thomas'sun- thinking about beatitude is only a particular derstanding of the interrelationshipof the in- good, it is possible for the will to choose not tellect and the will, another pivotal point for to engage in it, that is, not to command the undersunding Thomas's theory of the will. thinking, and then there will simply be no act The intellect is saidto move the will in that it of the will in regard to beatitude. In this way, specifies the will's act by providingthe will its then. the will remains free with resDectto the object(Ia IIae, Q. 9, a. l).20The will, on the exercise ofany ofits acts(a IIae, q. tO, r. Z;. other hand, is able to move the intellect by With regard to specification, the issue is exercising the intellect'sact; that a person more complicated. The sort of necessity in thinks at all or eventhinls aboutone objector question here is the following: for a given another(this is calledconsideration) denends object of the will, can it be either approved upon the will. At anypoint, the will ..rrlr-,o.,,e (i.e. loved, desired,rejoiced in) or disapproved the intellectto think aboutsorneobjector to (hated, rejected, sorrowed over), or rnust it stop thinking about it altogether.Still, the necessarily be only one of these?For example, specification of the intellect's act comesfrom with an object such as an act of adultery it may dre object;therefore,whar one concludes as be dcsiredas being pleasant, yet it may also be rue about a partrcular when one con- rejected as being contrary to the law of God. ob.lect sidersit might not be dependenton the will. So too, the good work of a colleague may be In the case of the intellect's assentto first cause for rejoicing becauseit helps the whole principles and the conclusionsof scientific firm or may be cause for sorrow becausethat demonstrations, for example, if there is willed colleague might receive more honor than I. In considerationof these propositions,there is such cases, Thomas argues,there is no necesnatural assent(Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 6).21This sity present in the way in which the will's act power of the will to exercise the intellect'sact is specified. The same object can be willed in

The Will and Ia Aca (Ia flae, qq. 6-17)


also the final end itself which stands among variouswaysdependingupon how the object appetibleobjecs in the sameway as the first is considered.If there were, howevel some principles of demonstration among intelligiobject that was good and desirablefrom all bles;and universally all those things which are poina ofview, then itwould notbe possible to suitable to the willer according to his nature. just will that object in any way, but only to For we desireby our will not only thosethings love,desire, rejoice in it. or that perain to the power of the will, but even Thomas points to two such objects.First, those which perain to the individual powers there is beatitude consideredin general.Beand to the man asa whole.Whencemannatucausethe very conceptofbeatitude is to posrally wills not only the object of the will, but sess all the good of which one is capable while also other objects which are suiable to the lacking no good, such an object cannot be other powers,such as the knowledgeof the truth, and existing and living and other things seenin any way other than as good. It is not of this sort that have to do with one'snatural possible to think ofbeatitudeandnot desireor well being. All thesethingp are comprehended reioice in it. It is of course, as I have said, under the object of the will asso many particupossiblenot to think ofit and so exercise no (a IIae, q. 10,a. l) lar goods.2r act in its regard,but if one thinls of it one will desire it. Second,there is God seen in the The general principle here is that a person divine essence as occursin the beatific vision naturally wills whatever is suitable (conamiens) (aisiobeatifica). Here again,it will be evident to human nature. Human nature being comthat all good that is to be found anywhere plex, many distinct goods are included. The besides God is found'more perfecdyin God; first are the objeca of all the other powers is to be found and, that all possiblegoodness will. Each power naturally tends besides the there.The willerthus sees that his or her total good is to be found in God and nowhereelse, toward its object, as for example, the intellect and so there is no possiblereasonto reject naturally tends toward the tmth, and the God. Apart from thesetwo objects,however, sense appetites toward what is sensibly pleasant. fu objects of these powers and of the all objectscan possiblybe seenasevil, ifonly powers' natural inclinations, such things are because pursuing them conflicts with the attainment of some other good. Thus, for all naturally seen as perfective and as contributother objecs, there is no necessity in willing ing to t}re general good or beatrtude of the them either from the point of view of exercis- person. Thus upon their being apprehended, ing the will's act in their regard, or tending there spontaneously arises in the will an aptoward or awayfrom them if there is suchan proving stance, either joy if the good is present or desire if it is absent. For example, when act (ibid.;De malo,q.6). Before leaving the topic of the will's fiee someone becomes aware of one's own ignoand natural acts,it is necessary to take up rance of some point of knowledge, he or she another set of actsof the will which Thomas spontaneously desires to have that knowlmean that one describes asbeing natural.There are,he says, edge.This does not necessarily certainobjectsof the will besides beatitudeor will actively seek to acquire the knowledge, the good in general toward which the will but only that there is a spontaneous motion of nanrrally tends, in somecases evenwith a cer- the will toward it that is not an act of free-will. tain necessity. Thesearegoodswhich arepar- Second, any good that is good for the person ticular in the sense of not being themselves as a whole and seen as such will be naturally the good which wholly beatifies,but they are willed. Thomas gives as examplesexisting and seento have a necessary connectionwith be- living. Another might be something like 'l-he autude. ciearestdescription of these health, which is not the object of a particular goods comesin the Prima serundae, in which power but a condition of well-being for the Thomas delineatesthe obiects which move person as a whole. These too are sponanethe will naturally: ously approved by the will either by an act of

This [whatis willednaturally] is the goodin

general toward which the will naturally tends just like any power toward its own object; and

joy if it is present or desire if it is absent. One way to express the natural quality of this motion is to say that it is not an act of free-will, that is, the will doesnot move in these


David M. Gallagher



f i

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cases because it has chosento do so. These presents a very highly developed theory ofthe thingsarewilled naturallyin the sense that the various kinds of will-acts, an understanding of will spontaneously movestoward them upon which is necessaryif one is to grasp his picture their being apprehended. So long asa thing is of the moral life. All these acts, as acts of the seento peftain to one'sbeatitudeor one'sper- will, are appetitive motions of the person as a fection, there will be a movementof the wil^ whole; they are the strivings, aversions, rests, towardit (IIIa q. 18,aa.3-6).The necessity of and so on of the person. It is precisely through this movementhasto do with the connectiona these appetitive motions, especially those that good haswith beatitude.If the good is seento are free, that each person determines himself be necessary for beatitude(for example, exist- with respect to goods and evils. ing), then it will be willed necessarily. NoneThere are many distinctions to be drawn theless, the kind of necessiw with which such among these acts of the will. The most goodsare willed is not the i"*" "r the neces- prominent in Thomas's treatrnent is that besitywith which beatitude is willed. Beatitudeis tween acts ordered to ends (ti*ph willing, innecessarily or absolutely willed because it be- tention, and, enjoymenr) and those ordered to longs to the very structureof the will; the de- means (cboice, consent,and ure).24 There is, in sirearises immediatelyfrom the very natureof addition, a distinction between the acts that the will. These other goods,by contrast,are are deliberate and free, arising from free-will, willed on the basisof ihe prioi willing of the and those that are natural or spontaneous and end,beatitude. Their necessity is, in Thomas's not the result of deliberate choice (IIIa, q. 18, language, the "necessity of thL end" (necessitas aa. 34} There is also a distinction between a thing haswhen it acts of the will directed to goods not yet posfinis), the hnd of necessity is a meanswithout which an end cannot be sessedand acts directed to possessedgoods. achieved. If the end is is necessary This distinction should not be overlooked. that this meansbe desired.And so here.sincb for it means that "willing" refers not just to beatitude is necessarily willed, whatever is seen acts directed to the acquisition or achieveas required for beatitudewill be willed with ment of goods or bringing about states of afthenecessity ofthe end(Ia,q. 82,a. 1). fairs that do not yet obtain, but also rejoicing Doesit then follow that all suchobjects are in goods or being sad about evils.25Finally, necessarily pursuedby the willer?This is not some of the acts occur in what Thomas calls the case. In order to seewhv. I will discuss the the order of intention, the affective tending variousactsof the will. Having clarified these toward goods in which ends precede means, according to Thomas's descriptions, I will be while others occur in the order of execution, in a positionto explainmore completelythe the willing of the exterior acts by which the naturalwilling of particular goods. desired good is actually achievedor possessed THE ACTS OF THE WILL For Thomas,a persondoesnot achieve beatitudeby a singleact;collsequently the rnoral life consists of many actsof the rvill together with the externalactsarisingfrom them. With God and the angels, it is otlerwise.For God, beatitude is identical with essence andno further actualization of a potenry that is, no operationis requiredin order to attainbeatitude. For the angels, on the other hand,just one act is requiredin which the angel's will is suitably disposed towardbeatitude.For humanbeings, however,many actsover a period of time are required (Ia IIae, 9. 5, a. 7). Moreover, these acts differ not only numerically but also in kind. In rhePrimasecundae, qq.8-17, Thomas
wherein means precede ends (Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 4; q. 16, a. 4). Aquinas's understanding of the will-acts is not properly seenby taking isolatedactsofthe will, but radrer by seeing each act in its relation to severalother acts. In general, Aquinas sees the relationships of these several acts of the will as parallel to the relationship among their objects. Those objects, qoods of one kind or another (or evils to be avoided),are related to one another as means and ends. These means and ends are grouped together into what I will call "chains' of ends; lower linla of the chain are goods sought as means for the sake of higher links, which in their turn are sought as means to yet higher ends Qa IIae, q. 12, a.2).If we start at a given point on the chain we can go "op" the chain toward

some end : the chain t to other er ble to proc Suppose. that her el come ill ar woman der mother rec virnre of tb mother, sh other self, her mother IIae, q. 28, tude incluc ing of her shemay ha her mothe: love her n then the u This is A, friendships ity (IIa IIa God as thr tude is to b the "highe concernbe If we go to Chicagr form oftra to I decides to do this, this, shem then actual persondeli achievethe priatemear extenor acl the willing Once this 1 son begins beenmade We shot
manV othr choice to , have to pr (another se have to par that entails the airpon means and up in any


The Will and Its Acts (a IIae, qq. 6-17) "down" someend sought for its own sakeor as the chain toward goodssought only means to other ends.In neither direction is it possible to proceedto infinity (Ia IIae, q. l, a' 4). that a woman learns for example, Suppose, that her elderly mother in Chicago has become ill and needsto be looked-after.The to go and help her woman decides(chooses) By mother recovef.What end is shepursuing? virnre of the love of friendshipshehasfor her mother, she considersher mother to be ansheconsiders othor self, and, consequentially, her mother'swelfareto be part of her own (Ia IIae,q. 28,a.2).Thus, her own goodor beatitude includesthe health and generalwell-beview, then, ing of her motler. On Aquinas's shemay havea yet further end. Shemay love her mother with supernaturalcharity and so love her mother as ordered to God who is then the ultimate end loved by the woman. This is Aquinas'sdoctrine that all human canbe orderedto the love of charfriendships ity (IIa IIae, q. 26, u 7). The woman loves -God as the ultimate end in which her beatitude is to be found.Thesesituationsrepresent the "higher" linla of the chain, all of which concernbeatitude.the ultimate end. from the decisionto go If we go downwards to Chicago, the woman must decide what she form oftransportation to take. Supposing an airline; decides to fly, shemust now choose to do this, she must call her travel agent;for this, shemust find the telephonenumber and then actuallymake the call. At eachstep the to aboutwhat is necessary persondeliberates the approthe good and then chooses achieve priate means until reachingthe point at which Up to this point all exterior action is possible. the willins occursin the order of intention. the perhoweveq Oncethis point is reached, the choicesthat have son besins to execute (Ia IIae,q.16, a.4). niade been We should also note that in fact tlere are many other chains descendingfrom the choice to go to Chicago.The woman may have to prepare many things for her f-amily (anotherset of personssheloveswith love of shewill friendship)to providefor her absence; have to pack her luggagewith all the choices that entails;shewill haveto makeher way to the airport, requiring yet another chain of meansand ends.Eachpersonis alwals caught up in any number of such chains,so that at


times the same act may serve as a means to more than one end or what serves one end may hinder another (a IIae, q. 12, a' 3). It is in this larger context that a person choosesthe various means and ends. Aquinas, however, in treating the different acts of the will (and in generally analyzing moral action) tends to aid, for the sake of analytic Iimplifr', clarity, often looks at choices or other acts of the will without describing the whole context in which they take place. It is always imporant to keep this fact in mind, for otherwise there is a danger of taking Aquinas's teaching too abstracdy. At the heart of Thomas's scheme lies the act of choice. From the moral point of view, the most significant acts are those in which the will, taken as free-will, exercises dominion over its own act, Such acts are proper to the will as will (q. 10, a. 1, ad l). Thomas also says that what one wills in the mode of free-will one wills simpliciter (IlIa, q.2L, a.4). Choice, as the act of frie-will, is the most significant act from the moral point of view, and, as such' it is the first act to consider. Choice (Electio) Choice, as we have seen, has the following stnrcture. A person must determine himself to one of t'wo (or more) possible actions. He so determines himself in the light of some enc for the sake of which one or the other of the prospectiveactions is chosen (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 3). Following Aristode, Thomas maintains that the object of choice is always some possible action. It is possible or at least taken as possible, for no one chooseswhat one knows to be impossible (a IIae, q. 13, a. 5). It is an action (an agibile) for whenever one chooses something other than an action, one is in fact choosing to have or to use that thing by means of an action (Ia IIae, q. 13, a. 4). So, for example, if one chooses to eat apples instead of orallgcs, one is choosing dre eating clf dre fbrmer over the eating of the latter; if one choosesa car, one is choosing to drive that car; if one votes for an individual or body to exercise authority, one is choosing to obey that person or body. The chosen action is, as I have said, a means to an end. That end is, first, the good immediatelv above it on the chain of means and


David M. Gallagher
being willed precisely as that which is to be achieved by the chosen means. This is exacdy how Thomas defines intention: the act of the will directed to an end taken as the terminus of tlre means ordered to it (Ia IIae, q. L2, a. l, ad 3). So, to return to the earlier example, in buyrng her ticket, tfie woman is intending to so to Chicago. " If one ttrinls of the chain of means and ends, it should be clear that at any link in the chain, all the goods above it are intended. When t}re woman buys her ticket, she is intending not just to go to Chicago, but also to care for her mother, to have her mother once again healthy, and ultimately her happiness. It sf,ould also be clear that any given link, while itself a chosen act, becomes an intended end with respect to the further choices made in order to achieve it. Ifone considers the choice to call the travel agent, buying the ticket now becomes the intended end. So, the notions of end and means and the corresponding notions of intention and choice are fluid; the willing of an action is a choice when seen in relation to what is above it, but is an intention when seen in relation to what is below it. In this case, there are not two distinct acts of willing to buy the ticket; rather, there is only one act, but it is vierved from different angles (q. 12, a.2). It should also be clear that acts of intention are the result of a choice. It is because the woman chooses to buy the ticket that buying the ticket becomes the intended end of her choice to call the travel agent. And this is how it nonnally occurs in one's voluntary actions: one choosessome action and then proceeds to choose means to accomplish it. It is only the ultimate end, beatitude in general, that is intended without having first been chosen.fu I goods, including the have shcrwn, all <-rther specific instantiation of beatitude that a person takes as his own, must be chosen. Once again, then, the centrality of the act of choice is clear.Savefor beatitudein general,the intending ofenl'goal or end is the consequence of a free choice, and for this reason, intention is usually an exercise of free-will and an essential part of the moral action for which a person is held responsible.26 As a final point with respect to intention, I should note that intentions can be of various durations-at times, of quite long duration. For example, a student who decides to earn a

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ends, but it also includes all ends up to and including beatitude. At any given stage on tlle chain, the means needed to achieve the higher stages are chosen. But if tlese means themselves require some other means for their achievement, then a further choice at the next lower level is required. This series of choices proceeds until a point is reached at which all the means are decided upon and only execution is required. Therefore, choice occurs anlrtime the means to achieve an end (ultimate or mediate) are not yet fixed. In order to fix these means, there is, prior to each choice, a deliberation, a process of thinking about the possible means and judging their relative advantages and disadvantages(Ia trae, q. 14). At each point on the chain, a person is determining him or herself, and, with each choice, the person becomes affectively committed to some good. This commitrnent to a good occurs in the order of intention, which is distinct from the order of execution. These two orders work in different directions. In the order of intention, what is first is the last end, and the higher an end is on the chain of ends, the more priority it has. In the order of execution, by contrast, what is lower is what is first accomplished and only at the end of the activity is the ultimate goal achieved.An important consequence of this distinction between the two orders is that, in temporal tenns, a choice is very often made quite some time before it is finally executed. The woman makes the choice to so to Chicaeo several days before she actualli goes. This io", ttot mean that the choice is not real; it simply means that a person can determine oneself to an action long before actually carrying it out (for example, scheduling a doctor's appointrnent). The gap between making a choice and executing the action chosen does allow that a person can retract a choice before (or even while) carrying it out. This occurs whenever a person ceeses to rvill the previouslyrvilled action. Intention (Intentio)

bachelor four yea tude of, period, I ally thir degree. that goa tention r that the distingu and inte a.6,ad. allows t persistf fidelity how it i only on many sI that a p, complet habitual comple: usually simplici

Unlike choice. intention is directed to ends and not to means. It is, however, intimately linked to choice. for wherever there is choice there is also intention. The reason for this is that, in any choice, there is a concomitant willing of the end. And in tlis case,the end is

Simple A sec the end ing" (at word zr will ant which power, its mos directer Now d the mel the en< good tl therefo IIae, q. How intentit intentir rected" as tbat pressed person the act ple wil willing thoser

The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6-17)


intend actually degreeintendsthat end for at least essarv reference to whether I bachelor's example, for good. an To take four vears.niakins during that time a multi- to ..toir. that that as something *ittt-taken *"y t"de bf choicesto:wardthlt end. During that vears'I DurParis' see go me-to for gbod be would period. however,the personis only occasiondo anything about .tlv tttittt ios explicitiy about the bachelor's ine those-years, I never there. This is simple willing -that decree.Ne"irthiless, the personis intending aoruallv eoins I finally decide actually to tha't soal throughout the whole time; the in- But supfose ibso now am I facto commftted to employit attim"ting much if not all so: tentiSnof that elttd necessary for this trip' At meani the all ins Thomas that the persondoes.For ttris reason, Paris' Clearly, betweenacnrallywilling an end tlris point, I intend to go to distinzuishes since one precedes intention, the end habinrally(Ia IIae, q' l, simnie willins and i.ritending not first did one if end an in;e;d *oold not Tlris distinction is important, for it a. 6, ad,3). at the it'-But possess to desire simple this have allows one to recognize that intentions can it sigintending by end an will to time, same (for example, persistfor long periods of time a ipouse); it also demonstrates nifies a much greater personal comrnitrnent; hd.fiw to onets compersonally is end an a person'while willing Derson who intends how ii is possible-that This is not the case only one'thing ^t ^ 'ilne actually,ca1 h.ave -itted to its achievement. q. 12, a' l, ad (Ia IIae, willings simple with manv simult"titont willings. All the choices 4).28 been not have and wlich that'apersonmakes The simple willings include-the spontanecompletelyexecutedexist in the willer in the I described earlier in habitual form. Here again,one encountersa o,rr, ,ratoral willingi acts. These willnatural willts the of soeakins complexiw in the life of the will that Thomas to beatitude first directed are saw, "t"*. irlEr. or,rrilu leavesaside for the sake of analytic to all the other things which a an?'second simplicity. (con

Simple Willittg (Simplex uoluntas) to A secondact of the will that is directed "will" or "willcalls Thomas what is the end fu he points out,-the or aelle). ing" (uoluntas refersboth to the power of the w6rd aoluntas will and to a specificact of the will, the act "simple willing'" A which he refers to as power, Thomas says,receivesits name from im -ott proper act, and that act is the one directedio th" power'smost proper object' Now the objectbf tn. will is the good, and, the meansbeinggood only by their.relation to of the end; the eid'has more'the character "will" is sood than the means'The act called iherefore that of simply willing the end (a llae.q. 8, a. 2).2; H"* it this act different frorlr the act of intention? The differencelies in the fact that "simple." Intention is not diintention is not rectedto the endsinipl',but ratherto the end Oq exby mcans' us thttt whiJ: witl beicitic'-ed pressedless formally, in intending an end a p"ttott is committed to actually carrying out the actionsneededto achievethat end' Simole willine. on the other hand, is simply the *ittitte oflome good as perfectiveof me (or to rie by love) without any necthose"united

person spontaneously ueniens\to his nature and thereby contnDutine to beatitude.2e A spontaneous willing "rir., ,rpon the apprehension of some suitable good; hence' to say that a simple willing is iatural does not mean that all persons have it nor that a given person always has it' For example,according to Thomas, parents natua desire for rallv iove their c[ildren-have natuchildren what is good for them-while a 9)' q' 26, parents IIae, their lov"e rallv @a However, beforb being parents they clearly ,Jo tnt cxperiencc this-nitural desire for the well-beine of their children; nor is everyone a parent. Siinilarly, Thomas speaks of a nanrral iorre for God, but also recognizesthat a person does not have such a love until she or he has sotne klowledge of God. Thus, an instancc of a person who does not know or love God does not invalidate his theory of a natural love for God.30 It seems also that when Thomas speaksof nanrral inclinations, as he does in the well-known text on the precepts of the natural law (Ia IIae, q. 94, a' 2), these inclinations fit into the catigory of natural willines. They are not merely movements of appbtite (for example, the desire for the se"nse truth), ttof ".. they the result of deliberate choice; rather, they arise spontaneously' This


David M. Gallagher
bv means of rational deliberation and in the pb*.r of the one acting (uoluntasat rfltio). It is onlv in this laner mode that a person is said to will simply; what is willed in the mode of nature is willed only in a qualified sense (secundarn qui d). Consequendy, whrle fr ee-w i II dependsupon the will in the mode of nature, the acts oi th. *lll that are the most significant for the moral life are those of free-will (IIIa, q. 21, a. 4).33 Consent (Consensus) The act of consent, on Aquinasts account, is very close to choice, indeed at times they are "application of identical. Consent names the the appetitive motion to something preexistinq in^the power of the one applying it" (Ia To consent to something is, IIa'e.q. 15, ;. 3).34 like'c'hoice, to be affectively related to that thins as something actually to be done. Henie. like choice, consent has to do with means to the end, is directed to what is possible, and follows upon deliberation. Also, like choice, consent is an act of free-will, an act in the conuol of the agent (ibid.)' Il out of several possible means to the intended end, only one tpp""tt to be suitable,then, saysThomas, consent and choice are one and the same act' Jb choose that means over the non-suitable ones and to apply the appetitive motion to it are the same act. At times, however, the two ac$ are not wholly identical. This occurs when more than one means is suitable. It may happen that the woman in my example could either fly o111ke a train to Chicago, and that either possibility is aqreeable,and even that each has its own advintases. It would be possible here to consent to"both as "cceptrble possibilities, but then a further act of choice would be required bv which she would decide upon one as prefeiable to the other. In this iase, the acts of consent and choice would not be identical, and only with. the act tif choice u'ould the prevrous act ot consent actually yield the achon. Choice, then, always implies consent, but consent need not imply What is important for the moral iife is the fact of selfdeiermination with regard to the means to one's beatitude. and Th"omas sometimes refers to this self-determination to action as consent and at other times as choice.

seemsto be exacdy what Thomas understands by simple willings. In contrast to-intention, a person need not act on his simple willings. That is to say' many simple willings remain- nothing more than that and are never transformed into intentions. To use one of Thomas's examples, a person has a natural revulsion to having a *ound cauterized. vet for the sake of health wills the operation'nonetheless. This revulsion is not merely a motion of the sense appetite, but also occurs at the level of will. The p.rsott, however, does not act upon his will tb flee the pain but rather intends the sood of health iilla, q. 18, a. 5).31An uniniended simple willing such as this is called "velleity" (uelleitqs) at times by Thomai a flIla. q.21. a.4). It is important to note the oi th"i. velleities, for they help to .* questions that seem difficult for explain Thomas's-understanding of the will. For example, at times it seeris difEcult to undertt"nd ho* a person can act against a natural 'act of the will. How, for example, can a person commit suicide if there is a natural willine of life? The answer lies in recognizing thit the natural willing is an act of simple willine and that such an act is not the same as intention. In suicide, the person stops intendins to live. It does not seem' however, that tie person ceases willing to live altogether, aJ is evidenced in the interior resisirnce to their action that such people experience. So too, when Thomas claims that rational beings nanrrally love God lnore than self, this doeinot mean that sin is impossible. The notion of velleity also helps to explain how a person can be tempted-experience an attraction at the level of will toward an evil-and yet not follow that temptation.i2 Finallv. note that, according to Thomas, what a pLrron is said to will simply (stmpliciter) is not *hat one wills by the act of simple willine, but rather what one wills by an act oi liie-wilt. Precisely as spontaneous and natural, simple willings do not involve the deg.". oi seli-determiiation that is found in ihoice and intention. Jb have a simple willing is not to commit oneself to action, whereas both intention and choice do necessarily involve such a commitment. Thomas distinguishes between will as producing natural acts (aoluntasut natura) and will as producing acts

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The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. Gl7)

Use (Urzs) Use is the connection between the act of choice and the execution of the chosen action. Simple willing, intention, consent, and choice alfoccur in the order of intention. By all of these acts the agent becomes affectively ordered to various goods; these acts occur within the agent and make the agent be appetitively oiiented to the various goo{s. -Choice is the last act in this order, for by a chdice person is committed to pursuing or rejecting some good. The choice, however, must b; executed. For example, having chosen to go to Chicago, to fly' ?"4 to- use a trarrel {ent, t}tere lt tto n-eed for further choices; rather, only execution is necessary-the woman must pick up the phone and call the asent. Thus, a further act of the will beyond ihoi". is required, one that- is found in the order of exlcution, the order of realizing the action (Ia IIae, q- lQ, a. 4)' The choici having been made and the time -for action having-arrived (these are not always simultaneous), otler powers of the soul "ttd the body must move in order to perform the action. These motions are not instinctual, but, rather, they are guided by reason and will. It is precisely the willing involved here "use," for the will uses that receives tlte name or exercises the other powers in order to carry out the chosen action. fu discussed in the tontext oftreating the exercise and specification of ttre will's own act' the will can command or exercisethe acs of other powers; precisely when it does this, its act is use (Ia IIae, q. 16, a. 1). As an act of the will (rational appetite), use necessarily follows uPon an act of reason. Thomas gives this att of reason a special "command" (imperiam) (Ia IIae, q. 17, name, a. l). Command and use are a paiS command naming the rational component and use the volitioial component of the voluntary act by which a power is exercised.If a person waiks in a rational way (for example, not sleepwalking), then Thomas would say that there is both an act of command, since the walking is being commanded by reason, and an act of use, since the will is exercising the motive power. There is, however, only one act here, ialled command when seen from the side of reason and called use when seen from the


side of will (a IIae, q. 17, a. 3)' So the sequence as Thomas describes it is that a cioice is made. there is then a command to exercise the appropriate powers for-the carcomrying out of the chosen action, and this governs-gives determination formal mand act of uie. Illtimately there is the to-thJ exterior act, such as walking, the act of the other, commanded

Enioyrnent (Fru.irto') Enjoymentis the act of the will which a a deor acquiring p.rsotthasuponpossessing

sired end, for example,the joy of the woman upon her mother'srecoveryof health or even ubon the securingof the airplane -of ticket' Entne execution end the a-t iovment occurs of the action,when the desiredgood hasbeen (Ia IIae, q. 11,a. 1). fu Thomas madepresent ,t t"r,'"Enjoyment s.e*t to belong -to tlre love or deiight which a person has-for the h"e hoped for,- that is, the end" last thing -This (ibid.).37 act-of the will shouldbe seen in the lieht of Thomas'slarger understanding of the will. The first of these of the aF'ections affectionsis love, which is directed to a good and not yet possimplv.If the good is absent ..rrld th.t. aises the further affectionof deis delight sire; if the good is possessed-there a.2)-r8 Enjoymentis or joy (Ia ilae, q.25, -produced in the will when the' ioy which is -the good, is actually posthe *illt obiect, sessed. in the fullest senseoccurswith Enior.rynent of the ultimate end QaIIae, the reafpossession poins to- Thomas q. ll, a. 3). which enjoymentcan be imperfect-First, the as.occurs good can be imperfectlypossessed in realitybut the good is not possessed ilnhen (Ia IIae, q. ll, a. onlv in intention,asdesired enjoyrnentassoof kind be the would This 4). ciatedwith hope. Second,the good desired may be not the final end,but only souregood that is a meansto the end' Sucha good, when gives rise to enioyment, but not possessed, Perfect enioymentin the most perfect sense. "rrioyttt.ttt occurswhen-thefinal end is really Obviously for posslssed. in the fullest sense'will occur only with the of the last end,God, in the next life possession (a IIae,q. I 1, a. 3).


David M. Gallagher succulc man ac do whr these" love m univers radona sake;al of ratic their sr Thom: much I life cor ing the amorir) person Secc of the what ir person of will edge c by one dition sic sm ing so basics acts:ir the fa' when some simple someI genera make r asthat make ' objecr guishe wills g persor of the what r
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At the rational level-the level of will-love LOVE AS THE FIRST AFFECTION alwavs takes the form of wanting a good for OF THE WILL to appealing ,o.rr.ot.; asThomas often states, In order to completethe Thomistic account Aristotle, "to love is to will the good fo-rsomeof the will's role in the moral life, it is neces- one."4l Accordingly dilection a]wa1s has wo good sarv to touch briefly on Thomas's doctrine oUi".". the perso"n'who the and loved is the love of especially will's concerninglove (arnor), The person' that for *hi.h is *anted or amiciiae),1hi+ is the firstof motion toward the person who is loved is friendship"(aza all the will's affectionsand the basisfor all its called love of friendihip, while the motion ac$. This teachingprovidesthe wider context directed to the -of good(s)willed for that persg.n the will's variousactsasde- is called love for understanding concupiscence'Formally scribedin Ia IIae, qq. 6-17 and alsoallowsus love of friendship a person ls to seethat for Thomas the moral life is essen- lo"ed aJthai for whom good is sought;by love amongpersons' of concupiscence tially a matter of relationships someihirtgis loved as.being afprimary the that first, teaches, (Ia IIae,q'26,a' 4)' The Thomas eoodfor someperson fection of the appetitive powers' both sense il.ttott loved canbe oneselfor anotherpersox' and rational, is love. Love denotesan appe- *a tn" thine willed for the person can be tite's most basic relationship to the good; it bodilv soodsiuch asfood or drink or spiritual denotesthe fundamentalsuitability of a being eoods iuch as honor or knowledge or even to that which constitutesits good. Thomas iitnr.t. For Thomas, thesetwo loves are alrefers to love as the proportion (proportio) wavs found together and indeed consdnrtea without that exists between a being and its good, sinlle act, not love someone soeakins.for example,of the suitability or *aiting *hat is good for that person,nor does otoootiott of a heavy obiect to the middle one love goods that are not personswlthout of the earth as love (ia Ilae, q. 26, a' 2)' On lovins them for somePerson." loveof friendship-is Th"ird,within dilectibn, the basisof such a proportion or suitabiliry tor there arise two other affectionsin the appe- more basic than love of concupiscence, if one good when the loved tite: desire(desiderium), one only wants the good for someone and delight or ioy \delec- first loves tltat person. Hence, Thomas says is not vet possessed, All that love of fri-endshipis love in the most if the good is possessed' tatio/gaudium) such goods toward perfect sense-and even speaksof love of motibns furth"erappetitive "including" love of concupisas hope bi f."t arise on the basisof desire; hiendship as then, is-thewill's Lorreof friendstrip, all mttions toward evils (fear, angeq etc') cence.*l of the will demotion is all most basic affection; arise frorn hate (odium)'which in turn love of a the on this of is based and besins with rived from love.leThe consequence toinclination natural will's motions all the Even evident: o.iron. doctrineis immediately a as Thomas by first described the is on based bearitude are ward poweri appetitive of the himself loves Eachpersonnaturaliy and moii basicaifection of love. In an article self-love. askingwhether agentsdo all that-they do (a love of friendship),^!d so he.larurally "I other from'love,Thomasstates: reply that every iants *hat is the greitest for himself,in 3)a' (Ia' 60, q' hiJeatitude however desires end words, The ' . . asentactsfor an end. that saying of What are the implications is"the sood which is loved and desiredby primary.affecwittt the is eachthing. Hence it is clearthat everyagent, love of friendship first, that the afwhateverit may be, carriesout everyacfion don or urotiou?It ureans, the most basicof is which will the of 6)'+u f"ction a' 28, from somelove" (Ia IIae, q. is precisely others all of source the is the at all and love distinguishes Second,Thomas "dilection" persons than Everything-other loae for persons' rationallevel by referringlo it as are persons only and persons for (dikxio) (Ia IIae, q. 26,1. 3). Moreover,he is willed Everythemselves' in good being all as willed points io'a determinatestructurefound in that is not a person, dilection, that is, in every love of every will' thine in the universe of by the distinction incl;dine even the accidentalperfections This structure is expressed for willed is virtue, or inch as health (amorconaqis- Dersons 'th. betweenlove of coniupiscence in which it is found' fu Thomas p..rottt (nmor amicitiae)' friendship of love and crntiae)

or he. friend,
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The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, qq. 6-17)

"The principal ends of husuccincdy statesit, man acts are God, self, and others, since we do whatever we do for the sake of one of tlrese' (Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9, c.)! This view of love mirrors Thomas's understanding of the universe as a whole according to which only rational beings-persons-exist for their own sake; all other created beings exist for the sake of rational beings and find their fulfillment in their service to those rational beingp.a5Thus Thomas's moral universe is, in a certain sense, rnuch like Kant's kingdom of ends. The moral life consists primarily in loving persons: loving the right persons in the proper order (orda arnoris),and loving the proper goods for those persons.46 Second, this doctrine means that in all acts of the will, especially in all acts of choice, what is being'chosen is some good for some person(s). While one might speak at times of willing something such as food or knowl"state edge or of affairs" (in the sense that, by one's choices, one can bring about a condition that did not previously obtain), the basic stnrcture of willing is always that of willing some good(s) for some person(s). This basic structure is to be found in all the will's acts: in the act of enjoyment, one rejoices in the fact that some person has some good; when one intends an end, one is intending some good for some person; and, even in simple willing, some good is being willed for some person. While the object of the will in general is the good, and while one can also make such formal distinctions among objects as that between means and ends, one can also make a more material distinction among the objects. This is the case when one distinguishes between the persons for whom one wills goods and the goods one wills for those persons.Every object of the will fits into one of tl'rese categfories. Hence, should one ask what a person wills, materially speaking, we must answer that a person wills, first, oneself and other persons (taking them as part of his or her own self by nreans of thc love of friendship) and wills, second, all the goods of those persons along with the means for achieving those goods. Finally, this understanding of the love of friendship-the affective affirmation of a person-as the most fundamental motion of the will helps in understanding why Thomas's


teaching on the will's natural inclination to beatitudeis not an egotisticalone. According to Thomas'steaching,eachpersonhasa natural inclination in his will toward his own good, of which constituteshis beatithe possession tude. This natural inclination is, as was said above,a love of friendship for oneselfwith a love of concupiscence for the perfectinggood. Aquinas's doctrine concerning the love of friendship shows how one can take the good of another person as one'sown good; thus, it opensup the possibility that one'sperfection can be found outside oneself in another person, especially in God.a7 According to to the love of Thomas, it belongpessentially friendshipto take asone'sown good the good of the beloved.Thus, one'sown good can be so to speak" when one hasa love of expanded, friendshipfor anotherperson.One lovesone's own good preciselyin loving the good of the sake(a IIae, q. other personfor that person's in the especially 28, aa.2-3). This happens case of loving God. If a personlovesGod with the love of friendship (carins)then the good his own good and his beatiof God becomes tude consistsin possessing @y tht aisiobeatifica) rJis good (IIa IIae, q. 180,a. 1).The will's natural inclination to beatitudedoesnot lock a Dersoninside himself: rather. it draws him of a out of himself and into the possession larger good, which, through the love of friendship,hasbecomehis own.

l"et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam volunatem." 2In I Etbiorum, lect. l: "Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesensintentio, proprium est considerareoperationes humanas secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis; nam, si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur voluntati et rltioni, non dicunquirenon subiacent rur propriac humanac scd naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur subiectum philosophiae naturalis est motus vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiecrum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem vel etiam homo prout estvoluntarie agens propter finem" (Leonine, +, 3949).




David M. Gallagher
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l0"Et hoc ideo est quia, cum bonum simpliciter 3"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas diin actu, et non in potentia, ultimus autem consistat contraaliam: viditur contranaturim, sicutunacausa quaedamenim fiunt naturaliter,et quaedamfiunt actus est operatio, vel usus quarumcumque re-rum proprius habiarum; bonum hominis simpliciter consideravoluntarie.Est autemaliusmoduscausandi praeter modum tur in bona operatione, vel bono usu rerum habiactus, sui est domina volunati, quae qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad tarum. Utimur autem rebus omnibus Per unum." C[ De aeriute,g.22, a. 5, td 7, in contrar- voluntatem. tlnde ex bona voluntate, qua homo ium: "hoc enim est proprium volunati in quantum bene utitur rebus habitis, dicitur homo bonus; et ex est voluntas, quod sir domina suonrm actuum' mala,malus."SeealsoDe nulo, q. l, a' 5 (Leonine, (Leonine,626,372-74);alsoDepotatia, 9.2, a.3, 2t:26). llDe nulo, q. 6, a. un.: "Si enim non sit liberum c.: "Voluntas, inquantum volunas, cum sit libera, ai movemur ac aliquid in nobis, sed ex necessitate utrumlibet sehabet" (Marieni' 30). 4On Thomas'suse of the term liberutnarbitrium, volindum tollitur deliberatio,exhoftatio,praecePsee also ln II Smt., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet, tum et punitio, et laus et vituperium circa-quemor4, 6(Leonine,689-92; alis Pfulosophia consistit. Huiusmodi autem 595 -98);Deaerinte,q. 24, aa. in questionhere is what opiniones que destruunt principia alicuius partis voluntariness The 694-96). Thomas calls the "perfect voluntary'' (aolmtarhtm philosophie dicunrur positiones extranee, sicut nichil moneri quod destruitprincipia scientienaturationemperfectnn).the sort ofvoluntarisecundunt De ueriute,q.24, See nessproper to free actions.This is contrastedwith ralis" (Leonine, 148,256-{.3). q. 83, a. l. (Leonine, STIa, 677-84); I a. voluntariness of son impe-rfeit voluntariness, the l2De malo, g. 6, a' un.: "Hec autem opinio est found in brute animals, the sort of voluntariness,I might add, that one finds Aristode dgsaiping (ErD. heretica. fbllit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in meritorium Ni;. 3.l-2 [ l09b]0-1 I 12al7)).For this distinction humanis actibus:non enim videtur esse agit ex necessitate sic aliquis quod demeritorium vel in Thomas,seeST Ia flae, q. 6, aa.l-2. inter Estetiamannumeranda 5It is important to note that Thomasuses_"appe- quodvitarenon possit. ate" (appeiitas)to designate both the tending or exffaneasphiloiophie opiniones,quia non solum desiring-andthe power by which such tending or contrariaturfidei,iet subvertitomniaprincipiaphiAngthpr losophiemoralis" (Leonine, 148,2+8-5.6). desiringarises. 6SeeDe ueritate,q. 24, a.2 (Leonine, 684-87); ,,""*t rt "ous opinion" namedbyThomas is the view that there is no such thing as motion, a view SCG II. chaps.47-48. T"Quaedam that deniesthe possibilityof physicsby denyingits per soin bonumr inclinantur enim lam naturalem habitudinem, absque cognitione, subjectmattel mobile being' These views are not Et talisinclinatio deait with by the scienceii question,since such sicutplantaeet corporainanimata' their subjectmatter and go on presuppose ad bonum rrocatuiappetirusnaturalis.-Quaedam sciences propenies of it. Rather, the the to demonstraie aliqua cognitione; vero ad bonum inclinantur cum ipsam rationem sciencewhich deals with extraneousopinions is non quidem sic quod cognoscant for it fallsto metaphysics aliquodbonum paniculare; metaphysics, boni, sed cognoscant -tod-efend.the (seeST Ia, q. l, a. qui cognoscitdulceet album et aliquid first principlesof all the sciences sicut sensus, that Thomas huiusmodi.Inclinatio autemhanc cognitionemse- 8). fherefore, it is understandable of free actswithin his quens,dicitur appetitussensitilrrs.Quaedamvero doesnot defendthe existence quacognos- moral treatises. ad bonumcum cognidone inclinanrur llFor this point, seealsothe following texts:De quodestpropriumintelboni rationem; cunt ipsam q. 22, a. 7 (Leonine, 629-30);ST Ia IIae, q. inclinantur in bonum; aeritate, lecrus.Et haecperfectissime a'2;Demalo, ; ' 5 ,a . 8 ;q . 1 0 , 1 , a a . 5 8 ;q . 2 , a a . 7 - 8q in directa solummodo alio qirasi ab non quidem As a representative in 9.6, a. un. (Leonine,145-51). bonum, sicut ea quae cognitione carent;ne_que "sicnecesse estquodomnis bonum parricularitertantum, sicut ea in quibusest text,STIa IIae,Q.5,a.8: velit. Ratio autembeatitudinis cognitio; sedquasiinclinata in ipsum homo beatitudinem solasensitiva Cum est ut sit bonum perfecrum. bonum.Et haccinclinatiodicitur volu-n- cornmunis uriversale tas. Unde, cum angeli per intellecrurncognoscant autent bonuru sit obiecrum voluntalis, perfccrum rationem boni, manifestrunest bonum estalicuiusquod totaliter eiusvoluntati satipsamuniversalem isfacit. Unde appetelebeatitudinemnihil aliud est voluntas." quod in eis sit "intellectus quam saderur." SSee ut voluntas appetere enim q. 22,a. 5, ad 3: Deaeritate, ' t+Di ieritate,q. 22,a. 7: "Aliis enim rebusinditus etsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid non tamen nominat ipsaminclinationemhominis,sedvoluntas est naturalis appetitus alicuius rei determinatae, ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat" (I-eonine, sicut cravi quod sit deorsum,et unicuique etiam suam secundum animaiiid quod estsibi conveniens 62+,2)8-241). 9For this point, seeesp.De aeritnte,q. 25, a. I naturam; sid homini inditus est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetatnaturaliter (Leonine,727-30).

(Leor IIae, 145-: tv in ter in Tl secura have respo tions wishe tion. Prychr vol. 225der F 6De (t962 liben uon ( doctri,
have i natior throu undel 2v) mora. will's princ.

truth: only i holdir in Th not nt act of g-2,a

The Will and Its Acts (a trae, qq. 6-17)


22Thisis what happens a personavoids whenever completumin bonitate.Sedin quoista comseesse pletio consiitat,utruln in virnrtibus vel scientiisvel havingto makea chtice simply by refusingto think ielecadonibusvel huiusmodialiis,non estei deter- abouiwhateverthe mafter might be. 23"Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod minatum a natura" (Leonine,630, 5G60). Seealso voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet ad6. l5"quia ornnes apPetunt suam perfectionem potentia in suum obiectum: et etiam ipse finis ulsicut timus, qui hoc modo sehabetin appetibilibus, adimpleri,quaeestratio ultimi finis . . '" l6be mah, 9. 6, a. un.: t'set forma intellecta est prima irincipia demonstrationumin intelligibiliomnia illa quaeconveniuntvouniversalis,sob qoa multa possunt comprehendi. Lus:et universaliter natunm. Non enim per suam secundum lenti nulquibus in Unde cum acntssint in singularibus, ad lum est quod adequetpotentiam universalis,re- voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ac pemnent quae ea potentiam etiam sed voluntatis; martetincirnatio voluntatis indeterminate sehabens Unde hominem. potentias, torum et ad iinzulas in domus formam concipiat si artifex multa; sicut ad universali, sub qua comprehenduntur diversefigure .t"tirttlit". homo vult non solumobiectumvolunaut domus, potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc-quod tis, sedetiam aliaquaeconveniuntaliispotentiis: esse et quae intellectui; convenit veri, faciatdomum quadraam vel rotundamvel alterius comitionem .t-rriu... et alia huiusmodi,quaerespiciuntconsisfi gure" (Leonine, l+8, 287-96)' 17 tentiam naturalem;quae omnia comprehenduntur q. 25, a. I (Leonine,727-10). De aeritate, l8On this point seealsoDe aeritate, sub obiecto voluntatis sicut quaedamparticularia q.22, aa'54 (Leonine, 6tl-29); ST Ia, q. 60,a, 2; q. 82, a. 2; Ia 2aThe Latin terrns are respectively, aohmtas, inIIae, q. 10, aa.l-2; De nulo,9' 6, a. un' (Leonine, tentio, and fntiab (directed to ends) and electio,con145-53). lgThe treatrnentof the freedomof the will's acts ,*nu, ord zsar (directed toward means). I shall use the English equivalens' is to be found eenerallv and specification in terms of exercise " 25Th; act of enjoymentls directed to the posin Thomas'slater works, especiallyin the Prim'a andin q. 6 of Demah. Somecommentators sessedgood; all otheis are directed to goods or evils secundae morosa(ST have seenthe introduction of this distinction as a ,rot y"iDottessed. Sins such as delectatio (Ia IIa9, envy 6-8), aa. 74, Iiae,-q. Ia proposi9. 36), or of certain to the condemnation response enjoytions in Paris in 1270, maintaining that Thomas jealousy are instances of morally significant sadnesses. and ments self-moand the will'sfreedom wishedto emphasize 26In considering the factors that affect the moralproblems see O. Lottin, of these tion.For discussion specialweight on the la,vs of an action, T=homas iry ed', aux Kie et XIIIe iicles,2d et ntorale Prycbologie "ol. t lcembloux: J. Ducolot, 1957), 207-16' o6iect and the end (ST Ia IIae, q. I 8, aa. 5-7) which "Philosophie und Theologie ".. th. objects respectively ofchoice and intention' 22543. O.-H. Pesch, disp. Thus, in evaluating the moraliry of a given action, in quaest. Aquin von Thomas bei Freiheit der Zeincbrift 13 the most importanl acts of the will are the choice 6 De malo," Miinchutr tbeohgiscbe "La and the intention, both being actsof free-will.These (1962\: 1-25; and H. M' Manteau-Bonamy, Thomasd'Aquin(la data- two acts, saysThomas, constirute a-single willing, libert6de I'hommeselon d'bistoire although ot" ."t always distinguish them on the Arcbhtes Malo)," tion de la Q. Disp. De 2, et lineraireda moymage46 (1979):7-34, basisof the distinction in their objects (Ia IIae, q. I doctrinale ^ . 4 ) . the condemto response havearzuedthatThomas's 27For Thomas's use of the tetm simpler aoluntas, ,r"tions" accentuated. -ouirn.ttt to be found "voluntaristic" ST IIIa, q. 18, a. 4; q. 21, a. 4'ln De aeitate, see more towarda hiscareer throuphout Thomas referi to this act under the name of simplex of choice. underitanding 2oThis point underliesthe principle that the uelle;seeq.22, aa.l3-14 (Leonine, 64348)' 28"Ad quartum dicendum quod intenrio est acrus upon how the of the will depends moral goodness finis. Sed voluntas respicit-finem voluntatiirespectu a will's object is presentedto it by the intellect, of tripliciter. Uno modo, absolute: sic dicitur voluntas, discussions principlethat iJcentralto Thomas's
the moraLry of acting oll an el'l'otlcousconsclellce (S'l'Ia llae, q. 19,aa.2-61. 21I should note that in cases of non-necessary truths-the will plays a role not tnrths-contingent only in consideiation but also in t}re assentor withholding of assent.This role of the will is highlighted in Thomas's discussion of the act of faith which is not made on the basis ofnatural evidence, but by an act of the will under the influence of grace @a IIae, q.2, a. l, ad2). ur'rut ,bsolutc ruluntus vel slnitrtcur rel si quid Aliu rrirJu euirsiJclanu' finis ,liu.l .r, huiusru.-, et hoc modo fruitio quiescitur: in eo quod secundum respicit finem. Grtio-modo consideratur finis se".rndrr* quod est terminus alicuius quod -in ipsum ordinaturi et sic intentio respicit finem. Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem, quia volumus eam: sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire." Seealso Da aeritate, q- 22, aa. I 3-l 5 (Leonine, 64349).


David M. Gallagher
thing), and not the act of the will governedby the comhand, that is, not the act of use.The act of the by command,then, woulc will that is presupposed trte normally be choice,for the commandto exercise other powerhasmoving force only if the person_has alreadvchosento carry out that act. Thomas does mention the possibilitythat commandand useprecede choice. What he has in mind is that in the deliberation that precedeschoice the intellect is in a voluntary way and hencethere must exercised be acts of command and use, acts which obviously precedethe choice.In this casethe willing that is prior to commandwould be the willing of the end, ior it is the desirefor the end that movesa person about the means(q. 17, a' 3, ad l). to deliberate 37"IJnde fruitio peninerevidetur ad amoremvel quam aliquishabetde ultimo expecdelectationem tato, quod estfinis." 38"Ipmautem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacenria boni; motus autem ad bonum est quiesautemin bono vel concupiscentia; desiderium est gaudiumvel delectatio.. . . Delectatioenim est fruitioboni..." 39Hope of the irascible and despairareaffections to desiredgoodswhos: acquiappetitewith respect ofdifficulty.Therefore,any sition presensan aspect of is already good that is hoped for or despaired loved(ST Ia IIae,q. 25,a. l). Hate Iesiredandhence evil is a privation love because (odiurn) presupposes of a good and so one hatesa privation only if one or the good that the privation diminishes first l,oves he because would liate sickness asa p"erson destroys, first loveshealth(q. 25,a. 2). "Respondeo aOST dicendum Ia IIae,q. 25,a.2: quod omne agensagit propter finem aliquem, ut i ora dictum est. Finis autemest bonum desideraruitl et amarum unicuique.Unde manifesnlm est sit, agit quamquod omne agens,quodcumque crr-q.t. actionemei aliquo amore." Also ad 2: "Unde omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque procedit etiam ex amore' sicut ex prima passione, Cf. Ia, q. 20,a. 1. causa." +rArist. 5):"Amareestvellealicui Rb. 2.+(l 380b3 bonum." 42ForThomas'sdocrrine on antor amicitiaeand seealsoIa, q. 60, a. 3; IIa IIae, amorconcupiscentiae, lect.9, n. chap.4, q. 23,a. 1;q. 25,a.2;In dia.nom', +05. $In d.ia. nom.,chap.4,lect. 10,nn. 404-5. aaThisquoation appears of within the discussion upon tlle person how the graviry of a sin depends dicendumquod perwhom it offends:"Respondeo obiectum est quodammodo sonain quam peccanrr, Dictum estautemsupraquodprima gravitas peccati. peccatianenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto anenditur maior gravitasin peccato,quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. Fines autem prlnc homr aliqu, unun 4sl chapr




,i I

29Seen. 22 above. 30In III Snt., d. 29, a. 3, ad 3 (Moos, 930). For Thomas's arguments for a natural love of God, see In III Sent.,d.29, a.3 (Moos, 927-30); ST Ia, q. 60, a . 5 ; I a I I a e , q . 1 0 9 ,a . 3 ; I I a I I a e , q . 2 6 , a . 3 . T w o examples Thomas gives of spontaneous willings arising are those of a person willing to be warm when cold (Ia IIae, q. 9, a. 5, ad 2) and ofa person naturally being repelled when having a wound cauteized (fIIa, q. 18, a. 5). The latter, being a negative willing by which one tends away from an evil, can be called anoluntas(IaIIae, q.8, a. 1, ad 1). ' 3l"Similiter voluntas ut natura repudiat ea quae naturae sunt contraria, et quae sunt secundum se mala, puta mortem et alia huiusmodi. Haec tamen quandbque voluntas per modum rationis eligere potest ex ordine ad finem: sicut etiam in aliquo puro homine sensualitas eius, et etiam voluntas absolute considerata, refu git ustionem, quam voluntas secundum rationem elegit propter finem sanitatis'" l2When one considers Thomas's undersanding (incontinentia),inwhich there are two ends of nkrasi.a to which a person is attracted (pleasure versus obedience to the divine law, for example), it seemsclear that the willing of the end for which the person does not act is a real willing but does not aftain the level of intentio. In short, the notions of ooluntas and aelleitashelp to understand all the cases in which there seems to be a conflict within a persont own will. The notion is also imponant for Thomast explanation of how a person can legitirnately will what God doesnotwill (STIa IIae, q. 19, a. l0; IIIa' q . 1 8 ,a a .5 - 6 ; q . 2 1 , a a . 2 , 4 ) . l3"Voluntas autem simpliciter hominis est voluntas rationis: hoc enim absolute volumus quod secundum deliberatam rationem volumus. Illud autem quod volumus secundum monlm sensualitatem, vel edam secundummonrm voluntatissimplicis'quae consideraturut natura, non simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid: scilicet, si aliud non obsistat quod " oer deliberationem rarionis invenitur. l4"consensus nominat applicationem appetitivr in potestateapplicanmotus ad aliquid praeexistens tis." l5Aquitras uraintaius, moreover, that even when the two acts are identical. thev still remain distinct When the in terms of their intelli glbilines (rationes). will's act is taken as consent it is being understood as simply a berng-pleasedwith the action as an acceptable action; when the will's act is taken as choice the action is taken as an action to be done in preference to other actions not to be done (ST la I I a e , q . 1 5 . ,a . 3 ) . 36Thomas defines command (imperiwt) as an act ofreason presupposing an act ofthe will (ST Ia IIae, q. 17, a. l). What he has in mind is an act of the will prior to the command bywhich that command gets its moving force (reason alone does not move any-

prim: treati them ated) way ( a.3, z view is the prim: recut law


Sele Br Histo Warr C;

Samt Aquit nine l 882

Actic lotopl borg 1982. G, tiona

2 9( r

Thor pbie,

The Will and Is Acts QaIIae, qq' 6-17)

orincipaleshumanorum acruum sunt Deus' ipse propter ho*o, "t pto*imus:quidquidenim facimus, trium horum etiam quamvis facimus; rtiq""a ni-." subaltero ordinerur"' unum 4iFot this doctrine in Aquinas,seeesp'SCG m' -'-6i["'tit"llarity chaps22,ll2. to Kant's kingdorn of endslies primarily in the fait that the moral life is a mafter ot L.*ing'p"tt"ns properly,which meansas endsin themsi,resand nbt as orderedto someoth91(cr-e"i"al l.i"S. All other beingsenter t}remoral lifety (5 r tta rtae'q' )o' way of their relation to persons ". i. ad 3). Thomas doesnot, howwer, sharel(ants view of tire autonomyof theseendssuchthat.each i, th" ,oo.." of mori law.For Thomas,God is the sourceof law and all other personshave ;ti*;; iectituie of will-moral rectirude-by obeyingthat '-"irIn Iaw alsoST d.29,a. 3 (Moos,927-10); III Srnt., a' 3' Ia, q.60, a. 5; Ia IIae,q. 109,


"pg6on andEthicsinThomasAquinas'" --. 4 (1995):5l-:71' Aaa PbihsoPhict "Intellectualisme et Garrieou-Lagrange, R. PbiScimces des Rant'e Safit T"homas." 'libert6 c"hez

-7 ; : 649 hgiqua.t (I 907) o i tq" o * rne i' op .3 lll 09,'

rn Liod:r7's 5-j2. Ti'ans' and repr. (with changes) 1949' Louis:-Herder,St' Niure. His and Erirn-ce -"Klobertattr, George P. Ttte PhilosopUtIHyry! Nzzre. NewYork Appleton-Century-Crotts'I v) J' jugemnt' unrs' Lebacqz, Joseph.Librearbitreet 1963' Brouwer, de sels:Descl6e "La preuvede la libert6 humarne Lottin, Odon. deTlt4ologie d'Aquin ." Recbercbes fnomas .tt.-" t.i"i 23 (1956\ 323-30', et m1diiaale ancimne "The Natural l)esre tor O'Conner, Wlliam R. 26 (1949): fUppitt"tt." Tbe Modon Schoolman 9l-120. (1953):361-409. '--Pirr", S. Tltoma d'Aluin' Smnme Servais. Lesaaeshumains'Vol' I (Ia llae 6-17)' fi;i;;iq"t. du Cerf, 1962. ParisiEditions - * --ltOer als Sinn fi;r die Freundschafisliebe Setyynn In Ethik'" thomistischen der Unatsache niiii' u""r*chungm zur Grundleg'ng der Etbt;k' fJ.--n n"g.lhardtl Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald' t9 ' 63. Klaus. Die Tian'nntdenzderFreiheit Riesenhuber, tjer Wilk in der Antbropoh-gie.-und t"*-C"ii. PhrlosoaonAquin' Pu'llac,her Thomas Metaohvsikdes 8. Munich: Berchmanskolleg phisihJ Forschungen V -Si;;", erlae,1971. of Choiu'-Ed' l^tltt Yves R' Freednm N"* York: FordhamUniversirvPress'1969' \ltolff. ' ':;iil";, "Narural Necesiitation,ofthe nou.t P. linll." Th, Thomist 14 (1951):351-99' H;;"; 490-528. '. Aristotle' W"rtberg, D aniel.Right Practtcal.Reason: in Aquinas'Oxford: Clarendon' ActionandFradence

Selected Further Reading An Tlt-ought: Bourke,Vernoir.I. Will in Westem and Sheed York New Srn'uey. - Hiieo-Crltlcal Ward,l964. -"j",r" (fhomas of \to)' Commentary on the de qq. 6-17' In SanctiTbomae Sr*tio Th)ologiae, LeoXIII' Leonis iaoino oprrno;ria htsn impnsaque nine ed. Vol. 6' Rome: Editori di san tommaso' 1882-. "Thollas Aquinas Alan' Donagan, 'Cambridge 91 Pbillistory of LaterMedie,aal A..ion.""ln rlnanoJ' Kenny' A' Kretzmann, Ed. N' losobhy. boig.' Carnbridge: Cambridge Universiry Press' 1982. "{qlit1: on \4iill as RaCailagher,David M' tional Afipetite."Journalof ibe lIittrtrl of Pbihnphv 29(le9l):55e-84.

1994. "Der Begriffder Freiheit Albert. Zi^*..-.nn, uon Aq.utn nach Thomas von Aquin'" ln Thomas -(iii+-iiiO. Munich: oeing-Hanhoff' L. Ed. der Philoso' Thomas Aquinas."lrcbia fiir Guchiehte 1974. Kosel-Verlag, (1994):2+7-77 pbie,76