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Elsa Zhou Stacie Hanneman from the Qing empire to a Chinese nation-state 3 May 2012 Rationality Eighteenth century

Enlightenment period Europe was a time of great progress, many changes, and numerous innovations. Characterized by a shift away from superstition, religion, and the restraints of custom, the enlightenment age turned to scientific inquiry and the power of reason as guides in human affairs. It was during this time that the Western concept of rationality entered into the consciousness, presented as a sort of inherent logic that all individuals possess. In examining what this idea of rationality entails, placed within the context of European dealings with Qing dynasty China, I will argue that use of the term rationality has strong ties with very western ideas of economics. For the Western framework of thinking, we will see that notions of market economy, division of labor, accumulation of capital, individualism etc., come to represent the rational and logical. But beyond what these concepts meant for the European mindset of the time, understanding this western economic rationality is important because it questions assumptions made about the Qing and reveals certain notions within the historiographical discourse on Qing Dynasty China. To historically specify the meaning of this term rationality, we come to James Mathesons text Present Positions and prospects of the British Trade With China, In his attempt to persuade the British government to open up trade with China, Matheson complains that the Chinese are arbitrary imposing unfair laws upon the British subjects, manipulative forcing the British to pay bribes, and insolent treating the British without respect in general. However, what seems to bother him most is that the Chinese threaten to simply end trade with the British if

they are unsatisfied. In one instance, in response to the complaints of the British merchants, they simply reply, If the foreigners dislike our restrictions, as difficult to be endured, it is perfectly competent to them not to take the trouble to come so great a distance.1 For Matheson, it seems the reason why this is so frustrating is not simply because he is angered that the Chinese do not care about trade with Britain. Rather, it is because he cannot understand why the Chinese would reject profit when the opportunity presents itself. For him, increased accumulation of capital is logical; the Chinese who are not so inclined are irrational. Ironically, in return, the Viceroy of Cantons judgment of the British is that, They are a mercenary gain-scheming set of adventurers, whom reason cannot rule. The dread of not making money is that which alone influences them.2 Thus we see that for Matheson, the irrationality of the Chinese, in part, rises out of his lack of comprehension of their priorities. On the other hand, what Matheson sees as rational, is Vattels theory of natural law, based on the idea that all nations should want to participate in commerce, indeed even has an obligation to trade with other nations for their mutual benefit. It is this idea that a rational human being must want to maximize profit and engage in free trade that becomes in opposition to the Chinese mindset, labeled as backwards and cultural. Thus we see the beginnings of the western economic rationality. But moving beyond the use of the term rationality in regards to the dealings between two nations during the Qing dynasty, John Fairbanks analysis shows that this economic rationality has a hand in structuring the historiographical discourse since then as well. In Fairbanks analysis of the tribute system, we see that the entire structure of his analysis is founded upon an exchange relationship between ______________
1

James Matheson, Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China: together with an outline of some leading occurrences in its past history (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1836), 11.
2

Matheson, Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, 18.

China and her tributaries. In return for ordering foreign relationships and the acknowledgement of the Emperor as the mandate of heaven, China allows these smaller neighboring states to trade on her shores. It is interesting to note that for Fairbank, the entire motivating factor the neighboring states to come to China is for trade and profit. In fact he even says, That tribute was a cloak for trade has been axiomatic ever since merchants from the Roman orient reached Cattigara in 166 A.D 3 Here we see that Fairbank makes assumptions about why neighboring states come to China, attributing their willingness to pay tribute to the profit motive of trading with China. Furthermore, Fairbanks entire analysis becomes based upon this system of exchange values. The kow-tow is in exchange for the emperors benevolence. The paying of tribute is in exchange for the material benefits of this process. In this we see that Fairbanks analysis is structured around a very western economic framework of exchange, incentives, and increasing profit. In his critique of China, he uses the same western economic rationality seen in Mathesons critique, and attributes the things that dont fit into what is rational as an ignorance of foreign realities and a willful refusal to take them into account. 4 In Fairbanks analysis of the tribute system, the blindness of the Chinese to the motivations of the tribute states which , for him, could logically only be for trade is the cause of their downfall. To some extent, we also see something similar happening in James Polachecks analysis in his text, The Inner Opium War. In one sense, his analysis is completely opposite of Fairbanks, presenting a history completely from the standpoint of Chinese motivations. Yet as Polacheck presents this history in terms of how China brought the opium wars upon themselves, we can _____________
3

John Fairbank, Tributary Trade and Chinas Relations with the West, The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1 no. 2 (February 1942): 138.
4

Judith B. Farquhar and James L. Hevia, Culture and Postwar American Historiography of China in positions 1 no. 2 (1993): 493.

also see echoes of this western economic rationality in the way Polacheck interprets the actions of the Qing. In his discussion of the different parties of the Qing government involved in the start of the opium war, Polacheck states, Though disagreeing among themselves, these different actors nevertheless had reached agreement by the late 1830s that interrupting foreign trade with Britain did not hold the real answer to the fiscal woes [of China]. If their views had prevailed, there probably never would have been an opium war.5 In these lines Polacheck states outright that trying to end foreign trade with Britain was not the resolution to the problems of the Chinese state. In fact, throughout Polachecks analysis, there is pervading sense that trying to restrict commerce, like the Chinese attempted, is not feasible or reasonable and that the rational, practical path to follow can only be to allow the free flow of commerce. In this way, Polacheck seems to ground his analysis based upon certain assumptions about the way commerce should work, creating an opposition wherein he dismisses the ideological view of banishing opium for moral reasons, and endorses the more practical view of regulating the opium trade to turn it into a mutually beneficial enterprise for the Qing as well as the British. Through presenting the situation in this way, Polacheck creates a certain framework that not only makes assumptions about trade and the market economy, but also about the Qings considerations of governance. In the end, we see that Polacheck assumes that certain ideas of western economic rationality must be apparent and within the considerations of the Qing, placing his interpretation of Qing motivations within certain categories that may not have truly applied to them at the time. Thus from these articles, we can see how the idea of European economic rationality has impacted not only the actors directly involved, but also the structures used to understand and analyze history. ____________
5

James Polachek, The Politics of Opium Suppression in The Inner Opium War (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1992), 103.

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