DG Contribution To Network Security - R2 PDF

SECURITY CONTRIBUTION FROM DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
(Extension part II)

K/EL/00287/REP URN 02/1288
Contractor
UMIST/PPA
Prepared by
Ron Allan Goran Strbac Keith Jarrett
The work described in this report was carried out under contract as part of the DTI New and Renewable Energy Programme, which is managed by Future Energy Solutions. The views and judgements expressed in this report are those of the contractor and do not necessarily reflect those of the DTI or Future Energy Solutions.
First Published 2003 Crown Copyright 2003
ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report
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ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension

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SECURITY CONTRIBUTION FROM DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Final Report ______________________________
Ron Allan Goran Strbac Keith Jarrett UMIST/PPA 11 December 2002
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CONTENTS Preface Terms of reference

I Project Extension II Project deliverables III Constraints and scope of the project IV Status of final report V Presentation of report VI Acknowledgements
Executive summary 1. Background and principles

1.1. DTI objectives of project 1.2. Principles 1.3. Historical perspective 1.3.1. Existing planning standards principles used 1.3.2. Formulation of ER P2/5 1.3.2.1.1. Availability and shift patterns 1.3.2.1.2. Load shapes 1.3.2.1.3. Persistence of generation 1.3.2.1.4. Reliability studies 1.3.2.1.5. Remote connection 1.3.2.1.6. The 11kV connection 1.3.2.1.7. Maintenance regimes 1.3.2.1.8. Materiality 1.3.2.1.9. Modern distributed generation
2. Principles and details of the methodology

2.1. Basic concept of P2/5 security standard 2.1.1. Principle of group demand 2.1.2. Recommended levels of security 2.1.3. Contribution of generation to network capacity 2.1.4. Capability of a network to meet demand 2.2. Types and parameters of generation to be considered 2.2.1. Historical (pre-privatisation) generation 2.2.2. Present (post-privatisation) generation 2.2.3. Characteristics of generating plant 2.2.4. Parameters of plant and systems 2.2.5. Approaches to be developed 2.3. Generating plant with non-intermittent energy sources 2.3.1. Generation model 2.3.2. Load model 2.3.3. Evaluation of EENS of generation 2.3.4. Evaluation of EENS due to effective circuit capacity 2.3.5. Availability of effective circuit what should it be? 2.3.6. Evaluating effective generation contribution 2.3.7. Evaluating security 2.3.8. Consideration of materiality
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________________________________________ 2.3.9. Concluding comments 2.4. Generating plant with intermittent energy sources 2.4.1. Impact of intermittency 2.4.2. Modelling intermittency 2.4.3. Modelling approaches 2.4.4. Application to wind and CHP plant 2.4.5. Assessment comparing generation with equivalent circuit 2.4.5.1. Assessment approach 2.4.5.2. Evaluating generation contribution to security 2.4.6. Concluding comments 2.5. Effect of remote generation and common coupling 2.5.1. Modelling concept 2.5.2. Generating plant with non-intermittent sources 2.5.3. Generating plant with intermittent sources 2.6. Contribution by multiple generation sites 2.7. Contribution by generation not available for 24hr 2.7.1. Introduction 2.7.2. Modelling approach 2.7.2.1. Approach used in P2/5 2.7.2.2. General principles 2.7.2.3. Generation is flexible 2.7.2.4. Generation not flexible but spans peak demand 2.7.2.5. Generation not flexible but does not span peak demand
3. Data availability and plant characteristics

3.1. Introduction 3.1.1. Group demand data 3.1.2. Distribution plant reliability and operational data 3.1.2.1. Reliability statistics 3.1.2.2. Operational statistics 3.1.3. Generation export data 3.1.3.1. Historic profiles 3.1.3.2.Forecast profiles 3.2. Specific plant types 3.2.1. Conventional generation 3.2.2. CHP 3.2.3. Land- fill gas fuelled generation 3.2.3.1. Samples obtained data accessibility 3.2.3.2. Review of sample profiles 3.2.3.3. Indications from the review 3.2.4. Wind powered generation 3.2.4.1. Samples obtained data accessibility 3.2.4.2. Review of sample profiles 3.2.4.3. Indication from the review 3.2.5. Micro-generation 3.2.6. Conclusions on data access and quality 4. Numerical studies and illustrative examples 4.1. Contribution of non- intermittent generation
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________________________________________ 4.1.1. Application of methodology algorithm 4.1.2. Re-establishing Table 2 of P2/5 4.1.3. Effect of materiality 4.1.4. Effect of availability and number of units 4.1.5. Effect of shape of LDC 4.1.6. Application example 4.2. Contribution of intermittent generation 4.2.1. Application of methodology algorithm 4.2.2. Effect of persistence level 4.2.3. Effect of seasonal variations 4.2.4. Sensitivity studies 4.3. Concluding comments
5. Implementation issues
5.1. Introduction 5.2. Data availability 5.2.1. Group demand estimates 5.2.2. Distribution system performance and other data 5.2.3. Techniques for profile analysis 5.2.4. Generation profiles - typicality 5.3. Derivation of Tm 5.4. Approach to determine the effective generation capacity 5.5. Format of specifying generation contribution in updated P2/5 5.5.1. Introduction 5.5.2. Tabular approach 5.5.3. Graphs and figures approach 5.5.4. Spread-sheet approach 5.5.5. Different types of generation in one demand group 5.6. Future activities
6. Conclusions and recommendations

6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. Objectives Proposed methodology Constraints an d restrictions Implementation
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PREFACE Terms of Reference

I. Project Extension
This report describes studies that are an extension to ETSU Project K/EL/00287. These previous studies are described in a separate report, Network Security Standards with Increasing Levels of Embedded Generation, written by R.N.Allan and G.Strbac of UMIST and dated 10 August 2002. The previous report considered the aspect in more detail as its scope and objectives were much more wide-ranging. This previous Report is referred to in this report as the Main Final Report. II. Project Deliverables The main objective of this extension was to develop a methodology to assess the security contribution from modern distributed generation in order to update Table 2 of Engineering Recommendation P2/5. The agreed deliverables of this project were a report specifying the following: background, issues and objectives data requirements of the proposed methodology principles and details of the proposed methodology examples illustrating the approach and methodology conclusions and recommendations for updating Table 2 III. Constraints and Scope of the Project The constraints were set by Workstream 3 of the DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Co-ordinating Group and its Technical Steering Group, and reflected its objectives and timescales. Consequently, the constraints consisted of: the methodology should permit simple and straightforward extensions to Table 2 the approach should be consistent with the concepts and analysis underpinning the existing P2/5 the results should be implementable in the short term IV. Status of Final Report and Material This report is the Final Report of this project extension and therefore all the content, including concepts and ideas, results, discussions and conclusions are the definitive findings of our studies. V. Presentation of Report This report was commissioned by FES and it is to this organisation that the report has been officially submitted. However Workstream 3 of the DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Co-ordinating Group and its Technical Steering Group has overseen the activity. Therefore the report has also been submitted to this Workstream, and it is understood that it will provide a major input to the subsequent output of this Workstream.
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________________________________________ VI. Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Mr Pedja Djapic for his contributions in analysing the numerical examples presented in this report.
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Executive Summary
Objectives This project was conducted in order to develop a methodology that could be used to assess the contribution of distributed generation to security of supply. The present standard P2/5 for assessing this security was written in the 1970s and clearly does not reflect present-day generating units nor their mode of operation. Therefore the specification was to develop an appropriate methodology that would reflect the attributes of present-day generation but constrained in two very specific respects. Firstly the approach had to be simple, easy to implement and achievable in the short term. Secondly the approach had to be consistent with that used to develop the generation contributions specified in the present P2/5. Proposed Methodology The proposed methodology determines the capacity of a perfect circuit which, when substituted for the distributed generation, gives the same level of expected energy not supplied (EENS). This capacity is the effective contribution of the generation system. This approach is identical in concept with that used in developing the present P2/5, a conclusion confirmed by the results given in the Report, which reproduce the 67% value specified in Table 2 of P2/5. The methodology however permits a more extensive set of plant and system attributes to be considered and reflects modern types of generating units and operational modes including conventional, CHP and renewable energy units. Specifically the methodology permits the following attributes to be assessed: unit attributes: number of units, capacity of units, technology of units system attributes: peak load, load profile, multiple generation sites, remote location of generation sites, units not available for 24hr in a day availability attributes: technical availability which relates to whether the plant is in a working state, i.e. it must not have failed: energy availability which relates to whether energy is available to drive the units: commercial availability which relates to whether it is commercially available materiality attributes: the methodology is applicable to all generation sites irrespective of number of units and their capacity, whereas the present P2/5 has special considerations for one and two units particularly if these have relatively large capacities. Constraints and Restrictions The project was subject to several specified constraints. The most significant, relating to the input of how to develop the methodology, was the need to be consistent with the existing P2/5. This restricted the methodology to comparing the generation with the effective capacity of a perfect circuit and to use EENS as the reliability criterion. There are alternative approaches and alternative reliability measures against
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________________________________________ which the generation could be compared. These aspects are discussed in a companion Report1 written by two of the present authors. In addition there are several aspects relating to constraints, restrictions and applications associated with the output of the methodology, including the following. The values given by the methodology are similar in concept to the 67% value quoted in P2/5. This value is essentially an average value representing the average behaviour of the generating system. In deciding whether a system complies with P2/5, this value is treated in a deterministic sense, i.e. effective capacities are summated and compared with the requirements specified in P2/5. There is therefore an implicit assumption that this level of capacity is available at all times of need. It must be recognised that the actual contribution can be greater or less than this assessed level and therefore P2/5 itself can not, and does not, ensure that a capability is deliverable at the time of need. It can also be recognised that this variability is generally greater with generating units than circuits, and greater with a small number of units than a large number of units. For this reason, one school of thought suggests that sites with a small number of units should be treated differently. However it must be recognised that the approach underpinning the methodology treats all units irrespective of number and size in an absolutely objective manner. This is completely consistent with the concepts of P2/5, and permits the actual effective contribution to be calculated, unlike the present P2/5 which specifies a single value of 67% contribution for all unit sizes and numbers. Consequently to vary the values given by the methodology would be to impose a subjective judgement, which is outside of the scope and specification of this present project. The methodology does not evaluate directly a level of risk as would be experienced by customers. Instead it establishes a proxy to this by evaluating a capability level which is perceived to be sufficient to minimise the duration of interruptions if they occur. Indeed this is the principle and philosophy of the present P2/5. It should be noted that the inherent risk is unaffected by the methodology. Therefore, given that EENS is the criterion for assessing the contribution of generation to network security, the inherent risk to loss of supply will be no greater than that assessed by the present P2/5. It is probably worth noting however that, if sections of the system, including generation and/or other transfer capacity, are ignored in determining whether the system is P2/5 compliant, then the actual capability of the system would be greater and in excess of P2/5 requirements, and the inherent risk would be lower. This is a consequence of the assessment procedure, not the methodology. In any practical situation, the protection and stability of the generation would need to be taken into account. This is outside the scope and specification of this project, and is also outside the explicit scope of P2/5. However, even if the generation is tripped following a fault, the developed methodology is still applicable for quantifying the security contribution made by that distributed generation. This may not be available instantaneously because of the time to restore the generation but could still be a contributing factor after a short period of time, such as 1min, 15min, 3hr etc. This is again consistent with the current P2/5, which permits generation to be considered in this way.
Network Security Standards with Increasing Levels of Embedded Generation. ETSU Project K/EL/00287. Final Report by R.N.Allan and G.Strbac, UMIST, 10 August 2002.
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________________________________________ Implementation There are three main ways of implementing the methodology. The first option is a look-up table in the form of the current Table 2 of P2/5. This would retain the simplistic and practical merits of this approach, but it is likely to be slightly more complex and extensive in its application than the present table. The second option is based on families of graphs and/or figures. Here a larger range of system design parameters can be factored into the graphs to reduce the implicit approximations of the tabular approach. The third option is a computerised approach based on a spreadsheet environment. Each situation is then the subject of an individual assessment, but using a standardised approach to ensure equity of treatment whilst recognising many local or site-specific parameters. It is only this approach that can accurately assess all specific attributes pertaining to specific situations including the ability to assess different generation technologies on the same site and multiple generation sites feeding the same load group.
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1. Background and Principles

1.1. DTI Objectives of Project As part of its wide brief on the impact of distributed and modern forms of generation, the DTI has established a workstream focussed on short-term network solutions, one of which relates to the immediate problem of how best to assess the contribution to network security from distributed generation. 2 Further work on longer-term reviews of this issue is also in hand. It was decided that this shorter-term work assessment should proceed in two phases a) the development of a methodology in sufficient detail such that it can be used to form the basis of a functional specification for a subsequent phase of work b) the implementation of this methodology, i.e. collating and processing the required data, presenting the results of the analysis in the form indicated by this piece of work and producing a guidance note to be attached to the supply industrys current planning standard, Engineering Recommendation P2/5 (ER P2/5). This present document describes the work done to further item (a) above. The Terms of Reference were agreed in July 2002 and UMIST was contracted to submit the final report by 1 December 2002.
1.2. Principles It was agreed that a methodology should be able to be used so that the assessments of underlying risk to security of supplies with modern distributed generation could be demonstrated to be the same as that implicit within ER P2/5. When developing the methodology, due consideration was to be given to the following issues a) the concepts of availability, persistence, reliability, and materiality of generation plant as understood during the development of P2/5 3 . For wind generation, consideration should be given to the size of the geographic footprint in relation to the Classes of Demand Group; b) the composition and interdependence of generation pla nt; c) the treatment of single and multiple generation units in a demand group; d) generation plant connection arrangements together with the associated network configuration and topology including the balance between the security provided by the network (toge ther with grid connected generation) and by distributed generation; e) the degree of alignment between the demand profile and generation export profile
2
In order to implement the recommendations of the DTI/Ofgem report, a Distributed Generation Co-ordinating Group together with a supporting Technical Steering Group (TSG) was established. A number of work streams are being pursued, WS3, is focussed on short-term network solutions.
3
These terms have been reviewed and revised in this document to reflect more modern terminology
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________________________________________ f) the requirements for the steady state and dynamic stability of generation connected to the network. Additionally the approach of ER P2/5 should be maintained if possible, which meant that ideally i) the effective generation contribution would be sought in terms of the effect of passive distribution circuit capacity offering similar benefits to the generatio n. Clearly this is a simplification, in that the frequency and duration of outages for circuits is different from that of generation plant. It also indicated that risk would primarily be assessed in terms of the Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS). Given that EENS is the criterion for assessing the contribution of generation to network security, the inherent risk to loss of supply will be no greater than that in P2/5 should account for modern plant characteristics, in particular, wind power and other intermittent forms of generation; the resulting analyses should be convertible to easily used algorithms.
ii) iii)
1.3. Historical Perspective ER P2/5, published in 1978, is a standard describing the criteria by which networks are designed to provide security of electricity supplies, afforded by distribution network operators (DNOs). It documents how to account for the security from local generation connected to networks at that time. It is probabilistic in derivation, but is normally applied in a prescriptive sense where tables are used to determine the required security for any particular demand group (Table 1 of P2/5) and to establish the contribution from generation plant (Table 2 of P2/5). In order to make a meaningful contribution to network security, generation needs to offer a certain degree of availability, reliability, persistence and materiality etc. ER P2/5 was conceived against a background of the plant being located in power stations comprising multiple sets, centrally managed by an organisation with strong links with the distribution system operators, and connected to the utility systems at 33kV and higher voltages. Whilst not explicitly excluded, no special consideration was given to single set arrangements. Certainly no consideration was given to single set production from landfill gas, municipal waste production, CHP plant, small CCGT generation, or other types of generation embedded within LV distribution systems. Modern plant offers a diverse spectrum of characteristics. The challenge is to establish and agree the key characteristics of modern distributed generation (DG) such that they can be incorporated in a security assessment methodology and hence into DNO planning standards. Between, say, 1960 and 1990, the economics of electricity generation encouraged the development of large power stations exporting bulk electricity at very high voltages. The large plant was also in the control of the CEGB 4 that also had responsibility for the transmission function.
4
Central Electricity Generating Board
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________________________________________ Thus the UK evolved a system with a backbone of a relatively limited number of large, reliable, generating stations that could be directed to generate and deliver power when required; plant that could operate for long periods without interruption whilst connected to high voltage networks; and which used reliable transmission and distribution systems. 1.3.1. Existing Planning Standards Principles Used ER P2/5 incorporates some recognition of the contributions provided by generation to local security. However the standard was constructed to accommodate the vestiges of smaller CEGB plant. These consisted mainly of stations of less than, say, 200MW capacity generally connected at 132kV or 33kV, rather than modern plant and its disposition at lower voltages (often of less than 10MW capacity and connected at 11kV). The result of this is that it is now unclear how to recognise the contribution to network security from modern DG, and how to maintain the underlying network security levels laid down in ER P2/5. In ER P2/5, generation in the context of local security is considered in terms of its ability to support local demands in times of shortages of capacity within the distribution and transmission system. Generation is much less reliable than (passive) distribution plant. Its role was conceived of as one of supporting systems in times of risk, for example by reducing the risks associated with peak demands thus avoiding investment in distribution circuits. The key attributes of generation plant that forms part of a distribution network are: Availability when needed, there must be a high expectation that plant will be able to respond and supply demand. Persistence the plant will be able to run for as long as it is needed. Reliability - the plant will not fail frequently when it is being operated. Materiality the plant capacity should not over-dominate the capability of the core distribution system. The generating characteristics: plant considered by ER P2/5 had the following
Availability - virtually all system plant under the CEGBs control was steam driven, much of it fossil- fuelled. Fuel sourcing was largely determined by the UKs national fuel stocking policy there were few constraints on plant operation caused by fuel management. Plant and transmission system maintenance scheduling were in the hands of the same organisation (the CEGB). No renewable generation (e.g. wind or tidal power) was included in the plant portfolio, and thus plant of this nature was not considered. In this context, the predictability of the operating regime was important. Shift and load factors would be relatively predictable and the uncertainties of the current market-driven dispatch regime did not exist. An important economic constraint that was recognised was that low merit plant was still assumed to be operated within the national merit order, and hence its operating hours were broadly assumed to be dictated by the national load requirements. Thus low merit plant was constrained to operate during national peak load time, which would not necessarily coincide with the local demand
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________________________________________ profile, although there was a practical mechanism for negotiating such out of merit operation. Persistence - plant was technically able to generate for long periods when needed. The timing of generation was dictated by centralised management systems and could be called on to provide system support when judged necessary. The plant had been designed to robust technical standards that allowed continuous operation under a wide range of system conditions and incidents. Reliability - typical power stations comprised several generating sets such that the output of at least a significant part of the station could be relied upon. Materiality - plant output was often not dominant within the 132kV demand groups that they supplemented, and most small plant was operating to two-shift or one-shift regimes (or less). Stations containing sets smaller than 20MW were unusual and there was no significant amount of generating plant connected at 11kV or lower voltages.
1.3.2. Formulation of ER P2/5 The process of formulating ER P2/5 took into account the key characteristics of plant. The practical constraints on availability were seen to be shift pattern and its interaction with load shape: reliability and persistence were taken to be relatively assured as a result of the technical and organisational arrangements that existed. 1.3.2.1. Availability and Shift Patterns The availability modelling used in the construction of ER P2/5 assumed a simplified model, with full generating capacity for each generating set being in place for 86% of the time. The shift patterns assumed were those that typified plant in the early 1970s and were assumed to continue for the future of ER P2/5. The load factors and correlation with the daily load shape were taken on the advice of the CEGB twoshift plant was indicated as servicing the daytime and evening demand and one shift plant servicing mainly the evening peak. It was taken that security contributions were not normally to be expected outside the expected shift periods, despite the (then) credible opportunity of out of merit operation if needed to support load. 1.3.2.2. Load Shapes At the time ER P2/5 was developed, there was a wide range of variation in demand shapes. National load shapes were used in most of the original studies, and where these deviated from the reasonable norm, then it was accepted that ER P2/5s guidance should be treated with circumspection because of their influence on plant shift patterns.
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________________________________________ 1.3.2.3. Persistence of Generation The load shapes indicate the scale of persistence that plant needed, and show the sub-periods for which generation is needed to support demand for the whole period after transmission system failures. It was an implicit assumption of the modelling that generating plant would normally be able to run for as long as needed without fuel restraints. 1.3.2.4. Reliability Studies The ER P2/5 guidance was checked during its development by carrying out reliability and cost benefit studies for a number of typical system arrangements. Where the support of only one or two generators of larger size existed, it was found that there would have been a higher than acceptable risk of loss of supply, and the results indicated that situations with large single sets, and possibly large two-set arrangements should be the subject of special studies. The recommendations given in ER P2/5 were guided by results of two sets of studies carried out on a sample of circuit topologies. In the first set of studies, a group demand was assumed to be supplied by two or three transformer feeders backed up by varying amounts of generation, typically connected at 33kV and 132kV. These were then compared with the second set of studies where the generation was replaced by a circuit which had its capacity adjusted so that the overall performance of the network was similar to that of the first. By this means it was possible to determine the extra circuit capacity required to replace a given number and size of generator sets, in order to provide the same level of security to the group. 1.3.2.5. Remote Connection In the modelling studies of ER P2/5s local generation, it was assumed that generation was directly connected to conventionally firm busbars. Remote connection was not modelled, given the adoption of a simplifying assumption - that the effect of short(ish) connections from such stations would not have any material effect on their effective availability of the connected generation5 , although there is a conditionality to recognise that the line failure might coincide with other transmission system failures, thus critically reducing the availability of local generations at the time when it is needed. Thus, to a degree, remote connection was covered by the normal standards, the extra insecurity contributed by the system not being considered to be of major importance. 1.3.2.6. The 11kV Connection At the higher voltages, generation is injected at a major system node often 132 or 33kV and is therefore able to support the whole group demand without load flow restriction. The connection of single or multiple set plants at 11kV was an arrangement that was not a realistic prospect when ER P2/5 was conceived.
. For example, a short connection of each set of say 5 km of 33kV overhead line would, at worse, introduce an extra average forced unavailability 0.04% and compared with the 14% assumed for the generation set. Comparable underground circuit figures would be an additional unavailability of 0.4%.
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________________________________________ The unreliability of many 11kV connections is higher than that of 33kV connections, and thus, in probability terms, the generation will be less available to the system because of the connection unreliability. 1.3.2.7. Maintenance Regimes ER P2/5 considered the traditional maintenance season as the summertime seven months in which lines would be maintained for about two weeks each, and generation for 1-2 months. The frequency and duration of forced outages was modelled to reflect the effect of summer and winter weather (lightning incidence and bad storm incidences being different in these seasons). 1.3.2.8. Materiality Table 2 of ER P2/5 only applies within specified bounds on circuit and generator size 6 , broadly saying that the generation needs to be small in comparison with circuit size to allow the Table 2 rules to apply, and that situations where there are only one or two large generators in the group present particular security assessment problems. ER P2/5 does not preclude such arrangements, but advises reliability studies of these situations. The standard also recognises that several types of plant can make a coincident and additive contribution7 , although sometimes constrained by the shift pattern and load shape. These limits to the application of Table 2 reflected considerations of the acceptability of long duration capacity outages at winter periods and the rapid increases in expected kWh lost that could arise with greater dependence on generation for relatively large demand groups. This, in part, is why there should be a lower dependence on their contribution of larger sets. Thus the limits of Section 3.6 of P2/5 are material to containing security risk. Reliability studies showed that the ratio of the effective output to the maximum output of the generation was not constant but varied mainly as a function of the ratio of the generator unit size to the transmission circuit rating, and confirmed that a few large generators make a less effective contribution to local security than the same capacity made up of a larger number of smaller sets. The general trend of this analysis showed that the scaling factor of 2/3 in Table 2 (of P2/5) would give reasonable results for most of the arrangements likely to be assessed under ER P2/5.
1.3.2.9.Modern Distributed Generation Modern embedded plant may exhibit some characteristics that are better and some that are worse than the assumptions made during the development of ER P2/5.
Extract from P2/5, Section 3.6. The contribution of generation specified in Table 2 is based on the assumptions that a) the cyclic rating of the largest transmission or distribution circuit is greater than two thirds of the total cent our capacity of the two largest units AND b) the cyclic rating of the two largest transmission or distribution circuits is greater than the two thirds of the total sent our capacity of the three largest generating units AND c) the load pattern in the group is similar to the national load pattern. 7 See Table A.1 of ACE 51, page 17
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________________________________________ a) Predictable Generation It may be reasonable to consider that plant such as landfill gas generation, process- linked CHP and waste to energy plants can be grouped into a category of plant that will exhibit better reliability and a persistence of output driven by economic necessity than the plant studied for ER P2/5. The likelihood that this modern plant will be connected by single circuit at lower voltages needs further consideration; possibly better availability of a given output level a predictable operating regime, irrespective of any formal contract with DNOs. Therefore the characteristics of these modern plants may not be radically different from those studied under ER P2/5. It is possible that the modelling and operating assumptions applied then will still apply. b) Unpredictable Generation In contrast, some forms of plant - wind, wave, and photovoltaic may exhibit greater variability of availability, persistence and reliability than the plant that was modelled during the development of ER P2/5. Wind power, as an example, may not exhibit the essential persistence of significant generation at times of system risk. In addition some of this plant may in the future exist in large numbers but small unit sizes. For this type of unpredictable generation a revised application process for ER P2/5 that simply changes the underlying availability figures etc., but implicitly retains the established modelling logic, would not result in the same level of security. The generation characteristics of some forms of plant within this group will need to be investigated, and clearly there are issues to be resolved.
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2. Principles and Details of the Methodology

2.1. Basic Concept of P2/5 Security Standard 2.1.1. Principle of Group Demand The purpose of Security Standard P2/5 is to provide acceptable levels of security in a transmission or distribution system following specified circuit outages. It does this by considering specific supply points or load groups and aggregating all the loads supplied by that group, both at the same voltage level and lower voltage levels. This principle is illustrated in Figure 1. The aggregated load is known as the group demand of that supply point or load group.
incoming feeders
supply point or load group

aggregated demand of all load points supplied in the load group, both at the same voltage level and all lower voltage levels
Figure 1 Principle of group demand
P2/5 does not consider nor represent the network structures associated with a particular load group. Firstly, it does not consider the network fed by the load group, only the aggregated demand within it. Secondly, it does not consider the incoming network, only whether there is one or more incoming feeders and whether, if a second one exists, it is a normally closed circuit or a normally open circuit with means of manual or automatic switching. Thirdly, if a source of generation exists, which could supply some (or all) of the interrupted demand, this is assumed to be closely coupled to the load group and any connecting network is neglected. These arrangements are shown typically in Figure 2, in which GD represents the group demand 8 . It follows from this description that P2/5 compares supply capabilities with the demand imposed on various load groups in the system. It is essential that the short term modification to P2/5 must retain this assumption. In so doing, this will not impose any change to the principles and philosophy of P2/5. One possible concern relates to any distributed generation in the system. In the 1970s when P2/5 was developed, local generation was usually closely coupled to the main load centre of the system, and therefore neglecting the network was an
8
This aspect of Group demand is defined specifically in P2/5
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________________________________________ acceptable assumption. In the 2000s however, much of the embedded generation is distributed around the network and may be quite some distance from the centres of the load groups. If necessary, this network can be included in an approximate, but sufficiently acceptable, manner.
GD
GD
GD
GD
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 2 Illustrative network structures
2.1.2. Recommended Levels of Security The normal levels of security are set out in Table 1 of P2/5, which indicates the maximum time periods within which specified demand levels should be restored. These requirements are divided into six Classes of Supply, each of which is associated with a different range of group demands. These Classes of Supply vary from Class A covering group demands less than 1 MW up to Class F covering group demands greater than 1500 MW. It is understood that, in the short term update of P2/5, these Classes, the associated group demands and the times in which demands should be recovered will not be reviewed and therefore Table 1 and all associated data is to be retained. Consequently, this Table and the values in it are not considered in this report. The previous Report 9 submitted as part of the FES project considers this aspect in much more detail since its scope and objectives were much more wide-ranging. This previous Report is referred to in this report as the Main Final Report . 2.1.3. Contribution of Generation to Network Capacity It is an accepted fact that a single generating unit is less reliable than a single transmission or distribution line or transformer. Therefore it is unrealistic to assume that a generating unit with a given capacity is equivalent to that of a circuit with the same capacity. Consequently P2/5 refers to the effective contribution of generation or simply effective gene ration. These effective contributions are specified in Table 2 of P2/5. P2/5 itself does not describe how these effective contributions were evaluated in the 1970s. However more information is given in the accompanying application report, ACE Report 51 10 , although even this is limited in its explanation. The most significant part of ACE Report 51 appears to be Appendix A3 headed Comparison of Generation and Transmission/Distribution Firm Capacity, and it is worthy to quote the relevant paragraphs. These are:-
Network Security Standards with Increasing Levels of Embedded Generation. ETSU Project K/EL/00287. Final Report by R.N.Allan and G.Strbac, UMIST, 10 August 2002. 10 ACE Report No.51, Report on the Application of Engineering Recommendation P2/5, Security of Supply. The Electricity Council, May 1979. (now the Electricity Association)
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________________________________________ The effective generation contribution was estimated by determining the transmission circuit capacities which, when substituted for the generating plant in various generation/transmission systems, would result in the same reliability of supply from each of these systems. This substituted capacity was considered as the effective generation contribution; the ratio of effective output to maximum output was determined in each case. For the various combinations of generators and transmission circuits examined, the ratio of effective output to maximum output of generators was not constant, but varied mainly as a function of the ratio of generator unit size to the transmission circuit capacity. Thus, where the set size was about one quarter of the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.8 and 0.9; with set sizes of one half the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.7 and 0.8, and with set sizes equal to the circuit size the ratio ranged between 0.4 and 0.5. It should be noted that throughout these studies a winter-time average availability of generation of 86% was assumed. Based on an examination of networks with local generation, it was decided that for the purpose of developing Table 2 of P2/5 a factor of two-thirds for the ratio of effective output to maximum output could be adopted. It follows from this description that generation was compared with a circuit in such a way that both could provide the same level of reliability. It can be assumed that the reliability criterion used was expected energy not supplied (EENS), as illustrated in Figure 3. It should be noted that EENS is not the only reliability index that could be used. Alternatives include other severity indices such as expected load lost (ELL), and likelihood indices such as frequency, CIs or CMLs. Further discussion of this aspect is provided in the Main Final Report . However, to be consistent with the existing P2/5, it was agreed by all concerned with this project, the authors and the Workstream 3 members, that EENS would be retained as the criterion.
same EENS
GD
GD
Figure 3 Comparison of generation with circuit capacity
It also follows from the above description that the outcome of the ACE 51 assessment was that the apparent average value of two-thirds, i.e. 67%, could be assumed to represent the contribution made by virtually all embedded generators, and is the value that is included in Table 2 of P2/5. However it is evident that this value is, at best, only the average of many situations and conditions. Although convenient in the 1970s and prior to privatisation, it is not realistic to assume all forms of generation under all conditions comply with the 67% value. In order to be transparent and to be equitable to all players, it is essential that the value used should be relevant to the condition being considered. Consequently the value should reflect the type of unit, number of units, availability of units, technology, and location, if it can be shown that
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________________________________________ the ratio is affected by such parameters. This has been confirmed by the extensive detailed discussion and assessment of effective generation provided in the Main Final Report 11 . It is important to observe that inherent risk to loss of supply, measured by EENS, will not increase by considering distributed generation. 2.1.4. Capability of a Network to Meet Demand P2/5 states that the capacity of a network to meet a group demand should be assessed as: the appropriate cyclic rating of the remaining transmission or distribution circuits which normally supply the group demand, following outage of the most critical circuit(s) PLUS the transfer capacity which can be made available from alternative sources PLUS for demand groups containing generation, the effective contribution of the generation to network capacity as specified in Table 2 (of P2/5). It is evident from this assessment procedure that P2/5 is used with the following steps, or steps similar to these: determine the group demand of the supply point being considered evaluate the effective contribution of the generation, if any, from Table 2 of P2/5 summate this effective generation with any transfer capacity and with that of the remaining circuits compare this with the requirements specified in Table 1 of P2/5 for the group demand under consideration to ascertain whether P2/5 is satisfied or not if not satisfied, consider alternative reinforcements, which could include circuit reinforcement or adding more generation. The former could be done by the transmission network operator (TNO) or distribution network operator (DNO) responsible for the network, but the latter would most likely be done by an independent generator under the present regulatory regime, and therefore could be outside of the direct control of the responsible TNO or DNO.
2.2. Types and Parameters of Generation to be Considered 2.2.1. Historical (Pre -privatisation) Generation Prior to privatisation, all generation was centrally owned and controlled. Furthermore there was a common owner of both the network and the generation. Consequently it was relatively easy to decide scheduling and dispatch since there were no conflicting considerations benefiting one owner or operator at the expense of
11
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________________________________________ another. Therefore the rules of operation could be relatively simple, and constrained only by what was considered to be the most effective and efficient mode of operation In addition, the types of local generation available in the 1970s were limited generally to conventional steam plant, mainly coal fired but with some oil fired, together with a limited amount of gas turbines. The steam plant was mainly local plant that existed prior to nationalisation and the gas turbines were mainly installed for security or system support purposes. In both cases, the primary source of energy was essentially unlimited, the units could be run at any time subject to them being manned at the time of requirement, and the units were not used for any purposes other than for outputting into the public supply system. P2/5 was created under these conditions: common ownership, limited types of generation, and unrestricted operation. 2.2.2. Present (Post-privatisation) Generation The rules of ownership and operation have changed enormously since 1990 when privatisation came into force. These changes include: local or embedded coal- fired steam plant has ceased to exist the use of gas turbines have increased significantly. There has been a major move from coal and oil fired plant to more efficient gas plant generation is mainly owned by private companies which operate them according to commercial principles the amount of CHP plant has increased. The primary purpose of these is to supply heat and power to their host, and therefore energy provided to the public supply system takes secondary consideration greater use is now being made of renewable energy sources, particularly wind. These are intermittent energy sources and cannot be controlled or scheduled in the normal sense of the word. It follows from this discussion that, although the network configuration itself is essentially the same as that existing in the 1970s, the type, structure, operation and control of the generation associated with it is very different. Therefore, the system for which P2/5 was created does not now exist and a review of relevant aspects of P2/5 is evidently needed. This report centres on a review of generation because, since generation is permitted by P2/5 to be considered as a contribution to security, the basis for this consideration should be transparent and equitable to all players.
2.2.3. Characteristics of Generating Plant P2/5 assumes that embedded generating plant will be available when required subject only to plant unavailability and shifting regimes. The latter can be neglected with modern plant and the former is generally construed to mean the relevant plant may not be available due to plant failures and forced outages. It would be convenient if this were the current situation, but there are now other considerations that need to be taken into account. To derive energy output from a generator, the following conditions are required: the generator must be in working state, i.e. it must not have failed. This aspect reflects the technical up and down states of the generating plant and can be captured using capacity outage probability tables as discussed later
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________________________________________ there must be a source of primary energy, e.g. gas for GTs, wind for wind generators, etc. If the primary source of energy to a generator is unrestricted then consideration of this source can be neglected. However if there are restrictions or the source is intermittent, then this may need to be considered. The most important area of concern is with wind plant and the intermittency of the wind regime. This would not matter if the wind and load were perfectly correlated because the variation in wind power would mirror the variation in load. However this is unlikely to be the case. it must be commercially advantageous to the generator owner/operator to run the plant . Present-day generating plant is privately owned and therefore its use for network support may be restricted for commercial reasons. Unless the stick approach is used where a generator is instructed to operate in emergencies, the carrot approach must be used, i.e. the generator must be given financial incentives to be available and to deliver when needed. If all these conditions are satisfied, then the generator can output power. However if only one condition is not satisfied, the plant will not output power. In the 1970s, all plant was under national control and generally primary energy was always available because the vast majority of plant was steam driven and relied only on coal. Consequently, only the first condition, plant reliability, was of real concern. This is no longer true. All plant is owned and operated by private companies, and much generating plant rely on intermittent energy sources such as wind and solar. For these reasons all the above conditions must be recognised. These are best defined respectively as: technical availability : relates to whether the plant is in a working state energy availability : relates to whether primary energy is available commercial availability : relates to whether it is commercially available The DTI and Ofgem have also recognised 12 these parameters and have defined them respectively as reliability, persistence and availability (see Section 1.3.1). This may be confusing particularly using the terms reliability and availability to refer to entirely different concepts. When used concurrently, it is widely understood that reliability means the likelihood of a component or system remaining in the operational state, and that availability means the likelihood of a component or system being found in the operational state. To use them otherwise could mislead, although the important point is to recognise their existence and be less concerned about the terms used to describe them. These different characteristics need to be considered in developing appropriate techniques for assessing security contributions if such characteristics are likely to affect the value of this contribution. The approaches and methodology described in the following sections reflect these needs. 2.2.4. Parameters of Plant and Systems The previous section discussed the need to consider the different availability characteristics of the plant. In addition, it has been shown in the Main Final Report that the parameters associated with both the plant and the system in which they are
12
DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation Coordination Group and WS03 of its Technical Steering Group
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________________________________________ embedded can also affect the security contributions made by the generation. These include: number of units capacity of units availability of units technology of units location of units peak load magnitude load profile. These different parameters also need to be considered in developing appropriate techniques for assessing security contributions as such parameters are likely to affect the value of this contribution. The approaches and me thodology described in the following sections reflect these needs.
2.2.5. Approaches to be Developed The approaches and methodology described in the following sections reflect the needs identified in the previous sections. Two main approaches are described. The first concerns generating plant with non- intermittent energy sources, and the second concerns generating plant with intermittent energy sources. The first category will be affected mainly by technical availability but also possibly by commercial availability. The second category will be affected by all three types of availability. Different modelling techniques are therefore required.
2.3. Generating Plant with Non-Intermittent Energy Sources 2.3.1. Generation Model The basic model for assessing the reliability of generation systems, the units of which are not constrained by intermittent energy sources and behave independently of each other, is best represented by a capacity outage probability table. The detailed theory relating to these is given in various reliability texts 13 , but can be summarised as follows. If all units in a given case are identical and behave independently, the capacity outage probability table can be evaluated using the binomial distribution in which the probability P{r} of a specific state {r} is given by:P{r} = n! p r q n r r!( n r )! (1)
where n = number of units, r = number of available units, (n-r) = number of unavailable units, p = availability and q = unavailability of each unit. If all units are not identical but still behave independently, the capacity outage probability table can be evaluated using the principle of state enumeration, i.e. if Pi
13
R.Billinton and R.N.Allan. Reliability of Engineering Systems: Concepts and Techniques. Second edition, 1992, and Reliability of Power Systems. Second edition, 1996. Both Plenum Publishing, New York.
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________________________________________ and Pj are the probabilities of state {i} and state {j} respectively, then the probability of the combined state {ij} is given by:P ij = Pi .Pj
(2)
Consider the case of three identical units each having a capacity C and availability p. Using Equation 1, the resulting capacity outage probability table is shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Capacity outage probability table for three identical units capacity available 3C 2C C 0 capacity unavailable 0 C 2C 3C total state probability p3 3p2 (1-p) 3p(1-p)2 (1-p)3 1.0
In the case of three non- identical units having capacities C1 , C2 and C3 with availabilities of p1 , p2 and p3 respectively, the resulting capacity outage probability table is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Capacity outage probability table for three non-identical units capacity available C1 + C2 + C3 C1 + C 2 C2 + C 3 C3 + C 1 C1 C2 C3 0 capacity unavailable 0 C3 C1 C2 C2 + C 3 C3 + C1 C1 + C 2 C1 + C2 + C3 total state probability p1 .p2 .p3 p1 .p2 .(1-p3 ) (1- p1 ).p2 .p3 p1 .(1- p2 ).p3 p1 .(1- p2 ).(1- p3 ) (1- p1 ). p2 .(1- p3 ) (1- p1 ).(1- p2 ). p3 (1- p1 ).(1- p2 ).(1- p3 ) 1.0
2.3.2. Load Model There are a number of alternative load models that can be used. In the case of this security assessment approach, the most appropriate is the load duration curve (LDC). This represents the variation in load over a specified period of time in terms of the number of time units the demand exceeds a particular load level. A simplified
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________________________________________ LDC is shown schematically in Figure 4. The abscissa can also be construed to represent the probability by which the demand exceeds a particular load level. load
time
Figure 4 Simplified schematic shape of a load duration curve
Referring to Figure 4, the following can be determined: the demand exceeds load level L for t time units. If these are hourly values, then load level L is exceeded for a period t/2 hrs the probability of the demand exceeding a load level L is t/T. The specified period of time T, i.e. total abscissa axis, can be any time period of concern, e.g. one whole year, one season, one month, etc. The time units along the abscissa axis are usually hourly or hourly values. These should not be greater than one hour because then the shape of the LDC becomes distorted and the area under the curve no longer can be assumed to represent the total energy demanded by the system during the time period being considered. This is essential in these studies because the expected energy not supplied (EENS) is used as the criterion of comparison. In many other types of system problems, this may not be critical and the daily variation of peak loads only may be sufficient. The LDC used in the development of P2/5 approximated to the the-then national average. If a small number of effective contributions similar to the concept of P2/5 are to be specified, then a similar principle would probably need to be retained. However, if an algorithmic approach is used in which each case is assessed individually, then the appropriate LDC for that situation could be used. In either case, the following approach remains valid.
2.3.3. Evaluation of EENS of Generation The principle of evaluating EENS was described in Section 7 of the Main Final Report and illustrated by a few simple examples. However it was not extended to the consideration of typically structured LDCs, nor were the numerical studies very extensive.
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________________________________________
load installed generating capacity
energy not supplied, Ei
capacity on outage capacity outage state i capacity available
Figure 5 Evaluating ENS for a generating system
The EENS is evaluated as follows: each state of the capacity outage probability table is superimposed on the LDC individually as shown for one state I in Figure 5 the energy not supplied Ei whilst in this capacity state is determined as the area below the LDC and above the capacity available this value of energy is weighted by the probability of being in this capacity state these weighted values of energy are summated over all capacity states from the concept of expectation, EENS = E i . p i . 2.3.4. Evaluation of EENS due to Effective Circuit Capacity This is evaluated in a similar manner to that of generation. The process in this case however is much simpler if it is assumed that the effective circuit does not fail. Therefore the circuit capacity is constant and exists continuously. In this case, the available circuit capacity is imposed on the LDC and the area above this capacity and below the LDC is evaluated as shown in Figure 6. This gives the EENS directly. Conversely, if the EENS is specified, the circuit capacity that would create this EENS can be found iteratively by moving the capacity up and down the LDC until the value giving this EENS is determined.
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________________________________________
load
energy not supplied (= EENS)
circuit capacity
Figure 6 Evaluating ENS due to circuit capacity
2.3.5. Availability of Effective Circuit What Should It Be? The availability of the circuit with which the generation is compared is assumed to be 100%. This concept may be questioned since in real life the circuits of the network can themselves fail. Consequently it may be felt that the availability of the circuit against which the generation is being compared should be less that 100%. If this were the case, then the result infer that the apparent contribution of the generation would increase as the availability of the circuit is decreased. This can be easily deduced by considering the effective contribution of a single generating unit. If the availability of this is 86% as in P2/5, and the availability of the circuit is also 86%, then the effective capacity of the line wo uld be equal to the net declared capability of the unit, i.e. the effective contribution of the unit would also be unity. This makes no sense.
hypothetical supply source
real circuit
same EENS
same EENS
GD
GD
GD
Figure 7 Comparing circuits and generation with a hypothetical supply source
The point of confusion is to assume that the effective circuit is a real circuit. In fact it is a hypothetical circuit. It would be less confusing if this circuit is simply treated, not as a circuit, but as a hypothetical supply component against which all real network sources are compared (see Figure 7). Therefore, if the generating unit is
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________________________________________ measured against this hypothetical supply component, the effective contribution is, say, 67%. A real circuit should also be compared against this hypothetical supply component. Therefore the above circuit having an availability of 86% would also have an effective contribution of 86%. Thus the ratio between the two real supply sources is unity, but against the hypothetical source, each is only 86%. If real circuits and generation are to be put on a level playing field and the contributions of each are to be compared objectively, then the effect of the availability of the real circuit must be taken into account. The assessment described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 can easily be extended to consider a circuit having an availability of Ac. In this case, the EENS of the circuit is evaluated similarly to that of generation in Section 2.3.3 using the concept of conditional probability14 :EENS = ENScircuit is available.Ac + ENScircuit is una vailable.(1 Ac) In this case, the ENS given the circuit is available is the area shown in Figure 6, and the ENS given the circuit is unavailable is the energy demanded, i.e. the total area under the LDC. An effective or equivalent circuit is then deduced using the iterative approach described in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.6. Evaluating Effective Generation Contribution The principle of P2/5 is to determine the effective generation contribution by comparing the generation with a fully reliable circuit which would result in the same level of reliability, actually estimated by comparing the same unreliabilities. In the present approach this is done by equating EENS. The approach uses the procedures described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 for assessing EENS and has the following steps: consider a specific generation system and LDC evaluate the EENS of this system using the approach described in Section 2.3.3 determine the circuit capacity which would give the same EENS using the approach described in Section 2.3.4 this circuit capacity is the value of effective generation calculate the ratio between the effective generation and the total generation capacity this gives the parameter that enables the effective contribution of generation to network capacity to be determined as defined in Table 2 of P2/5
2.3.7. Evaluating Security Evaluating security is identical to that currently specified in P2/5. The only change is that the generation contribution may not be 67% of declared net capability as in the present Table 2, but the value in the new Table 2 or assessed from a spreadsheet calculation. Consequently, the modified steps from those given in Section 2.1.4 are:
14
R.Billinton and R.N.Allan. Reliability of Engineering Systems: Concepts and Techniques. Second edition, 1992, and Reliability of Power Systems. Second edition, 1996. Both Plenum Publishing, New York
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________________________________________ determine the group demand of the supply point being considered evaluate the effective contribution of the generation, if any, from the new Table 2 of P2/5, or from a spread-sheet calculation summate this effective generation with any transfer capacity and with that of the remaining circuits compare this with the requirements specified in the existing Table 1 of P2/5 for the group demand under consideration to ascertain whether P2/5 is satisfied or not if not satisfied, consider alternative reinforcements, which could include circuit reinforcement or adding more generation. The former could be done by the TNO or DNO responsible for the network, but the latter may have to be done by an independent generator under the present regulatory regime, and therefore may be outside of the direct control of the responsible TNO or DNO.
2.3.8. Consideration of Materiality The approach described in the preceding sections can be used to evaluate the contribution made by a specific generation system. It should be noted that it is applicable in concept and application to any system with any number of units, including one or two units. However, there is a school of thought that believes security should not rely on a small (less than 3) number of units particularly if these make up a significant proportion of the system capacity. This concept has been defined as materiality and discussed in some detail in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.8. P2/5 included special conditions for these cases, including the recommendation that detailed risk and economic studies should be made if there are only one or two large generators. Such risk studies themselves could, and in fact should, be based on the approach described in this report. Therefore there seems to be no theoretical restrictions to the application of the approach provided the generating units are not energy limited, behave independently and are not constrained commercially, i.e. they are constrained only by technical availability. There may however be some implementation restrictions imposed to satisfy materiality, but these would be introduced for subjective rather than objective reasons.
2.3.9.
Concluding Comments
If there are constraints other than technical availability, then the resulting evaluations may be in error, the magnitude of which is dependent on the significance of the other constraints. If these errors are too significant, then the relevant units would need to be treated similarly to intermittent generation units. Neglecting these other constraints, it is evident from the above methodology that the effective generation contribution is dependent on the number of units, the technical availability of these units, and the magnitude and shape of the LDC. The impact of these parameters and typical numerical values are evaluated in Section 3.
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________________________________________ It is possible to structure the security assessment in one of three ways. All require extensive studies of real empirical data. These are: Look-Up Tables. Do extensive generalised studies in order to ascertain the range of effective generation contributions and create one or a set of look-up tables similar in concept to the existing Table 2 of P2/5 Look-Up Graphs. Do extensive sensitivity studies over an agreed range of input data and plot the outcomes as graphical representations. This is essentially then used as an extended look- up process Algorithms. Create a spread-sheet environment into which specific data can be inserted at the time of assessment so that the pertinent value of effective generation contribution can be determined.
2.4. Generating Plant with Intermittent Energy Sources 2.4.1. Impact of Intermittency The approach for modelling generation described in Section 2.3 is based on capacity outage probability tables. This approach uses unit technical availability as the only unit reliability parameter. This availability however is a measure of the total time the unit is found in the up state during an annual (or other specified) period. A given availability may be due to a small number of up states of long duration or a large number of up states of short duration. If the up-state durations are very short, then the state of the unit may change during the time it is required to operate, i.e. possibly during the time it is satisfying security demands. If this occurs then the unit may fail to provide the level of security expected of it. Most generating units, although exhibiting up-state durations that are generally shorter than lines and transformers with which they are compared in security studies, still have up-state durations longer than that required to contribute to system security. In these cases, technical availability and capacity outage probability tables are sufficient. However, this is not necessarily the case with units such as wind power units having primary energy sources that can vary very significantly over very short periods. These rapid output variations require extended modelling principles, and relate to the need to consider energy availability as well as technical availability. Furthermore some units in the system may not be available at certain periods or on a continuous basis due to commercial reasons and this may also create a form of intermittency. This may occur with CHP plant that are switched on and off or their outputs increased and decreased due to the demands of the host. In such cases the unit(s) may become unavailable when required or during the period when they are being used to provide security.
2.4.2. Modelling Intermittency
The only practical approach to deal with these chronological variations, whether random or certain, is to characterise the variable as a timevarying parameter with its chronological behaviour fully represented. A schematic illustration of a generation pattern is shown in Figure 8 in which the load is assumed constant. This
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________________________________________ chronological pattern captures all three types of availability, technical, energy and commercial availabilities, and hence is a suitable base model f or representing the capacity states of the generation. Detailed knowledge of individual units, capacities, availabilities, etc are therefore not required. In the case of multiple wind farms connected to the same demand group, the outputs on the individual farms should be aggregated and used as the chronological generation pattern. This enables diversity within and between sites, i.e. the footprint, to be taken into account
ti
generation pattern
load level, L
assumed Tm
= generation < load
= generation > load but lasting less than required minimum time T m
Figure 8 Chronological comparison of load and generation
Consider the schematic behaviour shown in Figure 8 and the following specific cases:a) load and generation are both certain. In this case only one characteristic for each is required. The occasions when the load exceeds generation are determined (shaded areas in Figure 8). This permits the frequency, duration and energy not supplied to be deduced. b) load is certain and generation is random. In this case the principle is the same as in (a) except for the following. The characteristic for the generation could be the average behaviour. In this case the results obtained as in (a) represent the average values. However, if the variation of these parameters is to be determined, then many generation characteristics need to be assessed, each producing its own individua l result. These individual values can be assessed to identify range, likelihood of durations (for instance) being greater than a required level, and other statistical parameters, etc. This could be done for some likely generation patterns found, say, from experimental data, or worst case scenarios, etc. However in principle, the number of possibilities could be infinite or tend to such a limit. In this case the number of scenarios are limitless. In such a case the only serious
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________________________________________ approach is stochastic simulation, generally known as Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), and probably, because of the chronological time dependencies, needing sequential MCS. c) load and generation are both random. This is an extension of case (b). In reality it further complicates the issue since by definition the number of possible scenarios is very much greater. It is possible that the average characteristic of each may be sufficient: otherwise all possibilities may need to be studied using MCS. It is clear that this problem has a solution but one that could require some very extensive studies, which are outside the scope and objective of this project. In this case, average characteristics or a restricted number of scenarios are assumed to be an acceptable approximation, bearing in mind the significant uncertainties in data and modelling, and therefore a sufficiently accurate solution to the real problem. It should be noted however that no statement of the degree of approximation can be reliably made unless a rigorous assessment is first made, and this can only be done using sequential MCS.
2.4.3. Modelling Approaches In order to decide the appropriate approach for modelling intermittent generation and to estimate the security contribution, it is necessary to note the concept underpinning P2/5. This concept is to compare the generation with a circuit providing the same level of reliability. In the case of conventional (non-intermittent) generation, this is achieved by comparing the generation with a line using EENS as the reliability index. In the case of intermittent generation, at least two possible approaches are possible. These are illustrated in Figure 9, which is an extension of the concept shown in Figure 3. The first compares the intermittent generation with a circuit using EENS as the index of comparison and the second compares the intermittent generation with the contribution that would be made by conventional generation using a reliability index defined as reliance probability. These are briefly described below.
circuit
IG
IG
GD
same EENS
same P R
GD
GD
GD
(a) comparing IG with circuit
(b) comparing IG with G
Figure 9 Comparing intermittent generation (IG) with circuit or with nonintermittent generation (G)
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________________________________________ (a) Comparing IG with circuit. This is essentially the same approach as used for non- intermittent generation. The two types of generation are therefore treated independently and both determine an equivalent circuit capacity giving the same level of reliability as the generation source with which it is being compared. The index used remains the value of EENS. The intermittent generation model must reflect energy and commercial availability as well as technical availability. The benefit of this approach is that it is consistent with that of P2/5. (b) Comparing IG with non-intermittent generation. One problem with generation systems that have outputs varying significantly with time is how much reliance can be placed on them when they are required. For instance, if a certain output is required from the generating units in order to satisfy P2/5 and the output fluctuates (particularly downwards), then the demand at that supply point will not be satisfied. In reality, it is not necessary for the generation systems to provide that output continuously, only for as long as it takes to restore the trans mission or distribution system to its originally intact form before the circuit outage(s) have occurred. Therefore the essential question is, how confident can one be that the generation will remain at the minimum required level for the required minimum time. This question can be quantified by evaluating the probability that the generation will be at or above a specified threshold level for a time period equal to or greater than a threshold value. The objective of this second approach is to address this problem by treating the two types of generation dependently. By choosing a suitable reference index, the equivalence of the two forms of generation can be ascertained. This approach is based on the developed concept of the proportion of time for which the generation capacity can be relied on as described in Section 8 of the Main Final Report. All forms of generation (also circuits as well) do not provide a constant level of capacity that can be relied on continuously, but change capacity states in a random manner. The ability to rely on a given capacity state or better can be deduced using probability theory (see Main Final Report), and defined as reliance probability. The benefit of this approach is that it enables the two distinct types of generation to be compared on the same basis, i.e. the ability to provide a capacity contribution with the same level of reliance. After discussion with members of the DTI/Ofgem Workstream 3 and their review of the above two possible approaches, only the first (Comparing IG with Circuit) is considered in the following sections.
2.4.4. Application to Wind and CHP Plant In the case of wind plant, it is evident that intermittency is of major concern. The nature of wind is very much a random process and therefore either Case (b) or Case (c) in Section 2.4.2 ought to be considered. The choice is therefore whether the average wind behaviour (Case (b)) is sufficient or the full random behaviour (Case (c)) is required. Significant case studies are needed to resolve this question. Data is available to allow both representations to be considered and modelled. In these studies, it is assumed that Case (b) is sufficient. It may seem to be less evident how CHP plant should be modelled. Generally such plant does not have random energy input because most are gas driven. This therefore does not exhibit the randomness associated with wind. However the problem is not concerned with the energy input but with the commercial operation. CHP plant is primarily installed to supply heat in the form of steam to its host organisation. This
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________________________________________ heat supply generally has total priority over generation of electrical energy for the public supply system. Clearly a commercial framework is required. However records are available of exported 15 CHP power as a function of time and that for new plants could be predicted on the basis of the operational characteristics of the host organisation. In both cases therefore, a chronological characteristic of generation exported output could be determined. This implies that the generation data seen by the public supply system is similar in concept to that of wind, i.e. the contribution to the public supply varies in a similar manner to that illustrated schematically in Figure 8. It follows therefore that wind plant and CHP plant can both be modelled and assessed using the same approach. The only difference is that the output of wind plant may vary more rapidly and with greater fluctuations than CHP plant. However this does not affect the concept, only the actual generation contribution and this will reflect the actual input data. It also follows that the approach could, in principle, be applied to any form of generation since all generators are subject to changing output, if only because of technical unavailability. However, if the average time between changes of state is much larger than the time for which the units are required to satisfy P2/5 (or its replacement), then these additional modelling techniques are not necessary 2.4.5. Assessment Comparing Generation with Equivalent Circuit 2.4.5.1.Assessment Approach This approach is identical in concept to that described for non- intermittent generation, and can be described using a schematic similar to that shown in Figure 7. This is shown in Figure 10.
ti generation pattern
generation level, Gi
assumed Tm
= generation < Gi
= generation > Gi but lasting less than required minimum time T m
Figure 10 Determining model for intermittent generation using first approach

15
Exported power into the public supply system, i.e. net of any generated output utilised internally by the host
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The main difference between modelling non- intermittent and intermittent generation is those periods of intermittent generation that do not persist for a required minimum period of time must be discarded from the assessment. It is assumed that this minimum time is Tm. The steps in the assessment process are then: identify the time dependent generation pattern consider a generation level Gi identify the occasions when the generation is at least equal to Gi and continues to remain at least equal to Gi for the minimum time Tm . These are the good or up states count the number of times, ni, that this occurs and the duration, ti, of each of these occasions therefore, if T is the total time period of the generation pattern, the probability that the generation is at least equal to Gi is given by: Pi = ni .t i / T
i
(3)
this can be repeated for all generation levels between the lowest and highest generation levels, from which a generation model identical in concept to the multi- state capacity outage probability tables described and used in Section 2.3.1 (see Table 2) can be determined. Each capacity state is given by G i and the state probability by Pi and all states are mutually exclusive. These states are imposed on the LDC in the same way as done in Section 2.3.3.
2.4.5.2. Evaluating Generation Contribution to Security The approach for evaluating the generation contribution to security in the case of intermittency of ge neration using this approach is virtually identical to that described for non- intermittent generation once the generation model described in the previous section has been deduced. For completeness at this point, the method previously described in Section 2.3.5 can be repeated. The approach uses the procedures described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 for assessing EENS and has the following steps: consider a specific generation system and LDC evaluate the EENS of this system using the approach described in Section 2.3.3 determine the circuit capacity which would give the same EENS using the approach described in Section 2.3.4 this circuit capacity is the value of effective generation calculate the ratio between the effective generation and the total generation capacity this gives the effective contribution of generation to network capacity as defined in Table 2 of P2/5
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2.4.6. Concluding Comments The procedure described in the preceding sections describes the approaches that could be used to evaluate the contribution made by a generation system, the output of which cannot be controlled by the TNO or DNO responsible for the security of the supply point being considered. The approaches can be used for any intermittent energy source including wind and CHP. The generation data requirement is the timevarying output and this must be known or estimated. This data reflects all the availability parameters discussed in Section 2.2.3, including technical, energy and commercial availabilities, since these are all coalesced into the generation output. For similar reasons, the units are not required to behave independently since this effect is also coalesced into the output. Care however is needed before using generic data to represent a specific system because all or some of these parameters will not be relevant to all systems. Two possible approaches have been considered. There are merits and demerits for each. The approach that compares intermittent generation with non- intermittent generation has the benefit that it directly compares the two alternative forms of generation and in a way that ensures the ability to rely on them is treated and compared transparently, i.e. the reliance probability is the same for both. Its demerit is that is does not really conform with the present approach underpinning P2/5, which deduces an equivalent circuit capacity. The approach that compares the intermittent generation with circuit capacity has the merit that this approach does use the P2/5 approach. Therefore at this stage of the developme nt of P2/5, it is reasonable to suggest that this approach is the one that should be adopted, and this has been described in detail. It is again possible to structure the security assessment in one of three ways. All require extensive studies of real empir ical data. These are: Look-Up Tables. Do extensive generalised studies in order to ascertain the range of effective generation contributions and create one or a set of look-up tables. These will not be of the same form as the existing Table 2 of P2/5. In addition, care must be taken before using generic information for specific cases because of the possible problem associated with dependence as discussed above Look-Up Graphs. Do extensive sensitivity studies over an agreed range of input data and plot the outcomes as graphical representations. This is essentially then used as an extended look- up process Algorithms. Create a spread-sheet environment into which specific data can be inserted at the time of assessment so that the pertinent value of effective generation contribution can be determined. This would be a more accurate approach to this security assessment.
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2.5. Effect of Remote Generation and Common Coupling
2.5.1. Modelling Concept It was assumed in the previous sections that the embedded generation was closely coupled to the main load centre or the effect of any network between the generation and the load centre had little or no impact on its ability to contribute to the security. This was discussed in Section 2.1.1 and conforms with the assumptions underpinning P2/5. However as also discussed in Section 2.1.1, this assumption may be less valid in present-day systems because the generation site may be some distance from the main load centre, connected to it via a relatively weak distribution network or coupled to the system with a single protection point. In this case, the network connecting the site to the load centre could affect the ability of the generation to contribute to security due to the unavailability of the connection. The only completely correct approach to solve this problem is to perform a reliability evaluation. However this is beyond the short-term solution. An alternative approach is to combine the unavailability of the circuit(s) connecting the generation with the load centre with the generation model (G) to create a composite generation/network model (G). This concept is illustrated in Figure 11.
network, N
G G
GD GD
(a) Figure 11 Composite generation/network model (a) remote generation (b) equivalent model
(b)
In a generation system having a single protection point, which could be a windfarm or any other generation source, a single fault could outage the whole site. This operational problem can be assessed in a similar manner to the approach described in this section, i.e. the group of generators are treated as if they were coupled to the demand centre via a remote connection using the above principles. This would account for the common coupling without any suggestion that it is a single generator site. For instance, wind farms are generally not single units but multiple generating units producing a multiple set of output states. Therefore they should be treated the same as the multiple output states of any other type of generation site with multiple generating units.
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________________________________________ 2.5.2. Generating Plant with Non-Intermittent Sources The model suggested for generation with non- intermittent energy sources is based on capacity outage probability tables as described in Section 2.3.1. These tables can be combined with the state probability table representing the network connecting the generation to the load centre using the principle of state enumeration and Equation 2. The procedure is illustrated in Tables 3, 4 and 5. This illustration assumes a generation system with two identical units and a single circuit connecting the generation to the load centre. The principle can be extended simply to any number of generating units (all that is required is the overall capacity outage probability table) and to any number of circuits (all that is required is the state probability table). Combined states are enumerated, the available capacity seen by the load centre whilst in each combined state is deduced (given by the minimum of generation state capacity or circuit state capacity), and the combined state probability evaluated using Equation 2.
Table 3 Capacity outage probability table for remote generation capacity available 2C C 0 capacity unavailable 0 C 2C probability P1 P2 P3 1.0
Table 4 State probability table for connecting network state up down state capacity CN ( 2C) 0 probability PN 1-PN 1.0
Table 5 - Capacity outage probability table for composite generation/network capacity available 2C C 0 capacity unavailable 0 C 2C probability P1 .PN P2 .PN P3 .PN + (1-PN) 1.0
2.5.3. Generating Plant with Intermittent Sources The model for generation with intermittent energy sources is virtually the same as that described in Section 2.5.2 for non- intermittent energy sources provided the approach being used is to compare the intermittent generation with an equivalent circuit capacity.
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________________________________________ In this case, the output of the generation system is an equivalent capacity outage probability table, which may differ from that used with non- intermittent generation only in the number of states needed to represent the generating states with reasonable accuracy. Therefore this table can be weighted by the availability of the connecting lines in the same way as described in Section 2.5.2. This produces an equivalent capacity outage probability table similar in concept to that shown in Table 5.
2.6. Contribution by Multiple Generation Sites The preceding sections consider a single generation site within the load group being assessed. In reality there may be two or more such sites, each of which could contribute to security. The question is whether these should be assessed separately or whether they should be combined into one generation model. If the effective contributions are evaluated for each generation site separately using the approaches described in previous sections and then summated, this will give a different result than that given by combining all generation sites into one model and evaluating the effective contribution for this combination. The reason is that the contribution made to security by generation depends on the number and size of the units. The primary objective of P2/5 is to determine whether the security requirements of P2/5 are satisfied by summating the generation contribution with that of the remaining circuits and transfer capacity. It is not to allocate the contribution to specific sources at this planning and design stage this is a subsequent operational decision. Having said this however, it may be useful to evaluate the apparent effective contributions separately as a means for ranking the individual sources and use this information as a guide for allocation, e.g. the source that could make the greatest contribution may be given priority in the allocation process. It follows from this discussion that the process to deal with multi-generating sites is: consider each generation site separately evaluate the capacity outage probability table for each site using the approaches for non-intermittent generation and intermittent generation as appropriate weight each table by the availability of the connecting link if the site is remote and weighting is deemed necessary combine the tables together using recursive application16 of state enumeration to give a resulting multi- state capacity outage probability table superimpose this final table on the LDC as before to determine the EENS by this combined generation system the procedure then continues as before. It is evident that the procedure is virtually identical to that described in previous sections and the approach remains the same.
16
R.Billinton and R.N.Allan. Reliability of Engineering Systems: Concepts and Techniques. Second edition, 1992, and Reliability of Power Systems. Second edition, 1996. Both Plenum Publishing, New York
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________________________________________ 2.7. Contribution by Generation Not Available for 24hr 2.7.1. Introduction During the development of P2/5, it was recognised that some generation stations may not be available for 24hr because of operational reasons. Generally this was due to some stations being manned only for one shift, say for 6hr, and others for two shifts, say for 14hr. An approach was created so that some credit could be given to these stations. This was achieved by identifying how much of the daily load curve could be covered by contribution from these one- and two-shift stations. ACE Report 51 describes how this was done. The result is embedded in Table 2 of P2/5 in which two possible contributions could be associated with such stations, i.e. either 67% of declared net capability or xm% 17 of group demand, whic hever was the smaller. A similar principle can be used in the present circumstances although the process must be a little more complex for one fundamental reason. This is that in the 1970s when P2/5 was created, the manning pattern of stations could be adjusted to ensure that contributing stations were manned during the peak demand of the system. With the present commercial structure, this may not necessarily be the case. The most likely situation occurs with CHP plant, the operational regime and output of which is mainly dependent on the host requirements. Although this may span system peak load, it may also not do. 2.7.2. Modelling Approach 2.7.2.1. Approach Used in P2/5
load
T xm% of peak demand
daily load curve
time, h
Figure 12 Contribution of flexible generation operating less than 24h
17
This value depends on the shifting pattern and number of circuit outages and varies between 7 and 20%
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________________________________________ The basic principle to consider this source of generation is illustrated in Figure 12. In P2/5, it is assumed that the shift period(s) of the generation T can be adjusted so that it spanned the peak demand and intercepted the load curve at equal load levels (xm%) at start and finish of the shift(s). This ensured that such generation was able to contribute to security at the most demanding point of time and minimised the demand that had to be covered by the remaining system, both the network and any other threeshift generation stations. For two-shift stations and a shift-time of 14h, the value of xm was found to be 80%. Since the other contributors to security had to cover all demands up this level of 80%, stations that were available only for 14h were given a credit of only 20% of peak demand. The same principle can be applied to the current situation with the exception that the time period for which the generation is made available may not be flexible, may not intercept the load curve at equal load levels at the start and finish of its available time, and may not even span the peak demand. Each of these cases needs to be considered separately.
2.7.2.2. General Principles Consider the situation with only one generation site. The 24h period is then divided into two sub-periods, one in which the generation is available and the other in which it is not available. This principle can be extended to deal with more than one generation site by dividing the 24h period into a number of mutually exclusive subperiods, each being associated with a specific set of circuits and generation sites. The assessment of security is then performed for each of these two sub-periods (or more if more exist). a) Period when restricted generation is unavailable . During this period, the security is covered by the remaining circuits, transfer capacity and any generation available for 24h. In terms of the generation, this is done using the approaches described previously and no further description is required at this point. b) Period when restricted generation is available. During this period, two values of contribution can be evaluated. calculating the contribution for this period assuming equal merit and therefore credit is given to all possible contributors. In this case, the process is identical to the approaches described in previous sections calculating the contribution for this period assuming less merit and therefore less credit is given to the generation not available for the full 24h. In this case, the process is essentially the same as that used in P2/5
2.7.2.3. Generation is Flexible In this case, the procedure can be said to be the same as performed in ACE Report 51 and used within P2/5. The generation shift pattern can be flexibly positioned so that it minimises the cover required from other plant, including circuits and other available generation, as shown in Figure 12. The two values of contribution mentioned above can then be evaluated:-
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________________________________________ calculating the contribution for this period assuming equal merit. In this case the capability provided by the restricted generation is assessed using the approaches described in previous sections. Let this be SVm. calculating the contribution for this period assuming less merit. In this case, the value of xm% in Figure 12 can be determined. Therefore the overall capability = min[SVm, (100 xm)]
2.7.2.4. Generation Not Flexible but Spans Peak Demand In this case, the procedure is virtually the same as in Section 2.7.2.3 with the exception that the restricted generation will either become available or become unavailable at a load level greater than xm, e.g. as shown in Figure 13 by x1 and x2 . Consequently the remaining circuits and any other generation will have to cover a greater demand level, and the need for the restricted generation will diminish. The two values of contribution mentioned above can then be evaluated: calculating the contribution for this period assuming equal merit. In this case the capability provided by the restricted generation is again assessed using the approaches described in previous sectio ns. Let this value be SV1 . If the generation system is the same as in Section 2.7.2.3, then SV1 = SVm. calculating the contribution for this period assuming less merit. In this case, the value of x1 % and x2 % in Figure 13 can be determined. Let x2 > x1 . Therefore the overall capability = min[SV1 , (100 x2 )]
load T x2 % of peak x1 % of peak xm of peak
daily load curve
time, h
Figure 13 - Contribution of inflexible generation operating less than 24h
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________________________________________ 2.7.2.5. Generation Not Flexible but Does Not Span Peak Demand In this case, sufficient capacity must be provided by the remaining circuits, any transfer capacity and any other available generation to cover peak demand. Since this condition is more onerous than at any other time, it can be concluded that P2/5 must be satisfied irrespective of the availability of the restricted generation. Such generation therefore does not appear in the assessment of whether the system satisfies P2/5 or not, and its capability can be stated to be zero. There is a subsequent aspect that is outside of the scope of this project. This is whether any contribution should be credited to such generation for simply being there and being available if needed. This is a longer term issue since it is beyond the fundamental consideration of the present version of P2/5.
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3. Data Availability and Plant Characteristics

3.1. Introduction This section considers the sources of data on generating plant that could be readily accessed to support the assessment of the security contribution of distributed generation. The aim of this part of the analysis is to indicate where, for the purposes of applying the security assessment methodology, DNOs may need to improve either their access to data, or the scope of collection of such information. The broad picture is as below, followed by sections related to specific plant classifications. 3.1.1. Group Demand Data Group demands for demand groups formed by 11kV feeders and at higher voltage levels can be estimated by DNOs from operational data, now usually collected by tele-control / SCADA systems. Most DNOs hold large databases covering several years history. Individual 11kV point demands and low voltage system demands are not so readily obtained, and may need to be estimated on the basis of any feeder maximum demand metering that exist, or statistically from profiled distributions associated with the simple metering data of all the customers normally supplied from a low voltage feeder. Thus, except for individual 11kV point demands and for LV systems, profiles of net demand by half- hour periods are fairly easily extractable. Nevertheless there is an overhead involved in such activity. Most DNOs have load-duration curves for typical rural and urban circuits. The group demand data so obtained will not identify the effects of embedded generation output, nor the effects of long periods of abnormal system configurations caused by sustained failures or other system re-organisations unless further judgements are made based on operational logs. 3.1.2. Distribution Plant Reliability and Operational Data
3.1.2.1. Reliability Statistics DNOs utilise the NAFIRS system or equivalent systems. These systems provide broadly sufficient data on equipment and circuit fault rates, and non-damage fault restoration times for 11kV systems upwards, but will not provide useful information for LV systems. The routine analyses provide fault rates by type of plant, together with restoration times for each phase of restoration. It is worth noting that NAFIRS does not collect network repair times or planned outage durations. These times are likely to be materially greater than supply restoration times.
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________________________________________ 3.1.2.2. Operational Statistics DNOs do not routinely identify backfeed capacities and the historic switching times associated with these back-feeds. Thus data bases for such information cannot be expected to exist. Instead, analyses of operational logs or engineering judgement may need to be considered. 3.1.3. Generation Export Data
3.1.3.1. Historic Profiles Historic profiles for generators connected at 11kV busbars and above are generally available within DNOs from SCADA on a halfhourly export basis. Virtually all small generators who are connected to the UK distribution systems at 11kV and above are required to install halfhourly metering to assess their exports. This information is available to DNOs for the purposes of system operation and planning. At present, some very small exporters (such as those with photovoltaic outputs) have special arrangements for separately measuring kWh input and output to low voltage distribution systems on a monthly basis. In other cases, trials of net metering arrangements are being tested. Thus for the distributed generation of the scale that is normally treated under ER P2/5, the exports from the plants concerned should be available however it is recognised that revised procedures may be required to secure access to the data in practice. Administrative and protocol issues exist within the supply industry concerning the governance of this data. Meter data collectors are the immediate owners of the data collected, and the release of this to DNOs is a formal arrangement, as are the purposes for which it can be used (as part of the DNO licence). 3.1.3.2. Forecast Profiles Forecast profiles for modern plant are not generally available within the DNO community. This indicates that studies of plant profiles may be needed during the implementation phase of this work. 3.2. Specific Plant Types 3.2.1. Conventional Generation One company was approached for a sample of halfhourly data for larger generation plant. In principle such data is available but, at the time of writing, confidentiality issues have delayed its provision.
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________________________________________ 3.2.2. CHP One company has offered a sample for halfhourly data for larger CHP plant. This is the export profile for this plant, but the on-site process consumption is n ot shown separately. Such information may or may not be held by the site operator, and is not automatically available to DNOs or NGC. Generating plant operators may know this information but it is not collected as a routine associated with the collection of export data. Operating logs will record this. Similarly the profiles are not generally available, for example the incidence of planned maintenance, lack of process demand and even gas/electricity trading decisions are not available to DNOs and NGC for planning purposes. This means that the analysis of plant outputs into various operational phases (for example to provide planned and forced outage rates) will not be possible unless this information is also available. Electricity export data for waste to energy plant also reveals similar data problems: some sites use some of the electricity production to operate on-site waste processing installations. Gas- fired CHP for leisure centres also provide some exports. Information on this form of plant is sparse, and generally related to metering database information. In most cases there is no material export from this plant, and metering may be on a monthly energy basis. 3.2.3. Land Fill Gas Fuelled Generation It is normally assumed that such plant aims to maintain full output for virtually all the year, apart from periods necessary for safety inspections and plant maintenance there are long periods where the generation plant is technically available, and the gas supply is sufficient to maintain full, or near full, output. It is noted that the NFFO5 test indicated that availabilities of over 90% were to be expected, The sample data obtained indicates that this picture may not be as representative as might be expected. 3.2.3.1. Samples Obtained Data Accessibility As with other types of generation plant, DNOs are not required to declare generation over 5MW site capacity to NGC, and planning data for smaller plant, in the form of export MWh and sometimes MVAr, is normally collected by all DNOs for planning purposes. Small land-fill gas generating sites need not be declared to NGC. Sample outputs for landfill gas generation were obtained from a DNO who has this information as a basis for system planning. These are daily averages, i.e. the energy exported in a full day. Dividing by 24 thus gives the average kW exported in the period. Half- hourly data for these small sets is not readily available to DNOs, but was obtained in these cases to examine the persistence of the generation output whilst the plant was operating. Data from four sites were obtained: Landfill 3 and Landfill 2 were considered to be mature and well established sites. Landfill 1 and Landfill 4 are established sites in the same area, but are still undergoing development and there are problems with
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________________________________________ achieving sufficient gas output to maintain the installed output. The following section looks at these profiles in more detail with the aim of determining if such plant could normally be considered intermittent or otherwise. 3.2.3.2. Review of Sample Profiles Landfill 3 is a mature and developed site using two 600kW spark ignition sets connected to an 11kV system. The profile of the average daily production is much as expected for such plant. An analysis of the profile indicates that these up periods occurred for 88% of the whole year, and no substantial planned outage periods appear. An examination of the up periods by half hour has indicated that output during these periods is substantially constant for many hours ahead with generation at about 970kW for much of the time). Landfill 2 is also a mature and developed site using two 600kW sets, supplying a 33kV system. The profile is still of the form expected, but shows far more frequent switches to the up period. An analysis of the profile indicates that these up periods occurred for 86% of all the whole year, and no substantial planned outage periods appear. An examination of the up periods by half hour has indicated that output during these periods is substantially constant for many hours ahead. Landfill 1 is an established site with two 600kW sets, but the site has problems in achieving a steady and sufficient output. Given the situation, the commercial opportunity has been taken to undertake some maintenance on the sets without reducing the maximum possib le conversion of gas to electricity. The electricity export profile is not that which might normally be expected for this form of installation. The output varies substantially from day to day, although a closer examination of the persistence of generation during the up times indicates that, when generating, output is maintained for many hours at a time. Near-full output is maintained for only about 50% of the year, but how much of the unavailability is caused by gas shortage is not known. An output in excess of 50% of the generation capacity level however, will be exceeded for 75% of the full year. Landfill 4 is part of the same landfill region as Landfill 1, but is a separate installation in a different sector of the landfill. Again, the output is relatively variable over the days shown, but closer examination of the up times indicates a steady output when operational. Generation at or near peak capacity has only occurred for 30% of the operating period (excluding the months when the installation was closed for commercial and technical reasons). Conversely generation output above 50% of the site capacity occurred for 75% of the operating period. 3.2.3.3. Indications from the Review of Land-Fill Gas Output Profiles The exercise of obtaining a sample of landfill gas generation has indicated that:-
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________________________________________ such data for halfhourly and for 24hr periods is available and in this example it could be extracted from data bases within a few days; during up times, the landfill gas electrical output on some sites is relatively steady for many hours, and thus this mature generation need not be considered to be intermittent; there will be some sites for which gas supplies may not be assured or proven, yet there is still a possibility that generation at a reduced level of max demand can be reasonably assured for a large proportion of an operating period. there was no evidence that system disturbances had precipitated the disconnection of the plant at any time. the data is not readily separable into maintenance and non- maintenance periods, nor can fuel shortage periods be readily identified without additional information from the plant operators.
3.2.4. Wind Powered Generation Land-based wind-power plant has long periods where the generating plant is technically available but the wind supply is insufficient to maintain anything like the plants full, or near full, output. This section considers the ability of DNOs to obtain the output data in sufficient detail to allow its application in local security assessments. In this aspect, the issue of persistence could be of importance, and hence the ability to look at the duration of output is pertinent to the viability of the analysis methodology. 3.2.4.1. Samples Obtained Data Accessibility Examples of electrical outputs on a half hourly basis for an individual turbine, for a small cluster of turbines and for a large site were assembled from a specific companys SCADA system. This system is able to access instantaneous data as well as the accumulated energy figures for any specified period. This data presented here is the energy supplied during a half- hour period, and thus can be taken to represent the average kW generation during the period. Additionally, a sample of minute by minute outputs were obtained to allow an examination of the persistence of output in the shorter operational time spans that might be of relevance to system security considerations that are related to the times needed for system re-configuration/switching. This mechanism for data collection is not always readily available to some DNOs, but in general, their SCADA systems can provide such detailed load flow data at 33kV and even 11kV levels for wind generation. Low voltage information is not so easily obtained, except by reference to meter data. Instead, it appears that only halfhourly data for wind-powered output will be available via the operators metering systems. 3.2.4.2. Review of Sample Profiles Single wind-turbine output has been studied. This shows a highly variable output over time, with few periods of higher demand lasting more that a few hours. The likelihood of generation output being above a given level at any point in time and
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________________________________________ then being maintained at that level (or above) for a specified period from that time can be derived from these examples if the persistence time is a multiple of half- hours. The output for a moderate size cluster of wind-turbines has also been considered. This also shows a variable output, but with slightly longer periods of persistence at various kW output levels. The persistence of output within each half hour is of interest. Looking at the minute-by- minute profile for a single large wind- generator, there is some broad stability in the look forward of one half- hour. Taking a starting point randomly in time, and then examining the forward profile for 30 minutes, although the output varies notably, there appears to be a high probability that throughout the time, the output will not vary by an order of magnitude; indeed, a variation of more that +/50% is most unlikely. Again, planned outage effects are not automatically identifiable, and information from the plant operators is needed to separate out these effects. 3.2.4.3. Indications from the Review The process of obtaining the sample export/time profiles for clusters of wind generators connected at 11kV and above indicates that halfhourly data can be obtained via the metering arrangements. Additionally, export data for shorter time periods can often be obtained, but this needs to be organised as a special analysis of the data collected from DNOs telecontrol systems.
3.2.5. Micro-Generation Domestic CHP (DCHP) data is not well established and no authoritative data samples have been obtained, although many profiles are believed to be held by the prospective DCHP manufacturers. In addition, these devices will be connected to low voltage distribution systems. DCHP units are not yet suited to being switched off or modulated, and the export to the distribution system will reflect not only the base-load nature of the output, but the magnified volatility of the varying domestic/local demand the output is effectively the difference between varying demand and a fairly steady off- setting local generation. No attempt has yet has been made to simulate this profile. A micro CHP system is the domestic appliance that produces heat and electricity. The appliance can be envisaged as a domestic floor-standing boiler, which in addition to heat also produces electricity. The operation of a micro CHP system is heat-led. This means that the system is operated according to the homes need for heating. Therefore, the heat is the primary output of the system and the electricity is a by-product. The sizing of a micro CHP system is determined by the heat requirement of the home. This implies that the heat output is the parameter that is considered for sizing. The electrical output will thus be determined as a function of the heat output, as these two outputs are linked together in a certain relationship by the laws of physics/thermodynamics. As the operation of the micro CHP system is heat- led, the system will virtually not be in operation during summer. The system will primarily run during winter, and depending on the size of the house (i.e. its heat requirement), the annual running time may be in the range of some 2000 to 3000 hours. Generally speaking it may be said that a heat-led micro CHP system will produce peak time
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________________________________________ electricity. This is due to the fact that electricity peak times normally coincide with the times at which heating occurs. These are the periods of the day when people are at home and require both heat and electricity. One should expect a DCHP unit to run something like 12+ hours a day in winter - and somewhat less in summer (if at all). Thus it may be feasible to construct a very crude winter-time and summer-time profile; say from 5am to 10am and from 2pm to 10pm for winter periods and from 5am to 8am and 4pm to 7pm in the summer. For the purposes of the assessment of this plants contribution to local security, it will be necessary to extrapolate manufactures or developers best estimates, and combine these with demand data analyses. 3.2.6. Conclusions on Data Access and Quality DNOs generally hold comprehensive historical data on the net export of many types of generating plant and feeder demands (at high voltage and above). These systems can be interrogated to provide site-specific and plant- specific information. However this information will need further analysis if it is to be sub-divided into data sectors for maintenance and non- maintenance periods, and may be further complicated by the effects of embedded generation outputs (with respect to group demand) and abnormal system demands. The necessary operational history may not be readily extractable. To support the analysis of LV system security issues, DNOs may feel a need to improve group demand estimation and generation profiling. DNO network reliability data is generally well provided and readily accessible, but statistically robust estimation of switching times may be less assured.
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4. Numerical Studies and Illustrative Examples

4.1. Contribution of Non-Intermittent Generation 4.1.1. Application of Methodology Algorithm The flow chart presented in Figure 14 summarises the methodology algorithm for assessing the contribution to security from non-intermittent generators. Given the number of units, their availabilities and capacities, the first step involves forming the capacity outage probability table (COPT) for this group of generators. An appropriate load duration curve (LDC) is then superimposed onto the COPT and the expected energy not supplied (EENS) is calculated. Finally, as in ACE Report 51, the effective generation contribution is determined from the transmission circuit capacity which, when substituted for this generating plant, results in the same level of EENS (assuming a perfect line, 100% reliable).
Number of units Availability Capacity
COPT
LDC
NON-INTERMITTENT
EENS
Contribution
Figure 14 - Flow chart for non-intermittent generation 4.1.2. Re-establishing Table 2 of P2/5 The developed methodology was first applied to the systems studied in ACE Report 51 in order to determine whether the values quoted in P2/5 could be reproduced. ACE Report 51 assumes the availability of the generator units to be 86% and the reliability of the circuits with which they are compared to be perfectly reliable. The outcomes are quoted as the ratio of effective output to maximum output of generators. Depending on the set size, these ratios varied between 0.4 and 0.9. From these ratios the report concludes that an average ratio of 0.67 could be used, this being the value quoted in Table 2 of P2/5. Other documents accompanying P2/5 suggest that the analysis was performed for one to ten units. In the studies performed, the generating systems are assumed to have the same total installed capacity. The LDC used in these studies is shown in Figure 15; this being a three-piece linear version of the winter LDC shown in Figure B7 of ACE Report 51.
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Load 100%
25%
100% 3624 h
Time
Figure 15 Three-piece linear version of LDC in Figure B7 of ACE Report 51 The results of these studies are shown in Figure 16. This figure shows the relationship between the number of units and their contribution to network security. As expected, the results show that the contribution increases as the number of units is increased, although the relationship is not linear. The contribution of a single generating unit is about 50% of its capacity, while for 10 units the contribution is greater than 75% of the total capacity. It is important to observe that the security contribution made by a generating system is always less than its availability (in this case 86%).
85% 80% 75%
Contribution
70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of generators
Figure 16 - Application of the developed methodology to systems described in ACE51
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________________________________________ These case studies clearly show that visual average value of the contribution across one to ten units is indeed very close to the value of 67% quoted in ACE Report 51 and in P2/5. 4.1.3. Effect of Materiality The results shown in Figure 16 also reflect the concern expressed about materiality and discussed previously in Sections 1.3, 2.3.8 and 4.1.3. The contribution is seen to decrease significantly for numbers of units less than three. In P2/5, only one single contributing ratio is given, i.e. 67%. From these results, it is evident that this would be very optimistic if used for one or two units. This justifies the stance taken in P2/5, in which special analyses are suggested for systems containing only one or two units particularly if they are relatively large compared with the remaining network capacities. However, it is not logical to extend this stance to an approach in which a range of contributing ratios are given in a table or graph, or in which the actual contributing ratio is evaluated for the specific system being considered. In the approach being proposed in this report, the methodology is applicable to all systems, even those with a very small number of relatively very large generating units. The concern seems to centre on whether the contribution of one and two sets can be relied on. In assessing this aspect, the following points should be noted: the proposed methodology uses a consistent approach for all unit numbers and is applicable to small and large numbers alike the objective of P2/5 is to determine whether a system is P2/5 compliant or not a binary decision answered simply by yes or no 18 for a unit availability of 0.86 (the P2/5 value), the generation contributions are given in Figure 16. Using these values, the following table can be compiled from information provided by the respective capacity outage probability tables:number of units % contribution from Figure 16 probability of delivering contribution 86 74 94.7 90.3 85.3 80.0 74.4 91.1 88.0 84.5 probability of not delivering contribution 14 26 5.3 9.7 14.7 20.0 25.6 8.9 12.0 15.4 degree of redundancy, i.e. number of units in excess of minimum needed 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50.0 60.8 65.7 68.1 69.6 71.3 72.5 73.8 74.7 76.1
18
It may be questioned whether this is sufficient but a different answer to this question would require a complete and radical change to the philosophy of P2/5
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________________________________________ This table shows that three units are best, two and seven units are worst, and most significantly six, seven and ten units are worse than a single unit. The reasoning is that the amount of redundancy does not increase continuously with number of units, only gradual discontinuous increases occur as shown in the above table. It is a fact that risk increases with increasing number of units if the degree of redundanc y does not increase. As discussed in Section 4.1.3, the reason why it was wise for P2/5 to consider one and two units as special cases was the fact that only one single average value (67%) for the contribution factor was used. Using the proposed methodology, the actual contribution factor is now available. From this discussion, there seems no objective or logical reason why one and two units should not be treated identically to all other number of units.
4.1.4. Effect of Availability and Number of Units The methodology was used to determine the contributions that generating systems having different number of units and hence unit capacity (the total system capacity was kept constant), and different unit availabilities make to system security. The LDC shown in Figure 15 was used to carry out these studies. The results are shown in Figure 17. These confirm the effect already shown in Figure 16 applies at all levels of unit availability.
100% 90% 80% 70%
Contrubution
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Availability
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 17 Effect of availability and number of units
4.1.5. Effect of Shape of LDC In order to establish the impact of the shape of the LDC on the contribution that a generating system makes to security, the duration of the peak period and the load level of the mid point (see Figure 18) were varied over a wide range.
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Load 100%
25%
100%
Time
Figure 18 Variations in shape of the LDCs
Impact of LDC shape

100% 90% 80% Contribution 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Availability Max Contribution Min Contribution Average Contribution
Figure 19 Effect of shape of LDC with three units
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Impact of LDC shape

100% 90% 80% Contribution 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Availability Max Contribution Min Contribution Average Contribution
Figure 20 - Effect of shape of LDC with ten units
The results of these case studies are shown in Figures 19 and 20 for a system of three and ten units respectively for a range of availabilities. These figures show that the generation contribution is dependent on the shape of the LDC and that the variation of contribution increases with unit availability. For units with an availability of less than about 50%, the contribution does not vary significantly with shape of the LDC. However for units with greater availabilities, it may be important to consider the LDC of the group demand being assessed. By comparing Figures 19 and 20, it can be concluded that the impact of the shape of LDC reduces with increasing number of units. 4.1.6. Application Example An example of the application of the proposed methodology for quantifying network capability is shown in Figure 21. The local group demand is supplied from a system composed of two transformers operated by the local DNO, two generators operated by Generating Company A and one generator operated by Generating Company B. The capacities of the transformers together with availabilities and capacities of the generators are given in Figure 21. The associated capacity outage probability table for this generation system is:-
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________________________________________ Capacity 55 MW Probability 0.441 45 0.189 35 0.189 30 0.049 25 0.081 20 0.021 10 0.021 0 0.009
This capacity outage probability table is then superimposed onto the LDC given in Figure 15 to compute the contribution that these three generators make to network security of 34.51 MW. The capability of the system after an outage of one transformer is composed of: the remaining transformer is capable of carrying 1.3 x 45MW = 58.50MW the overall contribution of the three generators is 34.51MW (62.82%) i.e. a total of 93.01MW, which is the capability of the system. If the peak demand of the group is less than 93.01MW, the system would be considered to be P2/5 compliant.
DNO
Gen A
Ava 70%
Gen B
Ava 90%
2x45MW
10MW
20MW
25MW
Load
Figure 21 System studied
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4.2. Contribution of Intermittent Generation 4.2.1. Application of Methodology Algorithm The flow chart shown in Figure 22 summarises the methodology algorithm for assessing the contribution to security from intermittent generators. Given the output profile (over one or more years) of an intermittent generator system, e.g. wind farm, and the required persistence level (Tm), the corresponding COPT is first formed. Then, as in the case of non-intermittent generation, the appropriate LDC is superimposed on the COPT and the EENS calculated. Finally, the effective generation contribution is deduced as the transmission circuit capacity which, when substituted for the generating plant, gives the same level of EENS.
Time Series
Tm
COPT
LDC
INTERMITTENT
EENS
Contribution
Figure 22 - Flow chart for intermittent generation
4.2.2. Effect of Persistence Level The methodology was applied to a NFFO wind farm having the normalised halfhourly profile output shown in Figure 23. The output of the wind farm was adjusted to achieve a 35% load factor. For a number of persistence levels from hr to seven days, the corresponding COPT was created using 20 discrete output states. The contribution of the wind farm to system security was then quantified and the results are shown in Figure 24.
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1 0.9 0.8 0.7 Power (p.u.) 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 2000 4000 Time (h) 6000 8000
35% load factor
Figure 23 - Normalised annual wind farm output profile
Year
35.0% 30.0% 25.0% Contribution 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0 50 Tm (h) 100 150
Figure 24 Effect of persistence level For Tm = hr, the contribution of the wind farm to network security is about 30%. Increasing the level of required persistence reduces the contribution to security as expected. For Tm = 24 hr, the contribution reduces to about 15%. 4.2.3. Effect of Seasonal Variations It is expected in general that the system peak demand and the greatest output level of wind generation would both occur in the winter period. In order to investigate
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________________________________________ the impact of this correlation between wind generation and peak demand, the previous analysis is repeated but covering only winter months. The energy output of the wind farm in various months of the year is shown in Figure 25. This figure clearly demonstrates that the output of the wind farm in winter is considerably higher than in the summer months.
60%
50% Average power (p.u.)
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Month
Figure 25 Average annual energy output of a wind farm Three sets of results are shown in Figure 26; these being for the periods considering: the whole year five months, November to March inclusive three months, December to February inclusive. As expected, the results show that the contribution to security of the wind farm is greater if only winter months are considered. For Tm = 24 hours, the contribution increases from about 15% when the whole year is considered, to over 21% when only three winter months are taken into account.
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40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0%

Contribution
20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0 20 40 60

Year
80
Tm (h) Winter 3 m
100
Winter 5 m
120
140
160
Figure 26 Annual and winter security contributions
4.2.4. Sensitivity Studies A number of sensitivity studies were performed to investigate the robustness of the algorithm and of the results. Three factors were considered: a) the impact of the number of discrete generation states b) the impact of variation in the probabilities of the wind generation states c) the impact of the time-period resolution of the wind data. a) The impact of the number of discrete generation states. Figure 27 shows the security contributions when different number of discrete generation states were used in representing the COPT. It is clear that the number of states does not have a very significant impact on the final results. A recommendation of 20 discrete states is a reasonable compromise between accuracy and computing effort. b) The impact of variation in the probabilities of the wind generation states Figure 28 shows the frequency distribution of the leve l of contribution to security obtained by varying state probabilities randomly in the range of 10%. For Tm = hr, the contribution was found to vary between 29.2% and 30.8%. Since this range of variation is relatively small, it can be concluded that the results are quite robust.
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29.8% 29.6% 29.4% Contribution 29.2% 29.0% 28.8% 28.6% 28.4% 28.2% 28.0% 27.8% 0 2 4 Tm (h) 100 20 10 6 8
Figure 27 Effect of number of states representing wind farm output
30 25 20 15 10 5 0
0.2 9 0.3 0.3 02 0.2 92 0.2 94 0.2 96 0.2 98 0.3 04 0.3 06 0.3 08 0.3 1
Frequency
Contribution
Figure 28 Effect of changes in wind-state probabilities for Tm = hr c) The impact of the time -period resolution of the wind data Since wind output may vary considerably during each half hour, this variation in associated levels of generation would need to be absorbed by the remaining circuits. For a short period of time, the generation output could drop significantly and hence the remaining circuits may become overloaded. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 29 in which wind output profiles using 30 min and 1 min resolutions are shown for a period of one day. In this example, the variation between the two resolutions can be observed by focusing on the highlighted region.
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________________________________________ The levels of contribution for 1 min and for 30 min resolutions are shown in Figure 30. As expected, the apparent contribution of wind reduces if the 1 min data is used.
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 Power (p.u.) 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 4 8 12 Time (h) 16 20 24
Figure 29 - Wind output profile using 1 min and 30 min resolutions
25%
20%
15% Contribution 10% 5% 0% 0 24 48 72 Time Tm (h) Half hour 1 minute 96 120 144 168
Figure 30 Effect of 1 min and 30 min data resolutions
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________________________________________ 4.3. Concluding Comments The proposed methodology was applied in this section to determine the contribution to network security from both non- intermittent and intermittent generating sources. Case studies are carried out on the systems presented in ACE Report 51 and the values quoted in P2/5 are reproduced. From these studies the relationship between the number of units and their contribution to network security was established. The approach and methodology being proposed in this report and demonstrated by the case studies performed in this section, is applicable to all systems, even those with a very small number of relatively very large generating units. A number of sensitivity studies are performed to demonstrate that the proposed methodology can be applied to determine the contributions from generating systems having different number of units and different unit availabilities. This included a study of the impact of the shape of the LDC indicating that, for generating systems with unit availabilities greater that 50%, it may be important to consider the specific rather than a generic LDC of the group demand being assessed. An example of the application of the proposed methodology for quantifying network capability is also provided. The developed methodology was applied to determine the contribution of intermittent generation to network security. From a half hourly annual profile of a wind farm the contribution was quantified for a number of persistence levels from hr to seven days. The results show that for the wind farm with an annual load factor of 35% and T m = hr, the contribution of the wind farm to network security is about 30%. As expected, increasing the level of required persistence reduces the contribution to security. For Tm = 24 hours it was found that the contribution to network security reduced to about 15%. The impact of the correlation between wind generation and peak demand was also studied showing the contribution to security of the wind farm is greater in this example if only winter months are considered. A number of sensitivity studies were performed to investigate the robustness of the algorithm and of the results. The factors considered were the impact of the number of discrete generation states, the impact of variation in the probabilities of the wind generation states and the impact of the time-period resolution of the wind data. The studies demonstrated that the number of states does not have a very significant impact on the final results and a recommendation of 20 discrete states is considered to be a reasonable compromise between accuracy and computing effort. Similarly, for a 10% variation in state probabilities did not affect the contribution quantified and it was concluded that the results obtained were quite robust. Since wind output may vary considerably during each half hour the studies are performed to determine the contribution based on one minute data resolution. As expected, the contribution of wind reduces if the 1 min data is used.
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5. Implementation Issues
5.1. Introduction The study team has considered the practicality of the methodologies proposed with respect to the problems that might be encountered in obtaining data and in being able to implement analyses using the theory described above. The key issues are: is all the data required by the methodology reasonably accessible by DNOs? is it credible to establish from existing data sources a value of Tm for systems in which intermittent generation exists? how can the methodology be consistently applied, i.e. systemised and codified, to determine the effective capacity of intermittent and non- intermittent generation, and what caveats can be determined on the issues of size and numbers of units? The implementation of the methods described in the previous sections of this document will require several issues to be addressed for the development of either (or both) a spreadsheet assessment of intermittent and non- intermittent generation, a black-box approach and/or its use for the derivation of a revision to Table 2 of ER P2/5. These matters are considered further in Section 5.5. 5.2. Data Availability Table 6 indicates the accessibility of the data required for the application of the proposed methodology. Ostensibly, the data needed is in existence or can be obtained. In reality several practical issues may arise, as discussed below. 5.2.1. Group Demand Estimates The time/demand profile for a group(s) will be needed, and raw data will be available. Firstly, this may include the effects of any demand-side management (DSM) and embedded generation and CHP (net of its site load), as well as the effects of demand transfers. In this case, DNOs will know the identities and performance of the related generation and DSM, but the details of any demand transfers that have taken place may be difficult to track down. Secondly, the information may need to be extracted for several years for statistical ana lysis. In this instance, whilst most DNOs will have information stored for a number of years, there is some evidence that some DNOs may have only recently started to accumulate full histories for most demand groups. Thus, in relation to the implementation phase, DNOs may need to be requested to provide information that is additional to the raw group demand database. Group demands for LV systems are not collected, and thus consideration of LV-connected generation may be difficult if the aim is to acquire actual data.
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________________________________________ Table 6 Accessibility of Data Data Requirement Data in Existence in format needed Readily Will it need accessible in analysis? format required but with administration
Partly most DNOs have customer performance and equipment fault rates etc. but restoration times are not normally analysed Yes. Most information has now been stored for over 1 year. Yes some further analysis may be needed
Will it need to be gathered how?
Fault rate statistics for transmis sion and distribution circuits
Routinely collected in most DNOs for reporting to OFGEM and for other applications. Similar situation for NGC and Scottish Systems Comprehensive data now kept using DNOs system monitoring facilities at substations. This records the flows at 11kV and above. It is therefore net of distributed generation output. DNOs may know the output of this generation (as below). Data collected will not be to the same accuracy as contract metering. Virtually all generators who are connected to and export into the distribution or transmission system have halfhourly metering, and this information is collected for contract purposes . It is generally to a high accuracy.
Not normally, although information on switching times may need to be gathered from operational logs.
Group demand data on a halfhourly basis
Analysis to adjust for generation export may be needed.
No already gathered. Some system control systems can be used to collect information at very fine intervals 1 minute data for wind power has been obtained in some areas.
Generation output data
DNOs have access to the National Data Transmission System and can down load information. Historic information is controlled by Data Collectors. Access to this often requires formal approval before its release.
Yes depending on the need to disaggregate data
Historic data may not be available for small domestic CHP, wave power, offshore wind plants or other active devices such as fuel cells. Systems will need to be improved to increase the availability of this data.
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________________________________________ 5.2.2. Distribution System Performance and Other Data DNOs utilise the NAFIRS system or equivalent systems. These systems provide broadly sufficient data on equipment and circuit fault rates, and non-damage fault restoration times (but not fault repair times) for 11kV systems upwards, but will not provide useful information for LV systems. The identification of Tm will still require the determination of the switching times that are associated with the system being studied. Tm will also be dependent on the particular fault or planned outage and hence be dependent on the return to service time. These may be inferred from some NAFIRS data, but it may be found that a separate analysis from operational records is more appropriate. If example networks are being studied, some information on the typical backfeed capacities will also be needed, together with the overload capacities of the equipment being considered. The use of overload capacities will be dependent on the particular outages and circuit loadings. 5.2.3. Techniques for Profile Analysis Whilst the study group has taken example profiles of generation output against time and has then assessed Tm and other factors, it is apparent that a more streamlined analysis package may be needed if the methodology is to be applied many times in the implementation phases and beyond. In addition, it may be necessary to undertake statistical analysis on several years of data. Given the large volumes of data for analysis, some resource may need to be expended to develop efficient processes for data and file handling. 5.2.4. Generation Profiles Typicality If the implementation phase is intended to assess a large number of generation profiles, it is apparent that these could be obtained. However, data for many types of generation fuel cells, domestic CHP for example - is sparse, and may not be appropriate for statistical analysis. The infancy of some generation installations has been found to have a significant effect on the robustness that could be ascribed to the output profiles found. The output of landfill gas generation, for example, seems to be very unreliable in the cases where the landfill itself is still under active development yet, in those instances where the landfill is finalised and mature, the generation output is highly reliable.
5.3. Derivation of Tm The concept of Tm is that of the period for which generation will be needed to operate to secure system security. The period is therefore related to the duration of the system conditions in which such generation may be required to reduce, or avoid, customer disconnections. In terms of the application of the methodology described above, it will be necessary to consider the Tm values for each failure mode and to incorporate these in
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________________________________________ the studies carried out. In terms of subsequent applications, it may be necessary to consider in more detail the use of a matrix of typical values derived from NAFIRS operational logs etc. These two aspects are discussed separately below; the rationale for the derivation of Tm being discussed immediately below, and the use of a matrix of typical values is considered in Section 5.5. Tm needs to be considered in the context of the systems that are being assessed, and in terms of each failure mode that is being assessed by the above methodology. Each failure mode will have a different T m value attached to it. The methodology requires Tm to be evaluated for each mode, and then the generation profile to be filtered accordingly. For example, 1) For situations in which, after a first circuit outage, the maximum demand may be slightly above the aggregate short-term capacity of the remaining circuits plus that of any switchable (normally open) backfeeds, then a) any generation that is connected within the demand group may act to relieve overloads on the main system circuitry (excluding the backfeed capacity) for the period during which the backfeed relief is being switched in. b) thus generation will have substantially the same effect for both nondamage events and damage events. c) in this circumstance, T m is conceived as the period for which generation should be considered to be able contribute whilst switching takes place. d) thus for 11kV systems for example, manual switching could take say 1.5 hours; for 33kV systems designed to P2/5, this period may be 15 minutes. Tm is therefore a function of the system design, and if system automation is included, then the contribution of wind power might be counted as higher than in situations where manual switching of a back-feed is utilised. e) half- hour data will not indicate if generation can provide reliable support over 15 minute periods. One minute data, etc. does provide some anecdotal evidence of acceptable stability. 2) For situations in which, after a first circuit outage, the maximum demand could exceed significantly the system firm capacity plus the back feed capacity, there is a risk of longer-term capacity shortage (relatively). In these circumstances the determination of the period for which generation may need to provide 'relief" can be of the order of days and weeks. a) for non-damage first circuit outages, generation still provides the immediate non-damage relief as in (1) above, and it is likely that with nondamage restoration of the order of 15 - 30 minutes in many circumstances, Tm is conceivable as the non-damage restoration time. However in the case of planned outages involving network development, the duration of the work, which could be in the order of days or weeks, may need to be considered.
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________________________________________ b) for damage first circuit outages, generation must provide support for days or weeks - the duration of repairs, unless some emergency relief work is carried out - standby mobile generation, urgent alternative line construction, etc. It is hard to imagine Tm being less than 24 to 48 hours for damage fault situations. c) the incidence of damage faults cannot be disregarded and thus consideration of the risks associated with such events in systems with intermittent generation must be looked at to ensure that acceptable customer disconnection frequency is not being risked. 3) For situations in which, after a second circuit outage, the maximum demand could exceed significantly the system firm capacity plus the back feed capacity, there is a risk of longer-term capacity shortage (relatively). In these circumstances the determination of the period for which generation may need to provide 'relief" can be related to the time it takes for an urgent return to service of the planned outage. In those conditions where this return time is less than the likely repair time of the failed circuits it is not unreasonable to assume that this time would be a component of the Tm matrix. In those conditions where the planned outage cannot be returned to service faster than the likely repair time of the faulted circuit, then the forced circuit repair or restoration times are appropriate. It has been concluded that Tm can be defined in terms of non-damage restoration times (measured from NAFIRS data), or from knowledge of switching or return to service times (estimated from operationa l logs or experience) for the networks concerned. There are usually no routine analyses made by DNO of these times, but operational logs may well be able to provide sufficient information for these purposes. Examination of the generation output data that is available indicates that only halfhourly information will be readily available. The value of T m , being switching times or non-damage restorations times, may in many cases be less that the half- hour interval of the generation output data. This means that further assumptions on the short term rating of circuits and assumptions on the variability of generation output during half- hour periods will need to be made. Preliminary considerations of a small sample of generation profiles suggest that it may be reasonable to assume that generation levels will not vary materially in may cases over a period of, say 15 minutes, and therefore simplifying assumptions may be credible.
The consideration of what Tm values should be used therefore leads to the proposal that these values should be geared to the demand groups being considered. Thus an apparently reasonable assumption is for the repair or urgent switching times for say 11kV and 33kV systems needs to be considered for Tm derivation. Engineering Recommendation P2/5 proposes times to restore supplies. For demands less that 1MW this can be the associated repair time of the system. For group demands up to 12MW, most of the demand should be restored within 3 hours and for group demands between 12MW and 60MW, much of the demand should be restored within 15 minutes. These times are therefore targets for demand restoration times. They do not relate to the system response times, and it is suggested that they should not be used as a proxy for Tm.
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5.4. Approach to Determine the Effective Generation Capacity The methodology can be applied to addressing the issue of the effective capacity of intermittent generation in the same way that ER P2/5 assesses the circuit capacity that would result in comparable expected energy lost. ER P2/5 expresses the effective contribution as a percentage of the rated plant capacity, and then caveats this in relation to the size and number of units concerned. These reservations reflect the perception of unacceptable risk related to single sets in particular and to large sizes of sets compared with the average circuit capacities. These issues will still need to be assessed from the results of actual implementation, and no guidance has been offered within the above methodology as to ho w these boundaries may be selected. The approach recommended is that the characteristics of the unacceptable extremes outlined in ER P2/5 are studied using the above methodology and the results of this overlaid on the studies to be made for modern plant, intermittent or otherwise. This will require assumptions to be made on the typical circuit configurations being studied if a standard-type Table 2 of the same level of simplicity as the existing ER P2/5 is required. In any practical situation, the protection and stability of the generation would need to be taken into account. Even if the generation is tripped following a fault, the developed methodology is still applicable for quantifying the security contribution made by that distributed generation. Howeve r it may not be available instantaneously but could still be a contributing factor after a short period of time, such as 1min, 15min, 3hr etc. The current P2/5 permits generation to be considered in this way. 5.5. Format of Specifying Generation Contribution in Updated P2/5 5.5.1. Introduction There are three main options for consideration. The following text outlines their relative strengths and weaknesses, and how the methodology described previously could be used to develop each option. The first option is a look-up table in the form of the current Table 2 of P2/5. This would retain the simplistic and practical merits of this approach, but it is likely to be slightly more complex and extensive in its application than the present table; situations in which there are small numbers of sets, and different types of generation would be incorporated. The second option is based on families of graphs and/or figures. This is an expansion of the Table 2 approach. Here a larger range of system design parameters can be factored into the graphs to reduce the implicit approximations of the tabular approach. Some specific and relevant aspects, such as load shape and atypical generation patterns may not be accommodated. The third option is a computerised approach based on a spread-sheet environment. Each situation is then the subject of an individual assessment, but using a standardised approach to ensure equity of treatment whilst recognising many local or site-specific parameters. The system planner nevertheless has more inputs to the planning assumptions. This approach may also provide a back-up option to the
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________________________________________ previous two approaches in those situations in which it is recognised that the central assumptions are not credible. 5.5.2. Tabular Approach This option is similar to that adopted by P2/5. Planners would use a revised Table 2 (or maybe one of several tables) to assess the capabilities of the distributed generation. It is possible that the tabulation would provide different valuations for different types or classifications of generation. The tabulation would then allow the assessment of contributions for each group of generation of the same type. The treatment of different types of generation within a demand group is seen to be the subject of testing and assessment during the next implementation phase (see Section 5.5.5). It is envisaged that the tabulation would apply nationally and that there would be no regional variations. There are merits in a standardised approach, mainly in the simplicity and expediency of the system planning process. The formulation of the tabulation would draw on the results of many studies of typical arrangements of generation, circuit topology and demand. In these studies, central assumptions on the values of Tm (if necessary) and load shape would be adopted. The results of the studies would then be codified in as simple a manner as possible. This Table 2 approach would be supported by guidance on what to do to recognise exceptional circumstances (e.g. where the central assumptions are not credible) and in these cases, then recommend one of the following approaches. The main strengths of this approach are: familiarity of the approach to system planners; simplicity, and its associated economy of effort; the advantage of only reverting to more detailed analysis when needed. There is an implicit degree of approximation in this approach, and its acceptability can only be assessed quantitatively through further implementation studies. The approach was acceptable under the situations of the original P2/5 environment. The methodology permits assessment and therefore tabulation of capabilities of single and small number of relatively large sets but this impact on materiality may be the subject of further consideration at the implementation stage. 5.5.3. Graphs and Figures Approach This option would assess the contribution from distributed generation using a set or family of graphs and figures. These would take, as basic variables, the set sizes, generation types or classifications, the demand size and number of circuits supplying the demand group. The graphs could also consider a family of standard load shapes and any other relevant system parameter. It follows therefore that these are similar in concept and application to the look- up table approach described above. The essential difference is that families of graphs contain continuous information and could include more extensive data. The information plotted in these graphs would be obtained in exactly the same way as the above look-up table. Therefore, the ir formulation would draw on the results of many studies of typical arrangement of generation, circuit topology and demand, including central assumptions on the values of Tm (if necessary) and relevant
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________________________________________ load shapes. The results of the studies would then be plotted in as simple a manner as possible. Again, it is envisaged that the graphs would assume central parameters and would apply nationally. There would be no regional variations. The treatment of different types of generation within one demand group s i again seen to be the subject of testing and assessment during the next implementation phase (see Section 5.5.5). The strengths of this approach are: familiarity of the approach to system planners whilst there is likely to be an increase in the number of look-up graphs or figures, the approach is very similar to that of the existing security standard; its associated economy of effort, especially in dealing with concerns over small numbers of larger sets; the advantage of only reverting to a more detailed analysis when needed. Again, there is an implicit degree of approximation in this approach, and its acceptability can only be assessed quantitatively though further implementation studies. However, the development of a range of look-up graphs and figures should reduce many of the approximations of a simple look-up table(s). However, some sitespecific issues, such as differences in load shape, and perhaps notable variations from the norms of availability or persistence, may not be readily taken into account. 5.5.4. Spread-Sheet Approach This option provides a standardised computer program approach but preferably based on a spread-sheet environment. It is envisaged that the methodology set out in earlier sections of this document would be embedded in a formally approved standard analysis package, with the user able to specify a large range of inputs. The output would be the capability that the generation provides, i.e. the distribution circuit capacity that results in the same EENS as the generation capacity. The treatment of different types of generation within one demand group is easy to accomplish unlike the previous two approaches (see Section 2.6). The methodology permits complete assessment of the capabilities of single and small number of relatively large sets. However this impact on materiality may be the subject of further consideration at the implementation stage. In this respect, a specific set of rules is the responsibility of the implementation phase of this activity. The great strengths of this approach are that it is able to authoritatively and objectively assess most situations, and is the only approach that will permit a mixture of generation sites supplying a particular demand group to be assessed correctly. The only weaknesses are that it would require planners to be familiar with the package and the required data format, may require more data to be sourced and would absorb resources to execute the studies to be undertaken.
5.5.5. Different Types of Generation in One Demand Group The underlying methodology permits the contribution from a number of generators that are all connected within one demand group to be assessed. However the first two approaches described above are insufficiently flexible to allow all possible combinations to be included in a simple look-up process. The third approach
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________________________________________ is the only one that would allow this to be done because each individual system arrangement could be modelled and analysed. ER P2/5 allows the contributions from different sites to be additive, but this does not give the true level of system capability. The theory of how this should be done is described in Section 2.6 and the application of the approach shown in Section 4.1.6. 5.6 Future Activities It is anticipated that future activities for an update of T able of P2/5 will be carried out in three phases: (a) Phase 1 It is envisaged that this report will be an input to a formal consultation process to be conducted by WS3 of the TSG. In their preparation to the consultation it is expected that the WS will develop additional material that would contain a list of specific points on which views would be invited. (b) Phase 2 In this phase, a consultation will be carried out on the proposed methodology and inputs will be collected on a number of specific issues. These will be used to develop terms of reference and identify the scope and specific tasks for the remaining work to be performed to produce an updated security standard. (c) Phase 3 In the final phase the work will be carried out in three areas: (i) resolving issues arising from the consultation (ii) data analysis and consensus of data usage (iii) application of the methodology and development of an updated security standard. The latter two items are likely to involve the following individual aspects:I. Data analysis and consensus of data usage Familiarisation. A sensible amount of time is needed to allow consultants who are not familiar with the methodology and data needs to become familiar with the proposed data collection and analysis process. Data requests and preparation. In this phase the consultants would draw up a detailed specification of the data that is needed, such that DNOs and other data suppliers can be informed of the structure and depth of information needed. This would cover such issues as the degree of subdivision of data for, say, demand profiles, generation output profiles (including site demand), system reliability data and considerations of the resolution and accuracy of data for intermittent sources, particularly wind farm clusters. Liaison with all suppliers will be an important aspect of this phase to ensure consistency of data collection practices.
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________________________________________ Initial discussions and data acquisition. In this phase, discussions with DNOs on the proposed structure and data sourcing would take place. This is an important phase since it will condition the quality of information collected. The process will also kick-off the data collection exercises and will include liaison with data suppliers, as well as progress chasing. Review of data. In this phase the consultant will analyze the data obtained for quality and scope, and will assess the classification and segregation into typical data sets by types of generation etc. The process will also test the efficacy of the analysis packages for assessing the filleting of the data profiles for various Tm requirements. Presentation of proposals on standard data to be employed. This phase of the work will include the production of an interim report on the database to be used for the applications of the methodology. Consultation process. In this part of the work, all stakeholders will be consulted on the final approach to data assessment and collection, which will be presented for their sign-on to the approach proposed. Formatting of data in agreed structure . This phase will see the finalization of the data sets after taking into account the output from the consultation process. Final report on data to be employed. This phase will provide the databases to be transferred to the application packages.
II. Application of the methodology and development of an updated standard Familiarisation. This task would involve familiarisation with the developed methodology for assessing generators contribution to network security. This should include methods for both non- intermittent and intermittent generation technologies. Selection of sample systems. In consultation with DNOs, representative networks and generation systems should be selected. These should cover typical situations for a number of group demand Categories. Coding and testing of analysis package. This aspect would be concerned with the development of the algorithms and corresponding codes of the analysis package to enable system studies to be carried out to quantify the contribution of various generation systems to network security. Comprehensive testing of the package will need to be undertaken to demonstrate its exactness. Application of analysis methods. In this stage the developed package would be employed to perform a number of case studies for various generation technologies together with sensitivity studies to quantify the impact of all selected critical factors, such as number of units, availability, shape of load duration curve, data resolution, Tm, etc.
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________________________________________ Presentation of results. An interim report with adequate analysis of the results obtained should be compiled in this stage. This would be used as a basis for discussions with DNOs, generators, suppliers and other interested parties. Conversion of results to P2/6 tables or processes . Results obtained from the analysis will be converted into a set of Tables, Graphs or Processes, as appropriate. Presentation of proposed treatment. This stage of the work will include the production of an interim report on the updated security standard to be used in the final consultation process. It may be appropriate to include a seminar to open a subsequent consultation processes. Consultation process. In this part of the work, all stakeholders should be consulted on the proposed update of present security standards including a new form of Table 2. Final report on analysis. Final report that presents the results of the studies performed including examples of the application of the updated security standard in characteristic situations.
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Objectives This project was conducted in order to develop a methodology that could be used to assess the contribution of distributed generation to security of supply. The present standard P2/5 for assessing this security was written in the 1970s and clearly does not reflect present-day generating units nor their mode of operation. Therefore the specification was to develop an appropriate methodology that would reflect the attributes of present-day generation but constrained in two very specific respects. Firstly the approach had to be simple, easy to implement and achievable in the very short term. Secondly the approach had to be consistent with that used to develop the generation contributions specified in the present P2/5. 6.2 Proposed Methodology The proposed methodology determines the capacity of a perfect circuit which, when substituted for the distributed generation, gives the same level of expected energy not supplied (EENS). This capacity is the effective contribution of the generation system. This approach is identical in concept with that used in developing the present P2/5, a conclusion confirmed by the results given in the Report, which reproduce the 67% value specified in Table 2 of P2/5. The methodology however permits a more extensive set of plant and system attributes to be considered and reflects modern types of generating units and operational modes including conventional, CHP and renewable energy units. Specifically the methodology permits the following attributes to be assessed: unit attributes: number of units capacity of units technology of units system attributes: peak load load profile multiple generation sites remote location of generation sites units not available for 24hr in a day availability attributes: technical availability: this relates to whether the plant is in a working state, i.e. it must not have failed. This aspect reflects the technical up and down states of the generating plant, and has also been referred to as reliability energy availability: this relates to whether energy is available to drive the units, i.e. there must be a source of primary energy, e.g. wind for wind generators, etc. If the primary source of energy to a generator is un-restricted then consideration of this source can be neglected. However if there are restrictions or the source is intermittent, then this
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________________________________________ may need to be considered. This has also been referred to as persistence commercial availability: this relates to whether it is commercially available, i.e. present-day generating plant is privately owned and therefore its use for network support may be restricted for commercial reasons. This has also been referred to as availability materiality attributes. The methodology is applicable to all generation sites irrespective of number of units and their capacity, whereas the present P2/5 has special considerations for one and two units particularly if these have relatively large capacities. This point is further discussed below.
6.3 Constraints and Restrictions As stated above, the project was subject to several specified constraints. The most significant relating to the input of how to develop the methodology was the need to be consistent with the existing P2/5. This restricted the methodology to comparing the generation with the effective capacity of a perfect circuit and to use EENS as the reliability criterion. There are alternative approaches and alternative reliability measures against which the generation could be compared. These aspects are discussed in a companion Report19 written by two of the present authors. In addition there are several aspects relating to constraints, restrictions and applications associated with the output of the methodology. These include the following. The values given by the methodology are similar in concept to the 67% value quoted in P2/5. This value is essentially an average value representing the average behaviour of the generating system. In deciding whether a system complies with P2/5, this value is treated in a deterministic sense, i.e. effective capacities are summated and compared with the requirements specified in P2/5. There is therefore an implicit assumption that this level of capacity is available at all times of need. It must be recognised that the actual contribution can be greater or less than this assessed level and therefore P2/5 itself can not, and does not, ensure that a capability is deliverable at the time of need. It can also be recognised that this variability is generally greater with generating units than circuits, and greater with a small number of units than a large number of units. For this reason, one school of thought suggests that sites with a small number of units should be treated differently. However it must be recognised that the approach underpinning the methodology treats all units irrespective of number and size in an absolutely objective manner. This is completely consistent with the concepts of P2/5, and permits the actual effective contribution to be calculated, unlike the present P2/5 which specifies a single value of 67% contribution for all unit sizes and numbers greater than two. Consequently to vary the values given by the methodology would be to impose a subjective judgement, which is outside of the scope and specification of this present project. The methodology does not evaluate directly a level of risk as would be experienced by customers. Instead it establishes a proxy to this by evaluating a capability level which is perceived to be sufficient to minimise the duration of interruptions if they occur. Indeed this is the principle and philosophy of the present
19
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________________________________________ P2/5. It should be noted that the inherent risk is unaffected by the methodology. Therefore, given that EENS is the criterion for assessing the contribution of generation to network security, the inherent risk to loss of supply will be no greater than that assessed by the present P2/5. It is probably worth noting however that, if sections of the system, including generation and/or other transfer capacity, are ignored in determining whether the system is P2/5 compliant, then the actual capability of the system would be greater and in excess of P2/5 requirements, and the inherent risk would be lower. This is a consequence of the assessment procedure, not the methodology. In any practical situation, the protection and stability of the generation would need to be taken into account. This is outside the scope and specification of this project, and is also outside the explicit scope of P2/5. However, even if the generation is tripped following a fault, the developed methodology is still applicable for quantifying the security contribution made by that distributed generation. This may not be available instantaneously because of the time to restore the generation but could still be a contributing factor after a short period of time, such as 1min, 15min, 3hr, etc. This is again consistent with the current P2/5, which permits generation to be considered in this way. 6.4 Implementation There are three main ways of implementing the methodology: The first option is a look-up table in the form of the current Table 2 of P2/5. This would retain the simplistic and practical merits of this approach, but it is likely to be slightly more complex and extensive in its application than the present table. The second option is based on families of graphs and/or figures. Here a larger range of system design parameters can be factored into the graphs to reduce the implicit approximations of the tabular approach. The third option is a computerised approach based on a spread-sheet environment. Each situa tion is then the subject of an individual assessment, but using a standardised approach to ensure equity of treatment whilst recognising many local or site-specific parameters. It is only this approach that can assess all specific attributes pertaining to specific situations including the ability to assess different generation technologies on the same site and multiple generation sites feeding the same load group.
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SECURITY CONTRIBUTION FROM DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

(Extension part II)

Ron Allan Goran Strbac Keith Jarrett

First Published 2003 Crown Copyright 2003

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension

SECURITY CONTRIBUTION FROM DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

Final Report ______________________________

Ron Allan Goran Strbac Keith Jarrett UMIST/PPA 11 December 2002

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

CONTENTS Preface Terms of reference

Executive summary 1. Background and principles

2. Principles and details of the methodology

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3. Data availability and plant characteristics

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6. Conclusions and recommendations

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PREFACE Terms of Reference

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ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

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ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

1. Background and Principles

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

Central Electricity Generating Board

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

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ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

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2. Principles and Details of the Methodology

supply point or load group

Figure 1 Principle of group demand

This aspect of Group demand is defined specifically in P2/5

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

Figure 2 Illustrative network structures

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Figure 3 Comparison of generation with circuit capacity

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

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Figure 4 Simplified schematic shape of a load duration curve

ETSU/FES Project K/EL/00287 Extension Final Report

load installed generating capacity

energy not supplied, Ei

capacity on outage capacity outage state i capacity available

Figure 5 Evaluating ENS for a generating system

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energy not supplied (= EENS)

Figure 6 Evaluating ENS due to circuit capacity

Figure 7 Comparing circuits and generation with a hypothetical supply source

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2.4.2. Modelling Intermittency

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= generation < load