Ukraine’s Unstable Alliances

Stefan Simanowitz reports on the prospects for Ukrainian political stability

Contemporary Review, Spring 2008, Vol.287, No.1688

'SO they've finished arguing over who will be in the new government', an elderly
woman in Kiev told me with a shrug; 'Now the real fighting will begin'. Although
the new coalition government looked different from its predecessor, with the
telegenic Yulia Tymoshenko at its head, it is the same coalition that spectacularly
collapsed after the Orange revolution in 2004 and that was unable to unite
following the 2006 parliamentary elections. The 2006 collapse necessitated the
prime ministerial reappointment of Viktor Yanukovych whose fraud-tainted
election victory had originally sparked the Orange revolution.

On 30th September 2007, Ukrainians went to the polls for the fifth time in three
years in a last-ditch bid to haul the country out of political crisis. The election was
called early to end a deadlock that has seen supporters of Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych pitted against those of President Viktor Yushchenko. The vote gave
the Tymoshenko and Yushchenko blocs a slim majority (with 30.71 per cent and
14.15 per cent respectively) over their rivals, the Party of Regions led by
Yanukovych and the Communist Party (with 34.37 per cent and 5.39 per cent
respectively). There then followed months of political deadlock and horse-trading.
In early December, after tortuous negotiations, President Yushchenko agreed to
put forward Tymoshenko as prime minister. However her nomination fell short of
endorsement by Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. She was put forward
again only to lose out by a single vote. Finally, at the third time of asking and
after much public wrangling, Tymoshenko became prime minister with the bare
minimum of votes required for confirmation after MPs used an unprecedented
roll-call vote to make the decision.

After more than two months in limbo, Ukraine's newly appointed a government
looks anything but strong. The coalition is riven by differences of policy and
riddled with personal antagonisms and rivalries. A total of 226 seats out of
parliament's 450 has made for a fragile working majority. The one-seat majority
may be enough to pass uncontentious legislation but it falls a long way short of
the two-thirds majority needed to adopt constitutional changes and any hope of a
radical reforming agenda will have to be put on hold. This at a time when Ukraine
is badly in need of strong decisive leadership.
The muted enthusiasm with which Tymoshenko's appointment has been greeted
in Ukraine contrasts starkly with the optimism that was so apparent following the
Orange revolution. In the sixteen months following those heady days in 2004,
amid rancorous public feuding, the Orange movement tore itself apart. In the four
months following the 2006 parliamentary elections it struggled to piece itself
together again. It failed then but now the Orange parties had another opportunity
to prove that they can work together.

Since becoming independent from the Soviet Union in 1992, Ukraine has been
troubled by an absence of constitutional precedent. This has made it hard for all
sides to agree on the balance of power between president, parliament, and
legislature. This has manifested in the resultant power struggle between
Yushchenko and Yanukovych which has dominated recent Ukrainian politics. In
April 2007 Mr Yanukovych gained the upper hand after persuading 11 deputies
from the pro-presidential Our Ukraine party to join his ruling coalition. This
brought him close to the two-thirds majority needed to veto any presidential
decree, which would have turned Mr Yushchenko into a lame duck president.
Yushchenko responded by dissolving parliament. With Ukraine's constitutional
court unable to solve the row, it seemed briefly that the crisis might escalate. In
May over three thousand troops led by a commander loyal to Mr Yushchenko
and acting in defiance of ministry orders, were reported to be heading to Kiev.
Ultimately the crisis was peacefully diffused and both sides agreed to a
September pre-term general election. The election result however, and
Tymoshenko's appointment seem unlikely to resolve Ukraine's underlying
constitutional problems.

Whilst the free and fair conduct of the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections
may represent an important step forward in Ukraine's democratic development,
the results reflect the deep divisions within the country. Yanukovych's pro-
Russian Party of Regions won the most votes in the both polls with President
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party pushed into a humiliating third place.
Yanukovych's poll results did not signify any increase in his popularity but were
rather a reflection of the split between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. During their
nine months in power together, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had fallen out very
publicly amid accusations of corruption. Their feud reached a climax in
September 2005 when Yushchenko fired Tymoshenko and she formed her own
eponymous opposition party. Yanukovych was able to take advantage of these
divisions.

After the 2006 election, a pact on national unity signed by Tymonshenko and her
erstwhile Orange revolutionary partner was short-lived. Although Yushchenko
agreed to nominate Tymoshenko following the 2007 election, this was an action
done of necessity and the bitter divisions that destroyed the coalition before
threaten to hamper the efficient running of government. In 2006 and 2007
Yushchenko flirted seriously with the idea of forming a coalition with the Party of
Regions. Allying with a former enemy of the Orange Revolution would have been
to risk accusations of opportunism or betrayal. Although Yushchenko, might have
tried to justify a coalition with the Party of Regions on the grounds of unifying the
country, such a coalition was ultimately deemed to be potentially too politically
damaging. His credibility as well as his ambition to steer Ukraine towards NATO
and EU membership would have been seriously compromised.

A key reason that Yushchenko was so opposed to Tymoshenko's appointment as

prime minister resulted from constitutional reforms brought in 2006 which had
redistributed political power more evenly among branches of government giving
parliament and the prime minister more influence at the president's expense.
Whilst constitutionally the president still has the power to appoint a large number
of key state posts, any coalition deal required posts to be spread among coalition
partners. Yushchenko was therefore against the generally accepted principle that
the prime minister should be named from the biggest coalition partner.
Ukraine is facing a number of hardships. Social problems, such as poverty and
spiralling levels of unemployment, are compounded by alcoholism, drug abuse
and the rapid spread of HIV/Aids. Economically, this country of 47 million people
experienced a decade-long recession throughout the 1990s and was severely
affected by the instability caused by the disputed elections in 2004. Although the
economy has been growing steadily in recent years buoyed by the Russian boom
next door, there are still many areas of anxiety. The battle with Russia in the
winter of 2006 over natural gas prices has only been temporarily resolved and
threatens to further destabilise the economy. Russia is Ukraine's main energy
supplier, and their ambassador indicated that the price of gas sold to Ukraine this
winter could be adversely affected if Tymoshenko became prime minister. Russia
has imposed three stiff price increases in as many years on natural gas exports
and Ukraine's own gas transport system, Naftogaz Ukrainy, is on the verge of
bankruptcy. On 22 February Prime Minister Tymoshenko announced that she
would proceed with the sell-off of government shares in six energy companies in
spite of President Yushchenko's opposition.

The country is also deeply polarised on regional grounds with the Ukrainian-
speaking population in central and western Ukraine supportive of greater
Western integration. Those in the eastern regions do not speak Ukrainian and
see themselves as much more closely aligned to Russia. Although Tymoshenko's
appointment as prime minister might go some way to diffuse regional tensions,
her party having gained support in both the east and west of the country,
attempts by the new government to speed Ukraine's membership into the
European Union and NATO are likely to further stir up regional resentments. With
her white clothes, traditional braided hair-do and populist style, Tymoshenko stirs
passionate support and anger in equal measure. Her declared determination to
combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law starting at the highest levels of
the government will inevitably lead to conflicts within the Rada whilst her foreign
policy looks set to shake up relations with Russia. Indeed her article published in
Foreign Affairs magazine last May entitled 'Containing Russia', has left many
politicians in Moscow deeply suspicious of Tymoshenko.
The harsh living conditions for many Ukrainians have been made harder to bear
by the weight of disappointed expectation. For most, the glittering promise of the
market economy has proved hollow. The general standard of living may be rising
but, for many, life has become harder and less secure since the fall of the Soviet
Union. The average monthly salary is around $200 and, although central Kiev
resembles any bustling modern city, its subways remain filled with elderly street
vendors. The disappointment that followed independence and the Orange
revolution has fed into a wider national mood; that of political fatalism, apathy
and pessimism. After three centuries of Russian Imperial control followed by the
brutalities of Stalinism and Nazi occupation, the origins of this fatalism are
understandable.

And yet in the freezing weeks before the Orange revolution, it seemed that the
pessimism for which Ukrainians are famed was starting to thaw. The centre of
Kiev was transformed into a medieval pageant of flags, tents, music and political
street theatre with thousands swelling into the central Maidan Square to attend
daily concerts and rallies. On election day, long queues had formed outside the
polling stations even before the doors were opened and the mood was festive.
The high voter turnout in the three subsequent elections and the largely free and
fair nature of the process represents a genuine step forward for Ukraine's infant
democracy.

Whilst the appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko is unlikely to result in a sudden

transformation of Ukrainian politics, the hope remains that Ukraine can now
produce something resembling accountable and transparent government.
Although the coalition might not be a stable one, the fact that an agreement was
reached represents an important achievement and suggests that Ukraine's
elected leaders might get beyond the politics of grievance and recognise the
importance of political compromise and nation-building.

According to the novelist Philip Roth, everyone has the predisposition to

melancholy but it is betrayal that forges despondency into a habit. In Ukraine,
where melancholy sometimes seems ingrained in the national psyche, the
country is braced for their hopes of effective leadership to be betrayed once
more. And yet, while there are reasons to fear for the success of the new
coalition government, is it not possible that this time the Orange parties might be
able to work together and form an effective government? Open optimism is hard
to come by in Ukraine, but as the first stanza of the country's national anthem
states: 'Ukraine is not yet dead'.

Stefan Simanowitz is a writer and political analyst. He was part of the

OSCE/ODIHR international election observation missions to Ukraine in
2004 and 2006.