International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.

*, ___________ 2011

EnhanceTrustBasedRoutingTechniquesagainstSinkholeAttackin AODVbasedVANET
A.Chinnasamy
Assistant professor/IT Tagore Engineering College Vandalur, Chennai -127

Dr S.Prakash
Professor/ECE Jerusalem College of Engineering, Chennai -100

P.Selvakumari
Assistant Professor/CSE Tagore Engineering College Vandalur, Chennai -127

chinnasamyamb@gmail.c om

Prakash.sav4@gmail.com

pselvakumari@hotmail.co m

ABSTRACT
Adhoc network is a collection of wireless nodes communicating among themselves over multihop paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points. Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are self-organizing, self-configuring confederation of wireless systems. At present, vehicular networks are still not considered to be very efficient because of their rapid topology changes and their highly dynamic structure. The Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks security attack is a challenging job. A new routing protocol based on the trust model is proposed and analysed in this paper. Here each node calculates trust value and association status for all its neighboring nodes through monitoring its behavior in the network. The trust model is integrated into the Adhoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) protocol which is the most common on demand routing protocol used in VANET. In the proposed scheme the route is not selected on the basis of first arrival of Route Reply and waits till it gets the Route Reply from all neighboring nodes and decides the path to be routed based on the nature of Association between them. Thus the Sinkhole nodes will be identified and will not be given preference in the route selection. The performance the proposed protocol is evaluated by comparing the Ns-2 simulation results of it with Standard AODV in presence of Sinkhole nodes. The simulation results demonstrate.

Keywords
VANET, AODV, Sinkholeattacks, Trust, Malicious nodes, Security.

INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks are a collection of nodes, which form a temporary network. There is no fixed infrastructure in adhoc Network environments each node may act as source or as a router. Nodes that cannot communicate directly depend on their neighbors in order to forward their messages to the appropriate destination every node of these wireless networks behave as routers and take part in discovery and maintenance of routes to other nodes in the network. Ad hoc networks are useful in the emergency operations and in which persons need to share information and data quickly. The security for routing protocols should be an important component in VANET. Security in such infrastructure-less networks has been proven

to be a challenging task. many, security threats arise against Vehicular ad hoc networks, as they are inherently vulnerable due to the way the build and preserve connectivity characteristics.The open medium presents the network with the first and most serious vulnerability. This paper addresses the problem of trust based routing in Mobile ad hoc network. The routing algorithm must react quickly to topological changes as per the degree of Trust of a node or a complete path between a source and a Destination pair. Trust is always established between two parties for a specific action. In particular, one party trusts the other party to perform an action. Trust may be referred as belief or reputation of one entity to other to perform an action. Trust in entities is based on the fact that the trusted entity will not act maliciously in a particular situation. In this case direct trust is established between two nodes rather nodes become dependent of the previous calculations of other neighboring nodes. Our goal in this paper is to present the trust- based route selection to the existing implementation of the AODV routing protocol of VANET to improve the security aspects of the routing protocol [1]. We also perform detailed simulation study for the proposed secure routing protocol for VANET. The main contributions of this paper are: Improving the security of the existing AODV protocol by enhancing a trustbased route selection. Comparing the implemented routing protocol with the existing AODV protocol, using simulations. Simulation experiments are the main tool for testing VANET routing protocols. Simulation experiments need to be conducted before any real implementation. Although many new security measures specifically designed for VANET systems have been proposed recently, such as Security Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector routing (SAODV) [2], Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) [3], Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [4], the literature survey illustrates that no specific article deals about the Sinkhole attack in AODV. This paper gives out the solution to combat against the greyhole attacks in mobile adhoc environment.

VANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS

The routing protocols mainly classified into three major categories proactive, reactive and hybrid. Proactive protocols continuously learns topology of the network by exchanging topological information among network nodes, where each node builds its own routing table which it can be use to find

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011 path to destination. If the network topology changes too frequently, the cost of maintaining network might be very high. DSDV, FSR belongs to this category. In reactive routing nodes do not exchange any routing information. A source node obtains path to specific destination only when it needs to send some data to it. AODV, DSR are some example of this category. Hybrid routing protocols is a combination of both reactive and proactive routing protocols. ZRP will represent this category. control network-wide broadcasts of RREQ packets, the source node use an expanding ring search technique. In this technique, source node starts searching the destination using some initial time to live (TTL) value. If no reply is received within the discovery period, TTL value incremented by an increment value. This process will continue until the threshold value is reached. When an intermediate node forwards the RREQ, it records the address of the neighbor from which first packet of the broadcast is received, thereby establishing a reverse path. It replies by unicasting the route towards the source node. As the RREP is routed back along the reverse path, the intermediate nodes paths are forwarded to the destination route table. When the RREP reaches the source node, a route from source to the destination established. Route Maintenance A route established between source and destination pair is maintained as long as needed by the source. If the source node moves during an active session, it can reinitiate route discovery to establish a new route to destination. However, if the destination or some intermediate node moves, the node upstream of the break remove the routing entry and send route error (RERR) message to the affected active upstream neighbors. These nodes in turn propagate the RERR to their precursor nodes, and so on until the source node is reached. The affected source node may then choose to either stop sending data or reinitiate route discovery for that destination by sending out a new RREQ message.

VANET ROUTING PROTOCOL

Proacti ve

Reactiv e

Hybrid

FSR

DSD V

AOD V

DSR

ZRP

REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOL Aodv Routing Protocol

The AODV is a very simple, efficient, and effective routing protocol which is use mostly. This algorithm was motivated by the limited bandwidth that is available in the media that are used for wireless communications. Obtaining the routes purely on-demand makes AODV a very useful and desired algorithm for VANET. Ad-hoc On-demand distance vector (AODV) is a purely reactive routing protocol or demand routing protocol. AODV is another variant of classical distance vector routing algorithm, based on DSDV and DSR. Routing information is maintained in routing tables at nodes and every mobile node keeps a next-hop routing table, which contains the destinations to which it currently has a route. AODV provides loop free routes while repairing link breakages but unlike DSDV, it doesnt require global periodic routing advertisements. Apart from reducing the number of broadcast resulting from a link break, AODV also has other significant features. Whenever a route is available from source to destination, it does not add any overhead to the packets. However, route discovery process is only initiated when routes are not used and/or they expired and consequently discarded. This strategy reduces the effects of stale routes as well as the need for route maintenance for unused routes. AODV is the ability to provide unicast, multicast and broadcast communication. Route Discovery When a node wants to send a packet to some destination node and does not locate a valid route in its routing table for that destination, it initiates a route discovery process. Source node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors, which then forwards the request to their neighbors and so on. It indicates the broadcast of RREQ across the network. To

Aodv Routing Protocol Attacks

The two types of routing protocols attacks, an active attack and passive attack. Denial of Services and flooding: They are considered as indirect results of the aforementioned attacks. A direct Denial of Services attack, introduced in, is the sleep deprivation torture. One node, or colluding nodes, continually request the services offered by the target node. This consumes the battery of the target, which goes into an idle or power saving state. Wormhole: where a malicious node uses a path outside the VANET (tunnel) to forward packets to another node in the fixed network. According to, the route discovery methods of on-demand, routing protocols are violated by avoiding the normal route and by forwarding the RREQ packets directly to the destination. Message Suppression Attack: An attacker selectively dropping packets from the network, these packets may hold critical information for the receiver, the attacker suppress these packets and can use them again in other time. The goal of such an attacker would be to prevent registration and insurance authorities from learning about collisions involving his vehicle and/or to avoid delivering collision reports to roadside access points. For instance, an attacker may suppress a congestion warning, and use it in another time, so vehicles will not receive the warning and forced to wait in the traffic. Fabrication Attack: An attacker can make this attack by transmitting false information into the network, the information could be false or the transmitter could claim that it is somebody else. This attack includes fabricating messages, warnings, certificates, Identities. Alteration Attack: This attack happens when attacker alters an existing data. It includes delaying the transmission of the information, replaying earlier transmission, or altering the actual entry of the data transmitted.

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011 Impersonation or spoofing: Such an attacker will try to spoof a node that resides in the route of the data flow of interest. Such an attack can be materialized since the conventional routing protocols (e.g., AODV, DSR, TORA, and ZRP) do not support authentication of IP addresses. A similar threat is called Sybil attack. An attacker does not only impersonate one node, but it assumes the identity of several nodes, and, thus, undermines the redundancy of many routing protocols. Sybil Attack: It is a critical attack. In this type of attack an attacker transmits multiple messages with different ids to the other vehicles. In this way other vehicles feels that these messages are coming from different vehicles, so there is a jam further and they are enforced to take alternate route . In other words we can say that the main task of the attacker is to provide an illusion of multiple vehicles to other vehicles and to enforce them to choose alternate route and leave the rod for the benefits of the attacker. This task is done by sending multiple messages with different ids. Sinkhole: A method wherein an attacker tries to attract all the data sent by its neighbours. This attack is the basis for example, eavesdropping. Sinkhole attackers present themselves to adjacent nodes as the most attractive relay in a multi-hop route. Black Hole: In this problem a node refuses to participate in the network or when an established node drops out to form a black hole. In this all the traffic of the network get redirected towards a specific node which is actually doesnt exists which results in data lost. The malicious code chooses whether to drop a packet to perform a denial-of-service attack or to use its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack. estimates a partial trust value for a given node based on the information received by the Classifier.

Distinctiveness of Trust
1. Trust is dynamic. 2. Not static. 3. Trust is subjective. 4. A decision method to determine trust against an entity should be fully distributed since the existence of a trusted third party. 5. Trust should be determined in a highly customizable manner without excessive computation and communication load, while also capturing the complexities of the trust relationship. 6. A trust decision framework for VANETs should not assume that all nodes are cooperative. In resource-restricted environments, selfishness is likely to be prevalent over cooperation. 7. Trust is not necessarily transitive. The fact that a trusts B and B trusts C does not imply that A trusts C. 8. Trust is asymmetric and not necessarily reciprocal. 9. Trust is context-dependent. A may trust B as a wine expert but not as a car fixer.

Simulation
The network simulator is an object oriented simulator, written in c++, with an OTcl interpreter as a frontend.In this section we have described about the tools and methodology used in our paper for analysis of ad-hoc routing protocol performance. Simulation Setup (traffic scenario, Single hop, Multi hop, Mobility model) performance metrics used and finally the performance of protocols is represented by using excel graph. Table 1. Parameter for Simulation Parameters Protocol Name Name of the Simulator Transmission range Packet size Transmission rate Nodes speed Simulation time Number of nodes Map size Maximum Malicious nodes Movement Model Types of attack Traffic Model Setting AODV Ns-2 200m 512 byte 5 packets/sec 25 m/s 800 s 40 1000 m *1000 m 15 nodes Random Sinkhole attack Constant Bit Rate

Trust Model
Trust is defined as a set of relations among entities that participate in a protocol. These relations are based on the evidence generated by the previous interactions of entities within a protocol. In general, if the interactions have been faithful to the protocol, then trust will accumulate between these entities. Trust has also been defined as the degree of belief about the behavior of other entities or agents. The goal is to provide nodes with a mechanism to evaluate the trust level of its direct neighbors. Our model can be divided in two distinct layers learning layer and trust layer. The Learning layer is responsible for gathering and converting information into knowledge. The Trust layer defines how to assess the trust level of each neighbor using the knowledge information provided by the Learning layer and the information exchanged with direct neighbors. Both layers can interact with all layers of the TCP/IP model. In this paper, we focus on the Trust layer. Trust layer defines how to assess the trust level of each neighbor using the knowledge information provided by the Learning plan and the information exchanged with neighbors. In learning plane, the Behavior Monitor observes neighbors in order to collect information about their behavior. It must be able to notice other nodes actions and transmit them to the Classifier. The Behavior Monitor also indicates the presence of new neighbors to the Recommendation Manager. The Classifier decides the quality of an action according to a previously defined classification. The Classifier then sends its verdict to the Experience Calculator. Experience Calculator

Malicious route containing Sinkhole

Now in order to detect the Sinkhole, the proposed approach attempts to find the number of hops on the second shortest route between two alternate nodes starting from the source S. If number of hops in the second shortest path is greater that

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011 the predefined threshold, then it is declared that the Sinkhole is present between the two nodes.

For example the malicious path containing the closed Sinkhole is S->1->2->6->D.

D S s 1 4 5 6 S I

SI

SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS DISCUSSION

THROUGUPUT: Throughput refers to how much data can be transferred from one location to another in a given amount of time. It is used to measure the performance. Throughput is usually measured in bits per second (bit/s or bps), and sometimes in data packets per second. Throughput = received packets packet size simulation time DELAY: The packet end-to-end delay is the time of generation of a packet by the source up to the destination reception. So this is the time that a packet takes to go across the network. This time is expressed in sec. Hence all the delays in the network are called packet end-to-end delay, like buffer queues and transmission time. Sometimes this delay can be called as latency; it has the same meaning as delay. LATENCY: The events which the framework deals with are urgent which should be recognized immediately by the operator. Therefore, the framework has to detect and notify the events quickly as soon as possible are known as latency. LOSS: Loss determines the maximum amount of packets loss the stream can tolerate to provide good quality. Each parameter has been investigated thoroughly and many solutions are proposed such as forward error correction and interleaving.

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011

Fig 7. Nodes transmitting data in range

Fig 8 .Nodes multiple transmitting data in range Fig 6. Nodes in initial Position

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011

CONCLUSIONS
By using simple technique for detecting sinkhole attack in adhoc networks. This method employs routing variation between neighbors to determine the existence of a sinkhole. In this paper we have discussed the dynamic trust based approach through which association between nodes are used to resist sinkhole attacks connected to ad hoc networks. The help of the Ns-2 we were able to prove that the proposed scheme increases the routing security and encourages the nodes to cooperate in the ad hoc structure and isolate the malicious nodes from the active data forwarding and routing. Sergio Marti.T.J. Giuli, Kevin Lai, and Mary Baker. Mitigating routing misbehavior in Mobile ad hoc Networks Proceedings of MOBICOM 2000. Pages 255265, C. Perkins, E. Belding-Royer, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing, The Internet Society 2003. I. Khalil, S. Bagchi, and N. B. Shroff, Lifework: Detection and isolation of the wormhole attack in static multihop wireless networks, Computer Network, vol. 51, no. 13, pp. 37503772, 2007. John Keane, Trust-based Dynamic Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, MS thesis, Department of Computer Science, Trinity College Dublin, September 2002. Y. C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole attacks in wireless networks, in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2003. A. Pirzada, C. McDonald and A. Data,Performance Comparison of Trust-based Reactive Routing Protocols, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, Vol 5(6), pages 695-710, 2006. R. Maheshwari, J. GAO, and S. R. Das, Detecting wormhole attacks in wireless networks using connectivity information, in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2007. Rajiv Misra and C.R.Manda, Performance Comparison of AODV/DSR On-demand Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc Networks in Constrained Situation, in IEEE International Conference, pp. 86-89, Jan 23-25, 2008 M Raya, J Pierre Hubaux, The Security of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks , Proc. of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks, 2005. The Network Simulator ns-2. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/index.html.

REFERENCES
Subramanian Bhatts & Swathed, A Performance Study of Proactive, Reactive and Hybrid Routing Protocols using Qualnet Simulator International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume 28 No.5, August 2011. Karloff C, Wagner D. Secure routing in wireless sensor Networks: Attacks and countermeasures Proceedings of 1s IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications May 2003. Douceur J. The Sybil attack Proceedings of 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS02), March 2002. Burg A. Ad hoc network specific attacks Seminar Ad Hoc networking: Concepts, Applications, and Security. Technische Universidad Munchen, 03. Hu YC, Perrig A, Johnson DB. Packet leashes: A Defense against wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc Networks Technical Report TR01-384, Department of Computer Science, Rice University, December 2001. Michiardi P. Cooperation enforcement and network Security mechanisms for mobile ad-hoc networks Ph. D. Thesis, Ecole national superieure des telecommunications, December 2004. Jsang A. The right type of trust for distributed Systems Proceedings of ACM New Security Paradigms Workshop, September 1996.

A.Chinnasamy born on 26thNov 1981 in Salem district, Tamilnadu, India. He obtained his Bachelors degree (B.E) in Computer Science and Engineering from Anna University in 2005, Master degree (M.E) in Computer Science and Engineering from Anna University in 2008.He is currently working as Assistant Professor in the Department of Information Technology at Tagore Engineering College affiliated to Anna University, Chennai, and (INDIA). He is a Research Scholar (Part-time) in the Anna University, Chennai-25. He research interest is Wireless Communication. He is a life member of the Computer Society of India (CSI).

Dr S.Prakash born on 4thSep 1968 in Tirunelveli district, Tamilnadu, India. He obtained his Bachelors degree (B.E) in Electronics & Communication Engineering from Madurai Kamaraj University in 1990, Master degree (M.E) in Electronics & Communication Engineering from BIT, Mesra, in 1992, and Ph.D from IISc Bangalore, in 1997 from the Department of Instrumentation. He worked on contact studies in GaN materials at the NUS, Singapore. Then he continued his research in the area of thin film transistors at the University of Waterloo, CANADA. He is currently working as Associative Professor in Department of Electronics & Communication

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 8887) Volume * No.*, ___________ 2011 Engineering at Jerusalem College of Engineering affiliated to Anna University, Chennai, and (INDIA). His research interests are in the area of Memory Systems, and Wireless Communication. He is a fellow member of IETE

P.Selvakumari born on 14thMar 1983 in Salem district, Tamilnadu, India. She obtained his Bachelors degree (B.Tech) in Information Technology from Anna University in 2005, Master degree (M.E) in Computer Science and Engineering from Anna University in 2009.She is currently working as Assistant Professor in Computer Science Department at Tagore Engineering College affiliated to Anna University, Chennai, and (INDIA). She research interest is Wireless Communication.