Deadly Arsenals

Praise for the First Edition
“As accessible as it is lucid and offers the most comprehensive unclassified assessment
available today. In context of the U.S. avowed war on terrorism, Deadly Arsenals is an
especially timely resource and comprehensive reference for scholars, students, and policy
makers interested in weapons of mass destruction.”
—CHOICE, Association of College & Research Libraries

“The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially to terrorists groups, ranks
today as the number one threat to America’s national security. Deadly Arsenals is required
“reading for those who care about the future of our country and our planet.”
—U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden

“To combat weapons of mass destruction, the United States must strengthen the non-
proliferation regime, address regional threats and bolster defenses. Deadly Arsenals is an
indispensable resource for anyone working in these critical areas.”
—Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger, Former U.S. National Security Adviser

“Deadly Arsenals is a proliferation encyclopedia. It is a powerful tool for anyone grap-
pling with ways to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”
—Susan Eisenhower, President, Eisenhower Institute

“Deadly Arsenals provides reliable information, solid analysis, and balanced assessments
of those programs that threaten international security, and on efforts undertaken to ad-
dress those threats.”
—Robert L. Gallucci, Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

D. Wolfsthal Miriam Rajkumar CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE Washington. BIOLOGICAL. AND CHEMICAL THREATS Second Edition Joseph Cirincione Jon B.Deadly Arsenals NUCLEAR. .C.

All rights reserved. Washington. 3. Weapons of mass destruction. Jon B. Title. Deadly arsenals : nuclear. or trustees. Jon B. — 2nd ed.edu Composition by Stephen McDougal Back cover photo by Chad Evans Wyatt Maps by Dave Merrill Printed by Automated Graphic Systems Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Cirincione. Miriam Rajkumar. Wolfsthal. Chemical arms control—Verification. Fax 202-483-1840 www. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue. contact Carnegie’s distributor: The Brookings Institution Press Department 029.C. Nuclear arms control—Verification.C57 2005 327. cm. 2. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Joseph. 20042-0029. III. USA 1-800-275-1447 or 1-202-797-6258 Fax 202-797-2960. Washington. E-mail bibooks@brook. the views and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment. biological. D. Wolfsthal.. and chemical threats / Joseph Cirincione.org The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional posi- tions on public policy issues. To order.© 2005 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Rajkumar.CarnegieEndowment. p.C. 20036 202-483-7600. N.W. D. Includes bibliographical references and index. II. I. staff. Biological arms control—Verification. Miriam. U793. ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-216-5 (isbn-13) ISBN-10: 0-87003-216-X (isbn-10) 1. its officers. 4.1’74—dc22 2005012915 10 09 2345 1st Printing 2005 .

. . . . . . . . . 329 Chapter 18 Non-Russian Nuclear Successor States: Belarus. . . . . . . and Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Chapter 7 China . 163 Chapter 8 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Chapter 3 Nuclear Weapons and Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 PART FIVE: NONPROLIFERATION SUCCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 PART FOUR: TWO HARD CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Chapter 19 Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Chapter 20 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 v . . . . . . . 197 Chapter 10 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Chapter 9 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 Chapter 21 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 83 PART TWO: DECLARED NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES . . . . . . . . 57 Chapter 5 Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . 279 Chapter 15 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Chapter 12 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PART ONE: ASSESSMENTS AND WEAPONS . . . . . . 119 Chapter 6 Russia . . . . . . . . . and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 1 Global Trends . . . . . . . Agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contents FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Chapter 2 The International Nonproliferation Regime . . . . . 203 PART THREE: NON-NPT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Chapter 13 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Chapter 4 Biological and Chemical Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Chapter 11 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Chapter 16 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 Chapter 14 North Korea . . . . . . 317 Chapter 17 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 About Carnegie’s Nonproliferation Resources . . . . . . . . . . . 467 List of Maps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 Appendix D Nuclear Supplier Organizations . . . . 490 . . . 469 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 Appendix B The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Appendix F Glossary . . . .vi Contents APPENDIXES . . . . . . . . 489 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . . . . 419 Appendix A The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 About the Authors . Figures. . Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and Tables . . . . . 443 Appendix E The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty . 427 Appendix C The Chemical Weapons Convention Fact Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

many more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have begun them. The threat brought to life by the attacks of Sep- tember 11. Libya. the field of nonpro- liferation has been through a period of breathtaking change—all of which is reflected in this new volume. Since the signing of the NPT in 1968. does not include a chapter on Algeria. North Korea’s violation of its commitments and subsequent announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). we set out to produce the most complete and authoritative resource available anywhere from nonclassified sources vii . In 2003. was able to traverse the world selling nuclear bomb designs and equipment necessary to produce nuclear weap- ons for years before it was stopped. The news is not all bleak. and perhaps others. or biological weapons in Iraq underlined how little outsiders can know about what happens within member states without inspectors on the ground. as did the Iraq conflict. chemical. Buyers included North Korea. which reflects the international community’s greater confidence in the peaceful intentions of that country’s nuclear program. the glaring gaps in the international community’s capacity for tough enforcement of nonprolifera- tion commitments. for example. Q. and its declaration that it had acquired nuclear weapons. Existing laws and export practices proved manifestly inad- equate to block these transfers of equipment and know-how. The threats posed by weapons pro- grams in the former Soviet republics have diminished considerably. The failure to find nuclear. however. chemical. One dangerous consequence of this failure has been the accelerated pace of the Iranian nuclear program. news emerged that the A. With the first edition of Deadly Arsenals. There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapons programs than there were 20 years ago. Iran. underlined the treaty’s Achilles heel that allows a state to exploit NPT membership to become a nuclear state. This new edition. North Korea’s actions emphasized. Khan network. And Libya has become an important success story and a model for other nations to follow as it verifiably dismantles its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. based in Pakistan but involving engineers and businesspeople from more than a dozen countries. or biological weapons—swiftly rose to the top of an agenda that for 40 years had been focused on threats from states. The new material in this volume on the United States and Russia re- flects the fact that these two countries continue to work cooperatively to dis- mantle materials left over from the Cold War. which benefited substantially from partnership with the Khan net- work. Foreword In the three years since the first edition of Deadly Arsenals. 2001—that terrorists might seek and one day use nuclear.

users will find it to be the same reliable guide that its predecessor proved to be. We would like to thank the John D. is well worth the effort. and biological weapons and their means of delivery. I am confident that this second edition will earn the same reputation for comprehensive coverage. The widespread use of that volume and the warm feedback we have received from scholars. government officials. MacArthur Founda- tion.viii Foreword on the spread of nuclear. and Catherine T. Though its content differs substantially from that of the first vol- ume. reflecting the extraordinary pace of change in this field. the Carnegie Corporation of New York. while highly labor intensive. JESSICA T. the Ford Foundation. and experts from around the world have reinforced our belief that this project. and the New Land Foundation for their generous support of our work. MATHEWS President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . and meticulous atten- tion to detail. accuracy. clarity. chemical. the Prospect Hill Foundation. the Nuclear Threat Initiative. the Ploughshares Fund.

who greatly improved the chemical and biological weapons chapter in the first edition. Toby Dalton. Alfred Imhoff copy ed- ited. We would like to thank publicly Wade Boese. We are indebted to the project’s founder. Once again. Revati Prasad. Kristensen at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Jessica Mathews. and Joshua Williams. and compositor Stephen McDougal produced the book in record time. Evan Medieros. Shai Feldman. as well as our Carnegie Endowment colleagues. and Sarah Schumacher—all of whom have now ad- vanced their careers. and Ashley Tellis. Judith Perera. Avner Cohen. and Gregory Koblentz. Mark Smith. Rose Gottemoeller. Norris and Hans M. data and analy- sis on the nuclear weapon arsenals of the United States and Russia relied heavily on the research and advice of Robert S. They did a fabulous job researching develop- ments. which formed the basis of our original study. Leonard Spector. we must ac- knowledge the international team of experts and scholars who generously gave their time and intellects to review chapters. Acknowledgments For this substantially improved second edition of Deadly Arsenals. Michael Swaine. graciously did the same for this new book. Camille Grand. and Andrew the chapter on missile proliferation. None of this would have been possible without the guidance and support of the Carnegie Endowment’s president. Paul Walker. Jonathan Tucker. Maya coauthored the first edition’s chapter on chemical and biological weapons. the library staff of Kathleen Higgs and Chris Henley provided wonderful and timely research. and to Rodney Jones. the late Mark McDonough. Joel Wit. Our research benefited from exten- sive private discusions with defense and foreign affairs officials in many nations. for their valuable amendments and suggestions. Michael Eisenstadt. Andrew Krepps. Jane Vaynman. We are still grateful to those who provided vaulable suggestions for the first edition of this book: Michael Barletta. the authors of Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (1998). Thomas Cochran. and Frank Pabian. As always. Sally Murray James of Cutting Edge Design gave us a clean. Maya Pilatowicz. artistic cover and book design. dissecting intelligence assessments. The first edition of this book stood on the broad shoulders of those who preceded us at the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project. John Simpson. Hussein Haqqani. and fact-checking revisions. George Perkovich. John Redick. We could not have produced this second edition without the help of the su- perb Carnegie Nonproliferation staff: Caterina Dutto. and the dedicated 2002 Carnegie Endowment staff of Marshall Breit. whose suggestion launched ix . John Russell. Gaurav Kampani. counting missiles. Geoffrey Kemp. The Carnegie Endowment’s Phyllis Jask patiently shepherded the manuscript through the publications maze to produce the high-quality book you now hold. Hadi Semati.

the authors alone accept responsibility for the content and any errors that may remain. MacArthur Foundation. We are ever grateful for the faith and generous support of the John T. the Nuclear Threat Initiative. the Carnegie Corporation of New York. and Carmen MacDougall.x Acknowledgments the first edition of this book three years ago. the Ford Founda- tion. and vice presidents George Perkovich. the Prospect Hill Foundation. With our great appreciation to those who worked to improve the quality of our work also goes our general absolution of any sins. the Ploughshares Fund and the New Land Foundation. Paul Balaran. . and Catherine D.

PART ONE Assessments and Weapons 1 .

AVAILABLE AT www.nv.doe. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. was a 61 kiloton device fired June 4. at the Nevada Test Site. part of Operation Upshot/Knothole. 1953.gov/news&pubs) .S. (U.PREVIOUS PAGE: The XX-39 CLIMAX.

which are needed to capture the dramatic developments of the past three years. which was possible. Biological weapon agents can be made in most medical laboratories. The first threat is real. has varied over the years from near hysteria to apathy. concern is very high. this phrase conflates very different threats from weapons that differ greatly in lethality. killing hundreds of thousands instantly and leaving lingering radiation that would ren- der large areas uninhabitable for years. with the danger that it had nuclear bombs.” Though used widely by officials and the media. All the parts of the book emphasize factual and historical analysis of weapons programs. During this first decade of the twenty-first century. this second edition of Deadly Arsenals revises and updates all the chapters. Iran.1 One significant change in the new edition is that it no longer employs the term “weapons of mass destruction. This study 3 . Official and public attention to proliferation issues. the repeated use of the term “weap- ons of mass destruction” to describe the potential threat from Iraq before the 2003 war merged the danger that it still had anthrax-filled shells. The book is in- tended to serve as a proliferation atlas and ready reference for students. but they inflict rela- tively limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly. however. consequence of use. North Korea. but its elimination requires an entirely different set of policies than does the second. with passionate international debates over which strategies can best prevent the spread and use of these weapons. biological. Similarly. and the availability of measures that can protect against them. Nuclear weap- ons are difficult to produce. saying that Syria has weapons of mass destruction merges the danger that it has chemical weapons. justifying for some the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a potential chemical weapons attack. and chemical weapons is widely recog- nized as the most serious threat to the national security of the United States and other nations. and concerned citizens alike. experts. For example. and new information and analysis on other countries. and prompt inoculation and quar- antine could limit the number of victims and the areas affected. with the danger that it has a nuclear bomb. This edition includes new chapters on Iraq. which was highly unlikely. CHAPTER 1 Global Trends The proliferation of nuclear. which is certainly not true. Libya. figures. A failure to differentiate these threats can lead to seriously flawed policy. but one weapon can destroy an entire city. Chemical weapons are easy to manufacture. which is almost certainly true. and tables from the first edition published in 2002. The term also blurs the possible responses to threats. but it is very difficult to turn these agents into effective weapons. To inform these debates.

N. later. Nuclear weapons were used for the first and last time at the end of that war. and 5 describe in greater detail the characteristics of the various weapons and the specific national programs that exist or may evolve. and other key technologies remains the greatest direct threat to U. Military researchers produced weapons that could deliver poison gas. but all the belligerent nations had biological weapon research programs. As the threat of global thermonuclear war receded. It has evolved into many separate threats. 4. officials and experts agreed that the acquisition of those weapons by other nations or groups posed the most serious remaining threat. and Germany invented and used nerve gas to kill millions of Jews and other prisoners in its concentration camps. the absolute numbers of these weapons have decreased dramati- cally. “The proliferation of nuclear. biological. considering weapons and programs as they actually appear. Chapters 3. Japan inaugurated biological war- fare in its attacks against the Chinese at the beginning of World War II. agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to eliminate all their chemical and biological weapons. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded in its annual threat assessment. missiles. the U. which had the vast majority of global holdings.S. As the Industrial Revolution mechanized warfare. In January 1992. aerial bombs. germs. when the United States struck Japanese cities. when both the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact perfected and produced tens of thousands of nuclear. Since then. and chemical weapons were twentieth-century inventions. the industrialized nations sought ways to more efficiently kill armored troops or unprotected popu- lations dispersed over wide areas and to annihilate military and economic tar- gets. including the international network of treaties and agreements constructed over the past 50 years to prevent and reduce prolifera- tion. the United States and the Soviet Union. biological. interests worldwide.S. Security Council declared that their spread constituted a “threat to international peace and secu- rity. and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. Poison gas was used for the first time during World War I. President George W. and outlines the prospects for the next few years. Global arse- nals peaked during the Cold War years of the 1960s. Bush said.”2 This chapter provides a brief overview of global proliferation threats. some of them harder to see and harder to answer. and other agents to break the trench warfare stalemate. biological.4 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s disaggregates these threats.” In 1998. missiles. 1970s. describes the weapons and the nations that have or wish to have them. and. for example. as both the Central Powers and the Allies tried attacks with chlorine gas. and nuclear explosions with artillery. Even before the end of the Cold War.” In early 2001. There is nothing new. of course. “The grave threat from nuclear. . chemical. about mass destruction. Chapter 2 details the major elements of the nonproliferation regime. and chemical bombs. The Twentieth Century’s Deadly Legacy Nuclear. and early 1980s. From ancient times. mustard gas. and biological weap- ons. a military campaign often meant the slaughter of tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians. the U.

ships. the history of their spread. cruise missiles. Today. debates. and the group remained remarkably stable . trucks. There is also now the added danger that terrorist organizations could kill thousands with these weapons or by sabotaging critical urban and industrial infrastructures. a list of abbreviations and acronyms also appears at the end of the book. are available at the Carnegie Endowment’s proliferation web site (www. It is followed by a global assessment of the current threats and of past and proposed nonproliferation policies. artillery. Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are the most deadly weapons ever invented—the only true weapons of mass destruction. in Madrid—the explosion of a nuclear weapon would be the most devastating. 2004. A single. aircraft. 2001. The members of this group acquired their arsenals dur- ing the 20 years after World War II. China. including ballistic missiles. with greater detail provided in the country chapters that follow (see table 1. in New York and Washington and on March 11. and the United Kingdom (see table 1.) Updates and expansion of the information in this volume.1). Global Trends 5 Chapters 6 through 21 review the history and status of the most significant national programs. The development of accurate threat assessments and effective national poli- cies requires understanding the technologies of the various types of weapons. plus the latest developments.2). and the successes and failures of nonproliferation efforts. (The appendixes to the book include detailed information on the main nonproliferation treaties and nuclear supplier organizations. A wide variety of delivery mechanisms for these weapons exists. In order of the size of their nuclear arsenals. and envelopes. Although a terrorist attack on these infrastructures using conventional weap- ons is the most likely threat—as seen by the terrorist attacks on September 11. Five nuclear weapon states are recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and enjoy spe- cial rights and privileges under international law. and discussions. only eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons.3 This calculation of “risk times consequences” should force us to focus most of our attention on this catastrophic possibility while not neglecting the threats from chemical and biological weapons and doing all we can to prevent conventional attacks. They also face the possibility that some nation or group still has or soon could have bio- logical weapons.ProliferationNews. they are Russia.org). France. including those countries that have given up nuclear weap- ons. the United States. Nuclear weapons are also the most difficult of the three types of weapons to manufacture or acquire. Weapons and Trends The nations of the world confront serious and immediate threats from the glo- bal presence of thousands of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons. along with an ex- tensive glossary of nonproliferation and weapons terms. The sections below give a brief overview. compact nuclear device can instantly devastate a midsized city.

and survivability under environmental stress. which similarly liberate energy and neutrons. and they provide the catalyst for more complex thermonuclear explosions. Biological Weapons Biological weapons intentionally disseminate agents of infectious diseases and of conditions that would otherwise appear only naturally or not at all. The advent of genetic engineering has had a profound impact on the threat from bio- logical weapons. owing to the possibility of organism inactivation caused by heat from the blast. lethality. mak- ing biological weapons even more attractive. transmissibility. Because most biological agents are living organisms.1. Nuclear fission weapons produce energy by splitting the nucleus of an atom—usually of highly enriched uranium or plutonium—into two or more parts by bombarding it with neutrons. Most modern nuclear weapons use a combination of the two processes. called boosting. most or all of which is derived from fission or a combination of fission and fusion processes. pathogenicity. fungi. Fission bombs. of chemical substances to cause physical or physiological harm . as opposed to the explosive properties. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons use the toxic properties. such as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Agents that are extremely harmful can be modified to increase their virulence. Though aerosol deliv- ery is optimal. chlamydia. but to a lesser extent. rickettsiae (such as Q fever). virulence. In such weapons. the incubation period. The features of these agents that influence their potential for use as weapons include infectivity. their natural rep- lication after dissemination increases the potential impact of a strike. are the easiest to make. Explosions from such devices cause catastrophic damage due both to the high temperatures and ground shocks produced by the initial blast and the lasting residual radiation. A Weapons Guide Nuclear Weapons A nuclear weapon is a device with explosive energy. viruses (such as smallpox). production rate per cell. These agents can be divided into bacteria (such as anthrax). as well as to mask their presence from immune- based detectors. explosive delivery is also effective. Any country possessing a pharmaceutical or food storage infrastructure already has an inherent sta- bilization and storage system for biological agents. a fission ex- plosion creates the high temperatures necessary to join light isotopes of hydrogen. and toxins (such as ricin). and stability. usually deuterium and tritium. to maintain high yields in smaller bombs. toxicity. Each nucleus that is split releases energy as well as additional neutrons that bombard nearby nuclei and sustain a chain reaction.6 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1.

were employed during World War I and consisted primarily of commer- cial chemicals used as choking and blood agents.org/nuke/intro/cw/intro. and missile warheads.S. Nerve gases can be classified as either G agents (sarin) or V agents (VX).org/nuke/ intro/bw/intro. Victims not injured in the explosion would be exposed to life-threatening levels of radiation.fas. such as a nuclear reactor or spent-fuel storage depots.gov/www/global/ arms/treaties/bwc1. available at www. which even in low doses cause painful burns necessitating medical attention. Such agents block an enzyme in the body that is essential for the functioning of the nervous system. U. available at www. Chemical weapons can be delivered through bombs. which in general use an explosion to expel an internal agent laterally. are lethal far more quickly and in far smaller quantities than are classic agents and are effective both when inhaled and when absorbed through the skin. such as chlorine and phosgene.htm. Federation of American Scientists. Alternatively. These gases. would contaminate large areas for years pending expensive removal operations. both of which are exceedingly volatile and toxic. both of which have under- gone limited military development. it was used to inflict numerous casualties during the Iran- Iraq War. or even a radioactive gas. The area of dis- persal would depend on the size of the explosion. SOURCES Federation of American Scientists. causing a loss of muscle control. . were discovered by the Ger- mans in the 1930s and represent the beginning of modern chemical war- fare. Chemical Weapons Intro- duction.state. or anti-cholinesterase agents. a source of radioactive material. has been a popular weapon. spray tanks. Classic chemical weapons. Other types of chemical weapons include mental and physical incapacitants (such as BZ) and binary systems. The most common method for their use is as explosives surrounded by radioactive material in the form of pellets. Mustard gas. because of its low cost and ability to produce resource-debilitating casualties. which caused respira- tory damage and asphyxiation.html. respi- ratory failure. This radiation also would inhibit or prevent emergency response teams from aiding the victims and. marked the first use of chemical weapons to produce a significant military effect. which are all liquids at room temperature.htm. Global Trends 7 to an enemy. available at www. The advent of such blistering agents as mustard gas and lewisite. and eventually death. Biological Weapons. powder. artillery shells. rockets. could be targeted with large explosive devices to disperse very high levels of radioactivity into the atmosphere and the surrounding area. depending on the size of the explosion. Radiological Weapons Radiological weapons use conventional explosives such as dynamite and C-4 to disperse radioactive materials over large areas. Biological Weapons Convention. Department of State. Nerve gases.fas.

when India and Pakistan both detonated nuclear devices and declared their intention to deploy weapons.2. and Israel are not parties to the NPT. until 1998. however. W. could subject it to additional sanctions or even military action through U. on the eve of its transition to majority rule. Pakistan. and Kazakhstan gave up the thousands of nuclear weapons deployed on their territories when the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine. Iran is a member state of the NPT and. as such. North Ko- rean officials declared publicly for the first time that they had nuclear weapons. if proved. several major countries have abandoned nuclear pro- grams. and it soon announced its withdrawal from the NPT. many more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have begun them. and four others have relinquished their nuclear weapons to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. In January 2005. President . The 1994 agree- ment that had frozen the nation’s plutonium program broke down in 2002. Belarus. Similarly.5 In the past 20 years. any nuclear weapons program is illegal and. North Korea acknowledges a program and may have accu- mulated enough material to construct as many as nine weapons.300 China 410 France 350 United Kingdom 200 Israel 100–170 suspected India 75–110 possible Pakistan 50–110 possible Suspected Programs Iran North Korea from 1964. two others may be actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs.8 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1.N. India. when China tested its first nuclear weapon. but both are capable of configuring aircraft and missiles with tens of weapons over the next few years. destroyed the six nuclear weapons its apartheid regime had secretly constructed.4 There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapons programs than there were 20 or 30 years ago. thanks in great measure to the dedi- cated diplomacy of the George H. World Nuclear Arsenals Known Programs Number of Weapons Russia 16. resolutions. Iran is slowly but steadily pursuing an open civilian nuclear power program and may be covertly developing expertise for nuclear weapons. Since the signing of the NPT in 1968. India and Pakistan have not yet openly deployed any weapons. Apart from these eight countries.000 United States 10. if they so desire. Israel is widely believed to have approxi- mately 100 nuclear weapons but neither acknowledges nor denies their exist- ence. South Africa. including Argentina and Brazil.

the United States and the Soviet Union perfected bio- logical weapons. where the use or possession of nuclear weap- ons is prohibited anywhere on the continent. storage pools for spent-fuel rods from civilian nuclear reactors).6 As with chemical and biological agents. They may be attractive weapons for ter- rorists owing to the relative ease of their acquisition and use and mass disruption potential. President Richard M.N. Radiological weapons. although not as destructive as nuclear explosive weap- ons. claiming that the country still had major programs for nuclear. In 1969. making the treatment of casualties more difficult.) Iraq gave up its nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent U. biological. Although instances of the deliberate spread of disease go back to the an- cient Greeks and Assyrians. such as dynamite. which is exactly the logic that inspired the original members of the NPT decades earlier. concluding that South Africa’s secu- rity was better served in a nuclear-free Africa than in one with several nuclear nations.S. the invisible and uncertain danger from these weapons would cause widespread fear and horror. Nixon an- nounced that the United States would unilaterally and unconditionally renounce biological weapons.g. particularly as a terrorist threat. pending sizable removal and cleansing operations. to disperse radioactive materials. biological weapons stockpile and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful . A terrorist act involving the dispersal of radioactive materials would contaminate a wide area. each developing arsenals capable of destroying all human life and many food crops on the planet. including the highly radioactive waste material from nuclear power reactors or other nonweapon sources. these weapons have not been used in modern warfare. triggering an explosion that could be many times more deadly than the accident at Chernobyl. Biological Weapons Biological weapons are weapons that intentionally use living organisms to kill. ex- posing many people unhurt in the initial explosion to death and injury from radioactivity and rendering large areas uninhabitable. Libya gave up its nuclear and chemical weapons programs and long-range missile pro- gram in December 2003 after negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom. These are weap- ons that use conventional explosives. There is also the risk of a “reverse dirty bomb” that brings the conventional explosive to an existing radioactive source (e. though the United States led a coalition of nations to invade Iraq.. disarmament efforts. also pose a serious danger. the efficient weaponization of biological agents did not occur until the twentieth century. They are second only to nuclear weapons in their potential to cause mass casu- alties. Global Trends 9 Nelson Mandela agreed with the decision. He ordered the destruction of the entire U. During the Cold War. and chemical weapons. With the exception of the Japanese attacks in China before and during World War II. (Africa is one of several areas of the world that have estab- lished nuclear-weapon-free zones. Algeria showed some interest in nuclear weapons over the years but turned away from these programs in the 1990s and is no longer considered a high-risk state.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS. or transfer of bio- logical weapons. are members of the BWC. Milton Leitenberg points out that official assessments rarely distinguish between suspected. and weapon.S. The chapters on specific countries provide the full details of each program. Israel. nations with such capabilities or programs are often lumped together in lists with countries that have chemical weapons programs or capabilities.S. four others—Iran. though not all the countries. China. Although the Soviet Union claimed that it had ended its extensive bioweapons program when it signed the BWC in 1972. officials believe that North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and may have the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so. and the states that are parties to it have been trying to negotiate a verification protocol and additional measures to strengthen it. the Soviet Union. Russia. There is still considerable uncertainty surrounding Russian weapon facilities.8 China has a large. continued at substantial levels. and Syria (table 1. Nixon successfully negotiated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- vention (BWC). 169 nations had signed the treaty. however. and the possibility exists that agents and weapons remain in Russia. This treaty requires all signatories to destroy all their biological weapons and biological weapon production facilities. He reversed 45 years of U. Almost all the programs are research efforts. North Korea. When the BWC originally entered into force in 1975. Worse. The treaty has no verifica- tion mechanism.10 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s purposes. production. Israel. Iran. stockpiling. advanced . These nations are all suspected of pursuing offensive biological weapons programs prohibited by the BWC. seven nations are suspected of having some level of offensive biological warfare research programs: China. signed in 1972 and ratified by the Senate in 1975. capability. have only research and development programs. and only one nation—Russia—is believed to have produced and stockpiled weapon agents. which pro- hibits the development. National programs are distinguished by whether they have produced actual weapons. Israel is believed to have a sophisticated bio- logical weapons program. in fact. Egypt. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION. including at the 1996 and 2001 review conferences for the BWC and in annual reports to Congress. acquisition. 4 nations were thought to have biological weapons: the United States. U. It is often difficult to get a complete picture of which countries or groups have biological weapons or programs. North Korea. By the spring of 2005. such as Israel.3). U. and China—may have done so. it may have produced anthrax and more advanced agents in weaponized form as well as toxins. developing. officials have publicly identified many of these nations on sev- eral occasions.7 This book differentiates the distinct programs and threats. however. reluctance and sought the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 disclosed that work had. and South Africa. or have the basic capability to produce agents.S. which prohibited the use of biological and chemical weapons in war (and which was subsequently ratified under President Gerald Ford).

believe that the voluntary BWC declarations submitted by China are inaccurate and incomplete.14 Sudan is not believed to have a biological weapons program. U. BIOTERRORISM. U. Countries Suspected of Retaining Biological Weapons or Programs China Egypt Iran Israel North Korea Russia Syria biotechnical infrastructure that could be used to develop and produce biological agents. officials reported that by 1972 Egypt had developed biological warfare agents and that there was “no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist.S. which is now rarely mentioned in either official or expert reviews. POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON RESEARCH PROGRAMS.3. U. but inspections after the 2003 war in Iraq and the 2003 agreement with Libya showed that neither had an active program.15 Finally. Iran may have an offen- sive biological weapons program. including the capability to produce small quan- tities of biological weapons agents. Global Trends 11 Table 1. and Taiwan.13 Syria has a biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited agent development but has not begun a major effort to produce biological agents or to put them into weapons. U. Almost all threats .S. India and Pakistan are not believed to have produced or stockpiled offensive biological weapons. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case. During the past several decades.”10 There is considerable evidence that Egypt started a program in the early 1960s that produced weaponized agents. or stockpiled biologi- cal weapons. In November 2001. assessments. undersecretary of state John Bolton said that Iran had actually produced agents and weapons.9 but he had a more cautious assessment in 2004: “I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iran has an offensive biological weap- ons program.S. terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents have fallen short of successful weaponization. officials have re- peatedly warned of Sudanese interest in developing such a program.11 In 1996. Other states of some concern include South Africa.S. but U. although official assessments note that both countries have the resources and capability to support biological warfare research and development efforts.S. however. officials had long believed that both Iraq and Libya had biological weapons or programs. produced. which had a bioweapons program that the new unity government says it ended in 1992.S. officials. Chinese officials have repeatedly asserted that the country has never re- searched or produced biological weapons.”12 Egyp- tian officials assert that Egypt never developed. according to official U.

Russia. a Hiroshima-size nuclear bomb of 12-kiloton yield would kill 50 percent of the population over 30 square kilometers. Even this limited attack caused mass disruption and cost billions of dollars in decontamination and prevention expenses. The attack could have been much worse. The first suc- cessful terrorist incident involving biological agents occurred in 1984 in Dalles.12 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s to use biological agents—including hundreds of terrorist anthrax hoaxes against abortion clinics and other targets in the United States—have been false alarms. The group’s extensive efforts failed. 2007. . and with con- siderable funding and expertise. The CWC requires all state parties possessing chemical weapons to de- stroy them in a safe and environmentally friendly manner not later than ten years after the treaty entered into force. Still. unless special extensions are granted. The treaty also requires all state parties to destroy or convert all present and past capabilities used to produce chemical weapons by that time. Chemical weapons have been used only in isolated instances of warfare since World War I. Chemical Weapons Mass casualties require large amounts of chemical agents relative to either bio- logical or nuclear weapons. Oregon. The 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) started a process of “deproliferation. The declarations by the United States and Russia account for the vast majority of known chemical weapon stockpiles. and it resorted to using the chemi- cal agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo subway in 1994 and 1995. 5 metric tons of the nerve gas sarin carried in bombs and dropped by two strike aircraft or the warheads of 36 Scud missiles could kill 50 percent of the people over 4 square kilometers. When the bioterrorism attack that many had long feared finally came. infecting 750 people. some- one sent letters containing anthrax to members of Congress and the media. or by April 29.S. 168 countries were state parties to the CWC.000 met- ric tons of agents. when a religious cult.16 By comparison. Russia’s 40. India. but this was the first time that a biological warfare agent was used against the U. The Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo. In the United States in October 2001. for example. population. The letters killed five and infected eighteen others. disseminated salmonella bacteria in ten restaurants.” whereby most nations declared their holdings (if any) and began eliminating their arsenals and production fa- cilities. Some experts contend that the complexity of a biological weapon design for effective dissemination has by and large thwarted bioterrorism. despite (or perhaps because of ) the substantial numbers of weap- ons that were in national arsenals. tried for several years. As of the spring of 2005. it was not what the experts had predicted. Four countries—the United States. to produce and weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax. There have been only two significant biological attacks by terrorists in recent times. and South Korea—have declared their possession of chemical weapons stockpiles totaling more than 70. Rajneesh.000 metric tons is the largest declared stockpile. but with no fatalities. The terrorist either did not realize that sophisticated dispersal mechanisms were re- quired for mass casualties from anthrax or simply did not care.

U.700 metric tons of chemical agents were destroyed. and Taiwan. the United States. The other coun- tries sometimes suspected of conducting chemical weapons research include India.4. . officials say that in the past Iran has stockpiled blister. rockets. and one-fourth of the 8.6 million chemical weapons declared by the four possessor states was eliminated through treaty procedures between 1997 and February 2005. Russia. Eleven nations have declared their possession of existing or former chemical weapon production facilities: Bosnia and Herzegovina. officials believe it has a significant stockpile of the nerve agent sarin. and blood agents.19 Egypt was the first country in the Middle East to obtain chemi- cal weapons and the first to use them. and U. and Egypt are not members of the CWC. and Syria (table 1. Japan. Iran. South Korea.17 The most significant remaining suspected national programs are those of China. and choking chemical agents and has weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells. Sudan. intelligence assessments state that North Korea has had a long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea. Pakistan.18 Israel is also believed to have an active research and development program for chemical warfare agents and to have produced and stockpiled weapons. India. China. Egypt.S.S. Syria has not signed the CWC. U. A 1990 intelligence assessment reported that Syria had weaponized these chemicals in 500-kilogram aerial bombs and warheads for its Scud-B missiles. Israel. France. North Korea is believed to have a large stockpile of these agents and weapons. and aerial bombs.20 It is believed still to have a research program and has never reported the destruction of any of its chemical agents or weapons. SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES. blood. blister.21 Iranian officials deny these charges. Global Trends 13 Table 1. Israel.4). mortars. nearly 10. It reportedly employed phosgene and mustard gas against Yemeni royalist forces in the mid-1960s. Countries Suspected of Retaining Significant Chemical Weapons Programs China Egypt Iran Israel North Korea Syria and that nation’s financial difficulties make complete elimination of its stockpile by 2007 impossible. Syria. and Yugoslavia.S. the United Kingdom. appar- ently developed in response to Iraqi chemical warfare attacks during the Iran- Iraq War. Iran. Iran’s declaration at the May 1998 session of the CWC conference was the first time that nation had admitted to having had a chemical weapons program. Forty-nine of the 64 declared facilities were destroyed or converted. choking. including the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve. but there is no publicly available evidence of such activity.

22 Libya gave up its offensive chemical weapons capability with the 2003 nego- tiations and has joined the CWC. The threat is certainly changing and is increasing. In comparison with the high point of deployments in the mid-1980s. Sudan is a member of the CWC. CHEMICAL WEAPON RESEARCH PROGRAMS. officials. This has not changed since Russia and China deployed their first intercontinental . Only China and Russia have the capability to hit the mainland of the United States with nuclear warheads on intercontinental land-based ballistic missiles. and medium-range ballistic missiles (see chapter 5. The number of countries trying to develop long- range ballistic missiles has not changed greatly in 20 years and is somewhat smaller than in the past. the ballistic missile threat to the United States is significantly smaller than it was in the mid-1980s. Though Pakistan has im- ported a number of dual-use chemicals. and many of these arsenals are being retired as they age. Yet by several other important criteria. an advanced chemical warfare pro- gram and a wide variety of potential delivery systems. poorer. Though it has pledged to destroy all agents and production facilities. believe that China has a moderate inventory of traditional agents. pledging to destroy them by 2006. The nations now attempting to do so are also smaller. and less technologically advanced than were those with missile programs 20 years ago. U.S. according to some measures.5). but it has not yet joined the CWC. Sudan may have an active interest in acquiring the capability to produce chemical agents but is not believed to have done so. “Missile Proliferation”). Missile Proliferation Much of the proliferation debate over the past few years has centered not on the weapons themselves but on one possible means for delivering them: ballistic missiles (table 1. India’s declaration under the CWC in June 1997 was the first time that nation acknowledged it had a chemical warfare production program. they are probably for the development of commercial chemical industrial activities and not for a dedicated warfare pro- gram. Most nations that have missiles have only short-range. Iraq’s chemical weapons program ended after the 1991 Gulf War. South Korea ended its weapons program when it ratified the CWC in 1997 and has been destroying its chemical weapons and production facilities. Albania discovered and declared a small cache of chemical weapons in 2004. Scud-type missiles. Pakistan sometimes appears on a list of countries with chemical “capabilities” because it has the ability to manu- facture chemical weapons should it choose to do so. India’s activities and exports of dual-use equipment and chemical precursors cause some concern. intermediate-range.14 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s China has ratified the CWC and has declared that it does not possess an inventory of chemical agents. however. It has become common wisdom and a political habit to refer to the growing threat of ballistic missiles. there are now dramatically fewer long-range.

it is reasonable to conclude that of all the potential threats.000–3. with ranges of less than 1. The greatest programs of concern are those developing medium-range mis- siles in India. We can catego- rize these threats along four axes. and regime collapse. This merges very-short-range mis- siles. of which there are few. . Confusion arises when policy makers speak of missile threats to the United States or to such U. but their neighbors take a decidedly differ- ent view. These four categories of threat are nuclear terrorism.000–5.000 kilometers): China Iran North Korea India Israel Pakistan Saudi Arabia One country possesses intermediate-range ballistic missiles (with ranges of 3.5. Iran. overall the ballistic missile threat is limited and changing slowly.500 kilometers): China Five countries possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (with ranges of 5. A Global Nuclear Threat Assessment On the basis of the proceeding information.000 kilometers): Afghanistan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Armenia Libya Ukraine Bahrain Slovakia United Arab Emirates Belarus South Korea Vietnam Egypt Syria Yemen Greece Taiwan Iraq Turkey Seven countries possess medium-range ballistic missiles (with ranges of 1. interests as forward-deployed troops or allied nations. Though these programs are a cause for serious regional concern and could develop into potential international threats. Global Trends 15 Table 1. though developments along one axis often influence developments along the others. and Pakistan.500+ kilometers): China Russia United Kingdom France United States ballistic missiles in 1959 and 1981.S. new nuclear weapon states and regional conflict. with long-range missiles. None of these nations view their programs as threatening. nuclear weapons pose the greatest risks. North Korea. of which there are many. Israel. existing nuclear arsenals. respectively. The Thirty Nations with Ballistic Missiles Nineteen countries possess only short-range ballistic missiles (that is. The greatest concerns are outlined here.

even as China and India continue their rivalry. New Nuclear Nations and Regional Conflicts The danger posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is not that either country would likely use these weapons to attack the United States. if any. weakening their ability to intervene to avoid conflict in dangerous regions—as well as. though with more difficulty. Existing regional nuclear tensions already pose serious risks. The gravest danger arises from terrorists’ access to state stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. And along with these rapid developments and the collapse of existing norms could come increased regional tensions. or national futures to protect. States are and will continue to be deterred from such attacks by the certainty of swift and massive retaliation. other states. The decades-long conflict between India and Pakistan has made South Asia for many years the re- gion most likely to witness the first use of nuclear weapons since World War II. the nations of Europe. and hence well guarded. because acquiring a supply of nuclear material (as opposed to making the weapon itself ) remains the most difficult challenge for a terrorist group. or other new possessors. There is an active missile race under way between the two nations. who do not have land. The greater danger is the reactions of other states in the region. and fissile material kept at dozens of civilian sites around the world. possibly leading to regional wars and to nuclear catastrophe. Pyongyang. Terrorist organi- zations and radical fundamentalist groups operate within Pakistan’s borders. emboldening Tehran. A nuclear chain reaction could ripple throughout a region and across the globe. So-called outlaw states are not the most likely source. Many of these caches of materials consist of highly enriched uranium that could be directly used in nuclear weap- ons or further enriched to weapons grade. or other countries. In Northeast Asia. may not be deterrable.) Rather. Terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear weapons therefore poses the greatest single nuclear threat. triggering weap- ons decisions in several. are small and exceedingly precious. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities . Russia and other former Soviet states possess thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of inadequately secured nuclear material. Their stockpiles. terrorists. perhaps many.16 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Nuclear Terrorism: The Most Serious Threat Although states can be deterred from using nuclear weapons by fear of retalia- tion. National instability or a radical change in government could lead to the collapse of state control over nuclear weapons and materials and to the migration of nuclear scientists to the service of other nations or groups. (Nor are these states likely to give away what they see as the jewels in their security crowns. of course. people. There are also significant stockpiles of plutonium that could be used in a weapon. the most likely sources of nuclear weap- ons and materials for terrorists are storage areas in the former states of the Soviet Union and in Pakistan. There is also a substantial risk of terrorist theft from the nuclear stockpiles in more than 40 countries around the world.23 New nuclear weapon states might also constrain the United States and others.

secure. Non-nuclear states may therefore feel released from their pledge not to acquire nuclear arms. India. Egypt. Because there is no time buffer built into each state’s decision-making process. Washing- ton and Moscow maintain thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert. or five such states within a de- cade—with existing political and territorial disputes still unresolved.S.25 Recent advocacy by some in the United States of new battlefield uses for nuclear weapons could lead to new nuclear tests. and essential to its security. Iran’s nuclear program. the United Kingdom. if not impossible. The NPT has already been severely threatened by the development in several states of facilities for enriching uranium and reprocessing plutonium. To the extent that the leaders of a given state are contemplating acceding to U. three. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. these leaders may feel a strong need for equity so that they can show their public that giving up nuclear aspira- tions is fair and in their interest. or international nonproliferation demands. Though the Cold War has been over for more than a dozen years. The Risk of Regime Collapse If U. The five nuclear weapon states recog- nized by the NPT have not tested since the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. each views others’ arsenals with suspicion. Miscalcula- tion or misunderstanding could bring nuclear war to the Korean peninsula. and no state has tested since India and Pakistan did so in May 1998. Israel. France. It is possible that the Middle East could go from a region with one nuclear weapon state to one with two. Though each state regards its nuclear weapons as safe. This greatly increases the risk of an unauthorized launch. New U.S. Saudi Arabia. and Russian nuclear arsenals remain at Cold War levels. add grave volatility to an already conflict-prone region. It is difficult. together with Israel’s nuclear ar- senal and the chemical weapons of other neighboring states. and Pakistan. this extreme level of readiness also enhances the possibility that either country’s president could prematurely order a nuclear strike based on flawed intelligence. In the Middle East. Global Trends 17 remain shrouded in uncertainty but presumably continue to advance. which is widely regarded as a pillar of the nonprolif- eration regime.24 The Risk from Existing Arsenals There are grave dangers inherent in the maintenance of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia and the hundreds of weapons held by China. Although . tests would trigger tests by other nations and cause the collapse of the CTBT. many nations will conclude that the weapon states’ promise to reduce and eventually eliminate these arsenals has been broken. to demonstrate either positive outcome when immensely powerful nuclear weapon states reas- sert the importance of nuclear weapons to their own security.S. ready to launch within fifteen minutes. or others might initiate or revive their nuclear weapons programs.

army. which ended nuclear tests in the atmosphere. for example. under water. U. whereas India had exploded a so-called peace- ful nuclear device and Israel was building a secret nuclear arsenal. and negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. the very fate of the Earth seemed to be at stake. More than once. particularly Japan and Germany. creating a bleak. diplomacy and international efforts to create legal and diplomatic barri- ers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.18 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s each state has asserted that these facilities are for civilian use only. as Jonathan Schell titled his book in 1982. with each country accruing prestige and increased attention from leading nuclear weapon states. there appears to be growing acceptance of the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. Several times in the past few decades. it is possible that Brazil. by the end of the decade 15 or 20 nations would have them. the public’s fear of nuclear war has moved millions of people worldwide to petition for an immediate change in their governments’ policies. which were codified in the NPT in 1968. under these conditions. and in outer space. Some now ar- gue that a nuclear Iran or North Korea could also be absorbed into the interna- tional system without serious consequence. the Soviet Union. including the United States. Twenty years after Kennedy’s warning. Additionally. and navy. He created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961. and France in the early 1960s possessed nuclear weapons. They have worried that proliferation could run out of control. the resulting supplies of nuclear materials give each country a “virtual” nuclear weapons capa- bility. began negotiations on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. many officials and experts have feared the future. Successes and Failures of the Nonproliferation Regime Ever since American scientists detonated the first nuclear bomb at Alamogordo. only China (with Soviet help) had openly joined the ranks of the new nuclear nations. If the number of states with nuclear weapons increases. was then developing plans to build 100 nuclear weapons to equip its air force. the original nuclear weapon states fail to comply with their disarmament obligations. if only for technological and economic reasons. All the other . Most nations would continue to eschew nuclear weapons. President John F. dangerous world with dozens of nations armed with nuclear weapons. Several European nations were already actively pursuing nuclear weap- ons programs. in July 1945. The concern was not that developing countries would acquire the bomb but rather that the advanced industrial nations would do so. dramatically stopped the rush toward nuclear weapons status. and other major non-nuclear nations will reconsider their nuclear choices. There is a real possibility. Japan. and states such as India gain status for having nuclear weapons. the United Kingdom. Kennedy moved aggressively to counter those trends. of a systemwide collapse. This situation greatly erodes the confidence that states can have in a neighbor’s non-nuclear pledge. Neutral Sweden.S. Kennedy worried that while only the United States. New Mexico. but others would decide that nuclear weapons were nec- essary to improve their security or status.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Even with all the serious challenges it has faced. But can it hold? Or are international conditions so different today that the regime can no longer work? Twenty-First-Century Proliferation Some argue that with the end of superpower conflict. the nonproliferation regime has still had a remarkable record of success (see figure 1. biological. The threat of nuclear terrorism is also growing. The spread of nuclear arms also increases the risk of their falling into the hands of dissident military elements or revolutionaries . Often a majority of nations was able to agree on new treaties and new restraints. the world has not been devastated by a thermonuclear war. only to have other nations block their progress or feign compliance. . to constrain the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers in the 1960s and 1970s.1). . few have questioned the need for urgent govern- ment action. Moreover. however. even if their eventual elimination seems but a distant hope. Though some nations renounced their weapons of mass destruction programs. the number of new prospective nuclear na- tions has shrunk dramatically during the past 20 years. Although the regime may have . . 2001. which was sometimes known as vertical proliferation. The pro- liferation of biological and chemical weapons is broader. Although nuclear. . chemical. but never easily and never without serious setbacks. and chemical arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union once grew to enormous levels and the technology of these weapons has become increasingly accessible. and nuclear weapons. the world confronts a fundamentally different proliferation problem. under any circumstances. . and the international norm has been firmly established that countries should not. Since 1964. but it is still mainly confined to two regions of the world: the Middle East and Northeast Asia. Most of the world’s biological weapons have been destroyed. and the bulk of the glo- bal chemical weapons arsenals will likely be eliminated in the next ten years. . As Leonard Spector said in 1984 in Nuclear Proliferation Today (the first book in the Carnegie Endowment’s series on proliferation): “The spread of nuclear weapons poses one of the greatest threats of our time and is among the most likely triggers of a future nuclear holocaust . The treaty did little at that time. only four nations are known to have overcome the substantial diplomatic and technical barriers to manufacturing nuclear weapons. Since September 11. however. We will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological. .”26 Nonproliferation efforts have steadily advanced in the past two decades. Global expectations are that the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons will be greatly reduced. Global Trends 19 nations that had studied nuclear programs in the 1950s and 1960s had aban- doned their pursuits. proliferation experts were again ringing alarms.”27 These new efforts can be built on the successes of pre- vious actions. “Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. not increased. . . possess or use either biological or chemical weapons. others started new ones. material and expertise. President Bush said during his meetings with Russian president Vladimir Putin in November 2001.

Brazil. and Yugoslavia. United States. North Korea. Previous presidents. national security interests. United Kingdom. Iran.20 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 1. or were discussing the pursuit of weapons: Argentina. Switzerland. promote a false sense of security as some nations sign. and Yugoslavia. In 2005. worked in the past.S. USSR. This inspection regime had failed to independently detect significant hidden programs in Iran. 23 countries had weapons. and Libya. In the 1980s. They argue that some of the treaties—such as the CTBT. USSR. South Africa. Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs (number of programs) 25 20 15 10 5 0 1960s 1980s 2005 N NOTE OTE In the 1960s. the agreements. Other treaties. Presi- dent Bill Clinton. they doubt the holdouts can be convinced to adopt the same norms as those held by the regime founders. Iraq. Sweden. thus weakening the principal nation that safeguards global peace and security. were conducting weapons-related research. President Bush framed the issue differ- ently in his 2003 State of the Union address: “The gravest danger facing America . France. Taiwan. India. then cheat on. Israel. United Kingdom. Libya. Brazil. Canada. South Korea. Many officials in the George W. as noted above. the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty. in addition to the 8 states with nuclear weapons. Egypt. Iraq. Spain. India. South Africa. France. West Germany. Pakistan. 19 countries had weapons or were conducting weapons-related research: Argentina. Japan. Iran and North Korea are suspected of having active nuclear weapons programs. for example. The Bush administration therefore has implemented a radically new nonpro- liferation approach. China. treated the weapons themselves as the problem and sought their elimination through treaties. Taiwan. biological. Romania. Israel. Australia.1. China. Italy. Norway. such as the CWC and the BWC. and the Landmine Treaty—restrict necessary armaments. Bush administration believe that the entire pro- cess of negotiating and implementing nonproliferation treaties is both unneces- sary and harmful to U. and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons” (italics added). United States. warned in November 1998 of the threat “posed by the proliferation of nuclear. Canada.

chemical. This action-oriented approach has been detailed in two key documents—The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002)—in which the administration states its view that the threat from weapons of mass destruction emanates from a small number of outlaw states and from the nexus of these states. Inspectors in 2003 were finding what there was to find.N. Libya has been the only unqualified success. Meanwhile. and British administra- tions but is widely accepted outside these governments. and declared itself a nuclear weapon state.S.30 Though U. a battle fought primarily over the claimed need to prevent the acquisition or transfer of nuclear. That country ended the freeze on its plutonium program. claimed to have reprocessed the plutonium into weapons. attention focused on the three “axis of evil” states. and biologi- cal weapons” (italics added).28 The first direct application of this theory was the war with Iraq. Three major conclusions can be drawn from the war: In 2003. sanctions and inspections were more effective than most realized in disarming Iraq after the 1991 War. So has North Korea. It is not clear if this network has shut down or merely gone further underground. But Iran has accelerated its program—whether peaceful or not—in the past few years. The Bush administration thus has changed the fo- cus from “what” to “who.S.” This corresponds to a strategy that seeks the elimina- tion of regimes rather than weapons. nuclear weapons and mate- rials. intelligence officials have concluded that the Iraq War made the terrorism problem worse and supplies of weapons and weapons materials remain dangerously insecure.S. the nuclear black market of Pakistan’s A. none of these conclusions appear to have diminished the enthusiasm of the proponents of the Iraq war for applying the Iraq model to other problem states. In the year prior to the war.29 This last finding is contested by officials in the U. as that nation has abandoned decades of work on nuclear and chemical weapons and missile programs. and British officials systematically misrep- resented Iraq’s weapon capabilities. the United States and Russia have ended the process of negotiat- ing reductions in their nuclear arsenals.6). however. nuclear. Global Trends 21 and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear. Iraq was not producing and did not have stockpiles of. withdrew from the NPT. and biological programs ended between 1991 and 1996. There had been previous applications of military force to deal with proliferation threats. and chemical weapons (see chapter 17. “Iraq”). U. not better (see table 1. Globally. The new strategy. the threat from nuclear terrorism has grown as U. biological. Q. and the reductions themselves are . chemical. has not yet proved superior to the one it replaced. All active nuclear. Further.S. bio- logical or chemical weapons or any Scud missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles designed to deliver such weapons. proliferation problems have grown worse. but this was the world’s first nonproliferation war. Khan spread nuclear weapons technology and know-how around the world. Since 2000. U. and terrorists.

? = is suspected Key: of having weapons or programs. North Korea. The right combination of force and diplomacy could yet result in negotiated solutions to the North Korean and Iranian programs.) Elements of a New Nonproliferation Policy Some believe that the strategy. .6. though only half the materials have been secured. could still prove its worth. Many countries are cooperating in the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict illegal trade in weapon components (see chapter 2 for more on this initiative). proceeding at a slower pace than previous administrations planned. Biological. and the United States for details. or some modified variation. The Fifteen Countries with Nuclear. There is a much greater willingness internationally to enforce non- proliferation commitments. or Chemical Weapons or Offensive Research Programs Country Nuclear Biological Chemical Russia W W W* China W W W Israel W W? W United States W W* France W United Kingdom W India W R? W* Pakistan W R? R? North Korea W? W W Iran R R? W? Egypt R? W Syria R? W South Korea W* Libya W* Albania W* Key: W = has known weapons or agents. And prospects for peacefully resolving regional conflicts may have increased through the growing movement for democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia. (See the chapters on Iran. Programs to secure nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union are also slowing down. and W* = possesses chemical weapons but has declared them under the Chemical Weapons Convention and is in the process of eliminating them. R = has known research program. Libya. Pakistan.22 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1. Finally. Russia. there is grow- ing concern that the entire nonproliferation regime is in danger of a catastrophic collapse.

31 This report analyzes how to end the threat of nuclear terror- ism by implementing comprehensive efforts to secure and eliminate nuclear materials worldwide and to stop the illegal transfer of nuclear technology. trade agreements to the observance of non- proliferation treaties and norms. The strategy would prevent new nuclear weapon states by increasing penalties for withdrawal from the NPT. The theory and practical applications of a new approach have been detailed in a 2005 Carnegie Endowment report. There is the need for a new strategy that combines the best elements of the United States– centric. Tomorrow’s solutions. These . to abandon nuclear weapons research. like yesterday’s. and biological agent weaponization. The critical importance of the NPT and other treaties is that they provide the necessary international legal mechanism and establish the global norms that give nations a clear path to a non-nuclear future. This is still true today and should give pause to those who predict a smooth and rapid rise to nuclear weapon status for new nations. enforcing compliance with strengthened treaties. This “soft power” approach could meld with the “hard power” of the United States to replicate the success of the United States and United Kingdom with Libya. Finally. and radically reforming the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent states from acquiring dual- use technologies for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. the European Union has crafted a joint nonproliferation strategy that includes tying all E. treaty-based ap- proach. it was on the decline. for example. however. Further thwarting proliferation. whereas the United States was not adverse to using strong-arm tactics to compel South Korea and Taiwan. and alliance factors were not. technical. As we struggle to develop new policies. For example. The Soviet Union simply forced nonproliferation on its alliance system. These financial. force-based approach with the traditional multilateral. Global Trends 23 A combination of approaches may offer the best chance of success. it is worth remembering that the non- proliferation treaties were an integral part of the political and military balance- of-power and alliance systems of the late twentieth century. Alliance security arrangements. including the promise that the United States would extend a “nuclear umbrella” over Europe and Japan. curtail- ing research on new nuclear weapons. greater efforts would be devoted to resolving the regional conflicts that fuel proliferation imperatives and to bringing the three nuclear weapon states outside the NPT into conformance with a expanded set of global nonproliferation norms. many developing nations found that their ambitions ran into formidable financial and technological obstacles to nuclear weapons development. will not emerge in a diplomatic vacuum. undoubtedly made it easier for sev- eral industrial nations to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. The Libyan model could emerge from and prevail over the Iraq model: Change a regime’s behavior rather than change the regime. and taking the weapons off hair-trigger- alert status. nuclear proliferation was on the rise. But before the signing of the NPT. The threat from existing arsenals would be reduced by shrinking global stockpiles. sufficient barriers to proliferation. afterward. These factors were present in the 1960s and 1970s.U. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security. missile engineering.

” Bethesda. February 13. “Iran’s Con- tinuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. “Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material. Belarus. N OTES 1. November 19. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. 3. October 24. 12. Shoham. see the first edition of this book: Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. 24. 14. President George W. Julian Perry Robinson. and Philip Sabin (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996. and Yugoslavia have abandoned nuclear weapon programs or nuclear weapons (or both) on their territory.pdf. Martin Navias. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.” 10. U. J. 17. Argentina. 2001). 2002). “Biological Weapons Arms Control. “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. Romania.S. 2004.S. Ibid. Ukraine. pp. Bush. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention. U. U.. Spain. 2005). Bolton. Norway.C. 15. p. 8.” Norfolk Naval Air Station. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington.” Center for International and Security Studies. 16. p.” July 1996. 6. Italy. 2001. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Taiwan. Brazil. Dany Shoham. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. mostly in the stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. South Korea. . Rose Gottemoeller. 5. Milton Leitenberg.: U. “Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 18. 21. 2001. Virginia. 16–17. Switzerland. Jessica Mathews. Sweden.. and West Germany. “A Chemical Weapons Atlas.S.ceip. Japan.” Nonproliferation Review. 28. Joseph Cirincione.S. “Annual Report to Congress. “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. Hogendoorn. available at www. p. pp.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.” in Non- Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East. p.000 nuclear weapons in global arsenals. by 1986. D. 11. Depart- ment of Defense. Ibid. South Africa. June 24. 1993).S. lest in our haste to construct new solutions we tear down the very structures we mean only to repair.000. 19. and Jon Wolfsthal. 20. 80. avail- able at www.” Geneva. North Korea and Iran are the only two states that began acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities in this later period and have not ceased the effort. Libya.S. 48–58. “Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel. 37. In 1970. p..org/ib/. 11. 2. p. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Department of Defense. Iraq. “Instant Briefing: Results. 45.000 worldwide. Spring– Summer 1998. 13. pp. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. 37. John Bolton. the year the NPT entered into force. Six nations abandoned indigenous nuclear weapon programs that were under way or under con- sideration in the 1960s: Egypt.opcw.” statement before the House International Rela- tions Committee Subcommittee on the Middle-East and Central Asia. 36. D. D.. see George Perkovich. 2001.C.org. U. Department of Defense. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. there were approximately 27.ProliferationNews. Kazakhstan. p.” p.C.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Canada. Australia. U. For a comprehensive study of a new nonproliferation strategy. For a brief discussion of the threat from conventional attacks on industrial and urban infrastruc- tures. Proliferation: Threat and Response.24 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s historic lessons must be remembered anew. 20.” available at www. 55.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/ leitenberg. E. Since the late 1970s. edited by Efraim Karsh. the number of weapons had increased to a peak of 65. 7. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 9. John Bolton. University of Maryland. Md. 4. there were about 38. September/ October 1997. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention. in 2004. Ibid.

responsible and irresponsible.pdf. Saudi Arabia might seek to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan or invite Pakistan to station nuclear weapons on its territory.: White House. in the hands of countries large and small. available at www. 15.gov/nsc/nss. “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” July 26. 2004). Kennedy. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washing- ton. including Saudi Arabia.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy. 2001.” John F. and Turkey.C.org/jfk_test_ban_speech. senator Sam Nunn argues. D.html. Global Trends 25 22. stable and unstable. . 25.gov/news/ releases/2001/11/20011113-3. no real security.jfklibrary. Egypt. February 16. Egypt and Turkey could probably acquire enough nuclear material to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade of launching such an effort. November 13. “There would be no rest for anyone then.org.ProliferationNews. 1963. to avoid an accidental or unauthorized launch. 2002).S. albeit not without significant political and economic consequences..C.org. Other countries have at least the basic facilities and capabilities to mount a nuclear weapon program. 23.html. D. available at www.pdf. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war.: White House.” press conference by President Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin. available at www. to exchange information. Perkovich et al. Former U. see Joseph Cirincione. avail- able at www.C. 2002). 3–4. 26.” he said. This is the danger President John Kennedy warned of in 1963: “I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands. scattered throughout the world. p. and George Perkovich. 24. 30. 29.whitehouse. to gain perspective.” Speech to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books. no stability.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 31. Several countries in the Middle East are capable of pursuing nuclear weapon programs or other- wise acquiring nuclear weapons. Ibid. 2005. 28.. p. “President Announces Reduction in Nuclear Arsenal. 1. 1984). “The more time the United States and Russia build into our process for ordering a nuclear strike the more time is available to gather data. For a detailed examination of these issues. National Security Council. 2004. D.ProliferationNews. Jessica Mathews. 27. See testimony of Central Intelligence director Porter Goss and Defense Intelligence Agency direc- tor Admiral Lowell Jacoby before the Senate Intelligence Committee. and no chance of effective disarmament. available at www. Universal Compliance. available at www. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. Leonard Spector. to discover an error.whitehouse. and an in- creased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts. National Security Council. pp. WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington. June 21.whitehouse.

.

inspections. The nuclear and chemical weapons regimes also involve extensive inspection and verification arrangements and are covered by comprehensive international export control arrangements. or use of chemical weapons. 1967. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The NPT helped establish the international norm against proliferation. “Nuclear weapon states” are defined by the treaty as countries that detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1. or use of biological weapons. and C for the text of each treaty or for more information. B. and biological weapons. organi- zations. (See appendixes A. It provides for a variety of export control and supplier arrangements. chemical. It is founded on the basis of the NPT and includes additional treaties that limit the testing and geographical spread of nuclear weap- ons. possession. the most important of which is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention bans the development. CHAPTER 2 The International Nonproliferation Regime The global nonproliferation regime is a network of interlocking treaties. At the core of this regime are three key treaties: The Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) restrains the spread of nuclear weap- ons. possession.) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the oldest and most elaborate of the weapon control systems. and it divides member countries into nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. An effort to negotiate a verification mechanism for biological weapons continues. These include only the United States 27 . and unilateral and bilateral arrangements aimed at halting the spread of nuclear. It was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The systems in place to control each type of weapon rely on a central agreement that establishes a norm against the possession of weapons and a set of obligations for treaty members. the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development.

(Both nuclear weapons and “peaceful nuclear explosives” are prohib- ited. France (1960).28 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s (first detonation in 1945). Kazakhstan. the Soviet Union (1949). Russia succeeded to the Soviet Union’s status as a nuclear weapon state under the treaty in 1992. the United Nations has not recognized this with- drawal because Pyongyang did not give the three months’ advance notice re- quired under article 10 of the treaty. The original term of the NPT was 25 years. The most recent addition to the treaty is East Timor. the treaty members approved a set of prin- ciples and objectives to guide the parties during a strengthened review process in the future. and China (1964). giving it (for all practical effect) a permanent duration. including North Korea. and the United Kingdom serve as the treaty’s depositary states. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference held in New York City in April and May 1995. non-nuclear-weapon states also agree to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities.2 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10.) • To verify that they are living up to this pledge. Only India.” The five permanent members of the U. It was a major victory in international efforts to combat the prolif- eration of all nuclear. United Kingdom (1952). The United States.1 Under the NPT: • Non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to manufacture or receive nuclear ex- plosives. in giving up their nuclear weapons. and Pakistan have yet to sign the treaty.N. By the spring of 2005. • All countries agree to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament under international control. Israel. the treaty had 184 non-nuclear-weapon state parties. The NPT defines all other countries as non-nuclear-weapon states. In addition. agreed to become non-nuclear- weapon states. 2003. Russia. and nuclear weapon states agree not to assist non-nuclear-weapon states in obtaining nuclear weapons. making it the most widely adhered to arms control treaty in history. • A party may withdraw from the treaty on 90 days’ notice if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty” have “jeopardized its su- preme interests. an arrangement known as full-scope safeguards. Security Council are all members of the NPT. which officially became a party on May 5. for a total of 189 parties. and chemical weapons. 2003. while Ukraine. However. • All countries agree not to export nuclear equipment or material to non-nuclear- weapon states except under IAEA safeguards. China and France did not join until 1992. the parties agreed to extend the agreement indefinitely and unconditionally. biological. This indefinite extension of the treaty was by no means a foregone conclusion. . • All countries agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology. and Belarus. with periodic reviews of the treaty occurring every 5 years.

there have been three separate preparatory sessions in anticipation of the seventh NPT review conference. measures to re- duce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 29 At the May 2000 NPT Review Conference. a num- ber of major themes were sounded. • the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). • concern over the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty and the potential proliferation effects of the development and deploy- ment of an antimissile system. the participants adopted a pro- gram of action (known as the “13 Steps”) that included the early entry into force of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as START II). Since the May 2000 NPT Review Conference. further reductions of both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals. • the need to consider measures to strengthen control over the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. which calls for the nuclear weapon states to move toward complete nuclear disarma- ment. • the feeling that the Moscow Treaty. • serious concern regarding the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and the challenge it represents to the nonproliferation regime. with its reductions in deployment and operational status. and • the feeling that the next logical step for the nonproliferation regime is a fissile material cutoff treaty. • the need for the verifiable and irreversible reductions in nonstrategic nuclear arsenals. such as • the importance of taking practical steps to fulfill article 6 of the NPT. before the NPT had even been .4 It was created in 1957. • support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and their accompanying security as- surances. a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies. and ap- plication of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament.3 The International Atomic Energy Agency The Vienna-based IAEA is a United Nations–affiliated organization with 137 member countries. • the need to incorporate the comprehensive safeguard agreements with the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (see below) to create the new NPT safeguards standard. among oth- ers (see appendix A). At these preparatory sessions. a moratorium on nuclear testing. cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in nuclear weapons. • support for the IAEA’s action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism (see below). which was scheduled to take place in May 2005.

and research and development on nuclear weapon design. The IAEA does not offer physical protection and is not a police force. Moreover. the IAEA monitored only those facilities declared by the inspected country and did not seek possible undeclared nuclear installations. and to implement a system of audits and on-site inspections (collectively known as safeguards) to verify that nuclear facilities and materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosions. non-nuclear-weapon states must accept “full-scope safeguards” over all nuclear materials—and the facilities that contain those ma- terials—within the jurisdiction of the state in question. It is then up to the IAEA’s Board of Governors (and possibly the U. Instead. A state may declare and exempt nuclear materials from IAEA inspection for narrow military purposes.6 The Additional Protocol Until 1991. This led the IAEA’s Board of Gover- nors in 1991 to reiterate the IAEA’s right to exercise its previously unused . Russia was the only nuclear weapon state not to have any facili- ties or materials under IAEA safeguards. such as fueling naval nuclear reactors. an exemption pointed to by some as a weakness in the IAEA system of verification. in non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. Security Council. Thus. its safeguards are designed to provide it and its member states with timely warning should significant quantities of nuclear-weapons-usable materials be diverted to nuclear weapons or for nuclear explosions of any kind. it was learned that Iraq had secretly developed a network of undeclared nuclear facilities as part of an extensive nuclear weapons program.5 The IAEA’s system of inspection was used to form the verification measures of the NPT. The activities outside the IAEA’s jurisdiction include the fabrication and testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear weap- ons.N. The IAEA does not possess the means or the legal authority to search for or investigate activities related to the development or production of nuclear weapons. although India. lacking a clear political mandate from its members to do so. high-explosive testing. the IAEA also monitors certain individual facilities and associated nuclear materials in the nuclear weapon states. Under the NPT. IAEA officials can monitor only those activities connected with the produc- tion or use of nuclear materials. however.30 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s negotiated. Israel. As of the spring of 2005. After the 1991 Gulf War. Its principal mission is twofold: to facilitate the use of nuclear en- ergy for peaceful purposes. several nuclear facilities in each of those countries are subject to IAEA monitoring and cannot be used to support those nations’ nuclear weapons pro- grams without detection by the IAEA. and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT. In addition to monitoring all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. the IAEA monitors some nuclear facilities and materials in non-NPT parties at the request of these states or their suppliers. it can- not prevent states from using nuclear materials under its control for use in nuclear weapons. to which major safeguard violations are reported) to take appropriate action.

or inconsistencies in. the information a state has provided on its nuclear activities. such as “nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities not involving nuclear materials” and “the location. implemented initially in 1996. which was designed to strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards to prevent the development of clandestine weapons programs. states will now have to provide an “expanded declaration” on a broad array of nuclear-related activities. In addition to the current requirement for data about nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle activities. 1997. if necessary—undeclared facilities in order “to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. access to “[a]ny location speci- fied by the Agency. to demand access to undeclared sites where it suspected nuclear activities were being conducted. In order to resolve questions about. the Additional Protocol provides for the IAEA’s right to use environ- mental sampling during inspections at both declared and undeclared sites. • Fourth. Subsequent measures.” • Third.” By negotiating an Additional Protocol. The model protocol outlined four key changes that must be incorporated into each NPT state party’s safeguards agreement:7 • First. who are guaranteed to receive within one month’s notice “appropriate multiple entry/exit” visas that are valid for at least a year. This evolved into the voluntary Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Part 1.) All trade in items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (see “Supplier Control Mechanisms” below) trigger list will have to be reported to the IAEA as well. operational status and the estimated annual production” of uranium mines and thorium concentration plants. in effect. The IAEA’s Board of Governors approved part 2 measures on May 15. states will. the IAEA’s ability to conduct short notice inspections is augmented by streamlining the visa process for inspectors. The Additional Protocol enables the IAEA’s inspectors to be proactive in their inspections. by demanding that the state of concern submit a more thorough declaration of its nuclear activities and by giving inspectors greater access to that state’s nuclear sites. the key ingredient for nuclear weapons. consisted of measures that could be traced to existing legal authority.” or preapproved. including environmental sampling and other holistic safeguard measures. Part 2 consisted of measures whose implementation would require complemen- tary legal authority. (Thorium can be processed to produce fissile material. to be implemented in two installments.” as well as all of the facilities specified in the “expanded declaration. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 31 authority to conduct “special inspections. the number and types of facilities that the IAEA will be able to in- spect and monitor are substantially increased beyond the previous level. the new inspection regime provides the IAEA with “complementary. • Second. such as that in Iraq before 1991. guarantee the IAEA access on short notice to all of their declared—and. were adopted under Program 93+2 of the protocol. It .” that is. the amount and type of information that states will have to provide to the IAEA is greatly expanded.

The IAEA’s most im- portant recent work under the Additional Protocol has come in Iran and Libya. As of the spring of 2005. which is a barrier to vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. the IAEA’s Board of Governors. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty The newest potential element of the nonproliferation regime is the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty. it cannot prevent a deter- mined state from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.” This action plan to guard against nuclear terrorism is designed “to supplement and reinforce national efforts in areas where interna- tional cooperation is indispensable to the strengthening of nuclear security. • detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. it could then withdraw from the NPT. The risk is that if a country builds these facilities—as allowed under article 4 of the NPT—the country could come right up to the edge of nuclear weapons capability. The same reprocess- ing facility that separates the plutonium from the spent-fuel rods for reuse as fuel or for disposal can separate it for weapons use. • strengthening of state systems for nuclear material accountancy and control. agreed on an “action plan designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and radioactive materials. . however. 2001. in March 2002. In a worst-case sce- nario. two states that are headed in opposite proliferation directions.9 These important safeguards. • security of radioactive sources. • response readiness in the case of a malicious event/emergency.8 Though the Additional Protocol greatly strengthens the IAEA’s ability to verify that non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT use nuclear materials and facilities only for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Action Plan After the September 11. • assessment of safety and security at nuclear facilities.32 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s further permits the use of environmental sampling over a wide area rather than being confined to specific facilities. do not address a fundamental problem in the regime: The same technologies that can enrich uranium to low levels for reactor fuel can enrich it to high levels for nuclear weapons. having used its rights within the treaty to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. and • enhancement of program coordination and information management for nuclear safety matters. the Additional Protocol had been signed by 90 nations.” The plan covers eight areas: • physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. terrorist attacks in the United States.

a number of Western and Soviet-bloc nuclear supplier states began consultations concerning the proce- dures and standards that would apply to nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. and Libya). The General Assembly adopted the CTBT on September 10. where decisions are made by majority rather than by consensus. Without any legal requirements. 1996. India. Is- rael. Of those nations. where decisions are usually made by consensus. 175 nations (including the five nuclear weapon states and Israel) have signed the treaty. see appendix E. In total. by a vote of 158 to 3 (the no votes were from Bhutan. these two coalitions consist of nations that voluntarily restrict the export of equipment and materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. These guidelines included a list of export items that would trigger the requirement for the application of IAEA safeguards in recipient states. Australia intro- duced the treaty to the U. and the United States—have yet to ratify it. The U. China joined the group in October 1997 and participated in trigger-list discussions for the first time in February 1999. to detect vio- lations. 3—India.N. would require India’s ratifi- cation to bring the pact into force. India temporarily blocked ap- proval of the treaty in mid-August 1996. including seismic monitoring and on-site inspections. it objected to the fact that the treaty did not include provisions demanded by India prescribing a “time-bound frame- work” for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. prohibits nuclear test explosions of any size and establishes a rigorous verifica- tion system. and 8—including China.” The CTBT.” which have been updated in subsequent years. in effect. The group.) Supplier Control Mechanisms The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group are two informal coalitions of nations that form a third major element of the nonproliferation regime. and Pakistan—have not signed the treaty. . represented the first major agreement on the uniform regulation of nuclear ex- ports by current and potential nuclear suppliers.S Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT in October 1999. The CTBT was negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. and 121 have ratified it as of the spring of 2005. known as the NPT Exporters Committee (or the Zangger Committee. which was opened for signature in New York on September 24. adopted a set of guidelines in August 1974. To circumvent India’s veto. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 33 The conclusion of this treaty fulfilled a preambular commitment of NPT par- ties to fulfill pledges made in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty “to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. India also opposed the treaty’s entry-into-force provision. 1996. though the United States and all other participating nations continue to voluntarily observe the treaty’s ban on further tests. which. The CTBT’s entry-into-force provision requires the ratification of the 44 “nuclear-capable” nations that possess either nuclear power or nuclear research reactors. so named after its Swiss chairman). North Korea. Shortly after the NPT came into force in 1970. These procedures and the “trigger list.10 (For more on the CTBT. General Assembly.

and promise not to use any imports to build nuclear explosives. and more detailed discussion is provided. apart from the requirement for full-scope safeguards. whose export controls are more far reaching. In 2002. In April 1992. They are waiting for endorsements from the five nuclear weapon states before the treaty is officially opened for signatures. effectively precludes nuclear commerce by NSG member states with India. . . which until then had covered only uniquely nuclear items. this London group. which had previously been adopted by only some NSG members. In January 1976. in May 2004 the NSG adopted a “catch-all” mecha- nism. and Pakistan. Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan. to cover 65 “dual-use” items as well. permitting member states to prevent any export that they suspect might be used for a nuclear weapons program. came into force in 1997. the South Pacific (SPNWFZ. which was not then a party to the NPT—met in London to further develop export guidelines. adopted guidelines that were similar to those of the NPT Exporters Committee but also extended to transfers of technology and included an agreement to “ex- ercise restraint” in the transfer of uranium enrichment and plutonium extrac- tion equipment and facilities. The growing role of NWFZs as part of the nonproliferation regime was reflected in the draft review docu- ment of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: “The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones . The Treaty of Bangkok. despite the fact that it has not yet attained protocol ratifica- tion from the five nuclear weapon states.) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) complement NPT arrangements because they can be geared to specific regional situations. although it has been partially eclipsed by the NSG. This rule. 1996). (The members of the two supplier groups are listed. in the wake of the Gulf War. Kyrgyzstan. pledge not to export nuclear materials and technologies to other nations without the permis- sion of the original exporting nation or without a pledge from the recipient nation to abide by those same rules. which continues to function. the NSG expanded its export control guidelines. and Uzbekistan completed negotiations to establish a Central Asian NWFZ. which became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG also added as a requirement for future exports that recipient states accept IAEA inspections on all their peaceful nuclear activities. 1967). in appendix D in this volume.12 . and Africa (ANWFZ. 1996). apply to exports regulated by the Zangger Committee. Israel.” NWFZs have been established in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Tajikistan. Finally. even if the blocked item does not appear on any of the NSG’s control lists. all nations importing regulated items from NSG member states must promise to furnish adequate physical security for transferred nuclear materials and facilities. which created a Southeast Asian NWFZ.34 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Following India’s nuclear test in 1974.11 Similar rules. In addition to agreeing to such full-scope safeguards. constitutes an important disarmament mea- sure which greatly strengthens the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects. an overlapping group of nuclear sup- plier states—in this case including France.

equip- ment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile pur- poses or in armed conflict. stockpiling. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating.”15 Yet the BWC’s shortcomings continue to restrict its impact. and use of such weapons. a system of measures to promote compliance with the Con- vention. 2001. It symbolically prohibited the use of both poison gases and bacte- riological weapons. and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925 was limited. member states established an ad hoc group in 1994 to draft binding verification guidelines for the convention. 1991. As of the spring of 2005. Recognizing these weaknesses.” Russia. and other peaceful purposes. acquisition. 1975. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 35 The Biological and Chemical Nonproliferation Regime Global efforts to contain the spread of biological and chemical weapons center on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). the United States. and a doubling of the number of states suspected of pursuing a biological weapons capability since 1975 have raised questions about the BWC’s effectiveness. as appropri- ate. incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures. 1996. the BWC was the first international treaty to ban an entire class of weapons. When it entered into force. In addition. and the United Kingdom are the three depositary governments for the BWC. efforts to expand and improve the implementation of the regimes continue.16 Efforts by the ad hoc group to negotiate a legally binding protocol for verification were se- verely damaged by the withdrawal from the talks by the United States in July . 1986. possession. Poisonous. or Other Gases. nor did it have verification or enforcement provisions.”13 The BWC also specifically bans “weapons. 2000. the treaty lacked effective verification and enforcement measures to ensure compliance. protective. or transfer of biological agents or toxins in “quantities that have no justification for prophylactic. persistent allegations regarding Iraq’s biological weapons activities prior to the spring of 2003. the BWC had 169 signatories and 153 member states. into the regime. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was opened for signature in April 1972 and entered into force on March 26. However. but it did not restrict the ability of states to acquire and store chemical and biological weapons. and 2002. production. The BWC prohibits the development. but they have made major advances in the past two decades and now establish international norms against the develop- ment. as witnessed by efforts to negotiate a verification protocol to the BWC. Violations of the convention by Russia. The ad hoc group is authorized to review four areas: “Definitions of terms and objective criteria. These treaties are not as well developed or long- standing as their nuclear counterparts. and specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full imple- mentation of Article X.14 Review conferences are held regularly and have taken place in 1980.

Vary- ing levels of control are then applied to the classified chemicals and to their production facilities. to disband the ad hoc group. Tóth warned that the meetings could easily become “an empty shell. Facilities producing chemicals listed in any of the three . This proposal was accepted and ensured that no verification pro- tocol would even be discussed until the next review conference in 2006. Chairman Tibor Tóth proposed the convening of three intersessional meetings between 2003 and 2005 to “discuss” and “promote” actions that could be taken by member states on a voluntary basis to strengthen the BWC and prevent bioterrorism. A year later. acquisition. 1997. effectively leaving it in limbo. however. that all facilities and locations be subject to the procedure. when the Soviet Union accepted provisions for systematic inspections at chemical weapons storage and production facilities. No decision was made on the future of the ad hoc group.”19 State parties to the treaty cannot conduct military preparations for the use of chemical weapons. and it maintains a compre- hensive web site with the latest information on treaty membership and activi- ties.20 The CWC includes a number of confidence-building measures and ensures transparency through a verification regime that subjects all declared chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities to systematic inspections. stockpiling. directly or indirectly. in seeking agreement on com- pliance and verification issues. As of the spring of 2005. 2002. the USSR also agreed to mandatory short-notice challenge inspections—insisting. Negotiations stalled. production. The treaty prohibits the development.” depending on their applicability for chemical weapons programs and for commercial purposes. and declarations and routine inspections at commercial industry sites.36 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 2001 and by a U.21 The CWC categorizes chemicals into three “schedules. Instead. demonstrating a clear absence of international means to prevent the acquisition and use of chemical weapons for conflict. the last day of the 2001 Review Conference. draft efforts began for a ban on chemical weapons. however.”18 The Chemical Weapons Convention Soon after the entry into force of the BWC. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established to oversee the inspection and verification proceedings. the destruction of production facilities. re- tention or use of chemical weapons. the CWC had 168 member states. Due in part to the limited agenda (largely at the United States’ behest) of the intersessional meetings. nor can they assist other states in any treaty-banned activity. The CWC also requires members to destroy all chemical weapons and production facilities under its jurisdiction or control. as well as the “transfer. The final catalyst for the completion of a chemical weapons treaty was the use of chemical attacks by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War. proposal on December 7. Progress resumed in 1986. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29. 2001.S. [of ] chemical weapons to anyone.17 The next review conference began on November 11. as well as any chemical weapons it may have abandoned on the territory of an- other state party. Full compliance is expected within ten years of the convention’s entry into force.

the “warning list” of chemicals subject to control had expanded to include 54 materials (chemicals. regardless of whether or not the export is on the group’s control lists. Chemical. Significant Additions to the Nuclear. which stated that any member of the group considering making an export to another state that had already been denied an export by any other member of the group must first consult with that member state before approving the export. By 1991. The CWC’s verification provisions regulate both the military and civilian chemical industries active in the production. .22 Its member nations work on the basis of consensus to limit the spread of CBW by the con- trol of chemical weapon precursors. Enterprises are asked to report any sus- picious activities. and consumption of relevant chemicals. the group took two important steps to strengthen export controls. which requires member states to halt all exports that could be used by importers in chemical or biological weapons pro- grams. however. The second was the “catch-all” provision. however. It initially focused on regulating the export of eight dual-use chemical precursors. 2001 The terrorist attacks of 2001 increased the willingness of many countries to take collective action on proliferation. also have legal industrial purposes. which forces control efforts to strike a difficult balance between security concerns and legitimate trade.23 Australia Group member states share the group’s “warning list” with chemical industries and scientific communities to promote an awareness of CBW prolif- eration risks within individual nations. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 37 schedules in quantities in excess of allotted amounts must be declared and will be subject to inspection.N. Measures to address CBW proliferation also include the coordination of national export controls and information sharing on suspicious activities. and short-notice challenge inspections to ensure compliance. Many substances used in the production of chemical weapons. Resolution 1540. The two most significant multilateral achieve- ments have been the Proliferation Security Initiative and the adoption of U. and CBW dual-use equipment. The conditions for challenge inspections of any declared or nondeclared facility are also included. The group was established in 1984 after the extensive use of chemical weap- ons in the Iran-Iraq War. The CWC also contains provisions for assistance in the event that a member state is attacked or threatened with chemical weapons and for promoting trade in chemicals and related equipment between states for peaceful purposes. processing. CWC provisions authorize a combina- tion of reporting requirements. the routine on-site inspections of declared sites. pathogens and toxins. and dual-use equipment). In 2002. The first was the “no-undercut” require- ment. and Biological Nonproliferation Regime since September 11. biological weapon pathogens. The Australia Group The Australia Group is an informal association of 39 countries that are opposed to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

Resolution 1540 requires all states to “establish. the Netherlands.N. Countries under whose flag a ship is traveling can give permission for that ship to be stopped and searched. and 3. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolu- tion 1540 under chapter 7 of the U. chemi- cal. sea. enhancing national legislation in participating states to ensure that shipments of controlled items can be searched or seized under national authority. transit. and it is limited only to the national territory. Spain. France.27 Although there was considerable consternation over the role of the Security Council as a law-making body.26 Though the PSI is an important addition to the tools of enforcement. the U. the United Kingdom. and the United States. trans-shipment and re-export” of materials that would contribute to proliferation. member states. chemical. Poland. States must enact “appropriate laws and regulations to control export. Security Council Resolution 1540 On April 28.25 The PSI has little standing in international law. airspace.24 More than 60 states have pledged their support for this initiative. The PSI’s members include Australia. Russia. interdiction training exercises and actual intercepts in nationally controlled areas (land. 2. thereby making it legally bind- ing on all member states. Italy. Portugal. U. and air). widespread recognition of the urgency of .N. develop. and waterways of participants.38 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s The Proliferation Security Initiative The United States–led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a voluntary group- ing to block the transfer of weapons and technology by improving information sharing and stepping up interdiction. with a two-year mandate. PSI-related activities fall into three main areas: 1. the two coun- tries most popular with shippers seeking flags of convenience. A Security Council committee was also set up to monitor progress and to receive implementation reports from member states. The primary advantage of the resolu- tion over treaties addressing similar matters is that it is binding on all U. 2004. Germany. Canada. intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation to identify illicit trans- fers. and the United States has strengthened its ability to use this effectively by work- ing out prior consents arrangements with Liberia and Panama. It encompasses only states that choose to abide by its provisions. Singapore.N. Norway. and therefore does not apply directly to international waters. Japan.N. and bio- logical weapons and their means of delivery. including those outside the scope of the nonproliferation regime and those non-nuclear states that serve as reexport and manufacturing points in the proliferation network. Charter. review and maintain appropriate effective national and trans-shipment controls” and “border controls” to prevent the proliferation of nuclear. or biological weapons to another country across international territory. still missing is a system that can deal with a legally flagged vessel or aircraft carrying material or technology related to nuclear.

Arms Control Association. See the web site www. “Fact Sheet: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance.iaea.asp. Q. May/ June 2002.asp.asp. 2000).pdf.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6.acronym.armscontrol.unog.html#A1. April 28–May 9. 13. “IAEA Action Plan to Guard against Nuclear Terrorism.org/wmd/npt/2005/index-PC3. The NPT and the nonproliferation regime have no legal category and no provision for additional nuclear weapon states. 12. 2004.org/About/ statute_text..armscontrol. www.” Third Session.org. Conference on Disarmament.N.iaea.org/TreatyStatus. “IAEA by the Numbers.un. Joseph Cirincione.html. In this book.htm. text of Biological Weapons Convention.acronym.html.” June 2004.” First Session. available at www. IAEA.org/About/by_the_numbers.org/factsheets/nwfz.org/factsheets/NSG. 2003.org.armscontrol. And see “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. no.” available at www.” Second Session.ch/disarm/distreat/bac_72. IAEA. .un. IAEA Statute. United Nations.iaea.un. 3. “The Nuclear Suppliers Group at a Glance.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol. 7. 16. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. 14. chemical. available at www.org/wmd/npt/ 2005/index-PC2. “Brief Background on the Biological Weapons Convention. 9. 10. article XII. 2. IAEA Annual Report for 2003. April 26–May 7. IAEA. available at http://disarmament2. India.org/wmd/npt/2005/index-PC1. In the wake of the unraveling of the A. Arms Control Association.” Fact Sheet by the Arms Control Association.” available at www. April 8–19. Jenni Rissanen.” Disarmament Diplomacy.iaea. 8. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge.uk/bwc/ revcon8.” available at http:// disarmament2.htm.uk/dd/dd64/64nr04.org/ OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol. and Pakistan are described as non-NPT nuclear weapon states.htm.un.” July 2003.org.” available at www. 4. 17.ctbto. available at http:// disarmament2. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 39 enforcement eventually overcame these reservations. available at www.html. Adapted from “The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol at a Glance. available at http://disarmament2. Israel. available at www.html. available at www. Khan nuclear black market network (see chapter 12). 6. IAEA. 11. N OTES 1.nsf Site. available at www. “Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols. In response to these objec- tions.opbw. table A23. “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements: View by Country and Treaty.html. and bio- logical weapons and also their means of delivery. 5.12. “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See the web site for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organi- zation.html. U. available at www. “Anger after the Ambush: Review Conference Suspended after US Asks for AHG’s Termination. 64. however. See also “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons.org.org/Publications/Reports/ Anrep2003/annex_tables. The resolution obliges member states to take action aimed at preventing both the proliferation of nuclear. Resolution 1540 states that it does not override the existing trea- ties of the nonproliferation regime.” BWC Review Conference Bulletin. paragraph C. ed. 2002.un. available at www. 15. this resolution focused particularly on member states’ responsibilities to actively restrain nonstate actors.

25. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. See www.html.org/factsheets/australiagroup. Rose Gottemoeller.opcw. pp. Australia Group. 24. “The Australia Group at a Glance. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 21 May 2005. Arms Control Association.net/en/agpart. “Australia Group Members. Jonathan B.miis.htm.pdf. .” June 2004. avail- able at www.opcw. 21.ProliferationNews. available at www.org/html/db/cwc/eng/ cwc_frameset.edu/pubs/npr/vol11/111/111tucker. Jessica Mathews. 57–58. available at www. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washing- ton.org. 19. pp.cns. This section has been adapted from George Perkovich. 27. pp. and Jon Wolfsthal.html.asp. 22. D. 26.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30–34. “The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment. Tucker.armscontrol. “The Proliferation Security Initiative at a Glance.asp. 20. Adapted from Perkovich et al. Arms Control Association. 59–60.” available at www.australiagroup. Ibid.org/html/db/members_frameset.” Nonproliferation Re- view..opcw. available at www.40 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 18.C.” September 2003.” available at www. available at www.org/factsheets/PSI. Universal Compliance. 2005). Joseph Cirincione. 23.armscontrol. Spring 2004.org.

A total of 121 member states. This is an organization of nuclear supplier states that voluntarily agree to coordinate export controls in order to prevent passing nuclear material and nuclear-related technologies to states that might use them in a nuclear weapons program. 184 signatories. stockpiling. The treaty prohibits the production. A total of 153 member states. production. The treaty prohibits the development. and transfer of chemical weapons. the five “nuclear weapon” states commit to pursue gen- eral and complete disarmament. 169 signatories. including the United States. A total of 44 participants. A total of 168 member states. Under the treaty. 175 signatories. Nuclear Suppliers Group Established in 1975. The treaty prohibits nuclear test explosions of any size and establishes a rigorous global verification system to detect violations. in force in 66 states. A total of 189 member states. must ratify it. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Entered into force on March 26. Signed by 90 states. acquisition. acquisition. The Additional Protocol facilitates more robust inspections by requiring states to submit an expanded declaration of their nuclear-related activi- ties. (table continues on the following page) . all 44 nuclear-capable states. while the remaining “non-nuclear- weapon” states agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 41 Table 2.1. 1975. 1997. 1996. Additional Protocol to the NPT Safeguards Agreement Approved on May 15. Chemical Weapons Convention Entered into force on April 29. and by giving International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors greater authority to visit both declared and undeclared sites of concern. For the treaty to enter into force. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Opened for signature on September 24. 1997. stockpiling. Major Treaties and Agreements of the Nonproliferation Regime Non-Proliferation Treaty Entered into force in 1970.

This is a voluntary association of states that work cooperatively to limit the spread of chemical weapons precursors.1. 2004. U. biological pathogens. This resolution obliges member states to take action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. and dual- use technologies that could be employed in a chemical or biological weap- ons program. A total of 39 participants.N. International (Hague) Code of Conduct Announced on November 25. Security Council Resolution 1540 Passed on April 28. or chemical weapons. It calls for restraint in domestic ballistic missile programs and for the nonproliferation of any ballistic missiles that can deliver nuclear. regardless of range. through strengthened border controls. A total of 114 participants. Legally binding on all U. sea. This is an informal export control arrangement designed to regulate the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500- kilogram payload at a range of 300 kilometers. . A total of 34 participants.42 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 2. 2002. 2003. This is a voluntary organization meant to supplement the Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime (see above). This initiative focuses on intelligence sharing and other methods of coop- eration to facilitate the interdiction of vessels carrying weapons of mass destruction and related goods and technologies via water.N. Proliferation Security Initiative Announced May 31. Australia Group Established in 1984. Major Treaties and Agreements of the Nonproliferation Regime (continued) and transfer of pathogens or toxins in weapons systems or other means of delivery. particularly by nonstate actors. Informal arrangement supported by more than 70 states. 1987. biological. and other domestic laws. or air. better export controls. Missile Technology Control Regime Announced on April 16. member states.

United Nations. “Nuclear Suppliers Group: Participants.” available at www. . “Fact Sheets.australiagroup.opcw.” available at www.org.” available at www.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.net/en/agpart.” available at http://disarmament2.armscontrol.htm. “Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements.” avail- able at www. Department for Disarma- ment Affairs. available at www.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.” avail- able at www.ctbto.org/html/db/members_frameset.” Arms Control Association. Aus- trian Foreign Ministry.php3?f_id=54&LNG=en&version.mtcr.org/ member. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.” available at www. “Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.at/ view.iaea.htm.org/factsheets/.bmaa. “Missile Technology Control Re- gime. “Ballistic Missiles-HCOC. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.” available at www.html.nuclearsuppliersgroup.html. “Strengthened Safeguards System: Additional Protocol. International Atomic Energy Agency.info/english/index.gv.un.html. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 43 SOURCES OURCES “Australia Group Members.

.

while some basic designs are much easier to understand and build. including weapons-usable materials. If they first acquired the necessary nuclear materials. or U-235. by the fact that nuclear materials. India. though not impossible. (Some facilities may need to be modified. making the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons with plutonium extremely difficult. CHAPTER 3 Nuclear Weapons and Materials Nuclear weapons were invented more than 60 years ago. France. the United Kingdom. The same facilities that enrich uranium to low levels for fuel for power reactors can also enrich uranium to the high levels needed for nuclear weapons. Nine countries (China. such as surveillance satellites. If these special nuclear materials can be pur- chased or stolen from existing state stockpiles. and political effort to do so. complicated. and also known as HEU) and plutonium. Some uranium enrichment technolo- gies are more easily concealed but are also possible to detect in many cases through national technical means.) 45 . More than 40 other coun- tries could also produce nuclear weapons. The same facilities that reprocess the spent fuel from reactors to separate plutonium for a special type of reactor fuel can also separate the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons (see below for more on these processes). The two main elements needed to produce a nuclear explosive device are highly enriched uranium (containing a high percentage of uranium-235. Russia. and observable part of building nuclear weapons is producing sufficient amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials needed to fuel a nuclear explosion. nuclear weapon concepts are well understood and widely available. even well-organized subnational organizations and terrorist groups with adequate time and resources could produce a nuclear explosive de- vice. Some nuclear weapon designs are highly complex. and the United States) and possibly North Korea have produced nuclear weapons. Pakistan. Israel. have peaceful uses. if their governments decided to invest the time. South Africa. Although the technol- ogy required to produce them is complex. however. Producing plutonium requires the construction of large and highly visible facilities. but the science and engineering required are essentially the same. By far the most costly. money. it dramatically reduces—but does not totally eliminate—the challenges associated with the production of nuclear weapons or explosive devices. The challenge of pre- venting the spread of nuclear weapons is complicated.

U-235 (92 pro- tons plus 143 neutrons). it is imperative to ensure that they cannot be stolen for use in nuclear weapons. there are also inter- national proposals under discussion that would further control the ability of any state to possess national nuclear material production capabilities. To the ex- tent that weapons-usable materials are used in civilian activities. or central core. Pu-241. hydrogen-2. the same number of protons) but a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. and so on. which have the same atomic number (that is. hydrogen-3. Plutonium isotopes (with 94 protons) include Pu-238. administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). and that any attempt to divert nuclear materials by a non-nuclear-weapon state can be de- tected in a timely manner. in which there are protons and neutrons surrounded by orbiting electrons. All atoms of the same element have the same number of protons in their respective nuclei. and U-238 (92 protons plus 146 neutrons). H-2 or H-3) fuse together. The IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared facilities also needs to be strengthened as part of broader nonproliferation enforcement efforts. And a third isotope with one proton and two neutrons is called tritium. Some isotopes with high atomic numbers (for example. While pursuing these long-term structural reforms. Pu-240. For example. Going beyond physical protection and diversion detection. For example. releasing energy and/or atomic particles. the international system of safeguards. and plutonium—are distinguished by an atomic number that is equal to the number of protons in their nucleus. or U-233 (which has 92 protons plus 141 neutrons). It is this fusing or splitting of atoms that produces the energy released in a nuclear weapon (or a . Pu-239. requires strengthening to provide timely warning of any diversion of nuclear materials or use of civil facilities for weapons material production. Elements—such as hydrogen. A second isotope has one proton and one neutron in the nucleus and is variously referred to as deuterium. or H-2. or H-3. uranium. The various isotopes interact with each other and with other atomic particles (such as other neutrons) differently. Nuclear explosions harness far greater amounts of energy by splitting or fusing together the nuclei of individual atoms. Atoms of uranium all have 92 protons in the nucleus.. Basic Nuclear Concepts Conventional explosives—like dynamite—release energy through rapid chemi- cal reactions involving changes in the structure of molecules. is a critical component of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. and each has properties that can be used in various ways.46 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s The physical protection of nuclear materials in the civilian sector. U-235 or Pu- 239) split apart into other isotopes after absorbing a neutron.g. at very high temperatures some isotopes with low atomic numbers (e. so that it can be halted and the material recovered. An atom consists of a nucleus. The simplest form has but a single proton in the nucleus and is referred to as hydrogen-1 (abbreviated H-1). therefore. but they can exist in different forms called isotopes. Some of the more common isotopes of uranium are ura- nium-233. iron. three isotopes of the element hydrogen—all with an atomic number of 1—are found in nature.

and the desired yield.” when a slowly moving neutron is absorbed into the nucleus are referred to as fissile materials. but for a variety of technical reasons they have not been. and are collectively referred to simply as “radiation. Some of these isotopes only exist in limited quantities. In a nuclear reac- tor. This fissioning of isotopes is accompanied by the release of energy and additional neutrons that can go on to be absorbed by and split other atoms. The amount of material in a critical mass depends on the exact type of materials present. beta particles (electrons). The minimum amount of material necessary to sustain a chain reaction is called a critical mass. neptunium) can also be used in weapons.” The significant quantities that the IAEA specifies are 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 kilograms of plutonium. making them unavailable to cause fissions in other nuclei. and uranium containing 90 percent U-235 will have a smaller critical mass than uranium containing 45 percent U-235.” Isotopes of uranium and plutonium are the main materials used in nuclear weapons. This chain reaction is what enables nuclear materials to be harnessed for various purposes. Isotopes that are readily split. including the production of heat in a nuclear reactor (for creating steam and then electricity) and the explosive power of a nuclear weapon. or “fissioned. but they are nonetheless a matter of some proliferation concern. or approximately 8 to 10 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The U. the chain reaction is controlled and limited over a long period of time. or a combination of these and other fissionable isotopes of ura- nium and plutonium. U-233. Basic Nuclear Weapon Concepts Some amounts of fissile material are too small to sustain a chain reaction be- cause a large fraction of the neutrons produced are able to escape the confines of the nuclear reaction. and gamma rays. purity. Isotopes of some other elements (for example. The mini- mum or exact amount of nuclear material needed to produce nuclear weapons is classified information in all nuclear weapon states. which in turn release more energy and more neutrons. Basic fission weapons (see the discussion below) are made using fissile materials. The amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon depends on design considerations. Nongovernment experts claim that a 1-kiloton-yield nuclear explosive device can be achieved using sophisticated de- signs with as little as 1 to 2 kilograms of plutonium. such as geometry.S. principally U-235. while in nuclear weapons most of the released energy typically takes place in a very short time (a fraction of a millionth of a second). X-rays. . Pu-239. The IAEA publishes figures on the quanti- ties of material required to produce a nuclear weapon—amounts known as a “significant quantity. the degree to which the fissile material is compressed. The energy and atomic particles released are in the form of alpha particles (subatomic fragments consisting of two protons and two neu- trons). classification regu- lation permits cleared individuals to state that a nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 4 kilograms of plutonium. neutrons. their density. and geometry. Pu-239 has a smaller critical mass than U-235. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 47 nuclear reactor).

20 kilotons). Such devices are called thermonuclear weapons. New Mexico. on July 16. even at that time. The implosion design was used in the first nuclear explosion (the Trinity test) at Alamogordo. Gun-design weapons can only use uranium as a fissile material. and the nuclear dissassembly will occur too quickly. These materials are typically in- jected as a gas into the center of the fissile material before initiating the nuclear chain reaction. the first hydrogen explosion had a force of 10. and the second is to rapidly compress a single subcritical mass (the implosion technique).48 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Basic Nuclear Weapon Designs There are two classical methods for achieving the desired mass and explosive yield of a single-stage nuclear weapon. in the southern Pacific Ocean. 1945.” thus further increasing the explosive yield of the nuclear weapon. the primary typically relies on a process referred to as “boosting.000 metric tons of TNT (that is. Japan. 1952. because the secondaries (and often the primaries) typically contain lighter isotopes—in the form of lithium deutride. such as those used in today’s modern missile warheads. before the desired yield can be achieved. or tritium—that are fused by the high temperature produced by a nuclear reaction. on August 6. which is an isotope of hydrogen)—was exploded by the United States on November 1. The device used a basic fission primary explosive to produce the heat and radiation necessary to ignite the secondary explosive of liquid deuterium. In advanced nuclear designs. Advanced Nuclear Designs Most advanced weapon designs have two or more separate nuclear components in the same device that are ignited in stages—the energy released in the explod- ing fission-based “primary” is contained and used to compress and ignite nuclear reactions in the separate fusion-based “secondary. and in the nuclear weapon dropped on Nagasaki. 1945. The first is to rapidly bring together two subcritical masses (the gun assembly technique). As the chain reaction releases energy in the initial phase of the . Japan.000 metric tons of TNT (10. highly enriched ura- nium is considered a particularly attractive material for terrorists seeking to ac- quire nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon that the United States dropped on Hiroshima.4 megatons). on Au- gust 9.400. was a gun-type weapon and was so well understood. 1945. that it was used without being explosively tested beforehand. Whereas the first fission nuclear explosions—the Trinity device—had a force of 20. fusion materials (such as deuterium and tritium) are located within the atomic device. deuterium. The chain reaction in a gun design using plutonium will begin too soon. Because uranium can be used in the simpler gun design. An implosion design is more complex but allows for a smaller device. The first multistage thermonuclear device—also referred to as a hydrogen bomb (because it used liquid deuterium. The gun design is the least complex of the known nuclear weapon designs.” In a boosted device. Either uranium and plutonium or a combination of the two can be used in the more complex implosion design.

and the neutrons cause additional fission reactions. and the gas- centrifuge method. One other technique. The con- centration of the desired isotope. Uranium Enrichment Numerous methods have been developed to enrich uranium. If the concentration of uraniun-235 is lower. U-235. the U-235 concentration can be increased to almost 100 percent. causing then to fuse together. nuclear weapons. Two principal enrich- ment techniques used today are the gaseous diffusion method. So much material is required if the enrichment is below 20 percent U-235 that the inter- national community has adopted a concentration of 20 percent U-235 as a thresh- old above which additional safeguards and physical security requirements are invoked. but it makes up only 0. including plutonium. The uranium used in a fission weapon is typically enriched to above 90 percent U-235. but none of these is yet efficient enough to use in the commercial production of enriched uranium. from a nonproliferation perspective. collectively referred to as “enrichment. South Africa used another technology for the production of enriched . but it was adopted by Iraq in its nuclear weapon program in the 1980s (see chapter 17). increasing the energy output and efficiency of the boosted device. causing increased concern about the control of this tech- nology. in which uranium hexafluoride gas is swirled in a cylinder that rotates at extremely high speeds. Considerable research and development has been conducted on several chemi- cal and laser isotope-separation technologies. All other fissile materials. and much higher concentrations are required to construct an actual nuclear explosive. fissile materials are not readily available in nature. must be created artifi- cially in a nuclear reactor and subsequently separated in a process referred to as reprocessing or chemical separation. Iran and South Korea have recently been found to have conducted uranium enrichment activities using lasers. can be increased through a variety of processes.7 percent of all of the uranium that comes out of the ground. All of them ulti- mately rely on the varying weights of different isotopes. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 49 explosion. was one of the processes used to enrich uranium for the first U. some of the energy is used to compress and heat these lighter atoms. although fission weapons can be made with less concentrated U-235. U-235 exists in natural uranium. The Production of Nuclear Materials Fortunately. thereby accelerating the ongoing fission chain reaction. This highly inefficient but relatively simple enrichment method was largely abandoned by the United States in the 1950s.S. in which uranium hexafluoride gas is forced through a selectively porous barrier. larger amounts of uranium (and the chemical explosive for compressing it) are required to fabricate a nuclear explosive device. electromagnetic iso- tope separation.” With some technologies. These thermonuclear reactions release additional energy and neutrons.

natural uranium must first be converted through a chemical process into uranium hexafluoride (figure 3. and possibly others that have not yet been identified. Khan nuclear black market net- work also made centrifuge technology. • a uranium mine. Q. equipment. Pakistan relies primarily on uranium enrichment for its nuclear weapons program (see chapter 12).1). the basic nuclear resources and facilities that are needed to produce weapons-grade uranium include • uranium deposits. but the weight differential between various ura- nium isotopes allows collectors at different positions along the centrifuge ends to pick up slightly higher or lower percentages of U-235 or U-238.” enrichment process. and expertise available to several states. but the Pakistan-based A. one small step at a time. The centrifuges must be made from specialized materials. for purifying yellowcake and converting it into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or uranium tetrachloride (UCl4). however. for processing uranium ore. • a chemical conversion plant. must spin at very high speeds (several times the speed of sound). which usually contains less than 1 percent uranium into uranium oxide concentrate. In centrifuge enrichment. Not only do centrifuges offer a highly efficient way to enrich uranium. and North Korea. for enriching the uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium tetrachloride in the isotope U-235. including metal alloys and carbon fibers.50 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s uranium for weapons—the aerodynamic. or “jet nozzle. Libya. • a uranium mill. Centrifuges Considerable attention has been focused on centrifuge enrichment technology in the past few years. The gaseous form of this chemical is then fed along the axis of cylinders spinning at the rate of several hundred miles per hour. depending on where they are positioned. The enrich- ment of uranium through centrifuges. The forces inside the cylinder fling the uranium gas to the exterior wall of the unit. For illustrative purposes. Fractional increases in the U-235 percentage can be multiplied by repeating the process thousands of times. or yellowcake. remains a highly technical and challenging activity that requires extensive experience and expertise to master. including Iran. and • a capability for converting the enriched uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium tetrachloride into uranium metal. Centrifuges are used in a wide variety of legitimate applications. and the basic concepts involved in their use are taught in college-level physics. Linking together hundreds or thousands of centrifuges into what is known as a “cascade” can thus enrich uranium gas from the natural level to much higher levels. the material processed in the enrichment plant. . • an enrichment plant. which is still a sensitive and controlled technology.

success is rarely quick and never guaranteed. but other states (such as India and North . requiring complete replacement. complicat- ing the industrial process. The United States and several other nuclear weapon states have used dedicated military reactors to pro- duce these weapons-usable materials. Without outside assistance. Diagram of a Centrifuge and must be perfectly balanced or they will fly apart. Along with these engineering challenges. it can take decades for a state to develop and master uranium centrifuge enrichment. and any system breaches can clog the entire centrifuge cascade. is not available in nature and must be created artificially in nuclear reactors. the other main nuclear material used in weapons. uranium hexafluoride—the feed- stock used in centrifuges—is a highly caustic mixture that must be heated to remain gaseous. Even with considerable assistance. The centrifuge units them- selves are surrounded by vacuum-sealed chambers to reduce friction. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 51 Figure 3. Plutonium Production Plutonium.1.

and Russia. However. In some fast reac- tors. These programs have encountered complex technical and political challenges—not the least of which is related to the proliferation risks caused by the overabundance of plutonium—and also questions about safety and the waste produced from these types of reactors and their spent-fuel handling. heavy lead casks must be used to transport them. Some form of chemical separation or other process is required to sepa- rate plutonium from the highly radioactive waste materials. and the plutonium is separated from the solution in a series of chemical processing steps. has apparently succeeded in constructing a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon without. almost every nation that has tried to develop nuclear weapons by the plutonium route—India.52 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Korea) have used civilian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. new plutonium is created in the core and the blanket. most notably in France. As the reactor oper- ates. depend- ing on the reactor design) is used to create a controlled nuclear chain reaction. Because the spent-fuel rods are highly radioactive. such as U-238 or thorium-232. Neutron capture produces new iso- topes. often surrounded by a “blanket” of natural uranium. however. Indeed. Although detailed information about reprocessing was declassified by the United States and France in the 1950s and is generally available. This reaction releases neutrons. “spent” fuel elements and target materials are taken to a separation or “reprocessing” plant. North Korea. throughout the 1970s. the economic advantages of breeders depend on natural uranium becoming scarce and expensive. Like plutonium recycling in general. and the rooms at the reprocessing plant where the plutonium is chemically extracted must have thick walls. more plutonium is produced than is consumed in the reactor. uranium fuel (either natural uranium or slightly enriched uranium. however. known as fast or “breeder” reactors. some of which are captured by fertile nuclear materials. lead shielding. it remains a complex engineering procedure. however. reprocessing plants can also be used for legitimate civilian purposes because plutonium can be used as fuel in nuclear power reactors. Iraq. new uranium reserves have been discovered. which—after radioactive decay—can be converted into fissile materials such as Pu-239 or U-233. the fuel rods containing these materials also contain other fission products and by-products. and special ventilation to contain radia- tion hazards. many of which are highly ra- dioactive. During the past three decades. it seems. Like enrichment facilities. Indeed. Japan. In a chemical separation plant. significant foreign assistance. plutonium would need to be extracted from spent fuel for use as a substitute fuel in conventional power reactors. Israel. Fast reactors typically use mixed plutonium-uranium fuel. research and development is under way in several nations on a new generation of reactors. To accomplish this separation. In a reac- tor. it was generally assumed that because nuclear power use would steadily grow and worldwide uranium resources would be depleted. hence the name “breeder” reactor. spent fuel is dissolved in hot nitric acid. and the improved efficiency in extraction has outpaced the depletion of higher-grade . In addition. and Paki- stan—has sought outside help from the advanced nuclear supplier countries.

the production of plutonium en- tails many steps. For illustrative purposes. though it is continuing to reprocess spent fuel on a commercial basis for itself and several industrial nations. and • a reprocessing plant. • a fuel fabrication plant. . If so. In the late 1970s. or yellowcake. which are all continuing to develop breeder reactors and are moving forward with sizable plutonium recycling programs. Broadly speaking. • a research or power reactor moderated by heavy water or graphite. and many installations and capabilities are needed along with the reactor and reprocessing plant. concern has grown over the proliferation risks of the wide-scale use of plutonium as a fuel. Like the production of enriched uranium. the following facili- ties and resources are required for an independent plutonium production capa- bility. Germany has aban- doned its breeder reactor program and is phasing out its recycling of plutonium and nuclear power in general. The United Kingdom has also frozen its program to develop breeder reactors. be produced. Japan. it represents an advanced technology that will pay off in the future and reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. In contrast to heavy-water and graphite-moderated reactors. Moreover. to manufacture the fuel elements placed in the reac- tor. including a capability to fabricate zircaloy or aluminum tubing. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 53 ores. a light-water-moderated reactor would necessitate the use of low-enriched uranium. implying that a domestic enrichment capability could be available. these factors led the United States to abandon its plans to recycle plutonium in light-water reactors and. to convert the yellowcake into reactor- grade uranium dioxide. in the early 1980s. ob- viating the need for plutonium as a weapon material. highly enriched uranium could. in theory. and spent-fuel reprocessing has proven to be far more expensive and complex than anticipated. assuming that a research or power reactor—moderated by either heavy water or graphite and employing natural uranium fuel—is used: • uranium deposits. • a uranium mill. • a heavy-water production plant or a reactor-grade graphite production plant. which use natu- ral uranium as fuel. • a uranium chemical conversion plant. the proponents of nuclear energy in these countries have maintained support for the civil use of plutonium by arguing that. to end its breeder reactor development program. The principal proponents of the use of plutonium for civilian purposes are France. though it may not be economical. and Russia. nuclear power has reached only a fraction of its expected growth levels. • a uranium mine. for processing uranium ore containing less than 1 percent uranium into uranium oxide concentrate. It is also possible that a state might import fuel for a light-water reactor under IAEA inspection and.

the state might one day abrogate its IAEA obligations and seize that material for use in nuclear arms. reprocess it to extract plutonium. Although IAEA rules would require the country involved to place any such plu- tonium under IAEA monitoring. .54 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s after using the material to produce electricity.

.

.

rickettsial agents.1 at the end of the chapter). The fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States transformed that concern into a requirement for substantial government action to respond to and prepare for terrorist attacks using chemical or biological war- fare agents. . Some experts categorize a number of these agents as weapons of mass destruction because of their potential to inflict massive casualties through- out a broad geographical area. The spread of dual-use chemical technologies has facilitated the surreptitious acquisition of indigenous CW programs by potential proliferators. or plant populations (see table 4. stability. and toxins: 57 . governments and the public have grown increasingly con- cerned over the threats posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons (CWs) and biological weapons (BWs). [that] do not destroy buildings. Biological agents can be grouped in four categories: bacterial agents. animal. while advances in biotech- nology could expand the availability and lethality of common BW agents. Agents. viral agents. The utility of a biological agent as a weapon is determined by its virulence. or causes deterioration of material. Biological Weapons BWs deliver pathogenic microorganisms or biologically manufactured toxins to cause illness or death in human. .2 NATO defines a biological agent as a “microorganism (or toxin derived from it) which causes disease in man. and ease of production. infectiousness. cities or trans- portation. BWs would be used deliber- ately to infect a target group.”1 Recent technological developments have contributed to the threat posed by these weapons. They unfortunately just destroy human lives. and Proliferation Since the mid-1990s. CHAPTER 4 Biological and Chemical Weapons. CWs and BWs have also been called “mass casualty weapons .”3 Unlike normal disease outbreaks. More accurately. plants or animals. which ap- pear naturally and may spread through contagion.

toxins are of biological origin. and stability in storage and after release into the environment. and like the seeds of a plant. Spores are more resistant to environmental stresses. bacteria. they can germinate when conditions are favor- able. • Biological toxins. although they can also be used to poison food or beverages. Unlike their chemical counterparts. some bacte- ria (for example. than are the original bacteria. are potent poisons gen- erated by living organisms (that is. such as temperature and humid- ity. Bacterial agents can be cultivated in nutrient-rich solutions. fungi. ease of dissemination. spores are often more effective as biologi- cal warfare agents. toxins are nonliving protein or nonprotein molecules. Spores are “a dormant form of bacterium. Viruses are microorganisms that can replicate only inside living cells. • Viral agents include smallpox virus. differentiate biological toxins from chemical agents. They are often highly susceptible to antibiotic treatments. are single- cell organisms that either invade host tissue or produce nonliving toxins (poi- sons). biological agents must be deliv- ered over a widespread area in a concentration high enough to infect and under atmospheric and weather conditions that ensure agent survival for a period of a few hours or more. Precise variables such as particle size and the altitude of dissemination are significant determinants of the range and . However. To maximize casualties. Some bacteria cause disease by both means.58 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Bacterial agents. Toxins are not volatile and hence are unlikely to penetrate the skin. and various viral hemorrhagic fever viruses. anthrax bacilli) can transform themselves into spores. such as those that cause anthrax and tularemia. Aerosol delivery—the dispersion of microscopic liquid drop- lets or dry particles of a microorganism or toxin in an airborne cloud—is con- sidered the most effective means of delivery. As nonliving agents. triggering changes that eventually lead to cell death. the toxicity of many biological toxins is several orders of magnitude higher than that of the most potent chemical poisons. toxins cannot reproduce or spread and are therefore less deadly than living pathogens. Several key characteristics make pathogens or toxins more or less suitable for use as BWs: the availability of virulent strains. Several characteristics.5 Like other biological agents. algae. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus. and plants). lethality. Unlike bacterial or viral agents. the effective delivery of toxins generally requires their dis- persal as an inhalable aerosol. Under specific conditions.”4 Because of their persistence. • Rickettsial agents include those that cause Q fever and epidemic typhus. The successful cultivation of viruses is more difficult than that of bacteria. ease of production. Rick- ettsiae are parasitic microorganisms that live and replicate inside living host cells. Viral agents act as intracellular parasites by commandeering the biochemical machinery of the infected cell to produce more virus particles. although some toxins can be produced by chemi- cal synthesis. The level of technical expertise required to acquire a biological warfare capa- bility may vary depending on the sophistication of the weapons being sought. particle size and weight. however. such as ricin and botulinum toxin.

Although biological agent production per se is not technically difficult. odorless. Other agents require moisture to survive.” have increased the availability of dual-use equipment and the number of individuals with the knowledge necessary for BW production. Terror- ist intentions involving BWs were exposed publicly by the repeated attempts of the Aum Shinrikyo cult to produce and distribute two lethal biological agents in Japan in the early 1990s. rockets. often termed the “biotechnology revolution. Depending on the number of victims who inhaled the agent. standard warfare munitions—artillery shells. Furthermore. This is a challenging task because biological warfare agents are vulnerable to a host of environmental con- ditions. (See the section on Russian CW and BW programs in chapter 6. The ability of an agent to survive and maintain its virulence for several hours in aerosol form as it floats downwind is a prerequisite for infecting large numbers of people. including microbiology and aerobiology. a BW must disseminate a microbial or toxin agent in the appropriate particle size range of 1 to 5 microns (a micron is a thousandth of a millimeter). particu- larly live organisms. to infect large num- bers of the target population. increase the risk that BW expertise and materials could leak from Russia to potential proliferators. Pathogenic micro- organisms are potential mass-casualty weapons because of their ability to multi- ply within the host.) Once disseminated. and bombs—are not effective delivery vehicles for BWs. depending on the specific agent and the amount that has been distributed and inhaled. Recent advances in the bio- logical sciences. the group was ultimately unsuccessful in acquiring and disseminating virulent strains of botulinum toxin and anthrax. Large quantities of biological agents. Agent stability and virulence must also be maintained during production.6 Incubation periods of BW agents vary from several hours to several days. missiles. The acquisition of an advanced BW capability requires expertise in various disciplines. their potential use by terrorists has been identified as a growing threat to international security.7 It also reveals the terrorists’ . As a result. Many agents. adding to concerns that rogue states or terrorist organizations may acquire a BW capability. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . die when exposed to ultraviolet light or oxygen. and dissemination. storage. the re- sult could be a massive. a BW attack could remain undetected until the victims began to exhibit symptoms of infection. BWs are also well suited for covert delivery. simultaneous outbreak of disease. could cause tens to hundreds of thousands of deaths. and oxidation. A g e n t s . and lay- offs or underemployment of former BW scientists and technicians. com- bining a stable biological agent with an effective dissemination device requires sophisticated technology and expertise. The cult’s failure demonstrates the significant tech- nical hurdles associated with BW development. Most cannot withstand the heat or blast of an explo- sion. Despite sustained and well-funded efforts. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the decommissioning of its massive BW program have also increased BW proliferation risks. aerosols of various pathogenic microorganisms and tox- ins are invisible. effectively distributed. grenades. Inadequate security at former BW institutes in Russia that still possess collections of highly virulent pathogen strains. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 59 damage that can be caused by a BW attack. including desiccation. As a result. humidity. Because of these characteristics. and tasteless.

Historical incidents of BW use in warfare have been rare but often dramatic.8 Growing capabilities sparked recognition of the destructive potential of BWs and were accompanied by international efforts to control their proliferation and use. British officers engaged in biological warfare in eighteenth-century North America by distributing blankets contaminated with the smallpox virus to Native Ameri- cans. In 1940. Japan developed an exten- sive BW and CW program. turn the slurry of spores into an aerosol to be inhaled by the target population. BW stockpiles and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful purposes. nearly twenty years after the Soviet Union had signed a treaty pledging not to develop or stock- pile BWs. the Tartars cata- pulted corpses of bubonic-plague victims over the walls of enemy fortresses.60 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s recognition of the utility of BWs as instruments of mass terror. the U. The potential diversion of biological agents from culture collections in the former Soviet states or from states with covert BW programs has increased concerns that terrorists may be able to acquire these weapons. Recent dis- cussions center on possible methods of protection and appropriate measures for emergency treatment and containment in the event of a large-scale BW attack. In 1346. which were infected by the fleas and then spread the disease to humans.10 The full extent of the Soviet BW program is still being uncovered. The Soviet BW program had two main components: one under the . which included experimentation with biological agents on human subjects in the infamous Units 731 and 100. The weapon thought most likely to be used was the E133 cluster bomb. on impact. the Cold War prompted the development of vast offensive BW programs in the United States and the Soviet Union. In the twentieth century. the sophistication of biological warfare was ampli- fied with the emergence of state-sponsored BW programs.S. A small explosive charge would. the United States held in storage some 40.000 liters of antipersonnel biological warfare agents and some 5. which held 536 biological bomblets. In the third century B.C. reportedly contracted the bubonic plague after the Japanese dropped ceramic bombs containing plague-infected fleas along with rice to at- tract rodents.S. and ex- posed the widespread vulnerabilities of population centers to BWs. when President Richard Nixon unilaterally and unconditionally renounced BWs and ordered the destruction of all U. From 1932 until the end of World War II.9 At the time.. The attacks exhibited the range of covert delivery options available to bioterrorists. the Carthaginian leader Hannibal filled pots with poi- sonous snakes and hurled them onto enemy ships. raised questions about the ease and source of acquisition. residents in Chuhsien.000 kilograms of antiagriculture agents. The fall 2001 mailings of anthrax bacterial spores in the United States raised widespread speculation about the methods and potential consequences of covert BW use. China. The United States officially ended its offensive BW program in November 1969. each contain- ing 35 milliliters of liquid-suspension anthrax spores. When the BW program was dismantled. All were destroyed in the early 1970s. Official admission of the program’s existence did not occur until 1992. biological warfare capability was formidable. Nevertheless.

including several hostile to Western democracies—Iran. Kanatjan Alibekov). and because it counts countries where a BW pro- gram is only alleged or suspected. Russia had refused to extend the site visits to facilities under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. Despite such concerns.500 metric tons of tula- remia bacteria. Senate that “there are a dozen countries believed to have biological warfare programs. the United States.k. Uzbekistan.S. It now seems clear. . including 1.”16 Although it is difficult to know with any certainty.13 As a result. described a Soviet bioweapons program that employed a total of more than 60. 4. Subsequently. . Other states are pursu- ing BW programs for counterinsurgency use and tactical applications. Iraq. Central Intelligence Agency stated that “about a dozen states. .”15 In Feb- ruary 2001. the director of the U.S. and the United Kingdom agreed to a trilateral process of information sharing and reciprocal site visits to verify the end of Russia’s illicit BW program. that neither Libya nor post-1991 Iraq possessed stockpiles of BWs.14 The exact number and identity of all countries having biological warfare ca- pabilities remain uncertain because of the dual-use nature of biotechnology and the ease with which BW development can be camouflaged. North Ko- rea. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 61 Ministries of Defense and Agriculture. A g e n t s .000 metric tons of glanders bacteria. causing the trilateral process to collapse and raising concerns about the extent of Russia’s deactivation of the Soviet BW com- plex. and Georgia that house lethal biological agents. chemical. Russia. . By 1994. Of these funds.S. although many govern- ments and outside experts believed that they did. Ken Alibek (a.a. Libya.11 At its peak.500 metric tons of bubonic plague bacteria.000 people and included several large-scale production facilities that could be mobilized during a period of crisis or war. Senate testimony in 1998. Some coun- tries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability. Nevertheless. both because it blurs together biologi- cal and chemical programs. and the other under an ostensibly civil- ian pharmaceutical development and production complex known as Biopreparat. Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged to halt the further development of offensive BW capabilities. and 2. and biological ar- senals. Defense Intelligence Agency also told the U. the Soviet BW program had the capacity to produce mas- sive quantities of several biological agents. the former first deputy director of Biopreparat. while the under- payment of former Russian BW scientists has increased the threat of diversion of biological warfare agents and technical expertise. .500 metric tons of anthrax. the director of the U.12 In April 1992. however. In March 2000. and spent over $10 billion on these programs between 1991 and 2004.S. Kazakhstan. the figure of a dozen na- tional BW programs appears exaggerated. and Syria—now either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical capabilities for use against their perceived enemies . . $300 million was spent directly on BW programs and $985 million was devoted to chemical demilitarization and destruction. the United States continues cooperative efforts to help secure the former Soviet Union’s vast nuclear. for example. important progress has been achieved in securing collections of biological patho- gens at former BW research institutes in the former Soviet Union. During U. 1. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . security remains lax at some former Soviet facilities in Russia.

inspections after the 1991 war. and must also be resistant to atmospheric water vapor and oxygen in order to maintain stability and effective- ness during dispersal. The most serious effects of cyanide poisoning are caused by a lack of oxygen to the brain.”17 The use of such chemical substances against soldiers or civilians constitutes chemical warfare. blistering agents (or vesicants).18 CW agents are produced by mixing various chemical ingredients.2 at the end of the chapter). and nerve agents: • Blood gases. and Syria. to be effective. are most likely at the research and development stage. • Choking agents. and all the governments concerned deny having any BW programs. damage the membrane of the lungs and ultimately cause suffocation from pulmonary edema. pen- etrate body tissues and mucous membranes and react with enzymes. choking agents. • Blistering agents. Israel may have produced BW agents but is not thought to have stockpiled weapons. fluid- filled blisters. called precursors. The pro- grams. such as chlorine and phosgene.62 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Iraq’s clandestine program is the one about which the most in known. Russia may also have done so. liq- uids. Army defines a chemical agent as “a chemical which is intended for use in military operations to kill. seriously injure. Most substances used in CWs are liquids. Other countries often mentioned by governments or experts as having suspected BW programs include China. CWs are generally categorized in four groups: blood gases. and lewisite.N. if they exist. The most significant remaining suspected BW programs are in Israel and North Korea. The Soviet Union. Iran. only a small number of chemicals are considered suitable for chemical warfare. The skin. There is no independent confirmation of these claims. Iraq. CW agents may also be allowed to evaporate spontaneously. or solids (see table 4. and South Africa’s BW program reportedly ended in 1992. The U. eyes. Throughout the twentieth century. Egypt. . even after it claimed to have ended its program (see chapter 6). Choking agents must be inhaled to harm the body. and DNA to destroy cells. approximately 70 different chemi- cal substances were used and stockpiled as CW agents. thanks to U. in specific ratios. poison cells by blocking the transport of oxygen by red blood cells from the lungs to the tissues. CW agents must also be able to withstand prolonged storage without deterioration. They may be disseminated by an explosive munitions or a sprayer system. proteins. and apartheid South Africa are the only nations known to have produced and stockpiled BWs since the 1980s.S. although some agents are used in a gaseous form. and airways are especially vulnerable. Finally. Such substances must be highly toxic yet not too difficult to handle. such as hydrogen cyanide. Chemical Weapons CW are lethal. or incapacitate man because of physiological effects. CW agents must be able to with- stand the high levels of heat that accompany explosive dispersal. such as mustard gas. Despite the abundance of modern-day toxic sub- stances. phosgene oxime. producing severe chemical burns and massive. human-made substances that can be disseminated as gases.

000 metric tons of chemical agents. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 63 • Nerve agents.000 and injured 1.”20 Sophisticated chemical delivery systems were perfected in the 1960s with the development of “binary” munitions. sarin. and mines.22 Japan produced 8. and V nerve agent (VX). whereas the smaller. poured into munitions. In a binary munition. handling. aerial bombs (including cluster bombs). All nerve agents are chemically categorized as organophosphorus com- pounds. Crop- dusting aircraft. A wide variety of possible delivery systems exists for CW agents. who mixed sulfur and pitch resin to engulf enemy troops in toxic fumes during the Trojan War. By the war’s end.2 million. resulting in death. warm temperatures and high humidity can increase the toxic concentration of the chemical cloud. causing skin or ground contamination. CWs were of a “unitary” design. Previously. binary technology ensures greater safety during transporta- tion. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . Crude methods of delivering CW agents are typically less efficient and reliable but can nevertheless be effective. and then stored. ready for use. The use of CW agents in warfare can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. and even simple aerosol spray cans offer po- tential dissemination methods for terrorists. the German CW program stockpiled 78.000 metric tons of agents. but fortunately did not use them. a significant use of chemical warfare occurred in 1935–1936. When dispersed. During World War II.19 Such chemical warfare agents are highly toxic and can kill within several minutes after exposure to a lethal dose through skin contact or inha- lation. Both the Allies and the Central Powers subse- quently employed chemical agents such as phosgene and mustard on a massive scale during World War I. Conversely. The CW agent was manufactured. By de- laying the synthesis of the toxic substance until after the weapon’s launch from an aircraft or gun. Effective CW delivery involves disseminating the agent as liquid droplets or an aerosol. A chemical cloud is highly susceptible to envi- ronmental conditions. when Fascist Italy employed mustard agent in bombs and aerosols during its invasion of Ethiopia. lighter droplets remain airborne as an aerosol that can be inhaled. All of these munitions types are intended to provide an appropriately sized aerosol that will remain suspended in the air close to the ground[. Rain and low temperatures may reduce agent effectiveness. Wind velocity necessarily dictates its direction and rate of spread. Typical mili- tary devices include “artillery shells. 1915. including 12. rockets. grenades. the larger droplets fall to earth. spray tanks. The first major instance of chemical warfare occurred on April 23. disrupt the trans- mission of nerve impulses in human and animal nervous systems.] where it will be readily inhaled.000 pounds of sarin. in contrast. missiles. an estimated 124. such as tabun.000 metric tons of tabun and 1. pesticide foggers. A g e n t s . when the German army used chlorine gas against Allied troops at Ypres. two precursor chemicals of lesser toxicity are re- acted together to create the lethal agent only after the munition is fired. Belgium.23 . Mustard gas alone killed 91.000 metric tons of chemicals had been used on the battlefield by both sides.21 After World War I. CWs have been used or stockpiled by various military forces throughout the twentieth century. and storage of CWs.

China. killing twelve people and injuring about a thousand. Libya. Destruction of U. An accident or sabotage at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal. which entailed an exchange of data about their respective CW stockpiles and production complexes. The September 11.25 The most significant remaining national CW programs are those of Egypt. In 1994. Initial multilateral efforts to prohibit the use of chemical and . Japan. Intentional de- struction or sabotage at chemical plants or involving trucks or trains transport- ing hazardous chemicals could turn industrial facilities into weapons of chemi- cal terrorism. Saudi Arabia.000 metric tons of CWs stored at seven sites. Currently.24 Six member countries have declared the possession of CW stockpiles totaling approximately 70. France. CWs began in 1985 and is still in progress at several CW depots across the nation. the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Wyo- ming Memorandum of Understanding.) Most major states with known CW stockpiles have pledged to destroy them under the Chemical Weapons Convention (see below).000 metric tons of CW agents. Official Russian dec- larations suggest that the country now has 40. India. and it carried out a second attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995. South Korea. and Vietnam are also sometimes listed as nations with active CW programs. South Korea. Approximately half the 64 declared CWPFs have been destroyed thus far. Japan. and perhaps China and Iran. and the United States. Taiwan. and Syria. The Soviet Union officially announced its possession of a CW stockpile in 1987. Russia. Israel. the United Kingdom. terrorist attacks raised a new worry: terrorists may not have to produce chemical agents in order to use chemicals to cause mass casualties.000 metric tons of agents: Albania.26 although these claims are difficult to verify. India. Iran. no nonstate actor or substate group is known to possess CWs.S. however. In 1989. the United States and Yugo- slavia. The United States stockpiled an estimated 30. the cult released sarin in a residential area of Masumoto. India. Russia. Aum Shinrikyo. Myanmar.64 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Immense quantities of CWs were also produced by both the United States and the Soviet Union throughout World War II and the Cold War. did successfully produce significant amounts of sarin nerve agent. Efforts to Control Biological and Chemical Weapons Global efforts to contain the spread of CWs and BWs center on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Conven- tion (CWC). These incidents elevated concern over the ability of terrorists to acquire a CW capability. South Korea. This announcement was followed by the deactivation of its CW produc- tion program. Twelve nations have also declared existing or former CW production fa- cilities (CWPFs): Bosnia and Herzegovina. concentrated in central Russia and the Urals. (See chapter 6. 2001. in December 1984 released a cloud of chlorine gas that killed at least 5. Libya. North Korea.000 people immediately and injured tens of thousands more.

production. and other peaceful purposes. its impact remained limited because it did not re- strict the ability of states to acquire or store CWs and BWs. and specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full implementation of Article X. the George W. when the United States rejected the draft treaty and withdrew from the talks. However. It prohibits the development.”31 Efforts by the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding protocol for veri- fication ended abruptly in July 2001.S. Violations of the BWC by the former Soviet Union. As of Spring 2005. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . In 1899. into the regime. protective.”27 The BWC also specifically bans “weapons. To that end. including the . Recognizing these weaknesses. stockpiling.32 The United States claimed that the BWC protocol would have jeopardized the security of U. persis- tent allegations regarding Iraq’s BW activities. The U. the treaty lacked effective verification and enforcement measures to ensure compliance.S. and the subsequent wave of anthrax attacks gave rise to a renewed U. 153 states were members of the treaty. namely in 1980. a system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention. acqui- sition. the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. the United Kingdom. Senate also failed to ratify the Geneva Protocol until January 1975. 1991. 1996. and a doubling of the number of states suspected of pursuing a BW capability since 197530 have all raised ques- tions about the BWC’s effectiveness. The BWC was opened for signature in April 1972 and entered into force on March 26. but without resuming multilateral negotiations. interest in strengthening the BWC. and because many states reserved the right to respond in kind to a chemical or biological attack. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 65 biological agents on the battlefield can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century.S. and Russia are the three depositary govern- ments for the BWC. member states established an Ad Hoc Group in 1994 to draft legally binding verification mea- sures for the convention. biotechnical and pharma- ceutical secrets without effectively detecting treaty violations. did not have verifi- cation or enforcement provisions. A g e n t s . and transfer of biological agents or toxins in types or “quantities that have no justification for prophylactic.” The extensive use of CWs during World War I in violation of the Hague gas projectile declaration led to another attempt by states to establish an interna- tional norm against the use of weapons of mass destruction: the 1925 Geneva Protocol. as ap- propriate. The Ad Hoc Group was authorized to negotiate in four areas: “Definitions of terms and objective criteria. equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. the First Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War included a declaration banning “the use of projectiles.29 The BWC was the first international treaty to ban an entire class of weapons. Bush administration proposed a series of measures that individual countries could adopt and implement to reduce the risk of bioterrorism.”28 The United States. 1986. fifty years after it was concluded. 2001. Review conferences of the BWC have taken place about every five years since the treaty entered into force. and 2001–2002. The terrorist at- tacks in New York and Washington on September 11. Although this treaty prohibited the use in war of both poison gases and bacteriological weapons. 1975. incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures.

The CWC includes an extensive verification regime that subjects all declared CW and weapon production facilities to systematic inspections. As of Spring 2005. A year later. Full elimination of CWs and former production facilities is expected within ten years of the convention’s entry into force. The conven- tion categorizes chemicals into three “schedules” depending on their applicabil- ity for CWs and for commercial purposes. and the strengthening of existing U. five-year extension in exceptional cases. stockpiling.34 The Organization for the Prohibi- tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). . These negotiations stalled. This treaty prohibits the development. processing. acquisition. efforts began to negotiate a ban on CWs. the destruction of production facilities. production. directly or indirectly. over compliance and verifica- tion issues. 1997. procedures for investigating suspicious disease outbreaks or alle- gations of BW use. and for promoting trade in chemicals and related pro- duction equipment among member states for peaceful purposes. Facilities produc- ing chemicals listed in any of the three schedules in quantities in excess of speci- fied threshold amounts must be declared and are subject to inspection. The CWC entered into force on April 29. or use of CWs. The verification provisions of the treaty regulate both military and civilian chemical facilities that are active in the production. The CWC also requires members to destroy all CW stockpiles and production facilities under its jurisdiction or control. headquartered in The Hague. The CWC also includes provisions for assistance in the event a member state is attacked or threatened with CWs. and consumption of chemi- cals relevant to the convention. as well as any CWs abandoned on the territory of another state party. The final catalyst for completion of the CWC was the use of CWs by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). retention. insisting that all facilities and locations be subject to this procedure. however. which demonstrated the absence of international means to prevent the acquisition and use of CWs in conflict. with a provision for a one-time.N. [of ] chemical weapons to anyone. routine on-site inspections of declared sites. Verification involves a combination of declara- tion and reporting requirements. Progress resumed in 1986 when the Soviet Union accepted provi- sions for systematic inspections at CW storage and production facilities. Soon after the conclusion of the BWC in 1972. declared or undeclared. oversees the implementation of the treaty. nor can they assist other states in any treaty-banned activity. and declarations and routine inspections at commercial industry sites. as well as the “transfer.”33 State parties to the CWC cannot conduct military preparations for the use of CWs. the USSR also agreed to mandatory short- notice challenge inspections. and short-notice challenge inspections in cases of alleged non-compliance. 168 countries had signed and ratified the CWC. A member state may request the OPCW international inspectorate to conduct a challenge inspection of any suspect facility.66 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s criminalization of activities prohibited by the BWC. the adoption of regulations to restrict access to dangerous pathogens and toxins. Varying levels of control are then applied to the listed chemicals and their production facilities.

The Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt and Company. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin War- fare. p. 6. Milton Leitenberg. but by 1991 the “warning list” of chemicals subject to control had been expanded to 54 precursors.” available at www. U.S. p. Md. 4th ed. America’s Achilles Heel (Cam- bridge. “FOA Briefing Book on Chemical Weap- ons. Spring–Summer 1999. NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Opera- tions (Washington. part 2. 1969–70. Army. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster. D. no. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook.: Borden Institute. Member nations work on the basis of consensus to limit the spread of CWs and BWs by “harmonizing” their national export controls on CW precursors. Newman. Tucker. Congress.S. HQ. 13.C. “Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the U. 14. N OTES 1. Tucker. Center for Interna- tional and Security Studies. and Thayer. 13.” Statement before the Joint Economic Com- mittee. “A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. U. Falkenrath. vol. Summer 2002. . The group focused initially on regulating the export of eight dual-use chemical precursors. 2. A g e n t s . Member states also share intelli- gence on CW-BW proliferation. 7. pp. Department of the Army. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s .S. Nonproliferation Review.S. The fact that many chemicals used in the production of CWs also have legal industrial applications has forced Australia Group members to strike a balance between chemical proliferation concerns and legitimate trade. Department of the Army. 416–419. ed. Falkenrath. 1997). May 1996.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.nti. Jonathan B. p. 1999). Nuclear Threat Initiative. See also Kenneth Alibek.opcw.” Associated Press.” International Security. D. 1-1. and CW-BW dual-use equipment. DA. and William Broad. p. Robert D. p. 27. 2001). “Officials Wary about Soviet Arsenal.asp. 2000). 3. 12. 2001).” conducted by Jonathan B. biological weapons program.35 The Australia Group was established in 1985 after the extensive use of CWs in the Iran-Iraq War. p. May 20. Part I. “Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. For more information on the U. 11. pp. “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Kenneth Alibek. (Maryland: Fort Detrick.S. 8. see Edward Regis. 1. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 14. 1.S. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge.C. 1998). 254.” in Medical As- pects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. AmedP-6(B). 9.. “Biological Weapons Arms Control. Economy.: U. 1966). Mass. 10.: MIT Press.: U. Richard A. BW pathogens. 15.” available at www. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. The group also began restricting BW-related exports in 1991. Thayer. “Controlling Nuclear Warheads & Materials Interactive Threat Reduc- tion Budget Database. Judith Miller. America’s Achilles Heel. Joseph Cirincione. Edward Eitzen and Ernest Takafuji.S. 1998. Stephen Engelberg.org/chemhaz/nerve. 7. 4. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 67 The Australia Group is an informal association of 39 countries plus the Eu- ropean Commission that seeks to prevent the proliferation of CWs and BWs.” PRAC Paper 16. U. 5.htm. 2001. The Textbook of Military Medicine (Washington. and Bradley A. Member states share the group’s core lists with chemical industries and scientific communities to promote awareness of CW and BW proliferation risks. Newman. October 30. 107–148. Office of the Surgeon General.

September/October 1997.” March 21. J.org/html/db/members_frameset.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.unog. 2000).net.armscontrol. U. 27. U. and smoke and flame materials.opcw. available at www.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6html. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defen- sive Operations. United Nations. August 1. George Tenet. William Patrick.” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. 147. Hogendoorn.org/files/projects/npp/resources/dia020701.S. 2001. “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. available at www. BWC (in Chronological Order by Deposit).opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng. D. director of central intelligence. 2001. 1993).” available at http://disarmament.opcw. 28. Conference on Disarmament.” International Herald Tribune. 35–39.cia.html. Chemical De- militarization. 26.australiagroup. 31.org:8080/TreatyStatus. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 19 November 2004. Excluded from consideration are riot control agents. 25. Government Printing Office.: U. available at www. 18. 22.asp.ceip. “FOA Briefing Book on Chemical Weap- ons. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington. and Thomas Dashiell. Cirincione. 29. 35. A.” statement for the record.68 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 15.htm. statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee. September 2004. Office of Technology Assessment.C.opcw. “The Australia Group at a Glance. 30.” available at www. p. available at www. p. 1-1 Field Manual 8-9.: Jane’s Information Group.” available at www. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 21.un.org/factsheets/australiagroup. 2000.html. Jeffrey Smart.” available at www. U. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. available at www.” Arms Control Association Fact Sheet.htm.un. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective.htm. p. “Brief Background on the Biological Weapons Convention. 37.html.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/dci_speech_032100. Thomas Wilson. 16. “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare. pp. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (Alexandria. “Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security.” 20.org/html/db/chemdemil_frameset. . Gert Harigel. 32. Department of the Army.htm. 23. “Global Threat and Challenges through 2015. Congress. “Verification Activities. 19. Frederick Sidell.N. available at www.html. Part 3.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.nsf. AmedP-6.org/files/ _publications/Harigelreport. 36. “Envoy Tries to Save Pact on Bio-War.opcw. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. chemical herbicides. Daryl Kimball and Celeste Powell. “Chemical Demilitarization. Text of the Biological Weapons Convention.ceip. Repairing the Regime.” available at www.S. February 7. 33. See also E. Ibid. Ibid. “A Chemical Weapons Atlas. available at www.ch/disarm/distreat/bac_72.asp. Impact on Society and Envi- ronment. V. see also www. Va. 24. Ibid.nl/cwc/cwc-eng. 34.org/html/db/chemdemil_frameset.S. 17.

malaise. onset of symptoms. shock.000– anthracis) fatigue which may be Treatable with high 50.1. Alternatively. and Vaccine is available. initial symptoms may progress directly to severe respiratory distress. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 69 . (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . Examples of Biological Warfare Agents Bacterial Agents Direct Person-to- BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/ Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose Anthrax (Bacillus High 1–6 Fever. Death normally follows within 24–36 hours of initiation of symptoms. A g e n t s . No 8.Table 4.000 followed by an dose of antibiotics spores improvement in administered before symptoms for 2–3 days. >90% fatality if untreated. pneumonia.

1. organisms dehydration. Treatable No 10–100 (Brucella suis) incapacitating nausea. organisms A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s malaise. Low Assumed low (Burkholderia pain. with antibiotics. and generalized papular/pustular eruptions. >50% fatality rate without treatment. with antibiotics. chills. headache. 70 Table 4. headache. >50% fatality if untreated. Fatalities in less than 5% of untreated patients. Death in 7–10 days. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission Dose Brucellosis Low. vomiting. Cholera (Vibrio Moderate 1–5 Severe gastroenteritis. 5–60 Fever. . sweats. Glanders High 3–5 Fever. weight loss. chest mallei) pain. No vaccine. Treatable No 10–500 cholerae) diarrhea. No vaccine. Symptoms may last for weeks or months. muscle No vaccine.

000 (Salmonella incapacitating colored spots on skin. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . exhaustion. Treatable if antibiotics infectious organisms (Yersinia pestis) headache. fever) Typhoid fever Low.000. highly 100–500 (Pneumonic) high fever. resulting in shortness of breath. Death in 1–6 days. stridor. 100% fatality if untreated. muscle ache Treatable with organisms tularensis) (rabbit and weight loss. chills. and circulatory failure. No 10–50 (Francisella headache. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 71 .Tularemia Moderate 2–10 Fever. Yes. 7–14 Fever. rose. Plague High 2–3 Pneumonia with malaise. 20% fatality if untreated. fever or deer-fly fatality if untreated. Treatable with organisms typhi) constipation. headache. Progresses rapidly. A g e n t s . fatigue. symptoms. Vaccine is available. 30–60% antibiotics. 10– antibiotics. bluish discoloration of skin and mucous membranes. Vaccine is available. muscle pain. are administered within and productive cough 12–24 hours of onset of with bloody sputum. Vaccine is available. No 10.

No 10–100 equine incapacitating general malaise. followed by the lower extremities and then centrally. vomiting. (VEE) Nausea. on Initial symptoms include Vaccine is available. cough. Rash and lesions develop in 2–3 days on face. Yes 10–100 major) moderate average fever. Venezuelan Low. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose 9LUDO$JHQWV A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Smallpox (Variola High to 12. Full recovery usually occurs within 1–2 weeks. 20–40% fatality in unvaccinated individuals. hands. organisms headache. severe organisms encephalitis headache.1. and forearms. and diarrhea may follow. and backache. Approximately 4% fatality. 2–6 Initial symptoms include Vaccine is available. and fever. 72 Table 4. . vomiting. malaise.

A g e n t s . : flushing of the face and Filiviridae chest. muscle aches. appetite. fatigue. nausea. muscle pain. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 73 . and weight loss. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . 2 3 Viral High 4–21 Fever. families. headache. vomiting. Approximately 1% fatality if untreated. Treatable with organisms burnetti) malaise. 14–21 Fever. hypotension. Vaccine is available. organisms fevers diarrhea. Can be (RNA viruses complicated by easy from several bleeding. incl. and No vaccine Unclear 1–10 hemorrhagic exhaustion. No 1–10 (Coxiella incapacitating excessive sweating. loss of antibiotics. –Ebola –Marburg Arenaviridae –Lassa –Junin –Machupo Flaviviridae –Yellow Fever Rickettsial Agents Q Fever Low. chills. and edema.

per poisoning) kilogram of body weight if ingested. Interruption of 1 µg/kg if neurotransmission.1. .001 µg/kg (Clostridium weakness. inhaled. Botulinum toxin High 1–3 Ptosis. progression to muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. followed by death. if difficulty in speaking and administered early. pain and (Rickettsia typhi/ delirium. Toxins Saxitoxin High Minutes to Dizziness. 74 Table 4. and antibiotics if weight. 65% fatality if untreated. numbness. ingested. dizziness. 10–40% prowazekii) fatality if untreated. swallowing. dry Treatable with of body botulinum) mouth. headache. generalized Vaccine is available. No vaccine No Endemic typhus weakness. No vaccine No 2–9 (paralytic hours paralysis of respiratory micrograms shellfish system. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose Epidemic typhus/ High 6–16 Fever. blurred vision. No . 30% fatality rate A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Rickettsia if untreated.

hemorrhage and death (Two castor within 36–72 hours.4–8 µg/kg through dermal contact. < 2% fatality rate. blisters. if respiratory distress. diarrhea. 2. Staphylococcal Low.03 µg/kg enterotoxin B incapacitating chills. ingested. headache. and stomach pain. A g e n t s . followed by inhaled. cough. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 75 . nausea. Cough may persist for 4 weeks. eye of body (Fusarium pain. body (castor beans) Progression to severe weight. weight if tricinetum) hemorrhage. 1–6 hours Sudden onset of fever. fever. No vaccine No 25-50 µg/kg 2) mcotoxins moderate vomiting. necrosis of tissues. non-productive aureus) cough. death.) Trichothecene (T– High to 1–4 hours Dizziness. beans have been fatal to humans. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . No vaccine No 3 µg/kg of communis) hours and pulmonary edema. Fever may last for 2–5 days. muscle per person (Staphylococcus pain. vomiting. No vaccine No .Ricin (Ricinus High 18–24 Weakness.

yet consistent evidence has not yet been found. available at www.htm. available at www. Henry L. OTES NOTES N 1. organs. D. February 2001. Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington. Patrick. Mitretek Systems.html. It is unclear how easily filoviruses can be transmitted from human to human. Office of the Secretary of Defense.cdc. Frederick R. 1996. (Washington.asp.osd. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (Alexandria.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedManual/Feb01/handbook. Navy and Air Force. “Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program.C.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/2toc.bt.org/cbw/?sn=cb2001112953. Licensed vaccine is available for yellow fever.vnh. 1998). ed. Stimson Center. William C.org/MedAspChemBioWar.gov/agent/agentlist. available at www.” available at www. A vaccine for Argentine hemorrhagic fever is available as an Investigational New Drug. 2000.: American Public Health Association.mitretek. Washington. 2. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) OURCES SSOURCES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.stimson. Sidell. “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases. 1997).” November 19. Biological.nbc-med. Dashiell. D.C. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. AmedP-6(B). “Annex C: Potential Biological Agents Operational Data Charts. Control of Communicable Diseases Manual. Department of the Army. “Biological Weapons Agents. 4th ed.org/home. . 3. Office of the Surgeon General. 17th ed. Research suggests that the transmission of viruses such as Marburg and Ebola by inhalation is possible.C. available at www. This vaccine may provide cross protection against Bolivian hemorrhagic fever.” NATO Handbook on Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. U. available at www..1.” available at www. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook.: Jane’s Information Group. “Background on Biological Warfare.anthrax. Departments of the Army. 2004.. or semen. part 2. Transmission clearly occurs by direct contact with infected blood.mil/Flash_interface/default. secretions. James Chin. Symptoms and clinical manifestations apply to the inhalation of the causative organism. 2004.htm.” May 5. Va.fas. and Thomas R. 76 Table 4.nsf/ A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s HomelandSecurity/BackgroundBioWar. D.: Borden Institute..S.

70–100 mg. convulsions. VX. copious secretions. respiratory failure (table continues on the following page) . dim vision. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . the neurotransmitter at cholinergic receptor sites. muscle twitching.000 mg. the central nervous system. Cholinergic receptor sites are found at smooth and skeletal muscles. copious secretions. convulsions. muscle twitching at site of exposure. Cyclohexyl sarin (GF). 50 mg. Sarin (GB). muscular twitching. Soman (GD). headache. RATE OF ACTION Vapor: Within seconds to several minutes after exposure Liquid: Within minutes to an hour after exposure.700 mg. weakness or paralysis. Commonly. feeling of weakness LARGE EXPOSURE: sudden loss of consciousness. Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents Nerve Agents NAME AND Tabun (GA) AGENT Sarin (GB) IDENTIFICATION Soman (GD) Cyclohexyl sarin (GF) V nerve agent (VX) MECHANISM OF These agents can be absorbed through any body surface: ACTION eyes. 30 m SYMPTOMS Vapor: SMALL EXPOSURE:contraction of pupils. and respiratory tract. 1. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Tabun (GA). This enzyme normally breaks down acetylcholine. 75–120 mg.2. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 77 Table 4. which is followed by a sudden onset of symptoms. 10 mg Inhalation: (2–10 minutes’ exposure): Tabun (GA). 1. The agents effectively prevent the transmission of nerve signals by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase. 70 mg. A g e n t s . vomiting. 200 mg. respiratory failure Liquid on skin: SMALL TO MODERATE EXPOSURE: localized sweating. 30 mg. Accumulation of acetylcholine leads to continued stimulation and clinical symptoms such as muscle paralysis. Soman (GD). there is an asymptomatic period of 1–30 minutes. mild difficulty breathing LARGE EXPOSURE: sudden loss of consciousness. and most exocrine glands. VX. Sarin (GB). skin. Cyclohexyl sarin (GF). weakness or paralysis.

Mustard can destroy a large number of cellular substances. Lewisite causes an increase in capillary permeability. 1. it causes extensive tissue damage and has therefore been called a corrosive agent. 1. Lewisite: Skin and mucous membranes are immediately affected after contact.2. Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents (continued) Vesicants NAME AND AGENT Mustard (H. Appearance of redness and blisters on skin. Exposure does not cause immediate pain. the structure of mustard changes. Lesions develop within hours. Lewisite (L).and extracellular enzymes and proteins. Lewisite: Immediate pain or irritation.78 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 4. Redness and blister formation occur more rapidly than following exposure to mustard. ACTION In this form. May lead to hepatic or renal necrosis with vomiting and diarrhea. conjunctivitis and corneal opacity and damage in the eyes.500 mg. HD). eyes. Clinical signs and symptoms may appear as early as 2 hours after a high-dose exposure or extend to 24 hours after a low-dose vapor exposure. irritation of nares. . Lewisite (L).200–1. 100 mg/kg. Phosgene oxime is not a true vesicant. thereby influencing numerous processes in living tissue. irritation. and airways most commonly affected. HD) IDENTIFICATION Lewisite (L) Phosgene oxime (CX) MECHANISM OF Following absorption. Contact with airways leads to similar signs and symptoms to mustard.500 mg SYMPTOMS Mustard: Skin. HD). and phosgene oxime are not known. Eye exposure causes pain and twitching of the eyelid. Phosgene oxime: Immediate burning and irritation. sinus and pharynx. it is extremely reactive to water and binds with intra. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Mustard (H. RATE OF ACTION Mustard: Binds irreversibly to tissue within several minutes after contact. lewisite.8 g Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Mustard (H. Edema of the conjunctiva and lids follow. The exact mechanisms of mustard. and eyes may be swollen shut within an hour. Increased permeability of capillaries resulting in low intravascular volume and shock. and increasingly severe productive cough if the lower airways are affected. 2.

Blood Gases NAME AND AGENT Hydrocyanic acid (AC) IDENTIFICATION Cyanogen chloride (CK) MECHANISM OF Blood gases allow red blood cells to acquire oxygen. wheal-like lesions on skin. 2.500–5000 mg. Cyanide ion combines with iron in a component of the mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase complex. RATE OF ACTION Death occurs 6–8 minutes after inhalation. Respiratory activity stops 2–3 minutes later. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 79 Phosgene oxime: Redness of skin and appearance of elongated. Causes pulmonary edema. No other chemical agent produces such immediate onset of symptoms followed by rapid tissue necrosis. The heart and brain rapidly decay from lack of oxygen and a buildup of carbon dioxide. Cyanogen chloride also irritates the eyes. Damage to eyes similar to that caused by lewisite. (table continues on the following page) . B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . Cyanogen chloride (CK). followed by cessation of cardiac activity. Cyanogen chloride (CK). an energy- providing process using oxygen. 11. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Hydrocyanic acid (AC). there is a period of rapid breathing that is followed in 15–30 seconds by convulsions. A g e n t s . 200 mg/kg Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Hydrocyanic acid (AC). This complex is necessary for cellular respiration. Pulmonary Agents NAME AND Chlorine (Cl) AGENT Phosgene (CG) IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM OF Pulmonary agents attack lung tissue. but ACTION prevent the transfer of this oxygen to other cells. Fifteen seconds after inhalation of a highly concentrated vapor.1 mg/kg. Phosgene irritates ACTION the alveoli in the lungs and results in the constant secretion of fluids into the lungs. and airways.000 mg SYMPTOMS Central nervous system and heart are most susceptible to cyanide. nose. Death results from a lack of oxygen when the lungs are filled with fluid. 1.

headache.” available at www. and respiratory tract. skin.C. Phosgene: Cough and chest discomfort may appear within 30 minutes of exposure.org/resp/html/cwagents. Pulmonary edema within 2–6 hours. Stimson Center.gov/Agent/AgentlistChem. SSOURCES OURCES: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Accumulation of fluid in lungs leads to fatal choking and pulmonary edema.80 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 4. Henry L. an asymptomatic period can last up to 24 hours. choking.” available at www.: Borden Institute.asp. and blurred vision. D.org/cbw/?sn=CB2001121892. vomiting. Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington. Burning sensation in the lungs.html.army. 3. 1997). 6. available at http://ccc.stimson. nausea. Occasionally. Phosgene (CG).2. difficulty breathing.htm. “Characteristics of Chemical Warfare Agents.bt. Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents (continued) RATE OF ACTION Chlorine: Immediate cough and choking sensation. Department of the Army.200 mg SYMPTOMS Corrosion of the eyes.cdc. Office of the Surgeon General. EFFECTIVE DOSE Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Chlorine (Cl). . coughing. “Chemical Agents Listing and Information.651 ppm/min.opcw. “An Overview of Chemicals Defined as Chemical Weapons. skin burns.” available at www. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. sore throat.apgea. Signs of pulmonary edema may appear within 30 minutes to 4 hours.mil/reference_materials/textbook/HTML_Restricted/index_2.

.

.

2 The August 31. a junior fellow with the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Donald Rumsfeld): With the external help now readily available. but still horrifically deadly. within about five years of de- ciding to do so. Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure would be able to achieve first flight of a long range missile.500 kilometers). Several threat assessments and reports followed the lead of the 1998 study by the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld Commission for its chair. territory.S.S. Each of these nations places a high priority on threatening U. As a result of this test and the changing Joshua Williams. or chemi- cal weapons could be used in smaller.320 kilometers. . . up to and including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range (greater than 5. .S. North Korean test of a Taepo Dong I missile/space launch vehicle appeared to lend credence to these warnings.1 The commission identified two countries—North Korea and Iran—as being particularly dangerous: The extraordinary level of resources that North Korea and Iran are now devot- ing to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and immediate danger to the U. though they constitute only one—and perhaps the most difficult—delivery method for those weapons. When the end of the Cold War largely eliminated the likelihood (if not the capability) of a global thermonuclear war. its vital interests and its allies. numbers. During several of those years the U. biological..S. 83 . but it had an enormous international impact due to the unexpected use of a third stage on the rocket. a nation with a well-developed. and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities to pose a direct threat to U. 1998. policy makers turned their attention to the very real danger that nuclear. CHAPTER 5 Missile Proliferation One of the most contentious proliferation debates of the past ten years has been about assessing the ballistic missile threat and deploying antimissile systems to defeat these weapons. is coauthor of this chapter. territory. The Proliferation Threat Many experts and officials view ballistic missiles as a particularly menacing and rapidly proliferating technology. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. The Taepo Dong I failed in its attempt to launch a small satellite into orbit and flew only 1. Bal- listic missiles garnered the lion’s share of attention.

biological. To compare more completely today’s ballistic missile threats with those of the past and to perform an accurate net assessment of the global ballistic missile threat. . and possibly Iraq—barring significant changes in their political orientations—in addition to the strategic forces of Russia and China. territory is more likely to be attacked with these [chemical.” Tenet’s rhetoric was more cautious in 2003.”6 This concern persisted in 2002. By 2015. The threats to the U. States with emerg- ing missile programs inevitably will run into problems that will delay and frustrate their desired development timelines. The impact of these problems increases with the lack of maturity of the program and depends on the level of foreign assistance. easier to acquire. the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold. It concluded that by 2015 the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran.S. nevertheless. which was made publicly available in December 2001. it is useful to evaluate the threat in its component parts. 2001. homeland. . from WMD [weapons of mass destruction] delivery systems to a critical threshold. though it will remain still well below the number of Russian or U.S. the pace and scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier intelligence es- timates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster pace than previously expected.5 Still. and nuclear] materials from nonmissile delivery means—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles. when Director of Central Intelli- gence George Tenet reported that “the proliferation of ICBM and cruise missile designs and technology has raised the threat to the U.4 The report also cautioned: Our assessments of future missile developments are inexact and subjective be- cause they are based on often fragmentary information. the assessment notes that U. even as funding for antimissile systems increased. argued that “in particular. . This expanded assessment was also used in the most recent NIE.”7 The issue was scarcely mentioned in the 2004 and 2005 assessments. They can also be used without attribution. . forces. . . will consist of dramatically fewer warheads than today owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces. radiological. primarily because nonmissile delivery means are less costly. and disturbance of the technology and information flow to their programs will have discernible short- term effects. Most emerging missile states are highly dependent on for- eign assistance at this stage of their development efforts.84 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s strategic environment. the Quadrennial Defense Review presented to Congress by the Depart- ment of Defense on October 1. . the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for the first time included countries other than Russia and China as ballistic missile threats to the United States. however: “The United States and its interests re- main at risk from increasingly advanced and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles.S.3 Significantly. and more reliable and accurate. China has been modernizing its long-range strategic missile force since the 1980s. One agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015.S.

9 The United States deployed 1.749. a decreasing number of long-range missiles remain from the stockpile lev- els of the Cold War. Thus.500 kilometers) in the world from their Cold War levels (figure 5. intermediate. and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the world today than there were during the Cold War. Russia. and the United States possess the ability to launch nuclear warheads on land-based ICBMs. respectively. The total number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) has also decreased.2). By the beginning of 2005. There is a slowly growing. medium.16 The final INF Treaty inspections took place on May 31. In 1987. a fact that is often overlooked.S. and intercontinental ranges of the world’s missile inventory often results in a misinterpretation of the oft-quoted assessment that more than 25 nations possess ballistic missiles. eliminated this entire class of missiles (with ranges of 3. This has not changed since Russia and China deployed their first ICBMs in 1959 and 1981. This statement is true. to 1. France . but still limited. though 5 new countries have developed or acquired MRBMs since the late 1980s. a bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR. the United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal but now holds the title to 58 long-range Trident SLBMs that it did not have in 1987.640 long-range missiles.8 An analysis of global ballistic missile arsenals shows that there are fewer ICBMs.17 In 1987. the Soviet Union deployed 2.10 In 2005. But only China.14 No other country has developed an ICBM or long-range SLBM during this time.500 kilometers) from the Soviet/Russian arsenal over a three-year period. Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Force reductions in U.12 Similarly. 2001. and the United States had 846. Most impor- tant. the most accurate way to summarize existing global ballistic missile capabilities is to say that there is a widespread capability to launch SRBMs.15 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles IRBM arsenals have undergone even more dramatic reductions (figure 5. capability to launch MRBMs.1). from the 4.380 long-range missiles in its combined ICBM and SLBM arsenals.040 that were deployed in 1987. and Russian arsenals have dramatically decreased the number of long-range ballistic missiles (missiles with a range of greater than 5. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Russia had 777 long-range missiles.11 France has reduced its total nuclear arsenal but now has 48 long-range SLBMs that it did not have in 1987. verifying the destruction of 660 Soviet IRBMs.13 During this period. China has maintained a force of about 20 Dong Feng–5 ICBMs. long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The number of countries with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) has in- creased during the past 20 years. the total number of long-range ballistic missiles in the world had decreased 57 percent.000 to 5. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 85 Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals The blurring of the short.

China has maintained about 12 DF-4 IRBMs. France also eliminated 64 medium-range SLBMs that it possessed in 1987. A total of 149 Russian SS-4s and 234 U. Iran. Thus. ballistic missile arsenals (figure 5.86 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 5.000 to 3. Iran. even though MRBMs are now in the hands of more countries than in 1987. the treaty re- sulted in the elimination of this class of missile (with a range of 1. North Korea. and Saudi Arabia have developed or obtained their missiles since the late 1980s. effectively reducing the current number of IRBMs by 98 percent from Cold War levels.18 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles The broad scope of the INF Treaty also covered MRBMs. North Korea. the total number of MRBMs in existence in 2005 is lower than the 547 MRBMs in the combined Chinese. The most significant proliferation threat comes from the slow but steady in- crease in the number of states possessing MRBMs. China. Pershing IIs were destroyed under this treaty. French.20 Only India. and Saudi Arabia all now possess MRBMs. Pakistan.S. Global Long-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals (Combined ICBM and SLBM) 4500 4040 4000 3500 3000 2500 Number 2000 1749 1500 1000 500 0 1987 2005 Year deployed 18 land-based and 32 submarine-based IRBMs. China may also possess a medium-range SLBM capability of 12 Julang I SLBMs. and no other nation has developed an IRBM. and . even though Russia and the United States have eliminated their arsenals.3). Numerically speaking. This development has attracted great attention and is often cited as evidence of a larger proliferation threat than be- fore.19 Outside the treaty. Russian.000 kilometers) from Soviet/Russian and U.S.1. which it has since de- activated and destroyed. India. and of these coun- tries all but India’s missiles are based primarily on assistance or technology re- ceived from North Korea or China. Pakistan. Israel.

and 17 only have missiles with a range of about 300 kilometers or less. 25 nations have ballis- tic missiles. Global Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals 900 770 800 700 600 500 Number 400 300 200 100 12 0 1987 2005 Year U.2 at the end of the chapter). respectively.2.22 while Saudi Arabia has approximately 40 CSS-2/DF-3As that it purchased from China. The number of countries with such programs has also decreased from the number pursuing . Countries with Ballistic Missile Programs Another factor by which proliferation can be measured is the number of states with ballistic missile development programs (see table 5.25 MRBMs in India and Pakistan and North Korea’s Taepo Dong I are still in operational testing. Of these 25 nations. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 87 Figure 5. Many of these missiles are old Scud-B systems that are not well maintained and are declining in military utility.1.23 North Korea is believed to have deployed close to 100 No Dongs. com- prehensive listing. in global MRBM arsenals from the 1987 level. forces in 1987.21 Since then. Assuming that each of these countries could deploy 1 to 5 missiles in a crisis during the next five years. the global total of MRBMs in existence is no more than 417 and possibly as low as 285. 19 only have missiles with ranges under 1. but it may have produced at least 150 missiles of this type.S.000 kilometers. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles In addition to the five recognized nuclear weapon states. also see table 5.24 At least five Iranian Shahab IIIs were deployed in July 2003. Israel is believed to have deployed 50 opera- tional Jericho IIs. for a detailed.26 This represents a 24 or 48 percent de- crease.

and less technologically advanced than those that had missile programs fifteen years ago. By 2005. through its December 2003 agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom. MRBMs. threats to global security. one that is confined to a few countries whose politi- cal evolution will be a determining factor in whether they emerge as. or remain. had scrapped all of its missiles and programs. strategic interest and political dynamics have fueled the continued development of ballistic missile technology as both a means of gaining international prestige and of obtaining a strategic advantage . Israel. Brazil. even with the inclusion of India and Pakistan. In addition to the five recognized nuclear weapon states. Libya. Egypt. and Libya. Syria and South Korea have active SRBM programs but have not yet demonstrated any great interest in. countries such as Argentina.88 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 5. Global Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals 600 547 500 417 400 Number 300 200 100 0 1987 Year 2005 development programs during the Cold War.3. and South Africa had programs to develop long-range or medium- range missiles in 1987. In South Asia and the Middle East. Iraq. or the capability to produce.28 Thus. India. which has never traveled more than 200 kilometers in a flight test. this listing highlights the limited nature of the missile proliferation threat. except for the Al Fatah. Iran and North Korea currently have active ballistic missile development programs.27 Today. The most recent NIE on foreign missile devel- opments confirmed that Syria is unlikely to gain an interest in ICBM develop- ment before 2015 but also indicated that strategic imperatives could lead to interest in acquiring an MRBM such as the No Dong. Brazil. the nations that are pursuing long-range missile development pro- grams are also smaller. and South Africa had abandoned their programs. Argentina. Egypt. poorer.

sensors. A cruise missile is an aerodynamic system with jet or rocket propulsion that is powered all the way to its target. this pro- liferation and the transfer of ballistic missile technology originating in North Korea and China continue to destabilize both regional and global security. Though somewhat limited. or unmanned aerial vehicles. France. Technical Background In addition to ballistic missiles. Countries with Active Ballistic Missile Development Programs with a Range of More Than 1. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 89 Table 5. Russia. communications equipment. Ballistic Missiles. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a remotely piloted or self-controlled aircraft that can carry cam- eras. and weapon payloads. Ballistic missiles travel at hypersonic speeds. developments in cruise missile technologies and the increasing use of drones.1. All these countries had developed ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1.000 Kilometers 1987 2005 Argentina India Brazil Iran Egypt Israel India North Korea Iraq Pakistan Israel Libya South Africa NOTE NOTE This table excludes the NPT nuclear weapon states China. ballistic missiles have been con- sidered the most threatening delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. vis-à-vis regional rivals and outside powers. As a . and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles A ballistic missile is a guided rocket that is powered during the initial part of its flight and then coasts without power—mostly above the atmosphere—along a ballistic path to its target. and the United States. UAVs are gen- erally powered either by jet or propeller engines.000 kilometers by 1987 and were continuing indigenous programs to develop and deploy new missiles that exceeded this range. allowing little warning time and making defense difficult. This section briefly discusses the various technologies and proliferation prospects. pose serious threats. Since the Cold War. and the possible threat of chemical and biological warheads. Cruise Missiles. The 1988 War of the Cities between Iran and Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the threat from Scud ballistic missiles armed with conventional (high-explosive) warheads.

is accurate on the order of 1. many commentators interpreted the missile threat to be one of ballistic missiles alone. but cruise missiles can weave around.S. they can disseminate chemical and biological agents from a dis- tance upwind. quicker. even high-explosive warheads are reliable in destroying their tar- gets. and increasingly available on world markets. creating a lethal area coverage that is about ten times as great as that from a ballistic missile. During the past few years. and easier to build. pro- duced by a number of regional powers. and with cruise missiles being more afford- able than ballistic missiles. for most countries. With chemical and biological agents being cheaper and more available than nuclear weapons. allowing them to loiter over a battlefield until given a target. All these factors make cruise missiles difficult to find in flight and therefore difficult to shoot down. Tomahawk can now be reprogrammed in flight. The Scud. Tomahawks. Ballistic missiles (except for the most sophisti- cated) coast along an observable and predictable path. cruise missiles need not fly directly over their targets. for example. A guidance system enabling cruise missiles to attack distant land targets was once such an expensive and sophisticated technology that. It would be possible to use a ship-launched cruise missile to attack North American targets.29 This accuracy greatly exceeds that available from all but the most sophisti- cated ballistic missiles. to attack land targets with as much as 6-meter accuracy.000 meters. The Chinese Silkworm. cruise missiles with chemical or biological war- heads may become more widespread threats than ballistic missiles. which cause damage over wide areas. Because a cruise missile can release chemical and biological agents in a gradual and con- trolled fashion (as opposed to a wasteful burst of agent or submunitions with a ballistic missile).90 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s result of their highly visible use. making it ineffective against discrete military targets except with nuclear. cruise missiles are • cheaper. Moreover. biological. • difficult to defend against. Toma- hawk. Further. which is already widely disseminated. however. allowing the most advanced cruise missiles. Advanced cruise missiles such as the U. . such as the U. which has already been demonstrated by U. and attack targets from any direction. • more effective for disseminating chemical and biological agents. With the high accuracy of cruise missiles. cruise missiles could be used only with terminal homing against ships. This makes it easier for cruise missiles to reach targets far from an attacker’s homeland. inexpensive satellite navigation (the U. and easily extended in range. cruise missiles can be small and stealthy. Global Positioning System and the Russian Glonass) has become univer- sally available.S. In some cases. in comparison with ballistic missiles. • easier to launch from planes and ships. may become the Scud of cruise missiles. or chemical warheads. for example. fly low following the contours of the earth.S.S. A proliferator can now acquire many cruise missiles quickly. Yet cruise missiles are now recognized as a rapidly growing and particularly dangerous problem. each cruise missile can adjust its attack to local conditions.

Afghanistan. Like their cruise missile counterparts.S. If. biological.”31 The United States has also begun experiments to arm UAVs with “flying plate” weapons that can destroy steel structures and penetrate bunkers. weighing only 250 pounds. or nuclear payloads. giving them the capability to expand both reconnaissance capability and long-range strike capability at the same time. can be recalled and retargeted.32 Most important. Army may also be using the armed Hunter UAV to combat insurgents in Iraq. Glo- bal Hawk UAV nonstop from the United States to Australia demonstrated the long-range capabilities of these machines. and Iraq. in the case of the Hellfire- equipped Predators. and with small diameter bombs. The Global Hawk. to deliver conventional. UAVs are capable of carrying heavier payloads and flying longer distances for extended periods than cruise missiles. basic UAV platforms can be produced to provide a state or group with both armed and unarmed versions. with high-temperature incendi- ary devices. the X-45A UCAV is now under testing and is capable of releasing a precision-guided “small smart bomb. which is capable of carrying a 900-kilogram payload and cruising at a maximum altitude of 19. The range of the Global Hawk increases if operators change the flight surveillance time of a given mission. chemical. which often forces the vehicle to fly at altitudes so low that it is in the range of enemy air defenses. China could respond by developing a large fleet of long-range UAVs. intended to neutralize chemical and biological agents. with high-power microwave tech- nology that disrupts enemy communication centers. When developed. which can create firestorms inextinguishable with water. UAVs are currently used primarily for intelligence and reconnais- sance missions. there is little public information on their effectiveness or. and would be diffi- cult to defend against once launched.”33 There is no doubt that the Predator still has many shortcomings. for example. however. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2003 that “the current UAV accident rate is 100 times that of manned air- craft. The April 2001 transpacific flight of the U.34 Despite these .300 kilometers and survey a given area for 36 hours while preserving the capability to return to its initial base 2.8 meters of reinforced concrete. the weaponization of UAVs into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) is also progressing. The operational effectiveness of UAVs. However.300 kilome- ters away. could be used to disseminate biological or chemical agents more effec- tively than ballistic missiles. The U.S.30 Furthermore. the United States were to deploy an antimissile system. and recent developments in UAV technology demonstrate their rapidly increasing military utility. their kill rates.800 meters. Though there have been many reports of the use of UAVs in Kosovo. As noted. armed UAVs are easier to launch than ballistic missiles. UAVs could simply be used in the same fashion as cruise missiles. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 91 UAVs offer many capabilities that are similar to those of cruise missiles. which can penetrate up to 1. providing a nuclear-strike capability difficult to detect by radar that also flies beneath the interceptor ranges of the system. can travel a distance of 2. in- cluding a susceptibility to inclement weather. The United States deployed a ver- sion of its Predator UAV armed with Hellfire missiles in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. is still an issue. Though not yet widely used as offensive weapons.

helping to create the Al Hussein missile with more than twice the range. Gormley notes that. One study cited by Gormley found that more than 80 percent of unarmed UAVs appear capable of exceeding the MTCR’s 300-kilometer range Category I threshold. A slightly lighter payload (well above 500 kilograms). and the United Kingdom possess medium-range. there will inevitably be in- creased pressure—led by the USA—to create more flexible. France.37 According to defense expert Dennis Gormley. Israel.36 Although many of the UAVs produced and deployed by other nations are no more than cameras attached to jet engines. this analysis has already proven to be accurate. According to the Department of Defense. Italy.42 (When only ranges are cited in the remainder of this chapter. they apply to the most commonly cited missile payloads. China. States need . Department of Defense is projected to spend more than $10 billion on UAVs over the course of this decade. 32 nations manufacture more than 250 models of UAVs. enough to reach Tehran. however. unarmed UAVs can be made into armed UAVs simply by changing their payload. precise data on the one-way range and payload trade-off for most UAVs are not readily available. China formally recognized the applicability of this trade-off. In 2002. did not have an adequate range to be restricted under the MTCR. unlike ballistic missiles. long-endurance UAVs. less restrictive.39 Complicating things even further. once claimed that its M-11 missile. In terms of their classification under the MTCR. rules governing the export of unarmed UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles. the United States took advantage of revised Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) rules to sell six Predator UAVs to Italy.S.”38 In fact. In October 1994.92 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s questions about their effectiveness. As a result. which is capable of delivering an 850-kilogram payload to a range of 280 kilometers. some exporters have tried to ignore the range/payload trade-off.41 Because the MTCR places special restrictions on missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilome- ters. many see UAVs as the wave of the future in aerial reconnaissance and combat.35 The production and use of UAVs are already widespread.000-kilogram payload of the 300-kilometer range Scud- B. would enable the M-11 to travel more than 300 kilo- meters. and 41 countries operate about 80 different types of these vehicles.40 Range/Payload Trade-Offs The ability to make trade-offs between range and payload is critical for under- standing missile and UAV nonproliferation. “Given the explosive growth anticipated in UAV systems over the next decade. or they can try to build them indigenously—normally using imported components and technology.) Routes to Proliferation States seeking ballistic or cruise missiles can acquire them in a variety of ways. They can attempt to import entire missile systems. the U. mean- ing that an unarmed UAV purchased for one stated purpose could easily be converted into a weapon. Iraq demonstrated this trade-off in 1987 by reducing the 1. for example.

M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 93 not admit that they are building missiles. The former commander-in-chief of the U. Strategic Command. scientific re- search rockets.000 to 1. are complex machines. the development of missiles is an expensive and time- consuming process. the warhead would have to be no heavier than 300 kg. and remotely piloted ve- hicles (some already delivering insecticides for agricultural purposes)—can be converted to weapons use. more advanced guidance systems. with the expended rockets reliably jettisoned from the missiles) and more sophisticated reentry ve- hicles (to keep the warhead in working order during its fiery descent through the atmosphere). and it takes a lot of time. it takes a lot of work. Habiger pointed out that it took the United States “six to eight years of very intensive engineering development and aggressive testing” to reduce its first ICBM warheads from 5. Missiles.000 parts. technology. the missile must use two more advanced technologies: staging (firing rockets in a series. target drones. the development of ballistic missiles becomes particularly difficult at a range of about 1.S. Moreover. lighter and stronger materials. I would submit that the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead is prob- ably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face. “The leap of faith is that the North Koreans would be able to go from a pristine laboratory weapon to 300 kg. Above that range. no tem- perature extremes—and to miniaturize something that’s going to go in the nose cone of an ICBM. further elaborates on the problems facing would be proliferators: For the Taepodong II to reach the western part of the United States would require some very optimistic operational objectives. there’s a big leap of faith be- tween developing a nuclear device—a weapon that operates in a laboratory kind of environment. that is going to experience the kinds of things that I’ve just described. especially ballistic missiles. and lighter and more advanced warheads (which is a considerable challenge when nuclear warheads are at issue).000 kilometers.44 The Dangers of Missile Proliferation From the point of view of a proliferator. often resulting in an unreliable weapons system. heat. That takes a lot of technology. each of which needed to work right the first time under high levels of acceleration. have helped to restrain missile proliferation. and pro- duction facilities that are interchangeable with those of ballistic missiles. General Eugene Habiger. in a concrete tunnel. no vibration. These technical difficulties. Various types of UAVs—reconnaissance drones. contained 250. The medium- range U. for example. Space launch vehicles. and large defensive missiles use hardware. Now. no G-loading. missiles have certain generic advantages over manned warplanes: . Thus. vibration.000 kilograms. Antiship cruise missiles can be converted to land- attack cruise missiles.43 Longer ranges also put a premium on more efficient rocket en- gines.” he said.S. Pershing II. For example. and cold. compounded by the export controls of the MTCR and active diplomatic efforts by the United States and other concerned countries.

Libya fired three Scuds at the Italian island of Lampadusa. Argentina’s French-supplied Exocet cruise missiles sank the British frigate Sheffield. which generally operate from airfields. inspectors discovered Iraqi Scud warheads with chemical .46 The record to date has been that. after a U. which had signifi- cant military effects because of their high accuracy. • Survivability: Airfields have known locations and are large. or biological weapon by means of a ballistic mis- sile can be used to achieve specific strategic or political goals. Serbia used SA-2 air defense missiles in their secondary role as ballistic missiles. In contrast. 88 Iraqi Scuds terrorized Is- raeli civilians and fell around coalition military bases in Saudi Arabia. and cruise missiles cause significant damage to specific military targets. The over- all military effect was negligible in spite of a strike on a U. In 1986. was demonstrated in 1988 in the Iran-Iraq War. • Defense penetration: Shooting down a ballistic or a cruise missile in flight is still a challenge even for the United States. however.94 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Simplicity: A “push-button war” with missiles is much easier for the less tech- nically advanced regional powers than is the development of a trained air force with manned aircraft and a large infrastructure. with conventional warheads. missing it. The terror of missiles. which has until recently empha- sized the role of protecting against manned aircraft for its active defenses. and in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. during the Gulf War. • Geopolitics: Long-range and ship-launched missiles will diminish the protec- tive effects of distance. Scuds were used again in the 1994 Yemen civil war. They can project the battle to the rear in regional conflicts and some day may reach other continents. chemical. • Accuracy: Cruise missiles with satellite navigation and some advanced regional ballistic missile systems are highly accurate. vulnerable targets beginning in the first minutes of a war. the United States used three times as many Tomahawk and air-launched cruise missiles. U. cannot be expected to last long against the United States and its allies.N. This threat can complicate the decision making of adversaries in times of crisis. In contrast. Missiles armed with conventional warheads have been used in regional con- flicts since the 1970s. Manned aircraft. air raid. the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan fired more than 2. Starting in 1989. barracks.S. the bombing accu- racy of manned aircraft depends on equipment and pilot training.S. no missiles have been used in warfare with unconventional payloads. which killed 28 soldiers. In 1995. • Blackmail or coercive diplomacy: The almost immediate ability to threaten to deliver a nuclear.45 Egypt fired a Scud at Israel at the end of the 1973 war. In the 1991 Gulf War. After the Gulf War. with Baghdad and Tehran receiving repeated Scud strikes over several weeks. By contrast. hidden or mobile missiles are difficult to find and destroy.000 Scuds against rebel forces. Thus far. which can yield variable results. ballistic mis- siles cause terror that can affect an adversary’s attitudes toward the continuation of a war.

and confidence-building measures. the U. as well as information on all launches from the previous year. It fills an important gap in the missile nonproliferation regime. and associated arrangements between member governments. “to supple- ment. chemical. pledges.and solid-propellant ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1. and it is meant. • Exercising restraint in domestic ballistic missile programs and seeking to re- duce national holdings of these missiles. including • Working to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile systems that can carry and deliver nuclear. the Missile Technology Control Regime. and chemical weapons.”53 The ICOC. was attempting to develop liquid. and anti- missile weapons. the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). he had not succeeded in doing so by March 2003. with 117 subscribing states as of the spring of 2005.52 The ICOC The ICOC.50 After the inva- sion.47 for remotely piloted vehicles to deliver biological agents. capable of hitting all of Western Europe. Department of State.S. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 95 and biological agents.49 During the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq. It consists of an export control policy. • Declining to assist any ballistic missile program in a state where illegal nuclear. The Missile Technology Control Regime The MTCR is the oldest and most prominent international policy to attempt to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear. U. • Attempting to ensure that any space launch vehicle (SLV) assistance is not manipulated to further a ballistic missile program. also known as the Hague Code of Conduct. Iraq Survey Group also concluded that Iraq had also been unsuc- cessful in attempts to develop a 1. according to the U.48 and for ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 3.000 kilometers. chemical. inspectors determined that while Saddam Hussein. not supplant. Iraqi plans for nuclear warheads. measures.54 consists of a set of goals. with some help from foreign sources. and biological weapons. unilateral and bilateral U. or biological programs or aspirations are present.000 kilometers. 2002. • Submitting an annual declaration of national ballistic missile and SLV poli- cies.S.N. which bans the export of missiles with ranges over 300 kilometers and with payloads greater than 500 kilograms. biological.S.51 Dealing with Missile Proliferation The four most prominent instruments for limiting the dangers of missile prolif- eration are the MTCR.000-kilometer-range cruise missile. . came into effect on November 25.

Such inducements as benefit packages can be used to help restrain proliferators.S. such as how one ensures that the sale of SLV technology does not further a ballistic missile program.S. the ICOC could prove to be a stepping stone to the adoption of stronger and more effective measures in the future. These sanctions last two years and include a ban on U. chemical. it is much more far reaching than the MTCR (which only has 34 members).S.” meaning that their activities may have involved either missiles or nuclear.S. or how one determines whether a country “might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction. was sanctioned five times in 2003 and 2004. Despite its shortcomings. government assistance and sales to the sanctioned entities. It also leaves much to be interpreted by the subscrib- ing states. • Providing prelaunch notifications for both ballistic missile and SLV launches. One organization. and a ban on issuing new export licenses to allow American companies to sell certain items to the sanctioned . The George W. policy toward China and North Korea through- out the 1990s made use of these tools in an attempt to limit proliferation at its source and to punish the countries and entities involved in the distribution and reception of controlled technology. while sanctions are used as punitive measures against both those supplying the tech- nology and those receiving it.55 The ICOC is a mixed bag as far as international nonproliferation agreements go.”56 The ICOC also must agree on implementation measures through consensus. and it goes well beyond the MTCR’s export controls on missiles that exceed a certain range (300 kilometers) and payload (500 kilograms) by calling for restraint in domestic programs and by formally recognizing the links between SLV and ballistic missile technology. if not to the Chinese government it- self. Unilateral and Bilateral U. the United States imposed sanc- tions on 24 different Chinese companies on 12 separate occasions. Conversely. however.96 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Voluntarily inviting international observers to SLV launch sites. Between January 2001 and December 2004. a ban on U. Bush administration has maintained a proactive and punitive approach to Chinese missile proliferators.57 Seven of these entities were explicitly accused of missile proliferation. government purchases of the company’s goods. Measures Legislatively prescribed sanctions and diplomatic inducements are commonly used in a carrot-and-stick fashion to limit the spread of missile technology. particularly as they continue to assist Iran’s missile development efforts. U. biological. regardless of range and pay- load. (Both the MTCR and ICOC call for the nonproliferation of all ballistic missiles. NORINCO. or biological weapon). the ICOC lacks any enforcement mechanism and is not legally bind- ing (as a treaty would be). cum- bersome process. and/or chemical weapons and their related technologies. With 117 members. Most of these sanctions were levied under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. if they can deliver any type of nuclear. The other 17 were more vaguely cited for “weapons proliferation. ensuring that achieving the goals and commitments laid out in the code will be a slow.

In all likelihood. The United States is the only country in the world that is devoting a consid- erable portion of its defense budget to antimissile weapons. increases in annual food aid. Israel’s program is largely funded by the United States (see chapter 13). which employed a proximity fuse and an explosive warhead to scatter pellet-sized fragments in the path of the intended target. Upon its arrival in office. The interceptors remain. the United States continues to raise the issue of Chinese missile-technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran in bilateral meetings. This was always a questionable defensive strategy mandated by the inability of the interceptors to score direct hits. Neverthe- less. Since 1998. Instead. the new interceptors will attempt to hit the target head-on. These systems are commonly referred to as “missile defense. The administration was unable to reach a final accord before the end of its second term. Russia deployed the world’s first operational antimissile system in the 1960s. Moscow tested an A-135 missile interceptor in late November 2004. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 97 groups. In the face of such little progress. Every step up represents a substan- tial increase in complexity and a lower probability of success. The United States is developing antimissile systems in three basic versions: short range. Antimissile Systems Antimissile weapons can play a role in an integrated nonproliferation policy. China’s bid to join the MTCR in 2004 failed because of its spotty missile proliferation record. it stated that it would seek further progress on nuclear and conventional military force issues as well as in the realm of missile proliferation. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov . in an attempt to demonstrate its military strength. no progress will come on North Korean ballistic missile proliferation until the nuclear program is ended. the Bush administration indicated that it would not pursue a “missiles-only” agreement.” but the term mistakenly implies that the systems provide an effective defense. Most of the pro- posed systems employ hit-to-kill interceptors. Experts disagree on the exact role. unlike the Patriot inter- ceptors used in the 1991 Gulf War. a set of 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors around Moscow. That is. medium range. with some arguing that they are the best and perhaps only defense. and without the nuclear warheads the system is strictly symbolic. This volume uses the more neutral term “antimissile” to refer to efforts to inter- cept offensive ballistic and cruise missiles. the Bill Clinton administration used promises of presiden- tial visits. while others view them as a last line of defense should all other efforts fail. the United States has also attempted to use diplomatic induce- ments and sanctions packages in dealing with North Korean entities in an at- tempt to limit that country’s ballistic missile proliferation activities. and offers of free launches for North Korean satellites as bargaining chips in an attempt to secure an agreement. and long range. Israel and Russia are the only other nations with indigenous antimissile efforts. using the kinetic energy of the encounter to destroy the target. After scor- ing a qualified success in obtaining a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing from North Korea. however. though it appears that the nuclear warheads may have been removed.

Taipei.61 Ever since the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The Japan Defense Agency. and an agreement has been reached with the United States as part of an $18 billion arms procurement package.S. because weapons programs in their developmental stages. with the help of the United States. Patriot sys- tem. Taiwan tested this system for the first time in June 2001. Russia has not given up all interest in developing some sort of functioning antimissile system.69 . is currently under way. Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (described just below) and is intended to intercept medium-range missiles.59 The development of an even newer system. typically experi- ence significant delays and cost overruns. the Aegis destroyer-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the land-based PAC-3 antimissile systems by March 2008.67 The U. but it acquired Patriot missiles from the United States in 1997 to protect its capital. and that they would not be used for the de- fense of another country.98 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s declared the test a success. It does not have an indigenous program. How- ever. then– foreign minister Ivan Ivanov. and then deploy. had been deployed in the Sea of Japan.62 Taiwan also figures prominently in antimissile discussions. a barrage attack using some of the hundreds of missiles that China is de- ploying would quickly overwhelm the systems.66 Japan has been very careful in saying that its systems would be solely for the protection of Japan. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. the head of the international affairs committee in the lower house of the Russian Duma.3 billion for antimissile systems in fiscal year 2005. This sometimes leads to erroneous claims that Russia has an operational antimissile system. such as all of the antimissile programs.60 Some analysts misunder- stand the limited nature of Russia’s systems and exaggerate their ability to pro- vide the accurate and timely tracking of incoming warheads. have all expressed interest in building antimissile weapons. Finally. which limited Russian and American antimissile systems. only two ships. claiming that Russia could now move forward with a life-extension program for the antimissile system.S. Department of Defense hopes to deploy six radar-equipped Aegis destroyers and eleven Aegis cruisers and destroyers carry- ing SM-3s by the end of 2007.63 The government is also seeking to upgrade to the Patriot Ad- vanced Capabilities 3 (PAC-3) system. though. requested $1. the S-500.58 Russia has also upgraded its conventionally armed S-300 air defense missile systems to give them some capability against short-range missiles. A newer S-400 system is comparable to the U. both with the modified Aegis Radar but none with the SM-3 antimissile interceptors.64 These defensive systems might provide some protection against Chinese short-range. Despite the lack of progress.S. Japan has shown an interest in developing its own antimissile system. President Vladimir Putin. and Dmitri Rogozin. but with few if any sales. many patrolling near Japan. Moscow has been cautiously interested in working with Washington to develop more ad- vanced antimissile technology. which already possesses PAC-2 missiles. conventionally armed ballistic missiles deployed across the Taiwan Strait. The version known as the SA-12 is being marketed as an alternative to the U.65 Tokyo hopes to test.68 These deadlines will likely prove difficult to meet. As of the spring of 2005.

It was simi- lar in concept to the original Patriot system. the new PAC-3 (along with an earlier upgrade of the PAC-2. Germany and Italy.S.000 to 3. Although the original Patriot was psychologically important in the Gulf War.500 kilometers: the army’s THAAD system and the Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier) system.S. The THAAD test record has been disappointing. These systems attempt to intercept missiles in their ter- minal phase as they reenter the atmosphere and close in on a target. All these tests occurred before 1999. would employ an upgraded version of the PAC-3 system and be a cooperative program between the United States and two of its NATO allies. MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS. Proof of these claims was not provided by the Army. outside-the-atmosphere in- terceptors. it is impossible to predict performance. The most advanced U. Two systems are under development to counter me- dium-range missiles that travel from 1. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 99 SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS. such as decoys and submunitions. Navy’s destroyers and cruisers. it hit few if any Scuds. system is the improved Patriot system. which is based on Aegis ships with a new Standard-3 missile (see discussion above of Japan’s antimissile ambitions).70 These incidents resulted in the deaths of three coalition soldiers. but for use on ships. Countermeasures. however. Together. demonstrate the serious and often fatal problems of even these short- range systems. In these incidents. The difficulties posed by cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft in the Iraq War. Terminal systems are practical only against short-range missiles. Both are now known as Midcourse Interceptor Systems because they primarily at- tempt to intercept missiles in their midcourse phase. the Army claims that it intercepted all nine “threatening” ballistic missiles: the relatively slow. and no additional flight or . The Navy Area-Wide program was an effort to upgrade the Aegis radar sys- tem and Standard missile on the U. remain a major unsolved technical barrier to effective antimissile systems. The multinational Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). and missed shooting down a third only because the pilot destroyed the Patriot unit. which is in the fledgling stages of development. In the 2003 Iraq War. the PAC-2 GEM) had mixed results. The Army hopes that MEADS will enter service by 2012. the Patriot radar and computers mistook the friendly aircraft for enemy missiles. The Patriot batteries also shot down two coalition aircraft. despite decades of effort. as later congressional and Israeli analyses con- firmed. after they have been boosted and are coasting outside the atmosphere. short-range al-Samoud 2 and Ababil 100 systems. because longer-range mis- siles would fly in too fast for any current intercept system.71 Without realistic tests. designed to intercept Scud- type missiles. or PAC-3. They rely on previously developed radar and hard- ware systems and—because they intercept their targets within the atmosphere after any decoys would have been stripped away—they do not encounter the difficult discrimination problems that face higher. missing in six of its eight attempts. now known as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. The navy canceled it in December 2001 after it fell badly behind schedule and over bud- get. but the Patriot and MEADS systems currently hold the only possibility for intercepting SRBMs armed with single warheads.

Two more tests are currently planned for 2005. and the testing program has pro- vided essentially no information about how the system would perform in a real missile attack. These systems would also intercept long-range missiles outside the atmosphere in their midcourse phase. the system intercepted the target on five occasions. The ABL system has run into major technical problems and serious cost overruns.74 Furthermore. the Pentagon planned to deploy six radar-equipped vessels and eleven missile-equipped ships by the end of 2007. The system already exceeds its weight limit after assembling just a few of the laser modules needed to create the high-energy laser beam. The scientists concluded: The GMD system has no demonstrated capability to defend against a real attack. These concerns were summarized in an April 5. however. and Vandenberg Air Force Base. including nine Nobel laureates. 2005.” In its ten highly scripted and unrealistic tests as of mid- 2005.100 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s interceptor tests have been conducted because the missiles are being redesigned. the Airborne Laser (ABL). is under development to test the idea of deploying a high-energy laser in a modified Boeing 747 aircraft. but most of those have been highly scripted. there will be no data on which to base an assessment of how effective the system might be in an actual attack. Current Pentagon plans call for more tests of THAAD through 2008. wanted to declare “limited operational defensive ca- pability by late 2004. these modules have not been mated with the aircraft and nothing more than flight tests of the unequipped 747 have occurred. . It remains in an early stage of development. with de- ployment possible (although highly unlikely) between 2006 and 2008. All flight intercept tests have been conducted under highly scripted conditions with the defense given advance information about the attack details. even from a single warhead unaccompanied by countermeasures. The Bush administration. Though a problem with the kill vehicle pre- vented any tests from taking place in 2004. These include delayed hardware deliveries and excessive vibration (or “jitter”) that impedes the high- energy laser from maintaining its aim on the target missile. as part of the so-called Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Although the system enjoys strong political support from the administration and Congress. to Congress. using very powerful ground- based interceptors. despite much opposition among experts as well as current and former military personnel.75 The Pentagon hopes that the ABL will be deployed be- tween 2008 and 2010. Up to 20 intercep- tors could be installed in Alaska and California by the end of 2005. California.76 This is probably wishful thinking. there are widespread technical doubts about its feasibility.72 The Navy Theater-Wide / Aegis system claims hits in five out of six tests.73 A third system. letter from twenty-two physi- cists. Until realistic tests are completed. the system enjoyed a successful test in February 2005. Alaska. The plane would fly within 300 to 400 kilometers of missile launch points and at- tempt to destroy missiles of all ranges in their boost phase by weakening their missile skins through applied laser heat. several missile interceptors were placed in silos at Fort Greely. In 2004. Finally. LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS. as discussed above.

This project is still very much in the developmental stages. Both plans are in the early exploratory stage and are at least a decade away from testing.S. 2002. 1997). Nuclear Weapons Databook. 7.” December 2001.html.. the Bush administration has advanced the idea of using a Kinetic Energy Interceptor on land and at sea to destroy long-range missiles in their boost phase. Robert S. 12.C. should one occur. p. 8.77 In addition to GMD.: Natural Resources Defense Council. 13. pp.defenselink. technical feasibility. and no tests will be conducted until at least 2008.5 billion allocated for antimissile research in 2005.gov/hasc/ testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat. 2003. “Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballis- tic Missile Threat to the United States.R. 5. Norris and Cochran. “Worldwide Threat: Converging Dangers in a Post-9/11 World.” Washington. respectively.cia. available at www. p. sched- ule. . Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.S. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 101 At the same time.80 including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction pro- grams. 7. 5. 3. Nuclear Weapons Databook: U.78 The administration has also revived concepts of placing kinetic-energy inter- ceptors in space (formerly known as Brilliant Pebbles). 2. 3.S.79 By comparison. available at www. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015. the system will be unable to defend against a real attack. Sep- tember 30. the United States allocated about $2 billion for all other nonproliferation pro- grams in 2005. Despite the lack of a consensus on the threat.house. “Executive Summary. Numerous government reports have identified simple countermeasures that are readily available to states such as North Korea. See also “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_speech_02062002. and it is again investigat- ing the idea of space-based lasers.” July 15. submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 1987 and 1995.–U.. with more than $10. 7. February 11. Ibid. 1945–1996 (Washington.pdf. even without such tests. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission.S. cost. 9.html.” testimony of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George J.” p.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (hereafter Ballistic Missile Threat Commission). Even if the defense components work perfectly as designed. Thus. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Norris and Thomas B.cia. 6–7. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2002. technical assessments demonstrate that the GMD system will be unable to counter a missile attack that includes even unsophisticated countermeasures. 8. Ibid. nonproliferation policy. pp.” testimony of DCI George J. D. France and the United Kingdom acquired intercontinental-range. 10. Cochran. 6. and strategic consequences of deploying antimissile systems. it is possible to understand the severe limitations of the system by analyzing the intrinsic capabilities of the system components.mil/pubs/qdr2001./Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces. February 6. N OTES 1. U.htm. 4. 1998. p. 6.S. Department of Defense (DOD). p. they represent by far the largest financial component of U. available at www. available at www. p. National Intelligence Council (NIC).

Military Balance. p.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Robert S. p. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces. 72. Ghauri II. at the time of the signing of the INF Treaty. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. p.. 16. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: North Korea’s Nuclear Program. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force.K.” World News Connection/Itar-Tass. 72. 201. according to IISS. and Pakistan (Ghauri. and Lt. It is possible that China has deployed as many as 20 DF-4 IRBMs (which some consider to be “limited ICBMs”). and no further IRBMs were produced or deployed. Darren Sawyer. March/April 2003. Najmeh Bozorgmehr.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. and 12 CSS N-3 sea-launched MRBMs. DF-21s. From 1958 to 1963.gov/t/vc/rls/ rm/2004/37220. 24. Kristensen. 77–80. Hans M. Leah Rubulcaba. Chinese DF-3s. 2004–2005. 59. Norris and Kristensen. 2004–2005. available at www. September 8. 70-72. Jordan. September 22. and Turkey. p. Deadly Arsenals. 13.” testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verifica- tion and Compliance Paula A. 6. the United States possessed 234 Pershing II MRBMs. 22. 73–75. Norris and Hans M.” Financial Times. 48 DF-21 MRBMs.state. ICBM arsenal. 19.army. The 285 number assumes the lowest estimate of Saudi CSS-2/DF3As (40). and Chinese long-range missiles. Also. Non-Proliferation. and the Soviet Union posessed 149 SS-4 Sandal MRBMs.” Arms Control Today. “Futures Center Working Two Initiatives for Troops in Iraq. Kristensen. p. 170. and CSS-N-3/JL Is (100). IRBM arsenal had long been eliminated by the time the INF Treaty entered into force. Phil Tissue. In 1987. and Joshua Handler. DF-21s. Robert S.” p.” Bul- letin of the Atomic Scientists.. March/April 2005. Joint and Combined Warfighting School. July 21. 50 Israeli Jericho IIs.mil/ocpa/read. 20.ndu. Lyle Powell. 30. pp. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Nonproliferation Review. Col.040 U. 2004. 2002). In 1987. Norris and Hans M. 2005. D. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces. “Attack- ing the Cruise Missile Threat. Indian Agni IIs (0). 15. See also Paul Kerr. Kristensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council. and SS-21 SRBMs. January 21. There are approximately 100 Jericho I and II missiles. Wolfsthal. 104 Chinese DF-3s.S.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments. Cdr.121. Listed as 50 each of Jericho I and Jericho II missiles in CNS. 15. 73. With its current arsenal of mobile Scud-B.php?story_id_key=6412. 2005. 17. July 21. 100 North Korean No Dongs. Military Balance. 2001. 2003. 28.” pp. Israeli Jericho IIs (50).” Army News Ser- vice. Winter 1996. the United States deployed Thor IRBMs on U. The U. China had a force of 40 DF- 3 MRBMs. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Goes Into Service. DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism. pp. there were 4. telephone conversation with Hans M. The Military Balance. See IISS. Robert Norris and Hans M. Russian. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. 29. 26. Ron Perkins. The 417 number assumes the highest estimate of each of these missiles (40 Saudi CSS-2/DF3As.” Joint Forces Staff College. p. 28. Robert Norris and William Arkin.S. Scud-C. Norris. and Shaheen IIs (0). Kristensen. 18. 111–12.” pp. These missiles were retired in 1963 following improvements in the U. 23. pp. 14. 2003. pp. Col. NIC. vol. . 21. Ibid. p.htm. See also Robert S.edu/current_students/documents_policies/ documents/jca_cca_awsp/Cruise_Missile_Defense_Final. Ghauri IIs. and Human Rights.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. North Korean No Dongs (90). 27. 12. Israel. or Shaheen II). according to one source. 25. and Rajkumar. territory in a joint agree- ment with the British government. 3. 2003. Lt. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). and 20 Iranian Shahab IIIs. 77–80. Kristensen. Norris and Kristensen. Cirincione. available at www4. 2005. Syria already possesses the capability to strike deep into the territory of potential regional adversaries such as Iraq. plus an additional five missiles for North Korea (Taepo Dong I). pp. 74–77. Pakistani Ghauris. July/August 2001.C.doc. p. Lt.S. 77–80. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: French Nuclear Forces. 70–71. November/December 2003. See also “Russian Expert: Iran May Field Up to 20 Shahab-3 Missiles By 2005. May 2004. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. India (Agni II). pp.jfsc. January/February 2005. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: United States Nuclear Forces. 2003. available at www. 2003. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. no. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2003. and Iranian Shahab IIIs (5). 2004). Col.102 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 11. 2003. and CSS-N-3/JL-1s.

Ibid.html. Ibid. Dennis M. p. U. U. 48–55. “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. 32. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press.gv. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 58. no. Veridian Pacific-Sierra Research.” pp. Karp. and Inspection Commission. 1994. “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Fact Sheet. 36. Security Council Document S/1996/261. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap.S. p. 43. “U.. Duncan Lennox. April 17. p. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap. Deadly Arsenals. North Korean ‘Proliferators. April 25. Disarmament. Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics. “Alaska Missile Interceptor Site Has No Credibility. Adelphi Paper 339 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).” available at www. U. February 16. 1996. U. 35. Ibid. 24.S. Barbara Starr. 38. 2004. p.” Available at www. 37. 33.” December 2002.nl/default.minbuza. 7. 2003.org/ Depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document. “Russia’s Anti-Missile Test Called Success. De- cember 2. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 103 31. in SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments. 45.un. 44–46. For a full discussion of the MTCR.bmaa.N.” March 6. Remarks by General Eugene Habiger. 46. 54.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. cited in Dennis Gormely. 48. 2003.cfm?fa=view&id=3000092.” Jane’s International Defense Review. Gormley. vol. 44. 22. Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 1996. available at http://editors. 2004. available at www. Stewart Stogel. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical and Operational Aspects of an Emerging Threat.S. Ibid. See also DOD. “Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents. 40. “Annex: List of Subscribing States to the HCOC.at/up-media/1121_hcoc_-_list_of__subscribing_states.osd. 52. 14. Slaps Sanctions on Five Chinese. 42. Department of State. Verification. 49.” January 6. pp.” October 4. and Interna- tional Security.doc.org/ npp/weapons/index. 2003. “Unresolved Disarma- ment Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes. 1996). p.mil/usd/ uav_roadmap. pp.” Chapter Summary. available at www. 403–9. 53.” pp. May–June 1990. 50. 2003).” parts 1 and 2. 21–22. distributed by the Office of the Spokesman. Wolfsthal. More information can also be found on Carnegie Nonproliferation’s “Missile Proliferation” web page. “Missile Plans by Iraq May Aim at Europe. United Nations Monitoring. Ibid.sipri.acq.” 2000. September 29.” p.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460871. 57. Department of State. 47. “New Developments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Land Attack Cruise Missiles. August 2004.” United Press International. Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles. April 11. Aaron Karp. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press. 51.. . 7. “In the Tracks of the Predator: Combat UAV Programs Are Gathering Speed. 39. and Rajkumar. available at www. 41. Bill Sweetman.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/27799. 43.’” Agence France-Presse. 1996. 4. “Key Findings: Delivery Systems.” Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Issue Brief. DOD. 56. November 29. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap: 2002–2027. 1995. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress.pdf. 55. Ballistic Missile Proliferation. “Joint Statement of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on Missile Proliferation. 1–2. 2004. 2004. 34.S.” Washington Times. 10. see appendix D in the first edition of this volume: Cirincione. publicly released March 11. Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez. Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review. “Ballistic Missiles. p. Summary.se/pubs/yb03/ch12. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” (Duelfer Report of September 30. 34. at www.htm. pp. Austrian Foreign Ministry. November 11.carnegieendowment. W.” Congressional Research Service.pdf. 2004). “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Missile Program.

Winter 2003–4.” Agence France-Presse. 2005. Official Warns of ‘Repercussions’ If Taiwan Fails to Approve Weapons Deal. April 7. July/August 2004. 70. 64.com/projects/meads. 75.acq.” Global Security Newswire. “Japan Wants Fatter Budget for Missile Defense. GAO-04-409. 56–66. Germany/Italy/USA.” Agence France-Presse. 2001.” Arms Control Today. 2004.S. 61–86. 45. 62.ransac.mil/mda/ mdalink/pdf/histfunds. Dennis M. available at www. 2002.” Survival.” New York Times.S. Wade Boese. October 6. Obering III. pp. March 2003. Government Accountability Office. Gormley. 78.armscontrol. 2004.ucsusa.org/global_security/ missile_defense/page. See also “U. 60. William Hoehn. . 68. 63. Lieutenant General Henry A. 61. Moscow Miffed Over Missile Shield but Others Merely Shrug.S. “Taiwan Officials Prepare for Their First Missile-Defense Test. June 18–24. “Raytheon Delivers SM-3 Missiles. August 31. see the web site of the Federation of American Scientists at www. 2004. 66.html. See also “Historical Funding for MDA FY 85-05. 2005. testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. “Congress Backs Bush’s Defense Budget. For details on these programs. October 6. September/October 2004. U. p. 72.fas. “Missile Defense. available at http://taiwansecurity. 26.” Defense News.S. “U. 2004. 31. Ibid. appendix III. 73.” Arms Control Today.armytechnology. Missile Defense Programs. 69.” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” Managing the Atom Project. See also Michael Wines. “Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Test- ing and Accountability.org/AP/2004/AP-061004.osd. vol. Boese. available at www. “Missile Defense: Winning Minds.” 76.” April 2004.” pp.” available at www. 80. Mulls Placing Missile Defense System in Japan: Report. November 10. p. available at www. Letter to Senator John W.asp. 4. 48–55. 30–31. p. October 13. January 10. Harvard University and Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. pp. Ibid. 65. pp. “Russia Considers Missile Defense.” Japan Times. 79. Not Hearts.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense. April 5. Wade Boese. Nicole C. 2004. Obering testimony. 2004. April 5. Defense. December 19. August 2004.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/index.S.htm. 77. “Japan Would Not Use Missile Defense to Intercept Missiles Targeting Other Countries. September 1. “Threat Reduction Funding in the Bush Administration: Claims and Counterclaims in the First Presidential Debate. 2005.armscontrolcenter. Looks to Counter North Korean Missiles. 67.” Arms Control Association. Jason Sherman. Fact Sheet.php.org. “U. 71. Intelligence.org/archives/000878.” Associated Press.cfm?pageID=1715. Warner. 2004.104 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 59. Evans. 8. “U. See also “Non-Proliferation Efforts in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Bill.S. no. available at www. 48–55. “Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War. Wade Boese. “Threats and Responses: U.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 74. “U. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance.S. Evans.pdf.” Available at www. Anthony Wier. pp. “MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System. and Matthew Bunn.

land-attack cruise mis- siles. Missiles reported to be in development are listed in ital- 1 ics. Scud-type missiles. National Air Intelligence Center further stipulates that cruise missiles are “usually categorized by intended mission and launch mode. Ballistic missiles are sometimes confused with cruise missiles.S. Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes Afghani. Ballistic missiles differ from military rockets. because they have guidance systems.000 USSR Operational stan status question- able. Scud-B O 300 1. A cruise missile. Only eight nations have been able to develop nuclear weapons that could be fitted as warheads on these missiles. State Department). Only eleven nations have missiles with ranges over 1.S. such as the widely prolifer- ated FROGs. self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. Belarus4 SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Scud-B O 300 1.000 Russia Bahrain MGM.” Such a missile may carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead (definitions are taken from an arms control glossary provided by the U. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 105 Table 5. If you are aware of informa- tion that could update this table. or of sources that could expand the information on this page. For more resources.2. and submarine-launched cruise missiles. is “an unmanned. The U.” such as antiship cruise missiles. We count 30 nations as fielding some type of ballistic missile. O 165 560 USA Missiles manu- 140 factured by (ATACMS) Lockheed- Martin. air-launched cruise missiles.000 USSR (table continues on the following page) . The development of ac- curate guidance systems remains one of the most challenging engineering obstacles facing states that wish to indigenously develop ballistic missiles.000 kilometers.ProliferationNews. Armenia3 Scud-B O 300 1. as defined by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Part of the flight of longer-range ballistic missiles may occur outside the atmosphere and involve the “reentry” of a warhead or the missile. A ballistic missile is one whose payload reaches its target by way of an initial powered boost and then a free flight along a high arcing trajectory. Notes and a key are provided below. please contact the authors. all the rest have only short-range.org. The Car- negie Endowment welcomes your comments. please visit the web pages devoted to “Missile Prolif- eration” and “Anti-Missile Systems” at www. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals This table represents the Carnegie Endowment’s best assessment of the world’s ballistic missile arsenals.

Road-mobile. first solid. (DF-11/M.106 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. 11) CSS-6 O 600 500 I Solid-fueled.700 2. O 5. CSS-X-7 O 300 500 I Solid-fueled.000 700 I Deployment (DF-31) expected later this decade.000/13. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes China CSS-8 O 150–230 190 I Two stage. Road-mobile.0006 I Extended ver- (DF-5/5A sion (DF-5A) to be deployed in 2005.2.500 2.11 Egypt Scud-B O/U 300 1.000 I SLBM .000 1.000 USSR/ DPRK Project T O 450 1.200 I 4 CSS-4 O 12.000 I/DPRK Improved Scud.5 CSS-3/DF.10 CSS-N-3 O? 1. Scud-C O? 500 600–700 DPRK France M-45 O 6.650/2. second liquid.000 700 I Sea-based ver- (Julang II) sion of DF-31.000 I May just be the first two stages of the DF-31. (DF-15/M. CSS-5 O 1.800 600 I (DF-21) DF-25 D? 1. 9) CSS-2 O 2.8 DF-31A9 D 12.900 2. Road- mobile.700 600 I (Julang I) SLBM CSS-N-4 D 8.7 CSS-9 D/T 8.000 800 I Could be de- ployed between 2006 and 2010. SLBM Could be de- ployed by end of decade.150 I Gradually being (DF-3/3A) retired.

(table continues on the following page) .20 M-7 (CSS.16 India says lim- ited production has begun. Last tested Oc- tober 20. Agni II O/P 2. D 350 500– I/USSR From Russian 350 1. France tested February. 18 1994.000–2.000 ? I Will replace the SLBM M-45 SLBM. Prithvi. Possible de- ployment by 2010.000 SA-2.000 I/USA/ From Scout. Dhanush D/T 250 500 I From Prithvi. Agni O15 600–750 1. First test sched- uled for 2005. Air Force missile. Prithvi. O 160 190 I 160 Fateh-110 P 200 600 I/PRC? Last confirmed (NP-110) test September 6. O 150 800– I/USSR From Russian 150 1. O 165 560 USA Purchased 160 140 ATACMS be- (ATACMS) tween 1995 and 1996. O 130 190 I 120 Mushak. 2004.12 Greece MGM. 2004.18 Iran19 Mushak.000 SA-2.300 750–800 I/DPRK From No Dong. (Naval Last tested No- Prithvi) vember 7.500 1.000 I/USA/ Last tested Au- France gust 29. 8) Scud-B O/U 300 1.000 I/Russia Based on Rus- sian SS-4. India Prithvi. O 150 190 PRC Modified SA-2. Army missile.00024 1.500 1.22 Shahab IV D/T?23 2.17 Agni III D 3. 2004.000? I Test planned by the end of 2004.000 I/DPRK Scud-C O 500–600 500–700 I/DPRK Shahab III O/T21 1. O 250 500–750 I/USSR From Russian 250 SA-2. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 107 M-51 D 8.13 Sagarika14 D? 250–350 500 I From Prithvi. 2002.

500?25 Russia? on the North Korean Taepo- dong I and II.000– ? I/DPRK/ Possibly based 5.000 France Road-mobile. Derived from Scud tech- nology.000 I Combined No dong I Dong and Scud.000 I Reportedly dong II ready for flight test if North Korea ends flight-test mora- torium35 . 1998. 1. Israel Lance O/S 130 450 USA Jericho I O 500 750-1. Tested May 1993.34 Taepo.000 USSR/ DPRK Al Fatah32 D/T 200 500 I North Scud-B O/P 300 1.500 1. I Reportedly 1. tested August 31. Scud-B O 300 1.26 Iraq27 Al O/U28 180–200 300 I Liquid-fuel Samoud II missile.000.108 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.500–5.000 France/I Road-mobile. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes Shahab V D? 3.300 700– I Single-stage. Taepo.000 USSR/ Korea33 Egypt? Scud-C O/P 500 600–700 I Variant No Dong O 1.000 USSR stan Tochka-U O 120 480 USSR (modified SS-21) Libya31 Scud-B E 300 1.500 1.2.500 1. Ababil. Jericho II O 1. T 1.500–2.30 Kazakh.300 based on the Shavit Space Launch Vehi- cle.000 liquid fuel mis- sile. From Scud B.000 1. D 3. O29 160 200–300 I Solid-fuel mis- 100/Al sile from Scud Fatah B. Jericho III D? 3.000-6.

37 Hatf III O 280–300 500 I/PRC 2001 NIE lists (Ghaznavi the Hatf-3 to be /M-11) an M-11. 2005. Ghauri III D/T 2. 2005.300 700 I/DPRK From No Dong. Ghauri II D/T 1. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 109 Pakistan Hatf I O 80 500 I Hatf-II/IIA D/T 180/280 500 I/PRC?36 First test-fired in (Abdali) 2002.000 4. 2004. Last tested December 8.350 I Liquid fuel. (Stiletto) SS-24 O 10. last tested April 14. 1999. Last tested Novem- ber 2. 2004.000-11. Thought to be an M-9 deriva- tive.44 (table continues on the following page) . Russia42 Scud B O 300 1.000 two-stage. (Scalpel) Rail-mobile. 2004.500 1. last tested October 12. SS-25 O 10.000 4.000 8. Last tested Novem- ber 29. 2004.000 I Liquid fuel.700–3.38 Shaheen I O/P39 700–750 500 I/PRC Solid fueled.500 ? I/DPRK Thought to be based on the Taepodong-1. Last tested March 31.050 I Solid fuel. but flight test planned for June 2004 never occurred.300 500–750 DPRK 2001 NIE lists (No the Ghauri to be Dong) a No Dong. Last tested March 19.000 I Solid fuel.000–2.43 SS-19 O 10. (SS-1c Mod 1) SS-21 O 120 480 I Solid fuel.800 I Liquid fuel. Last (Satan) tested Decem- ber 22.500–2. Road- (Sickle) mobile. SS-18 O 9. II41 1.40 Shaheen D/P 2. Engines have been tested.500 750– I/PRC? Road mobile. Ghauri O 1. 2004.

tested Septem- ber 23.47 SS-X-26 D/T 300 480 I Solid fuel.300 2.51 SS-N-23 O 8. SS-N-18 O 6. 2004. Saudi Dong O 2.2. version is known as the Sineva) SLBM. (CSS-2) Slovak SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Republic53 South Nike. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes 45 SS-27 O/P 10.48 Iskander. Solid E49 fuel. O 180 500 I/USA Modified SAM.500 1.300 2. Test- (Iskander) ing has been completed. SS-N-27 D/T 10.200 mobile version of SS-27 ex- pected to be- come opera- tional by 2006.000 1.000– I SLBM version of (Bulava) 1.550 I No longer in SLBM. 2004.150 PRC Purchased from Arabia Feng-3 China in 1987. 2004. D/T 280 480 I For export.110 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. Belarus.500–8.20052 the SS-27. could be ready by 2006.50 SS-N-20 O 8. will be carried by the Borey- class submarine. and Syria interested in this missile.800 I Last tested Sep- (upgraded tember 2004. Korea Hercules I/A . Iran. vember 2.600 2.000 1.46 Last tested De- cember 24. service.650 I Last tested No- SLBM. last SLBM.000– I First road- (Topol-M) 1. will enter service in 2005.

65 (table continues on the following page) .58 Taiwan Ching O59 130 270 I/Israel From Lance. Hercules Tested at re- II duced range in 1999. O 9. O 165/300/140 560/160/ I All three ver- States 140 270 sions have dif- (ATACMS ferent ranges Block and payloads. Syria may now be capable of producing its own Scud-Ds. Scud-B O 300 1. Feng Tien Chi60 O?61 300 500 I Modified SAM.000 USSR stan Ukraine SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Scud-B O 300 1.000 USSR Scud-C56 O 500–600 600–770 DPRK Syria can now produce its own Scud-Cs. Scud-B O 300 1. O 165 560 USA Purchased 120 140 ATACMS in (ATACMS) 1996. O 165/300 560 USA Block I pur- 140 chased in 1997. Project J62 D 150 150 I/PRC Based on Chi- nese WS-1. service lives 12/12A) being extended until at least 2020.400+ 2.800 USA Kingdom D-5 United MGM. (MK. Turkey MGM. deployed in 2004. Tested in 1997.150 I Last tested Sep- man III tember 2004.000 USSR United Scud-B O 300 1. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 111 Nike.000 Russia? Arab Emirates63 United Trident II O 7.54 MGM. I/IA/II) all three ver- sions have been delivered to the Army. Minute.57 Scud-D T 700 500 DPRK Based on the No Dong.650+64 1. D/T 260–300 450-500 I/USA Modified SAM. last tested September 2000. Turkmeni. (ATACMS Block IA pur- Block I/IA) chased in 2001.55 Syria SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Transferred 1983.

000 USSR Transferred to South Yemen in 1979.400+67 2. D. discussions with . Trident I O 7.950 I All will be deac- Peace. Scud O? 300–500 600– DPRK Spain and the (variant 1.112 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.2. U. National Intelligence Council. September 2000). Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.: DOD.S. Unclassified Na- tional Intelligence Estimate.500 km) ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile (> 5.000 USSR Yemen SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Transferred 1988. keeper although neither silos nor mis- siles will be destroyed. tivated by 2005. December 2001. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.500 I Will be retired C-4 SLBM by 2007.000 United States unknown) interdicted ship- ment from DPRK. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.C. 1997).500 km) Origin I Indigenous INF Treaty Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty SAM Surface-to-air missile NOTES N OTES: 1. at which time the SSBNs that carry the C-4’s will carry the D-5s.400 1. Scud-B O/U 300 1.000–5.650+ 3. The principal sources for this table include National Air Intelligence Center.000 km) IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile (3.68 Key to Status D in development E in process of elimination O operational P in production S in storage T tested U used RANGE SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SRBM short-range ballistic missile (<1.000–3. Department of Defense (DOD).800 I D-5 Vietnam Scud-B O 300 1. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes 66 MX O 9. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (National Air Intelligence Center. but sub- sequently al- lowed it to pro- ceed to Yemen. Trident II O 7.000 km) MRBM medium-range ballistic missile (1.

DOD reported that Iran also produces a 200-kilometer “Zelzal” missile and a 150- kilometer “Nazeat” missile. April 16.” available at www. “Nuclear Data. The DF-31A is often confused with the now-canceled DF-41 ICBM. 5. The Indian government first acknowledged the existence of the Sagarika in October 1998.to 350-kilometer sea-launched cruise missile derived from the Prithvi.000 kilometers is the range of the DF-5A. November/December 2003. India announced it had begun limited production of the Agni II and that it would be under the control of the army (Rahul Bedi. we include neither Argentina nor Azerbaijan in our final count of countries with ballistic missiles. which may be variations of its “Mushak” series.” 12.com/missiles/. the military armed itself with the Agni in August 2004.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC. (table continues on the following page) . “Belarus to Acquire Russian Multi-Warhead Missiles By 2010.” 7. “World- wide Ballistic Missile Inventories.armscontrol.pdf. See Norris and Kristensen. August 22.org/wmd/world/ missile. The Dhanush is the naval version of the Prithvi series. pp.” August 29. 4. “Indian Army Will Control Agni II. 2004). It traveled approximately 2. The Military Balance 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. however. 48–55.nic.nrdc.S.osd. “India Tests Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Mis- sile. 15). pp.” Government of India. 2003. identifying it as a 250.asp?relid=4788. Missile Defense Agency.com/2004/040829170937. which will be deployed in 2005. 2001. “Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 113 various U. 2004. See also Bruno Tertrais. See the DOD’s “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” for FY 2004.537jwumo. Claremont Institute. Andrew Feickert. NRDC: Nuclear Notebook. A number of sources report that Argentina tested and may have deployed the Alacran short-range ballistic missile in the late 1980s and early 1990s. and the U.” August 31. Press Information Bureau.com/fullstory. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. Ibid. 2004.000 kilometers in a January 2001 test. the Times of India reported that the government had approved the induction of the Agni II and the development of a longer-range missile. available at www. November 8.” 9. p. NRDC. See www.defenselink.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.S. In June 2001.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. International Institute for Stra- tegic Studies. 77–80.html. Available at www. See Feickert. Azerbaijan imported a number of Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union. 3. Robert S. traveling a distance of 1. “Chinese Nuclear Forces.” May 2002. 17.mil/mda/mdalink/pdf/BM2004. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean No Dong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. intelligence reports have classified it as an SLBM. 18. “Ballistic Missile Capability: 2004. 6. 13.” 8. See Norris and Kristensen. 16. p.acq. The deployment of this missile cannot be confirmed.” available at www. U. 14. government and relevant embassy officials. Belarus announced that they will acquire the Iskander-E SRBM from Russia by 2010. On May 31. 13.pdf. “Nuclear Policy: France Stands Alone.org/nuclear/nudb/datab16. and very few reliable and publicly available resources credit Azerbaijan with Scud-B missiles. 15. 2001. 2004.htm. According to Indian Defense ministry officials.” March 5. 2003. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. Arms Control Association. and Global Security. 15. Russia is thought to have shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia be- tween 1992 and 1995. 2004).” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2004. 19. See Nikolai Novichkov. “Dhanush Successfully Test Fired. The Azeri embassy states that Azerbaijan is no longer in possession of these missiles.org/ fact- sheets/missiles. 2003.” available at www. 2004. Kristensen. See “India Begins Deploying Agni Missiles.in/release/release. 2. There are some questions regarding whether Argentina and Azerbaijan continue to deploy ballistic missiles.S. available at www.spacewar. Congressional Research Service. available at http://pib.asp.” Bulletin of Atomic Scien- tists.” as published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. During the Cold War. See also Norris and Kristensen. The Agni II was tested for a third time on August 29. “Missile Proliferation Sum- mary. Department of State does not credit Argentina with this missile.globalsecurity.expressindia. 11.” available at www. 1997. Other sources maintained that the Sagarika program also contained a ballistic missile division. For these reasons. July/August 2004. See the DOD’s “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.” Financial Times. various Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) “Nuclear Notebooks. “Ballistic Missiles of the World.” 10.200 kilometers (Agence France-Presse. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. No- vember 12.php?newsid=35647. 2003.asp. Norris and Hans M. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries.missilethreat.

His claims may not be accurate. It is possible that Rubin is wrong. “Iran ‘Can’ Mass-Produce Missiles. and Inspection Commission.wisconsinproject. See “Iran ‘Increases Missile Range.” Agence France-Presse. drawing upon remarks by the Iranian defense minister. 28–29. but he also could have been talking about a significantly upgraded version of the Sha- hab III. This was based on some technical differences between the missile fired on August 11 and the Shahab III.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3997151.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3716490.org/countries/iran/missile2004. 28. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries.bbc.co. 2003. as Iranian officials declined to com- ment on the Shahab-3’s range after its most recent test. No al-Hussein missiles have been uncovered as of yet. “Iran Conducts New Shahab III Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. 2003. 2003. see www. p. 2004. September 27.” BBC News. 25. May 30. intelligence says Iran has a “small number .org/program/index.. See www. and the Iraq Survey Group’s “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD [weapons of mass destruction]” concluded that Iraq no longer retained the al-Hussein missile after 1991. Five al-Samoud II missiles were fired at coalition forces during the war.” available at www. 2.mod. sanctions).cfm?programid=82.N. September 6. 2004. 29. section 1. a dissi- dent coalition. Verification. Octo- ber 20. 6–7. 27.. and Inspection Commission. In all. The Shahab III was handed over to the Revolutionary Guard on July 20. and that the missile fired was an upgraded version of the Shahab III. in May and August 2002. 2004.” S/2003/580.2. U. though. “Iran Successfully Test-Fires Missile. on October 20. Ali Akbar Dareini. “Iran Unveils Redesigned Shahab Missile. having likely unilaterally destroyed them all. Al-Samoud II missiles began to be destroyed under the supervision of UNMOVIC on March 1. 16– 17. but a report in Jane’s Defense Weekly in September 2004 cited former Israeli ballistic missile defense director Uzi Rubin as saying that an August 11.’” BBC News.uk/linked_files/iraq/ wmd.bbc. two-thirds of the missiles were eliminated when the war began on March 17. See Feickert. available at www. Verification. 2004).shtml.114 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.htm.” Iraq illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles with a range of 650 kilo- meters (in violation of U. 2003. available at www. See also “Iran Conducts New Shahab-3 Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. 2003.” See United Nations Security Coun- cil. Iran denied that it was continuing development of the Shahab IV. “Thirteenth Quarterly Report on the Activities of the United Nations Monitoring.” Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani claimed in November 2004 that Iran could mass produce Shahab IIIs.” March 6. however.pdf.cdi. October 5. test was proba- bly a Shahab IV rather than a Shahab III. According to “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Gov- ernment. pp. but the system was recalled due to “failures.stm. “Unresolved Dis- armament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes.stm. . In November 2003.org.co.org/Depts/unmovic/new/ documents/cluster_document.” pp. vol.janes. who identified the missile as the “Shahab-V.un. 22. “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs.000- kilometer range in October 2004. 21. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) 20.” Agence France-Presse. October 20. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Iran had missiles with a 2. available at www.S. available at http://news.” Associated Press. See United Nations Monitoring. 2004. however. suggests that Iran has already tested the Shahab IV. 38. 2004.” 26. 2004. See Center for Defense Information. the National Council of Resistance of Iran. available at http://news. See also “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advi- sor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” (the Duelfer Report of September 30. It is possible that he was referring to the Shahab IV. 2002. See Alon Ben-David. 24. 2004. pp. Also.unmovic. Estimates of the range of this new IRBM are only speculative. 23.pdf. November 9.com/aerospace/ military/news/ jdw/jdw040927_1_n.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. available for use in a conflict.

March/April 2005. 1999. “Russia Test-Launches Land. 2004. November 29. Nonproliferation. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. “Russia’s Nuclear Forces. 2005. in September 2004. See DOD. D. September 22. Pact with India on Test Notification De- layed. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force.miis. “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Mis- sile Capability.” See “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. “Pakistan Tests Short-Range Hatf Missile. Nonprolifera- tion. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Libya . and thus was not included as part of the deal made between Libya and the United States in December 2003.htm. no. 61. Paula DeSutter. 37. March 1990. Most believe it is based on the Chinese M-11. The Russian SS-N-8 SLBM is no longer deployed and is in the process of elimination. at that time.nti. that is. 6. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. assistant sec- retary of state for verification and compliance. August 4. has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles. 2005.” Associated Press.” The Hindu. 2. See Atul Aneja.edu/research/ wmdme/israel. but one report says it is based on French motor technology. 42.” Agence France-Presse. November 2. Forty SS-27s have been produced and deployed. See “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context. 36. Norris and Hans M. 38. See Paul Kerr. March 9. Kristensen. missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. and Human Rights. In December 2003. “North Korea Deploys New Missiles. 47–48.320 kilometers from its launch point. There have also been unconfirmed re- ports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its De- cember 2003 decision to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. 2004. 34. “Pakistan Test-Fires Long-Range Ballistic Missile in Response to India. . demonstrating some progress in staging technology. 31.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defen- sive purposes. pp. The missile impacted 1. saying. Though intended to have a range of 950 kilometers.” Arms Control Today. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that North Korea was developing two new missiles.and Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles. 4. “Pakistan Begins Work on Shaheen-II. 41. Shah Alam. 43. 2001). p.” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. See Joseph S. December 22. March 31. See www.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/ 3834_3845. 40. (table continues on the following page) . It was agreed. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel” web page. See S. in August 2004.” Agence France-Presse. p. This was the most recent missile test of any kind conducted by North Korea. one land-based and the other sea-based. September 27. 28. It attempted and failed to put a small satellite into orbit. Bermudez. testified before the House Subcommit- tee on International Terrorism.” Testi- mony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. . p.htm.: DOD.C. because they have not yet been eliminated. 1999. 33. The Al Fatah was not considered to be MTCR-class.” Global Security Newswire. 2004. pp. 70–72.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2004/30816. vol. 45. 2004. 2004. the Al Fatah has been success- fully tested to only 200 kilometers. “Pakistan Test-Fires Missile. See www.html. and Human Rights. Chandrashekar. Both missiles are reportedly based on the Russian SS-N-6 SLBM. 35. 44. Pakistan announced “serial production” of this missile in October 2000. “Russia Test-Fires Ballistic Missile. at http://cns. The report has not been confirmed.state. 39. 2004. See Robert S.” Agence France-Presse. May 2004. 32. The 12 remaining SS-N-8s are still counted in the biannual START memoranda of understanding. Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would elimi- nate all Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)–class missiles. however.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism. However. April 14. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 115 30.

Kris- tensen. September 16. 2004.and Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles. It has been slightly modi- fied. Pavel Podvig.il/jcss/balance/ Turkey. 58. but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources. 189.htm. The Middle East Strategic Balance. pp. with a range of just 280 kilometers.” Available at www. Military Balance 2004–2005. An unidentified missile traveled 62 kilometers in a test firing on November 22. 68–70. 62. 2004. “New Missile Launchers Will Be Shipped to Troops Next Year.ac. October 9.pdf.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 56. 57.000 kilometers. “Russia Test-Fires Mobile Version of Its Latest Missile.116 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM. the United States has amended its plans to downgrade all Minuteman missiles to a single warhead. in order to comply with the 300-kilometers.nti. 2001. 65. Ibid. “U. 61. The Minuteman III missile may have a range of up to 13.” Associated Press. 2001. 49. With the demise of START II. See Don Kirk. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. 54. According to the Center for Nonprolifera- tion Studies. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) 46.” Jerusalem Post. available at www. 63. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. November 23.” Available at www.miis. 53.tau. but the U. 59. See www. 55. that Taiwan had deployed up to 50 Tien Chi missiles on Tungyin Island and at an undisclosed second location. See Arieh O’Sullivan. May/June 2004. Norris and Hans M. chap. December 10. International Institute for Strategic Studies.stratcom. 2004. October 1. the United Arab Emirates was not happy with the missiles and they were never operationalized. 1999. “South Korea Completes Deployment of New Medium-Range Missiles: Report. Our estimate based on the fact that the Bulava (SS-NX-30) is the SLBM version of the Topol-M (SS-27). the United Arab Emirates reportedly attempted to purchase 25 Hwasong-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles from North Korea. “Press Conference with Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov. 64. Strategic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9.” August 27.org/eng/navy/. 2004. 2004. 2004. 47. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported on March 26.S.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/fbmsl. “South Korea Launches Missile In Its First Test Since Last Year. Ivanov. There is no publicly available evidence to confirm these re- ports. “Syria: Missile Capabilities. 48. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 500-kilograms limit laid out by the Missile Technology Control Regime.2.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.650 kilometers. The Iskander-E is merely the export version of the SS-X-26.htm. however. Nuclear Forces. “Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon—Source. 51. 2004). “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK.S.” Associated Press.” Agence France-Presse. See Robert S. “Russia Test-Launches Land. 50. 19. Interfax News Agency. Strategic Forces Com- mander. 60.org/ e_research/profiles/Syria/ Missile/print/4126_4127. Personal conversation with a State De- partment official in the Office of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. In 1989.russianforces. . 2003–2004 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University. Slovakia has eliminated its Scud-B missiles. 52.prt.” available at http://cns. 2001.” Federal News Service. p. December 24.” New York Times. The Jerusalem Post reported the development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (which could possibly be the Scud-D tested in September of 2000). “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet.

p. Stops Then Releases Shipment of N. 67. and missile fuel on December 9. Strategic Command’s officially listed range.S. See www. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative.htm.S. Stra- tegic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9.mil/ factsheetshtml/submarines. Available at www. but this is the U. Spain and the United States interdicted a North Korean shipment of 15 Scud missiles. warheads. 68. See Paul Kerr.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/cap/NKILOMETER_Ch_hwaso6_GO.000 kilometers. It is not known whether the Scuds in question were Scud-Bs or Scud-Cs.” available at www.htm. “U. . html.nti. The Trident II D-5 may have a range greater than 7.400 kilometers.stratcom. 25.stratcom. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 117 66. 2001.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines. The shipment was eventually al- lowed to proceed and arrived in Yemen five days later. “Hwasong-6 (Scud-C): Overview and History. Arms Control Today. The MX Peacekeeper may have a range of up to 11. January/February 2003. Korean Missiles. but the U.650 kilometers.S.

.

Russia. the five nations possess more than 25. the vast majority of which belong to the United States and Russia.” and to “pursue negotia- tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Together.N. Several countries. France. to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. The following chapters on the five nuclear weapon states review the quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems possessed by each nation. with many thousands of nuclear weapons having been withdrawn and eliminated since the mid-1980s. however. the five states have agreed to an “unequivocal undertaking . All five—China. the pro- tection of which is of major importance in preventing the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons.000 nuclear weapons. . Each chapter also looks at the issues that affect efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. including the United States and Russia. and the United States—are also permanent members of the U. 119 . Security Council. Under the terms of the NPT and the commitments taken at its five- year review meetings.” The deployed arsenals of the nuclear weapon states are declining. still stockpile huge amounts (hundreds of metric tons) of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. PART TWO Declared Nuclear Weapon States T here are five legally acknowledged nuclear weapon states under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons (NPT). the United Kingdom. . This problem adds to global concern regarding the security of nuclear materials.

.

and the last on October 23. Since the end of the Cold War. and find alternative. If current trends continue. CHAPTER 6 Russia Nuclear Weapons Capability The Russian Federation is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).732 associated war- heads. al- though it could maintain a substantially larger nuclear arsenal given adequate resources. Russia maintains an account- able strategic nuclear force of 981 delivery vehicles with 4. biological. and the retirement of older systems that are reaching the end of their service lives. the negotiation of arms control agreements with the United States. Russia maintains a massive nuclear complex that consists of ten formerly secret nuclear cities that house hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials and hundreds of thousands of trained sci- entists and engineers with weapons-related knowledge.800.400 operational nonstrategic warheads and about 8. Russia may only deploy 1. Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).000 intact nuclear weapons. although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is about 3. Russia’s nuclear complex continues to pose a serious proliferation risk. Overall. the first on August 29. Russia also is estimated to have 3. To support this arsenal. benign employment for its nuclear workforce. and it possesses thou- sands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Russia is in the process of dramatically reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal and weapons complex owing to changed international security conditions. Russia has signed and ratified the Compre- hensive Test Ban Treaty.800 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles. 1990.1 The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear weapons tests. the United States has provided approximately $10. or chemical weapons to other countries or subnational groups. and much more remains to be done to adequately secure Russian nuclear materials and expertise. Russia has not conducted any tests since the fall of the Soviet Union.2 Despite these efforts. 1949. A failure to effectively address the proliferation chal- lenges in Russia could result in the spread of nuclear. in addition to work on the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons complex. Russia may possess as many as 16. 121 .3 billion to assist the states of the former Soviet Union to secure nuclear weapons and materials.989 strategic nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. eliminate aging nuclear weapon delivery systems.

driven by economic necessity and profit motive.7 Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s chemical and biological weap- ons stocks and facilities and is responsible for the elimination of the weapons and stocks in its possession. It appears that Russia may have had some limited missile-related con- tacts with Iraq before March 2003. Russia deployed 777 land.5 The United States has levied sanctions against more than a dozen Russian groups for such cooperation since 1998. However. also un- der construction. tularemia.000 metric tons of chemical weapons. a mas- sive stock of BW samples. The Soviet BW program reportedly weaponized plague. Many of Russia’s currently deployed strategic missiles are reaching the end of their service lives and are being retired. Russian government officials deny that any assistance is being provided to the military missile programs of either India or Iran. It also seeks to test and develop a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. despite extensive international as- sistance. Russia contin- ues to produce limited numbers of its new SS-27 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (40 were deployed as of the spring of 2005). in violation of U. and the Marburg virus and developed other possible agents.6 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability The Soviet Union had vast offensive chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) programs.3 Most of the major strategic ballistic missile produc- tion facilities of the former Soviet Union were located outside Russian territory.and submarine-based stra- tegic ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. the Bulava (SS-N-27). largely in Ukraine.N. after its original congressional sponsors). and Moscow has taken significant steps to improve its export controls over missile-related technology. the combination of Russia’s extensive mis- sile expertise with the economic hardships of its missile experts have raised con- cerns that. with the direct assistance of the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also called the Nunn-Lugar Program. sanctions. anthrax. Today. although this cooperation was limited to surface-to-air missiles and does not appear to have extended to ballistic missiles.122 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Aircraft and Missile Capabilities As of the spring of 2005. albeit currently depressed. and it is likely to retain a considerable chemical and biological weapons . Russia faces significant problems in complying with its commitments to eliminate these weapons. Russia is a state party to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. bru- cellosis.4 As with Russia’s nuclear complex. missile design and production infrastructure. Russian equipment and technology may be finding their way into the missile programs of other countries. for deployment on its next-generation strategic submarine. and a latent BW production capability. Rus- sia continues to possess almost 40. in addition to 78 strategic nuclear-capable bombers. smallpox. Russia continues to possess an advanced and accomplished.

and Ukraine was a tremendous achievement in interna- tional efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. a Soviet strike or an invasion of Europe. the potential.S. The new threats we face today—increased Russian reliance on early launch and first use and in- creased reliance on tactical-battlefield nuclear weapons—are threats made dan- gerous by Russia’s weakness. Former U. its weapons scientists and guards are poorly paid. Nuclear Analysis During the Cold War. there is much concern over the security of these materials as well as over the experts who are responsible for their production. and chemical weapons and materials are poorly secured. Russia 123 stockpile for many years to come. Much of Russia’s nuclear. These weapons serve as the ultimate guarantor for Russian . In the meantime. • Russia might lose control of nuclear weapons (especially tactical nuclear weap- ons) in its inventory. diverse. senator Sam Nunn summed up the risk when he said: The old threats we faced during the Cold War. The risk that chemical or biological weapons or critical pro- duction technology might leak out of Russia to proliferant states or terrorist groups remains high and will require a continued investment (domestic and international) to ensure that the Soviet chemical and biological weapons legacy does not lead to further proliferation. These dangers included several risks: • Nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. The threats of today go beyond nuclear forces and include terrorist groups. The return of the nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus.8 Those weapons deployed outside Russia when the Soviet Union dissolved have all been returned to Russia. Kazakhstan. and advanced arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. concern over Russia’s nuclear arsenal shifted to a new set of concerns. and Ukraine might not return to Russian control. biological. Strategic Weapons Russia possesses a large. • Russian nuclear materials and expertise might be bought or stolen and thus assist the efforts of countries or terrorist groups in developing nuclear weap- ons. In the aftermath of the Cold War. were threats made dangerous by Soviet strength. Kazakhstan. The creation of three new nuclear weapon states out of the Soviet Union would have been an almost certain fatal blow to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (see chapter 18). We can’t risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of his children only by endangering ours. deliberate use of Soviet nuclear weapons posed the main security threat to the United States.

1.2).1. It has produced only limited numbers of that system. Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state and has as- sumed its legal obligations under arms control agreements. 1 Type September 1990 January 2005 ICBMs Launchers 1. However. Intercontinental ballistic missiles have historically made up the largest com- ponent of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. Some elements of Russia’s nuclear forces have taken on an enhanced role in Russian security as its conventional military strength has fal- tered. Not- withstanding these concerns. Information contained in the April 2005 data exchange is for forces accountable as of January 31. April 1.732 AABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : START I = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.083 981 Warheads 7. the Russian deployed strategic arsenal could drop to just under 2. Russia could potentially maintain as many as 2. the Russian nuclear arsenal remains formidable (see table 6. also see table 6.S.124 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6.652 4. and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.9 It is also not yet clear how many of the new SS-27 land-based ICBMs Russia will produce and deploy. national security. START I. START I Data.672 Bombers Launchers 79 78 Warheads 570 624 Totals Launchers 2. The other two systems—the SS-24 (rail and silo) and SS-25—are expected to reach the end of their serviceable lives by 2010.064 611 Warheads 4.7 at the end of the chapter). many suffer from a lack of main- tenance funds. SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 2005. As the majority of Moscow’s strategic weapons reach the end of their service lives and are being retired. although its production capability could theoretically reach as high as . Despite its continued importance to Russian security. only three (the SS-18.000 weapons by the end of 2010. and SS-27) are expected to be in service by the end of the decade. Yet of the five types of ICBMs that Russia deployed in 2005. the country’s nuclear arsenal is shrinking.278 2. including the NPT. It is not yet clear to what level Russia’s strategic arsenal will drop by the end of the decade. 2005. Department of State.800 weapons by the end of 2010 (table 6. 1 START I Memorandum of Understanding Data Exchange. SS-19. raising questions about their long-term reliability and safety. ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles. U. On the basis of the most optimistic assumptions of Russia’s rela- tionship with the United States.436 SLBMs Launchers 940 292 Warheads 2.804 1. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces START I Data.

but it is much more probable that Moscow will simply retire its older SS-19s. which currently deploys 130 SS-19 ICBMs. This assumes that each SS-27 could be MIRVed with up to six warheads. 7. pp. March/April 2005. SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. See Robert S. while the upper-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 5 missiles each year from 2006 to 2010. 8. The older variant is expected to be withdrawn from service in the next few years. 70–72. 4.cfm. while others will have the capability to carry out either nuclear or conventional missions. replacing them with the 30 that it purchased from Ukraine in 2003. Strategic Missile Troops Commander Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia could add one regiment of SS-27s every two years (or roughly 5 missiles per year). Kristensen. Russia currently deploys 100 SS-18 ICBMs. This estimate assumes that six Delta IV SSBNs will be deployed.cdi. NOTES N OTES: 1. while the upper limit assumes that two will be deployed by that year.” pp. Experts speculate that some bombers will retain purely nuclear roles. 70–72. See www. while the newer variant is undergoing a life extension program that will allow it to remain in service until approximately 2015 or 2020. The lower-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 3 missiles per year from 2006 to 2010. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. See Norris and Kristensen. could extend the lives of these systems again (they have already been extended to 25 years). 6. 2. In a December 2004 interview. 3.org/russia/267-5. The lower limit assumes that no Borey class SSBNs will be deployed by 2010. Russia currently only has plans to purchase 4 SS-27 ICBMs in 2005.2. .989 364/2. Russia 125 Table 6. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces. 5. which would give Moscow a total of 44 deployed at the end of this year. 2005. Projection of Russian Nuclear Forces 2010 Lower Limit (Launchers/ 2010 Upper Limit Type Warheads) (Launchers/Warheads) 1 ICBMs SS-18 50/500 50/500 2 SS-19 30/180 30/180 SS-24 0/0 0/0 SS-25 0/0 0/0 3 4 SS-27 59/59 70/420 5 SLBMs Delta III/SS-N-18 0/0 96/288 Typhoon/SS-N-20 0/0 0/0 Delta IV/SS-N-23 6 (Sineva) 96/384 96/384 Borey/SS-N-27 7 (Bulava) 0/0 24/144 8 Bombers Bear Tu-95 H-6 27/162 32/192 Tu-95 H-16 32/512 32/512 Blackjack (Tu-160) 16/192 16/192 Total 230/1.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Norris and Hans M. It is theoretically possible that Russia.812 ABBREVIATIONS A BBREVIATIONS: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles. experts estimate Russia’s production capability to range from 3 to 9 missiles per year. The lower-limit numbers depend on how many strategic bombers are converted to conventional roles. This assumes that all six Delta III nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) could remain in service if necessary.

13 The two countries completed their implementation of the agreement in Decem- ber 2001. To address this dramatic development.000 warheads each. but the missile they are equipped to carry. Under START I. Upon the col- lapse of the Soviet state. known as the Borey class. The two main bomber types in the Russian military are the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95 Bear. ICBMs. the Dmitri Donskoi. Russia was almost immediately recognized by the inter- national community as the main nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union. next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). and both could enter service by 2012. START I was the first arms control agreement to actually reduce the levels of deployed strategic weapons.540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs. on schedule.12 The Russian bomber force is likely to remain the most stable component of the Russian strategic triad during the next ten years. and Ukraine would also need to ratify the agreement before the treaty would take effect. is nearing the end of its service life. of this subtotal. There are three Typhoon submarines in the current arsenal. The entry into force of START I was substantially delayed because many of the systems covered by the treaty were physically deployed in non-Russian re- publics when the USSR fell. It may be deployed by 2006. the SS- N-27. though it is possible that some could be retained if necessary.600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—that is. Kazakhstan. although it too will decline in numbers as aging systems are retired. previous agreements had served to cap the growth of existing arsenals.11 It is possible that some submarine launchers will remain operational in port if sufficient funds are not available for seagoing operations. the Yuri Dolgoruki. SLBMs.10 The six Delta III submarines in the current arsenal are slated for retirement by the end of the decade. the United States and Russia re- duced their strategic accountable nuclear forces to 6. Russia is pursuing work on the next generation of strategic ballistic missile submarines. the coun- tries involved agreed that Belarus. STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTIONS. High-end projections suggest that Russia will have just 70 SS-27s by the end of the decade (see table 6. In addition. Russia. 1991. no more than 1. the SS-N-20. serves as a test bed for Russia’s not-yet- deployed. in 1996. The Russian submarine force is also in a serious state of decline. The bulk of its submarine force is slated for elimination by the end of the decade. One of the Typhoon subs. with a sev- enth for testing purposes. deployed on no more than 1. and it is likely that Russia will deploy only eight submarines (six Delta IVs. Construction began on the first boat of this class.100 warheads may be deployed on mobile ICBMs. but obtaining agreement from the other three states required intensive diplomatic .2).900 weapons to be deployed on either side’s ICBMs and SLBMs and. Construc- tion of the second and third boats is under way. The sublimits for warheads allow no more than 4. and strategic bombers.126 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 50 a year with adequate funding. plus one Borey-class submarine) by 2010. On July 31. the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. no more than 1.

and Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT on February 14. The Belarusian parliament ratified START I on February 4. the Russian Duma ratified the agreement on April 14.S. would have capped the number of deployed strategic warheads in both countries at 3. In approving ratification on November 4. In separate letters to President George H. 1994. Belarus. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that after the signing of START I. Ukraine’s parliament approved START I and the NPT in two steps. signed on May 23. After more than six years’ delay. Senate to approve protocols to the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty before START II would enter into force. MIRVed ICBMs have been considered “destabiliz- ing” weapons.500 and resulted in the elimi- nation of all land-based MIRVed ICBMs by January 1. The Russian ratification included an important caveat. 2003. START II. had it ever entered into force. When the George W. 1992. the two sides would begin new talks on further reductions at the earliest practical date. Senate ratified START II on January 26. W. 1993. Through the protocol. W. Bush administration chose to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on June 13. however. Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan. 1994. and Ukraine agreed to “adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” as non-nuclear weapon state parties “in the shortest possible time” (article 5 of the protocol). Kazakhstan. Bush and Yeltsin signed the finalized START II agreement in Moscow on January 3. and Belarus formally acceded to the NPT on July 22. Russia. At a subsequent summit in June 1992. Second. 1992. First. 2002. 1993. the majority of Russian nuclear arsenals were based on MIRVed ICBMs. Russia 127 and strategic maneuvering by the United States. posing an attractive target for a disarming first strike. and on February 3. Kazakhstan’s parliament ratified START I on July 2. START II. Those talks began in September 1991. on Novem- ber 18. At the June 1990 Washington Summit. . Russia’s Supreme Soviet stipu- lated that Russia not exchange instruments of ratification until after the other three successor states had acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and carried out their other obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. Presidents George H. the four states agreed to participate jointly in START I as successors of the former Soviet Union and to “implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions” (article 2 of the protocol). 1992. and Ukraine. by Belarus. In addition. All nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus.S. Russia. each of the three presidents of the state parties also agreed to the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms on their territories within the seven-year START I implementation period. Presidents Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the basic principles of what was known as START II. 1996. including a ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) land-based ICBMs. requiring the U. 2000. 1993. The U. Bush. The result was the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to the START I agreement. 1993. and Ukraine were returned to Russia by the end of 1996 (see chapter 18). and the other countries involved. 1994. This was a significant develop- ment for two reasons. and it deposited its accession to the NPT on December 5.

[Russia is] prepared to present all our agreements in a treaty form.500 warheads by the end of 2007. Bush announced that the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1. 2002.”16 This agreement. nuclear forces. and tactical nuclear weapons. now known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Bush had previ- ously announced that this would be the level of U. no negotiations ever took place and no agreement was ever produced.200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons over the next ten years. and Russian offi- cials on issues to be addressed in the START III process. SORT is a significant departure from past arms control treaties. In a joint press conference with Bush after their summit meeting. THE TREATY OF MOSCOW (SORT).200 by December 31.500 or fewer weapons. they pledged to explore measures for long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. The agreement capped the number of each side’s strategic. Helsinki Summit. President George W. At their March 20–21. These discussions were to take place apart from. It is just two pages long.14 START III. but in the context of. SORT only requires that these systems. effectively killing the treaty. offensively deployed. START III negotiations. 1997. Senate ratified the pact in March 2003. he did not announce a formal Russian target for reduc- tions. The United States had pre- viously resisted having the reductions codified in any legal agreement. compared with the much lengthier and more detailed START agree- ments. and the Russian Duma followed suit in May 2003.700 and 2. Presidents Yeltsin and Bill Clinton agreed to begin negotiations on a START III agreement immedi- ately after START II entered into force and identified certain parameters for the new treaty. First.S. . 2012.128 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Moscow responded by declaring that it would no longer be bound by the limits agreed upon under START II.17 Nor does SORT follow up on the ambitious START III agenda. they agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control agree- ment to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the actual destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. including the issues of verification and control. which considered including controls on warheads. During his November 2001 summit with President Vladimir Putin.S. long-range nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The U.700 and 2. nuclear war- heads at between 1. but it finally accepted the Russian request to do so. Whereas START I and START II called for the total. and their corresponding warheads. and its elimination and verification measures are much weaker than those under the START agreement.000 and 2.15 Despite several years of informal discussions between U. In addition. they agreed that the pact would limit deployed strategic forces on both sides to between 2. Sec- ond. It abandons the START II pledge to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. Although in 2000 Putin had declared his interest in reducing the Russian nuclear arsenal to 1. was signed in Moscow on May 24. Putin did express his interest in having the reductions made part of a formal treaty: “For our part. verifi- able elimination of all delivery systems that were subject to strategic reductions.S. not be deployed.

Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency. The authors note in subsequent notebooks (2003. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY.and short-range U. “Russian Nuclear Forces.500 1.. 2001. Russia is believed to have possessed about 30. implementation was completed on May 31. composition. Yadernye Vooruzheniya Rossii (Moscow: IMEMO. 1 2 3 Weapon Type 1991 Agreements 2004 2005 Land-based 4. 2002.18 The INF Treaty is the only pact to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. All totals are approximations. Alexei Arbatov.000 3.500 3. Tactical Weapons Much less is known about the size.000 8. Arkin and Hans M.000 3. Russia 129 Table 6.S.000 0 0 0 Mines 700 0 0 0 Air defense 3. p.S.500 kilometers no later than June 1.846 Soviet missile systems. 17.000 640 4 Total 21. Its implementation resulted.000 1. Kristensen. and the two gov- ernments announced that they would no longer need to verify the complete elimination of weapons systems covered under the agreement. 2003). Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton. 2. 3. 71–73. 1987. At one point during the Cold War.500 1. July/August 2002. by May 1991. in the verified destruction of 846 long. 4. ed.3). 1997). INF missile systems and of 1.3. The INF Treaty required both countries to eliminate all nuclear-capable ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in their arsenals with a range of between 500 and 5. p. U. 1991 (three years after the agreement entered into force).700 8.000 3. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Total to Total Tactical Deployed Remain under Nuclear Tactical 1991 Bush– Weapon Nuclear Tactical Totals in Gorbachev Stockpiles Weapons. and Russian nuclear deployments are also partly controlled by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 8.19 Under the terms of the agreement.000 tactical weapons.200 Air force 7.500 1. 2005) that their estimates on tactical nuclear weapons remain unchanged since 2002. and deployment of the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons (table 6. See William M.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.000 3.540 Navy 5. 2004. pp. 56.000 0 0 0 missiles Artillery 2.400 NOTES: 1.20 .

and land-based aircraft). Stephen G.S. however.24 In fact. Russian president Yeltsin went further. the U. President Gorbachev responded to President George H. W. and half of its nuclear warheads for antiaircraft missiles. when the Washington Times reported that Russia was transferring tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad Oblast. artillery.22 Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in non-Russian republics were re- turned to Russia in early 1992. U.S. half of its tactical air-launched nuclear weapons. as well as the decision to elimi- nate the stockpiles of those weapons.400 and 8. submarines. and land mines.26 “Loose” Nuclear Weapons and Materials There has been great concern that the security of Russia’s nuclear complex since the collapse of the Soviet Union made the possible theft or unauthorized use of a Russian nuclear weapon a very real threat. He also announced that Russia would elimi- nate one-third of its tactical sea-launched nuclear warheads. There are no formal verification procedures in place or associated with the initiatives. assistance has been critical to improving the security of both nuclear weap- ons and nonweaponized nuclear materials in Russia and in other former Soviet . saying that Russia would “hold onto its stockpiles” of tactical nuclear weapons. Rademaker. With that decline. and tactical weapons elimination is believed to have continued through the beginning of the new century. and remove tactical nuclear weapons from navy forces (ships.S. announcing an end to the production of warheads for land- based tactical missiles. but in the absence of a formal inspection or other verification procedure. and land-mine war- heads.25 In October 2004. In late 2003. As a result. to ensure that the systems were in fact removed and destroyed. which is an isolated enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. Gorbachev matched Bush by announcing a plan that would eliminate all Soviet nuclear artillery. the U. assistant secretary of state for arms control. This uncertainty was reinforced in January 2001. Bush’s September initiative to dramatically reduce the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. par- ticularly with the general decline of Russia’s conventional military forces. a high-ranking Russian general reaffirmed these concerns.21 In October 1991. short-range missile. Congress started several programs to assist Russia in ensuring the security of its nuclear arsenal. In 1992. the truth of the allegations cannot be either confirmed or discounted. and informed estimates suggest that Russia has between 3. Russia de- nied the claim. it is likely that Russia is at least considering the development and deployment of new types of these weapons.23 Uncertainty about the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons has lingered.130 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Russia has substantially reduced its stocks of tactical weapons. stated that Washington remains concerned that Russian commitments on tacti- cal weapons in Europe have not been fulfilled. tactical nuclear weapons have taken on greater importance in Rus- sian security planning. remove all nuclear weapons for air defense missiles from deployment ar- eas (for storage or elimination). This raises questions about whether Moscow will con- tinue to eliminate these weapons.000 of these weapons.

collectively known as Coopera- tive Threat Reduction (CTR).S. focused on helping to protect nuclear warheads during transit. and on November 1.000 Kevlar blankets.7 million in additional assistance to purchase security systems for railcars. the Se- curity Assessment and Training Center.29 Soviet-era warhead accounting and management relied upon the manual (hand- written) tracking of its nuclear arsenal. Through the U. and 117 spe- cial railcar conversion kits (100 cargo.30 With shipments beginning in 1997. Department of Defense and the U. the United States provided Russia with 4. In addition. The program has certified hardware and software for the tracking system at nineteen key field and regional sites. and 2 prototypes) to ensure the security of warheads. Under the program. however. the U.S. the rest of the equipment was produced in the United States.S. Initial Russian weapons security programs. It is also identifying additional needs.S. the U. The program’s aims have now shifted to the replacement of railcars that are nearing the end of their service lives. access to Russian . The program demonstrates an unprecedented level of cooperation between two former Cold War adversaries as well as their ability to cooperate in addressing common security threats. a new automated system of tracking and accounting is being implemented in Russia. the CTR programs have also provided Russia with five mobile emergency response complexes to deal with accidents. as well as software and training. materials.S. 15 guard. This pro- gram continues. was completed in 2003.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense signed a new memorandum for $41. the U. the ministry in- dicated that it has installed only one-third of the fencing sets at 52 locations. Although Russia has never disclosed the total number of sites where nuclear weapons and materials are stored. Disputes over U.) The railcars themselves were produced in Russia using U. funds and some U.S.S. including site preparation for the installation of permanent communication equipment. U. For this purpose. Nuclear weapons generally enjoy a greater level of security than do Rus- sian nonweaponized nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium). the United States has provided Russia with 100 personal computers.31 The ministry planned to install all the upgrades. and installation has begun at additional sites. Department of Energy had identified at least 91 warhead storage sites27 and 40 fissile material storage sites. but it then asked the United States for additional funding assistance. (An ad- ditional 150 supercontainers were provided by the United Kingdom in May 1997. Russia 131 states.28 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY. In 2002. especially those coming from the former Soviet republics to Rus- sia. The program is scheduled to be completed in 2005. 1999. The programs also assisted with emergency planning and response in the event of an accident. 150 supercontainers (used to carry several warheads at a time) for the physical and ballistic protection of nuclear weapons. as of the spring of 2005.-funded programs have helped to secure the transport of Russian nuclear warheads and to develop a modern warhead ac- counting and tracking system.S. CTR program. Department of Defense CTR program transferred 123 “quick-fix” sets to the Russian Ministry of Defense for upgrading security at weapons storage sites. A demonstration facility.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has con- firmed that. many ex- perts believe this assessment is still correct. and the Energy Department expects to complete security upgrades at all 39 navy sites in 2006. chaired by the former Senate majority leader.132 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s weapons sites have seriously stalled the upgrades. seventeen cases of smuggled nuclear-weapons-usable materials occurred. the country’s vast holdings of nonweaponized nuclear materials will remain a major proliferation concern for decades to come. ap- proximately half of the total 123 quick-fix sets had been installed. A U. but Russia is believed to have produced roughly between 180 and 185 tons of weap- ons-usable separated plutonium (civil and military) and close to 1. For example. Russia. Department of Energy has been working successfully to improve security at Russian navy sites that contain nuclear weapons. It is not possible to be absolutely certain of the actual amount of nuclear material that Russia has produced and holds because their production cannot be fully accounted for even under the best circumstances (for example. Even if Russia were to eliminate its nuclear weap- ons. The project started in 1999.S. despite considerable efforts to improve the security of “loose” Russian materials. President Bush and President Putin have acknowledged this concern on a number of occasions.37 Of this material. In a joint statement from November 2001.38 Nuclear smuggling from Russian or former Soviet facilities continues to present an acute proliferation risk.35 Russia has the world’s largest stocks of weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.36 Reliable estimates of the total Russian nuclear material stockpile vary.”34 President Bush stated in February 2004 that the countries of the world must do all they can to protect nuclear materials. Lloyd Cutler. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international community as well as to American lives and liberties.32 At the same time. As of the spring of 2005. approximately 600 to 700 metric tons are thought to be in nuclear weapons. Howard Baker. “Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states. Much of this material is not adequately protected against theft or diversion. even the United States’ own nuclear production accounting system— considered vastly superior to the former Soviet system—has a margin of account- ing error of almost 1 percent for plutonium). In 1999. from January 1993 to December 2003.S. the Czech authorities recovered small amounts of HEU that had likely originated in Obninsk. concluded in 2000: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable mate- rial in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.100 tons of HEU. De- partment of Energy advisory group. . and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.33 NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY. and the former White House counsel. in 1994 and 1995. the U. many originating in the former So- viet Union. the two presi- dents said.” Though some progress has been made since that time.

however. Budgets in the following years contained $194 million (FY 2003). totaled more than $100 million from the previous year’s budget. Even after ten years of effort. Congress passed two supple- mental appropriations for MPC&A. the Department of Energy’s current plans anticipate that 50 percent of the material will be secured in 2007 and 2008. however. which hold about 83 percent of Russia’s fissile material. Moscow and Washington still have unresolved issues regarding American access to Rus- sian military sites.42 Second. and Accounting Program (MPC&A). run primarily by the Department of Energy. Additional cuts in Russian non- proliferation programs. a majority of nonweaponized Russian nuclear materials are inadequately protected. Upgrades at the civilian facilities had been nearly completed by the end of 2004. for two reasons. Bush campaign and then administration. $212 million (FY 2004). will be below the ac- cepted international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.40 Current U.S. Initial security efforts covered more than two-thirds of the total number of sites containing fissile material. After the September 11. No plans currently exist to provide Russia with the resources needed to reach this level of physical security and accounting. work to enhance security in the Russian nuclear complex. Control. Despite statements of support from the George W.4). much more has been done to install upgrades at civilian sites than at military sites. The Bush administration’s request for FY 2006 was $246 million. only 26 percent of materials had received comprehensive security upgrades. pro- grams. U.5 grams of plutonium. funding the program at the annual level requested by the Clinton administration. even though it will have taken the first twelve years of the program to secure the first 50 percent. and $275 million (FY 2005) (see table 6. while a relatively small number of military sites. terrorist attacks. The U. If the rate of comprehensive upgrades remains the same as it was in fiscal year (FY) 2003.43 Even this final level of protection. AND ACCOUNTING. NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION. the last two years of the pro- gram.S. CONTROL.S. Congress has broadly supported the Material Protection. increasing total 2002 funding to $267 million. Congressional action on the FY 2002 budget restored funding for nuclear security upgrades to 2001 levels. First. believe that such a timetable may be unrealistic. 2001. the United States also funded the construction of a large nuclear material storage facility in Russia to . and emphasized locking down the most vulnerable facilities. however.39 Hundreds of similar cases have been reported and investigated during the past decade. including the disposition of nuclear materials and brain drain programs (see below). Russia 133 Kyrgystani officials arrested two persons who were attempting to sell 1. its first budget request reduced funding for Russian nuclear material security from a little more than $170 million in 2001 to $138 million in 2002. government projects plan to complete comprehensive safeguards for all civilian and military material sites by the end of 2008. then the program will not be completed until 2013. lagged far behind.44 In addition to protecting nuclear materials in place.41 Experts. By the end of 2004. Consequently.

disputes over measuring total mass of material remain a significant hurdle. The first wing was completed in December 2003.134 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6.7 169.5 OURCES: SOURCE Nuclear Threat Initiative.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.0 139.5 266. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States would purchase 500 metric tons of Russia’s HEU from dismantled . 1993.1 275. The Fissile Material Storage Facility in Mayak was originally planned to have two wings. the United States and Russia have been cooperating on two important programs: the HEU purchase agreement and the plutonium disposition program.6 193.2 85.4 10. The actual appropriation will not be made until the fall of 2005. The budgets for fiscal years 1993 to 2000 were submitted by the Bill Clinton administration. terrorist attacks. Bush administration. To this end. securely store nuclear materials released from dismantled nuclear weapons. The Purchase of Highly Enriched Uranium On February 18.8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2 3 138.45 There are no current plans to construct the second wing. but Russia announced that it planned to store only 25 tons of plutonium and no HEU in the facility. with each holding 25.”46 The disposal of those materials no longer required for defense purposes is vital to reduce the risk that these materials might again be used to produce nuclear weapons in Russia or in other states or by subnational groups.asp NOTES: 1.9 212. 2001. This figure includes funding provided by supplemental appropriation passed by Congress in fiscal year 2002 in response to the September 11. 2.4. The continued possession of large stocks of excess nuclear materials is a recognized “clear and present danger.7 3. Addi- tionally. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992–FY 2006. Funding for Materials Protection.” available at www.5 245.000 canisters of nuclear material (50 tons of pluto- nium and 200 tons of HEU). This is the level of funding proposed by the Bush administration in February 2005.nti. No written agreement between the United States and Russia requires Moscow to store any material at Mayak. and Accounting (millions of dollars)1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2. Control. The budgets for fiscal years 2001 to 2006 were submitted by the George W. Though they have made progress on resolving some transparency issues. Even the best long-term storage and security of nuclear materials cannot elimi- nate the proliferation risks associated with these huge stocks.0 112. 3. and the two states have been at odds over the need to amend agreements to include storage obligations. the two sides have not agreed on transparency measures to verify the origin of the nuclear materials to be stored at the facility.6 137.

although the issue is reportedly under review by the Bush administration. Numerous nongovernmental experts have called for an expansion of the HEU agreement to include the purchase of larger amounts of HEU.482 nuclear weapons).49 Russia may have hundreds of additional metric tons of HEU not covered by this purchase agreement. The agreement has since been renego- tiated. the United States (through USEC) had purchased the equivalent of 237 metric tons of HEU (6. Russia then ships the material to the United States for fabrication into fuel for nuclear power reactors. the com- mercial arm of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosaton formerly Minatom). which cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons. much of which could eventually become excess to Russian military needs. At the June 2000 summit in Moscow. and both countries have pledged to take steps to ensure that the material is never again used for weapons. the two approved methods for the disposal of this material were the irradiation of plutonium in a nuclear reactor and the immobilization of . These amounts represent significant portions of the plutonium produced in both countries. Under the program. However. for which Russia received over $3.974 metric tons of low- enriched uranium fuel) from Russia (enough material to produce 9. Presi- dent Clinton designated 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess.S. Russia 135 Russian nuclear weapons. this material is enough to produce 25. This process takes place under in- trusive monitoring arrangements. As of the spring of 2005. There are no firm offi- cial plans to expand the scope of the purchase agreement. or “downblends. both countries will have large stocks of weapons- usable materials even after these amounts are dispositioned. Under the agreement.51 Collectively.000 nuclear warheads. Russia will now be paid according to market forces. The entire program is designed to take place over 20 years and was originally expected to pay Russia $12 billion for the material and services.50 and Boris Yeltsin declared that “up to” 50 metric tons of plutonium would be made excess through the nuclear disarmament process in 1997. The economic considerations of such a move are complicated by the fact that the private USEC lacks a financial incentive to expand its purchases. executive agent is the privatized United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The U. the United States and Russia agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons each of their excess weapons plutonium.47 The program reduces the risk of the theft of Russian nuclear material and speeds the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons by freeing storage space for released nuclear materials. Plutonium Disposition The United States and Russia have both declared large amounts of former de- fense-purpose plutonium to be excess to defense needs.48 Executing agents appointed by the two governments carry out the pact. and the Russian executive agent is Techsnabexport (Tenex). This conflict between national security and financial considerations is a major point of contention between experts and government officials. Russia dilutes. which will be less than the original payment envisioned.5 billion. On March 1. 1995.” weapons-grade HEU into low-enriched uranium.

The agreement called on both countries to “seek to” begin the operation of “in- dustrial-scale” facilities no later than December 2007.58 These pledges are signs of progress. . The U. the United States has appropriated approximately $494 million for this effort. and the United Kingdom. for the program to succeed. and U.54 Estimates now suggest that the entire Russian disposition program. both countries are hoping that third parties can assist in this essential nonproliferation endeavor. France.S.S.–Russian agreement completed at the June 2000 summit in Moscow “recognizes the need for international financ- ing and assistance” in order for Russia to implement its plutonium disposition plans.55 Moreover.S. disposition efforts at $464 million. in addition to the United States.52 There are several major problems looming over the implementation of the agreement. however. plutonium must also be suffi- ciently funded because Russia would be unwilling to dispose of its excess pluto- nium unless the United States does so as well. by the spring of 2005. Italy. including the con- struction and operation of facilities. Russia has also stated that it does not possess the funds required to carry out the disposition alone and would simply store the material if international sup- port were unavailable. but still only amount to 50 per- cent of the anticipated cost of the program. These include technical and political challenges to the U.57 The July 2000. Canada. which has delayed the beginning of construction of special mixed- oxide fuel facilities in each country by at least ten months.” an initiative launched in 2002. Although this deadline was not met. Nuclear Expertise The breakup of the Soviet Union and prolonged economic strain in Russia also pose serious nonproliferation risks in the form of Russian nuclear weapons ex- pertise and technical know-how. It appears unlikely that either side will begin disposing of significant amounts plutonium by the 2007 deadline. efforts to dispose of U. Japan. the European Union. The 2005 budget sets funding levels for Russian disposition at $73 million.136 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s plutonium with high-level radioactive waste (in either glass or ceramic form). the Netherlands. Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Okinawa called upon the G-8 to develop an international financing plan by the 2001 meeting that was held in Genoa. The Bush administration has decided to abandon immobilization and to pursue only reac- tor-based irradiation of this material. had pledged $981 million for Russian plutonium disposition as part of the “G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.53 The biggest remaining problem is a li- ability dispute.S. could cost $2 billion. Since the program was first funded in FY 1996. program and a lack of financing for the Russian disposition effort.56 Furthermore. at a disposal rate of 2 metric tons of plutonium per year. International efforts to prevent the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons have focused not only on trying to protect Russian nuclear materials but also on preventing Russian nuclear experts from selling their skills to would-be nuclear weapon states and organizations.

”60 A 2003 survey of Russian scientists with weapons exper- tise found that 20 percent of respondents would consider working in North Korea. and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). Department of State and the U. . Japan. these efforts were extended to countries such as Iraq and Libya under the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. Minsk. Canada. or Iraq.62 To ensure the full participation of all NIS member states. and the United States as donors. and dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Syria. the employees of Russia’s nuclear com- plex fell on hard times. engi- neers. Iran.59 After the collapse of the Soviet Union. These efforts consist of projects designed to provide grants for civilian research to scientists and institutions for- merly involved in weapons development. the risk that Russian nuclear experts might be forced by economic deprivation to sell their expertise or materials on hand rapidly changed the dynamics of Russian and U. Kyrgyz Republic. Armenia. branch offices of the ISTC have been established in Almaty. after the Soviet collapse. Georgia. Kazakhstan.S. many of whom have direct access to weapons-usable nuclear materi- als. maintenance. Norway. Belarus.63 In July 1995 the STCU. a separate but parallel organization. Department of Energy are involved in efforts to help prevent the brain drain. Russia. these nuclear elite found themselves in geographi- cally remote locations with rapidly dropping living standards and diminishing work orders from the central government. The three principal programs in this area are the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs). Georgia. The ISTC was founded in Moscow in 1992.000 excess weapons scientists and workers in the Russian nuclear complex. In 2002. and technicians who are responsible for the construction. the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP).S. Science Centers The State Department manages U. Belarus. Its current members include the European Union. but it also noted that offic- ers responsible for warhead storage and maintenance receive wages that “rarely exceed $70 a month. Kazakhstan. These centers are multilateral organizations designed to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology expertise by providing civilian employment opportunities to former weapons scientists and engineers in the newly indepen- dent states (NIS) of the former USSR. Tbilisi. South Korea. Yerevan. and Tajikstan are recipient countries. IPP and NCI were combined under the Russian Transition Initiative. A 2002 National Intelligence Council study indicated that economic improve- ments in Russia would mitigate the problem slightly. security considerations. Collectively referred to as a brain drain.S. Counts vary. participation in both the ISTC in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU). as well as to help in the conversion and commercialization of former defense industries. In 2005. Formerly the privileged inhabitants of Russia’s nuclear cities.61 Both the U. Armenia. and Bishkek.S. the Kyrgyz Republic. but there are ap- proximately 35. Russia 137 Russia’s nuclear complex is filled with tens of thousands of scientists.

Ukraine. 1998. the NCI pro- gram was designed to assist in downsizing the complex. Kharkiv. Currently. Azerbaijan.66 The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative The U. Since its inception. designed to assist Russia in the development of non-defense-related industries in Russia’s ten “closed” nuclear cities.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov on September 22.64 In addition to its headquarters in Kyiv. the U. generating combined revenue of $24 million. “and restructured to focus more effectively on projects to help Russia reduce its nuclear warhead complex. engineers. the IPP program aims to provide productive nonmilitary projects for former NIS weapons scientists and engineers.68 Unlike the ISTC and the STCU. thereby strengthening strategic stability. . which would reduce Russia’s ability to reconstitute its Cold War nuclear arsenal rapidly. the STCU also has field offices in the Ukrainian cities of Dnipropetrivsk. and Tashkent.S. The Bush administration. Minatom closed the Avangard weapons . 22 projects have been commercialized.”67 Like the Science Centers. Thus far.S. Azerbaijan. government in cooperation with an initiative from several nongovernmental organizations. Department of Energy manages and funds IPP and NCI. the IPP program has funded projects involving nearly 16. however.-NIS program and does not involve additional international partners. and Lviv. making it less likely that they will need to sell their services to would-be proliferators. IPP seeks to promote the conversion of NIS defense industries to civilian production through the commercialization of tech- nologies and the development of links between NIS institutes and U. the desperate financial situation of nuclear scientists and technicians in the So- viet Union’s remote nuclear complex has sparked proliferation fears.138 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s commenced operations in Kyiv.69 In 1998. The original concept was developed by the U. Department of Energy launched NCI. Canada.S.”70 The U. Department of Energy and Minatom agreed to focus initial activities at three of the ten Russian nuclear cities: Sarov (Arzamas-16). under the STCU auspices. Tbilisi. the initiative aims to “create a framework . The NCI agreement was signed by U.65 Since its inception. which are geographically isolated. the ISTC has funded 2.S. indus- trial partners. According to the agree- ment. that will provide new jobs for workers displaced from enterprises of the nuclear complex. Georgia.S. and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Georgia.S. Uzbekistan. As noted before. are home to hundreds of thousands of skilled scientists. and the NCI aims to develop paths to peaceful employment. as well as in Baku.000 specialists at more than 765 institutions have received grants from ISTC.000 former Soviet weapons scientists at 180 institutes. and Uzbekistan. Those cities. A total of 58. . IPP is exclusively a U. and technicians and hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials. the European Union. In addition. Snezinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). announced in December 2001 that the programs would be merged into one.000 projects valued at a total of $600 million. and the United States fund projects in Ukraine.

Progress to date. poor management. the United States and Russia signed a protocol that allowed the 69 ongoing NCI projects to be completed. however. including lewisite. without a new agreement. Russia 139 facility at Arzamas-16 in 2003.71 In September 2003. In addition. and bureaucratic conflicts. continue to pose serious proliferation threats. Moreover. however. “The Soviets had a prodigious bio-weapons pro- gram involving over 65. the NCI agreement was allowed to expire when Washington and Moscow could not work out a liability agreement that. indeed. the United States remains wary that Russia may not be fully comply- ing with all of its obligations under the chemical and biological weapons conventions. Minatom has stated its intention to cease weapon-related activities at Penza-19 by 2008.S.”73 Similar concerns exist for Russia’s chemical weap- ons capabilities. Three days before the expiration of the agreement. soman.280 metric tons of chemical weapons at seven storage sites.000 weapons scientists and technicians. with NCI contributing to the conversion of 40 percent of the facility to nonweapons uses. mustard. hardened others against antibiotic treatment. The risk that such materials or expertise might leak out of the former Soviet Union and aid countries or terrorist groups in the acquisition or use of chemical or biological weapons is a serious global security concern—a concern that has increased in the wake of the post–September 11 anthrax attacks in the United States. has been slow owing to inadequate funding. Without a doubt. Russia continues its efforts. Weapons expert Amy Smithson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2003. from the United States’ perspective. These materials are stored in both munition containers . this reservoir of talent is the deepest in the world. the bulk of which were inherited by Russia when the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991 (table 6. would sufficiently protect U. Russia’s stocks of chemical weapons and biological weapons samples. and VX viral agents. with the assistance of the United States and other countries. Moscow’s holdings include an estimated 39. to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons capabilities in com- pliance with its treaty commitments. officials and workers. They weaponized contagious diseases. including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. and I fear that terrorists may. No new projects will be taken up. Several key biological weapons facilities are located in non-Russian former Soviet republics. and lewisite- mustard mixtures.72 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis The Soviet Union had active and large-scale chemical and biological weapons programs. The remaining 19 percent is made up of blistering agents. however.74 Chemical Weapons Russia possesses the largest stocks of chemical weapons in the world. including sarin. Eighty one percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile consists of nerve agents. go there for help.5). and the expertise it took to produce them. and had ro- bust capabilities in anti-crop and anti-livestock agents.

that Russia has not made a full and complete declaration of all its past chemical weapons activities. and ratified it on November 5. spray devices.9 Bulk containers agent/mustard.140 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6.9 Bulk containers agent/lewisite NOTE: 1. Since 2003. which requires the elimination of all chemical weapons and the conversion of chemical weapon production facilities. but some of the blister agents are contained in bulk storage. seven. Libya and Albania have both officially declared chemical weapons . (Other countries.6 Projectiles and rocket warheads Popchep Nerve agent 18.76 Russia was the only one of the first four declared chemical weapon-possessing states (India.munition. 1997. however. There are continued suspicions. rocket warheads. Russia is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).75 All the nerve agents are in weaponized form.2 Air-delivered munitions Gorny Blister 2.4 Air-delivered munitions Kizner Blister 14.gov. and the United States) that failed to meet the initial April 2000 deadline for the elimination of 1 percent of its chemical weapons. completing the destruction of por- tions of the national stocks within three.8 Air-delivered munitions Leonidovka Nerve agent 17. Russia. bombs. and North Korea. lewisite. See Russian Munitions Agency. including Syria. and mixture Maradykovsky Nerve agent 17. available at www.8 percent of the total stockpile (an estimated 720 metric tons) had been destroyed at the Gorny site. 1993.html. Russia signed the treaty on January 13. (including projectiles. Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction. five.ru/eng/ objects. and Scud missile warheads) and bulk storage containers. The terms of the treaty require that all parties eliminate their chemical weapons stockpiles in four phases. As of the spring of 2005. are known to have or are thought to have chemical weapons. approximately 1. and ten years of the agreement’s entry into force. Chemical Weapons by Storage Location and Form Chemical Percentage of Weapons Original 1 Storage Site Chemical Type Stockpile Storage Form Shchuch’ye Nerve agent 13.2 Projectiles and agent/lewisite rocket warheads Kambarka Blister 15. South Korea.5. Israel. but either they have not made official declarations or are not parties to the CWC.

is thought to have destroyed its stocks of offensive weapons. including anthrax and smallpox. largely thanks to German funding. Russia has completed the destruction of “unfilled munitions and devices. estimated that the facility would be up and running by July 2009. Shchuch’ye.” controlled as Category III items under the CWC. 2001. some press reports have indicated that Moscow may have new plans to destroy its nerve agents at the various locations where they are already stored (including Shchuch’ye).S. Russia. . stating that the facility would be complete in 2007.82 Meanwhile. will likely be the main CW destruction facility for all Russian nerve agents. and Russian officials and experts. relied mainly on a surge capability to produce large amounts of weaponized agents in a time of crisis. and is scheduled to be complete by the end of 2005. The Soviet program. There is little hope that Russia will meet this dead- line. The covert program continued to expand even after the USSR signed the Bio- logical Weapons Convention in 1972 and eventually included a network of more than 50 institutes that produced vast amounts (metric tons) of biological agents. Congress decision not to fund the construction in 2000 and 2001. which is also currently under construction.S. the U. Still. blister agent destruction is ongoing at Gorny. Moscow has also finished eliminating its World War I chemical agents.79 A September 2003 accord between the U. 2007. which oversees the program. to eliminate 20 percent of the stockpile. Under the new plan.77 Its second deadline. controlled as Category II items under the CWC. which is now under construc- tion. In October 2003. The United States has agreed to pro- vide funds for the construction of the plant in Shchuch’ye.81 In 2004. one Russian official offered a slightly accelerated timetable. although this destruction cannot be independently verified and significant amounts of offensive stocks may con- tinue to exist in Russia. building upon the support provided by the United States and Germany. but it has been de- layed.S. At the same session. but Russian concerns about transportation make their compliance with the agreement anything but certain. Russia had completed destruction of nearly 2 percent of its stockpile. in part. however. by a U.78 The Russian government’s new plan for the elimination of chemical weapons was approved on July 5. the 45 percent and 100 percent deadlines were also extended “in principle” for both Russia and the United States.S.80 Russia is receiving considerable assistance from the United States and other countries to facilitate its CW destruction.83 Biological Weapons The former Soviet Union possessed the world’s largest offensive BW program. was extended five years to April 29. at the Eighth Session of the Conference of States Parties.) As of the spring of 2005. Department of Defense and the Rus- sian Munitions Agency determined that all nerve agents would be destroyed at Shchuch’ye. and equipment specifically de- signed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons. The large majority of Russia’s stockpile of blister agents will be destroyed at the Kambarka facility. Russia 141 stockpiles. Department of Defense. according to U.

offensive BW agents. including the only missile in production. Russia only produced and deployed 6 new SS-27s in 2003. especially given the continued economic stress in Russian society and in the Russian weapons complex. These samples are extremely portable. the SS-27 ICBM. Five Russian institutes and an additional eight in Kazakhstan. all through ISTC grants. Just as Russia relied on dedicated nuclear cities in the production of its nuclear arsenal. raising concerns that they may have migrated to help BW programs in other countries. Those factories and design bureaus maintain Russia’s current missile arsenal. the main proliferation risks posed by the former Soviet BW capability is the risk that the samples of BW agents could be stolen or that the experts responsible for their production might sell their skills to others.84 The State Department also provides employment for former bioweapons scientists through the ISTC grants.86 With the post–Cold War decline of its conventional forces.142 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Russia is known to maintain a large quantity of biological weapons samples that could be used to grow and produce large amounts of offensive biological agents. The U. and an adequate security and tracking system for these agents does not exist. the United States funds a number of biothreat reduction activities. Uzbekistan. Russia has begun to rely on its nuclear forces as a source of national pride and strength. In response to the Russian BW threats. Thousands of samples of these agents exist in several dozen “libraries” in Russia. In addition.S. the Soviet program developed genetically altered strains of weapons to make them resistant to common antibiotics. the official closure of the former BW program by the Russian government means that tens of thousands of experts and employees have been forced to find other ways to support themselves. which seeks to improve security and safety measures at institutes (in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union) involved in legitimate research with dangerous pathogens. Such . The nonproliferation threats posed by the former Soviet BW program are twofold. Russia continues to maintain many of the former facilities that would have been used in the production of BW stocks. Although initial plans seemed to allow for the production of as many as 50 SS- 27s per year. adding just 4 more in 2004. In addition. so too did it construct a series of missile design and production enterprises. many consisting merely of test tubes of agents. Though this residual production capability is of concern to some. In addition. The Soviet BW program produced large amounts of many BW agents. and Georgia have applied for assistance with security enhancements.85 Missile Analysis Russia’s advanced missile capabilities also pose important proliferation challenges. each sample of which could be used to grow large amounts of virulent. representing a latent ability to weaponize biological agents. Department of Defense runs the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program. The first is that the samples of BW agents are not adequately protected against theft.

In this same vein. in- cluding Executive Order 12938 (amended in 1998) and the Iran Nonprolifera- tion Act of 2000. or will have in the near future. Of the . Congress then–Central Intelligence Agency di- rector George Tenet focused on Russian missile assistance to Iran. This. India.”87 Presumably. Russia is developing a maneuverable reentry vehicle that can report- edly change its flight path after separating from its missile. and to a lesser degree in Syria. there is a large body of underpaid and underemployed missile experts who must find alternative ways to make a living.”89 In a 2003 report to the U.S. stating. Chief among these concerns is the possible role of Russia in helping Iran develop long-range missiles. law. along with the parallel concerns in the nuclear realm.88 Despite much talk. Russia 143 domestic political concerns. Iran. and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile produc- tion. the sanctioned entities. testified in February 2004 that “Russian enti- ties support missile and civil nuclear programs in China. whether the assistance to Iran is carried out by organizations within Russia operating in violation of Russian government policy and export controls. “Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic mis- sile.”90 It has never been shown conclusively. the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This would increase its ability to evade antimissile systems. he was referring to the new mobile version of the SS-27. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby. government assistance to. These sanctions prohibit any U. like President Putin’s No- vember 2004 claim that Russia is developing and preparing to deploy “weapons that not a single other nuclear power has. despite the fact that Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1995 and has adopted internal reforms to tighten controls over missile-related exports. such as those being developed by the United States. U. which are virtually identical to long-range missile programs. there continues to be con- cern over Russia’s role in helping India develop its advanced missile and space launch capabilities. as a result. The goal of the assistance would be to ensure Russia’s relation with a key potential ally in the Middle East. and. have led to a number of boastful statements. in addition to the desire to counter U.S. or con- tracts with. The United States has been highly vocal in its concern that Russian missile expertise is being exported to countries of proliferation concern.S. however. or whether the assistance is part of an official Russian government policy to aid Iran. espe- cially one with which the United States has no formal relations. the current level of missile production is quite low. and last a minimum of two years. In addition. These worries remain. has raised serious concern that Russia’s missile expertise may be assisting other countries in the production of advanced ballistic missile capabilities. authorizes the president to impose sanctions on companies that provide equipment or technology to Iran’s ballistic missile program (see table 6. antimissile efforts.S. Russian officials vigorously deny any formal assistance to Iran’s missile or nuclear weapons pro- grams.6).

January 12. People for Arms and Missile Sales to Iran. “U.pdf. Kristensen. 1.S.” Arms Control Today. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge. speech at Carnegie Endowment International Non-Proliferation Conference. national security adviser. These calculations are based on Nuclear Threat Initiative.S.” Agence France-Presse. Joseph Cirincione. Norris and Hans M. ed. The most recent group to be targeted for sanctions was Khazra Trading in September 2004. 3. .asp.” September 30. 2. 70–72.gov/duelfer/ Iraqs_WMD_Vol1. Director. 116–119. Charles Duelfer.91 N OTES 1.S. September 29. See the calculations in table 6.” available at www.cia. Sets.144 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6. Slaps Sanctions on 14 Firms. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraq’s WMD. 1999. Baltic State Technical University 2004 Baranov Engine Building Association Federal Scientific Research Center Altai Khazra Trading Vadim Vorobey SOURCES OURCES: Sandy Berger. Ibid. U. penal- ties have been lifted against five (INOR and Polyus in April 2000 and Europalace. Howard Diamond. March/April 2005.org/e_research/cnwm/charts/ cnm_funding_interactive_table. Robert S. available at www.foia. Imposes New Sanctions on Russia. “Clinton Vetoes Sanctions Bill.. 2004. 4. fourteen Russian entities sanctioned for missile proliferation since 1998. and MOSO in April 2004). 2004.nti.2. 5.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Grafit. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992–FY 2005. vol. pp. Sanctions against Russian Entities Year Organization 1998 Baltic State Technical University Europalace 2000 (sanctions lifted April 2004) Glavkosmos Grafit (sanctions lifted April 2004) INOR Scientific Center MOSO Company (sanctions lifted April 2004) Polyus Scientific Production Association 1999 Moscow Aviation Institute Mendeleyev University 2000 Yuri Savelyev. 2005. pp. 2000). June/July 1998.6. U.

S.cfm?fa=print&id=13823.S. D.C. 228. D. For Navy sites.gov/new. Department of Defense CTR program and 39 Russian Navy weapons storage sites identified by the National Nuclear Security Administration. 29. 19. Jon Wolfsthal et al. SIPRI. Discussions with DOD officials.state. DOD.org/publications/index. Nuclear Status Report.pdf. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. See also Amy F.edu/pubs/reports/tnw. 2001). D. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Washington. October 6. and p. p.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10. These figures include both mili- tary and civilian sites. 2004). 17.mil/toolbox/directorates/osi/programs/ops/ inf/index.htm. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook.” 26. Amy Smithson. p. 1999). 52. Norris and Kristensen. 70–72. 2001. Yearbook 1992: World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press. “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Ibid. U.” pp. “Executive Summary. “Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reduction in Nuclear Forces.. 28. “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Scare of 2001.items/ d03482. Woolf.” Helsinki.asp. eds. White House press conference transcript.nti. available at http://cns. 15. Russia 145 6.” chap. October 23. 27. 72–74. Rademaker. DOE has identified 243 buildings at 40 materials sites in Russia. 2 in Yearbook 1991. “Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Richard Fieldhouse et al. 18. 13. and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union (Washington. 10. available at www.org/c_press/c1_speeches. Defense Threat Resolution Agency. Woolf. 21. March 21.C.: GAO. 17. p.russianforces. 2003. footnote 51.org/factsheets/start2. U. 2004.. Arms Control Association. White House Fact Sheet.carnegieendowment.” chap. see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier.S. September 9. 24. Norris and Kristensen. Addi- tional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.” Carnegie Analysis May 14.cfm. U. available at www.” pp. 6 in Yearbook 1992. assistant secretary of state for arms control. 14. p. Acceptance Speech at Eisenhower Institute Awards Dinner.htm. “Nuclear Weapon Developments and Prolif- eration. Nikolai Sokov. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Stephen G. November 2001. Dunbar Lockwood and Jon Wolfsthal. Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal. Ibid. 11.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute. This figure is the sum of 52 Ministry of Defense weapons storage sites identified by the U. Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes.C. Fissile Material. “USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads” (table).S.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/37275.” Monterey Institute of Strategic Studies. START I Treaty. Harvard University. D. 25. available at www. Janu- ary 2003. 17. 8. p.” Congressional Research Service. 2004. Wolfsthal. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet. 35. 70. April 26. Press Roundtable at Interfax. . Department of Energy (DOE).C. SIPRI. Moscow. available at www. 175. Norris and Kristensen. 16. 2001. p. see U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council. Additional Russian Cooperation Needed.S. “START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance.. Yearbook 1991: World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press. See also Wolfsthal. Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons.armscontrol. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1992). 7. 2004. SIPRI. See also Pavel Podvig.. 70–72. Senator Sam Nunn. “Onsite Inspection Operations. “Nuclear Weapon Developments and Unilateral Reduction Initiatives. 9. p. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). GAO. 2001.” p. 23. 2001. available at www.” October 19. Report 32 (Washington.gao.org/eng/navy/. 1993).dtra. 24.” available at www.” pp.miis. Nuclear Status Report. GAO-03-482 (Washington. 2003). “SORT of a Treaty.” Fact Sheet. 54. 20.nrdc. available at www. For Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) numbers. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Stimson Center. 12.html.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom. 22. 1997. p. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. available at www. 34. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.asp. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.: Henry L.

D. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition. 51. available at http://cns. See IAEA. 47. 2004.C. 2005.” 1994.” p. 50. 56.: National Acad- emy of Science.” available at www. 2004. 11. March 1.pdf.html. 1. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget. 50 metric tons of plutonium in excess of defense needs. June 2004.pdf. See also David Albright.nti. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier.” Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. 2000.9/6. “Ma- terials Protection Control and Accounting. See Matthew Bunn. 48.miis.146 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 30.pdf.usec. 5.doe.” available at www.” 55. D. DOE. National Nuclear Security Administration.asp. Ibid. DOE.S. 53.” See also David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. 35.nti.C.asp.iaea. See also Willaim C. 41. pp. This estimate includes 95 metric tons of military plutonium. available at www.org/ global_stocks/tableofcontents. available at www.” ISIS. May 2005). including Second Line of Defense. White House transcript. August/September 1998.” Arms Con- trol Today. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress.g8usa. “Illicit Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” Nonproliferation Review. DOE. White House transcript.html.” June 2000.org/documents/fy06_ctr_annual_report_to_congress. “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. 447– 448. President Clinton. Thomas Neff. For a complete review of this program.doe. 54.mbe.” available at www. The full $150 million supplemental included funding for other programs managed by the MPC&A office. see Matthew Bunn.org/e_research/cnwm/ securing/mpca. 1994). pp. The actual number may not even be known in Russia. September 26. National Academy of Science. “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: Facts and Figures. Government Department. “Plutonium Watch: Tracking Plutonium Inventories.” available at www.S.” ISIS. p. 36. “Disposing of Surplus U. 52–54.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Fact_Figures. 34. 52. 45.asp. 32.htm. Fiscal Year 2006. “Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. November 13. 46–47. executive summary. “Military and Excess Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in the Acknowledged Nuclear Weapon States. available at www. June 11. DOD. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action. February 11. Plutonium Disposition Report (Washington. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).gov/budget/05budget/content/DEFNN/nn. 2001. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action. Volume 1.nnsa. Detailed Budget Justifications.isis-online. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative.org/ e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home. GAO.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Securing the Atom. 2004. International Atomic Energy Agency. Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Privatizing U. refer to Wolfsthal. available at www.S. Ibid.asp. 2003”. Statement delivered by Minatom Minister Mikhailov at 41st International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference. 2. 44.S. Bunn and Wier.gov/d_060904i.” .htm. p. June 25. January 10. “Civil Inventories of Highly Enriched Uranium. USEC Fact Sheet. Summer 2002. p. 42. 43. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Da- tabase: Subtotals by U. “Strategic Plan. Additional Russian Cooperation Needed.ransac.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92potsok. 8.2 metric tons of separated civil plutonium. March 31. 37. “Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. 33.org/e_research/ cnwm/securing/mayak. For more budget information.gov/na-26/pu. “Plutonium: The First Fifty Years. 40. Securing the Bomb 2005: New Global Imperatives (Washington. June 2004. Bunn and Wier. 38. 39.nti.–Russian HEU Deal Risk. and 38. 31. All ISIS documents are available at www. Nuclear Status Report. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1995. FY 1992–FY 2006”. “G8 Global Partnership Annual Report: G8 Senior Group. p. 49. Group of Eight. DOE. Speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. National Security: the U. p. INFCIRC/549/Add. available at www. DOE. 38. pp. 46. See also David Albright. Plutonium. 1997. Potter and Elena Sokova.com/v2001_02/html/megatons_fact.

63. Conference on States Parties.ru/ISTC/ sc. Russia 147 57. 67. 82. National Intelligence Council. 2003. 70. 2004. Also.html.pdf. 75.shtml.doe.sgpproject. 58.” available at www. 73. 1999. 68. October 24. 78.ru/ISTC/sc.” 80. although Belarus is still a party to the ISTC.int/about/structure/offices/ kyiv/index. Also. “Urgent Prob- lems of Chemical Weapons Disarmament in the Russian Federation. Production. “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Pro- liferation. 77.” Also.stcu. Nuclear Cities Initiative home page.nnsa..C. “Cooperative Threat Reduction. 72. ISTC. 74.org/docs/c8dec13.” p. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule to Eliminate Chemical Weapons Ar- senal by 2012. Conference on State Parties.gao. 69.” Global Security Newswire. 2003. 62.doe. DOE.gov/t/np/c12265. per- sonal communication with DOE staff. Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.state.” See also Viktor Kholstov. “Donor Fact Sheets.istc. 21–22.istc.nti. Moscow.” GAO-04-361.org/d_newswire/ issues/2004_11_19.” available at www.” available at www. November 19. available at www. 2000.stcu. the United States has not funded any new projects in Belarus since 1997.S.state.items/d04361.opcw. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons. Nartker. March 4. the decision to open the joint office in Tbilisi is contained in “Joint State- ment: STCU Governing Board Meeting.” February 2002. December 27.htm. First Re- view Conference Technical Secretariat Background Paper RC-1/S/6.htm. 59. White House Fact Sheet. National Nuclear Security Administration.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/18736. policy. GAO. V.int/docu- ments/gbm/gbm9. 60.htm. available at www. White House Fact Sheet. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule.stcu. Joe Fiorill. National Nuclear Security Administration. November 2001.nsf/html/profile-parties.” March 19. “Parties. Information about the STCU field offices is available at www. November 10. 7. Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex (Washington. Paula A.globalgreen. March 2004. “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 2001). 61.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.pdf. . 83. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Mike Nartker. September 22. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule. 76. 2003. 2003.cia.html.gov/nic/ special_russiannucfac. GAO. 2001. available at www. Ibid. 71. September 22.” Glo- bal Security Newswire. “Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.html#4215509C. article 4.istc. Nartker. 2003.org/html/global/docs_frameset. in accor- dance with U. 2004.shtml.nsf/html/public-info-fact-sheet.” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.ru/ISTC/sc.int/info/. ISTC Fact Sheet.” www.nsf/html/branch-offices.php.org/ Donor%20factsheets/Index. “Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise. available at www.” available at www.” available at www. International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance.” presentation at the Green Cross National Dialogue. “Branch Offices. available at www. available at www. p. “Notable Successes. available at www. June 4.gov/new. 64. 81. “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). December 15. 65.opcw.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill for Threat Reduction Programs. “U. Tikhonov.gov/na-20/ipp.S.” available at www. 20. Strengthening the Global Partnership. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. available at www. Fifth Session Decision Document C-8/Dec. 1998. p. Amy Smithson. available at www. D. 22. pp.org. 79. 66. 13. April 25. DeSutter. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative. “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.html.nnsa.htm.gov/na-20/nci/ about_success.

armscontrol.” pp. U. Navy director. available at http://intelligence.S. Bureau of Nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig. available at www.” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.senate. 91. Department of State. available at www.gov/0402hrg/ 040224/jacoby. Defense Intelligence Agency. February 24. “Fact Sheet: The U.” Arms Control Today.org/act/2004_03/Putin.S. Vice Admiral Lowell E. U. September 29. available at http:// russianforces. July 1– December 31. 2004. 88. Bio-Chem Redirect Program.shtml. available at www. 67– 68. Central Intelligence Agency. 2004. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 86. .” Agence France- Presse.cia.” August 17.S. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005. “Putin Boasts about Russian Military Capabilities. People for Arms and Missile Sales to Iran.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/ 721report_july_dec2003.state. “U. 2003”. Mike Eckel. For additional commentary on this issue.S. “Russia Developing New Nuclear Missile Systems. April 2004.” Associated Press. 2004.asp. “Changes in the Russian Strategic Forces. Slaps Sanctions on 14 Firms. 2004.org/eng/news/archive/000101. Wade Boese. March 2004. DOD. “Nuclear Necessity in Putin’s Russia. 85.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32398. Putin Says. November 17. Jacoby.htm. 87.” October 20. 89. 2004. see Rose Gottemoeller. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.pdf.148 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 84. 90.pdf.” Arms Control Today.

and plasma physics reactors. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Moscow and vicinity Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Fuel-cycle technology research/ Upgrades not yet Research Institute of Inorganic fissile material processing completed.5-MW research reactor. under No plans to conduct Biological Problems biological construction upgrades Institute of Theoretical and Research on heavy-water Upgrades not yet completed Experimental Physics applications for nuclear weapon production Electrostal Machine-building HEU fuel fabrication. 5 Upgrades completed June Physics Institute subcritical assemblies 1998. 7 critical assemblies completed.7. 2 subcritical assemblies Moscow Engineering and Educational institution 1 2. expected to be 1 Materials completed in 2005 Institute of Medical and Scientific research: medical and 1 research reactor. uranium HEU and LEU fuel production Upgrades not yet Plant conversion lines. 16 critical 2005 assemblies.Table 6. Russia (table continues on the following page) 149 .5-MW Upgrades completed Experimental Physics applications for nuclear weapon heavy-water research reactor February 1998 production Kurchatov Institute Research in solid-state physics. expected to be 2 completed in late 2006 Institute of Theoretical and Research on heavy-water 1 decommissioned 2. 10 research and power Upgrades completed May 3 fusion.

3 critical assemblies February 1998 Scientific Research Institute for R&D of radioelectronic instruments 5 nonoperational pulsed Upgrades not yet Instruments research reactors completed. 150 Table 6. 5 nonoperational plutonium Upgrades not yet spent-fuel storage and reprocessing production reactors. 2 HEU completed fueled tritium production reactors . Upgrades not yet D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Institute of Experimental Physics and development. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location Locationand Name andName Activity Activity Comments Comments MPC&A Status MPC&AStatus Scientific Research and Design Design of nuclear reactors for power 1 inactive (50 kW) research Upgrades completed Institute of Power Technology generation.7. research. naval propulsion reactor. Non-Proliferation completed (UNIIEF) Center Avangard Electromechanical Nuclear warhead assembly and No ongoing upgrades. expected to be 4 Lytkarino completed in 2005 Sarov (Arzamas-16) All-Russian Scientific Research Nuclear weapon design. Plant dismantlement part of plant closed under the Nuclear Cities 5 Initiative Osersk (Chelyabinsk-64) Mayak Production Association Warhead component production.

upgrades in progress Power reactor (part of the Power generation for city and Shutdown planned under NNSA Mining and Chemical Combine) production of weapons grade Elimination of Weapons Grade 6 plutonium Plutonium Production Program Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyark-45) Electrochemical Plant Uranium enrichment. HEU Centrifuge enrichment plant Upgrades completed in 7 downblending 2005 Zarechnyy (Penza-19) 8 START Production Association Nuclear warhead assembly and No ongoing upgrades dismantlement Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk-44) Urals Electrochemical Integrated Uranium enrichment Upgrades completed in 9 Plant 2005 (table continues on the following page) Russia 151 .Snezhinsk (Chelyabisnk-70) All-Russian Scientific Research Nuclear warhead research and design 3 pulse reactors Upgrades not yet Institute of Technical Physics completed (UNIITF) Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) Mining and Chemical Combine Spent-fuel storage and reprocessing 1 operational plutonium Construction of plutonium production power reactor (see storage facility in below) progress.

152 Table 6. up to 16 critical February 1998 assemblies . completed generation for city and production of a reprocessing plant. planned enrichment plant. 2 fast critical Upgrades completed Engineering nuclear power engineering assemblies. No ongoing upgrades dismantlement facility HEU downblending facilities Seversk (Tomsk-7) Siberian Chemical Combine Largest multi-function compound in 2 operational plutonium Upgrades not yet 11 the Russian nuclear complex. a uranium D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s weapons grade plutonium.7. plutonium pit site of MOX fuel fabrication fabrication facilities Power Reactors (part of the 2 operational plutonium production Power reactors shutdown Siberian Chemical Combine) power reactors planned under NNSA Elimination of Weapons Grade 12 Plutonium Production Program Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-36) 13 Instrument-making Plant Nuclear warhead assembly and Also produces ballistic missile No ongoing upgrades dismantlement reentry vehicles Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Research and development for 3 research reactors. power production reactors (see below). Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) 10 Elektrokhimpribor Combine Nuclear warhead production and Gas-centrifuge enrichment plant.

1 central Upgrades completed in 15 Association temperature uranium fuel elements storage facility 2003 Novosibirsk Novosibirsk Chemical HEU fuel fabrication for light–water HEU and LEU fuel production Upgrades completed in 16 Concentrates Plant reactors lines 2004 Gatchina Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Research on high-energy theoretical Operational 18-MW research Upgrades completed May Physics physics reactor. 3 critical Upgrades completed May Institute of Power Technology development assemblies. production and testing of high. 7 operational research reactors. expected to 17 be completed in 2005 Zarechnyy. Sverdlovsk oblast Scientific Research and Design Nuclear reactor design and 1 research reactor. Upgrades completed in 14 Institute of Physical Chemistry medical isotope production 1998 Dubna Joint Institute of Nuclear International scientific research Plutonium-fueled pulsed Upgrades completed Research center research reactor February 1998 Podolsk Luch Scientific Production R&D. Upgrades not yet Atomic Reactors spent-fuel reprocessing 2 critical assemblies completed. 3 research reactors. hot cells 1998 Russia (table continues on the following page) 153 .Karpov Scientific Research Research on chemical applications. MOX fuel fabrication. 100-MW research 1998 reactor under construction Dimitrovgrad Scientific Research Institute of Pilot plants.

waste Murmansk-140) management .and spent-fuel storage or June 1998 Tomsk Tomsk Polytechnical University Educational institution 1 research reactor. Upgrades completed May 18 fresh. decommissioned base nuclear submarine storage. nuclear (near Ostrovnoy. 154 Table 6. nuclear submarine defueling. 560 MWe Bn-600 fast-breeder reactor. formerly submarine defueling. waste management Gremikha-Yokanga Naval Base Former naval base.7. decommissioned nuclear submarine storage RTP Atomflot (2 km north of Operational nuclear-powered Upgrades completed Murmansk) icebreaker base. radioactive waste September 1999 processing and storage Gadzhiyevo Naval Base Operational naval base serving Northern Fleet’s largest SSBN nuclear submarines. Northern Fleet Ara Bay Naval Base (part of Operational naval base serving D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Vidyayevo Naval Base) nuclear submarines. fresh-fuel Upgrades completed July storage vault 1998 Navy Facilities. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Beloyarsky-3 Nuclear Power Plant.

10 nuclear submarines. waste management Severomorsk Naval Base Headquarters of the Northern Fleet. minimal submarine dismantlement activities Sayda Bay (near Gadzhiyevo) Decommissioned submarine storage. No upgrades planned Operational base serving two nuclear-powered battle cruisers Sevmorput Naval Shipyard No. waste SSBN. the Yury Dolgoruki. was completed Sevmash (Severodvinsk) management. 35 (Rosta district of Murmansk) decommissioned submarine storage. Olenya Bay Naval Base Operational naval base serving Upgrades completed nuclear submarines September 2000 Pala Bay Submarine Repair Nuclear submarine repair.Northern Machine Building START designated submarine The hull of the first Borey-class Upgrades not yet 20 Enterprise dismantlement facility. waste management Site 49 (Near Severomorsk) Fresh fuel storage facility Upgrades completed September 1999 (table continues on the following page) Russia 155 . waste Facility (Polyarnyy) management Polyarninskiy Shipyard. decommissioned (Polyarnyy) nuclear submarine storage. nuclear submarine laid down at Sevmash in construction facility November 1996. Nuclear submarine repairs. formerly Operational naval base serving Shkval Naval Shipyard No.

Operational naval base serving consists of four facilities: nuclear submarines.7. Nuclear submarine waste storage Upgrades completed Shkotovo Peninsula) January 2000 Chazhma Bay Repair Facility Fresh fuel storage (Site 34). 2000. Upgrades completed on as Vilyuchinskiy Shipyard #49 decommissioned nuclear submarine PM-74 ship in August (Kamchatka Peninsula) storage. submarine repair. no upgrades submarine repair and refueling planned for rest of facility . and September 2000 defueling. dismantlement facility Gornyak Shipyard. refueling. decommissioned Andreeva Bay. Pacific Fleet Amurskiy Zavod. Leninskiy SSBN and SSN construction. Bolshaya nuclear submarine storage. Malaya Lopatka. and management Nerpicha (Zaorzersk) Zvezdochka State Machine START-designated submarine Building Enterprise (Yagra Island) dismantlement facility. waste management D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Naval Facilities. 156 Table 6. and waste Lopatka. Upgrades completed 21 (Shkotovo Peninsula) submarine repair. waste management. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Zapadnya Litsa Naval Base. Komsomol Shipyard submarine repair (Komsomolsk-na-Amure) Cape Sysoyeva (Site 32. decommissioned nuclear submarine storage. also known Dismantlement facility.

decommissioned submarine and reactor compartment storage Razboynik Bay Decommissioned nuclear submarine and reactor compartment storage Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Operational naval base serving Base. Krasheninnikov Bay (near nuclear submarines Petropavlovsk. Kamchatka Peninsula) Zavety Ilyicha (Postavaya Bay) Former operational naval base.Pavlovsk Bay (Eastern edge of Main operational submarine base for Strelok Bay) Pacific Fleet. Department of Defense as part of CTR. decommissioned submarine storage Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard START-designated submarine Upgrades completed June (Bolshoy Kamen) dismantlement.S. waste management 2001 (work done by U. Petersburg) Construction of nuclear-propelled Upgrades not yet surface vessels completed (table continues on the following page) Russia 157 . not by DOE as part of MPC&A) Other Naval Facilities Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard Construction of submarines and naval (St. home port to several nuclear-powered ships. Petersburg) vessels Baltic Shipyard (St.

Petersburg) ABBREVIATIONS CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction program DOE U. naval and space vessels reactors completed formerly Zagorsk) Experimental Machine Building Nuclear reactor design 4 critical assemblies Design Bureau (Nizhniy Novgorod) Krylov Central Scientific R&D of nuclear reactors for naval 1 0. St. Department of Energy HEU highly enriched uranium kW kilowatts LEU low-enriched uranium MOX mixed-oxide fuel MPC&A material protection. 2 Upgrades completed 23 Research Institute (Krylov vessels critical assemblies November 1998 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Shipbuilding Institute.5-MW research reactor. control. and accounting MW megawatts MWe megawatts electric NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration R&D research and development SSBN nuclear ballistic missile submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty SSN nuclear-fueled submarine . 158 Table 6.7. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Central Physical-Technical Research on nuclear propulsion for At least 2 pulsed research Upgrades not yet 22 Institute (Sergiyev Posad.S.

DOE. Ibid. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. Author conversation with DOE official. GAO. 2005. 2001). Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons. GAO. 6. Detailed Budget Justifications. 17.. but the July 2001 DOE MPC&A Strategic Plan indicate that they would not be completed until late 2001. Author conversation with DOE official. 18. available at www. Ibid.gov. eds. appendix B. Volume 1. “U. 15. which also operates at Olenya Bay. See also Jon Wolfsthal et al. 19. Nuclear Status Report.pdf.” press release. Author conversation with DOE official. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving.doe. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. “Notable Successes.” say that upgrades were completed. Russia 22. 2.doe. 159 . 2001). 16. 20.nnsa.” press release. Ibid. 487. 35. 4. National Nuclear Security Administration. available at www. DOE. which also travels to Gornyak Shipyard. National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE. 7.S.gov/ na-20/nci/about_impact. 34. 3.gov/docs/PR_NA-04-34_Contract_signed_for_electricity_plant_in_EWGPP_program- shutting_down_pu_reactors_(12-04). GAO.” in The Nuclear Cities Initiative. p. National Nuclear Security Administration. National Nuclear Security Administration.” 13. DOE. available at www. Department of Energy (DOE) official. D. “NNSA Completes Security Upgrades at Nuclear Site in Moscow. and GAO. available at www.org/e_research/official_docs/doe/mpca2001. May 6. 21. The upgrades at Chazhma included upgrades on the PM-74 nuclear fuel service ship. 8. Signs Contract As Part of Effort to Permanently Shut Down Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia. Ibid. 10. Author conversation with DOE official.NOTES 1. Wolfsthal. Fissile Material.S.htm.: DOE. 2004. DOE. Author conversation with DOE official. National Nuclear Security Administration.nnsa.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute. MPC&A Program Strategic Plan (Washington. Ibid. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. Author conversation with U.shtml.nti. 34. December 20. Signs Contract. 5. D. 11. 9. The upgrades at Nerpa Shipyard were on the PM-12 nuclear fuel transfer ship.nnsa.C.S.” p. 23. 14. “U.” p.” p. Ibid..C. 12.doe. and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union (Washington.

.

.

.

1964. it is possible to estimate that China fields approximately 152 warheads on land.000- kilometer range) is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by Western stan- dards and is capable of reaching the continental United States.000 kilometers.500-kilometer range).and sea-launched missiles. 130 bomber weapons. China became a major supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to the developing world.2 China is developing and may have deployed the DF-31. short- range missiles. Currently. CHAPTER 7 China Nuclear Weapons Capability China is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and possesses enough nuclear material for hundreds of nuclear weapons (see table 7. a mobile. From these. only the DF-5 (13. although his- torically its progress has been slow and has lagged well behind foreign estimates. China conducted three flight tests of the DF-31. Aircraft and Missile Capabilities China is in the process of modernizing its strategic missile forces. mostly short. three-stage solid-fueled ICBM with an estimated range of 8. After developing its first nuclear weapon in 1964. Much of the unclassified information compiled on China’s forces is from unverified media reports and occasional statements by intelligence or government officials. Although China deploys several types of ballistic missiles. China has not officially released details about the size or composition of its nuclear arsenal. and the last on July 29. but they are now a relatively minor aspect of the United States–China relationship. and other weapons.1 at the end of the chapter). the first of which took place on October 16. China has approximately 400 nuclear weapons and various delivery platforms. China deploys approximately 20 DF-5 ICBMs and 12 DF-4 intermediate-range mis- siles (5. these efforts have achieved important progress. Proliferation is- sues exist. 1996.and medium-range mis- siles. the last one on 163 . and 120 weapons on artillery. The United States and other countries have worked to draw China step-by-step into the international nonproliferation regime. Over three decades. China has conducted 45 nuclear weapons tests.1 Beijing also maintains a fairly extensive nuclear weapons production and research complex. China has signed but not yet ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Approximately 20 Chinese weapons are deployed on missiles that can reach the continental United States. making estimates difficult to develop.

Department of Defense estimates that the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting the United States “could increase to around 30 by 2005 and may reach up to 60 by 2010. Following its first nuclear test in 1964.8 China is also developing the Julang-2. a solid-fueled ICBM with a range of 12. the NPT . It declared under the terms of the CWC that it previously had a chemical weapons program but that it destroyed those agents before joining the treaty.5 The U.12 Having been isolated by the West after the Communist revolution in 1949.3 One source concludes that 8 missiles were deployed in 2004. however.164 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s January 2002.11 There is no publicly available evidence of such weapons. appear to have been canceled in favor of an extended-range version of the DF-31. but it has converted some to con- ventionally armed missiles.800-kilometer range). to the United States.S. Questions about the security and accountability of the weapons and materials are particularly important. with a range of 3.S.100 kilometers.10 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability China is believed by U.7 China also has 48 DF-21As (1. intelligence to possess chemical and biological weap- ons research and development programs. it has a large nuclear weapons and material production complex. China has only one bal- listic missile submarine.9 China purchased 24 Su-30 fighter aircraft and SA-20 sur- face-to-air missile systems from Russia in 2004. but these are not thought to have been modified for a nuclear role. China was also isolated from the evolving international frame- work of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and from the collaboration that pro- duced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1950s. As a nuclear weapon state. a submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) based on the DF-31. the DF-31A. which has never left coastal waters and is not operational. China is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has denied having any biological warfare programs. There are some reports that a new missile submarine may be ready to enter service in the next few years. China. however. China began a slow but steady process of developing a full-fledged nuclear weapons infrastructure and strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal.000 kilometers.”6 China’s medium-range ballistic missiles include an aging force of 40 DF-3As (2. the DF-41.900-kilometer range) that it is phasing out after 30 years in service.4 Plans to develop another land-based missile. has also been a major supplier of nuclear technology and equipment in the develop- ing world. Nuclear Analysis China is of particular nonproliferation importance in two ways. and some offensive chemical weap- ons. These weapons and materials are of concern to its neighbors. and other potential adversaries. China’s bomber force consists mainly of aging H-6 aircraft based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger bomber. and its past behavior in the nuclear and missile fields was a significant nonproliferation concern.

14 Major efforts have been made over the past 25 years to persuade China to modify its approach formally. and Sudan because its booming . and Soviet power. China has. and North Korea. where this theme once had some appeal as a rallying point for anti- imperialism. particularly in the developing world. In October 2004. and the development of nuclear export control guidelines in the 1970s. Angola. gives us much more weight in these negotiations. encouragement. 1994. Despite China’s de facto commitments in 1992.13 Through the 1970s. which it still saw as limiting U. (China has also signed oil deals with Brazil. the People’s Republic of China adopted a posture that rhe- torically favored nuclear weapons proliferation. China signed oil and gas contracts with Iran worth an estimated $100 to $200 billion. while urging it to make economic assistance to North Korea conditional on Pyongyang’s cooperation in the six-party talks designed to end its nuclear activities. Depart- ment of State’s former director for policy planning. North Korea. In the early years.S.”16 During an April 2004 visit to China. evident in China’s accession to the Zangger Committee in October 1997 and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May 2004 and in greatly reduced technology transfers. but it is still a work in progress and has not yet become completely effective. Vice President Dick Cheney spoke approvingly of China’s increased commitment to the nonproliferation regime. China’s policy was not to oppose nuclear pro- liferation. apparently over China’s failure to meet fully their nonprolif- eration standards. and 1998 to uphold the nonproliferation regulations of the MTCR. bringing it into closer alignment with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states. the thirty-four members of the MTCR rejected China’s bid to become a member. China 165 in the late 1960s. Chinese state-owned corporations continued to engage in illicit nuclear arms transfers to Pakistan. and Libya. he said. has charac- terized China as the “mediator” between North Korea and the U. Mitchell Reiss. And so to get [it] on board . China’s practical approach to the export of nuclear and military goods did not. however.15 A domestic export control system has developed with constant U. After China be- gan to open to the West in the 1970s. . which originated in 1987 as a Western arrangement to exchange in- formation on and restrain the exports of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. China was also ex- cluded from the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). . These efforts have produced demonstrable results. at their meeting in Seoul. In November 2004. in discus- sions.S. Iran. “the most influence on the North. As a Communist power during the Cold War. conform to the standards of the international nonproliferation regime. China plays a central role in both the North Korean and Iranian proliferation crises. The U.S. Many experts believe that China’s entry into the MTCR could deter it from proliferating its nuclear-related materials to countries such as Iran. its rhetorical position gradually shifted to one that opposes nuclear proliferation.S.17 China’s relationship with Iran has become a greater concern as China’s eco- nomic relationship with that country grows. Pakistan.The United States believes that ending North Korea’s nuclear program depends heavily on China’s ability to pressure Pyongyang.

intelligence assessments. Should China’s concerns about its security substantially increase.S. China’s Nuclear Weapons China is slowly modernizing its strategic nuclear forces but still has the least advanced nuclear arsenal of the five declared nuclear weapon states.to 5- megaton warhead.” according to U. The 12 Dong Feng–4 missiles “are almost certainly intended as a retaliatory deterrent against targets in Russia and Asia.N. and develop and deploy (and possibly sell) countermeasures to defeat antimissile systems. Security Council for possible sanctions. In addition. and is not currently operational. mobile missiles with intercontinental ranges. though they did not explicitly say that they would veto such a resolu- tion. China’s sea-based force (one Xia submarine armed with twelve medium-range ballistic missiles) does not pose a credible threat to either Moscow or Washington. . The United States theoreti- cally would then have the ability to destroy or defeat China’s deterrent force. It sees Iran and North Korea not as threats that must be confronted but as problems that can be managed through flexible and patient diplomacy. China currently has the capability to strike U. together with advanced theater antimissile systems sold to America’s Asian allies. it would likely increase its number of deployed warheads. and if military modernization were given preference over economic modernization. Chinese officials announced that they would not support an effort to bring Iran to the U. A national antimissile system designed to counter strikes on the United States. cities with a force of approxi- mately 20 long-range Dong Feng–5 missiles. is considered vulnerable to modern antisubmarine warfare techniques.) The time needed to launch these liquid-fueled ICBMs. but neither does it want U. The Chi- nese doctrine is centered on the maintenance of a “minimum nuclear deterrent” capable of launching a retaliatory strike on a small number of countervalue tar- gets (such as cities) after an adversary’s nuclear attack. actions to increase instability in areas vital to its economic development.S. The design and deploy- ment of China’s nuclear forces appear consistent with the declared policy and have been shaped by two key concerns: the survival of a second-strike capability and the potential deployment of antimissile systems. could greatly complicate China’s nuclear planning.166 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s economy has stimulated a huge and growing need for natural resources.S. China has historically been particularly concerned about the potential development of antimissile systems.20 To overcome these concerns. The Xia has never sailed outside China’s territorial waters. a lack of hardened missile silos. China is not looking for a confrontation with the United States over Iran. each armed with a single 4. increase its production of planned systems.)18 Shortly after concluding the Iran oil deal. China has been pursuing the development of smaller.19 (China has 80–100 other missiles that could strike tar- gets in Eurasia. but the missiles could strike parts of Alaska and the Hawaiian island chain. and a lack of missile mobility have raised concern in the Chinese leadership about the survivability of these forces. Because of its limited second-strike capabilities.

a development that had not been expected before 2010. appear to have been canceled in favor of a longer-range version of the DF-31. solid-fueled ICBMs over the next fifteen years.S. 2004. China has approximately 120 Hong-6s. and equipped with various penetration aids to defeat missile defenses. National Intelli- gence Estimate concluded that that China could field between 75 and 100 war- heads on MIRVed. The first Chinese test of a multiple-warhead missile took place in September 1984. road-mobile missile with a range of 8. its current me- dium-range bomber.S. also solid-fueled and road-mobile but less developed. Exact deployment numbers are unknown. While similar tests have been conducted on several missile types since then (including November 2000 and January 2002 tests of the DF-31 with decoy warheads).26 STRATEGIC BOMBERS.22 The DF-31 is designed to be a solid-fueled. Plans to develop a 12. with two new land-based ICBMs.25 Each submarine could be armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs. Press reports on December 3. China does not currently have an operational submarine capable of launch- ing ballistic missiles. deploying a new-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine. were centered on China’s in- terest in developing smaller warheads for future MIRVed missiles.27 It is based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger of 1950s vintage. and deploying more nuclear-powered submarines. the H-7. the DF-41. but the official could not confirm whether any were ready for deployment.600 miles.000- kilometer land-based missile.000 kilometers.29 China purchased 24 . however. with a range of 8.23 This missile may be deployed near 2010 as the DF-5 leaves service. which erupted in 1999. China 167 China’s concerns over the U.100 kilometers and can carry up to three nuclear bombs. though not the continental United States.000 kilometers and a potential MIRV capability. ICBMS. defense official that China had launched a Type 094 submarine with a range in excess of 4. cited claims by an unnamed U.21 China is thought to have been developing smaller warheads when it ended its nuclear test program before signing the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. and it has a range of 3. but a 2002 U. and allegations over nuclear espionage by China against the United States.S.28 The Chinese air force flight tested a more modern medium-range bomber. and potentially the DF-4s.24 SLBMS. China plans by 2010 to have modernized its nuclear forces by developing a new generation of strategic and possibly substrategic weapons on various delivery platforms. both mobile and in hardened silos. Some of the newer DF-5s may remain in service past that date. Strategic Defense Initiative announced in 1983 reportedly spurred its plans to develop multiple-warhead technology. its progress has been slow and lagged well behind foreign estimates. which experts now believe to have a nuclear role. Historically. no missile currently deployed is thought to carry multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The planned improvements of China’s land-based forces include the re- placement of the aging force of DF-5s. capable of reaching parts of Alaska and Hawaii. The JL-2 is based on the DF-31 missile and has been under development since the 1980s.

and accounting (MPC&A) system. The primary loca- tions of nonweaponized fissile material are believed to be China’s facilities for plutonium production and uranium enrichment as well as its research institutes for nuclear weapons and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities across the country. Their locations and the amounts of China’s nonweaponized fissile material. The exact size of China’s fissile material stock is unknown because Beijing has not disclosed it or the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile.37 In 1996. China’s Fissile Material Stockpile A frequently overlooked proliferation issue in China is its large stockpile of weapons-usable fissile material. Information on China’s MPC&A system is scarce. but they were suspended in the wake of allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage in the Wen Ho Lee case in 1999.S. Jiuquan and Guangyuan. reportedly devel- oping an air-launched cruise missile. and con- trols all fissile material for civilian as well as military applications. Plutonium weapons might require 3 to 4 kilograms on average. The China National Nuclear Corpora- tion (which has the status of a government ministry) “produces.35 China presumably has stored its residual fissile material stocks at various nuclear facilities. and it is estimated that China uses 20 to 30 kilograms per weapon.33 China produced weapons-usable enriched uranium from 1964 until 1987 at two sites. Analysts estimate that China has produced between 3 and 7 metric tons of weapons-grade pluto- nium and between 15 and 25 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. nor is the level of security at the storage sites. but the United States has been concerned about it enough to initiate discussions on China’s MPC&A (among other issues) between the national nuclear laboratories in both coun- tries. however. from 1968 until 1991. have not been declared and are not specifically known. national laboratories ranked China’s MPC&A system as better than that of the Soviet Union before it collapsed. Although the situation in China seems stable at present. China is.34 Plutonium was also produced at two sites. It is unlikely that China will invest substantial resources in its airborne nuclear capability unless it is able to purchase the T-22M Backfire from Russia. Contacts between the nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States and China were developing beginning in 1994.32 Chinese weapons are believed to be heavily dependent on weapons-grade uranium. there is no evidence that China made such modifications. however.168 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s multirole Su-30 aircraft and an Su-27/Flanker aircraft “kit” from Russia. an expert at one of the U. increased political and economic strain could raise the risk of the diver- sion of fissile material from China’s nuclear complex. Lanzhou and Heping.”36 It is esti- mated that about fourteen sites associated with China’s nuclear weapons program have significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile material.31 China is believed to have ended its production of plutonium for weapons in 1991 and of uranium for weapons in 1987.30 Al- though these multirole aircraft can be configured to have a nuclear role. control. stores. China . Little is known about the state of China’s material protection. Although China’s MPC&A system is modeled after the Soviet system.

an American scientist at Los Alamos laboratory. “These codes and their associated data bases and the input file. 1999. • The stolen U. China has renewed efforts to improve international cooperation with the United States to install laboratory-to-laboratory collaboratives to coordinate advanced safeguard techniques between the nations. three-volume. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermo- nuclear weapons on a par with our own. it faded in 1999. House of Representatives chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif. corporations while using Chinese rockets to launch U. was arrested under suspicion of espionage. since the September 11.S. combined with someone that knew how to use them. a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratories. China lacks the resources to modernize its MCP&A tech- nology.).S. and filed its report on January 3. could.S. . . The committee turned to the matter of Chinese espionage on October 21. Wen Ho Lee. terrorist attacks. theft. Government investigators have identified a suspect. then–associate director for nuclear weapons at Los Alamos. Some political leaders believed the investigation might lead to impeachment charges against then-president Bill Clinton. . or PRC] to design.40 The committee spent most of its time in 1998 investigating charges that criti- cal technology had been transferred to China by major U.S. declassified report on May 25. . Also. China’s MPC&A system is vulnerable to “insider” theft. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U. . government laboratory. in my opinion.S. The committee released a glossy. 2001. thermonuclear warheads. testified at Lee’s bail hearing. However. Stephen Younger. Although it was a major political issue during much of 1998. that concluded: • These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories en- abled the [People’s Republic of China.S. 1998. questions remain about the level of protection at China’s nuclear facilities. . The report led to sensational charges. Still.S.S.38 Alleged Chinese Nuclear and Missile Espionage United States–China relations were rocked in 1999 by reports that China had stolen the designs of the most advanced U. China 169 commissioned a computerized “national nuclear materials accounting system” at about twelve nuclear facilities to improve its ability to prevent the illegal loss. 1999.”39 The story was based on leaks from a special investiga- tive committee in the U. 1999. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons. concluded taking testimony on the issue from three witnesses on November 15. develop and suc- cessfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. satellites. China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs. The New York Times launched the scandal in a March 6. “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from a U. nuclear warheads. . • The stolen U. story that claimed. or transfer of nuclear materials.

The administration did so. conferences and publications. the alleged spy. particularly to Pakistan. . In April 1999. . Since opening a dialogue with China in the early 1970s. including the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA). As the political fires cooled. A criminal inves- tigation of the charges was resolved in January 2002 with a fine against the Loral Corporation for its failure to follow proper declassification procedures before providing a report to Chinese officials who sought information on launch fail- ures. the aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent mod- ernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons de- ployment. declassified U. contact with U. but has not done so.S. During the 1980s and 1990s. the supreme national interest. • China has had the technical capability to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system for its large. China’s Commitment to the Nonproliferation Regime Drawing China into the nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes has been a long-term process. the United States has used a range of positive incentives and disincentives to encour- age China to sign on to the various unilateral and multilateral commitments that make up the regime. change the global strategic balance. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined. chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah and including General Brent Scowcroft and John Foster. most experts agreed with the concerned but cautious inde- pendent assessment. They represent the gravest possible security risk to . To date.S. This net assessment reached three critical conclusions: • China’s technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and un- classified information derived from espionage. China’s nuclear-related exports.” He added. nuclear weapons information. • Significant deficiencies remain in the Chinese weapons program. The case brought against Lee. . was dropped in 2001 after he was held for months in solitary confinement.S.42 This assessment contradicted the central claims of the Cox report. An independent panel of nuclear experts.170 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s in the wrong hands.43 Neither the Bush administration nor the Senate or House of Representa- tives has raised anew any of the allegations in the Cox report. the panel issued its report. . then reviewed their damage assessment. and Chinese indigenous development. currently deployed ICBM for many years. . Federal Bureau of Investigation. forming a team of officials from the intelligence and investigative agencies. weapons information. . and nuclear labo- ratories. unauthorized media dis- closures.”41 The Cox committee report recommended that the executive branch conduct a comprehensive damage assessment on the implications of China’s acquisition of U. and other countries’ scientists. . . were of major international proliferation . “They en- able the possessor to design the only objects that could result in the military defeat of America’s conventional forces.

China 171 concern. pledg- ing to strengthen ties with the group. U. The certification concluded that “the People’s Republic of China has provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United States that it is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state. beginning with its accession to the NPT in 1992. These exports and other issues have provoked several serious crises in United States–China relations and triggered repeated congressional demands for sanctions.45 It is still not a full partner to the MTCR and may not be fully observant of the revised guidelines of 1993. however. These steps.”47 Sensitive Nuclear Exports The continuing nature of China’s role as an international supplier of nuclear technology to weapons programs is in question.46 Under direct U. China disregarded international norms in the 1980s by selling nuclear materials to such countries as Argentina. promulgation of expanded ex- port controls.”48 Given China’s his- tory of exports to weapons programs. have been a leading cause of concern. 2004. and again on June 1–2. In the matter of chemical weapons. Pakistan. and strengthened oversight mechanisms. pressure. without requiring the items be placed under IAEA safeguards. “Over the past several years.S. but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern. Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commit- ments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes. its cessation of nuclear weapons explosive testing. Intelligence officials in 2004 concluded.44 It held talks to consider joining the MTCR on Feburary 20.–China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. China’s nuclear exports to two particular countries. China. in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the mate- rial and components for such devices. Pakistan and Iran. 2004. even if the items in question were not intended for or were diverted for nonpeaceful ends. China has moved to establish a domestic legal system to control sensitive nuclear exports by private or semiprivate Chinese entities. sensitive nuclear technology as part of the implementation of the 1985 U. while imperfect.S. were sufficient by 1998 for the United States to certify that China could be trusted to safeguard U. its signature (1993) and ratification (1997) of the Chemical Weapons Convention. and South Africa. any sensitive nuclear exports by China are likely to be interpreted as contradicting its pledges to conform to international standards. China and the Australia Group held discussions on export control. 2004. China is a member of the Zangger Committee and acceded to the Nuclear Suppliers Group on May 28. made notable strides in the 1990s by joining formal arms control and nonproliferation regimes. . China has supported multilateral negotiations on a fissile material production cutoff con- vention. It may also have a unilateral interpretation of certain guidelines. India. China has not joined the Australia Group. either directly or indirectly. and its signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996. and it had acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984.S.S. but in March 2004. China has softened its stance toward “informal” multilateral control arrange- ments.

China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program may have been critical to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons breakthroughs in the 1980s. Libya turned over to U. they would serve to train personnel in a sensitive nuclear activity. China provided Iran with three zero-power and one very small (30- kilowatt-thermal) research reactor.172 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s PAST EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN. and U. and Iran agreed in 1992 to purchase two 300-MWe pressurized-water reactors from China. and Chasma.S.53 China pledged to the United States that it would not export heavy water for the Khusab reactor.58 China and Iran signed a ten-year nuclear cooperation agreement in 1990.55 China will also proceed with plans to build the Chasma II reactor. the PARR I and PARR I. . Questions remain about contacts be- tween Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.52 Since June 2000.S. government officials state that IAEA safe- guards will apply. the United States concluded that China had assisted Pa- kistan in developing nuclear explosives. Pakistan has not accepted full-scope safeguards as its official govern- ment policy. While calutrons in those num- bers would not themselves produce fissile uranium in significant quantities. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta. China has also assisted Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program. Khusab has been producing between 8 and 10 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium a year. China’s close ties proved useful as Chinese officials played a quiet but— according to U.51 China also assisted Pakistan with the construction of an unsafeguarded 50.56 China does not appear to have supplied any new weapons technology to Pa- kistan.”50 In February 2004. In the early 1980s.S.59 . but it has accepted IAEA safeguards for the KANUPP power reactor. circumventing the nuclear trade embargo on Pakistan observed by members of the Nuclear Suppli- ers Group.57 EXPORTS TO IRAN.S.to 70-megawatt-thermal (MWt) plutonium production reactor at Khusab. and the completion of a plutonium-reprocessing facility at Chasma that had been started with French assistance in the early 1970s. China is believed to have supplied Pakistan with the plans for one of its earlier nuclear bombs and possibly to have provided enough highly enriched uranium for two such weapons. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: “Prior to China’s [1992] accession [to the NPT]. the U. as well as two or three small calutrons (electromagnetic isotope separation machines).54 China in 1995 also sold Paki- stan ring magnets used on centrifuges for enriching uranium at the A. The NSG allows members to fulfill agreements made before their accession to the group. but when reports in 1998 claimed China was transferring an excess of heavy water to the KANUPP reactor.S. China has also been a principal supplier of nuclear technol- ogy to Iran. officials Chinese nuclear bomb designs that it had received from Pakistan’s illicit nuclear black market. suspected that it may be rerouted to fuel the military reactor at Khusab. . . by helping build a 300-megawatt-electric (MWe) power reactor at Chasma. Q.49 According to an August 1997 report by the U. diplomats—crucial role in supporting Pakistan and coordi- nating with the United States after the September 11 attacks. This reactor will be placed under IAEA safeguards as a condition-of- supply under the existing China–Pakistan agreement for peaceful nuclear coop- eration.

Russia agreed to supply light-water nuclear reactors to Iran and to help Iran finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. China signed agreements with Algeria that covered the second and third stages of nuclear cooperation between the countries. and an agreement on safe- guards for this purpose was signed in February 1992. United States pressure has made a differ- ence. According to the State De- partment.63 Yet it seems that these activities were carried out in accordance with the NPT and under IAEA safeguards. a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman acknowledged that “the implementation of the agreements between China and Iran on nuclear cooperation has ceased. In 1966.”62 China continued until 1997. China has also provided nuclear assistance to Algeria. to assist Iran in constructing a plant near Isfahan to produce uranium hexafluoride. In October 1997. which they said made their work more difficult.61 A few months later. Algeria agreed to place it under IAEA safeguards. Iranian officials expressed their frustration at the abrupt end to the Chinese assistance. At any rate. China 173 The United States has led an international effort to prevent the supply of nuclear technology to Iran and has placed pressure on China (and other suppli- ers) to cancel nuclear deals with Iran. . the material fed into gas centri- fuges for enrichment. Chinese technicians were assisting Iran with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thus the reactor has been subject to IAEA inspections since its inauguration in December 1993. intelligence assessments note that “al- though the Chinese appear to have lived up to these commitments.66 China is helping to construct the Algerian Center of Nuclear Energy Research.S. By 1995. the administration is seeking to address these questions with appro- priate Chinese authorities. Iran had still not been able to produce finished zirconium or uranium hexafluoride of ad- equate quality for use in centrifuges. During a visit to these facilities by one of the authors in March 2005. Another factor in this retrenchment may have been Russia’s competition as an alternative supplier.65 Shortly after the reactor was discovered and publicized in April 1991. in September 1995 China finally agreed to “suspend for the time be- ing” its reactor sale to Iran.”64 EXPORTS TO ALGERIA. China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on the uranium conversion facility and not to undertake any new cooperation with Iran after completion of the two existing projects—the zero-power reactor and a zirco- nium production plant. the Chinese-built heavy machinery was clearly in evidence. Opposition from the United States to China’s reactor contract probably also played a part. such as uranium mining and processing and fuel fabrica- tion. U.60 Iranian shortages of capital may have been a third factor. there were signs that China’s nuclear cooperation with Iran was being scaled back. under an agreement that dates back to 1983. which had been abandoned by German contractors during the Iran-Iraq War. which will be placed under IAEA safeguards. we are aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised ques- tions about its ‘no new nuclear cooperation’ pledge. As of early 2005. involved the secret construction of the Es Salam 15-MWt research reactor at Ain Oussera. The first stage of this cooperation. however.

allow IAEA environmental sampling.174 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Algeria has also built a hot-cell facility capable of separating plutonium and connected it by a covered canal to the Es Salam research reactor. Unlike in the nuclear arena. the Bush administration placed sanctions on thirteen foreign companies. By the summer of 1997. China was not involved in the creation of the MTCR and for many years resisted being held to its standards. Pakistan. Over time—through the application of sanctions required under U. Saudi Arabia. In June 1991. China’s role as a provider of missile and missile- related technology to several countries has been a controversial issue in overall relations with the United States and other countries.S. Iraq. there are no international treaties that prohibit the export of ballistic missiles and related equipment. While Algeria formally acceded to the NPT in January 1995 and signed an agreement on safeguards with the IAEA in May 1996.” Washington took this confirmation to mean that China would not export either the M-9 or the M-11 missile. China was believed to have transferred key compo- nents for the short-range.68 PAST EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN. officials that Algeria will operate the facility under safeguards. The hot-cell facility was declared to the IAEA in 1992. but that some Western officials believe may be intended as a large-scale reprocessing facility. five of which were Chinese. Libya. China reportedly has aided the missile programs of Iran.67 Of additional interest is a larger facility nearby that Algeria has not declared to the IAEA as a nuclear facility.” In May 2004. for export- ing nuclear-related materials to Iran. Sensitive Missile Exports As with its nuclear exports. If it were used in conjunction with a boosted output of the Es Salam reactor.S. the United States imposed MTCR Category II sanctions against entities in Pakistan and China for missile technol- ogy transfers. The CIA stated in 2003 that “although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and indi- viduals on the new missile-related export regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003. China’s nuclear coopera- tion with the country remains sensitive in light of Algeria’s interest in reprocess- ing facilities and its past lack of candor. however. satellites on Chinese commercial space launch vehicles—China did agree to abide by some terms of the MTCR. and with the incentive of licensing the launch of U.S. and will not build up an inventory of separated pluto- nium from spent fuel. IAEA inquiries appeared to satisfy U. and Syria. nuclear-capable M-11 surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s. law for the export of missiles and equipment. These sanctions were lifted in March 1992 after the United States received written confirmation from China that it would abide by the MTCR “guidelines and parameters. North Korea. it could produce up to 5 kilograms of plutonium a year. . although the extent of that assistance has been greatly reduced in recent years.

using blueprints and equipment supplied by China. In June 1995.69 It was said that those missiles.S. along with maintenance facilities and missile launchers. and to abide by the “guidelines and parameters” of the MTCR.S. China pledged to the United States that it would not export C-801s and C-802s. or of the production technology for missiles covered by the MTCR would be a major violation of MTCR guidelines and.72 He also said that the United States could not make the determination that complete.71 In April 1997.70 A Chinese supply of complete missiles. operational missiles had been transferred. was then expected to be operational in one or two years. according to U. State Department official Robert Einhorn reiterated the Clinton administration’s concerns over Chinese transfers of missile-related com- ponents. China has also played a role in Iran’s efforts to set up an indig- enous ballistic missile development and production program.S. One quoted a recent U. technology. such a determination would require a “high evi- dentiary standard” because the consequences of sanctions on U. U. law. China has been a supplier to Iran of antiship cruise missiles (Silkworms. rocket fuel ingredients. Press reports in the fall of 1996 revealed new evidence of additional Chinese transfers of complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan. More recently. China and Pakistan have both denied the existence of the missile plant. located near Rawalpindi.74 In August 1996. and Iran is modifying additional fast- attack craft to launch the missiles. In addition. China has sold ten fast-attack craft armed with C-802 antiship cruise missiles to Iran. would trigger Category I sanctions—which could block all trade between the United States and Chinese aerospace and electronics firms. C-801s. dating back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. solid-fuel missiles based on the Chinese-designed M-11. and C-802s). In 1997. The factory. China 175 But reports surfaced that China had again transferred complete M-11s to Pakistan in late 1992. Even more disturbing in the report was the conclusion that Pakistan. west of Lahore. and computerized machine tools to Iran to assist that country in improving imported ballistic missiles and in producing its own missiles. and production technology to Pakistan.S. These sanctions were lifted in October 1994 after China again promised not to export M-11 or similar mis- siles.” could be unpacked. although not “operational. The Clinton administration again imposed Category II sanctions on Pakistan and China in August 1993. firms would be highly damaging. The CIA reported in 2003 that Chinese entities continued to assist Pakistan in the “serial production of solid-propellant [short-range bal- listic missiles] and supported the development of solid-propellant [medium-range ballistic missiles]. mated with launchers.75 China has transferred short-range CSS-8 ballistic missiles to Iran. Na- tional Intelligence Estimate that indicated that Pakistan already had roughly three dozen M-11s stored in canisters at the Sargodha Air Force Base.”73 EXPORTS TO IRAN.76 China has improved relations with . the China Precision Engineering Institute reportedly agreed to sell missile guidance equipment to Iran. had begun construction of a factory in late 1995 that was capable of producing short-range. the CIA had reportedly concluded that China had delivered guidance systems. and made ready for launch in 48 hours.

Its current program is largely based on technology that was developed before it became a state party to the BWC. Nevertheless. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment. and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. produced.78 Nevertheless. most recently in December 2004. Syria also has received Chinese assistance for its ballis- tic missile program. technology. Several hundred Chinese tech- nicians maintain the missiles at their bases at Al Sulayyil and Al Leel. 1994. but China has supplied Syria with technical expertise for its missile program and ingredients for solid rocket fuel.”84 Chinese sales of biological weapon–related technology from China remain a concern. PAST EXPORTS TO SAUDI ARABIA. and Saudi Arabia has been looking for replacements for some time. only the capability to produce such weap- ons. or stockpiled biological weapons. In 1988. officials do not allege that China has biological weapons.83 Research involving biological weapons is also al- legedly “being conducted at two ostensibly civilian research facilities known to be under de facto military control. the United States has received reports that Chinese firms . Chemical and Biological Weapons Analysis Official Chinese government statements consistently claim that China never researched. China released a white paper listing a comprehensive set of export controls that reiterated many of those stated in the MTCR.79 The CIA reported in 2003 that “ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union.77 In 2002.176 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s the United States by making de facto commitments to halt missile-related trans- fers in 1992. U.”80 PAST EXPORTS TO SYRIA. A 1988 deal to sell Syria the M-9 missile was apparently canceled under pressure from the United States. Although China had deployed these missiles earlier in its own arsenal with nuclear warheads. It is widely believed nevertheless that the Chinese declarations are inaccurate and that China retains a limited biological warfare research capability despite Beijing’s accession to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984. and expertise.82 U. 1998. China’s biotechnical infrastruc- ture and munitions production facilities are sufficient to develop. China supplied Saudi Arabia with 30 or more DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles. and 2002.81 China has also sold Silkworm antiship cruise missiles to Iraq. missile sanctions laws could be triggered if China or Saudi Arabia were to arrange transfers of CSS-2 replace- ments. According to former secretary of state Madeleine Albright. These missiles are near the end of their operational life. 2000.S. produce. North Korea. the United States placed sanctions on 28 Chinese companies or individuals. and weaponize biological agents.S. China is believed to have begun its biological weapons program in the 1950s. Chinese and Saudi officials insist that the missiles transferred to Saudi Arabia were equipped only with conventional warheads.

aerial bombs.88 Upon ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997. China. Beijing is seeking to restrain .S.92 In May 1997. In 2002.89 Other reports contend that China’s “current inventory is believed to include the full range of traditional chemical agents. mortars. The United States has on numerous occasions sanctioned Chinese companies and individu- als for chemical weapons proliferation activities. China an- nounced that it had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 listed by the Australia Group but not prohibited by the CWC. In 1940.87 Joint Chinese-Japanese efforts to destroy the stockpiles of mustard. and phosgene munitions continue. Chemical exports to Iran are of particular concern.”91 China’s chemical industry is able to manufacture numerous chemicals relevant to chemical weapons production. but it is less clear if China retains actual weapons. cholera bacteria. Japan established a large biological warfare research and testing facility in Manchuria. including nerve agent precursors. officials maintain that is does.000 fatalities and 80. Known as Unit 731. China also main- tains a broad range of delivery systems for chemical agents. a legacy of the former Japanese army’s occupation.86 In 1992. China reportedly delivered 400 metric tons of chemicals to Iran. China revealed that more than 2 million chemical weapons had been abandoned in several sites on its territory. There is some evidence that Beijing destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons before signing the CWC. Department of State official concluded that “China possesses an inventory of traditional CW agents. China’s revised list of export control regulations included all major controls outlined by the Australia Group. residents in Chuhsien. By the end of 1945. China had suffered an estimated 10. During the summer of 1996.000 casualties from Japan’s use of chemical weapons in China.85 China is one of the few countries that has been the victim of biological war- fare. Numerous instances of Chinese chemical weapons materials and technology sales abroad have established China as a serious proliferation concern. reportedly contracted the bubonic plague after the Japanese dropped ceramic bombs containing plague-infected fleas along with rice to attract ro- dents. In the late 1930s.93 Ostensibly. including artillery rockets. In June 1998. A similar Japanese attack in Ning Bo resulted in the death of 500 villagers. land mines. There is little dispute that China retains an extensive chemical weapons capability. Before and during World War II.”90 Testimony in 2003 by a U. China 177 have supplied Iran with dual-use equipment that could be used in a biological weapons program. U. These sanc- tions remained in effect at the beginning of 2002.S. and short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. and the plague in attacks against Chinese civilians and troops. the United States imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for know- ingly and materially contributing to Iran’s chemical warfare program. China acknowledged its former chemical weapons production capability but did not declare possession of a chemical weapons stockpile. the program included human testing on Chinese prisoners. the Japanese successfully disseminated typhus rickettsia. Many countries have sought chemicals and technology of Chinese origin. lewisite. which were infected by the fleas and then spread the disease to humans.

thebulletin.” list for 2003 at the web site of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.” available at www. have been mixed.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. See also “Chinese Nuclear Forces.pdf.C.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Howard W. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Nuclear Weapons Databook. 10. and Chinese Weapons (Boulder.se/ nuclear/china. 13.: Central Intelligence Agency. 9. Report.” Statement for the Record.” Arms Control Today. available at www. “China Tests Shield-Busting Missile. Joseph W.org/act/2004_05/NK.globalsecurity. Andrew Burrows. p. Global Security. and Richard Fieldhouse. available at www. “U. Military Balance. French.missile/. p. 2002).asp. U.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/04/china. 2004). director. Hans M. Lumpkin. 7. “Global Threats and Chal- lenges through 2015. 2002. “China Launches New Class of Nuclear Submarine Designed to Fire ICBMs. available at http://projects.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.sipri. p.org/wmd/world/china/df-31. January 2003.” New York Times.C. North Korea Jockey for China’s Support as Working Group Nuclear Talks Ap- proach.org/act/2004_10/Zaborsky. “China’s Splurge on Resources May Not Be a Sign of Strength. “Annual Report. Vol. “DF-31. Unclassified Summary of a National Intelli- gence Estimate (Washington.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2002. China’s Changing Nuclear Posture (Washington.gov/ news/releases/2004/04/20040415-1.asp.” April 15. December 12. . Foreign Missile Developments. China Builds the Bomb (Stanford. N OTES 1. 3. Fudan University of Shanghai. Dick Cheney. 4. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai.com/2004/12/12/weekinreview/ 12fren.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/24518. Ming Zhang. 12. See Robert Norris. Department of Defense. 2. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. Paula A. DeSutter. available at www. 24. National Intelligence Council (NIC). Kristensen.state.S. Ibid. John J. Ibid. 18. December 3. 10.cnn. D. 9. Colo. 14.htm. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. NIC. NIC. Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson. 36.armscontrol. 1999). Febru- ary 7.” February 4. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. available at www. 2001.178 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s proliferation from within its borders. Victor Zaborsky. available at www. 20. 2000. 8. “Foreign Missile Developments.” p.org/issues/nukenotes/nd03nukenote.S. “Chinese Nuclear Forces”. V: British.. “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.nytimes. 16. Global Security.armscontrol. 5. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. October 2004. China.html?oref=login. “China’s Record of Proliferation Activities. The Military Balance.” 11.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 17. however.fas. Foreign Missile Devel- opments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Project on Nuclear Technology and Arms Control. D. “Remarks by the Vice President at Fudan University Followed by Student Body Q&A.” available at www.: Westview Press. See also Harold Brown. 10.S. “China’s Record. The results of government enforcement. French.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Defense Intelligence Agency. 2004.htm.pdf. 1988).” July 24.html. 2004. Paul Kerr.” Associated Press. “DF-31. 23. Kristensen.”. U. 22. 25. 21. 19. Calif. 6. CNN. DeSutter. IISS. available at http://archives. 2004. “Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime?” Arms Control Today. available at www. May 2004. 1994).html. 2003. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press.whitehouse.: Stanford University Press. Department of Defense. Preuher and Adam Segal.” 15.

26. 1991.” Washington Post. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces. available at www.” paper presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 44th Annual Meeting. iii. Leslie Gelb. and “China Stole Nuclear Secrets for Bombs. “Breach at Los Alamos: A Special Report”. 49. Department of Defense. China 179 “Chinese Military Power. 18. 47. June 23. 36. 43. David Albright.ceip. available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- tists. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 30. p. 1996. 128–130. pp. “China Stops Production of Military HEU.” Council of Foreign Relations Task Force Report. 44.asp. January 9.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ChinaDamageAssessment. and Walker.” Nuclear Fuel. U. Norris. “Atomic Scientist Is Taking Case to Court of Public Opinion. 2002. Tang Bin. 37. Phoenix. Probe for $14 Million. January 9. issued by the White House.asp?print. 45.” New York Times. Berkhout.” 31. June 22. “New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980–1995.” April 21. No- vember 26. September 27. 48.org/global_stocks/ bulletin_albright_kramer. p. “China Seeks to Join Nuclear. Missile Control Groups.isis-online. p. 45. Interview with U. cited in Albright. and “Excerpt from Testimony at Hearing on the Wen Ho Lee Case.org/act/2004_07-08/NSG.nti. “Peking Said to Balk at Nuclear Pledges. “China and Multilateral Non- Proliferation Mechanisms. 126. 1984. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. Wade Boese. Sep- tember/October 2001.htm. Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol.S.armscontrol. available at www. Presidential Determination 98-10. 2001.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 1997).S.” 2004. 42. Paul Kerr and Wade Boese. 46.htm.” Nonproliferation Review.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/ fkswt/dbfks/t141201. 5–6. Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development of Future Chinese Weapons. 41. 1999.” New York Times. and William Walker. p.” available at www. “A New China Syndrome: Beijing’s Atomic Bazaar. 1 July through 31 December 2003. Nuclear Threat Initiative. in FBIS-CST-96-019. and Gary Milhollin and Gerard White. 32. 1998. 38. available at www. 2000. “Stockpiles are Still Growing. D. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. 1 (Washington.org/db/china/sacorg.S. 71. Central Intelligence Agency.htm. who was told the date by the head of the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation. 27. pp. James Risen and Jeff Gerth.” New York Times. 1989. Ann MacLachlan and Mark Hibbs. May 12.” Arms Control Association. 5. 35. March 2004. pp. vol.pdf. June 1996. p. “Bombers and Dual-Capable Aircraft.S. 350. 1999. “Pakistan Link Perils U. Hui Zhang. Frans Berkhout. available at www. 1996.org/act/2004_03/China. November 13. 1984. and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press. U.” New York Times.” Washington Post. Spring–Summer 1996. 60.S. Wendy Frieman. November/December 2004.htm. 29.” New York Times. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer.S. March 6. Government Printing Office. “Nuclear Suppliers Pass on U. “The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment on the Implications of China’s Acquisition of U.nti.” Arms Control Today.S. 52.” June 29. 40. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. .C. 39. Burrows. Report of the Select Committee on U. Capabilities. 2003.armscontrol. “Evaluating China’s MPC&A System. Ibid. December 2003. 2000. “China and the ZAC.S. Nuclear Threat Initiative.org/db/ china/wdsmdat. January 15. pp. V. and Fieldhouse.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 34. July/August 2004. “Loral Settles U. 1999).fmprc. Aides Say. “Annual Report. The 1987 date is based on a personal communication from Mark Hibbs. National Laboratory official. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. September 11. 28.: U. 2004.” available at www.” Zhongguo He Gongye Bao [China Nuclear Industry News]. Gelb.gov. ii.–China Nuclear Pact. 76–78. “China: Major Advances Realized in Nation’s Nuclear Fuel Accounting System.S. Proposals. 33.

com/stories/2004/10/12/terror/main648733.” New York Times.” available at www. Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin.htm. Central Intelligence Agency.org/wmd/world/pakistan/chashma.” Washington Times.” Jane’s Special Report. Aurang Zeb. 68. 1997. “China–Iran. 63. 77. May 23.S.” 78. “CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms Components. p. Barbara Opall. D. “China Seeks to Join Nuclear.” Wall Street Journal.gov/t/np/rls/rm/32570.” New York Times. 57. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Jeffrey Smith. Albright. “U.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khushab. p. June 21. Elaine Sciolino. 67. 359–360. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington. May 18.” New York Times.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. “China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors. June 2. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.shtml. Queries China on Iran. August 25. and Walker.htm. R. 1 July through 31 December 2003. 1996. Imposes Sanctions on 3 Chinese Firms. Global Security. “China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant.cbsnews. “Algeria Signs Nuclear Draft Agreement with China. pp. “China’s Missile Exports and Assistance to Iran.” Testimony before the House International Relations Committee.” Reuters. 1995. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. “Pakistan Producing Weapon-Grade Plutonium. 1996. December 2. 64. 1995.” The Dawn. May 21. 1997.” Washington Post. May 14. “China Nuclear Deal with Iran Is Feared. 66.” 79.C. “Chasma. available at www. 11. “Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China. p. 363–364. June 14. Bill Gertz.” available at www.: U.state. Mark Hibbs.” Associated Press. 1995. 1. available at www. “U. 1992. 60. Nuclear Threat Initiative.globalsecurity. July 1. Albright.pdf. 25. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. 1 January through 30 June 2002.” Washington Times. “China’s Quiet.S. 59. Elaine Sciolino. Algeria to Cooperate in Nuclear Energy Development. “Pakistan Denies It’s Building Missile Factory. 2004. p. December 18. Berkhout. 2000. “Report: China Nuke Traffic Link.S. in FBIS-CHI-97- 141.” 73.” Washington Times. Central Intelligence Agency. 1997. 1996. September 17. 1997). “China Sold Iran Missile Technology.nytimes. August 26. 58. Jeffrey Smith. Central Intelligence Agency. 76.” Defense News.” Nucleonics Week. 1 July through 31 December 2003. August 7.htm.” Washington Post. and Walker. 51. 54.” Associated Press.” Associated Press. 55.org/ db/china/miranpos. 56. 65. 70. “China in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Bill Gertz.” Reuters. U.” 74. 3. Missile Control Groups. April 17.nti. R. “An Iranian Bomb?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.htm. p. “Khushab. Berkhout. 75. John Wolf. 2004. available at www. 62.S.” available at www. 2004.globalsecurity.nti. . and “Chinese Shipments Violate Controls.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42692- 2004Feb14?language=printer. and “China: PRC.org/e_research/official_docs/cia/cia041003.html.com/aponline/international/AP-China-US-Iran.htm.com/2000/06/14/top8. “Weapons Proliferation in China. 1995. 2004. September 30. 52. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. February 16. June 14–25.” 69. Global Security.” available at www. Nucleonics Week. and David Albright. Crucial Role in the War. “Move to Block China Certification. “China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant. 72. DeSutter. Kerr and Boese. 53. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 1996. Bill Gertz. Charles Hutzler. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.180 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 50. available at www. April 3. p.” Washington Post. “Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No Atom Arms. November 21. 2001. Ibid. 1996. “Russian Industry May Be Key to Iran’s Reactor Prospects. “Iran Gets China’s Help on Nuclear Arms. 80. April 17. 61. 1996. February 15. 3. 1996. “China’s Record. pp. Mark Hibbs.washingtonpost. 1995. available at www.dawn.” Xinhua. January 9. July/August 1995. 1995. 71. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.

83. DeSutter. Office of the Surgeon General. “China’s Record. Central Intelligence Agency. 1997.S. 87.” 81. p.” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. 3. p. U.: Borden Institute. The Textbook of Military Medicine. 89.” . Elaine Sciolino. “Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China Come to Light. Depart- ment of Defense. 84. “China: Chemical and Biological Weapons. 91. Part I.cdi. Peter O’Meara Evans.” 92. Edward Eitzen and Ernest Takafuji. 85.” 90. “China Sold Iran Missile Technology. The Textbook of Military Medicine (Washington. 417. and William Safire.C.: U. Department of Defense. “Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. Gertz.org/issues/cbw/china. March 5.html. Center for Defense Information.” available at www. “Saudis Study Missile Buy To Replace Aging Arsenal. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. 15. 1992. 82. p. “China Said to Sell Parts for Missiles. Center for Defense Information.” in Medical As- pects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. 1997). January 31. 1 July through 31 December 2003.” available at www. Part I. January 24.” Defense News. 1992. July 1. “Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.C. D.” Paper 13 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion.’” New York Times. 33. Bill Gertz. “China. September 1997).org/nuke/juide/china/cbw/index. “China’s ‘Hama Rules. 1998. DeSutter. China 181 80.S. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective. Philip Finnegan. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 1997. p. “China. “China’s Record.fas.html. “Albright Concedes ‘Concern’ over China-Iran Transfers. March 17– 23.” New York Times.” 93. 86. Federation of American Scientists. 2001). 7. p.” Washington Times. and see also Jeffrey Smart. 88. D.

Sichuan possible nuclear weapon component pro- duction facility. U. design. and neering Physics (CAEP) technology complex.182 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7.1. nat. Nuclear weapons research. nuclear weap- 3 Xi’an. called the 7 Chinese Sandia Laboratory Institute of Applied Physics Conducts research on nuclear warhead de- and Computational sign computations for CAEP Mathematics 8 Beijing Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Engaged in tomography. shutdown Complex (Plant 404) 14 Subei. operational 12 Guangyuan. Zheijiang Harbin Military Engineering Served to train nuclear weapon research and 9 Institute design personnel Harbin Possible warhead assembly and production 10 Heilongjiang site Plant 821 Possible nuclear weapon assembly facility. 1. Gansu down Northwest Institute of Institute that was responsible for conducting Nuclear Technology and analyzing nuclear tests. also site of plutonium pro- duction reactor and reprocessing plant (see below) Plutonium Production Reactors 13 Plant 821 LWGR. Sichuan Largest plutonium producing reactor in China Jiuquan Atomic Energy LWGR. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern Name/Location of Facility Type/Status 1 Nuclear Weapons Complex Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. shut- 2 Subei. U. tests solid missile Research (at Fudan propellants. Gansu . high-level waste 4 Xinjiang storage Chinese Academy of Engi. and final weapons assembly. Shaanxi ons archive.000 MW. nat. Sichuan Laboratory of China Institute 905 of CAEP Ordnance engineering lab for nonnuclear outside Mianyang components of nuclear weapons. 11 Guangyuan. 500 MW. currently studying CTBT verifi- cation issues Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons test site and possible nu- Test Base Malan clear weapons stockpile. called the Los Alamos 5 6 Mianyang. and detonation University) packages for nuclear weapons Shanghai.Fabrication of fissile materials into bomb plex (Plant 404) cores. explosives.

125 MWt. Institute of Nuclear Energy 10 MWt. operational Guangdong Zero-Power Fast Critical Re. MWt). HEU (90%). operational Energy 18 Tuoli. operational Nuclear Power Institute of China Chengdu.027 China Institute of Atomic MWt). 0 MWt. Reactor (CFER) expected to be completed in 2007 HTR-10 High-temperature gas reactor. Sichuan HFETR critical Critical assembly. 30 kWt (. Tsinghua University Beijing16 NHR-5 Heating prototype. LW. HEU (90%). LW. opera- Nuclear Power Institute of tional China Chengdu. under construction. Sichuan (table continues on the following page) . LW. HEU (90%). Sichuan MNSR IAE Tank in pool. 33 kWt (. operational Technology. 5 MWt.03 Shenzhen University MWt). 30 kWt (. LW. operational logical Sciences Jinan Shandong MNSR-SH Tank in pool. planned China Institute of Atomic Energy Chinese Experimental Fast Fast-breeder. Critical fast. . Tsinghua University Beijing HFETR Tank. opera- actor tional China Institute of Atomic Energy Jianiang/Chengdu. HEU (90%).033 Research Institute of Geo. 27 kWt (. LW. MWt). operational Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology. 65 MWt.05 kWt. China 183 15 Research Reactors CARR 60 MWt. Sichuan MJTR Pool. HEU (90%).03 Shanghai Institute for Meas. 17 Nuclear Power Institute of shutdown China Chengdu. HEU (90%). LW. operational urement and Testing Tech- nology Shanghai MNSR–SZ Tank in pool. pebble bed. LW. LW. HEU (90%). near Beijing MNSR–SD Tank in pool. 5 MWt. HEU (90%).

and pilot reprocessing plant (both 29 Subei. 15 MWt.Reprocessing plant. 3 MWt.1. operational Southwest Institute of Nu- clear Physics and Chemistry Jianiang/Chengdu. Sichuan Uranium Enrichment Heping Uranium Enrichment Gaseous diffusion plant: able to produce 20 Plant 750–2. no longer operational 28 Plutonium Reprocessing Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. Gansu struction. estimated to have 22 plex produced at least 150–330 kg HEU/year. LW. LEU (10%). near Beijing SPRR–300 Pool. near Beijing Lanzhou in 1964. Shaanxi Two gaseous diffusion plants. 3.0 million SWU/year 26 Hanzhong. completion expected in 2005. two cores. operational. LEU (10%). LEU (10%). opera- Nuclear Power Institute of tional China Chengdu. total capacity of up to 500. 1 MWt.5 MWt. operational 19 Heping. Sichuan Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Com. part still under con- 24 north of Lanzhou. part operational. UZRH. 21 23 Lanzhou. capacity of 300–400 kg plex (Plant 404) Pu/year. LW. Institute of Nuclear Energy operational Technology. shutdown . 25 capacity of 1. LEU (3%). near Beijing SPR IAE Pool.950 kg HEU/year.184 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7. operational China Institute of Atomic Energy Tuoli. LW. Sichuan Tsinghua Pool Pool. 1 MWt. 25 km ity. Gaseous diffusion plant. and nuclear fuel proc- essing plant for refining plutonium into weapons-usable metals.000 SWU/year China Institute of Atomic Laboratory-scale gaseous diffusion facility: Energy developed enrichment process installed at 27 Tuoli. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern (continued) Name/Location of Facility Type/Status HWRR–II Heavy-water. HEU (20%). Gansu use PUREX method). Gansu reportedly decommissioned in 1999 Russian-supplied centrifuge Large-scale gas-centrifuge enrichment facil- enrichment plant. opera- China Institute of Atomic tional Energy Under IAEA safeguards Tuoli. Tsinghua University Beijing PPR Pulsing Reactor Pool.

plutonium production and process- ing. opera- Plant (202) tional Baotou. Inner Mongolia Nuclear Fuel Component Fuel-rod fabrication. operational Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. Sichuan capacity of 300–400 kg Pu/year Nuclear Fuel Component Civilian light-water reactor fuel element Plant (Plant 812) plant (see below). Gansu shutdown Tritium. operational Plant (202). Candu Fuel Plant 34 Baotou. plutonium fuel rod pro- 31 Yibin. Li-6 deuterium production.Nuclear Fuel Processing Plant: Converts plex (Plant 404) enriched UF6 to UF4 for shaping into metal. Pilot spent-fuel reprocessing plant. Ningxia Nuclear Fuel Component Tritium. reportedly no longer handles weapons- grade material. being expanded to pro- Plant (Plant 812) duce fuel elements for new types of power 35 Yibin. Subei. 30 Guangyuan. under construction. 32 Lanzhou. Gansu but experiencing logistical delays. Sichuan reactors. operational 36 Helanshan. capacity plex of 100 kg/HM per year. Sichuan ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty HEU highly enriched uranium HM heavy metal kWt thousands of watts of thermal output LEU low-enriched uranium LW light-water LWGR light-water graphite-moderated reactor MNSR miniature neutron source reactor MW megawatts MWt megawatts thermal nat. China 185 Plant 821 China’s largest plutonium separation facility. Inner Mongolia Nuclear Fuel Element Plant Probable production of tritium and Li-6 deu- (Plant 812) terium. Sichuan duction. U natural uranium Pu plutonium SWU separative work unit UZRH uranium-zirconium-hydride (table continues on the following page) . commer- 33 cial-scale reprocessing plant planned Uranium Processing Nuclear Fuel Component Fuel-rod fabrication. and Beryllum Ningxia Non-ferrous Metal China’s main research and production site Research Institute (Plant 905) for beryllium. Lithum Deuteride. operating Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Com. not operational37 Yibin.

Nuclear Engineering International.htm. 1997). John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai. There is also a Harbin Military Engineering Institute that trains personnel in nuclear research and design. and Fieldhouse. November 1995. although perhaps they are not explicitly weapon- related: the Atomic Research Center. In addition to the sites listed under Nuclear Weapons Complex.htm. p. the Institute of Materials and Elements at the Sichuan Institute of Nuclear Power.” available at www. In 1999. Shanxi. 2. Yaiyuan. the China Institute for Radiation Protection (CIRP). p. “Guangyuan. 6. 348. China Builds the Bomb (Stanford.org/db/china/ sec3. pp. 2004). International Atomic Energy Agency. Western officials. Burrows. 9. 3–9. Nuclear Weapons Databook V (Boulder.1.org/worldatom/rrdb.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). Tsinghua University. Sichuan University. Nuclear Threat Initia- tive.” available at www.nti. 338. “Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathemat- ics. Beijing. the Beijing Nuclear Engineering Research and Development Academy. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” Risk Report.nti.” available at www. the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology. 4.. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Sichuan. Colo.htm. southeast of Beijing.” Nuclear Fuel. 8. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex. doubt that the facility would have been shut down.K. 1988). See Lewis and Litai. “Nuclear Profile: China.: Westview Press. p.org/db/china/ guang. p.htm. and the Nuclear Re- search and Development Institute. 10. Chengdu. Xingjiang.nti.” available at www. because it is China’s only operating military plutonium production and separation center.nti. Calif.org/db/china/caep. 12. 1994). 264. and William Walker. Nuclear Research Reactors in the World.org/db/china/jiuq. Fieldhouse.htm. World Nuclear Industry Handbook 2004 (Sidcup. 13. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories.” available at www. 203–204.htm. See Mark Hibbs. available at www. 14. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern (continued) SOURCES OURCES : David Albright. however. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex. “China Nuclear Non-Proliferation Database. “China Said to be Preparing for Decommis- sioning Defense Plants.” available at www. 5.: Stanford University Press. 3. U. China Builds the Bomb. there was speculation that the reprocessing facility at Guangyuan might be shut down as part of an effort to streamline and restructure the China National Nu- clear Corporation. Chengdu.” available at www. “Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology. Burrows. May 17. Beijing. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Ibid.” available at www. the following sites are engaged in nuclear research.htm. Sichuan province.186 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7. pp.nti. . 7 Ibid. and “Nuclear Profile: China. the original Chinese weapon design facility that has since been phased out.htm.nti.iaea. Nuclear Threat Initiative. the Institute of Nuclear Energy Tech- nology (INET). “Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Test Base. Norris.org/db/china/nwint. Tianjin.org/db/china/lopnur.org/db/china/jiuq. Nuclear Threat Initiative. and Richard W. See Norris. 1999. Frans Berkhout. Robert S. NOTES OTES: 1.org/db/china/iapcm. Nuclear Weapons Databook V. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 6 CAEP is an identical copy of the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy in Haiyan. Andrew S. “Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics.: Wilmington Publishing. Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press.nti.nti. 11. and the work transferred to CAEP.

C. April 30. 22.org/db/china/ yibin. 126–130. See Nuclear Threat Initiative. A commercial-scale facility is still provisionally planned. November 22. 18. see Hibbs. CIAE Says. it did early research on hexafluoride (UF6) production and on boost materials for a hydrogen bomb. 2004. “Datafile: China. 21. 37. 32. This reactor is being jointly developed with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Tsinghua U to Team on Pebble Bed R&D. 1999. 31.S Government Printing Office.htm. January 27. 20. Nuclear Threat Initiative. In addition to this research reactor and the old gaseous diffusion pilot plant (see the uranium enrichment section). TCS-65475-72 (Washington. Defense Intelligence Agency. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency.nti.” available at www. the second in late September 2000. Berkhout. 28. “China Expected Soon to Request Bids for Qinshan Transport Cask.” 36. “China Said to be Preparing for Decommissioning Defense Plants. combined with that located at Hanzhong. 23. D. Nuclear Threat Initiative. and “China’s Centrifuge SWU Plant Up and Running. although the 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook states that it is still operational. Construction is likely years away. this facility is shut down. There has been some confusion as to the location of this new facility. but the most recent reports indicate that it is in fact near Lanzhou. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex.” . May 17.htm. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” Nuclear Fuel. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” 33. 24. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex”. China reportedly ceased HEU production in 1987. “China Institute of Atomic Energy. 34. See note 13. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex. 25.iaea.htm. see discussion in Albright.” Nuclear News. though China has not yet determined where it will be located. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” See also Hibbs. See Nuclear Threat Initiative. p.nti.htm.htm. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. “Yibin Fuel Plant.” Nuclear Fuel. 1972). “Russian Atomic Ministry Delegation to Participate in Launch of Third Line of Gas-Centrifuge Plant in China. Mark Hibbs. 2001.nti.” available at www.” 26.nti. Nuclear Threat Initiative. China 187 15. p. See “MIT. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Hibbs. 3. October 1993.htm.” available at www. “Yibin Fuel Plant.org/db/china/heping.” available at www. “Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metal Research Institute. 29. 2001.S. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex. November 13. Completion of the final module is expected around 2005.org/db/china/ciae.” Nuclear Engineering International. and Walker. “Yibin Fuel Plant. 17. 1997. “Separation Plant on Drawing Board until 2006–2010 Plan.” available at www.” 30. The primary source for this section was the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Research Reactor Database. Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Heping Uranium Enrichment Plant.: U. “Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant. and Hibbs.” Nuclear Fuel. and Yumen. and the third in November 2001.org/db/china/lanzhou.” available at www. Ibid.org/worldatom/rrdb.org/db/china/ningxia.” Economic News. Earlier reports suggested that the facility might be located in Chengdu. 22.” available at www. 35. 19.org/db/china/baotou.” Nuclear Fuel. Minatom Says. The first module of the plant began operating in 1998. Gansu province. U. See Mark Hibbs. Ibid. The China Institute for Atomic Energy is China’s main nuclear research organization. Additional military reprocessing facilities are thought to be located at Urumqi. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. Soviet and Peoples’ Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy.nti. is China’s main uranium enrichment center. December 2003. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. pp.nti.” 27. 16. This facility. Xinjiang province.

.

all of which are nuclear ca- pable. It has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Three of the four SSBNs are deployed at any given time. the 1956 Suez crisis was a key turning point. not all of which are deployed. CHAPTER 8 France Nuclear Weapons Capability France is a nuclear weapon state recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Strategic Context France launched its nuclear program incrementally during the Fourth Republic (1945–1958). 1996. The 189 . In 2004.110 nuclear war- heads between 1960 and 1992. 1960. In this process. In fiscal year 2005. it eliminated its entire stockpile before joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.084 billion (20 per- cent of its annual defense budget) to maintain its nuclear arsenal.1 France has conducted 210 nuclear weapons tests. and each is capable of carrying 16 M-45 SLBMs with a total of 96 warheads. Though it stockpiled chemical weapons before World War II and continued chemical weapons research in Al- geria until the late 1960s. the first on February 13. the country appropriated $4.2 Each bomber is ca- pable of carrying an Air Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) supersonic guided missile.1 at the end of the chapter). It is a member of both the Biological Weapons Conven- tion and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability France does not have any research or production programs for either biological or chemical weapons. Missile and Aircraft Capability France currently relies on a limited nuclear force consisting of four nuclear bal- listic missile submarines (SSBNs) and 94 bombers. France’s aircraft capabil- ity includes 24 Super Étendard bombers carrying a total of 10 warheads and 60 Mirage 2000N bombers carrying a total of 50 warheads. France deployed 10 new Rafale bombers. and the last on January 27. It deploys approximately 350 nuclear weapons on 84 nuclear-capable aircraft and 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on four nuclear submarines (3 of them carrying 16 missiles each) (see table 8. France produced approximately 1. France plans to equip these with nuclear-armed ASMP missiles.

8 He followed much of the white paper’s sugges- tions for France’s defense but changed funding priorities from nuclear weaponry to intelligence. and the shorter-range Hades mis- siles. France developed a “three-circles” defense policy aimed at protecting its vital interests against external threats (primarily the Soviet Union) through nuclear deterrence.190 Declared Nuclear Weapon States decision to test a nuclear device was taken during the last weeks of the Fourth Republic in 1958. Nuclear weapons would nevertheless continue to ensure the protection of France’s “vital interests. and land-based weapons systems with a few hundred warheads. In February 1960.” pri- marily against the “resurgence of a major threat against Western Europe.4 For that purpose. The concept. nuclear deterrence today is an essential foundation of our security and will remain so for many more years in the new strategic context.9 Against substantial international criticism. . following a national policy of “sufficiency” (suffisance) and relying on the threat of massive retaliation. France’s 1994 defense white paper (the first since 1972) identified French security risks as being the likely increase in the weaponry and military of other nations. Thanks to the continuous efforts made since the time of General de Gaulle. He continued to effect reductions in nuclear spending from the Cold War level of more than 30 percent of the procurement budget to about 20 percent. the French arsenal grew to a triad of sea-. and Russia’s continuing strong military power in Europe.”7 In 1995–1996. After the fall of the Soviet Union. force projection. Chirac briefly resumed nuclear weapons testing with a series of six tests in 1995–1996 (after a moratorium from 1992 to 1995) and began to restructure the arsenal. participation in the general defense of Western Eu- rope within the Atlantic Alliance. however. based in Albion. initiated the restructuring of the French nuclear arsenal.5 With the end of the Cold War.3 During the Cold War. He decided to dismantle two ground-to-ground missile systems: the S-3D. preserving French vital interests vis-à-vis all potential threats. The nuclear arsenal became operational in 1964 with the entry into active service of the first Mirage IVA nuclear bombers. Assuming office after a period of “cohabitation” with a socialist president and a Gaullist prime minister. France reviewed its nuclear strategy. including the proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction.” posture to counter emerging nuclear threats and proliferation of uncon- ventional weapons. There was a debate as policy shifted from the Cold War era “weak to the strong” posture against the Soviet Union to a “strong to the weak. Chirac faced difficult defense choices.” or “strong to the crazy. air-. Jacques Chirac.6 The 1994 white paper also sought to emphasize a reduction in the central role of French nuclear weapons while maintaining a deterrence stance. the newly elected Gaullist president. retained its original logic: that is. and by maintaining an active role outside Europe (mainly in Africa and the Middle East). France tested its first weapon in then- French Algeria.10 President Chirac summarized the current French nuclear doctrine in June 2001: Nuclear deterrence is the crux of the resources enabling France to affirm the principle of strategic autonomy from which derives our defense policy. where it remains fully mean- ingful and effective. and a professional army.

By impos- ing restraint and inciting [others] to exercise reason. The efforts also suffered heavily from World War II (when France was occu- pied). France urged the United States and the Soviet Union to discontinue atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. the Parliament set out a five-year plan to produce 50 kilograms of plutonium a year. a French atomic energy commission (Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique) was established. France signed the Euratom treaty. to fuel nuclear power plants. France has always given a European dimension to its nuclear forces. using natural uranium reactors. France promised that all its nuclear efforts would be peaceful. At the U. That idea was soon rejected. giving access to nuclear fuel to all members for peaceful purposes. Nuclear Analysis As early as the 1930s. when the decision to test a nuclear weapon was finally made.14 When de Gaulle became president. the last mention having been for a “concerted deterrence” (1995). It soon began a secret nuclear weapons development program. did not participate in the initial production and testing of the first nuclear weapon. however. France discussed the possibility of renouncing nuclear weapons. Our nuclear forces are not directed against any country. uranium ore was discovered in central France. In 1948. Four years later. France imple- mented a long-term nuclear plan. At the United Nations in 1946.11 As suggested in this speech and in previous speeches. but these were stopped at an early stage when General Charles de Gaulle came back into office in 1958. French scientists. General Assembly. France 191 Nuclear deterrence is above all an important factor of global stability. France has made several openings to Europeanize its nuclear capabilities more formally.N. the nuclear program was accelerated. There were parallel exploratory talks with Italy and Germany about military nuclear cooperation.12 In 1945. and France initiated plans for its first nuclear test to take place in 1960. unlike their American and British colleagues. these attempts have not. and we have always refused [to accept] that nuclear weapons should be regarded as weapons of war to be used as part of a military strategy. which became increasingly important throughout the 1950s.13 In 1956. but efforts were slowed by a lack of nuclear scientific knowledge and a shortage of uranium. been very successful so far. ignoring criticism made in conjunction with the Partial Test Ban Treaty . a credible nuclear threat commands peace. It is thanks to nuclear deterrence that Europe has been protected for more than 50 years from the ravages it experienced during the twentieth century. In the early stages of the European Union’s development. ignoring international objectors. After the 1960 test. which would act as a unifier on European civilian nuclear policy. Besides increasing France–United King- dom cooperation. but it began focusing on military applications only in the mid-1950s. France began working on a nuclear weapon. however. until 1958. After the 1956 Suez crisis. and in par- ticular. he confirmed the proposed nuclear test date and accelerated the nuclear program.

equipped with 16 M-45 SLBMs and carrying 6 TN-75–type nuclear warheads each.192 Declared Nuclear Weapon States (1963). Of those missiles. the M- 45. which also carries the M-45 SLBM. 18 land-based intermediate-range S-3 ballistic missiles. decided to dismantle and discon- tinue various systems. a low- altitude bomber.000 kilome- ters. France operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in two classes. such as the S-3D intermediate-range missile. and 56 Plutons. 18 were equipped to the Mirage IVA/P. with full flight tests . It joined the treaty only in 1992. which were mobile short-range surface ballistic missiles used by the army. President Chirac. That same year. France’s second Triomphant-class SSBN officially entered service. France has used at least nine reactors for plutonium production.19 Today. The country owns three Triomphant submarines armed with the M- 45 SLBM. France deployed an estimated total of 538 nuclear warheads. but not least. Last. it was a longtime critic of the NPT per se.18 France conducted its last nuclear test in 1996. It only arms 3 of its 4 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at any given time.21 The three-stage M-51 missile will replace the current French SLBM. however. A third Triomphant-class submarine.15 Even though France became increasingly involved in the nuclear nonprolif- eration regime (notably as a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group). and one L’Inflexible submarine. HEU in 1996) for military purposes. Altogether. and it has started dis- mantling its fissile material production facilities (the Marcoule reprocessing plant and the Pierrelatte enrichment facility). France has 48 SLBMs.16 Paris also deactivated and dismantled the Plateau d’Albion missile site in southern France in 1997–1998. 42 missiles were attached to the Mirage 2000N sonic attack aircraft. In January 2000. It has now ceased the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) (plu- tonium in 1992. which first entered service in 1996. Each SSBN is capable of carrying 16 SLBMs. The remainder of France’s arsenal included 384 warheads on M-45 submarine- based ballistic missiles. France avoided the talks even though the treaty recognized its status as a nuclear weapon state. the M-51. France agreed to observe its conditions without signing it.20 France has plans to build and deploy a fourth Triomphant submarine by 2010 and is currently testing a new missile. Le Vigilant. The system is scheduled to enter active service in 2008. the French nuclear forces have been reduced by more than 40 percent since the end of the Cold War. President Chirac also decided to dismantle the South Pacific testing facili- ties in Mururoa and Fangataufa in 1996. when other European countries were negotiating the NPT. entered into active duty in the fall of 2004 and carries M-45 SLBMs. and 20 armed the carrier-based naval strike aircraft. The M-51 will be deployed on all four of France’s strategic nuclear submarines and will have a range of 6. In 1968. which were supersonic wingless guided missiles. France continued atmospheric testing until 1974. the Super Étendard. When the treaty was signed. The arsenals included 80 ASMPs.17 Missile and Aircraft Analysis At its peak from 1991 to 1992. having stopped fissile material production.

the Mirage 2000N’s nuclear precursor. France 193 scheduled to begin in 2005. and 24 carrier-based nuclear-capable fighter- bombers in its navy. possibly with more inactive weapons stored on board. the Clémenceau was modified to carry the AN-52 nuclear gravity bomb and the Super Étendard fleet. After its commission in 1961. The air force expects to purchase 234 Rafales for operation in 2005. In June 2004. The carrier Charles de Gaulle. France announced the continuation of its development program for the ASMP-A (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée-Amélioré) nuclear air-launched cruise missile program. The Rafale (B-301) will replace the Mirage 2000N as the multirole fighter- bomber.26 In 2006. The development of this system has sparked some criticism among non-nuclear-weapon states. the French government decided to build a second aircraft carrier that will be conventionally powered rather than nuclear. two are stationed at Luxeuil and the other at Istres. and the Charles de Gaulle. France also retains in service five Mirage IVPs. France has built three aircraft carriers: the Clémenceau. France will deploy its first Rafale air force squadron. for reconnaissance missions while other retired Mirage IVPs are stored. the first 10 Rafale bombers entered service aboard the Charles de Gaulle and do not yet carry the ASMP.28 . the navy formed a squadron of Rafale M jets in Landivisiau. France has in service 60 ASMP cruise missiles equipped with a TN-81 warhead. France’s 2003–2008 defense budget projects the deployment of 234 Rafale aircraft for the armed services and 60 for the navy. armed with either the ASMP or the ASMP-A. The French plan to begin its construction by 2006 so that it will be operational by 2014. In 2001.24 Of the three squadrons of Mirage 2000N. the Foch. to be developed by simulation in France’s Atomic Energy Commission laboratories. The ASMP-A is scheduled for use in 2007. initially launched in 1994. The Rafale (B-301). Some countries view this deployment in the same light as the United States’ interest in developing a new generation of nuclear weapons. today France has 60 nuclear- capable aircraft in its air force. entered active duty in Oc- tober 2000.22 As part of its airborne nuclear component. The ASMP-A will also be armed with a new TNA (tête nucléaire aéro-portée) warhead. such as replacement ASMPs for the Super Étendard fighter jets. is being designed for air defense and ground attacks.25 France has 50 missiles of the TN-81 type stock- piled for the Mirage 2000N and 10 TN-81 warheads stockpiled for the Super Étendard. which promises to double the range of the ASMP from 250 to 500 kilometers. The Mirage 2000N has some conventional capability in ad- dition to its primary nuclear role.27 In February 2004. and later on the Rafale.23 The ASMP-A will first be deployed on the Mirage 2000N. In early October 1999. some of which maintain that the development and deployment of a new nuclear weapon launcher is inconsistent with the commitment to nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear weapon states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Foch began service in 1963 and was then altered to contain nuclear weapons. Both the Clémenceau and Foch have now been decommissioned. The Mirage 2000N and Super Étendard aircraft use ASMP air-to-surface nuclear missiles with a range of 250 to 300 kilometers and armed with warheads of the TN-81 type.

” in A European Non-Proliferation Policy. 20. p.: Princeton University Press. 4.pdf. V (Boulder. p. December 17. D. Grand. Transcript of President Jacques Chirac’s speech before the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies in Paris. “France. British. 19. 35.” p. edited by Harald Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1987). L’arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris: Kronos/SPM. 17.194 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Previous Chemical Weapons Program France does not have research or production programs for either chemical or biological weapons. Colo. 10.” p.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 12–14.se/ nuclear/france. In 1988. Robert Norris. British. pp. 1992). consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council. 2004. “France. 12. 14. 40. Burrows. Camille Grand. p. 2001. 1945–1958 (Louvain-la-Neuve.: Westview Press. President François Mitterrand announced before the United Nations that France had no chemical weapons and had no plans to produce chemical weapons. 183–184.” p. 39. Pierre Goldschmidt. 5. “France. 1997). 2. 13. “Nuclear Notebook. In conversation with French government officials. In conversation with French government officials.” p. and Paris: LGDJ. and Fieldhouse. 2005.C. 24. French. Ibid.sipri.: Henry L. 70. p. Grand. edited by Harald Müller (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press. 38. Grand. 35. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. and Richard Fieldhouse.” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries. 1969). pp. It has declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it has a stockpile of old chemical weap- ons on its territory and has opened its facilities for inspection. 70. “French Nuclear Forces.” p. 9. 6. It stockpiled mustard gas and phosgene before World War II and continued chemical weap- ons research and testing at B2-Namous in Algeria until the late 1960s. 15.29 N OTES 1. 7. On the origins of the French nuclear program. Atomic Energy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton. Andrew Burrows. 8. see Marcel Duval and Yves Le Baut. 16. Norris and Arkin. 2004. “Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Western Europe: A Historical Sur- vey. Norris. 70. Ibid. January 21.J. Stimson Center. “Nuclear Notebook. Kristensen. p. Belgium: Bruylant. 3. 18.. June 8. Vol. December 22. Camille Grand. Occasional Paper 38 (Washington. available at http://projects. It is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Kristensen. French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. and Dominique Mongin. 1998). 1998). On French nuclear policy during the Cold War. N. and Robert Norris and William Arkin. . see Lawrence Scheinmann. June/July 2001. 9.” p. “Nuclear Notebook. 11. Hans M. p. In Conversation with Hans M.. A French Nuclear Exception. “France. January 2003.” Stockholm International Peace Re- search Institute Project on Nuclear Technology and Arms Control. 10. Norris and Arkin. “France. Grand. 1994). 12. La bombe atomique française. Ibid.

27. 24.750 1 × 300 50 2000N / kT ASMP ASMP Rafale / 10 2004 3. 2005 Launcher capacity / nuclear ballistic Warheads Submarine missile × Yield Type / submarine First Range (kilotons.html.” p. Table 8.125 1 × 300 0 ASMP kT ASMP Subtotal. 94 60 aircraft Total strategic 158 348 nuclear forces NOTE: 1. Ibid.000 6 × 150 96 class SSBN / kT M-45 Subtotal. 48/31 288 ballistic missiles Launcher Launchers/ First Range Warheads Deployable Type / SSBNs Deployed (kilometers) × yield Warheads Designation (kT) Aircraft Super 24 1978 650 1 × 300 10 Étendard / kT ASMP ASMP Mirage 60 1988 2. Norris and Arkin. 29.fas.” March 20. It only arms 3 of its 4 SSBNs at a given time. Triomphant. 2004. Global Security. In conversation with French government officials. 71.” p. Norris and Arkin. 25. French Nuclear Forces.1. “Nuclear Notebook. Federation of Atomic Scientists web site on French chemical and biological weapons capability. 26.htm. available at www. In conversation with French government officials.org/military/world/europe/dpa. 2005.globalsecurity. In conversation with the authors. Each SSBN is capable of carrying 16 SLBMs. 48/3 1996 6. “Nuclear Notebook. 28. available at www. 71. In conversation with French government officials. 22.000 6 × 100 192 launched class SSBN / kT ballistic M-45 missiles (SLBMs) L’Inflexible. Deployable Designation (SSBN) Deployed (kilometers) kT) Warheads Submarine. “Second Aircraft Carrier/ Deuxième Porte-Avions. 23.org/nuke/guide/france/cbw/index. France has 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. France 195 21. . 16/1 1991 5.

.

The aircraft concerned had been reassigned to other duties and. The actual force loadings. The first submarine. only one of which is to be on ac- tive patrol duty at any one time. relocated. the HMS Vanguard. By 1998. the country produced approximately 834 nuclear warheads. Between 1952 and 1992. for a maximum of 128 warheads. all the WE-177 bombs had been withdrawn from service. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability The United Kingdom is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each Vanguard nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) can carry 16 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). however. Each Trident II SLBM can carry up to 8 multiple independent reentry vehicles.1 at the end of the chapter). went on patrol in December 1994. where appropriate. This discussion also confirmed the elimination of the country’s tactical nuclear arsenal. The country has declared to the Organiza- tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it has old chemical weapons 197 . 1952.1 It has conducted 44 nuclear weapons tests. the first on October 3. and the last on November 26. Aircraft and Missile Capability The 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) confirmed that the United Kingdom’s new nuclear force structure would consist solely of the four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. which stipulated that all Tri- dent submarines should carry 48 warheads per boat when on deterrent patrol. are lower than this because of the SDR. It currently maintains four nuclear-powered ballistic mis- sile submarines. the Royal Air Force operated eight squadrons of nuclear-capable Tornado GR1/1A bombers armed with WE-177 nuclear gravity bombs.2 Before the SDR revisions. The SDR stated that the future stockpile would be less than 200 operationally available warheads. CHAPTER 9 The United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons Capability The United Kingdom is recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear weapon state. each armed with up to 16 Trident II missiles and with 48 war- heads (see table 9. 1991.

According to the British Ministry of Defence.198 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s on its territory and has opened its facilities for inspection. Its equip- ment includes biological and chemical monitoring devices. The British argued over the most cost-effective nuclear defense replacement sys- tem for the family of submarines and whether a replacement was necessary. and army. communication and information sys- tems for tracking hazardous material movement and duration. and an expanded threat analysis program.5 Nuclear Analysis The British were an integral part of helping the United States to develop the bomb. The . but other warheads were supplied by the United States under standard NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. a group of British scientists dedicated to fission research. the Maud Committee. but follow- ing the end of the war in 1946. estimated that the development of the bomb would take two and a half years. air. individual protection equipment. which was another reason that the United Kingdom believed that it needed to construct its own nuclear arms. Biological. the change in the size and composition of the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces had significantly affected its means of implementing deterrence policies from the Cold War era.3 The Strategic Context During the Cold War. Post– Cold War policies have left NATO as the ultimate defense for the United King- dom. The United Kingdom manufactured and owned the warheads for its strategic nuclear delivery systems. and Chemical Regi- ment provides “a defence capability” for the air force. such as the man-portable chemical agent detector and the Integrated Biological Detection System. except for one patrolling nuclear submarine off the British coastline.4 By 1998. The United States clearly showed no interest in sharing atomic knowledge with other coun- tries under its Atomic Energy Act of 1946. and sea nuclear forces to the Alliance. navy. In 1941. The British also sought nuclear weapons as a way to achieve greater power after slipping in status as a world leader. The United Kingdom joined NATO in combat- ing the Soviet threat by contributing its land. The United Kingdom wanted a nuclear force as leverage against the Soviets should they obtain weapons. motivated by such issues as the opportunity to reduce the cost of arsenal maintenance and the lack of an imminent Russian threat. the United Kingdom and NATO planned for the worst— a European nuclear war with the Soviet Union and its allies. The arsenal was re- duced to a single type of warhead and a submarine delivery system. The close geo- graphical position of the United Kingdom to the Soviet threat created a need for nuclear defense and deterrence. the Joint Nuclear. Developing a successor to the Polaris SSBN became an issue for debate during the Cold War. This scientific process slowed during World War II. work was started on plants to produce fissile material. Its disarmament decision was reached unilater- ally. medical research on countermeasures for biological or chemical exposure.

7 British nuclear warheads are designed at the Aldermaston facility in Berk- shire. using plutonium as the fissile material.S. artil- lery shells. The Royal Air Force also had access to U. The WE-177. and depth bombs for land-based maritime patrol aircraft were re- turned to the United States for dismantlement in 1991. Three hundred to 400 of these warheads were made available to the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1952. Bombers such as the Buccaneer.K. The United Kingdom 199 United States and the United Kingdom have developed a close relationship and share extensive nuclear information under their Mutual Defense Agreement. called Hurricane. entered service with the Royal Air Force strategic bomber force in 1966 and was later deployed on Royal Navy and Air Force attack aircraft and helicopters. The British stockpile was supplemented by U. at the Monto Bello Islands off the Australian coast.8 Missile Analysis Beginning in 1960. each believed to have a yield of 200 kilotons. and 200 to 300 warheads in the 1980s. nuclear stockpile of British- produced warheads was estimated to have been between 250 and 350 warheads. followed by its successor. The Polaris A3T missile carried a delivery system that incorporated three warheads. which were available under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements from 1958 to 1991. At the same time.6 From the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. The smaller and lighter “Red Beard” weapon entered into service in 1958. This came into service in 1962. the United Kingdom conducted its first nuclear test. at Cardiff. Ini- tial models were transferred to the Royal Air Force in November 1953. was closed in February 1997. Yellow Sun Mk I. Both used an Anglicized version of the U. weapons. Yellow Sun Mk II was the first British thermonuclear operational gravity bomb with a yield in the megaton range.S. and Tornado were capable of delivering WE-177 bombs.S. the British deployed the first four Polaris (or Resolution-class) sub- marines carrying 16 A3T SLBMs supplied by the United States. depth bombs for its long-range Nimrod aircraft. the megaton fission bomb Violet Club was produced. Warheads are assembled and disassembled at Burghfield. Jag- uar. the United Kingdom operated a nuclear-capable land force of Lance missiles and 155-millimeter howitzers based in Germany with bor- rowed warheads and delivery devices from the United States under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. the U. The “Blue Danube” was the first nuclear weapon that Britain produced. Lance warheads.9 In 1968. The other production facility. MK-28 warhead and remained in the stockpiles until 1970. the most recent family of British nuclear-gravity aircraft bombs. The Polaris A3TK or Chevaline missile replaced the A3T in 1982 and was designed to penetrate the Soviet antiballistic . The Royal Navy operated Sea Harriers and antisubmarine helicopters capable of carrying WE- 177s. as are weapon components. at the same time as the thermonuclear Blue Steel air-launched cruise missiles. The WE-177 was decommissioned between 1992 and 1998. Disassembly of Chevaline warheads took place at the Burghfield facility and was completed in April 2002.

9. 2. pp. 12. the Polaris SLBM. British. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. 60.200 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s missile system around Moscow. pp. Howlett and Simpson. The re- maining WE-177s were planned for replacement in about 2005 with tactical air-to-surface cruise missiles. and Richard Fieldhouse. and Fieldhouse. Robert Norris and William Arkin. British.” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries.10 The United Kingdom currently deploys the Trident II D-5 inertially guided SLBM. Ministry of Defence.12 N OTES 1. Darryl Howlett and John Simpson. “United Kingdom. V (Boulder.400 kilometers at full payload. Europe and Nuclear Disarmament. Nimrod bombers. which has a greater payload capability. Howlett and Simpson. but in 1993 the British dropped the idea.. and accuracy than its pre- cursor. pp. November/December 2001. 7. Norris. available at www. French. In June 1992. The three-stage. p. 78–79. pp. pp. edited by Harald Müller (Brussels: Euro- pean Interuniversity Press. British. and it was replaced by the Vanguard SSBNs. the United Kingdom announced the removal of all WE-177 bombs from navy surface ships. Burrows. 3.mod. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. 5 Howlett and Simpson. French. and nuclear artillery were transferred from Europe to the United States when NATO’s nuclear forces were drastically reduced after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1998. Robert Norris.: Westview Press. Burrows. 1994). “British Nuclear Forces. 59. solid-propellant missile has a range of more than 7. range. 60–61. 63–66. Vol.gov. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 59.” pp.11 By October 1991. “United Kingdom.php3?page=1920. Ibid.fco. The warhead carried by the Tri- dent II D-5 reentry vehicle is believed to have a yield of 100 kilotons. 8. Colo. Actions Towards Verifiable Global Nuclear Disarmament. 168–169. 2001. pp. the United Kingdom’s forces were losing diversity: war- heads for Lance missiles.” p. 10. 1998). the Trident missiles aboard the Vanguard SSBNs took over the substrategic role of the WE-177 bombs. 6.. . “U. United Kingdom. p.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1087554459698.uk/index. Ibid. 4. The fleet of Polaris SSBNs was phased out by the end of 1996. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. and Fieldhouse. Andrew Burrows. 100–115. “The United Kingdom.” available at www.K. French. 63.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Norris. 11. 54–60.

2005 Launcher Type / Launchers/ First Warheads Deployable Designation SSBNs Deployed × Yield Range Warheads SLBMs Vanguard.400 200 class kilotons kilometers SSBN / Trident D- 5 II Total 60. The United Kingdom 201 Table 9.1.58/4 1994 1–3 × 100 7. SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile .0 200 megatons ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : SSBN = nuclear ballistic missile submarine. British Nuclear Forces.

.

1 Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Re- duction Treaty (START I).and subma- rine-based missiles and a fleet of nuclear-capable long-range bomber aircraft. and will be completely phased out of service by October 2005. 1945. the best independent estimate details 961 deployed delivery vehicles with 4. In addition. Twelve additional Ohio-class submarines are armed with 24 D-5 Trident II missiles each. The first U. The last of its 1.030 nuclear weapons tests took place on Septem- ber 23. As of January 2005. The United States continues to maintain the world’s largest force of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. on August 6 and 9. The MX/Peacekeeper missiles are in the process of being retired. The United States plans to reduce this number by about 50 percent by 2012. after which the United States became the only country to use nuclear weapons in combat. Aircraft and Missile Capability The United States maintains a triad of nuclear forces on board land. The United States has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. the United States maintains an accountable strategic nuclear force of 1. and 150 armed with one warhead each).3 The United States also has 780 operational nonstrategic war- heads and approximately 5. 300 armed with two to three warheads.300 nuclear weapons. although the arsenal is gradually being reduced in accordance with several arms control agreements with Russia (see table 10. 1992. nuclear test was conducted on July 16.1 at the end of the chapter).225 delivery vehicles with 5.2 although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is less. 1945. The missiles and their silos will be retained and most likely their warheads will be held in the reserve force. for a total of approximately 10.216 as- sociated warheads.S. each of which is loaded with six warheads. carrying six 203 .966 associated warheads. Two Ohio-class submarines are each equipped with 24 C-4 Trident I mis- siles. CHAPTER 10 The United States Nuclear Weapons Capability The United States was the first country to develop and test a nuclear weapon and is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States deploys 10 MX/Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic mis- siles (ICBMs) armed with ten warheads each and 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (50 armed with three warheads. Washington maintains 14 nuclear armed ballistic missile subma- rines.000 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles.

a decade after the collapse of the main nuclear challenger to the United States. nuclear arsenal are equipped to carry nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs. It ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997.204 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s warheads per missile.6 At the broadest level. The stated goal and developing mis- sion of U. This evolution was highlighted in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was released by the Department of Defense on January 9.S. The review. Four older submarines. low-yield nuclear weapons.S. The 94 B-52s in the U. the mission for U. outlined plans to implement negotiated reductions in strategic forces. the review stated that nuclear weapons continue to “play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States. the B-52 and the B-2. U.S. The Strategic Context The United States is the most advanced nuclear weapon state in the world.S. as well as large stocks of weapons-grade nuclear materials. nuclear arsenal has been shrinking as part of a negotiated arms reduc- tion process with the Soviet Union and its successor. The United States has a vast stockpile of chemical weapons that are slated for destruction on its territory and has opened its related facilities for inspection. which formerly carried 24 C-4 Trident I missiles each are being converted to non-nuclear operations although their former 96 total missiles. 2002. the U.” Thus. but are still accountable under START I. Dedicated to nuclear deterrence during most of its existence.S.S. It maintains a diverse arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Though the NPR’s commitment to deep cuts in the nuclear arsenal .S. to accelerate efforts to develop antimissile sys- tems (see chapter 5). Russia.4 The 81 B-1 bombers currently in service have been con- verted to conventional roles. nuclear weap- ons remained central to U. its allies and friends. The U. defense efforts. includ- ing WMD and large-scale conventional military force. and to begin the development of new. to retain and improve the ability to increase these forces if necessary. nuclear bomber force consists of 115 planes of two different types. begin- ning in 1969. are still accountable under START I rules. with 576 associated nuclear warheads. The United States also maintains nuclear-equipped tactical aircraft. It unilaterally destroyed its formidable arsenal of biological weapons over several years. which was mandated by Congress. After peaking in the mid-1980s.5 Biological and Chemical Capability The United States does not have research or production programs for either chemical or biological offensive weapons. nuclear forces continues to evolve. The 21 B-2s only carry gravity bombs. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats. nuclear weapons has become less clear with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the global superpower.

goal.S. U.8 During the past ten years. Under SORT. This position contradicts one advanced by the United States in the late 1990s.S.S. the United States will field 1. (NNSA). plans. sought to require warhead dismantlement to make future reductions both transparent and irreversible.S. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin signed in June 2002). the irreversibility of nuclear cuts is no longer a U. The United States 205 was significant.S. the United States has: • curtailed bomber and ICBM production.000 warheads. many of which are already under way.000 warheads will be reduced to just under 6.” below). this approach provides the United States with the greatest amount of flex- ibility to reconfigure its nuclear forces in response to changes in the world. This agreement would leave both Russia and the United States with more weapons in the field than was envisioned in the arms reduction process pursued throughout the 1990s.000 to 2. the United States and Russia agreed on a reduction goal of 2. In 1997. and tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines. president George W.200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012. it was basically a slower and less verifiable version of earlier U.7 This plan reflects preexisting commitments to the retirements of certain components of most “reserve” and “inactive” warheads. . This is a “responsive reserve” of warheads that can be redeployed should strate- gic conditions change for the worse. Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) (the replacement for the STARTs. announced that the United States would cut the stock- pile of nuclear weapons “about in half” by 2012. which U. officials have noted that since the end of the Cold War. and spending on strategic forces by almost 70 percent. the director of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In June 2004.700–2. With the signing of SORT. developed in the 1990s in START II and discussions for START III.500 de- ployed strategic warheads by the end of 2007 (see “The Effect of Arms Con- trol. thus accounting for lower numbers without changing exist- ing nuclear force plans. • removed all sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles. the United States has reduced its strategic nuclear systems by more than 50 percent. when the Bill Clinton administration. • taken all bombers off day-to-day alert. with 192 warheads each. The lower number agreed to in SORT is derived by no longer counting the warheads on submarines or bombers in overhaul as being “opera- tionally deployed. offi- cials. in the proposed START III. According to U. bombs. are usu- ally in overhaul at any given time. as are several bombers capable of carrying dozens of weapons. some warheads removed from delivery vehicles will be dis- mantled.” Two Trident submarines. but the removed systems could also be maintained in the active stock- pile for potential return to delivery systems on short notice (weeks or months). The official plan is classified. nonstrategic systems by more than 80 percent. Linton Brooks. al- though it remains unclear exactly what projected developments might trigger the need for such flexibility. but experts estimate that the current total arsenal of more than 10.

prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. the George W. Nuclear weapons—not only nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons ready for rapid launch—are essential.S. The strategic submarine force is the most survivable leg of the triad. low-cost. The di- versity is required to “complicate any adversary’s offensive and defense planning calculations while simultaneously providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad. pro- viding the United States with a powerful. • closed major portions of the nuclear weapons production complex. and highly capable nuclear forces. reliance on nuclear weapons for defense and security would also improve prospects for keeping new nations from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Sixty years after the invention of nuclear weapons. • eliminated all nuclear short-range attack missiles from the bomber force. are telling the world that conventional weapons are not enough to ensure security. • halted underground nuclear testing. That is. Despite these development. defense policy is still hotly debated. forces must remain ca- pable of withstanding a first strike and responding after the attack with an over- whelming and devastating nuclear counterattack. Mies explained the importance of each triad component: Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable.9 Reducing U. “the United States and Russia. .S.” according to the former commander-in-chief of the Stra- tegic Command. U. Admiral Richard Mies.206 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s • eliminated the Minuteman II ICBM force. the United States will retain for the foreseeable future robust. • eliminated all ground-launched intermediate. and • converted the entire B-1 bomber force from nuclear to conventional mis- sions. whether they intend the message or not. . the role of these systems in U. diverse. assured response capability against . Such a posture would reduce the risk that intact nuclear weapons could be acquired by terrorist groups or used without authorization and through miscalculation. They also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes their geographically dispersed capa- bilities into account if contemplating a disarming first strike. Bush administration concluded that there will be a need to maintain thousands of deployed nuclear weapons in a triad of bombers. • canceled almost all new warhead research and development.S. Some experts and former officials maintain that the new security environ- ment—even one dominated by the war on terrorism—provides the United States and the other nuclear weapons states an opportunity to reduce their nuclear weapons and that doing so would diminish the perceived political and military utility of these weapons.and short-range nuclear weap- ons. . Former senator Sam Nunn argues that with the current nuclear policies. and land-based missiles for the indefinite future.”10 In the 2002 NPR. submarines.

but chemical and biological weapons and even conventional explosives. and force operational planning for nuclear and conventional operations. . . .S. . . I intend to conduct experiments to better understand the value of weapons accuracy within a range of stressing environ- ments. Cartwright.S. Strategic Command] responsibility for inte- grating and synchronizing DoD’s [the Department of Defense’s] efforts for combating weapons of mass destruction. communication.”12 He continued. . would contribute to lowering the nuclear threshold. Strategic Com- mand. allow force dispersal to improve survivability and air- craft recall during mission execution. . These policies discussed in the NPR and implemented since raised two con- cerns. The Pentagon states that by more closely linking intelligence. The B-52 bomber can be employed in a standoff role using long-range cruise missile to attack from out- side enemy air defenses. this may lead to new thoughts on the balance between nuclear and conventional strike capabilities. making the use of nuclear weapons less likely. 2005. commander of the U. First. Another important development in the NPR is the closer integration of con- ventional and nuclear force planning. .S. there are few if any military contingencies that would explicitly rule out a possible nuclear response by the United States. . making the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable. The low-observable technology of the B- 2 bomber enables it to penetrate heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside an adversary’s territory. Second.” This statement appears to suggest that nuclear and conventional weapons are increasingly seen as interchangeable. For example. The United States 207 any adversary. The United States must preserve a sufficiently large strate- gic nuclear submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary in a crisis. General James E. meaning that some current nuclear missions might be assigned to conventional weapons—but also opening up the alternative whereby nuclear weapons might be seen as credible replace- ments for conventional weapons. . If modeling and testing confirm the value of such capability. The review stated that the United States would rely on nuclear weapons to deter and respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction. Within the new nuclear use policy formulation. that “the Secretary of Defense recently as- signed USSTRATCOM [the U. testified on April 4. by threatening the . . . While the right to respond to chemical and bio- logical weapons threats has been stated U.11 The review also called for steps that make the use of nuclear weapons by the United States more likely. Strategic bombers . . saying that the United States “will look at rationalizing our nuclear forces as an element of the overall force structure and the proper tailoring of nuclear effects as part of the broad spectrum of power. combined with greater operational integration. low-yield and “bunker buster” weapons. . the NPR formulation was more explicit and also called for the development of new weapons to make the threat of such use more credible. even in response to non-nuclear threats or attacks. conventional forces can more easily replace opera- tions previously limited to nuclear options. defined in the review to include not only nuclear weapons. policy since the early 1990s.

14 . while also reducing funding for a new facility to produce pluto- nium “pits” or cores for nuclear weapons. the United States constructed a massive nuclear weapons production com- plex. but supported a study on a replacement warhead.”13 Congress again eliminated funds for the “bunker buster” in 2005. nuclear arsenal has developed greatly since its inception in 1945. NNSA administrator Linton Brooks testified that the United States needs to resume researching and possibly developing new nuclear warheads to maintain the country’s scientific and engineering base and to preserve the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. In 2003. and for a program to prepare for the rapid resumption of nuclear weapons tests if needed. nuclear submarines. low-yield nuclear weapon) and funded a research program for low-yield nuclear weapons. America’s Cold War nuclear adversary. This evolution has continued with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the dis- solution of the Soviet Union. and a second program to modify existing warheads to create a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.” He continued that the United States should “begin concept and feasibility studies on replacement warheads and warhead components that pro- vide the same or comparable military capabilities to existing warheads on the stockpile. Congress reacted to these concerns by cutting funds for the programs in 2004. known as the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts Initiative. retires. We must train the next generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers before the last generation. which is funded at just over $6 billion each year. if for no other reason than to deter the use of such weapons by the United States. The safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal is already the focal point of the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program.S. In April 2005. even against conventionally armed adversaries. Wash- ington is actually increasing the incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons. . The cost of producing and maintaining this arsenal since 1940 has been estimated at almost $6 trillion. that “there is another reason why it is critical that we begin now to transform the stockpile. the Bush administration appeared to take a different approach to restarting the development of nuclear weapons in the United States. nuclear material production. and weapon assembly sites also included a large and advanced complex for the pro- duction of ballistic missiles. Dif- ferent strategies have guided the formation of nuclear forces and their possible use as international circumstances and technologies have continued to evolve. however. which honed its skills on nuclear testing. Nuclear Analysis The U. and long-range strategic bomb- ers. This system of national laboratories. Brooks noted. We are losing expertise.208 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s use of nuclear weapons. From its small-scale beginnings during the Manhattan Project in World War II. Congress denied funding for these programs in the fiscal year 2005 defense ap- propriations. The Bush administration began preliminary work on new weapons designs at the time of the NPR. . . Congress had modified the Spratt-Furse amend- ment of 1993 (which had prohibited the development of any new.

Additional amounts were consumed as waste products. in conjunction with similar efforts in Russia. The United States 209 The U. operational strate- gic nuclear arsenal is just over 4. verified arms reduction agreements in U. During the Cold War. including perhaps 480 deployed in Europe.200 nuclear weapons. supplied to foreign countries.4 metric tons of pluto- nium.15 The United States also maintains a large reserve of nuclear weapons in storage and inactive reserve. they demonstrate the value of negotiated. It is not clear from this information how much material might have been consumed in nuclear tests or nuclear reactors. the United States has declared 174 metric tons of HEU to be in excess to defense needs. the United States produced an extensive stockpile of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. reliable estimates put the stockpile at more than 10. A report released by the Department of Energy in 1996 documented the past U. civilian industry. arsenal. the United States maintains a smaller number (approximately 780) of tactical nuclear weapons.000 accountable nuclear weapons under the terms of START I.S. 3.S. Each side reduced its arsenal to 6. The United States ceased its production of highly enriched uranium for weapons in 1964 and ended plutonium produc- tion for weapons in 1988. production of plutonium. 2001. In 1994. through inventory differences. In addition to its de- ployed. strategic nuclear arsenal. security policy.S. a stockpile sur- passed only by that of the Soviet Union. In addition.4 metric tons had been used in nuclear weapons tests and in the nuclear weapons used at the end of World War II. a country or group must possess special nuclear- weapons-usable materials. The actual deployed. strategic arsenal consists of just under 6. when both sides completed reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals.S.300 weapons. Of this amount. . The material will be diluted and used as fuel for light-water reactors or disposed of as waste. through radioactive decay. to dispose of the material.000 accountable warheads as required by START I. These are substantial reductions from the nuclear arsenals that both countries deployed when the agreement was signed on July 31.16 To produce nuclear weapons. The Effect of Arms Control The United States and Russia reached an important arms control milestone on December 5.S. No official inventory is available on the total stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced by the United States. and trans- mutation. Russia and the United States agreed in 2000 to pursue joint programs to dispose of 34 tons of high-purity plutonium each. the Department of Energy released an estimate that the nuclear complex had produced 994 metric tons of HEU. fission. 1991. The report revealed that by 1988 the United States had produced or acquired from other sources 111. While no official numbers have been released on the size of the total U. or were transferred to the U.17 The United States has declared 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess to defense needs and has programs under way.

which was signed by President George H.S. When the U. START II. Thus. and to increased transparency and irreversibility in the reduction process.700 and 2.500 strategic war- heads for each nation and eliminated the most destabilizing strategic nuclear systems: multiple-warhead ICBMs. At a March 1997 meeting in Helsinki. START II effectively ceased to exist. the SORT agreement does not require the irreversible elimination of the deliv- ery systems or of the warheads themselves. after several months of hesitation by administration officials. however. Russia. includ- ing the elimination of the ten-warhead MX missile force. “providing the benefits of a reduced force structure four years prior to the agreed 2007 date for full elimination. 2012. culminating in May 2003 with the Duma’s rati- fication. too. pulled out of the ABM Treaty in 2002. the United States is confident that Russia has achieved START I reductions. Second. That treaty required reductions to 3.and submarine- launched). although the two sides will continue to use the verification terms of START I until it expires in December 2009. as well as the assistance that the United States has provided Russia in implement- ing cuts to its arsenal. First. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in general to reduce to 2. W. and its entry into force the following month. START I does not provide a totally accurate picture of the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed by each side. and to a limit on the number of accountable warheads on ballistic missiles (land. by the negotiation. and ratification of SORT. to treaty sublimits on strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers). Instead. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States endorsed those reductions and began planning for a smaller force. The Department of Defense also planned to implement the START II reductions by the end of 2007 and to deactivate by the end of 2003 all strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles planned for elimination.”18 Clinton administration plans for START III were abandoned by the Bush administration in 2002 when Presidents Bush and Putin made unilateral state- ments that each country would reduce their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1.000 warhead level.S.500 deployed strategic warheads in a future START III. SORT represents a significant departure from previous U. There is no mechanism written into the treaty that permits each side to confirm the required reductions made by the other side. . The Russian Duma ratified the treaty with the qualifi- cation that the United States honor the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.200 strategic warheads to be deployed by December 31.000–2. since it attributes weapons to some systems that may not reflect actual loadings.210 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Through an extensive set of verification and data exchange procedures. Bush and Russian president Boris Yeltsin in January 1993. to talks on tactical nuclear weapons. Both countries now plan to retain multiple warhead missiles after the demise of START II. sign- ing. These statements were followed. The treaty also does not address substrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons or nondeployed weapons in storage. if the treaty is not extended prior to that date. it simply calls for no more than 2.200 weapons. it is not fully verifiable. at which point the treaty expires. was ratified by both nations but has never entered into force. is able to verify adequately that the United States has made reductions to the 6.-Russian arms reduction treaties on two counts.000–3.

testing facilities in Mississippi and Utah. . The various agreements signed over the past three decades first regulated the arms race and then allowed Russia and the United States to make substantial progress in reducing arms from their Cold War peaks.966 START-accountable weapons on 1. the num- ber of tactical weapons had dropped to an estimated 780 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and air-dropped bombs. nuclear reductions. Although no official numbers have ever been provided. human glanders. research focused on the evaluation of such agents as anthrax. New York City. and weaponization technologies. 2013. and tularemia. biological warfare program was established during World War II un- der the direction of the War Reserve Service and the Army Chemical Warfare Service.23 Biological weapons facilities were expanded at Camp Detrick (renamed Fort Detrick in 1956). and a production site in Terre Haute. the United States had 10. concentration. reliable estimates from nongovern- mental organizations suggest that the United States had 7. The Korean War (1950–1953) prompted an expansion of the program. brucellosis. San Francisco. and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Large-scale open-air tests with live agents were performed on Johnston Atoll in the central Pacific Ocean from 1963 to 1969. American cities—Minneapolis.S.246 missiles and bombers. botulinum toxin. A biologi- cal weapons defense program was established in 1953 and included the development of vaccines and anti-sera to protect troops from biological attack. they are seen by the current administration as relics of the Cold War.22 Efforts were made to develop more virulent and stable strains. psittacosis. with the number of deployed and stock- piled strategic and tactical weapons totaling about 10. Saint Louis.19 These num- bers do not reflect the full extent of U. Throughout the 1950s. The Bush administration intends for SORT to be the last arms reduction treaty. The testing of agents involved both human and animal subjects.225 launchers. After 1945. Arkansas. storage. Despite the impressive record of threat reduction achieved by these agree- ments. Indiana. shigellosis (dysentery). for a total stockpile of 21. As of January 2005.300. Large-scale production began in 1954 with the advancement of fer- mentation. dengue fever. the United States had 5. however. and in 1954 the army’s main center for the production and stockpiling of biological weapons agents and munitions was opened in Pine Bluff.20 By 2005. creating instability in the strategic relationship between the two countries.) In 1990.S. agents that were easier and cheaper to produce and weaponize. other agents were added to the biological weapons research list: cholera. The United States 211 each side could choose to redeploy however many warheads it desired beginning January 1. Q fever.563 START-accountable nuclear weapons on 2. The fledgling program was limited to research and development facili- ties at Camp Detrick. plague.000 warheads. and others—were also subjected to the clandestine testing of dispersal and aerosolization methods involving harm- less bacterium.657 tactical nuclear warheads in 1990. (The Russian reductions are de- tailed in chapter 6. Maryland.21 Former Biological Weapons Programs The U.

thereby depriving enemy forces of ground cover.S. Bacterial pathogens. North Korea. vaccines. the Sergeant. By 1969.26 China. and phosgene. missile.S. mortars. the U. With a 25-kilometer range. biological weapons program also involved the development of antiplant and antianimal agricultural warfare agents. Early agent production focused on chlorine. the CWS stockpiled chemical shells. In 1925. the United States signed the Geneva Protocol. both by becoming potential terrorist targets and by undermining attempts to limit or control other countries’ research into biological agents. President Richard Nixon unilaterally and unconditionally renounced offensive biological weapons and ordered the de- struction of all U.25 In November 1969. and Fort Detrick. and fungal plant pathogens were developed. Oppo- nents worry that these new laboratories will unintentionally worsen the threat. All the research is unclassified. the war- head could deliver 356 4. After the September 11. and portable cylinders.S. Former Chemical Weapons Programs The U. The institute’s research includes the development of countermeasures. The United States signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. tox- ins. administration dra- matically increased biodefense funding. however. weapons stockpiles and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful purposes. The United States denied the allegations and asked for an impartial investigation. biological weapons arsenal took place between May 1971 and February 1973 at the Pine Bluff Arsenal. China and North Korea. chemical warfare program was initiated with the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in 1918.S.212 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s By 1958 weaponization research yielded “the first missile to carry a BW war- head—the 762-mm Honest John rocket. The allega- tions remain unsubstantiated. the first long-range U. 2001. and the Soviet Union accused the United States of using biological weapons during the Korean War against China and North Korea. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s. de- fense strategies. terrorist attacks.S. The entire anticrop stockpile was also destroyed.”24 The U. By the early 1960s. Rocky Mountain Arsenal. chloropicrin.S. which . the annual budget for chemical and biological warfare research was reported to be $300 million. extended the warhead’s reach to 120 kilometers and the payload up to 720 spherical bomblets.S. and medical therapies. as well as herbicides to destroy food crops or defoliate trees. and started construction on new de- fense laboratories capable of handling the most dangerous pathogens. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases was estab- lished in 1969 to continue research on medical defense against biological weap- ons. rejected World Health Organization and In- ternational Red Cross efforts to intervene to mount an investigation. with $5 million set aside for agricultural-agent development. Biological research was reoriented to the devel- opment of defense measures such as vaccines and countermeasures against bio- logical weapon attack. The U.5-inch (11. The service also began the production and weaponization of the chemical agents tabun and sarin.5-centimeter) spherical bomblets. The destruction of the U. mustard gas.

Public Law 19-121 imposed restrictions on the testing.S. transport.000-pound M-34 and M-34A1 cluster bombs were developed.S. as the United States de- ployed more than 400 chemical battalions and companies. though efforts to produce new “binary” weapons continued through the 1980s. the 1. passed by Congress in 1985. and disposal of chemical warfare agents. three programs.31 The ar- senal is now stored at eight U. Under the auspices of the Army’s Chemical Materials Agency. the Alternative Technol- ogy and Approaches Program. Each cluster contained 76 M-125 or M-125A1 ten-pound bombs. the United States did not change its no-first-use policy.32 In 2000.30 In addition. the United States manufactured more than 146. Public Law 99-145. The CWS expanded rapidly during World War II.28 Despite the growth of the U. recovered chemical weapons. and mus- tard gas. Roosevelt announced a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons. Senate. “We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such [chemical] weapons unless they are first used by our enemies. The U.27 Production and storage facilities were also expanded in more than ten states. the U. The development. Ul- timately.33 It is now for sale. located 800 miles south- west of Hawaii. requires the army to destroy all obsolete chemical agents and munitions. and former chemical weapons production . President Franklin D. chemi- cal warfare program concentrated on the weaponization of sarin.6 pounds of sarin.”29 With the onset of the Korean War the use of chemical weapons was seriously considered. chemical weapons pro- gram was substantially slowed. pledg- ing to dispose of its entire unitary chemical weapons stockpile. did not ratify the protocol until 1974. The United States 213 banned the use of chemical and biological warfare. the Chemical Corps (the CWS was renamed in 1946) began the research and development of the V nerve agent (VX).S. however. During the 1950s. the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. binary chemical weapons.S. hydrogen cyanide. lewisite. the U. storage. although riot control agents were used on prisoners of war.S. In 1969. particularly as a means to offset the enemy’s superior numbers. rockets. An official statement issued in 1943 declared.6 percent of the American chemical weapons stockpile at the Johnston Atoll facility. The VX program reached its height in the 1960s with the weaponization of artillery. The U. The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. For air deliv- ery. Combined with President Nixon’s reaffirmation of the no-first-use policy for chemical weapons and the resubmission of the Geneva Protocol for Senate ratification. chemical warfare program. and other delivery systems. the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program completed the destruction of 6. production. More than half of the stockpile is in bulk storage containers and the remainder is stored in obsolete munitions. Army sites. including cyanogen chloride. and the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Pro- gram all work to dispose of the materials. each holding 2. and stockpiling of chemical agents continued. The facility was shut down at the end of 2004.000 metric tons of chemi- cal agents. Between 1940 and 1945.S. arsenal currently consists of unitary lethal chemical munitions that contain blister agents and nerve agents.

” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Steven Schwartz. 73–75. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. available at www. before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Subcommittee.htm. 91. Sam Nunn.globalsecurity. due to the huge quantities of chemical weapons to be eliminated. pp. 2007. 2005. 9. 14. .–USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces.” April 1.htm.org. 2005). 4. see Thomas B. “Remarks to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. 74–75.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/nunn. Cohen. p. 6. 15. Bureau of Arms Control Fact Sheet. “What’s Behind Bush’s Nuclear Cuts?” Arms Control Today. Ibid. 8. as well as its subsequent deadline to eliminate 100 percent of its chemical weapons by an undetermined date after December 31. 2004. 1984).C. Kristensen. General James Cartwright. July 11. Department of Energy. 2005 (for forces accountable as of January 31. U. p. See George Perkovich.C. 1998). 73–75. testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.: Brookings Institution Press. Jessica Mathews. Nuclear Weapons Databook: U. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Wash- ington.S. 20.: Ballinger. January 2001). Rose Gottemoeller. January/February 2005. 2005. Nuclear Forces. Robert S. pp. pp. William M.C. 2007.: Natural Resources Defense Council. 1945–1996 (Washington. “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. State Department. Norris and Hans M. Cochran. State Department. 11. Cochran. Kristensen.: Department of Defense. D. Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington. and because of citizen concerns regarding the environmental effects of destroying the stockpiles through incineration. 2001. D. The process of destruction has been a slow one. Milton Hoenig. 2. 2007. U.ceip. 2005.org/strategy. D.” February 1996. available at www. 5.thebulletin.. Robert S. Ibid. Ibid. and the web site of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. As a result. Robert S.” pp.S. 19. 2004. “Statement of Admiral Richard W. 18. Atomic Audit. Norris and Thomas B.” June 21.” Washington. Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U. 10. Joseph Cirincione. 1997). Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/npr.C. www. Norris and Hans M. William S. 2005). Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. Bureau of Arms Control Fact Sheet. the United States has not met each of its incremental deadlines under the Chemical Weapons Convention. April 4. Mies. 16. 2–3. and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons extended the United States’ deadline to destroy 45 percent of its stockpile to December 31. 7.S. 17. United States Strategic Command..carnegieendowment. U. D.214 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s facilities by April 29. 13.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 6–12. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook.C. For further details. Norris and Kristensen. Schwartz.” 12. Excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review can be found at www.S. 54. Ambassador Linton Brooks. U. and Jon Wolfsthal. however.. October 2004. Strategic Forces Subcommittee.” July 31. Mies.S. April 4. ed. “Statement of Admiral Richard W. pp. “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee. commander in chief.S. Arkin. Mass. D.34 N OTES 1. 3.

” C-8 / Dec.armscontrol. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective. p.pdf. 25.fas.cma. 49. 33.htm. Jonathan Yang.” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. See www. Ibid. 44. 23.” available at www. pp. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster. “United States: Chemical Weapons.org/docs/c8dec15.htm. p. 1997). 2003. 15. p. and William Broad. 29. 37–38. “U. 28. p. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. p.org/act/2003_09/Biodefense. Federation of American Scientists. Federation of American Scientists.mil/aboutcma. . October 24. Jeffery Smart. The Textbook of Military Medicine (Washington. Plague Wars. Part I.aspx?state=Hawaii. “United States: Biological Weapons. Conference of the States Parties. 42. Eighth Session.army.” Arms Control Today. public health concerns emerged following an experiment using Serratia marcescens in San Francisco. available at www. Judith Miller. 22.fas.mil/state. Biodefense Plans Worry Nonproliferation Advocates. Office of the Surgeon General.” pp.. 34. 73–75.org/ nuke/guide/usa/cbw/bw.” available at www. Mangold and Goldberg. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg. 2001). 26. Investigation by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found no evidence that the experiments posed a public health risk. D. 2000). Norris and Kristensen.org/ nuke/guide/usa/cbw/cw.aspx. Ibid. In late 1950. 31.opcw. 34. The United States 215 21.. 24. 27. Ibid. Stephen Engelberg. 30.cma. available at www. Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (London: Macmillan.army. 38. “Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons. See www.C.S. 32.: Borden Institute. September 2003.asp.

-4.216 Nonstrategic Warheads B-61-3.1.400+ 6 1.400+ 6 384 SLBM Totals 336/14 2.400 6 288 Trident II D-5 288/12 MK-4 1992 7.650+ 1 150 MX 1 Peacekeeper 10 1986 9.016 Ballistic Missile Totals 846 3.216 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 10. U.S.166 Strategic Bombers B-52H 94 1961 14. -10 N/A 1979 580 Tomahawk SLBM 325 1984 1 200 Nonstrategic Totals N/A 780 Total Deployed Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems 1.650+ 10 100 ICBM Totals 510 1.344 MK-5 1990 7.000 .000 850 B-2 Spirit 21 1994 9.650+ 2–3 750 Minuteman III (MK-12) 50 1970 9.600 200 Bomber Totals 115 1.650+ 3 150 Minuteman III (MK-12) 150 1970 9.150 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) Launchers/ Boats Trident I C-4 48/2 1979 7.286+ ~5. Nuclear Forces Deployed Systems Year Range Warheads/ Total Name/Type Launchers Deployed (kilometers) Launcher Warheads Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman III (MK-12A) 300 1979 9.050 Total Strategic Launchers and Warheads TOTAL 961 4.

ICBM.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Kristensen. leaving the Minuteman III as the only operational. The 10 remaining MX Peacekeeper missiles are scheduled to be withdrawn by the end of 2005. Nuclear Forces 2005. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook.” available at www. U.S. U.htm. OTES: NOTE 1. “Fact File: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. January/February 2005. pp.” available at www. “Fact File: Ballistic Missile Submarines.stratcom. U.mil/FactSheetshtml/ ballistic_missiles. Nuclear Arsenal ~10.S.S. Strategic Command.S. Strategic Command.315 OURCES: SOURCES Derived from Robert S. The United States 217 Nondeployed Weapons (Hedge. deployed U. Inactive) ~5. .mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.stratcom. 73–75. Norris and Hans M. Spares.S.315 Total U.htm. Current plans are to begin deployment of a next-generation ICBM in 2018.

.

None of the countries therefore qualifies under the treaty as a nuclear weapon state. therefore. Pakistan’s program was driven by similar concerns about India. PART THREE Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States I n addition to the five declared nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). three countries possess nuclear weapons: India. The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state as a country that has tested a nuclear weapon device before January 1. The drive to create a universal nonproliferation regime is greatly complicated by these three countries. and all have a signifi- cant capability to produce. 1967 (article 9). which would have to be approved by the national procedures of all 187 current members. something that has generally been regarded as an unac- ceptable and unlikely approach. India’s decision is more complex. Israel’s nuclear program was developed in direct response to its inse- curity vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. despite the fact that all three possess nuclear weapons. but perceived threats from China and Pakistan played an important role. Israel. It would be legally impossible for them to join the treaty without its being amended. The nuclear programs of all three countries demonstrate how re- gional security affects national decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. are directly tied to regional security and political dynamics. 219 . and Pakistan. build. and deliver nuclear weapons. None of these three countries is a member of the NPT. Efforts to reverse nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia.

.

the Indian Air Force 221 . By the end of 2005. India may also be producing significant quantities of highly enriched uranium at its gas-centrifuge plant in Trombay. As of the spring of 2005. and it has not officially stated how many weapons it has or plans to produce. and potentially the MiG-27. and Jaguar aircraft. the most likely options are the Mirage 2000. January 2001. with a declared range of 2. India had deployed the short-range Prithvi missile (two versions). and 350 kilometers and 500 kilograms (the Navy version). was successfully tested in April 1999.3 Yet after India’s “Shakti” (strength) nuclear tests.1 at the end of the chapter). road-mobile Prithvi exist. The medium-range Agni II. India’s nuclear weapons are believed to be stored as separate components. with fighter-bomber aircraft being the most likely delivery vehicle (see table 11. though precisely how much is still unknown. Su-30. the most striking aspect of the country’s weap- ons program has been its moderate pace. These are the short-range Prithvi and the medium- range Agni. with ranges of 150 kilometers and payloads of 500 kilograms (the Army version). MiG-29. In a 2001 classified internal memorandum.4 Despite its pursuit of ballistic missiles. CHAPTER 11 India Nuclear Weapons Capability India possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weapons within a few days or weeks.5 Of India’s bomber aircraft.2 It is not known how many actual weapons India has produced from this material. It continues to produce nuclear materials for use in weapons. India’s probable delivery platforms re- main its fighter-bomber aircraft. India may have produced between 334 and 504 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium. 250 kilometers and 500–750 kilograms (the Air Force version). and the medium-range Agni I and Agni II with the Army. though it is most likely on the low end of the estimates. It conducted a test of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 and five tests of nuclear weapons in May 1998.500 kilometers.1 enough to produce between 75 and 110 nuclear weapons. and Au- gust 2004. Three variants of the liquid-fueled. India is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).000 to 2. Aircraft and Missile Capability India has developed several types of ballistic missiles capable of carrying and delivering a nuclear payload. The Army and Air Force versions are in serial production.

India’s then–prime minister.9 Some come from the way the country’s security and political elite look at current international power equations. that India’s significant biotechnical infrastructure and expertise are being used to conduct research on biological warfare defenses. and that nuclear weapons still form a central part of U. pronuclear Indian strategists argue that. which was in power during the May 1998 tests.13 Despite improved relations since 2002.”8 India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and its public display of this capability can be seen as self- validation and as steps toward acquiring the power and status that the country believed was its due. nuclear weapons make strategic sense only vis-à-vis China. invasion of Iraq versus the toler- ance of North Korea. China still remains a criti- cal factor in India’s nuclear weapons objectives. how- ever.12 Indeed.N. therefore. Atal Behari Vajpayee.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s reportedly determined that the country’s fighter-bomber aircraft will remain the only feasible delivery system until the end of this decade. define power in terms of military power and define military power in terms of nuclear weapons capability. the U.7 Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention.S. cited the threat from China as the reason for India’s nuclear testing program. for example. that international status and power are still related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. but it possesses a sizable indigenous chemical industry. has explained that with the nuclear tests of May 1998 India achieved “a degree of strategic autonomy by acquiring those symbols of power . There is no publicly available evidence that India is pursuing either a chemical or biological offensive warfare program. .6 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability India is a signatory to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemi- cal Weapons Convention. Some of these perceptions are reinforced by colonial memo- ries that still underlie a part of India’s search for status and policy independence. many members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). and they note the difference in the U. Security Council are all nuclear weapon states. that countries that hold a permanent seat on the U. for India. These views on the benefits of nuclear weapons have been as influential as military concerns in driving India’s weapons program.S. India’s Ministry of Defense expressed concern that “the . Jaswant Singh. .S. and NATO military strategy. president Bill Clinton. In its 2002–2003 annual report assessing India’s security environment. They note. particularly as the Indian secu- rity establishment considers contingencies for a China that in the future will possibly be much more powerful. India has pledged to destroy all its chemical agents and production facilities. intelligence assessments maintain. Some U. They believe. response to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo versus Russian atrocities in Chechnya. The Strategic Context India’s then–foreign minister.S.11 In a letter to U. which have universal currency.S. Indian government officials have publicly proclaimed the need for a credible deterrent against Chi- nese threats.222 N o n .10 Certainly.

”14 The Pakistan–China nuclear and missile nexus is also a critical factor in India’s strategy. with a newfound self-confidence. on China and Pakistan. point- ing in particular to the fact that the nuclear tests neutralized its conventional weaponry advantage over Pakistan and solidified the Pakistani–Chinese nexus. some Indian analysts argue that nuclear weapons have caused a deterioration in the country’s security environment.19 Relations with the United States From India’s perspective. by which India was left out of the nuclear club. China has provided major assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs—including a blueprint for a nuclear weapon. plans to deploy antimissile systems. (3) progress to- ward accepting the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). missile defense program. then the nuclear tests have ultimately achieved India’s objectives. Many pronuclear Indian analysts have argued that the resulting increased attention from the sole remaining superpower proved that nuclear weapons were the only way in which to gain international relevance. attention is a measure of respect and status. and is likely to get further accentuated as China responds to counter the U. The Indian government was one of the few that lauded U.”16 Some analysts note that India’s decision to test its nuclear weapons may have been hastened by Pakistan’s April 1998 test of the 1. (2) restraint from deploying nuclear weapons and delivery systems. a plutonium production reactor. the nuclear tests raised the country’s visibility and clout in the post–Cold War era. India’s concern about China’s strategic cooperation with Pakistan is intensified by a perception that the United States has not done all that it could have to stop Chinese proliferation. missiles.S.S. If U. a missile pro- duction factory. President Clinton’s hugely popular visit to India in March 2000 (delayed from 1997 by the collapse of the government and from 1998 by the Indian tests) set the stage for improved ties.300-kilometer-range Ghauri missile.S. which demonstrated for the first time Pakistan’s capability to hit deep within India’s territory. (4) formal assurance . They argue that the level nuclear playing field emboldened Pakistan to initiate the Kargil conflict in 1999 and constrained India’s ability to respond. respectively).S. strategic vision. New Delhi had warmed to the U.18 Despite the argument of India’s pronuclear lobby.15 and that the international community has done little to reprimand Pakistan on its “nuclear sabre-rattling. India 223 asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is pronouncedly in favor of China. Those in India who were eager to test again viewed the nuclear regime as a potential stranglehold that they had to preempt. The Clinton administration had set five benchmarks for the Indian and Paki- stani governments to meet before the sanctions it imposed in the aftermath of the nuclear tests would be removed: (1) signing and ratifying the CTBT.17 Indian strategists also saw the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT as a con- solidation of the nuclear status quo. and the technology and know- how for uranium enrichment (see chapters 7 and 12. By May 2001. This feeling set the stage for India’s rejection of the CTBT in 1996 and for the tests in 1998.

India anticipates only a further deepening of ties in the second Bush term. High-level military meetings in December 2001 produced a joint statement that India and the United States would cooperate “to counter threats such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond ensuring that Kashmir does not explode. concerns to ensure com- pliance with U.S. the lifting of most sanctions imposed on India opened the way for hitherto unprecedented defense ties. export controls that had been imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests.21 The two countries see eye to eye on antimissile systems. and (5) a resump- tion of a dialogue on Kashmir. Thus. its positive record on nuclear export controls. With Republican antipathy toward the CTBT. policy direction was exem- plified by the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Henry Shelton. The NSSP liberalized some U. willingness to sell major weapons platforms to India. export controls on proliferation-sensitive items. India took notice when then–deputy secretary of state Rich- ard Armitage included New Delhi on an Asian trip to “consult” with allies in the region on deploying missile interceptors.S. who promised renewed defense ties.S. A joint U. government believed that its interests in India extended beyond nonproliferation and. international terrorism. deeper relations between India and the United . Bush administration has sought to build on the newfound camaraderie with the Indian government. and missile defense. sanctions were lifted on the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organization. allies Japan and South Korea. under the NSSP rubric. India was assuming the role of America’s “strategic partner” in South Asia. a major Indo-U. with Pakistan struggling under the weight of sanctions and isolation. In return. something that Washington had not consid- ered since 1984. which is a significant part of transforming our strategic relationship. even though the benchmarks had not been met. During the Bush administration’s first term.” The agreements that were reached reflected a U. That gesture was followed by an unprecedented visit by the then–Joint Chiefs of Staff chair. a potential counterweight to China.22 In September 2004.S.”23 Because India’s quest for international status has been one of the motivating factors for its nuclear program. high-technology trade. this new U. India was especially elated when. agreement on bilateral cooperation on civilian nuclear activities. India has committed to addressing U. Benchmarks are no longer discussed. The U.224 N o n .S. His other stops were to visit U. India’s commitment to a test moratorium. commercial space programs. before September 11.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s that nuclear and missile technology exports would be banned. the Bush administration has decided to downplay nuclear proliferation concerns so that it can renew defense ties and establish “strategic” relations with India.S.- Indian statement characterized the NSSP as “only the first phase in this important effort. The George W. pressure on India to sign the treaty has disappeared.S. moreover.S.S. Clinton had already begun to lift sanctions. and it has taken the relationship to new heights. that sanctions were no longer effective either in deterring proliferation in South Asia or in facilitating better relations with India and Pakistan in general. narcotics trafficking and piracy. and its expressed willingness to consider the CTBT and FMCT made it more palatable for Washington to ease sanctions in the period after the Clinton visit.20 Toward the end of his administration. 2001.

may in fact ultimately serve to moder- ate New Delhi’s nuclear ambitions. The United States sold India some of the heavy water needed for Cirus operations under the same assurances. There is some controversy over whether India successfully tested a thermonuclear device. The Indian government claimed that the May 11 test consisted of a fission device with a 12-kiloton yield. After a testing hiatus of 24 years. Homi Bhabha. in spite of international oppro- brium and initial sanctions. and India’s growing international reputation for being a “responsible” nuclear weapon state. Nuclear Analysis India was an early beneficiary of the United States–sponsored “Atoms for Peace” program launched in 1953. the world’s remaining superpower.24 On May 13. India 225 States. Ten years later. When fully operational. as part of an ambitious scheme to pave the way for breeder reactors. because the yield recorded and analyzed by Western seis- mographers was low. the country’s foreign policy elite also perceive two other successes: the continuing develop- ment of India’s nuclear and missile programs. India detonated a nuclear device that it said was for peaceful uses only. Canada required only written “peaceful assurances” that the reactor would be used exclusively for peace- ful purposes. shortly before China detonated its first nuclear explosive device. leading many in the scientific community to believe that the boosted-fission primary or the thermonuclear secondary did not function as designed. especially of plutonium separation. This facility was commissioned in late 1964. India tested two more subkiloton devices with a range of between 0. Though its growing economic success remains the primary variable in India’s growing self-confidence. India’s nuclear weapons program originated at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) at Trombay. demonstrating India’s weapons capabilities. Led by its atomic energy chief. India began to design and acquire the equipment for its Trombay plu- tonium-reprocessing facility. There was little evidence before the mid-1950s that India had any interest in nuclear weapons. and a subkiloton device. the Trombay facility had an estimated capacity to separate up to 10 kilograms of plutonium annually (enough for perhaps two bombs a year). This program was intended to stem the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons by offering access to civilian uses of nuclear technology in exchange for pledges not to apply the technology to weapons.2 and 0. a ther- monuclear device with a 43-kiloton yield. in 1955 Canada supplied India with the Cirus 40-megawatts-thermal heavy-water-moderated research reactor (from which In- dia later derived the plutonium for its 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion). In 1958. On the basis of the prevailing atmosphere of trust in the early Atoms for Peace years. in western India. India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998: three on May 11 and two on May 13.25 . India recognized early the potential dual-use nature of many nuclear technologies.6 kilotons. The device used plutonium that had been generated in Cirus and separated in the Trombay reprocessing facility. In lieu of safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (which did not exist until after the agency was founded in 1957).

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress-led government reaffirmed the existing nuclear policy: “We will maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. based on an average of 4. In April 2000.5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon. As long as India’s decision makers believe that the existing nuclear weapon states will not or cannot work toward disarmament. it must be addressed globally.226 N o n . is being pursued. therefore.27 Any Indian government will remain committed to weaponization. therefore. Speaking at his inaugural address. The country’s testing of short.” Prime Minister Singh’s remarks reflect India’s assertion that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a global rather than regional problem.and medium-range missiles continues. India’s Department of Atomic Energy acknowledged for the first time that it has implemented a program to develop and deploy nuclear weapons: “Following the successful nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokharan. India will not countenance a rollback of its own program. At the same time. These are the upper limits of the possible. Given the limited test experience. however.” BARC is the scientific nerve center of India’s nuclear weaponization program. A change in government from the right- wing BJP to the more left-leaning Congress Party has not altered India’s nuclear posture. India has maintained a self-declared moratorium on further nuclear tests. and we will continue to work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. which was . despite some domestic voices calling for their resump- tion. and. even if budget and technical realities and international political considerations continue to restrain its pace.26 Some analysts viewed this termination as an indication of accelerated weapon-related activity at BARC. India’s nuclear policy remains officially defensive. and India’s perceived needs. along with a policy of no-first- use in our nuclear doctrine. are based on the range of material that India could have produced from its reactors. we remain committed to the goal of universal nuclear disarma- ment. the government distanced itself from the doctrine. it is most likely that India has produced roughly 36 nuclear devices and unlikely that it has produced 100 or more. the technical difficul- ties. There is no public information on how many nuclear weapons India may have produced. The doctrine. regardless of the party in power. India’s Nuclear Doctrine A draft report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doc- trine was released in August 1999. All estimates. The government has cooled its early rhetorical bravado. In 2005. India is a responsible nuclear power. the government ended indepen- dent safety oversight at BARC. imple- mentation of the program to meet the national policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence in terms of necessary research and development as well as manufacture. though that does not appear to be the case. with then–foreign minister Singh calling it a “possible Indian Nuclear Doctrine. After it became public. enough for 7 to 112 weapons.” which was released for public debate. just before national elections by the then- governing BJP.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s In its 1999–2000 report.

after much delay. and employment of nuclear forces” will be determined by “the strategic environment.” raising the question of the country’s doctrinal commitment to not using nuclear weapons against a non- nuclear-weapon state. which advises the nuclear command au- thority and carries out orders from the political council. Some experts have argued that India’s doctrine is essentially “conservative” in character.S.” The doctrine further calls for nuclear forces based on a “triad of aircraft. The Indian government . effective intelli- gence and early warning capabilities. but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail. while vaguely reaffirming “credible minimum deterrence. and interservice rivalry over the control of India’s land-based missiles. because it emphasizes deterrence rather than war fighting. shall form part of the system. deployment.” and “the “actual size. Deterrence will be a “dynamic concept. the authority to use nuclear weapons rests with the prime minister and with a “designated successor.” whereby India “will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike.” The nuclear doctrine also outlines a plan for the command and control of nuclear forces: “An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and re- sponsiveness shall be in place. and operationally pre- pared nuclear forces. However. India 227 officially affirmed only in January 2003. and the needs of na- tional security.” Even during the height of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001.” the Indian government announced for the first time that India “will retain the option” of using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a biological or chemical weapons attack against the country. An integrated operational plan. which includes a political council and an executive council.”28 In January 2003. India established a Nuclear Command Authority. or a series of se- quential plans. The national secu- rity adviser chairs the executive council. This pro- cess was delayed by the 2001–2002 crisis with Pakistan. which has the sole author- ity to order a nuclear strike and was set up to formulate political principles and administrative arrangements to manage India’s nuclear arsenal. calls for a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” based on a policy of “retaliation only.”30 In January 2003. India’s prime minister chairs the political council. survivable.29 This echo of U. components. and sea-based assets. predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy. India reaffirmed its no-first-use policy. India’s Nuclear Command Structure According to India’s nuclear doctrine. doctrine narrows the definition of “no-first-strike.” The doctrine makes no effort to quan- tify either the deterrence or associated costs. for India a “‘no-first-strike” policy does not mean that the government will not have a first strike capability. and be- cause ultimately the country’s nuclear force will likely be “minimum” rather than “expansive. a robust command and control system. mobile land-based missiles. technological imperatives. the doc- trine says that India will require “sufficient. however.” For this deterrence to work. and comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy.

The Army first received the 150-kilometer-range Prithvi in 1994. India also created alternative nuclear command chains. Air Force and Navy. one of India’s prominent nuclear strategic thinkers. Prithvi units include numerous vehicles that could be detected once deployed. and hours would be required in the field to prepare the missiles for launch. and Air Force. The Prithvi and the Agni I and II are the nuclear-capable missiles in the hands of the Indian military.32 Nuclear warheads remain under civilian control.”37 Given the Prithvi’s range. and Su-30MKI squadrons and the Navy will deploy some naval warships and submarines to complete the nucleus of India’s first nuclear command. it still has questions about its guidance system. Estimates of the number of Prithvis the Indian Army possesses range from 75 to 90. it poses significant op- erational liabilities as a nuclear delivery system. arguing that it was necessary to establish them to ensure re- taliation for a nuclear strike. beginning with the Air Force. A nuclear war game exercise staged by the Indian Army in the summer . wrote that the nuclear-capable aircraft’s “limitations of range and susceptibility to in- terception by hostile systems make it critical that the central component of the nuclear arsenal must rest on ballistic missiles.38 The Army is reportedly unenthusiastic about the Prithvi. The post will rotate among the three services—Army. which was begun in 1983.500-kilometer Agni missiles—will be part of the nucleus of the new Strategic Forces Command. The Annual Report 2002–2003 of the Ministry of Defense empha- sizes: “As far as India is concerned.”36 This is particularly true given China’s missile capability. which is a principal driving force behind India’s mis- sile program. Mirage 2000.34 The creation of the Nuclear Command Authority under the political council headed by the prime minister and the SFC headed by a commander-in-chief have deliberately obscured the actual chain of command with respect to autho- rizing the use of India’s nuclear weapons.39 Moreover. because the Prithvi is liquid-fueled.228 N o n . in the physical custody of the Defense Research Development Organization and the Department of Energy. which would allow interdiction by Pakistan. The commander-in-chief of the SFC will manage and administer the nuclear forces but not the nuclear war- heads. The Air Force will earmark some Jaguar.31 The SFC consists of representatives from the Army. however. the retired Indian air commodore Jasjit Singh.33 Two operational missile groups of the Indian Army—one armed with the 150–250-kilometer short-range Prithvi missiles and the other with the longer- version 2.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s also approved the appointment of a commander-in-chief of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to take charge of the nuclear arsenal. it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further aug- mented to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In 1998. its role would be restricted to use against Pakistan. never hav- ing been involved in its development. Navy.35 Missile Analysis India’s missile capabilities are the result of its Integrated Guided Missile Devel- opment Program.

40 There are even reports that the govern- ment has decided not to weaponize any Prithvi variant with a nuclear warhead. allowing India to base it deep within the country.500–5. It is a two-stage.46 The Agni II is an improvement over the “technology demonstrator” Agni I. has been in development since 1983 but had its first successful test only in September 2001. A Rand study argues that no upgrade of the Agni II is likely to produce a missile with the 3. The naval version. The Agni II could reach all of Pakistan. India has the technical expertise to pursue intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. could allow India to develop its missile capabilities faster. a Prithvi. Even given India’s technical expertise. While India has certainly boosted its image by going nuclear.41 However.47 The Agni I has a liquid-solid motor combination. having successfully launched both the Polar Space Launch Vehicle and the Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle. The program resumed under the BJP government in 1998 with a second version of the missile. India has continued its tests of the short-range ballistic missile system.500-kilometer-range Agni II in October 2003. The Agni II could reach parts of western China. DRDO is also currently working on a new missile.48 Currently. . . including Beijing. particularly Russian. but most of northeast China. a country’s international standing is founded on the reach of the weapons in its armory. remains out of reach. thereby increasing the survivability factor against its western neighbor. it will truly emerge as an international power only when it tests its first ICBM. The cadre of India’s defense scientists who were influential in the nuclear tests would also like to demonstrate India’s scientific capability by fielding an ICBM.000-kilogram payload. Foreign assistance. was suspended in 1994 owing to technological problems and diplomatic pressure from the United States.42 In September 2002. . argue that an ICBM is not necessary for India’s defensive needs. the Dhanush. Nine years after receiving the Prithvi I. scientists at India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) are working to upgrade the Agni II to increase its accuracy.45 The Agni medium-range program.49 One member of the BJP-led National Security Advisory Board has written: “In the final analy- sis.and road-mobile MRBM with a solid-fueled rocket.51 Perhaps India will be content with an intercontinental . capable of carrying an estimated 1. however. with the second stage consisting of. and in August 2004. rail.000 kilometer range necessary to hold China’s most valued assets at risk.44 The Air Force version of the Prithvi (the Prithvi-250) was successfully tested in December 2001. India announced that the Dhanush was “ready for induction after successful trials at sea. the Army took receipt of the 700-kilometer-range Agni I and the 1. even if the missile were based in north- east India east of Bangladesh. India 229 of 2001 did not include the Prithvi. begun in the late 1980s.500- kilometer range. that range (which will also be a matter of payload) could require the develop- ment of a new ballistic missile. again in January 2001.”43 The missile was successfully test fired again in October 2004.”50 Some Indian politicians. essentially. was first tested success- fully in April 1999 (just before the BJP faced a no-confidence motion in the Indian Parliament).000-kilogram payload to a 3. which is capable of carrying a 1. The Agni II medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). the Agni III.

Russia is providing 40 nuclear-capable Su- 30 aircraft and is also reportedly leasing a small number of nuclear-capable. then–defense minister George Fernandes informed the Indian Parliament that “in consonance with the threat perception. which can carry a heavy nuclear weapon to a range of 5. many years will be required before India has a test-proven capability to carry nuclear weapons to ranges of 5.57 Russian assis- tance could enable faster progress. Currently. After ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1996.61 These are materials and items that are not themselves weapons but are used to produce chemical agents.56 A 2000 Rand study estimated that an Indian SLBM capability was still another 10 to 20 years away. to develop a nuclear-powered submarine that could be equipped with nuclear-tipped missiles. made in June 1997. which can carry a 1. Navy- based Tu-22 bombers.58 India also has a variant of the Russian Tu-95 Bear. India disclosed that it had a chemical weapons production program. The Sagarika SLBM project is reportedly continuing with assistance from Russia.500 kilometers or more. .60 India ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974. progress has been slow. known as the Tu-142 Bear.000 kilometers. India’s inventory of nuclear-capable aircraft consist of the Jaguar. U. Much like the rest of India’s missile program. and the MiG-27 and MiG-29.55 The Advanced Technology Vessel project was begun in the late 1970s. the Mirage 2000. Though it has pledged to destroy all agents and production facilities. Because India has a sizable indigenous chemical industry.400 kilometers. marked the first time that India publicly admitted to be pursuing an offensive chemical warfare capability. also with Russian assistance.59 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis India has many well-qualified scientists and numerous biological and pharma- ceutical production facilities that could be used for advanced research or for the development of pathogens. fi- nancial.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s satellite-launch-vehicle capability.000– 6. This official acknowledg- ment. includ- ing specific chemical agent precursors and dual-use equipment. although this assessment is rarely highlighted. and bureaucratic problems indicate that there are hurdles ahead for any submarine-based nuclear delivery system.230 N o n . no ICBM development project has been undertaken. scientists at DRDO publicly reaffirmed that India did not have an ICBM pro- gram because it did not face an ICBM threat.52 In 2000. India has no submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. The program’s substantial technical. intelligence believes it will not be deployed until 2010 or later.54 In any case. in the past Indian firms have ex- ported a number of items proscribed under Australia Group guidelines.”53 In 2003. India be- gan the Sagarika program in 1991. and U. its activities and sales could remain a cause for concern.S.S.000-kilogram warhead to a range of 900–1. intelligence assessments have maintained that India’s significant biotechnical infrastructure and expertise are being used to conduct research on biological warfare defenses.

” Arms Control Today.” New York Times. available at www. “Nuclear Data. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. 16. interview with National Public Radio. September 17. 2000. “To Strengthen Military Ties. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Edward Alden and Edward Luce. India’s Nuclear Bomb. see pp. 2002–2003. p. Brahma Chellaney. D. vol.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000. 1998. p. 7.S. 8. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. pp. Department of Defense.” India Today. pp.html. 24. India could produce approximately 17 kilograms of plutonium per year. October 11. pp. 24. Fall–Winter 2000. 404–443. assistant secretary of state. Nuclear Threat Reduction Country Profiles. February 13.org/nuclear/nudb/datab20. Department of Defense. no.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). Ibid. 23. Chari. available at www. 22. Washington. Testimony to the U. 11.nti.htm. p. R. 2001.state.” The Hindu. December 6. 13. “Joint Statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Scientific Adviser to the Defense Minister. November 16. February 16. 19. India’s Nuclear Bomb.nrdc. 419. and Karen Yourish. R. “Dystrophy of Nuclear Muscle. quoted in George Perkovich.nic.org/act/2003_11/IndiaandPakistan. See also P. Annual Report. 2000. 14–16. p. 2001. U. as Albright believes. 417.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.S.S. available at www. 17. “Load Up!” Hindustan Times. Jaswant Singh.org/countries/india/nuke2003. 2001. October 16. “India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories. 25. 8. “Fissile Materials: Stockpiles Still Growing. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.asp. As- suming the Cirus and Dhurva reactors are operating at 40 percent capacity. India’s Nuclear Bomb. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India. 18. “United States–India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership. Perkovich. Chari.S.” Nonprolifera- tion Review. Shishir Gupta. available at www. End of 1999. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. See also David Albright. available at http://mod. 1999). Senate Foreign Relations Committee on India and Pakistan. March/April 2002.wisconsinproject. Chari (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies). 15. “India Nuclear Weapon Update 2003. 23. 426–427. “Fernandes for Maintaining Parity with China. Chari. 14. October 10.org/e_research/profiles/India/index. 9.S. 3.” Financial Times. 409–412. “A New Friend in Asia: George Bush Is Relegating Concerns about Nuclear Proliferation in Order to Win the Friendship of India as a Strategic Ally in the Region.” www. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable.htm. 1999. 421. “Fissile Materials: Stock- piles Still Growing. p. 20. Perkovich.” Outlook India. 2004. India’s Nuclear Bomb. P. See also Perkovich. 10.html.” pp. 2001. 128–129.asp.S.” Institute for Science and International Security. D. For a comprehensive discussion of India’s motivations. State Depart- ment Press Release. 6. 12. September–October 2003. “India. India 231 N OTES 1. 2000. “Down to Brasstacks. 14–16. p. U. 3. p. India’s Nuclear Bomb. 2002–2003.armscontrol. Weapon estimates are based on 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon. This estimate is extrapolated from David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. 2. 21. 2001). Pakistan Move Forward with New Weapons. Albright and Cramer.: U. Febru- ary 16. Annual Report. . “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions. May 18.S. U. George Perkovich. Chellaney was one of the strategists on India’s Nuclear Security Advisory Board. 2001.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August 21. George Perkovich.isis- online. Celia Dugger. and U. 4.” U. 7. 8. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine. November 2003.in/reports/welcome. November/December 2004. Department of Defense. Karl Inderfurth. 5. 2001. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press. May 28.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290. Perkovich. July 13. Beats Path to India..” Times of India. Perkovich. 1998.C.html.” pp. Natural Resources Defense Council. www. For a similar estimate see.C.

htm. 37. “Nuclear Data. Natural Resources Defense Council. October 2003. 29. p. July 4. November 2000. “Pakistan Scores over India in Ballistic Missile Race. Yourish. Rethiniraj and Clifford Singer.” 32. p. “India. p. “Missile Groups to Form Nucleus of Strategic Forces Command. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. “India Developing Ballistic Missiles to Counter Threats. “India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure. “Readying for Nukes. 28. 54. Ashley J. David Orr. p. Department of Defense.” Hindustan Times.” August 17.” Jane’s International Defense Review.” Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative. August 14. 48. Harinder Baweja. January 10. Chellaney. Janu- ary/February 2003. Michael Krepon. Nuclear India (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. 59.” 36. 61. S.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 26. Kampani.htm. 30. Tellis. Pravin Sawhney. “India. 2001. 53. Ravi Velloor. 58. Pakistan Move Forward. February 2001. 21. 2003. Yourish. “India Prepares to Attack Rebel Camps.rediff. available at www.. “India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure.” Times of India. “India Has ‘Problems’ Managing Nuclear Arms.com.” India Today.com/news/2003/jan/07nuke. December 13.asp. “Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves. Relationship Takes on a Commercial Bent with New Trade Agreements. 1998). 2000).” Straits Times. February 13. September 18.S.232 N o n .nic. 42. 46. and Mark Franchetti. 41.” Press Trust of India.” Sunday Times (London). 57.. Ibid.” Rediff.: Rand Corporation.” Agence France-Presse. 45. “Going Global: India Aims for a Credible Nuclear Doctrine. “IAF version of Prithvi Passes Test.html.” 47. 51. 49. U. 40. 50. available at www. 2001. The Military Balance. 315. 2001).” Reuters. . “Load Up!” Hindustan Times. Calif. 2004. November 22.” 44. 31. “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine. “Dhanush Missile Test Fired. October 2000. available at www. 2001. “India and Russia Ink Defence Deal. December 4. Says Kalam. National Bureau of Asian Research.armscontrol. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gopi T. available at www.” NBR Analysis. “Whither Nuclear Safety?” The Hindu. 2001. “India Consolidates its Nuclear Force. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces. Pakistan Move Forward. 2001.org/act/2003_01-02/india_janfeb03. see also Tom Walker. May 28. p. “India Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile. ed. Ibid. Atul Aneja. 2000.asp.” Arms Control Today. Kerry Boyd.nti.” The Hindu. Proliferation: Threat and Response. 2000. 43.meadev. India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica. 2004). January 7.: Rand Corporation. 33. 2001. 2003. 38. 34. 24.org/act/2003_10/IndiaPakistan. February 10. February 16.” 56.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. “India’s Missile Overview. 152. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India. 2003. 1999. 55. 39.” The Hindu. “India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revo- lution. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Paki- stan Issue Paper 192 (Santa Monica. Gaurav Kampani. p. site. 2000. available at www.” Jane’s Intelligence Review.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index. Calif. Annual Report.” Arms Control Today. “India Reports It Has Ability to Build ICBM. 2002–2003. 2002. Boyd. Jones.in/govt/indnucld. 52. “ICBMs Any Day.armscontrol. Jasjit Singh. “Asthana Appointed Strategic Forces Command Chief. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 60. September 21. Gregory Jones. “India’s Missile Overview. October 27. 41. 35. Mark Hewish.” Times of India. 2001. 27. 25. June 9. Ashley Tellis. 2004.

U. U. RAPP-3 Heavy-water. 2000 No 202 MWe Kaiga 2 Heavy-water. nat.1. nat. U. nat. nat. U. U. 1986 No Kalpakkam (Tamil 202 MWe Nadu) Narora 1 Heavy-water. 2000 No 202 MWe Rajasthan. LEU and/or 1969 Yes MOX. nat. RAPP-4 Heavy-water. 1995 No 202 MWe Kaiga 1 Heavy-water. 1981 Yes Kota 1871 MWe Madras. 1993 No 202 MWe Kakrapar 2 Heavy-water. nat. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Power Reactors: Operating Tarapur 1 Light-water. 1973 Yes Kota 90 MWe Rajasthan. 150 MWe Tarapur 2 Light-water. U. 2007 No 490 MWe (table continues on the following page) . U. 150 MWe Rajasthan. 1991 No 202 MWe Narora 2 Heavy-water. 1992 No 202 MWe Kakrapar 1 Heavy-water. nat. MAPS-1 Heavy-water. U. U. U. U. nat. U. MAPS-2 Heavy-water. nat. 2000 No Kota 202 MWe Rajasthan. nat. nat. RAPS-1 Heavy-water. U. nat. 2000 No Kota 202 MWe Power Reactors: Under Construction Tarapur 3 Heavy-water. 1984 No Kalpakkam 155 MWe Madras. nat. LEU and/or 1969 Yes MOX. RAPS-2 Heavy-water. India 233 Table 11.

nat.234 N o n . U.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 11. Trombay uranium. 2008 No Light-water. 2007 No 202 MWe Kudankulam-1 Russian VVER–1000/392. U. nat. LEU 917 MWe Rajasthan. – No 700 MWe Kaiga 6 Heavy-water. 1 MWt Cirus Heavy-water. nat. 1960 No BARC. 2007 No 5 Kota 202 MWe Rajasthan. – No 7 Kota 700 MWe Rajasthan. nat. 2007 No Light-water. high-enriched 1956 No BARC. – No 8 Kota 700 MWe Research Reactors Apsara Light-water. nat. Heavy-water. RAPP. U. Trombay 40 MWt Dhruva Heavy-water. 2008 No 6 Kota 202 MWe 1 Power Reactors: Planned and Proposed Kaiga 5 Heavy-water. U. LEU 917 MWe Kudankulam-2 Russian VVER–1000/392. U. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Tarapur 4 Heavy-water. nat. RAPP. nat. nat. 2007 No 202 MWe Kaiga 4 Heavy-water. 1985 No BARC. nat. nat. – No 700 MWe Rajasthan. RAPP. RAPP. U. U. Trombay 100 MWt . U. pool type. Heavy-water. nat. Heavy-water.1. 2006 No 490 MWe Kaiga 3 Heavy-water. U. Heavy-water. U. U.

IGCAR began in 2003 Kalpakkam Uranium Enrichment Trombay Pilot-scale ultracentrifuge 1985 No plant. Trombay assembly 0. Trombay 0. decommissioned in 1986 Purnima 3 Light-water. – No BARC. 40 MWt IGCAR Kalpakkam Prototype Fast Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. U. excavation work (PFBR). critical 1972 No BARC. operating Rattehalli Mysore Pilot-scale ultracentrifuge 1990 No plant. uranium-233. 50 tHM/year.03 MWt Zerlina Heavy-water. Uranium-233. 1985 No Reactor (FBTR).01 kWt.1 kWt. decommissioned in 1983 Purnima 1 Fast neutron. Trombay assembly zero-power. operating Center for Laser enrichment research 1993 No Advanced site Technology Indore Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Trombay Small-scale. critical 1984 No BARC. IGCAR. 1996 No Kalpakkam 0. variable fuel 1961 No BARC. Trombay zero-power. India 235 Kamini. 2009 No Breeder Reactor 470 MWe. decommissioned in 1983 Purnima 2 Light-water. decomissioned in 1993 Breeder Reactors Fast-Breeder Test Plutonium and nat. 1985 No operating (table continues on the following page) .

operating 1997 (PWR-2 fuel fabrication) Trombay Uranium conversion (UF6). standby 1977 No Tuticorin 49 t/year. facility produces fuel for PWR fuel light-water reactors). Tarapur fabrication. Surda Uranium recovery plants at 1986 No Mosaboni copper concentrator. operating 1978 No . operating 2 Heavy-Water Production Nangal 6. operating Kalpakkam Medium-scale. decommissioned 1962 No in 2002 Baroda 15 t/year. one fabrication. 1985 No operating Advanced Fuel Mixed uranium-plutonium No Fabrication oxide (MOX) fuel Facility. 125 1986 No tHM/year. operating Hyderabad Uranium purification No (UO2). all fabrication).1.1. No under construction Uranium Processing Rakha. operating Kalpakkam Large-scale.236 N o n .N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 11. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Tarapur Medium-scale. 100 1977 No tHM/year. operating Hyderabad Fuel fabrication (two 1974 (LWR Yes facilities produce fuel for fuel heavy-water reactors. operating Jaduguda Uranium mining and 1968 No milling.6 t/year.000 tHM/y.

. 1991 No under expansion Hazira 80 t/year. “Director General’s Annual Report. uranium MOX mixed-oxide fuel MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal t tons tHM/yr tons of heavy metal per year SOURCES: IAEA. phase 2 72 t/year. operating 1987 No Manuguru 185 t/year. Chaturvedi. operating 1985 No Thal-Vaishet 78 t/year.html.” available at www. and RAPP-8 will all have 700 MWe capacity. 2002. but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water. According to V. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities.asp.org/Default. Nuclear Threat Initiative.html. not applicable nat. Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Corporation. operating.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2103.iaea.org/programmes/ a2/index. IAEA.iaea. “Research Reactor Database. India 237 Talcher.: Wilmington Publishing. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System. RAPP-7.” Press Trust of India. “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: 2003. 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup.” available at www. 2.A. October 18. “India: Nuclear Facilities. NOTES N OTES: 1.K.iaea.” available at www. K. Nuclear Engineering International. 2004). IAEA. phase 1 62.org/ worldatom/rrdb/.” available at www-nfcis. 2003. Kaiga 5. U nat. IAEA.5 t/year. See “RAPS- Review. operating 1985 No Talcher. U.” table A24. Kaiga 6. “Power Reactor Information System.nti.” IAEA. proposed No Kota 85 t/year. operating 1991 No Nuclear Weapon Test Site Pokharan Range Site of nuclear tests No conducted in 1998 ABBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency LEU low-enriched uranium N.

.

has a range of 700 to 750 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms. has a range of 1. Pakistan may have also produced 36 to 80 kilo- grams of weapons-grade plutonium by the end of 2005. Pakistan has refused to sign the Non- Proliferation Treaty.110 and 1. with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives. or enough for 10 to 20 additional weapons.6 Pakistan has acquired the bulk of its missile capabilities from North Korea and China. CHAPTER 12 Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Capability Pakistan possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weap- ons within a few days or weeks (see table 12. it is not known if Pakistan has been able to develop nuclear warheads for its missiles. The country also possesses missiles with ranges from 280 to 2.S. Its surface to surface missile arsenal includes the Chinese-built and -supplied M-11.000-kilogram bomb up to 1. The Ghauri I. Pakistan may have produced between 1. however.-supplied F-16 is likely Pakistan’s primary nuclear-capable aircraft. 239 . signed but not ratified the Com- prehensive Test Ban Treaty.5 Other delivery vehicles possibly include the French Mi- rage V fighter-bombers and the Chinese A-5 Fantan. 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore. Aircraft and Missile Capability Fighter-bomber aircraft are Pakistan’s most likely delivery vehicles. Pakistan has. The M-11 has a range of 280 to 300 kilometers. probably a derivative of the Chinese M-9 missile.440 kilo- grams of weapons-grade uranium. the Pakistani version of the Nodong missile.1 at the end of the chapter).3 Where Pakistan stores its fissile material and war- heads is not publicly known. the North Korean. The U. the Hatf short-range series.4 Like India.600 kilometers. However.000 kilometers. F-16s modified to carry nuclear weapons are deployed at Sargodha Air Force Base. and the solid-fueled Shaheen series. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are reportedly stored in component parts.300 kilometers with a payload estimated at 500 to 750 kilograms and was delivered to the army in 2003.2 Their principal device design uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium (HEU) rather than plutonium. The Shaheen I.7 Longer-range Ghauri II and Shaheen II missiles are in development and may not yet be operational. liquid-fueled Ghauri medium-range missiles. By the end of 2005.1 enough to produce between 50 and 110 nuclear weapons. able to carry a 1.

Pakistan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 1997 and did not declare the pos- session of any chemical weapons. Pakistan had developed a nuclear capability. However. led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. economy. whose population.S.240 N o n . The country has been locked in a conflict with India since the two countries became independent from the United Kingdom in 1947 through partition. finally declaring itself a nuclear weapon state. relations between Islamabad and New Delhi have alternated between periods of relative peace and considerable tension. its former eastern wing became the independent state of Bangladesh. it does have a biotechnical infrastructure sufficient to support a limited biological weapons research and development effort. and political and bureaucratic pressures. Pakistan is actively improving its commercial chemical industry and has im- ported chemicals with both commercial and weapons utility. international offi- cials and experts feared that Pakistan might take steps to deploy its nascent nuclear arsenal. During the latter crisis. Other factors that have also contributed to Pakistan’s bid for nuclear arms include its desire for leadership and status in the Islamic world. This was punctuated with crises that nearly erupted into war during the winter of 1986–1987 and the spring of 1990. Conflicts in Kargil in 1999 and military mobilizations after terrorist attacks on the Indian government in late 2001 and . there has been no verified evidence suggesting that it has a chemical or biological weapons program. Since 1947. The Strategic Context Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear deterrent has been motivated largely by fears of domination by India. in 1971. diplo- matic efforts to defuse the situation. and ultimately successful. Pakistan secretly commenced its nuclear weapons program shortly thereafter. it did not test its weapons until May 28 and 30.9 It could eventu- ally have the capability to produce a variety of chemical agents because of the dual-use nature of its chemicals and equipment. Since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. convinced that it was essential as a deter- rent to ensure its survival. when it responded to India’s May 11 and 13 nuclear tests by conducting tests of its own. U. two of which have been over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The third and last of these wars. 1998.8 Although its facilities are less well developed than those of India. and military resources dwarf its own. Pakistan has fought three full-scale wars with India. To date. By the mid-1980s. Pakistan is ac- tively seeking foreign assistance to expand its civilian biological and pharmaceu- tical facilities. they could nonetheless support the production of lethal pathogens. popular nationalist sentiment.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Pakistan is not known to have any biological or chemical weapons or agents. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1974 and regularly participated in negotiations to establish an effective verification protocol for the treaty. However. These concerns spurred intensive. There is some concern that it is conducting a limited chemical weapons research progam.

S.and Pakistani-held Kashmir. and government leaders have proceeded as rapidly as possible since 1972 in developing their country’s nuclear weapons capability.S. and it may well have emboldened Pakistan to increase its militancy in the Kashmir Valley. Atal Behari Vajpayee. Though India did decide against testing at that time. including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. they have always sought to appear as though they were responding to India.”15 The Lahore Declaration also included a commitment to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and . the self-proclaimed father of the Paki- stani nuclear weapons program. following the Indian nuclear tests. has written that “Pakistan’s nuclear programme was India specific and therefore it was of no consequence to Pakistan what other nuclear power nations decided for them- selves. the govern- ment of Nawaz Sharif finally gave its permission. and the two signed the Lahore Declaration. made a widely publicized bus trip to Lahore to meet Pakistan’s prime minister Sharif. It is possible that Pakistan’s summer 1999 military incursion into Kargil. and dangerous confidence in “limited war. Abdul Qadeer Khan. U. “We have judged that if India should test.S. satellite photographs report- edly revealed evidence of Pakistani nuclear test preparations at Chagai Hills.S. On May 28. “Today we have settled a score. In late February 1996. Pakistan’s army chief from 1988 to 1991. and India and Pakistan have struggled to find a measure of stability in their relations. India’s prime minister.” Both leaders recognized that “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries. provocative rhetoric. a desire to validate the weapon design—independent of India’s test preparations—is also likely to have driven Pakistan’s nuclear test preparations. Pakistan 241 early 2002 again raised the possibility of war spiraling into a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India. While Pakistani scientists. which is located over the line of control that di- vides Indian. This detection resulted in a major U. Pakistan would fol- low.”10 In late 1995.” In February 1999. 1998. after the tests took place at Chagai Hill in western Pakistan. an apparent response to India’s earlier preparations. agreeing to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues. However.14 Relations between India and Pakistan after the Nuclear Tests The nuclear tests greatly raised the cost of war in South Asia. was a undertaken with this newfound parity in mind.-led international effort to dissuade India from testing.” they were ready and able to test a nuclear weapon.12 In May 1998. then– director of the Central Intelligence Agency. expressed these U. U. General Aslam Beg. John Deutch. it raised the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear test. Sharif declared.”13 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal offers the country a sense of military parity with India.”11 Two weeks after Deutch’s statement. Diplo- matic initiatives have been interspersed all too frequently with nuclear brinkmanship. engineers. agencies detected Indian preparations for a nuclear explosive test. concerns. declared that as soon as Pakistani scientific teams could “get permission from the government. In April 1998. saying.

Because the Indians regarded Musharraf as the chief architect of the Kargil incursion. a means of pressuring the George W. aimed at prevention of conflict. in part. raising fears of a wider war. Sharif ’s government withdrew Pakistani troops from Kargil.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confi- dence building in the nuclear and conventional fields.16 Instead. The summer 1999 incursion of Pakistani troops into Kargil. Under U. India’s Bharatiya Janata Party–led gov- ernment was wary of entirely alienating Washington. and dialogue on nuclear and security issues. relations between the two countries deteriorated further. officials of the Bill Clinton administration intervened dip- lomatically. pressure. punctuated with gestures to pull back from the brink. This withdrawal contributed to his political downfall. Both countries mobi- lized a large number of troops along the border in Kashmir. Alarmed by the po- tential for escalation. precisely because they wanted to demon- strate that their nuclear weapons did not have a restraining effect on India. bring- ing General Pervez Musharraf to power. however. however. to set up mechanisms for future negotiations. India and Pakistan held talks once again in July 2001. the nuclear tests appear to have emboldened Pakistan to launch an offensive against India. The three-day Agra summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf ended abruptly without a joint declaration and was deemed a fail- ure. brought this diplomatic momentum to an abrupt halt. a Memorandum of Understanding was signed that laid out specific nuclear confidence-building measures. and it destroyed any illusions that the overt nuclear postures of the two countries would act as a re- straint on military conflict.242 N o n . both countries valued their close ties with the United States . combined with alarming rhetoric. but partly to demonstrate that they were responsible nuclear stewards.” which proponents argued could be fought under a nuclear umbrella.17 Relations took a turn for the worse in October 2001. In- dian aircraft bombed Pakistani positions in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Kargil conflict was the first between the two neighbors after the nuclear tests of 1998. In these efforts. when a militant attack on the State Assembly in Indian-administered Kashmir claimed 38 lives.” To this effect. Domestic compulsions notwithstanding.19 India’s brinkmanship was. however. after the Kargil conflict. some Indian strategists proffered scenarios of limited war under the nuclear shadow.18 Relations between India and Pakistan took a precipitous turn after the terror- ist attack on India’s parliament in early December 2001. Bush administration to expand its focus on the war on terrorism to include Pakistan’s eastern border. This revived Indian charges against Pakistan for sponsoring cross-border terror- ism. including prior notification of ballistic missile tests. Indeed. once again raised the specter of a nuclear confrontation in South Asia. a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. new thinking emerged in India on “lim- ited war. largely because Indian political leaders did not want to risk escalation to a wider war. Most of 2002 was spent on nuclear brinkmanship. but never over the line of control.S. This massive troop buildup. when in October 1999 his government was overthrown in a military coup. Conversely.

then–U. U. Musharraf ’s willingness to publicly affirm that he will not “per- mit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner” was critical to pushing the process along. drug trafficking. Pakistan also barred the leader of the outlawed Jaish-e-Mohammed.24 The rapprochement continued in January 2004. Pakistan banned Hizbul Mujahideen activities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.S. President Musharraf reassured him that he would take action against the terrorist camps. and had extended their moratorium on nuclear tests. Pakistan 243 and were reluctant to jeopardize that relationship. This group was designated a “terrorist group” by the U.S. These South Asian semantics may seem trivial. diplomacy was helpful. and economic coopera- tion. The program acquired further momentum after India’ s nuclear test in May 1974. but they were critical in getting the peace process moving. Libya and Saudi Arabia funded the program in its early years. and meets Pakistan’s requirements because it keeps the Kashmir issue on the table. These U. The two countries restored air links. State Department just before Armitage’s visit to Islamabad. Kashmir was part of an agenda that included terrorism. Indian forces had pulled back. By the end of June 2004.S. and worked on confidence-building measures. the new prime minister. who was behind the December 2001 attack on India’s Par- liament. including a cease-fire along the line of control in Kashmir.20 This antiterrorism language in a January 2003 joint statement reassured the Indian government. citing a need for a “new beginning. The two countries then embarked on a “composite dialogue” process that meets India’s requirements because it departs from the “centrality” of the Kashmir issue. and by September–October 2002. Significantly.26 The talks and cautious optimism continued into the spring of 2005.22 While visiting the region in May 2003.” then–Indian prime minister Vajpayee offered to resume dialogue with Pakistan.S.-secured steps were essential to the return of diplomacy in South Asia. also pledged to work for peace between India and Pakistan.25 After Vajpayee’s defeat in the general elections in India in April 2004. This gave the United States additional leverage to buy time and engage the two adversaries to help prevent a potential disaster. Manmohan Singh. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage said that he was “cautiously optimistic” that Vajpayee’s diplomatic opening “could possibly lead to a step-by-step process that would eventually resolve all issues.”23 During Armitage’s May 2003 visit to Pakistan. when President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met for the first time since 2001.21 and full diplomatic ties were incrementally restored over the next few months. they had set up a hotline between their countries’ foreign secretaries to avoid a nuclear confrontation. exchanged ambassadors. from entering Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. In April 2003.27 The weapon effort focused substantially on the production of highly enriched uranium with technology . including the details of an agreement on ad- vance notification of missile tests and establishing a hotline. as part of nuclear confidence-building measures. Nuclear Analysis Pakistan secretly launched its nuclear weapons program in 1972.

the United States suspended the application of the uranium enrich- ment sanctions for six years. The 1979 economic and military aid cutoff was made pursuant to the 1977 Glenn-Symington Amendment to the U. in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Af- ghanistan.S. It included the illicit import of an entire facility from West Germany for producing uranium hexafluoride. Khan brought to Pakistan personal knowledge of gas-centrifuge equipment and industrial suppliers (primarily in Europe).30 The 1985 Pressler Amendement to the Foreign Assistance Act also reflected the Afghanistan-related ambivalence of U. despite numerous pledges to the United States that it would not do so. This was expedited by the return to Pakistan in 1975 of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Pakistani sources now state that the nation acquired its first nuclear explosive capability in 1987. a German-trained metallur- gist who in the early 1970s was employed at the classified Urenco uranium en- richment plant at Almelo in the Netherlands.S.29 Some Pakistani experts say that the country had acquired a capability as early as 1984. the United Kingdom. In 1981.S. continued its nuclear weapons program. France. This amendment requires the termination of assistance to any state that has imported uranium enrichment equipment or technology since 1977 and that has refused to place it under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). which were later improved and formed the core of the black market network he headed (see below). This legis- lation specified that U. China. when it crossed the threshold of being able to produce weapons-grade uranium. sanctions. By 1986. nonproliferation objectives by enhancing Pakistan’s overall security.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s gained covertly during the late 1970s and 1980s.S. Switzerland. He also reportedly returned to Pakistan with stolen plans for European centrifuges. equipping. policy toward Pakistan. It also involved du- plicitous procurement from Canada. Officials of Ronald Reagan’s administration also argued that the restoration of aid would advance U. which began with the clandestine acquisition of key technology for the Kahuta plant from the Netherlands. which reached a key milestone in 1985. Pakistan. and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment facility. fiscal year that Pakistan did “not possess a nuclear explosive device and that . and the United States. Foreign Assis- tance Act. He was eventually put in charge of building.S.28 Since 1979. Washing- ton restrained its pressure on Islamabad because of Pakistan’s role in the cam- paign to oust Soviet forces from Afghanistan. aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan would be cut off unless the president certified at the beginning of each U. Italy. Pakistan had apparently produced enough material to make its first nuclear device. which have been intermittently waived as a result of devel- opments in Afghanistan.244 N o n . Instead. Pakistan’s nuclear program has repeatedly brought the country under U. thereby reducing Islamabad’s motivation to acquire nuclear arms.S. Although the United States sought to discourage Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear program throughout this period. when they were reportedly considering a first test. however. Washington provided greatly increased military and economic assistance to Pakistan to create a bulwark against further Soviet expansion and to establish Pakistan as a strategic partner in the Cold War. The Pakistani nuclear weapons effort relied on a massive smuggling program.

Pakistan 245 the proposed U. and the enlargement of Pakistan’s capacity to enrich uranium.S. U. thereby enlarg- ing its total nuclear weapons potential. undercut the Clinton administration’s efforts to restore a measure of nonproliferation influence in its relations with Pakistan. China’s ring-magnet assistance to Pakistan. the construction of a Chinese-designed and supplied plutonium produc- tion reactor of 40 megawatts thermal at Khushab. 28 additional F-16s and other military hardware were on order but were never transferred because of the sanctions. a freeze that reportedly held until the spring of 1998. a key component of the bearings that support the high- speed rotation of centrifuges. hoping to receive these armaments in the event that the prohibi- tion against such U. aid and arms sales. however.” or whether they were intended to permit Pakistan to increase its number of uranium enrichment centrifuges. aid to Pakistan was limited primarily to the country’s refugee and narcotics problems. W. Pakistan apparently ended this freeze. In late 1991. W. The shipments of the magnets. however. military sales was rescinded. which modified the Pressler Amendment’s sanctions.S. It was not clear whether the ring magnets were intended for Kahuta as a “future reserve supply. Bush made the certifications necessary to permit U. By this time.” However. Presidents Ronald Reagan and then George H. Islamabad continued making payments on the purchases after October 1990. reportedly through the construction of an enrichment plant at Golra. and in October 1990. agreed to suspend the further production of weapons-grade uranium. In late 1989 and early 1990. reportedly. either at Kahuta or at another location. The country fabricated cores for several nuclear weapons from preexisting stocks of weapons-grade uranium. The United States terminated all aid and govern- ment-to-government military sales to Pakistan. assistance program would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. the Soviet army had left Afghanistan. although congressional amendments allowed for some military sales to Pakistan. perhaps because of the threat of war with India. During the 1990s. Prime Minister Sharif reinstated the freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium.S. the George H. despite further Paki- stani nuclear weapons advances through October 1989. Benazir Bhutto. Throughout the 1990s. .S. apparently began in December 1994 and con- tinued until the Clinton administration became aware of the transaction in August 1995.31 Pakistan continued to produce low-enriched uranium. Bush administration was unable or unwilling to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive.000 custom- made ring magnets. It prevented Pakistan from receiving economic or targeted military aid. At the time. The most publicized incident was Pakistan’s purchase from China of 5. which the administration and many legislators had earlier anticipated after the 1999 Brown Amendment. sized to fit the type of centrifuge at the Kahuta plant. Other aspects of the Pakistani nuclear program also continued to advance—including work on nuclear weapon de- signs. The 1989 certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device was. Pakistani specialists sought to improve the Kahuta enrichment plant and to expand the country’s capacity to enrich uranium. made only after Pakistan’s prime minister.

in turn.”38 In the absence of an agreement on mutual restraints with India. President George W. Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests. Pakistan established the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan rejects a “no-first-use” policy. when it announced that the Khushab reactor had begun operation. produced only a single seismic signal. but they are all thought to have employed a simple fission design.246 N o n . But citing the need to work with both governments in the fight against terrorism and using the author- ity granted him by the “Brownback II” amendment of June 1999. This. has spoken of unofficial thresholds for nuclear use.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission.S.34 The tests activated Glenn- Symington Amendment sanctions once more. Nuclear Tests and Nuclear Policy In May 1998. where the country’s existence is considered at stake: .32 Access to plutonium can allow Pakistan to develop smaller and lighter nuclear warheads. In 1999. three highly influential Pakistani statesmen made the case for a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence. they suggested that “a high state of alert will become more necessary as India proceeds with deploy- ment of nuclear weapons. would facilitate Pakistan’s development of warheads for ballistic missiles. Khan from his leadership role at the former. An addition test or tests on May 30.” Further. government’s economic assistance and military transfers to Pakistan. However.35 In February 2000.33 Pakistan claims to have conducted five tests on May 28.37 The following year. The single signal led U. which consists of two committees to advise President Musharraf on the employment and development of nuclear weapons. It functions as the secretariat to the NCA. 1998. ending the U. The tests appear to have been success- ful and to have validated Pakistan’s design of a nuclear device with a yield of 10 to 15 kilotons. General Khalid Kidwai. retiring A. Its efforts came to fruition in April 1998. there are some unofficial but authoritative pointers to the broad outlines of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. Given India’s over- whelming superiority in conventional weaponry. the director of Pakistan’s SPD. This facility is not subject to IAEA inspections and is capable of gen- erating enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons annually. produced a seismic signal equivalent to a yield of 2 to 8 kilotons.36 The Army Strategic Plan Division (SPD) was also set up to better control nuclear weapons.”39 In addition. Q. Pakistan consolidated the Khan Research Laboratories and the rival Pakistan Atomic Research Corporation into one Nuclear Defense Complex. Bush waived sanctions for Pakistan and India on September 22.S. There has been no official Pakistani statement on the types of weapons tested. which indicated a total yield of 6 to 13 kilo- tons. they posited that “the size of Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment pattern have to be adjusted to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception. possibly the cumulative effect of simultaneous detonations. Pakistan has yet to officially enunciate a nuclear doctrine. The tests. scientists to question whether five detonations did take place. 2001. however. Pakistan actively pursued a plutonium production capability during the 1990s.

and possibly other countries. Khan was at the center of an illegal nuclear trafficking network. In case that deterrence fails. Pakistan 247 Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. • India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military thresh- old).S. The potential for civil unrest and instability inside Pakistan has raised inter- national concern over the safety of its nuclear strategic assets.S. Q. given that Pakistan had actively supported the Taliban and that its intelligence service was intimately involved with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.42 Pakistani leaders may well have feared the possibility of a U. they have not disavowed the parameters.44 This specter was raised particularly when Pakistan arrested two of its nuclear scientists for alleged connections with members of the Taliban. all nuclear-related sanctions were waived.41 Developments since September 11. strike. • India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic stran- gling).S preemptive strike against Pakistan. Musharraf justified his cooperation with the United States by telling his pub- lic that Pakistan’s “strategic assets” were best protected by joining the U. this time against international terrorism. how- ever. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market In late 2003. IAEA investigations into Iran’s nuclear program and Libya’s deci- sion to come clean on its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons programs exposed the A. Khan–led nuclear black market. As a result of President Musharraf ’s decision to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism. Musharraf may have calculated that this was the best way to diminish the possibility of a U.45 A. IAEA . It became public knowledge that A. In the aftermath of September 11. and • India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization). The United States also waived the democracy-related sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan after an army coup brought Musharraf to power in October 1999. policy on nuclear-based sanctions against Pakistan. Q.40 How any of these principles may translate into operational policy is unclear.S. Some experts have urged the United States to offer Pakistan assistance in securing its fissile material and weapons from theft by outside terrorist groups.43 Some Pakistani officials and nuclear experts believe the more likely risk may be that militants within the military or government could seize nuclear assets or provide expertise to oth- ers. Libya. Q. Pakistan immediately dispersed different components of its nuclear assets to six locations. battle in Afghanistan. whose clients included Iran. which once again became a frontline state in a U.S. they will be used if • India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space thresh- old). After the United States began bombing Afghanistan. Pakistani officials have said that these thresholds are “purely academic”. have dramatically altered the U. 2001. North Korea. coa- lition against international terrorism.

which transferred compo- nents and weapon-related designs and drawings between 1989 and 1991. Musharraf maintains that Khan ran a private enter- prise that had nothing to do with the government.” ElBaradei said. among a list of about thirty countries. and the United Kingdom. Khan led this multinational black market export operation. Khan’s nuclear black market trade spanned the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and the military-led gov- ernment of President Musharraf. Khan supplied Libya with actual designs for nuclear weapons.53 His personal travels are another piece of evidence that the Paki- stani government was aware of at least some of his illegal activities. adding. models. that means there’s lots of offices all over the world. because all his international trips were presumably tracked. they should have known about and stopped the transfers.49 Khan used transit points and middlemen in Dubai in the Persian Gulf. machinery. was startling. Germany.52 Pa- kistani officials say Khan met personally with Iranian scientists in both Pakistan and Malaysia. there were reports of Pakistan providing nuclear assistance to Libya. shipped to a fourth. “The sophistication of the process. Libya re- portedly bought those blueprints from Khan’s dealers for more than $50 million. which netted more than $100 million from Libya alone. frankly. Between 1991 and 1997. It provided blueprints.248 N o n .55 The blueprints were copies of the design that China had apparently . specifications. enrich- ment equipment.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s director general Mohamed ElBaradei called it “the Wal-Mart of private prolif- eration. however. South Africa. has surpassed my ex- pectations. as early as 1979. components. given the highly sensitive nature of the trade and the fact that Pakistan’s military controls the country’s nuclear assets. and. Switzerland.50 In February 2004.51 Even if the military leaders did not formally authorize the transfers. technical design data. in exchange for a full pardon from President Musharraf. Khan’s full pardon raises the possibility that the military wanted to ensure that he did not reveal details that would have incriminated its leadership.”48 For at least twelve years.”46 Suspicions about Pakistan’s nuclear exports have long persisted. Khan confessed (in English on Pakistani television) to his proliferation crimes and took sole responsibility. “When you see things being de- signed in one country. redirected to a fifth.47 The breadth and scale of the procurement.54 Libya’s war- head blueprints were the first evidence that the black market had provided its customers with far more than just uranium enrichment technology. Turkey. and notes on first-generation P-1 and the next- generation P-2 centrifuges. manufactured in two or three others. along with some complete centrifuge rotor assemblies. however. Malaysia. Reports of Pakistan’s assistance to Iran go back to 1988. Iran purchased P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs through the Khan network. This assertion is implausible. And Pakistani military cargo planes transported missiles from North Korea to Pakistan—systems for which North Korea may have accepted nuclear assistance instead of hard currency—suggesting the military’s com- plicity. IAEA investigations of Iran’s nuclear program reveal that Tehran acquired centrifuge equipment from Khan’s black market sources.

Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540. including reexport. August 1999. One visit occurred as late as June 2002. The National Assembly and the Senate ratified the legislation on September 19.57 It was reported that North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000. Pakistan had passed export legislation in July 1998.N. Several loopholes and contradictions per- meated these laws (for example.S. will be allowed to interrogate Khan. 2004. requires licensing and record keeping.59 Musharraf has insisted that no independent authority. transshipment. and.” saying that Khan was not operating alone. the military is exempted). and transit. In April 2004. and again in November 2000. Thus. Mohamed ElBaradei has called Khan “the tip of an ice- berg. Pakistan passed a new export control bill on July 7.61 U. February 1999. Furthermore. calling into question the Musharraf government’s claims that such transfers had stopped in 2000 after the military took necessary action. Security Council Resolution 1540 and Pakistan’s Export Control Law The Khan black market network revealed both the gaping loopholes in Pakistan’s domestic export control laws and the glaring gap in international law and en- forcement capabilities to prosecute such illicit trade. requiring states to criminalize such trade and prosecute their practitioners. intelligence officials have claimed that Pakistan supplied enrichment equipment to Pyongyang in exchange for Nodong missiles. in large part because the full extent of the operations is not yet known. Pakistan 249 transferred to Pakistan in the 1960s and reportedly had notations in Chinese from Chinese engineers and designers. the U. Musharraf ’s role as an ally in the war on terrorism and domestic sen- sitivities in Pakistan have led the United States to publicly downplay any con- cerns it may have that Musharraf or the government was directly involved. Despite the grave consequences of Khan’s activities. His case “raises more questions than it answers. facing increased international pressure.56 Since the discovery of North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment pro- gram. There is also the possibility that secondary operatives might now launch their own lucra- tive nuclear businesses.58 Between 1997 and 2002. That is.62 The new law prohibits the diversion of controlled goods and technologies. including the IAEA. Pakistan still requires imports to maintain its own nuclear weapons capability.60 There remains little assurance that the exports have ended permanently. Khan reportedly made thirteen trips to North Korea. establishes export control lists and penal provisions of up to fourteen .N. states are held fully responsible for the illicit proliferation activity that occurs within their ju- risdiction. 2004.” ElBardei has noted. U. This denial of direct access to Khan has impeded a comprehensive investigation. it is possible that the country’s leaders do not favorably view a permanent and full dismantling of this existing international procurement system because of Pakistan’s continuing reliance on nuclear-weapon-related imports.

It would also cover any foreign national in Pakistan.and biological-related goods and technology. Rivalry between these two organizations has probably driven the country’s missile pro- gram. Pakistan used a dual-track approach for its ballistic missile de- velopment. which could be equipped to arm nuclear weapons in flight.-supplied F-16s. Khan nuclear black market and the authorities are willing and able to enforce the laws. nuclear-capable M-11 ballistic missile system (known in Pakistan as the Hatf III). ships. If.65 The development of several mature ballistic missile systems—primarily with assistance from China and North Korea—has now given Pakistan the means to deliver nuclear weapons by missile as well. in terms of both procurement and pace. infor- mation in the public domain or related to basic scientific research for peaceful or provocative purpose to kill anyone. There are reports that some of these have already been modified to carry nuclear weapons. with Chinese assistance.63 The act also calls for the creation of an oversight board to administer export control regulations. and state enforcement is weak. The control lists of items subject to licensing requirements will be reviewed periodically and updated as required by the government. ex- porters will also be required to maintain records of all transactions and report them to the designated government agencies.S. Later.500). Competing development projects pitted the North Korean. a person in the service of Pakistan within or outside Pakistan. Q. the former is North Korean technology and the latter Chinese. it launched a program to develop two short-range ballistic missile systems: the 80-kilometer-range Hatf I and the 300-kilometer-range Hatf II. liquid- fueled Ghauri missiles of Khan Research Laboratories against the Chinese. then no set of legal changes will be suffi- cient in a country where the rule of law is not guaranteed. The shipment and transfer of nuclear and bio- logical technology via ground transport.250 N o n .64 This may well be a positive step. were the most likely means of delivering a Pakistani nuclear weapon. Pakistan also sought to acquire from China the 280. including the Ghauri and Shaheen systems.S.66 Pakistan’s efforts to acquire ballistic missiles began in the early 1980s and intensified in the mid-1980s when. or any Pakistani visiting or working abroad.67 .N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s years imprisonment and a fine of PRs 5 million (about $86. and aircraft registered in Paki- stan is also criminalized. and licensing for export and reex- port of nuclear. along with associated equipment. as long as Pakistan’s civilian governments and army were not complicit in the A. All agencies involved in the licens- ing process will be required to maintain records of all relevant recommendations and decisions.to 300-kilometer range. The act describes “technology” as a document. however. Pakistan procured longer-range systems. extending over all of Pakistan and to every Pakistani. that was the case. U. Missile and Aircraft Analysis Throughout the 1990s. Before 2001. Furthermore. officials believed that the U. Its jurisdiction closes some of the previous loopholes and exemptions. enforcement of the act. solid- fueled Shaheen missiles of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.

official Chinese assistance has largely petered out since 2001. Meanwhile. a third version of the Ghauri. 2000.S. on the heels of India’s semideployment of the Prithvi short- range missile in Punjab. The measure was a result of the high-level di- plomacy over the summer between the two rivals. Neither the Shaheen I nor II is reported to have a nuclear capability as of the spring of 2005. In the fall of 2004. This missile. a solid-fueled missile.70 In January 2003. Finally. adding that the missile had been “inducted” into the army. In April 1999. would probably not be able to reach India’s capital. based on North Korea’s No Dong.000-kilometer Agni II. 2004. is under development and was test launched on August 15. and it is launched from a road- mobile launcher. It was tested on October 8. a nuclear- capable 300-kilometer-range ballistic missile. The Shaheen II.000 kilometers. though they both have the potential. was displayed in a March 2000 parade. nuclear- capable Shaheen I (also called the Hatf IV) in April 1999. Pakistan announced that the Ghauri had been handed over to the army. Some concern continues to linger. However.700 to 3. India’s largest industrial city. Pakistan tested the Ghauri I missile.74 Foreign Assistance Although Chinese assistance has been critical to the progress of Pakistan’s ballis- tic missile programs. from Pakistani terri- tory. New Delhi. with a range of approximately 2. 2004. is capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload.300 kilometers and carries a payload estimated at 500 to 750 kilograms. Pakistan claimed to have successfully tested the Ghauri II. possibly a derivative of the Chinese M-9. On April 6. and it was tested on November 29. Its development has recently slowed. which has a range of upward of 1. 2003. however. with an uncon- firmed range of 2.500 kilometers and to carry a 1. Pakistan reportedly tested the Hatf III.73 The two-stage Shaheen-II medium-range missile is said by the Pakistani government to have a full range of 2. 2004. government states that assistance from Chinese entities has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of the solid propellant Shaheen submarine- launched ballistic missiles and has supported Pakistan’s development of solid- . Pakistan 251 In July 1997. Pakistan continues to develop the Ghauri II. 2002. is Pakistan’s only liquid-fueled missile. The U. before India’s nuclear tests in May. The Pakistani Hatf III (M-11) with a 280-kilometer-range capability. India and Pakistan agreed to develop a formal system for early notification of missile tests. solid-fueled.69 The Ghauri.500 kilometers. In early 2001. Pakistan also successfully tested the 750-kilometer. and a test launch scheduled for June 2004 never occurred.68 This missile is operational. after India’s test of the 2. the Ghauri III. Pakistan claims that both tests were successful. Pakistan announced serial production of the Shaheen I. 1998.72 a year later on October 8 and 14. the Shaheen I (M-9) could target not only New Delhi but possi- bly also reach as far as Mumbai (Bombay).000-kilogram payload. however.71 The most recent Ghauri flight test occurred on October 12. and on December 8. and it was tested for the first time in March 2004. over Chinese entities.

In 1999. Pakistani officials visited North Korea to view a No Dong prototype. after Bhutto first visited Pyongyang. Indian custom officials seized a North Korean ship off India’s western coastline that was carrying missile com- ponents and metal casings to Pakistan. it is unclear whether or not this relationship has been terminated since the fall of 2002. This relationship has continued under the Musharraf regime. Q. which produces the Ghauri systems. which was under the purview of the Khan Research Laboratories. North Korea also transferred complete missile systems (the No Dong) to Pakistan. which was finally brokered in late 1995.76 North Korea’s assistance has been crucial to Pakistan’s medium-range Ghauri missile program.83 Despite President Musharraf ’s assurances that such a relationship no longer exists.79 The missile cooperation became public when Pakistan first tested the Ghauri missile in April 1998 in the presence of North Koreans. The relationship continued.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s propellant Shaheen medium-range ballistic missiles. with North Korean missile experts reportedly working in Pakistan. the United States imposed Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime sanctions on the Khan Research Laboratories and on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.78 As part of their missile agreements. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.81 In March 2003. Pakistan may have also turned to North Korea because of the above-mentioned rivalry between the Pakistan Atomic Research Corpora- tion and the Khan Research Laboratories. Pakistani engineers and scientists watched the No Dong test launch. Indian officials also found 22 technical manuals for Scud-type missiles. how- ever. and against a North Korean entity.82 The sanctions reportedly in- volved the transfer of fully assembled. Actual work on the Ghauri missile began in 1993 with North Korean assistance. the United States imposed sanctions against the Khan Re- search Laboratory.80 The A. under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. “for specific missile-related transfers” that occurred in the summer of 2002. Khan black market revelations have shed more light on long-held suspicions that this missile technology was provided in return for Pakistan’s as- sistance with gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology. In 1992. The relationship between Pyongyang and Islamabad was established between 1992 and 1995 during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s tenure. Consequently. nuclear-capable No Dong missiles from North Korea to Pakistan. even while it maintains a self- imposed moratorium on missile flight tests.75 It appears that the overall decline in Chinese assistance has left Pakistan turning to North Korea as an alternative supplier.252 N o n . who reportedly helped with the test launch.77 The Ghauri is virtually a renamed No Dong missile. and in May 1993.84 . The exchange may have also given North Korea a means of testing its missiles. Prime Min- ister Bhutto visited Pyongyang in December 1993 to set the stage for a missile deal.

Natural Resources Defense Council. 2. 21. Pakistan 253 N OTES 1. 2000). End of 1999 (Washington. February 19. Weapons estimates are based on 13 to 18 kilograms of HEU per weapon. Pervez Hoodbhoy. 1999.” New York Times. George Perkovich. India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories. “The Lahore Declaration. no. Arms Control Association. 14–16.asp. available at www.” 25. in Kashmir. “Pakistan: It’s Deja-Vu All Over Again. vol. January 9. 2002. “Nuclear Nirvana. Ibid.proliferationnews. 6.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000. November/December 2004. pp.htm.” Carnegie Analysis. January 21.” pp.proliferationnews.” Carnegie Analysis. Miriam Rajkumar. 2000.” Select Committee on Intelligence. Paulo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini. “Indian Leader.org. 2002.” a concise report of a visit by Landau Network–Centro Volta. 2003. Muralidhar Reddy. Rahul Bedi. 2001. p. February 22. see “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. U. 2004. 9. April 19.. 52–59.” Washington Post. Conventional CBMs from Tomorrow.armscontrol. D.” www. Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan. 5.” New York Times. 11. 3. Leonard Weiss. 14–16.” Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project Issue Brief.proliferationnews. “India. Testimony of John Deutch. 26. 70–71. “Peace Process in South Asia. This estimate is extrapolated from David Albright. “Spring Thaw in South Asia. October 22. May/June 2004. January/February 2002.” Sep- tember 2002. 18.” New York Times. 413.org/factsheets/cbwprolif.org/nuclear/nudb/ datab21. December 13. Pakistan Agree Nuclear Hotline. Pakistan Trade Blame over Summit. .isis-online.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.” 17. “Nuclear Nirvana. 8. Hari Kumar. Ibid. pp. available at www. 2001.” Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. pp. 2004. Anti-Terror Coalition Faces Challenge. 433. Hoodbhoy. 1999). “Fissile Materials.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 22.nrdc. B. available at www. May 20. “India and Pakistan: The Dispute Burns On. 10. 3.org. and George Perkovich.” February 21. 24. 2003. For a similar estimate based on 15–20 kilograms per weapon. See “Pakistan Blasts Indian Missile Test. 27. Amy Waldman and David Rohde. 13. 12. July 18. November 16. p. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press. April 9. Albright and Cramer. p. “Tension Rises in Volatile Kashmir.” The Hindu. Pamela Constable. October 16. 14. 12.S. Miriam Rajkumar. “India. Ibid. 7. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Propriety.” CNN News Online. Amy Waldman. “Indian and Pakistani Forces Agree to Cease-Fire in Kashmir.C. 33. November 26.” Pakistan Observer. 20. “Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation at a Glance. Senate. September 26. Rajiv Chandrasekaran.asp. 16. General Mirza Aslam Beg.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear. “Spring Thaw in South Asia. “Nuclear Notebook. director of central intelligence. available at www. 2004.pugwash. 1999. 23. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma. 19. Pakistan Bristles at Indian Shelling. Rajkumar. “Nuclear Safety. available on the Carnegie Non-Proliferation web site at www. “Fissile Materials: Stockpiles Still Growing. July 7.proliferationnews. available at www. 2003. 1996.org. “Talks on Nuclear. available at www. Extends Olive Branch to Pakistan.org. 15. “Current and Projected National Secu- rity Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2003.html. and David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. Ibid.: Institute for Science and International Secu- rity. 4.” Washington Post. 2001.

Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.” New Yorker. 35. 2004. “Nuclear Safety.” 52. Department of Defense (DOD). “Nuclear Jitters.C.: Rand. Congressional Research Service. 34. June 8. “Pakistan. February 16. 30. Gaurav Kampani. Policy Constraints and Options. and Sattar.” Arms Control Today. 53. “Explosion Is Detected by U. 1998. and Weiss. See also William J. Board and David E. “UN Official Sees a ‘Wal-Mart’ in Nuclear Trafficking. “A. 32. “Nuclear Safety. 2000. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Propriety. Gregory Jones.: Westview Press. p. and Abdul Sattar.” 40. Mark Lander. “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan. “U. 59. Broad. Khan. Janu- ary 25.S. February 23. October 5. “Weapons of Mass Destruction. February 4. “UN Official Sees a ‘Wal-Mart’ in Nuclear Trafficking. “Bush Waives Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India. Needs a Contingency Plan for Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal.” 57. 55. Ijaz and R. Technologies.. 2004. “Securing Nuclear Peace.” 45. p. 47. 7. “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 28. 1990). U. 2004. 61. “Pakistan’s Disturbing Nuclear Trail. 10. “Pakistan. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommenda- tions of the 9/11 Commission: U. 36.” Report for Congress. Khan: Nuclear Rogue. “Pakistani Scientist Tied to Illicit Nuclear Supply Network. “Watching the Warheads: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- ons at Risk.” For an overview. “A. Ibid. 2001. “Securing Nuclear Peace. and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Bio- logical Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act.” 38. Q. Ramusino and Martellini. 56.” p. 58. 4. October 2001. General Mirza Aslam Beg. 37. 46. 54. and Ramusino and Martellini. Faye Brown. 2004. Smith. J.” 43. Jones.” National Development and Security. Zulfikar Ali Khan. see Ramusino and Martellini. p.” 48. 1999. 2001. “Nuclear Safety. October 27. “Pakistan. p.” Christian Science Monitor. D. 44. Colo. Issue Paper 192 (Santa Monica. February 4.” Report for Congress. and Michael Hirsh and John Barry. 42. 50. Broad and Sanger. pp.: DOD. 24–25.254 N o n . “Warhead Blueprints. “How Secure Is Pakistan’s Plutonium? New York Times. January 23. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Paki- stan. 10. Khan. 39.” Center for Nonprolif- eration Studies. Material.” Pakistan submitted a copy to the IAEA on . “Export Control on Goods. Weiss. 1998. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Nuclear Ambi- tions (Boulder. Scientists. 2004. 2004. 24.” 41.” Los Angeles Times. 62.” Washington Post.” New York Times. Lander. October 26.” Newsweek. The “P” refers to Pakistani origin/design. 60. Weiss.” New York Times. March 11. 29. Sanger. 33. 2004. This assumes 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per bomb. M. February 7. Woolsey.S.” 49. Congressional Research Service. Ibid. 1.” Washington Post.” News and Dawn. Jon Wolfsthal. 2001. 32. Q. Pakistan. “Nuclear Safety. Ibid. “Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Fig- ure. Congressional Research Service. William J. “Ending Pakistan’s Nuclear Trade.S. see Leonard Spector and Jacqueline R.” New York Times. Alex Wagner. “Nuclear Safety. Also see Seymour Hersh.” India Today. 51. Ramusino and Martellini. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces. chaps. Agha Shahi. May 29. For details on this setup. Calif. Shahi. October 16. Friends Quarterly Journal.” 31. 2001). 2004.S. November 28. 29.” p. Ramusino and Martellini. Ibid. 2005. 2000).

74.” Pakistan Times. September 2004. April 24–May 7. March 10. Shi-chin Lin. 2002. DOD. November 1999. Pakistan Conduct Missile Tests. 65. Q. “Pakistan Helped North Korea Make Bomb. “Pakistan Nuclear Update 2003. vol. October 19.nrdc. “North Korea.” Daily Times. 66. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. Najum Mushtaq.iaea.” .. issue 9. See “Pakistan Blasts Indian Missile Test.” 82. 2001. 16. For an excellent synopsis of this relationship. 71.” available at www. 1998. Bermudez Jr. issue 9. and www. Pakistan 255 November 4.” Arms Control Today. 84.” Guardian. January 9.cia. Pakistan Seek Missile Test Pact.org/news/nuclear/nuclear-arsenals. 70. Suzanne Goldenberg. and R. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. 2003. 57. Central Intelligence Agency. “Pakistan Tests Medium-Range Missile.” Washington Post. Jones. Rose Gordon.” 80. April 7. 2004.pdf.” 81.” CNN News Online. 78.org/nuclear/nudb/datab21.html.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/ infcirc636. “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK. For a good synopsis of this relationship. “Summary of Pakistan’s Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems. “India.pdf. 2004. “Ballistic Missile: Pakistan Test-Fires Shaheen II. “The A.cdi. Center for Defense Information.” Arms Control Today. 67. “Pakistan’s Ballistic Response. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. “Pakistan: Khan Forced Out. 64. “Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. vol. www. vol. November–December 2003. 79. May 2003. Joseph S.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Khan with Atta ul Mohsin. 04. 72. Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Con- trols. 76. 69. May 6. 1 January through 30 June 2003. “14 Years in Jail. to Secunderabad in southern India.” Occasional Paper 2. November 2002. 8. The Prithvi has since been moved to a “strategic” location. Center for Nonproliferation Studies.asp. 1999.” www.” Frontline. Rs 5m Fine for N-Proliferation.nti.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/ jan_jun2003. “India. Pakistani Lab Sanctioned for Proliferation. Proliferation: Threat and Response. 63. October 2004. available at www. 73. 2004. 75. Maria A.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). see “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter- Trades. no. 68. see “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter- Trades.htm#17.org/e_research/e3_54a. Gabrielle Kohlmeier. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces.” Arms Control Today. Ramachandran. July/August 2001.” Strategic Comments (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 77. Novem- ber 2002. 83.

Light-water. 325 MWe. 50 MWt. Wah Power Reactors KANUPP Heavy-water. No centrifuges. LEU. U. Yes Karachi operating KANUPP-2 600 MWe. planned Planned Chasma-1/ Light-water. No Production Reactor operating Khushab Uranium Enrichment Khan Research Large-scale ultracentrifuge facility.256 N o n . operat- (PARR 1) ing (may have been used clandestinely Rawalpindi to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons) PARR 2 MNSR. HEU. 30 KWt.000 Sihala Ultracentrifuge Pilot plant of 54 ultra. nat. operating Golra Ultracentrifuge plant reportedly to be No used as a testing facility. U. operational status unknown .1. Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Nuclear Weapons Research & Development Complex Khan Research Fabrication of HEU into nuclear No Laboratories (KRL) weapon Kahuta Ras Koh Site of nuclear tests conducted in 1998 No Kharan Desert Site of nuclear tests conducted in 1998 No Pakistan Ordnance Possible nuclear weapons assembly site No Factory. planned Planned Chasnupp 2 Research Reactors Pakistan Atomic Pool-type. light-water. LEU. Yes Research Reactor 1 modified to use LEU. 137 MWe. No Laboratories (KRL) operating Kahuta Capacity 5.000 Swu/y will expand to 15. Yes Rawalpindi operating Research/Plutonium Heavy-water. nat. originally HEU.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 12. 310 MWe. 10 MWt. operating Yes Chasnupp 1 Chasma-2/ Light-water.

operational status unknown New laboratories. U308 No production. U308 No production. capacity 30tu Chasma/Kundian Fuel fabrication. 15 MT/year. closed No Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium ore processing. operating. No operating Teitium Tritium Production Can produce 5-10 grams/day. PHWR. 13 MT/year. near Uranium ore processing. operational status Rawalpindi unclear PINSTECH Experimental-scale laboratory for No Rawalpindi research on solvent extraction Uranium Processing Baghalchar Uranium mining. indigenous construction of the building shell may be complete. operating Issa Khel Uranium ore processing. French design. operating No Issa Khel Lahore Pilot-scale uranium mill. No annual production 23tu. located 150 km south of Rawalpindi (Khushab) Storage Hawks Bay Depot Operating Yes Karachi (table continues on the following page) . planned Qabul Khel. operating No 1 Heavy-Water Production Multan Supplied by Belgium. No operating Karachi Water Upgrading plant. operating No Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium conversion (UF6). Pakistan 257 Gadwal Enrichment plant Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Chasma Partially built and terminated by France No (1978). capacity for No SPINSTECH 10-20 kg/year. acquired No Facility from West Germany in 1987 and tested in 1987. Pilot-scale.

” Center for Strategic and International Studies. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal SSOURCES OURCES: Nuclear Engineering International.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/9707paki.” available at www. 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup. “Research Reactor Database (RRDB). NOTE NOTES: 1. available at http://cns.org/burke/hd/ reports/threat_pak_nukes.1. available at www.” available at www. “The Threat of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. Andrew Koch and Jennifer Topping. 2001.” November 8. Global Security.” Nonproliferation Review. .org/wmd/world/pakistan/facility. IAEA. “Pakistan Special Weapons Facilities.258 N o n .pdf.csis. 3. 4.org/programmes/a2/ index. “Power Reactor Information System (PRIS). no. 2004. U. vol.miis.: Wilmington Publishing.htm.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 12. Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium LEU low-enriched uranium nat.” available at www.pdf.globalsecurity. Anthony Cordesman and Arleigh Burke. “Pakistan’s Nuclear-Related Facilities.K. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities.org/worldatom/rrdb/.html. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water.iaea.iaea.

Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons. indisputably regarded as a de facto nuclear weapon state.500 kilometers) Jericho II ballistic missiles. however.* It is. 259 . becoming the sixth nation in the world to do so. It is. or ISIS. The weapons calculation is described later in this chapter. see note 1.2 It remains the only nation in the Middle East with nuclear weapons. Aircraft and Missile Capability As the most capable military power in the region. Israel’s successful satellite launches using the Shavit space launch vehicle suggest that it could quickly develop missile plat- forms with much longer ranges than the Jericho II. and ship.1 Plutonium separated from the fuel rods in the reactor allowed Israel to complete the devel- opment of its first nuclear device by late 1966 or 1967. Israel may have produced between 530 and 684 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the start of its nuclear research reactor at Dimona in early 1964 through the end of 2005. ballistic missiles. Both missiles use solid pro- pellant and are nuclear-capable. Israel may have produced between 530 and 684 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the start of its nuclear research reactor at Dimona in early 1964 through the end of 2005. indisputably regarded as a de facto nuclear weapon state. The development of the *This weapons estimate is based on plutonium production data provided by the Institute for Science and International Security. ISIS has an alternative calculation that yields a slightly larger range of possible weapons. The exact number of weapons Israel has assembled is unknown but is more likely on the lower end of the possible range. The exact number of weapons Israel has assembled is unknown but is more likely on the lower end of the possible range. Israel fields both short-range Jericho I (500 kilometers. CHAPTER 13 Israel Nuclear Weapons Capability Israel has an advanced nuclear weapons capability and is thought to possess enough nuclear material for between 100 and 170 nuclear weapons. with a 750–1. It is capable of delivering nuclear weapons by aircraft.000 kilogram payload) and medium- range (1. however.and submarine-launched cruise missiles. In all. In all.

N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s .260 N o n .

10 kilometers south of Tel Aviv. Israel also has a growing inventory of cruise missiles that includes the U. Israel is believed to have had sophisticated CBW programs for several de- cades. with first deployment in 1990.3 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Israel possesses advanced chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities.4 The government of Israel.S.and rail-mobile. non-Israeli publications have made many claims about Israel’s CBW capabilities. and maybe even deployed chemical weapons at some point in its history. from the trivial to the sensational. Iraq. it is highly doubtful that Israel engages in the ongoing production or stockpiling of BW agents. The Harpoons can travel up to 120 kilometers with a payload of 220 kilograms. centered at the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Ness Ziona.”7 Israel has signed but not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and is not a party to the Biologi- cal Weapons Convention. according to foreign sources. The extended range and 1. Israel 261 single-stage Jericho I missile began in the early 1960s with French assistance.-origin Harpoon. or submarine. . by Israel’s possession of a wide range of such weapons. which can be launched from an aircraft. Although it is probable that Israel has maintained some sort of production capability. however. Israel reportedly tested a new sea-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile off Sri Lanka. Israel is believed to have deployed 100 Jericho missiles. Both missiles are land. ship. as part of its traditional and deliberate policy of ambiguity.S. Israel could also deliver nuclear weapons using its F-16I Falcons. The development of the two-stage Jericho II began in the mid-1970s. has neither confirmed nor denied those reports. Cohen is more cautious and tentative: “It would be logical—given the experience with Iraq—that Israel has acquired expertise in most aspects of weaponization. F-15I Eagles. and F-4E Phantoms (now being replaced with F-16Is) and may also possess artillery-launched nuclear munitions. although it is not known what type or how many offensive agents it currently has.”5 As to biological weapons. and the missile was first deployed in 1973. the authoritative Middle East Military Balance. “The chemical and biological capabilities of Syria.”6 A 1990 U. Acknowledging the difficulty of assessing Israel’s CBW programs and capabilities. which is produced by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. notes.500 kilometers. with the possible exception of testing. In all.000-kilogram payload of the Jericho II makes it a likely nuclear delivery vehicle. In an oblique reference to Israel. Avner Cohen characterized them thus: “A near-consensus exists among experts—based on anecdotal evi- dence and intelligence leaks—that Israel developed. produced. Lacking authoritative information. In May 2000. and Iran are matched. stockpiled. Defense Intelligence Agency study reported that Israel had an operational chemical warfare testing facility. The missiles are said to have hit targets at a range of 1.

Israel completed taking delivery .S. It claimed that Israel’s nuclear weapons are assembled at a facil- ity in Yodefat.9 However. Israel is likely to rely on simple.10 The reactor can produce between 10. make different assumptions. and nuclear weapons are stored at Tirosh (see table 13. a few kilometers from the town of Beit Shemesh. enhanced-radiation. Rely- ing largely on interviews with U. David Albright calculated that. that is. as well as full-fledged thermonuclear weapons. identifying an installation at Soreq as a research facility on nuclear weapons design. intelligence analysts and Israelis knowledgeable about the country’s nuclear program. and that tactical nuclear weapons are stored at Eilabun. Israel could have produced 510 to 650 kilograms of weapons-grade plu- tonium by the end of 2003. with enough new material for an additional 2 to 4 new weapons a year.14 A New Development: Sea-Launched Capability Probably the most important nuclear-related development in Israel is the forma- tion of its sea-based nuclear arm.11 it is assumed that it has not advanced to the point of producing thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs).12 A 1994 report alleged plausible new details about Israel’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. suggesting that Israel may have developed “boosted” nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear inventory probably contained far fewer weap- ons.6 kilograms of plutonium a year. that Israel has a nuclear missile base and bunker near Moshav Zekharya. By July 2000. depending on the power level of the Dimona reactor.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Nuclear Analysis Unclassified estimates of Israel’s nuclear capabilities are based in large part on former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu’s revelations in October 1986.6 and 18. most experts who have attempted to harmonize Vanunu’s testimony with other relevant information concluded that. located at the Dimona research complex.1 at the end of the chapter). A 1991 book by the Ameri- can investigative journalist Seymour Hersh argued that Israel’s arsenal was consid- erably larger and more advanced than even Vanunu’s information suggested. proven designs that would require more plutonium than the intensively tested U.13 Other reports suggest that gravity bomb storage bunkers are located near the Tel Nof airbase. Because Israel is not known to have conducted any nuclear tests (with the possible excep- tion of the 1979 “flash” off South Africa. given the small size of Israel’s only plutonium-producing reactor.S. “neutron”-type warheads. Assuming a more conservative 5 kilograms for each warhead would mean that Israel has enough material for 105 to 135 weapons. Israel could have enough material for 130 to 170 weapons at the end of 2005. Hersh concluded that Israel possessed “hun- dreds” of low-yield.262 N o n . however. weapons that use a nuclear-fusion reaction to increase their efficiency. or Russian designs that use less than four kilograms. Vanunu also indicated that Israel had produced tritium and lithium deuteride. Assuming 4 kilograms of plutonium for each warhead. many in the form of artillery shells and land mines.8 On the basis of Vanunu’s information about Israeli plutonium produc- tion. the London Sunday Times projected that Israel might have as many as 200 nuclear devices. Some experts.

Leviathan. German leaks indicate that the three 1. Dolphin. the Los Angeles Times re- ported that U. While the submarines were under construction in Kiel.S. Israel 263 of all three Dolphin-class submarines that it had ordered at the Thyssen- Nordseewerke shipyard in Kiel. by early 2000 Israel had carried out the first launching tests of its cruise missiles. it decided to purchase the third one as well. “Elite crews have assembled to man [the submarines]. Israel sought a German shipyard as a contractor for the project. less than two years after the first submarine. In 1991.” an Israeli euphemism for a sea-launched nuclear capability. the German government offered to fully finance the purchase of two submarines and to share in the financing of the third to compensate for the role that the German indus- try had played in the development of Iraq’s nonconventional weaponry. remain highly classified. . large submarines. Shortly afterward (apparently in a response to alarming reports on Iranian nuclear and missiles projects). communication. The cost of each submarine was estimated to be about $300 million. it was vetoed by General Ehud Barak. . and cruise missiles. capable of launching torpedoes.S. mines. Israel immediately accepted the German offer for the first two submarines. Five specially selected offic- ers solely responsible for the warheads will be added to each vessel once the missiles are operational. in the wake of Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel during the Gulf War. and assembled by the Israeli defense industries. referred to the new submarine as the finest conventional submarine of its class in the world. Because no American shipyard had the appro- priate expertise in building modern diesel.17 It is reported that the Israeli-made cruise missiles have the capability of hitting targets in a range of more than 900 miles. was developed and built in Israel.”19 . electrical-powered.- supplied Harpoon missiles for use with nuclear warheads. and weapons systems in those submarines were reportedly de- veloped. These submarine-launched cruise missiles provide Israel with a largely invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability. built.900-metric-ton submarines are equipped with ten 21-inch multipur- pose tubes. the Israeli Navy (jointly with other governmental agencies) lobbied hard for building a small fleet of modern diesel submarines for “strategic purposes. and Israeli officials confirmed Israel’s modification of U. when a deal was almost signed in early 1990. It is also believed (but not confirmed) that the most sensitive aspect of the project. Germany agreed to sell Israel two additional submarines in 2004. Speaking at the ceremony for the arrival of the third submarine at its Haifa base in July 2000. According to that report. Israel maintained tight security measures and technological oversight on the project.18 According to one report in the London Sunday Times.16 Since the early 1980s (and probably even earlier). Many of the navigation. then Israel’s chief of staff. After a complex series of negotiations. and Tekumah. named Dolphin. because of cost. Rear Admiral Yedidya Yaari. the commander of the Israeli Navy. the cruise mis- sile technology that renders the diesel submarines nuclear-capable launching platforms.15 In October 2003. Germany. The details of the specific capabilities of the submarines. was delivered. .

the scientific head of the French Atomic Energy Commis- sion from 1951 to 1970. which reached its climax during the Suez crisis. aimed at both security and energy. Francis Perrin.”24 No conclusive proof exists that Israel has ever conducted a full-scale nuclear test. The two states confronted dangers stem- ming from Arab nationalism. In an on-the-record 1986 interview with the London Sunday Times.23 Research by Avner Cohen concludes that by late 1966 Israel had successfully completed the research and development stage of its program. with French Atomic Energy Commission’s approval. for example. In 1956–1957. to have obtained data from France’s first nuclear test. was intimately involved with the French–Israeli nuclear program.22 In mid-1957. and one that no potential nuclear enemy of Israel could ignore. was deeply committed to Israel’s survival. in 2004 Germany agreed to sell two additional submarines to Israel. Its nuclear arsenal is thought to have been developed in part through the testing of non-nuclear components and computer simulations. Such a survivable deterrent is perceived as essential because of Israel’s unique geopoliti- cal and demographical vulnerability to nuclear attack. which took place in 1960. including the key installation (where Vanunu would subsequently work) for extracting plutonium from the Dimona reactor’s spent fuel. and through the acquisition of weapons design and test information from abroad.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s A fleet of three submarines is believed to be the minimum that Israel needs to have a deployment at sea of one nuclear-armed submarine at all times. France secretly pledged to assist Israel in developing nuclear arms and agreed to supply a sizable plutonium-producing reactor to be built at Dimona. During the tense days of the crisis in late May 1967. France also gave Israel important information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons them- selves. for at least two years during the late 1950s. Soon thereafter. Perrin acknowledged that France had supplied the Dimona reactor and the plu- tonium extraction plant and that. Gobain Techniques Nouvelles for the construction of several additional facilities at the Dimona site. History Israel’s interest in establishing a national nuclear infrastructure.25 It may also have obtained data from U. nuclear tests at . France and Israel had collaborated on the design and development of nuclear weapons. Israel because of its isolated position in the Middle East and France because of growing unrest in French Algeria.21 At the time.20 By 1955. France’s socialist government. Israel is thought. Israel improvised the assembly of two deliverable nuclear devices and placed them on “operational alert.264 N o n .S. Israel signed an agreement with the French firm St. in the Negev. As noted above. just days before the Six-Day War. in the wake of David Ben Gurion’s return to power in Israel. is as old as the state itself. the Israeli nuclear weapons program was born as a result of Israeli–French collaboration. 40 miles from Beersheba. Shimon Peres (then the director general of the Ministry of Defense) started to explore in earnest the feasibility of a nuclear weapons project. led by Guy Mollet.

Questioned about Israel’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. that a signal detected on September 22. government scientific review concluded that the most likely explanation was that it was a non-nuclear event. which makes it difficult to absorb a conventional attack and respond effectively. Meir explained to Nixon . Hersh’s sources stated. Although the official U. however. culminating in Israel’s refusal to join the NPT in 1968. and some of whom still reject Israel’s right to exist. during an official state visit to the United States. and President John F. According to a May 1989 U.26 There has been speculation. boosted and thermonuclear weapons that were being developed at the time.S. almost all of whom have been hostile adversaries throughout its his- tory. VELA monitoring satellite orbiting over the South Atlantic was in fact the flash from a low-yield nuclear explosive test. and the “preponderance of men and equipment” enjoyed by its Arab neighbors. Israeli prime minister Golda Meir and President Richard Nixon for the first time reached a secret understanding on this sensitive issue that brought an end to the friction. television documen- tary.27 The first two tests. were obscured by storm clouds. tests from the 1950s and early 1960s. the readings have been attrib- uted by some to a nuclear test conducted by South Africa. 1979. Israel was able to gain access to information concerning U.S. possibly from a tactical nuclear weapon or from the fission trigger of a thermonuclear device. this critical matter remains unresolved. Israel 265 approximately that time.28 Even as Israel decided to pursue a nuclear deterrent.S. then Israel’s deputy minister of defense. It was first enunciated in a 1963 meeting of Shimon Peres. Peres responded that “Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the [Middle East]. The Strategic Context Israel’s pursuit of the nuclear deterrent option as the basis of national survival has been founded primarily on two factors: Israel’s lack of territorial strategic depth.” the Sep- tember 1979 event was indeed an Israeli nuclear weapon test and was the third of a series of tests conducted at that time. by a U.S. there was continuous friction between the United States and Israel over the question of Israel’s nuclear development.S. and by others to Israel. Out of this predicament. because the satellite is said to rely in part on infrared sen- sors that can penetrate cloud cover. however. The claim that clouds would prevent the detection of an atmospheric nuclear detonation by a VELA satellite has been challenged.30 In September 1969. it did not want this decision to alienate the United States. Seymour Hersh reported that “according to Israeli officials whose informa- tion about other aspects of Dimona’s activities has been corroborated.”29 Beginning in the early 1960s. Thus. Kennedy. At the same time. Israel has sought to maintain a margin of qualitative conventional military superiority that would both discourage its foes from resorting to force and ensure victory without the use of nuclear arms in the event of conflict. The test data could have included the results of tests of U. Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity or nuclear opac- ity originated.

it was later disclosed that Iraq had stock- piled chemical and biological warheads for such missiles. after its invasion of Kuwait. Several nuclear installations had not been identified by the United States or its partners. Although suspicion of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program existed before the 1991 Gulf War. while publicly calling on all states to sign the NPT. The emerging threat was dem- onstrated during the 1991 Gulf War when Israeli cities and sites in Saudi Arabia were attacked by Iraqi extended-range Scud missiles. Israeli nuclear opacity was born and cultivated as a symbiotic U. causing two deaths and hundreds of injuries. It was left to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discover. The case of Iraq raises important . the magnitude of the Iraqi nuclear program. allowing the Iraqis to remove and hide equipment. the scale and range of its efforts were not known. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin then declared that Israel would block any at- tempt by adversaries to acquire nuclear weapons. in a painstaking effort.)34 At the same time. the strategic balance in the Middle East underwent signifi- cant changes. and Syria were expanding their chemical weapons capabilities. Israel also pledged not to test nuclear weapons or publicly admit to possessing them. he would destroy “half of Israel” with chemical weapons. Some Arab states undertook or accelerated programs to develop or acquire unconventional weapons as well as delivery systems. Libya. By the end of the decade. Although the attacking Scud missiles carried conventional warheads. much of Iraq’s nuclear weapons infrastructure remained intact. Likewise.S.266 N o n . but also. Saddam Hussein was boasting about Iraq’s extensive ballistic missile forces and chemical weapons capabilities by declaring (in April 1990) that. In spite of a massive air campaign. and ended American pressure on Israel to sign the NPT. attacked nuclear-related facilities suffered only slight damage. on Iraq’s Osiraq research reactor. and some of Israel’s adversaries were also pursuing the de- velopment of biological weapons. Nixon accepted the Israeli posi- tion. nuclear opacity has become Israel’s most distinct contribution to the nuclear age. Over the years. Iran.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s why Israel had developed nuclear weapons—and hence could not sign the NPT— and why a policy of nuclear opacity (using the old formulation that “Israel will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons” to the Middle East) would best serve the interests of both countries. It was subsequently revealed that Iraq had embarked not only on a multifaceted nuclear weapons development program. In some cases. on a crash program to develop a single nuclear device by April 1991.32 A refinement in Israel’s defense posture was the Begin doctrine. all Israeli governments have adhered to the agreement.35 The 1991 Gulf War also demonstrated the difficulties of identifying and strik- ing facilities involved in clandestine proliferation programs. 1981. administrations have not pres- sured Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. which justi- fied Israel’s air attack on June 7.S. efforts to halt the Israeli nuclear program. all subsequent U. recognizing that the Israeli bomb was a fait accompli. (Iraq had already used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.–Israeli policy.33 During the 1980s. if Israel attacked any Iraqi nuclear installations.31 The agreement put an end to a decade of unsuccessful (and at times half- hearted) U. Iraq launched a total of 39 Scud missiles against Israel.S. Since then.

Saudi Arabia. Israel accelerated its development of antimissile systems. Egypt. From Israel’s point of view. Egypt. as ballistic missile threats increased. Israel 267 questions over the practicality of the Begin doctrine in the future if potential nuclear infrastructure targets are too distant. a possible biological warfare program. if any. An additional multilateral component of this process was the establish- ment of five working groups to address regional issues of common interest. as well as Alge- ria.38 Israel’s response was embodied in Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ ex- change with Egyptian foreign minister Amr Mussa: Peres explained that Israel would agree to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East two years after the conclusion of a comprehensive peace accord between all states in the region. which opened in Madrid on October 30. At the same time. the collapse of the peace process established by the 1993 Oslo accords not only undermined efforts to resume the regional arms control talks but also created a deeply pessimistic mood among the Israeli public about peace. hidden too well. and possibly Iraq. raising the prospect of a transition to arms control. A provocative visit by Likud Party leader . including Iran. security conditions deteriorated rapidly both in- ternally and regionally after 1995. Libya. one being the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. The talks were suspended in early 1995 with very limited. ma- jor Israeli antagonists in the region. Israel’s threat assessment became more dire when Syria tested advanced 600-kilometer Scud- C missiles. In the context of the April 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 1991.36 A Perspective on Arms Control The Gulf War provided an impetus for the initiation of a peace process in the region. began sets of bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors aimed at a comprehensive peace in the region.37 The Middle East Peace Conference. a system capable of striking Israeli sites from deep within Syria. Israel believed that it continued to face mis- sile threats from Libya. under the sponsorship of the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel also saw Iran as an increas- ingly serious threat. that would enable Iran to target Israel for the first time (see chapters 5 and 15). and possibly with chemical and biological weapons. led by Egypt. and too numerous to be destroyed by air attacks. Efforts by Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat to negotiate an accord showed promise throughout 1999 but stalled at the end of 2000. attempted but failed to pressure Israel into renouncing its nuclear option. the Arab states. with ranges of up to 2. did not participate in the talks. and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.000 kilometers. At the fourth Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session of the Review and Extension Conference in January 1995. and Syria. information surfaced that Iran was developing Shahab missiles. issued statements indicating that they would consent to an indefinite extension of the NPT only after Israel had agreed to accede to the treaty. In addition to its suspected stockpile of chemical weapons. con- crete accomplishments. However. such as Iran and Syria. Moreover. During that period.

however. Unofficially. and in the fact that it was one of its first signatories. the only one of the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states to do so. In 1993. The impetus for the 1991 Bush regional proposal was the perception that the “fissban” idea. adherence to the CTBT and its earlier signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrated Israel’s interest in arms control regimes with reliable verification systems that are not subject to abuse or frivo- lous requests. the Israel government refrained from making an official and public response to the Bush and Clinton initiatives.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in September 2000 ignited a four-year intifada that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and Israelis. both the George H. a pos- sible shift by Hezbollah to political rather than military operations. it was evident that Israel had to be a part of any effort to reduce the nuclear threat in the Middle East. In the wake of the Gulf War. advocates of a fissban argued that it offered a realistic compromise: a limited but real con- straint on the Israeli nuclear program.268 N o n . in addition to the effort to disarm Iraq. Israeli officials expressed reservation about the proposals but were careful not to reject them outright. would put Israel on a slippery slope leading to the demise of nuclear opacity and to increased pres- sure to abandon its nuclear arsenal entirely. together with the associated verification modalities. in its cosponsor- ship of the United Nations resolution that opened the CTBT for signature. calling for a global fissile material cutoff treaty that would ban the further production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons as well as the pro- duction of such materials outside IAEA safeguards. and the pending Israeli withdrawal from Gaza contributed to a cautious optimism shared by all sides. According to this view. From the Israeli perspective. coupled with an implicit legitimization of Israel’s nuclear status. Israel. could be an important milestone toward an eventual nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Bush administration in 1991 and subsequently the Bill Clinton administration in 1993 made proposals to ban the further production of fissile materials for weapons both in the Middle East and globally. 1996. The election in January 2005 of Mahmoud Abbas as the new president of the Palestinian Authority brought a new potential for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. the Clinton administration modified the Bush proposal. and Pakistan) to retain their existing stocks of unsafeguarded fissile material.39 In the early 1990s. Israel’s arms control credentials and poli- cies were also reflected in the active role it played in the negotiations of the CTBT as a primary participant in the drafting of the accord.40 In the early 1990s.41 . W. In this context. The April 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The cutoff proposal would permit the five nuclear weapon states and the three de facto nuclear powers (In- dia. Treaties and Negotiations Israel signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 25. The main concern was that the constraints imposed by the fissban.

no pressure will help. based on the Shavit SLV. The multi-billion-dollar Arrow sys- tem will attempt to intercept short-range Scud-type missiles just as they start reen- tering the atmosphere after reaching the highest point of their flight trajectory. Israel is report- edly developing a third version of the Jericho missile. According to Aluf Benn. It appears that only a dramatic change in the nuclear ambitions of Iran could trigger a change in the Israeli position. Missile Analysis Israel currently deploys two nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems: the Jericho I and Jericho II.44 Israel’s anti–ballistic missile system is a joint U. a substantive discussion of regional arms control issues is inextricably linked to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. linked to the military. the conflict forced Yitzhak Rabin. and do not delude yourselves. Netanyahu told Clinton: “We will never sign the treaty. following the collapse of ACRS. Commercial satellite photographs indicate that the missile base between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean was enlarged between 1989 and 1993 to allow for Jericho II deployment. two-stage missile can travel an estimated 1. geo- graphic and demographic asymmetries in the region. whose existence cannot be confirmed. In his view.500 kilometers. The Jericho II solid-fueled. one Israeli observer argues. the Jericho III. and other Israeli leaders to articulate for the first time “links between the maintenance of the nuclear capa- bility and the continued threats to national survival. Israeli decision makers will also continue to hold the view that as long as adversaries in the Middle East region maintain the capability to mount large-scale military attacks against Israel or to threaten Israeli cities with missiles carrying chemical or biological warheads. In some respects. Ha’aretz’s diplomatic correspondent. . could potentially have an intermediate (greater than 3.”42 Despite India’s and Pakistan’s declarations of nuclear weapons in 1998 and the end of any threat from Iraq. In 1998.000 km) or intercontinental (greater than 5. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told (and wrote to) President Clinton in unequivocal language that Israel could not accept the fissban proposal. it is unlikely that Israel will follow suit or change its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear posture may have been better understood internationally as a result of its controversy with Egypt before and during the course of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.500 kilometer) range. Up to 50 Jericho I solid-fueled.”43 From the Israeli per- spective. We will not sign the treaty because we will not commit sui- cide. in two letters and several conversations.S. Peres. The Jericho III. Furthermore. Israel 269 By the middle to late 1990s. two-stage missiles with an ap- proximate range of 500 kilometers are thought to be deployed in shelters on mobile launchers.–Israeli undertaking begun in 1988 and funded largely by the United States. Israeli opposi- tion to the fissban proposal grew firmer. Israel will need to maintain the nuclear deterrence op- tion. despite the fact that Tel Aviv can already reach all of its regional adversaries with the Jericho II medium-range ballistic missile. possibly at a facility located midway between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean.

New Mexico. Many of these sensationalist stories appeared in the Sunday Times (London). and can be used for reconnaissance as well as precision attack. pp. 2000. “Israel and CBW: History. Israel’s armament industries are believed to have exten- sive ties. with a 400-kilometer range and a 450-kilogram payload.49 N OTES 1. The Delilah.” Foreign Report. Deterrence. while the laser gun is under- going development and testing in White Sands. which is not manufactured at the Institute.org/global_stocks/de_facto_states. The new Delilah GL (ground launch) is a derivation of the air-launched Delilah missile.isis-online. has a range of more than 250 kilometers.45 The system links operations with Patriot air defense units. 1998). 2. Israel is also developing jointly with the United States the Nautilus laser (also called a tactical high-energy laser system).” Uzi Mahnaimi. is said to have been developed with Chinese cooperation. India. This system will try to intercept Scud-like missiles soon after launch with an air-to-air missile fired from an unmanned aerial ve- hicle flying at high altitude. one near Tel-Aviv and one in Ein Shemer. June 18. August 20.html. Israel has sought to acquire a land-based cruise missile for almost a decade. Produced in Nuclear Weapons Programs. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer.” in Global Fissile Material Inventories (Washington. available at www. “Israel’s Secret Institute.: Institute for Science and International Security.” Sunday Times (London).N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Israel has tested the Arrow II interceptor twelve times. February 5.” Sunday Times. One of these stories cites a biologist who once held a senior post in the Israeli intelligence as saying that “there is hardly a single known or unknown form of chemical or biological weapon. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that Israel has developed its first surface-to-surface cruise missile. and Turkey.and ground- launched variants of the Delilah cruise missile. “ISIS Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material in De Facto Nuclear Weapon States. capable of shooting down short-range artillery rockets. . 1998.47 Israel’s unmanned aerial vehicle program has been extended to cover cruise missile development. This system is intended for de- ployment in Israel’s northern regions to help protect against rocket attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon and Gaza. 3. Avner Cohen.” Foreign Report. 239. and Arms Control. “Israel’s Nes[s] Ziona Mystery.48 Moreover. 4.” Nonproliferation Re- view. See also. In June 2004.270 N o n .C. “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves with Submarine Missile Test. including projected cruise missile cooperation with China. Octo- ber 4. Fall 2001. and the entire system seven times. “Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare. Israel is also experimenting with another missile interceptor. a third is being developed for southern Israel. Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press. The radar component of the Nautilus system was delivered to Israel in December of 2004. 273– 276. 1998. D. pp. 1–20. The estimate for production totals at the end of 2003 has been extended here to the end of 2005 using the institute’s estimates for annual plutonium production. 5.46 Israel and the United States optimistically expect the laser to be ready for deployment by 2007. the Moab. including land-attack cruise missiles. Two Arrow II batteries have been deployed. South Korea. 1998. 2004). funded in part by the United States. These systems ap- pear to be the sea-launched Harpoon cruise missile and the air. Avner Cohen. Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell.

Mahnaimi and Campbell. Israel 271 6. 24. p. Ha’aretz. Ibid.: MIT Press. 9. This extrapolation is based on the assumption that the Dimona reactor has been operating reliably at a power level of between 40 and 70 megawatts thermal (MWt) and has not experienced any significant shutdowns nor extended operation at its theoretical upper limit of 150 MWt. “Peres: Keep Nuclear Details Secret. 67. Ibid. pp. pp. 1991).: Ballinger. “Israel: The Covert Connection.” 11. 1. Harold Hough. Israel and the Bomb. The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books.” Sunday Times (London). . July 29–August 4. 1989. 14. pp. 12. 18. 16. PBS Network. Frans Berkhout. Novem- ber/December 1997.story. The Undeclared Bomb (Cam- bridge. p. December 23. 188. Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir. 291. 7. 484. 17. 2001). and William Walker. “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal. 9–11. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. 1988). Mass.. 9–31. Gerald Steinberg. chaps. p. Barbara Opall. Hans M. available at www. p. David Albright and Corey Gay. 7. 31. 1981). The Issue Complicates Efforts to Rein in Iran’s Ambitions. 1986. and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen. “Israel to Acquire Two More German Submarines. 16–17. 1986. “A Flash from the Past. In light of what is known about Israel’s nuclear infrastructure. 1990). 2003. September 14. Benn. November 21–23. 273–276. Steven Weissman and Herbert Krosney. pp.” 33. pp. pp. Aluf Benn. 26. Sea and Air. 12.com/news/ nationworld/world/la-fg-iznukes12oct12.” Los Angeles Times. 32. Les Deux Bombes (Paris: Fayard. pp. Geneva.. Seymour Hersh. The Middle East Military Balance 2000–2001. 336–338. 13. 118–119.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. Israel and the Bomb. chaps. 114. October 12. 271. Cohen. 165–187.” Sunday Times (London). 30. Pierre Pean. 1999 (English Internet edition). the authors assume in their calculations that Israel uses 5 kilograms of plutonium for each warhead. The authors of this volume assume that Israel uses 4 kilograms for each warhead. 15–17. Samson Option. Ibid. 167. Israel and the Bomb. see Albright and Kramer. 259. 2000. 41–55. 4. “Open Secrets. “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves. 28. Leonard Spector. chaps. Capabilities. 10. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. pp. Ibid.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Israeli Perspectives.” paper presented at the Ninth Amaldi Conference on Security Ques- tions at the End of the Twentieth Century. Ibid. pp. Israel and the Bomb.” Ha’aretz. Cohen.” Maariv International. pp. 8.. 27. 1996. pp. Colo. 1997). 5–7. Tel Aviv University (Cambridge. 17. 1996. Cohen. pp.” Frontline.” 19. Leonard Spector. “Israel’s Arsenal Is Point of Contention: Officials Confirm That the Nation Can Now Launch Atomic Weapons from Land. Israel and the Bomb. 319. 23. 2004.: Westview Press. 2001). 22. 1996. eds. November 1994. 15. 20.” Defense News. The Samson Option (New York: Random House. October 12.. 5. it has long been assumed that its weapons use plutonium rather than highly enriched uranium for their cores. 57–68. 341–344. October 5. p. 8. “Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure. July 26. “ISIS Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material. 1981). revised November 25. Cohen. For the plutonium estimate through 2003. esp. 312. Disarmament. 29.latimes. with Jacquelin Smith. 508. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder. chap. 21. p. Israel and the Bomb. Cohen. SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments. “Open Secrets: The Struggle to Keep Nuclear Capabilities Secret. See David Albright. 25. and International Security. Mass. “France Admits It Gave Israel A-Bomb. Douglas Frantz. 3. Hersh. May 16. 262.

Calif. p. Fall 1996. Efraim Inbar.” Congres- sional Research Service. 1993. no. 46. Working Paper 99. 2001.” 42. “Senior Governmental Officials: Israel Could Live with Clinton’s Arms Control Initia- tive. Bar-Ilan University. 1995. May 2. 2000. April 3.html. and “BRF Israel Missiles. “Arrow. 8. 2004.” in Missile Defense Systems (Claremont.” paper prepared for the Stanley Foundation’s Strategy for Peace Conference at Airlie Conference Center.S. 1998. D. “Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects. MissileThreat.” Nonproliferation Review. “Iraq Threatens to Use Chemical Weapons against Israeli Attack. Israel: BESA Center for Stra- tegic Studies. 35. 2004. “Sharon Will Stick to Tradition of Nuclear Ambiguity. p. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller. 47. 37. June 16.: Woodrow Wilson Center. 1995. “Open Secrets. December 21.C. October 5.S. 1. 36. Andrew Feickert.: MIT Press.” 43. Avner Cohen.” Defense Analysis. Aluf Benn. 41. Benn.edu/research/wmdme/israel. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1997. 2001. 36. Aluf Benn. February 18. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller.” Associated Press.” 40. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. February 2. and the De Facto Nuclear Weap- ons States. Gerald Steinberg.” in Inter- national Perspectives on Counterproliferation. March 14. March 5. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Israeli Perspectives. “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel”. “Missile Survey.missilethreat. Avner Cohen.. Mass. Alon Ben-David.” Jerusalem Post. “Anti-Katyusha Laser to Be Tested. Warrenton.html. p. “Israel Resists Pressure on Its Nuclear Policy. pp. no. January 3. p. Feickert.missilethreat. Aluf Benn. Mark Hibbs. 352. 2000. and Shmuel Sandler. See also Center for Nonproliferation Studies.: Claremont Institute. Spring 1993.com. “The U. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 126–127.272 N o n . 49. available at www.htm.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 34.” Ha’aretz. Cohen and Miller. edited by Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (Washington. “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision. 2005). and the De Facto Nuclear Weapons States: A Post–September 11 Perspective. Shai Feldman. available at http:// cns.miis. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge. 1990.” paper presented at a U. 45.” Ha’aretz. James Bruce. Spring 1997. “Israel’s Space and Missile Projects. 36. . 101–113. 39.com. “Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). available at www. pp. The Military Balance. 6. “The Lessons of Osiraq and the American Counterproliferation Debate.” in Missile Defense Systems. reprinted in Lessons for Arms Control in a Changing Middle East.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. Institute of Peace seminar.” p. 40. “De Facto Nuclear Weapons States.” Security Dia- logue.com/systems/arrow_israel. October 25–27.S.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1103514262459. vol. Security and Policy Studies 26 (Ramat Gan.com/systems/thel_usa. 7. Cohen and Miller. avail- able at www. Efraim Karsh. “Israel Develops Ground-Launched Delilah Missile. 38.jpost. 2004.” Ha’aretz. 12.” Nucleonics Week. “How to Think About—and Implement—Nuclear Arms Con- trol in the Middle East. June 1996). 2004).” Jane’s Intelligence Review. MissileThreat. 1996. “Deterrence and Middle East Stability: An Israeli Perspective. Monterey Institute. Steinberg. 44.” Ha’aretz. 48. “The U. 1997). Arieh O’Sullivan. “Last NPT PrepCom Moves toward Limited Extension. vol. “Arms Control and the New Middle Eastern Environment.” Financial Times. April 8. Gerald Steinberg.” Washington Quarterly. 1994). Va.

No 10 operating Uranium Enrichment 11 Dimona Suspected pilot-scale laser and No centrifuge-enrichment programs. pool. status unknown Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Mochon 2 Underground facility. converts separated plutonium into metal and shapes plutonium metal 12 into bomb cores. 40–150 MWt. 5 MWt. status unknown No 14 Uranium Processing Negev area. Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Nuclear Weapons Complex Negev Nuclear Plutonium production research reactor No Research Center and plutonium extraction facilities (see Dimona below) and other weapon-related infrastructure 1 Moshav Soreq Nuclear weapon research and design No facility 2 Yodefat Possible nuclear weapon assembly No facility Moshav Zekharya Nuclear missile base (reportedly No 3 (Zachariah) Jericho II) 4 Sdot Micha Nuclear missile base (reportedly No Jericho I). near Uranium phosphate mining. Dimona Heavy-water. Israel 273 Table 13. Nahal Light-water. HEU. Yes 9 Soreq operating IRR-2. uses PUREX No Dimona method. operating 13 Nahal Soreq Suspected. U. nat.1. status No Beersheeba unknown (table continues on the following page) . status unknown 5 Tel Nof Airbase near suspected nuclear gravity No 6 bomb storage bunkers Tirosh7 Possible nuclear weapon storage facility No 8 Eilabun Possible nuclear weapon storage facility No Research Reactors IRR-1.

Capabilities. uranium No conversion (UF6). Hans M. and Policies (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. See also Hans M. See also Kristensen and Handler. available at http://fas. “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a Pre-Emptive Strike?” . p. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service. International Atomic Energy Agency. January 9. Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Ar- maments. Lithium Deuteride Dimona Tritium may have been extracted from No heavy water and/or from irradiated lith- 17 ium targets. 2004. 1995”.shtml.’” NBC News. available at www. status No 16 (Rehovot) unknown Tritium. 1997. 42. Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- tute (Oxford: Oxford University Press.com/id/4788784/.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke. available at http://msnbc. status unknown Southern Israel Suspected yellowcake production in No phosphate plant. Disarmament. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. and International Secu- rity (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002). April 6. “Appendix 10A. Facilities under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded material on 31 December 2003”. Disarmament.” 3. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. Appendix 2.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 13. “Table A24. irradiated lithium targets can also produce lithium deuteride. and International Security. 2001). Kristensen and Joshua Handler. Hough. 1997).” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments. Stockholm International Peace Re- search Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hans M.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/table_A24. Preston Mendenhall.msn. Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Haifa Suspected yellowcake production in two No phosphate plants. available at www. Frans Berkhout. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. and International Security. NNOTES OTES: : 1. “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a Pre-Emptive Strike?” Jane’s Intelligence Review.iaea. 2.274 N o n . and fuel-fabrication 15 facility.” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments. all operating Heavy-Water Processing Weizmann Institute Suspected pilot-scale plant. 2002). “The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Problems of Extension.pdf. “Is- rael Releases ‘Atomic Prisoner.janes. “Appendix 10A: World Nuclear Forces.htm#israel. “Appendix 10A: World Nuclear Forces. U natural uranium MWt megawatts thermal OURCES: SOURCES David Albright. status unknown Dimona Uranium purification (UO2).1. Harold Hough.com/regional_news/africa_middle_east/news/jir/jir990901_1 _n. April 21.18 status unknown ABBREVIATIONS A BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium nat. and William Walker. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service.

17.globalsecurity. Israel produces roughly 10 tons of uranium yellowcake annually. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Ura- nium 1996. 7.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona. 1998). and Walker. SIPRI Yearbook 2001.. p. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. p. Berkhout.” available at www. 257–264. 12.globalsecurity. .” 5. .org/wmd/world/israel/dimona. Israel 275 4. According to Albright. see Albright. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. According to a 1987 Pentagon study. Ibid. the “Soreq Center runs the full nuclear gamut of activities .htm. and Walker. “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World. 13. required for nuclear weapons design and fabrication. See www. 260. Berkhout. and Walker. For a good discussion of the reactor power mystery. Berkhout. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service.” See Kristensen and Handler. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996.iaea. Berkhout.org/worldatom/rrdb. Kristensen and Handler. 11. 14. Albright. Estimates of the reactor’s capacity vary widely. International Atomic Energy Agency. 9. . 264. Kristensen and Handler. Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York. 16. and Walker. 15. “Appendix 10A. Ibid. SIPRI Yearbook 2001. 18. Avner Cohen. p. p.htm. 263. 8. 6. Albright. 15. pp. See www. 10. Ibid.

.

These two hard cases are the focus of major international nonproliferation efforts. The success or failure of nonproliferation with these two nations could decide the future of the entire nonproliferation regime. Each of these countries is pursuing nuclear capabilities for various reasons. 277 . or perhaps many. which need to be understood to shape effective nonproliferation policies. new nuclear nations. only two new countries— North Korea and Iran—are now moving toward producing nuclear weapons in the next decade. the number of states aggressively pursuing these capabilities is remarkably small. The primary danger of this spread of nuclear capabilities is not that each country would use nuclear weapons to attack the United States or other nations but that its acquisition of nuclear weapons would force neighboring states to reconsider their own nuclear options. chemical. Part Four Two Hard Cases A lthough very serious consequences are associated with the pro- liferation of nuclear. In fact. and biological weapons and of ballistic missiles. A nuclear chain reaction could spread from the Middle East or North- east Asia. resulting in several.

.

having tested and de- ployed missiles with ranges of more than 1. It is unclear how many.S. intelligence agencies have stated that “in the mid- 1990s North Korea had produced one possibly two. North Korea may also be gaining important flight test infor- mation from missiles being tested in other countries.1 at the end of the chapter). CHAPTER 14 North Korea Nuclear Weapons Capability North Korea has an active nuclear weapon program and may already possess enough separated plutonium to produce as many as nine nuclear weapons (see table 14. there is evidence that North Korea may be pursuing a uranium enrichment centrifuge program that could increase its access to weapons-grade nuclear material in the coming years. U.S. Aircraft and Missile Capability North Korea has an advanced ballistic missile capability. nuclear weapons. intelligence has yet to publicly identify any cen- trifuge enrichment facilities in North Korea. The exact scale of the North Korean centrifuge program. if fully developed. North Korea continues to operate a small plutonium production reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear center that can produce enough weapons-grade pluto- nium for one nuclear weapon every year. the me- dium-range No Dong.2 Pyongyang continues to abide by a self-declared suspen- sion of its missile flight tests but retains the ability to resume tests at any time. North Korea is the leading exporter of short-range ballistic missiles in the world. and it continues to conduct ground-based testing of missile engines and components. Libya. Pakistan. Reliable estimates indicate that North Korea has deployed approximately 100 of its most advanced ballistic missile.000 kilometers and conducted a single test of a longer-range system that. weapons North Korea has built. however. and it is unclear when North Korea will be able to begin production of weapons-grade uranium. is not publicly known. if any. Iran. In addition. and Syria.”1 but this estimate may be based on assumptions about Pyongyang’s intentions and capa- bilities rather than direct evidence. may be able to deliver a small payload to the United States. as well as an infrastructure that can be used to produce biological 279 . such as Iran. and it has sold missiles or missile production capabilities to Egypt. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability North Korea is believed to possess large stocks of chemical weapons and precur- sor chemicals. U.

S. Past efforts that have alternated between enticing and pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program have been unsuccessful. officials believe that North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and is able to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for mili- tary purposes within weeks of a decision to do so. and to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.280 Tw o H a r d C a s e s weapons.S. Policy toward North Korea The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. it has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The parties remain. U. the United States be- gan an initially cautious and then more active strategy of engagement with . U. The United States has long-standing treaty and political commit- ments to defend South Korea from North Korean attack. or South Korean troops in combat. Other nations possess a limited set of tools to influ- ence North Korean behavior and convince its enigmatic leadership to abandon its unconventional weapons production and export activities. There is increasing con- cern that as North Korea consolidates its nuclear position. The key to the U. it may become more adventurous in its attempts to extract concessions from other countries and to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies in the region. In 1991.S. to this day. in a technical state of war. Although it has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- vention. North Korea’s alleged possession of nuclear weapons and its continued produc- tion of nuclear materials threaten the United States’ ability to deter North Korea actions that undermine U. and in the coming decades it could produce large amounts of nuclear materials for its own weapons and pos- sibly for export to others. U.S. or South Korean interests. allies. Defense Depart- ment believes that North Korea would use chemical weapons against U.S.000 troops in South Korea. policy toward the reclusive state has alternated in the past two decades from one of open engagement to outright confrontation.S. The continued military confrontation between North Korea and South Ko- rea (and its ally the United States) represents the main source of instability in Northeast Asia—a standoff exacerbated by North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.S.S. The United States currently deploys more than 30. This isolated and highly secretive country has developed a largely indigenous nuclear weap- ons and ballistic missile production capability. The Strategic Context North Korea’s unchecked nuclear weapons capabilities represent a serious threat to regional security. approach to stability on the Korean peninsula is to make clear to the North that any attack against the South would fail and present unacceptable costs to Pyongyang. including South Korea and Japan.3 The U. and the possible collapse of this poor and reclusive country cannot be discounted. although it has plans to realign and reduce its troop presence on the peninsula in the coming years. to several key U.

S.S. That crisis eventually resulted in the completion of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Attempts by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung to win President Bush’s endorsement for his engage- ment or “sunshine” policy toward the North was bluntly rejected during a Wash- ington summit between U. 2001. which also featured several periods of crisis including one that almost led to war with North Korea. 2001.”5 Despite this stated desire to pursue discussions. Then–secretary of state Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang in 2000 and became the highest-ranking U. and held open the possible use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. President Bush included North Korea as a charter member of the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address. the Bush administration undertook a wholesale reas- sessment of U. But the details of a missile elimination agreement could not be concluded by the time George W.–North Korean relationship was steadily deteriorating. openly called for regime change in these states. This process continued and expanded under President Bill Clinton. Confronting the North Korean regime and other “rogue” states was a clear priority for the new administration even before the terrorist attacks of September 11. On June 6. which froze North Korea’s nuclear material production for eight years. verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile pro- grams and a ban on its missile exports. the White House completed its policy review and issued a presidential statement announcing that the United States should “undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities. including a prolonged set of discussions dating from the mid-1990s.4 a desire that was quickly countermanded by more conservative elements of the Bush team and the president himself. the fabric of the U. This process included a high-level meeting in 1991 between then–undersecretary of state Arnold Kantor and North Korean representative Kim Yong Sun that convinced North Korea to complete the legal process of adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. Less than a year later. N o r t h K o re a 281 Pyongyang. official ever to meet with Kim Jong Il. sought to “pick up where Presi- dent Clinton and his administration left off ” with North Korea. with the goal of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities and encouraging improved relations between North Korea and South Korea. Other officials. and South Korean leaders in March 2001.S. Many incoming officials had ac- tively opposed the 1994 Agreed Framework and were highly skeptical of North Korea’s commitment to give up its nuclear weapon programs. and a less threatening conventional mili- tary posture. The National Security Strategy Statement of the United States released in 2002 talked about the pos- sible need to take preemptive military action against states like North Korea. most notably Secretary of State Colin Powell. despite pledges in the Agreed . Bush was inaugurated in January 2001. The final months of the Clinton administration saw an intense negotiat- ing effort to end North Korea’s ballistic missile program. These and additional statements made it clear that the Bush administration in- tended to pursue a more assertive policy of confronting hostile states such as North Korea. Upon assuming office. policy toward North Korea.S.

U. For more than a year. The assessment was based primarily on efforts by North Korea—some successful—to buy and import enrichment- related equipment through the A. according to all U. also stated that the United States had recently learned that the “North had begun construction of a centrifuge facility. Q. The situation remained tense in 2002.282 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Framework to provide Pyongyang with assurances against the use of these weap- ons. intelligence reports indi- cated that North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts stretched back to 1999 or 2000. During the talks. At the time.6 In October 2002.8 The . traveled to Pyongyang for long-postponed discussions with his counterpart. North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors from the country and removed all IAEA monitoring equipment and seals from its nuclear facilities. officials maintain that Kim not only admitted to the program’s existence but also claimed that North Korea had the right to possess nuclear weapons because of the hostile policies of the Bush administration. In the summer of 2002. admitted that the enrichment effort did exist. the assistant secretary of state for East Asia. partici- pants. In addition. as well as the 1992 North–South denuclearization agreement. summed up in an unclassified summary submitted to Congress in 2002. In December 2002. It may also. have constituted a further violation of the NPT. Kim Gye Gwan.S. 2005. hostility. North Korea claimed on February 10. Kelly confronted Kim over the North’s uranium enrichment effort and informed him that any improvement in United States– North Korea relations would be conditional on the immediate and verified elimi- nation of the enrichment program. 2003. North Korean officials consistently denied the enrichment allegation. on January 10. North Korea announced that it was immedi- ately withdrawing from the NPT. which requires that all nuclear facilities be declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placed under safeguards. the administra- tion made no concrete progress on its stated desire to pursue comprehensive talks with North Korea.S. Vice Minister Kang reportedly had no response when confronted with the allegation that the enrichment program predated the election of George W. joined the talks and.” although no such site has been publicly identified. Khan network of black market nuclear suppliers.S.7 During the two days of meetings. the vice foreign minister. after having been confronted by the United States over its alleged uranium enrichment program. Bush. that it had “manufactured” nuclear weapons as a deterrent to U. James Kelly. The enrichment program violated the spirit of the 1994 Agreed Frame- work and the stated interpretation by the United States of that arrangement. claiming that their words were translated incorrectly. The intelligence findings confirmed doubts about North Korea’s intentions in the minds of those government officials who were skeptical of engagement with North Korea and reinforced their desire to adopt a different approach toward Pyongyang. intelligence agencies con- cluded that North Korea had been secretly trying to acquire a uranium enrich- ment program for at least two years. until Kang Sok Ju. Since then. depending on how far the program had advanced.S. The assessment. including the seals on the 8. U. North Korean officials have consistently denied the admission.000 fuel rods stored at Yongbyon.

. sanctions against the North. This process has centered on what are known as the six-party talks.S. weapons and related equipment. Assistant Secretary Kelly stressed that as North Korea undertook its obligation. This proposal included U. and also to eliminate all its nuclear weapons capabilities under effective verification. The proposal called for a new declaration to be made by North Korea. and once the declaration was given by the North and deemed credible. a major change from previous U. South Korea. non-U. At the urging of South Korean and Japanese officials. which began on June 21. international pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities and has refused to provide anything to North Korea that could be deemed as a reward for Pyongyang’s participation in the talks or any interim moves on the North’s nuclear program. North Korea. the United States offered a detailed proposal for ending North Korea’s nuclear program. as of April 2005. and Russia. The reactor shut down in April 2005 and could provide North Korea with an additional 12 to 19 kilograms of plutonium. posture at the talks changed significantly at their third round. the other parties would provide North Korea with multilateral security assurances. to include all plutonium production and uranium enrichment capabilities. and begin a dis- cussion of lifting all remaining U. has tried to use the talks as a way of extracting conces- sions from the United States and other countries and has also tried to leverage the talks by demanding rewards simply for participating in them. The United States has sought to use the talks largely as a vehicle to bring coordi- nated. nuclear materials. for its part. which would become more enduring as the process proceeded.S. support for incentives for North Korea to be provided by other states—particularly South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s February 2005 announce- ment that it possesses nuclear weapons and the apparent shutdown of its 5- MWe reactor at Yongbyon make an early resumption of the talks unlikely. begin a study on North Korea’s energy requirements to see how to best meet them with non-nuclear energy programs. which convened in August 2003 and then again in February and June 2004 in Beijing.S. the United States has sought to convince the country to admit to and eliminate its uranium enrichment pro- gram. In exchange for agreeing to this proposed approach. China was instrumental in creating the talks. and for the elimi- nation of all of these to begin after a three-month preparatory period.”10 No new talks have been held since the third round. The United States has also rejected calls to engage in any formal bilateral negotiations with North Korea. The talks include representatives from the United States.S.9 The first two rounds of the six-party talks produced little agreement. N o r t h K o re a 283 5-megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon was restarted in 2002 and op- erated for more than two years. and it has been influential (according to both Chinese and American offi- cials) in persuading North Korea to participate in them. something Pyongyang has long sought and that might also be interpreted as a reward for its past behavior. Since confronting North Korea in October 2002.S. North Korea. policy. the moves by the other parties would be temporary and “would only yield lasting benefits to [North Korea] after the dismantlement of its nuclear program had been completed. Japan. China. The U. 2004. parties would provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil. In describing the talks before Congress.

15 This would have given it enough time to refuel the en- tire reactor and provide it with a source of enough nuclear material to build a nuclear device.11 This would provide it with enough nuclear materials to build its own nuclear arsenals and to export substantial quantities of plutonium to other states. obtained complete and detailed nuclear warhead designs from Pakistan. neither the United States nor any other country took direct action in response to these activities.12 Because it was a Soviet client state. open press sources indicated for the first time that North Korea possessed a plu- tonium production reactor and extraction capability. intelligence satellites reportedly photographed the construction of a research reactor and the beginnings of a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. Although there is no conclusive. Q. The strategy pursued was to . At least one other Khan customer. North Korea has the potential to become a full-fledged nuclear weapon state.284 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Nuclear Analysis As of the spring of 2005. The United States and several other countries are also convinced that North Korea is developing the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium through cen- trifuge enrichment. Though there are no public signs that North Korea has resumed construction at other known nuclear facilities. based on intelligence sources. public evidence that North Korea possesses any actual nuclear weapons. it was previously pursuing nuclear reactors. Pyongyang was on the verge of becoming a major producer of weapons-grade plutonium. as much as anything.14 Also in 1989. North Korea’s access to the A. And on February 10. North Korea declared for the first time that it possesses nuclear weapons. enough for 50 weapons annually. several top officials have stated that it already possesses such weapons. U. led to the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.13 In 1989. Over the long run. Previous Plutonium Production North Korea’s nuclear research program is reported to have begun as early as the 1950s. At the time. The 5-MWe research reactor at Yongbyon can produce enough plutonium for one more nuclear weapon each year. It is unclear when North Korea might be able to start pro- ducing enriched uranium. and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities able to produce 275 kilograms of plutonium a year. given its current state of technology. Before its decisions to freeze its nuclear program in 1994. 2005. Concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program did not fully emerge until the mid-1980s. to have shut down its main research and plutonium production reactor for ap- proximately 100 days. North Korea may have possessed enough separated plutonium to produce up to nine nuclear weapons. fuel-fabrication.S. During this period. its nuclear engineers were largely trained at Soviet scientific institutes and it received a small research reactor from the USSR that began operation in 1965. Libya. Khan black market has only enhanced the assessment that it can produce nuclear weapons. North Korea was reported. It was this export capability that. Pyongyang is thought to be capable of building a first-generation nuclear device.

after a concerted effort led by the Soviet Union. Instead. six official IAEA inspection missions took place in North Korea from 1992 to 1993.16 or less than 1/40th of the amount required to build a nuclear device). In all. 1985.S. contradicted North Korea’s claims that it had previ- ously separated only the 90 grams of plutonium on one occasion. a waste glove and a plutonium glove. “We found two gloves. starting in 1989. and they don’t match. Initial inspections to verify the accuracy of North Korea’s initial declaration began in May 1992. North Korea completed the negotiation of a safeguard agreement with the IAEA within the eighteen months required by the treaty. These long-awaited developments came after the United States signaled that it would withdraw its nuclear weap- ons from South Korea as part of a global tactical nuclear withdrawal in 1991. North Korea informed the IAEA as part of this initial inspection process that it had conducted a one-time plutonium extraction experiment on “damaged” fuel rods removed from the 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon in 1989. The IAEA was given access to the small amount separated by North Korea (approximately 90 grams. however. the IAEA results indicated that the North had separated plutonium in four cam- paigns over a three-year period. but it was not until April 9. N o r t h K o re a 285 press North Korea to join and then come into full compliance with its obliga- tions under the NPT. nuclear weapons from South Korea a condition of its completion of a safeguard agreement. North Korea had publicly made the withdrawal of U. Intelligence infor- mation provided to the IAEA also indicated that waste products from the North’s . The United States had stationed a large number (more than 700 in some years) of nuclear weapons in South Korea as part of its alliance with South Korea and its Cold War strategy of flexible response to a possible attack by the Soviet Union or its allies. includ- ing some small-scale extraction equipment. referred to as hot cells. The findings added weight to the allegation that North Korea had removed significant amounts of fuel from its 5-MWe reactor during the observed shut- down in 1989. In describing the findings. The initial inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities included tours of the completed 5-MWe reactor and of the 50-MWe plant still under construction. as well as of the incomplete “radiochemical laboratory.”18 This means that North Korea’s statements re- garding its past plutonium production were not consistent with what the samples revealed and indicate that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has declared to the IAEA or to the international community. intelligence analysts believed that the reactor’s core might have been completely replaced during a 100-day shutdown. Pyongyang acceded to the NPT on April 18.17 The samples taken by the IAEA showed a variety of radioactive by-products that suggested numerous in- stances of reprocessing activities. that Pyongyang finally approved its IAEA safeguard agreement. and to make that compliance a condition of progress on diplomatic issues. Subsequent inspections fo- cused mainly on the plutonium-reprocessing facilities in North Korea.” described by the IAEA as a plutonium-reprocessing facility. The IAEA’s chemical analysis of samples taken from the radiochemical labora- tory and hot cells. U. which hoped to sell North Korea light-water-power reactors (which were never built). IAEA director gen- eral Hans Blix explained. 1992.S.

” This led Blix to declare in December 1993 that IAEA safeguards in North Korea could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that nuclear materials were not being diverted to weapons uses. when North Korea announced that it was going to defuel its 5-MWe reactor.19 Negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea continued. as part of a complicated package deal with the United States. indicating that North Korea had indeed removed an entire load of fuel from the reactor during the 1989 shutdown. but it then blocked the IAEA from taking key radioactive samples at the plutonium extraction plant at Yongbyon. which appeared to be linked to the radiochemical laboratory by underground pipes capable of transporting liquid wastes. North Korea’s atomic energy minister informed Blix that the North was refusing the IAEA’s special inspection request. The need for the IAEA to gain access to the fuel to be removed from this reactor immediately became of inter- national concern. On Febru- ary 11. the fuel contained up to 30 kilograms of plutonium. Second. by getting access to the fuel and taking appropriate samples. North Korea did not permit full access to the sites. Pyongyang severely constrained the IAEA inspection activities that are needed to preserve the “con- tinuity of safeguards. North Korea asserted that it was no longer a full party to the NPT and that the IAEA no longer had the right to conduct even normal routine and ad hoc inspections. which were not included in its “initial declaration. After a round of negotiations with the United States in June 1993. North Korea ini- tially agreed to an IAEA inspection of its declared facilities. The North Koreans had unsuccessfully camouflaged the sites and the underground pipes. which could be used to produce several nuclear weapons. . First.” Ten days later. Blix officially requested a “special inspection” of the two suspected waste sites. which permits such action on 90 days’ notice if a party’s “supreme national interests” are jeopardized. for two reasons. the IAEA could determine whether the fuel had been in the reactor since its initial operation began in 1986 or whether the fuel was a secondary batch. Although these sites had been visited by the IAEA during the third inspection mission to North Korea in September 1993. to take effect in 90 days as spelled out in article 10. includ- ing an unusual visit to North Korea by Blix. In March 1994. 1993.286 Tw o H a r d C a s e s plutonium extraction campaigns may have been stored at two nearby sites. Yet the talks did not enable the IAEA inspectors to gain the unfettered access to sites and information consid- ered necessary to resolve the discrepancies that had been discovered. in a letter to the three NPT depositary states and the other NPT members.20 More Plutonium The crisis escalated further in mid-May 1994. A long series of discussions and negotiations ensued over these issues. marking the first time in the IAEA’s history that it had used its right to conduct such visits. However. North Korea said that it was exercising its right of withdrawal from the NPT. North Korea agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal one day short of the 90-day count- down. And on March 12. During the ensuing nine months.

to be triggered if the North continued to reject the IAEA’s de- mands. which was signed on October 21. In the second phase. Security Council on June 15 calling for two phases of sanctions against North Korea. 1994. Hans Blix de- clared in a letter to the U. because other ways to determine the reactor’s history have since been developed and put forward. The first phase of the sanctions.and security-related inducements. has been . whether nuclear material from the reactor has been diverted in the past.”22 Some controversy surrounds this point. The North Korean leader agreed to freeze his country’s nuclear program if the United States would resume high-level diplomatic talks. and arms exports to.S. a worldwide ban on financial dealings with Pyongyang would be imple- mented. 1994. with North Korea agreeing to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities and eliminate its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for the construction of two modern nuclear power reactors and normalized rela- tions with the United States. the United States publicly began discussing plans to rein- force its military presence in South Korea. The crisis eased after former U. military action against North Korea to prevent it from gaining full access to the plutonium-bearing spent fuel. These talks eventually led to the negotiation of an Agreed Statement on August 12. but before delivery of key nuclear components.N. These developments prompted the United States to circulate a proposal to the U.21 As Pyongyang accelerated and completed the defueling. consisted of a worldwide ban on arms imports from. which were to be activated after a grace period.26 The agreement required North Korea to remain a member of the NPT and to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement once a “signifi- cant portion of the LWR project is completed. 1994. a process that resulted in the Agreed Frame- work. . in broad terms.000-rod core. with sufficient confidence. . president Jimmy Carter met with North Korean president Kim Il Sung on June 16 and 17.25 The deal contained a basic trade of obligations. and there were growing calls for U.23 Moreover. These negotiations took place in July but were sus- pended until early August because of the sudden death of Kim Il Sung on July 9. under which. N o r t h K o re a 287 North Korea steadfastly refused to implement procedures demanded by the IAEA to segregate 300 carefully selected fuel rods from the 8. North Korea agreed to dismantle the elements of its nuclear program linked to the production of nuclear arms in return for the supply of two.” This delay postponed the question of North Korea’s past produc- tion of plutonium until the final stages of the agreement’s implementation. that the “agency’s ability to ascertain. North Korea. Security Council on June 2.S. claim- ing that it was not a fully bound member of the NPT or of its safeguard agree- ment. lost. along with a downgrading of diplomatic ties.N. leav- ing open the question of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while its existing . light-water reactors (LWRs) and a number of other energy. less proliferation-prone.24 The Agreed Framework The United States and North Korea engaged in several months of negotiations in the summer and fall of 1994.

000 centrifuges. though not yet proven.28 Moreover. Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis North Korea possesses chemical weapons and a large quantity of chemical precur- sors for the production of such weapons. had initially led South Korea and Chinese officials to express doubts about the U. which is the feed material needed to enrich uranium through the centrifuge process. claims of a uranium program by the North. which banned uranium enrichment and plutonium re- processing on the entire peninsula. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.S. As noted above. and eventually completion of North Korea’s uranium efforts remain unanswered. but it was not clear if the North had acquired enough complete centrifuge kits to assemble that many units. choking. that North Korea purchases centrifuge equipment for the purpose of selling or transferring it to other customers of the A. or if it had the technical training or assistance needed to assemble and operate a full-scale ura- nium enrichment cascade.S. At the time. pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the North.29 North Korea’s continued refusal to publicly acknowledge that it possesses a uranium enrichment program. but many questions about the scale. blister.288 Tw o H a r d C a s e s capabilities were frozen. It is also possible.”27 Other sources claim that North Korea was able to obtain parts for just over 2. intelligence agencies concluded in the summer of 2002 that North Korea had embarked on a uranium enrichment program. Uranium Enrichment The full scope of North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment pro- gram is unknown. was buying centrifuge equipment from outside suppliers. U. and blood agent. The majority of publicly available evidence surrounding North Korea’s en- richment effort comes through tracking Pyongyang’s foreign procurement ef- forts. and a North Korean commitment to implement the 1992 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. progress. Q. and it has not . there is no publicly available evidence that North Korea can produce large amounts of uranium hexaflouride. The Agreed Framework also included a U. and had begun the construction of a uranium enrichment centrifuge facility.”30 Moreover. and the United States’ inability or refusal to publicly identify uranium enrichment sites. Moreover.S. it established North Korea’s obligation to accept whatever steps the IAEA decides are necessary to verify the accuracy of the country’s nuclear declaration. These doubts have been reduced by American sharing of informa- tion with both of these countries. It is likely to have the ability to pro- duce “bulk quantities of nerve. Khan network and no longer possesses any uranium enrichment equip- ment. the Central Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that “North [Korea] is con- structing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soon as mid-decade.

The third stage is thought to be a solid rocket “kick motor” of unknown origin. North Korean troops have also been trained to fight in contaminated areas. and plague. Although the third stage of the missile failed to boost its payload into orbit. development and deployment of missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California. North Korea acquired a number of Scud missiles from Egypt in the 1970s.000 kilogram payload). are uncertain. In addition.32 North Korea possesses a rudimentary biological weapons capability and has engaged in biological research since the 1960s. cholera. Its biological weapons program is not nearly as advanced as its nuclear. Presumably. With substantial financing from customer states. sarin.31 North Korea maintains facilities involved in producing or storing chemical precursors. and the No Dong (with a 1.to 340- kilometer range and a 1. as well as by conventional artillery or aircraft. and a family of mustard gases—constituting the basis of North Korea’s chemical weap- ons—are produced there.000 metric tons. North Korea is thought to possess the means to deliver chemical weapons by ballistic missile.000- kilometer range and a 700–1. including artillery or possibly ballistic missiles. or ballistic missile programs. The system is believed to use a No Dong as its first stage and a Scud-B as its second stage. with some estimates of chemical stockpiles running as high as 5.33 Missile Analysis North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile program. phosgene.S. and weapons. the Scud–Mod C (with a 500- kilometer range and a 700-kilogram payload).000-kilogram payload). according to the U. The threat from this untested missile is the main justification for the U. It either successfully reverse- engineered the system (improving its range and accuracy) or received substan- tially more equipment and assistance from the Soviet Union than is publicly known. It has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents. including Iran. However. but it is believed to have the basic infrastructure to produce several biological agents. prussic acid. adamsite. N o r t h K o re a 289 acknowledged that it possesses chemical weapons or agreed to eliminate its hold- ings. The production rate and types of munitions.S. accommodated at perhaps a half dozen major stor- age sites and in as many as 170 mountain tunnels. chemical. agents. It could deliver such weapons by several means. North Korea is observing a self-declared moratorium . tabun. According to the assessment of U. intelligence ser- vices. however. 1998.S. North Korea has developed and deployed the Scud–Mod B (with a 320. North Korea tested a ballistic missile/space launch vehicle known as the Taepo Dong I on August 31. including anthrax. Defense Department. the system demonstrated North Korea’s accelerating ability to launch a multistage missile and to develop a system with the potential for intercontinental range. North Korea is also reportedly working on a longer-range Taepo Dong II missile that could enable it to deliver a nuclear-sized payload to the continental United States. North Korea’s reserves. based primarily on tech- nology derived from Soviet-designed Scud-B missiles. total at least 180 to 250 metric tons.

13. Iran’s and Pakistan’s missile capabilities are thought to be highly dependent on North Korean technology and equipment. For details of the controversy surrounding these issues. 7. 14. Department of State. p. p. and the End of the Agreed Framework.” 12. KCNA.” Washington Post. “N.gov/ secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116. National Intelligence Council. p. “The United States. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek. North Korea. North Korea claimed at the time it was not fully bound by the NPT and was under a special status having “temporarily suspended” its withdrawal from the NPT. available at www. Powell.co. 2003. Secretary Colin L. “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Day Talks for Indeterminate Period. 1994. “Press Availability with Her Excellency Anna Lindh.C. 16. Don Oberdorfer.html. Moreover. “North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Produce Nuclear Weapons. April 27. Hans M. available at www. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Lexington. Iran is also believed to have received North Korean assistance in establishing its own missile production capabilities and may intend to enter the missile export market. “United States. “Bush Statement on Undertaking Talks with North Korea. constitute a violation of the North–South agreement or the NPT. to Senate Committee on Foreign Re- lations. a status rejected by the United States. John Bolton.: Addison-Wesley. which was established as part of its discussions with the United States on a broader agreement to end Pyongyang’s missile production and export activities. “Statement of Hon.htm. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Kristensen. See Pollack. 12. 1995). 250. and Joshua Handler. John Fialka. 11. pp. 2001). and Syria. 5.jp. 3. see Kenneth Pollack. 1993.” 10. December 1993. North Korea is the leading exporter of ballistic missiles to the developing world. Martin’s Press. 9. purchasing uranium enrichment equipment does not. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program. 11–49. D. The Agreed Framework contains no legal prohibitions against the construction of new nuclear facilities by North Korea. March/April 2003. Robert Gallucci. U. Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 3. 4. 2.” February 10. 74–77.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. R. “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs. July 19. N OTES 1. and the End of the Agreed Framework. July 15. pp. The start of construction of a uranium enrichment facility without providing design information to the IAEA would be a violation of safeguards and therefore the NPT.” prepared testimony of James A.gov/ news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4. States that have received missiles from North Korea include Iran.state.” March 6. Mass. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Conventional Meeting. Libya. and its exports have continued despite its flight-test moratorium. vol.” Wall Street Journal. 6. Norris. by itself. Les Aspin. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 (Washington. 2005. 2001. no. 2004.” Naval War College Review. 56. November 19.” available at www. December 1.whitehouse. 1997). Ambassador-at-Large. Summer 2003. Pakistan. Mike Mazarr. Robert S.290 Tw o H a r d C a s e s on missile flight tests. 1989. Jeffrey Smith. Egypt may also have received some systems from Pyongyang.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden.” Geneva.kcna. 2001. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. 8. McNeil-Lehrer Newshour. 25. North Korea. .: National Intelligence Council. 15.

“Unclassified CIA Fact Sheet. 28. September 16. Unveils Proposal for Sanctions. Joby Warrick. 1993.” Nucleonics Week.S.” 19. Might Help North Korea Refuel Reactor. “Fuel Readiness Means North Korea Can Start Reactors Up on Schedule. February 18. R. Author discussions with Korean government officials. March 22. “Inspection of North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities Is Halted. 31. Department of Defense. “U. 2002. Korean Conduct in Inspection Draws Criticism of U. 1994. 1994. 1994. David E. “U.” Wash- ington Post. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington. 26. 1994. “White House Asks for Global Sanctions on North Koreans. U. 24. 20. Agency Finds No Assurance North Korea Bans Nuclear Arms. June 3. June 8. “U. 1998).gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003. 1994. 95–108.S. 18. Smith. June 19. Hibbs. Michael Gordon. pp. 1994. November 8. “Leaders of 2 Koreas Seek First Summit.html. Gordon. 1993. “U. “U. Mark Hibbs. Mark Hibbs. Spent Fuel Details. p.” Washington Post.S.C. and Smith. For a detailed account of the Carter-Kim meeting.” New York Times. 32. Wit.” Washington Post. 1994. 1994. see Sigal. DPRK to Meet in Berlin on LWR Transfer.N.” Washington Post. “N. Smith. Gallucci. R.” June 2.S. September 8. 16. 33.. and Robert L. March 10. 23.htm#5. December 12. Korea and the Bomb. David Ottaway. Proliferation: Threat and Response. “N.” Washington Post. 1994. “West Watching Reac- tor for Sign of North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions. 21. March 16. Department of Defense. 1994. April 7. Smith.: U. 1994. 2001).” available at www. Ann Devroy.” October 21.C. Carter Declares the Crisis Is Over.S.” Washington Post.S. “IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance. Officials.” New York Times. Reid. March 16.cia. pp. Jeffrey Smith. April 28.” Reuters. 1. “N. Korea and the Bomb”. and R. see Joel S. “N. December 3. www. 22. 10–11. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang’s Effort to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans.” New York Times. and Michael R. Weapons of Mass Destruction web site. “U. see Leon Sigal.” Washing- ton Post. 30. D. “U.” Nuclear Fuel. N o r t h K o re a 291 17. For a compre- hensive assessment of the March 1994 inspection.” November 19. June 16. 150–162. Daniel B. “N. “North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples from Site. October 18.: Brookings Institution Press. Korea Forbids Inspections.N. 1994. Mark Hibbs.” Nucleon- ics Week. Korea. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. For a complete history of the negotiation and contents of the Agreed Framework. June 20. to Increase the Pressure on North Korea.” Washington Post. p. U. and Michael Gordon. Disarming Strangers. 17.” Washington Post. 1 July through 31 December 2003. Federation of American Scientists. 1994. 1993.J. 1994. 1993.” New York Times.fas. and Julia Preston. 2004). Central Intelligence Agency.org/nuke/ guide/dprk/cw/index. Poneman. p. 25. “Back from Korea. “North Korea Rejects Special Nuclear Inspections. D. T. June 3. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton. Jeffrey Smith. 1994. and “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Depart- ment of Defense. 29. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 27. “Letter from the Director General of the IAEA Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Relating to North Korea. p. Sanger.S. 11–12. 1994. see Sigal. Korea Refuses Demand to Inspect Reactor Fuel. Disarming Strangers. David Sanger.S.: Princeton University Press. 2002.” Nucleonics Week. pp. pp. For a detailed examination of the IAEA’s relations with North Korea. to Seek Sanctions on N. 14.S.” New York Times. N. Goes to U.S. .

U. construction No suspended Sinpo-2 Kumho Light-water. no evidence that it has resumed Taechon Gas-graphite. U.292 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Table 14. 0. 200 MWe.1. no evidence that it has resumed Research Factors 2 IRT Pool-type. status unknown No Sanchon. PWR. status unknown No Yongbyon Uranium purification (UO2) facility. construction No suspended Yongbyon Gas-graphite. No Yongbyon operating Yongbyon Critical assembly. status unknown No Pakchon Uranium ore processing. 1.1 MWt No Pyongyang Subcritical assembly No Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) 3 Radiochemical Operational No Laboratory 4 Yongbyon Pyongyang Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale hot cells. status unknown No Wolbingson mine Pakchon Pyongsan Uranium ore processing. No operating .000 MWe. 50 MWe. 1. No construction halted. U. operating No Yongbyon Gas-graphite. nat. 5 MWe. HEU (80 percent).040 MWe. Uranium ore processing. construction No halted. No 5 status unknown Uranium Processing Pyongsan Uranium ore processing. 8 MWt. nat. North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Power Reactors 1 Sinpo-1 Kumho Light-water. nat.

before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. N o r t h K o re a 293 Yongbyon Fuel-fabrication facility. a senior fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory who visited the Yongbyon nuclear facility in January 2004. Jared S. . partially under maintenance Yongbyon Pilot-scale fuel-fabrication facility. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 3.org/ NFCISMAin. The Sinpo-1 and Sinpo-2 light-water reactors were being constructed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup. According to the IAEA.asp?Region=The%20World&Country=All&Type=All&Status=All&Scale= All&Order=2&Page=1&RightP=List&Table=1. pp.” NOTES N OTES: 1. respectively. 2. however. January 21.K. partially opera. senior fellow. Testimony of Sieg- fried S.: Wilmington Publishing. capable of reprocessing 110 tons of spent fuel per year. North Korean officials claimed that they had successfully extracted plutonium from all 8. according to North Korean officials ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium nat. Hecker.000 spent-fuel rods stored at Yongbyon between January and June 2003. No tional. 2004). “How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?” Science & Global Security.nfcis. 8. 4. 273–286. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems. Dreicer. 5. both are subject to safe- guards regardless of whether or not North Korea is a party to the NPT. U.iaea. According to Siegfried Hecker. No tled. (See IAEA Infor- mation Circular 66 for more).” Available at www. Neither of these facilities is currently under safeguards. 2004. because the IRT research reactor and the critical assembly located at Yongbyon were acquired from the Soviet Union. because North Korea has not permitted inspectors to return to the country since expelling them at the end of 2002. Construction has been sus- pended since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in late 2002 and early 2003. disman. Nuclear Engineering International. 2000. According to North Korean officials. vol. “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal PWR pressurized water reactor SSOURCES OURCES: IAEA.

.

The first flight test was carried out on July 22.6 295 . to meet its obligations under its safe- guards agreement. For example. 2004. U. The system is derived from the North Korean No Dong missile. CHAPTER 15 Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Iran does not possess nuclear weapons. officials and intelligence services in several other nations have concluded that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapon program. but he provided no evidence to support this claim. . although no direct evidence of weapon activities has been made public.300 kilometers and a payload of about 750 kilograms. 2004. .4 Iran has conducted at least ten tests of the medium-range Shahab III. and more recently it was tested on October 20. with a range of 1. Missile Capability Iran possesses up to 300 Scud-B missiles with a 300-kilometer range and with a payload of 1. but for more than two decades Tehran has secretly pursued the ability to produce nuclear materials that can be used in weapons.000-kilogram payload. 1998.” Efforts to sanction Iran for its “failures” have been put on hold while members of the European Union attempt to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear fuel production programs.000 kilograms. Despite Iran’s membership in the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). it could take several years for Iran to build and operate a fully func- tioning uranium enrichment “cascade” and an additional one to two years for that facility to produce enough weapons-grade material for the country’s first nuclear device. a 1992 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate concluded that Iran would have the bomb by 2000.3 Iran has also received enough assistance from North Korea to enable the country to produce its own Scud missiles. that agency’s Secretariat concluded in November 2004 that Iran had “failed .5 Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed on Octo- ber 5.000 kilometers. that Iran possessed a missile with a range of 2. Past estimates about when Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon have proven unreliable. and perhaps 100 Scud-Cs with an approximate range of 500 kilometers with a 1.2 If Iran’s nuclear activities continued without outside constraint and without significant outside assistance.S.1 Iran remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

”9 In November 2004. and probably nerve agents and also the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran’s efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce chemical nerve agents. Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani claimed that Iran was capable of mass producing Shahab III missiles.S. U. Some Iranian leaders have come to see the pos- session of unconventional weapons. blood. U. The CIA. but it may be able to adapt its Soviet-built Su-24 strike aircraft to carry the KH-55. geography. which it had previously manufactured.7 The Shahab III has a sufficient range and payload to deliver a nuclear war- head as far as Israel and parts of southern Europe. after acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Strategic Context A Persian power with a keen sense of history.S.11 Iran does not possess such bombers.12 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Although Iran is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention. claims that Iran continues to seek production technology. The Iranian CW program began in the 1980s during the war with Iraq. and resources. however. if Iran possesses the technology needed to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to deliver it by missile.10 Iran allegedly bought six KH-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2000. traveled only 100 kilometers before crashing to the ground. choking. Tehran acknowledged its previous chemical weapon (CW) development and produc- tion. commensurate with its his- tory. intelli- gence reports from 2003 claim that Iran probably maintains an “offensive bio- logical weapon program. and a limited number reportedly have been deployed with units of Iran’s elite Revo- lutionary Guard. These Soviet-era missiles are designed to carry a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead on Rus- sian-made Tupolev long-range bombers. It is not known. in an August 2004 test. Iran occupies a pivotal position straddling the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. a vital maritime pathway for crude oil transport. and Iranian officials say that the program was dismantled at the war’s end. In May 1998. The CIA believes that Iran likely possesses both a stockpile of blister. Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes of the missile. officials have assessed that Tehran could have the Shahab III on “emergency operational status. There is no independent confirmation of these claims.8 For several years. Some Western intelligence officials believe that the Shahab III. train- ing. Iran has the largest population in the Middle East and the world’s third largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. however.13 There is no independent confirmation of these claims. including nuclear weapons and ballistic and . although this claim has not been confirmed.296 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Both Iranian and foreign officials often claim greater progress for Tehran’s missile program than tests seem to indicate. and it aspires to again become the region’s major power.” with the capability to produce small quantities of biological weapon (BW) agents but limited ability to weaponize them.

India’s. the parliament voted unanimously to resume uranium enrichment after a temporary suspension. a NATO member and European Union applicant.S. a situation that may greatly complicate efforts to convince Iranian officials to end the pursuit of their country’s sensitive nuclear fuel cycle programs. Indeed. high-technology weaponry—often supplied by the United States. the pursuit of civilian nuclear capabilities has become a po- tent domestic issue in Iran. and if Tehran succeeds in continuing its nuclear development. military action—par- ticularly given the large U. Since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Iran has likely seen unconventional weapons as a deterrent to possible U. However. If the international community is unable or unwilling to im- pose penalties on Iran. military presence in the region—and as a way to increase Tehran’s power and prestige in the Persian Gulf. and even Turkey. Mohammad Mossadeq. nationalized the country’s oil assets. Moreover. sanctions. Iran’s Nuclear History In 1951. Iranian officials have also apparently been influenced by Israel’s.S. North Korea’s ability to deter U. Syria. as compared with Gulf Arab states. Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. military officials in Iran may see nuclear weapons as a way to com- pensate for the gap between Iran’s conventional military. the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. Ostensibly.S. The discovery of these clandestine activities has contributed to international suspicion about Iran’s program.15 and in November of that year. constrained by U. there is serious concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would lead other states in the Gulf and Middle East to reexamine their nuclear options. and Pakistan’s advanced nuclear capabilities. many states will question the strength and utility of the nonprolif- eration system. Q. the country hid sen- sitive nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world for more than eighteen years. hundreds of university students gathered outside the Atomic En- ergy Organization demanding that the government not concede Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. both conservatives and reformers support Iran’s development of its nuclear fuel cycle capabilities as an inherent right ac- corded by the NPT. and Israel’s growing ties with Turkey to the north and India to the east. Khan. having acquired advanced uranium enrichment equipment and expertise through the nuclear black market of Pakistan’s A. In addition. The successful acquisition by Iran of a fissile material production ca- pability or of actual nuclear weapons would be a serious blow to global nonpro- liferation efforts. which spend vast amounts of money on state-of-the-art. including possibly Saudi Arabia.16 Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is seen as a source of national pride across the political spectrum. In October 2004.S. coercion with its nuclear capa- bilities. Egypt.17 This potential wave of proliferation would seriously challenge regional and global security and undermine the world- wide effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. as critical parts of their national security and domestic political strategies. Iran 297 cruise missiles. The leaders of the United States .14 In recent years.

it is unclear if other programs have as well. including direct as- sistance from the A. bacteriological. code named Operation Ajax. Iran developed plans to build 22 nuclear power reactors with an elec- trical output of 23 gigawatts. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolu- tions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are com- mitted in the battlefield.S. but Khomeini froze construction of these reactors and all other work on “Western” nuclear technologies and forced many Western-educated scientists and engineers to flee the country. During this period. Eisenhower approved a joint British-American operation to overthrow Mossadeq. as U. it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. The new revolutionary government inherited two partially com- pleted West German–supplied nuclear power reactors at Bushehr. These nuclear activities were halted when the shah was toppled in 1979 and the Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini came to power. North Korea. and radiological weapons. relations with Iraq actually improved during this period. China. relations between the United States and Iran thrived. Iran has relied extensively on outside assistance for the acquisition of its unconventional weapons capabilities. The CIA successfully toppled the young democratic govern- ment and installed Mohammad Raza Shah Pehlavi as the new pro-West ruler. and indirect assistance from Russia and countries in Europe.20 During the 1970s. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical. Iran acquired its first nuclear research reactor.S. chemical weapons.298 Tw o H a r d C a s e s and the United Kingdom concluded that his policies meant “that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain” resulting in “a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East.S. Iranians often point out that no na- tion came to Iran’s aid when it was invaded and attacked by Iraq with chemical weapons.21 Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s drove Iran’s more recent pursuit of nuclear technologies. which then progressed slowly until the late 1960s. . a small U. declared: With regard to chemical.”18 Declassified documents show that in 1953 President Dwight D. missile systems. and possibly biological weapons. then–speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces and later Iran’s president. officials aided the secular Saddam as a counter to what was seen as the greater threat of Iran’s militant Islamic theocracy. and Ukraine. Iran began its nuclear power program. Khan black market network. and radiological weapons training. Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Also during this period.19 Under the shah’s autocratic rule. sowing the seeds of Iran’s lingering distrust of Western powers. Shortly after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire. Q.22 The missile programs have continued until the present day.-supplied 5-megawatt-thermal (MWt) reactor that is still in operation at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. bacteriological. U. The regime in Tehran appears to have then decided to pursue unconventional weapons as an important means of de- terrence and self-defense.

are intended for peaceful pur- poses. known as the P-1 and the more efficient P-2 designs (the “P” stands for the Pakistani origins of the design). while the laser enrichment program began under the shah in the 1970s. a deal that died after the United States complained to Moscow about the potential proliferation implications of such a facility. that Iranian agents have sought to acquire nuclear materials and even weapons from other countries.23 Yet for the past two decades. including stocks of plutonium and highly en- riched uranium left in Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union. Tehran claims . some more reliable than others. and production of two types of centrifuges. Iran has been engaged in a secret. Moreover. or than of which the IAEA was aware (see table 15. All of Iran’s known installed and production capabilities rely on the P- 1 design. even those previously hidden from the IAEA. After almost two years of intensive investigations. although in January 2004 Iran acknowledged that it had received ad- vanced P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1995. if mastered. multifaceted program to produce nuclear materials. Work on Iran’s uranium centrifuge was greatly accelerated in the 1990s after Iran gained access to centrifuge technology and material through the A. Iran had previously tried to purchase a centrifuge facility from Russia in the 1990s. Iran 299 Nuclear Analysis As of the spring of 2005. in 2003 Iran signed and pledged to implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. the IAEA reported in November 2004 that it was still not “in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. there have been reports. Q. Iran’s uranium enrichment program involves the acqui- sition.”24 It is now known that Iran’s activities include the pursuit of several nuclear material production tech- nologies that. testing. In addition. This has created widespread concern that Iranian lead- ers are committed to acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons. and it has agreed to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.1 at the end of the chapter). Work on the gas-centrifuge enrichment program appears to have begun in 1985. there was no evidence that Iran possesses enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons or possessed any nuclear devices. which includes expanded inspection rights and tools. CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM. although exactly when these contacts were made remains unclear. if not actual weapons. Iran maintains that all its nuclear activities. Uranium Enrichment Iran has pursued at least two different methods for enriching uranium: gas cen- trifuges and lasers. could provide Tehran with the ability to produce the core materials for nuclear weapons. Iran maintains that no P-2 centrifuges or components were obtained from abroad and that all P-2 components in its possession were produced domestically. an Iranian opposition group revealed that the country’s nuclear pro- gram was much more extensive and alarming than Tehran had previously de- clared. In 2002. Khan network.

approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. an opposition group based in France. Iran does not appear either to have mastered the techniques needed to reliably operate the cascade or to have restarted tests during 2004. The industrial-scale plant. In June 2003. and it has since inspected numerous times and taken more than 300 environmental samples at this and related sites. 2003. the IAEA conducted its first visit to the site in February 2003.000 centrifuge machines. publicly disclosed the existence of the site. . Between March and May 2003. including its Oc- tober 2003 declarations to the IAEA) due to “time constraints. both located at Natanz. Iran had earlier denied importing any centrifuge com- ponents. The site contains buildings both above and below ground and covers approximately 100. which were believed to have come from Pakistan. Iran began testing a small.300 Tw o H a r d C a s e s that information about the P-2 program had not been included in previous dec- larations (which it had characterized as correct and complete. but it shut the cascade down that month as part of its agreement with the European Union. Iran had planned to eventually install up to 1. Iran officially introduced uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into a single centrifuge at the pilot plant for testing purposes. In October 2003. industrial-scale centrifuge facility. it is required to declare all facilities to the IAEA 180 days before the introduction of nuclear materials to the facility. On August 19. which consists of three underground structures.000 P-1 centrifuges at the pilot enrichment plant.000 square meters. When operations were suspended in November 2004. These samples revealed particles of highly enriched uranium. Though officials in several countries. especially in the United States. After the disclosure. al- though the IAEA had not yet been granted sufficient cooperation by Pakistan to fully confirm its findings. The IAEA’s November 2004 report concluded that this explanation appears plausible.26 Further cascade operations are precluded by the November 2004 suspension negotiated with the European Union and moni- tored by the IAEA. but when confronted with the evidence changed its story. which had previously been unknown and undeclared to the IAEA. the site contained 164 centrifuges. thought contamination indicated that Iran was working on fissile material for nuclear weapons.” Iran has a complete pilot-scale centrifuge facility and a larger. Under Iran’s safeguards obligations. the IAEA took envi- ronmental samples before uranium was officially introduced at the facility. Iran was finalizing installation of a test 164-machine cascade at the site. the production of which Iran had previously denied. the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The two largest buildings would house cascade halls large enough to contain approxi- mately 50. as yet incom- plete. was originally scheduled to start accepting P-1 centrifuges in 2005. In August 2002. Centrifuge work had not restarted as of the spring of 2005.25 Officials from several nations believe that Iran’s attempt to produce uranium hexafluoride in November 2004 failed to produce a gas of sufficient quality that could be used in centrifuge enrichment. Iranian officials attributed the sample results to the contamination of imported centrifuge components. ten-machine cascade with UF6 gas.27 No centrifuges had been installed at the site when the November 2004 suspension was implemented.

These activities were less advanced than the uranium enrichment effort at the time Iran suspended its nuclear activities in November 2004. Plutonium Facilities Iran has also been engaged in efforts to test and develop the means to produce and separate plutonium. Iran has also developed and built the full suite of supporting capabilities needed to pursue a uranium enrichment capability. as Iran claims. The IAEA did. This production took place at the U. Iran’s laser enrichment program. raising further questions about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activi- ties. that a small number of gas centrifuges was tested with uranium gas at the site between 1998 and 2002. is based on two techniques: atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation (MLIS). which began in the 1970s. its goal in pursuing uranium enrichment is to become more independent of foreign supplies of fuel. Iran initially denied. that is. The IAEA has completed its review of the AVLIS program and has concluded that the levels of enrichment achieved matched Iran’s description of the activity. It is not clear that Iran’s uranium reserves are sufficient. LASER ENRICHMENT. This uranium metal was part of a 50-kilogram shipment that was undeclared and is suspected to have come from the Soviet Union in 1993. determine that the equipment could have been used for the production of highly enriched uranium. Iran claims that it did not enrich uranium beyond 1. then it would also need to possess a reliable domestic source of uranium. Without a large supply of indigenous uranium ore. The IAEA analyzed the environmental samples and found en- richment levels consistent with those declared by Iran. These experiments report- edly involved 1. to provide enough material to fuel the Bushehr reactors or additional reac- tors. but subsequently admitted in 2003.9 kilograms of UF6. up to 15 percent U-235 enrichment. including uranium mining. These experiments involved 7 kilograms . however. Iran 301 Most of the known research and development of Iran’s enrichment program has taken place at the Kalaye Electric Company facility.-supplied Tehran Research Reactor between 1988 and 1998 when Iran irradiated depleted ura- nium dioxide (UO2) targets using materials previously exempted from safeguards in 1978 and later declared lost as waste. Iranian authorities claim that all equip- ment at Lashkar Ab’ad was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred to a storage facility at Karaj. how- ever. a violation of its IAEA commitments. If. which can be used for both nuclear reactors and weap- ons. Laser enrichment experiments at the site between October 2002 and January 2003 used 22 kilo- grams of natural uranium metal and produced small amounts (milligrams) of reactor-grade enriched uranium (3–4 percent U-235). milling.28 Iran established a pilot laser en- richment plant at a site known as Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000.2 percent uranium-235 (U-235).S. Iran admits that it produced a small amount of plutonium outside of safeguards. and conversion. it is difficult to justify the fuel cycle program it is pursuing on commercial or self-sufficiency grounds.

Iran signed an $800 million deal with Moscow to finish the construction of one of the reactors based on a Russian-designed reac- tor and to house it in the German-designed reactor facility. yielding approximately 100 milligrams of plutonium. It plans to build a 40-MWt heavy-water reactor at Arak that could go into operation by 2014. During the course of the 1990s. The former West Germany began construction of the facility under the shah’s regime. However. the impact of sanctions. but until recently it has been unable to effectively use much of what it has acquired. first refused to complete the project after the Iranian revolution. and therefore the leaders did not muster the necessary economic and scientific resources to accelerate the program. Iran has been actively engaged in acquiring a variety of sensitive nuclear capabilities. This amount is far less than would be needed to pro- duce a nuclear weapon but enough to validate the production and separation processes. almost all Iran’s critical nuclear materi- als. 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed. The facility could open in 2005 and reach full ca- pacity by 2006. Iran has also been pursuing the construction of a plutonium production reac- tor since the 1980s. The plans for the reactor were completed in 2002 and would rely on the use of natural uranium oxide as fuel. although it has now acquired the ability to produce its own Scud-type missiles. Sources of Technology Despite constant claims to the contrary. Russia announced that the construction of the 1. the bulk of Iran’s known nuclear activities focused on the Bushehr reactor program. and a less than fully developed industrial and education base may partly explain why most estimates of when Iran might be able to acquire a nuclear capability have proven incorrect. Khan nuclear black market and from poor export controls across the globe. as a condition of supply. and technology have been acquired from foreign suppliers. multifaceted program to acquire nuclear and related technology and equipment from a variety of sources and that it has benefited from the A. including Europe. Moscow and Tehran signed contracts that finalized these spent-fuel arrangements. Russia has insisted that fuel for the facility should be provided by Russia and that spent fuel should be re- turned to Russia for disposal. After years of delay. Bonn. . on October 14. Q.000- MW reactor was complete. and work at the site is thought to be ongoing. In February 2005. equipment. Poor management. Iran has also built a heavy-water production plant at Arak and had hoped to start producing heavy water there in 2004. It is also possible that Iranian leaders were ambivalent about pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. During the past 25 years. It is now clear that Iran has engaged in a long-term. In 1995. that it was not a policy priority. The same is true for its missile capabilities. and then refused to repair the damaged facility after the Iran-Iraq War. 2004.302 Tw o H a r d C a s e s of pressed UO2 pellets prepared at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. which was in the process of being com- pleted by Russia. This project was not covered by the suspension agree- ment with the European Union in 2004. however.

substantiating suspected efforts to establish a secret gas-centrifuge ura- nium enrichment program. although the under- lying cause may have been Iran’s difficulties in obtaining financing. press reports of Western intelligence findings indicated that Iran had established experimental programs in fissile material production at Sharif University in Tehran and possibly at other locations. China For a decade starting in the mid-1980s. potentially useful in the develop- ment of centrifuge top bearings. the details of Iran’s successful procurement of enrichment technology and nuclear know-how from A. Khan and his international nuclear black market became public. France. In the fall of 1995.34 In addition. Iran opened a nuclear research center in Isfahan. however.S. Iran had approached German and Swiss firms to purchase balancing machines and diagnostic and monitoring equipment—all dual-use items potentially valuable for laboratory-scale centrifuge development. In 1992. In addition. in line with Iran’s NPT obligations. Iranian agents were said to have contacted a British company to obtain samarium-cobalt magnetic equipment. Specifically. China also supplied Iran with a calutron. Washington persuaded Beijing to postpone indefinitely the sale to Iran of a plutonium-producing research reactor and also convinced Argentina not to export supporting fuel cycle and heavy-water production facilities. China reportedly trained Iranian nuclear technicians and engineers in China. By 1992. the type of equip- ment used in Iraq’s electromagnetic isotope separation enrichment program for the separation of weapons-grade uranium. and Japan apparently had declined to supply China with essential . Some reports indicated that China suspended or even terminated the deal because of strong U. ostensibly because of difficulties over site selection.30 In January 2004. Both countries claim that the aid has been used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China was a source of significant assis- tance to Iran’s civilian nuclear program.29 In the spring of 1995. China agreed to supply two 300-MW-electric nuclear power reac- tors to Iran. some details emerged on Iran’s nuclear procurement activities. pressure. Iran appears to have sup- ported these efforts through an active but clandestine procurement network. Iran also pur- chased a number of small companies (particularly in Germany) to serve as platforms for exporting sensitive equipment to Iran. since 1990. Germany. Q.32 Under a ten-year agreement for coop- eration signed in 1990. dual-use technologies. Western intelligence sources were quoted as stating that. using front companies and false end-user certificates to persuade Western Euro- pean companies to provide nuclear-related.33 In March 1992. China supplied Iran with two “mini” research reactors installed at Isfahan. Iran 303 Nuclear Black Market In 1984. China’s reactor sale to Iran was sus- pended. in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. Other factors may also have been involved.31 This network provided Iran with key centrifuge technology and is thought to have provided Iran with a list of suppliers for es- sential equipment (see the fuller discussion in chapter 12 on Pakistan).

35 In the United States–China summit of Oc- tober 1997. It is also possible that Iran lost interest in the arrangement once it was confident that Russia would complete the Bushehr project. as well as exports to Iran of all . and restricted U. and the training of Ira- nian graduates in nuclear sciences in Russia. In March and April 1995. be- cause Russian entities were known to also be cooperating with Iran on other projects as well. concerns extended even beyond Bushehr. U. In April 1996.S.000 metric tons of natural uranium. The project will augment Iran’s nuclear technology infra- structure. Russia proceeded with its contract to help Iran build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. helping Tehran’s nuclear weapons research and development. By 2001. its attacks in 1987 on U.36 Russia During early 1995. the U. prohib- ited the importation of Iranian-origin goods. the United States imposed a wide range of sanctions on Iran because of Tehran’s support for international terrorism.39 Iran could also benefit from the presence of the thousands of Russian nuclear scien- tists who are expected to take part in the Bushehr project. 2. contributions to multilateral organizations that assist Iran and U.37 Washington urged Moscow to halt its work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor but met with little success. although the United States continues to be concerned about some missile assis- tance from China to Iran. inter- ests. Russia had agreed to provide Iran with a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.S. Other disturbing elements of the protocol were an agreement in principle for Russia to supply a light-water research reactor of 30 to 50 MWt. tensions rose with Russia when the Bill Clinton administration learned that. could have enabled Iran to secretly build and operate a similar plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. Department of Defense still regarded China as Iran’s main source of nuclear assistance.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers. The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act expressly prohibited trans- fers of nuclear equipment and materials to Iran. and other actions considered hostile to U.S.40 The United States During the 1980s. noting that “China appears to be living up to its 1997 commitments.38 Bushehr’s benefits for Iran’s nuclear weapons program are likely to be largely indirect.S.S. though itself under IAEA inspec- tion and dedicated to the production of low-enriched (non-weapons-grade) ura- nium.304 Tw o H a r d C a s e s components that it might have needed for the reactors it had offered Iran.S.” the Department of Defense no longer viewed China as Iran’s main nuclear source. Such a facility. Those sanctions blocked economic and military assistance to Iran. U.S. however. efforts to curtail foreign nuclear sales to Iran intensified in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Export-Import Bank cred- its for Iran. as part of a secret protocol to the reactor sale contract. China made a commitment to cancel almost all its existing nuclear assistance to Iran and to provide Iran with no new nuclear assistance.

however. Security Council for violating its NPT obligations. but in the summer of 2001 Congress extended ILSA for five years.42 The legislation permitted the president to waive this restriction at six-month intervals. The law imposes sanctions on foreign enterprises that invest $20 million or more in the energy sector of Iran. upon a determination that making U. 2004. secretary of state Colin Powell told reporters that Iran was working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon. Iran 305 dual-use commodities and U.S. or NSG) and to strategic dual-use commodities (that is. economic assistance to Russia to be made contingent upon presidential determination that Russia had terminated its nuclear-related assistance to Iran. In 1995 and 1996. citing a classified intelligence report that Iran was working on mating warheads to mis- siles. The restriction applies both to nuclear dual-use commodities (that is. unvetted walk-in source who provided documents purported to be Iranian drawings and technical documents. this legislation faced a serious challenge from French. remains unverified.44 Since then. terrorist attacks. however. and biological weapons and exporting terror. Such waivers have been regularly exercised.N. The Bush administration has not been enthusiastic about ILSA. officials have repeatedly charged Iran with developing such weapons and called on the members of the IAEA Board of Governors to report Iran to the U. The Bush administra- tion has also insisted that Iran “abandon” its nuclear fuel cycle activities. NSG rules per- mit the sale of such items. 2001. Malaysian. funds available to Russia was in the interest of U. the United States tightened sanctions on Iran. The Clinton administration backed away from imposing the sanctions because of the economic crisis in East Asia and in Russia in the fall of 1997 and spring of 1998. through the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA).S. foreign policy interests at stake. then–U. chemical. . The report. but Washington has convinced its Western trading partners to adopt the stricter policy in the case of Iran. government and commercial arms sales. The United States has relied on the NSG to coordinate the Western embargo on nuclear sales to Iran and has persuaded some states to withhold goods that were regulated under the NSG’s core export control guidelines. those having military and nonmilitary uses. aiming in part to constrain Tehran’s unconventional weapons programs.S. those having nuclear and non-nuclear uses and that are regulated internationally by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. which placed larger U.41 Legislation adopted in February 1996 provided for U. which currently are regulated under the Wassenaar Arrangement). national secu- rity.43 Washington further intensified economic pressure on Iran by imposing sec- ondary sanctions on it and Libya.” pursuing nuclear.S. and Russian oil companies that had signed a deal with Iran to help recover and market oil and natural gas. provided they are subject to IAEA inspection in the recipient state.45 On November 17.46 Press reports revealed that the claim was based on a single. U.S. Bush declared Iran a member of an “axis of evil. By the fall of 1997. In his first State of the Union address after the September 11.S. President George W.S. including a nuclear warhead design.

it became clear that North Korea was exporting missile capabilities to Iran. during the Iran- Iraq War. In June 1995. “entities have continued to supply a wide variety of missile-related goods. officials believe Russian assistance remains critical to Iran’s development of the Shahab series. against the Ira- nian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and against two North Korean entities for engaging in missile proliferation activities.S.S. U. Iran hoped to employ these technologies to develop two Iranian derivatives of the 1. but U. In September 1997. Libya. According to these assessments. 1992. vice president Al Gore raised the issue in Moscow with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. however. and defense-production companies—were transferring Rus- sian SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile technologies to Iran.S. Department of Defense still determined that Chinese.300-kilometer No Dong from North Korea. and scien- tific know-how that could be used in the manufacture of short-range ballistic missiles such as the Chinese M-9 and M-11. helping Iran to “save years in its development . under the missile nonproliferation provisions of the Arms Export Control and Export Administration Acts. the U. and materials to Iran. It turned to China. U. During 1997. the United States did not find that China’s missile transac- tions with Iran violated China’s pledges related to the Missile Technology Con- trol Regime. equipment. As a result. technology and expertise to Iran. 1996. the Iranian State Purchasing Office.S. and thus it declined to impose regime-related sanctions against ei- ther China or Iran.49 China was believed to have trans- ferred “dozens. and the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau. the United States imposed sanctions. as well as rocket propellant ingredients that could be used in its current stockpile of short-range Scud–Mod Bs and Scud–Mod Cs.S. then–U. production technology. as well as on Scud variants that Iran might produce in the future. of missile guidance systems and computer- ized machine tools” to Iran.S.”52 In 1996. the press cited U. Iran sought to acquire ballistic missile capabilities that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. North Korea provided Iran with about 100 Scud-Bs and with facilities that enabled Iran to produce the Scuds indigenously. perhaps hundreds. as a result of which there was a visible decline in Russian assistance until the summer of 1998.47 During the early 1990s. press reports quoted U.54 Nevertheless. materials. Iran reportedly discussed buy- ing the 1. along with Russian.306 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Missile Analysis Iran’s acquisition of ballistic missiles began in the 1980s when.S.000-kilometer-range North Korean No Dong missile. officials indicated that North Korea had sold missile components. intelligence reports that “strongly implicate[d]” China in the transfer to Iran of equipment. and North Korea for missile sys- tems and related technologies.48 On March 6. however.50 In the final analysis.53 The precise nature of the offend- ing transactions remains classified. and Israeli intelligence findings that Russian enterprises—including cash-strapped Russian technical institutes. on May 26. although not complete missiles. or major subsystems. the United States imposed sanctions on the Iranian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. In the early 1990s. research facilities.51 In 2001.

said that Iran had “probably” produced and weaponized BW agents. the National Intelligence Estimates have tended to overestimate the missile capabilities of developing nations. 2003.S. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet speculated that Iran “could begin flight testing [SLVs] in the mid.300 kilometers. and it claims to have follow-on versions of the Shahab III in development.56 The primary Iranian jus- tification for the country’s program is Israel’s missile programs. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security at that time.63 In 2004.58 On November 5. at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. intelligence community has indicated that Iran will likely continue development of intermediate-range and even intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems by initially testing them as space launch vehicle (SLV) pro- grams. could be based on the single-stage. the Iranian Defense Ministry stated that Iran did not have a program to build a Shahab IV missile. In his 2004 Worldwide Threat Assessment. The 2001 National Intelligence Estimate indicated uniform agreement among U.”55 The Shahab III is projected to have a range of ap- proximately 1.S. liquid-fueled missiles.60 Yet none of these capabilities has actually surfaced. his assessment was more cautious: “Because BW programs are easily concealed. and they may simply be official aspirations or bravado. A Shahab V missile program could be based on either of these missiles. The U. Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani said in August 2004 that “the Israelis have recently tried to increase their missile capability and we will also try to upgrade our Shahab III missile in every respect.61 It was also noted that one agency does not find it likely that Iran will achieve a successful test of an ICBM before 2015. officials believe that Iran has pursued biological weapons under the guise of its extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. In 2001. These are both two-stage.to latter-part of the decade.500 ki- lometers.S.000-kilogram payload. U. John Bolton. intelligence agencies that “Iran could attempt to launch an ICBM/ SLV about mid-decade although most agencies believe Iran is likely to take until the last half of the decade to do so” (emphasis in original). Since 1998. as well as a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow . Iran has announced that the Shahab III is in production.S. came just two weeks after Israel’s Arrow antimissile system—designed to intercept Shahab mis- siles—shot down a test Scud missile for the first time.59 Iran is report- edly interested in two developmental North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missiles.000 and 3.000-kilometer range and a 1. the Fateh-110. Iran 307 of the Shahab III” and to “significantly accelerate the pace of its ballistic missile development program. with an alleged 2. respectively. the Taepo Dong I (TD-I) and Taepo Dong II (TD-II). Outside experts had speculated that a Shahab IV. the U.”57 An August 2004 test. liquid-fueled SS-4. with theoretical ranges of 2.”62 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis Despite Iran’s ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1973. for example.

DOD.C. Conversation with authors. October 20.308 Tw o H a r d C a s e s of a doubt that Iran has an offensive BW program. 1 January through 30 June 2003. “Ukraine Probe Uncovers Illicit Weapons Sales. Andrew Feickert. January 15. 2004.65 The United States believes that Iran also continues a chemical weapons pro- gram that seeks production technology.” pp.” BBC News.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3997151. director of central intelligence. . 9.” 14. Proliferation: Threat and Response (2001). p. October 5. 1992. the NCR said. 38. the NCR reported that the anthrax weapons were part of a program begun in 2001 intended to triple Iran’s biowarfare program. 16. 5.” Boston Globe. with approximately 50. and cholera. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries.” Agence France-Presse.stm. 10. See also Feickert. included alfatoxin. train- ing. “Iran ‘Can’ Mass-Produce Missiles. presentation at Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. the Washington Post reported that Iran had begun producing biological weapons. on the basis of intelligence from the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR). June 2001. small- pox. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case. 4.” statement before the Senate Government Affairs Committee. 13. 2005.” Agence France-Presse. typhus.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). February 5. John Bolton. Aleksander Vasovic. Iran also employed chemical weapons late in the war.” Boston Globe. but with less success than Iraq.: DOD. 16–17. 3.68 N OTES 1. 2004. “Missile Survey. 11. 8. March 5. p. plague.67Allegedly. 2. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. “Iran’s Continu- ing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. See also.000 casu- alties reported. During that war. D. but the CIA reports that Iran has continued to seek technology. The group could not produce any evidence to support its claims. 7.” statement before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. “Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order. primarily mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun. “Ukraine Missile Sales Are Alleged. November 9. Geoffrey Kemp.000 Km Range. Other pathogens being weaponized. 12. Iraq employed chemical weapons. available at http:// news. training. 2004. The Middle East Military Balance 2003–2004 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.”64 In May 2003.bbc. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. including anthrax. “Iran Says It Now Has Missile with 2. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. and expertise from Chinese entities. against Iranian troops. p. “Iran Conducts New Shahab III Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. 38. Citing informants within the Iranian government. 2001). Department of Defense (DOD). February 3. 2004). 2005. 2004. U. Robert Gates. 2004. “Iran’s Missile Update. and expertise to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents.66 Iran began its chemical weap- ons program to deter Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. November 2004. 6.co. March–April 2004. June 24. Aleksander Vasovic.” Congres- sional Research Service.S. See Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

November 1. Hibbs. 33. 25. 10. 1991. 4. 1992.” Nucleonics Week. and Mitchell B.: Central Intelligence Agency.” Nucleonics Week.: Brookings Institution Press. May 21. FBIS-NES. Has Proof of Weapons Ambitions. 54. “U. “Moscow to Proceed with Nuclear Deal with Iran. This section is based on IAEA director general. October 5. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran.” Washington Post. 2000. Officials Say Iran Is Pursuing Fissile Material Production Research.C. 67–72. R. p. “Iran Confirms Nuclear Cooperation with China. January 28. and IAEA director gen- eral. 22. 1995. May 16. “Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from Argentina. pp. October 3. October 7. 14. 30.. p. 2004. p.” New York Times. 2004. p. Elaine Sciolino.” Nuclear Fuel.S. “Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No Atom Arms. February 9. Tehran Domestic Service. IAEA director general. 2004. 1995.” New York Times.S.” Washington Post. Wilber. 1988. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. January 11. 1996. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. eds. “Iran. Einhorn. 17. 2004. Ibid. NPT Diplomatic Effort. 2004. September 24. p. 20. “Pakistanis Exploited Nuclear Network.’ September 1. Jeffrey Smith. in FBIS-SOV 95-191. Steve Coll. October 2.’ September 1.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). Nerves Frayed over Nuclear Ties to Iran. Moscow Says Iran Nuclear Program Is Peace- ful. November 6. IAEA director general. D. 1992. Robert J. November/December 2004. Kamran Khan. IAEA director general.” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London). December 7. 1995. Hibbs. October 31.” 29. September 2.” Nuclear Threat Initiative.” Washington Post. PBS Network. 1995. Donald N. “China/Iran: Reactor Plans Shelved—Again?” Nucleonics Week.. 1994. Kurt M. 27. p. 1995. China Said to Disagree Only on Site Selection for New PWRs. 36. 1996. 52. 1996). March 14.” Washington Post. p. Available at http:// news.” Washington Post. April 13. 1995. 1995. and Miriam Rajkumar and Joseph Cirincione. Mark Hibbs. 9. “Iran Parliament OKs Nuke Enrichment Bill. Bonn Agency Says. 38. 32.” 24.: DOD. “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on the Future of the IRGC Iranian Revo- lutionary Guards Corps. “The IAEA’s Report on Iran: No Slam Dunk. 35. p. p.S. 22.C. “Secret History of the CIA in Iran.” Nuclear Fuel. 1994. February 1.stm. 5. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. April 17. Shai Feldman. 10. 1993. “U. .S. D.” October 6. 14. 36. Hibbs. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safe- guards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. April 16.’ November 15. p. 1997). Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East. DOD. Mark Hibbs. 21. November 1952–August 1953 (Washington. Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. 1954). 28. 9. 1995. 23. “Countering U.C. David Albright and Cory Hinderstein. September 2004. 16. 34. 2004.co. 2. Mass. “Source: Nuclear Plans with China Near Collapse.’ September 1. Harvard University’s BCSIA Studies in International Studies (Cambridge.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3972711. p. April 20.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.” BBC News Online. May 23. p. Claims. p. “Investigators Deny Iran Smuggled Weapons Material from Germany. 2004. 1991.” Nucleonics Week.S. 35. Iran 309 15. D. James Risen. p.” Nucleonics Week. Proliferation: Threat and Response (1996).S. Mark Hibbs. “Iran Students in Nuclear Protest. 1992. “Iran: Countdown to Showdown. 18. March 28. “China–Iran Nuclear Tie Long Known.’ September 1. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1995.bbc. 37. Thomas Lippman. 2004". 1. Mark Hibbs. 2004". “German–U. p.” Nuclear Fuel.” p.” Nuclear Fuel. 26. p. No- vember 17. 24. 1988. “Clinton’s Iran Embargo Initiative Impedes U. “Stepped-Up Nuclear Effort Renews Alarm about Iran.” Carnegie Analysis. 2004). 6. “Iran and the Bomb.” Frontline.” United Press International. DOD. p. Mark Hibbs. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington.” Nucleonics Week. Campbell.: MIT Press. “Iran: Nuclear Overview. May 8. 1995. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Iran’s Arab Neighbors Don’t Believe U. 47. in FBIS-NES 95-099. October 31. Interviews with authors. 19. “Sharif University Activity Continues Despite IAEA Visit. China. 31. Reiss.

June 21. and Dana Linzer.” in Repairing the Regime: Pre- venting the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. p. in FBIS-EAS 96-127. 18.” December. 1 January through 30 June 2003. “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified. 59. The president’s State of the Union address.” 67.S. Policies and Op- tions. August 11. Robert Gallucci.whitehouse.” p. 2004. 54. Richburg.” Washington Post. March 9. 1996. 10. 1. “Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference.html. November 19.gov/news/releases/2002/ 01/20020129-11. Bolton. Michael Sirak. “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs.uk/bwc/revcon1. Jenni Rissanen. 1. Jeffrey Smith. 2001. 36. “Iran: U.” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul).” Post-Soviet Nuclear and De- fense Monitor.” 57. “Iran Tests Missile Capable of Hitting Israel. 1993). p.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. July 1. “Iran’s Missile Update. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee. DCI Nonproliferation Center. Ibid. October 5.” BWC Review Conference Bulletin.S. June 19–25. p. 2004. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015. p. Congress. Katzman. Could Mean Loss of U. Robin Wright and Keith B.310 Tw o H a r d C a s e s 39.” Washington Post. Nuclear Weapons.” 65. November 19. 2004. 1996. 56. June 28. 2004. “Russia Firm on Iran Reactor Sale. 2004. Joby Warrick. available at www. R. 1 January through 30 June 2003. July 3. June 30. 44.” p. pp. January 14. 48. 4.” New York Times. Federal Register. 51. DOD. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Office of Technology Assessment.” testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. “Chinese Shipments Violate Controls. Aid. Government Notice of Sanctions against DPRK. before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs. 64. 68.C. May 15. May 31. 29785. View. 66.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb. “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context.” 46. Queries China on Iran. 52. Proliferation: Threat and Response (1996).S.acronym. 40.” Washington Post. 60. 12. “U. July 1. 2004. Elaine Sciolino. 42.S. 50. Alon Ben-David. Ibid. Bolton. D. Report Says. “Iran Said to Be Producing Bioweapons. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington. 63. Government Printing Office. U. 1995. 61. Barbara Opall.S. 1996. Katzman. For a detailed look at the sanctions adopted. 3. 48. see Kenneth Katzman. 2000. Bolton. and Andrew Koch. 47.: U. p.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. p. 1995. p. 2003. available at www. p. p. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Testimony of John Lauder. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 1995.” Washington Post.S. 1995. November 17. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Risk Report. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 58. 1996. National Intelligence Council.org. “Iran–Russia Missile Cooperation: A U. November 18.” . director.” Reuters. 45. “Iran. “Iran. “CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms Components. “Iran. 187. 2001. 2000.” Defense News. 53. 41.html. 43. Israel Trade Barbs over New Missile Tests. “Daily on U. edited by Joseph Cirincione (New York: Routledge.S. 16. August 16. Feldman. “Iran’s Missile Technology Linked to China. 11–14. “President Clinton Says Aid to Russia Critical to National Security. 2000).” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor. 55. p. 62.” Center for Defense Information. June 17. 49. 1995.

construction completed October 2004.000 P-1 centrifuges. zero-power reactor (HWZPR). 27 kWt. pool type. 50. damaged by Yes Iraqi air strikes (1987.1. 1988). operating ENTC GSCR Graphite-moderate subcritical assembly. Iran 311 Table 15. construction/operation suspended Natanz Fuel Commercial plant. LEU. Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Power Reactors Bushehr I Light-water. 1988). zero-power. damaged by No Iraqi air strikes (1987. went critical in 1992. LEU. operating ENTC LWSCR Light-water. originally scheduled to start Plant (FEP) accepting centrifuges in 2005. operating Isfahan Uranium Encirhment Pilot Fuel Capacity of 1.000 MWe. Yes Research operating Reactor/ IR-0001 IR-0005/MNSR Miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR). Natanz construction/operation suspended Kalaye Electric Centrifuge tests using UF6 conducted Yes Company between 1998 and 2003 (table continues on the following page) . LEU. 5 MWt. operating IR-0004/ Heavy-water. scheduled to be launched 2005 and reach full capacity by 2006 Bushehr II Light-water. 1. facility remains unfinished. HEU.300 MWe. went critical in 1992. began Yes Enrichment testing a ten-machine cascade in August Plant (PFEP) 2003. LEU. open tank facility Yes Isfahan fueled by uranium metal pins.000-centrifuges Yes Enrichment capacity. and project is currently suspended Research Reactors Tehran Light-water. Yes HWZPR 10 kWt. Yes Isfahan Chinese-built. LEU. Chinese-built. Yes Isfahan 900 grams of HEU fuel. 1.

under construction .1. 5. 1 shielded boxes dismantled in 1992. near Heavy-water production plant. Plutonium Production Arak Heavy 40 MWt heavy-water reactor. Facility operation suspended Esfahan Fuel Scheduled to be commissioned 2007. became operational in February 2004.312 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Table 15. Uranium Processing Isfahan Converts uranium yellowcake into UF4 and Yes Conversion UF6. nat. construction scheduled to begin in (IR-40) 2004 and reactor to go into operation in 2014. Yes Manufacturing capacity of 40 tons per year of UO2 fuel Plant Jabr Ibn Hayan UF4 converted into uranium metal. also Nuclear storage of plutonium separated from Research depleted uranium at Tehran Nuclear Center Research Center Saghand Discovery of uranium deposits announced No Yazd Province in 1990. plant dismantled in 2003 Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Tehran Nuclear Irradiated depleted UO2 targets at the Tehran Yes Research Research Reactor between 1988 and 1998. planned 2 Heavy-Water Production Khondab. storage Yes Lab—Tehran of UF6. scheduled to start producing heavy water in 2004. laser enrichment experiments conducted between October 2002 and January 2003.000 tons of uranium reserves. UF4. production No Arak capacity 100 tons per year. Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Lashkar Ab’ad Pilot laser enrichment plant established in Yes 2000. U oxide Yes Water Reactor as fuel. Center Also 3 kilograms of UO2 reprocessed in three shielded boxes in a hot cell to produce at least 200 micrograms of plutonium. and UO2 from China.

. but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water. IAEA is investigating this discrepancy.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/3119.” available at www. 2004. and IAEA director general.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies for Nuclear Threat Initiative.’ September 1. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal SSOURCES OURCES: IAEA director general. stored ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : HEU highly enriched uranium LEU low-enriched uranium nat. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2.’ November 15. Iran 313 Storage Karaj Equipment from Pilot Laser Enrichment plant Yes at Lashkar Ab’ad. 2004”. NOTES N OTES: 1. “Iran: Nuclear Facilities.nti. dismantled in May 2003. Iran claims that it produced 200 micrograms of plutonium in these experiments.html. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities. but the IAEA estimates that more plutonium should have been produced.

.

315 . but the interna- tional regime drew attention to these countries’ acquisition efforts and slowed their pace. however. For those countries that gave up their nuclear weapons—the states of the former Soviet Union and South Africa—the international non- proliferation regime was essential to locking in their non-nuclear sta- tus. the regime failed to stop the government’s clandestine pursuit of a nuclear capability but did slow it down. When Libya’s leadership changed direction. the inspections and sanctions imposed after the 1991 war suc- ceeded in both ending its nuclear weapons program and convincing the government not to restart it. That success. In Iraq’s case. the regime then provided the international tools for verifying and consolidating that change. or that debated developing nuclear weapons but de- cided not to do so. that were pursing a nuclear capability but renounced it. establish- ing a civilian-led government was a critical factor. PART FIVE Nonproliferation Successes One of the most striking and underappreciated facts of the nuclear age is the large number of countries that have turned away from the nuclear weapons path. was not ap- preciated soon enough to prevent a new war to disarm Iraq in 2003. For those states that once pursued nuclear capabilities but have since abandoned their efforts. This includes nations that possessed nuclear weapons but gave them up. such as Argentina and Brazil. In Libya.

.

CHAPTER 16 Libya Nuclear Weapons Capability After over three decades of trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. and the United States supported the proposal. and U. and British officials investigating Libya’s unconventional weapons programs found no evidence of an offensive BW program.1 Libya’s major nuclear facilities include a 10-megawatt light-water research reactor and a critical assembly (100 watts).4 Libya has been a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention since 1982. Missile Capability Libya possessed a limited and aging arsenal of Scud-B missiles (300-kilometer range. the OPCW continues to monitor and inspect Libya’s CW facilities. In October 2004. intelligence estimates had long held that Libya had a basic biological weapon (BW) research program. Libya announced that it was abandoning its clandestine nuclear program on Decem- ber 19. Libya reported past production of approximately 23 tons of mustard agent be- tween 1980 and 1990 at a CW production facility (Rabta) to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). 2003.5 Libya struggled to continue its indigenous efforts to develop the 200-kilometer-range Al Fatah missile in the face of international 317 . Libya permitted international officials to inspect eleven previously undisclosed nuclear sites and to remove and destroy key components of its nuclear weapons program. In March 2004. both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. Libya asked the OPCW if it could con- vert the former weapons plant at Rabta into a plant to manufacture low-cost pharmaceuticals.S. In 2003.2 Pending the destruction of the mustard agent. Libya denies any BW program. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Libya renounced its chemical weapons (CW) program in December 2003 and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 6.3 U. Libya also disclosed that it had produced thousands of unfilled muni- tions and stored the agent at two sites.200 unfilled CW shells. The OPCW destroyed more than 3. 700-kilogram payload). 2004.S. as well as a handful of North Korean Scud-Cs (600-kilometer range. 700-kilogram payload) that it obtained from the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

sanctions were imposed in 1992 in response to the downing of an airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988. President Bill Clinton signed legislation imposing sanctions on foreign companies that invest more than $40 million for future petroleum ventures in Iran and Libya.6 Some U.S. sanctions followed in 1992 and 1996. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the successor regime to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. More U. The Strategic Context On December 19. U. As part of that effort. which was estab- lished during the Cold War to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies with military applications to the Soviet bloc. partial missiles. Libya’s mercurial leader. led to economic sanctions being imposed on Libya by the United Nations and individual countries. missile launchers.7 In July 1996. had ambitions to become the leader of the Arab world and to raise Libya’s pres- tige among Islamic and other countries in the developing world. as well as . efforts to block the export of dual-use and military tech- nology to Libya won approval by 33 nations of the Charter of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. having been imposed in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan. U. In 2004. The process has become a model for how to end a nation’s nuclear weapons program by changing the behavior of even troubling regimes. it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Libya is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the Biologi- cal Weapons Convention. it continued its efforts to obtain nuclear and chemical arms. Its nuclear weapons and CW programs were all heavily dependent on foreign technology and expertise. This pursuit.S. Nonetheless. Libya does not possess any aircraft capable of de- livering a nuclear payload. until the late 1990s Gadhafi sought to obtain nuclear and chemical arms and remained defiant on nonproliferation and arms control issues.318 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s sanctions through the 1990s. and related equipment were flown out of the coun- try. especially those related to Israel’s nuclear capability. 2003. and British officials. efforts to end Libya’s weapons programs spanned four presidential ad- ministrations. after years of negotiations capped by months of secret talks with U. Libya agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms. Colonel Mu‘ammar Gadhafi. and Libya’s support for terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. By March 5. Despite constant international con- demnation.S. Libya announced its decision to dismantle its unconventional weapons capabilities and permit international verification inspections. and Exocet antiship cruise missiles. such as SS-N-2c Styx. U.S. Otomat Mk 2. its substantial oil wealth enabled Libya to buy the technology it needed.N. In November 2001.S. For 30 years. sanctions were already in place by then.8 In August 1996. Scud-C missiles. Libya’s pledge will leave it with short-range cruise missiles.

S. “The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction. Bush administration resumed the talks with Libya but maintained the position that Libya would have to address concerns over its weapons programs before U.11 The George W. He said in a January 2005 interview.S. Gadhafi seems to have concluded that he needed Western contracts and markets more than he needed chemical or nuclear weapons. If someone attacks you and you use a nuclear bomb. invasion of Tripoli. President Gadhafi’s chief of intelligence. Others claimed that the Libyans alerted Lon- don and Washington to the ship as a gesture of their good faith. the United States and the United Kingdom struck the right combination of force and diplomacy. We had no target. And then we started thinking about the cost.S.9 Decades of sanctions finally had their impact.”14 A significant moment in the final negotiations seems to have been the Octo- ber 2003 interception by British and American officials of a German cargo ship heading to Libya from Dubai.15 Negotiations picked up pace after the seizure. In the late 1990s.17 . American and British spokesmen claimed that the seizure convinced Gadhafi that his pro- grams could not escape detection. forces in the region undoubtedly had an impact. overcoming opposi- tion from the U. Musa Kussa.S. and chemical weapons and advanced conventional weapons programs. The U. Libya turned over two intelligence officers who had been implicated in the Pan Am Flight 103 attack.S.”13 A former State Department official involved in the Bush administration’s negotia- tions with Libya noted that these talks predated the war in Iraq. The administration made Libyan cooperation in the Lockerbie bombing case a prerequisite to normalizing United States–Libya relations. The Bush administration linked Libya’s turnaround to President Bush’s na- tional security strategy and the invasion of Iraq.”12 Whether by design or by chance. Department of Defense to any “deals with dictators. sanctions would be lifted.000 U. sanc- tions remained in place. The presence of 250. and the United Nations suspended its sanctions in 1999. biological. Prime Minister Tony Blair seems to have been a decisive influence on President Bush. approached British M16 officials seeking to con- clude negotiations for the end of its unconventional weapons programs in ex- change for normalizing ties. Libya ap- proached the Clinton administration in hopes of ending its international isola- tion. “We started to ask our- selves. officials reportedly visited ten previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories and military factories over three weeks in October and early December. Libya 319 companies exporting items to Libya that enhance its nuclear.S. ‘By manufacturing nuclear weapons. we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation.10 In March 2003. shortly before the Iraq War began. The ship carried a cargo of centrifuge parts re- portedly based on Pakistani designs and manufactured in Malaysia. British and U.16 They searched for evidence of activity related to nuclear fuel cycles and for chemical and missile programs. but it does not seem that Presi- dent Gadhafi feared a U. against whom are we going to use them?’ World alliances have changed. you are in effect using it against yourself.

18 On December 19. The IAEA will also draw up an inventory de- tailing all aspects of Libya’s nuclear program by surveying ten sites. while the United States and the United Kingdom seemed determined to retain control over the process. After President Gadhafi endorsed the deal through a press release.000 chemical munitions and consolidated and secured its stocks of chemical weapon agents and precursors for destruction. centrifuge parts.21 In early January 2004. Libya destroyed 3.) arrived in Libya on January 24 on a goodwill visit. American and British teams arrived to dismantle Libya’s facilities. it had also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. News reports said that blue- prints for a warhead design. the IAEA argued that it should be responsible for the dismantlement. Lantos had been one of the most fervent advocates of tight sanctions on Libya.”19 In the last week of December. Prime Minis- ter Blair and President Bush released press statements applauding “Qaddafi’s statesmanship.000 pounds of docu- ments and components of Libya’s nuclear and ballistic programs out of the country into the United States. based on a first-generation Pakistani design.000 metric tons of nuclear equipment. They ultimately reached an agreement that the United King- dom and the United States will be responsible for dismantling the program while the IAEA will verify this process.”20 ElBaradei said that it was difficult to judge with confidence but that he had a “gut feeling” that Libya was three to seven years away from producing a nuclear weapon.) met with Gadhafi and called for a normalization of relations the following day.26 Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif.22 Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 6.24 Libya’s nuclear components are being held at the Oak Ridge National Labora- tory in Tennessee. Mohamed ElBaradei. stated that the fa- cilities he visited indicated a program that was “in the initial stages of develop- ment. Scud-C missiles and their launchers. were brought to the United States in late January 2004. 2003. By January 19. On January 27. the first in 30 years. The IAEA’s director general.23 This was the first phase of the disarmament process. On January 19. the United States airlifted 55. and more .320 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s The final details of the accord were hammered out in London on December 16. The United States removed more than 1. inspectors from the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited previously undisclosed nuclear sites in Tripoli. Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalqam announced that Libya would halt its unconventional weapon programs and elimi- nate any stockpiles of weapons under international verification and supervision.25 A delegation of seven members of Congress headed by Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa. documentation. During the second phase of disarmament. 2004.” without any “industrial scale facility to produce highly enriched ura- nium. According to news reports. the United Kingdom and the United States opened their first direct negotiations with the IAEA to determine who should be re- sponsible for dismantling Libya’s nuclear capabilities. 2004. de- signed from China. and guidance devices for long-range missiles. 2003. The cargo reportedly included uranium hexafluoride.

the Soviet Union supplied Libya with a 10- megawatt research reactor. the United Kingdom. told Congress that phase three of Libya’s disarmament had been completed. he noted. President Bush lifted most remaining U. For the re- maining disarmament work. apparently hoping to share in the results of Pakistan’s nuclear pro- gram.S. the U. he complained.27 The United States and the United Kingdom agreed “in principle” to allow Libya to keep some of its medium-range Scud-B missiles. leaving Libya no option but to develop its own nuclear facilities. He said he needed more security guarantees from the United States. But this also came to nothing. This. On Sep- tember 22. But there must be at least a declaration of a program like the Marshall Plan. offering financial aid and supplies of uranium from Niger. sanctions on Libya. However. but these missiles must con- form with range and payload limitations to which Libya agreed in December 2003. in November 2004. Europe. assistant secretary of state for verification and com- pliance. After Libya ratified the NPT in 1975 (it had been signed in 1969 by King Idris). Libya 321 than 15 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium reactor fuel to Russia.28 Phase three involved implementing verification mechanisms to ensure that Libya had or would definitely eliminate all its material and efforts that were related to nuclear and chemical weapons as well as all its missile programs that fell under the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. They promised. to show the world that those who wish to abandon the nuclear weapon program will be helped. although they were nice words— from America and Europe. the United States. Libya remains subject to some sanctions because it remains on the U. provided little incentive for countries like Iran and North Korea to dismantle their nuclear programs. 2004. Blair and Bush expressed their satisfaction. and Japan. “Libya and the whole world expected a positive response—not just words. The .29 Two days before that announcement. Washington and Tripoli had resumed diplomatic ties in June 2004.30 The European Union formally ended twelve years of economic sanc- tions on October 12.” Again in January 2005. when its attempts to buy nuclear weapons directly from China were rebuffed. as well as “civilian-use technology in return for abandoning military tech- nology.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. and Libya have established a trilateral steering and cooperation committee. In January 2005.S.”31 Nuclear Analysis Libya’s nuclear ambitions first became evident in 1970. on September 20. 2004. The United States permitted direct air flights between the two countries and unfroze Libyan assets.S. but we haven’t seen anything yet. Paula DeSutter. In 1977 Libya re- portedly turned to Pakistan. oil companies for the first time in 20 years. after President Bush termi- nated sanctions on Libya under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Gadhafi voiced his disappointment that Libya had not been properly recompensed. Libya awarded major oil and gas exploration contracts to U. which began operating at Tajoura in 1979.

however.33 Nevertheless. in- cluding the A. The total amount of uranium imported by Libya was 1. along with Bhutan and India. pressure on the potential supplier.367 drums. Between 1978 and 1991. 2001.322 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s following year. The possibility of coop- eration in the construction of a nuclear power station was reportedly under discussion in 1999. which are similar in design to the P-1 and P- 2 centrifuges found in Iran.S. arguing that it should provide for nuclear disarmament within a specified time. Libya imported a total of 2. Libya’s undeclared nuclear program involved frequent move- ments of key equipment and nuclear material. stipulated that no fuel fabrication equipment was ever received from any sources. The following September. Yet in January 1996. In October 1997. Libya conducted a series of uranium conversion experiments in a previously undeclared facility during the 1980s. In the 1980s. but only the smallest (using 9 cascades) was completely assembled in 2002. Russia reopened nuclear cooperation talks with Libya. despite Israel’s continued refusal to sign it. 38 In September 2000.263 metric tons of yellowcake. General Assembly. In 1984. and a loss of interest by Moscow.587 metric tons contained in 6. Q.35 and in March 1998 the Atomenergoeksport Company signed an $8 million contract involv- ing the partial overhaul of the Tajoura research center. Libya received two small cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from a foreign source (most likely Pakistan) in September 2000 and a large cylinder of UF6 again in February 2001. Most of the equipment was delivered in 1994. Libya was among 43 African countries that signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in April 1996. Libya ordered a modular uranium conversion facility from a foreign company.37 Libya acquired L-2 and L-1 centrifuges through various foreign sources. Plans to have Russia build a power reactor near the Gulf of Sidra were subse- quently dropped because of U. Libya finally signed the treaty on November 13. Libya. and it relied heavily on support from foreign sources. but Libyan authorities stated that one module of the facility (related to the production of uranium tetrafluoride. Libya managed to construct 3 different enrichment cascades.36 The true extent of Libya’s clandestine nuclear program only became clear after its voluntary renunciation and the IAEA inspections that followed. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Belgium. Libya acquired 2 centrifuges of the .N. voted against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the U. Libya negotiated a formal safeguard agreement with the IAEA.34 None- theless. The large cylinder contained natural uranium and the smaller one contained depleted uranium. Libya eventually sup- ported an indefinite extension of the treaty.32 Gadhafi has also asserted that the Arab states would be justified in possessing chemical and biological weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear capability. Libya’s official news agency restated Gadhafi’s posi- tion that the Arab states should acquire nuclear weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear hegemony in the region. UF4) was never received by Libya. Khan network. Libya purchased 20 preassembled L-1 centrifuges in 1997 and components for another 200. Libya. Argentina and Libya cooper- ated on nuclear technology and information.

S. Khan network. Allegations that Libya used chemical weapons against Chad in 1986 have not been substantiated. 650 kilometers south of Tripoli. It had refused to sign the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. U. was reportedly being built under- ground at a military base near Sebha. Some Penta- gon officials suggested that the United States might use a modified version of .S. and it once had a substantial CW stockpile. however. defense secretary William Perry that he would not rule out the use of military force to block completion of the plant. and British intelligence officials told Malaysian law enforcement offi- cials in November that “a certain amount” of “enriched” UF6 was shipped from Pakistan to Libya in 2001. Libyan officials have told investigators that they bought the blueprints from dealers who are part of that network. Libya had been developing a gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facil- ity.45 Libya maintained that the plant was part of an irrigation system.43 Little is known about that facility. which can then produce either low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear reactors or high- enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. John Deutch. Libya finished the construction of a chemical produc- tion facility at Rabta.40 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis Libya’s bid to acquire chemical weapons in the late 1980s has been well docu- mented. but in 1971 it became a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol forbidding the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. apparently for more than $50 million.44 U. which uses maraging steel for its rotors and can there- fore spin at much faster speeds. The designs were reported to closely resemble the warheads that China had tested in the late 1960s and had passed on to Pakistan decades ago. Libya also provided the IAEA with documents related to the design and fab- rication of a nuclear explosive device that were provided by the A. as reports surfaced that Libya had suspended construction. intelligence sources indicated in early 1996 that the plant would be completed “late in this decade” and would be capable of produc- ing the ingredients for tons of poison gas daily.000. known as Pharma-150.42 At the same time. Tripoli had complete centrifuges and thousands of centrifuge components. a similar plant.S. according to a February 20 report from Malaysia’s inspector general of police. Most concern about Libya had focused on what the then–director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).47 following comments by U. Pharma-200. but it did not have an operating enrich- ment facility.39 UF6 is fed into the centrifuges. 40 miles southeast of Tripoli. Q. It placed an order for another 10. with extensive foreign technical assistance.41 It produced at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents be- fore it closed in 1990 in the face of United States–led international pressure. In late 1988. described as the “world’s larg- est underground chemical weapons plant” in a mountain at Tarhuna. Libya 323 more advanced L-2 type.46 Tensions over the Tarhuna plant appeared to ease by late 1996.

and M-11. such as the Soviet/Russian SS-23 and SS- 21. which has meant eliminating ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms or more. Libya has also begun the process at the OPCW to seek approval to convert its former CW production facility at Rabta to produce pharmaceutical prod- ucts. Libya’s limited and antiquated missile arsenal includes basic Scud-Bs bought from the Soviet Union in the mid- 1970s as well as North Korean Scud-Cs.52 Missile Analysis In the late 1980s and early 1990s.49 Libya declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on March 5.56 and it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. By March 2004.000 chemical munitions and consolidated and secured their stocks of CW agents and precursors for destruc- tion. Since December 2003. sanctions from 1992 to 1999 was believed to have severely limited Libya’s ability to main- tain its Scud-B arsenal and to make further progress in its domestic ballistic missile program. though in recent years several shipments of Scud components have been intercepted en route to Libya. 2004. or other help” from Chinese entities. Tripoli also pursued a program to de- velop the indigenous Al Fatah missile.53 The CIA confirmed that Libya had received “ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how” from Russian entities and “missile-related items.N.55 Reports had circulated that Libya had purchased the 1. acknowl- edging only that Libya had an interest in obtaining a longer-range missile capa- bility.324 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s the B-61 nuclear warhead. Libya’s missile complex was heavily dependent upon foreign suppliers. The presence of U.51 Libyans have already destroyed more than 3. Libya made several apparently unsuccessful attempts to purchase foreign missiles.50 Libya also declared two storage sites to the OPCW. On the whole. According to those reports. 2007. but Western defense and intelligence sources have not confirmed such a purchase. The United States has supported this proposal.48 There were also reports in mid-1997 that Libya had received South African equipment for the manufacture of chemical and biologi- cal weapons. after the 1994 national elections in South Africa. The OPCW set a deadline of April 29. and the Chinese DF-3A. Libya had relinquished five North Korean Scud-C missiles and their launch- ers.300-kilometer- range No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea. Libya also agreed to convert its Scud-B arsenal into shorter-range defensive missiles. several scientists from the South African military’s CW and BW program (called Project Coast) had sold equipment and perhaps had even trav- eled to Libya to advise on the project. M-9. raw materials. that it had produced approximately 23 tons of mustard agent in one CW production facility (Rabta) between 1980 and 1990.57 . for Libya to completely destroy its chemical weapons and the capacity to produce them.54 Serbian and Indian assistance to Libya’s missile program was also cited in an unclassified CIA report to Con- gress. Libya had agreed to abide by the Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime. as well as provided a destruction plan for these weapons and production facilities.

” Arms Control Today. 25. 7. Paul Kerr. “Future of Multinational Export Control Remains in Ques- tion. 104-172.” press release. Tyler. “Nuclear Watchdog Agrees to Role in Libya. 1996. “United States Supports Libyan Weapons Plant Conversion Plan. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.” Con- gressional Research Service. 9. 2004.N. March 31.” Financial Times. Libya 325 N OTES 1. “Return to the Fold: How Gadaffi Was Per- suaded to Give Up His Nuclear Goals.” New York Times. Leverett. In 1997. Basic Reports: Newsletter on International Security Policy. 22.’ May 28. Glen Frankel. “Post-Cocom ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’ Set to Begin New Export Control Role. January 23. Patrick E. “Return to the Fold.htm. Patrick E. 1996. p. Government Printing Office. 2004. Leverett. January 20. 2003. 12.com/time/magazine/article/0. 3.: U. 2004". “Libya’s Atom Bid in Early Phases. 2004. available at www.time. “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction. IAEA director general. Mark Huband. available at www. Tyler and James Risen. January 8. 2003.” Washington Post. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan. Department of State. DeSutter. Paula A. Book I: January 1 to June 27. Resolution 748 (1992).00. S/RES/748. Ibid. April 22. “A Long Slog Led to Libya’s Decision. February 9. 1996. Flynt L. January 28.” October 13. Tyler.” Guardian.” Financial Times. 11.” Washington Post. September 22.org/ wmd/library/news/libya/2004/040528-iaea.” New York Times.pdf. and Roula Khalaf.9171. assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance.S.” . 4. Fidler.C.” Defense News. Broad. 1996. Mark Huband. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. 8. Patrick E. 23.html.S.S. Scott MacLeod and Amany Radwan. January 28. Libya.” Financial Times. U. 10. 5. 1996. and Eric Pianin. 1992.. March 5. 20. Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickhert.” New York Times. Tenn. Security Council. U. 21. available at www. 24. July 22–28. 2003. “President Imposes Boycott on Business with Libya. Stephen Fidler. and David Hoffman. and Jeff Erlich. DeSutter. the threshold investment was dropped to $20 million. 50 USC 1701. Nonproliferation and Human Rights. 2004. 2004. December 21. William J. and Khalaf. “Clinton Approves Sanctions for Investors in Iran.” 18. “US Must Pay for Libya to Dismantle Weapons. Gains Libyan Nuclear Gear and Flies it to Knoxville.” New York Times. May 2004.1022560. 16. 17. 1988). Brian Whitaker. August 6. 13. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya.” New York Times. February 21. 19. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 2004. 2004. “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi. January 30. December 21.” Washington Post. 14. 2.gov/t/vc/rls/ rm/2004/37220.” testimony before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism.S. “U. 2004. “Libya Submits Initial Chemical Weap- ons Declaration.L. “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb.globalsecurity. “Secret Diplomacy Won Libyan Pledge on Arms. Guy Dinmore. 29.” Arms Control Today. 2004. Qadhafi’s Isolation Urged. Ibid.” New York Times. December 30. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 17. 6. December 1995–January 1996.” Time. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. 2005. January 27.state. 26. Huband. 2004. January 27. Ibid. 2003. “US Praises Libya’s Progress on Arms. P. D. 2003. 28.” 15. January 8. 1986 (Washington. “Libyan Stagnation a Big Factor in Qaddafi Surprise. 27. Private conversations between the authors and U. “Libya’s A-Bomb Blueprints Reveal New Tie to Pakistani. and foreign officials during 2004.

sipri. “U.” 48. “Arabs Must Get Nuclear Bomb to Match Israel—Libya. 42. “Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion. March 30. in FBIS-TAC 97-007. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. United Nations.iaea. revised.” address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.” Washington Post. 40.or. 1996).” 32. available at www.org. 31. April 19. April 23. “Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya.” Washington Post. “South Africa: Scientists Said to Sell CBW Technology to Libya after 1994. Department of Defense.S. available at www. . “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Hints It Would Bomb Libyan Facility.uk/1/hi/uk/596088. 2000. and “Scud Missile Parts Intercepted. 2000. “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi. Robert Burns. Also see “Arabs Need Nuclear Bomb. February 11.” Reuters.org/html/global/press_releases/2k4/PR8_2004. January 1.326 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s 30. 2004. “Libya Denies Weapons-Factory Link.’” Johannesburg SAPA.K. 37. April 7. February 25.-Libya. Qadhafi Says. “Germans Accused of Helping Libya Build Nerve Gas Plant. 1997. 1996. Available at http:// news. 49.” New York Times.’ May 28. 2004". 1996. 35. May 30. October 22.” New York Times.S. 1997. Charles Aldinger.at/ Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-59. D. Maryland. Peta Thornycroft. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” Interfax (Moscow).” 46.” Interfax (Moscow).” 38. 52.” Arms Control Today. Paul Kerr. Octo- ber. James Woolsey. 1996.” Associated Press. Pine. Libya tried to give the impression that the facility was seriously damaged.S.S. p. 1989. “Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Fig- ure. Lifts Remaining Economic Sanctions Against Libya. Department of Defense.” Arms Control Today. 39. January 9. “South Africa: Mandela Fears Chemical Arms Sales to Libya ‘Tip of Iceberg.” Reuters. April 23.” Johannesburg Mail and Guardian. Also see Art Pine. by fabricating a fire. p. director of central intelligence. 43.” press release. Lancaster. 2004. and IAEA director general.S.” Reuters. 1996. “U. 1996. “Qadhafi Says Arabs Have Right to Germ Warfare Arms. “Russia Ready to Start Talks with Libya on Nuclear Center. “Perry Presses U. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. March 2004.S. “U. September 1996. “Perry Presses U. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Reuters. “A-Bomb against Libya Target Suggested. Squassoni and Feickhert. In 1990. September 10. 1996.” 53.S. February 23. Broad and David E. 1996.” Associated Press. “Assembly Adopts Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Qadhafi Tunnels into Trouble Both within and without. Says Libya Implementing WMD Pledge. “Libya. 2004. 1994.html. “U.” BBC News. See U. 1999. 41. February 7.stm. Charge against Libya. 34. Lacks Con- ventional Arms to Destroy Libya Plant. April 12. “U. Weiner. February 27. Paul Kerr. in FBIS-TAC 97-007. 1996.opcw. R. April 4. John Lancaster. Wye Plantation. April 24. IAEA director general.S. DeSutter. 1996. 24. 1996. Sanger.” Washington Times. 26.’ August 30. 36. “Libya Submits Initial Chemical Weapons Declaration. “Chal- lenges to Peace in the Middle East.S. Tim Weiner.” BBC News. “Egypt De- nies Libyan Chemical Arms Site. 33. “Watching China.: U.pdf. MacLeod and Radwan.” Los Angeles Times. March 5. 1997.co. “Moscow Set to Expand Trade Ties with Libya. 1996. February 4. “U.” Los Angeles Times. See also John Diamond.C.” Press Release GA/ 9083. 47. 45. Stephen Engelberg with Michael Gordon. Charge against Libya.” New York Times. 1996. William J. January 27. Warns Libya after Scud Find. Ibid. Lancaster. 2004. 44. September 23.bbc. 1995.” 51.” education module on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation. available at www. May 17. 50.

director of central intelligence.” September 7. 55. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction. February 7. Squassoni and Feickhert. Libya 327 54. 56. 2001. Kerr.” statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.” .” 57. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion and Advanced Conventional Munitions. CIA. George Tenet. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. 2001. “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World. July–December 2000.

.

All the available evidence indicates that Iraq did not reconstitute or maintain a nuclear program after 1991. Verification. and Inspec- tion Commission (UNMOVIC.2 In September 2004.N. The activities of the inspectors in the early 1990s did a tremendous amount” to prevent reconstitution. nor had it tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. All its related programs appear to have ended in 1992. chemical. and the U. U.”3 Duelfer’s pre- decessor at the ISG.1 During December 1998. and its nuclear program begun in the 1970s almost certainly ended in 1991. 1999–). David Kay.5 329 . When UNSCOM’s inspectors left Iraq in 1998. definitively concluded in his “Compre- hensive Report” that “Iraq did not possess a nuclear device. and missile programs: the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM. regular monitoring. and British air strikes during Operation Desert Fox inflicted further damage on Iraqi leadership offices linked to the program. But many suspected Iraq still had nuclear ambitions and retained the capability and intention to restart its program co- vertly. Charles Duelfer. after four months of newly restarted inspections. and verification ef- forts—along with the damage from the Gulf War—had incapacitated the country’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. there were justifiable suspicions that Iraq could have tons of chemical weapons hidden or enough growth media to produce tons of new biological weapon agents.N. Security Council gave two groups the responsibility to inspect the Iraqi biologi- cal. After conducting six years of inspections in Iraq. the chief of the U.S. CHAPTER 17 Iraq Nuclear Weapons Capability Iraq never successfully developed a nuclear weapon. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) con- cluded in 1997 that its dismantling.S. For instance. The IAEA—charged by the U. Monitoring. The U. they still had many ques- tions about Iraq’s biological and chemical programs.4 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Iraq does not have an active chemical or biological weapons program or weap- ons stockpiles.N. government’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG). 1991–1999). stated his belief that Saddam Hussein main- tained an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons after 1991 but that the program “had been seriously degraded. Security Coun- cil with supervising nuclear disarmament and verification efforts in Iraq—was close to drawing such a conclusion in March 2003.

The ISG did find evidence of two cruise missile programs. after 1996. Missile and Delivery System Capability Iraq does not have an active missile or delivery system program beyond short- range systems. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq. The Strategic Context Iraq was created by the British Empire after World War I from three disparate Mesopotamian provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire. and inspections had destroyed Iraq’s ability to develop stocks of these weapons. only the missile program made any ad- vances after the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq was forced to destroy Al Samoud II missiles that exceeded the permitted 150-kilometer range by 30 kilometers. Iraq’s longest-range missiles were the 600- kilometer range Al Husseins (a modified Scud).” but he noted that Iraq essentially halted missile development once U.S. U. it had neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. abandoned chemical muni- tions have been discovered. inspectors did not find any Scud missiles.S. Kay concluded that air strikes. By the time the war began. troops after the 2003 Iraq War did not turn up any evidence of weapons stockpiles or of chemical or biological weap- ons programs active after 1991.8 Before the 2003 war. “In 1991 and 1992. offi- cials to conclude that it was maintaining active programs. Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological weapons] and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent.N. of which one may have been intended to develop systems with a 1.000-kilometer range. and Kurds in bloody counterinsurgency operations that killed tens of thousands of Arabs and more than 2.”7 Iraq ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1991. It did not have longer-range missiles after 1991. As of the spring of 2005. sanctions.N.” He also noted. had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. A military coup overthrew the monarchy in 1958 and soon established relations and arms trade with the Soviet . inspections began in 2002. the United States did not uncover evidence of Scud missiles or of UAVs capable of delivering chemical or biological agents.6 Intensive searches by the ISG and U.330 Nonpro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s Baghdad’s refusal to fully disclose all the details of its past efforts led U. but under UNMOVIC’s supervision. . Duelfer reported in 2004: “While a small number of old. Kay described a “substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs. Iraq had destroyed two-thirds of these missiles (72) and UNMOVIC was examining Iraqi UAVs for possible chemical weapon or biological weapon (CW or BW) delivery capability. . officials claimed that Iraq still possessed a force of Scud-type missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The British ruled Iraq through an installed monarchy after they suppressed a revolt by Sunni.000 British troops. After the war. Of all Iraq’s alleged illicit programs. These were destroyed after the 1991 war. U. .S. ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its unde- clared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. Shia.

. Iraq characterized this “aggression” as a coordinated effort by Iran and Saudi Arabia. which declared a formal cease-fire and ordered Iraq to “unconditionally accept the destruction. chemical. according to the former Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidhir Hamza. After the Osiraq attack. Iraq’s relations with Iran remained tense. and throughout the 1980s he saw nuclear. and it provided arms and diplomatic support to Iraq during the 1980s.N. After t