Deadly Arsenals

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Wolfsthal Miriam Rajkumar CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE Washington.C. AND CHEMICAL THREATS Second Edition Joseph Cirincione Jon B. . D.Deadly Arsenals NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL.

To order. I. Fax 202-483-1840 www. III. biological. D. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Includes bibliographical references and index. USA 1-800-275-1447 or 1-202-797-6258 Fax 202-797-2960. Jon B. Nuclear arms control—Verification. N. Wolfsthal. or trustees. II. Rajkumar.edu Composition by Stephen McDougal Back cover photo by Chad Evans Wyatt Maps by Dave Merrill Printed by Automated Graphic Systems Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Cirincione. Miriam Rajkumar.C. Chemical arms control—Verification. E-mail bibooks@brook. Biological arms control—Verification. 20042-0029.C57 2005 327. cm. U793. Washington. Weapons of mass destruction. the views and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment. 3.© 2005 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wolfsthal. Miriam. 2. Deadly arsenals : nuclear. All rights reserved. 20036 202-483-7600. its officers. and chemical threats / Joseph Cirincione. Title. ISBN-13: 978-0-87003-216-5 (isbn-13) ISBN-10: 0-87003-216-X (isbn-10) 1. Joseph. Jon B.org The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional posi- tions on public policy issues.C. D. contact Carnegie’s distributor: The Brookings Institution Press Department 029.CarnegieEndowment. p.. staff. Washington. — 2nd ed. 4. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue.1’74—dc22 2005012915 10 09 2345 1st Printing 2005 .W.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PART ONE: ASSESSMENTS AND WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 Chapter 14 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Chapter 10 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Chapter 12 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 PART TWO: DECLARED NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES . . . . . . . . . 57 Chapter 5 Missile Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 Chapter 21 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contents FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . 279 Chapter 15 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Chapter 11 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Chapter 16 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Chapter 2 The International Nonproliferation Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Chapter 4 Biological and Chemical Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Chapter 18 Non-Russian Nuclear Successor States: Belarus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Chapter 20 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Chapter 7 China . . . 317 Chapter 17 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Chapter 13 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Chapter 8 France . . . . . . . Agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Chapter 9 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 PART FIVE: NONPROLIFERATION SUCCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . and Proliferation . . . . 1 Chapter 1 Global Trends . 203 PART THREE: NON-NPT NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 PART FOUR: TWO HARD CASES . . . . . 119 Chapter 6 Russia . . . . . . 27 Chapter 3 Nuclear Weapons and Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Chapter 19 Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

489 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . . . 427 Appendix C The Chemical Weapons Convention Fact Sheet . . . . . . . 490 . . . . . 435 Appendix D Nuclear Supplier Organizations . . . . . . . and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Appendix F Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 Abbreviations and Acronyms . .vi Contents APPENDIXES . . . . . . . 488 About Carnegie’s Nonproliferation Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 About the Authors . . . . . . . . . 443 Appendix E The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 Appendix B The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 Appendix A The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 List of Maps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction . . . .

chemical. which reflects the international community’s greater confidence in the peaceful intentions of that country’s nuclear program. for example. 2001—that terrorists might seek and one day use nuclear. North Korea’s violation of its commitments and subsequent announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran. as did the Iraq conflict. however. The new material in this volume on the United States and Russia re- flects the fact that these two countries continue to work cooperatively to dis- mantle materials left over from the Cold War. news emerged that the A. Foreword In the three years since the first edition of Deadly Arsenals. underlined the treaty’s Achilles heel that allows a state to exploit NPT membership to become a nuclear state. Libya. Existing laws and export practices proved manifestly inad- equate to block these transfers of equipment and know-how. Khan network. and its declaration that it had acquired nuclear weapons. or biological weapons—swiftly rose to the top of an agenda that for 40 years had been focused on threats from states. based in Pakistan but involving engineers and businesspeople from more than a dozen countries. the field of nonpro- liferation has been through a period of breathtaking change—all of which is reflected in this new volume. or biological weapons in Iraq underlined how little outsiders can know about what happens within member states without inspectors on the ground. And Libya has become an important success story and a model for other nations to follow as it verifiably dismantles its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. does not include a chapter on Algeria. many more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have begun them. The threats posed by weapons pro- grams in the former Soviet republics have diminished considerably. we set out to produce the most complete and authoritative resource available anywhere from nonclassified sources vii . This new edition. Buyers included North Korea. chemical. which benefited substantially from partnership with the Khan net- work. There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapons programs than there were 20 years ago. and perhaps others. With the first edition of Deadly Arsenals. The news is not all bleak. In 2003. Q. The failure to find nuclear. One dangerous consequence of this failure has been the accelerated pace of the Iranian nuclear program. The threat brought to life by the attacks of Sep- tember 11. Since the signing of the NPT in 1968. the glaring gaps in the international community’s capacity for tough enforcement of nonprolifera- tion commitments. was able to traverse the world selling nuclear bomb designs and equipment necessary to produce nuclear weap- ons for years before it was stopped. North Korea’s actions emphasized.

MacArthur Founda- tion. We would like to thank the John D. MATHEWS President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . JESSICA T. accuracy. the Ford Foundation. I am confident that this second edition will earn the same reputation for comprehensive coverage. Though its content differs substantially from that of the first vol- ume. while highly labor intensive. clarity. chemical. the Nuclear Threat Initiative. reflecting the extraordinary pace of change in this field. is well worth the effort. government officials. the Ploughshares Fund. The widespread use of that volume and the warm feedback we have received from scholars. and Catherine T. and the New Land Foundation for their generous support of our work. users will find it to be the same reliable guide that its predecessor proved to be.viii Foreword on the spread of nuclear. and meticulous atten- tion to detail. the Carnegie Corporation of New York. and experts from around the world have reinforced our belief that this project. and biological weapons and their means of delivery. the Prospect Hill Foundation.

Leonard Spector. We are still grateful to those who provided vaulable suggestions for the first edition of this book: Michael Barletta. John Simpson. John Russell. Evan Medieros. and Frank Pabian. artistic cover and book design. Michael Eisenstadt. Maya coauthored the first edition’s chapter on chemical and biological weapons. graciously did the same for this new book. Michael Swaine. Our research benefited from exten- sive private discusions with defense and foreign affairs officials in many nations. and Sarah Schumacher—all of whom have now ad- vanced their careers. Thomas Cochran. the late Mark McDonough. we must ac- knowledge the international team of experts and scholars who generously gave their time and intellects to review chapters. Shai Feldman. Andrew Krepps. counting missiles. Avner Cohen. Acknowledgments For this substantially improved second edition of Deadly Arsenals. Hussein Haqqani. Judith Perera. as well as our Carnegie Endowment colleagues. As always. Camille Grand. and the dedicated 2002 Carnegie Endowment staff of Marshall Breit. They did a fabulous job researching develop- ments. Sally Murray James of Cutting Edge Design gave us a clean. We could not have produced this second edition without the help of the su- perb Carnegie Nonproliferation staff: Caterina Dutto. and Joshua Williams. and Gregory Koblentz. which formed the basis of our original study. Paul Walker. Geoffrey Kemp. We are indebted to the project’s founder. Toby Dalton. Kristensen at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Norris and Hans M. who greatly improved the chemical and biological weapons chapter in the first edition. and fact-checking revisions. Maya Pilatowicz. Revati Prasad. Jonathan Tucker. the authors of Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (1998). Jane Vaynman. and Andrew the chapter on missile proliferation. We would like to thank publicly Wade Boese. Rose Gottemoeller. the library staff of Kathleen Higgs and Chris Henley provided wonderful and timely research. The Carnegie Endowment’s Phyllis Jask patiently shepherded the manuscript through the publications maze to produce the high-quality book you now hold. and compositor Stephen McDougal produced the book in record time. Joel Wit. whose suggestion launched ix . John Redick. The first edition of this book stood on the broad shoulders of those who preceded us at the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project. Mark Smith. dissecting intelligence assessments. Once again. Gaurav Kampani. and Ashley Tellis. for their valuable amendments and suggestions. Alfred Imhoff copy ed- ited. George Perkovich. Hadi Semati. Jessica Mathews. None of this would have been possible without the guidance and support of the Carnegie Endowment’s president. and to Rodney Jones. data and analy- sis on the nuclear weapon arsenals of the United States and Russia relied heavily on the research and advice of Robert S.

the Ploughshares Fund and the New Land Foundation.x Acknowledgments the first edition of this book three years ago. and Carmen MacDougall. the Prospect Hill Foundation. With our great appreciation to those who worked to improve the quality of our work also goes our general absolution of any sins. Paul Balaran. and vice presidents George Perkovich. the Ford Founda- tion. the Carnegie Corporation of New York. the Nuclear Threat Initiative. MacArthur Foundation. We are ever grateful for the faith and generous support of the John T. . and Catherine D. the authors alone accept responsibility for the content and any errors that may remain.

PART ONE Assessments and Weapons 1 .

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.S. (U.doe.PREVIOUS PAGE: The XX-39 CLIMAX. was a 61 kiloton device fired June 4. at the Nevada Test Site. part of Operation Upshot/Knothole. 1953. AVAILABLE AT www.gov/news&pubs) .nv.

The term also blurs the possible responses to threats. but it is very difficult to turn these agents into effective weapons. killing hundreds of thousands instantly and leaving lingering radiation that would ren- der large areas uninhabitable for years. concern is very high. and the availability of measures that can protect against them. North Korea. figures. The book is in- tended to serve as a proliferation atlas and ready reference for students. this phrase conflates very different threats from weapons that differ greatly in lethality. All the parts of the book emphasize factual and historical analysis of weapons programs. which is almost certainly true. Biological weapon agents can be made in most medical laboratories. biological. The first threat is real. Nuclear weap- ons are difficult to produce. To inform these debates. which was highly unlikely. Chemical weapons are easy to manufacture. has varied over the years from near hysteria to apathy. saying that Syria has weapons of mass destruction merges the danger that it has chemical weapons.1 One significant change in the new edition is that it no longer employs the term “weapons of mass destruction. Libya. and tables from the first edition published in 2002. Iran. consequence of use. but one weapon can destroy an entire city. and prompt inoculation and quar- antine could limit the number of victims and the areas affected. During this first decade of the twenty-first century. and concerned citizens alike.” Though used widely by officials and the media. This edition includes new chapters on Iraq. For example. Official and public attention to proliferation issues. experts. but they inflict rela- tively limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly. and chemical weapons is widely recog- nized as the most serious threat to the national security of the United States and other nations. which is certainly not true. this second edition of Deadly Arsenals revises and updates all the chapters. however. but its elimination requires an entirely different set of policies than does the second. This study 3 . which are needed to capture the dramatic developments of the past three years. which was possible. CHAPTER 1 Global Trends The proliferation of nuclear. and new information and analysis on other countries. A failure to differentiate these threats can lead to seriously flawed policy. with the danger that it had nuclear bombs. with the danger that it has a nuclear bomb. with passionate international debates over which strategies can best prevent the spread and use of these weapons. Similarly. justifying for some the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a potential chemical weapons attack. the repeated use of the term “weap- ons of mass destruction” to describe the potential threat from Iraq before the 2003 war merged the danger that it still had anthrax-filled shells.

Military researchers produced weapons that could deliver poison gas. aerial bombs. Chapters 3. including the international network of treaties and agreements constructed over the past 50 years to prevent and reduce prolifera- tion. Security Council declared that their spread constituted a “threat to international peace and secu- rity. biological. but all the belligerent nations had biological weapon research programs. and Germany invented and used nerve gas to kill millions of Jews and other prisoners in its concentration camps.4 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s disaggregates these threats.” In early 2001. Japan inaugurated biological war- fare in its attacks against the Chinese at the beginning of World War II. of course. interests worldwide. There is nothing new. the United States and the Soviet Union. chemical. biological. the absolute numbers of these weapons have decreased dramati- cally. officials and experts agreed that the acquisition of those weapons by other nations or groups posed the most serious remaining threat. when both the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact perfected and produced tens of thousands of nuclear. when the United States struck Japanese cities. agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to eliminate all their chemical and biological weapons. Bush said. and chemical weapons were twentieth-century inventions. as both the Central Powers and the Allies tried attacks with chlorine gas. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded in its annual threat assessment. and other key technologies remains the greatest direct threat to U. Global arse- nals peaked during the Cold War years of the 1960s. for example. some of them harder to see and harder to answer. Poison gas was used for the first time during World War I.” In 1998. and other agents to break the trench warfare stalemate. considering weapons and programs as they actually appear. 4. about mass destruction. Nuclear weapons were used for the first and last time at the end of that war. and outlines the prospects for the next few years. “The grave threat from nuclear. the U. describes the weapons and the nations that have or wish to have them. Since then. and early 1980s. mustard gas. biological. and 5 describe in greater detail the characteristics of the various weapons and the specific national programs that exist or may evolve. and chemical bombs.S. It has evolved into many separate threats. missiles.N. germs. later. 1970s. the U. missiles. As the Industrial Revolution mechanized warfare. President George W. the industrialized nations sought ways to more efficiently kill armored troops or unprotected popu- lations dispersed over wide areas and to annihilate military and economic tar- gets. and nuclear explosions with artillery. Chapter 2 details the major elements of the nonproliferation regime. In January 1992. The Twentieth Century’s Deadly Legacy Nuclear. .”2 This chapter provides a brief overview of global proliferation threats. and biological weap- ons. and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. which had the vast majority of global holdings. “The proliferation of nuclear. Even before the end of the Cold War.S. a military campaign often meant the slaughter of tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians. and. As the threat of global thermonuclear war receded. From ancient times.

The development of accurate threat assessments and effective national poli- cies requires understanding the technologies of the various types of weapons. The members of this group acquired their arsenals dur- ing the 20 years after World War II. Global Trends 5 Chapters 6 through 21 review the history and status of the most significant national programs. The sections below give a brief overview. In order of the size of their nuclear arsenals.) Updates and expansion of the information in this volume. including those countries that have given up nuclear weap- ons. Today. They also face the possibility that some nation or group still has or soon could have bio- logical weapons. including ballistic missiles. artillery. Although a terrorist attack on these infrastructures using conventional weap- ons is the most likely threat—as seen by the terrorist attacks on September 11. plus the latest developments. There is also now the added danger that terrorist organizations could kill thousands with these weapons or by sabotaging critical urban and industrial infrastructures. It is followed by a global assessment of the current threats and of past and proposed nonproliferation policies.ProliferationNews. compact nuclear device can instantly devastate a midsized city. 2004.1). France. Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are the most deadly weapons ever invented—the only true weapons of mass destruction. trucks. in New York and Washington and on March 11. aircraft. in Madrid—the explosion of a nuclear weapon would be the most devastating. only eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. ships. Weapons and Trends The nations of the world confront serious and immediate threats from the glo- bal presence of thousands of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons. cruise missiles. A single. (The appendixes to the book include detailed information on the main nonproliferation treaties and nuclear supplier organizations. they are Russia. China. with greater detail provided in the country chapters that follow (see table 1. and envelopes.2). along with an ex- tensive glossary of nonproliferation and weapons terms. Five nuclear weapon states are recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and enjoy spe- cial rights and privileges under international law. the history of their spread. and the successes and failures of nonproliferation efforts. and discussions. 2001. the United States. A wide variety of delivery mechanisms for these weapons exists. are available at the Carnegie Endowment’s proliferation web site (www. and the group remained remarkably stable .3 This calculation of “risk times consequences” should force us to focus most of our attention on this catastrophic possibility while not neglecting the threats from chemical and biological weapons and doing all we can to prevent conventional attacks.org). a list of abbreviations and acronyms also appears at the end of the book. and the United Kingdom (see table 1. debates. Nuclear weapons are also the most difficult of the three types of weapons to manufacture or acquire.

to maintain high yields in smaller bombs. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons use the toxic properties. called boosting. and survivability under environmental stress. as opposed to the explosive properties. A Weapons Guide Nuclear Weapons A nuclear weapon is a device with explosive energy. and they provide the catalyst for more complex thermonuclear explosions. lethality. The advent of genetic engineering has had a profound impact on the threat from bio- logical weapons. virulence. Because most biological agents are living organisms. but to a lesser extent. viruses (such as smallpox). Any country possessing a pharmaceutical or food storage infrastructure already has an inherent sta- bilization and storage system for biological agents. usually deuterium and tritium. their natural rep- lication after dissemination increases the potential impact of a strike.6 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1. such as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. most or all of which is derived from fission or a combination of fission and fusion processes. Explosions from such devices cause catastrophic damage due both to the high temperatures and ground shocks produced by the initial blast and the lasting residual radiation. and toxins (such as ricin). rickettsiae (such as Q fever). In such weapons. Biological Weapons Biological weapons intentionally disseminate agents of infectious diseases and of conditions that would otherwise appear only naturally or not at all. production rate per cell. Though aerosol deliv- ery is optimal. explosive delivery is also effective. a fission ex- plosion creates the high temperatures necessary to join light isotopes of hydrogen. the incubation period. and stability. are the easiest to make. of chemical substances to cause physical or physiological harm . toxicity. Each nucleus that is split releases energy as well as additional neutrons that bombard nearby nuclei and sustain a chain reaction. These agents can be divided into bacteria (such as anthrax).1. Fission bombs. The features of these agents that influence their potential for use as weapons include infectivity. pathogenicity. fungi. which similarly liberate energy and neutrons. Most modern nuclear weapons use a combination of the two processes. chlamydia. Agents that are extremely harmful can be modified to increase their virulence. transmissibility. mak- ing biological weapons even more attractive. owing to the possibility of organism inactivation caused by heat from the blast. as well as to mask their presence from immune- based detectors. Nuclear fission weapons produce energy by splitting the nucleus of an atom—usually of highly enriched uranium or plutonium—into two or more parts by bombarding it with neutrons.

marked the first use of chemical weapons to produce a significant military effect. SOURCES Federation of American Scientists. . which are all liquids at room temperature. or anti-cholinesterase agents. Mustard gas. Global Trends 7 to an enemy.org/nuke/intro/cw/intro. which even in low doses cause painful burns necessitating medical attention.fas. would contaminate large areas for years pending expensive removal operations. The area of dis- persal would depend on the size of the explosion. could be targeted with large explosive devices to disperse very high levels of radioactivity into the atmosphere and the surrounding area. Department of State.fas. and eventually death. it was used to inflict numerous casualties during the Iran- Iraq War. Radiological Weapons Radiological weapons use conventional explosives such as dynamite and C-4 to disperse radioactive materials over large areas. or even a radioactive gas.org/nuke/ intro/bw/intro. artillery shells. available at www. Victims not injured in the explosion would be exposed to life-threatening levels of radiation. The advent of such blistering agents as mustard gas and lewisite. depending on the size of the explosion. both of which are exceedingly volatile and toxic. were employed during World War I and consisted primarily of commer- cial chemicals used as choking and blood agents.gov/www/global/ arms/treaties/bwc1. Other types of chemical weapons include mental and physical incapacitants (such as BZ) and binary systems. such as a nuclear reactor or spent-fuel storage depots. which in general use an explosion to expel an internal agent laterally. Alternatively.S. a source of radioactive material. Classic chemical weapons. rockets.htm. both of which have under- gone limited military development. These gases.html. were discovered by the Ger- mans in the 1930s and represent the beginning of modern chemical war- fare. causing a loss of muscle control. such as chlorine and phosgene. Biological Weapons. has been a popular weapon. Such agents block an enzyme in the body that is essential for the functioning of the nervous system. are lethal far more quickly and in far smaller quantities than are classic agents and are effective both when inhaled and when absorbed through the skin. respi- ratory failure. Chemical weapons can be delivered through bombs. because of its low cost and ability to produce resource-debilitating casualties. U. Chemical Weapons Intro- duction.state. available at www. This radiation also would inhibit or prevent emergency response teams from aiding the victims and. which caused respira- tory damage and asphyxiation. spray tanks. powder. Nerve gases. Nerve gases can be classified as either G agents (sarin) or V agents (VX). Federation of American Scientists.htm. Biological Weapons Convention. The most common method for their use is as explosives surrounded by radioactive material in the form of pellets. and missile warheads. available at www.

as such. thanks in great measure to the dedi- cated diplomacy of the George H.2. on the eve of its transition to majority rule.300 China 410 France 350 United Kingdom 200 Israel 100–170 suspected India 75–110 possible Pakistan 50–110 possible Suspected Programs Iran North Korea from 1964. and it soon announced its withdrawal from the NPT. two others may be actively pursuing nuclear weapons programs. resolutions. Since the signing of the NPT in 1968. South Africa. Israel is widely believed to have approxi- mately 100 nuclear weapons but neither acknowledges nor denies their exist- ence. W.000 United States 10.4 There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapons programs than there were 20 or 30 years ago. India and Pakistan have not yet openly deployed any weapons. Iran is a member state of the NPT and. and Israel are not parties to the NPT. and Kazakhstan gave up the thousands of nuclear weapons deployed on their territories when the Soviet Union dissolved. Iran is slowly but steadily pursuing an open civilian nuclear power program and may be covertly developing expertise for nuclear weapons. if proved. could subject it to additional sanctions or even military action through U. many more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have begun them.5 In the past 20 years. Apart from these eight countries. Ukraine. when China tested its first nuclear weapon. and four others have relinquished their nuclear weapons to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. however. Similarly. several major countries have abandoned nuclear pro- grams. India. North Ko- rean officials declared publicly for the first time that they had nuclear weapons. Belarus. The 1994 agree- ment that had frozen the nation’s plutonium program broke down in 2002. President . but both are capable of configuring aircraft and missiles with tens of weapons over the next few years. World Nuclear Arsenals Known Programs Number of Weapons Russia 16. North Korea acknowledges a program and may have accu- mulated enough material to construct as many as nine weapons. if they so desire.8 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1. any nuclear weapons program is illegal and. destroyed the six nuclear weapons its apartheid regime had secretly constructed. when India and Pakistan both detonated nuclear devices and declared their intention to deploy weapons. In January 2005. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations.N. Pakistan. until 1998. including Argentina and Brazil.

disarmament efforts. They are second only to nuclear weapons in their potential to cause mass casu- alties. and chemical weapons. the United States and the Soviet Union perfected bio- logical weapons. to disperse radioactive materials. which is exactly the logic that inspired the original members of the NPT decades earlier. Global Trends 9 Nelson Mandela agreed with the decision. biological weapons stockpile and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful . where the use or possession of nuclear weap- ons is prohibited anywhere on the continent. A terrorist act involving the dispersal of radioactive materials would contaminate a wide area. including the highly radioactive waste material from nuclear power reactors or other nonweapon sources. Radiological weapons. also pose a serious danger. triggering an explosion that could be many times more deadly than the accident at Chernobyl. Although instances of the deliberate spread of disease go back to the an- cient Greeks and Assyrians. During the Cold War. storage pools for spent-fuel rods from civilian nuclear reactors). With the exception of the Japanese attacks in China before and during World War II. making the treatment of casualties more difficult. In 1969. Nixon an- nounced that the United States would unilaterally and unconditionally renounce biological weapons.6 As with chemical and biological agents. the efficient weaponization of biological agents did not occur until the twentieth century. There is also the risk of a “reverse dirty bomb” that brings the conventional explosive to an existing radioactive source (e. (Africa is one of several areas of the world that have estab- lished nuclear-weapon-free zones. although not as destructive as nuclear explosive weap- ons. These are weap- ons that use conventional explosives. such as dynamite.S. concluding that South Africa’s secu- rity was better served in a nuclear-free Africa than in one with several nuclear nations. the invisible and uncertain danger from these weapons would cause widespread fear and horror.N. particularly as a terrorist threat. ex- posing many people unhurt in the initial explosion to death and injury from radioactivity and rendering large areas uninhabitable.) Iraq gave up its nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent U. They may be attractive weapons for ter- rorists owing to the relative ease of their acquisition and use and mass disruption potential. though the United States led a coalition of nations to invade Iraq. Libya gave up its nuclear and chemical weapons programs and long-range missile pro- gram in December 2003 after negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom. each developing arsenals capable of destroying all human life and many food crops on the planet.. Algeria showed some interest in nuclear weapons over the years but turned away from these programs in the 1990s and is no longer considered a high-risk state. He ordered the destruction of the entire U. claiming that the country still had major programs for nuclear. these weapons have not been used in modern warfare. pending sizable removal and cleansing operations. President Richard M.g. Biological Weapons Biological weapons are weapons that intentionally use living organisms to kill. biological.

There is still considerable uncertainty surrounding Russian weapon facilities. These nations are all suspected of pursuing offensive biological weapons programs prohibited by the BWC. 169 nations had signed the treaty. and the possibility exists that agents and weapons remain in Russia. Iran. stockpiling. China. in fact. Although the Soviet Union claimed that it had ended its extensive bioweapons program when it signed the BWC in 1972. officials have publicly identified many of these nations on sev- eral occasions. advanced . such as Israel. He reversed 45 years of U. however. Israel. capability. or transfer of bio- logical weapons. Milton Leitenberg points out that official assessments rarely distinguish between suspected. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION.10 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s purposes. Egypt. The chapters on specific countries provide the full details of each program. acquisition. four others—Iran. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS. U. Nixon successfully negotiated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- vention (BWC). and the states that are parties to it have been trying to negotiate a verification protocol and additional measures to strengthen it.7 This book differentiates the distinct programs and threats.S. which prohibited the use of biological and chemical weapons in war (and which was subsequently ratified under President Gerald Ford). Almost all the programs are research efforts. it may have produced anthrax and more advanced agents in weaponized form as well as toxins. have only research and development programs. are members of the BWC. officials believe that North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and may have the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of a decision to do so. This treaty requires all signatories to destroy all their biological weapons and biological weapon production facilities. and South Africa. however. and weapon.8 China has a large. Worse. though not all the countries. By the spring of 2005. North Korea. and China—may have done so. Israel. 4 nations were thought to have biological weapons: the United States. and Syria (table 1. production. which pro- hibits the development. and only one nation—Russia—is believed to have produced and stockpiled weapon agents. North Korea. reluctance and sought the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.S. National programs are distinguished by whether they have produced actual weapons. or have the basic capability to produce agents. developing.S. continued at substantial levels. the Soviet Union. It is often difficult to get a complete picture of which countries or groups have biological weapons or programs. nations with such capabilities or programs are often lumped together in lists with countries that have chemical weapons programs or capabilities. When the BWC originally entered into force in 1975. signed in 1972 and ratified by the Senate in 1975.3). U. including at the 1996 and 2001 review conferences for the BWC and in annual reports to Congress. President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 disclosed that work had. seven nations are suspected of having some level of offensive biological warfare research programs: China. The treaty has no verifica- tion mechanism. Russia. Israel is believed to have a sophisticated bio- logical weapons program.

POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON RESEARCH PROGRAMS.S. and Taiwan. U.14 Sudan is not believed to have a biological weapons program. but inspections after the 2003 war in Iraq and the 2003 agreement with Libya showed that neither had an active program.11 In 1996.S. terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents have fallen short of successful weaponization. or stockpiled biologi- cal weapons. although official assessments note that both countries have the resources and capability to support biological warfare research and development efforts.13 Syria has a biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited agent development but has not begun a major effort to produce biological agents or to put them into weapons. including the capability to produce small quan- tities of biological weapons agents.15 Finally. undersecretary of state John Bolton said that Iran had actually produced agents and weapons.S. Iran may have an offen- sive biological weapons program. however. During the past several decades. assessments. but U.9 but he had a more cautious assessment in 2004: “I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iran has an offensive biological weap- ons program. officials reported that by 1972 Egypt had developed biological warfare agents and that there was “no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case. India and Pakistan are not believed to have produced or stockpiled offensive biological weapons. BIOTERRORISM. Global Trends 11 Table 1. U.”12 Egyp- tian officials assert that Egypt never developed.”10 There is considerable evidence that Egypt started a program in the early 1960s that produced weaponized agents. Chinese officials have repeatedly asserted that the country has never re- searched or produced biological weapons.S. produced. according to official U. U. which is now rarely mentioned in either official or expert reviews.S.S. Countries Suspected of Retaining Biological Weapons or Programs China Egypt Iran Israel North Korea Russia Syria biotechnical infrastructure that could be used to develop and produce biological agents. officials had long believed that both Iraq and Libya had biological weapons or programs. officials. Almost all threats . officials have re- peatedly warned of Sudanese interest in developing such a program. which had a bioweapons program that the new unity government says it ended in 1992. U.3. believe that the voluntary BWC declarations submitted by China are inaccurate and incomplete. Other states of some concern include South Africa. In November 2001.

2007. Rajneesh. The letters killed five and infected eighteen others. Chemical weapons have been used only in isolated instances of warfare since World War I. infecting 750 people. The first suc- cessful terrorist incident involving biological agents occurred in 1984 in Dalles.12 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s to use biological agents—including hundreds of terrorist anthrax hoaxes against abortion clinics and other targets in the United States—have been false alarms. Chemical Weapons Mass casualties require large amounts of chemical agents relative to either bio- logical or nuclear weapons. and it resorted to using the chemi- cal agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo subway in 1994 and 1995. but with no fatalities. tried for several years. some- one sent letters containing anthrax to members of Congress and the media. population. despite (or perhaps because of ) the substantial numbers of weap- ons that were in national arsenals. to produce and weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax. The CWC requires all state parties possessing chemical weapons to de- stroy them in a safe and environmentally friendly manner not later than ten years after the treaty entered into force. 5 metric tons of the nerve gas sarin carried in bombs and dropped by two strike aircraft or the warheads of 36 Scud missiles could kill 50 percent of the people over 4 square kilometers. Still. The treaty also requires all state parties to destroy or convert all present and past capabilities used to produce chemical weapons by that time. In the United States in October 2001. and South Korea—have declared their possession of chemical weapons stockpiles totaling more than 70. Russia. disseminated salmonella bacteria in ten restaurants. The declarations by the United States and Russia account for the vast majority of known chemical weapon stockpiles. Some experts contend that the complexity of a biological weapon design for effective dissemination has by and large thwarted bioterrorism. 168 countries were state parties to the CWC. when a religious cult. and with con- siderable funding and expertise. or by April 29. a Hiroshima-size nuclear bomb of 12-kiloton yield would kill 50 percent of the population over 30 square kilometers. The group’s extensive efforts failed. When the bioterrorism attack that many had long feared finally came. The 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) started a process of “deproliferation.000 met- ric tons of agents. Four countries—the United States. Even this limited attack caused mass disruption and cost billions of dollars in decontamination and prevention expenses.S. The terrorist either did not realize that sophisticated dispersal mechanisms were re- quired for mass casualties from anthrax or simply did not care. Oregon. As of the spring of 2005.000 metric tons is the largest declared stockpile. India.” whereby most nations declared their holdings (if any) and began eliminating their arsenals and production fa- cilities.16 By comparison. but this was the first time that a biological warfare agent was used against the U. unless special extensions are granted. it was not what the experts had predicted. The Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo. . The attack could have been much worse. There have been only two significant biological attacks by terrorists in recent times. Russia’s 40. for example.

the United States. Pakistan.700 metric tons of chemical agents were destroyed. Countries Suspected of Retaining Significant Chemical Weapons Programs China Egypt Iran Israel North Korea Syria and that nation’s financial difficulties make complete elimination of its stockpile by 2007 impossible. Israel. and blood agents. officials say that in the past Iran has stockpiled blister. Russia. Japan. intelligence assessments state that North Korea has had a long-standing chemical warfare program. South Korea.19 Egypt was the first country in the Middle East to obtain chemi- cal weapons and the first to use them. but there is no publicly available evidence of such activity. The other coun- tries sometimes suspected of conducting chemical weapons research include India. U.20 It is believed still to have a research program and has never reported the destruction of any of its chemical agents or weapons. North Korea is believed to have a large stockpile of these agents and weapons.6 million chemical weapons declared by the four possessor states was eliminated through treaty procedures between 1997 and February 2005. and U. including the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve. Eleven nations have declared their possession of existing or former chemical weapon production facilities: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Forty-nine of the 64 declared facilities were destroyed or converted. France. SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES.4). China. mortars. officials believe it has a significant stockpile of the nerve agent sarin. and Yugoslavia.21 Iranian officials deny these charges. the United Kingdom. Iran’s declaration at the May 1998 session of the CWC conference was the first time that nation had admitted to having had a chemical weapons program. Iran. Israel. Syria.17 The most significant remaining suspected national programs are those of China. U. It reportedly employed phosgene and mustard gas against Yemeni royalist forces in the mid-1960s. A 1990 intelligence assessment reported that Syria had weaponized these chemicals in 500-kilogram aerial bombs and warheads for its Scud-B missiles. choking. blood.S. and Taiwan. and Egypt are not members of the CWC. appar- ently developed in response to Iraqi chemical warfare attacks during the Iran- Iraq War.S. Sudan. and Syria (table 1. India. Syria has not signed the CWC. . and one-fourth of the 8.18 Israel is also believed to have an active research and development program for chemical warfare agents and to have produced and stockpiled weapons. and aerial bombs. Iran. blister. nearly 10. and choking chemical agents and has weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells. North Korea. Global Trends 13 Table 1.4. rockets.S. Egypt.

S. pledging to destroy them by 2006. they are probably for the development of commercial chemical industrial activities and not for a dedicated warfare pro- gram. Yet by several other important criteria.5). The number of countries trying to develop long- range ballistic missiles has not changed greatly in 20 years and is somewhat smaller than in the past. believe that China has a moderate inventory of traditional agents. and medium-range ballistic missiles (see chapter 5. intermediate-range. Pakistan sometimes appears on a list of countries with chemical “capabilities” because it has the ability to manu- facture chemical weapons should it choose to do so. Scud-type missiles. but it has not yet joined the CWC. the ballistic missile threat to the United States is significantly smaller than it was in the mid-1980s. South Korea ended its weapons program when it ratified the CWC in 1997 and has been destroying its chemical weapons and production facilities. Though Pakistan has im- ported a number of dual-use chemicals. Sudan is a member of the CWC. Most nations that have missiles have only short-range. according to some measures.14 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s China has ratified the CWC and has declared that it does not possess an inventory of chemical agents. The nations now attempting to do so are also smaller.22 Libya gave up its offensive chemical weapons capability with the 2003 nego- tiations and has joined the CWC. Iraq’s chemical weapons program ended after the 1991 Gulf War. India’s activities and exports of dual-use equipment and chemical precursors cause some concern. Albania discovered and declared a small cache of chemical weapons in 2004. Though it has pledged to destroy all agents and production facilities. CHEMICAL WEAPON RESEARCH PROGRAMS. and many of these arsenals are being retired as they age. This has not changed since Russia and China deployed their first intercontinental . U. Missile Proliferation Much of the proliferation debate over the past few years has centered not on the weapons themselves but on one possible means for delivering them: ballistic missiles (table 1. It has become common wisdom and a political habit to refer to the growing threat of ballistic missiles. “Missile Proliferation”). India’s declaration under the CWC in June 1997 was the first time that nation acknowledged it had a chemical warfare production program. Sudan may have an active interest in acquiring the capability to produce chemical agents but is not believed to have done so. however. there are now dramatically fewer long-range. an advanced chemical warfare pro- gram and a wide variety of potential delivery systems. and less technologically advanced than were those with missile programs 20 years ago. Only China and Russia have the capability to hit the mainland of the United States with nuclear warheads on intercontinental land-based ballistic missiles. The threat is certainly changing and is increasing. officials. poorer. In comparison with the high point of deployments in the mid-1980s.

500+ kilometers): China Russia United Kingdom France United States ballistic missiles in 1959 and 1981. and Pakistan. This merges very-short-range mis- siles.000 kilometers): Afghanistan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Armenia Libya Ukraine Bahrain Slovakia United Arab Emirates Belarus South Korea Vietnam Egypt Syria Yemen Greece Taiwan Iraq Turkey Seven countries possess medium-range ballistic missiles (with ranges of 1. and regime collapse. nuclear weapons pose the greatest risks.5.S.000 kilometers): China Iran North Korea India Israel Pakistan Saudi Arabia One country possesses intermediate-range ballistic missiles (with ranges of 3. of which there are few. new nuclear weapon states and regional conflict. interests as forward-deployed troops or allied nations.500 kilometers): China Five countries possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (with ranges of 5. of which there are many.000–5. Iran. We can catego- rize these threats along four axes. respectively. though developments along one axis often influence developments along the others. with long-range missiles. A Global Nuclear Threat Assessment On the basis of the proceeding information. The greatest programs of concern are those developing medium-range mis- siles in India. The greatest concerns are outlined here. None of these nations view their programs as threatening. . Though these programs are a cause for serious regional concern and could develop into potential international threats.000–3. North Korea. existing nuclear arsenals. overall the ballistic missile threat is limited and changing slowly. Global Trends 15 Table 1. These four categories of threat are nuclear terrorism. The Thirty Nations with Ballistic Missiles Nineteen countries possess only short-range ballistic missiles (that is. with ranges of less than 1. Israel. it is reasonable to conclude that of all the potential threats. but their neighbors take a decidedly differ- ent view. Confusion arises when policy makers speak of missile threats to the United States or to such U.

A nuclear chain reaction could ripple throughout a region and across the globe. or national futures to protect. The greater danger is the reactions of other states in the region. weakening their ability to intervene to avoid conflict in dangerous regions—as well as. possibly leading to regional wars and to nuclear catastrophe. and hence well guarded. Existing regional nuclear tensions already pose serious risks.16 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Nuclear Terrorism: The Most Serious Threat Although states can be deterred from using nuclear weapons by fear of retalia- tion. because acquiring a supply of nuclear material (as opposed to making the weapon itself ) remains the most difficult challenge for a terrorist group. though with more difficulty. the nations of Europe. States are and will continue to be deterred from such attacks by the certainty of swift and massive retaliation. There are also significant stockpiles of plutonium that could be used in a weapon. There is also a substantial risk of terrorist theft from the nuclear stockpiles in more than 40 countries around the world. Terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear weapons therefore poses the greatest single nuclear threat. emboldening Tehran. people. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities . if any. and fissile material kept at dozens of civilian sites around the world. the most likely sources of nuclear weap- ons and materials for terrorists are storage areas in the former states of the Soviet Union and in Pakistan. So-called outlaw states are not the most likely source. And along with these rapid developments and the collapse of existing norms could come increased regional tensions. or other new possessors. are small and exceedingly precious. even as China and India continue their rivalry.23 New nuclear weapon states might also constrain the United States and others. Their stockpiles. National instability or a radical change in government could lead to the collapse of state control over nuclear weapons and materials and to the migration of nuclear scientists to the service of other nations or groups. In Northeast Asia. Pyongyang. Many of these caches of materials consist of highly enriched uranium that could be directly used in nuclear weap- ons or further enriched to weapons grade. terrorists. triggering weap- ons decisions in several. of course. who do not have land.) Rather. Terrorist organi- zations and radical fundamentalist groups operate within Pakistan’s borders. may not be deterrable. The decades-long conflict between India and Pakistan has made South Asia for many years the re- gion most likely to witness the first use of nuclear weapons since World War II. Russia and other former Soviet states possess thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of inadequately secured nuclear material. other states. There is an active missile race under way between the two nations. New Nuclear Nations and Regional Conflicts The danger posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is not that either country would likely use these weapons to attack the United States. or other countries. perhaps many. The gravest danger arises from terrorists’ access to state stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. (Nor are these states likely to give away what they see as the jewels in their security crowns.

which is widely regarded as a pillar of the nonprolif- eration regime.25 Recent advocacy by some in the United States of new battlefield uses for nuclear weapons could lead to new nuclear tests. Egypt. each views others’ arsenals with suspicion. Non-nuclear states may therefore feel released from their pledge not to acquire nuclear arms. or international nonproliferation demands. these leaders may feel a strong need for equity so that they can show their public that giving up nuclear aspira- tions is fair and in their interest. The NPT has already been severely threatened by the development in several states of facilities for enriching uranium and reprocessing plutonium.S. This greatly increases the risk of an unauthorized launch. Global Trends 17 remain shrouded in uncertainty but presumably continue to advance.S. and essential to its security. the United Kingdom. The five nuclear weapon states recog- nized by the NPT have not tested since the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. India. Though the Cold War has been over for more than a dozen years. Iran’s nuclear program. In the Middle East.24 The Risk from Existing Arsenals There are grave dangers inherent in the maintenance of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia and the hundreds of weapons held by China. three. To the extent that the leaders of a given state are contemplating acceding to U. Although . Though each state regards its nuclear weapons as safe. and Pakistan. It is difficult. or five such states within a de- cade—with existing political and territorial disputes still unresolved. tests would trigger tests by other nations and cause the collapse of the CTBT. together with Israel’s nuclear ar- senal and the chemical weapons of other neighboring states. and Russian nuclear arsenals remain at Cold War levels. many nations will conclude that the weapon states’ promise to reduce and eventually eliminate these arsenals has been broken. and no state has tested since India and Pakistan did so in May 1998. France. if not impossible. or others might initiate or revive their nuclear weapons programs. to demonstrate either positive outcome when immensely powerful nuclear weapon states reas- sert the importance of nuclear weapons to their own security. ready to launch within fifteen minutes. New U. this extreme level of readiness also enhances the possibility that either country’s president could prematurely order a nuclear strike based on flawed intelligence. It is possible that the Middle East could go from a region with one nuclear weapon state to one with two.S. add grave volatility to an already conflict-prone region. The Risk of Regime Collapse If U. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia. Miscalcula- tion or misunderstanding could bring nuclear war to the Korean peninsula. Israel. Washing- ton and Moscow maintain thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert. secure. Because there is no time buffer built into each state’s decision-making process.

There is a real possibility. and France in the early 1960s possessed nuclear weapons. If the number of states with nuclear weapons increases.S. of a systemwide collapse. Twenty years after Kennedy’s warning. Several times in the past few decades. with each country accruing prestige and increased attention from leading nuclear weapon states. Most nations would continue to eschew nuclear weapons. there appears to be growing acceptance of the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. Successes and Failures of the Nonproliferation Regime Ever since American scientists detonated the first nuclear bomb at Alamogordo. and negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. if only for technological and economic reasons. was then developing plans to build 100 nuclear weapons to equip its air force. dangerous world with dozens of nations armed with nuclear weapons. President John F. the public’s fear of nuclear war has moved millions of people worldwide to petition for an immediate change in their governments’ policies. creating a bleak. Neutral Sweden. it is possible that Brazil. the original nuclear weapon states fail to comply with their disarmament obligations. New Mexico. the resulting supplies of nuclear materials give each country a “virtual” nuclear weapons capa- bility. many officials and experts have feared the future. but others would decide that nuclear weapons were nec- essary to improve their security or status. which were codified in the NPT in 1968. in July 1945. This situation greatly erodes the confidence that states can have in a neighbor’s non-nuclear pledge. for example. and other major non-nuclear nations will reconsider their nuclear choices. Kennedy moved aggressively to counter those trends. More than once. U. Japan. only China (with Soviet help) had openly joined the ranks of the new nuclear nations. Additionally. the United Kingdom. began negotiations on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. They have worried that proliferation could run out of control. The concern was not that developing countries would acquire the bomb but rather that the advanced industrial nations would do so. as Jonathan Schell titled his book in 1982. the Soviet Union. All the other . under these conditions. and states such as India gain status for having nuclear weapons. and in outer space. Kennedy worried that while only the United States. diplomacy and international efforts to create legal and diplomatic barri- ers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. including the United States. under water. the very fate of the Earth seemed to be at stake. Several European nations were already actively pursuing nuclear weap- ons programs. and navy. which ended nuclear tests in the atmosphere. He created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961. dramatically stopped the rush toward nuclear weapons status. whereas India had exploded a so-called peace- ful nuclear device and Israel was building a secret nuclear arsenal.18 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s each state has asserted that these facilities are for civilian use only. by the end of the decade 15 or 20 nations would have them. army. Some now ar- gue that a nuclear Iran or North Korea could also be absorbed into the interna- tional system without serious consequence. particularly Japan and Germany.

. which was sometimes known as vertical proliferation. Although nuclear. under any circumstances. The threat of nuclear terrorism is also growing. Moreover. . others started new ones. Global Trends 19 nations that had studied nuclear programs in the 1950s and 1960s had aban- doned their pursuits. The pro- liferation of biological and chemical weapons is broader. possess or use either biological or chemical weapons. and the international norm has been firmly established that countries should not. the nonproliferation regime has still had a remarkable record of success (see figure 1. Most of the world’s biological weapons have been destroyed. 2001. Although the regime may have . Often a majority of nations was able to agree on new treaties and new restraints. biological. Global expectations are that the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons will be greatly reduced. even if their eventual elimination seems but a distant hope. “Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. the number of new prospective nuclear na- tions has shrunk dramatically during the past 20 years. material and expertise. President Bush said during his meetings with Russian president Vladimir Putin in November 2001. . however. to constrain the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Even with all the serious challenges it has faced. but never easily and never without serious setbacks. . . . however. only four nations are known to have overcome the substantial diplomatic and technical barriers to manufacturing nuclear weapons. the world confronts a fundamentally different proliferation problem. the world has not been devastated by a thermonuclear war. and chemical arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union once grew to enormous levels and the technology of these weapons has become increasingly accessible. The spread of nuclear arms also increases the risk of their falling into the hands of dissident military elements or revolutionaries . not increased. Since September 11. . The treaty did little at that time. But can it hold? Or are international conditions so different today that the regime can no longer work? Twenty-First-Century Proliferation Some argue that with the end of superpower conflict. and the bulk of the glo- bal chemical weapons arsenals will likely be eliminated in the next ten years. few have questioned the need for urgent govern- ment action. Though some nations renounced their weapons of mass destruction programs.1). only to have other nations block their progress or feign compliance. chemical. As Leonard Spector said in 1984 in Nuclear Proliferation Today (the first book in the Carnegie Endowment’s series on proliferation): “The spread of nuclear weapons poses one of the greatest threats of our time and is among the most likely triggers of a future nuclear holocaust . .”26 Nonproliferation efforts have steadily advanced in the past two decades. .”27 These new efforts can be built on the successes of pre- vious actions. proliferation experts were again ringing alarms. Since 1964. We will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological. and nuclear weapons. but it is still mainly confined to two regions of the world: the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

such as the CWC and the BWC. South Africa. Taiwan. Israel. national security interests. the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty. Other treaties. Romania. United Kingdom. 19 countries had weapons or were conducting weapons-related research: Argentina. promote a false sense of security as some nations sign. Libya. for example. worked in the past. Previous presidents. were conducting weapons-related research. and Yugoslavia. Bush administration believe that the entire pro- cess of negotiating and implementing nonproliferation treaties is both unneces- sary and harmful to U. Japan. South Korea. France. USSR. thus weakening the principal nation that safeguards global peace and security. Canada. Presi- dent Bill Clinton. Australia. Norway. then cheat on. India. North Korea. and Libya. treated the weapons themselves as the problem and sought their elimination through treaties. and Yugoslavia. United Kingdom. France. Italy. Egypt. West Germany. Brazil. and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons” (italics added). President Bush framed the issue differ- ently in his 2003 State of the Union address: “The gravest danger facing America .20 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 1. Iraq. In 2005. Brazil. This inspection regime had failed to independently detect significant hidden programs in Iran. or were discussing the pursuit of weapons: Argentina. South Africa. United States. They argue that some of the treaties—such as the CTBT. USSR. Israel. India. China. biological. In the 1980s. Iran.1. as noted above. Spain. The Bush administration therefore has implemented a radically new nonpro- liferation approach. 23 countries had weapons. they doubt the holdouts can be convinced to adopt the same norms as those held by the regime founders. Many officials in the George W. the agreements. Sweden. Taiwan. Switzerland. Iran and North Korea are suspected of having active nuclear weapons programs. United States.S. warned in November 1998 of the threat “posed by the proliferation of nuclear. China. Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs (number of programs) 25 20 15 10 5 0 1960s 1980s 2005 N NOTE OTE In the 1960s. Iraq. Pakistan. in addition to the 8 states with nuclear weapons. and the Landmine Treaty—restrict necessary armaments. Canada.

sanctions and inspections were more effective than most realized in disarming Iraq after the 1991 War. Q. proliferation problems have grown worse.30 Though U. a battle fought primarily over the claimed need to prevent the acquisition or transfer of nuclear. Three major conclusions can be drawn from the war: In 2003. biological.S. attention focused on the three “axis of evil” states. the threat from nuclear terrorism has grown as U. has not yet proved superior to the one it replaced.28 The first direct application of this theory was the war with Iraq. “Iraq”). intelligence officials have concluded that the Iraq War made the terrorism problem worse and supplies of weapons and weapons materials remain dangerously insecure. as that nation has abandoned decades of work on nuclear and chemical weapons and missile programs. the United States and Russia have ended the process of negotiat- ing reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Global Trends 21 and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear.N.” This corresponds to a strategy that seeks the elimina- tion of regimes rather than weapons.S. In the year prior to the war. none of these conclusions appear to have diminished the enthusiasm of the proponents of the Iraq war for applying the Iraq model to other problem states. and British administra- tions but is widely accepted outside these governments. and chemical weapons (see chapter 17. and terrorists. however. That country ended the freeze on its plutonium program.6). Inspectors in 2003 were finding what there was to find. and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. but this was the world’s first nonproliferation war. It is not clear if this network has shut down or merely gone further underground. So has North Korea.S. Further.29 This last finding is contested by officials in the U. bio- logical or chemical weapons or any Scud missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles designed to deliver such weapons. Libya has been the only unqualified success. U. not better (see table 1. and biologi- cal weapons” (italics added). and British officials systematically misrep- resented Iraq’s weapon capabilities. chemical. Khan spread nuclear weapons technology and know-how around the world. There had been previous applications of military force to deal with proliferation threats. Iraq was not producing and did not have stockpiles of. claimed to have reprocessed the plutonium into weapons. This action-oriented approach has been detailed in two key documents—The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002)—in which the administration states its view that the threat from weapons of mass destruction emanates from a small number of outlaw states and from the nexus of these states. withdrew from the NPT. Since 2000.S. and the reductions themselves are . chemical. The new strategy. U. But Iran has accelerated its program—whether peaceful or not—in the past few years. The Bush administration thus has changed the fo- cus from “what” to “who. and biological programs ended between 1991 and 1996. the nuclear black market of Pakistan’s A. nuclear weapons and mate- rials. All active nuclear. Meanwhile. nuclear. Globally.

or some modified variation. Pakistan. There is a much greater willingness internationally to enforce non- proliferation commitments. proceeding at a slower pace than previous administrations planned. and W* = possesses chemical weapons but has declared them under the Chemical Weapons Convention and is in the process of eliminating them.6. (See the chapters on Iran. though only half the materials have been secured. and the United States for details. R = has known research program. Programs to secure nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union are also slowing down. there is grow- ing concern that the entire nonproliferation regime is in danger of a catastrophic collapse. The Fifteen Countries with Nuclear. Libya. North Korea. could still prove its worth. . Many countries are cooperating in the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict illegal trade in weapon components (see chapter 2 for more on this initiative). Biological. or Chemical Weapons or Offensive Research Programs Country Nuclear Biological Chemical Russia W W W* China W W W Israel W W? W United States W W* France W United Kingdom W India W R? W* Pakistan W R? R? North Korea W? W W Iran R R? W? Egypt R? W Syria R? W South Korea W* Libya W* Albania W* Key: W = has known weapons or agents. ? = is suspected Key: of having weapons or programs. The right combination of force and diplomacy could yet result in negotiated solutions to the North Korean and Iranian programs.) Elements of a New Nonproliferation Policy Some believe that the strategy.22 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 1. Finally. And prospects for peacefully resolving regional conflicts may have increased through the growing movement for democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia.

treaty-based ap- proach. Alliance security arrangements. The critical importance of the NPT and other treaties is that they provide the necessary international legal mechanism and establish the global norms that give nations a clear path to a non-nuclear future. The Soviet Union simply forced nonproliferation on its alliance system. sufficient barriers to proliferation. technical. The Libyan model could emerge from and prevail over the Iraq model: Change a regime’s behavior rather than change the regime. For example. Further thwarting proliferation. many developing nations found that their ambitions ran into formidable financial and technological obstacles to nuclear weapons development. This is still true today and should give pause to those who predict a smooth and rapid rise to nuclear weapon status for new nations. whereas the United States was not adverse to using strong-arm tactics to compel South Korea and Taiwan. These . for example. and taking the weapons off hair-trigger- alert status. greater efforts would be devoted to resolving the regional conflicts that fuel proliferation imperatives and to bringing the three nuclear weapon states outside the NPT into conformance with a expanded set of global nonproliferation norms. including the promise that the United States would extend a “nuclear umbrella” over Europe and Japan. These factors were present in the 1960s and 1970s. The threat from existing arsenals would be reduced by shrinking global stockpiles. Global Trends 23 A combination of approaches may offer the best chance of success. it is worth remembering that the non- proliferation treaties were an integral part of the political and military balance- of-power and alliance systems of the late twentieth century. undoubtedly made it easier for sev- eral industrial nations to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. the European Union has crafted a joint nonproliferation strategy that includes tying all E. The theory and practical applications of a new approach have been detailed in a 2005 Carnegie Endowment report. This “soft power” approach could meld with the “hard power” of the United States to replicate the success of the United States and United Kingdom with Libya. As we struggle to develop new policies. and alliance factors were not. however. force-based approach with the traditional multilateral.U. trade agreements to the observance of non- proliferation treaties and norms. like yesterday’s.31 This report analyzes how to end the threat of nuclear terror- ism by implementing comprehensive efforts to secure and eliminate nuclear materials worldwide and to stop the illegal transfer of nuclear technology. There is the need for a new strategy that combines the best elements of the United States– centric. The strategy would prevent new nuclear weapon states by increasing penalties for withdrawal from the NPT. These financial. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security. Finally. it was on the decline. curtail- ing research on new nuclear weapons. nuclear proliferation was on the rise. enforcing compliance with strengthened treaties. missile engineering. But before the signing of the NPT. and biological agent weaponization. afterward. Tomorrow’s solutions. and radically reforming the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent states from acquiring dual- use technologies for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. will not emerge in a diplomatic vacuum. to abandon nuclear weapons research.

Japan.S.” available at www. p. E. Spain.org. South Korea. Italy.org/ib/. Department of Defense.” in Non- Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East. 36.C. “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. Argentina.” Bethesda. and Jon Wolfsthal. In 1970. 80.” Geneva. 3. 21. Belarus. 37. in 2004. 16–17. 12. pp.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 6. 2002). p.ProliferationNews.S. Hogendoorn. Ibid.. For a brief discussion of the threat from conventional attacks on industrial and urban infrastruc- tures. Ibid. Joseph Cirincione. U. 13. 2001. Australia. 2005). “Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material. N OTES 1.” Center for International and Security Studies.opcw. 2001. mostly in the stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. 9.” statement before the House International Rela- tions Committee Subcommittee on the Middle-East and Central Asia. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Dany Shoham. 28. Rose Gottemoeller. “Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel. edited by Efraim Karsh. 20. John Bolton. and West Germany. and Philip Sabin (Oxford: Clarendon Press. February 13.: U. Spring– Summer 1998. pp. October 24.S.” p. University of Maryland. Canada. D.pdf. U. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Bush. 2001. 15. For a comprehensive study of a new nonproliferation strategy. . lest in our haste to construct new solutions we tear down the very structures we mean only to repair. 17. see the first edition of this book: Joseph Cirincione with Jon B.” Norfolk Naval Air Station.C. Julian Perry Robinson. the number of weapons had increased to a peak of 65. U. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. Switzerland. 1996. Since the late 1970s. there were about 38.” 10. Six nations abandoned indigenous nuclear weapon programs that were under way or under con- sideration in the 1960s: Egypt. President George W. 2. Md. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 55. Norway. 2004. 20. and Yugoslavia have abandoned nuclear weapon programs or nuclear weapons (or both) on their territory. John Bolton. available at www. 11. Ukraine. p. Brazil. 48–58. 5. “Annual Report to Congress. Proliferation: Threat and Response.24 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s historic lessons must be remembered anew.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/ leitenberg. November 19. 45.S.S. p. 1993). p.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. by 1986. the year the NPT entered into force. Sweden. 37. “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt. 24. June 24. D. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. Taiwan.000 nuclear weapons in global arsenals. “Biological Weapons Arms Control. Romania. 14. U. Bolton. Milton Leitenberg. Department of Defense. Libya. Iraq.. pp. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention. 16. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. 19. “Iran’s Con- tinuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.000. see George Perkovich.C. Shoham. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention. D. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. Jessica Mathews. North Korea and Iran are the only two states that began acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities in this later period and have not ceased the effort.. 18. J.” Nonproliferation Review. Virginia. “Instant Briefing: Results. “Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East. p. p. 2001). Martin Navias.000 worldwide. there were approximately 27. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. 11. Kazakhstan.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 8. U.. 4.ceip.S. South Africa. avail- able at www. 7. Depart- ment of Defense.” July 1996. “A Chemical Weapons Atlas. Ibid. September/ October 1997.

Saudi Arabia might seek to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan or invite Pakistan to station nuclear weapons on its territory. . “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.: White House. This is the danger President John Kennedy warned of in 1963: “I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands. avail- able at www. WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington. 3–4.. available at www.” he said.C. to exchange information. 27. “The more time the United States and Russia build into our process for ordering a nuclear strike the more time is available to gather data. available at www.ProliferationNews. see Joseph Cirincione. Several countries in the Middle East are capable of pursuing nuclear weapon programs or other- wise acquiring nuclear weapons.C.whitehouse.. p. 25.whitehouse. 15.org/jfk_test_ban_speech.gov/news/ releases/2001/11/20011113-3. Leonard Spector. to gain perspective.whitehouse. “President Announces Reduction in Nuclear Arsenal. 24. June 21. Perkovich et al. 28. and George Perkovich.jfklibrary.org. Global Trends 25 22. scattered throughout the world. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war. pp.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.S. Other countries have at least the basic facilities and capabilities to mount a nuclear weapon program. D. and an in- creased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.pdf. to discover an error. no stability. to avoid an accidental or unauthorized launch. no real security. “There would be no rest for anyone then.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. National Security Council. 30. including Saudi Arabia. Egypt. 26. 2001. available at www. 31. November 13.html.ProliferationNews.C. Former U. Kennedy.” Speech to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. and Turkey. See testimony of Central Intelligence director Porter Goss and Defense Intelligence Agency direc- tor Admiral Lowell Jacoby before the Senate Intelligence Committee.html. Jessica Mathews.” July 26. available at www. available at www. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. 29.” press conference by President Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin. 2002). D. and no chance of effective disarmament. stable and unstable. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washing- ton.: White House. 1.gov/nsc/nss. 1984). 2002). in the hands of countries large and small. For a detailed examination of these issues.org.pdf. responsible and irresponsible. Universal Compliance. February 16. Ibid. Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books. 1963. senator Sam Nunn argues. Egypt and Turkey could probably acquire enough nuclear material to produce a nuclear weapon within a decade of launching such an effort. National Security Council. albeit not without significant political and economic consequences. 2004. 2005. D. p. 23.” John F. 2004).

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1967. At the core of this regime are three key treaties: The Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) restrains the spread of nuclear weap- ons. or use of chemical weapons. CHAPTER 2 The International Nonproliferation Regime The global nonproliferation regime is a network of interlocking treaties. and it divides member countries into nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The NPT helped establish the international norm against proliferation. the most important of which is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). chemical. and unilateral and bilateral arrangements aimed at halting the spread of nuclear. It provides for a variety of export control and supplier arrangements. possession. It is founded on the basis of the NPT and includes additional treaties that limit the testing and geographical spread of nuclear weap- ons. possession. The nuclear and chemical weapons regimes also involve extensive inspection and verification arrangements and are covered by comprehensive international export control arrangements. The systems in place to control each type of weapon rely on a central agreement that establishes a norm against the possession of weapons and a set of obligations for treaty members. and biological weapons. (See appendixes A. It was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. and C for the text of each treaty or for more information.) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the oldest and most elaborate of the weapon control systems. These include only the United States 27 . the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development. “Nuclear weapon states” are defined by the treaty as countries that detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1. and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention bans the development. or use of biological weapons. organi- zations. inspections. B. An effort to negotiate a verification mechanism for biological weapons continues.

The original term of the NPT was 25 years. with periodic reviews of the treaty occurring every 5 years. and the United Kingdom serve as the treaty’s depositary states. including North Korea. In addition. (Both nuclear weapons and “peaceful nuclear explosives” are prohib- ited. Russia succeeded to the Soviet Union’s status as a nuclear weapon state under the treaty in 1992. non-nuclear-weapon states also agree to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities. China and France did not join until 1992. the treaty had 184 non-nuclear-weapon state parties. • All countries agree to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament under international control.2 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10.1 Under the NPT: • Non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to manufacture or receive nuclear ex- plosives. an arrangement known as full-scope safeguards. the Soviet Union (1949). and chemical weapons. and Belarus.N. United Kingdom (1952). making it the most widely adhered to arms control treaty in history. agreed to become non-nuclear- weapon states. 2003. the parties agreed to extend the agreement indefinitely and unconditionally. Russia. The most recent addition to the treaty is East Timor. The United States. while Ukraine. Kazakhstan. Israel. France (1960).” The five permanent members of the U. . in giving up their nuclear weapons. • All countries agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology. the treaty members approved a set of prin- ciples and objectives to guide the parties during a strengthened review process in the future. and nuclear weapon states agree not to assist non-nuclear-weapon states in obtaining nuclear weapons. Only India.) • To verify that they are living up to this pledge. • A party may withdraw from the treaty on 90 days’ notice if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty” have “jeopardized its su- preme interests.28 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s (first detonation in 1945). for a total of 189 parties. giving it (for all practical effect) a permanent duration. biological. and Pakistan have yet to sign the treaty. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference held in New York City in April and May 1995. and China (1964). which officially became a party on May 5. By the spring of 2005. However. • All countries agree not to export nuclear equipment or material to non-nuclear- weapon states except under IAEA safeguards. It was a major victory in international efforts to combat the prolif- eration of all nuclear. The NPT defines all other countries as non-nuclear-weapon states. 2003. Security Council are all members of the NPT. This indefinite extension of the treaty was by no means a foregone conclusion. the United Nations has not recognized this with- drawal because Pyongyang did not give the three months’ advance notice re- quired under article 10 of the treaty.

• concern over the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty and the potential proliferation effects of the development and deploy- ment of an antimissile system. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 29 At the May 2000 NPT Review Conference. which was scheduled to take place in May 2005. • serious concern regarding the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and the challenge it represents to the nonproliferation regime. among oth- ers (see appendix A). the participants adopted a pro- gram of action (known as the “13 Steps”) that included the early entry into force of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as START II). a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies. and • the feeling that the next logical step for the nonproliferation regime is a fissile material cutoff treaty. measures to re- duce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. such as • the importance of taking practical steps to fulfill article 6 of the NPT. a moratorium on nuclear testing. • the need to consider measures to strengthen control over the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. • support for the IAEA’s action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism (see below). with its reductions in deployment and operational status. • support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and their accompanying security as- surances. • the need for the verifiable and irreversible reductions in nonstrategic nuclear arsenals. before the NPT had even been . a num- ber of major themes were sounded. • the need to incorporate the comprehensive safeguard agreements with the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (see below) to create the new NPT safeguards standard. • the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At these preparatory sessions. which calls for the nuclear weapon states to move toward complete nuclear disarma- ment.4 It was created in 1957. • the feeling that the Moscow Treaty. Since the May 2000 NPT Review Conference. and ap- plication of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament. there have been three separate preparatory sessions in anticipation of the seventh NPT review conference. further reductions of both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals.3 The International Atomic Energy Agency The Vienna-based IAEA is a United Nations–affiliated organization with 137 member countries. cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in nuclear weapons.

several nuclear facilities in each of those countries are subject to IAEA monitoring and cannot be used to support those nations’ nuclear weapons pro- grams without detection by the IAEA.30 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s negotiated. such as fueling naval nuclear reactors. Moreover. After the 1991 Gulf War. Under the NPT. A state may declare and exempt nuclear materials from IAEA inspection for narrow military purposes. Thus. It is then up to the IAEA’s Board of Governors (and possibly the U. Instead. it can- not prevent states from using nuclear materials under its control for use in nuclear weapons. Security Council. and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT. lacking a clear political mandate from its members to do so. and research and development on nuclear weapon design. it was learned that Iraq had secretly developed a network of undeclared nuclear facilities as part of an extensive nuclear weapons program. non-nuclear-weapon states must accept “full-scope safeguards” over all nuclear materials—and the facilities that contain those ma- terials—within the jurisdiction of the state in question. its safeguards are designed to provide it and its member states with timely warning should significant quantities of nuclear-weapons-usable materials be diverted to nuclear weapons or for nuclear explosions of any kind. The IAEA does not possess the means or the legal authority to search for or investigate activities related to the development or production of nuclear weapons. the IAEA monitors some nuclear facilities and materials in non-NPT parties at the request of these states or their suppliers. As of the spring of 2005. In addition to monitoring all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. an exemption pointed to by some as a weakness in the IAEA system of verification. however. high-explosive testing. This led the IAEA’s Board of Gover- nors in 1991 to reiterate the IAEA’s right to exercise its previously unused . Israel. and to implement a system of audits and on-site inspections (collectively known as safeguards) to verify that nuclear facilities and materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosions.5 The IAEA’s system of inspection was used to form the verification measures of the NPT. IAEA officials can monitor only those activities connected with the produc- tion or use of nuclear materials. to which major safeguard violations are reported) to take appropriate action. in non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT. The IAEA does not offer physical protection and is not a police force.N. Its principal mission is twofold: to facilitate the use of nuclear en- ergy for peaceful purposes. The activities outside the IAEA’s jurisdiction include the fabrication and testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear weap- ons.6 The Additional Protocol Until 1991. the IAEA monitored only those facilities declared by the inspected country and did not seek possible undeclared nuclear installations. Russia was the only nuclear weapon state not to have any facili- ties or materials under IAEA safeguards. the IAEA also monitors certain individual facilities and associated nuclear materials in the nuclear weapon states. although India.

states will now have to provide an “expanded declaration” on a broad array of nuclear-related activities. operational status and the estimated annual production” of uranium mines and thorium concentration plants. Part 2 consisted of measures whose implementation would require complemen- tary legal authority. In order to resolve questions about. The IAEA’s Board of Governors approved part 2 measures on May 15. in effect. were adopted under Program 93+2 of the protocol. 1997. implemented initially in 1996. the information a state has provided on its nuclear activities. • Fourth.” that is.” or preapproved. which was designed to strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards to prevent the development of clandestine weapons programs. consisted of measures that could be traced to existing legal authority. including environmental sampling and other holistic safeguard measures. the Additional Protocol provides for the IAEA’s right to use environ- mental sampling during inspections at both declared and undeclared sites. the IAEA’s ability to conduct short notice inspections is augmented by streamlining the visa process for inspectors.” • Third. the amount and type of information that states will have to provide to the IAEA is greatly expanded. This evolved into the voluntary Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.) All trade in items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (see “Supplier Control Mechanisms” below) trigger list will have to be reported to the IAEA as well. if necessary—undeclared facilities in order “to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 31 authority to conduct “special inspections. by demanding that the state of concern submit a more thorough declaration of its nuclear activities and by giving inspectors greater access to that state’s nuclear sites. the key ingredient for nuclear weapons. guarantee the IAEA access on short notice to all of their declared—and. (Thorium can be processed to produce fissile material. In addition to the current requirement for data about nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle activities. to be implemented in two installments. Subsequent measures.” as well as all of the facilities specified in the “expanded declaration. such as “nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities not involving nuclear materials” and “the location. who are guaranteed to receive within one month’s notice “appropriate multiple entry/exit” visas that are valid for at least a year. to demand access to undeclared sites where it suspected nuclear activities were being conducted. It . such as that in Iraq before 1991. states will. the new inspection regime provides the IAEA with “complementary. access to “[a]ny location speci- fied by the Agency. Part 1. the number and types of facilities that the IAEA will be able to in- spect and monitor are substantially increased beyond the previous level. The Additional Protocol enables the IAEA’s inspectors to be proactive in their inspections. • Second. The model protocol outlined four key changes that must be incorporated into each NPT state party’s safeguards agreement:7 • First.” By negotiating an Additional Protocol. or inconsistencies in.

in March 2002.9 These important safeguards. • security of radioactive sources.8 Though the Additional Protocol greatly strengthens the IAEA’s ability to verify that non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT use nuclear materials and facilities only for peaceful purposes. agreed on an “action plan designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and radioactive materials. and • enhancement of program coordination and information management for nuclear safety matters. • assessment of safety and security at nuclear facilities. The IAEA Action Plan After the September 11.” This action plan to guard against nuclear terrorism is designed “to supplement and reinforce national efforts in areas where interna- tional cooperation is indispensable to the strengthening of nuclear security. • detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. . 2001. terrorist attacks in the United States. it cannot prevent a deter- mined state from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. • strengthening of state systems for nuclear material accountancy and control. • response readiness in the case of a malicious event/emergency.” The plan covers eight areas: • physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. the IAEA’s Board of Governors. the Additional Protocol had been signed by 90 nations. which is a barrier to vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. having used its rights within the treaty to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. it could then withdraw from the NPT. two states that are headed in opposite proliferation directions. The risk is that if a country builds these facilities—as allowed under article 4 of the NPT—the country could come right up to the edge of nuclear weapons capability.32 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s further permits the use of environmental sampling over a wide area rather than being confined to specific facilities. The IAEA’s most im- portant recent work under the Additional Protocol has come in Iran and Libya. As of the spring of 2005. do not address a fundamental problem in the regime: The same technologies that can enrich uranium to low levels for reactor fuel can enrich it to high levels for nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty The newest potential element of the nonproliferation regime is the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty. In a worst-case sce- nario. The same reprocess- ing facility that separates the plutonium from the spent-fuel rods for reuse as fuel or for disposal can separate it for weapons use. however.

represented the first major agreement on the uniform regulation of nuclear ex- ports by current and potential nuclear suppliers. and the United States—have yet to ratify it.) Supplier Control Mechanisms The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group are two informal coalitions of nations that form a third major element of the nonproliferation regime. by a vote of 158 to 3 (the no votes were from Bhutan. and 8—including China.10 (For more on the CTBT. India. to detect vio- lations. These procedures and the “trigger list. would require India’s ratifi- cation to bring the pact into force. China joined the group in October 1997 and participated in trigger-list discussions for the first time in February 1999. In total. India temporarily blocked ap- proval of the treaty in mid-August 1996. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 33 The conclusion of this treaty fulfilled a preambular commitment of NPT par- ties to fulfill pledges made in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty “to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. General Assembly. these two coalitions consist of nations that voluntarily restrict the export of equipment and materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. India also opposed the treaty’s entry-into-force provision. and Pakistan—have not signed the treaty.S Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT in October 1999. The group. To circumvent India’s veto. These guidelines included a list of export items that would trigger the requirement for the application of IAEA safeguards in recipient states. The CTBT’s entry-into-force provision requires the ratification of the 44 “nuclear-capable” nations that possess either nuclear power or nuclear research reactors. known as the NPT Exporters Committee (or the Zangger Committee. Australia intro- duced the treaty to the U. prohibits nuclear test explosions of any size and establishes a rigorous verifica- tion system. in effect. . and 121 have ratified it as of the spring of 2005. 1996. Shortly after the NPT came into force in 1970. The U.” which have been updated in subsequent years. though the United States and all other participating nations continue to voluntarily observe the treaty’s ban on further tests. where decisions are usually made by consensus. The CTBT was negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. see appendix E. North Korea. Of those nations. 3—India. including seismic monitoring and on-site inspections. which.” The CTBT. Without any legal requirements. where decisions are made by majority rather than by consensus. a number of Western and Soviet-bloc nuclear supplier states began consultations concerning the proce- dures and standards that would apply to nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states.N. 175 nations (including the five nuclear weapon states and Israel) have signed the treaty. and Libya). Is- rael. it objected to the fact that the treaty did not include provisions demanded by India prescribing a “time-bound frame- work” for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. which was opened for signature in New York on September 24. so named after its Swiss chairman). The General Assembly adopted the CTBT on September 10. adopted a set of guidelines in August 1974. 1996.

despite the fact that it has not yet attained protocol ratifica- tion from the five nuclear weapon states. in the wake of the Gulf War. and Uzbekistan completed negotiations to establish a Central Asian NWFZ. . effectively precludes nuclear commerce by NSG member states with India. Finally. In addition to agreeing to such full-scope safeguards. In 2002. The Treaty of Bangkok. 1967). which had previously been adopted by only some NSG members. In January 1976. came into force in 1997. even if the blocked item does not appear on any of the NSG’s control lists. to cover 65 “dual-use” items as well. Kazakhstan. The NSG also added as a requirement for future exports that recipient states accept IAEA inspections on all their peaceful nuclear activities. which until then had covered only uniquely nuclear items. The growing role of NWFZs as part of the nonproliferation regime was reflected in the draft review docu- ment of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: “The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones . (The members of the two supplier groups are listed. constitutes an important disarmament mea- sure which greatly strengthens the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects. adopted guidelines that were similar to those of the NPT Exporters Committee but also extended to transfers of technology and included an agreement to “ex- ercise restraint” in the transfer of uranium enrichment and plutonium extrac- tion equipment and facilities.) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) complement NPT arrangements because they can be geared to specific regional situations. 1996). the South Pacific (SPNWFZ.11 Similar rules.12 . apply to exports regulated by the Zangger Committee. . Israel. which was not then a party to the NPT—met in London to further develop export guidelines. which became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). in appendix D in this volume.” NWFZs have been established in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco. the NSG expanded its export control guidelines. this London group. all nations importing regulated items from NSG member states must promise to furnish adequate physical security for transferred nuclear materials and facilities. and Africa (ANWFZ.34 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Following India’s nuclear test in 1974. and Pakistan. Tajikistan. 1996). They are waiting for endorsements from the five nuclear weapon states before the treaty is officially opened for signatures. an overlapping group of nuclear sup- plier states—in this case including France. permitting member states to prevent any export that they suspect might be used for a nuclear weapons program. In April 1992. although it has been partially eclipsed by the NSG. which created a Southeast Asian NWFZ. pledge not to export nuclear materials and technologies to other nations without the permis- sion of the original exporting nation or without a pledge from the recipient nation to abide by those same rules. Kyrgyzstan. apart from the requirement for full-scope safeguards. Turkmenistan. This rule. in May 2004 the NSG adopted a “catch-all” mecha- nism. which continues to function. and promise not to use any imports to build nuclear explosives. and more detailed discussion is provided. whose export controls are more far reaching.

2001. Recognizing these weaknesses. 1996. However.16 Efforts by the ad hoc group to negotiate a legally binding protocol for verification were se- verely damaged by the withdrawal from the talks by the United States in July . 2000. 1991. Poisonous. stockpiling. but they have made major advances in the past two decades and now establish international norms against the develop- ment. into the regime. efforts to expand and improve the implementation of the regimes continue. incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures.”13 The BWC also specifically bans “weapons. protective. nor did it have verification or enforcement provisions. but it did not restrict the ability of states to acquire and store chemical and biological weapons. possession.” Russia. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. and other peaceful purposes.”15 Yet the BWC’s shortcomings continue to restrict its impact. and 2002. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 35 The Biological and Chemical Nonproliferation Regime Global efforts to contain the spread of biological and chemical weapons center on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). the BWC was the first international treaty to ban an entire class of weapons. a system of measures to promote compliance with the Con- vention. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was opened for signature in April 1972 and entered into force on March 26. production. and a doubling of the number of states suspected of pursuing a biological weapons capability since 1975 have raised questions about the BWC’s effectiveness.14 Review conferences are held regularly and have taken place in 1980. as appropri- ate. member states established an ad hoc group in 1994 to draft binding verification guidelines for the convention. as witnessed by efforts to negotiate a verification protocol to the BWC. The BWC prohibits the development. persistent allegations regarding Iraq’s biological weapons activities prior to the spring of 2003. These treaties are not as well developed or long- standing as their nuclear counterparts. The ad hoc group is authorized to review four areas: “Definitions of terms and objective criteria. and use of such weapons. and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925 was limited. As of the spring of 2005. Violations of the convention by Russia. 1975. When it entered into force. or transfer of biological agents or toxins in “quantities that have no justification for prophylactic. In addition. equip- ment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile pur- poses or in armed conflict. and specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full imple- mentation of Article X. and the United Kingdom are the three depositary governments for the BWC. acquisition. the United States. It symbolically prohibited the use of both poison gases and bacte- riological weapons. or Other Gases. the BWC had 169 signatories and 153 member states. the treaty lacked effective verification and enforcement measures to ensure compliance. 1986.

the destruction of production facilities. however. 2002. and it maintains a compre- hensive web site with the latest information on treaty membership and activi- ties. proposal on December 7. when the Soviet Union accepted provisions for systematic inspections at chemical weapons storage and production facilities. Negotiations stalled. As of the spring of 2005. that all facilities and locations be subject to the procedure. The final catalyst for the completion of a chemical weapons treaty was the use of chemical attacks by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War.” depending on their applicability for chemical weapons programs and for commercial purposes. No decision was made on the future of the ad hoc group. production. in seeking agreement on com- pliance and verification issues. The treaty prohibits the development. Due in part to the limited agenda (largely at the United States’ behest) of the intersessional meetings. stockpiling. Instead. A year later.21 The CWC categorizes chemicals into three “schedules. demonstrating a clear absence of international means to prevent the acquisition and use of chemical weapons for conflict. the last day of the 2001 Review Conference. Progress resumed in 1986. This proposal was accepted and ensured that no verification pro- tocol would even be discussed until the next review conference in 2006. 1997. draft efforts began for a ban on chemical weapons. the USSR also agreed to mandatory short-notice challenge inspections—insisting. as well as any chemical weapons it may have abandoned on the territory of an- other state party. re- tention or use of chemical weapons. Vary- ing levels of control are then applied to the classified chemicals and to their production facilities.20 The CWC includes a number of confidence-building measures and ensures transparency through a verification regime that subjects all declared chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities to systematic inspections. and declarations and routine inspections at commercial industry sites. Chairman Tibor Tóth proposed the convening of three intersessional meetings between 2003 and 2005 to “discuss” and “promote” actions that could be taken by member states on a voluntary basis to strengthen the BWC and prevent bioterrorism. Full compliance is expected within ten years of the convention’s entry into force.36 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 2001 and by a U. [of ] chemical weapons to anyone. the CWC had 168 member states.”19 State parties to the treaty cannot conduct military preparations for the use of chemical weapons. directly or indirectly. as well as the “transfer.17 The next review conference began on November 11. The CWC also requires members to destroy all chemical weapons and production facilities under its jurisdiction or control.S. to disband the ad hoc group. acquisition. Facilities producing chemicals listed in any of the three . however. nor can they assist other states in any treaty-banned activity. Tóth warned that the meetings could easily become “an empty shell. 2001.”18 The Chemical Weapons Convention Soon after the entry into force of the BWC. effectively leaving it in limbo. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established to oversee the inspection and verification proceedings.

and CBW dual-use equipment. however. however. 2001 The terrorist attacks of 2001 increased the willingness of many countries to take collective action on proliferation. regardless of whether or not the export is on the group’s control lists. By 1991. In 2002.23 Australia Group member states share the group’s “warning list” with chemical industries and scientific communities to promote an awareness of CBW prolif- eration risks within individual nations.N. also have legal industrial purposes. which forces control efforts to strike a difficult balance between security concerns and legitimate trade. and consumption of relevant chemicals. Many substances used in the production of chemical weapons. Resolution 1540. . Measures to address CBW proliferation also include the coordination of national export controls and information sharing on suspicious activities. The CWC’s verification provisions regulate both the military and civilian chemical industries active in the production. biological weapon pathogens. pathogens and toxins. which stated that any member of the group considering making an export to another state that had already been denied an export by any other member of the group must first consult with that member state before approving the export. The group was established in 1984 after the extensive use of chemical weap- ons in the Iran-Iraq War. The two most significant multilateral achieve- ments have been the Proliferation Security Initiative and the adoption of U. The Australia Group The Australia Group is an informal association of 39 countries that are opposed to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). processing. The CWC also contains provisions for assistance in the event that a member state is attacked or threatened with chemical weapons and for promoting trade in chemicals and related equipment between states for peaceful purposes. Significant Additions to the Nuclear. Chemical. The first was the “no-undercut” require- ment. the routine on-site inspections of declared sites. and dual-use equipment). It initially focused on regulating the export of eight dual-use chemical precursors. which requires member states to halt all exports that could be used by importers in chemical or biological weapons pro- grams. The second was the “catch-all” provision. Enterprises are asked to report any sus- picious activities. and short-notice challenge inspections to ensure compliance. CWC provisions authorize a combina- tion of reporting requirements. The conditions for challenge inspections of any declared or nondeclared facility are also included. the group took two important steps to strengthen export controls.22 Its member nations work on the basis of consensus to limit the spread of CBW by the con- trol of chemical weapon precursors. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 37 schedules in quantities in excess of allotted amounts must be declared and will be subject to inspection. and Biological Nonproliferation Regime since September 11. the “warning list” of chemicals subject to control had expanded to include 54 materials (chemicals.

A Security Council committee was also set up to monitor progress and to receive implementation reports from member states. transit. Japan. and bio- logical weapons and their means of delivery. still missing is a system that can deal with a legally flagged vessel or aircraft carrying material or technology related to nuclear. The primary advantage of the resolu- tion over treaties addressing similar matters is that it is binding on all U. It encompasses only states that choose to abide by its provisions. Italy. airspace. States must enact “appropriate laws and regulations to control export. Singapore. and the United States has strengthened its ability to use this effectively by work- ing out prior consents arrangements with Liberia and Panama.N.N. and the United States. The PSI’s members include Australia. review and maintain appropriate effective national and trans-shipment controls” and “border controls” to prevent the proliferation of nuclear.N. the United Kingdom. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolu- tion 1540 under chapter 7 of the U. Portugal.N. Spain.24 More than 60 states have pledged their support for this initiative. thereby making it legally bind- ing on all member states. enhancing national legislation in participating states to ensure that shipments of controlled items can be searched or seized under national authority. Poland. Security Council Resolution 1540 On April 28. including those outside the scope of the nonproliferation regime and those non-nuclear states that serve as reexport and manufacturing points in the proliferation network. U. France. the Netherlands. and 3. or biological weapons to another country across international territory. widespread recognition of the urgency of . and therefore does not apply directly to international waters.25 The PSI has little standing in international law. and it is limited only to the national territory. the two coun- tries most popular with shippers seeking flags of convenience. and waterways of participants. sea. 2004. trans-shipment and re-export” of materials that would contribute to proliferation. and air). member states. chemical. PSI-related activities fall into three main areas: 1. develop. intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation to identify illicit trans- fers. chemi- cal. with a two-year mandate. Norway. Resolution 1540 requires all states to “establish. Russia.38 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s The Proliferation Security Initiative The United States–led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a voluntary group- ing to block the transfer of weapons and technology by improving information sharing and stepping up interdiction. 2. interdiction training exercises and actual intercepts in nationally controlled areas (land. Countries under whose flag a ship is traveling can give permission for that ship to be stopped and searched. Charter. Canada. Germany.26 Though the PSI is an important addition to the tools of enforcement. the U.27 Although there was considerable consternation over the role of the Security Council as a law-making body.

IAEA. “The Nuclear Suppliers Group at a Glance.html.html. Arms Control Association. available at www. April 8–19. 6.org.org/wmd/npt/2005/index-PC3. table A23. paragraph C.nsf Site. 3. 2002. 2. “Brief Background on the Biological Weapons Convention.” July 2003.un.htm.html.asp.org/factsheets/NSG.” Third Session.opbw. 4. available at www.armscontrol. 15.un. In this book.pdf.” available at www. “Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols. “Fact Sheet: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) at a Glance. available at www.html#A1. text of Biological Weapons Convention. . United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. 7. 2000).uk/dd/dd64/64nr04. Joseph Cirincione.” available at http:// disarmament2. “IAEA by the Numbers. IAEA. available at www.org/About/by_the_numbers.org/About/ statute_text.org/wmd/npt/ 2005/index-PC2.acronym.un. In the wake of the unraveling of the A. The NPT and the nonproliferation regime have no legal category and no provision for additional nuclear weapon states.” First Session.iaea. Arms Control Association.org/Publications/Reports/ Anrep2003/annex_tables.org/ OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol. N OTES 1. See the web site www.” available at www.org/factsheets/nwfz. IAEA. 5.acronym. however. available at www. ed. available at http:// disarmament2.uk/bwc/ revcon8.iaea.armscontrol.” June 2004.N. Khan nuclear black market network (see chapter 12).” Fact Sheet by the Arms Control Association. The resolution obliges member states to take action aimed at preventing both the proliferation of nuclear. 64.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6. 12. 13. And see “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 10. Jenni Rissanen.htm.ch/disarm/distreat/bac_72.org/TreatyStatus. “Anger after the Ambush: Review Conference Suspended after US Asks for AHG’s Termination.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.unog. Adapted from “The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol at a Glance.html. “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. www.” BWC Review Conference Bulletin. “IAEA Action Plan to Guard against Nuclear Terrorism. Israel. “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements: View by Country and Treaty. 14. this resolution focused particularly on member states’ responsibilities to actively restrain nonstate actors. IAEA Annual Report for 2003. United Nations. April 26–May 7. In response to these objec- tions. available at www. no. 2003. Q. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 39 enforcement eventually overcame these reservations. available at http://disarmament2.un.asp.ctbto. IAEA.” Second Session.iaea. 11. and Pakistan are described as non-NPT nuclear weapon states. available at www.asp. available at http://disarmament2.org/wmd/npt/2005/index-PC1. Resolution 1540 states that it does not override the existing trea- ties of the nonproliferation regime.htm. article XII..” Disarmament Diplomacy. U. April 28–May 9. 9. See the web site for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organi- zation.” available at www.org.armscontrol. 16. Conference on Disarmament.html. May/ June 2002.html. and bio- logical weapons and also their means of delivery. India. 8. See also “Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons.org.12. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge.org. available at www. 17. chemical. 2004.iaea. IAEA Statute.

” Nonproliferation Re- view. Ibid. Spring 2004. See www.armscontrol.pdf. 23. 2005). 21. Arms Control Association.org/html/db/cwc/eng/ cwc_frameset. available at www.edu/pubs/npr/vol11/111/111tucker. 19.org/html/db/members_frameset.org/factsheets/PSI.” June 2004.australiagroup. Universal Compliance.org. Tucker.” available at www. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. available at www. 22. pp.ProliferationNews. D. This section has been adapted from George Perkovich. 27.40 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 18. Rose Gottemoeller. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 21 May 2005. 59–60. “The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment. Jessica Mathews. 30–34. Australia Group.” available at www. 26.htm.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The Proliferation Security Initiative at a Glance.org/factsheets/australiagroup.net/en/agpart. Jonathan B. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washing- ton. Arms Control Association. and Jon Wolfsthal. available at www.miis. 20.org. available at www. 24..asp. avail- able at www.opcw.opcw. Adapted from Perkovich et al. pp.html.asp. “Australia Group Members.” September 2003. “The Australia Group at a Glance.cns. pp.html.opcw.armscontrol. . 57–58. Joseph Cirincione. 25.C.

all 44 nuclear-capable states. For the treaty to enter into force. Under the treaty. 1996. The treaty prohibits the production. including the United States. The Additional Protocol facilitates more robust inspections by requiring states to submit an expanded declaration of their nuclear-related activi- ties. The treaty prohibits the development. A total of 168 member states. acquisition. stockpiling. 169 signatories. (table continues on the following page) . T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 41 Table 2. 1975. and transfer of chemical weapons. the five “nuclear weapon” states commit to pursue gen- eral and complete disarmament. while the remaining “non-nuclear- weapon” states agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. 1997. A total of 44 participants. This is an organization of nuclear supplier states that voluntarily agree to coordinate export controls in order to prevent passing nuclear material and nuclear-related technologies to states that might use them in a nuclear weapons program. Nuclear Suppliers Group Established in 1975.1. Major Treaties and Agreements of the Nonproliferation Regime Non-Proliferation Treaty Entered into force in 1970. A total of 189 member states. in force in 66 states. and by giving International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors greater authority to visit both declared and undeclared sites of concern. 1997. production. Chemical Weapons Convention Entered into force on April 29. acquisition. 184 signatories. Signed by 90 states. A total of 121 member states. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Entered into force on March 26. The treaty prohibits nuclear test explosions of any size and establishes a rigorous global verification system to detect violations. 175 signatories. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Opened for signature on September 24. must ratify it. A total of 153 member states. Additional Protocol to the NPT Safeguards Agreement Approved on May 15. stockpiling.

biological. International (Hague) Code of Conduct Announced on November 25. 2003. through strengthened border controls. and other domestic laws. and dual- use technologies that could be employed in a chemical or biological weap- ons program. . Security Council Resolution 1540 Passed on April 28. This is a voluntary organization meant to supplement the Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime (see above).N. particularly by nonstate actors. or chemical weapons.1. 1987. member states. This is a voluntary association of states that work cooperatively to limit the spread of chemical weapons precursors. sea. This initiative focuses on intelligence sharing and other methods of coop- eration to facilitate the interdiction of vessels carrying weapons of mass destruction and related goods and technologies via water. 2002. Australia Group Established in 1984.N. biological pathogens. better export controls. Proliferation Security Initiative Announced May 31. Legally binding on all U. This is an informal export control arrangement designed to regulate the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500- kilogram payload at a range of 300 kilometers. A total of 34 participants.42 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 2. Missile Technology Control Regime Announced on April 16. regardless of range. or air. It calls for restraint in domestic ballistic missile programs and for the nonproliferation of any ballistic missiles that can deliver nuclear. 2004. U. Informal arrangement supported by more than 70 states. A total of 39 participants. A total of 114 participants. Major Treaties and Agreements of the Nonproliferation Regime (continued) and transfer of pathogens or toxins in weapons systems or other means of delivery. This resolution obliges member states to take action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n R e g i m e 43 SOURCES OURCES “Australia Group Members.html.org/factsheets/. available at www.html.” avail- able at www. “Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements.” available at http://disarmament2.org/TreatyStatus.iaea.nsf.mtcr. “Missile Technology Control Re- gime.org.gv.info/english/index.htm.” Arms Control Association.net/en/agpart. Aus- trian Foreign Ministry.htm.org/ member.ctbto.un. “Nuclear Suppliers Group: Participants.” avail- able at www.armscontrol. “Fact Sheets. “Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. “Ballistic Missiles-HCOC.bmaa.nuclearsuppliersgroup. Department for Disarma- ment Affairs.opcw.australiagroup.at/ view. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.php3?f_id=54&LNG=en&version.” available at www.html. . International Atomic Energy Agency. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. “Strengthened Safeguards System: Additional Protocol.” available at www.org/html/db/members_frameset.” available at www.” available at www. United Nations.” available at www.

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France. money. or U-235. South Africa. but the science and engineering required are essentially the same. even well-organized subnational organizations and terrorist groups with adequate time and resources could produce a nuclear explosive de- vice. More than 40 other coun- tries could also produce nuclear weapons. The same facilities that enrich uranium to low levels for fuel for power reactors can also enrich uranium to the high levels needed for nuclear weapons. and political effort to do so. making the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons with plutonium extremely difficult. and also known as HEU) and plutonium. have peaceful uses. though not impossible. if their governments decided to invest the time. India. complicated. Producing plutonium requires the construction of large and highly visible facilities. CHAPTER 3 Nuclear Weapons and Materials Nuclear weapons were invented more than 60 years ago.) 45 . it dramatically reduces—but does not totally eliminate—the challenges associated with the production of nuclear weapons or explosive devices. and observable part of building nuclear weapons is producing sufficient amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials needed to fuel a nuclear explosion. Some uranium enrichment technolo- gies are more easily concealed but are also possible to detect in many cases through national technical means. The same facilities that reprocess the spent fuel from reactors to separate plutonium for a special type of reactor fuel can also separate the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons (see below for more on these processes). Although the technol- ogy required to produce them is complex. however. Israel. By far the most costly. If they first acquired the necessary nuclear materials. including weapons-usable materials. Russia. while some basic designs are much easier to understand and build. Nine countries (China. The two main elements needed to produce a nuclear explosive device are highly enriched uranium (containing a high percentage of uranium-235. nuclear weapon concepts are well understood and widely available. the United Kingdom. If these special nuclear materials can be pur- chased or stolen from existing state stockpiles. Pakistan. Some nuclear weapon designs are highly complex. (Some facilities may need to be modified. by the fact that nuclear materials. and the United States) and possibly North Korea have produced nuclear weapons. such as surveillance satellites. The challenge of pre- venting the spread of nuclear weapons is complicated.

and each has properties that can be used in various ways. The various isotopes interact with each other and with other atomic particles (such as other neutrons) differently. hydrogen-3. and that any attempt to divert nuclear materials by a non-nuclear-weapon state can be de- tected in a timely manner. at very high temperatures some isotopes with low atomic numbers (e. Pu-239. And a third isotope with one proton and two neutrons is called tritium. Some of the more common isotopes of uranium are ura- nium-233. the same number of protons) but a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. Going beyond physical protection and diversion detection. or H-2. It is this fusing or splitting of atoms that produces the energy released in a nuclear weapon (or a . or H-3. releasing energy and/or atomic particles. Atoms of uranium all have 92 protons in the nucleus. H-2 or H-3) fuse together. three isotopes of the element hydrogen—all with an atomic number of 1—are found in nature. For example. there are also inter- national proposals under discussion that would further control the ability of any state to possess national nuclear material production capabilities. Plutonium isotopes (with 94 protons) include Pu-238. hydrogen-2. Some isotopes with high atomic numbers (for example. An atom consists of a nucleus. and plutonium—are distinguished by an atomic number that is equal to the number of protons in their nucleus. A second isotope has one proton and one neutron in the nucleus and is variously referred to as deuterium. therefore. in which there are protons and neutrons surrounded by orbiting electrons. For example. Pu-240.46 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s The physical protection of nuclear materials in the civilian sector. U-235 (92 pro- tons plus 143 neutrons). and U-238 (92 protons plus 146 neutrons). uranium. Elements—such as hydrogen. it is imperative to ensure that they cannot be stolen for use in nuclear weapons. U-235 or Pu- 239) split apart into other isotopes after absorbing a neutron. administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). or central core. The IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared facilities also needs to be strengthened as part of broader nonproliferation enforcement efforts. To the ex- tent that weapons-usable materials are used in civilian activities. Nuclear explosions harness far greater amounts of energy by splitting or fusing together the nuclei of individual atoms. Pu-241. so that it can be halted and the material recovered. requires strengthening to provide timely warning of any diversion of nuclear materials or use of civil facilities for weapons material production. the international system of safeguards. Basic Nuclear Concepts Conventional explosives—like dynamite—release energy through rapid chemi- cal reactions involving changes in the structure of molecules. The simplest form has but a single proton in the nucleus and is referred to as hydrogen-1 (abbreviated H-1). While pursuing these long-term structural reforms. but they can exist in different forms called isotopes. and so on. or U-233 (which has 92 protons plus 141 neutrons).g. All atoms of the same element have the same number of protons in their respective nuclei. is a critical component of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. which have the same atomic number (that is. iron..

Pu-239 has a smaller critical mass than U-235. Basic fission weapons (see the discussion below) are made using fissile materials. This chain reaction is what enables nuclear materials to be harnessed for various purposes. . Isotopes of some other elements (for example. or “fissioned. classification regu- lation permits cleared individuals to state that a nuclear weapon can be made with as little as 4 kilograms of plutonium. The U. X-rays. Isotopes that are readily split. or a combination of these and other fissionable isotopes of ura- nium and plutonium. Some of these isotopes only exist in limited quantities. purity. Nongovernment experts claim that a 1-kiloton-yield nuclear explosive device can be achieved using sophisticated de- signs with as little as 1 to 2 kilograms of plutonium. The amount of material in a critical mass depends on the exact type of materials present.” Isotopes of uranium and plutonium are the main materials used in nuclear weapons. principally U-235. In a nuclear reac- tor. This fissioning of isotopes is accompanied by the release of energy and additional neutrons that can go on to be absorbed by and split other atoms. The mini- mum or exact amount of nuclear material needed to produce nuclear weapons is classified information in all nuclear weapon states. and uranium containing 90 percent U-235 will have a smaller critical mass than uranium containing 45 percent U-235. the degree to which the fissile material is compressed. beta particles (electrons). their density. Pu-239. which in turn release more energy and more neutrons. and the desired yield. and gamma rays.” The significant quantities that the IAEA specifies are 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 8 kilograms of plutonium.S. The energy and atomic particles released are in the form of alpha particles (subatomic fragments consisting of two protons and two neu- trons). making them unavailable to cause fissions in other nuclei. neptunium) can also be used in weapons. neutrons. The amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon depends on design considerations. Basic Nuclear Weapon Concepts Some amounts of fissile material are too small to sustain a chain reaction be- cause a large fraction of the neutrons produced are able to escape the confines of the nuclear reaction. and geometry.” when a slowly moving neutron is absorbed into the nucleus are referred to as fissile materials. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 47 nuclear reactor). or approximately 8 to 10 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. and are collectively referred to simply as “radiation. the chain reaction is controlled and limited over a long period of time. U-233. but for a variety of technical reasons they have not been. such as geometry. but they are nonetheless a matter of some proliferation concern. The IAEA publishes figures on the quanti- ties of material required to produce a nuclear weapon—amounts known as a “significant quantity. including the production of heat in a nuclear reactor (for creating steam and then electricity) and the explosive power of a nuclear weapon. The minimum amount of material necessary to sustain a chain reaction is called a critical mass. while in nuclear weapons most of the released energy typically takes place in a very short time (a fraction of a millionth of a second).

and in the nuclear weapon dropped on Nagasaki. The first multistage thermonuclear device—also referred to as a hydrogen bomb (because it used liquid deuterium. 1945.” In a boosted device. Japan. An implosion design is more complex but allows for a smaller device. The implosion design was used in the first nuclear explosion (the Trinity test) at Alamogordo. such as those used in today’s modern missile warheads.000 metric tons of TNT (10. fusion materials (such as deuterium and tritium) are located within the atomic device. before the desired yield can be achieved. the first hydrogen explosion had a force of 10. or tritium—that are fused by the high temperature produced by a nuclear reaction. 1945. The chain reaction in a gun design using plutonium will begin too soon. and the nuclear dissassembly will occur too quickly. and the second is to rapidly compress a single subcritical mass (the implosion technique). that it was used without being explosively tested beforehand. on Au- gust 9. highly enriched ura- nium is considered a particularly attractive material for terrorists seeking to ac- quire nuclear weapons. 1952. Such devices are called thermonuclear weapons. Whereas the first fission nuclear explosions—the Trinity device—had a force of 20. New Mexico. because the secondaries (and often the primaries) typically contain lighter isotopes—in the form of lithium deutride. in the southern Pacific Ocean.” thus further increasing the explosive yield of the nuclear weapon. on August 6. even at that time. The gun design is the least complex of the known nuclear weapon designs. These materials are typically in- jected as a gas into the center of the fissile material before initiating the nuclear chain reaction. Because uranium can be used in the simpler gun design. The device used a basic fission primary explosive to produce the heat and radiation necessary to ignite the secondary explosive of liquid deuterium. The first is to rapidly bring together two subcritical masses (the gun assembly technique). which is an isotope of hydrogen)—was exploded by the United States on November 1. on July 16. Either uranium and plutonium or a combination of the two can be used in the more complex implosion design. In advanced nuclear designs.400. the primary typically relies on a process referred to as “boosting.48 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Basic Nuclear Weapon Designs There are two classical methods for achieving the desired mass and explosive yield of a single-stage nuclear weapon. was a gun-type weapon and was so well understood. Japan. Gun-design weapons can only use uranium as a fissile material. deuterium. 1945.4 megatons). 20 kilotons). The nuclear weapon that the United States dropped on Hiroshima. Advanced Nuclear Designs Most advanced weapon designs have two or more separate nuclear components in the same device that are ignited in stages—the energy released in the explod- ing fission-based “primary” is contained and used to compress and ignite nuclear reactions in the separate fusion-based “secondary.000 metric tons of TNT (that is. As the chain reaction releases energy in the initial phase of the .

fissile materials are not readily available in nature. nuclear weapons. although fission weapons can be made with less concentrated U-235. One other technique. must be created artifi- cially in a nuclear reactor and subsequently separated in a process referred to as reprocessing or chemical separation. some of the energy is used to compress and heat these lighter atoms.S. So much material is required if the enrichment is below 20 percent U-235 that the inter- national community has adopted a concentration of 20 percent U-235 as a thresh- old above which additional safeguards and physical security requirements are invoked. All other fissile materials. Iran and South Korea have recently been found to have conducted uranium enrichment activities using lasers. collectively referred to as “enrichment. and the gas- centrifuge method. but it makes up only 0. electromagnetic iso- tope separation. If the concentration of uraniun-235 is lower. The con- centration of the desired isotope. including plutonium. causing increased concern about the control of this tech- nology. in which uranium hexafluoride gas is swirled in a cylinder that rotates at extremely high speeds. This highly inefficient but relatively simple enrichment method was largely abandoned by the United States in the 1950s.” With some technologies. These thermonuclear reactions release additional energy and neutrons. The uranium used in a fission weapon is typically enriched to above 90 percent U-235. The Production of Nuclear Materials Fortunately. in which uranium hexafluoride gas is forced through a selectively porous barrier. Two principal enrich- ment techniques used today are the gaseous diffusion method. causing then to fuse together. Considerable research and development has been conducted on several chemi- cal and laser isotope-separation technologies. U-235 exists in natural uranium. was one of the processes used to enrich uranium for the first U. South Africa used another technology for the production of enriched . larger amounts of uranium (and the chemical explosive for compressing it) are required to fabricate a nuclear explosive device. and the neutrons cause additional fission reactions. U-235. but it was adopted by Iraq in its nuclear weapon program in the 1980s (see chapter 17). N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 49 explosion. Uranium Enrichment Numerous methods have been developed to enrich uranium. but none of these is yet efficient enough to use in the commercial production of enriched uranium. increasing the energy output and efficiency of the boosted device.7 percent of all of the uranium that comes out of the ground. from a nonproliferation perspective. can be increased through a variety of processes. thereby accelerating the ongoing fission chain reaction. the U-235 concentration can be increased to almost 100 percent. All of them ulti- mately rely on the varying weights of different isotopes. and much higher concentrations are required to construct an actual nuclear explosive.

and expertise available to several states. Not only do centrifuges offer a highly efficient way to enrich uranium. or “jet nozzle. Fractional increases in the U-235 percentage can be multiplied by repeating the process thousands of times. • a chemical conversion plant. for enriching the uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium tetrachloride in the isotope U-235. for processing uranium ore. • a uranium mine. Libya. and North Korea. For illustrative purposes. remains a highly technical and challenging activity that requires extensive experience and expertise to master.50 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s uranium for weapons—the aerodynamic. however. The forces inside the cylinder fling the uranium gas to the exterior wall of the unit. equipment. but the Pakistan-based A. the basic nuclear resources and facilities that are needed to produce weapons-grade uranium include • uranium deposits. The enrich- ment of uranium through centrifuges. or yellowcake. must spin at very high speeds (several times the speed of sound). which usually contains less than 1 percent uranium into uranium oxide concentrate. The gaseous form of this chemical is then fed along the axis of cylinders spinning at the rate of several hundred miles per hour.1).” enrichment process. one small step at a time. Centrifuges Considerable attention has been focused on centrifuge enrichment technology in the past few years. for purifying yellowcake and converting it into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) or uranium tetrachloride (UCl4). but the weight differential between various ura- nium isotopes allows collectors at different positions along the centrifuge ends to pick up slightly higher or lower percentages of U-235 or U-238. natural uranium must first be converted through a chemical process into uranium hexafluoride (figure 3. • an enrichment plant. which is still a sensitive and controlled technology. Q. Centrifuges are used in a wide variety of legitimate applications. • a uranium mill. depending on where they are positioned. Pakistan relies primarily on uranium enrichment for its nuclear weapons program (see chapter 12). the material processed in the enrichment plant. including Iran. and the basic concepts involved in their use are taught in college-level physics. The centrifuges must be made from specialized materials. and • a capability for converting the enriched uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium tetrachloride into uranium metal. and possibly others that have not yet been identified. . including metal alloys and carbon fibers. In centrifuge enrichment. Linking together hundreds or thousands of centrifuges into what is known as a “cascade” can thus enrich uranium gas from the natural level to much higher levels. Khan nuclear black market net- work also made centrifuge technology.

The United States and several other nuclear weapon states have used dedicated military reactors to pro- duce these weapons-usable materials. it can take decades for a state to develop and master uranium centrifuge enrichment. success is rarely quick and never guaranteed. Along with these engineering challenges. Plutonium Production Plutonium. Even with considerable assistance. complicat- ing the industrial process. The centrifuge units them- selves are surrounded by vacuum-sealed chambers to reduce friction. requiring complete replacement. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 51 Figure 3. uranium hexafluoride—the feed- stock used in centrifuges—is a highly caustic mixture that must be heated to remain gaseous.1. Without outside assistance. Diagram of a Centrifuge and must be perfectly balanced or they will fly apart. the other main nuclear material used in weapons. and any system breaches can clog the entire centrifuge cascade. is not available in nature and must be created artificially in nuclear reactors. but other states (such as India and North .

the economic advantages of breeders depend on natural uranium becoming scarce and expensive. spent fuel is dissolved in hot nitric acid. Fast reactors typically use mixed plutonium-uranium fuel. “spent” fuel elements and target materials are taken to a separation or “reprocessing” plant. significant foreign assistance. it seems. often surrounded by a “blanket” of natural uranium. and the improved efficiency in extraction has outpaced the depletion of higher-grade . it was generally assumed that because nuclear power use would steadily grow and worldwide uranium resources would be depleted. and the rooms at the reprocessing plant where the plutonium is chemically extracted must have thick walls. Indeed. Like enrichment facilities. depend- ing on the reactor design) is used to create a controlled nuclear chain reaction. Iraq. plutonium would need to be extracted from spent fuel for use as a substitute fuel in conventional power reactors. has apparently succeeded in constructing a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon without. which—after radioactive decay—can be converted into fissile materials such as Pu-239 or U-233. Indeed. lead shielding. research and development is under way in several nations on a new generation of reactors. it remains a complex engineering procedure. Israel. however. new uranium reserves have been discovered. some of which are captured by fertile nuclear materials. new plutonium is created in the core and the blanket. This reaction releases neutrons. uranium fuel (either natural uranium or slightly enriched uranium. To accomplish this separation. almost every nation that has tried to develop nuclear weapons by the plutonium route—India. and special ventilation to contain radia- tion hazards. many of which are highly ra- dioactive. Japan. throughout the 1970s. however. more plutonium is produced than is consumed in the reactor. and the plutonium is separated from the solution in a series of chemical processing steps. Although detailed information about reprocessing was declassified by the United States and France in the 1950s and is generally available. As the reactor oper- ates. known as fast or “breeder” reactors. In some fast reac- tors. however. the fuel rods containing these materials also contain other fission products and by-products.52 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Korea) have used civilian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. These programs have encountered complex technical and political challenges—not the least of which is related to the proliferation risks caused by the overabundance of plutonium—and also questions about safety and the waste produced from these types of reactors and their spent-fuel handling. Because the spent-fuel rods are highly radioactive. Some form of chemical separation or other process is required to sepa- rate plutonium from the highly radioactive waste materials. However. Neutron capture produces new iso- topes. most notably in France. Like plutonium recycling in general. North Korea. hence the name “breeder” reactor. In addition. and Paki- stan—has sought outside help from the advanced nuclear supplier countries. heavy lead casks must be used to transport them. During the past three decades. In a reac- tor. and Russia. such as U-238 or thorium-232. In a chemical separation plant. reprocessing plants can also be used for legitimate civilian purposes because plutonium can be used as fuel in nuclear power reactors.

in the early 1980s. implying that a domestic enrichment capability could be available. The United Kingdom has also frozen its program to develop breeder reactors. a light-water-moderated reactor would necessitate the use of low-enriched uranium. • a fuel fabrication plant. It is also possible that a state might import fuel for a light-water reactor under IAEA inspection and. and spent-fuel reprocessing has proven to be far more expensive and complex than anticipated. it represents an advanced technology that will pay off in the future and reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. In contrast to heavy-water and graphite-moderated reactors. assuming that a research or power reactor—moderated by either heavy water or graphite and employing natural uranium fuel—is used: • uranium deposits. the following facili- ties and resources are required for an independent plutonium production capa- bility. If so. and Russia. these factors led the United States to abandon its plans to recycle plutonium in light-water reactors and. • a uranium mine. • a uranium chemical conversion plant. for processing uranium ore containing less than 1 percent uranium into uranium oxide concentrate. the production of plutonium en- tails many steps. nuclear power has reached only a fraction of its expected growth levels. ob- viating the need for plutonium as a weapon material. N u c l e a r We a p o n s a n d M a t e r i a l s 53 ores. to end its breeder reactor development program. be produced. or yellowcake. • a heavy-water production plant or a reactor-grade graphite production plant. Japan. and many installations and capabilities are needed along with the reactor and reprocessing plant. • a research or power reactor moderated by heavy water or graphite. in theory. The principal proponents of the use of plutonium for civilian purposes are France. Broadly speaking. For illustrative purposes. which use natu- ral uranium as fuel. concern has grown over the proliferation risks of the wide-scale use of plutonium as a fuel. to convert the yellowcake into reactor- grade uranium dioxide. and • a reprocessing plant. . In the late 1970s. the proponents of nuclear energy in these countries have maintained support for the civil use of plutonium by arguing that. highly enriched uranium could. though it is continuing to reprocess spent fuel on a commercial basis for itself and several industrial nations. though it may not be economical. to manufacture the fuel elements placed in the reac- tor. • a uranium mill. which are all continuing to develop breeder reactors and are moving forward with sizable plutonium recycling programs. Germany has aban- doned its breeder reactor program and is phasing out its recycling of plutonium and nuclear power in general. Like the production of enriched uranium. Moreover. including a capability to fabricate zircaloy or aluminum tubing.

the state might one day abrogate its IAEA obligations and seize that material for use in nuclear arms. Although IAEA rules would require the country involved to place any such plu- tonium under IAEA monitoring.54 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s after using the material to produce electricity. reprocess it to extract plutonium. .

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”3 Unlike normal disease outbreaks.”1 Recent technological developments have contributed to the threat posed by these weapons. BWs would be used deliber- ately to infect a target group. and Proliferation Since the mid-1990s.1 at the end of the chapter). CHAPTER 4 Biological and Chemical Weapons. while advances in biotech- nology could expand the availability and lethality of common BW agents. The spread of dual-use chemical technologies has facilitated the surreptitious acquisition of indigenous CW programs by potential proliferators. [that] do not destroy buildings. which ap- pear naturally and may spread through contagion. cities or trans- portation. Agents. or causes deterioration of material. They unfortunately just destroy human lives. governments and the public have grown increasingly con- cerned over the threats posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons (CWs) and biological weapons (BWs). Biological agents can be grouped in four categories: bacterial agents. Some experts categorize a number of these agents as weapons of mass destruction because of their potential to inflict massive casualties through- out a broad geographical area. and toxins: 57 . rickettsial agents. viral agents. More accurately. The utility of a biological agent as a weapon is determined by its virulence. . animal. and ease of production. stability.2 NATO defines a biological agent as a “microorganism (or toxin derived from it) which causes disease in man. Biological Weapons BWs deliver pathogenic microorganisms or biologically manufactured toxins to cause illness or death in human. plants or animals. infectiousness. CWs and BWs have also been called “mass casualty weapons . The fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States transformed that concern into a requirement for substantial government action to respond to and prepare for terrorist attacks using chemical or biological war- fare agents. or plant populations (see table 4. .

differentiate biological toxins from chemical agents. Some bacteria cause disease by both means. Viral agents act as intracellular parasites by commandeering the biochemical machinery of the infected cell to produce more virus particles. As nonliving agents. they can germinate when conditions are favor- able. The level of technical expertise required to acquire a biological warfare capa- bility may vary depending on the sophistication of the weapons being sought. and various viral hemorrhagic fever viruses. Bacterial agents can be cultivated in nutrient-rich solutions. Unlike bacterial or viral agents.5 Like other biological agents. however. Toxins are not volatile and hence are unlikely to penetrate the skin. the effective delivery of toxins generally requires their dis- persal as an inhalable aerosol.58 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Bacterial agents. Spores are “a dormant form of bacterium. are single- cell organisms that either invade host tissue or produce nonliving toxins (poi- sons). are potent poisons gen- erated by living organisms (that is. algae. spores are often more effective as biologi- cal warfare agents. Viruses are microorganisms that can replicate only inside living cells. • Biological toxins. • Rickettsial agents include those that cause Q fever and epidemic typhus. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus. biological agents must be deliv- ered over a widespread area in a concentration high enough to infect and under atmospheric and weather conditions that ensure agent survival for a period of a few hours or more. toxins cannot reproduce or spread and are therefore less deadly than living pathogens. and stability in storage and after release into the environment. ease of production. and plants). and like the seeds of a plant. toxins are nonliving protein or nonprotein molecules. Several key characteristics make pathogens or toxins more or less suitable for use as BWs: the availability of virulent strains. Under specific conditions. To maximize casualties. such as temperature and humid- ity. ease of dissemination. However. triggering changes that eventually lead to cell death. Rick- ettsiae are parasitic microorganisms that live and replicate inside living host cells. anthrax bacilli) can transform themselves into spores. Aerosol delivery—the dispersion of microscopic liquid drop- lets or dry particles of a microorganism or toxin in an airborne cloud—is con- sidered the most effective means of delivery. although some toxins can be produced by chemi- cal synthesis. some bacte- ria (for example. bacteria. particle size and weight. although they can also be used to poison food or beverages. They are often highly susceptible to antibiotic treatments. such as ricin and botulinum toxin. toxins are of biological origin. Precise variables such as particle size and the altitude of dissemination are significant determinants of the range and . Several characteristics. Unlike their chemical counterparts. such as those that cause anthrax and tularemia.”4 Because of their persistence. than are the original bacteria. fungi. The successful cultivation of viruses is more difficult than that of bacteria. Spores are more resistant to environmental stresses. the toxicity of many biological toxins is several orders of magnitude higher than that of the most potent chemical poisons. • Viral agents include smallpox virus. lethality.

grenades. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 59 damage that can be caused by a BW attack. Depending on the number of victims who inhaled the agent. and tasteless. odorless. and dissemination. missiles. Recent advances in the bio- logical sciences. BWs are also well suited for covert delivery. storage.7 It also reveals the terrorists’ . including microbiology and aerobiology. The ability of an agent to survive and maintain its virulence for several hours in aerosol form as it floats downwind is a prerequisite for infecting large numbers of people. adding to concerns that rogue states or terrorist organizations may acquire a BW capability. A g e n t s . depending on the specific agent and the amount that has been distributed and inhaled.” have increased the availability of dual-use equipment and the number of individuals with the knowledge necessary for BW production. Many agents. Despite sustained and well-funded efforts. humidity. simultaneous outbreak of disease. their potential use by terrorists has been identified as a growing threat to international security. rockets. com- bining a stable biological agent with an effective dissemination device requires sophisticated technology and expertise. aerosols of various pathogenic microorganisms and tox- ins are invisible. to infect large num- bers of the target population. including desiccation. Furthermore. Pathogenic micro- organisms are potential mass-casualty weapons because of their ability to multi- ply within the host. standard warfare munitions—artillery shells. could cause tens to hundreds of thousands of deaths. and bombs—are not effective delivery vehicles for BWs. As a result. the re- sult could be a massive. and oxidation. a BW must disseminate a microbial or toxin agent in the appropriate particle size range of 1 to 5 microns (a micron is a thousandth of a millimeter). Other agents require moisture to survive. particu- larly live organisms. Large quantities of biological agents. The acquisition of an advanced BW capability requires expertise in various disciplines.) Once disseminated.6 Incubation periods of BW agents vary from several hours to several days. (See the section on Russian CW and BW programs in chapter 6. Most cannot withstand the heat or blast of an explo- sion. often termed the “biotechnology revolution. As a result. The cult’s failure demonstrates the significant tech- nical hurdles associated with BW development. Although biological agent production per se is not technically difficult. This is a challenging task because biological warfare agents are vulnerable to a host of environmental con- ditions. the group was ultimately unsuccessful in acquiring and disseminating virulent strains of botulinum toxin and anthrax. Because of these characteristics. and lay- offs or underemployment of former BW scientists and technicians. Terror- ist intentions involving BWs were exposed publicly by the repeated attempts of the Aum Shinrikyo cult to produce and distribute two lethal biological agents in Japan in the early 1990s. effectively distributed. Agent stability and virulence must also be maintained during production. die when exposed to ultraviolet light or oxygen. a BW attack could remain undetected until the victims began to exhibit symptoms of infection. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the decommissioning of its massive BW program have also increased BW proliferation risks. Inadequate security at former BW institutes in Russia that still possess collections of highly virulent pathogen strains. increase the risk that BW expertise and materials could leak from Russia to potential proliferators.

From 1932 until the end of World War II. and ex- posed the widespread vulnerabilities of population centers to BWs. In the twentieth century. when President Richard Nixon unilaterally and unconditionally renounced BWs and ordered the destruction of all U. The potential diversion of biological agents from culture collections in the former Soviet states or from states with covert BW programs has increased concerns that terrorists may be able to acquire these weapons. the United States held in storage some 40.9 At the time.C. In 1940. Recent dis- cussions center on possible methods of protection and appropriate measures for emergency treatment and containment in the event of a large-scale BW attack. In the third century B. biological warfare capability was formidable. each contain- ing 35 milliliters of liquid-suspension anthrax spores. The United States officially ended its offensive BW program in November 1969. which were infected by the fleas and then spread the disease to humans. Official admission of the program’s existence did not occur until 1992. on impact. Nevertheless. British officers engaged in biological warfare in eighteenth-century North America by distributing blankets contaminated with the smallpox virus to Native Ameri- cans.000 liters of antipersonnel biological warfare agents and some 5.10 The full extent of the Soviet BW program is still being uncovered. nearly twenty years after the Soviet Union had signed a treaty pledging not to develop or stock- pile BWs. BW stockpiles and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful purposes. the Tartars cata- pulted corpses of bubonic-plague victims over the walls of enemy fortresses. reportedly contracted the bubonic plague after the Japanese dropped ceramic bombs containing plague-infected fleas along with rice to at- tract rodents. Historical incidents of BW use in warfare have been rare but often dramatic. The fall 2001 mailings of anthrax bacterial spores in the United States raised widespread speculation about the methods and potential consequences of covert BW use. The Soviet BW program had two main components: one under the . A small explosive charge would. the Carthaginian leader Hannibal filled pots with poi- sonous snakes and hurled them onto enemy ships. The weapon thought most likely to be used was the E133 cluster bomb. the U. residents in Chuhsien.8 Growing capabilities sparked recognition of the destructive potential of BWs and were accompanied by international efforts to control their proliferation and use. Japan developed an exten- sive BW and CW program. which included experimentation with biological agents on human subjects in the infamous Units 731 and 100..000 kilograms of antiagriculture agents. the Cold War prompted the development of vast offensive BW programs in the United States and the Soviet Union. When the BW program was dismantled. raised questions about the ease and source of acquisition.S. the sophistication of biological warfare was ampli- fied with the emergence of state-sponsored BW programs. All were destroyed in the early 1970s. In 1346.60 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s recognition of the utility of BWs as instruments of mass terror. China. The attacks exhibited the range of covert delivery options available to bioterrorists. which held 536 biological bomblets.S. turn the slurry of spores into an aerosol to be inhaled by the target population.

Nevertheless.k. In March 2000.13 As a result. and spent over $10 billion on these programs between 1991 and 2004.500 metric tons of bubonic plague bacteria. for example. It now seems clear. During U. the Soviet BW program had the capacity to produce mas- sive quantities of several biological agents. Russia had refused to extend the site visits to facilities under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. and 2. .S.”16 Although it is difficult to know with any certainty. the former first deputy director of Biopreparat. although many govern- ments and outside experts believed that they did.000 metric tons of glanders bacteria. the director of the U.14 The exact number and identity of all countries having biological warfare ca- pabilities remain uncertain because of the dual-use nature of biotechnology and the ease with which BW development can be camouflaged. causing the trilateral process to collapse and raising concerns about the extent of Russia’s deactivation of the Soviet BW com- plex. including 1. Other states are pursu- ing BW programs for counterinsurgency use and tactical applications. important progress has been achieved in securing collections of biological patho- gens at former BW research institutes in the former Soviet Union. Defense Intelligence Agency also told the U. Ken Alibek (a. Of these funds. Kazakhstan. Despite such concerns. . Iraq.11 At its peak. and the other under an ostensibly civil- ian pharmaceutical development and production complex known as Biopreparat.S. .”15 In Feb- ruary 2001. Russia. and Georgia that house lethal biological agents. both because it blurs together biologi- cal and chemical programs. and Syria—now either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical capabilities for use against their perceived enemies . the figure of a dozen na- tional BW programs appears exaggerated. Senate testimony in 1998. and the United Kingdom agreed to a trilateral process of information sharing and reciprocal site visits to verify the end of Russia’s illicit BW program. that neither Libya nor post-1991 Iraq possessed stockpiles of BWs. Subsequently. however. Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged to halt the further development of offensive BW capabilities.S. the director of the U. including several hostile to Western democracies—Iran. Central Intelligence Agency stated that “about a dozen states.500 metric tons of tula- remia bacteria. By 1994. while the under- payment of former Russian BW scientists has increased the threat of diversion of biological warfare agents and technical expertise.000 people and included several large-scale production facilities that could be mobilized during a period of crisis or war. described a Soviet bioweapons program that employed a total of more than 60. Libya. Some coun- tries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability. North Ko- rea. . .a. 1. and because it counts countries where a BW pro- gram is only alleged or suspected. Senate that “there are a dozen countries believed to have biological warfare programs. chemical.500 metric tons of anthrax.S. Kanatjan Alibekov). security remains lax at some former Soviet facilities in Russia. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . the United States. A g e n t s .12 In April 1992. 4. the United States continues cooperative efforts to help secure the former Soviet Union’s vast nuclear. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 61 Ministries of Defense and Agriculture. Uzbekistan. $300 million was spent directly on BW programs and $985 million was devoted to chemical demilitarization and destruction. and biological ar- senals. .

and airways are especially vulnerable. The U. • Choking agents. and Syria. approximately 70 different chemi- cal substances were used and stockpiled as CW agents. Choking agents must be inhaled to harm the body. Finally. and DNA to destroy cells. human-made substances that can be disseminated as gases. Iran. Russia may also have done so. Such substances must be highly toxic yet not too difficult to handle.62 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Iraq’s clandestine program is the one about which the most in known. only a small number of chemicals are considered suitable for chemical warfare. The Soviet Union. to be effective. Throughout the twentieth century. The most significant remaining suspected BW programs are in Israel and North Korea. Egypt.2 at the end of the chapter). Army defines a chemical agent as “a chemical which is intended for use in military operations to kill. poison cells by blocking the transport of oxygen by red blood cells from the lungs to the tissues. and nerve agents: • Blood gases. such as chlorine and phosgene. fluid- filled blisters. There is no independent confirmation of these claims. liq- uids. and must also be resistant to atmospheric water vapor and oxygen in order to maintain stability and effective- ness during dispersal. even after it claimed to have ended its program (see chapter 6). CWs are generally categorized in four groups: blood gases. proteins. inspections after the 1991 war. and South Africa’s BW program reportedly ended in 1992. called precursors. and all the governments concerned deny having any BW programs. and lewisite. seriously injure. although some agents are used in a gaseous form. CW agents must also be able to withstand prolonged storage without deterioration. are most likely at the research and development stage. CW agents may also be allowed to evaporate spontaneously. Despite the abundance of modern-day toxic sub- stances. thanks to U. Other countries often mentioned by governments or experts as having suspected BW programs include China. Chemical Weapons CW are lethal. and apartheid South Africa are the only nations known to have produced and stockpiled BWs since the 1980s. They may be disseminated by an explosive munitions or a sprayer system. or incapacitate man because of physiological effects. producing severe chemical burns and massive.18 CW agents are produced by mixing various chemical ingredients. damage the membrane of the lungs and ultimately cause suffocation from pulmonary edema. choking agents. in specific ratios. such as mustard gas. or solids (see table 4. eyes. blistering agents (or vesicants).S. phosgene oxime. The most serious effects of cyanide poisoning are caused by a lack of oxygen to the brain.N. The pro- grams. The skin.”17 The use of such chemical substances against soldiers or civilians constitutes chemical warfare. Most substances used in CWs are liquids. Israel may have produced BW agents but is not thought to have stockpiled weapons. • Blistering agents. CW agents must be able to with- stand the high levels of heat that accompany explosive dispersal. Iraq. if they exist. such as hydrogen cyanide. pen- etrate body tissues and mucous membranes and react with enzymes. .

handling. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 63 • Nerve agents. Wind velocity necessarily dictates its direction and rate of spread. Effective CW delivery involves disseminating the agent as liquid droplets or an aerosol. warm temperatures and high humidity can increase the toxic concentration of the chemical cloud. By the war’s end. When dispersed. All nerve agents are chemically categorized as organophosphorus com- pounds. two precursor chemicals of lesser toxicity are re- acted together to create the lethal agent only after the munition is fired. 1915.000 metric tons of agents. whereas the smaller.000 metric tons of chemical agents.2 million. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . In a binary munition. Belgium. poured into munitions.”20 Sophisticated chemical delivery systems were perfected in the 1960s with the development of “binary” munitions. but fortunately did not use them. All of these munitions types are intended to provide an appropriately sized aerosol that will remain suspended in the air close to the ground[. aerial bombs (including cluster bombs). when Fascist Italy employed mustard agent in bombs and aerosols during its invasion of Ethiopia.21 After World War I. when the German army used chlorine gas against Allied troops at Ypres. The use of CW agents in warfare can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. Both the Allies and the Central Powers subse- quently employed chemical agents such as phosgene and mustard on a massive scale during World War I. spray tanks. sarin. By de- laying the synthesis of the toxic substance until after the weapon’s launch from an aircraft or gun. During World War II. Conversely. Mustard gas alone killed 91. in contrast. CWs were of a “unitary” design.22 Japan produced 8.000 and injured 1. binary technology ensures greater safety during transporta- tion. who mixed sulfur and pitch resin to engulf enemy troops in toxic fumes during the Trojan War. causing skin or ground contamination.23 . Previously. disrupt the trans- mission of nerve impulses in human and animal nervous systems.19 Such chemical warfare agents are highly toxic and can kill within several minutes after exposure to a lethal dose through skin contact or inha- lation. The first major instance of chemical warfare occurred on April 23. Rain and low temperatures may reduce agent effectiveness. the German CW program stockpiled 78. and even simple aerosol spray cans offer po- tential dissemination methods for terrorists. The CW agent was manufactured. a significant use of chemical warfare occurred in 1935–1936. lighter droplets remain airborne as an aerosol that can be inhaled. missiles.000 metric tons of tabun and 1. and storage of CWs. ready for use. an estimated 124. pesticide foggers. A wide variety of possible delivery systems exists for CW agents.000 pounds of sarin. and V nerve agent (VX). CWs have been used or stockpiled by various military forces throughout the twentieth century. Typical mili- tary devices include “artillery shells. Crop- dusting aircraft.] where it will be readily inhaled. resulting in death. including 12. A chemical cloud is highly susceptible to envi- ronmental conditions. and then stored. A g e n t s . Crude methods of delivering CW agents are typically less efficient and reliable but can nevertheless be effective. and mines. grenades.000 metric tons of chemicals had been used on the battlefield by both sides. such as tabun. rockets. the larger droplets fall to earth.

South Korea. killing twelve people and injuring about a thousand. did successfully produce significant amounts of sarin nerve agent. and it carried out a second attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995. This announcement was followed by the deactivation of its CW produc- tion program. the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Wyo- ming Memorandum of Understanding. the cult released sarin in a residential area of Masumoto. France. The September 11. however. The United States stockpiled an estimated 30.64 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Immense quantities of CWs were also produced by both the United States and the Soviet Union throughout World War II and the Cold War.26 although these claims are difficult to verify. 2001. no nonstate actor or substate group is known to possess CWs.000 people immediately and injured tens of thousands more. Libya. terrorist attacks raised a new worry: terrorists may not have to produce chemical agents in order to use chemicals to cause mass casualties. Official Russian dec- larations suggest that the country now has 40. Approximately half the 64 declared CWPFs have been destroyed thus far.000 metric tons of CWs stored at seven sites. the United States and Yugo- slavia. Taiwan. South Korea. and the United States. CWs began in 1985 and is still in progress at several CW depots across the nation. Efforts to Control Biological and Chemical Weapons Global efforts to contain the spread of CWs and BWs center on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Conven- tion (CWC). In 1994. These incidents elevated concern over the ability of terrorists to acquire a CW capability. Initial multilateral efforts to prohibit the use of chemical and . China. Iran. Japan. India. Twelve nations have also declared existing or former CW production fa- cilities (CWPFs): Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intentional de- struction or sabotage at chemical plants or involving trucks or trains transport- ing hazardous chemicals could turn industrial facilities into weapons of chemi- cal terrorism. concentrated in central Russia and the Urals. Currently. and Vietnam are also sometimes listed as nations with active CW programs. (See chapter 6. South Korea. India.000 metric tons of agents: Albania. Myanmar. The Soviet Union officially announced its possession of a CW stockpile in 1987. India. Russia. and Syria. Saudi Arabia. Russia.) Most major states with known CW stockpiles have pledged to destroy them under the Chemical Weapons Convention (see below). Aum Shinrikyo. Destruction of U. in December 1984 released a cloud of chlorine gas that killed at least 5. North Korea.25 The most significant remaining national CW programs are those of Egypt. An accident or sabotage at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal. In 1989. the United Kingdom. Japan. Libya.000 metric tons of CW agents.S. Israel.24 Six member countries have declared the possession of CW stockpiles totaling approximately 70. and perhaps China and Iran. which entailed an exchange of data about their respective CW stockpiles and production complexes.

did not have verifi- cation or enforcement provisions. 1991. including the . Review conferences of the BWC have taken place about every five years since the treaty entered into force. the George W.”28 The United States.29 The BWC was the first international treaty to ban an entire class of weapons. In 1899. a system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention.S. 2001.S. To that end. its impact remained limited because it did not re- strict the ability of states to acquire or store CWs and BWs. Bush administration proposed a series of measures that individual countries could adopt and implement to reduce the risk of bioterrorism. 153 states were members of the treaty. The terrorist at- tacks in New York and Washington on September 11. and Russia are the three depositary govern- ments for the BWC. incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures. Senate also failed to ratify the Geneva Protocol until January 1975. Recognizing these weaknesses. stockpiling. and other peaceful purposes. Although this treaty prohibited the use in war of both poison gases and bacteriological weapons.”27 The BWC also specifically bans “weapons. as ap- propriate. protective. but without resuming multilateral negotiations. 1986. into the regime. fifty years after it was concluded. interest in strengthening the BWC. the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. 1996. However. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . Violations of the BWC by the former Soviet Union. persis- tent allegations regarding Iraq’s BW activities. The Ad Hoc Group was authorized to negotiate in four areas: “Definitions of terms and objective criteria. equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. acqui- sition. biotechnical and pharma- ceutical secrets without effectively detecting treaty violations. A g e n t s . and the subsequent wave of anthrax attacks gave rise to a renewed U.S. and 2001–2002. and because many states reserved the right to respond in kind to a chemical or biological attack. The U. member states established an Ad Hoc Group in 1994 to draft legally binding verification mea- sures for the convention. when the United States rejected the draft treaty and withdrew from the talks.32 The United States claimed that the BWC protocol would have jeopardized the security of U. As of Spring 2005.” The extensive use of CWs during World War I in violation of the Hague gas projectile declaration led to another attempt by states to establish an interna- tional norm against the use of weapons of mass destruction: the 1925 Geneva Protocol. namely in 1980. and specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full implementation of Article X. the First Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War included a declaration banning “the use of projectiles. the United Kingdom. and transfer of biological agents or toxins in types or “quantities that have no justification for prophylactic. 1975.”31 Efforts by the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding protocol for veri- fication ended abruptly in July 2001. and a doubling of the number of states suspected of pursuing a BW capability since 197530 have all raised ques- tions about the BWC’s effectiveness. the treaty lacked effective verification and enforcement measures to ensure compliance. It prohibits the development. The BWC was opened for signature in April 1972 and entered into force on March 26. production. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 65 biological agents on the battlefield can be traced to the end of the nineteenth century.

A member state may request the OPCW international inspectorate to conduct a challenge inspection of any suspect facility. The CWC also requires members to destroy all CW stockpiles and production facilities under its jurisdiction or control.34 The Organization for the Prohibi- tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These negotiations stalled. five-year extension in exceptional cases. efforts began to negotiate a ban on CWs. procedures for investigating suspicious disease outbreaks or alle- gations of BW use. the destruction of production facilities. A year later. The CWC entered into force on April 29. stockpiling. as well as any CWs abandoned on the territory of another state party. routine on-site inspections of declared sites. Full elimination of CWs and former production facilities is expected within ten years of the convention’s entry into force. and the strengthening of existing U. The CWC includes an extensive verification regime that subjects all declared CW and weapon production facilities to systematic inspections. directly or indirectly. and short-notice challenge inspections in cases of alleged non-compliance. acquisition. or use of CWs. oversees the implementation of the treaty. The CWC also includes provisions for assistance in the event a member state is attacked or threatened with CWs. Varying levels of control are then applied to the listed chemicals and their production facilities. insisting that all facilities and locations be subject to this procedure. The conven- tion categorizes chemicals into three “schedules” depending on their applicabil- ity for CWs and for commercial purposes. Soon after the conclusion of the BWC in 1972. production. retention. the adoption of regulations to restrict access to dangerous pathogens and toxins.”33 State parties to the CWC cannot conduct military preparations for the use of CWs. The final catalyst for completion of the CWC was the use of CWs by both sides during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). declared or undeclared.66 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s criminalization of activities prohibited by the BWC. nor can they assist other states in any treaty-banned activity. over compliance and verifica- tion issues. As of Spring 2005. and consumption of chemi- cals relevant to the convention. headquartered in The Hague. Progress resumed in 1986 when the Soviet Union accepted provi- sions for systematic inspections at CW storage and production facilities. . with a provision for a one-time. processing.N. 1997. and declarations and routine inspections at commercial industry sites. Verification involves a combination of declara- tion and reporting requirements. Facilities produc- ing chemicals listed in any of the three schedules in quantities in excess of speci- fied threshold amounts must be declared and are subject to inspection. [of ] chemical weapons to anyone. The verification provisions of the treaty regulate both military and civilian chemical facilities that are active in the production. 168 countries had signed and ratified the CWC. which demonstrated the absence of international means to prevent the acquisition and use of CWs in conflict. and for promoting trade in chemicals and related pro- duction equipment among member states for peaceful purposes. as well as the “transfer. This treaty prohibits the development. however. the USSR also agreed to mandatory short- notice challenge inspections.

: Borden Institute. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. 5. 13. D. p. See also Kenneth Alibek. The Textbook of Military Medicine (Washington. Newman. Falkenrath. but by 1991 the “warning list” of chemicals subject to control had been expanded to 54 precursors.nti. 1966). “A Farewell to Germs: The U. The group focused initially on regulating the export of eight dual-use chemical precursors. AmedP-6(B). Nuclear Threat Initiative. p. 1997). Member nations work on the basis of consensus to limit the spread of CWs and BWs by “harmonizing” their national export controls on CW precursors. vol. Office of the Surgeon General. Edward Eitzen and Ernest Takafuji. D. 8. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge.” International Security. 1-1. biological weapons program. and William Broad. “Officials Wary about Soviet Arsenal. “Controlling Nuclear Warheads & Materials Interactive Threat Reduc- tion Budget Database. Summer 2002. The fact that many chemicals used in the production of CWs also have legal industrial applications has forced Australia Group members to strike a balance between chemical proliferation concerns and legitimate trade.35 The Australia Group was established in 1985 after the extensive use of CWs in the Iran-Iraq War. 9. “Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. 7. (Maryland: Fort Detrick.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home. Md. Milton Leitenberg. 1. NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Opera- tions (Washington. Thayer. Member states share the group’s core lists with chemical industries and scientific communities to promote awareness of CW and BW proliferation risks. 107–148. 254. 11. 2001. 15.S. Nonproliferation Review. N OTES 1. Department of the Army. 4th ed.” conducted by Jonathan B. 2000). p. Army. 1999). pp. DA.” Statement before the Joint Economic Com- mittee. “Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the U. BW pathogens. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . 1998.S. America’s Achilles Heel (Cam- bridge. The group also began restricting BW-related exports in 1991. and Bradley A.: U.” available at www. U.S.” available at www. Tucker. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 67 The Australia Group is an informal association of 39 countries plus the Eu- ropean Commission that seeks to prevent the proliferation of CWs and BWs.” in Medical As- pects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Kenneth Alibek. 2001). Member states also share intelli- gence on CW-BW proliferation. U. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.. 1969–70. 7. p. 14. HQ. Robert D. Department of the Army. and Thayer. 27. Spring–Summer 1999. 6. 3. October 30. Part I. America’s Achilles Heel.htm. part 2. 10. Mass.S. 1. For more information on the U.org/chemhaz/nerve.asp.C. see Edward Regis.S. A g e n t s . 13. Judith Miller. 416–419. Falkenrath.: U. Stephen Engelberg. 14. ed. 12. Richard A. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin War- fare. Tucker. The Biology of Doom: The History of America’s Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt and Company. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook. 1998). Center for Interna- tional and Security Studies. . Joseph Cirincione.” PRAC Paper 16. 2.: MIT Press. no. U. Economy.S. May 20. “FOA Briefing Book on Chemical Weap- ons.S. 2001). Congress. Newman.opcw. Jonathan B. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster. “Biological Weapons Arms Control. 4. p. pp. May 1996.” Associated Press. and CW-BW dual-use equipment.S.C. p.

United Nations. available at www. George Tenet. Gert Harigel.: U.N. “The Australia Group at a Glance. Frederick Sidell. William Patrick. and smoke and flame materials. 23. 36.opcw.htm.org/html/db/members_frameset. . 34.org/factsheets/australiagroup. 33.asp.opcw.org/files/projects/npp/resources/dia020701. “Verification Activities. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington.opcw. statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee. AmedP-6.” available at www.html. 147.org/html/db/chemdemil_frameset.unog. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. Hogendoorn. “Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/dci_speech_032100. J.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.S. 19.68 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 15. Jeffrey Smart.” available at www. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (Alexandria.htm. September 2004.org/files/ _publications/Harigelreport. “Chemical Demilitarization. 31. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Impact on Society and Envi- ronment. BWC (in Chronological Order by Deposit). Daryl Kimball and Celeste Powell. 17. Congress.org:8080/TreatyStatus. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Conference on Disarmament. A. February 7.” International Herald Tribune.html. available at www.html. September/October 1997. p. available at www.C. 35. Government Printing Office. 2000. U. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defen- sive Operations. 27. Chemical De- militarization.australiagroup.cia.htm. “Global Threat and Challenges through 2015.” available at http://disarmament. Excluded from consideration are riot control agents. 21. director of central intelligence. 2001.ceip. p.” Arms Control Association Fact Sheet.opcw. See also E. available at www. 2000). available at www.” statement for the record. Thomas Wilson.” 20.net. Repairing the Regime. U.nl/cwc/cwc-eng. 30. 28. 32. V. p.ch/disarm/distreat/bac_72. chemical herbicides. Cirincione.S. “Envoy Tries to Save Pact on Bio-War. 24. D.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/page6html.asp. available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective.: Jane’s Information Group. 18. 16. “Brief Background on the Biological Weapons Convention.” available at www. 1-1 Field Manual 8-9. Ibid.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.nsf.org/html/db/chemdemil_frameset. “FOA Briefing Book on Chemical Weap- ons.” available at www. 37. Va. “A Chemical Weapons Atlas. Text of the Biological Weapons Convention.ceip.un. Part 3. Ibid.S. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 29.” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. August 1. 35–39. and Thomas Dashiell. U.html. see also www.opcw. Office of Technology Assessment. 25. 22. “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare. “Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements. pp. 26. Department of the Army. Ibid. Text of Chemical Weapons Convention. available at www. 1993).htm. “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 19 November 2004.armscontrol. 2001.” March 21.

onset of symptoms.000 followed by an dose of antibiotics spores improvement in administered before symptoms for 2–3 days. Death normally follows within 24–36 hours of initiation of symptoms.1. initial symptoms may progress directly to severe respiratory distress. shock. No 8. pneumonia. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents Bacterial Agents Direct Person-to- BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/ Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose Anthrax (Bacillus High 1–6 Fever. A g e n t s .Table 4. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . and Vaccine is available. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 69 . malaise. Alternatively.000– anthracis) fatigue which may be Treatable with high 50. >90% fatality if untreated.

Glanders High 3–5 Fever. Fatalities in less than 5% of untreated patients. 70 Table 4. >50% fatality if untreated. No vaccine. No vaccine. Treatable No 10–500 cholerae) diarrhea. headache. chills. organisms dehydration. chest mallei) pain. >50% fatality rate without treatment. Symptoms may last for weeks or months. headache. Death in 7–10 days. . Cholera (Vibrio Moderate 1–5 Severe gastroenteritis. with antibiotics.1. weight loss. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission Dose Brucellosis Low. Treatable No 10–100 (Brucella suis) incapacitating nausea. with antibiotics. Low Assumed low (Burkholderia pain. vomiting. muscle No vaccine. sweats. and generalized papular/pustular eruptions. 5–60 Fever. organisms A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s malaise.

A g e n t s .000 (Salmonella incapacitating colored spots on skin.Tularemia Moderate 2–10 Fever. resulting in shortness of breath. Vaccine is available. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 71 . Plague High 2–3 Pneumonia with malaise. Vaccine is available. No 10. Treatable if antibiotics infectious organisms (Yersinia pestis) headache. fever) Typhoid fever Low. symptoms. rose. Vaccine is available. are administered within and productive cough 12–24 hours of onset of with bloody sputum. Yes. 7–14 Fever. fatigue. Treatable with organisms typhi) constipation. bluish discoloration of skin and mucous membranes. 10– antibiotics. headache. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . and circulatory failure. 30–60% antibiotics.000. No 10–50 (Francisella headache. muscle pain. chills. muscle ache Treatable with organisms tularensis) (rabbit and weight loss. Progresses rapidly. 100% fatality if untreated. Death in 1–6 days. stridor. exhaustion. highly 100–500 (Pneumonic) high fever. fever or deer-fly fatality if untreated. 20% fatality if untreated.

Approximately 4% fatality. and backache. vomiting. 72 Table 4. Rash and lesions develop in 2–3 days on face. Yes 10–100 major) moderate average fever. malaise. and diarrhea may follow. 2–6 Initial symptoms include Vaccine is available. . on Initial symptoms include Vaccine is available. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose 9LUDO$JHQWV A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Smallpox (Variola High to 12. cough. 20–40% fatality in unvaccinated individuals. and fever. severe organisms encephalitis headache. followed by the lower extremities and then centrally. Venezuelan Low. No 10–100 equine incapacitating general malaise. vomiting. hands. and forearms. Full recovery usually occurs within 1–2 weeks. organisms headache.1. (VEE) Nausea.

Approximately 1% fatality if untreated. headache. muscle aches. fatigue. organisms fevers diarrhea. loss of antibiotics. and edema. muscle pain. 14–21 Fever. –Ebola –Marburg Arenaviridae –Lassa –Junin –Machupo Flaviviridae –Yellow Fever Rickettsial Agents Q Fever Low. nausea. and weight loss. Can be (RNA viruses complicated by easy from several bleeding. appetite. A g e n t s . (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . 2 3 Viral High 4–21 Fever. vomiting. Treatable with organisms burnetti) malaise. hypotension. Vaccine is available. chills. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 73 . : flushing of the face and Filiviridae chest. families. and No vaccine Unclear 1–10 hemorrhagic exhaustion. incl. No 1–10 (Coxiella incapacitating excessive sweating.

Toxins Saxitoxin High Minutes to Dizziness. progression to muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. 30% fatality rate A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Rickettsia if untreated. 10–40% prowazekii) fatality if untreated. swallowing. followed by death. . 74 Table 4. pain and (Rickettsia typhi/ delirium. numbness. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) Direct Person-to BW Agent Incubation Person (causative Period Symptoms/Clinical Aerosol Infective 1 organism) Lethality (days) Manifestations Prophylaxis/Treatment Transmission? Dose Epidemic typhus/ High 6–16 Fever. generalized Vaccine is available. inhaled. No vaccine No Endemic typhus weakness.001 µg/kg (Clostridium weakness. headache. and antibiotics if weight. per poisoning) kilogram of body weight if ingested. dizziness. No vaccine No 2–9 (paralytic hours paralysis of respiratory micrograms shellfish system. 65% fatality if untreated. ingested. Botulinum toxin High 1–3 Ptosis. blurred vision.1. if difficulty in speaking and administered early. No . dry Treatable with of body botulinum) mouth. Interruption of 1 µg/kg if neurotransmission.

Fever may last for 2–5 days. diarrhea. ingested. cough. vomiting. Cough may persist for 4 weeks. and stomach pain. < 2% fatality rate. body (castor beans) Progression to severe weight. beans have been fatal to humans. 1–6 hours Sudden onset of fever. blisters. headache.4–8 µg/kg through dermal contact. death. No vaccine No . fever.03 µg/kg enterotoxin B incapacitating chills. hemorrhage and death (Two castor within 36–72 hours. Staphylococcal Low. A g e n t s . 2. No vaccine No 3 µg/kg of communis) hours and pulmonary edema.Ricin (Ricinus High 18–24 Weakness. necrosis of tissues. nausea. followed by inhaled.) Trichothecene (T– High to 1–4 hours Dizziness. non-productive aureus) cough. weight if tricinetum) hemorrhage. if respiratory distress. (table continues on the following page) B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 75 . muscle per person (Staphylococcus pain. No vaccine No 25-50 µg/kg 2) mcotoxins moderate vomiting. eye of body (Fusarium pain.

htm. Frederick R. . Department of the Army. Departments of the Army.1. Patrick.: American Public Health Association. Research suggests that the transmission of viruses such as Marburg and Ebola by inhalation is possible. Washington. 2000. yet consistent evidence has not yet been found. available at www. 1997). Navy and Air Force.nbc-med.” May 5. Dashiell.htm. Licensed vaccine is available for yellow fever.. organs. available at www.. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (Alexandria.vnh. Sidell.anthrax.cdc. Control of Communicable Diseases Manual.: Jane’s Information Group. secretions.mitretek.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/2toc.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedManual/Feb01/handbook. Biological. This vaccine may provide cross protection against Bolivian hemorrhagic fever.. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Stimson Center. Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook.html. Symptoms and clinical manifestations apply to the inhalation of the causative organism.org/MedAspChemBioWar. February 2001. 2004. available at www. D.asp. Examples of Biological Warfare Agents (continued) OURCES SSOURCES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It is unclear how easily filoviruses can be transmitted from human to human.: Borden Institute. (Washington.mil/Flash_interface/default. AmedP-6(B).stimson.gov/agent/agentlist.fas.” available at www. or semen.osd. “Annex C: Potential Biological Agents Operational Data Charts. 1996. “Background on Biological Warfare. “Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program.C. 3. part 2.” available at www. James Chin.bt.S. available at www. “Biological Weapons Agents. U.nsf/ A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s HomelandSecurity/BackgroundBioWar.org/cbw/?sn=cb2001112953. 1998). A vaccine for Argentine hemorrhagic fever is available as an Investigational New Drug.C. available at www. Mitretek Systems.” November 19. “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases. Va. 2004. Transmission clearly occurs by direct contact with infected blood. D.org/home. Office of the Surgeon General. 2.C. OTES NOTES N 1. William C. Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington. 76 Table 4. 17th ed. Henry L.” NATO Handbook on Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations. ed. 4th ed. D. and Thomas R.

convulsions. there is an asymptomatic period of 1–30 minutes. and respiratory tract. muscle twitching. Cyclohexyl sarin (GF). A g e n t s . and most exocrine glands. 1. dim vision. Commonly. muscular twitching. the neurotransmitter at cholinergic receptor sites. 30 mg. the central nervous system. Accumulation of acetylcholine leads to continued stimulation and clinical symptoms such as muscle paralysis. VX.2. 50 mg. RATE OF ACTION Vapor: Within seconds to several minutes after exposure Liquid: Within minutes to an hour after exposure. 1. 10 mg Inhalation: (2–10 minutes’ exposure): Tabun (GA). Soman (GD). Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents Nerve Agents NAME AND Tabun (GA) AGENT Sarin (GB) IDENTIFICATION Soman (GD) Cyclohexyl sarin (GF) V nerve agent (VX) MECHANISM OF These agents can be absorbed through any body surface: ACTION eyes. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Tabun (GA). weakness or paralysis. copious secretions. Sarin (GB). Soman (GD). headache. which is followed by a sudden onset of symptoms. 30 m SYMPTOMS Vapor: SMALL EXPOSURE:contraction of pupils. skin. The agents effectively prevent the transmission of nerve signals by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . respiratory failure Liquid on skin: SMALL TO MODERATE EXPOSURE: localized sweating. Cyclohexyl sarin (GF). 70 mg. 200 mg.700 mg. feeling of weakness LARGE EXPOSURE: sudden loss of consciousness. weakness or paralysis. respiratory failure (table continues on the following page) . VX. convulsions. copious secretions. muscle twitching at site of exposure. mild difficulty breathing LARGE EXPOSURE: sudden loss of consciousness. Cholinergic receptor sites are found at smooth and skeletal muscles. vomiting. This enzyme normally breaks down acetylcholine.000 mg. Sarin (GB). 75–120 mg. 70–100 mg. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 77 Table 4.

HD). it is extremely reactive to water and binds with intra. conjunctivitis and corneal opacity and damage in the eyes. . 1. the structure of mustard changes. Lewisite: Immediate pain or irritation.500 mg SYMPTOMS Mustard: Skin. The exact mechanisms of mustard. Appearance of redness and blisters on skin. Lewisite: Skin and mucous membranes are immediately affected after contact. Phosgene oxime is not a true vesicant. Phosgene oxime: Immediate burning and irritation. HD) IDENTIFICATION Lewisite (L) Phosgene oxime (CX) MECHANISM OF Following absorption.200–1. Increased permeability of capillaries resulting in low intravascular volume and shock. ACTION In this form.2. RATE OF ACTION Mustard: Binds irreversibly to tissue within several minutes after contact. 2. sinus and pharynx. irritation of nares. Clinical signs and symptoms may appear as early as 2 hours after a high-dose exposure or extend to 24 hours after a low-dose vapor exposure. Lewisite (L).78 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 4. 1. Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents (continued) Vesicants NAME AND AGENT Mustard (H. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Mustard (H. Redness and blister formation occur more rapidly than following exposure to mustard. Exposure does not cause immediate pain. lewisite.and extracellular enzymes and proteins.8 g Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Mustard (H. it causes extensive tissue damage and has therefore been called a corrosive agent. thereby influencing numerous processes in living tissue. and eyes may be swollen shut within an hour. 100 mg/kg. Lewisite (L). Contact with airways leads to similar signs and symptoms to mustard.500 mg. Edema of the conjunctiva and lids follow. HD). and airways most commonly affected. Lewisite causes an increase in capillary permeability. and phosgene oxime are not known. Lesions develop within hours. Mustard can destroy a large number of cellular substances. eyes. May lead to hepatic or renal necrosis with vomiting and diarrhea. Eye exposure causes pain and twitching of the eyelid. and increasingly severe productive cough if the lower airways are affected. irritation.

Fifteen seconds after inhalation of a highly concentrated vapor. Cyanogen chloride also irritates the eyes. an energy- providing process using oxygen. Phosgene irritates ACTION the alveoli in the lungs and results in the constant secretion of fluids into the lungs. Cyanide ion combines with iron in a component of the mitochondrial cytochrome oxidase complex. Pulmonary Agents NAME AND Chlorine (Cl) AGENT Phosgene (CG) IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM OF Pulmonary agents attack lung tissue. Death results from a lack of oxygen when the lungs are filled with fluid. Cyanogen chloride (CK). followed by cessation of cardiac activity.500–5000 mg. (table continues on the following page) .000 mg SYMPTOMS Central nervous system and heart are most susceptible to cyanide. there is a period of rapid breathing that is followed in 15–30 seconds by convulsions. The heart and brain rapidly decay from lack of oxygen and a buildup of carbon dioxide. 2. 1. B i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l We a p o n s . and airways. Cyanogen chloride (CK). nose. Damage to eyes similar to that caused by lewisite.1 mg/kg. a n d P ro l i f e r a t i o n 79 Phosgene oxime: Redness of skin and appearance of elongated. Causes pulmonary edema. A g e n t s . 200 mg/kg Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Hydrocyanic acid (AC). wheal-like lesions on skin. 11. EFFECTIVE DOSE Skin contact: Hydrocyanic acid (AC). No other chemical agent produces such immediate onset of symptoms followed by rapid tissue necrosis. but ACTION prevent the transfer of this oxygen to other cells. Blood Gases NAME AND AGENT Hydrocyanic acid (AC) IDENTIFICATION Cyanogen chloride (CK) MECHANISM OF Blood gases allow red blood cells to acquire oxygen. Respiratory activity stops 2–3 minutes later. RATE OF ACTION Death occurs 6–8 minutes after inhalation. This complex is necessary for cellular respiration.

Signs of pulmonary edema may appear within 30 minutes to 4 hours.” available at www. 1997). Office of the Surgeon General. and blurred vision.2. Henry L. “An Overview of Chemicals Defined as Chemical Weapons. EFFECTIVE DOSE Inhalation (2–10 minutes exposure): Chlorine (Cl).mil/reference_materials/textbook/HTML_Restricted/index_2.gov/Agent/AgentlistChem. choking. Department of the Army.C. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Accumulation of fluid in lungs leads to fatal choking and pulmonary edema. Occasionally.” available at www. coughing. Phosgene: Cough and chest discomfort may appear within 30 minutes of exposure.: Borden Institute.army.651 ppm/min. an asymptomatic period can last up to 24 hours.bt.200 mg SYMPTOMS Corrosion of the eyes. 6. “Characteristics of Chemical Warfare Agents.” available at www.apgea.html. SSOURCES OURCES: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.org/resp/html/cwagents. skin. vomiting. Examples of Chemical Warfare Agents (continued) RATE OF ACTION Chlorine: Immediate cough and choking sensation. nausea. “Chemical Agents Listing and Information. difficulty breathing.htm.80 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 4. sore throat.opcw. Phosgene (CG). Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington. 3. and respiratory tract.cdc.asp. Burning sensation in the lungs.stimson. Stimson Center. available at http://ccc. skin burns. headache.org/cbw/?sn=CB2001121892. Pulmonary edema within 2–6 hours. D. .

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Bal- listic missiles garnered the lion’s share of attention. Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure would be able to achieve first flight of a long range missile. and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities to pose a direct threat to U. . Donald Rumsfeld): With the external help now readily available.1 The commission identified two countries—North Korea and Iran—as being particularly dangerous: The extraordinary level of resources that North Korea and Iran are now devot- ing to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and immediate danger to the U. Each of these nations places a high priority on threatening U.2 The August 31. . territory. biological. is coauthor of this chapter. The Proliferation Threat Many experts and officials view ballistic missiles as a particularly menacing and rapidly proliferating technology. within about five years of de- ciding to do so. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. When the end of the Cold War largely eliminated the likelihood (if not the capability) of a global thermonuclear war.S. but it had an enormous international impact due to the unexpected use of a third stage on the rocket. or chemi- cal weapons could be used in smaller. 1998. though they constitute only one—and perhaps the most difficult—delivery method for those weapons.S.. a junior fellow with the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. but still horrifically deadly. its vital interests and its allies. Several threat assessments and reports followed the lead of the 1998 study by the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld Commission for its chair.S. numbers. a nation with a well-developed. up to and including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range (greater than 5. CHAPTER 5 Missile Proliferation One of the most contentious proliferation debates of the past ten years has been about assessing the ballistic missile threat and deploying antimissile systems to defeat these weapons. During several of those years the U.S. The Taepo Dong I failed in its attempt to launch a small satellite into orbit and flew only 1. North Korean test of a Taepo Dong I missile/space launch vehicle appeared to lend credence to these warnings. territory. . As a result of this test and the changing Joshua Williams. policy makers turned their attention to the very real danger that nuclear.500 kilometers). 83 .320 kilometers.

. China has been modernizing its long-range strategic missile force since the 1980s. The threats to the U. though it will remain still well below the number of Russian or U. primarily because nonmissile delivery means are less costly.” Tenet’s rhetoric was more cautious in 2003. They can also be used without attribution. the Quadrennial Defense Review presented to Congress by the Depart- ment of Defense on October 1.S.S. homeland. Most emerging missile states are highly dependent on for- eign assistance at this stage of their development efforts. territory is more likely to be attacked with these [chemical.”6 This concern persisted in 2002. biological. from WMD [weapons of mass destruction] delivery systems to a critical threshold. and nuclear] materials from nonmissile delivery means—most likely from terrorists—than by missiles. . By 2015. It concluded that by 2015 the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran.4 The report also cautioned: Our assessments of future missile developments are inexact and subjective be- cause they are based on often fragmentary information. the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold. .5 Still. nevertheless. the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for the first time included countries other than Russia and China as ballistic missile threats to the United States. and more reliable and accurate. which was made publicly available in December 2001. To compare more completely today’s ballistic missile threats with those of the past and to perform an accurate net assessment of the global ballistic missile threat.84 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s strategic environment. . it is useful to evaluate the threat in its component parts.S. and possibly Iraq—barring significant changes in their political orientations—in addition to the strategic forces of Russia and China. when Director of Central Intelli- gence George Tenet reported that “the proliferation of ICBM and cruise missile designs and technology has raised the threat to the U. 2001. This expanded assessment was also used in the most recent NIE.S.3 Significantly. even as funding for antimissile systems increased. easier to acquire. argued that “in particular. . The impact of these problems increases with the lack of maturity of the program and depends on the level of foreign assistance. . and disturbance of the technology and information flow to their programs will have discernible short- term effects. will consist of dramatically fewer warheads than today owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces. States with emerg- ing missile programs inevitably will run into problems that will delay and frustrate their desired development timelines. One agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015. however: “The United States and its interests re- main at risk from increasingly advanced and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles. radiological. the assessment notes that U. the pace and scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier intelligence es- timates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster pace than previously expected. forces. .”7 The issue was scarcely mentioned in the 2004 and 2005 assessments.

10 In 2005. Thus.040 that were deployed in 1987.S.500 kilometers) in the world from their Cold War levels (figure 5.16 The final INF Treaty inspections took place on May 31. The total number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) has also decreased. though 5 new countries have developed or acquired MRBMs since the late 1980s.15 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles IRBM arsenals have undergone even more dramatic reductions (figure 5. the United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal but now holds the title to 58 long-range Trident SLBMs that it did not have in 1987.14 No other country has developed an ICBM or long-range SLBM during this time. China has maintained a force of about 20 Dong Feng–5 ICBMs. verifying the destruction of 660 Soviet IRBMs. The number of countries with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) has in- creased during the past 20 years.1).17 In 1987. the most accurate way to summarize existing global ballistic missile capabilities is to say that there is a widespread capability to launch SRBMs. This statement is true. 2001.380 long-range missiles in its combined ICBM and SLBM arsenals. This has not changed since Russia and China deployed their first ICBMs in 1959 and 1981. intermediate. a decreasing number of long-range missiles remain from the stockpile lev- els of the Cold War. Russia had 777 long-range missiles. from the 4. eliminated this entire class of missiles (with ranges of 3. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 85 Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals The blurring of the short. and the United States possess the ability to launch nuclear warheads on land-based ICBMs. but still limited. and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the world today than there were during the Cold War.500 kilometers) from the Soviet/Russian arsenal over a three-year period. to 1.13 During this period.11 France has reduced its total nuclear arsenal but now has 48 long-range SLBMs that it did not have in 1987. capability to launch MRBMs. But only China. France . The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). the total number of long-range ballistic missiles in the world had decreased 57 percent. long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). and intercontinental ranges of the world’s missile inventory often results in a misinterpretation of the oft-quoted assessment that more than 25 nations possess ballistic missiles.9 The United States deployed 1. medium.2).000 to 5.8 An analysis of global ballistic missile arsenals shows that there are fewer ICBMs. In 1987. the Soviet Union deployed 2.749. respectively. and the United States had 846. There is a slowly growing. By the beginning of 2005. Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Force reductions in U. a fact that is often overlooked. a bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR. Most impor- tant.640 long-range missiles. Russia.12 Similarly. and Russian arsenals have dramatically decreased the number of long-range ballistic missiles (missiles with a range of greater than 5.

and of these coun- tries all but India’s missiles are based primarily on assistance or technology re- ceived from North Korea or China. Russian. Iran. Pakistan.18 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles The broad scope of the INF Treaty also covered MRBMs. Global Long-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals (Combined ICBM and SLBM) 4500 4040 4000 3500 3000 2500 Number 2000 1749 1500 1000 500 0 1987 2005 Year deployed 18 land-based and 32 submarine-based IRBMs. and Saudi Arabia all now possess MRBMs. Israel. The most significant proliferation threat comes from the slow but steady in- crease in the number of states possessing MRBMs. North Korea. Pershing IIs were destroyed under this treaty. Numerically speaking.3). even though Russia and the United States have eliminated their arsenals. the treaty re- sulted in the elimination of this class of missile (with a range of 1. North Korea.000 kilometers) from Soviet/Russian and U. A total of 149 Russian SS-4s and 234 U. China.000 to 3.1. Iran. even though MRBMs are now in the hands of more countries than in 1987. which it has since de- activated and destroyed. the total number of MRBMs in existence in 2005 is lower than the 547 MRBMs in the combined Chinese. India. and Saudi Arabia have developed or obtained their missiles since the late 1980s. France also eliminated 64 medium-range SLBMs that it possessed in 1987.20 Only India. effectively reducing the current number of IRBMs by 98 percent from Cold War levels.S. This development has attracted great attention and is often cited as evidence of a larger proliferation threat than be- fore.S.19 Outside the treaty. and . and no other nation has developed an IRBM. China may also possess a medium-range SLBM capability of 12 Julang I SLBMs.86 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 5. Thus. French. Pakistan. ballistic missile arsenals (figure 5. China has maintained about 12 DF-4 IRBMs.

and 17 only have missiles with a range of about 300 kilometers or less. Of these 25 nations.24 At least five Iranian Shahab IIIs were deployed in July 2003. 19 only have missiles with ranges under 1.25 MRBMs in India and Pakistan and North Korea’s Taepo Dong I are still in operational testing.21 Since then. the global total of MRBMs in existence is no more than 417 and possibly as low as 285. also see table 5. Israel is believed to have deployed 50 opera- tional Jericho IIs. Global Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals 900 770 800 700 600 500 Number 400 300 200 100 12 0 1987 2005 Year U.22 while Saudi Arabia has approximately 40 CSS-2/DF-3As that it purchased from China.S.2.000 kilometers. com- prehensive listing. but it may have produced at least 150 missiles of this type. forces in 1987. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles In addition to the five recognized nuclear weapon states.1.2 at the end of the chapter). Countries with Ballistic Missile Programs Another factor by which proliferation can be measured is the number of states with ballistic missile development programs (see table 5.26 This represents a 24 or 48 percent de- crease.23 North Korea is believed to have deployed close to 100 No Dongs. 25 nations have ballis- tic missiles. for a detailed. Assuming that each of these countries could deploy 1 to 5 missiles in a crisis during the next five years. respectively. The number of countries with such programs has also decreased from the number pursuing . M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 87 Figure 5. in global MRBM arsenals from the 1987 level. Many of these missiles are old Scud-B systems that are not well maintained and are declining in military utility.

through its December 2003 agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom.27 Today.88 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Figure 5. Argentina. Libya. had scrapped all of its missiles and programs. even with the inclusion of India and Pakistan. In South Asia and the Middle East. In addition to the five recognized nuclear weapon states. or remain. and South Africa had abandoned their programs. poorer. MRBMs. countries such as Argentina. and less technologically advanced than those that had missile programs fifteen years ago. Egypt. Syria and South Korea have active SRBM programs but have not yet demonstrated any great interest in. India. and South Africa had programs to develop long-range or medium- range missiles in 1987. the nations that are pursuing long-range missile development pro- grams are also smaller. Iran and North Korea currently have active ballistic missile development programs. By 2005. Brazil. Iraq. one that is confined to a few countries whose politi- cal evolution will be a determining factor in whether they emerge as. Egypt.3. Israel. Global Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenals 600 547 500 417 400 Number 300 200 100 0 1987 Year 2005 development programs during the Cold War. strategic interest and political dynamics have fueled the continued development of ballistic missile technology as both a means of gaining international prestige and of obtaining a strategic advantage . The most recent NIE on foreign missile devel- opments confirmed that Syria is unlikely to gain an interest in ICBM develop- ment before 2015 but also indicated that strategic imperatives could lead to interest in acquiring an MRBM such as the No Dong.28 Thus. and Libya. which has never traveled more than 200 kilometers in a flight test. threats to global security. Brazil. this listing highlights the limited nature of the missile proliferation threat. except for the Al Fatah. or the capability to produce.

France. and the United States. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a remotely piloted or self-controlled aircraft that can carry cam- eras. Cruise Missiles. This section briefly discusses the various technologies and proliferation prospects. Ballistic Missiles. Russia.000 Kilometers 1987 2005 Argentina India Brazil Iran Egypt Israel India North Korea Iraq Pakistan Israel Libya South Africa NOTE NOTE This table excludes the NPT nuclear weapon states China. and the possible threat of chemical and biological warheads. Since the Cold War. allowing little warning time and making defense difficult. Ballistic missiles travel at hypersonic speeds. Technical Background In addition to ballistic missiles. this pro- liferation and the transfer of ballistic missile technology originating in North Korea and China continue to destabilize both regional and global security. and weapon payloads. vis-à-vis regional rivals and outside powers. Though somewhat limited.000 kilometers by 1987 and were continuing indigenous programs to develop and deploy new missiles that exceeded this range. and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles A ballistic missile is a guided rocket that is powered during the initial part of its flight and then coasts without power—mostly above the atmosphere—along a ballistic path to its target. sensors. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 89 Table 5. Countries with Active Ballistic Missile Development Programs with a Range of More Than 1. ballistic missiles have been con- sidered the most threatening delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. developments in cruise missile technologies and the increasing use of drones. As a . pose serious threats. All these countries had developed ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 1. or unmanned aerial vehicles. communications equipment.1. UAVs are gen- erally powered either by jet or propeller engines. A cruise missile is an aerodynamic system with jet or rocket propulsion that is powered all the way to its target. The 1988 War of the Cities between Iran and Iraq and the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the threat from Scud ballistic missiles armed with conventional (high-explosive) warheads.

or chemical warheads. which has already been demonstrated by U.S.S. fly low following the contours of the earth. This makes it easier for cruise missiles to reach targets far from an attacker’s homeland. even high-explosive warheads are reliable in destroying their tar- gets. It would be possible to use a ship-launched cruise missile to attack North American targets. for most countries.000 meters. cruise missiles with chemical or biological war- heads may become more widespread threats than ballistic missiles. however. is accurate on the order of 1. In some cases. • difficult to defend against. may become the Scud of cruise missiles. for example. and easier to build. . such as the U. Tomahawks. Because a cruise missile can release chemical and biological agents in a gradual and con- trolled fashion (as opposed to a wasteful burst of agent or submunitions with a ballistic missile). cruise missiles could be used only with terminal homing against ships. they can disseminate chemical and biological agents from a dis- tance upwind. The Chinese Silkworm. and easily extended in range. Toma- hawk. Global Positioning System and the Russian Glonass) has become univer- sally available. which is already widely disseminated.29 This accuracy greatly exceeds that available from all but the most sophisti- cated ballistic missiles.S. Tomahawk can now be reprogrammed in flight. to attack land targets with as much as 6-meter accuracy. and attack targets from any direction. The Scud. for example. which cause damage over wide areas. With the high accuracy of cruise missiles. cruise missiles are • cheaper. Advanced cruise missiles such as the U.S. pro- duced by a number of regional powers. During the past few years. allowing them to loiter over a battlefield until given a target. All these factors make cruise missiles difficult to find in flight and therefore difficult to shoot down. inexpensive satellite navigation (the U. and increasingly available on world markets. Further.90 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s result of their highly visible use. cruise missiles can be small and stealthy. With chemical and biological agents being cheaper and more available than nuclear weapons. but cruise missiles can weave around. each cruise missile can adjust its attack to local conditions. biological. allowing the most advanced cruise missiles. quicker. A proliferator can now acquire many cruise missiles quickly. Moreover. many commentators interpreted the missile threat to be one of ballistic missiles alone. creating a lethal area coverage that is about ten times as great as that from a ballistic missile. cruise missiles need not fly directly over their targets. making it ineffective against discrete military targets except with nuclear. • easier to launch from planes and ships. • more effective for disseminating chemical and biological agents. and with cruise missiles being more afford- able than ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles (except for the most sophisti- cated) coast along an observable and predictable path. A guidance system enabling cruise missiles to attack distant land targets was once such an expensive and sophisticated technology that. in comparison with ballistic missiles. Yet cruise missiles are now recognized as a rapidly growing and particularly dangerous problem.

armed UAVs are easier to launch than ballistic missiles. could be used to disseminate biological or chemical agents more effec- tively than ballistic missiles. the weaponization of UAVs into unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) is also progressing. with high-temperature incendi- ary devices. the X-45A UCAV is now under testing and is capable of releasing a precision-guided “small smart bomb. The April 2001 transpacific flight of the U. however. UAVs are capable of carrying heavier payloads and flying longer distances for extended periods than cruise missiles. can be recalled and retargeted.30 Furthermore. in the case of the Hellfire- equipped Predators. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 91 UAVs offer many capabilities that are similar to those of cruise missiles. with high-power microwave tech- nology that disrupts enemy communication centers. and would be diffi- cult to defend against once launched. Army may also be using the armed Hunter UAV to combat insurgents in Iraq. Afghanistan. The operational effectiveness of UAVs. which often forces the vehicle to fly at altitudes so low that it is in the range of enemy air defenses. which can create firestorms inextinguishable with water. there is little public information on their effectiveness or. is still an issue. When developed.300 kilome- ters away. UAVs could simply be used in the same fashion as cruise missiles. in- cluding a susceptibility to inclement weather. The U. intended to neutralize chemical and biological agents. biological. China could respond by developing a large fleet of long-range UAVs. and Iraq. As noted. can travel a distance of 2.8 meters of reinforced concrete. their kill rates.S. The range of the Global Hawk increases if operators change the flight surveillance time of a given mission. chemical. Though there have been many reports of the use of UAVs in Kosovo. which is capable of carrying a 900-kilogram payload and cruising at a maximum altitude of 19. providing a nuclear-strike capability difficult to detect by radar that also flies beneath the interceptor ranges of the system. However. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2003 that “the current UAV accident rate is 100 times that of manned air- craft.”31 The United States has also begun experiments to arm UAVs with “flying plate” weapons that can destroy steel structures and penetrate bunkers. and with small diameter bombs. for example. The United States deployed a ver- sion of its Predator UAV armed with Hellfire missiles in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. to deliver conventional. the United States were to deploy an antimissile system.34 Despite these . Like their cruise missile counterparts. which can penetrate up to 1. weighing only 250 pounds. giving them the capability to expand both reconnaissance capability and long-range strike capability at the same time. Glo- bal Hawk UAV nonstop from the United States to Australia demonstrated the long-range capabilities of these machines.32 Most important. UAVs are currently used primarily for intelligence and reconnais- sance missions. or nuclear payloads. The Global Hawk. Though not yet widely used as offensive weapons.300 kilometers and survey a given area for 36 hours while preserving the capability to return to its initial base 2. basic UAV platforms can be produced to provide a state or group with both armed and unarmed versions.S.800 meters. and recent developments in UAV technology demonstrate their rapidly increasing military utility. If.”33 There is no doubt that the Predator still has many shortcomings.

35 The production and use of UAVs are already widespread. this analysis has already proven to be accurate. Gormley notes that.39 Complicating things even further.S. They can attempt to import entire missile systems. 32 nations manufacture more than 250 models of UAVs. China formally recognized the applicability of this trade-off.41 Because the MTCR places special restrictions on missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilome- ters. rules governing the export of unarmed UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles. some exporters have tried to ignore the range/payload trade-off. China. the United States took advantage of revised Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) rules to sell six Predator UAVs to Italy. or they can try to build them indigenously—normally using imported components and technology. A slightly lighter payload (well above 500 kilograms). for example. In October 1994. unarmed UAVs can be made into armed UAVs simply by changing their payload. Department of Defense is projected to spend more than $10 billion on UAVs over the course of this decade. which is capable of delivering an 850-kilogram payload to a range of 280 kilometers. One study cited by Gormley found that more than 80 percent of unarmed UAVs appear capable of exceeding the MTCR’s 300-kilometer range Category I threshold. In terms of their classification under the MTCR.42 (When only ranges are cited in the remainder of this chapter. According to the Department of Defense. less restrictive. helping to create the Al Hussein missile with more than twice the range. precise data on the one-way range and payload trade-off for most UAVs are not readily available. Italy. long-endurance UAVs. In 2002. mean- ing that an unarmed UAV purchased for one stated purpose could easily be converted into a weapon. France.”38 In fact.92 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s questions about their effectiveness. many see UAVs as the wave of the future in aerial reconnaissance and combat. they apply to the most commonly cited missile payloads. Israel. “Given the explosive growth anticipated in UAV systems over the next decade. there will inevitably be in- creased pressure—led by the USA—to create more flexible. As a result. the U.36 Although many of the UAVs produced and deployed by other nations are no more than cameras attached to jet engines. would enable the M-11 to travel more than 300 kilo- meters.000-kilogram payload of the 300-kilometer range Scud- B.37 According to defense expert Dennis Gormley.40 Range/Payload Trade-Offs The ability to make trade-offs between range and payload is critical for under- standing missile and UAV nonproliferation. once claimed that its M-11 missile. States need . did not have an adequate range to be restricted under the MTCR. enough to reach Tehran. and 41 countries operate about 80 different types of these vehicles.) Routes to Proliferation States seeking ballistic or cruise missiles can acquire them in a variety of ways. Iraq demonstrated this trade-off in 1987 by reducing the 1. however. and the United Kingdom possess medium-range. unlike ballistic missiles.

have helped to restrain missile proliferation. are complex machines. Now.43 Longer ranges also put a premium on more efficient rocket en- gines. Thus. for example. Antiship cruise missiles can be converted to land- attack cruise missiles. Moreover. especially ballistic missiles. missiles have certain generic advantages over manned warplanes: . Space launch vehicles. and lighter and more advanced warheads (which is a considerable challenge when nuclear warheads are at issue). Pershing II. and remotely piloted ve- hicles (some already delivering insecticides for agricultural purposes)—can be converted to weapons use. Habiger pointed out that it took the United States “six to eight years of very intensive engineering development and aggressive testing” to reduce its first ICBM warheads from 5.000 parts. compounded by the export controls of the MTCR and active diplomatic efforts by the United States and other concerned countries. no vibration. the development of ballistic missiles becomes particularly difficult at a range of about 1. no G-loading.000 kilometers. in a concrete tunnel. vibration. that is going to experience the kinds of things that I’ve just described. further elaborates on the problems facing would be proliferators: For the Taepodong II to reach the western part of the United States would require some very optimistic operational objectives. Missiles. The former commander-in-chief of the U. These technical difficulties. For example. lighter and stronger materials.S. it takes a lot of work. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 93 not admit that they are building missiles.” he said. and large defensive missiles use hardware. heat. General Eugene Habiger. technology. no tem- perature extremes—and to miniaturize something that’s going to go in the nose cone of an ICBM. I would submit that the miniaturization of a nuclear warhead is prob- ably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face. there’s a big leap of faith be- tween developing a nuclear device—a weapon that operates in a laboratory kind of environment. the development of missiles is an expensive and time- consuming process. The medium- range U. “The leap of faith is that the North Koreans would be able to go from a pristine laboratory weapon to 300 kg. Strategic Command. Above that range. Various types of UAVs—reconnaissance drones. and cold. and pro- duction facilities that are interchangeable with those of ballistic missiles. That takes a lot of technology.000 kilograms. more advanced guidance systems. with the expended rockets reliably jettisoned from the missiles) and more sophisticated reentry ve- hicles (to keep the warhead in working order during its fiery descent through the atmosphere).S. the warhead would have to be no heavier than 300 kg. and it takes a lot of time.000 to 1. target drones. contained 250. often resulting in an unreliable weapons system.44 The Dangers of Missile Proliferation From the point of view of a proliferator. scientific re- search rockets. the missile must use two more advanced technologies: staging (firing rockets in a series. each of which needed to work right the first time under high levels of acceleration.

46 The record to date has been that. air raid. U. In contrast. which can yield variable results. which had signifi- cant military effects because of their high accuracy. which killed 28 soldiers.S. vulnerable targets beginning in the first minutes of a war. the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan fired more than 2. In 1986. and cruise missiles cause significant damage to specific military targets. and in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. In contrast.N. This threat can complicate the decision making of adversaries in times of crisis. barracks. ballistic mis- siles cause terror that can affect an adversary’s attitudes toward the continuation of a war. chemical. which generally operate from airfields. no missiles have been used in warfare with unconventional payloads. Serbia used SA-2 air defense missiles in their secondary role as ballistic missiles. however. or biological weapon by means of a ballistic mis- sile can be used to achieve specific strategic or political goals. 88 Iraqi Scuds terrorized Is- raeli civilians and fell around coalition military bases in Saudi Arabia. was demonstrated in 1988 in the Iran-Iraq War. Starting in 1989. By contrast. • Survivability: Airfields have known locations and are large.94 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Simplicity: A “push-button war” with missiles is much easier for the less tech- nically advanced regional powers than is the development of a trained air force with manned aircraft and a large infrastructure. Thus far. Argentina’s French-supplied Exocet cruise missiles sank the British frigate Sheffield.45 Egypt fired a Scud at Israel at the end of the 1973 war. • Defense penetration: Shooting down a ballistic or a cruise missile in flight is still a challenge even for the United States. Manned aircraft. Scuds were used again in the 1994 Yemen civil war.000 Scuds against rebel forces. After the Gulf War. In 1995. Libya fired three Scuds at the Italian island of Lampadusa. cannot be expected to last long against the United States and its allies. the bombing accu- racy of manned aircraft depends on equipment and pilot training. hidden or mobile missiles are difficult to find and destroy. inspectors discovered Iraqi Scud warheads with chemical .S. The terror of missiles. The over- all military effect was negligible in spite of a strike on a U. missing it. during the Gulf War. • Accuracy: Cruise missiles with satellite navigation and some advanced regional ballistic missile systems are highly accurate. • Blackmail or coercive diplomacy: The almost immediate ability to threaten to deliver a nuclear. after a U. They can project the battle to the rear in regional conflicts and some day may reach other continents. the United States used three times as many Tomahawk and air-launched cruise missiles. In the 1991 Gulf War. • Geopolitics: Long-range and ship-launched missiles will diminish the protec- tive effects of distance. Missiles armed with conventional warheads have been used in regional con- flicts since the 1970s. with conventional warheads. with Baghdad and Tehran receiving repeated Scud strikes over several weeks. which has until recently empha- sized the role of protecting against manned aircraft for its active defenses.

also known as the Hague Code of Conduct. Iraqi plans for nuclear warheads.S. measures. with some help from foreign sources. capable of hitting all of Western Europe. Department of State. It fills an important gap in the missile nonproliferation regime.54 consists of a set of goals. “to supple- ment.N. came into effect on November 25. • Submitting an annual declaration of national ballistic missile and SLV poli- cies.S.52 The ICOC The ICOC. unilateral and bilateral U.000 kilometers.S.47 for remotely piloted vehicles to deliver biological agents. according to the U. 2002.”53 The ICOC. or biological programs or aspirations are present. biological.49 During the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq. • Attempting to ensure that any space launch vehicle (SLV) assistance is not manipulated to further a ballistic missile program. and confidence-building measures. chemical.50 After the inva- sion. pledges. It consists of an export control policy. and associated arrangements between member governments. The Missile Technology Control Regime The MTCR is the oldest and most prominent international policy to attempt to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear. including • Working to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile systems that can carry and deliver nuclear. he had not succeeded in doing so by March 2003.48 and for ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 3. • Exercising restraint in domestic ballistic missile programs and seeking to re- duce national holdings of these missiles.000 kilometers. not supplant. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 95 and biological agents.000-kilometer-range cruise missile. inspectors determined that while Saddam Hussein. the U. as well as information on all launches from the previous year. Iraq Survey Group also concluded that Iraq had also been unsuc- cessful in attempts to develop a 1. and biological weapons.and solid-propellant ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1. was attempting to develop liquid. U. and chemical weapons.51 Dealing with Missile Proliferation The four most prominent instruments for limiting the dangers of missile prolif- eration are the MTCR. and it is meant. . and anti- missile weapons. the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). • Declining to assist any ballistic missile program in a state where illegal nuclear. chemical. the Missile Technology Control Regime. with 117 subscribing states as of the spring of 2005. which bans the export of missiles with ranges over 300 kilometers and with payloads greater than 500 kilograms.

the United States imposed sanc- tions on 24 different Chinese companies on 12 separate occasions.”56 The ICOC also must agree on implementation measures through consensus. • Providing prelaunch notifications for both ballistic missile and SLV launches. regardless of range and pay- load. or biological weapon). and it goes well beyond the MTCR’s export controls on missiles that exceed a certain range (300 kilometers) and payload (500 kilograms) by calling for restraint in domestic programs and by formally recognizing the links between SLV and ballistic missile technology. Measures Legislatively prescribed sanctions and diplomatic inducements are commonly used in a carrot-and-stick fashion to limit the spread of missile technology.96 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s • Voluntarily inviting international observers to SLV launch sites. biological.S. however. and/or chemical weapons and their related technologies. NORINCO.S. Most of these sanctions were levied under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. the ICOC lacks any enforcement mechanism and is not legally bind- ing (as a treaty would be).55 The ICOC is a mixed bag as far as international nonproliferation agreements go. the ICOC could prove to be a stepping stone to the adoption of stronger and more effective measures in the future. These sanctions last two years and include a ban on U. Despite its shortcomings. if not to the Chinese government it- self. it is much more far reaching than the MTCR (which only has 34 members). such as how one ensures that the sale of SLV technology does not further a ballistic missile program. With 117 members. was sanctioned five times in 2003 and 2004. and a ban on issuing new export licenses to allow American companies to sell certain items to the sanctioned . Such inducements as benefit packages can be used to help restrain proliferators. particularly as they continue to assist Iran’s missile development efforts.S.57 Seven of these entities were explicitly accused of missile proliferation. a ban on U. It also leaves much to be interpreted by the subscrib- ing states. Bush administration has maintained a proactive and punitive approach to Chinese missile proliferators. policy toward China and North Korea through- out the 1990s made use of these tools in an attempt to limit proliferation at its source and to punish the countries and entities involved in the distribution and reception of controlled technology.” meaning that their activities may have involved either missiles or nuclear. government purchases of the company’s goods. The George W. Between January 2001 and December 2004.S. ensuring that achieving the goals and commitments laid out in the code will be a slow. if they can deliver any type of nuclear. or how one determines whether a country “might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction. government assistance and sales to the sanctioned entities. (Both the MTCR and ICOC call for the nonproliferation of all ballistic missiles. while sanctions are used as punitive measures against both those supplying the tech- nology and those receiving it. chemical. One organization. The other 17 were more vaguely cited for “weapons proliferation. Unilateral and Bilateral U. U. Conversely. cum- bersome process.

with some arguing that they are the best and perhaps only defense. Since 1998. In all likelihood. a set of 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors around Moscow. After scor- ing a qualified success in obtaining a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing from North Korea. Upon its arrival in office.” but the term mistakenly implies that the systems provide an effective defense. the United States continues to raise the issue of Chinese missile-technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran in bilateral meetings. Israel’s program is largely funded by the United States (see chapter 13). and long range. That is. Israel and Russia are the only other nations with indigenous antimissile efforts. though it appears that the nuclear warheads may have been removed. Russia deployed the world’s first operational antimissile system in the 1960s. The interceptors remain. it stated that it would seek further progress on nuclear and conventional military force issues as well as in the realm of missile proliferation. while others view them as a last line of defense should all other efforts fail. Most of the pro- posed systems employ hit-to-kill interceptors. Antimissile Systems Antimissile weapons can play a role in an integrated nonproliferation policy. the United States has also attempted to use diplomatic induce- ments and sanctions packages in dealing with North Korean entities in an at- tempt to limit that country’s ballistic missile proliferation activities. In the face of such little progress. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 97 groups. China’s bid to join the MTCR in 2004 failed because of its spotty missile proliferation record. which employed a proximity fuse and an explosive warhead to scatter pellet-sized fragments in the path of the intended target. medium range. in an attempt to demonstrate its military strength. unlike the Patriot inter- ceptors used in the 1991 Gulf War. increases in annual food aid. Neverthe- less. however. Experts disagree on the exact role. the Bush administration indicated that it would not pursue a “missiles-only” agreement. Instead. These systems are commonly referred to as “missile defense. and offers of free launches for North Korean satellites as bargaining chips in an attempt to secure an agreement. This volume uses the more neutral term “antimissile” to refer to efforts to inter- cept offensive ballistic and cruise missiles. and without the nuclear warheads the system is strictly symbolic. the new interceptors will attempt to hit the target head-on. Moscow tested an A-135 missile interceptor in late November 2004. The United States is the only country in the world that is devoting a consid- erable portion of its defense budget to antimissile weapons. The United States is developing antimissile systems in three basic versions: short range. using the kinetic energy of the encounter to destroy the target. the Bill Clinton administration used promises of presiden- tial visits. no progress will come on North Korean ballistic missile proliferation until the nuclear program is ended. Every step up represents a substan- tial increase in complexity and a lower probability of success. The administration was unable to reach a final accord before the end of its second term. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov . This was always a questionable defensive strategy mandated by the inability of the interceptors to score direct hits.

because weapons programs in their developmental stages. As of the spring of 2005. and an agreement has been reached with the United States as part of an $18 billion arms procurement package. which limited Russian and American antimissile systems. though.98 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s declared the test a success.59 The development of an even newer system.65 Tokyo hopes to test.62 Taiwan also figures prominently in antimissile discussions. such as all of the antimissile programs.3 billion for antimissile systems in fiscal year 2005. The version known as the SA-12 is being marketed as an alternative to the U.S. How- ever. had been deployed in the Sea of Japan. a barrage attack using some of the hundreds of missiles that China is de- ploying would quickly overwhelm the systems.66 Japan has been very careful in saying that its systems would be solely for the protection of Japan. Department of Defense hopes to deploy six radar-equipped Aegis destroyers and eleven Aegis cruisers and destroyers carry- ing SM-3s by the end of 2007. Russia has not given up all interest in developing some sort of functioning antimissile system. the S-500. A newer S-400 system is comparable to the U. requested $1. typically experi- ence significant delays and cost overruns. Taiwan tested this system for the first time in June 2001. is currently under way.61 Ever since the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. claiming that Russia could now move forward with a life-extension program for the antimissile system. conventionally armed ballistic missiles deployed across the Taiwan Strait. have all expressed interest in building antimissile weapons.67 The U. but it acquired Patriot missiles from the United States in 1997 to protect its capital. President Vladimir Putin. Taipei.64 These defensive systems might provide some protection against Chinese short-range.S. This sometimes leads to erroneous claims that Russia has an operational antimissile system. Moscow has been cautiously interested in working with Washington to develop more ad- vanced antimissile technology. Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (described just below) and is intended to intercept medium-range missiles. The Japan Defense Agency. with the help of the United States.S.68 These deadlines will likely prove difficult to meet.60 Some analysts misunder- stand the limited nature of Russia’s systems and exaggerate their ability to pro- vide the accurate and timely tracking of incoming warheads. Despite the lack of progress. It does not have an indigenous program. Finally. Patriot sys- tem. Japan has shown an interest in developing its own antimissile system. then– foreign minister Ivan Ivanov. and then deploy. which already possesses PAC-2 missiles. and Dmitri Rogozin.69 .63 The government is also seeking to upgrade to the Patriot Ad- vanced Capabilities 3 (PAC-3) system. the head of the international affairs committee in the lower house of the Russian Duma.58 Russia has also upgraded its conventionally armed S-300 air defense missile systems to give them some capability against short-range missiles. many patrolling near Japan. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. the Aegis destroyer-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the land-based PAC-3 antimissile systems by March 2008. only two ships. and that they would not be used for the de- fense of another country. but with few if any sales. both with the modified Aegis Radar but none with the SM-3 antimissile interceptors.

the Patriot radar and computers mistook the friendly aircraft for enemy missiles.71 Without realistic tests. but the Patriot and MEADS systems currently hold the only possibility for intercepting SRBMs armed with single warheads. missing in six of its eight attempts. The Navy Area-Wide program was an effort to upgrade the Aegis radar sys- tem and Standard missile on the U. such as decoys and submunitions. which is based on Aegis ships with a new Standard-3 missile (see discussion above of Japan’s antimissile ambitions). it is impossible to predict performance. now known as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 99 SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS.000 to 3.500 kilometers: the army’s THAAD system and the Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier) system. All these tests occurred before 1999. which is in the fledgling stages of development. MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS. demonstrate the serious and often fatal problems of even these short- range systems. however. In the 2003 Iraq War. The multinational Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). the Army claims that it intercepted all nine “threatening” ballistic missiles: the relatively slow. Together.S. They rely on previously developed radar and hard- ware systems and—because they intercept their targets within the atmosphere after any decoys would have been stripped away—they do not encounter the difficult discrimination problems that face higher. The THAAD test record has been disappointing. Navy’s destroyers and cruisers.70 These incidents resulted in the deaths of three coalition soldiers. short-range al-Samoud 2 and Ababil 100 systems. Both are now known as Midcourse Interceptor Systems because they primarily at- tempt to intercept missiles in their midcourse phase. Proof of these claims was not provided by the Army. system is the improved Patriot system. despite decades of effort. It was simi- lar in concept to the original Patriot system. The Patriot batteries also shot down two coalition aircraft. and no additional flight or . The difficulties posed by cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft in the Iraq War. The navy canceled it in December 2001 after it fell badly behind schedule and over bud- get. In these incidents. or PAC-3. would employ an upgraded version of the PAC-3 system and be a cooperative program between the United States and two of its NATO allies. the new PAC-3 (along with an earlier upgrade of the PAC-2. but for use on ships. remain a major unsolved technical barrier to effective antimissile systems. and missed shooting down a third only because the pilot destroyed the Patriot unit. Terminal systems are practical only against short-range missiles. Countermeasures. after they have been boosted and are coasting outside the atmosphere. designed to intercept Scud- type missiles. These systems attempt to intercept missiles in their ter- minal phase as they reenter the atmosphere and close in on a target. as later congressional and Israeli analyses con- firmed. The most advanced U. Two systems are under development to counter me- dium-range missiles that travel from 1. it hit few if any Scuds. Germany and Italy.S. the PAC-2 GEM) had mixed results. The Army hopes that MEADS will enter service by 2012. because longer-range mis- siles would fly in too fast for any current intercept system. outside-the-atmosphere in- terceptors. Although the original Patriot was psychologically important in the Gulf War.

the Pentagon planned to deploy six radar-equipped vessels and eleven missile-equipped ships by the end of 2007.75 The Pentagon hopes that the ABL will be deployed be- tween 2008 and 2010. several missile interceptors were placed in silos at Fort Greely. These concerns were summarized in an April 5. the Airborne Laser (ABL). Until realistic tests are completed. Up to 20 intercep- tors could be installed in Alaska and California by the end of 2005. In 2004. despite much opposition among experts as well as current and former military personnel. The system already exceeds its weight limit after assembling just a few of the laser modules needed to create the high-energy laser beam. The ABL system has run into major technical problems and serious cost overruns. these modules have not been mated with the aircraft and nothing more than flight tests of the unequipped 747 have occurred. It remains in an early stage of development. wanted to declare “limited operational defensive ca- pability by late 2004.100 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s interceptor tests have been conducted because the missiles are being redesigned. the system enjoyed a successful test in February 2005.72 The Navy Theater-Wide / Aegis system claims hits in five out of six tests. Current Pentagon plans call for more tests of THAAD through 2008. but most of those have been highly scripted.74 Furthermore. 2005. is under development to test the idea of deploying a high-energy laser in a modified Boeing 747 aircraft. however. with de- ployment possible (although highly unlikely) between 2006 and 2008. All flight intercept tests have been conducted under highly scripted conditions with the defense given advance information about the attack details. including nine Nobel laureates. letter from twenty-two physi- cists. Two more tests are currently planned for 2005. the system intercepted the target on five occasions. These include delayed hardware deliveries and excessive vibration (or “jitter”) that impedes the high- energy laser from maintaining its aim on the target missile. The plane would fly within 300 to 400 kilometers of missile launch points and at- tempt to destroy missiles of all ranges in their boost phase by weakening their missile skins through applied laser heat. as part of the so-called Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. there are widespread technical doubts about its feasibility. The Bush administration. Although the system enjoys strong political support from the administration and Congress. The scientists concluded: The GMD system has no demonstrated capability to defend against a real attack. Alaska. even from a single warhead unaccompanied by countermeasures. and the testing program has pro- vided essentially no information about how the system would perform in a real missile attack.” In its ten highly scripted and unrealistic tests as of mid- 2005.73 A third system. to Congress. using very powerful ground- based interceptors. as discussed above. . California. Though a problem with the kill vehicle pre- vented any tests from taking place in 2004. LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS. there will be no data on which to base an assessment of how effective the system might be in an actual attack. Finally. and Vandenberg Air Force Base. These systems would also intercept long-range missiles outside the atmosphere in their midcourse phase.76 This is probably wishful thinking.

7. Norris and Thomas B.html.78 The administration has also revived concepts of placing kinetic-energy inter- ceptors in space (formerly known as Brilliant Pebbles).S. See also “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World. Ibid. U. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2002. .. “Worldwide Threat: Converging Dangers in a Post-9/11 World.house. Numerous government reports have identified simple countermeasures that are readily available to states such as North Korea. 5. “Executive Summary.C. Department of Defense (DOD). Even if the defense components work perfectly as designed. 13. available at www.R./Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces.” testimony of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George J.S.S. p.html. p.gov/hasc/ testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat. available at www. 1945–1996 (Washington. “Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballis- tic Missile Threat to the United States.80 including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction pro- grams. Thus. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 101 At the same time. technical feasibility.” December 2001. they represent by far the largest financial component of U. February 6.: Natural Resources Defense Council. the system will be unable to defend against a real attack. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015. Nuclear Weapons Databook. 6. 8. February 11. pp. 5.defenselink. 7. 1998.–U.” July 15. 7. cost. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (hereafter Ballistic Missile Threat Commission). and no tests will be conducted until at least 2008. N OTES 1.” p. and strategic consequences of deploying antimissile systems. pp. available at www. p. Robert S. Nuclear Weapons Databook: U. Cochran. with more than $10.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/dci_speech_02062002. Ibid. 3. National Intelligence Council (NIC). Norris and Cochran. 4. Sep- tember 30. D.” testimony of DCI George J. 1997). Ballistic Missile Threat Commission. it is possible to understand the severe limitations of the system by analyzing the intrinsic capabilities of the system components. even without such tests. 12. 2. available at www.S. Despite the lack of a consensus on the threat.79 By comparison. Both plans are in the early exploratory stage and are at least a decade away from testing. 2003.” Washington. This project is still very much in the developmental stages. 2002. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 6. 6–7. p. the United States allocated about $2 billion for all other nonproliferation pro- grams in 2005.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003. the Bush administration has advanced the idea of using a Kinetic Energy Interceptor on land and at sea to destroy long-range missiles in their boost phase.mil/pubs/qdr2001. should one occur. respectively. and it is again investigat- ing the idea of space-based lasers. 3.cia. p.S.pdf. 10..htm. 9. submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 1987 and 1995.cia.77 In addition to GMD.5 billion allocated for antimissile research in 2005. France and the United Kingdom acquired intercontinental-range. 8. technical assessments demonstrate that the GMD system will be unable to counter a missile attack that includes even unsophisticated countermeasures. nonproliferation policy. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. sched- ule.

72. Israeli Jericho IIs (50). p.. 2004). 77–80. Scud-C. and Human Rights. Col.S.doc. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. 14. 2003. 12. available at www. and Pakistan (Ghauri. India (Agni II). 170. and Chinese long-range missiles. 70-72. ICBM arsenal. 28.” Joint Forces Staff College.” Arms Control Today. 28.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 77–80. Norris and Kristensen.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. according to one source. 15. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. and 12 CSS N-3 sea-launched MRBMs. Israel. 2003. 2005.S. and the Soviet Union posessed 149 SS-4 Sandal MRBMs. DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces. Najmeh Bozorgmehr. Lyle Powell. Ron Perkins. Jordan.” pp. Norris. Non-Proliferation.K. p. Hans M. March/April 2003. pp. there were 4. See also Robert S. and Lt. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Goes Into Service.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. the United States deployed Thor IRBMs on U. Col. 2003. North Korean No Dongs (90). p. 3. 2004. Cdr. Ibid. 59. Kristensen. It is possible that China has deployed as many as 20 DF-4 IRBMs (which some consider to be “limited ICBMs”). September 8. 21.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2005.” Army News Ser- vice. and 20 Iranian Shahab IIIs. 26. “Attack- ing the Cruise Missile Threat. Robert Norris and William Arkin. 201. 50 Israeli Jericho IIs. 30. 17. March/April 2005. p.” Financial Times. 100 North Korean No Dongs. Also.htm. September 22. Kristensen. 2003. Pakistani Ghauris. NIC. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: North Korea’s Nuclear Program. 2001. January/February 2005. telephone conversation with Hans M. p. See also Paul Kerr.” pp. Robert S. 25. Lt. pp. and Rajkumar. and no further IRBMs were produced or deployed. 70–71. 20. 6. and Turkey.” World News Connection/Itar-Tass. at the time of the signing of the INF Treaty. the United States possessed 234 Pershing II MRBMs. The U. IRBM arsenal had long been eliminated by the time the INF Treaty entered into force. July/August 2001. The 417 number assumes the highest estimate of each of these missiles (40 Saudi CSS-2/DF3As.” p. DF-21s. In 1987. July 21. Military Balance.gov/t/vc/rls/ rm/2004/37220. Joint and Combined Warfighting School. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. Syria already possesses the capability to strike deep into the territory of potential regional adversaries such as Iraq. In 1987. Kristensen. 2002). 2004–2005. p.php?story_id_key=6412.102 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 11. Ghauri IIs. Military Balance. 24. pp. 15. 2004–2005. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. 74–77. January 21.state. Nonproliferation Review. 19. Russian. 73. 23.” testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verifica- tion and Compliance Paula A. Indian Agni IIs (0). Kristensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council. and SS-21 SRBMs. See IISS. 48 DF-21 MRBMs. November/December 2003. See also “Russian Expert: Iran May Field Up to 20 Shahab-3 Missiles By 2005. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: United States Nuclear Forces. and Shaheen IIs (0). 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. Cirincione. Darren Sawyer. July 21. 29.jfsc. available at www4. May 2004.C. From 1958 to 1963. 18. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces. “Futures Center Working Two Initiatives for Troops in Iraq. These missiles were retired in 1963 following improvements in the U. Listed as 50 each of Jericho I and Jericho II missiles in CNS. 2003.” Bul- letin of the Atomic Scientists. Robert Norris and Hans M. territory in a joint agree- ment with the British government. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. Deadly Arsenals. 2005. p. vol. 111–12. Norris and Hans M.army. 2003.edu/current_students/documents_policies/ documents/jca_cca_awsp/Cruise_Missile_Defense_Final. “Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments. Norris and Hans M. The 285 number assumes the lowest estimate of Saudi CSS-2/DF3As (40). 2003. p. and Iranian Shahab IIIs (5). 27. and Joshua Handler. 77–80. no. Phil Tissue. Lt. pp.. . pp.mil/ocpa/read. Leah Rubulcaba. available at www. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: French Nuclear Forces. according to IISS. China had a force of 40 DF- 3 MRBMs. and CSS-N-3/JL-1s. 72. With its current arsenal of mobile Scud-B. and CSS-N-3/JL Is (100). Joseph Cirincione with Jon B.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Chinese DF-3s. Winter 1996. Ghauri II. D. pp. 16. There are approximately 100 Jericho I and II missiles. Norris and Kristensen. 73–75. 104 Chinese DF-3s.ndu. Col. Wolfsthal. plus an additional five missiles for North Korea (Taepo Dong I). 13. Kristensen. or Shaheen II).040 U.121. 22. DF-21s. The Military Balance. Robert S.S.

cfm?fa=view&id=3000092. DOD. 50.” 2000.” pp. Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom.pdf. 14. Slaps Sanctions on Five Chinese. 36.osd. 47. 45. Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles. p. 58. see appendix D in the first edition of this volume: Cirincione. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap: 2002–2027. U.S. April 25. “New Developments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Land Attack Cruise Missiles. Security Council Document S/1996/261. 38. and Interna- tional Security.” Jane’s International Defense Review. Dennis M.” Chapter Summary.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Fact Sheet. available at www. Remarks by General Eugene Habiger. 32. September 29.. Wolfsthal. vol. “Ballistic Missiles. U.html. 54. 1996. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 103 31. North Korean ‘Proliferators.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460871. U. 44–46. Barbara Starr. “Russia’s Anti-Missile Test Called Success. Verification. 43. 52. “Iraq Reveals a Startling Range of Toxin Agents. 1996). 49.at/up-media/1121_hcoc_-_list_of__subscribing_states. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress.” Available at www. Department of State. cited in Dennis Gormely. 403–9. 1996. distributed by the Office of the Spokesman. 35. Ibid. April 11. 22. Ballistic Missile Proliferation. 2003). pp. Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez. 39. available at http://editors. 2003. p. February 16.” p. 53. “Joint Statement of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China on Missile Proliferation. 41. p. 56. 2004. 24. p. Disarmament.” pp. For a full discussion of the MTCR. 1995. May–June 1990.se/pubs/yb03/ch12.un. “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.” December 2002. De- cember 2. 48–55. Veridian Pacific-Sierra Research. pp. Duncan Lennox. Deadly Arsenals. “In the Tracks of the Predator: Combat UAV Programs Are Gathering Speed. Stewart Stogel. Gormley. Ibid.acq. “Annex: List of Subscribing States to the HCOC. See also DOD.sipri. 42. Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press.mil/usd/ uav_roadmap. no.” Congressional Research Service. 2004. available at www. More information can also be found on Carnegie Nonproliferation’s “Missile Proliferation” web page.state. and Inspection Commission. 43. “Alaska Missile Interceptor Site Has No Credibility. “Iraq’s Al-Husayn Missile Program.org/ Depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document. United Nations Monitoring.” January 6.N.” March 6. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap. Bill Sweetman. Aaron Karp. Austrian Foreign Ministry. 1996. August 2004. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap. 4. 7. available at www.” United Press International. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press. “Unresolved Disarma- ment Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes. 46. “Missile Plans by Iraq May Aim at Europe.org/ npp/weapons/index. 21–22. Ibid. November 29.S. 37. Ibid. p. 2004. 2003. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” (Duelfer Report of September 30. 2003. U.gov/t/np/rls/fs/27799. publicly released March 11. pp.S.” October 4. April 17. 10.. November 11. W. 34. 33. 1994.htm.minbuza. Karp.’” Agence France-Presse. at www.carnegieendowment. 55. 57. p.bmaa.S. . in SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments.” parts 1 and 2. Ibid. Department of State.” Carnegie Endowment Non-Proliferation Issue Brief. Office of the Secretary of Defense. 1–2. 2004). and Rajkumar. 40. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical and Operational Aspects of an Emerging Threat. Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review.gv. Adelphi Paper 339 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).” Washington Times.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 44.doc. Summary. “U. 48.nl/default. 34. 2004.” available at www. 7. 51. “Key Findings: Delivery Systems.pdf.

php. “U. August 2004. December 19. available at http://taiwansecurity. “Russia Considers Missile Defense. 66. 63. 8. April 5. William Hoehn.” April 2004.S.” Survival. “Japan Wants Fatter Budget for Missile Defense. Boese.S. p.ransac. GAO-04-409. and Matthew Bunn.ucsusa. Gormley. 64.org/AP/2004/AP-061004. 2005.” Arms Control Today.” Managing the Atom Project. Ibid. “U. 70.” 76. pp. 26. “Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War. 2005.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 2004.htm. October 6.osd. .fas. March 2003. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance. Jason Sherman. Nicole C. April 5.” Associated Press. See also “Historical Funding for MDA FY 85-05. 2002.html.” Defense News. For details on these programs. 2004. available at www. Wade Boese. See also “U.” Arms Control Association.” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Moscow Miffed Over Missile Shield but Others Merely Shrug. Intelligence.S. 71. appendix III. 2005. 80. 30–31. 2004. Warner. 72.asp.mil/mda/ mdalink/pdf/histfunds.org/archives/000878. September 1. Germany/Italy/USA. See also Michael Wines. 65. 2004. Mulls Placing Missile Defense System in Japan: Report. October 6. 2004. Dennis M. 2004. Wade Boese.” New York Times. April 7. U. Defense. 69. “MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System. p.” Japan Times.S. pp. 77. 61. 48–55. Wade Boese. “Raytheon Delivers SM-3 Missiles.armscontrol. August 31. 4. September/October 2004. 56–66. available at www. 2004.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/index. 74. Evans. 62.acq. Official Warns of ‘Repercussions’ If Taiwan Fails to Approve Weapons Deal. Obering III. 31. 79. Ibid.” Agence France-Presse. June 18–24.” Agence France-Presse. Obering testimony. “U.104 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s 59. “Missile Defense. 75. “Threat Reduction Funding in the Bush Administration: Claims and Counterclaims in the First Presidential Debate. p. pp. Winter 2003–4.S.S. “U. 45. Lieutenant General Henry A. Anthony Wier. testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services.cfm?pageID=1715.S. 60. “Missile Defense: Winning Minds. 67. See also “Non-Proliferation Efforts in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Bill.” Available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Taiwan Officials Prepare for Their First Missile-Defense Test. “Japan Would Not Use Missile Defense to Intercept Missiles Targeting Other Countries. October 13. Fact Sheet.org/global_security/ missile_defense/page. Looks to Counter North Korean Missiles. Letter to Senator John W.” pp. pp. Not Hearts. November 10. “Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Test- ing and Accountability.” Arms Control Today. January 10.” available at www. 61–86. 68. Missile Defense Programs. Harvard University and Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council.armytechnology. Evans. vol. see the web site of the Federation of American Scientists at www. 48–55.com/projects/meads. Government Accountability Office. available at www.” Global Security Newswire. 2001. “Congress Backs Bush’s Defense Budget. available at www.armscontrolcenter. July/August 2004. no.org. “Threats and Responses: U.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense. 73. 78.pdf.

such as the widely prolifer- ated FROGs. please contact the authors. Belarus4 SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Scud-B O 300 1. The Car- negie Endowment welcomes your comments. Missiles reported to be in development are listed in ital- 1 ics. Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes Afghani. self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. air-launched cruise missiles. because they have guidance systems. The U.org. is “an unmanned. The development of ac- curate guidance systems remains one of the most challenging engineering obstacles facing states that wish to indigenously develop ballistic missiles. Only eleven nations have missiles with ranges over 1. Ballistic missiles differ from military rockets. all the rest have only short-range. O 165 560 USA Missiles manu- 140 factured by (ATACMS) Lockheed- Martin. and submarine-launched cruise missiles.000 Russia Bahrain MGM.S. Notes and a key are provided below. Ballistic missiles are sometimes confused with cruise missiles. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 105 Table 5. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals This table represents the Carnegie Endowment’s best assessment of the world’s ballistic missile arsenals. or of sources that could expand the information on this page.” such as antiship cruise missiles. National Air Intelligence Center further stipulates that cruise missiles are “usually categorized by intended mission and launch mode. Only eight nations have been able to develop nuclear weapons that could be fitted as warheads on these missiles. A cruise missile.000 kilometers. A ballistic missile is one whose payload reaches its target by way of an initial powered boost and then a free flight along a high arcing trajectory.000 USSR (table continues on the following page) . please visit the web pages devoted to “Missile Prolif- eration” and “Anti-Missile Systems” at www. Armenia3 Scud-B O 300 1. State Department).ProliferationNews.000 USSR Operational stan status question- able. Scud-type missiles.” Such a missile may carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead (definitions are taken from an arms control glossary provided by the U. Scud-B O 300 1. land-attack cruise mis- siles. We count 30 nations as fielding some type of ballistic missile.S.2. Part of the flight of longer-range ballistic missiles may occur outside the atmosphere and involve the “reentry” of a warhead or the missile. For more resources. as defined by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. If you are aware of informa- tion that could update this table.

second liquid.000/13. CSS-5 O 1. O 5.000 USSR/ DPRK Project T O 450 1.5 CSS-3/DF.000 800 I Could be de- ployed between 2006 and 2010.000 I SLBM . Scud-C O? 500 600–700 DPRK France M-45 O 6.500 2. 11) CSS-6 O 600 500 I Solid-fueled.8 DF-31A9 D 12.7 CSS-9 D/T 8. 9) CSS-2 O 2.900 2.000 700 I Deployment (DF-31) expected later this decade.000 I/DPRK Improved Scud.200 I 4 CSS-4 O 12.0006 I Extended ver- (DF-5/5A sion (DF-5A) to be deployed in 2005.000 700 I Sea-based ver- (Julang II) sion of DF-31. Road-mobile. (DF-11/M. Road- mobile.000 1.700 2. CSS-X-7 O 300 500 I Solid-fueled. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes China CSS-8 O 150–230 190 I Two stage.000 I May just be the first two stages of the DF-31. Road-mobile.106 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. SLBM Could be de- ployed by end of decade.10 CSS-N-3 O? 1.700 600 I (Julang I) SLBM CSS-N-4 D 8.650/2.800 600 I (DF-21) DF-25 D? 1.2.150 I Gradually being (DF-3/3A) retired. (DF-15/M.11 Egypt Scud-B O/U 300 1. first solid.

O 150 800– I/USSR From Russian 150 1.13 Sagarika14 D? 250–350 500 I From Prithvi. O 160 190 I 160 Fateh-110 P 200 600 I/PRC? Last confirmed (NP-110) test September 6. (table continues on the following page) .000? I Test planned by the end of 2004. 2004. 8) Scud-B O/U 300 1.000 SA-2. D 350 500– I/USSR From Russian 350 1.000–2.18 Iran19 Mushak.00024 1.16 India says lim- ited production has begun. Agni II O/P 2.000 I/Russia Based on Rus- sian SS-4.17 Agni III D 3.500 1. First test sched- uled for 2005. 2004.000 ? I Will replace the SLBM M-45 SLBM. Dhanush D/T 250 500 I From Prithvi. 18 1994. Prithvi. India Prithvi. Possible de- ployment by 2010. 2002.500 1. O 165 560 USA Purchased 160 140 ATACMS be- (ATACMS) tween 1995 and 1996. Army missile. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 107 M-51 D 8.12 Greece MGM. O 150 190 PRC Modified SA-2. 2004. Agni O15 600–750 1. France tested February. Prithvi.000 I/USA/ From Scout.000 I/USA/ Last tested Au- France gust 29. (Naval Last tested No- Prithvi) vember 7.000 I/DPRK Scud-C O 500–600 500–700 I/DPRK Shahab III O/T21 1.20 M-7 (CSS. O 250 500–750 I/USSR From Russian 250 SA-2. O 130 190 I 120 Mushak.22 Shahab IV D/T?23 2.000 SA-2.300 750–800 I/DPRK From No Dong. Last tested Oc- tober 20. Air Force missile.

000-6. Taepo.2.000. Jericho III D? 3.000 France/I Road-mobile. I Reportedly 1. Tested May 1993.000 liquid fuel mis- sile.000 USSR stan Tochka-U O 120 480 USSR (modified SS-21) Libya31 Scud-B E 300 1. Scud-B O 300 1.000– ? I/DPRK/ Possibly based 5.000 USSR/ DPRK Al Fatah32 D/T 200 500 I North Scud-B O/P 300 1.500–2.000 I Combined No dong I Dong and Scud.500–5.30 Kazakh.500?25 Russia? on the North Korean Taepo- dong I and II. O29 160 200–300 I Solid-fuel mis- 100/Al sile from Scud Fatah B. 1998.108 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.300 700– I Single-stage.300 based on the Shavit Space Launch Vehi- cle.500 1. Israel Lance O/S 130 450 USA Jericho I O 500 750-1. Ababil. D 3.500 1. T 1.000 France Road-mobile. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes Shahab V D? 3. Derived from Scud tech- nology.000 I Reportedly dong II ready for flight test if North Korea ends flight-test mora- torium35 .000 1.26 Iraq27 Al O/U28 180–200 300 I Liquid-fuel Samoud II missile. tested August 31. From Scud B.500 1.34 Taepo. Jericho II O 1. 1.000 USSR/ Korea33 Egypt? Scud-C O/P 500 600–700 I Variant No Dong O 1.

44 (table continues on the following page) . 2004. Ghauri O 1. 2005.000 two-stage. SS-25 O 10. Ghauri III D/T 2.300 700 I/DPRK From No Dong. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 109 Pakistan Hatf I O 80 500 I Hatf-II/IIA D/T 180/280 500 I/PRC?36 First test-fired in (Abdali) 2002. (Scalpel) Rail-mobile.350 I Liquid fuel.050 I Solid fuel. Ghauri II D/T 1. last tested October 12.43 SS-19 O 10. but flight test planned for June 2004 never occurred. Last tested December 8. (SS-1c Mod 1) SS-21 O 120 480 I Solid fuel. Last tested March 19.700–3. 2005. 1999. 2004.000 8. Road- (Sickle) mobile. SS-18 O 9.000–2. Last (Satan) tested Decem- ber 22. 2004.300 500–750 DPRK 2001 NIE lists (No the Ghauri to be Dong) a No Dong.000 4.500 750– I/PRC? Road mobile.500 ? I/DPRK Thought to be based on the Taepodong-1. Engines have been tested.800 I Liquid fuel.000 I Liquid fuel. (Stiletto) SS-24 O 10. II41 1. Last tested March 31.000-11. Last tested Novem- ber 29.000 4.000 I Solid fuel.500–2. Thought to be an M-9 deriva- tive. Russia42 Scud B O 300 1.40 Shaheen D/P 2.38 Shaheen I O/P39 700–750 500 I/PRC Solid fueled. Last tested Novem- ber 2.500 1. last tested April 14. 2004.37 Hatf III O 280–300 500 I/PRC 2001 NIE lists (Ghaznavi the Hatf-3 to be /M-11) an M-11. 2004.

300 2.2. will be carried by the Borey- class submarine. O 180 500 I/USA Modified SAM. could be ready by 2006. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes 45 SS-27 O/P 10. 2004.650 I Last tested No- SLBM. D/T 280 480 I For export. SS-N-18 O 6. 2004.20052 the SS-27.200 mobile version of SS-27 ex- pected to be- come opera- tional by 2006. version is known as the Sineva) SLBM.46 Last tested De- cember 24. (CSS-2) Slovak SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Republic53 South Nike.500–8.500 1.50 SS-N-20 O 8.150 PRC Purchased from Arabia Feng-3 China in 1987. Saudi Dong O 2. Iran. Korea Hercules I/A .800 I Last tested Sep- (upgraded tember 2004.110 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. SS-N-27 D/T 10. Belarus. Solid E49 fuel. vember 2.000 1.47 SS-X-26 D/T 300 480 I Solid fuel.000 1.300 2. 2004.000– I First road- (Topol-M) 1.550 I No longer in SLBM. tested Septem- ber 23. Test- (Iskander) ing has been completed. service. and Syria interested in this missile. will enter service in 2005.000– I SLBM version of (Bulava) 1.51 SS-N-23 O 8. last SLBM.600 2.48 Iskander.

Turkey MGM. O 165/300/140 560/160/ I All three ver- States 140 270 sions have dif- (ATACMS ferent ranges Block and payloads.000 USSR Scud-C56 O 500–600 600–770 DPRK Syria can now produce its own Scud-Cs.000 USSR stan Ukraine SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Scud-B O 300 1. Syria may now be capable of producing its own Scud-Ds. Feng Tien Chi60 O?61 300 500 I Modified SAM. O 165/300 560 USA Block I pur- 140 chased in 1997. Tested in 1997. (ATACMS Block IA pur- Block I/IA) chased in 2001.000 USSR United Scud-B O 300 1. Minute.400+ 2. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 111 Nike. service lives 12/12A) being extended until at least 2020. (MK.58 Taiwan Ching O59 130 270 I/Israel From Lance.650+64 1.000 Russia? Arab Emirates63 United Trident II O 7.800 USA Kingdom D-5 United MGM.150 I Last tested Sep- man III tember 2004. deployed in 2004. Scud-B O 300 1. Hercules Tested at re- II duced range in 1999. Scud-B O 300 1.55 Syria SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Transferred 1983. Project J62 D 150 150 I/PRC Based on Chi- nese WS-1.54 MGM. Turkmeni.57 Scud-D T 700 500 DPRK Based on the No Dong. O 9.65 (table continues on the following page) . D/T 260–300 450-500 I/USA Modified SAM. last tested September 2000. O 165 560 USA Purchased 120 140 ATACMS in (ATACMS) 1996. I/IA/II) all three ver- sions have been delivered to the Army.

000 United States unknown) interdicted ship- ment from DPRK.950 I All will be deac- Peace. Unclassified Na- tional Intelligence Estimate. but sub- sequently al- lowed it to pro- ceed to Yemen. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.000–5. September 2000).S.000 km) MRBM medium-range ballistic missile (1.112 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.C.400 1. Trident II O 7. The principal sources for this table include National Air Intelligence Center. National Intelligence Council.000 USSR Yemen SS-21 O 120 480 USSR Transferred 1988.: DOD. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) Payload System Range (kilo- 2 Country Name Status (kilometers) grams) Origin Notes 66 MX O 9.650+ 3. keeper although neither silos nor mis- siles will be destroyed.000 USSR Transferred to South Yemen in 1979.500 I Will be retired C-4 SLBM by 2007. tivated by 2005. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (National Air Intelligence Center. Scud O? 300–500 600– DPRK Spain and the (variant 1. discussions with .500 km) ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile (> 5.000–3.500 km) Origin I Indigenous INF Treaty Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty SAM Surface-to-air missile NOTES N OTES: 1.800 I D-5 Vietnam Scud-B O 300 1. U. at which time the SSBNs that carry the C-4’s will carry the D-5s. 1997). Trident I O 7.400+67 2. D. December 2001. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Department of Defense (DOD).68 Key to Status D in development E in process of elimination O operational P in production S in storage T tested U used RANGE SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SRBM short-range ballistic missile (<1.000 km) IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile (3.2. Scud-B O/U 300 1. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.

Norris and Hans M.osd.” available at www.com/fullstory. 2004).in/release/release.S. however. “World- wide Ballistic Missile Inventories. pp.000 kilometers is the range of the DF-5A.mil/mda/mdalink/pdf/BM2004. 17. Missile Defense Agency. The DF-31A is often confused with the now-canceled DF-41 ICBM. According to Indian Defense ministry officials. p. Andrew Feickert. p.S. NRDC.com/2004/040829170937. the Times of India reported that the government had approved the induction of the Agni II and the development of a longer-range missile. “Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia. Other sources maintained that the Sagarika program also contained a ballistic missile division. 1997. See Norris and Kristensen. November/December 2003. 2001. 13. 2004). 2003.spacewar. See www. various Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) “Nuclear Notebooks. 2.” March 5. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean No Dong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles. 15. pp.” 10. 2003. For these reasons. Robert S. The Indian government first acknowledged the existence of the Sagarika in October 1998. “Nuclear Policy: France Stands Alone. 2004.org/wmd/world/ missile. India announced it had begun limited production of the Agni II and that it would be under the control of the army (Rahul Bedi. The deployment of this missile cannot be confirmed.” available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. On May 31.S. and Global Security. No- vember 12. “Ballistic Missiles of the World. 5. 18. See the DOD’s “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. 48–55. See Nikolai Novichkov.to 350-kilometer sea-launched cruise missile derived from the Prithvi. 3. See the DOD’s “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” for FY 2004.org/nuclear/nudb/datab16.nrdc. Press Information Bureau. A number of sources report that Argentina tested and may have deployed the Alacran short-range ballistic missile in the late 1980s and early 1990s.pdf. Congressional Research Service.nic.asp?relid=4788. “Missile Proliferation Sum- mary.” 7. 2004. the military armed itself with the Agni in August 2004. The Azeri embassy states that Azerbaijan is no longer in possession of these missiles. traveling a distance of 1. Available at www.html. 11. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. 15). April 16. Russia is thought to have shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia be- tween 1992 and 1995. The Dhanush is the naval version of the Prithvi series. 15. 2001. U. Arms Control Association.” August 31.” available at www. 2003.pdf.” Government of India. available at www.com/missiles/. There are some questions regarding whether Argentina and Azerbaijan continue to deploy ballistic missiles. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. Belarus announced that they will acquire the Iskander-E SRBM from Russia by 2010. See also Bruno Tertrais. 2004.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” available at www. 2004.expressindia. August 22. DOD reported that Iran also produces a 200-kilometer “Zelzal” missile and a 150- kilometer “Nazeat” missile. available at http://pib.php?newsid=35647. government and relevant embassy officials.” Financial Times. identifying it as a 250.globalsecurity.” 12. The Agni II was tested for a third time on August 29. “Indian Army Will Control Agni II. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. 19. See also Norris and Kristensen. we include neither Argentina nor Azerbaijan in our final count of countries with ballistic missiles. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. 6.acq. Claremont Institute. 2003.” Bulletin of Atomic Scien- tists.htm. Kristensen. (table continues on the following page) . 16.200 kilometers (Agence France-Presse.” 8.” May 2002.org/ fact- sheets/missiles.000 kilometers in a January 2001 test.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.asp. available at www.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” August 29.537jwumo. During the Cold War. 4. July/August 2004. The Military Balance 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 14. which may be variations of its “Mushak” series.asp. See “India Begins Deploying Agni Missiles. In June 2001. See Feickert. Azerbaijan imported a number of Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union. “India Tests Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Mis- sile.missilethreat. See Norris and Kristensen. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 113 various U. Ibid. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. 13. and the U. “Ballistic Missile Capability: 2004.” 9.armscontrol.” as published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. which will be deployed in 2005. Department of State does not credit Argentina with this missile. and very few reliable and publicly available resources credit Azerbaijan with Scud-B missiles.defenselink. intelligence reports have classified it as an SLBM. “Chinese Nuclear Forces. “Nuclear Data. 77–80. “Dhanush Successfully Test Fired. November 8. It traveled approximately 2. NRDC: Nuclear Notebook. “Belarus to Acquire Russian Multi-Warhead Missiles By 2010. International Institute for Stra- tegic Studies. 2004.

2003.N. having likely unilaterally destroyed them all. Verification. 2004.pdf. See United Nations Monitoring. available at www. though.” March 6. 2003. and that the missile fired was an upgraded version of the Shahab III.” Associated Press. 16– 17. available at www. however.” Agence France-Presse. available at http://news. suggests that Iran has already tested the Shahab IV.bbc. 2004. It is possible that he was referring to the Shahab IV.htm. p.” 26. intelligence says Iran has a “small number . 28. vol. “Unresolved Dis- armament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes. “Iran Conducts New Shahab III Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. Iran denied that it was continuing development of the Shahab IV. His claims may not be accurate.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. but he also could have been talking about a significantly upgraded version of the Sha- hab III. 6–7. Five al-Samoud II missiles were fired at coalition forces during the war.” available at www. October 5. It is possible that Rubin is wrong. “Iran Successfully Test-Fires Missile. a dissi- dent coalition.” pp.org/Depts/unmovic/new/ documents/cluster_document. 29. pp. October 20. 23.org/countries/iran/missile2004. 21. See Feickert.mod.” Agence France-Presse. May 30. 25. “Iran ‘Can’ Mass-Produce Missiles.janes. September 27. “Iran Unveils Redesigned Shahab Missile.un.org/program/index. 38. 22.stm.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3716490. U. See Center for Defense Information. September 6.wisconsinproject. .” S/2003/580. on October 20. “Thirteenth Quarterly Report on the Activities of the United Nations Monitoring. two-thirds of the missiles were eliminated when the war began on March 17. but a report in Jane’s Defense Weekly in September 2004 cited former Israeli ballistic missile defense director Uzi Rubin as saying that an August 11. 2004). Al-Samoud II missiles began to be destroyed under the supervision of UNMOVIC on March 1. and Inspection Commission. 24. “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs.S.” Iraq illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles with a range of 650 kilo- meters (in violation of U. the National Council of Resistance of Iran.shtml. and the Iraq Survey Group’s “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD [weapons of mass destruction]” concluded that Iraq no longer retained the al-Hussein missile after 1991. In all.2. 2004. Also.com/aerospace/ military/news/ jdw/jdw040927_1_n. test was proba- bly a Shahab IV rather than a Shahab III.co. This was based on some technical differences between the missile fired on August 11 and the Shahab III..” Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani claimed in November 2004 that Iran could mass produce Shahab IIIs. Verification. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Iran had missiles with a 2. available for use in a conflict. The Shahab III was handed over to the Revolutionary Guard on July 20.org. See Alon Ben-David. section 1. sanctions). According to “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Gov- ernment. In November 2003.” BBC News. but the system was recalled due to “failures. 2004. who identified the missile as the “Shahab-V. 2004. See also “Iran Conducts New Shahab-3 Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. 28–29. however.unmovic.” See United Nations Security Coun- cil. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) 20.cdi. 2004. 2003. 2002.cfm?programid=82.. available at www. drawing upon remarks by the Iranian defense minister. pp. available at http://news.bbc. see www. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. in May and August 2002. Ali Akbar Dareini.000- kilometer range in October 2004. See “Iran ‘Increases Missile Range. See www.114 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5.uk/linked_files/iraq/ wmd. 2004.co. as Iranian officials declined to com- ment on the Shahab-3’s range after its most recent test. November 9. 2. Estimates of the range of this new IRBM are only speculative. Octo- ber 20. and Inspection Commission.’” BBC News. 27. 2003. 2003.pdf. See also “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advi- sor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD” (the Duelfer Report of September 30.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3997151.stm. No al-Hussein missiles have been uncovered as of yet.

2004. 33. 6. See DOD. p.” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism. 45.” Arms Control Today. See Atul Aneja. The missile impacted 1. 2. September 27. The report has not been confirmed.: DOD. assistant sec- retary of state for verification and compliance.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. the Al Fatah has been success- fully tested to only 200 kilometers. 1999. pp. D. and Human Rights. 44. 34.” Agence France-Presse. but one report says it is based on French motor technology.htm. missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. NRDC Nuclear Notebook.nti.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. May 2004. has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles. in August 2004. “Libya . March/April 2005. 31. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that North Korea was developing two new missiles. that is. 4. 41. March 1990. Shah Alam. Chandrashekar. See Paul Kerr. Pakistan announced “serial production” of this missile in October 2000.320 kilometers from its launch point. However. p. “Pakistan Test-Fires Long-Range Ballistic Missile in Response to India. 47–48. that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defen- sive purposes. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 115 30. at http://cns. “Russia Test-Launches Land. 36. 37. September 22.” Associated Press. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee. and thus was not included as part of the deal made between Libya and the United States in December 2003. Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would elimi- nate all Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)–class missiles. There have also been unconfirmed re- ports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its De- cember 2003 decision to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. This was the most recent missile test of any kind conducted by North Korea. “Pakistan Tests Short-Range Hatf Missile. no. In December 2003. 61. 2005. The Russian SS-N-8 SLBM is no longer deployed and is in the process of elimination. See www. Most believe it is based on the Chinese M-11. “Russia Test-Fires Ballistic Missile. See Robert S. 40. because they have not yet been eliminated. March 31. one land-based and the other sea-based. Kristensen. testified before the House Subcommit- tee on International Terrorism. Both missiles are reportedly based on the Russian SS-N-6 SLBM.state. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. It attempted and failed to put a small satellite into orbit. 2004. See Joseph S. (table continues on the following page) . 2001).edu/research/ wmdme/israel. 28. 38. See www. 2004. The Al Fatah was not considered to be MTCR-class. at that time. 39. demonstrating some progress in staging technology. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel” web page.” The Hindu. 2004. Paula DeSutter. December 22.miis. November 29. Forty SS-27s have been produced and deployed. Pact with India on Test Notification De- layed. 70–72.C. 32. Norris and Hans M. vol. 1999. The 12 remaining SS-N-8s are still counted in the biannual START memoranda of understanding.” See “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. March 9. p. . Bermudez. 2005.” Agence France-Presse. Nonproliferation.” Global Security Newswire. 43.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2004/30816. April 14. . pp. 2004.” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. Nonprolifera- tion. however. “North Korea Deploys New Missiles.htm. November 2. “Pakistan Begins Work on Shaheen-II. “Russia’s Nuclear Forces. “Pakistan Test-Fires Missile. saying. See S. Though intended to have a range of 950 kilometers. in September 2004. and Human Rights. It was agreed. 42.and Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles. August 4. See “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context.” Agence France-Presse.html. “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Mis- sile Capability.” Testi- mony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. 2004. 35.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/ 3834_3845.

According to the Center for Nonprolifera- tion Studies. Pavel Podvig. 2004). “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK. 189. 57. 63. In 1989. 2004.nti. See www. 51. the United Arab Emirates was not happy with the missiles and they were never operationalized. “Syria: Missile Capabilities. 50. An unidentified missile traveled 62 kilometers in a test firing on November 22. Strategic Forces Com- mander. NRDC Nuclear Notebook. but the U.” available at http://cns.and Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles. Personal conversation with a State De- partment official in the Office of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. Norris and Hans M. “South Korea Completes Deployment of New Medium-Range Missiles: Report. Nuclear Threat Initiative.ac. 2004.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines. The Minuteman III missile may have a range of up to 13.” Associated Press.S. “Russia Test-Fires Mobile Version of Its Latest Missile.htm.il/jcss/balance/ Turkey. 2004. “New Missile Launchers Will Be Shipped to Troops Next Year. with a range of just 280 kilometers. 54.650 kilometers. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM. p. 2001.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. December 10.” Available at www. See Don Kirk. “Press Conference with Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov. 55. November 23. 1999. 2001. Military Balance 2004–2005. May/June 2004. 59.org/ e_research/profiles/Syria/ Missile/print/4126_4127. “Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon—Source. 60. 64. however.” Agence France-Presse. World Ballistic Missile Arsenals (continued) 46. Our estimate based on the fact that the Bulava (SS-NX-30) is the SLBM version of the Topol-M (SS-27). . The Jerusalem Post reported the development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (which could possibly be the Scud-D tested in September of 2000). 65. With the demise of START II. but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources.tau.stratcom. 52. See Arieh O’Sullivan. 61. “South Korea Launches Missile In Its First Test Since Last Year. 58. September 16. December 24. 2004.” New York Times. 500-kilograms limit laid out by the Missile Technology Control Regime. 47. 49. 2003–2004 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/fbmsl.” August 27.htm. “Russia Test-Launches Land. Strategic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9. The Middle East Strategic Balance. the United Arab Emirates reportedly attempted to purchase 25 Hwasong-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles from North Korea. 19. Ivanov. 68–70. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2004. that Taiwan had deployed up to 50 Tien Chi missiles on Tungyin Island and at an undisclosed second location. 2001. See Robert S.116 A s s e s s m e n t s a n d We a p o n s Table 5. There is no publicly available evidence to confirm these re- ports. 62. in order to comply with the 300-kilometers.2.russianforces. 53. Nuclear Forces.” Federal News Service. October 9.000 kilometers. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. chap. 2004. 56. Interfax News Agency. It has been slightly modi- fied. the United States has amended its plans to downgrade all Minuteman missiles to a single warhead. Ibid. The Iskander-E is merely the export version of the SS-X-26. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported on March 26. pp. Kris- tensen. October 1. available at www.” Associated Press. “U.pdf.org/eng/navy/. 48.S. Slovakia has eliminated its Scud-B missiles.prt. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies.miis. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet.” Jerusalem Post.” Available at www.

67.stratcom. 2001.stratcom. Arms Control Today. 25. Stops Then Releases Shipment of N.org/db/profiles/dprk/msl/cap/NKILOMETER_Ch_hwaso6_GO. and missile fuel on December 9. 68. p. .000 kilometers.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm.nti. The shipment was eventually al- lowed to proceed and arrived in Yemen five days later. but the U. Spain and the United States interdicted a North Korean shipment of 15 Scud missiles.” available at www. Korean Missiles. It is not known whether the Scuds in question were Scud-Bs or Scud-Cs. See Paul Kerr.S.400 kilometers.S.S. January/February 2003. Stra- tegic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9. warheads. The MX Peacekeeper may have a range of up to 11.mil/ factsheetshtml/submarines. “U. M i s s i l e P ro l i f e r a t i o n 117 66. Available at www. The Trident II D-5 may have a range greater than 7.htm. html. See www. but this is the U. Strategic Command’s officially listed range. “Hwasong-6 (Scud-C): Overview and History.650 kilometers. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative.

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with many thousands of nuclear weapons having been withdrawn and eliminated since the mid-1980s. the vast majority of which belong to the United States and Russia. .” and to “pursue negotia- tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Together. France. Russia. Each chapter also looks at the issues that affect efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT and the commitments taken at its five- year review meetings.000 nuclear weapons. and the United States—are also permanent members of the U. the five states have agreed to an “unequivocal undertaking .N. . the United Kingdom. still stockpile huge amounts (hundreds of metric tons) of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Security Council. to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. All five—China. PART TWO Declared Nuclear Weapon States T here are five legally acknowledged nuclear weapon states under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons (NPT). including the United States and Russia. however. The following chapters on the five nuclear weapon states review the quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems possessed by each nation. 119 . Several countries.” The deployed arsenals of the nuclear weapon states are declining. the pro- tection of which is of major importance in preventing the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons. This problem adds to global concern regarding the security of nuclear materials. the five nations possess more than 25.

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CHAPTER 6 Russia Nuclear Weapons Capability The Russian Federation is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). and much more remains to be done to adequately secure Russian nuclear materials and expertise. Russia has signed and ratified the Compre- hensive Test Ban Treaty. benign employment for its nuclear workforce. the United States has provided approximately $10. or chemical weapons to other countries or subnational groups. Overall.989 strategic nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. Since the end of the Cold War.400 operational nonstrategic warheads and about 8. Russia is in the process of dramatically reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal and weapons complex owing to changed international security conditions. and the retirement of older systems that are reaching the end of their service lives. Russia maintains an account- able strategic nuclear force of 981 delivery vehicles with 4. Russia may only deploy 1. 1949. A failure to effectively address the proliferation chal- lenges in Russia could result in the spread of nuclear. biological. in addition to work on the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons complex. eliminate aging nuclear weapon delivery systems.3 billion to assist the states of the former Soviet Union to secure nuclear weapons and materials. Russia may possess as many as 16.732 associated war- heads. al- though it could maintain a substantially larger nuclear arsenal given adequate resources.000 intact nuclear weapons. Russia has not conducted any tests since the fall of the Soviet Union.2 Despite these efforts.800. Russia maintains a massive nuclear complex that consists of ten formerly secret nuclear cities that house hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials and hundreds of thousands of trained sci- entists and engineers with weapons-related knowledge. and it possesses thou- sands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.1 The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear weapons tests. 1990. although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is about 3. Russia also is estimated to have 3. and the last on October 23. Russia’s nuclear complex continues to pose a serious proliferation risk. Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).800 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles. 121 . To support this arsenal. and find alternative. If current trends continue. the first on August 29. the negotiation of arms control agreements with the United States.

Russia contin- ues to produce limited numbers of its new SS-27 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (40 were deployed as of the spring of 2005).4 As with Russia’s nuclear complex. Russia is a state party to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. smallpox. a mas- sive stock of BW samples.and submarine-based stra- tegic ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. for deployment on its next-generation strategic submarine.N. largely in Ukraine. Russian government officials deny that any assistance is being provided to the military missile programs of either India or Iran. in violation of U.000 metric tons of chemical weapons. bru- cellosis. However. and Moscow has taken significant steps to improve its export controls over missile-related technology.7 Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s chemical and biological weap- ons stocks and facilities and is responsible for the elimination of the weapons and stocks in its possession. despite extensive international as- sistance. Today. sanctions. It also seeks to test and develop a new submarine-launched ballistic missile.122 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Aircraft and Missile Capabilities As of the spring of 2005. and a latent BW production capability. anthrax. Many of Russia’s currently deployed strategic missiles are reaching the end of their service lives and are being retired. with the direct assistance of the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also called the Nunn-Lugar Program. The Soviet BW program reportedly weaponized plague. Russia faces significant problems in complying with its commitments to eliminate these weapons. Russia continues to possess an advanced and accomplished. tularemia. Russian equipment and technology may be finding their way into the missile programs of other countries. after its original congressional sponsors). also un- der construction. and the Marburg virus and developed other possible agents.3 Most of the major strategic ballistic missile produc- tion facilities of the former Soviet Union were located outside Russian territory. albeit currently depressed. Rus- sia continues to possess almost 40. the Bulava (SS-N-27). driven by economic necessity and profit motive. missile design and production infrastructure. although this cooperation was limited to surface-to-air missiles and does not appear to have extended to ballistic missiles. the combination of Russia’s extensive mis- sile expertise with the economic hardships of its missile experts have raised con- cerns that. Russia deployed 777 land. It appears that Russia may have had some limited missile-related con- tacts with Iraq before March 2003. in addition to 78 strategic nuclear-capable bombers. and it is likely to retain a considerable chemical and biological weapons .6 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability The Soviet Union had vast offensive chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) programs.5 The United States has levied sanctions against more than a dozen Russian groups for such cooperation since 1998.

In the meantime. and Ukraine might not return to Russian control. Strategic Weapons Russia possesses a large.8 Those weapons deployed outside Russia when the Soviet Union dissolved have all been returned to Russia. These weapons serve as the ultimate guarantor for Russian . The creation of three new nuclear weapon states out of the Soviet Union would have been an almost certain fatal blow to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (see chapter 18). The threats of today go beyond nuclear forces and include terrorist groups. senator Sam Nunn summed up the risk when he said: The old threats we faced during the Cold War. • Russia might lose control of nuclear weapons (especially tactical nuclear weap- ons) in its inventory. and chemical weapons and materials are poorly secured. Much of Russia’s nuclear. were threats made dangerous by Soviet strength. These dangers included several risks: • Nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. Kazakhstan. a Soviet strike or an invasion of Europe. deliberate use of Soviet nuclear weapons posed the main security threat to the United States. the potential. The new threats we face today—increased Russian reliance on early launch and first use and in- creased reliance on tactical-battlefield nuclear weapons—are threats made dan- gerous by Russia’s weakness. Former U. and advanced arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Russia 123 stockpile for many years to come. Kazakhstan. In the aftermath of the Cold War. The return of the nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. biological. We can’t risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of his children only by endangering ours.S. Nuclear Analysis During the Cold War. and Ukraine was a tremendous achievement in interna- tional efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. there is much concern over the security of these materials as well as over the experts who are responsible for their production. • Russian nuclear materials and expertise might be bought or stolen and thus assist the efforts of countries or terrorist groups in developing nuclear weap- ons. diverse. The risk that chemical or biological weapons or critical pro- duction technology might leak out of Russia to proliferant states or terrorist groups remains high and will require a continued investment (domestic and international) to ensure that the Soviet chemical and biological weapons legacy does not lead to further proliferation. concern over Russia’s nuclear arsenal shifted to a new set of concerns. its weapons scientists and guards are poorly paid.

1 Type September 1990 January 2005 ICBMs Launchers 1. Despite its continued importance to Russian security. also see table 6. Russia could potentially maintain as many as 2.9 It is also not yet clear how many of the new SS-27 land-based ICBMs Russia will produce and deploy. On the basis of the most optimistic assumptions of Russia’s rela- tionship with the United States.2). Department of State.1. Not- withstanding these concerns.732 AABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : START I = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. It has produced only limited numbers of that system. and SS-27) are expected to be in service by the end of the decade.672 Bombers Launchers 79 78 Warheads 570 624 Totals Launchers 2.436 SLBMs Launchers 940 292 Warheads 2. only three (the SS-18. It is not yet clear to what level Russia’s strategic arsenal will drop by the end of the decade. raising questions about their long-term reliability and safety. 2005. Some elements of Russia’s nuclear forces have taken on an enhanced role in Russian security as its conventional military strength has fal- tered. ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles. SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 1 START I Memorandum of Understanding Data Exchange. national security. and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. including the NPT. START I.652 4. Information contained in the April 2005 data exchange is for forces accountable as of January 31.000 weapons by the end of 2010.124 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6. although its production capability could theoretically reach as high as . START I Data. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces START I Data. The other two systems—the SS-24 (rail and silo) and SS-25—are expected to reach the end of their serviceable lives by 2010. Intercontinental ballistic missiles have historically made up the largest com- ponent of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state and has as- sumed its legal obligations under arms control agreements. As the majority of Moscow’s strategic weapons reach the end of their service lives and are being retired. However. April 1. the country’s nuclear arsenal is shrinking.083 981 Warheads 7.278 2. the Russian nuclear arsenal remains formidable (see table 6.064 611 Warheads 4.S. the Russian deployed strategic arsenal could drop to just under 2.1.804 1. SS-19. 2005. U. many suffer from a lack of main- tenance funds.7 at the end of the chapter).800 weapons by the end of 2010 (table 6. Yet of the five types of ICBMs that Russia deployed in 2005.

See www. Russia currently deploys 100 SS-18 ICBMs. Experts speculate that some bombers will retain purely nuclear roles.cfm. 4. 8. Strategic Missile Troops Commander Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia could add one regiment of SS-27s every two years (or roughly 5 missiles per year). The older variant is expected to be withdrawn from service in the next few years. which currently deploys 130 SS-19 ICBMs.812 ABBREVIATIONS A BBREVIATIONS: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles. 2005. 2. NOTES N OTES: 1. This assumes that each SS-27 could be MIRVed with up to six warheads. while the upper-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 5 missiles each year from 2006 to 2010.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.org/russia/267-5. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces. March/April 2005. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. pp. could extend the lives of these systems again (they have already been extended to 25 years). 6. 5.cdi. replacing them with the 30 that it purchased from Ukraine in 2003. See Norris and Kristensen. while others will have the capability to carry out either nuclear or conventional missions. 70–72. This assumes that all six Delta III nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) could remain in service if necessary. but it is much more probable that Moscow will simply retire its older SS-19s. Kristensen. The lower-limit numbers depend on how many strategic bombers are converted to conventional roles. SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Norris and Hans M. In a December 2004 interview. See Robert S. It is theoretically possible that Russia. experts estimate Russia’s production capability to range from 3 to 9 missiles per year. Russia currently only has plans to purchase 4 SS-27 ICBMs in 2005. The lower-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 3 missiles per year from 2006 to 2010. Russia 125 Table 6. 3. . Projection of Russian Nuclear Forces 2010 Lower Limit (Launchers/ 2010 Upper Limit Type Warheads) (Launchers/Warheads) 1 ICBMs SS-18 50/500 50/500 2 SS-19 30/180 30/180 SS-24 0/0 0/0 SS-25 0/0 0/0 3 4 SS-27 59/59 70/420 5 SLBMs Delta III/SS-N-18 0/0 96/288 Typhoon/SS-N-20 0/0 0/0 Delta IV/SS-N-23 6 (Sineva) 96/384 96/384 Borey/SS-N-27 7 (Bulava) 0/0 24/144 8 Bombers Bear Tu-95 H-6 27/162 32/192 Tu-95 H-16 32/512 32/512 Blackjack (Tu-160) 16/192 16/192 Total 230/1. The lower limit assumes that no Borey class SSBNs will be deployed by 2010. 7. while the newer variant is undergoing a life extension program that will allow it to remain in service until approximately 2015 or 2020.2. which would give Moscow a total of 44 deployed at the end of this year. This estimate assumes that six Delta IV SSBNs will be deployed.” pp. 70–72.989 364/2. while the upper limit assumes that two will be deployed by that year.

ICBMs. Russia is pursuing work on the next generation of strategic ballistic missile submarines.000 warheads each. START I was the first arms control agreement to actually reduce the levels of deployed strategic weapons. with a sev- enth for testing purposes.900 weapons to be deployed on either side’s ICBMs and SLBMs and. is nearing the end of its service life. but obtaining agreement from the other three states required intensive diplomatic . One of the Typhoon subs. Kazakhstan. Upon the col- lapse of the Soviet state. SLBMs. The sublimits for warheads allow no more than 4. of this subtotal. STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTIONS.11 It is possible that some submarine launchers will remain operational in port if sufficient funds are not available for seagoing operations. on schedule. On July 31. It may be deployed by 2006.600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—that is. the Dmitri Donskoi.100 warheads may be deployed on mobile ICBMs. To address this dramatic development. The bulk of its submarine force is slated for elimination by the end of the decade. the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. though it is possible that some could be retained if necessary. no more than 1.540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs. the United States and Russia re- duced their strategic accountable nuclear forces to 6. The two main bomber types in the Russian military are the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95 Bear. and strategic bombers. Construc- tion of the second and third boats is under way. The Russian submarine force is also in a serious state of decline. next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). although it too will decline in numbers as aging systems are retired. and it is likely that Russia will deploy only eight submarines (six Delta IVs. In addition. plus one Borey-class submarine) by 2010.2). serves as a test bed for Russia’s not-yet- deployed. The entry into force of START I was substantially delayed because many of the systems covered by the treaty were physically deployed in non-Russian re- publics when the USSR fell. previous agreements had served to cap the growth of existing arsenals. but the missile they are equipped to carry. the Yuri Dolgoruki. Russia. Under START I. Construction began on the first boat of this class. the SS-N-20.126 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 50 a year with adequate funding. 1991. no more than 1.10 The six Delta III submarines in the current arsenal are slated for retirement by the end of the decade. in 1996.12 The Russian bomber force is likely to remain the most stable component of the Russian strategic triad during the next ten years. the SS- N-27. and Ukraine would also need to ratify the agreement before the treaty would take effect. High-end projections suggest that Russia will have just 70 SS-27s by the end of the decade (see table 6. known as the Borey class. Russia was almost immediately recognized by the inter- national community as the main nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union. deployed on no more than 1.13 The two countries completed their implementation of the agreement in Decem- ber 2001. the coun- tries involved agreed that Belarus. and both could enter service by 2012. There are three Typhoon submarines in the current arsenal.

In addition. Presidents George H. Kazakhstan. 2003. Through the protocol. and it deposited its accession to the NPT on December 5. posing an attractive target for a disarming first strike. In separate letters to President George H. Belarus. and on February 3. First. each of the three presidents of the state parties also agreed to the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms on their territories within the seven-year START I implementation period. 2000. the majority of Russian nuclear arsenals were based on MIRVed ICBMs. and Ukraine were returned to Russia by the end of 1996 (see chapter 18). the two sides would begin new talks on further reductions at the earliest practical date. Second. including a ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) land-based ICBMs. and Ukraine agreed to “adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” as non-nuclear weapon state parties “in the shortest possible time” (article 5 of the protocol). Russia’s Supreme Soviet stipu- lated that Russia not exchange instruments of ratification until after the other three successor states had acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and carried out their other obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. Bush administration chose to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on June 13. and Ukraine. The U. 1994. had it ever entered into force. All nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. 1992. In approving ratification on November 4. however. START II. Kazakhstan. the four states agreed to participate jointly in START I as successors of the former Soviet Union and to “implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions” (article 2 of the protocol). the Russian Duma ratified the agreement on April 14. This was a significant develop- ment for two reasons. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that after the signing of START I. and the other countries involved. 1993. 2002. 1994. Presidents Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the basic principles of what was known as START II. 1996. signed on May 23. W.S. . START II. 1992. on Novem- ber 18. MIRVed ICBMs have been considered “destabiliz- ing” weapons. Russia 127 and strategic maneuvering by the United States. 1993. and Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT on February 14. 1992.500 and resulted in the elimi- nation of all land-based MIRVed ICBMs by January 1. 1993. would have capped the number of deployed strategic warheads in both countries at 3. Kazakhstan’s parliament ratified START I on July 2. Russia. by Belarus. Those talks began in September 1991. Senate to approve protocols to the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty before START II would enter into force. 1993. and Belarus formally acceded to the NPT on July 22. Ukraine’s parliament approved START I and the NPT in two steps. At a subsequent summit in June 1992.S. W. Bush. Senate ratified START II on January 26. Bush and Yeltsin signed the finalized START II agreement in Moscow on January 3. At the June 1990 Washington Summit. The Belarusian parliament ratified START I on February 4. 1994. Kazakhstan. requiring the U. The Russian ratification included an important caveat. When the George W. Russia. After more than six years’ delay. The result was the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to the START I agreement.

14 START III. long-range nuclear-capable cruise missiles. Bush announced that the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1. It is just two pages long. offensively deployed. It abandons the START II pledge to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs. compared with the much lengthier and more detailed START agree- ments. he did not announce a formal Russian target for reduc- tions. now known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). 1997. they agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control agree- ment to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the actual destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.S. During his November 2001 summit with President Vladimir Putin. verifi- able elimination of all delivery systems that were subject to strategic reductions. These discussions were to take place apart from. and Russian offi- cials on issues to be addressed in the START III process. President George W. but it finally accepted the Russian request to do so. Bush had previ- ously announced that this would be the level of U. and its elimination and verification measures are much weaker than those under the START agreement.”16 This agreement. START III negotiations. [Russia is] prepared to present all our agreements in a treaty form. Whereas START I and START II called for the total. Helsinki Summit.500 or fewer weapons. nuclear forces. Putin did express his interest in having the reductions made part of a formal treaty: “For our part. 2002. In a joint press conference with Bush after their summit meeting.128 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Moscow responded by declaring that it would no longer be bound by the limits agreed upon under START II. effectively killing the treaty. including the issues of verification and control. no negotiations ever took place and no agreement was ever produced. they agreed that the pact would limit deployed strategic forces on both sides to between 2.000 and 2. and their corresponding warheads. The agreement capped the number of each side’s strategic. which considered including controls on warheads. Senate ratified the pact in March 2003. Sec- ond. 2012. Although in 2000 Putin had declared his interest in reducing the Russian nuclear arsenal to 1. not be deployed. First. . was signed in Moscow on May 24.700 and 2. SORT is a significant departure from past arms control treaties.17 Nor does SORT follow up on the ambitious START III agenda.S.200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons over the next ten years.700 and 2. The United States had pre- viously resisted having the reductions codified in any legal agreement.200 by December 31.15 Despite several years of informal discussions between U. and tactical nuclear weapons. THE TREATY OF MOSCOW (SORT).500 warheads by the end of 2007. The U. At their March 20–21. but in the context of. Presidents Yeltsin and Bill Clinton agreed to begin negotiations on a START III agreement immedi- ately after START II entered into force and identified certain parameters for the new treaty. they pledged to explore measures for long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. and the Russian Duma followed suit in May 2003. nuclear war- heads at between 1. SORT only requires that these systems.S. In addition.

1987.3. The INF Treaty required both countries to eliminate all nuclear-capable ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in their arsenals with a range of between 500 and 5. Tactical Weapons Much less is known about the size. 2001. p.S. Yadernye Vooruzheniya Rossii (Moscow: IMEMO.20 .. 1 2 3 Weapon Type 1991 Agreements 2004 2005 Land-based 4. 2004. 4. 1997). Kristensen.200 Air force 7. INF missile systems and of 1.500 1.500 3. 3. Its implementation resulted. 2005) that their estimates on tactical nuclear weapons remain unchanged since 2002. by May 1991. implementation was completed on May 31. Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY.000 0 0 0 Mines 700 0 0 0 Air defense 3. and the two gov- ernments announced that they would no longer need to verify the complete elimination of weapons systems covered under the agreement.846 Soviet missile systems. 71–73. Alexei Arbatov. pp.18 The INF Treaty is the only pact to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.3). The authors note in subsequent notebooks (2003. p.000 8. “Russian Nuclear Forces.000 1.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. composition.540 Navy 5.000 3.500 1. U. Russia is believed to have possessed about 30.000 640 4 Total 21. 2003). 1991 (three years after the agreement entered into force). 2. 56. 2002. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency. At one point during the Cold War. 17.000 tactical weapons. July/August 2002. and Russian nuclear deployments are also partly controlled by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 8.000 3. All totals are approximations. in the verified destruction of 846 long. Russia 129 Table 6. Arkin and Hans M.500 1.19 Under the terms of the agreement.000 3.700 8.and short-range U. and deployment of the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons (table 6. See William M.500 kilometers no later than June 1.000 3.S. ed.000 0 0 0 missiles Artillery 2.400 NOTES: 1. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Total to Total Tactical Deployed Remain under Nuclear Tactical 1991 Bush– Weapon Nuclear Tactical Totals in Gorbachev Stockpiles Weapons.

a high-ranking Russian general reaffirmed these concerns. Congress started several programs to assist Russia in ensuring the security of its nuclear arsenal.S. half of its tactical air-launched nuclear weapons. saying that Russia would “hold onto its stockpiles” of tactical nuclear weapons. In late 2003. and remove tactical nuclear weapons from navy forces (ships. the U. however. and half of its nuclear warheads for antiaircraft missiles. the U. Rademaker.25 In October 2004.S. He also announced that Russia would elimi- nate one-third of its tactical sea-launched nuclear warheads. the truth of the allegations cannot be either confirmed or discounted.22 Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in non-Russian republics were re- turned to Russia in early 1992. In 1992. Stephen G.26 “Loose” Nuclear Weapons and Materials There has been great concern that the security of Russia’s nuclear complex since the collapse of the Soviet Union made the possible theft or unauthorized use of a Russian nuclear weapon a very real threat. Russian president Yeltsin went further.S. announcing an end to the production of warheads for land- based tactical missiles. submarines. and informed estimates suggest that Russia has between 3. This raises questions about whether Moscow will con- tinue to eliminate these weapons. it is likely that Russia is at least considering the development and deployment of new types of these weapons. artillery. Bush’s September initiative to dramatically reduce the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. to ensure that the systems were in fact removed and destroyed. Russia de- nied the claim. Gorbachev matched Bush by announcing a plan that would eliminate all Soviet nuclear artillery.130 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Russia has substantially reduced its stocks of tactical weapons. par- ticularly with the general decline of Russia’s conventional military forces. President Gorbachev responded to President George H. There are no formal verification procedures in place or associated with the initiatives. assistant secretary of state for arms control. remove all nuclear weapons for air defense missiles from deployment ar- eas (for storage or elimination).21 In October 1991.400 and 8. tactical nuclear weapons have taken on greater importance in Rus- sian security planning. and land mines.23 Uncertainty about the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons has lingered. but in the absence of a formal inspection or other verification procedure. and land-mine war- heads. short-range missile. U. This uncertainty was reinforced in January 2001. W.24 In fact. stated that Washington remains concerned that Russian commitments on tacti- cal weapons in Europe have not been fulfilled. as well as the decision to elimi- nate the stockpiles of those weapons. As a result. and land-based aircraft). assistance has been critical to improving the security of both nuclear weap- ons and nonweaponized nuclear materials in Russia and in other former Soviet . which is an isolated enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania.000 of these weapons. and tactical weapons elimination is believed to have continued through the beginning of the new century. when the Washington Times reported that Russia was transferring tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad Oblast. With that decline.

and 2 prototypes) to ensure the security of warheads. It is also identifying additional needs.7 million in additional assistance to purchase security systems for railcars.) The railcars themselves were produced in Russia using U. focused on helping to protect nuclear warheads during transit.S.28 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY.S.30 With shipments beginning in 1997. Russia 131 states. but it then asked the United States for additional funding assistance. funds and some U. Disputes over U. CTR program. however. and 117 spe- cial railcar conversion kits (100 cargo. (An ad- ditional 150 supercontainers were provided by the United Kingdom in May 1997.31 The ministry planned to install all the upgrades. and on November 1. materials. For this purpose.29 Soviet-era warhead accounting and management relied upon the manual (hand- written) tracking of its nuclear arsenal. and installation has begun at additional sites. Nuclear weapons generally enjoy a greater level of security than do Rus- sian nonweaponized nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium). A demonstration facility.000 Kevlar blankets. Although Russia has never disclosed the total number of sites where nuclear weapons and materials are stored.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense signed a new memorandum for $41.S. the U. was completed in 2003. the U. the CTR programs have also provided Russia with five mobile emergency response complexes to deal with accidents. Department of Defense CTR program transferred 123 “quick-fix” sets to the Russian Ministry of Defense for upgrading security at weapons storage sites. 15 guard. 1999. In addition. The program’s aims have now shifted to the replacement of railcars that are nearing the end of their service lives.S. as well as software and training. the United States provided Russia with 4. the rest of the equipment was produced in the United States. the ministry in- dicated that it has installed only one-third of the fencing sets at 52 locations. The program is scheduled to be completed in 2005. the Se- curity Assessment and Training Center. Initial Russian weapons security programs. This pro- gram continues. Through the U.-funded programs have helped to secure the transport of Russian nuclear warheads and to develop a modern warhead ac- counting and tracking system. the United States has provided Russia with 100 personal computers. a new automated system of tracking and accounting is being implemented in Russia.S. U. Department of Defense and the U.S. collectively known as Coopera- tive Threat Reduction (CTR). especially those coming from the former Soviet republics to Rus- sia. 150 supercontainers (used to carry several warheads at a time) for the physical and ballistic protection of nuclear weapons.S. The program demonstrates an unprecedented level of cooperation between two former Cold War adversaries as well as their ability to cooperate in addressing common security threats. including site preparation for the installation of permanent communication equipment. The programs also assisted with emergency planning and response in the event of an accident. In 2002. as of the spring of 2005. The program has certified hardware and software for the tracking system at nineteen key field and regional sites. the U. access to Russian . Department of Energy had identified at least 91 warhead storage sites27 and 40 fissile material storage sites.S. Under the program.

132 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s weapons sites have seriously stalled the upgrades.36 Reliable estimates of the total Russian nuclear material stockpile vary. and the former White House counsel. the two presi- dents said.32 At the same time. In 1999. .” Though some progress has been made since that time. Much of this material is not adequately protected against theft or diversion.38 Nuclear smuggling from Russian or former Soviet facilities continues to present an acute proliferation risk.33 NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY. the U. and the Energy Department expects to complete security upgrades at all 39 navy sites in 2006. Howard Baker. The International Atomic Energy Agency has con- firmed that. It is not possible to be absolutely certain of the actual amount of nuclear material that Russia has produced and holds because their production cannot be fully accounted for even under the best circumstances (for example. seventeen cases of smuggled nuclear-weapons-usable materials occurred. For example. ap- proximately half of the total 123 quick-fix sets had been installed.S. in 1994 and 1995.35 Russia has the world’s largest stocks of weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.37 Of this material. concluded in 2000: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable mate- rial in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”34 President Bush stated in February 2004 that the countries of the world must do all they can to protect nuclear materials. Even if Russia were to eliminate its nuclear weap- ons. the Czech authorities recovered small amounts of HEU that had likely originated in Obninsk. De- partment of Energy advisory group. In a joint statement from November 2001. chaired by the former Senate majority leader.S.100 tons of HEU. despite considerable efforts to improve the security of “loose” Russian materials. Lloyd Cutler. many originating in the former So- viet Union. “Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states. but Russia is believed to have produced roughly between 180 and 185 tons of weap- ons-usable separated plutonium (civil and military) and close to 1. approximately 600 to 700 metric tons are thought to be in nuclear weapons. Russia. from January 1993 to December 2003. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international community as well as to American lives and liberties. As of the spring of 2005. even the United States’ own nuclear production accounting system— considered vastly superior to the former Soviet system—has a margin of account- ing error of almost 1 percent for plutonium). the country’s vast holdings of nonweaponized nuclear materials will remain a major proliferation concern for decades to come. The project started in 1999. many ex- perts believe this assessment is still correct. A U. Department of Energy has been working successfully to improve security at Russian navy sites that contain nuclear weapons. President Bush and President Putin have acknowledged this concern on a number of occasions. and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.

Additional cuts in Russian non- proliferation programs. AND ACCOUNTING.43 Even this final level of protection.39 Hundreds of similar cases have been reported and investigated during the past decade. then the program will not be completed until 2013. even though it will have taken the first twelve years of the program to secure the first 50 percent. If the rate of comprehensive upgrades remains the same as it was in fiscal year (FY) 2003. much more has been done to install upgrades at civilian sites than at military sites. Consequently. No plans currently exist to provide Russia with the resources needed to reach this level of physical security and accounting. a majority of nonweaponized Russian nuclear materials are inadequately protected. funding the program at the annual level requested by the Clinton administration. including the disposition of nuclear materials and brain drain programs (see below). The Bush administration’s request for FY 2006 was $246 million. work to enhance security in the Russian nuclear complex. its first budget request reduced funding for Russian nuclear material security from a little more than $170 million in 2001 to $138 million in 2002. NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION. Congress passed two supple- mental appropriations for MPC&A. Even after ten years of effort. After the September 11. lagged far behind.40 Current U. terrorist attacks. $212 million (FY 2004).42 Second. however. CONTROL. and emphasized locking down the most vulnerable facilities. government projects plan to complete comprehensive safeguards for all civilian and military material sites by the end of 2008.S.41 Experts. U. Moscow and Washington still have unresolved issues regarding American access to Rus- sian military sites. the United States also funded the construction of a large nuclear material storage facility in Russia to .S. while a relatively small number of military sites. Initial security efforts covered more than two-thirds of the total number of sites containing fissile material. Despite statements of support from the George W. the Department of Energy’s current plans anticipate that 50 percent of the material will be secured in 2007 and 2008. Russia 133 Kyrgystani officials arrested two persons who were attempting to sell 1. Control.44 In addition to protecting nuclear materials in place. Bush campaign and then administration.5 grams of plutonium. Upgrades at the civilian facilities had been nearly completed by the end of 2004. believe that such a timetable may be unrealistic. which hold about 83 percent of Russia’s fissile material.4). the last two years of the pro- gram. only 26 percent of materials had received comprehensive security upgrades. First. and Accounting Program (MPC&A). will be below the ac- cepted international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials. 2001.S. increasing total 2002 funding to $267 million. pro- grams. By the end of 2004. however. Congress has broadly supported the Material Protection. however. totaled more than $100 million from the previous year’s budget. Congressional action on the FY 2002 budget restored funding for nuclear security upgrades to 2001 levels. and $275 million (FY 2005) (see table 6. Budgets in the following years contained $194 million (FY 2003). for two reasons. The U. run primarily by the Department of Energy.

nti. with each holding 25.” available at www. To this end. This is the level of funding proposed by the Bush administration in February 2005.7 3. and Accounting (millions of dollars)1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2.9 212.6 137. and the two states have been at odds over the need to amend agreements to include storage obligations. Funding for Materials Protection. This figure includes funding provided by supplemental appropriation passed by Congress in fiscal year 2002 in response to the September 11.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home. Addi- tionally. Bush administration. 2.0 139. 2001. The Fissile Material Storage Facility in Mayak was originally planned to have two wings. the two sides have not agreed on transparency measures to verify the origin of the nuclear materials to be stored at the facility. the United States and Russia have been cooperating on two important programs: the HEU purchase agreement and the plutonium disposition program. Though they have made progress on resolving some transparency issues.2 85. Control. securely store nuclear materials released from dismantled nuclear weapons.4.6 193.5 245. 1993. The budgets for fiscal years 2001 to 2006 were submitted by the George W.7 169. The first wing was completed in December 2003. The continued possession of large stocks of excess nuclear materials is a recognized “clear and present danger.8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2 3 138. No written agreement between the United States and Russia requires Moscow to store any material at Mayak. but Russia announced that it planned to store only 25 tons of plutonium and no HEU in the facility.0 112.5 266. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992–FY 2006.asp NOTES: 1. disputes over measuring total mass of material remain a significant hurdle.45 There are no current plans to construct the second wing.5 OURCES: SOURCE Nuclear Threat Initiative.1 275. The budgets for fiscal years 1993 to 2000 were submitted by the Bill Clinton administration. The Purchase of Highly Enriched Uranium On February 18. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States would purchase 500 metric tons of Russia’s HEU from dismantled .134 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6. terrorist attacks. Even the best long-term storage and security of nuclear materials cannot elimi- nate the proliferation risks associated with these huge stocks. The actual appropriation will not be made until the fall of 2005.4 10.”46 The disposal of those materials no longer required for defense purposes is vital to reduce the risk that these materials might again be used to produce nuclear weapons in Russia or in other states or by subnational groups.000 canisters of nuclear material (50 tons of pluto- nium and 200 tons of HEU). 3.

the United States and Russia agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons each of their excess weapons plutonium. Presi- dent Clinton designated 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess. At the June 2000 summit in Moscow.47 The program reduces the risk of the theft of Russian nuclear material and speeds the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons by freeing storage space for released nuclear materials. There are no firm offi- cial plans to expand the scope of the purchase agreement. These amounts represent significant portions of the plutonium produced in both countries. which cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons. The U. Numerous nongovernmental experts have called for an expansion of the HEU agreement to include the purchase of larger amounts of HEU. This conflict between national security and financial considerations is a major point of contention between experts and government officials. However. the United States (through USEC) had purchased the equivalent of 237 metric tons of HEU (6. much of which could eventually become excess to Russian military needs.000 nuclear warheads. Russia then ships the material to the United States for fabrication into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Under the program.974 metric tons of low- enriched uranium fuel) from Russia (enough material to produce 9. 1995.5 billion. although the issue is reportedly under review by the Bush administration. the two approved methods for the disposal of this material were the irradiation of plutonium in a nuclear reactor and the immobilization of . As of the spring of 2005. Russia 135 Russian nuclear weapons. This process takes place under in- trusive monitoring arrangements. executive agent is the privatized United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC).50 and Boris Yeltsin declared that “up to” 50 metric tons of plutonium would be made excess through the nuclear disarmament process in 1997. The agreement has since been renego- tiated. and both countries have pledged to take steps to ensure that the material is never again used for weapons. which will be less than the original payment envisioned.51 Collectively. Russia will now be paid according to market forces.S.49 Russia may have hundreds of additional metric tons of HEU not covered by this purchase agreement.48 Executing agents appointed by the two governments carry out the pact. and the Russian executive agent is Techsnabexport (Tenex). for which Russia received over $3. Under the agreement. both countries will have large stocks of weapons- usable materials even after these amounts are dispositioned. Russia dilutes. or “downblends. The economic considerations of such a move are complicated by the fact that the private USEC lacks a financial incentive to expand its purchases. Plutonium Disposition The United States and Russia have both declared large amounts of former de- fense-purpose plutonium to be excess to defense needs. On March 1.482 nuclear weapons). The entire program is designed to take place over 20 years and was originally expected to pay Russia $12 billion for the material and services.” weapons-grade HEU into low-enriched uranium. the com- mercial arm of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosaton formerly Minatom). this material is enough to produce 25.

International efforts to prevent the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons have focused not only on trying to protect Russian nuclear materials but also on preventing Russian nuclear experts from selling their skills to would-be nuclear weapon states and organizations. The Bush administration has decided to abandon immobilization and to pursue only reac- tor-based irradiation of this material. and U.S.56 Furthermore. Russia has also stated that it does not possess the funds required to carry out the disposition alone and would simply store the material if international sup- port were unavailable. the Netherlands. had pledged $981 million for Russian plutonium disposition as part of the “G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. program and a lack of financing for the Russian disposition effort.54 Estimates now suggest that the entire Russian disposition program. . and the United Kingdom. the United States has appropriated approximately $494 million for this effort. in addition to the United States. by the spring of 2005. however. Nuclear Expertise The breakup of the Soviet Union and prolonged economic strain in Russia also pose serious nonproliferation risks in the form of Russian nuclear weapons ex- pertise and technical know-how. These include technical and political challenges to the U. The agreement called on both countries to “seek to” begin the operation of “in- dustrial-scale” facilities no later than December 2007. The U. for the program to succeed. but still only amount to 50 per- cent of the anticipated cost of the program.136 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s plutonium with high-level radioactive waste (in either glass or ceramic form).S. Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Okinawa called upon the G-8 to develop an international financing plan by the 2001 meeting that was held in Genoa. disposition efforts at $464 million. both countries are hoping that third parties can assist in this essential nonproliferation endeavor. Although this deadline was not met.53 The biggest remaining problem is a li- ability dispute.–Russian agreement completed at the June 2000 summit in Moscow “recognizes the need for international financ- ing and assistance” in order for Russia to implement its plutonium disposition plans. the European Union. which has delayed the beginning of construction of special mixed- oxide fuel facilities in each country by at least ten months. plutonium must also be suffi- ciently funded because Russia would be unwilling to dispose of its excess pluto- nium unless the United States does so as well.55 Moreover. Since the program was first funded in FY 1996.52 There are several major problems looming over the implementation of the agreement. Canada.S. efforts to dispose of U.57 The July 2000. could cost $2 billion.58 These pledges are signs of progress. Japan. France. The 2005 budget sets funding levels for Russian disposition at $73 million.S. at a disposal rate of 2 metric tons of plutonium per year.” an initiative launched in 2002. Italy. It appears unlikely that either side will begin disposing of significant amounts plutonium by the 2007 deadline. including the con- struction and operation of facilities.

000 excess weapons scientists and workers in the Russian nuclear complex.S. participation in both the ISTC in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU). but there are ap- proximately 35. Georgia. but it also noted that offic- ers responsible for warhead storage and maintenance receive wages that “rarely exceed $70 a month. Norway. the employees of Russia’s nuclear com- plex fell on hard times. these nuclear elite found themselves in geographi- cally remote locations with rapidly dropping living standards and diminishing work orders from the central government. engi- neers. The three principal programs in this area are the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs). Japan. In 2002. South Korea. Department of State and the U. A 2002 National Intelligence Council study indicated that economic improve- ments in Russia would mitigate the problem slightly. Iran. Its current members include the European Union.63 In July 1995 the STCU. Armenia. after the Soviet collapse. and Tajikstan are recipient countries. Kazakhstan. Collectively referred to as a brain drain. branch offices of the ISTC have been established in Almaty. These efforts consist of projects designed to provide grants for civilian research to scientists and institutions for- merly involved in weapons development. Russia.”60 A 2003 survey of Russian scientists with weapons exper- tise found that 20 percent of respondents would consider working in North Korea. these efforts were extended to countries such as Iraq and Libya under the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. maintenance. a separate but parallel organization. In 2005.59 After the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus.61 Both the U. Science Centers The State Department manages U. and Bishkek. IPP and NCI were combined under the Russian Transition Initiative. Yerevan. as well as to help in the conversion and commercialization of former defense industries.S. Kyrgyz Republic. the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). and dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Department of Energy are involved in efforts to help prevent the brain drain. or Iraq. Georgia. the risk that Russian nuclear experts might be forced by economic deprivation to sell their expertise or materials on hand rapidly changed the dynamics of Russian and U. . and the United States as donors. the Kyrgyz Republic. Syria.S. Russia 137 Russia’s nuclear complex is filled with tens of thousands of scientists. and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). Counts vary. security considerations. and technicians who are responsible for the construction. many of whom have direct access to weapons-usable nuclear materi- als. Tbilisi. Canada. Kazakhstan.62 To ensure the full participation of all NIS member states. Armenia. These centers are multilateral organizations designed to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology expertise by providing civilian employment opportunities to former weapons scientists and engineers in the newly indepen- dent states (NIS) of the former USSR. Belarus. The ISTC was founded in Moscow in 1992.S. Minsk. Formerly the privileged inhabitants of Russia’s nuclear cities.

the ISTC has funded 2. Since its inception. Azerbaijan. Thus far. . that will provide new jobs for workers displaced from enterprises of the nuclear complex. Department of Energy launched NCI.000 projects valued at a total of $600 million. Tbilisi. the NCI pro- gram was designed to assist in downsizing the complex. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov on September 22.S. The Bush administration. Those cities. and the United States fund projects in Ukraine. and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). The NCI agreement was signed by U.”70 The U.-NIS program and does not involve additional international partners. the IPP program has funded projects involving nearly 16. As noted before. Minatom closed the Avangard weapons . . thereby strengthening strategic stability. and the NCI aims to develop paths to peaceful employment. Uzbekistan.000 specialists at more than 765 institutions have received grants from ISTC.S. government in cooperation with an initiative from several nongovernmental organizations. the IPP program aims to provide productive nonmilitary projects for former NIS weapons scientists and engineers.”67 Like the Science Centers. Kharkiv. are home to hundreds of thousands of skilled scientists.S. however. engineers. and Uzbekistan. Snezinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). According to the agree- ment.S. 22 projects have been commercialized.138 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s commenced operations in Kyiv. and technicians and hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials. which are geographically isolated. Canada. generating combined revenue of $24 million. as well as in Baku. the desperate financial situation of nuclear scientists and technicians in the So- viet Union’s remote nuclear complex has sparked proliferation fears. A total of 58. “and restructured to focus more effectively on projects to help Russia reduce its nuclear warhead complex. The original concept was developed by the U. IPP seeks to promote the conversion of NIS defense industries to civilian production through the commercialization of tech- nologies and the development of links between NIS institutes and U. 1998. the initiative aims to “create a framework . the European Union. designed to assist Russia in the development of non-defense-related industries in Russia’s ten “closed” nuclear cities. announced in December 2001 that the programs would be merged into one.68 Unlike the ISTC and the STCU. Azerbaijan. the STCU also has field offices in the Ukrainian cities of Dnipropetrivsk. Department of Energy and Minatom agreed to focus initial activities at three of the ten Russian nuclear cities: Sarov (Arzamas-16). making it less likely that they will need to sell their services to would-be proliferators. and Tashkent.S. Department of Energy manages and funds IPP and NCI. Georgia. and Lviv.64 In addition to its headquarters in Kyiv. In addition. under the STCU auspices. IPP is exclusively a U.S. indus- trial partners.000 former Soviet weapons scientists at 180 institutes. the U.69 In 1998.65 Since its inception. Currently. which would reduce Russia’s ability to reconstitute its Cold War nuclear arsenal rapidly.66 The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative The U. Georgia. Ukraine.S.

Several key biological weapons facilities are located in non-Russian former Soviet republics. from the United States’ perspective. indeed. the bulk of which were inherited by Russia when the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991 (table 6.71 In September 2003. The remaining 19 percent is made up of blistering agents. the United States and Russia signed a protocol that allowed the 69 ongoing NCI projects to be completed. poor management. continue to pose serious proliferation threats. officials and workers. including lewisite. In addition. These materials are stored in both munition containers .72 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis The Soviet Union had active and large-scale chemical and biological weapons programs. They weaponized contagious diseases. Russia continues its efforts. however. No new projects will be taken up. and VX viral agents.S. and had ro- bust capabilities in anti-crop and anti-livestock agents. with NCI contributing to the conversion of 40 percent of the facility to nonweapons uses. including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. the NCI agreement was allowed to expire when Washington and Moscow could not work out a liability agreement that. go there for help. “The Soviets had a prodigious bio-weapons pro- gram involving over 65.”73 Similar concerns exist for Russia’s chemical weap- ons capabilities. Without a doubt. hardened others against antibiotic treatment. and lewisite- mustard mixtures. Russia 139 facility at Arzamas-16 in 2003. with the assistance of the United States and other countries. however. Russia’s stocks of chemical weapons and biological weapons samples. Three days before the expiration of the agreement. and bureaucratic conflicts. Minatom has stated its intention to cease weapon-related activities at Penza-19 by 2008. however. the United States remains wary that Russia may not be fully comply- ing with all of its obligations under the chemical and biological weapons conventions.000 weapons scientists and technicians.74 Chemical Weapons Russia possesses the largest stocks of chemical weapons in the world. Progress to date. The risk that such materials or expertise might leak out of the former Soviet Union and aid countries or terrorist groups in the acquisition or use of chemical or biological weapons is a serious global security concern—a concern that has increased in the wake of the post–September 11 anthrax attacks in the United States. this reservoir of talent is the deepest in the world. would sufficiently protect U. Moscow’s holdings include an estimated 39.5). to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons capabilities in com- pliance with its treaty commitments. mustard. including sarin. has been slow owing to inadequate funding. Moreover. and I fear that terrorists may. and the expertise it took to produce them. Weapons expert Amy Smithson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2003. soman. without a new agreement.280 metric tons of chemical weapons at seven storage sites. Eighty one percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile consists of nerve agents.

html. Russia.munition.9 Bulk containers agent/mustard. (including projectiles. The terms of the treaty require that all parties eliminate their chemical weapons stockpiles in four phases. and the United States) that failed to meet the initial April 2000 deadline for the elimination of 1 percent of its chemical weapons. Israel. however. rocket warheads. Since 2003. Libya and Albania have both officially declared chemical weapons . As of the spring of 2005. but either they have not made official declarations or are not parties to the CWC.4 Air-delivered munitions Kizner Blister 14.5. and mixture Maradykovsky Nerve agent 17.8 Air-delivered munitions Leonidovka Nerve agent 17. that Russia has not made a full and complete declaration of all its past chemical weapons activities. (Other countries. Chemical Weapons by Storage Location and Form Chemical Percentage of Weapons Original 1 Storage Site Chemical Type Stockpile Storage Form Shchuch’ye Nerve agent 13.9 Bulk containers agent/lewisite NOTE: 1.8 percent of the total stockpile (an estimated 720 metric tons) had been destroyed at the Gorny site. but some of the blister agents are contained in bulk storage. available at www.76 Russia was the only one of the first four declared chemical weapon-possessing states (India. and ten years of the agreement’s entry into force. Russia signed the treaty on January 13.2 Projectiles and agent/lewisite rocket warheads Kambarka Blister 15. five. lewisite. and Scud missile warheads) and bulk storage containers. South Korea. seven.2 Air-delivered munitions Gorny Blister 2. and ratified it on November 5. including Syria. approximately 1. Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction.6 Projectiles and rocket warheads Popchep Nerve agent 18. spray devices.75 All the nerve agents are in weaponized form. bombs. which requires the elimination of all chemical weapons and the conversion of chemical weapon production facilities. Russia is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).ru/eng/ objects.gov. are known to have or are thought to have chemical weapons. and North Korea. There are continued suspicions. See Russian Munitions Agency.140 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6. 1993. 1997. completing the destruction of por- tions of the national stocks within three.

2007. to eliminate 20 percent of the stockpile. controlled as Category II items under the CWC.S. including anthrax and smallpox. Russia. although this destruction cannot be independently verified and significant amounts of offensive stocks may con- tinue to exist in Russia.S. which oversees the program. Department of Defense. in part. At the same session. building upon the support provided by the United States and Germany. and equipment specifically de- signed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons.S. according to U. but it has been de- layed. There is little hope that Russia will meet this dead- line.78 The Russian government’s new plan for the elimination of chemical weapons was approved on July 5. and is scheduled to be complete by the end of 2005. blister agent destruction is ongoing at Gorny. Congress decision not to fund the construction in 2000 and 2001. Under the new plan. In October 2003. and Russian officials and experts. The United States has agreed to pro- vide funds for the construction of the plant in Shchuch’ye. Moscow has also finished eliminating its World War I chemical agents. but Russian concerns about transportation make their compliance with the agreement anything but certain.80 Russia is receiving considerable assistance from the United States and other countries to facilitate its CW destruction. Department of Defense and the Rus- sian Munitions Agency determined that all nerve agents would be destroyed at Shchuch’ye. . relied mainly on a surge capability to produce large amounts of weaponized agents in a time of crisis. at the Eighth Session of the Conference of States Parties.82 Meanwhile.” controlled as Category III items under the CWC. however. the U. Russia has completed the destruction of “unfilled munitions and devices. The Soviet program. The large majority of Russia’s stockpile of blister agents will be destroyed at the Kambarka facility. which is now under construc- tion. which is also currently under construction. will likely be the main CW destruction facility for all Russian nerve agents. one Russian official offered a slightly accelerated timetable. largely thanks to German funding. Still.77 Its second deadline.83 Biological Weapons The former Soviet Union possessed the world’s largest offensive BW program. some press reports have indicated that Moscow may have new plans to destroy its nerve agents at the various locations where they are already stored (including Shchuch’ye). by a U. was extended five years to April 29. Shchuch’ye. stating that the facility would be complete in 2007. the 45 percent and 100 percent deadlines were also extended “in principle” for both Russia and the United States. Russia 141 stockpiles. estimated that the facility would be up and running by July 2009. is thought to have destroyed its stocks of offensive weapons.81 In 2004.79 A September 2003 accord between the U.) As of the spring of 2005.S. 2001. The covert program continued to expand even after the USSR signed the Bio- logical Weapons Convention in 1972 and eventually included a network of more than 50 institutes that produced vast amounts (metric tons) of biological agents. Russia had completed destruction of nearly 2 percent of its stockpile.

the Soviet program developed genetically altered strains of weapons to make them resistant to common antibiotics. Russia continues to maintain many of the former facilities that would have been used in the production of BW stocks. and an adequate security and tracking system for these agents does not exist. many consisting merely of test tubes of agents. These samples are extremely portable. including the only missile in production. the United States funds a number of biothreat reduction activities. and Georgia have applied for assistance with security enhancements. Russia only produced and deployed 6 new SS-27s in 2003. Department of Defense runs the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program.86 With the post–Cold War decline of its conventional forces. In addition. raising concerns that they may have migrated to help BW programs in other countries. Thousands of samples of these agents exist in several dozen “libraries” in Russia. Uzbekistan. In addition. which seeks to improve security and safety measures at institutes (in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union) involved in legitimate research with dangerous pathogens. Such . the official closure of the former BW program by the Russian government means that tens of thousands of experts and employees have been forced to find other ways to support themselves. the main proliferation risks posed by the former Soviet BW capability is the risk that the samples of BW agents could be stolen or that the experts responsible for their production might sell their skills to others. Just as Russia relied on dedicated nuclear cities in the production of its nuclear arsenal. offensive BW agents. each sample of which could be used to grow large amounts of virulent. adding just 4 more in 2004. the SS-27 ICBM.142 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Russia is known to maintain a large quantity of biological weapons samples that could be used to grow and produce large amounts of offensive biological agents. Those factories and design bureaus maintain Russia’s current missile arsenal. representing a latent ability to weaponize biological agents. Though this residual production capability is of concern to some. Although initial plans seemed to allow for the production of as many as 50 SS- 27s per year. In addition.85 Missile Analysis Russia’s advanced missile capabilities also pose important proliferation challenges. The U.S. The first is that the samples of BW agents are not adequately protected against theft. Russia has begun to rely on its nuclear forces as a source of national pride and strength. especially given the continued economic stress in Russian society and in the Russian weapons complex. all through ISTC grants. The nonproliferation threats posed by the former Soviet BW program are twofold. The Soviet BW program produced large amounts of many BW agents. In response to the Russian BW threats. Five Russian institutes and an additional eight in Kazakhstan. so too did it construct a series of missile design and production enterprises.84 The State Department also provides employment for former bioweapons scientists through the ISTC grants.

Chief among these concerns is the possible role of Russia in helping Iran develop long-range missiles. In this same vein. espe- cially one with which the United States has no formal relations. U. despite the fact that Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1995 and has adopted internal reforms to tighten controls over missile-related exports. or whether the assistance is part of an official Russian government policy to aid Iran. the sanctioned entities. In addition. Iran. whether the assistance to Iran is carried out by organizations within Russia operating in violation of Russian government policy and export controls.”87 Presumably. he was referring to the new mobile version of the SS-27. Russian officials vigorously deny any formal assistance to Iran’s missile or nuclear weapons pro- grams. the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.”90 It has never been shown conclusively. authorizes the president to impose sanctions on companies that provide equipment or technology to Iran’s ballistic missile program (see table 6. the current level of missile production is quite low. and to a lesser degree in Syria. government assistance to. as a result. This. “Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic mis- sile. has raised serious concern that Russia’s missile expertise may be assisting other countries in the production of advanced ballistic missile capabilities. and last a minimum of two years. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby.S. like President Putin’s No- vember 2004 claim that Russia is developing and preparing to deploy “weapons that not a single other nuclear power has. India. however. which are virtually identical to long-range missile programs. These worries remain.6). Russia is developing a maneuverable reentry vehicle that can report- edly change its flight path after separating from its missile. law. such as those being developed by the United States. stating. along with the parallel concerns in the nuclear realm. have led to a number of boastful statements.S. antimissile efforts. there continues to be con- cern over Russia’s role in helping India develop its advanced missile and space launch capabilities. This would increase its ability to evade antimissile systems. Of the . These sanctions prohibit any U. or will have in the near future. The United States has been highly vocal in its concern that Russian missile expertise is being exported to countries of proliferation concern. in addition to the desire to counter U. testified in February 2004 that “Russian enti- ties support missile and civil nuclear programs in China. in- cluding Executive Order 12938 (amended in 1998) and the Iran Nonprolifera- tion Act of 2000.S. The goal of the assistance would be to ensure Russia’s relation with a key potential ally in the Middle East. and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile produc- tion. and. or con- tracts with.”89 In a 2003 report to the U. Congress then–Central Intelligence Agency di- rector George Tenet focused on Russian missile assistance to Iran.88 Despite much talk. there is a large body of underpaid and underemployed missile experts who must find alternative ways to make a living. Russia 143 domestic political concerns.S.

S. vol.6. ed. 1. 2005. “U. Robert S. The most recent group to be targeted for sanctions was Khazra Trading in September 2004. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraq’s WMD.. Sanctions against Russian Entities Year Organization 1998 Baltic State Technical University Europalace 2000 (sanctions lifted April 2004) Glavkosmos Grafit (sanctions lifted April 2004) INOR Scientific Center MOSO Company (sanctions lifted April 2004) Polyus Scientific Production Association 1999 Moscow Aviation Institute Mendeleyev University 2000 Yuri Savelyev. Sets. available at www. 3. “Clinton Vetoes Sanctions Bill. January 12. Slaps Sanctions on 14 Firms. 5. 2.144 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 6. U.cia.” Arms Control Today. September 29.gov/duelfer/ Iraqs_WMD_Vol1. People for Arms and Missile Sales to Iran. These calculations are based on Nuclear Threat Initiative. pp. Director. Norris and Hans M. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992–FY 2005. Kristensen. Imposes New Sanctions on Russia. and MOSO in April 2004). 2004.” available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March/April 2005. Ibid. fourteen Russian entities sanctioned for missile proliferation since 1998. 2004. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces.foia. penal- ties have been lifted against five (INOR and Polyus in April 2000 and Europalace. Grafit.S. June/July 1998.” September 30. 4.” Agence France-Presse.org/e_research/cnwm/charts/ cnm_funding_interactive_table. Charles Duelfer. speech at Carnegie Endowment International Non-Proliferation Conference. See the calculations in table 6. 1999. Baltic State Technical University 2004 Baranov Engine Building Association Federal Scientific Research Center Altai Khazra Trading Vadim Vorobey SOURCES OURCES: Sandy Berger. 116–119. U. Joseph Cirincione. 70–72. pp. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge.2. Howard Diamond.S. national security adviser.91 N OTES 1.nti.pdf. . 2000).asp.

2001. 2001.org/publications/index. Fissile Material. 29. White House Fact Sheet. 28. This figure is the sum of 52 Ministry of Defense weapons storage sites identified by the U. 18. Press Roundtable at Interfax. March 21. Ibid. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. 25. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. 12. 1993).nrdc. 27. Stimson Center. “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.” Congressional Research Service. 2001. “Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons.. 52. Dunbar Lockwood and Jon Wolfsthal. 34. 9. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Janu- ary 2003. Wolfsthal. Yearbook 1992: World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press. White House press conference transcript. available at www.russianforces. Defense Threat Resolution Agency.: Henry L. p. assistant secretary of state for arms control. 19. 70.” pp.S. April 26. p. D. 2 in Yearbook 1991.gov/new. GAO.” pp. 24. p. Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons.cfm?fa=print&id=13823.htm. See also Wolfsthal.S.” 26. 35. Acceptance Speech at Eisenhower Institute Awards Dinner.pdf. eds. 70–72.armscontrol. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Addi- tional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U. 24. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. available at www. 2004). “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Scare of 2001. D.state. 21.gao. Woolf. See also Pavel Podvig. 175. “Nuclear Weapon Developments and Prolif- eration. footnote 51.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom. Yearbook 1991: World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press. see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier. “USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads” (table). D. Norris and Kristensen. 2001. 8. 11.mil/toolbox/directorates/osi/programs/ops/ inf/index. available at www. Moscow. October 23. 17. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Nikolai Sokov.” Carnegie Analysis May 14.” October 19.org/eng/navy/. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). U. U. For Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) numbers. see U.S. SIPRI. 2004. Department of Defense CTR program and 39 Russian Navy weapons storage sites identified by the National Nuclear Security Administration. Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal. Jon Wolfsthal et al. 14. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. 2004.C.S. available at www. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. “Onsite Inspection Operations. “Executive Summary. p. available at www. DOE has identified 243 buildings at 40 materials sites in Russia.htm. Additional Russian Cooperation Needed. Arms Control Association. October 6. Stephen G.edu/pubs/reports/tnw.dtra. 1992). “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet.org/factsheets/start2. Rademaker.” p. and p.html.” chap. START I Treaty. 16. Nuclear Status Report. U. SIPRI.C.S. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Washington. 17. 15.” chap. Amy Smithson. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. 20. and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union (Washington. 2001). September 9. 23. GAO-03-482 (Washington. 72–74. 1999).C. 17. For Navy sites. 1997. available at http://cns.S.. 10. Senator Sam Nunn. 2003. Woolf.” Fact Sheet.nti. 2004. These figures include both mili- tary and civilian sites.. 6 in Yearbook 1992. “Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reduction in Nuclear Forces.org/c_press/c1_speeches.asp. p.cfm. Nuclear Status Report. D. 13. Richard Fieldhouse et al. SIPRI.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.carnegieendowment.” Monterey Institute of Strategic Studies.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute. “START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance. 2003). 228.asp. 70–72. p. “SORT of a Treaty. “Nuclear Weapon Developments and Unilateral Reduction Initiatives. Discussions with DOD officials. 54. available at www. Natural Resources Defense Council. available at www.items/ d03482. See also Amy F.miis. Harvard University.” pp.. Ibid. Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes.: GAO. DOD. p. Norris and Kristensen. Report 32 (Washington. Russia 145 6. 7. p.” Helsinki. Department of Energy (DOE). November 2001.” available at www. Norris and Kristensen. .gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/37275. 22.

nti. DOE.doe. 1995. FY 1992–FY 2006”. 2004. 37. See also Willaim C.miis. 2001. available at http://cns.146 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 30. Volume 1. 41. 39. See IAEA. 44.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92potsok.usec. “Privatizing U.asp.nti. “Illicit Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” Nonproliferation Review. 1994). Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier. White House transcript. p. 34. 52. Statement delivered by Minatom Minister Mikhailov at 41st International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference. “Military and Excess Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in the Acknowledged Nuclear Weapon States. available at www.gov/d_060904i. available at www. Plutonium Disposition Report (Washington. Group of Eight. Thomas Neff.g8usa.pdf. 38. “Plutonium Watch: Tracking Plutonium Inventories. 8. pp.org/e_research/cnwm/ securing/mpca.S. Plutonium. 2004. 54. 11.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Fact_Figures. available at www. See also David Albright.asp.” See also David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. January 10.html. “Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. GAO.” ISIS. National Academy of Science.–Russian HEU Deal Risk. The actual number may not even be known in Russia. DOE.mbe. Nuclear Threat Initiative. National Nuclear Security Administration.nti. p. available at www. 46. 1. 43. 33. D. 31. “Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium.: National Acad- emy of Science. September 26.” June 2000. March 1. Bunn and Wier. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress. White House transcript. 53. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Da- tabase: Subtotals by U. 48. DOD. “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. February 11. 47. 2003”. November 13. Bunn and Wier. May 2005). 49. p. Detailed Budget Justifications.” p.htm. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget.S. International Atomic Energy Agency. Fiscal Year 2006.2 metric tons of separated civil plutonium. See Matthew Bunn. 2005. 5.9/6. INFCIRC/549/Add. 45.” available at www. 2. DOE. DOE.org/ e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home. June 2004. 40. 50.com/v2001_02/html/megatons_fact. 36.asp.” 1994. June 2004. The full $150 million supplemental included funding for other programs managed by the MPC&A office.gov/na-26/pu. “Disposing of Surplus U.asp.” . March 31. executive summary.S.gov/budget/05budget/content/DEFNN/nn.C. “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget.” available at www. “Ma- terials Protection Control and Accounting. For a complete review of this program. 32.” available at www. p. see Matthew Bunn. “Civil Inventories of Highly Enriched Uranium.S. 51. “Strategic Plan. “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: Facts and Figures.” available at www. June 11. 42.nnsa. “Plutonium: The First Fifty Years. National Security: the U. 447– 448. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action.isis-online.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Securing the Atom. This estimate includes 95 metric tons of military plutonium.html. 46–47. 56.C.” Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. and 38.org/ global_stocks/tableofcontents. June 25. DOE. pp. For more budget information. p. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative. 52–54. 2004. 38. “G8 Global Partnership Annual Report: G8 Senior Group. refer to Wolfsthal. 50 metric tons of plutonium in excess of defense needs. Nuclear Status Report. Summer 2002. USEC Fact Sheet.doe. August/September 1998. 2000.pdf. Potter and Elena Sokova.htm. available at www. pp. All ISIS documents are available at www.” 55.org/e_research/ cnwm/securing/mayak. See also David Albright. including Second Line of Defense. Government Department.org/documents/fy06_ctr_annual_report_to_congress. Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action. 1997. Securing the Bomb 2005: New Global Imperatives (Washington. D.” ISIS. Ibid. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.ransac. 35.” Arms Con- trol Today.pdf.iaea. Additional Russian Cooperation Needed.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Nuclear Threat Initiative. Speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. President Clinton. Ibid.

2004. article 4. the decision to open the joint office in Tbilisi is contained in “Joint State- ment: STCU Governing Board Meeting. Production.” available at www. available at www. 2003. 83. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. White House Fact Sheet. “Urgent Prob- lems of Chemical Weapons Disarmament in the Russian Federation.stcu. DOE. 58. 73. “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Pro- liferation. 79. Fifth Session Decision Document C-8/Dec.html. “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces. “Parties. 2000. 63. Russia 147 57. 70. D.” p. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Paula A. 74.nnsa.” Global Security Newswire. although Belarus is still a party to the ISTC. National Nuclear Security Administration. 2001).cia.” Also.ru/ISTC/sc.htm. Strengthening the Global Partnership. Ibid. 60. National Intelligence Council.int/info/. 2003.” available at www.” GAO-04-361.” March 19. 1998.int/docu- ments/gbm/gbm9. Amy Smithson.istc. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule to Eliminate Chemical Weapons Ar- senal by 2012. Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex (Washington. 69.” available at www. April 25. 1999. pp. September 22. 72. “U. “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP).nsf/html/profile-parties. 2001.” available at www. 7. 65.gov/t/np/c12265. available at www.pdf. 59. Nartker. ISTC. available at www. 68. 76. available at www.C.doe. “Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.gov/nic/ special_russiannucfac.” available at www.org/ Donor%20factsheets/Index. Information about the STCU field offices is available at www. per- sonal communication with DOE staff. 61. December 15.items/d04361.S.opcw. “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.htm.state. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule.istc. available at www.” available at www. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons. “Cooperative Threat Reduction.gov/na-20/ipp.nti. September 22. DeSutter.pdf.htm.sgpproject.ru/ISTC/sc. 20. p.opcw. assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance.state. “Branch Offices. 64.globalgreen. White House Fact Sheet. policy.” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. March 2004. Conference on States Parties. 62. October 24. 75. 2003.org/d_newswire/ issues/2004_11_19. Moscow.gov/na-20/nci/ about_success.nsf/html/public-info-fact-sheet. “Notable Successes. 77.int/about/structure/offices/ kyiv/index. Tikhonov. 71.” Glo- bal Security Newswire.org. . GAO. Conference on State Parties.” See also Viktor Kholstov. Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). 66.htm.ru/ISTC/ sc.. Mike Nartker. GAO.istc. V.gao.” www. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative.org/docs/c8dec13. March 4.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.gov/new. available at www. Also. in accor- dance with U.php. Nuclear Cities Initiative home page. available at www. November 10.stcu. 82.nnsa. 81. available at www.html. Joe Fiorill. p. 2004. 67. 21–22.” February 2002.org/html/global/docs_frameset. the United States has not funded any new projects in Belarus since 1997.stcu. 2003. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development.S. ISTC Fact Sheet.” 80. First Re- view Conference Technical Secretariat Background Paper RC-1/S/6. “Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise. International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). June 4. November 19.html#4215509C. “Donor Fact Sheets. National Nuclear Security Administration.nsf/html/branch-offices.shtml. 78. available at www. December 27.html. Nartker.” presentation at the Green Cross National Dialogue. Also. 13.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/18736. “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill for Threat Reduction Programs. 2003.doe. 22. “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule.shtml. November 2001.

” pp. available at www.” Agence France- Presse.S. Navy director. March 2004.gov/0402hrg/ 040224/jacoby. 2004. April 2004.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/ 721report_july_dec2003. . U. 2004.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32398. Putin Says.asp.shtml. Pavel Podvig. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. July 1– December 31.pdf. 87.” testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Wade Boese.org/act/2004_03/Putin. U. 2003”. November 17. “Putin Boasts about Russian Military Capabilities. see Rose Gottemoeller. 89. available at http:// russianforces. “Fact Sheet: The U. “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.senate. September 29.armscontrol.” Associated Press.” Arms Control Today.htm. Vice Admiral Lowell E. 85. For additional commentary on this issue. Defense Intelligence Agency. “Russia Developing New Nuclear Missile Systems.org/eng/news/archive/000101. DOD. Mike Eckel.cia. Bio-Chem Redirect Program.” August 17. Slaps Sanctions on 14 Firms. available at www.S. “U. 86. People for Arms and Missile Sales to Iran. “Changes in the Russian Strategic Forces. 67– 68. available at www.S.” October 20. “Nuclear Necessity in Putin’s Russia.148 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 84. available at http://intelligence. 88. Central Intelligence Agency. Jacoby. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005. February 24. 2004. 91. 90. Bureau of Nonproliferation.state. Department of State.S. 2004.” Arms Control Today. 2004.pdf.

and plasma physics reactors. 2 subcritical assemblies Moscow Engineering and Educational institution 1 2.7. 5 Upgrades completed June Physics Institute subcritical assemblies 1998.5-MW research reactor. expected to be 1 Materials completed in 2005 Institute of Medical and Scientific research: medical and 1 research reactor. under No plans to conduct Biological Problems biological construction upgrades Institute of Theoretical and Research on heavy-water Upgrades not yet completed Experimental Physics applications for nuclear weapon production Electrostal Machine-building HEU fuel fabrication. Russia (table continues on the following page) 149 . 7 critical assemblies completed. expected to be 2 completed in late 2006 Institute of Theoretical and Research on heavy-water 1 decommissioned 2. uranium HEU and LEU fuel production Upgrades not yet Plant conversion lines. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Moscow and vicinity Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Fuel-cycle technology research/ Upgrades not yet Research Institute of Inorganic fissile material processing completed.5-MW Upgrades completed Experimental Physics applications for nuclear weapon heavy-water research reactor February 1998 production Kurchatov Institute Research in solid-state physics. 10 research and power Upgrades completed May 3 fusion. 16 critical 2005 assemblies.Table 6.

5 nonoperational plutonium Upgrades not yet spent-fuel storage and reprocessing production reactors. Plant dismantlement part of plant closed under the Nuclear Cities 5 Initiative Osersk (Chelyabinsk-64) Mayak Production Association Warhead component production. 2 HEU completed fueled tritium production reactors . 150 Table 6.7. expected to be 4 Lytkarino completed in 2005 Sarov (Arzamas-16) All-Russian Scientific Research Nuclear weapon design. Non-Proliferation completed (UNIIEF) Center Avangard Electromechanical Nuclear warhead assembly and No ongoing upgrades. research. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location Locationand Name andName Activity Activity Comments Comments MPC&A Status MPC&AStatus Scientific Research and Design Design of nuclear reactors for power 1 inactive (50 kW) research Upgrades completed Institute of Power Technology generation. 3 critical assemblies February 1998 Scientific Research Institute for R&D of radioelectronic instruments 5 nonoperational pulsed Upgrades not yet Instruments research reactors completed. Upgrades not yet D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Institute of Experimental Physics and development. naval propulsion reactor.

upgrades in progress Power reactor (part of the Power generation for city and Shutdown planned under NNSA Mining and Chemical Combine) production of weapons grade Elimination of Weapons Grade 6 plutonium Plutonium Production Program Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyark-45) Electrochemical Plant Uranium enrichment.Snezhinsk (Chelyabisnk-70) All-Russian Scientific Research Nuclear warhead research and design 3 pulse reactors Upgrades not yet Institute of Technical Physics completed (UNIITF) Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) Mining and Chemical Combine Spent-fuel storage and reprocessing 1 operational plutonium Construction of plutonium production power reactor (see storage facility in below) progress. HEU Centrifuge enrichment plant Upgrades completed in 7 downblending 2005 Zarechnyy (Penza-19) 8 START Production Association Nuclear warhead assembly and No ongoing upgrades dismantlement Novouralsk (Sverdlovsk-44) Urals Electrochemical Integrated Uranium enrichment Upgrades completed in 9 Plant 2005 (table continues on the following page) Russia 151 .

2 fast critical Upgrades completed Engineering nuclear power engineering assemblies. No ongoing upgrades dismantlement facility HEU downblending facilities Seversk (Tomsk-7) Siberian Chemical Combine Largest multi-function compound in 2 operational plutonium Upgrades not yet 11 the Russian nuclear complex. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45) 10 Elektrokhimpribor Combine Nuclear warhead production and Gas-centrifuge enrichment plant. completed generation for city and production of a reprocessing plant.7. 152 Table 6. planned enrichment plant. power production reactors (see below). up to 16 critical February 1998 assemblies . a uranium D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s weapons grade plutonium. plutonium pit site of MOX fuel fabrication fabrication facilities Power Reactors (part of the 2 operational plutonium production Power reactors shutdown Siberian Chemical Combine) power reactors planned under NNSA Elimination of Weapons Grade 12 Plutonium Production Program Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-36) 13 Instrument-making Plant Nuclear warhead assembly and Also produces ballistic missile No ongoing upgrades dismantlement reentry vehicles Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Research and development for 3 research reactors.

Sverdlovsk oblast Scientific Research and Design Nuclear reactor design and 1 research reactor. production and testing of high. 1 central Upgrades completed in 15 Association temperature uranium fuel elements storage facility 2003 Novosibirsk Novosibirsk Chemical HEU fuel fabrication for light–water HEU and LEU fuel production Upgrades completed in 16 Concentrates Plant reactors lines 2004 Gatchina Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Research on high-energy theoretical Operational 18-MW research Upgrades completed May Physics physics reactor. 7 operational research reactors. 3 critical Upgrades completed May Institute of Power Technology development assemblies. 100-MW research 1998 reactor under construction Dimitrovgrad Scientific Research Institute of Pilot plants. expected to 17 be completed in 2005 Zarechnyy. MOX fuel fabrication.Karpov Scientific Research Research on chemical applications. hot cells 1998 Russia (table continues on the following page) 153 . Upgrades not yet Atomic Reactors spent-fuel reprocessing 2 critical assemblies completed. 3 research reactors. Upgrades completed in 14 Institute of Physical Chemistry medical isotope production 1998 Dubna Joint Institute of Nuclear International scientific research Plutonium-fueled pulsed Upgrades completed Research center research reactor February 1998 Podolsk Luch Scientific Production R&D.

fresh-fuel Upgrades completed July storage vault 1998 Navy Facilities. 560 MWe Bn-600 fast-breeder reactor. nuclear (near Ostrovnoy. waste management Gremikha-Yokanga Naval Base Former naval base. formerly submarine defueling. 154 Table 6. waste Murmansk-140) management . Northern Fleet Ara Bay Naval Base (part of Operational naval base serving D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Vidyayevo Naval Base) nuclear submarines. decommissioned nuclear submarine storage RTP Atomflot (2 km north of Operational nuclear-powered Upgrades completed Murmansk) icebreaker base. radioactive waste September 1999 processing and storage Gadzhiyevo Naval Base Operational naval base serving Northern Fleet’s largest SSBN nuclear submarines.7. nuclear submarine defueling. Upgrades completed May 18 fresh. decommissioned base nuclear submarine storage.and spent-fuel storage or June 1998 Tomsk Tomsk Polytechnical University Educational institution 1 research reactor. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Beloyarsky-3 Nuclear Power Plant.

Northern Machine Building START designated submarine The hull of the first Borey-class Upgrades not yet 20 Enterprise dismantlement facility. 10 nuclear submarines. formerly Operational naval base serving Shkval Naval Shipyard No. nuclear submarine laid down at Sevmash in construction facility November 1996. 35 (Rosta district of Murmansk) decommissioned submarine storage. the Yury Dolgoruki. minimal submarine dismantlement activities Sayda Bay (near Gadzhiyevo) Decommissioned submarine storage. waste Facility (Polyarnyy) management Polyarninskiy Shipyard. decommissioned (Polyarnyy) nuclear submarine storage. waste management Site 49 (Near Severomorsk) Fresh fuel storage facility Upgrades completed September 1999 (table continues on the following page) Russia 155 . Nuclear submarine repairs. was completed Sevmash (Severodvinsk) management. Olenya Bay Naval Base Operational naval base serving Upgrades completed nuclear submarines September 2000 Pala Bay Submarine Repair Nuclear submarine repair. waste SSBN. waste management Severomorsk Naval Base Headquarters of the Northern Fleet. No upgrades planned Operational base serving two nuclear-powered battle cruisers Sevmorput Naval Shipyard No.

submarine repair. Operational naval base serving consists of four facilities: nuclear submarines. dismantlement facility Gornyak Shipyard. also known Dismantlement facility. Komsomol Shipyard submarine repair (Komsomolsk-na-Amure) Cape Sysoyeva (Site 32. no upgrades submarine repair and refueling planned for rest of facility . refueling. and waste Lopatka. Nuclear submarine waste storage Upgrades completed Shkotovo Peninsula) January 2000 Chazhma Bay Repair Facility Fresh fuel storage (Site 34). Upgrades completed 21 (Shkotovo Peninsula) submarine repair.7. and management Nerpicha (Zaorzersk) Zvezdochka State Machine START-designated submarine Building Enterprise (Yagra Island) dismantlement facility. Leninskiy SSBN and SSN construction. decommissioned nuclear submarine storage. waste management. Upgrades completed on as Vilyuchinskiy Shipyard #49 decommissioned nuclear submarine PM-74 ship in August (Kamchatka Peninsula) storage. Malaya Lopatka. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Zapadnya Litsa Naval Base. 156 Table 6. Bolshaya nuclear submarine storage. 2000. Pacific Fleet Amurskiy Zavod. decommissioned Andreeva Bay. and September 2000 defueling. waste management D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Naval Facilities.

S. not by DOE as part of MPC&A) Other Naval Facilities Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard Construction of submarines and naval (St. Petersburg) Construction of nuclear-propelled Upgrades not yet surface vessels completed (table continues on the following page) Russia 157 . home port to several nuclear-powered ships. waste management 2001 (work done by U. Kamchatka Peninsula) Zavety Ilyicha (Postavaya Bay) Former operational naval base. decommissioned submarine storage Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard START-designated submarine Upgrades completed June (Bolshoy Kamen) dismantlement. Department of Defense as part of CTR.Pavlovsk Bay (Eastern edge of Main operational submarine base for Strelok Bay) Pacific Fleet. Petersburg) vessels Baltic Shipyard (St. decommissioned submarine and reactor compartment storage Razboynik Bay Decommissioned nuclear submarine and reactor compartment storage Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Operational naval base serving Base. Krasheninnikov Bay (near nuclear submarines Petropavlovsk.

St. Petersburg) ABBREVIATIONS CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction program DOE U. Russian Nuclear Facilities with Weapons Materials (continued) Location and Name Activity Comments MPC&A Status Central Physical-Technical Research on nuclear propulsion for At least 2 pulsed research Upgrades not yet 22 Institute (Sergiyev Posad. 2 Upgrades completed 23 Research Institute (Krylov vessels critical assemblies November 1998 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Shipbuilding Institute.S. control. Department of Energy HEU highly enriched uranium kW kilowatts LEU low-enriched uranium MOX mixed-oxide fuel MPC&A material protection. and accounting MW megawatts MWe megawatts electric NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration R&D research and development SSBN nuclear ballistic missile submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty SSN nuclear-fueled submarine .5-MW research reactor. naval and space vessels reactors completed formerly Zagorsk) Experimental Machine Building Nuclear reactor design 4 critical assemblies Design Bureau (Nizhniy Novgorod) Krylov Central Scientific R&D of nuclear reactors for naval 1 0. 158 Table 6.7.

“Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. 3. available at www. GAO. GAO. DOE. Wolfsthal. Ibid. DOE. 2004.” press release. Russia 22. 35. and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union (Washington. The upgrades at Nerpa Shipyard were on the PM-12 nuclear fuel transfer ship. 7. GAO.” p. 18.gov/ na-20/nci/about_impact. which also operates at Olenya Bay.NOTES 1.pdf.nnsa. which also travels to Gornyak Shipyard. See also Jon Wolfsthal et al. Author conversation with DOE official.: DOE.doe.S. available at www. 21. “Notable Successes. Fissile Material. 19. National Nuclear Security Administration.shtml. available at www. December 20.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute. Ibid. Signs Contract As Part of Effort to Permanently Shut Down Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia. “NNSA Completes Security Upgrades at Nuclear Site in Moscow. 11. 34.S.C.htm. National Nuclear Security Administration.doe. 159 .” p.” p. 9. 2. Detailed Budget Justifications. and GAO.” 13. Author conversation with U. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. 16.C.nnsa.” say that upgrades were completed.nti. 2005.gov/docs/PR_NA-04-34_Contract_signed_for_electricity_plant_in_EWGPP_program- shutting_down_pu_reactors_(12-04).” press release.. but the July 2001 DOE MPC&A Strategic Plan indicate that they would not be completed until late 2001. D.nnsa. 14. 487. Ibid. 17. 15. 2001). 6. MPC&A Program Strategic Plan (Washington. available at www. DOE. Ibid. National Nuclear Security Administration.doe.gov. Author conversation with DOE official. DOE.org/e_research/official_docs/doe/mpca2001. D.. National Nuclear Security Administration. 34. Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons. 4. Nuclear Status Report. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. appendix B.S. “Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving. National Nuclear Security Administration. Author conversation with DOE official. Signs Contract. 8.” in The Nuclear Cities Initiative. Author conversation with DOE official. Author conversation with DOE official. Volume 1. 23. DOE. The upgrades at Chazhma included upgrades on the PM-74 nuclear fuel service ship. Ibid. 10. 12. p. May 6. 5. “U. Department of Energy (DOE) official. eds. Ibid. 2001). 20. “U.

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Aircraft and Missile Capabilities China is in the process of modernizing its strategic missile forces. CHAPTER 7 China Nuclear Weapons Capability China is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and possesses enough nuclear material for hundreds of nuclear weapons (see table 7. these efforts have achieved important progress.and medium-range mis- siles. making estimates difficult to develop. Much of the unclassified information compiled on China’s forces is from unverified media reports and occasional statements by intelligence or government officials. three-stage solid-fueled ICBM with an estimated range of 8. China has not officially released details about the size or composition of its nuclear arsenal.000 kilometers. Although China deploys several types of ballistic missiles. Proliferation is- sues exist. and the last on July 29. China has signed but not yet ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 1996. Over three decades. it is possible to estimate that China fields approximately 152 warheads on land. China has conducted 45 nuclear weapons tests. and 120 weapons on artillery. 130 bomber weapons.2 China is developing and may have deployed the DF-31. 1964. only the DF-5 (13.1 Beijing also maintains a fairly extensive nuclear weapons production and research complex. China has approximately 400 nuclear weapons and various delivery platforms. the last one on 163 . China conducted three flight tests of the DF-31. but they are now a relatively minor aspect of the United States–China relationship. After developing its first nuclear weapon in 1964. Approximately 20 Chinese weapons are deployed on missiles that can reach the continental United States. Currently. mostly short. although his- torically its progress has been slow and has lagged well behind foreign estimates. the first of which took place on October 16. short- range missiles. and other weapons. The United States and other countries have worked to draw China step-by-step into the international nonproliferation regime. China became a major supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to the developing world. From these. a mobile.and sea-launched missiles. China deploys approximately 20 DF-5 ICBMs and 12 DF-4 intermediate-range mis- siles (5.000- kilometer range) is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by Western stan- dards and is capable of reaching the continental United States.1 at the end of the chapter).500-kilometer range).

however. has also been a major supplier of nuclear technology and equipment in the develop- ing world.S. China began a slow but steady process of developing a full-fledged nuclear weapons infrastructure and strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal.800-kilometer range). to the United States.S. Questions about the security and accountability of the weapons and materials are particularly important. China. which has never left coastal waters and is not operational.100 kilometers. Department of Defense estimates that the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting the United States “could increase to around 30 by 2005 and may reach up to 60 by 2010. Nuclear Analysis China is of particular nonproliferation importance in two ways. the NPT . As a nuclear weapon state. China has only one bal- listic missile submarine.”6 China’s medium-range ballistic missiles include an aging force of 40 DF-3As (2. the DF-41. and other potential adversaries. appear to have been canceled in favor of an extended-range version of the DF-31.7 China also has 48 DF-21As (1. It declared under the terms of the CWC that it previously had a chemical weapons program but that it destroyed those agents before joining the treaty. China’s bomber force consists mainly of aging H-6 aircraft based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger bomber.900-kilometer range) that it is phasing out after 30 years in service. Following its first nuclear test in 1964. These weapons and materials are of concern to its neighbors. a submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) based on the DF-31.11 There is no publicly available evidence of such weapons. with a range of 3.9 China purchased 24 Su-30 fighter aircraft and SA-20 sur- face-to-air missile systems from Russia in 2004. the DF-31A.164 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s January 2002. intelligence to possess chemical and biological weap- ons research and development programs. China was also isolated from the evolving international frame- work of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and from the collaboration that pro- duced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1950s.12 Having been isolated by the West after the Communist revolution in 1949. and some offensive chemical weap- ons. a solid-fueled ICBM with a range of 12. however. but these are not thought to have been modified for a nuclear role.3 One source concludes that 8 missiles were deployed in 2004. China is a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has denied having any biological warfare programs. it has a large nuclear weapons and material production complex. and its past behavior in the nuclear and missile fields was a significant nonproliferation concern. but it has converted some to con- ventionally armed missiles.5 The U.10 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability China is believed by U. There are some reports that a new missile submarine may be ready to enter service in the next few years.000 kilometers.8 China is also developing the Julang-2.4 Plans to develop another land-based missile.

conform to the standards of the international nonproliferation regime. apparently over China’s failure to meet fully their nonprolif- eration standards. the People’s Republic of China adopted a posture that rhe- torically favored nuclear weapons proliferation. particularly in the developing world. China has. These efforts have produced demonstrable results. at their meeting in Seoul. Many experts believe that China’s entry into the MTCR could deter it from proliferating its nuclear-related materials to countries such as Iran. and 1998 to uphold the nonproliferation regulations of the MTCR. 1994.14 Major efforts have been made over the past 25 years to persuade China to modify its approach formally. however. and North Korea.S. Mitchell Reiss. and Sudan because its booming . and Soviet power. In the early years. the thirty-four members of the MTCR rejected China’s bid to become a member.S. its rhetorical position gradually shifted to one that opposes nuclear proliferation. where this theme once had some appeal as a rallying point for anti- imperialism. In October 2004. The U.S.17 China’s relationship with Iran has become a greater concern as China’s eco- nomic relationship with that country grows. Pakistan.15 A domestic export control system has developed with constant U. evident in China’s accession to the Zangger Committee in October 1997 and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in May 2004 and in greatly reduced technology transfers. which it still saw as limiting U. China signed oil and gas contracts with Iran worth an estimated $100 to $200 billion. China’s policy was not to oppose nuclear pro- liferation. China’s practical approach to the export of nuclear and military goods did not. bringing it into closer alignment with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states. . and the development of nuclear export control guidelines in the 1970s. Vice President Dick Cheney spoke approvingly of China’s increased commitment to the nonproliferation regime. In November 2004. encouragement. gives us much more weight in these negotiations. Despite China’s de facto commitments in 1992. which originated in 1987 as a Western arrangement to exchange in- formation on and restrain the exports of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. China was also ex- cluded from the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). And so to get [it] on board . he said. Angola. but it is still a work in progress and has not yet become completely effective. (China has also signed oil deals with Brazil. while urging it to make economic assistance to North Korea conditional on Pyongyang’s cooperation in the six-party talks designed to end its nuclear activities. and Libya. Iran. China 165 in the late 1960s.S. North Korea.”16 During an April 2004 visit to China.The United States believes that ending North Korea’s nuclear program depends heavily on China’s ability to pressure Pyongyang. As a Communist power during the Cold War. China plays a central role in both the North Korean and Iranian proliferation crises. Depart- ment of State’s former director for policy planning. After China be- gan to open to the West in the 1970s. has charac- terized China as the “mediator” between North Korea and the U. Chinese state-owned corporations continued to engage in illicit nuclear arms transfers to Pakistan. in discus- sions. .13 Through the 1970s. “the most influence on the North.

The Xia has never sailed outside China’s territorial waters.19 (China has 80–100 other missiles that could strike tar- gets in Eurasia. Security Council for possible sanctions. The Chi- nese doctrine is centered on the maintenance of a “minimum nuclear deterrent” capable of launching a retaliatory strike on a small number of countervalue tar- gets (such as cities) after an adversary’s nuclear attack. Because of its limited second-strike capabilities. China is not looking for a confrontation with the United States over Iran. and a lack of missile mobility have raised concern in the Chinese leadership about the survivability of these forces. together with advanced theater antimissile systems sold to America’s Asian allies. China’s sea-based force (one Xia submarine armed with twelve medium-range ballistic missiles) does not pose a credible threat to either Moscow or Washington. but the missiles could strike parts of Alaska and the Hawaiian island chain. The United States theoreti- cally would then have the ability to destroy or defeat China’s deterrent force. actions to increase instability in areas vital to its economic development. China has been pursuing the development of smaller. The 12 Dong Feng–4 missiles “are almost certainly intended as a retaliatory deterrent against targets in Russia and Asia. though they did not explicitly say that they would veto such a resolu- tion.) The time needed to launch these liquid-fueled ICBMs. but neither does it want U. mobile missiles with intercontinental ranges. each armed with a single 4. China has historically been particularly concerned about the potential development of antimissile systems. increase its production of planned systems. cities with a force of approxi- mately 20 long-range Dong Feng–5 missiles.N. is considered vulnerable to modern antisubmarine warfare techniques.S.to 5- megaton warhead. China currently has the capability to strike U. The design and deploy- ment of China’s nuclear forces appear consistent with the declared policy and have been shaped by two key concerns: the survival of a second-strike capability and the potential deployment of antimissile systems. could greatly complicate China’s nuclear planning. and develop and deploy (and possibly sell) countermeasures to defeat antimissile systems. A national antimissile system designed to counter strikes on the United States. a lack of hardened missile silos. . In addition. intelligence assessments. Chinese officials announced that they would not support an effort to bring Iran to the U.S. it would likely increase its number of deployed warheads.)18 Shortly after concluding the Iran oil deal.166 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s economy has stimulated a huge and growing need for natural resources.” according to U. Should China’s concerns about its security substantially increase. It sees Iran and North Korea not as threats that must be confronted but as problems that can be managed through flexible and patient diplomacy.S.20 To overcome these concerns. China’s Nuclear Weapons China is slowly modernizing its strategic nuclear forces but still has the least advanced nuclear arsenal of the five declared nuclear weapon states. and if military modernization were given preference over economic modernization. and is not currently operational.

Exact deployment numbers are unknown. While similar tests have been conducted on several missile types since then (including November 2000 and January 2002 tests of the DF-31 with decoy warheads). with a range of 8. the H-7.23 This missile may be deployed near 2010 as the DF-5 leaves service. ICBMS.24 SLBMS. which erupted in 1999. no missile currently deployed is thought to carry multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China has approximately 120 Hong-6s. cited claims by an unnamed U. appear to have been canceled in favor of a longer-range version of the DF-31. National Intelli- gence Estimate concluded that that China could field between 75 and 100 war- heads on MIRVed. though not the continental United States. China plans by 2010 to have modernized its nuclear forces by developing a new generation of strategic and possibly substrategic weapons on various delivery platforms. and allegations over nuclear espionage by China against the United States.S.000 kilometers and a potential MIRV capability. deploying a new-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine.000 kilometers.28 The Chinese air force flight tested a more modern medium-range bomber. were centered on China’s in- terest in developing smaller warheads for future MIRVed missiles. its current me- dium-range bomber.000- kilometer land-based missile. which experts now believe to have a nuclear role. however. Plans to develop a 12. also solid-fueled and road-mobile but less developed. and potentially the DF-4s.21 China is thought to have been developing smaller warheads when it ended its nuclear test program before signing the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. Historically. road-mobile missile with a range of 8. but a 2002 U. The planned improvements of China’s land-based forces include the re- placement of the aging force of DF-5s.100 kilometers and can carry up to three nuclear bombs. Some of the newer DF-5s may remain in service past that date.29 China purchased 24 .S. China does not currently have an operational submarine capable of launch- ing ballistic missiles. and deploying more nuclear-powered submarines. China 167 China’s concerns over the U. with two new land-based ICBMs. capable of reaching parts of Alaska and Hawaii. and it has a range of 3. Strategic Defense Initiative announced in 1983 reportedly spurred its plans to develop multiple-warhead technology. both mobile and in hardened silos.600 miles. a development that had not been expected before 2010. its progress has been slow and lagged well behind foreign estimates. 2004.S. but the official could not confirm whether any were ready for deployment.26 STRATEGIC BOMBERS. The JL-2 is based on the DF-31 missile and has been under development since the 1980s. solid-fueled ICBMs over the next fifteen years.25 Each submarine could be armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs.27 It is based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger of 1950s vintage. defense official that China had launched a Type 094 submarine with a range in excess of 4. and equipped with various penetration aids to defeat missile defenses. The first Chinese test of a multiple-warhead missile took place in September 1984. the DF-41.22 The DF-31 is designed to be a solid-fueled. Press reports on December 3.

37 In 1996.”36 It is esti- mated that about fourteen sites associated with China’s nuclear weapons program have significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile material. Little is known about the state of China’s material protection. The exact size of China’s fissile material stock is unknown because Beijing has not disclosed it or the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. from 1968 until 1991.34 Plutonium was also produced at two sites. The China National Nuclear Corpora- tion (which has the status of a government ministry) “produces. reportedly devel- oping an air-launched cruise missile. China’s Fissile Material Stockpile A frequently overlooked proliferation issue in China is its large stockpile of weapons-usable fissile material.33 China produced weapons-usable enriched uranium from 1964 until 1987 at two sites. an expert at one of the U. and con- trols all fissile material for civilian as well as military applications. and accounting (MPC&A) system. have not been declared and are not specifically known. Lanzhou and Heping. Although the situation in China seems stable at present.30 Al- though these multirole aircraft can be configured to have a nuclear role. Although China’s MPC&A system is modeled after the Soviet system. The primary loca- tions of nonweaponized fissile material are believed to be China’s facilities for plutonium production and uranium enrichment as well as its research institutes for nuclear weapons and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities across the country. control. and it is estimated that China uses 20 to 30 kilograms per weapon. It is unlikely that China will invest substantial resources in its airborne nuclear capability unless it is able to purchase the T-22M Backfire from Russia.32 Chinese weapons are believed to be heavily dependent on weapons-grade uranium. China is.35 China presumably has stored its residual fissile material stocks at various nuclear facilities. but they were suspended in the wake of allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage in the Wen Ho Lee case in 1999.31 China is believed to have ended its production of plutonium for weapons in 1991 and of uranium for weapons in 1987. national laboratories ranked China’s MPC&A system as better than that of the Soviet Union before it collapsed. however.S. Information on China’s MPC&A system is scarce. Their locations and the amounts of China’s nonweaponized fissile material. there is no evidence that China made such modifications. but the United States has been concerned about it enough to initiate discussions on China’s MPC&A (among other issues) between the national nuclear laboratories in both coun- tries. Analysts estimate that China has produced between 3 and 7 metric tons of weapons-grade pluto- nium and between 15 and 25 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. nor is the level of security at the storage sites. however. stores.168 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s multirole Su-30 aircraft and an Su-27/Flanker aircraft “kit” from Russia. Contacts between the nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States and China were developing beginning in 1994. Jiuquan and Guangyuan. Plutonium weapons might require 3 to 4 kilograms on average. increased political and economic strain could raise the risk of the diver- sion of fissile material from China’s nuclear complex. China .

thermonuclear warheads. . 2001. satellites. concluded taking testimony on the issue from three witnesses on November 15. Wen Ho Lee. or PRC] to design.S. The committee turned to the matter of Chinese espionage on October 21.S. testified at Lee’s bail hearing. House of Representatives chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif. government laboratory.”39 The story was based on leaks from a special investiga- tive committee in the U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermo- nuclear weapons on a par with our own. Although it was a major political issue during much of 1998. 1999. three-volume.38 Alleged Chinese Nuclear and Missile Espionage United States–China relations were rocked in 1999 by reports that China had stolen the designs of the most advanced U. or transfer of nuclear materials. it faded in 1999. questions remain about the level of protection at China’s nuclear facilities. .S. story that claimed. The report led to sensational charges. . The committee released a glossy. The New York Times launched the scandal in a March 6. . corporations while using Chinese rockets to launch U. then–associate director for nuclear weapons at Los Alamos. China lacks the resources to modernize its MCP&A tech- nology. terrorist attacks. 1999.40 The committee spent most of its time in 1998 investigating charges that criti- cal technology had been transferred to China by major U. nuclear warheads. since the September 11. develop and suc- cessfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. Also. that concluded: • These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories en- abled the [People’s Republic of China. “These codes and their associated data bases and the input file. was arrested under suspicion of espionage. However. a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratories. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S.S.S. Some political leaders believed the investigation might lead to impeachment charges against then-president Bill Clinton. in my opinion. • The stolen U. • The stolen U. . 1998. combined with someone that knew how to use them. . secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons. Still. China’s MPC&A system is vulnerable to “insider” theft.S. 1999. declassified report on May 25. “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from a U. theft. and filed its report on January 3. an American scientist at Los Alamos laboratory. could. China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs. Government investigators have identified a suspect.). China 169 commissioned a computerized “national nuclear materials accounting system” at about twelve nuclear facilities to improve its ability to prevent the illegal loss. Stephen Younger. . China has renewed efforts to improve international cooperation with the United States to install laboratory-to-laboratory collaboratives to coordinate advanced safeguard techniques between the nations.

The relative contribution of each cannot be determined. contact with U. • China has had the technical capability to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system for its large. A criminal inves- tigation of the charges was resolved in January 2002 with a fine against the Loral Corporation for its failure to follow proper declassification procedures before providing a report to Chinese officials who sought information on launch fail- ures. . the aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent mod- ernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons de- ployment. The administration did so. “They en- able the possessor to design the only objects that could result in the military defeat of America’s conventional forces. . the supreme national interest. then reviewed their damage assessment. . and other countries’ scientists.S. conferences and publications. the United States has used a range of positive incentives and disincentives to encour- age China to sign on to the various unilateral and multilateral commitments that make up the regime. but has not done so. including the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA). and Chinese indigenous development. In April 1999. • Significant deficiencies remain in the Chinese weapons program. most experts agreed with the concerned but cautious inde- pendent assessment. declassified U. change the global strategic balance. the alleged spy. China’s nuclear-related exports. To date. This net assessment reached three critical conclusions: • China’s technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and un- classified information derived from espionage. currently deployed ICBM for many years. particularly to Pakistan. the panel issued its report.S. China’s Commitment to the Nonproliferation Regime Drawing China into the nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes has been a long-term process. .”41 The Cox committee report recommended that the executive branch conduct a comprehensive damage assessment on the implications of China’s acquisition of U.170 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s in the wrong hands. The case brought against Lee. weapons information.” He added. .43 Neither the Bush administration nor the Senate or House of Representa- tives has raised anew any of the allegations in the Cox report. . . was dropped in 2001 after he was held for months in solitary confinement. were of major international proliferation . and nuclear labo- ratories. During the 1980s and 1990s. They represent the gravest possible security risk to . Since opening a dialogue with China in the early 1970s.S. As the political fires cooled. nuclear weapons information. forming a team of officials from the intelligence and investigative agencies. Federal Bureau of Investigation. chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah and including General Brent Scowcroft and John Foster. unauthorized media dis- closures. An independent panel of nuclear experts. .42 This assessment contradicted the central claims of the Cox report.

and it had acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984. Beijing improved its nonproliferation posture through commit- ments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes.”48 Given China’s his- tory of exports to weapons programs. and strengthened oversight mechanisms. The certification concluded that “the People’s Republic of China has provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United States that it is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state. but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of great concern. China. and South Africa. 2004. .44 It held talks to consider joining the MTCR on Feburary 20. have been a leading cause of concern.S. while imperfect. promulgation of expanded ex- port controls. and again on June 1–2. and its signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996. pressure. pledg- ing to strengthen ties with the group. any sensitive nuclear exports by China are likely to be interpreted as contradicting its pledges to conform to international standards. China has softened its stance toward “informal” multilateral control arrange- ments. China and the Australia Group held discussions on export control.S. sensitive nuclear technology as part of the implementation of the 1985 U. In the matter of chemical weapons.46 Under direct U. beginning with its accession to the NPT in 1992. “Over the past several years.45 It is still not a full partner to the MTCR and may not be fully observant of the revised guidelines of 1993. 2004. its cessation of nuclear weapons explosive testing. made notable strides in the 1990s by joining formal arms control and nonproliferation regimes. 2004. U. China’s nuclear exports to two particular countries.S. were sufficient by 1998 for the United States to certify that China could be trusted to safeguard U.–China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. China is a member of the Zangger Committee and acceded to the Nuclear Suppliers Group on May 28. its signature (1993) and ratification (1997) of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It may also have a unilateral interpretation of certain guidelines. China has not joined the Australia Group. China 171 concern. India. These exports and other issues have provoked several serious crises in United States–China relations and triggered repeated congressional demands for sanctions. These steps. China has moved to establish a domestic legal system to control sensitive nuclear exports by private or semiprivate Chinese entities. even if the items in question were not intended for or were diverted for nonpeaceful ends. Intelligence officials in 2004 concluded. but in March 2004. Pakistan and Iran. in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the mate- rial and components for such devices. however. Pakistan.S. without requiring the items be placed under IAEA safeguards. China disregarded international norms in the 1980s by selling nuclear materials to such countries as Argentina. China has supported multilateral negotiations on a fissile material production cutoff con- vention. either directly or indirectly.”47 Sensitive Nuclear Exports The continuing nature of China’s role as an international supplier of nuclear technology to weapons programs is in question.

52 Since June 2000. While calutrons in those num- bers would not themselves produce fissile uranium in significant quantities.51 China also assisted Pakistan with the construction of an unsafeguarded 50. as well as two or three small calutrons (electromagnetic isotope separation machines). .53 China pledged to the United States that it would not export heavy water for the Khusab reactor.54 China in 1995 also sold Paki- stan ring magnets used on centrifuges for enriching uranium at the A. circumventing the nuclear trade embargo on Pakistan observed by members of the Nuclear Suppli- ers Group. Libya turned over to U.S. China has also assisted Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program. by helping build a 300-megawatt-electric (MWe) power reactor at Chasma.S.49 According to an August 1997 report by the U. . but when reports in 1998 claimed China was transferring an excess of heavy water to the KANUPP reactor.to 70-megawatt-thermal (MWt) plutonium production reactor at Khusab. the PARR I and PARR I. diplomats—crucial role in supporting Pakistan and coordi- nating with the United States after the September 11 attacks.57 EXPORTS TO IRAN. and Iran agreed in 1992 to purchase two 300-MWe pressurized-water reactors from China. . Questions remain about contacts be- tween Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. government officials state that IAEA safe- guards will apply. China has also been a principal supplier of nuclear technol- ogy to Iran. In the early 1980s.S. China provided Iran with three zero-power and one very small (30- kilowatt-thermal) research reactor. China’s close ties proved useful as Chinese officials played a quiet but— according to U.59 . the U.172 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s PAST EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN. but it has accepted IAEA safeguards for the KANUPP power reactor.”50 In February 2004. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: “Prior to China’s [1992] accession [to the NPT].58 China and Iran signed a ten-year nuclear cooperation agreement in 1990. China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program may have been critical to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons breakthroughs in the 1980s. This reactor will be placed under IAEA safeguards as a condition-of- supply under the existing China–Pakistan agreement for peaceful nuclear coop- eration. and the completion of a plutonium-reprocessing facility at Chasma that had been started with French assistance in the early 1970s.S. Khusab has been producing between 8 and 10 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium a year. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta. Pakistan has not accepted full-scope safeguards as its official govern- ment policy.56 China does not appear to have supplied any new weapons technology to Pa- kistan. the United States concluded that China had assisted Pa- kistan in developing nuclear explosives. and Chasma.S. suspected that it may be rerouted to fuel the military reactor at Khusab. The NSG allows members to fulfill agreements made before their accession to the group. they would serve to train personnel in a sensitive nuclear activity. and U.55 China will also proceed with plans to build the Chasma II reactor. China is believed to have supplied Pakistan with the plans for one of its earlier nuclear bombs and possibly to have provided enough highly enriched uranium for two such weapons. officials Chinese nuclear bomb designs that it had received from Pakistan’s illicit nuclear black market. Q.

63 Yet it seems that these activities were carried out in accordance with the NPT and under IAEA safeguards. U. intelligence assessments note that “al- though the Chinese appear to have lived up to these commitments. Algeria agreed to place it under IAEA safeguards. Chinese technicians were assisting Iran with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. By 1995. China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on the uranium conversion facility and not to undertake any new cooperation with Iran after completion of the two existing projects—the zero-power reactor and a zirco- nium production plant. which they said made their work more difficult. In October 1997. in September 1995 China finally agreed to “suspend for the time be- ing” its reactor sale to Iran. Thus the reactor has been subject to IAEA inspections since its inauguration in December 1993. Iran had still not been able to produce finished zirconium or uranium hexafluoride of ad- equate quality for use in centrifuges. In 1966.60 Iranian shortages of capital may have been a third factor. which had been abandoned by German contractors during the Iran-Iraq War. Another factor in this retrenchment may have been Russia’s competition as an alternative supplier.66 China is helping to construct the Algerian Center of Nuclear Energy Research. the Chinese-built heavy machinery was clearly in evidence. China has also provided nuclear assistance to Algeria. however. Iranian officials expressed their frustration at the abrupt end to the Chinese assistance. to assist Iran in constructing a plant near Isfahan to produce uranium hexafluoride. a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman acknowledged that “the implementation of the agreements between China and Iran on nuclear cooperation has ceased.S.61 A few months later. As of early 2005. there were signs that China’s nuclear cooperation with Iran was being scaled back. under an agreement that dates back to 1983. During a visit to these facilities by one of the authors in March 2005.”62 China continued until 1997. which will be placed under IAEA safeguards. and an agreement on safe- guards for this purpose was signed in February 1992. The first stage of this cooperation. involved the secret construction of the Es Salam 15-MWt research reactor at Ain Oussera. According to the State De- partment. China 173 The United States has led an international effort to prevent the supply of nuclear technology to Iran and has placed pressure on China (and other suppli- ers) to cancel nuclear deals with Iran. . United States pressure has made a differ- ence. China signed agreements with Algeria that covered the second and third stages of nuclear cooperation between the countries.65 Shortly after the reactor was discovered and publicized in April 1991. Russia agreed to supply light-water nuclear reactors to Iran and to help Iran finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. we are aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised ques- tions about its ‘no new nuclear cooperation’ pledge. such as uranium mining and processing and fuel fabrica- tion. Opposition from the United States to China’s reactor contract probably also played a part. At any rate. the material fed into gas centri- fuges for enrichment. the administration is seeking to address these questions with appro- priate Chinese authorities.”64 EXPORTS TO ALGERIA.

IAEA inquiries appeared to satisfy U. for export- ing nuclear-related materials to Iran. . These sanctions were lifted in March 1992 after the United States received written confirmation from China that it would abide by the MTCR “guidelines and parameters. but that some Western officials believe may be intended as a large-scale reprocessing facility. In June 1991. China’s nuclear coopera- tion with the country remains sensitive in light of Algeria’s interest in reprocess- ing facilities and its past lack of candor. China was believed to have transferred key compo- nents for the short-range.174 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Algeria has also built a hot-cell facility capable of separating plutonium and connected it by a covered canal to the Es Salam research reactor. nuclear-capable M-11 surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s. five of which were Chinese.S. although the extent of that assistance has been greatly reduced in recent years. While Algeria formally acceded to the NPT in January 1995 and signed an agreement on safeguards with the IAEA in May 1996.S. Sensitive Missile Exports As with its nuclear exports. Pakistan. Saudi Arabia. North Korea. it could produce up to 5 kilograms of plutonium a year. and Syria. If it were used in conjunction with a boosted output of the Es Salam reactor. Unlike in the nuclear arena. and will not build up an inventory of separated pluto- nium from spent fuel. Over time—through the application of sanctions required under U. China’s role as a provider of missile and missile- related technology to several countries has been a controversial issue in overall relations with the United States and other countries.” Washington took this confirmation to mean that China would not export either the M-9 or the M-11 missile. Iraq. Libya. allow IAEA environmental sampling. The CIA stated in 2003 that “although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and indi- viduals on the new missile-related export regulations—offering its first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003—Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003. China reportedly has aided the missile programs of Iran. the Bush administration placed sanctions on thirteen foreign companies. however. The hot-cell facility was declared to the IAEA in 1992. China was not involved in the creation of the MTCR and for many years resisted being held to its standards. officials that Algeria will operate the facility under safeguards. and with the incentive of licensing the launch of U. the United States imposed MTCR Category II sanctions against entities in Pakistan and China for missile technol- ogy transfers.S.67 Of additional interest is a larger facility nearby that Algeria has not declared to the IAEA as a nuclear facility.” In May 2004. satellites on Chinese commercial space launch vehicles—China did agree to abide by some terms of the MTCR. there are no international treaties that prohibit the export of ballistic missiles and related equipment. law for the export of missiles and equipment. By the summer of 1997.68 PAST EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN.

These sanctions were lifted in October 1994 after China again promised not to export M-11 or similar mis- siles. technology. operational missiles had been transferred.69 It was said that those missiles. Na- tional Intelligence Estimate that indicated that Pakistan already had roughly three dozen M-11s stored in canisters at the Sargodha Air Force Base.” could be unpacked.75 China has transferred short-range CSS-8 ballistic missiles to Iran.S. China has sold ten fast-attack craft armed with C-802 antiship cruise missiles to Iran.S. rocket fuel ingredients. according to U. China 175 But reports surfaced that China had again transferred complete M-11s to Pakistan in late 1992. The factory. the CIA had reportedly concluded that China had delivered guidance systems. west of Lahore. such a determination would require a “high evi- dentiary standard” because the consequences of sanctions on U.72 He also said that the United States could not make the determination that complete.70 A Chinese supply of complete missiles.74 In August 1996. The Clinton administration again imposed Category II sanctions on Pakistan and China in August 1993. would trigger Category I sanctions—which could block all trade between the United States and Chinese aerospace and electronics firms. In 1997. using blueprints and equipment supplied by China. China pledged to the United States that it would not export C-801s and C-802s. China has been a supplier to Iran of antiship cruise missiles (Silkworms. C-801s. Press reports in the fall of 1996 revealed new evidence of additional Chinese transfers of complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan. although not “operational.71 In April 1997. State Department official Robert Einhorn reiterated the Clinton administration’s concerns over Chinese transfers of missile-related com- ponents. located near Rawalpindi. solid-fuel missiles based on the Chinese-designed M-11. mated with launchers. One quoted a recent U. along with maintenance facilities and missile launchers.”73 EXPORTS TO IRAN. dating back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. and to abide by the “guidelines and parameters” of the MTCR. had begun construction of a factory in late 1995 that was capable of producing short-range. The CIA reported in 2003 that Chinese entities continued to assist Pakistan in the “serial production of solid-propellant [short-range bal- listic missiles] and supported the development of solid-propellant [medium-range ballistic missiles]. and production technology to Pakistan. and Iran is modifying additional fast- attack craft to launch the missiles. or of the production technology for missiles covered by the MTCR would be a major violation of MTCR guidelines and. U.76 China has improved relations with . and computerized machine tools to Iran to assist that country in improving imported ballistic missiles and in producing its own missiles. and made ready for launch in 48 hours. and C-802s). In addition. More recently.S. China and Pakistan have both denied the existence of the missile plant. the China Precision Engineering Institute reportedly agreed to sell missile guidance equipment to Iran. law. Even more disturbing in the report was the conclusion that Pakistan. China has also played a role in Iran’s efforts to set up an indig- enous ballistic missile development and production program. was then expected to be operational in one or two years.S. firms would be highly damaging. In June 1995.

produced. and expertise. PAST EXPORTS TO SAUDI ARABIA. Chemical and Biological Weapons Analysis Official Chinese government statements consistently claim that China never researched.81 China has also sold Silkworm antiship cruise missiles to Iraq. the United States placed sanctions on 28 Chinese companies or individuals. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include equipment. These missiles are near the end of their operational life.77 In 2002.”80 PAST EXPORTS TO SYRIA. most recently in December 2004. Several hundred Chinese tech- nicians maintain the missiles at their bases at Al Sulayyil and Al Leel. and Saudi Arabia has been looking for replacements for some time. Although China had deployed these missiles earlier in its own arsenal with nuclear warheads. Chinese and Saudi officials insist that the missiles transferred to Saudi Arabia were equipped only with conventional warheads.176 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s the United States by making de facto commitments to halt missile-related trans- fers in 1992. A 1988 deal to sell Syria the M-9 missile was apparently canceled under pressure from the United States. China released a white paper listing a comprehensive set of export controls that reiterated many of those stated in the MTCR.S.”84 Chinese sales of biological weapon–related technology from China remain a concern. Syria also has received Chinese assistance for its ballis- tic missile program. U. North Korea. 1994. Nevertheless.79 The CIA reported in 2003 that “ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union. It is widely believed nevertheless that the Chinese declarations are inaccurate and that China retains a limited biological warfare research capability despite Beijing’s accession to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984.82 U. technology. officials do not allege that China has biological weapons. but China has supplied Syria with technical expertise for its missile program and ingredients for solid rocket fuel. or stockpiled biological weapons.78 Nevertheless. and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles.83 Research involving biological weapons is also al- legedly “being conducted at two ostensibly civilian research facilities known to be under de facto military control. 2000. produce. China’s biotechnical infrastruc- ture and munitions production facilities are sufficient to develop. China supplied Saudi Arabia with 30 or more DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In 1988. 1998.S. the United States has received reports that Chinese firms . and 2002. According to former secretary of state Madeleine Albright. China is believed to have begun its biological weapons program in the 1950s. missile sanctions laws could be triggered if China or Saudi Arabia were to arrange transfers of CSS-2 replace- ments. Its current program is largely based on technology that was developed before it became a state party to the BWC. and weaponize biological agents. only the capability to produce such weap- ons.

China. and short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles.”90 Testimony in 2003 by a U. including artillery rockets. the program included human testing on Chinese prisoners. Before and during World War II. but it is less clear if China retains actual weapons. and the plague in attacks against Chinese civilians and troops. China had suffered an estimated 10. Numerous instances of Chinese chemical weapons materials and technology sales abroad have established China as a serious proliferation concern. which were infected by the fleas and then spread the disease to humans. Beijing is seeking to restrain . China revealed that more than 2 million chemical weapons had been abandoned in several sites on its territory. In 2002. A similar Japanese attack in Ning Bo resulted in the death of 500 villagers. Japan established a large biological warfare research and testing facility in Manchuria. including nerve agent precursors. China acknowledged its former chemical weapons production capability but did not declare possession of a chemical weapons stockpile. a legacy of the former Japanese army’s occupation. lewisite. mortars. China’s revised list of export control regulations included all major controls outlined by the Australia Group.S.85 China is one of the few countries that has been the victim of biological war- fare. China reportedly delivered 400 metric tons of chemicals to Iran.89 Other reports contend that China’s “current inventory is believed to include the full range of traditional chemical agents. land mines. the United States imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for know- ingly and materially contributing to Iran’s chemical warfare program. Many countries have sought chemicals and technology of Chinese origin. These sanc- tions remained in effect at the beginning of 2002. Chemical exports to Iran are of particular concern.”91 China’s chemical industry is able to manufacture numerous chemicals relevant to chemical weapons production.000 casualties from Japan’s use of chemical weapons in China.000 fatalities and 80.S.88 Upon ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997.86 In 1992. China also main- tains a broad range of delivery systems for chemical agents. In June 1998. aerial bombs. residents in Chuhsien. Known as Unit 731. Department of State official concluded that “China possesses an inventory of traditional CW agents. U. In the late 1930s. By the end of 1945. reportedly contracted the bubonic plague after the Japanese dropped ceramic bombs containing plague-infected fleas along with rice to attract ro- dents. the Japanese successfully disseminated typhus rickettsia. In 1940. China an- nounced that it had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 listed by the Australia Group but not prohibited by the CWC. China 177 have supplied Iran with dual-use equipment that could be used in a biological weapons program. The United States has on numerous occasions sanctioned Chinese companies and individu- als for chemical weapons proliferation activities. There is little dispute that China retains an extensive chemical weapons capability. There is some evidence that Beijing destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons before signing the CWC.93 Ostensibly. During the summer of 1996. officials maintain that is does. and phosgene munitions continue.87 Joint Chinese-Japanese efforts to destroy the stockpiles of mustard. cholera bacteria.92 In May 1997.

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Gansu . also site of plutonium pro- duction reactor and reprocessing plant (see below) Plutonium Production Reactors 13 Plant 821 LWGR. 500 MW. U. and neering Physics (CAEP) technology complex. Sichuan possible nuclear weapon component pro- duction facility. U. nuclear weap- 3 Xi’an.182 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7.Fabrication of fissile materials into bomb plex (Plant 404) cores. Zheijiang Harbin Military Engineering Served to train nuclear weapon research and 9 Institute design personnel Harbin Possible warhead assembly and production 10 Heilongjiang site Plant 821 Possible nuclear weapon assembly facility. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern Name/Location of Facility Type/Status 1 Nuclear Weapons Complex Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. 1. currently studying CTBT verifi- cation issues Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons test site and possible nu- Test Base Malan clear weapons stockpile. Gansu down Northwest Institute of Institute that was responsible for conducting Nuclear Technology and analyzing nuclear tests. nat. nat.000 MW. high-level waste 4 Xinjiang storage Chinese Academy of Engi. Sichuan Laboratory of China Institute 905 of CAEP Ordnance engineering lab for nonnuclear outside Mianyang components of nuclear weapons. and final weapons assembly. Nuclear weapons research. design. explosives. shut- 2 Subei. 11 Guangyuan. shutdown Complex (Plant 404) 14 Subei. Sichuan Largest plutonium producing reactor in China Jiuquan Atomic Energy LWGR. called the 7 Chinese Sandia Laboratory Institute of Applied Physics Conducts research on nuclear warhead de- and Computational sign computations for CAEP Mathematics 8 Beijing Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Engaged in tomography. Shaanxi ons archive.1. operational 12 Guangyuan. tests solid missile Research (at Fudan propellants. called the Los Alamos 5 6 Mianyang. and detonation University) packages for nuclear weapons Shanghai.

27 kWt (.03 Shanghai Institute for Meas. LW. MWt). 17 Nuclear Power Institute of shutdown China Chengdu. HEU (90%). Sichuan HFETR critical Critical assembly. operational Nuclear Power Institute of China Chengdu. operational Energy 18 Tuoli. HEU (90%). LW. LW. opera- Nuclear Power Institute of tional China Chengdu. pebble bed. LW. 125 MWt. MWt). HEU (90%). HEU (90%). LW. 0 MWt. 30 kWt (. 33 kWt (. 65 MWt. operational logical Sciences Jinan Shandong MNSR-SH Tank in pool.033 Research Institute of Geo. Tsinghua University Beijing HFETR Tank. planned China Institute of Atomic Energy Chinese Experimental Fast Fast-breeder. HEU (90%). near Beijing MNSR–SD Tank in pool. operational Technology. LW. opera- actor tional China Institute of Atomic Energy Jianiang/Chengdu. operational Guangdong Zero-Power Fast Critical Re. China 183 15 Research Reactors CARR 60 MWt. operational Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology. Critical fast. operational urement and Testing Tech- nology Shanghai MNSR–SZ Tank in pool. 30 kWt (. 5 MWt.027 China Institute of Atomic MWt). .05 kWt. LW. Institute of Nuclear Energy 10 MWt. HEU (90%). Reactor (CFER) expected to be completed in 2007 HTR-10 High-temperature gas reactor. Sichuan MJTR Pool. 5 MWt. HEU (90%). under construction. Sichuan MNSR IAE Tank in pool. Tsinghua University Beijing16 NHR-5 Heating prototype.03 Shenzhen University MWt). HEU (90%). LW. Sichuan (table continues on the following page) .

950 kg HEU/year. LEU (10%). near Beijing Lanzhou in 1964. total capacity of up to 500. capacity of 300–400 kg plex (Plant 404) Pu/year. completion expected in 2005. LEU (10%). opera- Nuclear Power Institute of tional China Chengdu. LEU (3%). Tsinghua University Beijing PPR Pulsing Reactor Pool. Sichuan Uranium Enrichment Heping Uranium Enrichment Gaseous diffusion plant: able to produce 20 Plant 750–2. part operational. LW.5 MWt. 15 MWt. 1 MWt. operational. LEU (10%). and nuclear fuel proc- essing plant for refining plutonium into weapons-usable metals. 21 23 Lanzhou. 3. Sichuan Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Com. operational China Institute of Atomic Energy Tuoli. Gansu struction. Shaanxi Two gaseous diffusion plants. estimated to have 22 plex produced at least 150–330 kg HEU/year. 1 MWt. shutdown . operational 19 Heping. part still under con- 24 north of Lanzhou.184 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7.Reprocessing plant. two cores. operational Southwest Institute of Nu- clear Physics and Chemistry Jianiang/Chengdu. and pilot reprocessing plant (both 29 Subei. Gansu reportedly decommissioned in 1999 Russian-supplied centrifuge Large-scale gas-centrifuge enrichment facil- enrichment plant. no longer operational 28 Plutonium Reprocessing Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. 25 capacity of 1. Gaseous diffusion plant.0 million SWU/year 26 Hanzhong.000 SWU/year China Institute of Atomic Laboratory-scale gaseous diffusion facility: Energy developed enrichment process installed at 27 Tuoli. Gansu use PUREX method).1. Sichuan Tsinghua Pool Pool. LW. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern (continued) Name/Location of Facility Type/Status HWRR–II Heavy-water. 3 MWt. near Beijing SPRR–300 Pool. near Beijing SPR IAE Pool. LW. 25 km ity. Institute of Nuclear Energy operational Technology. opera- China Institute of Atomic tional Energy Under IAEA safeguards Tuoli. UZRH. HEU (20%).

operational 36 Helanshan. commer- 33 cial-scale reprocessing plant planned Uranium Processing Nuclear Fuel Component Fuel-rod fabrication. Inner Mongolia Nuclear Fuel Component Fuel-rod fabrication. Lithum Deuteride. Inner Mongolia Nuclear Fuel Element Plant Probable production of tritium and Li-6 deu- (Plant 812) terium. plutonium production and process- ing. Sichuan duction. operational Jiuquan Atomic Energy Com. U natural uranium Pu plutonium SWU separative work unit UZRH uranium-zirconium-hydride (table continues on the following page) . and Beryllum Ningxia Non-ferrous Metal China’s main research and production site Research Institute (Plant 905) for beryllium. Ningxia Nuclear Fuel Component Tritium. 32 Lanzhou. Sichuan capacity of 300–400 kg Pu/year Nuclear Fuel Component Civilian light-water reactor fuel element Plant (Plant 812) plant (see below). opera- Plant (202) tional Baotou. 30 Guangyuan. Sichuan ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty HEU highly enriched uranium HM heavy metal kWt thousands of watts of thermal output LEU low-enriched uranium LW light-water LWGR light-water graphite-moderated reactor MNSR miniature neutron source reactor MW megawatts MWt megawatts thermal nat. Li-6 deuterium production. Gansu shutdown Tritium. Sichuan reactors. Pilot spent-fuel reprocessing plant.Nuclear Fuel Processing Plant: Converts plex (Plant 404) enriched UF6 to UF4 for shaping into metal. not operational37 Yibin. plutonium fuel rod pro- 31 Yibin. Candu Fuel Plant 34 Baotou. China 185 Plant 821 China’s largest plutonium separation facility. Gansu but experiencing logistical delays. being expanded to pro- Plant (Plant 812) duce fuel elements for new types of power 35 Yibin. capacity plex of 100 kg/HM per year. operating Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Com. reportedly no longer handles weapons- grade material. Subei. operational Plant (202). under construction.

May 17. 203–204.htm. Xingjiang.org/db/china/ sec3. See Mark Hibbs. doubt that the facility would have been shut down.org/db/china/jiuq. NOTES OTES: 1. Robert S. Norris.: Westview Press. 14. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Chengdu.org/db/china/lopnur. 10. 2004).: Stanford University Press. “Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. the original Chinese weapon design facility that has since been phased out.” available at www. Tsinghua University. 338.htm.htm. 3. U. and “Nuclear Profile: China. 5. Burrows.” available at www.org/db/china/ guang. “China Said to be Preparing for Decommis- sioning Defense Plants.186 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 7. Nuclear Weapons Databook V. 1994). 1988). the Institute of Nuclear Energy Tech- nology (INET). 348. and the Nuclear Re- search and Development Institute.nti. “Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Test Base. Sichuan University. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. p. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” available at www. Colo.htm. China Builds the Bomb. p.iaea.htm. China Builds the Bomb (Stanford. “China Nuclear Non-Proliferation Database. Frans Berkhout. southeast of Beijing.” Risk Report. Nuclear Threat Initiative.org/db/china/jiuq. See Norris. Calif. 7 Ibid. the China Institute for Radiation Protection (CIRP). November 1995.org/worldatom/rrdb. 264. 6. 8. Tianjin. Beijing. “Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology. “Nuclear Profile: China. 13.nti. 6 CAEP is an identical copy of the Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy in Haiyan. pp. Nuclear Threat Initiative. because it is China’s only operating military plutonium production and separation center. 3–9. Sichuan.nti.org/db/china/nwint. Chengdu. . Western officials. and the work transferred to CAEP. “Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathemat- ics. Sichuan province.nti.K. In addition to the sites listed under Nuclear Weapons Complex.” available at www. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” available at www. the following sites are engaged in nuclear research. and Richard W. Ibid. Nuclear Threat Initia- tive. See Lewis and Litai. 1997). Yaiyuan. and William Walker. Andrew S. available at www.htm. Nuclear Threat Initiative.: Wilmington Publishing. Fieldhouse.” available at www. p. the Beijing Nuclear Engineering Research and Development Academy. Nuclear Engineering International.nti. There is also a Harbin Military Engineering Institute that trains personnel in nuclear research and design. Nuclear Weapons Databook V (Boulder. “Guangyuan. World Nuclear Industry Handbook 2004 (Sidcup. and Fieldhouse. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex. China’s Nuclear Infrastructure of Proliferation Concern (continued) SOURCES OURCES : David Albright. 4.nti. 9. Burrows. Shanxi.” available at www. 1999. although perhaps they are not explicitly weapon- related: the Atomic Research Center.org/db/china/iapcm. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai.nti.nti. pp. there was speculation that the reprocessing facility at Guangyuan might be shut down as part of an effort to streamline and restructure the China National Nu- clear Corporation. however. International Atomic Energy Agency. 11. 12.” Nuclear Fuel. p.” available at www. Nuclear Research Reactors in the World. Beijing. 2.htm.org/db/china/caep. In 1999.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). the Institute of Materials and Elements at the Sichuan Institute of Nuclear Power. Nuclear Threat Initiative..htm. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex.1. the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology. Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press.

See “MIT.htm. “China Institute of Atomic Energy. 1972). “Datafile: China.” Nuclear Fuel. 32.: U. “Yibin Fuel Plant. See Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. Construction is likely years away.htm. 18. This facility. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Gansu province.htm.S Government Printing Office. Berkhout.nti.” available at www. 29. 24.nti. 2004. In addition to this research reactor and the old gaseous diffusion pilot plant (see the uranium enrichment section).S.” Nuclear Engineering International.” available at www. 21. December 2003. “Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metal Research Institute. October 1993. 25. but the most recent reports indicate that it is in fact near Lanzhou.nti. 3. combined with that located at Hanzhong. 2001. and the third in November 2001. “Yibin Fuel Plant. p. Completion of the final module is expected around 2005. “Separation Plant on Drawing Board until 2006–2010 Plan. 37. Defense Intelligence Agency.” available at www. CIAE Says. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency.org/db/china/heping. This reactor is being jointly developed with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 28. “Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant. 31. “Russian Atomic Ministry Delegation to Participate in Launch of Third Line of Gas-Centrifuge Plant in China. There has been some confusion as to the location of this new facility. “Yibin Fuel Plant. “Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex.nti.org/worldatom/rrdb. 17. Mark Hibbs. 19.” 27.org/db/china/lanzhou.” available at www. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex.nti. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. see Hibbs. and “China’s Centrifuge SWU Plant Up and Running. see discussion in Albright. it did early research on hexafluoride (UF6) production and on boost materials for a hydrogen bomb. 126–130.htm. The primary source for this section was the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Research Reactor Database. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Ibid. November 22. D.iaea. “China Said to be Preparing for Decommissioning Defense Plants.” Nuclear News. the second in late September 2000. and Walker.” Nuclear Fuel.” 33. 35. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 22. China reportedly ceased HEU production in 1987. See note 13. January 27. although the 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook states that it is still operational. 20. Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex. “China Expected Soon to Request Bids for Qinshan Transport Cask.” . U.C. May 17. China 187 15. Tsinghua U to Team on Pebble Bed R&D. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1997. See Nuclear Threat Initiative. and Hibbs. 16. Xinjiang province. 22. Nuclear Threat Initiative.” 26. November 13.” Nuclear Fuel. TCS-65475-72 (Washington. A commercial-scale facility is still provisionally planned.” 30. 23. Nuclear Threat Initiative. and Yumen. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex”.org/db/china/ningxia.htm. The China Institute for Atomic Energy is China’s main nuclear research organization.org/db/china/ciae.” Nuclear Fuel.” available at www. “China Moved Centrifuge Complex. this facility is shut down. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 34. though China has not yet determined where it will be located. “Heping Uranium Enrichment Plant. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Minatom Says. pp.” 36.” available at www. Soviet and Peoples’ Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy.org/db/china/baotou. See Mark Hibbs. p.” available at www. 1999. Earlier reports suggested that the facility might be located in Chengdu. Ibid.org/db/china/ yibin. Hibbs. is China’s main uranium enrichment center. April 30.htm. The first module of the plant began operating in 1998. Additional military reprocessing facilities are thought to be located at Urumqi. 2001.nti.” Economic News.” See also Hibbs.

.

and each is capable of carrying 16 M-45 SLBMs with a total of 96 warheads.1 France has conducted 210 nuclear weapons tests.1 at the end of the chapter).110 nuclear war- heads between 1960 and 1992. It has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Though it stockpiled chemical weapons before World War II and continued chemical weapons research in Al- geria until the late 1960s. The 189 . It is a member of both the Biological Weapons Conven- tion and the Chemical Weapons Convention.084 billion (20 per- cent of its annual defense budget) to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The Strategic Context France launched its nuclear program incrementally during the Fourth Republic (1945–1958).2 Each bomber is ca- pable of carrying an Air Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) supersonic guided missile. the 1956 Suez crisis was a key turning point. and the last on January 27. the first on February 13. the country appropriated $4. In this process. not all of which are deployed. Three of the four SSBNs are deployed at any given time. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability France does not have any research or production programs for either biological or chemical weapons. it eliminated its entire stockpile before joining the Chemical Weapons Convention. Missile and Aircraft Capability France currently relies on a limited nuclear force consisting of four nuclear bal- listic missile submarines (SSBNs) and 94 bombers. France’s aircraft capabil- ity includes 24 Super Étendard bombers carrying a total of 10 warheads and 60 Mirage 2000N bombers carrying a total of 50 warheads. In fiscal year 2005. CHAPTER 8 France Nuclear Weapons Capability France is a nuclear weapon state recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). France deployed 10 new Rafale bombers. 1996. France plans to equip these with nuclear-armed ASMP missiles. In 2004. all of which are nuclear ca- pable. 1960. It deploys approximately 350 nuclear weapons on 84 nuclear-capable aircraft and 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on four nuclear submarines (3 of them carrying 16 missiles each) (see table 8. France produced approximately 1.

participation in the general defense of Western Eu- rope within the Atlantic Alliance. Chirac briefly resumed nuclear weapons testing with a series of six tests in 1995–1996 (after a moratorium from 1992 to 1995) and began to restructure the arsenal. Chirac faced difficult defense choices.5 With the end of the Cold War. force projection. including the proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction.10 President Chirac summarized the current French nuclear doctrine in June 2001: Nuclear deterrence is the crux of the resources enabling France to affirm the principle of strategic autonomy from which derives our defense policy. preserving French vital interests vis-à-vis all potential threats. France tested its first weapon in then- French Algeria.”7 In 1995–1996. .4 For that purpose.” posture to counter emerging nuclear threats and proliferation of uncon- ventional weapons. nuclear deterrence today is an essential foundation of our security and will remain so for many more years in the new strategic context. After the fall of the Soviet Union. retained its original logic: that is.3 During the Cold War. following a national policy of “sufficiency” (suffisance) and relying on the threat of massive retaliation. He continued to effect reductions in nuclear spending from the Cold War level of more than 30 percent of the procurement budget to about 20 percent. France reviewed its nuclear strategy.” or “strong to the crazy. The nuclear arsenal became operational in 1964 with the entry into active service of the first Mirage IVA nuclear bombers.” pri- marily against the “resurgence of a major threat against Western Europe. where it remains fully mean- ingful and effective. In February 1960. based in Albion. and land-based weapons systems with a few hundred warheads.190 Declared Nuclear Weapon States decision to test a nuclear device was taken during the last weeks of the Fourth Republic in 1958. however. He decided to dismantle two ground-to-ground missile systems: the S-3D. the newly elected Gaullist president. Assuming office after a period of “cohabitation” with a socialist president and a Gaullist prime minister. France’s 1994 defense white paper (the first since 1972) identified French security risks as being the likely increase in the weaponry and military of other nations. and Russia’s continuing strong military power in Europe.8 He followed much of the white paper’s sugges- tions for France’s defense but changed funding priorities from nuclear weaponry to intelligence. the French arsenal grew to a triad of sea-.9 Against substantial international criticism. The concept. and the shorter-range Hades mis- siles. Thanks to the continuous efforts made since the time of General de Gaulle. air-. and by maintaining an active role outside Europe (mainly in Africa and the Middle East). France developed a “three-circles” defense policy aimed at protecting its vital interests against external threats (primarily the Soviet Union) through nuclear deterrence. initiated the restructuring of the French nuclear arsenal. and a professional army. There was a debate as policy shifted from the Cold War era “weak to the strong” posture against the Soviet Union to a “strong to the weak. Nuclear weapons would nevertheless continue to ensure the protection of France’s “vital interests.6 The 1994 white paper also sought to emphasize a reduction in the central role of French nuclear weapons while maintaining a deterrence stance. Jacques Chirac.

these attempts have not. uranium ore was discovered in central France. In the early stages of the European Union’s development. At the United Nations in 1946. when the decision to test a nuclear weapon was finally made.12 In 1945. France urged the United States and the Soviet Union to discontinue atmospheric nuclear weapons testing. using natural uranium reactors. a credible nuclear threat commands peace. unlike their American and British colleagues. which became increasingly important throughout the 1950s. There were parallel exploratory talks with Italy and Germany about military nuclear cooperation.13 In 1956. Nuclear Analysis As early as the 1930s. After the 1960 test. It is thanks to nuclear deterrence that Europe has been protected for more than 50 years from the ravages it experienced during the twentieth century. ignoring criticism made in conjunction with the Partial Test Ban Treaty . a French atomic energy commission (Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique) was established. France imple- mented a long-term nuclear plan. and in par- ticular. After the 1956 Suez crisis. France promised that all its nuclear efforts would be peaceful. France signed the Euratom treaty. France 191 Nuclear deterrence is above all an important factor of global stability. but these were stopped at an early stage when General Charles de Gaulle came back into office in 1958. At the U. been very successful so far. and France initiated plans for its first nuclear test to take place in 1960. the nuclear program was accelerated. In 1948. Besides increasing France–United King- dom cooperation. which would act as a unifier on European civilian nuclear policy. however. the last mention having been for a “concerted deterrence” (1995). That idea was soon rejected. and we have always refused [to accept] that nuclear weapons should be regarded as weapons of war to be used as part of a military strategy. did not participate in the initial production and testing of the first nuclear weapon.N. France began working on a nuclear weapon. ignoring international objectors. to fuel nuclear power plants. It soon began a secret nuclear weapons development program.14 When de Gaulle became president. By impos- ing restraint and inciting [others] to exercise reason. Our nuclear forces are not directed against any country. the Parliament set out a five-year plan to produce 50 kilograms of plutonium a year. France has always given a European dimension to its nuclear forces. however. France has made several openings to Europeanize its nuclear capabilities more formally. Four years later. France discussed the possibility of renouncing nuclear weapons. General Assembly. French scientists. he confirmed the proposed nuclear test date and accelerated the nuclear program.11 As suggested in this speech and in previous speeches. but it began focusing on military applications only in the mid-1950s. giving access to nuclear fuel to all members for peaceful purposes. until 1958. but efforts were slowed by a lack of nuclear scientific knowledge and a shortage of uranium. The efforts also suffered heavily from World War II (when France was occu- pied).

17 Missile and Aircraft Analysis At its peak from 1991 to 1992. the M- 45. It has now ceased the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) (plu- tonium in 1992. 42 missiles were attached to the Mirage 2000N sonic attack aircraft. and it has started dis- mantling its fissile material production facilities (the Marcoule reprocessing plant and the Pierrelatte enrichment facility). and 56 Plutons. the French nuclear forces have been reduced by more than 40 percent since the end of the Cold War.000 kilome- ters. In January 2000. That same year. President Chirac also decided to dismantle the South Pacific testing facili- ties in Mururoa and Fangataufa in 1996. the Super Étendard.16 Paris also deactivated and dismantled the Plateau d’Albion missile site in southern France in 1997–1998. In 1968. Last. which first entered service in 1996. a low- altitude bomber. President Chirac.15 Even though France became increasingly involved in the nuclear nonprolif- eration regime (notably as a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group). France has used at least nine reactors for plutonium production. Altogether. 18 were equipped to the Mirage IVA/P. Each SSBN is capable of carrying 16 SLBMs. France continued atmospheric testing until 1974. The M-51 will be deployed on all four of France’s strategic nuclear submarines and will have a range of 6. Of those missiles. which were mobile short-range surface ballistic missiles used by the army. 18 land-based intermediate-range S-3 ballistic missiles. The system is scheduled to enter active service in 2008. It joined the treaty only in 1992. The arsenals included 80 ASMPs. equipped with 16 M-45 SLBMs and carrying 6 TN-75–type nuclear warheads each. France agreed to observe its conditions without signing it. entered into active duty in the fall of 2004 and carries M-45 SLBMs. such as the S-3D intermediate-range missile. France has 48 SLBMs. It only arms 3 of its 4 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at any given time. France avoided the talks even though the treaty recognized its status as a nuclear weapon state. Le Vigilant. which also carries the M-45 SLBM. however. The country owns three Triomphant submarines armed with the M- 45 SLBM. decided to dismantle and discon- tinue various systems.192 Declared Nuclear Weapon States (1963). it was a longtime critic of the NPT per se. When the treaty was signed. and 20 armed the carrier-based naval strike aircraft.21 The three-stage M-51 missile will replace the current French SLBM. which were supersonic wingless guided missiles.18 France conducted its last nuclear test in 1996.20 France has plans to build and deploy a fourth Triomphant submarine by 2010 and is currently testing a new missile. the M-51. HEU in 1996) for military purposes. France deployed an estimated total of 538 nuclear warheads. having stopped fissile material production. when other European countries were negotiating the NPT.19 Today. with full flight tests . but not least. The remainder of France’s arsenal included 384 warheads on M-45 submarine- based ballistic missiles. France’s second Triomphant-class SSBN officially entered service. France operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in two classes. and one L’Inflexible submarine. A third Triomphant-class submarine.

23 The ASMP-A will first be deployed on the Mirage 2000N. the Clémenceau was modified to carry the AN-52 nuclear gravity bomb and the Super Étendard fleet. France 193 scheduled to begin in 2005. for reconnaissance missions while other retired Mirage IVPs are stored. is being designed for air defense and ground attacks. France also retains in service five Mirage IVPs. the Foch. such as replacement ASMPs for the Super Étendard fighter jets. France announced the continuation of its development program for the ASMP-A (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée-Amélioré) nuclear air-launched cruise missile program. which promises to double the range of the ASMP from 250 to 500 kilometers. In early October 1999. The Mirage 2000N and Super Étendard aircraft use ASMP air-to-surface nuclear missiles with a range of 250 to 300 kilometers and armed with warheads of the TN-81 type. some of which maintain that the development and deployment of a new nuclear weapon launcher is inconsistent with the commitment to nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear weapon states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. two are stationed at Luxeuil and the other at Istres. entered active duty in Oc- tober 2000. initially launched in 1994. In June 2004.22 As part of its airborne nuclear component. The ASMP-A will also be armed with a new TNA (tête nucléaire aéro-portée) warhead. The Mirage 2000N has some conventional capability in ad- dition to its primary nuclear role. The Rafale (B-301) will replace the Mirage 2000N as the multirole fighter- bomber. Both the Clémenceau and Foch have now been decommissioned. The Foch began service in 1963 and was then altered to contain nuclear weapons. Some countries view this deployment in the same light as the United States’ interest in developing a new generation of nuclear weapons. the navy formed a squadron of Rafale M jets in Landivisiau. The carrier Charles de Gaulle. the first 10 Rafale bombers entered service aboard the Charles de Gaulle and do not yet carry the ASMP. and later on the Rafale. possibly with more inactive weapons stored on board. the Mirage 2000N’s nuclear precursor. France has in service 60 ASMP cruise missiles equipped with a TN-81 warhead.24 Of the three squadrons of Mirage 2000N. France will deploy its first Rafale air force squadron. the French government decided to build a second aircraft carrier that will be conventionally powered rather than nuclear. and 24 carrier-based nuclear-capable fighter- bombers in its navy. armed with either the ASMP or the ASMP-A. The development of this system has sparked some criticism among non-nuclear-weapon states.25 France has 50 missiles of the TN-81 type stock- piled for the Mirage 2000N and 10 TN-81 warheads stockpiled for the Super Étendard. to be developed by simulation in France’s Atomic Energy Commission laboratories.27 In February 2004. and the Charles de Gaulle. After its commission in 1961. today France has 60 nuclear- capable aircraft in its air force. The ASMP-A is scheduled for use in 2007. The French plan to begin its construction by 2006 so that it will be operational by 2014.28 . France has built three aircraft carriers: the Clémenceau. The air force expects to purchase 234 Rafales for operation in 2005. France’s 2003–2008 defense budget projects the deployment of 234 Rafale aircraft for the armed services and 60 for the navy. The Rafale (B-301). In 2001.26 In 2006.

C. 2001. Andrew Burrows. p. Vol. “France. and Paris: LGDJ. 35. Belgium: Bruylant. 35.” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries.” p. On French nuclear policy during the Cold War. December 22. Kristensen. 40. 38. Ibid. pp.29 N OTES 1. Grand. La bombe atomique française.sipri. Hans M. “Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Western Europe: A Historical Sur- vey. January 2003. A French Nuclear Exception. and Richard Fieldhouse. Grand. Ibid. 39. edited by Harald Müller (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press.” p. L’arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris: Kronos/SPM.” Stockholm International Peace Re- search Institute Project on Nuclear Technology and Arms Control. 13. available at http://projects. Atomic Energy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton. 1998). Pierre Goldschmidt. British.: Westview Press. British.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Robert Norris.J. 1997). President François Mitterrand announced before the United Nations that France had no chemical weapons and had no plans to produce chemical weapons. consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council. It is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 2004. Stimson Center.. 2. “Nuclear Notebook. It has declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it has a stockpile of old chemical weap- ons on its territory and has opened its facilities for inspection. 2004.” p. 183–184. see Lawrence Scheinmann. “Nuclear Notebook. Occasional Paper 38 (Washington. Camille Grand. 8. 10. 6. “Nuclear Notebook. 70. 9.: Henry L.” p. p. French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. Transcript of President Jacques Chirac’s speech before the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies in Paris. Norris and Arkin. Colo. V (Boulder. 2005. June/July 2001.se/ nuclear/france. 24. 12–14. “France. 7. p. January 21. 5. 1998). 19. 12. In conversation with French government officials. 1969). p. “French Nuclear Forces. 14. D. 12. pp. Norris. and Dominique Mongin. 4. Ibid. “France. 11.: Princeton University Press. It stockpiled mustard gas and phosgene before World War II and continued chemical weap- ons research and testing at B2-Namous in Algeria until the late 1960s. 15. 17. December 17. “France. N. On the origins of the French nuclear program. see Marcel Duval and Yves Le Baut. 9. 18. Camille Grand. p. 1994). French.194 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Previous Chemical Weapons Program France does not have research or production programs for either chemical or biological weapons. Grand. 20. . 70. In conversation with French government officials. In 1988. Norris and Arkin.” p. p. 1992). In Conversation with Hans M. edited by Harald Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1987)..” in A European Non-Proliferation Policy.” p. and Robert Norris and William Arkin. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. 70. 1945–1958 (Louvain-la-Neuve. June 8. Grand. “France. 16. 3. and Fieldhouse.pdf. Kristensen. Burrows. 10.

000 6 × 100 192 launched class SSBN / kT ballistic M-45 missiles (SLBMs) L’Inflexible. In conversation with the authors. 23. Ibid. 16/1 1991 5. Norris and Arkin. “Nuclear Notebook. France 195 21. available at www. 22. available at www.globalsecurity.1. 27. Deployable Designation (SSBN) Deployed (kilometers) kT) Warheads Submarine.” p. “Nuclear Notebook.” p.125 1 × 300 0 ASMP kT ASMP Subtotal. 48/31 288 ballistic missiles Launcher Launchers/ First Range Warheads Deployable Type / SSBNs Deployed (kilometers) × yield Warheads Designation (kT) Aircraft Super 24 1978 650 1 × 300 10 Étendard / kT ASMP ASMP Mirage 60 1988 2. Table 8. Triomphant. In conversation with French government officials.org/nuke/guide/france/cbw/index.htm. 48/3 1996 6. Global Security.org/military/world/europe/dpa. 25. Each SSBN is capable of carrying 16 SLBMs. 2005 Launcher capacity / nuclear ballistic Warheads Submarine missile × Yield Type / submarine First Range (kilotons. 71.000 6 × 150 96 class SSBN / kT M-45 Subtotal. 94 60 aircraft Total strategic 158 348 nuclear forces NOTE: 1. 2005. . French Nuclear Forces. In conversation with French government officials. 24. France has 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.html. 26. “Second Aircraft Carrier/ Deuxième Porte-Avions. In conversation with French government officials. 28. It only arms 3 of its 4 SSBNs at a given time. 71. 2004.750 1 × 300 50 2000N / kT ASMP ASMP Rafale / 10 2004 3.” March 20. Federation of Atomic Scientists web site on French chemical and biological weapons capability. 29. Norris and Arkin.fas.

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are lower than this because of the SDR. The aircraft concerned had been reassigned to other duties and.1 It has conducted 44 nuclear weapons tests. each armed with up to 16 Trident II missiles and with 48 war- heads (see table 9.1 at the end of the chapter). the first on October 3. however. The country has declared to the Organiza- tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it has old chemical weapons 197 . Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability The United Kingdom is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. the Royal Air Force operated eight squadrons of nuclear-capable Tornado GR1/1A bombers armed with WE-177 nuclear gravity bombs. went on patrol in December 1994. CHAPTER 9 The United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons Capability The United Kingdom is recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear weapon state. for a maximum of 128 warheads. The actual force loadings. By 1998. Between 1952 and 1992. The first submarine. It has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. relocated. Each Vanguard nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) can carry 16 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). where appropriate. The SDR stated that the future stockpile would be less than 200 operationally available warheads. Aircraft and Missile Capability The 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) confirmed that the United Kingdom’s new nuclear force structure would consist solely of the four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. which stipulated that all Tri- dent submarines should carry 48 warheads per boat when on deterrent patrol. the country produced approximately 834 nuclear warheads. It currently maintains four nuclear-powered ballistic mis- sile submarines. 1991.2 Before the SDR revisions. This discussion also confirmed the elimination of the country’s tactical nuclear arsenal. Each Trident II SLBM can carry up to 8 multiple independent reentry vehicles. and the last on November 26. 1952. the HMS Vanguard. only one of which is to be on ac- tive patrol duty at any one time. all the WE-177 bombs had been withdrawn from service.

the change in the size and composition of the United Kingdom’s nuclear forces had significantly affected its means of implementing deterrence policies from the Cold War era. but follow- ing the end of the war in 1946. The United Kingdom joined NATO in combat- ing the Soviet threat by contributing its land.198 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s on its territory and has opened its facilities for inspection. The British argued over the most cost-effective nuclear defense replacement sys- tem for the family of submarines and whether a replacement was necessary. a group of British scientists dedicated to fission research. the Joint Nuclear. and army. and sea nuclear forces to the Alliance. which was another reason that the United Kingdom believed that it needed to construct its own nuclear arms.4 By 1998. medical research on countermeasures for biological or chemical exposure. Biological. This scientific process slowed during World War II. The United Kingdom manufactured and owned the warheads for its strategic nuclear delivery systems. Its disarmament decision was reached unilater- ally. the Maud Committee.5 Nuclear Analysis The British were an integral part of helping the United States to develop the bomb. Post– Cold War policies have left NATO as the ultimate defense for the United King- dom. According to the British Ministry of Defence. communication and information sys- tems for tracking hazardous material movement and duration. such as the man-portable chemical agent detector and the Integrated Biological Detection System. The United Kingdom wanted a nuclear force as leverage against the Soviets should they obtain weapons. The arsenal was re- duced to a single type of warhead and a submarine delivery system.3 The Strategic Context During the Cold War. The British also sought nuclear weapons as a way to achieve greater power after slipping in status as a world leader. navy. The . except for one patrolling nuclear submarine off the British coastline. but other warheads were supplied by the United States under standard NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. and Chemical Regi- ment provides “a defence capability” for the air force. the United Kingdom and NATO planned for the worst— a European nuclear war with the Soviet Union and its allies. and an expanded threat analysis program. air. work was started on plants to produce fissile material. motivated by such issues as the opportunity to reduce the cost of arsenal maintenance and the lack of an imminent Russian threat. estimated that the development of the bomb would take two and a half years. The close geo- graphical position of the United Kingdom to the Soviet threat created a need for nuclear defense and deterrence. Developing a successor to the Polaris SSBN became an issue for debate during the Cold War. individual protection equipment. In 1941. The United States clearly showed no interest in sharing atomic knowledge with other coun- tries under its Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Its equip- ment includes biological and chemical monitoring devices.

At the same time. In 1952. This came into service in 1962.S. the United Kingdom conducted its first nuclear test. depth bombs for its long-range Nimrod aircraft. called Hurricane. at Cardiff.K. The WE-177. each believed to have a yield of 200 kilotons. which were available under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements from 1958 to 1991. Three hundred to 400 of these warheads were made available to the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s. the megaton fission bomb Violet Club was produced. The British stockpile was supplemented by U. as are weapon components. nuclear stockpile of British- produced warheads was estimated to have been between 250 and 350 warheads. Disassembly of Chevaline warheads took place at the Burghfield facility and was completed in April 2002. Both used an Anglicized version of the U. Yellow Sun Mk I. Lance warheads. the British deployed the first four Polaris (or Resolution-class) sub- marines carrying 16 A3T SLBMs supplied by the United States. and 200 to 300 warheads in the 1980s.8 Missile Analysis Beginning in 1960. Yellow Sun Mk II was the first British thermonuclear operational gravity bomb with a yield in the megaton range. The Royal Navy operated Sea Harriers and antisubmarine helicopters capable of carrying WE- 177s. at the Monto Bello Islands off the Australian coast. Ini- tial models were transferred to the Royal Air Force in November 1953. The Polaris A3T missile carried a delivery system that incorporated three warheads.7 British nuclear warheads are designed at the Aldermaston facility in Berk- shire. Bombers such as the Buccaneer. The Polaris A3TK or Chevaline missile replaced the A3T in 1982 and was designed to penetrate the Soviet antiballistic .S. The WE-177 was decommissioned between 1992 and 1998.S. The “Blue Danube” was the first nuclear weapon that Britain produced. and depth bombs for land-based maritime patrol aircraft were re- turned to the United States for dismantlement in 1991. The United Kingdom 199 United States and the United Kingdom have developed a close relationship and share extensive nuclear information under their Mutual Defense Agreement. entered service with the Royal Air Force strategic bomber force in 1966 and was later deployed on Royal Navy and Air Force attack aircraft and helicopters. the U. MK-28 warhead and remained in the stockpiles until 1970. artil- lery shells. The Royal Air Force also had access to U. The smaller and lighter “Red Beard” weapon entered into service in 1958. and Tornado were capable of delivering WE-177 bombs.6 From the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. Warheads are assembled and disassembled at Burghfield.9 In 1968. weapons. the most recent family of British nuclear-gravity aircraft bombs. at the same time as the thermonuclear Blue Steel air-launched cruise missiles. The other production facility. Jag- uar. the United Kingdom operated a nuclear-capable land force of Lance missiles and 155-millimeter howitzers based in Germany with bor- rowed warheads and delivery devices from the United States under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. using plutonium as the fissile material. followed by its successor. was closed in February 1997.

but in 1993 the British dropped the idea. The warhead carried by the Tri- dent II D-5 reentry vehicle is believed to have a yield of 100 kilotons. Andrew Burrows. . Ibid. 3. 10. United Kingdom. 5 Howlett and Simpson. 2. 2001. 1994). French. the Trident missiles aboard the Vanguard SSBNs took over the substrategic role of the WE-177 bombs. and it was replaced by the Vanguard SSBNs.php3?page=1920.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. pp. British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 12. 78–79.. Actions Towards Verifiable Global Nuclear Disarmament. 11.K. and accuracy than its pre- cursor.” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries. 7. and Richard Fieldhouse. Norris. In 1998.mod.400 kilometers at full payload. pp. the United Kingdom announced the removal of all WE-177 bombs from navy surface ships.200 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s missile system around Moscow.: Westview Press. Robert Norris and William Arkin. The three-stage. Howlett and Simpson. “British Nuclear Forces. November/December 2001. British. pp. Robert Norris. 168–169. Ministry of Defence. Darryl Howlett and John Simpson. pp.11 By October 1991. 59. “United Kingdom. The re- maining WE-177s were planned for replacement in about 2005 with tactical air-to-surface cruise missiles.” p.” available at www. Vol.” pp. available at www. p. the United Kingdom’s forces were losing diversity: war- heads for Lance missiles. and Fieldhouse. Howlett and Simpson. the Polaris SLBM. Colo. 60–61. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. 63–66. Europe and Nuclear Disarmament.10 The United Kingdom currently deploys the Trident II D-5 inertially guided SLBM.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1087554459698. Ibid.. Burrows. French. pp.gov. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons.fco. “The United Kingdom. V (Boulder. and nuclear artillery were transferred from Europe to the United States when NATO’s nuclear forces were drastically reduced after the fall of the Soviet Union. The fleet of Polaris SSBNs was phased out by the end of 1996. “United Kingdom.12 N OTES 1. British. and Fieldhouse.uk/index. Norris. solid-propellant missile has a range of more than 7. 59. 9. Burrows. French. edited by Harald Müller (Brussels: Euro- pean Interuniversity Press. range. 63. which has a greater payload capability. Nimrod bombers. In June 1992. 8. 1998). British. “U. 60. 54–60. pp. 100–115. p. and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. 4. 6.

2005 Launcher Type / Launchers/ First Warheads Deployable Designation SSBNs Deployed × Yield Range Warheads SLBMs Vanguard. SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile .1.0 200 megatons ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : SSBN = nuclear ballistic missile submarine. The United Kingdom 201 Table 9.58/4 1994 1–3 × 100 7.400 200 class kilotons kilometers SSBN / Trident D- 5 II Total 60. British Nuclear Forces.

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The missiles and their silos will be retained and most likely their warheads will be held in the reserve force.030 nuclear weapons tests took place on Septem- ber 23.966 associated warheads. The United States continues to maintain the world’s largest force of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. 1992. Two Ohio-class submarines are each equipped with 24 C-4 Trident I mis- siles.S. the United States maintains an accountable strategic nuclear force of 1.3 The United States also has 780 operational nonstrategic war- heads and approximately 5.225 delivery vehicles with 5. on August 6 and 9. for a total of approximately 10.1 at the end of the chapter). 1945. The United States has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. CHAPTER 10 The United States Nuclear Weapons Capability The United States was the first country to develop and test a nuclear weapon and is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Aircraft and Missile Capability The United States maintains a triad of nuclear forces on board land. nuclear test was conducted on July 16. 1945. after which the United States became the only country to use nuclear weapons in combat. Washington maintains 14 nuclear armed ballistic missile subma- rines. The last of its 1.and subma- rine-based missiles and a fleet of nuclear-capable long-range bomber aircraft. although the arsenal is gradually being reduced in accordance with several arms control agreements with Russia (see table 10.1 Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Re- duction Treaty (START I). and 150 armed with one warhead each). The United States deploys 10 MX/Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic mis- siles (ICBMs) armed with ten warheads each and 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (50 armed with three warheads. The MX/Peacekeeper missiles are in the process of being retired.300 nuclear weapons. and will be completely phased out of service by October 2005.000 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles.2 although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is less.216 as- sociated warheads. carrying six 203 . In addition. 300 armed with two to three warheads. each of which is loaded with six warheads. The first U. The United States plans to reduce this number by about 50 percent by 2012. the best independent estimate details 961 deployed delivery vehicles with 4. Twelve additional Ohio-class submarines are armed with 24 D-5 Trident II missiles each. As of January 2005.

S. The United States has a vast stockpile of chemical weapons that are slated for destruction on its territory and has opened its related facilities for inspection. The stated goal and developing mis- sion of U. the B-52 and the B-2.S. The 94 B-52s in the U.” Thus. It unilaterally destroyed its formidable arsenal of biological weapons over several years. Dedicated to nuclear deterrence during most of its existence.5 Biological and Chemical Capability The United States does not have research or production programs for either chemical or biological offensive weapons. the U. nuclear bomber force consists of 115 planes of two different types. as well as large stocks of weapons-grade nuclear materials. the review stated that nuclear weapons continue to “play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States. begin- ning in 1969. nuclear weap- ons remained central to U. to accelerate efforts to develop antimissile sys- tems (see chapter 5). Four older submarines. outlined plans to implement negotiated reductions in strategic forces. It ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. 2002. The 21 B-2s only carry gravity bombs. a decade after the collapse of the main nuclear challenger to the United States. Though the NPR’s commitment to deep cuts in the nuclear arsenal .S. which was mandated by Congress. nuclear weapons has become less clear with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the global superpower. The review. Russia. This evolution was highlighted in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was released by the Department of Defense on January 9. The Strategic Context The United States is the most advanced nuclear weapon state in the world. The U.S. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats. to retain and improve the ability to increase these forces if necessary. but are still accountable under START I. U. are still accountable under START I rules. which formerly carried 24 C-4 Trident I missiles each are being converted to non-nuclear operations although their former 96 total missiles. low-yield nuclear weapons. nuclear forces continues to evolve. the mission for U. nuclear arsenal has been shrinking as part of a negotiated arms reduc- tion process with the Soviet Union and its successor. its allies and friends. nuclear arsenal are equipped to carry nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and gravity bombs.4 The 81 B-1 bombers currently in service have been con- verted to conventional roles. The United States also maintains nuclear-equipped tactical aircraft. It maintains a diverse arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.204 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s warheads per missile.S. includ- ing WMD and large-scale conventional military force. and to begin the development of new.S.6 At the broadest level. After peaking in the mid-1980s.S. defense efforts. with 576 associated nuclear warheads.

developed in the 1990s in START II and discussions for START III. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin signed in June 2002). and spending on strategic forces by almost 70 percent. thus accounting for lower numbers without changing exist- ing nuclear force plans. .7 This plan reflects preexisting commitments to the retirements of certain components of most “reserve” and “inactive” warheads. U. This is a “responsive reserve” of warheads that can be redeployed should strate- gic conditions change for the worse.S. goal. sought to require warhead dismantlement to make future reductions both transparent and irreversible. plans. According to U.8 During the past ten years. are usu- ally in overhaul at any given time. The official plan is classified. the director of the National Nuclear Security Administration. the irreversibility of nuclear cuts is no longer a U. announced that the United States would cut the stock- pile of nuclear weapons “about in half” by 2012.200 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2012.000 warheads will be reduced to just under 6. this approach provides the United States with the greatest amount of flex- ibility to reconfigure its nuclear forces in response to changes in the world. Under SORT. it was basically a slower and less verifiable version of earlier U. as are several bombers capable of carrying dozens of weapons. officials have noted that since the end of the Cold War.” Two Trident submarines.000 to 2.S. • removed all sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles. the United States will field 1. the United States has reduced its strategic nuclear systems by more than 50 percent. many of which are already under way. • taken all bombers off day-to-day alert.S.S.000 warheads. al- though it remains unclear exactly what projected developments might trigger the need for such flexibility. This agreement would leave both Russia and the United States with more weapons in the field than was envisioned in the arms reduction process pursued throughout the 1990s. in the proposed START III. offi- cials. the United States has: • curtailed bomber and ICBM production. The United States 205 was significant. nonstrategic systems by more than 80 percent. which U. when the Bill Clinton administration. In 1997. Linton Brooks. president George W.S. and tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines. With the signing of SORT. In June 2004.500 de- ployed strategic warheads by the end of 2007 (see “The Effect of Arms Con- trol. This position contradicts one advanced by the United States in the late 1990s. the United States and Russia agreed on a reduction goal of 2. bombs. but the removed systems could also be maintained in the active stock- pile for potential return to delivery systems on short notice (weeks or months). with 192 warheads each. (NNSA).” below).700–2. The lower number agreed to in SORT is derived by no longer counting the warheads on submarines or bombers in overhaul as being “opera- tionally deployed. Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) (the replacement for the STARTs. some warheads removed from delivery vehicles will be dis- mantled. but experts estimate that the current total arsenal of more than 10.

Bush administration concluded that there will be a need to maintain thousands of deployed nuclear weapons in a triad of bombers. defense policy is still hotly debated. and highly capable nuclear forces. U. pro- viding the United States with a powerful. Admiral Richard Mies. • halted underground nuclear testing. are telling the world that conventional weapons are not enough to ensure security. Despite these development. diverse.” according to the former commander-in-chief of the Stra- tegic Command.S. Some experts and former officials maintain that the new security environ- ment—even one dominated by the war on terrorism—provides the United States and the other nuclear weapons states an opportunity to reduce their nuclear weapons and that doing so would diminish the perceived political and military utility of these weapons.9 Reducing U. Mies explained the importance of each triad component: Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable.S. the role of these systems in U. . the United States will retain for the foreseeable future robust.S. Such a posture would reduce the risk that intact nuclear weapons could be acquired by terrorist groups or used without authorization and through miscalculation. The strategic submarine force is the most survivable leg of the triad. They also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes their geographically dispersed capa- bilities into account if contemplating a disarming first strike. forces must remain ca- pable of withstanding a first strike and responding after the attack with an over- whelming and devastating nuclear counterattack. assured response capability against . • closed major portions of the nuclear weapons production complex. The di- versity is required to “complicate any adversary’s offensive and defense planning calculations while simultaneously providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad. Nuclear weapons—not only nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons ready for rapid launch—are essential. the George W. submarines. Former senator Sam Nunn argues that with the current nuclear policies.”10 In the 2002 NPR. • eliminated all ground-launched intermediate. . . That is.and short-range nuclear weap- ons. whether they intend the message or not. reliance on nuclear weapons for defense and security would also improve prospects for keeping new nations from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. and • converted the entire B-1 bomber force from nuclear to conventional mis- sions. low-cost. and land-based missiles for the indefinite future. prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. “the United States and Russia. • canceled almost all new warhead research and development. • eliminated all nuclear short-range attack missiles from the bomber force. Sixty years after the invention of nuclear weapons.206 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s • eliminated the Minuteman II ICBM force.

. would contribute to lowering the nuclear threshold. by threatening the .S. policy since the early 1990s. there are few if any military contingencies that would explicitly rule out a possible nuclear response by the United States. communication. Strategic Command] responsibility for inte- grating and synchronizing DoD’s [the Department of Defense’s] efforts for combating weapons of mass destruction. The low-observable technology of the B- 2 bomber enables it to penetrate heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside an adversary’s territory. . meaning that some current nuclear missions might be assigned to conventional weapons—but also opening up the alternative whereby nuclear weapons might be seen as credible replace- ments for conventional weapons. I intend to conduct experiments to better understand the value of weapons accuracy within a range of stressing environ- ments.11 The review also called for steps that make the use of nuclear weapons by the United States more likely. 2005. Within the new nuclear use policy formulation. making the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable. even in response to non-nuclear threats or attacks. Another important development in the NPR is the closer integration of con- ventional and nuclear force planning. allow force dispersal to improve survivability and air- craft recall during mission execution. First. These policies discussed in the NPR and implemented since raised two con- cerns. . . The United States must preserve a sufficiently large strate- gic nuclear submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary in a crisis. that “the Secretary of Defense recently as- signed USSTRATCOM [the U. low-yield and “bunker buster” weapons. .S. making the use of nuclear weapons less likely. . Cartwright. testified on April 4.”12 He continued. combined with greater operational integration. Strategic bombers . If modeling and testing confirm the value of such capability. The United States 207 any adversary. The review stated that the United States would rely on nuclear weapons to deter and respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction. conventional forces can more easily replace opera- tions previously limited to nuclear options. While the right to respond to chemical and bio- logical weapons threats has been stated U. . The Pentagon states that by more closely linking intelligence.S. this may lead to new thoughts on the balance between nuclear and conventional strike capabilities. Strategic Com- mand. . . defined in the review to include not only nuclear weapons. Second. the NPR formulation was more explicit and also called for the development of new weapons to make the threat of such use more credible. The B-52 bomber can be employed in a standoff role using long-range cruise missile to attack from out- side enemy air defenses. but chemical and biological weapons and even conventional explosives. General James E. and force operational planning for nuclear and conventional operations. . . commander of the U. saying that the United States “will look at rationalizing our nuclear forces as an element of the overall force structure and the proper tailoring of nuclear effects as part of the broad spectrum of power. For example.” This statement appears to suggest that nuclear and conventional weapons are increasingly seen as interchangeable. . . .

even against conventionally armed adversaries. Nuclear Analysis The U. .14 . but supported a study on a replacement warhead. nuclear submarines. however. the Bush administration appeared to take a different approach to restarting the development of nuclear weapons in the United States. and long-range strategic bomb- ers. that “there is another reason why it is critical that we begin now to transform the stockpile. Congress denied funding for these programs in the fiscal year 2005 defense ap- propriations. We must train the next generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers before the last generation. which honed its skills on nuclear testing. . . The safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal is already the focal point of the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program. nuclear material production.”13 Congress again eliminated funds for the “bunker buster” in 2005. known as the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts Initiative. and weapon assembly sites also included a large and advanced complex for the pro- duction of ballistic missiles.” He continued that the United States should “begin concept and feasibility studies on replacement warheads and warhead components that pro- vide the same or comparable military capabilities to existing warheads on the stockpile. if for no other reason than to deter the use of such weapons by the United States. and a second program to modify existing warheads to create a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. the United States constructed a massive nuclear weapons production com- plex.S. retires. Brooks noted. Dif- ferent strategies have guided the formation of nuclear forces and their possible use as international circumstances and technologies have continued to evolve. low-yield nuclear weapon) and funded a research program for low-yield nuclear weapons. Wash- ington is actually increasing the incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons. From its small-scale beginnings during the Manhattan Project in World War II.208 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s use of nuclear weapons. In 2003. The cost of producing and maintaining this arsenal since 1940 has been estimated at almost $6 trillion. In April 2005. This system of national laboratories. This evolution has continued with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the dis- solution of the Soviet Union. We are losing expertise. Congress reacted to these concerns by cutting funds for the programs in 2004. The Bush administration began preliminary work on new weapons designs at the time of the NPR. Congress had modified the Spratt-Furse amend- ment of 1993 (which had prohibited the development of any new. which is funded at just over $6 billion each year. America’s Cold War nuclear adversary. and for a program to prepare for the rapid resumption of nuclear weapons tests if needed. nuclear arsenal has developed greatly since its inception in 1945. NNSA administrator Linton Brooks testified that the United States needs to resume researching and possibly developing new nuclear warheads to maintain the country’s scientific and engineering base and to preserve the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. while also reducing funding for a new facility to produce pluto- nium “pits” or cores for nuclear weapons.

including perhaps 480 deployed in Europe.17 The United States has declared 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess to defense needs and has programs under way. the Department of Energy released an estimate that the nuclear complex had produced 994 metric tons of HEU.000 accountable nuclear weapons under the terms of START I. arsenal. security policy. 3.4 metric tons had been used in nuclear weapons tests and in the nuclear weapons used at the end of World War II. in conjunction with similar efforts in Russia.16 To produce nuclear weapons. In addition. 1991. strategic arsenal consists of just under 6. a country or group must possess special nuclear- weapons-usable materials. In addition to its de- ployed. Each side reduced its arsenal to 6. reliable estimates put the stockpile at more than 10.S. a stockpile sur- passed only by that of the Soviet Union. It is not clear from this information how much material might have been consumed in nuclear tests or nuclear reactors.15 The United States also maintains a large reserve of nuclear weapons in storage and inactive reserve.4 metric tons of pluto- nium. During the Cold War. Russia and the United States agreed in 2000 to pursue joint programs to dispose of 34 tons of high-purity plutonium each.300 weapons. to dispose of the material. supplied to foreign countries. strategic nuclear arsenal.S.200 nuclear weapons. the United States produced an extensive stockpile of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. 2001. when both sides completed reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals. A report released by the Department of Energy in 1996 documented the past U. While no official numbers have been released on the size of the total U. through inventory differences. verified arms reduction agreements in U. civilian industry. These are substantial reductions from the nuclear arsenals that both countries deployed when the agreement was signed on July 31. The report revealed that by 1988 the United States had produced or acquired from other sources 111. the United States has declared 174 metric tons of HEU to be in excess to defense needs. or were transferred to the U.S. The Effect of Arms Control The United States and Russia reached an important arms control milestone on December 5. In 1994. The actual deployed. through radioactive decay. production of plutonium. The United States 209 The U. . the United States maintains a smaller number (approximately 780) of tactical nuclear weapons. The United States ceased its production of highly enriched uranium for weapons in 1964 and ended plutonium produc- tion for weapons in 1988. operational strate- gic nuclear arsenal is just over 4. and trans- mutation. Additional amounts were consumed as waste products. fission. No official inventory is available on the total stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced by the United States.000 accountable warheads as required by START I.S. The material will be diluted and used as fuel for light-water reactors or disposed of as waste. Of this amount.S. they demonstrate the value of negotiated.

500 deployed strategic warheads in a future START III. SORT represents a significant departure from previous U.and submarine- launched). These statements were followed. to treaty sublimits on strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers). it simply calls for no more than 2.210 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Through an extensive set of verification and data exchange procedures.700 and 2.S. includ- ing the elimination of the ten-warhead MX missile force. which was signed by President George H. START II effectively ceased to exist.-Russian arms reduction treaties on two counts. since it attributes weapons to some systems that may not reflect actual loadings. the United States is confident that Russia has achieved START I reductions. START I does not provide a totally accurate picture of the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed by each side. Instead.500 strategic war- heads for each nation and eliminated the most destabilizing strategic nuclear systems: multiple-warhead ICBMs. and to increased transparency and irreversibility in the reduction process. Second. Bush and Russian president Boris Yeltsin in January 1993. and ratification of SORT. it is not fully verifiable. sign- ing. W.200 weapons.000–2. was ratified by both nations but has never entered into force. is able to verify adequately that the United States has made reductions to the 6. When the U. Both countries now plan to retain multiple warhead missiles after the demise of START II. after several months of hesitation by administration officials.000 warhead level. At a March 1997 meeting in Helsinki.000–3. There is no mechanism written into the treaty that permits each side to confirm the required reductions made by the other side. the SORT agreement does not require the irreversible elimination of the deliv- ery systems or of the warheads themselves. however. Thus. if the treaty is not extended prior to that date. That treaty required reductions to 3. First. and its entry into force the following month. as well as the assistance that the United States has provided Russia in implement- ing cuts to its arsenal. at which point the treaty expires. too. pulled out of the ABM Treaty in 2002.S. although the two sides will continue to use the verification terms of START I until it expires in December 2009.200 strategic warheads to be deployed by December 31. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in general to reduce to 2. and to a limit on the number of accountable warheads on ballistic missiles (land. START II. The Department of Defense also planned to implement the START II reductions by the end of 2007 and to deactivate by the end of 2003 all strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles planned for elimination. culminating in May 2003 with the Duma’s rati- fication. . by the negotiation. Russia. to talks on tactical nuclear weapons. “providing the benefits of a reduced force structure four years prior to the agreed 2007 date for full elimination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States endorsed those reductions and began planning for a smaller force. The treaty also does not address substrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons or nondeployed weapons in storage. The Russian Duma ratified the treaty with the qualifi- cation that the United States honor the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.”18 Clinton administration plans for START III were abandoned by the Bush administration in 2002 when Presidents Bush and Putin made unilateral state- ments that each country would reduce their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1. 2012.

concentration.657 tactical nuclear warheads in 1990. however. psittacosis.S. reliable estimates from nongovern- mental organizations suggest that the United States had 7. creating instability in the strategic relationship between the two countries. and others—were also subjected to the clandestine testing of dispersal and aerosolization methods involving harm- less bacterium. New York City. nuclear reductions. with the number of deployed and stock- piled strategic and tactical weapons totaling about 10. Q fever. they are seen by the current administration as relics of the Cold War. A biologi- cal weapons defense program was established in 1953 and included the development of vaccines and anti-sera to protect troops from biological attack. testing facilities in Mississippi and Utah. Large-scale open-air tests with live agents were performed on Johnston Atoll in the central Pacific Ocean from 1963 to 1969. research focused on the evaluation of such agents as anthrax.225 launchers.19 These num- bers do not reflect the full extent of U. for a total stockpile of 21. the United States had 10.22 Efforts were made to develop more virulent and stable strains. and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Saint Louis. and in 1954 the army’s main center for the production and stockpiling of biological weapons agents and munitions was opened in Pine Bluff.) In 1990. Indiana. dengue fever. Maryland.S.20 By 2005. brucellosis. human glanders. biological warfare program was established during World War II un- der the direction of the War Reserve Service and the Army Chemical Warfare Service. other agents were added to the biological weapons research list: cholera.000 warheads. Although no official numbers have ever been provided. The fledgling program was limited to research and development facili- ties at Camp Detrick. and tularemia. botulinum toxin. As of January 2005. The United States 211 each side could choose to redeploy however many warheads it desired beginning January 1.23 Biological weapons facilities were expanded at Camp Detrick (renamed Fort Detrick in 1956).966 START-accountable weapons on 1. the United States had 5. Throughout the 1950s. and a production site in Terre Haute. (The Russian reductions are de- tailed in chapter 6. The various agreements signed over the past three decades first regulated the arms race and then allowed Russia and the United States to make substantial progress in reducing arms from their Cold War peaks. plague. The testing of agents involved both human and animal subjects. Arkansas. agents that were easier and cheaper to produce and weaponize. The Korean War (1950–1953) prompted an expansion of the program. and weaponization technologies. Despite the impressive record of threat reduction achieved by these agree- ments. The Bush administration intends for SORT to be the last arms reduction treaty. American cities—Minneapolis. . the num- ber of tactical weapons had dropped to an estimated 780 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and air-dropped bombs.21 Former Biological Weapons Programs The U. 2013. shigellosis (dysentery). storage.563 START-accountable nuclear weapons on 2.246 missiles and bombers. San Francisco. After 1945.300. Large-scale production began in 1954 with the advancement of fer- mentation.

Oppo- nents worry that these new laboratories will unintentionally worsen the threat. China and North Korea. weapons stockpiles and the conversion of all production facilities to peaceful purposes. Early agent production focused on chlorine.5-inch (11. chloropicrin. the United States signed the Geneva Protocol.S. biological weapons program also involved the development of antiplant and antianimal agricultural warfare agents. administration dra- matically increased biodefense funding. The destruction of the U. extended the warhead’s reach to 120 kilometers and the payload up to 720 spherical bomblets. The institute’s research includes the development of countermeasures. and the Soviet Union accused the United States of using biological weapons during the Korean War against China and North Korea. both by becoming potential terrorist targets and by undermining attempts to limit or control other countries’ research into biological agents. The United States signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972.212 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s By 1958 weaponization research yielded “the first missile to carry a BW war- head—the 762-mm Honest John rocket. the first long-range U. By the early 1960s. mustard gas. de- fense strategies. All the research is unclassified. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s.S. the CWS stockpiled chemical shells. rejected World Health Organization and In- ternational Red Cross efforts to intervene to mount an investigation.25 In November 1969. vaccines. Former Chemical Weapons Programs The U.S. thereby depriving enemy forces of ground cover. as well as herbicides to destroy food crops or defoliate trees. The U. however. and portable cylinders. The entire anticrop stockpile was also destroyed. President Richard Nixon unilaterally and unconditionally renounced offensive biological weapons and ordered the de- struction of all U. chemical warfare program was initiated with the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in 1918. tox- ins. Biological research was reoriented to the devel- opment of defense measures such as vaccines and countermeasures against bio- logical weapon attack.S. Rocky Mountain Arsenal. In 1925. terrorist attacks. and phosgene.S. which . 2001.S. The United States denied the allegations and asked for an impartial investigation. the U.26 China. By 1969. After the September 11. North Korea.”24 The U. and fungal plant pathogens were developed.S. the annual budget for chemical and biological warfare research was reported to be $300 million. with $5 million set aside for agricultural-agent development. and medical therapies. the war- head could deliver 356 4. mortars. The service also began the production and weaponization of the chemical agents tabun and sarin. the Sergeant. The allega- tions remain unsubstantiated. and Fort Detrick. biological weapons arsenal took place between May 1971 and February 1973 at the Pine Bluff Arsenal. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases was estab- lished in 1969 to continue research on medical defense against biological weap- ons. and started construction on new de- fense laboratories capable of handling the most dangerous pathogens.5-centimeter) spherical bomblets. Bacterial pathogens. missile. With a 25-kilometer range.

production. the Alternative Technol- ogy and Approaches Program. An official statement issued in 1943 declared. Between 1940 and 1945. More than half of the stockpile is in bulk storage containers and the remainder is stored in obsolete munitions. and other delivery systems. lewisite. President Franklin D. binary chemical weapons. passed by Congress in 1985. the 1.S. the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program completed the destruction of 6.S. the U. chemical warfare program. During the 1950s. The development.28 Despite the growth of the U. the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. the Chemical Corps (the CWS was renamed in 1946) began the research and development of the V nerve agent (VX). chemical weapons pro- gram was substantially slowed.6 percent of the American chemical weapons stockpile at the Johnston Atoll facility. each holding 2.”29 With the onset of the Korean War the use of chemical weapons was seriously considered. however. although riot control agents were used on prisoners of war.S.31 The ar- senal is now stored at eight U.S.27 Production and storage facilities were also expanded in more than ten states. The VX program reached its height in the 1960s with the weaponization of artillery. storage. Combined with President Nixon’s reaffirmation of the no-first-use policy for chemical weapons and the resubmission of the Geneva Protocol for Senate ratification.000 metric tons of chemi- cal agents. The facility was shut down at the end of 2004. the United States did not change its no-first-use policy. Under the auspices of the Army’s Chemical Materials Agency. The United States 213 banned the use of chemical and biological warfare. the U.6 pounds of sarin. hydrogen cyanide. In 1969. pledg- ing to dispose of its entire unitary chemical weapons stockpile. chemi- cal warfare program concentrated on the weaponization of sarin.S. and the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Pro- gram all work to dispose of the materials. The U. particularly as a means to offset the enemy’s superior numbers. and former chemical weapons production . including cyanogen chloride. Public Law 99-145. The CWS expanded rapidly during World War II. though efforts to produce new “binary” weapons continued through the 1980s. Army sites. as the United States de- ployed more than 400 chemical battalions and companies. and disposal of chemical warfare agents. Each cluster contained 76 M-125 or M-125A1 ten-pound bombs. Roosevelt announced a no-first-use policy for chemical weapons. Ul- timately. The U. three programs. the United States manufactured more than 146. recovered chemical weapons. Senate. Public Law 19-121 imposed restrictions on the testing. arsenal currently consists of unitary lethal chemical munitions that contain blister agents and nerve agents. and mus- tard gas. “We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such [chemical] weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.32 In 2000. and stockpiling of chemical agents continued. The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.33 It is now for sale. rockets. For air deliv- ery.30 In addition. did not ratify the protocol until 1974. located 800 miles south- west of Hawaii.S.000-pound M-34 and M-34A1 cluster bombs were developed. requires the army to destroy all obsolete chemical agents and munitions. transport.

“Remarks to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. See George Perkovich. 8. July 11.C. “Statement of Admiral Richard W. Kristensen. Milton Hoenig.globalsecurity.” pp.thebulletin.” Washington. 15. Bureau of Arms Control Fact Sheet. p. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington. 2007.S. 2005 (for forces accountable as of January 31. 20. 54.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.C. William S. Nuclear Weapons Databook: U. Schwartz. pp. as well as its subsequent deadline to eliminate 100 percent of its chemical weapons by an undetermined date after December 31. U. .: Natural Resources Defense Council. 74–75. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge.” June 21. 2. Robert S. U. 5. Rose Gottemoeller. State Department.” July 31. www. United States Strategic Command.S.” April 1. 14. 2005. before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Subcommittee. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook.C. Cohen. see Thomas B. January 2001). Robert S.carnegieendowment. U. 2001.” February 1996. 6–12. D.. Mies. The process of destruction has been a slow one. Mass. 1997). 1998). Ibid. 18.. 16.ceip. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. D. Mies. Arkin. and Jon Wolfsthal.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.214 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s facilities by April 29. 3. Norris and Hans M. “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. October 2004. Jessica Mathews. the United States has not met each of its incremental deadlines under the Chemical Weapons Convention.S. Norris and Hans M. D. however. 6. Norris and Kristensen. available at www.: Ballinger.” 12. Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U. William M. For further details. 10.org/wmd/library/ policy/dod/npr. D.: Department of Defense.S. 73–75. As a result.htm. 91.C. 7. 13. available at www. and because of citizen concerns regarding the environmental effects of destroying the stockpiles through incineration. testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Ambassador Linton Brooks.C.org. 2005. p. U.org/strategy. Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington. 2005). April 4. Robert S.S. Cochran. 2007.htm. Norris and Thomas B. due to the huge quantities of chemical weapons to be eliminated. and the web site of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 11. Sam Nunn. April 4. 2005. 73–75. 1945–1996 (Washington.S. 2004.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/nunn. 4. Excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review can be found at www. Kristensen. Cochran. Ibid. pp. pp. State Department. General James Cartwright. “What’s Behind Bush’s Nuclear Cuts?” Arms Control Today. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Wash- ington. “Statement of Admiral Richard W. “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. Department of Energy.–USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces. 2004. 17. “START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.. Strategic Forces Subcommittee. 2005). Bureau of Arms Control Fact Sheet. testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Nuclear Forces. D. pp. Joseph Cirincione. 2–3. ed. 19.34 N OTES 1. Steven Schwartz. Ibid. Atomic Audit. January/February 2005.: Brookings Institution Press. 1984). 9. and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons extended the United States’ deadline to destroy 45 percent of its stockpile to December 31. commander in chief. 2007.

” available at www. 42. D.aspx?state=Hawaii. Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (London: Macmillan.org/ nuke/guide/usa/cbw/bw.. Biodefense Plans Worry Nonproliferation Advocates. 15. Eighth Session. 73–75.” pp.fas. The Textbook of Military Medicine (Washington. “United States: Chemical Weapons. Plague Wars.army. 34. “U. Stephen Engelberg. Federation of American Scientists. Part I. Norris and Kristensen. In late 1950. and William Broad. 1997)..fas. Judith Miller.mil/state.mil/aboutcma.” available at www. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective. 28.cma. p. 44. October 24. Ibid.cma. 22.” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.aspx. September 2003.htm. Office of the Surgeon General.org/docs/c8dec15. Ibid. pp. Investigation by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found no evidence that the experiments posed a public health risk.C. 38. Federation of American Scientists. See www. Jeffery Smart. 33.S.asp.pdf. 49. 29. Ibid. 32. 2000).” Arms Control Today. 30. 37–38. 2001).org/act/2003_09/Biodefense. 2003. p.armscontrol.army. 26. “United States: Biological Weapons. See www. 27. public health concerns emerged following an experiment using Serratia marcescens in San Francisco. 25.opcw. Conference of the States Parties. Jonathan Yang. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster. The United States 215 21.htm. . 24. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg.: Borden Institute. 31. 23.” C-8 / Dec. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Mangold and Goldberg. p. p. available at www. p. 34. available at www.org/ nuke/guide/usa/cbw/cw. “Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons.

216 Nonstrategic Warheads B-61-3.650+ 1 150 MX 1 Peacekeeper 10 1986 9.216 D e c l a re d N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 10.S.286+ ~5.650+ 2–3 750 Minuteman III (MK-12) 50 1970 9.600 200 Bomber Totals 115 1.400 6 288 Trident II D-5 288/12 MK-4 1992 7.400+ 6 1.344 MK-5 1990 7.1.000 850 B-2 Spirit 21 1994 9. U. Nuclear Forces Deployed Systems Year Range Warheads/ Total Name/Type Launchers Deployed (kilometers) Launcher Warheads Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Minuteman III (MK-12A) 300 1979 9.150 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) Launchers/ Boats Trident I C-4 48/2 1979 7. -10 N/A 1979 580 Tomahawk SLBM 325 1984 1 200 Nonstrategic Totals N/A 780 Total Deployed Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems 1.016 Ballistic Missile Totals 846 3.650+ 3 150 Minuteman III (MK-12) 150 1970 9.400+ 6 384 SLBM Totals 336/14 2.050 Total Strategic Launchers and Warheads TOTAL 961 4.000 .650+ 10 100 ICBM Totals 510 1.166 Strategic Bombers B-52H 94 1961 14. -4.

htm.315 Total U.stratcom.S.315 OURCES: SOURCES Derived from Robert S. “Fact File: Ballistic Missile Submarines.S.” available at www.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Current plans are to begin deployment of a next-generation ICBM in 2018. deployed U. Inactive) ~5. Norris and Hans M.S. Nuclear Arsenal ~10. Nuclear Forces 2005.mil/FactSheetshtml/ ballistic_missiles. “Fact File: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The 10 remaining MX Peacekeeper missiles are scheduled to be withdrawn by the end of 2005. Strategic Command. Kristensen.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines. pp.stratcom.htm.” available at www.S. . U. U.S. OTES: NOTE 1. U. ICBM. January/February 2005. Strategic Command. The United States 217 Nondeployed Weapons (Hedge. leaving the Minuteman III as the only operational. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. Spares. 73–75.

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Pakistan’s program was driven by similar concerns about India. something that has generally been regarded as an unac- ceptable and unlikely approach. and Pakistan. three countries possess nuclear weapons: India. The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state as a country that has tested a nuclear weapon device before January 1. The drive to create a universal nonproliferation regime is greatly complicated by these three countries. PART THREE Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States I n addition to the five declared nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Israel’s nuclear program was developed in direct response to its inse- curity vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. build. but perceived threats from China and Pakistan played an important role. 1967 (article 9). therefore. Israel. The nuclear programs of all three countries demonstrate how re- gional security affects national decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Efforts to reverse nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia. despite the fact that all three possess nuclear weapons. It would be legally impossible for them to join the treaty without its being amended. India’s decision is more complex. None of the countries therefore qualifies under the treaty as a nuclear weapon state. are directly tied to regional security and political dynamics. 219 . which would have to be approved by the national procedures of all 187 current members. None of these three countries is a member of the NPT. and deliver nuclear weapons. and all have a signifi- cant capability to produce.

.

3 Yet after India’s “Shakti” (strength) nuclear tests. India may have produced between 334 and 504 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium. India had deployed the short-range Prithvi missile (two versions). Three variants of the liquid-fueled. road-mobile Prithvi exist. and 350 kilometers and 500 kilograms (the Navy version). The medium-range Agni II.500 kilometers. India may also be producing significant quantities of highly enriched uranium at its gas-centrifuge plant in Trombay.2 It is not known how many actual weapons India has produced from this material. It conducted a test of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 and five tests of nuclear weapons in May 1998.1 enough to produce between 75 and 110 nuclear weapons. By the end of 2005. The Army and Air Force versions are in serial production. January 2001. and potentially the MiG-27.1 at the end of the chapter). the most likely options are the Mirage 2000. India’s probable delivery platforms re- main its fighter-bomber aircraft. These are the short-range Prithvi and the medium- range Agni. It continues to produce nuclear materials for use in weapons. though precisely how much is still unknown. the most striking aspect of the country’s weap- ons program has been its moderate pace.5 Of India’s bomber aircraft. and the medium-range Agni I and Agni II with the Army. MiG-29. and it has not officially stated how many weapons it has or plans to produce. the Indian Air Force 221 . and Au- gust 2004.4 Despite its pursuit of ballistic missiles. Su-30. India is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). and Jaguar aircraft. As of the spring of 2005. with ranges of 150 kilometers and payloads of 500 kilograms (the Army version). with fighter-bomber aircraft being the most likely delivery vehicle (see table 11. In a 2001 classified internal memorandum. with a declared range of 2.000 to 2. India’s nuclear weapons are believed to be stored as separate components. 250 kilometers and 500–750 kilograms (the Air Force version). CHAPTER 11 India Nuclear Weapons Capability India possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weapons within a few days or weeks. though it is most likely on the low end of the estimates. Aircraft and Missile Capability India has developed several types of ballistic missiles capable of carrying and delivering a nuclear payload. was successfully tested in April 1999.

that India’s significant biotechnical infrastructure and expertise are being used to conduct research on biological warfare defenses. India’s Ministry of Defense expressed concern that “the .9 Some come from the way the country’s security and political elite look at current international power equations. for example. president Bill Clinton. Atal Behari Vajpayee. The Strategic Context India’s then–foreign minister. . nuclear weapons make strategic sense only vis-à-vis China. Indian government officials have publicly proclaimed the need for a credible deterrent against Chi- nese threats. which have universal currency. that countries that hold a permanent seat on the U.7 Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. response to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo versus Russian atrocities in Chechnya.”8 India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and its public display of this capability can be seen as self- validation and as steps toward acquiring the power and status that the country believed was its due.10 Certainly.6 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability India is a signatory to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemi- cal Weapons Convention.12 Indeed. define power in terms of military power and define military power in terms of nuclear weapons capability. Security Council are all nuclear weapon states. India has pledged to destroy all its chemical agents and production facilities.S. .11 In a letter to U. intelligence assessments maintain. cited the threat from China as the reason for India’s nuclear testing program. pronuclear Indian strategists argue that. how- ever. and that nuclear weapons still form a central part of U. Some U. These views on the benefits of nuclear weapons have been as influential as military concerns in driving India’s weapons program. They note. for India. There is no publicly available evidence that India is pursuing either a chemical or biological offensive warfare program.S.S. but it possesses a sizable indigenous chemical industry. China still remains a criti- cal factor in India’s nuclear weapons objectives.N. invasion of Iraq versus the toler- ance of North Korea. Some of these perceptions are reinforced by colonial memo- ries that still underlie a part of India’s search for status and policy independence.13 Despite improved relations since 2002. has explained that with the nuclear tests of May 1998 India achieved “a degree of strategic autonomy by acquiring those symbols of power . many members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). particularly as the Indian secu- rity establishment considers contingencies for a China that in the future will possibly be much more powerful.S. that international status and power are still related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They believe. the U. therefore. and they note the difference in the U.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s reportedly determined that the country’s fighter-bomber aircraft will remain the only feasible delivery system until the end of this decade. Jaswant Singh. which was in power during the May 1998 tests. and NATO military strategy.S. India’s then–prime minister. In its 2002–2003 annual report assessing India’s security environment.222 N o n .

S. missiles. with a newfound self-confidence. some Indian analysts argue that nuclear weapons have caused a deterioration in the country’s security environment. (4) formal assurance .17 Indian strategists also saw the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT as a con- solidation of the nuclear status quo.”16 Some analysts note that India’s decision to test its nuclear weapons may have been hastened by Pakistan’s April 1998 test of the 1. Those in India who were eager to test again viewed the nuclear regime as a potential stranglehold that they had to preempt. China has provided major assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs—including a blueprint for a nuclear weapon. India 223 asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces is pronouncedly in favor of China. By May 2001.300-kilometer-range Ghauri missile. plans to deploy antimissile systems. President Clinton’s hugely popular visit to India in March 2000 (delayed from 1997 by the collapse of the government and from 1998 by the Indian tests) set the stage for improved ties. by which India was left out of the nuclear club.S.18 Despite the argument of India’s pronuclear lobby. a plutonium production reactor. and is likely to get further accentuated as China responds to counter the U. This feeling set the stage for India’s rejection of the CTBT in 1996 and for the tests in 1998.S. the nuclear tests raised the country’s visibility and clout in the post–Cold War era. strategic vision. which demonstrated for the first time Pakistan’s capability to hit deep within India’s territory. If U.15 and that the international community has done little to reprimand Pakistan on its “nuclear sabre-rattling. missile defense program. a missile pro- duction factory. New Delhi had warmed to the U. then the nuclear tests have ultimately achieved India’s objectives. attention is a measure of respect and status.”14 The Pakistan–China nuclear and missile nexus is also a critical factor in India’s strategy. The Indian government was one of the few that lauded U. The Clinton administration had set five benchmarks for the Indian and Paki- stani governments to meet before the sanctions it imposed in the aftermath of the nuclear tests would be removed: (1) signing and ratifying the CTBT. on China and Pakistan. (3) progress to- ward accepting the fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). Many pronuclear Indian analysts have argued that the resulting increased attention from the sole remaining superpower proved that nuclear weapons were the only way in which to gain international relevance. They argue that the level nuclear playing field emboldened Pakistan to initiate the Kargil conflict in 1999 and constrained India’s ability to respond.S. and the technology and know- how for uranium enrichment (see chapters 7 and 12. (2) restraint from deploying nuclear weapons and delivery systems. India’s concern about China’s strategic cooperation with Pakistan is intensified by a perception that the United States has not done all that it could have to stop Chinese proliferation. respectively). point- ing in particular to the fact that the nuclear tests neutralized its conventional weaponry advantage over Pakistan and solidified the Pakistani–Chinese nexus.19 Relations with the United States From India’s perspective.

India was especially elated when.”23 Because India’s quest for international status has been one of the motivating factors for its nuclear program. under the NSSP rubric. which is a significant part of transforming our strategic relationship. That gesture was followed by an unprecedented visit by the then–Joint Chiefs of Staff chair. export controls that had been imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests. The U. High-level military meetings in December 2001 produced a joint statement that India and the United States would cooperate “to counter threats such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction.S. export controls on proliferation-sensitive items. India anticipates only a further deepening of ties in the second Bush term. narcotics trafficking and piracy. With Republican antipathy toward the CTBT. moreover. India took notice when then–deputy secretary of state Rich- ard Armitage included New Delhi on an Asian trip to “consult” with allies in the region on deploying missile interceptors.20 Toward the end of his administration.S. concerns to ensure com- pliance with U. The NSSP liberalized some U. international terrorism. high-technology trade. 2001.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s that nuclear and missile technology exports would be banned. deeper relations between India and the United . pressure on India to sign the treaty has disappeared. The George W. even though the benchmarks had not been met. In return. His other stops were to visit U. government believed that its interests in India extended beyond nonproliferation and. and (5) a resump- tion of a dialogue on Kashmir. a potential counterweight to China. before September 11. Thus. Beyond ensuring that Kashmir does not explode. willingness to sell major weapons platforms to India. the lifting of most sanctions imposed on India opened the way for hitherto unprecedented defense ties. A joint U. this new U. Benchmarks are no longer discussed. the Bush administration has decided to downplay nuclear proliferation concerns so that it can renew defense ties and establish “strategic” relations with India. allies Japan and South Korea.22 In September 2004. Henry Shelton. with Pakistan struggling under the weight of sanctions and isolation.S.S. India has committed to addressing U. During the Bush administration’s first term. and its expressed willingness to consider the CTBT and FMCT made it more palatable for Washington to ease sanctions in the period after the Clinton visit.S.S. India’s commitment to a test moratorium. something that Washington had not consid- ered since 1984.S. sanctions were lifted on the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organization. India was assuming the role of America’s “strategic partner” in South Asia. agreement on bilateral cooperation on civilian nuclear activities. who promised renewed defense ties. that sanctions were no longer effective either in deterring proliferation in South Asia or in facilitating better relations with India and Pakistan in general. and it has taken the relationship to new heights.224 N o n . commercial space programs.” The agreements that were reached reflected a U. Bush administration has sought to build on the newfound camaraderie with the Indian government.- Indian statement characterized the NSSP as “only the first phase in this important effort. and missile defense.S. a major Indo-U.21 The two countries see eye to eye on antimissile systems. policy direction was exem- plified by the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). its positive record on nuclear export controls. Clinton had already begun to lift sanctions.S.

Led by its atomic energy chief.2 and 0. India tested two more subkiloton devices with a range of between 0. India began to design and acquire the equipment for its Trombay plu- tonium-reprocessing facility. demonstrating India’s weapons capabilities. and a subkiloton device. Though its growing economic success remains the primary variable in India’s growing self-confidence. This program was intended to stem the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons by offering access to civilian uses of nuclear technology in exchange for pledges not to apply the technology to weapons. a ther- monuclear device with a 43-kiloton yield. India recognized early the potential dual-use nature of many nuclear technologies. In lieu of safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency (which did not exist until after the agency was founded in 1957). especially of plutonium separation. There is some controversy over whether India successfully tested a thermonuclear device. India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998: three on May 11 and two on May 13. After a testing hiatus of 24 years. as part of an ambitious scheme to pave the way for breeder reactors. India’s nuclear weapons program originated at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) at Trombay. in spite of international oppro- brium and initial sanctions.25 . On the basis of the prevailing atmosphere of trust in the early Atoms for Peace years. The device used plutonium that had been generated in Cirus and separated in the Trombay reprocessing facility. because the yield recorded and analyzed by Western seis- mographers was low. Homi Bhabha. The Indian government claimed that the May 11 test consisted of a fission device with a 12-kiloton yield. leading many in the scientific community to believe that the boosted-fission primary or the thermonuclear secondary did not function as designed. Nuclear Analysis India was an early beneficiary of the United States–sponsored “Atoms for Peace” program launched in 1953. shortly before China detonated its first nuclear explosive device. When fully operational. in western India. Ten years later. the Trombay facility had an estimated capacity to separate up to 10 kilograms of plutonium annually (enough for perhaps two bombs a year).24 On May 13.6 kilotons. There was little evidence before the mid-1950s that India had any interest in nuclear weapons. Canada required only written “peaceful assurances” that the reactor would be used exclusively for peace- ful purposes. and India’s growing international reputation for being a “responsible” nuclear weapon state. may in fact ultimately serve to moder- ate New Delhi’s nuclear ambitions. the world’s remaining superpower. the country’s foreign policy elite also perceive two other successes: the continuing develop- ment of India’s nuclear and missile programs. In 1958. India 225 States. India detonated a nuclear device that it said was for peaceful uses only. in 1955 Canada supplied India with the Cirus 40-megawatts-thermal heavy-water-moderated research reactor (from which In- dia later derived the plutonium for its 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion). The United States sold India some of the heavy water needed for Cirus operations under the same assurances. This facility was commissioned in late 1964.

which was . There is no public information on how many nuclear weapons India may have produced. even if budget and technical realities and international political considerations continue to restrain its pace. A change in government from the right- wing BJP to the more left-leaning Congress Party has not altered India’s nuclear posture. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress-led government reaffirmed the existing nuclear policy: “We will maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. just before national elections by the then- governing BJP. Speaking at his inaugural address. After it became public.26 Some analysts viewed this termination as an indication of accelerated weapon-related activity at BARC. enough for 7 to 112 weapons. based on an average of 4.” Prime Minister Singh’s remarks reflect India’s assertion that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a global rather than regional problem. India’s nuclear policy remains officially defensive. These are the upper limits of the possible. Given the limited test experience. the government distanced itself from the doctrine. India will not countenance a rollback of its own program. In 2005.226 N o n . with then–foreign minister Singh calling it a “possible Indian Nuclear Doctrine. therefore. and India’s perceived needs. therefore.and medium-range missiles continues. India’s Nuclear Doctrine A draft report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doc- trine was released in August 1999. along with a policy of no-first- use in our nuclear doctrine. India is a responsible nuclear power. As long as India’s decision makers believe that the existing nuclear weapon states will not or cannot work toward disarmament.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s In its 1999–2000 report. The government has cooled its early rhetorical bravado. India’s Department of Atomic Energy acknowledged for the first time that it has implemented a program to develop and deploy nuclear weapons: “Following the successful nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokharan. At the same time. The doctrine. and we will continue to work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon. imple- mentation of the program to meet the national policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence in terms of necessary research and development as well as manufacture.” BARC is the scientific nerve center of India’s nuclear weaponization program. In April 2000. The country’s testing of short. and. the technical difficul- ties. is being pursued. the government ended indepen- dent safety oversight at BARC. we remain committed to the goal of universal nuclear disarma- ment. regardless of the party in power.27 Any Indian government will remain committed to weaponization. All estimates. it is most likely that India has produced roughly 36 nuclear devices and unlikely that it has produced 100 or more.” which was released for public debate. though that does not appear to be the case. are based on the range of material that India could have produced from its reactors. it must be addressed globally. despite some domestic voices calling for their resump- tion. however. India has maintained a self-declared moratorium on further nuclear tests.

29 This echo of U.” The doctrine further calls for nuclear forces based on a “triad of aircraft. An integrated operational plan. and operationally pre- pared nuclear forces. doctrine narrows the definition of “no-first-strike. while vaguely reaffirming “credible minimum deterrence. This pro- cess was delayed by the 2001–2002 crisis with Pakistan.” The doctrine makes no effort to quan- tify either the deterrence or associated costs. which includes a political council and an executive council. Some experts have argued that India’s doctrine is essentially “conservative” in character. The national secu- rity adviser chairs the executive council. the authority to use nuclear weapons rests with the prime minister and with a “designated successor. and interservice rivalry over the control of India’s land-based missiles. India’s Nuclear Command Structure According to India’s nuclear doctrine.” The nuclear doctrine also outlines a plan for the command and control of nuclear forces: “An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and re- sponsiveness shall be in place. deployment. and employment of nuclear forces” will be determined by “the strategic environment. or a series of se- quential plans. However.” raising the question of the country’s doctrinal commitment to not using nuclear weapons against a non- nuclear-weapon state. which has the sole author- ity to order a nuclear strike and was set up to formulate political principles and administrative arrangements to manage India’s nuclear arsenal. India reaffirmed its no-first-use policy. India 227 officially affirmed only in January 2003. shall form part of the system.”28 In January 2003. but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” and “the “actual size.” whereby India “will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike. mobile land-based missiles. however. the doc- trine says that India will require “sufficient.S. for India a “‘no-first-strike” policy does not mean that the government will not have a first strike capability. India established a Nuclear Command Authority. and the needs of na- tional security. and sea-based assets. because it emphasizes deterrence rather than war fighting. predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy. The Indian government . calls for a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” based on a policy of “retaliation only. a robust command and control system.”30 In January 2003. effective intelli- gence and early warning capabilities. Deterrence will be a “dynamic concept. and be- cause ultimately the country’s nuclear force will likely be “minimum” rather than “expansive. after much delay. components. which advises the nuclear command au- thority and carries out orders from the political council. and comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy.” the Indian government announced for the first time that India “will retain the option” of using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a biological or chemical weapons attack against the country. survivable. technological imperatives.” Even during the height of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001.” For this deterrence to work. India’s prime minister chairs the political council.

India also created alternative nuclear command chains. it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further aug- mented to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). however. Estimates of the number of Prithvis the Indian Army possesses range from 75 to 90.500-kilometer Agni missiles—will be part of the nucleus of the new Strategic Forces Command. the retired Indian air commodore Jasjit Singh. beginning with the Air Force. it poses significant op- erational liabilities as a nuclear delivery system. Navy. The Air Force will earmark some Jaguar.38 The Army is reportedly unenthusiastic about the Prithvi. and Air Force. Mirage 2000. Air Force and Navy. it still has questions about its guidance system. The post will rotate among the three services—Army. and hours would be required in the field to prepare the missiles for launch. in the physical custody of the Defense Research Development Organization and the Department of Energy. one of India’s prominent nuclear strategic thinkers. wrote that the nuclear-capable aircraft’s “limitations of range and susceptibility to in- terception by hostile systems make it critical that the central component of the nuclear arsenal must rest on ballistic missiles.35 Missile Analysis India’s missile capabilities are the result of its Integrated Guided Missile Devel- opment Program. A nuclear war game exercise staged by the Indian Army in the summer . arguing that it was necessary to establish them to ensure re- taliation for a nuclear strike. never hav- ing been involved in its development. its role would be restricted to use against Pakistan. The commander-in-chief of the SFC will manage and administer the nuclear forces but not the nuclear war- heads. and Su-30MKI squadrons and the Navy will deploy some naval warships and submarines to complete the nucleus of India’s first nuclear command. In 1998. which is a principal driving force behind India’s mis- sile program.34 The creation of the Nuclear Command Authority under the political council headed by the prime minister and the SFC headed by a commander-in-chief have deliberately obscured the actual chain of command with respect to autho- rizing the use of India’s nuclear weapons. because the Prithvi is liquid-fueled. The Prithvi and the Agni I and II are the nuclear-capable missiles in the hands of the Indian military. which was begun in 1983.39 Moreover.228 N o n .33 Two operational missile groups of the Indian Army—one armed with the 150–250-kilometer short-range Prithvi missiles and the other with the longer- version 2. The Army first received the 150-kilometer-range Prithvi in 1994. The Annual Report 2002–2003 of the Ministry of Defense empha- sizes: “As far as India is concerned.31 The SFC consists of representatives from the Army.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s also approved the appointment of a commander-in-chief of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to take charge of the nuclear arsenal. Prithvi units include numerous vehicles that could be detected once deployed. which would allow interdiction by Pakistan.”37 Given the Prithvi’s range.32 Nuclear warheads remain under civilian control.”36 This is particularly true given China’s missile capability.

45 The Agni medium-range program. that range (which will also be a matter of payload) could require the develop- ment of a new ballistic missile. The cadre of India’s defense scientists who were influential in the nuclear tests would also like to demonstrate India’s scientific capability by fielding an ICBM. capable of carrying an estimated 1. The Agni II could reach all of Pakistan. scientists at India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) are working to upgrade the Agni II to increase its accuracy. again in January 2001.”43 The missile was successfully test fired again in October 2004. remains out of reach. . India 229 of 2001 did not include the Prithvi.and road-mobile MRBM with a solid-fueled rocket.44 The Air Force version of the Prithvi (the Prithvi-250) was successfully tested in December 2001. including Beijing. could allow India to develop its missile capabilities faster. but most of northeast China. argue that an ICBM is not necessary for India’s defensive needs.000-kilogram payload to a 3. however.41 However. DRDO is also currently working on a new missile.47 The Agni I has a liquid-solid motor combination.”50 Some Indian politicians.500–5.000-kilogram payload. even if the missile were based in north- east India east of Bangladesh. a Prithvi.42 In September 2002. the Dhanush. rail. thereby increasing the survivability factor against its western neighbor.51 Perhaps India will be content with an intercontinental . a country’s international standing is founded on the reach of the weapons in its armory. Even given India’s technical expertise. particularly Russian.000 kilometer range necessary to hold China’s most valued assets at risk. was suspended in 1994 owing to technological problems and diplomatic pressure from the United States. India has the technical expertise to pursue intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. The program resumed under the BJP government in 1998 with a second version of the missile. The Agni II could reach parts of western China. The Agni II medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).500- kilometer range.46 The Agni II is an improvement over the “technology demonstrator” Agni I.49 One member of the BJP-led National Security Advisory Board has written: “In the final analy- sis. India has continued its tests of the short-range ballistic missile system. The naval version. begun in the late 1980s. India announced that the Dhanush was “ready for induction after successful trials at sea. A Rand study argues that no upgrade of the Agni II is likely to produce a missile with the 3. While India has certainly boosted its image by going nuclear. allowing India to base it deep within the country. the Agni III. having successfully launched both the Polar Space Launch Vehicle and the Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle. has been in development since 1983 but had its first successful test only in September 2001. Nine years after receiving the Prithvi I. . was first tested success- fully in April 1999 (just before the BJP faced a no-confidence motion in the Indian Parliament). Foreign assistance.500-kilometer-range Agni II in October 2003. essentially. with the second stage consisting of. it will truly emerge as an international power only when it tests its first ICBM.48 Currently.40 There are even reports that the govern- ment has decided not to weaponize any Prithvi variant with a nuclear warhead. and in August 2004. It is a two-stage. which is capable of carrying a 1. the Army took receipt of the 700-kilometer-range Agni I and the 1. .

U. . and the MiG-27 and MiG-29.500 kilometers or more. the Mirage 2000.400 kilometers. Because India has a sizable indigenous chemical industry. then–defense minister George Fernandes informed the Indian Parliament that “in consonance with the threat perception. which can carry a heavy nuclear weapon to a range of 5.58 India also has a variant of the Russian Tu-95 Bear. fi- nancial.”53 In 2003. intelligence believes it will not be deployed until 2010 or later.000-kilogram warhead to a range of 900–1. progress has been slow.60 India ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974. to develop a nuclear-powered submarine that could be equipped with nuclear-tipped missiles. Navy- based Tu-22 bombers. The Sagarika SLBM project is reportedly continuing with assistance from Russia. Much like the rest of India’s missile program.S. also with Russian assistance.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s satellite-launch-vehicle capability. This official acknowledg- ment. The program’s substantial technical. Currently.59 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis India has many well-qualified scientists and numerous biological and pharma- ceutical production facilities that could be used for advanced research or for the development of pathogens.56 A 2000 Rand study estimated that an Indian SLBM capability was still another 10 to 20 years away. intelligence assessments have maintained that India’s significant biotechnical infrastructure and expertise are being used to conduct research on biological warfare defenses. scientists at DRDO publicly reaffirmed that India did not have an ICBM pro- gram because it did not face an ICBM threat. and U. which can carry a 1. India’s inventory of nuclear-capable aircraft consist of the Jaguar.57 Russian assis- tance could enable faster progress. many years will be required before India has a test-proven capability to carry nuclear weapons to ranges of 5. although this assessment is rarely highlighted.52 In 2000.230 N o n . India be- gan the Sagarika program in 1991. marked the first time that India publicly admitted to be pursuing an offensive chemical warfare capability. Russia is providing 40 nuclear-capable Su- 30 aircraft and is also reportedly leasing a small number of nuclear-capable. Though it has pledged to destroy all agents and production facilities. in the past Indian firms have ex- ported a number of items proscribed under Australia Group guidelines.54 In any case. known as the Tu-142 Bear. no ICBM development project has been undertaken.000 kilometers.61 These are materials and items that are not themselves weapons but are used to produce chemical agents. and bureaucratic problems indicate that there are hurdles ahead for any submarine-based nuclear delivery system. made in June 1997. includ- ing specific chemical agent precursors and dual-use equipment. its activities and sales could remain a cause for concern.000– 6. India has no submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. After ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1996.55 The Advanced Technology Vessel project was begun in the late 1970s. India disclosed that it had a chemical weapons production program.S.

Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000. 14–16. Chari (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies). India’s Nuclear Bomb. November/December 2004. 14–16.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2001). p.org/e_research/profiles/India/index.” Outlook India. U. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. Jaswant Singh. P. India could produce approximately 17 kilograms of plutonium per year. Edward Alden and Edward Luce. “Joint Statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Scientific Adviser to the Defense Minister. See also David Albright. available at www.nrdc. www. February 13.” Financial Times. 16. R. 17. September 17. Weapon estimates are based on 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon. State Depart- ment Press Release.S. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press. December 6. quoted in George Perkovich. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable.” pp. 23. Department of Defense. February 16. Febru- ary 16. October 11. Albright and Cramer.nti. End of 1999. Department of Defense. 1998.” pp. p. November 16. Nuclear Threat Reduction Country Profiles. India’s Nuclear Bomb. 11. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. 2001. D.S. 3. 23. Pakistan Move Forward with New Weapons.” India Today. “United States–India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership. See also Perkovich.html. Perkovich. 417. assistant secretary of state. p. September–October 2003. as Albright believes.S. 3.org/nuclear/nudb/datab20.htm. 10. 404–443.htm.wisconsinproject. 2000.isis- online. 426–427. 2. Chellaney was one of the strategists on India’s Nuclear Security Advisory Board.html. October 16. U. 2000. 14. July 13. Natural Resources Defense Council. available at http://mod. 421. “Load Up!” Hindustan Times. pp. October 10. Testimony to the U. As- suming the Cirus and Dhurva reactors are operating at 40 percent capacity. p. 2001. 18. p. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions.in/reports/welcome. see pp.S. “A New Friend in Asia: George Bush Is Relegating Concerns about Nuclear Proliferation in Order to Win the Friendship of India as a Strategic Ally in the Region. 9. Annual Report. May 18. March/April 2002. 128–129.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Chari. available at www.C.S. 21. 2002–2003.” The Hindu.” Times of India.” Nonprolifera- tion Review.asp. Proliferation: Threat and Response. D. “Fernandes for Maintaining Parity with China. 12.C. 2000. See also P. vol. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on India and Pakistan.asp.state. May 28. p. 7. .S. 8. interview with National Public Radio. 15. “India’s Nuclear Doctrine. “India. 8. India’s Nuclear Bomb. 419. Washington. available at www.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.nic. 24. India’s Nuclear Bomb.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). 20. available at www. 24. Annual Report.S.” Arms Control Today. 2001. Chari. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India. Chari. “India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories. no. 2001. George Perkovich. “India Nuclear Weapon Update 2003. Brahma Chellaney. 4. “Down to Brasstacks. R. 6. 2001. 5.: U. For a comprehensive discussion of India’s motivations. November 2003.org/countries/india/nuke2003. This estimate is extrapolated from David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. 22. For a similar estimate see. Celia Dugger. 7. 8. “Fissile Materials: Stock- piles Still Growing. “To Strengthen Military Ties. “NRDC Nuclear Notebook. August 21. Perkovich. India 231 N OTES 1. Shishir Gupta. pp. 1999.armscontrol..org/act/2003_11/IndiaandPakistan. 25. 1998.” www. 1999).” New York Times.” U. 2002–2003. “Nuclear Data. Fall–Winter 2000. Department of Defense. p. 19. Ibid. and U. 409–412. Perkovich. pp. U. Perkovich. Beats Path to India. India’s Nuclear Bomb. 2001. “Fissile Materials: Stockpiles Still Growing.” Institute for Science and International Security. 13.html. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India. George Perkovich. Karl Inderfurth. and Karen Yourish. 2004. “Dystrophy of Nuclear Muscle.

315. January 7. 42. 2000.nti. December 4. Gregory Jones.” 32. Ravi Velloor.html. “Nuclear Data. 52. available at www.S. 1998). 2001. 2001. 35. p. see also Tom Walker.” Reuters. Kerry Boyd. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Paki- stan Issue Paper 192 (Santa Monica.” The Hindu. ed.” India Today. p.nic. 2001. “Dhanush Missile Test Fired.” Jane’s International Defense Review. “India Prepares to Attack Rebel Camps. site. 2000).” 56. “Asthana Appointed Strategic Forces Command Chief. 34. 41. 49. 2001. Janu- ary/February 2003. 51. 39. September 21. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces.. 2003. “India. Annual Report. Mark Hewish. 57. 2002–2003. available at www. David Orr. Tellis.” 47. Pakistan Move Forward. 2003.in/govt/indnucld. 50. August 14. “India Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile.rediff. Says Kalam. Nuclear India (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. “India and Russia Ink Defence Deal. Harinder Baweja. 54. “India Has ‘Problems’ Managing Nuclear Arms. Calif. Natural Resources Defense Council.” Rediff.com/news/2003/jan/07nuke.asp. National Bureau of Asian Research. Yourish. Rethiniraj and Clifford Singer. “Going Global: India Aims for a Credible Nuclear Doctrine. U. Boyd. 43. 58.org/act/2003_01-02/india_janfeb03. Ministry of Defense of the Government of India.: Rand Corporation.” Hindustan Times. 1999. 59. 37. Jones. 2004. 2001. Ibid.armscontrol. Michael Krepon. 30.meadev.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. Yourish. 38.” 36. “India Reports It Has Ability to Build ICBM. 21. Ashley Tellis. 2000.” The Hindu.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. “Load Up!” Hindustan Times. 55. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Pravin Sawhney. January 10. “India Developing Ballistic Missiles to Counter Threats.htm. p. Kampani. p. “India’s Missile Overview.” NBR Analysis. “Readying for Nukes. 27. 53. The Military Balance. November 22.com. “ICBMs Any Day. 46.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure.org/act/2003_10/IndiaPakistan. 29. Department of Defense. February 10. Chellaney. . available at www. September 18. “India’s Missile Overview. 2004. 25. 2000.” Agence France-Presse. June 9. 2002. 41.” Press Trust of India.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 26. p. Gopi T.” Arms Control Today. India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica. 2001. May 28. 40. 48. “Whither Nuclear Safety?” The Hindu.” Times of India. 45.htm. October 27. Jasjit Singh. Pakistan Move Forward. Atul Aneja. 31. 33. 28.armscontrol. “IAF version of Prithvi Passes Test. “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine. 60. available at www.: Rand Corporation. 2004).” August 17. 2001).asp. available at www. Ashley J. “India Consolidates its Nuclear Force. October 2003. February 2001.” 44. July 4. December 13.” Arms Control Today.” Straits Times. “Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves. “India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure. “Pakistan Scores over India in Ballistic Missile Race. Gaurav Kampani. 2001. “Missile Groups to Form Nucleus of Strategic Forces Command. February 16. Ibid. and Mark Franchetti. “India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revo- lution. October 2000. February 13.232 N o n .” Times of India. 152.” Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative. S. 2003. 24. 61.” Sunday Times (London). p. November 2000. “India. Relationship Takes on a Commercial Bent with New Trade Agreements.. Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Calif.

nat. nat. RAPP-4 Heavy-water. 2007 No 490 MWe (table continues on the following page) . U. nat. RAPS-1 Heavy-water. nat. U. U. 1981 Yes Kota 1871 MWe Madras. 2000 No Kota 202 MWe Rajasthan. 1995 No 202 MWe Kaiga 1 Heavy-water. 1991 No 202 MWe Narora 2 Heavy-water.1. U. nat. 1986 No Kalpakkam (Tamil 202 MWe Nadu) Narora 1 Heavy-water. U. 150 MWe Rajasthan. 1993 No 202 MWe Kakrapar 2 Heavy-water. U. 150 MWe Tarapur 2 Light-water. nat. 2000 No Kota 202 MWe Power Reactors: Under Construction Tarapur 3 Heavy-water. 1973 Yes Kota 90 MWe Rajasthan. U. RAPS-2 Heavy-water. LEU and/or 1969 Yes MOX. U. U. U. 1984 No Kalpakkam 155 MWe Madras. nat. nat. nat. India 233 Table 11. U. 2000 No 202 MWe Rajasthan. 1992 No 202 MWe Kakrapar 1 Heavy-water. RAPP-3 Heavy-water. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Power Reactors: Operating Tarapur 1 Light-water. LEU and/or 1969 Yes MOX. nat. nat. nat. MAPS-2 Heavy-water. U. MAPS-1 Heavy-water. nat. 2000 No 202 MWe Kaiga 2 Heavy-water. U.

U. Trombay uranium. U. nat. pool type. Heavy-water. Heavy-water. nat. U. 1 MWt Cirus Heavy-water. nat.1. U. Trombay 40 MWt Dhruva Heavy-water. – No 700 MWe Rajasthan. high-enriched 1956 No BARC. 1985 No BARC. RAPP. U. 2007 No 202 MWe Kudankulam-1 Russian VVER–1000/392. 2006 No 490 MWe Kaiga 3 Heavy-water. nat. U. Heavy-water. 2008 No 6 Kota 202 MWe 1 Power Reactors: Planned and Proposed Kaiga 5 Heavy-water. 2008 No Light-water. nat. 2007 No 5 Kota 202 MWe Rajasthan. – No 7 Kota 700 MWe Rajasthan. Trombay 100 MWt . LEU 917 MWe Rajasthan. nat. Heavy-water. nat. RAPP. – No 700 MWe Kaiga 6 Heavy-water. U.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 11.234 N o n . – No 8 Kota 700 MWe Research Reactors Apsara Light-water. U. U. nat. nat. RAPP. nat. 2007 No 202 MWe Kaiga 4 Heavy-water. 2007 No Light-water. U. India’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Tarapur 4 Heavy-water. U. nat. LEU 917 MWe Kudankulam-2 Russian VVER–1000/392. 1960 No BARC. RAPP.

1 kWt. Trombay zero-power. Trombay 0. Uranium-233.01 kWt. excavation work (PFBR). variable fuel 1961 No BARC. IGCAR began in 2003 Kalpakkam Uranium Enrichment Trombay Pilot-scale ultracentrifuge 1985 No plant. 2009 No Breeder Reactor 470 MWe. 50 tHM/year. uranium-233. U. decommissioned in 1986 Purnima 3 Light-water. critical 1984 No BARC. decommissioned in 1983 Purnima 1 Fast neutron. – No BARC. critical 1972 No BARC. operating Center for Laser enrichment research 1993 No Advanced site Technology Indore Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Trombay Small-scale.03 MWt Zerlina Heavy-water. 1985 No Reactor (FBTR). 40 MWt IGCAR Kalpakkam Prototype Fast Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. decommissioned in 1983 Purnima 2 Light-water. Trombay assembly zero-power. decomissioned in 1993 Breeder Reactors Fast-Breeder Test Plutonium and nat. 1996 No Kalpakkam 0. India 235 Kamini. Trombay assembly 0. operating Rattehalli Mysore Pilot-scale ultracentrifuge 1990 No plant. IGCAR. 1985 No operating (table continues on the following page) .

236 N o n .6 t/year. operating 1978 No . India’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Completion Name/Location Type and or Target IAEA of Facility Capacity Data Safeguards Tarapur Medium-scale.1. operating Kalpakkam Large-scale. all fabrication). operating Jaduguda Uranium mining and 1968 No milling. 1985 No operating Advanced Fuel Mixed uranium-plutonium No Fabrication oxide (MOX) fuel Facility. operating Hyderabad Uranium purification No (UO2). Surda Uranium recovery plants at 1986 No Mosaboni copper concentrator.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 11. one fabrication. 125 1986 No tHM/year. Tarapur fabrication. facility produces fuel for PWR fuel light-water reactors). standby 1977 No Tuticorin 49 t/year. operating Hyderabad Fuel fabrication (two 1974 (LWR Yes facilities produce fuel for fuel heavy-water reactors. No under construction Uranium Processing Rakha. operating 2 Heavy-Water Production Nangal 6. operating 1997 (PWR-2 fuel fabrication) Trombay Uranium conversion (UF6). operating Kalpakkam Medium-scale. decommissioned 1962 No in 2002 Baroda 15 t/year.000 tHM/y.1. 100 1977 No tHM/year.

“Country Nuclear Power Profiles: 2003. October 18. U nat.iaea. phase 2 72 t/year. Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Corporation.A. 2004). 2002.iaea. See “RAPS- Review. RAPP-7. Nuclear Engineering International. operating 1985 No Talcher.” available at www.org/ worldatom/rrdb/.iaea.” available at www-nfcis.org/programmes/ a2/index.” available at www. . Kaiga 6. operating 1985 No Thal-Vaishet 78 t/year. IAEA. IAEA.html.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2103. K. operating 1987 No Manuguru 185 t/year.org/Default. Kaiga 5.K. U. operating.” IAEA.” Press Trust of India. 2. phase 1 62.: Wilmington Publishing. proposed No Kota 85 t/year. “Power Reactor Information System. India 237 Talcher.asp.nti. but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water. “Research Reactor Database. 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup. According to V. Chaturvedi. uranium MOX mixed-oxide fuel MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal t tons tHM/yr tons of heavy metal per year SOURCES: IAEA.” table A24. NOTES N OTES: 1. and RAPP-8 will all have 700 MWe capacity. operating 1991 No Nuclear Weapon Test Site Pokharan Range Site of nuclear tests No conducted in 1998 ABBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency LEU low-enriched uranium N. “Director General’s Annual Report. “India: Nuclear Facilities.html. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities. 1991 No under expansion Hazira 80 t/year.5 t/year. IAEA. 2003. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System. Nuclear Threat Initiative. not applicable nat.” available at www.

.

300 kilometers with a payload estimated at 500 to 750 kilograms and was delivered to the army in 2003. has a range of 1. signed but not ratified the Com- prehensive Test Ban Treaty. The M-11 has a range of 280 to 300 kilometers. probably a derivative of the Chinese M-9 missile. Aircraft and Missile Capability Fighter-bomber aircraft are Pakistan’s most likely delivery vehicles. liquid-fueled Ghauri medium-range missiles. The Ghauri I. 239 .1 enough to produce between 50 and 110 nuclear weapons. 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore.000-kilogram bomb up to 1. F-16s modified to carry nuclear weapons are deployed at Sargodha Air Force Base.3 Where Pakistan stores its fissile material and war- heads is not publicly known.600 kilometers. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are reportedly stored in component parts. the North Korean. CHAPTER 12 Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Capability Pakistan possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weap- ons within a few days or weeks (see table 12.2 Their principal device design uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium (HEU) rather than plutonium. the Hatf short-range series.S. the Pakistani version of the Nodong missile. The U. able to carry a 1.110 and 1.6 Pakistan has acquired the bulk of its missile capabilities from North Korea and China. By the end of 2005. has a range of 700 to 750 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms. Pakistan may have also produced 36 to 80 kilo- grams of weapons-grade plutonium by the end of 2005. with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives.5 Other delivery vehicles possibly include the French Mi- rage V fighter-bombers and the Chinese A-5 Fantan. Pakistan has. The Shaheen I.-supplied F-16 is likely Pakistan’s primary nuclear-capable aircraft. Its surface to surface missile arsenal includes the Chinese-built and -supplied M-11. However. or enough for 10 to 20 additional weapons.000 kilometers.4 Like India. it is not known if Pakistan has been able to develop nuclear warheads for its missiles. Pakistan may have produced between 1. Pakistan has refused to sign the Non- Proliferation Treaty. however. The country also possesses missiles with ranges from 280 to 2.7 Longer-range Ghauri II and Shaheen II missiles are in development and may not yet be operational.1 at the end of the chapter).440 kilo- grams of weapons-grade uranium. and the solid-fueled Shaheen series.

Conflicts in Kargil in 1999 and military mobilizations after terrorist attacks on the Indian government in late 2001 and . it did not test its weapons until May 28 and 30. its former eastern wing became the independent state of Bangladesh. 1998. there has been no verified evidence suggesting that it has a chemical or biological weapons program. Since 1947. Since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. The Strategic Context Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear deterrent has been motivated largely by fears of domination by India. By the mid-1980s. However. Pakistan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 1997 and did not declare the pos- session of any chemical weapons. and military resources dwarf its own.S. relations between Islamabad and New Delhi have alternated between periods of relative peace and considerable tension.9 It could eventu- ally have the capability to produce a variety of chemical agents because of the dual-use nature of its chemicals and equipment. Pakistan secretly commenced its nuclear weapons program shortly thereafter. Pakistan had developed a nuclear capability. whose population. convinced that it was essential as a deter- rent to ensure its survival. Pakistan is ac- tively seeking foreign assistance to expand its civilian biological and pharmaceu- tical facilities. they could nonetheless support the production of lethal pathogens. To date. economy.8 Although its facilities are less well developed than those of India. led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. There is some concern that it is conducting a limited chemical weapons research progam. it does have a biotechnical infrastructure sufficient to support a limited biological weapons research and development effort. Pakistan has fought three full-scale wars with India. and ultimately successful.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Pakistan is not known to have any biological or chemical weapons or agents. The country has been locked in a conflict with India since the two countries became independent from the United Kingdom in 1947 through partition. U. finally declaring itself a nuclear weapon state. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1974 and regularly participated in negotiations to establish an effective verification protocol for the treaty. During the latter crisis. This was punctuated with crises that nearly erupted into war during the winter of 1986–1987 and the spring of 1990. diplo- matic efforts to defuse the situation. Pakistan is actively improving its commercial chemical industry and has im- ported chemicals with both commercial and weapons utility. The third and last of these wars. international offi- cials and experts feared that Pakistan might take steps to deploy its nascent nuclear arsenal. These concerns spurred intensive. However. when it responded to India’s May 11 and 13 nuclear tests by conducting tests of its own.240 N o n . and political and bureaucratic pressures. two of which have been over the disputed territory of Kashmir. in 1971. popular nationalist sentiment. Other factors that have also contributed to Pakistan’s bid for nuclear arms include its desire for leadership and status in the Islamic world.

In late February 1996. It is possible that Pakistan’s summer 1999 military incursion into Kargil. “Today we have settled a score. Pakistan 241 early 2002 again raised the possibility of war spiraling into a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India. Sharif declared. provocative rhetoric. saying. This detection resulted in a major U. U. Though India did decide against testing at that time. John Deutch.S.S.”10 In late 1995. Atal Behari Vajpayee. Pakistan would fol- low. concerns. Abdul Qadeer Khan.12 In May 1998. On May 28. 1998. engineers. it raised the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear test.”15 The Lahore Declaration also included a commitment to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and .-led international effort to dissuade India from testing. and the two signed the Lahore Declaration. a desire to validate the weapon design—independent of India’s test preparations—is also likely to have driven Pakistan’s nuclear test preparations.” In February 1999. satellite photographs report- edly revealed evidence of Pakistani nuclear test preparations at Chagai Hills. and dangerous confidence in “limited war. and India and Pakistan have struggled to find a measure of stability in their relations. However. agencies detected Indian preparations for a nuclear explosive test. Diplo- matic initiatives have been interspersed all too frequently with nuclear brinkmanship. expressed these U. after the tests took place at Chagai Hill in western Pakistan. “We have judged that if India should test. General Aslam Beg. has written that “Pakistan’s nuclear programme was India specific and therefore it was of no consequence to Pakistan what other nuclear power nations decided for them- selves. then– director of the Central Intelligence Agency.”13 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal offers the country a sense of military parity with India. which is located over the line of control that di- vides Indian. made a widely publicized bus trip to Lahore to meet Pakistan’s prime minister Sharif. an apparent response to India’s earlier preparations. the govern- ment of Nawaz Sharif finally gave its permission. agreeing to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues.14 Relations between India and Pakistan after the Nuclear Tests The nuclear tests greatly raised the cost of war in South Asia. In April 1998.” Both leaders recognized that “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries. and it may well have emboldened Pakistan to increase its militancy in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan’s army chief from 1988 to 1991. While Pakistani scientists.S. they have always sought to appear as though they were responding to India.”11 Two weeks after Deutch’s statement. including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. following the Indian nuclear tests.and Pakistani-held Kashmir.” they were ready and able to test a nuclear weapon.S. declared that as soon as Pakistani scientific teams could “get permission from the government. was a undertaken with this newfound parity in mind. the self-proclaimed father of the Paki- stani nuclear weapons program. U. India’s prime minister. and government leaders have proceeded as rapidly as possible since 1972 in developing their country’s nuclear weapons capability.

however. This withdrawal contributed to his political downfall. both countries valued their close ties with the United States . however. Alarmed by the po- tential for escalation. Indeed. but never over the line of control. but partly to demonstrate that they were responsible nuclear stewards. In these efforts.16 Instead. India and Pakistan held talks once again in July 2001. combined with alarming rhetoric. In- dian aircraft bombed Pakistani positions in Indian-administered Kashmir. Because the Indians regarded Musharraf as the chief architect of the Kargil incursion. raising fears of a wider war.S. bring- ing General Pervez Musharraf to power. including prior notification of ballistic missile tests. This revived Indian charges against Pakistan for sponsoring cross-border terror- ism. India’s Bharatiya Janata Party–led gov- ernment was wary of entirely alienating Washington. Most of 2002 was spent on nuclear brinkmanship. Domestic compulsions notwithstanding. in part. a Memorandum of Understanding was signed that laid out specific nuclear confidence-building measures. The Kargil conflict was the first between the two neighbors after the nuclear tests of 1998. aimed at prevention of conflict. officials of the Bill Clinton administration intervened dip- lomatically. Bush administration to expand its focus on the war on terrorism to include Pakistan’s eastern border.17 Relations took a turn for the worse in October 2001. This massive troop buildup. after the Kargil conflict. when a militant attack on the State Assembly in Indian-administered Kashmir claimed 38 lives. when in October 1999 his government was overthrown in a military coup. pressure.242 N o n . largely because Indian political leaders did not want to risk escalation to a wider war. however. Conversely.” To this effect. to set up mechanisms for future negotiations. the nuclear tests appear to have emboldened Pakistan to launch an offensive against India. and dialogue on nuclear and security issues. brought this diplomatic momentum to an abrupt halt. punctuated with gestures to pull back from the brink. a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing.” which proponents argued could be fought under a nuclear umbrella.18 Relations between India and Pakistan took a precipitous turn after the terror- ist attack on India’s parliament in early December 2001. The three-day Agra summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf ended abruptly without a joint declaration and was deemed a fail- ure. precisely because they wanted to demon- strate that their nuclear weapons did not have a restraining effect on India. Both countries mobi- lized a large number of troops along the border in Kashmir. new thinking emerged in India on “lim- ited war. some Indian strategists proffered scenarios of limited war under the nuclear shadow. Sharif ’s government withdrew Pakistani troops from Kargil. a means of pressuring the George W. Under U. relations between the two countries deteriorated further. once again raised the specter of a nuclear confrontation in South Asia.19 India’s brinkmanship was. and it destroyed any illusions that the overt nuclear postures of the two countries would act as a re- straint on military conflict. The summer 1999 incursion of Pakistani troops into Kargil.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confi- dence building in the nuclear and conventional fields.

24 The rapprochement continued in January 2004. President Musharraf reassured him that he would take action against the terrorist camps. they had set up a hotline between their countries’ foreign secretaries to avoid a nuclear confrontation. Manmohan Singh.-secured steps were essential to the return of diplomacy in South Asia. Significantly. diplomacy was helpful. Nuclear Analysis Pakistan secretly launched its nuclear weapons program in 1972. This gave the United States additional leverage to buy time and engage the two adversaries to help prevent a potential disaster. Pakistan 243 and were reluctant to jeopardize that relationship. Kashmir was part of an agenda that included terrorism. and economic coopera- tion. In April 2003.27 The weapon effort focused substantially on the production of highly enriched uranium with technology . This group was designated a “terrorist group” by the U. drug trafficking. including a cease-fire along the line of control in Kashmir.21 and full diplomatic ties were incrementally restored over the next few months. but they were critical in getting the peace process moving. as part of nuclear confidence-building measures. The two countries restored air links. By the end of June 2004.S. The two countries then embarked on a “composite dialogue” process that meets India’s requirements because it departs from the “centrality” of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan also barred the leader of the outlawed Jaish-e-Mohammed. State Department just before Armitage’s visit to Islamabad. Musharraf ’s willingness to publicly affirm that he will not “per- mit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner” was critical to pushing the process along.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage said that he was “cautiously optimistic” that Vajpayee’s diplomatic opening “could possibly lead to a step-by-step process that would eventually resolve all issues. including the details of an agreement on ad- vance notification of missile tests and establishing a hotline. These U.S. and meets Pakistan’s requirements because it keeps the Kashmir issue on the table.” then–Indian prime minister Vajpayee offered to resume dialogue with Pakistan. who was behind the December 2001 attack on India’s Par- liament. when President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met for the first time since 2001. citing a need for a “new beginning. These South Asian semantics may seem trivial.25 After Vajpayee’s defeat in the general elections in India in April 2004. and had extended their moratorium on nuclear tests. also pledged to work for peace between India and Pakistan.”23 During Armitage’s May 2003 visit to Pakistan. Indian forces had pulled back. then–U. Pakistan banned Hizbul Mujahideen activities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.22 While visiting the region in May 2003. The program acquired further momentum after India’ s nuclear test in May 1974.26 The talks and cautious optimism continued into the spring of 2005.20 This antiterrorism language in a January 2003 joint statement reassured the Indian government.S. from entering Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. exchanged ambassadors. the new prime minister. and worked on confidence-building measures. Libya and Saudi Arabia funded the program in its early years. and by September–October 2002. U.

S. which began with the clandestine acquisition of key technology for the Kahuta plant from the Netherlands.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s gained covertly during the late 1970s and 1980s.29 Some Pakistani experts say that the country had acquired a capability as early as 1984. It also involved du- plicitous procurement from Canada. This amendment requires the termination of assistance to any state that has imported uranium enrichment equipment or technology since 1977 and that has refused to place it under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Italy. Pakistani sources now state that the nation acquired its first nuclear explosive capability in 1987.244 N o n . It included the illicit import of an entire facility from West Germany for producing uranium hexafluoride. Although the United States sought to discourage Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear program throughout this period. equipping.S. Washing- ton restrained its pressure on Islamabad because of Pakistan’s role in the cam- paign to oust Soviet forces from Afghanistan. and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment facility. when they were reportedly considering a first test. Switzerland. which have been intermittently waived as a result of devel- opments in Afghanistan. which reached a key milestone in 1985.S. This legis- lation specified that U. Foreign Assis- tance Act. fiscal year that Pakistan did “not possess a nuclear explosive device and that . Pakistan’s nuclear program has repeatedly brought the country under U. The 1979 economic and military aid cutoff was made pursuant to the 1977 Glenn-Symington Amendment to the U.S. when it crossed the threshold of being able to produce weapons-grade uranium. policy toward Pakistan.30 The 1985 Pressler Amendement to the Foreign Assistance Act also reflected the Afghanistan-related ambivalence of U. Pakistan had apparently produced enough material to make its first nuclear device. Officials of Ronald Reagan’s administration also argued that the restoration of aid would advance U. Khan brought to Pakistan personal knowledge of gas-centrifuge equipment and industrial suppliers (primarily in Europe). China. which were later improved and formed the core of the black market network he headed (see below). aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan would be cut off unless the president certified at the beginning of each U. thereby reducing Islamabad’s motivation to acquire nuclear arms. despite numerous pledges to the United States that it would not do so. the United Kingdom. continued its nuclear weapons program. Pakistan. He also reportedly returned to Pakistan with stolen plans for European centrifuges. in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Af- ghanistan. however.S. He was eventually put in charge of building. sanctions.S. In 1981. France. Instead. a German-trained metallur- gist who in the early 1970s was employed at the classified Urenco uranium en- richment plant at Almelo in the Netherlands. the United States suspended the application of the uranium enrich- ment sanctions for six years. The Pakistani nuclear weapons effort relied on a massive smuggling program.28 Since 1979. By 1986. nonproliferation objectives by enhancing Pakistan’s overall security. and the United States. This was expedited by the return to Pakistan in 1975 of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Washington provided greatly increased military and economic assistance to Pakistan to create a bulwark against further Soviet expansion and to establish Pakistan as a strategic partner in the Cold War.

” or whether they were intended to permit Pakistan to increase its number of uranium enrichment centrifuges. In late 1989 and early 1990. W. military sales was rescinded. The United States terminated all aid and govern- ment-to-government military sales to Pakistan. which modified the Pressler Amendment’s sanctions. hoping to receive these armaments in the event that the prohibi- tion against such U. assistance program would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. Pakistan 245 the proposed U. China’s ring-magnet assistance to Pakistan. By this time. Presidents Ronald Reagan and then George H. During the 1990s. agreed to suspend the further production of weapons-grade uranium. apparently began in December 1994 and con- tinued until the Clinton administration became aware of the transaction in August 1995.S. Pakistan apparently ended this freeze. a key component of the bearings that support the high- speed rotation of centrifuges.S. and the enlargement of Pakistan’s capacity to enrich uranium. undercut the Clinton administration’s efforts to restore a measure of nonproliferation influence in its relations with Pakistan. either at Kahuta or at another location. The 1989 certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device was.31 Pakistan continued to produce low-enriched uranium. The most publicized incident was Pakistan’s purchase from China of 5. W. the construction of a Chinese-designed and supplied plutonium produc- tion reactor of 40 megawatts thermal at Khushab. sized to fit the type of centrifuge at the Kahuta plant. however.S. although congressional amendments allowed for some military sales to Pakistan. aid to Pakistan was limited primarily to the country’s refugee and narcotics problems. Throughout the 1990s. The country fabricated cores for several nuclear weapons from preexisting stocks of weapons-grade uranium.000 custom- made ring magnets. thereby enlarg- ing its total nuclear weapons potential. perhaps because of the threat of war with India. It was not clear whether the ring magnets were intended for Kahuta as a “future reserve supply. the Soviet army had left Afghanistan. reportedly through the construction of an enrichment plant at Golra. It prevented Pakistan from receiving economic or targeted military aid. reportedly. The shipments of the magnets. Benazir Bhutto. 28 additional F-16s and other military hardware were on order but were never transferred because of the sanctions. a freeze that reportedly held until the spring of 1998. the George H. U.” However. however. which the administration and many legislators had earlier anticipated after the 1999 Brown Amendment. Pakistani specialists sought to improve the Kahuta enrichment plant and to expand the country’s capacity to enrich uranium. . At the time. Bush made the certifications necessary to permit U. Bush administration was unable or unwilling to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive. aid and arms sales. made only after Pakistan’s prime minister. Prime Minister Sharif reinstated the freeze on the production of weapons-grade uranium. Other aspects of the Pakistani nuclear program also continued to advance—including work on nuclear weapon de- signs. Islamabad continued making payments on the purchases after October 1990.S. and in October 1990. In late 1991. despite further Paki- stani nuclear weapons advances through October 1989.

there are some unofficial but authoritative pointers to the broad outlines of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The tests appear to have been success- ful and to have validated Pakistan’s design of a nuclear device with a yield of 10 to 15 kilotons.”38 In the absence of an agreement on mutual restraints with India. Pakistan actively pursued a plutonium production capability during the 1990s. This facility is not subject to IAEA inspections and is capable of gen- erating enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons annually. Pakistan has yet to officially enunciate a nuclear doctrine. Bush waived sanctions for Pakistan and India on September 22.” Further. Pakistan rejects a “no-first-use” policy. has spoken of unofficial thresholds for nuclear use. However. when it announced that the Khushab reactor had begun operation.32 Access to plutonium can allow Pakistan to develop smaller and lighter nuclear warheads. Given India’s over- whelming superiority in conventional weaponry. Q.”39 In addition. possibly the cumulative effect of simultaneous detonations.S.33 Pakistan claims to have conducted five tests on May 28. In 1999. they posited that “the size of Pakistan’s arsenal and its deployment pattern have to be adjusted to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception. where the country’s existence is considered at stake: . Its efforts came to fruition in April 1998. The tests. but they are all thought to have employed a simple fission design. It functions as the secretariat to the NCA. the director of Pakistan’s SPD. produced a seismic signal equivalent to a yield of 2 to 8 kilotons.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission.35 In February 2000. 2001. they suggested that “a high state of alert will become more necessary as India proceeds with deploy- ment of nuclear weapons. three highly influential Pakistani statesmen made the case for a “credible minimum nuclear deterrence. ending the U. General Khalid Kidwai. Nuclear Tests and Nuclear Policy In May 1998. This. Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests. which consists of two committees to advise President Musharraf on the employment and development of nuclear weapons. retiring A. President George W. however. which indicated a total yield of 6 to 13 kilo- tons. 1998. There has been no official Pakistani statement on the types of weapons tested. Pakistan established the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).34 The tests activated Glenn- Symington Amendment sanctions once more. The single signal led U. Pakistan consolidated the Khan Research Laboratories and the rival Pakistan Atomic Research Corporation into one Nuclear Defense Complex. produced only a single seismic signal.246 N o n . scientists to question whether five detonations did take place. government’s economic assistance and military transfers to Pakistan.37 The following year. in turn.S.36 The Army Strategic Plan Division (SPD) was also set up to better control nuclear weapons. would facilitate Pakistan’s development of warheads for ballistic missiles. But citing the need to work with both governments in the fight against terrorism and using the author- ity granted him by the “Brownback II” amendment of June 1999. Khan from his leadership role at the former. An addition test or tests on May 30.

strike. IAEA investigations into Iran’s nuclear program and Libya’s deci- sion to come clean on its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons programs exposed the A. Libya. and • India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization). this time against international terrorism. IAEA .40 How any of these principles may translate into operational policy is unclear. • India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic stran- gling). Khan was at the center of an illegal nuclear trafficking network. Khan–led nuclear black market. whose clients included Iran.S. they will be used if • India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space thresh- old).S. North Korea. • India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military thresh- old).41 Developments since September 11. and possibly other countries. Pakistan 247 Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. Q. how- ever. Q. After the United States began bombing Afghanistan.S preemptive strike against Pakistan. Musharraf justified his cooperation with the United States by telling his pub- lic that Pakistan’s “strategic assets” were best protected by joining the U. As a result of President Musharraf ’s decision to cooperate with the United States in the war against terrorism. Pakistan immediately dispersed different components of its nuclear assets to six locations. given that Pakistan had actively supported the Taliban and that its intelligence service was intimately involved with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In case that deterrence fails. Pakistani officials have said that these thresholds are “purely academic”. all nuclear-related sanctions were waived. they have not disavowed the parameters. Some experts have urged the United States to offer Pakistan assistance in securing its fissile material and weapons from theft by outside terrorist groups.45 A. have dramatically altered the U. It became public knowledge that A.42 Pakistani leaders may well have feared the possibility of a U.43 Some Pakistani officials and nuclear experts believe the more likely risk may be that militants within the military or government could seize nuclear assets or provide expertise to oth- ers. The United States also waived the democracy-related sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan after an army coup brought Musharraf to power in October 1999. Q. 2001.44 This specter was raised particularly when Pakistan arrested two of its nuclear scientists for alleged connections with members of the Taliban. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market In late 2003. Musharraf may have calculated that this was the best way to diminish the possibility of a U. which once again became a frontline state in a U. In the aftermath of September 11.S. battle in Afghanistan. The potential for civil unrest and instability inside Pakistan has raised inter- national concern over the safety of its nuclear strategic assets. policy on nuclear-based sanctions against Pakistan. coa- lition against international terrorism.S.

And Pakistani military cargo planes transported missiles from North Korea to Pakistan—systems for which North Korea may have accepted nuclear assistance instead of hard currency—suggesting the military’s com- plicity.”48 For at least twelve years.” ElBaradei said.51 Even if the military leaders did not formally authorize the transfers. Khan’s nuclear black market trade spanned the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and the military-led gov- ernment of President Musharraf.248 N o n . which transferred compo- nents and weapon-related designs and drawings between 1989 and 1991. Khan confessed (in English on Pakistani television) to his proliferation crimes and took sole responsibility.47 The breadth and scale of the procurement. machinery.49 Khan used transit points and middlemen in Dubai in the Persian Gulf. Reports of Pakistan’s assistance to Iran go back to 1988. has surpassed my ex- pectations. Khan led this multinational black market export operation.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s director general Mohamed ElBaradei called it “the Wal-Mart of private prolif- eration. however.”46 Suspicions about Pakistan’s nuclear exports have long persisted. frankly. however. models. Libya re- portedly bought those blueprints from Khan’s dealers for more than $50 million. and notes on first-generation P-1 and the next- generation P-2 centrifuges. enrich- ment equipment. adding. shipped to a fourth. as early as 1979.53 His personal travels are another piece of evidence that the Paki- stani government was aware of at least some of his illegal activities. Malaysia. technical design data. Turkey. Switzerland. in exchange for a full pardon from President Musharraf. IAEA investigations of Iran’s nuclear program reveal that Tehran acquired centrifuge equipment from Khan’s black market sources.55 The blueprints were copies of the design that China had apparently . “The sophistication of the process.52 Pa- kistani officials say Khan met personally with Iranian scientists in both Pakistan and Malaysia.50 In February 2004. “When you see things being de- signed in one country. Between 1991 and 1997. along with some complete centrifuge rotor assemblies. was startling. given the highly sensitive nature of the trade and the fact that Pakistan’s military controls the country’s nuclear assets. South Africa. Khan’s full pardon raises the possibility that the military wanted to ensure that he did not reveal details that would have incriminated its leadership. which netted more than $100 million from Libya alone. and the United Kingdom. they should have known about and stopped the transfers. It provided blueprints. Musharraf maintains that Khan ran a private enter- prise that had nothing to do with the government.54 Libya’s war- head blueprints were the first evidence that the black market had provided its customers with far more than just uranium enrichment technology. components. there were reports of Pakistan providing nuclear assistance to Libya. among a list of about thirty countries. Germany. specifications. manufactured in two or three others. Iran purchased P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs through the Khan network. Khan supplied Libya with actual designs for nuclear weapons. redirected to a fifth. This assertion is implausible. because all his international trips were presumably tracked. that means there’s lots of offices all over the world. and.

Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540. 2004. The National Assembly and the Senate ratified the legislation on September 19. calling into question the Musharraf government’s claims that such transfers had stopped in 2000 after the military took necessary action. requires licensing and record keeping. and.S. U.62 The new law prohibits the diversion of controlled goods and technologies. Pakistan had passed export legislation in July 1998.57 It was reported that North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000. One visit occurred as late as June 2002. In April 2004. Pakistan still requires imports to maintain its own nuclear weapons capability. There is also the possibility that secondary operatives might now launch their own lucra- tive nuclear businesses.N. in large part because the full extent of the operations is not yet known. This denial of direct access to Khan has impeded a comprehensive investigation. it is possible that the country’s leaders do not favorably view a permanent and full dismantling of this existing international procurement system because of Pakistan’s continuing reliance on nuclear-weapon-related imports. and transit. establishes export control lists and penal provisions of up to fourteen . facing increased international pressure. including reexport. the military is exempted). Pakistan 249 transferred to Pakistan in the 1960s and reportedly had notations in Chinese from Chinese engineers and designers.” saying that Khan was not operating alone.56 Since the discovery of North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment pro- gram. Musharraf ’s role as an ally in the war on terrorism and domestic sen- sitivities in Pakistan have led the United States to publicly downplay any con- cerns it may have that Musharraf or the government was directly involved. requiring states to criminalize such trade and prosecute their practitioners.61 U.58 Between 1997 and 2002. Khan reportedly made thirteen trips to North Korea. February 1999. will be allowed to interrogate Khan. the U. August 1999. Security Council Resolution 1540 and Pakistan’s Export Control Law The Khan black market network revealed both the gaping loopholes in Pakistan’s domestic export control laws and the glaring gap in international law and en- forcement capabilities to prosecute such illicit trade. Mohamed ElBaradei has called Khan “the tip of an ice- berg. states are held fully responsible for the illicit proliferation activity that occurs within their ju- risdiction. Thus. Furthermore. His case “raises more questions than it answers.59 Musharraf has insisted that no independent authority. intelligence officials have claimed that Pakistan supplied enrichment equipment to Pyongyang in exchange for Nodong missiles. and again in November 2000. transshipment.” ElBardei has noted. 2004.60 There remains little assurance that the exports have ended permanently.N. Despite the grave consequences of Khan’s activities. Several loopholes and contradictions per- meated these laws (for example. That is. including the IAEA. Pakistan passed a new export control bill on July 7.

There are reports that some of these have already been modified to carry nuclear weapons. U.-supplied F-16s. enforcement of the act. Pakistan procured longer-range systems.67 .to 300-kilometer range. as long as Pakistan’s civilian governments and army were not complicit in the A. a person in the service of Pakistan within or outside Pakistan. along with associated equipment. ex- porters will also be required to maintain records of all transactions and report them to the designated government agencies. Competing development projects pitted the North Korean. All agencies involved in the licens- ing process will be required to maintain records of all relevant recommendations and decisions. Furthermore. with Chinese assistance. that was the case. Missile and Aircraft Analysis Throughout the 1990s. The control lists of items subject to licensing requirements will be reviewed periodically and updated as required by the government. and licensing for export and reex- port of nuclear.63 The act also calls for the creation of an oversight board to administer export control regulations. in terms of both procurement and pace. The shipment and transfer of nuclear and bio- logical technology via ground transport. Rivalry between these two organizations has probably driven the country’s missile pro- gram. were the most likely means of delivering a Pakistani nuclear weapon. Later. it launched a program to develop two short-range ballistic missile systems: the 80-kilometer-range Hatf I and the 300-kilometer-range Hatf II.S. Khan nuclear black market and the authorities are willing and able to enforce the laws. nuclear-capable M-11 ballistic missile system (known in Pakistan as the Hatf III).and biological-related goods and technology. including the Ghauri and Shaheen systems. and state enforcement is weak. Pakistan also sought to acquire from China the 280. Its jurisdiction closes some of the previous loopholes and exemptions. then no set of legal changes will be suffi- cient in a country where the rule of law is not guaranteed. liquid- fueled Ghauri missiles of Khan Research Laboratories against the Chinese. infor- mation in the public domain or related to basic scientific research for peaceful or provocative purpose to kill anyone.250 N o n .65 The development of several mature ballistic missile systems—primarily with assistance from China and North Korea—has now given Pakistan the means to deliver nuclear weapons by missile as well.S. The act describes “technology” as a document.500). Before 2001. Q. If. however.66 Pakistan’s efforts to acquire ballistic missiles began in the early 1980s and intensified in the mid-1980s when. officials believed that the U.64 This may well be a positive step. which could be equipped to arm nuclear weapons in flight. It would also cover any foreign national in Pakistan. the former is North Korean technology and the latter Chinese. ships. extending over all of Pakistan and to every Pakistani. solid- fueled Shaheen missiles of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s years imprisonment and a fine of PRs 5 million (about $86. and aircraft registered in Paki- stan is also criminalized. Pakistan used a dual-track approach for its ballistic missile de- velopment. or any Pakistani visiting or working abroad.

however. over Chinese entities. In April 1999. government states that assistance from Chinese entities has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of the solid propellant Shaheen submarine- launched ballistic missiles and has supported Pakistan’s development of solid- . solid-fueled. with an uncon- firmed range of 2.73 The two-stage Shaheen-II medium-range missile is said by the Pakistani government to have a full range of 2. from Pakistani terri- tory. a solid-fueled missile. a third version of the Ghauri. was displayed in a March 2000 parade. However. It was tested on October 8. however. In the fall of 2004. before India’s nuclear tests in May. Its development has recently slowed. Neither the Shaheen I nor II is reported to have a nuclear capability as of the spring of 2005. On April 6. a nuclear- capable 300-kilometer-range ballistic missile.000 kilometers. This missile. India and Pakistan agreed to develop a formal system for early notification of missile tests. is Pakistan’s only liquid-fueled missile. Pakistan claims that both tests were successful. and on December 8. and it was tested for the first time in March 2004. adding that the missile had been “inducted” into the army.300 kilometers and carries a payload estimated at 500 to 750 kilograms. New Delhi. is under development and was test launched on August 15. Pakistan continues to develop the Ghauri II. and it was tested on November 29. and a test launch scheduled for June 2004 never occurred. Pakistan announced serial production of the Shaheen I.500 kilometers and to carry a 1. would probably not be able to reach India’s capital. Pakistan 251 In July 1997.500 kilometers.72 a year later on October 8 and 14. is capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload. the Ghauri III. 2002. Pakistan also successfully tested the 750-kilometer. 2004. The Shaheen II.000-kilogram payload. 2004. Finally. 1998. possibly a derivative of the Chinese M-9.70 In January 2003. which has a range of upward of 1.74 Foreign Assistance Although Chinese assistance has been critical to the progress of Pakistan’s ballis- tic missile programs.69 The Ghauri. In early 2001. and it is launched from a road- mobile launcher. after India’s test of the 2.S. Meanwhile. Pakistan reportedly tested the Hatf III. official Chinese assistance has largely petered out since 2001.000-kilometer Agni II. Some concern continues to linger. on the heels of India’s semideployment of the Prithvi short- range missile in Punjab. Pakistan tested the Ghauri I missile. 2003. 2004. The U. nuclear- capable Shaheen I (also called the Hatf IV) in April 1999.71 The most recent Ghauri flight test occurred on October 12. India’s largest industrial city. based on North Korea’s No Dong.700 to 3. Pakistan announced that the Ghauri had been handed over to the army. Pakistan claimed to have successfully tested the Ghauri II. the Shaheen I (M-9) could target not only New Delhi but possi- bly also reach as far as Mumbai (Bombay). The Pakistani Hatf III (M-11) with a 280-kilometer-range capability.68 This missile is operational. 2000. with a range of approximately 2. The measure was a result of the high-level di- plomacy over the summer between the two rivals. though they both have the potential.

In 1999. Pakistan may have also turned to North Korea because of the above-mentioned rivalry between the Pakistan Atomic Research Corpora- tion and the Khan Research Laboratories. and in May 1993. Actual work on the Ghauri missile began in 1993 with North Korean assistance. the United States imposed Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime sanctions on the Khan Research Laboratories and on North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation. nuclear-capable No Dong missiles from North Korea to Pakistan.82 The sanctions reportedly in- volved the transfer of fully assembled. under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani officials visited North Korea to view a No Dong prototype. The relationship between Pyongyang and Islamabad was established between 1992 and 1995 during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s tenure. Q. The relationship continued.76 North Korea’s assistance has been crucial to Pakistan’s medium-range Ghauri missile program. after Bhutto first visited Pyongyang.79 The missile cooperation became public when Pakistan first tested the Ghauri missile in April 1998 in the presence of North Koreans. with North Korean missile experts reportedly working in Pakistan. North Korea also transferred complete missile systems (the No Dong) to Pakistan.75 It appears that the overall decline in Chinese assistance has left Pakistan turning to North Korea as an alternative supplier. Prime Min- ister Bhutto visited Pyongyang in December 1993 to set the stage for a missile deal.78 As part of their missile agreements. Indian officials also found 22 technical manuals for Scud-type missiles. Consequently.77 The Ghauri is virtually a renamed No Dong missile. and against a North Korean entity.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s propellant Shaheen medium-range ballistic missiles. it is unclear whether or not this relationship has been terminated since the fall of 2002. The exchange may have also given North Korea a means of testing its missiles. the United States imposed sanctions against the Khan Re- search Laboratory. In 1992. which produces the Ghauri systems. Pakistani engineers and scientists watched the No Dong test launch. even while it maintains a self- imposed moratorium on missile flight tests.84 . “for specific missile-related transfers” that occurred in the summer of 2002. which was finally brokered in late 1995. Indian custom officials seized a North Korean ship off India’s western coastline that was carrying missile com- ponents and metal casings to Pakistan.81 In March 2003. This relationship has continued under the Musharraf regime. how- ever.83 Despite President Musharraf ’s assurances that such a relationship no longer exists. which was under the purview of the Khan Research Laboratories. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation. Khan black market revelations have shed more light on long-held suspicions that this missile technology was provided in return for Pakistan’s as- sistance with gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology. who reportedly helped with the test launch.80 The A.252 N o n .

2000. “Fissile Materials. December 13. 33.” 17.org. 2003. Ibid. 1999.org. Hari Kumar. October 22. January/February 2002.C. October 16. 70–71. 21.” Carnegie Analysis.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation at a Glance. Rajkumar. Miriam Rajkumar.org. “Indian Leader. D. Amy Waldman and David Rohde. Weapons estimates are based on 13 to 18 kilograms of HEU per weapon. 5. July 7. 22.htm. “Tension Rises in Volatile Kashmir. Pamela Constable. Miriam Rajkumar. Anti-Terror Coalition Faces Challenge. “Nuclear Nirvana. “Spring Thaw in South Asia. “India and Pakistan: The Dispute Burns On. 9. This estimate is extrapolated from David Albright. Ibid. General Mirza Aslam Beg. Senate. 16.” Pakistan Observer. November 26. U. 27. End of 1999 (Washington. available at www.” New York Times. 2003.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. 2003. 12.” February 21. “Fissile Materials: Stockpiles Still Growing. 6. 4. 2003. 23. May/June 2004. pp.: Institute for Science and International Secu- rity. Leonard Weiss. Albright and Cramer.” New York Times. 24.” The Hindu. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press. 8. Paulo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini.armscontrol.” Sep- tember 2002. see “NRDC Nuclear Notebook.” Carnegie Analysis.isis-online. Hoodbhoy. 12.html. p. Pakistan Trade Blame over Summit.” CNN News Online. 2000). “India. 413.S. India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventories.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Rajiv Chandrasekaran. 14.org/publications/southasia/stocks1000.org/factsheets/cbwprolif. 2. pp. p. “Pakistan: It’s Deja-Vu All Over Again.” Select Committee on Intelligence. 2004. Rahul Bedi. 18. in Kashmir. “The Lahore Declaration. 2001.asp. “Nuclear Nirvana. 1999. May 20. 15. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Propriety. Natural Resources Defense Council. Pakistan 253 N OTES 1. February 19. July 18. Amy Waldman.” New York Times. Extends Olive Branch to Pakistan.proliferationnews.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear. “India. Ibid. 2002. Pervez Hoodbhoy. Pakistan Agree Nuclear Hotline. November 16. See “Pakistan Blasts Indian Missile Test. 14–16. 2001. 19. 433.pugwash. and David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. 20.proliferationnews. Arms Control Association. available at www. no.nrdc. 1999). 13. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma.asp. .” Jane’s Defense Weekly. February 22. available at www. 10. available at www. 14–16. Testimony of John Deutch. available at www. pp. p. Ibid. 26.” www. 2004. 3.org. B. 52–59. Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan. “Indian and Pakistani Forces Agree to Cease-Fire in Kashmir. “Talks on Nuclear. April 9. 2001. January 9. George Perkovich. Pakistan Bristles at Indian Shelling. vol. available at www.” Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project Issue Brief.org/nuclear/nudb/ datab21. 1996. 2002.” 25.” Carnegie Proliferation Roundtable.” Washington Post. January 21. 7. “Nuclear Safety. and George Perkovich. Muralidhar Reddy.. director of central intelligence. Conventional CBMs from Tomorrow. “Nuclear Notebook.” pp. 2004.” a concise report of a visit by Landau Network–Centro Volta. available on the Carnegie Non-Proliferation web site at www. 11. “Spring Thaw in South Asia. September 26.proliferationnews.proliferationnews. April 19. “Peace Process in South Asia. For a similar estimate based on 15–20 kilograms per weapon. November/December 2004. “Current and Projected National Secu- rity Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad.” Washington Post. 3.

1999. 1998.. “Pakistan’s Disturbing Nuclear Trail. October 5. 2001). “Nuclear Safety. “UN Official Sees a ‘Wal-Mart’ in Nuclear Trafficking. Also see Seymour Hersh. 2001. The “P” refers to Pakistani origin/design. Needs a Contingency Plan for Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal. “Warhead Blueprints. February 16. “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan. 55.: Rand. 10. Scientists. January 23. Department of Defense (DOD). For details on this setup. “UN Official Sees a ‘Wal-Mart’ in Nuclear Trafficking. 35.” 49. Board and David E. 32. 2001. “Nuclear Jitters. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommenda- tions of the 9/11 Commission: U.” Christian Science Monitor. June 8. Woolsey. “Pakistan. 2005.S. Congressional Research Service. 2004. Smith. “A. See also William J. 4. “Securing Nuclear Peace. 37. 1998. pp. Material.” National Development and Security. Weiss. p. 50. 36. p. Nuclear Ambi- tions (Boulder. 7. May 29.” 31.” Center for Nonprolif- eration Studies.” 48. 2004. Agha Shahi. 1. 2004.S. Calif. “Watching the Warheads: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- ons at Risk. 56. 42. February 4.” Washington Post. “How Secure Is Pakistan’s Plutonium? New York Times. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Propriety.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 28. 51. Ijaz and R. Ramusino and Martellini. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Paki- stan. “Pakistan. see Leonard Spector and Jacqueline R.” Report for Congress. 2004.” New York Times. 59. Sanger. “Nuclear Safety. “U. Weiss.” Report for Congress. Issue Paper 192 (Santa Monica.” Washington Post. 29. “Nuclear Safety. 24. Ramusino and Martellini. and Michael Hirsh and John Barry.” 52.S. 2000).: DOD. 47. November 28. 60. 32. “A. Gregory Jones.” p. Alex Wagner. “Bush Waives Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India.” Arms Control Today. p. October 26. “Pakistani Scientist Tied to Illicit Nuclear Supply Network. Zulfikar Ali Khan.” 57. “Pakistan.” For an overview. William J. October 2001. Technologies. Gaurav Kampani.” News and Dawn. Janu- ary 25. “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan.” Los Angeles Times. Broad and Sanger. February 23. and Sattar.S.” 40. February 4.” 45. 29.” 43. Khan.” p. Ramusino and Martellini. 46. Ibid. “Ending Pakistan’s Nuclear Trade. and Weiss. Mark Lander. Congressional Research Service. and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Bio- logical Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act. “Securing Nuclear Peace.” Newsweek. “Export Control on Goods. Policy Constraints and Options. p. 62. Jones. and Abdul Sattar. Broad. Ibid. February 7. Ibid. Shahi. 33.254 N o n . Faye Brown.” New Yorker. 44. 53. 24–25. 2004. 58.” Pakistan submitted a copy to the IAEA on . J. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces. Friends Quarterly Journal. Pakistan. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.” New York Times. 34. This assumes 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per bomb. “Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Fig- ure. 2004.: Westview Press.” India Today. Jon Wolfsthal. Q. D. 2000. 2004.” 38.” New York Times.C. Lander. U. “Nuclear Safety. Congressional Research Service. “Explosion Is Detected by U. 10. March 11. 2004. and Ramusino and Martellini. 2001. Khan. 61. M. Colo. Khan: Nuclear Rogue. 1990). 39. “Weapons of Mass Destruction. “Nuclear Safety. Q. chaps. October 27. General Mirza Aslam Beg. 54.” 41. Ibid. 30. Monterey Institute of International Studies. October 16. see Ramusino and Martellini.

66. vol.” Strategic Comments (International Institute for Strategic Studies). Center for Nonproliferation Studies. www. see “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter- Trades. 67. 71.pdf.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. DOD. Rs 5m Fine for N-Proliferation.” CNN News Online.pdf. July/August 2001.” Arms Control Today. Novem- ber 2002.” Washington Post. 75.” www. “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK.” Arms Control Today. From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces. 1999. 69. Khan with Atta ul Mohsin. September 2004. 70. and www. Q. 77. November 2002. “Ballistic Missile: Pakistan Test-Fires Shaheen II. 8. “India. 65. See “Pakistan Blasts Indian Missile Test.html. 1998. 78. 2004. March 10. April 7. issue 9. “Pakistan Nuclear Update 2003.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control).org/nuclear/nudb/datab21. Central Intelligence Agency.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/ infcirc636.” Pakistan Times.” 80.” Occasional Paper 2. “The A.org/news/nuclear/nuclear-arsenals. Pakistan Conduct Missile Tests. “Summary of Pakistan’s Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems. Joseph S.cia.. 1 January through 30 June 2003. issue 9. Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Con- trols.” 81. Jones. 83. Gabrielle Kohlmeier. “Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.” Arms Control Today.nti. Shi-chin Lin.asp. “India. 72. Pakistan Seek Missile Test Pact.” available at www. Bermudez Jr. vol. October 19.iaea. 2001. Ramachandran. October 2004.htm#17.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/ jan_jun2003. 64. “Pakistan Tests Medium-Range Missile. 79. Proliferation: Threat and Response. Center for Defense Information. The Prithvi has since been moved to a “strategic” location. 76. Maria A. vol. January 9. Suzanne Goldenberg. 84.” Frontline. 2004.nrdc. “Pakistan: Khan Forced Out. “Pakistan Helped North Korea Make Bomb. see “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter- Trades. 74. For a good synopsis of this relationship.” Guardian. 04. 2004. Pakistani Lab Sanctioned for Proliferation.” 82. 73. 2002. 63. Rose Gordon.” Daily Times. “14 Years in Jail. 57. November–December 2003.org/e_research/e3_54a.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 16. available at www. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. April 24–May 7. and R.cdi. “North Korea. November 1999. Pakistan 255 November 4. Najum Mushtaq. May 2003.” . 68. no. May 6. to Secunderabad in southern India. “Pakistan’s Ballistic Response. For an excellent synopsis of this relationship. “Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-Trades. 2003.

30 KWt. nat. planned Planned Chasma-1/ Light-water.000 Swu/y will expand to 15. light-water.000 Sihala Ultracentrifuge Pilot plant of 54 ultra. 137 MWe. originally HEU. U. planned Planned Chasnupp 2 Research Reactors Pakistan Atomic Pool-type. operating Golra Ultracentrifuge plant reportedly to be No used as a testing facility.1. HEU. 310 MWe. No Production Reactor operating Khushab Uranium Enrichment Khan Research Large-scale ultracentrifuge facility. Yes Research Reactor 1 modified to use LEU. operating Yes Chasnupp 1 Chasma-2/ Light-water. nat. No Laboratories (KRL) operating Kahuta Capacity 5. Yes Karachi operating KANUPP-2 600 MWe. Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Nuclear Weapons Research & Development Complex Khan Research Fabrication of HEU into nuclear No Laboratories (KRL) weapon Kahuta Ras Koh Site of nuclear tests conducted in 1998 No Kharan Desert Site of nuclear tests conducted in 1998 No Pakistan Ordnance Possible nuclear weapons assembly site No Factory. operat- (PARR 1) ing (may have been used clandestinely Rawalpindi to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons) PARR 2 MNSR. operational status unknown . U. Light-water. LEU. Wah Power Reactors KANUPP Heavy-water. 50 MWt. LEU.256 N o n . No centrifuges. 325 MWe. 10 MWt.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 12. Yes Rawalpindi operating Research/Plutonium Heavy-water.

operating No Issa Khel Lahore Pilot-scale uranium mill. Pakistan 257 Gadwal Enrichment plant Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Chasma Partially built and terminated by France No (1978). operational status Rawalpindi unclear PINSTECH Experimental-scale laboratory for No Rawalpindi research on solvent extraction Uranium Processing Baghalchar Uranium mining. capacity 30tu Chasma/Kundian Fuel fabrication. capacity for No SPINSTECH 10-20 kg/year. operating Issa Khel Uranium ore processing. closed No Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium ore processing. No operating Karachi Water Upgrading plant. operating No Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium conversion (UF6). near Uranium ore processing. French design. indigenous construction of the building shell may be complete. No annual production 23tu. U308 No production. located 150 km south of Rawalpindi (Khushab) Storage Hawks Bay Depot Operating Yes Karachi (table continues on the following page) . operating. No operating Teitium Tritium Production Can produce 5-10 grams/day. Pilot-scale. operational status unknown New laboratories. PHWR. 15 MT/year. planned Qabul Khel. U308 No production. acquired No Facility from West Germany in 1987 and tested in 1987. 13 MT/year. operating No 1 Heavy-Water Production Multan Supplied by Belgium.

258 N o n .iaea.org/wmd/world/pakistan/facility. Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium LEU low-enriched uranium nat.org/burke/hd/ reports/threat_pak_nukes. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). . U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal SSOURCES OURCES: Nuclear Engineering International. but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water. available at http://cns.” available at www.org/programmes/a2/ index.pdf.K. Andrew Koch and Jennifer Topping.1. 3.: Wilmington Publishing. available at www.” Nonproliferation Review. “Pakistan Special Weapons Facilities. “Power Reactor Information System (PRIS). IAEA. Anthony Cordesman and Arleigh Burke.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.pdf.miis.” available at www.” available at www. NOTE NOTES: 1. 2004.org/worldatom/rrdb/.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 12. vol.” November 8.htm. 2001. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities. U.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/9707paki. “Pakistan’s Nuclear-Related Facilities.csis. “The Threat of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. “Research Reactor Database (RRDB).globalsecurity. no.iaea. 2004 World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup. Global Security. 4.html.

Aircraft and Missile Capability As the most capable military power in the region. indisputably regarded as a de facto nuclear weapon state.* It is. The weapons calculation is described later in this chapter. however.000 kilogram payload) and medium- range (1.1 Plutonium separated from the fuel rods in the reactor allowed Israel to complete the devel- opment of its first nuclear device by late 1966 or 1967.2 It remains the only nation in the Middle East with nuclear weapons. It is capable of delivering nuclear weapons by aircraft. 259 .and submarine-launched cruise missiles. however. see note 1. ISIS has an alternative calculation that yields a slightly larger range of possible weapons. becoming the sixth nation in the world to do so. It is. Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons.500 kilometers) Jericho II ballistic missiles. Israel’s successful satellite launches using the Shavit space launch vehicle suggest that it could quickly develop missile plat- forms with much longer ranges than the Jericho II. In all. indisputably regarded as a de facto nuclear weapon state. or ISIS. The development of the *This weapons estimate is based on plutonium production data provided by the Institute for Science and International Security. CHAPTER 13 Israel Nuclear Weapons Capability Israel has an advanced nuclear weapons capability and is thought to possess enough nuclear material for between 100 and 170 nuclear weapons. Both missiles use solid pro- pellant and are nuclear-capable. with a 750–1. Israel may have produced between 530 and 684 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the start of its nuclear research reactor at Dimona in early 1964 through the end of 2005. Israel may have produced between 530 and 684 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the start of its nuclear research reactor at Dimona in early 1964 through the end of 2005. and ship. The exact number of weapons Israel has assembled is unknown but is more likely on the lower end of the possible range. The exact number of weapons Israel has assembled is unknown but is more likely on the lower end of the possible range. ballistic missiles. Israel fields both short-range Jericho I (500 kilometers. In all.

N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s .260 N o n .

has neither confirmed nor denied those reports. . notes.S. and F-4E Phantoms (now being replaced with F-16Is) and may also possess artillery-launched nuclear munitions.and rail-mobile.”5 As to biological weapons. from the trivial to the sensational. centered at the Israel Institute for Biological Research at Ness Ziona.4 The government of Israel.-origin Harpoon. it is highly doubtful that Israel engages in the ongoing production or stockpiling of BW agents. with the possible exception of testing.”7 Israel has signed but not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and is not a party to the Biologi- cal Weapons Convention. Lacking authoritative information. according to foreign sources. F-15I Eagles. Cohen is more cautious and tentative: “It would be logical—given the experience with Iraq—that Israel has acquired expertise in most aspects of weaponization. or submarine. stockpiled. produced. which is produced by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. The missiles are said to have hit targets at a range of 1. the authoritative Middle East Military Balance. Israel is believed to have deployed 100 Jericho missiles. which can be launched from an aircraft. with first deployment in 1990. ship. Acknowledging the difficulty of assessing Israel’s CBW programs and capabilities. Israel 261 single-stage Jericho I missile began in the early 1960s with French assistance. 10 kilometers south of Tel Aviv. and Iran are matched. as part of its traditional and deliberate policy of ambiguity. Avner Cohen characterized them thus: “A near-consensus exists among experts—based on anecdotal evi- dence and intelligence leaks—that Israel developed. The Harpoons can travel up to 120 kilometers with a payload of 220 kilograms.500 kilometers. and the missile was first deployed in 1973. In May 2000. although it is not known what type or how many offensive agents it currently has. “The chemical and biological capabilities of Syria. and maybe even deployed chemical weapons at some point in its history. Israel reportedly tested a new sea-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile off Sri Lanka.”6 A 1990 U. by Israel’s possession of a wide range of such weapons. The extended range and 1. Israel also has a growing inventory of cruise missiles that includes the U.000-kilogram payload of the Jericho II makes it a likely nuclear delivery vehicle. In an oblique reference to Israel. Israel could also deliver nuclear weapons using its F-16I Falcons.3 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Israel possesses advanced chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities.S. Defense Intelligence Agency study reported that Israel had an operational chemical warfare testing facility. Israel is believed to have had sophisticated CBW programs for several de- cades. however. non-Israeli publications have made many claims about Israel’s CBW capabilities. In all. Iraq. The development of the two-stage Jericho II began in the mid-1970s. Both missiles are land. Although it is probable that Israel has maintained some sort of production capability.

It claimed that Israel’s nuclear weapons are assembled at a facil- ity in Yodefat. Israel’s nuclear inventory probably contained far fewer weap- ons. “neutron”-type warheads. most experts who have attempted to harmonize Vanunu’s testimony with other relevant information concluded that.13 Other reports suggest that gravity bomb storage bunkers are located near the Tel Nof airbase.S.1 at the end of the chapter). intelligence analysts and Israelis knowledgeable about the country’s nuclear program. Israel is likely to rely on simple. David Albright calculated that. make different assumptions.11 it is assumed that it has not advanced to the point of producing thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs). Assuming a more conservative 5 kilograms for each warhead would mean that Israel has enough material for 105 to 135 weapons. and that tactical nuclear weapons are stored at Eilabun.12 A 1994 report alleged plausible new details about Israel’s nuclear weapons infrastructure. a few kilometers from the town of Beit Shemesh. Vanunu also indicated that Israel had produced tritium and lithium deuteride.6 and 18. that is. Israel could have produced 510 to 650 kilograms of weapons-grade plu- tonium by the end of 2003. Because Israel is not known to have conducted any nuclear tests (with the possible excep- tion of the 1979 “flash” off South Africa. with enough new material for an additional 2 to 4 new weapons a year. Some experts.10 The reactor can produce between 10. By July 2000.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Nuclear Analysis Unclassified estimates of Israel’s nuclear capabilities are based in large part on former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu’s revelations in October 1986.S. Rely- ing largely on interviews with U. Israel completed taking delivery . as well as full-fledged thermonuclear weapons. Hersh concluded that Israel possessed “hun- dreds” of low-yield. Assuming 4 kilograms of plutonium for each warhead. located at the Dimona research complex. A 1991 book by the Ameri- can investigative journalist Seymour Hersh argued that Israel’s arsenal was consid- erably larger and more advanced than even Vanunu’s information suggested.6 kilograms of plutonium a year.262 N o n .9 However. many in the form of artillery shells and land mines.8 On the basis of Vanunu’s information about Israeli plutonium produc- tion. and nuclear weapons are stored at Tirosh (see table 13. or Russian designs that use less than four kilograms. enhanced-radiation. Israel could have enough material for 130 to 170 weapons at the end of 2005. that Israel has a nuclear missile base and bunker near Moshav Zekharya. identifying an installation at Soreq as a research facility on nuclear weapons design. suggesting that Israel may have developed “boosted” nuclear weapons. proven designs that would require more plutonium than the intensively tested U. given the small size of Israel’s only plutonium-producing reactor. weapons that use a nuclear-fusion reaction to increase their efficiency. however.14 A New Development: Sea-Launched Capability Probably the most important nuclear-related development in Israel is the forma- tion of its sea-based nuclear arm. depending on the power level of the Dimona reactor. the London Sunday Times projected that Israel might have as many as 200 nuclear devices.

by early 2000 Israel had carried out the first launching tests of its cruise missiles. referred to the new submarine as the finest conventional submarine of its class in the world. the cruise mis- sile technology that renders the diesel submarines nuclear-capable launching platforms. then Israel’s chief of staff. Shortly afterward (apparently in a response to alarming reports on Iranian nuclear and missiles projects). because of cost. was delivered. the Israeli Navy (jointly with other governmental agencies) lobbied hard for building a small fleet of modern diesel submarines for “strategic purposes. electrical-powered. According to that report. in the wake of Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel during the Gulf War. communication. German leaks indicate that the three 1. Leviathan. large submarines. Israel sought a German shipyard as a contractor for the project. it decided to purchase the third one as well. the commander of the Israeli Navy.16 Since the early 1980s (and probably even earlier). Many of the navigation. Germany agreed to sell Israel two additional submarines in 2004. and Israeli officials confirmed Israel’s modification of U. and cruise missiles.15 In October 2003. “Elite crews have assembled to man [the submarines]. it was vetoed by General Ehud Barak. Dolphin.S.- supplied Harpoon missiles for use with nuclear warheads. when a deal was almost signed in early 1990. and weapons systems in those submarines were reportedly de- veloped. Israel immediately accepted the German offer for the first two submarines. Five specially selected offic- ers solely responsible for the warheads will be added to each vessel once the missiles are operational. Israel 263 of all three Dolphin-class submarines that it had ordered at the Thyssen- Nordseewerke shipyard in Kiel. the Los Angeles Times re- ported that U. In 1991. The details of the specific capabilities of the submarines.18 According to one report in the London Sunday Times. Because no American shipyard had the appro- priate expertise in building modern diesel. After a complex series of negotiations. mines. While the submarines were under construction in Kiel. Speaking at the ceremony for the arrival of the third submarine at its Haifa base in July 2000. Rear Admiral Yedidya Yaari. Germany.900-metric-ton submarines are equipped with ten 21-inch multipur- pose tubes. It is also believed (but not confirmed) that the most sensitive aspect of the project. Israel maintained tight security measures and technological oversight on the project. and Tekumah. . remain highly classified. was developed and built in Israel. built. named Dolphin. and assembled by the Israeli defense industries. .” an Israeli euphemism for a sea-launched nuclear capability.17 It is reported that the Israeli-made cruise missiles have the capability of hitting targets in a range of more than 900 miles. These submarine-launched cruise missiles provide Israel with a largely invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability. capable of launching torpedoes. the German government offered to fully finance the purchase of two submarines and to share in the financing of the third to compensate for the role that the German indus- try had played in the development of Iraq’s nonconventional weaponry.”19 .S. less than two years after the first submarine. . The cost of each submarine was estimated to be about $300 million.

which reached its climax during the Suez crisis.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s A fleet of three submarines is believed to be the minimum that Israel needs to have a deployment at sea of one nuclear-armed submarine at all times. France also gave Israel important information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons them- selves.25 It may also have obtained data from U. the scientific head of the French Atomic Energy Commis- sion from 1951 to 1970.”24 No conclusive proof exists that Israel has ever conducted a full-scale nuclear test. France secretly pledged to assist Israel in developing nuclear arms and agreed to supply a sizable plutonium-producing reactor to be built at Dimona.20 By 1955. is as old as the state itself. in the wake of David Ben Gurion’s return to power in Israel. France and Israel had collaborated on the design and development of nuclear weapons. Soon thereafter.S. Francis Perrin. In an on-the-record 1986 interview with the London Sunday Times. just days before the Six-Day War. France’s socialist government. The two states confronted dangers stem- ming from Arab nationalism. Gobain Techniques Nouvelles for the construction of several additional facilities at the Dimona site. Its nuclear arsenal is thought to have been developed in part through the testing of non-nuclear components and computer simulations. the Israeli nuclear weapons program was born as a result of Israeli–French collaboration. and through the acquisition of weapons design and test information from abroad. nuclear tests at . and one that no potential nuclear enemy of Israel could ignore. for at least two years during the late 1950s. was intimately involved with the French–Israeli nuclear program. Israel because of its isolated position in the Middle East and France because of growing unrest in French Algeria. As noted above. with French Atomic Energy Commission’s approval. 40 miles from Beersheba.23 Research by Avner Cohen concludes that by late 1966 Israel had successfully completed the research and development stage of its program. to have obtained data from France’s first nuclear test. Shimon Peres (then the director general of the Ministry of Defense) started to explore in earnest the feasibility of a nuclear weapons project.21 At the time. in 2004 Germany agreed to sell two additional submarines to Israel. led by Guy Mollet.22 In mid-1957. including the key installation (where Vanunu would subsequently work) for extracting plutonium from the Dimona reactor’s spent fuel. In 1956–1957. History Israel’s interest in establishing a national nuclear infrastructure. Israel is thought.264 N o n . which took place in 1960. Perrin acknowledged that France had supplied the Dimona reactor and the plu- tonium extraction plant and that. Israel signed an agreement with the French firm St. for example. aimed at both security and energy. During the tense days of the crisis in late May 1967. in the Negev. was deeply committed to Israel’s survival. Such a survivable deterrent is perceived as essential because of Israel’s unique geopoliti- cal and demographical vulnerability to nuclear attack. Israel improvised the assembly of two deliverable nuclear devices and placed them on “operational alert.

then Israel’s deputy minister of defense. boosted and thermonuclear weapons that were being developed at the time. It was first enunciated in a 1963 meeting of Shimon Peres. The claim that clouds would prevent the detection of an atmospheric nuclear detonation by a VELA satellite has been challenged. tests from the 1950s and early 1960s. it did not want this decision to alienate the United States.30 In September 1969. Israel 265 approximately that time. Hersh’s sources stated. this critical matter remains unresolved. Israel has sought to maintain a margin of qualitative conventional military superiority that would both discourage its foes from resorting to force and ensure victory without the use of nuclear arms in the event of conflict.S. Although the official U. the readings have been attrib- uted by some to a nuclear test conducted by South Africa.S. Kennedy. Peres responded that “Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the [Middle East]. however. government scientific review concluded that the most likely explanation was that it was a non-nuclear event. culminating in Israel’s refusal to join the NPT in 1968. 1979. Meir explained to Nixon .”29 Beginning in the early 1960s. According to a May 1989 U.S. Thus.” the Sep- tember 1979 event was indeed an Israeli nuclear weapon test and was the third of a series of tests conducted at that time. and some of whom still reject Israel’s right to exist. VELA monitoring satellite orbiting over the South Atlantic was in fact the flash from a low-yield nuclear explosive test. and President John F. The Strategic Context Israel’s pursuit of the nuclear deterrent option as the basis of national survival has been founded primarily on two factors: Israel’s lack of territorial strategic depth. which makes it difficult to absorb a conventional attack and respond effectively. Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity or nuclear opac- ity originated. and by others to Israel.S. At the same time. Out of this predicament. and the “preponderance of men and equipment” enjoyed by its Arab neighbors. there was continuous friction between the United States and Israel over the question of Israel’s nuclear development. Seymour Hersh reported that “according to Israeli officials whose informa- tion about other aspects of Dimona’s activities has been corroborated. that a signal detected on September 22. during an official state visit to the United States.26 There has been speculation.S. were obscured by storm clouds. by a U. because the satellite is said to rely in part on infrared sen- sors that can penetrate cloud cover. almost all of whom have been hostile adversaries throughout its his- tory. television documen- tary. however. possibly from a tactical nuclear weapon or from the fission trigger of a thermonuclear device.27 The first two tests. Israeli prime minister Golda Meir and President Richard Nixon for the first time reached a secret understanding on this sensitive issue that brought an end to the friction.28 Even as Israel decided to pursue a nuclear deterrent. Israel was able to gain access to information concerning U. Questioned about Israel’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. The test data could have included the results of tests of U.

Libya. The emerging threat was dem- onstrated during the 1991 Gulf War when Israeli cities and sites in Saudi Arabia were attacked by Iraqi extended-range Scud missiles. Although suspicion of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program existed before the 1991 Gulf War. It was left to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discover. much of Iraq’s nuclear weapons infrastructure remained intact. which justi- fied Israel’s air attack on June 7. while publicly calling on all states to sign the NPT.S. Israeli nuclear opacity was born and cultivated as a symbiotic U.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s why Israel had developed nuclear weapons—and hence could not sign the NPT— and why a policy of nuclear opacity (using the old formulation that “Israel will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons” to the Middle East) would best serve the interests of both countries. Iran. Likewise. Since then. administrations have not pres- sured Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. Some Arab states undertook or accelerated programs to develop or acquire unconventional weapons as well as delivery systems. he would destroy “half of Israel” with chemical weapons. 1981.35 The 1991 Gulf War also demonstrated the difficulties of identifying and strik- ing facilities involved in clandestine proliferation programs. in a painstaking effort. it was later disclosed that Iraq had stock- piled chemical and biological warheads for such missiles. Saddam Hussein was boasting about Iraq’s extensive ballistic missile forces and chemical weapons capabilities by declaring (in April 1990) that. The case of Iraq raises important . Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin then declared that Israel would block any at- tempt by adversaries to acquire nuclear weapons.–Israeli policy. allowing the Iraqis to remove and hide equipment. the strategic balance in the Middle East underwent signifi- cant changes. but also.31 The agreement put an end to a decade of unsuccessful (and at times half- hearted) U. It was subsequently revealed that Iraq had embarked not only on a multifaceted nuclear weapons development program. all subsequent U. In spite of a massive air campaign. the scale and range of its efforts were not known. and some of Israel’s adversaries were also pursuing the de- velopment of biological weapons. Several nuclear installations had not been identified by the United States or its partners. the magnitude of the Iraqi nuclear program. By the end of the decade. and Syria were expanding their chemical weapons capabilities. causing two deaths and hundreds of injuries. (Iraq had already used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. In some cases. Israel also pledged not to test nuclear weapons or publicly admit to possessing them.32 A refinement in Israel’s defense posture was the Begin doctrine.266 N o n . Over the years. if Israel attacked any Iraqi nuclear installations.S. on Iraq’s Osiraq research reactor. nuclear opacity has become Israel’s most distinct contribution to the nuclear age. and ended American pressure on Israel to sign the NPT. attacked nuclear-related facilities suffered only slight damage. after its invasion of Kuwait.33 During the 1980s. efforts to halt the Israeli nuclear program. Nixon accepted the Israeli posi- tion. on a crash program to develop a single nuclear device by April 1991. recognizing that the Israeli bomb was a fait accompli. Although the attacking Scud missiles carried conventional warheads.S.)34 At the same time. Iraq launched a total of 39 Scud missiles against Israel. all Israeli governments have adhered to the agreement.

a possible biological warfare program. con- crete accomplishments. At the same time. issued statements indicating that they would consent to an indefinite extension of the NPT only after Israel had agreed to accede to the treaty. raising the prospect of a transition to arms control. Egypt.37 The Middle East Peace Conference. the Arab states. At the fourth Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session of the Review and Extension Conference in January 1995. During that period. including Iran. did not participate in the talks. one being the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. under the sponsorship of the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition to its suspected stockpile of chemical weapons. ma- jor Israeli antagonists in the region. and Syria. as ballistic missile threats increased. information surfaced that Iran was developing Shahab missiles. such as Iran and Syria. Israel accelerated its development of antimissile systems. and too numerous to be destroyed by air attacks. as well as Alge- ria. a system capable of striking Israeli sites from deep within Syria. if any. and possibly Iraq. security conditions deteriorated rapidly both in- ternally and regionally after 1995. began sets of bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors aimed at a comprehensive peace in the region. hidden too well. attempted but failed to pressure Israel into renouncing its nuclear option.38 Israel’s response was embodied in Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ ex- change with Egyptian foreign minister Amr Mussa: Peres explained that Israel would agree to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East two years after the conclusion of a comprehensive peace accord between all states in the region. From Israel’s point of view. which opened in Madrid on October 30. Egypt. Israel’s threat assessment became more dire when Syria tested advanced 600-kilometer Scud- C missiles. and possibly with chemical and biological weapons. 1991. An additional multilateral component of this process was the establish- ment of five working groups to address regional issues of common interest. However.36 A Perspective on Arms Control The Gulf War provided an impetus for the initiation of a peace process in the region. Efforts by Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat to negotiate an accord showed promise throughout 1999 but stalled at the end of 2000. In the context of the April 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Israel also saw Iran as an increas- ingly serious threat. Israel 267 questions over the practicality of the Begin doctrine in the future if potential nuclear infrastructure targets are too distant. led by Egypt. that would enable Iran to target Israel for the first time (see chapters 5 and 15). The talks were suspended in early 1995 with very limited. Saudi Arabia. with ranges of up to 2.000 kilometers. Moreover. and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. the collapse of the peace process established by the 1993 Oslo accords not only undermined efforts to resume the regional arms control talks but also created a deeply pessimistic mood among the Israeli public about peace. A provocative visit by Likud Party leader . Israel believed that it continued to face mis- sile threats from Libya. Libya.

and in the fact that it was one of its first signatories. adherence to the CTBT and its earlier signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrated Israel’s interest in arms control regimes with reliable verification systems that are not subject to abuse or frivo- lous requests.268 N o n . in addition to the effort to disarm Iraq. The main concern was that the constraints imposed by the fissban. Israel’s arms control credentials and poli- cies were also reflected in the active role it played in the negotiations of the CTBT as a primary participant in the drafting of the accord. Israeli officials expressed reservation about the proposals but were careful not to reject them outright. both the George H. would put Israel on a slippery slope leading to the demise of nuclear opacity and to increased pres- sure to abandon its nuclear arsenal entirely. Treaties and Negotiations Israel signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 25. the Israel government refrained from making an official and public response to the Bush and Clinton initiatives. In the wake of the Gulf War. and the pending Israeli withdrawal from Gaza contributed to a cautious optimism shared by all sides. The April 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. together with the associated verification modalities. Israel. in its cosponsor- ship of the United Nations resolution that opened the CTBT for signature. From the Israeli perspective. Bush administration in 1991 and subsequently the Bill Clinton administration in 1993 made proposals to ban the further production of fissile materials for weapons both in the Middle East and globally. the only one of the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states to do so. it was evident that Israel had to be a part of any effort to reduce the nuclear threat in the Middle East. calling for a global fissile material cutoff treaty that would ban the further production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons as well as the pro- duction of such materials outside IAEA safeguards. Unofficially.40 In the early 1990s. a pos- sible shift by Hezbollah to political rather than military operations. In this context. According to this view. The impetus for the 1991 Bush regional proposal was the perception that the “fissban” idea. W. could be an important milestone toward an eventual nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. The election in January 2005 of Mahmoud Abbas as the new president of the Palestinian Authority brought a new potential for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in September 2000 ignited a four-year intifada that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and Israelis.41 . the Clinton administration modified the Bush proposal. coupled with an implicit legitimization of Israel’s nuclear status. however.39 In the early 1990s. In 1993. 1996. and Pakistan) to retain their existing stocks of unsafeguarded fissile material. The cutoff proposal would permit the five nuclear weapon states and the three de facto nuclear powers (In- dia. advocates of a fissban argued that it offered a realistic compromise: a limited but real con- straint on the Israeli nuclear program.

Netanyahu told Clinton: “We will never sign the treaty. Commercial satellite photographs indicate that the missile base between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean was enlarged between 1989 and 1993 to allow for Jericho II deployment. despite the fact that Tel Aviv can already reach all of its regional adversaries with the Jericho II medium-range ballistic missile.–Israeli undertaking begun in 1988 and funded largely by the United States. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told (and wrote to) President Clinton in unequivocal language that Israel could not accept the fissban proposal.”43 From the Israeli per- spective. the Jericho III. Israel’s nuclear posture may have been better understood internationally as a result of its controversy with Egypt before and during the course of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. . The multi-billion-dollar Arrow sys- tem will attempt to intercept short-range Scud-type missiles just as they start reen- tering the atmosphere after reaching the highest point of their flight trajectory. Israel 269 By the middle to late 1990s. the conflict forced Yitzhak Rabin. one Israeli observer argues.500 kilometers. In his view. and do not delude yourselves. According to Aluf Benn. possibly at a facility located midway between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean. The Jericho II solid-fueled. could potentially have an intermediate (greater than 3. a substantive discussion of regional arms control issues is inextricably linked to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Furthermore. Israeli decision makers will also continue to hold the view that as long as adversaries in the Middle East region maintain the capability to mount large-scale military attacks against Israel or to threaten Israeli cities with missiles carrying chemical or biological warheads.”42 Despite India’s and Pakistan’s declarations of nuclear weapons in 1998 and the end of any threat from Iraq. linked to the military. Israel will need to maintain the nuclear deterrence op- tion. The Jericho III. In 1998. We will not sign the treaty because we will not commit sui- cide. two-stage missiles with an ap- proximate range of 500 kilometers are thought to be deployed in shelters on mobile launchers. based on the Shavit SLV. in two letters and several conversations.500 kilometer) range. In some respects. two-stage missile can travel an estimated 1. Up to 50 Jericho I solid-fueled. Missile Analysis Israel currently deploys two nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems: the Jericho I and Jericho II. Peres. it is unlikely that Israel will follow suit or change its policy of nuclear ambiguity.000 km) or intercontinental (greater than 5. geo- graphic and demographic asymmetries in the region. It appears that only a dramatic change in the nuclear ambitions of Iran could trigger a change in the Israeli position. whose existence cannot be confirmed. Ha’aretz’s diplomatic correspondent.44 Israel’s anti–ballistic missile system is a joint U. and other Israeli leaders to articulate for the first time “links between the maintenance of the nuclear capa- bility and the continued threats to national survival. no pressure will help. following the collapse of ACRS.S. Israel is report- edly developing a third version of the Jericho missile. Israeli opposi- tion to the fissban proposal grew firmer.

which is not manufactured at the Institute.html.” in Global Fissile Material Inventories (Washington.46 Israel and the United States optimistically expect the laser to be ready for deployment by 2007. The new Delilah GL (ground launch) is a derivation of the air-launched Delilah missile. a third is being developed for southern Israel. capable of shooting down short-range artillery rockets. 1998). February 5. “Israeli Jets Equipped for Chemical Warfare. 1998.C. Israel is also experimenting with another missile interceptor. The estimate for production totals at the end of 2003 has been extended here to the end of 2005 using the institute’s estimates for annual plutonium production. These systems ap- pear to be the sea-launched Harpoon cruise missile and the air. June 18. This system will try to intercept Scud-like missiles soon after launch with an air-to-air missile fired from an unmanned aerial ve- hicle flying at high altitude. funded in part by the United States. is said to have been developed with Chinese cooperation. Fall 2001. Israel’s armament industries are believed to have exten- sive ties. 2004).isis-online. and Arms Control. South Korea. “ISIS Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material in De Facto Nuclear Weapon States. . See also. In June 2004. 3. the Moab. 1–20.47 Israel’s unmanned aerial vehicle program has been extended to cover cruise missile development. and can be used for reconnaissance as well as precision attack. Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Israel has tested the Arrow II interceptor twelve times.” Sunday Times (London). Deterrence. Avner Cohen. “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves with Submarine Missile Test. Two Arrow II batteries have been deployed. has a range of more than 250 kilometers. 2.270 N o n . Many of these sensationalist stories appeared in the Sunday Times (London). 2000. 1998. with a 400-kilometer range and a 450-kilogram payload.and ground- launched variants of the Delilah cruise missile. This system is intended for de- ployment in Israel’s northern regions to help protect against rocket attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon and Gaza. One of these stories cites a biologist who once held a senior post in the Israeli intelligence as saying that “there is hardly a single known or unknown form of chemical or biological weapon. India.org/global_stocks/de_facto_states. The Delilah.” Sunday Times. “Israel and CBW: History.” Foreign Report. and the entire system seven times. Israel has sought to acquire a land-based cruise missile for almost a decade. D. 273– 276.” Nonproliferation Re- view. 4. including land-attack cruise missiles. “Israel’s Secret Institute. Avner Cohen. available at www. Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press. Octo- ber 4.48 Moreover. 1998. 239. Israel is also developing jointly with the United States the Nautilus laser (also called a tactical high-energy laser system). “Israel’s Nes[s] Ziona Mystery. pp. The radar component of the Nautilus system was delivered to Israel in December of 2004. New Mexico. and Turkey. while the laser gun is under- going development and testing in White Sands. pp. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer. Produced in Nuclear Weapons Programs.” Foreign Report.45 The system links operations with Patriot air defense units.: Institute for Science and International Security.49 N OTES 1. August 20. one near Tel-Aviv and one in Ein Shemer.” Uzi Mahnaimi. including projected cruise missile cooperation with China. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that Israel has developed its first surface-to-surface cruise missile. 5.

2003. Ibid. Israel and the Bomb. In light of what is known about Israel’s nuclear infrastructure. Aluf Benn. 57–68. see Albright and Kramer. 165–187. Benn. See David Albright. 273–276. 18. p. “Open Secrets: The Struggle to Keep Nuclear Capabilities Secret. 26. pp. pp. Samson Option. October 12. 24. 1990). “Open Secrets. Harold Hough.latimes. 29. 9–31. Capabilities. p. The authors of this volume assume that Israel uses 4 kilograms for each warhead. Cohen. 32. Gerald Steinberg. Hans M. Colo. “ISIS Estimates of Unirradiated Fissile Material. 259. 21. This extrapolation is based on the assumption that the Dimona reactor has been operating reliably at a power level of between 40 and 70 megawatts thermal (MWt) and has not experienced any significant shutdowns nor extended operation at its theoretical upper limit of 150 MWt. “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal. 188. Pierre Pean. 16–17. Seymour Hersh. 262.” Ha’aretz. 16. Sea and Air. Israel and the Bomb. 5–7. 2001). p. “Peres: Keep Nuclear Details Secret. pp. October 12.” 33. eds. 13. SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments.. 1996. 3. 17. “A Flash from the Past.: Ballinger. Israel and the Bomb. December 23. 9–11.story. David Albright and Corey Gay. 27. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Ibid. pp. 15–17. p. pp.: Westview Press. Cohen. 12. 1988). pp. 22. 17. Douglas Frantz. 2004.. November 21–23. with Jacquelin Smith. Mass. 4. 1986.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Israeli Perspectives. pp.” Defense News. Geneva. Leonard Spector. p. Mass. November 1994. July 26. “Israel’s Arsenal Is Point of Contention: Officials Confirm That the Nation Can Now Launch Atomic Weapons from Land. Cohen. Leonard Spector. pp. the authors assume in their calculations that Israel uses 5 kilograms of plutonium for each warhead. PBS Network.” 11. chaps. The Samson Option (New York: Random House. Cohen. 1996. 15.” Los Angeles Times. “France Admits It Gave Israel A-Bomb. Cohen. 1981).” Sunday Times (London). “Israel Makes Nuclear Waves. “Israel to Acquire Two More German Submarines. Israel and the Bomb. it has long been assumed that its weapons use plutonium rather than highly enriched uranium for their cores. chaps. 508. Disarmament.. and International Security. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. 14. Israel 271 6. Mahnaimi and Campbell. Israel and the Bomb. 8. 25. 7.. Ha’aretz. Ibid. 1999 (English Internet edition). 118–119. and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 312. Novem- ber/December 1997. Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder. 319. July 29–August 4. 1991). The Undeclared Bomb (Cam- bridge.” paper presented at the Ninth Amaldi Conference on Security Ques- tions at the End of the Twentieth Century. p. 1989. May 16. pp. revised November 25. and William Walker. 1. Les Deux Bombes (Paris: Fayard. “Israel: The Covert Connection. 8. October 5. 336–338.com/news/ nationworld/world/la-fg-iznukes12oct12. pp. Ibid. 5. 1981).” 19. September 14.” Frontline. Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir. 20. pp. 1996. Steven Weissman and Herbert Krosney. 7. 30. 67. 484.” Sunday Times (London). Frans Berkhout. The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Books. Tel Aviv University (Cambridge. The Issue Complicates Efforts to Rein in Iran’s Ambitions. Cohen. 271. pp. 2000. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. Hersh. 2001). esp. chaps. 10. Israel and the Bomb. 114. . 31. 9. For the plutonium estimate through 2003. 1997). 12.: MIT Press. 167. chap. 41–55. 28. Ibid. 23. 291. Barbara Opall. The Middle East Military Balance 2000–2001. available at www.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. 1986. 341–344. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press.” Maariv International. “Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure.

Cohen and Miller. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies. 46. 36. “Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).” Nucleonics Week.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s 34. and “BRF Israel Missiles. vol. Warrenton.” Ha’aretz. Fall 1996.” 42.: Claremont Institute. and the De Facto Nuclear Weap- ons States.com. 2005).. Mark Hibbs. 2001. Institute of Peace seminar. 41. “Missile Survey. Va. See also Center for Nonproliferation Studies. February 2. Andrew Feickert. “Arrow. “Deterrence and Middle East Stability: An Israeli Perspective. Bar-Ilan University.” Ha’aretz. December 21. no.” Security Dia- logue. June 1996). “Senior Governmental Officials: Israel Could Live with Clinton’s Arms Control Initia- tive.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 49. Aluf Benn.com/systems/arrow_israel. 38. 1998. D.S. Efraim Inbar.” Associated Press.S. Steinberg.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. p. April 8. p. 44. “Israel Develops Ground-Launched Delilah Missile. Mass. “Anti-Katyusha Laser to Be Tested. 1997. May 2. Israel: BESA Center for Stra- tegic Studies. March 14. 1996.” in Missile Defense Systems (Claremont. 2004. and the De Facto Nuclear Weapons States: A Post–September 11 Perspective. 2004). 47.missilethreat. Gerald Steinberg. “The U.” Financial Times. p. “De Facto Nuclear Weapons States.” in Missile Defense Systems. 39. “Last NPT PrepCom Moves toward Limited Extension. 126–127. 1. 7. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge. . April 3. “Iraq Threatens to Use Chemical Weapons against Israeli Attack. available at www.htm. Spring 1993.html. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. “How to Think About—and Implement—Nuclear Arms Con- trol in the Middle East.jpost. 1994). MissileThreat. p. pp. Security and Policy Studies 26 (Ramat Gan. 1997).: Woodrow Wilson Center.S.” Washington Quarterly. Efraim Karsh. 2004. 2004–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Avner Cohen. available at www. Aluf Benn.” paper prepared for the Stanley Foundation’s Strategy for Peace Conference at Airlie Conference Center. 2000. 35. The Military Balance. vol. Benn. October 25–27. 2000. “Nuclear Arms Control in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller.” paper presented at a U. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Israeli Perspectives. edited by Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (Washington. “Israel’s Space and Missile Projects.com/systems/thel_usa.html. 352. “Arms Control and the New Middle Eastern Environment.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1103514262459. Monterey Institute. 40. “The Lessons of Osiraq and the American Counterproliferation Debate. October 5. available at http:// cns.” Congres- sional Research Service. James Bruce. Shai Feldman. 1993. 2001. avail- able at www. June 16. Gerald Steinberg. Avner Cohen.” Nonproliferation Review. January 3. Alon Ben-David. 8. 36.com. Feickert. 1995.C. no. 1990. “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision. 2004.” Defense Analysis. “Sharon Will Stick to Tradition of Nuclear Ambiguity.” Ha’aretz.: MIT Press. “Open Secrets. MissileThreat. Arieh O’Sullivan. February 18. “The U. Calif.” Ha’aretz.” 40.missilethreat.” 43. 45. and Shmuel Sandler. Aluf Benn.” p. 101–113. 1995. Cohen and Miller. 12. 48. 36.” in Inter- national Perspectives on Counterproliferation. 37. reprinted in Lessons for Arms Control in a Changing Middle East.272 N o n . Spring 1997. “Israel Resists Pressure on Its Nuclear Policy. “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel”. 6.” Jerusalem Post. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller. pp. March 5. Working Paper 99.

U. near Uranium phosphate mining. uses PUREX No Dimona method. Yes 9 Soreq operating IRR-2. 5 MWt. converts separated plutonium into metal and shapes plutonium metal 12 into bomb cores. status No Beersheeba unknown (table continues on the following page) . Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Nuclear Weapons Complex Negev Nuclear Plutonium production research reactor No Research Center and plutonium extraction facilities (see Dimona below) and other weapon-related infrastructure 1 Moshav Soreq Nuclear weapon research and design No facility 2 Yodefat Possible nuclear weapon assembly No facility Moshav Zekharya Nuclear missile base (reportedly No 3 (Zachariah) Jericho II) 4 Sdot Micha Nuclear missile base (reportedly No Jericho I). pool. Dimona Heavy-water.1. status unknown Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Mochon 2 Underground facility. 40–150 MWt. Nahal Light-water. No 10 operating Uranium Enrichment 11 Dimona Suspected pilot-scale laser and No centrifuge-enrichment programs. status unknown 5 Tel Nof Airbase near suspected nuclear gravity No 6 bomb storage bunkers Tirosh7 Possible nuclear weapon storage facility No 8 Eilabun Possible nuclear weapon storage facility No Research Reactors IRR-1. nat. HEU. Israel 273 Table 13. status unknown No 14 Uranium Processing Negev area. operating 13 Nahal Soreq Suspected.

janes.msn. and International Security.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke. status unknown Southern Israel Suspected yellowcake production in No phosphate plant.” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments.com/id/4788784/. and Policies (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. “Table A24. 2. p. 42. and William Walker.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/table_A24. irradiated lithium targets can also produce lithium deuteride. “Appendix 10A. 2001). and fuel-fabrication 15 facility.’” NBC News. available at http://msnbc. available at www. Lithium Deuteride Dimona Tritium may have been extracted from No heavy water and/or from irradiated lith- 17 ium targets. Harold Hough.” 3. Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler.1. available at http://fas. “Appendix 10A: World Nuclear Forces. Stockholm International Peace Re- search Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press. status No 16 (Rehovot) unknown Tritium. Disarmament. Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Haifa Suspected yellowcake production in two No phosphate plants. 1997). See also Hans M. “The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Problems of Extension. SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Ar- maments. Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- tute (Oxford: Oxford University Press. uranium No conversion (UF6). 1995”.N P T N u c l e a r We a p o n S t a t e s Table 13. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories. and International Secu- rity (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hans M.iaea. “Is- rael Releases ‘Atomic Prisoner. all operating Heavy-Water Processing Weizmann Institute Suspected pilot-scale plant. Preston Mendenhall.” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments. Frans Berkhout.com/regional_news/africa_middle_east/news/jir/jir990901_1 _n. International Atomic Energy Agency. Facilities under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded material on 31 December 2003”. Disarmament. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service.pdf. Appendix 2. 2002). “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a Pre-Emptive Strike?” Jane’s Intelligence Review. 1997.18 status unknown ABBREVIATIONS A BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium nat. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. Kristensen and Joshua Handler. “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a Pre-Emptive Strike?” . Hough.274 N o n . 2004. NNOTES OTES: : 1. See also Kristensen and Handler. January 9. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service. Disarmament. Capabilities. U natural uranium MWt megawatts thermal OURCES: SOURCES David Albright. “Appendix 10A: World Nuclear Forces. and International Security. April 21. April 6. 2002).shtml. status unknown Dimona Uranium purification (UO2). available at www.htm#israel.

According to a 1987 Pentagon study. Ibid.globalsecurity.org/worldatom/rrdb. 9. 10.htm. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996.” See Kristensen and Handler.globalsecurity. Berkhout. see Albright. See www. . . Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. Albright. 12. Kristensen and Handler. and Walker. 16.” 5. 14.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona. required for nuclear weapons design and fabrication. and Walker.htm. “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World. For a good discussion of the reactor power mystery. Ibid. 7. 264. 11. 18. 8. See www. Berkhout. According to Albright. and Walker. Israel produces roughly 10 tons of uranium yellowcake annually. p. the “Soreq Center runs the full nuclear gamut of activities .iaea. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service. 260. Berkhout. 1998). SIPRI Yearbook 2001. p. Ibid. Berkhout. p. “Appendix 10A. Israel 275 4. Estimates of the reactor’s capacity vary widely. Avner Cohen. 15. International Atomic Energy Agency. 257–264. Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York. 17. pp. 6. Kristensen and Handler. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. Albright. and Walker. SIPRI Yearbook 2001. 15.” available at www. 263. 13. .. p. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Ura- nium 1996.org/wmd/world/israel/dimona.

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and biological weapons and of ballistic missiles. The success or failure of nonproliferation with these two nations could decide the future of the entire nonproliferation regime. resulting in several. These two hard cases are the focus of major international nonproliferation efforts. the number of states aggressively pursuing these capabilities is remarkably small. chemical. or perhaps many. 277 . The primary danger of this spread of nuclear capabilities is not that each country would use nuclear weapons to attack the United States or other nations but that its acquisition of nuclear weapons would force neighboring states to reconsider their own nuclear options. A nuclear chain reaction could spread from the Middle East or North- east Asia. Part Four Two Hard Cases A lthough very serious consequences are associated with the pro- liferation of nuclear. In fact. only two new countries— North Korea and Iran—are now moving toward producing nuclear weapons in the next decade. new nuclear nations. which need to be understood to shape effective nonproliferation policies. Each of these countries is pursuing nuclear capabilities for various reasons.

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as well as an infrastructure that can be used to produce biological 279 .1 at the end of the chapter). U.”1 but this estimate may be based on assumptions about Pyongyang’s intentions and capa- bilities rather than direct evidence. Aircraft and Missile Capability North Korea has an advanced ballistic missile capability. CHAPTER 14 North Korea Nuclear Weapons Capability North Korea has an active nuclear weapon program and may already possess enough separated plutonium to produce as many as nine nuclear weapons (see table 14. such as Iran. and it continues to conduct ground-based testing of missile engines and components. intelligence has yet to publicly identify any cen- trifuge enrichment facilities in North Korea. North Korea continues to operate a small plutonium production reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear center that can produce enough weapons-grade pluto- nium for one nuclear weapon every year. It is unclear how many. is not publicly known. North Korea may also be gaining important flight test infor- mation from missiles being tested in other countries. nuclear weapons. however. North Korea is the leading exporter of short-range ballistic missiles in the world. and Syria. having tested and de- ployed missiles with ranges of more than 1. Pakistan. there is evidence that North Korea may be pursuing a uranium enrichment centrifuge program that could increase its access to weapons-grade nuclear material in the coming years. Libya. intelligence agencies have stated that “in the mid- 1990s North Korea had produced one possibly two.S. may be able to deliver a small payload to the United States.000 kilometers and conducted a single test of a longer-range system that. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability North Korea is believed to possess large stocks of chemical weapons and precur- sor chemicals. and it has sold missiles or missile production capabilities to Egypt. and it is unclear when North Korea will be able to begin production of weapons-grade uranium. The exact scale of the North Korean centrifuge program. U.S. if any.2 Pyongyang continues to abide by a self-declared suspen- sion of its missile flight tests but retains the ability to resume tests at any time. Iran. the me- dium-range No Dong. In addition. Reliable estimates indicate that North Korea has deployed approximately 100 of its most advanced ballistic missile. weapons North Korea has built. if fully developed.

Defense Depart- ment believes that North Korea would use chemical weapons against U. and to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. or South Korean interests.S. The United States has long-standing treaty and political commit- ments to defend South Korea from North Korean attack. Past efforts that have alternated between enticing and pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program have been unsuccessful. to several key U. although it has plans to realign and reduce its troop presence on the peninsula in the coming years. it has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. or South Korean troops in combat.S. including South Korea and Japan. policy toward the reclusive state has alternated in the past two decades from one of open engagement to outright confrontation. allies.280 Tw o H a r d C a s e s weapons. the United States be- gan an initially cautious and then more active strategy of engagement with . The United States currently deploys more than 30.S. This isolated and highly secretive country has developed a largely indigenous nuclear weap- ons and ballistic missile production capability. In 1991. U. The key to the U.S. The continued military confrontation between North Korea and South Ko- rea (and its ally the United States) represents the main source of instability in Northeast Asia—a standoff exacerbated by North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Although it has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con- vention. approach to stability on the Korean peninsula is to make clear to the North that any attack against the South would fail and present unacceptable costs to Pyongyang.S.3 The U. in a technical state of war.S. to this day. North Korea’s alleged possession of nuclear weapons and its continued produc- tion of nuclear materials threaten the United States’ ability to deter North Korea actions that undermine U. The parties remain. U.000 troops in South Korea. Other nations possess a limited set of tools to influ- ence North Korean behavior and convince its enigmatic leadership to abandon its unconventional weapons production and export activities. The Strategic Context North Korea’s unchecked nuclear weapons capabilities represent a serious threat to regional security.S. it may become more adventurous in its attempts to extract concessions from other countries and to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies in the region. and the possible collapse of this poor and reclusive country cannot be discounted. Policy toward North Korea The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. and in the coming decades it could produce large amounts of nuclear materials for its own weapons and pos- sibly for export to others. officials believe that North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s and is able to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for mili- tary purposes within weeks of a decision to do so.S. U. There is increasing con- cern that as North Korea consolidates its nuclear position.

the White House completed its policy review and issued a presidential statement announcing that the United States should “undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities. sought to “pick up where Presi- dent Clinton and his administration left off ” with North Korea. which froze North Korea’s nuclear material production for eight years. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001.–North Korean relationship was steadily deteriorating. verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile pro- grams and a ban on its missile exports. most notably Secretary of State Colin Powell. Less than a year later. policy toward North Korea.S.S. including a prolonged set of discussions dating from the mid-1990s. That crisis eventually resulted in the completion of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Upon assuming office.S. despite pledges in the Agreed . This process included a high-level meeting in 1991 between then–undersecretary of state Arnold Kantor and North Korean representative Kim Yong Sun that convinced North Korea to complete the legal process of adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992.4 a desire that was quickly countermanded by more conservative elements of the Bush team and the president himself. the fabric of the U. and a less threatening conventional mili- tary posture. which also featured several periods of crisis including one that almost led to war with North Korea.”5 Despite this stated desire to pursue discussions. openly called for regime change in these states. Confronting the North Korean regime and other “rogue” states was a clear priority for the new administration even before the terrorist attacks of September 11. and South Korean leaders in March 2001. This process continued and expanded under President Bill Clinton.S. Other officials. Attempts by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung to win President Bush’s endorsement for his engage- ment or “sunshine” policy toward the North was bluntly rejected during a Wash- ington summit between U. President Bush included North Korea as a charter member of the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address. the Bush administration undertook a wholesale reas- sessment of U. and held open the possible use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. The National Security Strategy Statement of the United States released in 2002 talked about the pos- sible need to take preemptive military action against states like North Korea. But the details of a missile elimination agreement could not be concluded by the time George W. The final months of the Clinton administration saw an intense negotiat- ing effort to end North Korea’s ballistic missile program. N o r t h K o re a 281 Pyongyang. Many incoming officials had ac- tively opposed the 1994 Agreed Framework and were highly skeptical of North Korea’s commitment to give up its nuclear weapon programs. These and additional statements made it clear that the Bush administration in- tended to pursue a more assertive policy of confronting hostile states such as North Korea. Then–secretary of state Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang in 2000 and became the highest-ranking U. On June 6. official ever to meet with Kim Jong Il. 2001. 2001. with the goal of ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities and encouraging improved relations between North Korea and South Korea.

In addition. until Kang Sok Ju. Q. In the summer of 2002. summed up in an unclassified summary submitted to Congress in 2002.8 The . officials maintain that Kim not only admitted to the program’s existence but also claimed that North Korea had the right to possess nuclear weapons because of the hostile policies of the Bush administration. have constituted a further violation of the NPT. including the seals on the 8. James Kelly. the administra- tion made no concrete progress on its stated desire to pursue comprehensive talks with North Korea. North Korean officials have consistently denied the admission. the assistant secretary of state for East Asia. admitted that the enrichment effort did exist. North Korea claimed on February 10.S. In December 2002. North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors from the country and removed all IAEA monitoring equipment and seals from its nuclear facilities.S. Kim Gye Gwan.6 In October 2002. claiming that their words were translated incorrectly. after having been confronted by the United States over its alleged uranium enrichment program. U. as well as the 1992 North–South denuclearization agreement. The intelligence findings confirmed doubts about North Korea’s intentions in the minds of those government officials who were skeptical of engagement with North Korea and reinforced their desire to adopt a different approach toward Pyongyang.” although no such site has been publicly identified. Since then. 2003. also stated that the United States had recently learned that the “North had begun construction of a centrifuge facility. according to all U. intelligence agencies con- cluded that North Korea had been secretly trying to acquire a uranium enrich- ment program for at least two years. hostility. The enrichment program violated the spirit of the 1994 Agreed Frame- work and the stated interpretation by the United States of that arrangement. that it had “manufactured” nuclear weapons as a deterrent to U. At the time. which requires that all nuclear facilities be declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placed under safeguards. joined the talks and. North Korean officials consistently denied the enrichment allegation.S. The situation remained tense in 2002. on January 10. 2005. Khan network of black market nuclear suppliers. Vice Minister Kang reportedly had no response when confronted with the allegation that the enrichment program predated the election of George W.7 During the two days of meetings. The assessment was based primarily on efforts by North Korea—some successful—to buy and import enrichment- related equipment through the A. It may also. North Korea announced that it was immedi- ately withdrawing from the NPT. depending on how far the program had advanced. U. Kelly confronted Kim over the North’s uranium enrichment effort and informed him that any improvement in United States– North Korea relations would be conditional on the immediate and verified elimi- nation of the enrichment program. partici- pants.000 fuel rods stored at Yongbyon. The assessment. For more than a year.S. the vice foreign minister. Bush. intelligence reports indi- cated that North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts stretched back to 1999 or 2000.282 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Framework to provide Pyongyang with assurances against the use of these weap- ons. During the talks. traveled to Pyongyang for long-postponed discussions with his counterpart.

The talks include representatives from the United States. This proposal included U. for its part. the moves by the other parties would be temporary and “would only yield lasting benefits to [North Korea] after the dismantlement of its nuclear program had been completed. South Korea. policy. parties would provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil. and Russia.S. the United States offered a detailed proposal for ending North Korea’s nuclear program. to include all plutonium production and uranium enrichment capabilities.S. non-U. a major change from previous U.S. The United States has also rejected calls to engage in any formal bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Japan.9 The first two rounds of the six-party talks produced little agreement. and once the declaration was given by the North and deemed credible. international pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear activities and has refused to provide anything to North Korea that could be deemed as a reward for Pyongyang’s participation in the talks or any interim moves on the North’s nuclear program. China. and for the elimi- nation of all of these to begin after a three-month preparatory period.”10 No new talks have been held since the third round. In describing the talks before Congress. as of April 2005. In exchange for agreeing to this proposed approach. and begin a dis- cussion of lifting all remaining U. and also to eliminate all its nuclear weapons capabilities under effective verification. At the urging of South Korean and Japanese officials. The United States has sought to use the talks largely as a vehicle to bring coordi- nated. which would become more enduring as the process proceeded. sanctions against the North.S. begin a study on North Korea’s energy requirements to see how to best meet them with non-nuclear energy programs. nuclear materials. posture at the talks changed significantly at their third round. the United States has sought to convince the country to admit to and eliminate its uranium enrichment pro- gram. something Pyongyang has long sought and that might also be interpreted as a reward for its past behavior. The proposal called for a new declaration to be made by North Korea. N o r t h K o re a 283 5-megawatt-electric (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon was restarted in 2002 and op- erated for more than two years. which began on June 21. and it has been influential (according to both Chinese and American offi- cials) in persuading North Korea to participate in them. North Korea. the other parties would provide North Korea with multilateral security assurances. The reactor shut down in April 2005 and could provide North Korea with an additional 12 to 19 kilograms of plutonium. The U. has tried to use the talks as a way of extracting conces- sions from the United States and other countries and has also tried to leverage the talks by demanding rewards simply for participating in them. Assistant Secretary Kelly stressed that as North Korea undertook its obligation. . North Korea’s February 2005 announce- ment that it possesses nuclear weapons and the apparent shutdown of its 5- MWe reactor at Yongbyon make an early resumption of the talks unlikely. Since confronting North Korea in October 2002. 2004. North Korea. support for incentives for North Korea to be provided by other states—particularly South Korea and Japan. This process has centered on what are known as the six-party talks. China was instrumental in creating the talks. weapons and related equipment. which convened in August 2003 and then again in February and June 2004 in Beijing.S.

North Korea has the potential to become a full-fledged nuclear weapon state. Khan black market has only enhanced the assessment that it can produce nuclear weapons.284 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Nuclear Analysis As of the spring of 2005. open press sources indicated for the first time that North Korea possessed a plu- tonium production reactor and extraction capability. enough for 50 weapons annually. given its current state of technology. Previous Plutonium Production North Korea’s nuclear research program is reported to have begun as early as the 1950s. Pyongyang was on the verge of becoming a major producer of weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea declared for the first time that it possesses nuclear weapons. North Korea’s access to the A. obtained complete and detailed nuclear warhead designs from Pakistan. The United States and several other countries are also convinced that North Korea is developing the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium through cen- trifuge enrichment. Before its decisions to freeze its nuclear program in 1994.15 This would have given it enough time to refuel the en- tire reactor and provide it with a source of enough nuclear material to build a nuclear device. fuel-fabrication. intelligence satellites reportedly photographed the construction of a research reactor and the beginnings of a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. Though there are no public signs that North Korea has resumed construction at other known nuclear facilities.12 Because it was a Soviet client state. It was this export capability that. Q. U. Although there is no conclusive. And on February 10.14 Also in 1989. 2005. The strategy pursued was to . its nuclear engineers were largely trained at Soviet scientific institutes and it received a small research reactor from the USSR that began operation in 1965. several top officials have stated that it already possesses such weapons. North Korea was reported. based on intelligence sources. to have shut down its main research and plutonium production reactor for ap- proximately 100 days. Pyongyang is thought to be capable of building a first-generation nuclear device. neither the United States nor any other country took direct action in response to these activities.13 In 1989. public evidence that North Korea possesses any actual nuclear weapons. It is unclear when North Korea might be able to start pro- ducing enriched uranium. led to the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994. and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities able to produce 275 kilograms of plutonium a year. Libya. North Korea may have possessed enough separated plutonium to produce up to nine nuclear weapons. During this period. The 5-MWe research reactor at Yongbyon can produce enough plutonium for one more nuclear weapon each year. as much as anything. Over the long run. it was previously pursuing nuclear reactors.11 This would provide it with enough nuclear materials to build its own nuclear arsenals and to export substantial quantities of plutonium to other states. At the time. At least one other Khan customer. Concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program did not fully emerge until the mid-1980s.S.

North Korea had publicly made the withdrawal of U. In describing the findings. North Korea completed the negotiation of a safeguard agreement with the IAEA within the eighteen months required by the treaty. Initial inspections to verify the accuracy of North Korea’s initial declaration began in May 1992. that Pyongyang finally approved its IAEA safeguard agreement. The findings added weight to the allegation that North Korea had removed significant amounts of fuel from its 5-MWe reactor during the observed shut- down in 1989. IAEA director gen- eral Hans Blix explained. N o r t h K o re a 285 press North Korea to join and then come into full compliance with its obliga- tions under the NPT. which hoped to sell North Korea light-water-power reactors (which were never built). after a concerted effort led by the Soviet Union. 1992.S. The initial inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities included tours of the completed 5-MWe reactor and of the 50-MWe plant still under construction. The IAEA was given access to the small amount separated by North Korea (approximately 90 grams. U. Pyongyang acceded to the NPT on April 18. starting in 1989. 1985.16 or less than 1/40th of the amount required to build a nuclear device).17 The samples taken by the IAEA showed a variety of radioactive by-products that suggested numerous in- stances of reprocessing activities. contradicted North Korea’s claims that it had previ- ously separated only the 90 grams of plutonium on one occasion. however.”18 This means that North Korea’s statements re- garding its past plutonium production were not consistent with what the samples revealed and indicate that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has declared to the IAEA or to the international community.S. a waste glove and a plutonium glove.” described by the IAEA as a plutonium-reprocessing facility. the IAEA results indicated that the North had separated plutonium in four cam- paigns over a three-year period. Instead. Subsequent inspections fo- cused mainly on the plutonium-reprocessing facilities in North Korea. includ- ing some small-scale extraction equipment. North Korea informed the IAEA as part of this initial inspection process that it had conducted a one-time plutonium extraction experiment on “damaged” fuel rods removed from the 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon in 1989. six official IAEA inspection missions took place in North Korea from 1992 to 1993. intelligence analysts believed that the reactor’s core might have been completely replaced during a 100-day shutdown. nuclear weapons from South Korea a condition of its completion of a safeguard agreement. referred to as hot cells. “We found two gloves. Intelligence infor- mation provided to the IAEA also indicated that waste products from the North’s . These long-awaited developments came after the United States signaled that it would withdraw its nuclear weap- ons from South Korea as part of a global tactical nuclear withdrawal in 1991. In all. but it was not until April 9. and to make that compliance a condition of progress on diplomatic issues. and they don’t match. as well as of the incomplete “radiochemical laboratory. The IAEA’s chemical analysis of samples taken from the radiochemical labora- tory and hot cells. The United States had stationed a large number (more than 700 in some years) of nuclear weapons in South Korea as part of its alliance with South Korea and its Cold War strategy of flexible response to a possible attack by the Soviet Union or its allies.

the fuel contained up to 30 kilograms of plutonium. includ- ing an unusual visit to North Korea by Blix. North Korea said that it was exercising its right of withdrawal from the NPT. First. North Korea agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal one day short of the 90-day count- down. the IAEA could determine whether the fuel had been in the reactor since its initial operation began in 1986 or whether the fuel was a secondary batch. And on March 12. North Korea did not permit full access to the sites. . North Korea’s atomic energy minister informed Blix that the North was refusing the IAEA’s special inspection request. marking the first time in the IAEA’s history that it had used its right to conduct such visits. Yet the talks did not enable the IAEA inspectors to gain the unfettered access to sites and information consid- ered necessary to resolve the discrepancies that had been discovered. which were not included in its “initial declaration. which appeared to be linked to the radiochemical laboratory by underground pipes capable of transporting liquid wastes. indicating that North Korea had indeed removed an entire load of fuel from the reactor during the 1989 shutdown.” This led Blix to declare in December 1993 that IAEA safeguards in North Korea could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that nuclear materials were not being diverted to weapons uses.” Ten days later. for two reasons. During the ensuing nine months. but it then blocked the IAEA from taking key radioactive samples at the plutonium extraction plant at Yongbyon. The need for the IAEA to gain access to the fuel to be removed from this reactor immediately became of inter- national concern. to take effect in 90 days as spelled out in article 10. Blix officially requested a “special inspection” of the two suspected waste sites. A long series of discussions and negotiations ensued over these issues. North Korea ini- tially agreed to an IAEA inspection of its declared facilities. On Febru- ary 11. which permits such action on 90 days’ notice if a party’s “supreme national interests” are jeopardized. as part of a complicated package deal with the United States. Second. The North Koreans had unsuccessfully camouflaged the sites and the underground pipes. in a letter to the three NPT depositary states and the other NPT members. North Korea asserted that it was no longer a full party to the NPT and that the IAEA no longer had the right to conduct even normal routine and ad hoc inspections. 1993. which could be used to produce several nuclear weapons. In March 1994. Although these sites had been visited by the IAEA during the third inspection mission to North Korea in September 1993.286 Tw o H a r d C a s e s plutonium extraction campaigns may have been stored at two nearby sites. However. After a round of negotiations with the United States in June 1993.19 Negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea continued.20 More Plutonium The crisis escalated further in mid-May 1994. when North Korea announced that it was going to defuel its 5-MWe reactor. Pyongyang severely constrained the IAEA inspection activities that are needed to preserve the “con- tinuity of safeguards. by getting access to the fuel and taking appropriate samples.

light-water reactors (LWRs) and a number of other energy. whether nuclear material from the reactor has been diverted in the past.21 As Pyongyang accelerated and completed the defueling.N. consisted of a worldwide ban on arms imports from.24 The Agreed Framework The United States and North Korea engaged in several months of negotiations in the summer and fall of 1994. and there were growing calls for U. with North Korea agreeing to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities and eliminate its nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for the construction of two modern nuclear power reactors and normalized rela- tions with the United States.000-rod core. president Jimmy Carter met with North Korean president Kim Il Sung on June 16 and 17. under which.”22 Some controversy surrounds this point. Security Council on June 2. and arms exports to. the United States publicly began discussing plans to rein- force its military presence in South Korea. military action against North Korea to prevent it from gaining full access to the plutonium-bearing spent fuel. The first phase of the sanctions. with sufficient confidence. claim- ing that it was not a fully bound member of the NPT or of its safeguard agree- ment. has been . a worldwide ban on financial dealings with Pyongyang would be imple- mented. that the “agency’s ability to ascertain. but before delivery of key nuclear components. The North Korean leader agreed to freeze his country’s nuclear program if the United States would resume high-level diplomatic talks. in broad terms. along with a downgrading of diplomatic ties. lost. leav- ing open the question of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while its existing .” This delay postponed the question of North Korea’s past produc- tion of plutonium until the final stages of the agreement’s implementation. North Korea agreed to dismantle the elements of its nuclear program linked to the production of nuclear arms in return for the supply of two.26 The agreement required North Korea to remain a member of the NPT and to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement once a “signifi- cant portion of the LWR project is completed. Security Council on June 15 calling for two phases of sanctions against North Korea. .23 Moreover. . Hans Blix de- clared in a letter to the U. 1994. These talks eventually led to the negotiation of an Agreed Statement on August 12. a process that resulted in the Agreed Frame- work. These negotiations took place in July but were sus- pended until early August because of the sudden death of Kim Il Sung on July 9. The crisis eased after former U. N o r t h K o re a 287 North Korea steadfastly refused to implement procedures demanded by the IAEA to segregate 300 carefully selected fuel rods from the 8. 1994.25 The deal contained a basic trade of obligations. In the second phase.N. which was signed on October 21. because other ways to determine the reactor’s history have since been developed and put forward. which were to be activated after a grace period.and security-related inducements. to be triggered if the North continued to reject the IAEA’s de- mands. less proliferation-prone. 1994.S.S. North Korea. These developments prompted the United States to circulate a proposal to the U.

was buying centrifuge equipment from outside suppliers. As noted above.S. U. choking. and the United States’ inability or refusal to publicly identify uranium enrichment sites. Uranium Enrichment The full scope of North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment pro- gram is unknown. Q. These doubts have been reduced by American sharing of informa- tion with both of these countries. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.S. pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the North.S. there is no publicly available evidence that North Korea can produce large amounts of uranium hexaflouride.288 Tw o H a r d C a s e s capabilities were frozen. that North Korea purchases centrifuge equipment for the purpose of selling or transferring it to other customers of the A. which is the feed material needed to enrich uranium through the centrifuge process. it established North Korea’s obligation to accept whatever steps the IAEA decides are necessary to verify the accuracy of the country’s nuclear declaration. The Agreed Framework also included a U.28 Moreover. but many questions about the scale.”30 Moreover. the Central Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that “North [Korea] is con- structing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational—which could be as soon as mid-decade. or if it had the technical training or assistance needed to assemble and operate a full-scale ura- nium enrichment cascade. and eventually completion of North Korea’s uranium efforts remain unanswered. but it was not clear if the North had acquired enough complete centrifuge kits to assemble that many units. intelligence agencies concluded in the summer of 2002 that North Korea had embarked on a uranium enrichment program. and had begun the construction of a uranium enrichment centrifuge facility. had initially led South Korea and Chinese officials to express doubts about the U. and it has not .”27 Other sources claim that North Korea was able to obtain parts for just over 2.29 North Korea’s continued refusal to publicly acknowledge that it possesses a uranium enrichment program. The majority of publicly available evidence surrounding North Korea’s en- richment effort comes through tracking Pyongyang’s foreign procurement ef- forts. Moreover.000 centrifuges. Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis North Korea possesses chemical weapons and a large quantity of chemical precur- sors for the production of such weapons. Khan network and no longer possesses any uranium enrichment equip- ment. It is also possible. It is likely to have the ability to pro- duce “bulk quantities of nerve. and a North Korean commitment to implement the 1992 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. which banned uranium enrichment and plutonium re- processing on the entire peninsula. and blood agent. claims of a uranium program by the North. though not yet proven. blister. At the time. progress.

000 kilogram payload).000-kilogram payload). are uncertain. sarin. chemical. North Korean troops have also been trained to fight in contaminated areas. including Iran. total at least 180 to 250 metric tons.31 North Korea maintains facilities involved in producing or storing chemical precursors.000 metric tons. but it is believed to have the basic infrastructure to produce several biological agents. cholera. tabun. With substantial financing from customer states. and plague. and weapons. as well as by conventional artillery or aircraft. including artillery or possibly ballistic missiles.32 North Korea possesses a rudimentary biological weapons capability and has engaged in biological research since the 1960s. North Korea is thought to possess the means to deliver chemical weapons by ballistic missile. It either successfully reverse- engineered the system (improving its range and accuracy) or received substan- tially more equipment and assistance from the Soviet Union than is publicly known. accommodated at perhaps a half dozen major stor- age sites and in as many as 170 mountain tunnels.S. N o r t h K o re a 289 acknowledged that it possesses chemical weapons or agreed to eliminate its hold- ings. The threat from this untested missile is the main justification for the U. according to the U. intelligence ser- vices. The production rate and types of munitions. and the No Dong (with a 1. It could deliver such weapons by several means. agents.000- kilometer range and a 700–1. North Korea’s reserves. phosgene. North Korea tested a ballistic missile/space launch vehicle known as the Taepo Dong I on August 31. Although the third stage of the missile failed to boost its payload into orbit. North Korea is observing a self-declared moratorium . the system demonstrated North Korea’s accelerating ability to launch a multistage missile and to develop a system with the potential for intercontinental range. based primarily on tech- nology derived from Soviet-designed Scud-B missiles. The third stage is thought to be a solid rocket “kick motor” of unknown origin. the Scud–Mod C (with a 500- kilometer range and a 700-kilogram payload). North Korea has developed and deployed the Scud–Mod B (with a 320. Defense Department.S. and a family of mustard gases—constituting the basis of North Korea’s chemical weap- ons—are produced there. Presumably.to 340- kilometer range and a 1. 1998. prussic acid. According to the assessment of U. Its biological weapons program is not nearly as advanced as its nuclear. adamsite.S. however. development and deployment of missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California. It has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents. North Korea is also reportedly working on a longer-range Taepo Dong II missile that could enable it to deliver a nuclear-sized payload to the continental United States.33 Missile Analysis North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile program. with some estimates of chemical stockpiles running as high as 5. including anthrax. North Korea acquired a number of Scud missiles from Egypt in the 1970s. In addition. However. The system is believed to use a No Dong as its first stage and a Scud-B as its second stage. or ballistic missile programs.

R. “Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Conventional Meeting. States that have received missiles from North Korea include Iran. 15. Mass.” Wall Street Journal. “North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Produce Nuclear Weapons. Les Aspin. The Agreed Framework contains no legal prohibitions against the construction of new nuclear facilities by North Korea. 14. p.kcna.” 10. 1995).whitehouse. 6. U. “Statement of Hon. See Pollack.” available at www. March/April 2003. Robert S.S. vol. November 19. which was established as part of its discussions with the United States on a broader agreement to end Pyongyang’s missile production and export activities. 11–49.htm. For details of the controversy surrounding these issues. 2001. “The United States. p. Martin’s Press. Norris. and its exports have continued despite its flight-test moratorium. p. and the End of the Agreed Framework. KCNA. 2005.jp.” February 10. December 1.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. see Kenneth Pollack. John Bolton.” Washington Post. purchasing uranium enrichment equipment does not. Libya. Iran is also believed to have received North Korean assistance in establishing its own missile production capabilities and may intend to enter the missile export market. Don Oberdorfer. 8. 2004. 74–77. N OTES 1. The start of construction of a uranium enrichment facility without providing design information to the IAEA would be a violation of safeguards and therefore the NPT. 56. Ambassador-at-Large. by itself. July 19. pp. 25.state. “North Korea’s Nuclear Program. Department of State. Hans M. “Bush Statement on Undertaking Talks with North Korea. Powell. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 (Washington. and Joshua Handler. December 1993. Robert Gallucci.gov/ news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4. constitute a violation of the North–South agreement or the NPT. 2001). July 15. available at www. 3. Moreover. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Mike Mazarr.” 12. “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Day Talks for Indeterminate Period. 2. 5. Secretary Colin L. 3. available at www. North Korea. D. 2001.290 Tw o H a r d C a s e s on missile flight tests. April 27. Summer 2003. Kristensen. and the End of the Agreed Framework. Jeffrey Smith.” prepared testimony of James A. 1989. pp. to Senate Committee on Foreign Re- lations. 2003. John Fialka. National Intelligence Council.: Addison-Wesley. 1997). 16. 1994. Egypt may also have received some systems from Pyongyang.” March 6. “Press Availability with Her Excellency Anna Lindh. McNeil-Lehrer Newshour. 250. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. 13.co. “United States. 1993. Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. no.” Geneva.gov/ secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116. . and Syria.: National Intelligence Council.” Naval War College Review. a status rejected by the United States.C. “N. Pakistan. 12. North Korea. 9. North Korea is the leading exporter of ballistic missiles to the developing world. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Lexington. Iran’s and Pakistan’s missile capabilities are thought to be highly dependent on North Korean technology and equipment. 11. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden.html. 4. 7. North Korea claimed at the time it was not fully bound by the NPT and was under a special status having “temporarily suspended” its withdrawal from the NPT. “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs.

“U. N. Gordon.S. “U. see Joel S. Korean Conduct in Inspection Draws Criticism of U. D. Michael Gordon.S.S. “Unclassified CIA Fact Sheet.” Washington Post. “U. 27. 1. R. 2004). Joby Warrick. March 16. pp. Ann Devroy. “N. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. 14. “U.S. Department of Defense. For a detailed account of the Carter-Kim meeting. 1994. 2002. www. Department of Defense. David Ottaway. Sanger.: Brookings Institution Press. “Letter from the Director General of the IAEA Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Relating to North Korea. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang’s Effort to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans. 18.: Princeton University Press. Wit. to Increase the Pressure on North Korea. Officials. 33. June 16.: U. David E. to Seek Sanctions on N. March 10. and R. June 19. February 18. T. 10–11.cia. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington.” New York Times.N. U. 16. 25. pp. 1993. Korea and the Bomb”. Jeffrey Smith. Smith.N. “West Watching Reac- tor for Sign of North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions. p. pp. 1994.” Washington Post.” New York Times.” Wash- ington Post. Federation of American Scientists.S. “North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples from Site. December 12.html. 1994. Korea Forbids Inspections. Gallucci. “North Korea Rejects Special Nuclear Inspections. Mark Hibbs. 1994. and Smith. 17. p. November 8. Smith.” 19.” available at www. Disarming Strangers. and Robert L.S.” Washington Post. For a complete history of the negotiation and contents of the Agreed Framework.fas.C. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton. Unveils Proposal for Sanctions. 23.C. Depart- ment of Defense. pp. R.S.. Author discussions with Korean government officials. “Inspection of North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities Is Halted. and Michael Gordon. 2001). April 7. and “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.org/nuke/ guide/dprk/cw/index. 1993. Goes to U. 1994. and Michael R. Mark Hibbs. “Fuel Readiness Means North Korea Can Start Reactors Up on Schedule. and Julia Preston. 24. p. 1994. “Back from Korea. “N. 1994. 1993. 31. Agency Finds No Assurance North Korea Bans Nuclear Arms. 1994. Smith.” New York Times.S. 22. 11–12. 28. Spent Fuel Details. see Sigal. For a detailed examination of the IAEA’s relations with North Korea. “U. David Sanger. 21. March 22.” New York Times. “U. 1998). Korea and the Bomb. Hibbs. 1994.” Nucleon- ics Week. Mark Hibbs. 32. “U.” Nucleonics Week. Reid. “N. see Sigal.” Washington Post. “N. p. October 18. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. April 28.” June 2. 29. “N.” Nuclear Fuel. 150–162.” Washington Post.” New York Times.” October 21. 1993. Central Intelligence Agency. Carter Declares the Crisis Is Over. Proliferation: Threat and Response. 26.” Washington Post. 20. .” Reuters. September 8. 1994. 1994. “Leaders of 2 Koreas Seek First Summit. Korea Refuses Demand to Inspect Reactor Fuel. Might Help North Korea Refuel Reactor. December 3.” Nucleonics Week. 1994. DPRK to Meet in Berlin on LWR Transfer. Disarming Strangers.htm#5. For a compre- hensive assessment of the March 1994 inspection. 1 July through 31 December 2003. see Leon Sigal. N o r t h K o re a 291 17.S.” November 19. “White House Asks for Global Sanctions on North Koreans. Korea. U. June 3. September 16.S. Daniel B. 95–108. 1994. June 3. Poneman. Weapons of Mass Destruction web site. 1994.” Washington Post. March 16. June 8. 1994. D.” Washing- ton Post. Jeffrey Smith.J.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003. “IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance. 2002. June 20. 1994. 30.

Uranium ore processing. 8 MWt. 1. construction No suspended Sinpo-2 Kumho Light-water. 0. No 5 status unknown Uranium Processing Pyongsan Uranium ore processing. status unknown No Sanchon. No construction halted. U. operating No Yongbyon Gas-graphite. status unknown No Yongbyon Uranium purification (UO2) facility.292 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Table 14. no evidence that it has resumed Research Factors 2 IRT Pool-type. nat. U.1. No operating . North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Power Reactors 1 Sinpo-1 Kumho Light-water.1 MWt No Pyongyang Subcritical assembly No Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) 3 Radiochemical Operational No Laboratory 4 Yongbyon Pyongyang Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale hot cells. 50 MWe. construction No halted. 5 MWe. 200 MWe. nat. nat.000 MWe. No Yongbyon operating Yongbyon Critical assembly. 1. status unknown No Wolbingson mine Pakchon Pyongsan Uranium ore processing.040 MWe. status unknown No Pakchon Uranium ore processing. no evidence that it has resumed Taechon Gas-graphite. HEU (80 percent). U. PWR. construction No suspended Yongbyon Gas-graphite.

because North Korea has not permitted inspectors to return to the country since expelling them at the end of 2002. The Sinpo-1 and Sinpo-2 light-water reactors were being constructed by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). No tional. partially opera. Neither of these facilities is currently under safeguards. Hecker. 2004. (See IAEA Infor- mation Circular 66 for more). N o r t h K o re a 293 Yongbyon Fuel-fabrication facility. Dreicer. Los Alamos National Laboratory.org/ NFCISMAin. according to North Korean officials ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS: HEU highly enriched uranium nat. North Korean officials claimed that they had successfully extracted plutonium from all 8.iaea.” Available at www. vol. Jared S. however.: Wilmington Publishing. Nuclear Engineering International. According to the IAEA. capable of reprocessing 110 tons of spent fuel per year. respectively.K. 8. 2000. a senior fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory who visited the Yongbyon nuclear facility in January 2004. Construction has been sus- pended since the breakdown of the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in late 2002 and early 2003. partially under maintenance Yongbyon Pilot-scale fuel-fabrication facility.asp?Region=The%20World&Country=All&Type=All&Status=All&Scale= All&Order=2&Page=1&RightP=List&Table=1. According to Siegfried Hecker. disman. pp. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems. 2004).nfcis. . before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 5. senior fellow. 273–286. According to North Korean officials. 3. because the IRT research reactor and the critical assembly located at Yongbyon were acquired from the Soviet Union. Testimony of Sieg- fried S. World Nuclear Industry Handbook (Sidcup.” NOTES N OTES: 1. “How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?” Science & Global Security. U. January 21. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal PWR pressurized water reactor SSOURCES OURCES: IAEA.000 spent-fuel rods stored at Yongbyon between January and June 2003. No tled. 2. “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea. 4. both are subject to safe- guards regardless of whether or not North Korea is a party to the NPT.

.

Despite Iran’s membership in the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).5 Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed on Octo- ber 5. . that agency’s Secretariat concluded in November 2004 that Iran had “failed .000-kilogram payload.300 kilometers and a payload of about 750 kilograms. but he provided no evidence to support this claim. officials and intelligence services in several other nations have concluded that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapon program. it could take several years for Iran to build and operate a fully func- tioning uranium enrichment “cascade” and an additional one to two years for that facility to produce enough weapons-grade material for the country’s first nuclear device. . with a range of 1. that Iran possessed a missile with a range of 2. to meet its obligations under its safe- guards agreement. although no direct evidence of weapon activities has been made public.000 kilograms. 2004.” Efforts to sanction Iran for its “failures” have been put on hold while members of the European Union attempt to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear fuel production programs.000 kilometers. The first flight test was carried out on July 22.S. but for more than two decades Tehran has secretly pursued the ability to produce nuclear materials that can be used in weapons. 1998. U. Missile Capability Iran possesses up to 300 Scud-B missiles with a 300-kilometer range and with a payload of 1. 2004. Past estimates about when Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon have proven unreliable.6 295 .1 Iran remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).2 If Iran’s nuclear activities continued without outside constraint and without significant outside assistance. CHAPTER 15 Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Iran does not possess nuclear weapons.3 Iran has also received enough assistance from North Korea to enable the country to produce its own Scud missiles. and more recently it was tested on October 20. The system is derived from the North Korean No Dong missile. For example. and perhaps 100 Scud-Cs with an approximate range of 500 kilometers with a 1.4 Iran has conducted at least ten tests of the medium-range Shahab III. a 1992 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate concluded that Iran would have the bomb by 2000.

Iran has the largest population in the Middle East and the world’s third largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. Some Western intelligence officials believe that the Shahab III.”9 In November 2004. The Iranian CW program began in the 1980s during the war with Iraq.13 There is no independent confirmation of these claims.” with the capability to produce small quantities of biological weapon (BW) agents but limited ability to weaponize them. and probably nerve agents and also the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them.S. blood. traveled only 100 kilometers before crashing to the ground. It is not known. choking. U.8 For several years. officials have assessed that Tehran could have the Shahab III on “emergency operational status. but it may be able to adapt its Soviet-built Su-24 strike aircraft to carry the KH-55. although this claim has not been confirmed. U. Tehran acknowledged its previous chemical weapon (CW) development and produc- tion. however. Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes of the missile. if Iran possesses the technology needed to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to deliver it by missile. In May 1998. The CIA believes that Iran likely possesses both a stockpile of blister.11 Iran does not possess such bombers. Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani claimed that Iran was capable of mass producing Shahab III missiles. There is no independent confirmation of these claims. and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran’s efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce chemical nerve agents. Iran occupies a pivotal position straddling the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. geography. and a limited number reportedly have been deployed with units of Iran’s elite Revo- lutionary Guard. The CIA.296 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Both Iranian and foreign officials often claim greater progress for Tehran’s missile program than tests seem to indicate. which it had previously manufactured.S.10 Iran allegedly bought six KH-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2000. and it aspires to again become the region’s major power. and Iranian officials say that the program was dismantled at the war’s end. a vital maritime pathway for crude oil transport. and resources. train- ing.7 The Shahab III has a sufficient range and payload to deliver a nuclear war- head as far as Israel and parts of southern Europe. after acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention. intelli- gence reports from 2003 claim that Iran probably maintains an “offensive bio- logical weapon program. including nuclear weapons and ballistic and .12 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Although Iran is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention. Some Iranian leaders have come to see the pos- session of unconventional weapons. These Soviet-era missiles are designed to carry a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead on Rus- sian-made Tupolev long-range bombers. however. commensurate with its his- tory. claims that Iran continues to seek production technology. The Strategic Context A Persian power with a keen sense of history. in an August 2004 test.

there is serious concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would lead other states in the Gulf and Middle East to reexamine their nuclear options. Iranian officials have also apparently been influenced by Israel’s. If the international community is unable or unwilling to im- pose penalties on Iran. Iran has likely seen unconventional weapons as a deterrent to possible U. Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. Khan. The leaders of the United States . The successful acquisition by Iran of a fissile material production ca- pability or of actual nuclear weapons would be a serious blow to global nonpro- liferation efforts. and even Turkey. However. as compared with Gulf Arab states. Since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Iran 297 cruise missiles. military action—par- ticularly given the large U. a situation that may greatly complicate efforts to convince Iranian officials to end the pursuit of their country’s sensitive nuclear fuel cycle programs. Indeed. coercion with its nuclear capa- bilities. Syria.16 Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities is seen as a source of national pride across the political spectrum. a NATO member and European Union applicant. military officials in Iran may see nuclear weapons as a way to com- pensate for the gap between Iran’s conventional military. which spend vast amounts of money on state-of-the-art. the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. India’s.15 and in November of that year. Q.S. the pursuit of civilian nuclear capabilities has become a po- tent domestic issue in Iran. and Pakistan’s advanced nuclear capabilities. military presence in the region—and as a way to increase Tehran’s power and prestige in the Persian Gulf. The discovery of these clandestine activities has contributed to international suspicion about Iran’s program. In addition. including possibly Saudi Arabia.S. and if Tehran succeeds in continuing its nuclear development. many states will question the strength and utility of the nonprolif- eration system. both conservatives and reformers support Iran’s development of its nuclear fuel cycle capabilities as an inherent right ac- corded by the NPT. Mohammad Mossadeq. and Israel’s growing ties with Turkey to the north and India to the east.S. high-technology weaponry—often supplied by the United States.17 This potential wave of proliferation would seriously challenge regional and global security and undermine the world- wide effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. constrained by U. Ostensibly. nationalized the country’s oil assets. the country hid sen- sitive nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world for more than eighteen years. as critical parts of their national security and domestic political strategies. Moreover. Iran’s Nuclear History In 1951.14 In recent years. the parliament voted unanimously to resume uranium enrichment after a temporary suspension. hundreds of university students gathered outside the Atomic En- ergy Organization demanding that the government not concede Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. In October 2004. Egypt.S. North Korea’s ability to deter U. having acquired advanced uranium enrichment equipment and expertise through the nuclear black market of Pakistan’s A. sanctions.

North Korea. missile systems. and Ukraine. it is unclear if other programs have as well. The regime in Tehran appears to have then decided to pursue unconventional weapons as an important means of de- terrence and self-defense. bacteriological. Shortly after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire. China. U. it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. Khan black market network. Iran began its nuclear power program.S. declared: With regard to chemical. Iran acquired its first nuclear research reactor. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolu- tions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are com- mitted in the battlefield.”18 Declassified documents show that in 1953 President Dwight D. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical.-supplied 5-megawatt-thermal (MWt) reactor that is still in operation at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Iran has relied extensively on outside assistance for the acquisition of its unconventional weapons capabilities. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.19 Under the shah’s autocratic rule. but Khomeini froze construction of these reactors and all other work on “Western” nuclear technologies and forced many Western-educated scientists and engineers to flee the country. a small U. which then progressed slowly until the late 1960s. Iran developed plans to build 22 nuclear power reactors with an elec- trical output of 23 gigawatts.298 Tw o H a r d C a s e s and the United Kingdom concluded that his policies meant “that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain” resulting in “a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East. officials aided the secular Saddam as a counter to what was seen as the greater threat of Iran’s militant Islamic theocracy. and radiological weapons training. These nuclear activities were halted when the shah was toppled in 1979 and the Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini came to power.S. relations with Iraq actually improved during this period. During this period.S. sowing the seeds of Iran’s lingering distrust of Western powers. Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. code named Operation Ajax. Iranians often point out that no na- tion came to Iran’s aid when it was invaded and attacked by Iraq with chemical weapons. The new revolutionary government inherited two partially com- pleted West German–supplied nuclear power reactors at Bushehr. chemical weapons. and radiological weapons.20 During the 1970s.21 Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s drove Iran’s more recent pursuit of nuclear technologies. as U. . Q. The CIA successfully toppled the young democratic govern- ment and installed Mohammad Raza Shah Pehlavi as the new pro-West ruler. Also during this period. including direct as- sistance from the A.22 The missile programs have continued until the present day. then–speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces and later Iran’s president. relations between the United States and Iran thrived. Eisenhower approved a joint British-American operation to overthrow Mossadeq. and indirect assistance from Russia and countries in Europe. and possibly biological weapons. bacteriological.

In 2002. known as the P-1 and the more efficient P-2 designs (the “P” stands for the Pakistani origins of the design). which includes expanded inspection rights and tools. Q. Iran had previously tried to purchase a centrifuge facility from Russia in the 1990s. although exactly when these contacts were made remains unclear.1 at the end of the chapter). Tehran claims . This has created widespread concern that Iranian lead- ers are committed to acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons.”24 It is now known that Iran’s activities include the pursuit of several nuclear material production tech- nologies that. Iran’s uranium enrichment program involves the acqui- sition. although in January 2004 Iran acknowledged that it had received ad- vanced P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1995. if mastered. In addition. Khan network. and it has agreed to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. could provide Tehran with the ability to produce the core materials for nuclear weapons. Iran has been engaged in a secret. Iran maintains that no P-2 centrifuges or components were obtained from abroad and that all P-2 components in its possession were produced domestically. Moreover. testing. the IAEA reported in November 2004 that it was still not “in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. multifaceted program to produce nuclear materials. including stocks of plutonium and highly en- riched uranium left in Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union. CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM. Work on Iran’s uranium centrifuge was greatly accelerated in the 1990s after Iran gained access to centrifuge technology and material through the A. After almost two years of intensive investigations. an Iranian opposition group revealed that the country’s nuclear pro- gram was much more extensive and alarming than Tehran had previously de- clared. are intended for peaceful pur- poses. Iran maintains that all its nuclear activities. while the laser enrichment program began under the shah in the 1970s. there have been reports. Work on the gas-centrifuge enrichment program appears to have begun in 1985. Uranium Enrichment Iran has pursued at least two different methods for enriching uranium: gas cen- trifuges and lasers. if not actual weapons. that Iranian agents have sought to acquire nuclear materials and even weapons from other countries. and production of two types of centrifuges. or than of which the IAEA was aware (see table 15. there was no evidence that Iran possesses enough fissile material to produce nuclear weapons or possessed any nuclear devices. some more reliable than others. even those previously hidden from the IAEA.23 Yet for the past two decades. a deal that died after the United States complained to Moscow about the potential proliferation implications of such a facility. Iran 299 Nuclear Analysis As of the spring of 2005. All of Iran’s known installed and production capabilities rely on the P- 1 design. in 2003 Iran signed and pledged to implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.

the production of which Iran had previously denied. Iran does not appear either to have mastered the techniques needed to reliably operate the cascade or to have restarted tests during 2004. al- though the IAEA had not yet been granted sufficient cooperation by Pakistan to fully confirm its findings. The site contains buildings both above and below ground and covers approximately 100. In June 2003. ten-machine cascade with UF6 gas. 2003. an opposition group based in France. which consists of three underground structures.000 P-1 centrifuges at the pilot enrichment plant. . After the disclosure.25 Officials from several nations believe that Iran’s attempt to produce uranium hexafluoride in November 2004 failed to produce a gas of sufficient quality that could be used in centrifuge enrichment. which were believed to have come from Pakistan. Though officials in several countries. Under Iran’s safeguards obligations. Centrifuge work had not restarted as of the spring of 2005. but it shut the cascade down that month as part of its agreement with the European Union. Iran had earlier denied importing any centrifuge com- ponents. The two largest buildings would house cascade halls large enough to contain approxi- mately 50.000 square meters. These samples revealed particles of highly enriched uranium. the IAEA took envi- ronmental samples before uranium was officially introduced at the facility. Iranian officials attributed the sample results to the contamination of imported centrifuge components. and it has since inspected numerous times and taken more than 300 environmental samples at this and related sites. Iran had planned to eventually install up to 1.000 centrifuge machines. publicly disclosed the existence of the site. In October 2003. On August 19. the site contained 164 centrifuges. but when confronted with the evidence changed its story.26 Further cascade operations are precluded by the November 2004 suspension negotiated with the European Union and moni- tored by the IAEA. which had previously been unknown and undeclared to the IAEA. was originally scheduled to start accepting P-1 centrifuges in 2005. the National Council of Resistance of Iran. especially in the United States. Iran began testing a small.27 No centrifuges had been installed at the site when the November 2004 suspension was implemented. In August 2002. industrial-scale centrifuge facility.” Iran has a complete pilot-scale centrifuge facility and a larger. The IAEA’s November 2004 report concluded that this explanation appears plausible. When operations were suspended in November 2004. including its Oc- tober 2003 declarations to the IAEA) due to “time constraints. it is required to declare all facilities to the IAEA 180 days before the introduction of nuclear materials to the facility.300 Tw o H a r d C a s e s that information about the P-2 program had not been included in previous dec- larations (which it had characterized as correct and complete. the IAEA conducted its first visit to the site in February 2003. The industrial-scale plant. Iran officially introduced uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into a single centrifuge at the pilot plant for testing purposes. thought contamination indicated that Iran was working on fissile material for nuclear weapons. both located at Natanz. approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. Between March and May 2003. as yet incom- plete. Iran was finalizing installation of a test 164-machine cascade at the site.

milling. Iran admits that it produced a small amount of plutonium outside of safeguards. that is. and conversion. then it would also need to possess a reliable domestic source of uranium.-supplied Tehran Research Reactor between 1988 and 1998 when Iran irradiated depleted ura- nium dioxide (UO2) targets using materials previously exempted from safeguards in 1978 and later declared lost as waste. The IAEA did. It is not clear that Iran’s uranium reserves are sufficient. its goal in pursuing uranium enrichment is to become more independent of foreign supplies of fuel. to provide enough material to fuel the Bushehr reactors or additional reac- tors.S. If. a violation of its IAEA commitments. These experiments report- edly involved 1. These activities were less advanced than the uranium enrichment effort at the time Iran suspended its nuclear activities in November 2004. it is difficult to justify the fuel cycle program it is pursuing on commercial or self-sufficiency grounds. but subsequently admitted in 2003. how- ever. These experiments involved 7 kilograms . Iran initially denied. Iran has also developed and built the full suite of supporting capabilities needed to pursue a uranium enrichment capability. up to 15 percent U-235 enrichment.28 Iran established a pilot laser en- richment plant at a site known as Lashkar Ab’ad in 2000. which began in the 1970s. This production took place at the U. determine that the equipment could have been used for the production of highly enriched uranium. The IAEA analyzed the environmental samples and found en- richment levels consistent with those declared by Iran.9 kilograms of UF6. Laser enrichment experiments at the site between October 2002 and January 2003 used 22 kilo- grams of natural uranium metal and produced small amounts (milligrams) of reactor-grade enriched uranium (3–4 percent U-235). is based on two techniques: atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation (MLIS). Iranian authorities claim that all equip- ment at Lashkar Ab’ad was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred to a storage facility at Karaj. Without a large supply of indigenous uranium ore. including uranium mining.2 percent uranium-235 (U-235). Iran claims that it did not enrich uranium beyond 1. which can be used for both nuclear reactors and weap- ons. Iran’s laser enrichment program. LASER ENRICHMENT. Iran 301 Most of the known research and development of Iran’s enrichment program has taken place at the Kalaye Electric Company facility. raising further questions about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activi- ties. as Iran claims. that a small number of gas centrifuges was tested with uranium gas at the site between 1998 and 2002. This uranium metal was part of a 50-kilogram shipment that was undeclared and is suspected to have come from the Soviet Union in 1993. The IAEA has completed its review of the AVLIS program and has concluded that the levels of enrichment achieved matched Iran’s description of the activity. however. Plutonium Facilities Iran has also been engaged in efforts to test and develop the means to produce and separate plutonium.

302 Tw o H a r d C a s e s of pressed UO2 pellets prepared at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. During the course of the 1990s. multifaceted program to acquire nuclear and related technology and equipment from a variety of sources and that it has benefited from the A. and therefore the leaders did not muster the necessary economic and scientific resources to accelerate the program. and technology have been acquired from foreign suppliers. the impact of sanctions. Iran has also built a heavy-water production plant at Arak and had hoped to start producing heavy water there in 2004. In 1995. but until recently it has been unable to effectively use much of what it has acquired. Iran signed an $800 million deal with Moscow to finish the construction of one of the reactors based on a Russian-designed reac- tor and to house it in the German-designed reactor facility. yielding approximately 100 milligrams of plutonium. and work at the site is thought to be ongoing. It plans to build a 40-MWt heavy-water reactor at Arak that could go into operation by 2014. however. . The plans for the reactor were completed in 2002 and would rely on the use of natural uranium oxide as fuel. first refused to complete the project after the Iranian revolution. This project was not covered by the suspension agree- ment with the European Union in 2004. It is now clear that Iran has engaged in a long-term. Sources of Technology Despite constant claims to the contrary. Iran has been actively engaged in acquiring a variety of sensitive nuclear capabilities. Russia announced that the construction of the 1. In February 2005. Poor management.000- MW reactor was complete. This amount is far less than would be needed to pro- duce a nuclear weapon but enough to validate the production and separation processes. that it was not a policy priority. as a condition of supply. including Europe. and a less than fully developed industrial and education base may partly explain why most estimates of when Iran might be able to acquire a nuclear capability have proven incorrect. equipment. The same is true for its missile capabilities. almost all Iran’s critical nuclear materi- als. Q. and then refused to repair the damaged facility after the Iran-Iraq War. After years of delay. Khan nuclear black market and from poor export controls across the globe. 2004. It is also possible that Iranian leaders were ambivalent about pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. which was in the process of being com- pleted by Russia. although it has now acquired the ability to produce its own Scud-type missiles. Russia has insisted that fuel for the facility should be provided by Russia and that spent fuel should be re- turned to Russia for disposal. 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed. Bonn. the bulk of Iran’s known nuclear activities focused on the Bushehr reactor program. The facility could open in 2005 and reach full ca- pacity by 2006. However. The former West Germany began construction of the facility under the shah’s regime. During the past 25 years. Iran has also been pursuing the construction of a plutonium production reac- tor since the 1980s. Moscow and Tehran signed contracts that finalized these spent-fuel arrangements. on October 14.

China was a source of significant assis- tance to Iran’s civilian nuclear program. Germany. Iran had approached German and Swiss firms to purchase balancing machines and diagnostic and monitoring equipment—all dual-use items potentially valuable for laboratory-scale centrifuge development. some details emerged on Iran’s nuclear procurement activities.S.29 In the spring of 1995. the type of equip- ment used in Iraq’s electromagnetic isotope separation enrichment program for the separation of weapons-grade uranium. In the fall of 1995. France. in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. ostensibly because of difficulties over site selection. China also supplied Iran with a calutron.34 In addition.31 This network provided Iran with key centrifuge technology and is thought to have provided Iran with a list of suppliers for es- sential equipment (see the fuller discussion in chapter 12 on Pakistan). using front companies and false end-user certificates to persuade Western Euro- pean companies to provide nuclear-related. pressure.33 In March 1992. By 1992. Iran opened a nuclear research center in Isfahan. Western intelligence sources were quoted as stating that. China agreed to supply two 300-MW-electric nuclear power reac- tors to Iran. Iran also pur- chased a number of small companies (particularly in Germany) to serve as platforms for exporting sensitive equipment to Iran. however. since 1990. China For a decade starting in the mid-1980s. dual-use technologies.30 In January 2004. press reports of Western intelligence findings indicated that Iran had established experimental programs in fissile material production at Sharif University in Tehran and possibly at other locations. Iran appears to have sup- ported these efforts through an active but clandestine procurement network. Some reports indicated that China suspended or even terminated the deal because of strong U. Other factors may also have been involved. although the under- lying cause may have been Iran’s difficulties in obtaining financing. potentially useful in the develop- ment of centrifuge top bearings. Q. Iran 303 Nuclear Black Market In 1984. China supplied Iran with two “mini” research reactors installed at Isfahan.32 Under a ten-year agreement for coop- eration signed in 1990. Khan and his international nuclear black market became public. the details of Iran’s successful procurement of enrichment technology and nuclear know-how from A. Specifically. Iranian agents were said to have contacted a British company to obtain samarium-cobalt magnetic equipment. China’s reactor sale to Iran was sus- pended. Washington persuaded Beijing to postpone indefinitely the sale to Iran of a plutonium-producing research reactor and also convinced Argentina not to export supporting fuel cycle and heavy-water production facilities. substantiating suspected efforts to establish a secret gas-centrifuge ura- nium enrichment program. China reportedly trained Iranian nuclear technicians and engineers in China. In addition. In 1992. in line with Iran’s NPT obligations. Both countries claim that the aid has been used exclusively for peaceful purposes. and Japan apparently had declined to supply China with essential .

China made a commitment to cancel almost all its existing nuclear assistance to Iran and to provide Iran with no new nuclear assistance.000 metric tons of natural uranium. 2.37 Washington urged Moscow to halt its work on the Bushehr nuclear reactor but met with little success.S. could have enabled Iran to secretly build and operate a similar plant to produce weapons-grade uranium.S. In March and April 1995. as well as exports to Iran of all .S. and other actions considered hostile to U. U. tensions rose with Russia when the Bill Clinton administration learned that.39 Iran could also benefit from the presence of the thousands of Russian nuclear scien- tists who are expected to take part in the Bushehr project.S. the U.304 Tw o H a r d C a s e s components that it might have needed for the reactors it had offered Iran. however. In April 1996.” the Department of Defense no longer viewed China as Iran’s main nuclear source.38 Bushehr’s benefits for Iran’s nuclear weapons program are likely to be largely indirect.S. Those sanctions blocked economic and military assistance to Iran. By 2001.35 In the United States–China summit of Oc- tober 1997. its attacks in 1987 on U. The project will augment Iran’s nuclear technology infra- structure.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers. contributions to multilateral organizations that assist Iran and U. The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act expressly prohibited trans- fers of nuclear equipment and materials to Iran.S. It is also possible that Iran lost interest in the arrangement once it was confident that Russia would complete the Bushehr project.S. though itself under IAEA inspec- tion and dedicated to the production of low-enriched (non-weapons-grade) ura- nium. Russia had agreed to provide Iran with a gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. and the training of Ira- nian graduates in nuclear sciences in Russia. although the United States continues to be concerned about some missile assis- tance from China to Iran. Export-Import Bank cred- its for Iran. Other disturbing elements of the protocol were an agreement in principle for Russia to supply a light-water research reactor of 30 to 50 MWt. U. Such a facility. Russia proceeded with its contract to help Iran build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr.36 Russia During early 1995. be- cause Russian entities were known to also be cooperating with Iran on other projects as well. efforts to curtail foreign nuclear sales to Iran intensified in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.40 The United States During the 1980s. noting that “China appears to be living up to its 1997 commitments. helping Tehran’s nuclear weapons research and development. as part of a secret protocol to the reactor sale contract. concerns extended even beyond Bushehr. prohib- ited the importation of Iranian-origin goods. Department of Defense still regarded China as Iran’s main source of nuclear assistance. and restricted U. inter- ests. the United States imposed a wide range of sanctions on Iran because of Tehran’s support for international terrorism.

economic assistance to Russia to be made contingent upon presidential determination that Russia had terminated its nuclear-related assistance to Iran. Security Council for violating its NPT obligations. but in the summer of 2001 Congress extended ILSA for five years. The restriction applies both to nuclear dual-use commodities (that is.42 The legislation permitted the president to waive this restriction at six-month intervals. remains unverified.43 Washington further intensified economic pressure on Iran by imposing sec- ondary sanctions on it and Libya.N. By the fall of 1997. The Clinton administration backed away from imposing the sanctions because of the economic crisis in East Asia and in Russia in the fall of 1997 and spring of 1998.S. unvetted walk-in source who provided documents purported to be Iranian drawings and technical documents. and biological weapons and exporting terror. U.S. aiming in part to constrain Tehran’s unconventional weapons programs. this legislation faced a serious challenge from French. through the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA).” pursuing nuclear. funds available to Russia was in the interest of U. which currently are regulated under the Wassenaar Arrangement). national secu- rity. terrorist attacks. which placed larger U. In 1995 and 1996. The Bush administra- tion has also insisted that Iran “abandon” its nuclear fuel cycle activities. citing a classified intelligence report that Iran was working on mating warheads to mis- siles. secretary of state Colin Powell told reporters that Iran was working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon. Malaysian. the United States tightened sanctions on Iran. . but Washington has convinced its Western trading partners to adopt the stricter policy in the case of Iran. The Bush administration has not been enthusiastic about ILSA.S.S. The United States has relied on the NSG to coordinate the Western embargo on nuclear sales to Iran and has persuaded some states to withhold goods that were regulated under the NSG’s core export control guidelines. 2004. and Russian oil companies that had signed a deal with Iran to help recover and market oil and natural gas. NSG rules per- mit the sale of such items.41 Legislation adopted in February 1996 provided for U.S.45 On November 17.S. upon a determination that making U.46 Press reports revealed that the claim was based on a single. 2001. officials have repeatedly charged Iran with developing such weapons and called on the members of the IAEA Board of Governors to report Iran to the U. those having nuclear and non-nuclear uses and that are regulated internationally by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Iran 305 dual-use commodities and U. or NSG) and to strategic dual-use commodities (that is. including a nuclear warhead design. The law imposes sanctions on foreign enterprises that invest $20 million or more in the energy sector of Iran.S. President George W. Such waivers have been regularly exercised. In his first State of the Union address after the September 11. The report. however. government and commercial arms sales. foreign policy interests at stake. chemical. those having military and nonmilitary uses. Bush declared Iran a member of an “axis of evil. provided they are subject to IAEA inspection in the recipient state.44 Since then. however. then–U.

In June 1995.306 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Missile Analysis Iran’s acquisition of ballistic missiles began in the 1980s when. as well as on Scud variants that Iran might produce in the future. and thus it declined to impose regime-related sanctions against ei- ther China or Iran. U. as well as rocket propellant ingredients that could be used in its current stockpile of short-range Scud–Mod Bs and Scud–Mod Cs. materials.50 In the final analysis. however. and North Korea for missile sys- tems and related technologies. Iran reportedly discussed buy- ing the 1. As a result.48 On March 6. under the missile nonproliferation provisions of the Arms Export Control and Export Administration Acts. 1992.S. as a result of which there was a visible decline in Russian assistance until the summer of 1998.S. the Iranian State Purchasing Office. and Israeli intelligence findings that Russian enterprises—including cash-strapped Russian technical institutes. along with Russian.S. and scien- tific know-how that could be used in the manufacture of short-range ballistic missiles such as the Chinese M-9 and M-11. it became clear that North Korea was exporting missile capabilities to Iran. and defense-production companies—were transferring Rus- sian SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile technologies to Iran. North Korea provided Iran with about 100 Scud-Bs and with facilities that enabled Iran to produce the Scuds indigenously. the United States did not find that China’s missile transac- tions with Iran violated China’s pledges related to the Missile Technology Con- trol Regime. “entities have continued to supply a wide variety of missile-related goods. It turned to China.51 In 2001. of missile guidance systems and computer- ized machine tools” to Iran. the press cited U.”52 In 1996. officials indicated that North Korea had sold missile components. against the Ira- nian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and against two North Korean entities for engaging in missile proliferation activities. According to these assessments. During 1997.47 During the early 1990s. Iran hoped to employ these technologies to develop two Iranian derivatives of the 1. the U. intelligence reports that “strongly implicate[d]” China in the transfer to Iran of equipment. press reports quoted U. technology and expertise to Iran. Department of Defense still determined that Chinese.49 China was believed to have trans- ferred “dozens.S. U. In the early 1990s. officials believe Russian assistance remains critical to Iran’s development of the Shahab series.S. the United States imposed sanctions on the Iranian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. then–U. equipment.300-kilometer No Dong from North Korea. however. vice president Al Gore raised the issue in Moscow with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Iran sought to acquire ballistic missile capabilities that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. research facilities. production technology. helping Iran to “save years in its development .S. perhaps hundreds.S. 1996. and materials to Iran.53 The precise nature of the offend- ing transactions remains classified. during the Iran- Iraq War. but U.54 Nevertheless. and the Korea Mining Development Trading Bureau. Libya. the United States imposed sanctions.000-kilometer-range North Korean No Dong missile. although not complete missiles. on May 26. or major subsystems. In September 1997.

came just two weeks after Israel’s Arrow antimissile system—designed to intercept Shahab mis- siles—shot down a test Scud missile for the first time.63 In 2004. Outside experts had speculated that a Shahab IV. with an alleged 2. liquid-fueled SS-4.”57 An August 2004 test. said that Iran had “probably” produced and weaponized BW agents. as well as a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. The 2001 National Intelligence Estimate indicated uniform agreement among U. I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow . and it claims to have follow-on versions of the Shahab III in development.56 The primary Iranian jus- tification for the country’s program is Israel’s missile programs. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security at that time. the Fateh-110.59 Iran is report- edly interested in two developmental North Korean intermediate-range ballistic missiles.S. intelligence community has indicated that Iran will likely continue development of intermediate-range and even intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems by initially testing them as space launch vehicle (SLV) pro- grams. Iran 307 of the Shahab III” and to “significantly accelerate the pace of its ballistic missile development program.”55 The Shahab III is projected to have a range of ap- proximately 1.”62 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis Despite Iran’s ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1973.000 and 3. the Iranian Defense Ministry stated that Iran did not have a program to build a Shahab IV missile. Iran has announced that the Shahab III is in production.300 kilometers.S. for example. In 2001. with theoretical ranges of 2. his assessment was more cautious: “Because BW programs are easily concealed. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet speculated that Iran “could begin flight testing [SLVs] in the mid.58 On November 5. intelligence agencies that “Iran could attempt to launch an ICBM/ SLV about mid-decade although most agencies believe Iran is likely to take until the last half of the decade to do so” (emphasis in original).500 ki- lometers. A Shahab V missile program could be based on either of these missiles.60 Yet none of these capabilities has actually surfaced. could be based on the single-stage. These are both two-stage.000-kilometer range and a 1.S. Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani said in August 2004 that “the Israelis have recently tried to increase their missile capability and we will also try to upgrade our Shahab III missile in every respect.to latter-part of the decade. John Bolton. the National Intelligence Estimates have tended to overestimate the missile capabilities of developing nations. U. liquid-fueled missiles. 2003. and they may simply be official aspirations or bravado.S.61 It was also noted that one agency does not find it likely that Iran will achieve a successful test of an ICBM before 2015. the U. at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. The U. Since 1998. In his 2004 Worldwide Threat Assessment. respectively. the Taepo Dong I (TD-I) and Taepo Dong II (TD-II).000-kilogram payload. officials believe that Iran has pursued biological weapons under the guise of its extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.

Robert Gates.” pp. Andrew Feickert. plague. 2004. “Ukraine Probe Uncovers Illicit Weapons Sales. director of central intelligence. 2004. January 15. Department of Defense (DOD). U. “Iran ‘Can’ Mass-Produce Missiles. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Other pathogens being weaponized. See also. Iran also employed chemical weapons late in the war.65 The United States believes that Iran also continues a chemical weapons pro- gram that seeks production technology. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case. 16–17. 38.” Agence France-Presse. with approximately 50. “Ukraine Missile Sales Are Alleged. primarily mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun. p. and cholera.: DOD. training.000 casu- alties reported. 2004. “Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order.” 14. small- pox. March–April 2004. 16. 9. February 5. “Iran Says It Now Has Missile with 2.stm. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.” Risk Report (Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control). 10.” Congres- sional Research Service. 2004. June 24. 11.” Agence France-Presse. the NCR said. D. During that war. October 20.” Boston Globe. against Iranian troops. train- ing. 2005. available at http:// news. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. 5. The Middle East Military Balance 2003–2004 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University. November 2004. the Washington Post reported that Iran had begun producing biological weapons.000 Km Range. “Iran’s Missile Update.bbc.308 Tw o H a r d C a s e s of a doubt that Iran has an offensive BW program. the NCR reported that the anthrax weapons were part of a program begun in 2001 intended to triple Iran’s biowarfare program. 1992. 13. 2001). p.66 Iran began its chemical weap- ons program to deter Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Aleksander Vasovic. but with less success than Iraq. and expertise from Chinese entities. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. February 3.68 N OTES 1. but the CIA reports that Iran has continued to seek technology. typhus. 8. including anthrax.” statement before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. on the basis of intelligence from the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR). 3. included alfatoxin.” statement before the Senate Government Affairs Committee.co. “Missile Survey. “Iran’s Continu- ing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2005.C.” BBC News. 12. 2004). “Iran Conducts New Shahab III Missile Test with Observers Present: Minister. 6. presentation at Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference. Conversation with authors. Aleksander Vasovic. 2. p. . 38. Geoffrey Kemp. 2004. June 2001. DOD. 7. See Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. 4. 1 January through 30 June 2003.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3997151. See also Feickert.” Boston Globe.S. November 9. and expertise to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Proliferation: Threat and Response (2001). October 5. Citing informants within the Iranian government.”64 In May 2003.67Allegedly. “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries. March 5. Iraq employed chemical weapons. John Bolton. The group could not produce any evidence to support its claims.

October 2. 2004. p. 24.S. Mark Hibbs. 33.” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London). 32. p.” Frontline. 2004. March 28. “Iran’s Arab Neighbors Don’t Believe U. “Iran Parliament OKs Nuke Enrichment Bill.stm.’ September 1. 18.” Nuclear Fuel. Mark Hibbs. Hibbs. May 8.” Washington Post. p. p. “The IAEA’s Report on Iran: No Slam Dunk. October 31. November 1. Claims. 2004. September 2. Jeffrey Smith. in FBIS-SOV 95-191. Steve Coll. Wilber.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 1994. October 5. 67–72. 47. Donald N. October 31. D.” 24.S. 35. IAEA director general. May 16. “Iran Confirms Nuclear Cooperation with China. 10. Elaine Sciolino. 14. “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks on the Future of the IRGC Iranian Revo- lutionary Guards Corps.C. IAEA director general. “Countering U. Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. 30. 1995. 22. Tehran Domestic Service. 16. FBIS-NES. Mark Hibbs. Mark Hibbs. 9. December 7. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safe- guards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. p. “Moscow to Proceed with Nuclear Deal with Iran. 2004". 2004). 1988.” Nuclear Fuel. Available at http:// news.’ September 1. 21. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. May 23. November/December 2004. Has Proof of Weapons Ambitions. October 3. “China/Iran: Reactor Plans Shelved—Again?” Nucleonics Week. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Harvard University’s BCSIA Studies in International Studies (Cambridge.’ November 15. 27. 54. 2004. 1992. “China–Iran Nuclear Tie Long Known. Shai Feldman. January 28. 36. D. D. Kamran Khan. R. 1995.co. 2.C. 2004.” October 6.” Washington Post.” Washington Post.: Central Intelligence Agency. David Albright and Cory Hinderstein.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3972711.. “Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from Argentina. “Iran: Countdown to Showdown. NPT Diplomatic Effort. p. 1992. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. “U. 4. 38. Hibbs. “Sharif University Activity Continues Despite IAEA Visit. in FBIS-NES 95-099. and Mitchell B. eds. 6. Nerves Frayed over Nuclear Ties to Iran. “Iran and the Bomb. March 14. 1994. p. February 9. IAEA director general. p. Proliferation: Threat and Response (1996). 1954). 34. . 1995.S. November 1952–August 1953 (Washington. “Iran: Nuclear Overview. 2004". China. p.” New York Times. 36.” Carnegie Analysis.’ September 1. 23.” Washington Post.” p. Iran 309 15. 1995. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington.” ITAR-TASS (Moscow). “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1997). April 17. Einhorn. This section is based on IAEA director general. 19.” Nuclear Fuel. Kurt M. 1991. 1996. China Said to Disagree Only on Site Selection for New PWRs. p.” 29. 35. Ibid. 28. p. “Clinton’s Iran Embargo Initiative Impedes U. April 13. 1995. May 21. No- vember 17.. Thomas Lippman.” Nucleonics Week. 1995.: DOD. 1995. Officials Say Iran Is Pursuing Fissile Material Production Research.: Brookings Institution Press. pp.” Washington Post. Bonn Agency Says.C. 1995. 52. Campbell. “Iran. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington.” Nucleonics Week. 1995. “Investigators Deny Iran Smuggled Weapons Material from Germany. “Stepped-Up Nuclear Effort Renews Alarm about Iran. 20. “Pakistanis Exploited Nuclear Network. September 2004.S.” United Press International.” Nucleonics Week. 25. p. 22. Interviews with authors. April 16. 10. “Iran Students in Nuclear Protest. 1. October 7.” BBC News Online. PBS Network. Moscow Says Iran Nuclear Program Is Peace- ful. 17.” Nucleonics Week. DOD. “Secret History of the CIA in Iran. 2004. “German–U. January 11. 37. p. “Source: Nuclear Plans with China Near Collapse. 1988. Robert J. “Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants But No Atom Arms. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East. DOD. Mass. and IAEA director gen- eral. 1991.: MIT Press. and Miriam Rajkumar and Joseph Cirincione.S.” Nucleonics Week. p. James Risen. February 1. 1996). Hibbs. 5. 2000. p. 1995. 1996. 1993.” Nuclear Fuel.S. “U. 31.bbc. April 20. 9. Mark Hibbs. 26. November 6. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.’ September 1. 2004. p.” New York Times. Reiss. 1992. 14. September 24. p.

” Washington Post.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. 1996. 2000.S.” in Repairing the Regime: Pre- venting the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 55. 56. 10. “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified. 2004. Government Notice of Sanctions against DPRK.” Center for Defense Information. 2001. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.uk/bwc/revcon1.” Washington Post. Aid.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 2004. p. Richburg. November 18. May 15. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Congress. “Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference. 2004. Joby Warrick.” December.: U.C. June 19–25. available at www. U. 2000. 12. 1 January through 30 June 2003.” testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. 53.” New York Times. May 31. 1995. “Chinese Shipments Violate Controls. Feldman. Jeffrey Smith. 40.html. Bolton. Policies and Op- tions. 52. “Iran’s Missile Update.” p. 4.” . October 5. Could Mean Loss of U. 54.” Risk Report. 1996. “Iran. Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee. July 1. 62. Government Printing Office. 18. and Dana Linzer. 1995.” p. The president’s State of the Union address. and Andrew Koch. 58. For a detailed look at the sanctions adopted. Robert Gallucci.S. 42. Katzman. 60. 44. “Iran’s Missile Technology Linked to China.” Washington Post. director.” 67. Bolton. “Iran Tests Missile Capable of Hitting Israel. 1993).org. “U. November 19. 2004.S. 11–14. Office of Technology Assessment. D. “CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms Components. 36. “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs.S. 1995. “Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Proliferation: Threat and Response (1996). 2003. p. 41. March 9. 64.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.html. p. Barbara Opall. 1.acronym. DCI Nonproliferation Center. Robin Wright and Keith B. 66. 1. 47.S. 48. “Iran: U. 48. June 17.” 46. 68.” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor.gov/news/releases/2002/ 01/20020129-11. 49. “Daily on U. 2004.” 57. 45. “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. 59. November 17. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015. Federal Register. Ibid. Jenni Rissanen. Katzman. 63.S. p. June 30. 1996. see Kenneth Katzman. 29785. edited by Joseph Cirincione (New York: Routledge.” Washington Post. 1995. Israel Trade Barbs over New Missile Tests.” Post-Soviet Nuclear and De- fense Monitor.” Defense News. “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context. 43. “Russia Firm on Iran Reactor Sale. before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington. DOD.” 65. available at www. 2000). 50.” Reuters. p. “Iran Said to Be Producing Bioweapons. “Iran. “Iran–Russia Missile Cooperation: A U. Alon Ben-David. August 16. p.” BWC Review Conference Bulletin. Elaine Sciolino. 16. “Iran. R. June 28. Nuclear Weapons. Bolton. Ibid.310 Tw o H a r d C a s e s 39. National Intelligence Council.S. January 14. p. in FBIS-EAS 96-127. p. 1995.” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul).whitehouse. 2001. June 21. July 3. 1996. 2004. View. 61. August 11. November 19. July 1. “President Clinton Says Aid to Russia Critical to National Security. 1 January through 30 June 2003. 187. p. 51. pp. Michael Sirak. 3. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Testimony of John Lauder. Queries China on Iran. p. Report Says.

Yes Research operating Reactor/ IR-0001 IR-0005/MNSR Miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR). operating Isfahan Uranium Encirhment Pilot Fuel Capacity of 1. 1. zero-power reactor (HWZPR). damaged by No Iraqi air strikes (1987. LEU. Chinese-built. operating IR-0004/ Heavy-water. pool type. zero-power. Yes Isfahan 900 grams of HEU fuel. facility remains unfinished. LEU. open tank facility Yes Isfahan fueled by uranium metal pins. went critical in 1992. began Yes Enrichment testing a ten-machine cascade in August Plant (PFEP) 2003. LEU. 1988).000 MWe.000 P-1 centrifuges. construction/operation suspended Natanz Fuel Commercial plant. HEU. LEU.000-centrifuges Yes Enrichment capacity. operating ENTC GSCR Graphite-moderate subcritical assembly. Iran 311 Table 15. LEU. 50. originally scheduled to start Plant (FEP) accepting centrifuges in 2005. Natanz construction/operation suspended Kalaye Electric Centrifuge tests using UF6 conducted Yes Company between 1998 and 2003 (table continues on the following page) . scheduled to be launched 2005 and reach full capacity by 2006 Bushehr II Light-water. 5 MWt. Yes Isfahan Chinese-built. went critical in 1992. Yes HWZPR 10 kWt.1. 1988). 1.300 MWe. Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Power Reactors Bushehr I Light-water. damaged by Yes Iraqi air strikes (1987. construction completed October 2004. operating ENTC LWSCR Light-water. 27 kWt. and project is currently suspended Research Reactors Tehran Light-water.

1. 5. planned 2 Heavy-Water Production Khondab. near Heavy-water production plant. Uranium Processing Isfahan Converts uranium yellowcake into UF4 and Yes Conversion UF6. Center Also 3 kilograms of UO2 reprocessed in three shielded boxes in a hot cell to produce at least 200 micrograms of plutonium. scheduled to start producing heavy water in 2004. plant dismantled in 2003 Reprocessing (Plutonium Extraction) Tehran Nuclear Irradiated depleted UO2 targets at the Tehran Yes Research Research Reactor between 1988 and 1998. and UO2 from China. Plutonium Production Arak Heavy 40 MWt heavy-water reactor. construction scheduled to begin in (IR-40) 2004 and reactor to go into operation in 2014.312 Tw o H a r d C a s e s Table 15. production No Arak capacity 100 tons per year. nat. became operational in February 2004. laser enrichment experiments conducted between October 2002 and January 2003.000 tons of uranium reserves. Yes Manufacturing capacity of 40 tons per year of UO2 fuel Plant Jabr Ibn Hayan UF4 converted into uranium metal. U oxide Yes Water Reactor as fuel. storage Yes Lab—Tehran of UF6. 1 shielded boxes dismantled in 1992. also Nuclear storage of plutonium separated from Research depleted uranium at Tehran Nuclear Center Research Center Saghand Discovery of uranium deposits announced No Yazd Province in 1990. UF4. Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure (continued) Name/Location IAEA of Facility Type/Status Safeguards Lashkar Ab’ad Pilot laser enrichment plant established in Yes 2000. Facility operation suspended Esfahan Fuel Scheduled to be commissioned 2007. under construction .

nti.’ November 15. . NOTES N OTES: 1. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran 313 Storage Karaj Equipment from Pilot Laser Enrichment plant Yes at Lashkar Ab’ad.” available at www. “Iran: Nuclear Facilities. but safeguards are required on the export of heavy water.” Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies for Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2004. stored ABBREVIATIONS BBREVIATIONS : HEU highly enriched uranium LEU low-enriched uranium nat. 2. dismantled in May 2003. IAEA is investigating this discrepancy. and IAEA director general. but the IAEA estimates that more plutonium should have been produced.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/3119. The nonproliferation regime does not include the application of safeguards to heavy- water production facilities.html. Iran claims that it produced 200 micrograms of plutonium in these experiments. U natural uranium MWe megawatts electric MWt megawatts thermal kWt kilowatts thermal SSOURCES OURCES: IAEA director general.’ September 1. 2004”.

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but the interna- tional regime drew attention to these countries’ acquisition efforts and slowed their pace. the regime then provided the international tools for verifying and consolidating that change. This includes nations that possessed nuclear weapons but gave them up. In Libya. In Iraq’s case. PART FIVE Nonproliferation Successes One of the most striking and underappreciated facts of the nuclear age is the large number of countries that have turned away from the nuclear weapons path. however. For those countries that gave up their nuclear weapons—the states of the former Soviet Union and South Africa—the international non- proliferation regime was essential to locking in their non-nuclear sta- tus. that were pursing a nuclear capability but renounced it. When Libya’s leadership changed direction. That success. the inspections and sanctions imposed after the 1991 war suc- ceeded in both ending its nuclear weapons program and convincing the government not to restart it. 315 . For those states that once pursued nuclear capabilities but have since abandoned their efforts. or that debated developing nuclear weapons but de- cided not to do so. was not ap- preciated soon enough to prevent a new war to disarm Iraq in 2003. the regime failed to stop the government’s clandestine pursuit of a nuclear capability but did slow it down. such as Argentina and Brazil. establish- ing a civilian-led government was a critical factor.

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1 Libya’s major nuclear facilities include a 10-megawatt light-water research reactor and a critical assembly (100 watts). as well as a handful of North Korean Scud-Cs (600-kilometer range. In October 2004. 2003. Libya denies any BW program.200 unfilled CW shells. Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Libya renounced its chemical weapons (CW) program in December 2003 and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 6. Libya asked the OPCW if it could con- vert the former weapons plant at Rabta into a plant to manufacture low-cost pharmaceuticals. Libya announced that it was abandoning its clandestine nuclear program on Decem- ber 19. Libya permitted international officials to inspect eleven previously undisclosed nuclear sites and to remove and destroy key components of its nuclear weapons program. both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. 700-kilogram payload) that it obtained from the Soviet Union in the 1970s.5 Libya struggled to continue its indigenous efforts to develop the 200-kilometer-range Al Fatah missile in the face of international 317 .2 Pending the destruction of the mustard agent. 700-kilogram payload).S. intelligence estimates had long held that Libya had a basic biological weapon (BW) research program. 2004. In March 2004. The OPCW destroyed more than 3.S. CHAPTER 16 Libya Nuclear Weapons Capability After over three decades of trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.4 Libya has been a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention since 1982. and U. In 2003. Libya also disclosed that it had produced thousands of unfilled muni- tions and stored the agent at two sites.3 U. the OPCW continues to monitor and inspect Libya’s CW facilities. Missile Capability Libya possessed a limited and aging arsenal of Scud-B missiles (300-kilometer range. Libya reported past production of approximately 23 tons of mustard agent be- tween 1980 and 1990 at a CW production facility (Rabta) to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). and British officials investigating Libya’s unconventional weapons programs found no evidence of an offensive BW program. and the United States supported the proposal.

Libya is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the Biologi- cal Weapons Convention. This pursuit. it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nonetheless. Despite constant international con- demnation. Libya agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer range with a payload of 500 kilograms. it continued its efforts to obtain nuclear and chemical arms. and related equipment were flown out of the coun- try. missile launchers. such as SS-N-2c Styx.S. Libya’s mercurial leader.6 Some U. led to economic sanctions being imposed on Libya by the United Nations and individual countries. until the late 1990s Gadhafi sought to obtain nuclear and chemical arms and remained defiant on nonproliferation and arms control issues. By March 5.S. and Libya’s support for terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s. and British officials.S. In November 2001. The process has become a model for how to end a nation’s nuclear weapons program by changing the behavior of even troubling regimes.7 In July 1996. had ambitions to become the leader of the Arab world and to raise Libya’s pres- tige among Islamic and other countries in the developing world. President Bill Clinton signed legislation imposing sanctions on foreign companies that invest more than $40 million for future petroleum ventures in Iran and Libya. The Strategic Context On December 19. Libya’s pledge will leave it with short-range cruise missiles. sanctions were already in place by then. efforts to end Libya’s weapons programs spanned four presidential ad- ministrations. its substantial oil wealth enabled Libya to buy the technology it needed. Libya does not possess any aircraft capable of de- livering a nuclear payload. U. More U.N. sanctions followed in 1992 and 1996. having been imposed in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan. 2003.318 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s sanctions through the 1990s. efforts to block the export of dual-use and military tech- nology to Libya won approval by 33 nations of the Charter of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. which was estab- lished during the Cold War to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies with military applications to the Soviet bloc. Its nuclear weapons and CW programs were all heavily dependent on foreign technology and expertise. especially those related to Israel’s nuclear capability. after years of negotiations capped by months of secret talks with U. and Exocet antiship cruise missiles.S. as well as . The Wassenaar Arrangement is the successor regime to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. sanctions were imposed in 1992 in response to the downing of an airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988. U. U. Libya announced its decision to dismantle its unconventional weapons capabilities and permit international verification inspections.8 In August 1996.S. Otomat Mk 2. Colonel Mu‘ammar Gadhafi. In 2004. As part of that effort. partial missiles. Scud-C missiles. For 30 years.

S.S. “The lesson is incontrovertible: to persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction. Prime Minister Tony Blair seems to have been a decisive influence on President Bush. American and British spokesmen claimed that the seizure convinced Gadhafi that his pro- grams could not escape detection. and the United Nations suspended its sanctions in 1999. the United States and the United Kingdom struck the right combination of force and diplomacy. we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation. We had no target. biological.11 The George W.S. And then we started thinking about the cost. forces in the region undoubtedly had an impact. The presence of 250. Others claimed that the Libyans alerted Lon- don and Washington to the ship as a gesture of their good faith. Libya ap- proached the Clinton administration in hopes of ending its international isola- tion. overcoming opposi- tion from the U.16 They searched for evidence of activity related to nuclear fuel cycles and for chemical and missile programs. If someone attacks you and you use a nuclear bomb. Libya 319 companies exporting items to Libya that enhance its nuclear. Department of Defense to any “deals with dictators. The ship carried a cargo of centrifuge parts re- portedly based on Pakistani designs and manufactured in Malaysia.S. Musa Kussa. “We started to ask our- selves.10 In March 2003. but it does not seem that Presi- dent Gadhafi feared a U.15 Negotiations picked up pace after the seizure. The Bush administration linked Libya’s turnaround to President Bush’s na- tional security strategy and the invasion of Iraq. sanc- tions remained in place.17 .”12 Whether by design or by chance. Gadhafi seems to have concluded that he needed Western contracts and markets more than he needed chemical or nuclear weapons. He said in a January 2005 interview. against whom are we going to use them?’ World alliances have changed. British and U.S. The administration made Libyan cooperation in the Lockerbie bombing case a prerequisite to normalizing United States–Libya relations. officials reportedly visited ten previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories and military factories over three weeks in October and early December. President Gadhafi’s chief of intelligence. you are in effect using it against yourself. In the late 1990s. The U. Libya turned over two intelligence officers who had been implicated in the Pan Am Flight 103 attack. invasion of Tripoli.S. and chemical weapons and advanced conventional weapons programs. approached British M16 officials seeking to con- clude negotiations for the end of its unconventional weapons programs in ex- change for normalizing ties.9 Decades of sanctions finally had their impact.000 U. shortly before the Iraq War began. sanctions would be lifted. ‘By manufacturing nuclear weapons.”13 A former State Department official involved in the Bush administration’s negotia- tions with Libya noted that these talks predated the war in Iraq.”14 A significant moment in the final negotiations seems to have been the Octo- ber 2003 interception by British and American officials of a German cargo ship heading to Libya from Dubai. Bush administration resumed the talks with Libya but maintained the position that Libya would have to address concerns over its weapons programs before U.

documentation. During the second phase of disarmament. On January 19. The United States removed more than 1. Scud-C missiles and their launchers. News reports said that blue- prints for a warhead design. 2004.23 This was the first phase of the disarmament process. the IAEA argued that it should be responsible for the dismantlement. de- signed from China. Lantos had been one of the most fervent advocates of tight sanctions on Libya. By January 19.320 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s The final details of the accord were hammered out in London on December 16. based on a first-generation Pakistani design. 2003. the United Kingdom and the United States opened their first direct negotiations with the IAEA to determine who should be re- sponsible for dismantling Libya’s nuclear capabilities.21 In early January 2004.) met with Gadhafi and called for a normalization of relations the following day.22 Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 6. inspectors from the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited previously undisclosed nuclear sites in Tripoli.25 A delegation of seven members of Congress headed by Representative Curt Weldon (R-Pa. After President Gadhafi endorsed the deal through a press release.24 Libya’s nuclear components are being held at the Oak Ridge National Labora- tory in Tennessee. The IAEA’s director general. centrifuge parts. 2004.26 Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif. stated that the fa- cilities he visited indicated a program that was “in the initial stages of develop- ment. Prime Minis- ter Blair and President Bush released press statements applauding “Qaddafi’s statesmanship. were brought to the United States in late January 2004. Libya destroyed 3. 2003. the United States airlifted 55. while the United States and the United Kingdom seemed determined to retain control over the process.000 chemical munitions and consolidated and secured its stocks of chemical weapon agents and precursors for destruction. and guidance devices for long-range missiles.) arrived in Libya on January 24 on a goodwill visit. Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalqam announced that Libya would halt its unconventional weapon programs and elimi- nate any stockpiles of weapons under international verification and supervision.”20 ElBaradei said that it was difficult to judge with confidence but that he had a “gut feeling” that Libya was three to seven years away from producing a nuclear weapon.” without any “industrial scale facility to produce highly enriched ura- nium. According to news reports. Mohamed ElBaradei. The cargo reportedly included uranium hexafluoride. On January 27. American and British teams arrived to dismantle Libya’s facilities.000 metric tons of nuclear equipment. The IAEA will also draw up an inventory de- tailing all aspects of Libya’s nuclear program by surveying ten sites.18 On December 19.”19 In the last week of December. the first in 30 years. and more . it had also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. They ultimately reached an agreement that the United King- dom and the United States will be responsible for dismantling the program while the IAEA will verify this process.000 pounds of docu- ments and components of Libya’s nuclear and ballistic programs out of the country into the United States.

Europe. to show the world that those who wish to abandon the nuclear weapon program will be helped. sanctions on Libya. Libya awarded major oil and gas exploration contracts to U. told Congress that phase three of Libya’s disarmament had been completed. he complained. Libya remains subject to some sanctions because it remains on the U. he noted. They promised. On Sep- tember 22. The United States permitted direct air flights between the two countries and unfroze Libyan assets. However. He said he needed more security guarantees from the United States.27 The United States and the United Kingdom agreed “in principle” to allow Libya to keep some of its medium-range Scud-B missiles.S.” Again in January 2005.29 Two days before that announcement. Washington and Tripoli had resumed diplomatic ties in June 2004. Gadhafi voiced his disappointment that Libya had not been properly recompensed.”31 Nuclear Analysis Libya’s nuclear ambitions first became evident in 1970.S. assistant secretary of state for verification and com- pliance. in November 2004. Libya 321 than 15 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium reactor fuel to Russia. After Libya ratified the NPT in 1975 (it had been signed in 1969 by King Idris). list of state sponsors of terrorism. as well as “civilian-use technology in return for abandoning military tech- nology. 2004.28 Phase three involved implementing verification mechanisms to ensure that Libya had or would definitely eliminate all its material and efforts that were related to nuclear and chemical weapons as well as all its missile programs that fell under the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. the United States.S. and Japan. although they were nice words— from America and Europe. oil companies for the first time in 20 years. after President Bush termi- nated sanctions on Libya under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. 2004. and Libya have established a trilateral steering and cooperation committee. but these missiles must con- form with range and payload limitations to which Libya agreed in December 2003.S. on September 20. offering financial aid and supplies of uranium from Niger. provided little incentive for countries like Iran and North Korea to dismantle their nuclear programs. which began operating at Tajoura in 1979. Blair and Bush expressed their satisfaction. “Libya and the whole world expected a positive response—not just words.30 The European Union formally ended twelve years of economic sanc- tions on October 12. In January 2005. But there must be at least a declaration of a program like the Marshall Plan. when its attempts to buy nuclear weapons directly from China were rebuffed. In 1977 Libya re- portedly turned to Pakistan. apparently hoping to share in the results of Pakistan’s nuclear pro- gram. leaving Libya no option but to develop its own nuclear facilities. This. but we haven’t seen anything yet. President Bush lifted most remaining U. Paula DeSutter. the Soviet Union supplied Libya with a 10- megawatt research reactor. The . But this also came to nothing. For the re- maining disarmament work. the United Kingdom. the U.

Libya purchased 20 preassembled L-1 centrifuges in 1997 and components for another 200. despite Israel’s continued refusal to sign it. Khan network. pressure on the potential supplier.37 Libya acquired L-2 and L-1 centrifuges through various foreign sources. Libya was among 43 African countries that signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty in April 1996. 2001. Libya eventually sup- ported an indefinite extension of the treaty. The possibility of coop- eration in the construction of a nuclear power station was reportedly under discussion in 1999. however. in- cluding the A. The large cylinder contained natural uranium and the smaller one contained depleted uranium.33 Nevertheless. Argentina and Libya cooper- ated on nuclear technology and information. arguing that it should provide for nuclear disarmament within a specified time.N.322 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s following year. Libya imported a total of 2. Libya’s official news agency restated Gadhafi’s posi- tion that the Arab states should acquire nuclear weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear hegemony in the region. Belgium. stipulated that no fuel fabrication equipment was ever received from any sources. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Libya’s undeclared nuclear program involved frequent move- ments of key equipment and nuclear material.36 The true extent of Libya’s clandestine nuclear program only became clear after its voluntary renunciation and the IAEA inspections that followed. but Libyan authorities stated that one module of the facility (related to the production of uranium tetrafluoride. along with Bhutan and India. General Assembly. Libya.32 Gadhafi has also asserted that the Arab states would be justified in possessing chemical and biological weapons to counter Israel’s nuclear capability. UF4) was never received by Libya. In October 1997.367 drums. but only the smallest (using 9 cascades) was completely assembled in 2002. The following September. Libya. The total amount of uranium imported by Libya was 1. Libya received two small cylinders of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from a foreign source (most likely Pakistan) in September 2000 and a large cylinder of UF6 again in February 2001. Most of the equipment was delivered in 1994. 38 In September 2000. In the 1980s. Libya finally signed the treaty on November 13. Libya conducted a series of uranium conversion experiments in a previously undeclared facility during the 1980s. which are similar in design to the P-1 and P- 2 centrifuges found in Iran. and it relied heavily on support from foreign sources.S. Russia reopened nuclear cooperation talks with Libya. and a loss of interest by Moscow.263 metric tons of yellowcake. Libya ordered a modular uranium conversion facility from a foreign company. Libya negotiated a formal safeguard agreement with the IAEA.34 None- theless. Plans to have Russia build a power reactor near the Gulf of Sidra were subse- quently dropped because of U. Q. voted against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the U. Between 1978 and 1991.35 and in March 1998 the Atomenergoeksport Company signed an $8 million contract involv- ing the partial overhaul of the Tajoura research center. Libya managed to construct 3 different enrichment cascades.587 metric tons contained in 6. Yet in January 1996. In 1984. Libya acquired 2 centrifuges of the .

42 At the same time. described as the “world’s larg- est underground chemical weapons plant” in a mountain at Tarhuna.S. which can then produce either low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear reactors or high- enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. It placed an order for another 10.40 Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis Libya’s bid to acquire chemical weapons in the late 1980s has been well docu- mented. apparently for more than $50 million. was reportedly being built under- ground at a military base near Sebha. and British intelligence officials told Malaysian law enforcement offi- cials in November that “a certain amount” of “enriched” UF6 was shipped from Pakistan to Libya in 2001.47 following comments by U. however.45 Libya maintained that the plant was part of an irrigation system.39 UF6 is fed into the centrifuges. Khan network. Pharma-200. a similar plant. but in 1971 it became a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol forbidding the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. Libya also provided the IAEA with documents related to the design and fab- rication of a nuclear explosive device that were provided by the A. as reports surfaced that Libya had suspended construction. Allegations that Libya used chemical weapons against Chad in 1986 have not been substantiated.41 It produced at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents be- fore it closed in 1990 in the face of United States–led international pressure. Some Penta- gon officials suggested that the United States might use a modified version of .44 U. known as Pharma-150. and it once had a substantial CW stockpile. but it did not have an operating enrich- ment facility. U. The designs were reported to closely resemble the warheads that China had tested in the late 1960s and had passed on to Pakistan decades ago. John Deutch. 40 miles southeast of Tripoli.000. Libyan officials have told investigators that they bought the blueprints from dealers who are part of that network. Libya finished the construction of a chemical produc- tion facility at Rabta. It had refused to sign the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Most concern about Libya had focused on what the then–director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Q. according to a February 20 report from Malaysia’s inspector general of police. with extensive foreign technical assistance.46 Tensions over the Tarhuna plant appeared to ease by late 1996. Libya 323 more advanced L-2 type. In late 1988. which uses maraging steel for its rotors and can there- fore spin at much faster speeds. Libya had been developing a gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facil- ity.S.43 Little is known about that facility. intelligence sources indicated in early 1996 that the plant would be completed “late in this decade” and would be capable of produc- ing the ingredients for tons of poison gas daily.S. 650 kilometers south of Tripoli. Tripoli had complete centrifuges and thousands of centrifuge components. defense secretary William Perry that he would not rule out the use of military force to block completion of the plant.

000 chemical munitions and consolidated and secured their stocks of CW agents and precursors for destruc- tion. Libya had agreed to abide by the Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime. which has meant eliminating ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms or more. On the whole. and M-11. though in recent years several shipments of Scud components have been intercepted en route to Libya. 2004.54 Serbian and Indian assistance to Libya’s missile program was also cited in an unclassified CIA report to Con- gress. acknowl- edging only that Libya had an interest in obtaining a longer-range missile capa- bility. that it had produced approximately 23 tons of mustard agent in one CW production facility (Rabta) between 1980 and 1990. By March 2004. Since December 2003. as well as provided a destruction plan for these weapons and production facilities. Libya’s missile complex was heavily dependent upon foreign suppliers. for Libya to completely destroy its chemical weapons and the capacity to produce them. 2007.324 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s the B-61 nuclear warhead. and the Chinese DF-3A. The OPCW set a deadline of April 29.53 The CIA confirmed that Libya had received “ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how” from Russian entities and “missile-related items.48 There were also reports in mid-1997 that Libya had received South African equipment for the manufacture of chemical and biologi- cal weapons. The presence of U.50 Libya also declared two storage sites to the OPCW. but Western defense and intelligence sources have not confirmed such a purchase.49 Libya declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on March 5.57 . Libya made several apparently unsuccessful attempts to purchase foreign missiles. The United States has supported this proposal. M-9. raw materials.N. Libya’s limited and antiquated missile arsenal includes basic Scud-Bs bought from the Soviet Union in the mid- 1970s as well as North Korean Scud-Cs.51 Libyans have already destroyed more than 3. sanctions from 1992 to 1999 was believed to have severely limited Libya’s ability to main- tain its Scud-B arsenal and to make further progress in its domestic ballistic missile program.56 and it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. such as the Soviet/Russian SS-23 and SS- 21.55 Reports had circulated that Libya had purchased the 1. after the 1994 national elections in South Africa. Libya also agreed to convert its Scud-B arsenal into shorter-range defensive missiles. several scientists from the South African military’s CW and BW program (called Project Coast) had sold equipment and perhaps had even trav- eled to Libya to advise on the project. Libya had relinquished five North Korean Scud-C missiles and their launch- ers.52 Missile Analysis In the late 1980s and early 1990s.300-kilometer- range No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea. Libya has also begun the process at the OPCW to seek approval to convert its former CW production facility at Rabta to produce pharmaceutical prod- ucts. or other help” from Chinese entities. According to those reports. Tripoli also pursued a program to de- velop the indigenous Al Fatah missile.

“President Imposes Boycott on Business with Libya.” New York Times. U.S. Paula A. 1996. February 9. 2004. March 31. Basic Reports: Newsletter on International Security Policy. Mark Huband. 26. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 50 USC 1701.” New York Times. 1988). 23. Huband. July 22–28. Tyler. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. “US Praises Libya’s Progress on Arms. 2003.” Defense News. IAEA director general. January 8. 17.time.” 15. DeSutter.” Washington Post.S. Tyler and James Risen. “Future of Multinational Export Control Remains in Ques- tion.” press release. February 21. January 28.N. Ibid. Libya 325 N OTES 1. 27. and Jeff Erlich.gov/t/vc/rls/ rm/2004/37220. D. Guy Dinmore.pdf.htm. “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. “Return to the Fold: How Gadaffi Was Per- suaded to Give Up His Nuclear Goals. May 2004. Book I: January 1 to June 27.: U. 1996. 7. Government Printing Office. 2004. 1996. “Secret Diplomacy Won Libyan Pledge on Arms. 10. “A Long Slog Led to Libya’s Decision. 25. Fidler. 1992. “Libya Submits Initial Chemical Weap- ons Declaration. “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb.” Arms Control Today.” testimony before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism. December 1995–January 1996. 2004. 2004.L. Resolution 748 (1992).” New York Times. 29. 2003. “Return to the Fold. “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb. 2004. 104-172.” . 11.00. 17. 16.S. and Roula Khalaf. P. 8.” 18. Mark Huband.” Washington Post. 14. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 24. 22. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan. Glen Frankel. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction. 5.org/ wmd/library/news/libya/2004/040528-iaea. “Libyan Stagnation a Big Factor in Qaddafi Surprise. and Eric Pianin. available at www. available at www.C. 21. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. 2004. 13. “Libya’s Atom Bid in Early Phases. William J. January 8. “U. “Libya’s A-Bomb Blueprints Reveal New Tie to Pakistani. Tenn. Private conversations between the authors and U. Security Council. and Khalaf. Patrick E.html. Leverett.” Financial Times.” Financial Times. 2004.” New York Times. S/RES/748. Qadhafi’s Isolation Urged. 2003. U. In 1997. Patrick E. Ibid. Scott MacLeod and Amany Radwan. 2005. Libya. January 27. 19.1022560. 12. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 3. Brian Whitaker. p. 1986 (Washington. 2. 2004. December 21.com/time/magazine/article/0. Tyler. January 27.globalsecurity.” Con- gressional Research Service. 20. Gains Libyan Nuclear Gear and Flies it to Knoxville. Patrick E. September 22. available at www. and foreign officials during 2004. Department of State. August 6. January 20.S. Leverett. 2004". 2004.” Guardian. and David Hoffman. “Clinton Approves Sanctions for Investors in Iran.state.” Washington Post. January 28. December 21. Flynt L.” New York Times. 1996. “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi. “Post-Cocom ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’ Set to Begin New Export Control Role. January 23. “United States Supports Libyan Weapons Plant Conversion Plan. Stephen Fidler.’ May 28.” Arms Control Today. March 5.. 2003. “US Must Pay for Libya to Dismantle Weapons. “Nuclear Watchdog Agrees to Role in Libya.” October 13. 6. 28. Nonproliferation and Human Rights. Broad. 2003. the threshold investment was dropped to $20 million. 2004.9171. Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickhert. Paul Kerr. 4. April 22. 9.” Financial Times. December 30. Ibid.” New York Times. assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance. 1996. DeSutter.” Time. January 30.

52. 2000.uk/1/hi/uk/596088. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 2004. MacLeod and Radwan. “Arabs Must Get Nuclear Bomb to Match Israel—Libya.” education module on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation.” Jane’s Defense Weekly.” New York Times. p. 1995. September 10.K.S. May 30.S. Wye Plantation. 47. James Woolsey. Charge against Libya. Hints It Would Bomb Libyan Facility. April 7. Lancaster. “Perry Presses U.” BBC News. Available at http:// news.” Reuters.’ August 30. Robert Burns. 2004". Department of Defense.sipri. 1996.” 51. 35.: U. available at www. February 7. R. 24. and “Scud Missile Parts Intercepted. 44.” 32.” New York Times. February 25.at/ Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-59.” Reuters.’ May 28. “U.” Associated Press. September 23. January 9. 1996. “Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan Fig- ure. “U.” address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 12. 49.co. 39. 1996. 1996. “Libya. director of central intelligence. Lifts Remaining Economic Sanctions Against Libya. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction. Sanger. “Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion.” Washington Times. 31. “South Africa: Mandela Fears Chemical Arms Sales to Libya ‘Tip of Iceberg. April 24. “U. Squassoni and Feickhert. 26. William J. Peta Thornycroft. Stephen Engelberg with Michael Gordon. April 23. 1996. by fabricating a fire.pdf.” Arms Control Today.” Los Angeles Times. April 4. “Chal- lenges to Peace in the Middle East.” Johannesburg Mail and Guardian.” Reuters.” press release. 2004.S. Ibid. “Qadhafi Tunnels into Trouble Both within and without. See U. 2000. 2004.326 N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s 30.” Washington Post.” Washington Post. “Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya.or. in FBIS-TAC 97-007. Charge against Libya.” 38. Lacks Con- ventional Arms to Destroy Libya Plant. IAEA director general.stm. Pine. Broad and David E.org/html/global/press_releases/2k4/PR8_2004.” 46. Weiner.S. revised.org. Libya tried to give the impression that the facility was seriously damaged. “Watching China. “Moscow Set to Expand Trade Ties with Libya. “Perry Presses U. Says Libya Implementing WMD Pledge. 42. February 27. 1996. 1997. May 17. February 4. available at www. 1996. Maryland. 1996).” Press Release GA/ 9083. 1989. Octo- ber. January 1.” Interfax (Moscow). April 19. In 1990. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington. “Russia Ready to Start Talks with Libya on Nuclear Center. Also see Art Pine. 1996.iaea.html. United Nations.’” Johannesburg SAPA. 1996. “U. 40.S.” Interfax (Moscow). in FBIS-TAC 97-007. “U. Qadhafi Says.” 48. 1999. April 23. and IAEA director general. 33. January 27. 1996.-Libya.” Arms Control Today. “Egypt De- nies Libyan Chemical Arms Site.S. Lancaster. Warns Libya after Scud Find. Charles Aldinger. DeSutter. 45.S. March 2004. p. 43. “Completion of Verification Work in Libya. “Libya Submits Initial Chemical Weapons Declaration.” Associated Press. 2004. February 23.” 53. “Qadhafi Says Arabs Have Right to Germ Warfare Arms. “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi.S.bbc. 36. 1996. February 11. Paul Kerr.C. “Assembly Adopts Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. John Lancaster. 41.opcw.” Reuters. 34. “U.” Los Angeles Times. 1994. See also John Diamond.” BBC News. Department of Defense. 1996. 37. 1997.” New York Times. “Libya Denies Weapons-Factory Link. September 1996. “Report on ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. . “A-Bomb against Libya Target Suggested. available at www. “Germans Accused of Helping Libya Build Nerve Gas Plant. Also see “Arabs Need Nuclear Bomb. October 22. 1997.S. March 5. 50. Paul Kerr. Tim Weiner. March 30. D. “South Africa: Scientists Said to Sell CBW Technology to Libya after 1994.

“Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force. Squassoni and Feickhert. George Tenet. February 7.” September 7. 2001. 55. July–December 2000.” . “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World. “Disarming Libya Weapons of Mass Destruction. Libya 327 54. “Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion and Advanced Conventional Munitions. CIA. Kerr.” 57.” statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2001. 56. director of central intelligence.

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chemical. the chief of the U. The IAEA—charged by the U. they still had many ques- tions about Iraq’s biological and chemical programs. CHAPTER 17 Iraq Nuclear Weapons Capability Iraq never successfully developed a nuclear weapon. All its related programs appear to have ended in 1992. 1991–1999).N. U. The U.S.4 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability Iraq does not have an active chemical or biological weapons program or weap- ons stockpiles. But many suspected Iraq still had nuclear ambitions and retained the capability and intention to restart its program co- vertly. government’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG). and the U. and its nuclear program begun in the 1970s almost certainly ended in 1991.S.N. nor had it tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. and missile programs: the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM. definitively concluded in his “Compre- hensive Report” that “Iraq did not possess a nuclear device.1 During December 1998. When UNSCOM’s inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Security Council gave two groups the responsibility to inspect the Iraqi biologi- cal. Monitoring.5 329 . After conducting six years of inspections in Iraq. Charles Duelfer. Security Coun- cil with supervising nuclear disarmament and verification efforts in Iraq—was close to drawing such a conclusion in March 2003. David Kay.2 In September 2004. after four months of newly restarted inspections. The activities of the inspectors in the early 1990s did a tremendous amount” to prevent reconstitution. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) con- cluded in 1997 that its dismantling. All the available evidence indicates that Iraq did not reconstitute or maintain a nuclear program after 1991. and British air strikes during Operation Desert Fox inflicted further damage on Iraqi leadership offices linked to the program. and Inspec- tion Commission (UNMOVIC. Verification.N. For instance. stated his belief that Saddam Hussein main- tained an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons after 1991 but that the program “had been seriously degraded. 1999–). there were justifiable suspicions that Iraq could have tons of chemical weapons hidden or enough growth media to produce tons of new biological weapon agents.”3 Duelfer’s pre- decessor at the ISG. regular monitoring. and verification ef- forts—along with the damage from the Gulf War—had incapacitated the country’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Kay described a “substantial illegal procurement for all aspects of the missile programs. The British ruled Iraq through an installed monarchy after they suppressed a revolt by Sunni.330 Nonpro l i f e r a t i o n S u c c e s s e s Baghdad’s refusal to fully disclose all the details of its past efforts led U.6 Intensive searches by the ISG and U.N.N. inspectors did not find any Scud missiles. only the missile program made any ad- vances after the 1991 Gulf War. “In 1991 and 1992. Duelfer reported in 2004: “While a small number of old. abandoned chemical muni- tions have been discovered. had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. Iraq had destroyed two-thirds of these missiles (72) and UNMOVIC was examining Iraqi UAVs for possible chemical weapon or biological weapon (CW or BW) delivery capability. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq. it had neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. A military coup overthrew the monarchy in 1958 and soon established relations and arms trade with the Soviet . The Strategic Context Iraq was created by the British Empire after World War I from three disparate Mesopotamian provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire. . . ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its unde- clared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. These were destroyed after the 1991 war. after 1996. Shia. troops after the 2003 Iraq War did not turn up any evidence of weapons stockpiles or of chemical or biological weap- ons programs active after 1991.8 Before the 2003 war. Kay concluded that air strikes. offi- cials to conclude that it was maintaining active programs. Iraq was forced to destroy Al Samoud II missiles that exceeded the permitted 150-kilometer range by 30 kilometers. By the time the war began.S. The ISG did find evidence of two cruise missile programs. Missile and Delivery System Capability Iraq does not have an active missile or delivery system program beyond short- range systems. but under UNMOVIC’s supervision. U. Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological weapons] and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. the United States did not uncover evidence of Scud missiles or of UAVs capable of delivering chemical or biological agents. and Kurds in bloody counterinsurgency operations that killed tens of thousands of Arabs and more than 2.S.S.000 British troops. As of the spring of 2005. Of all Iraq’s alleged illicit programs. .” He also noted.000-kilometer range.” but he noted that Iraq essentially halted missile development once U. U.”7 Iraq ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1991. After the war. inspections began in 2002. officials claimed that Iraq still possessed a force of Scud-type missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It did not have longer-range missiles after 1991. Iraq’s longest-range missiles were the 600- kilometer range Al Husseins (a modified Scud). of which one may have been intended to develop systems with a 1. and inspections had destroyed Iraq’s ability to develop stocks of these weapons. sanctions.

would ensure his victory over Iraq’s regional rivals. After the Osiraq attack. decisive campaign. he believed. removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and component and all research. Saddam invaded Iran on September 22. 1991. Saddam adopted a strategy of frustrating and hindering it. .9 Israel’s destruction of the Osiraq reactor in 1981 increased his determi- nation to acquire a nuclear capability. Instead.000 in a timeframe of five years. Iraq