CONCEPTS AS OBJECTS John McCarthy Computer Science Department jmc@cs.stanford.edu http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/ 1. Concepts (including propositions) as objects 2.

Functions from objects to concepts of them.

3. Concepts and propositions are not a natural kind.

There are a variety of useful spaces of concept Concepts are (usually) approximate entities.
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Concepts and propositions1

...it seems that hardly anybody proposes to use dier variables for propositions and for truth-values, or di ent variables for individuals and individual concepts. (Carnap 1956, p. 113).

Variables for propositions and individuals are written lower case, e.g. p and x. Variables for propositions a individual concepts are capitalized, e.g. P and X .

This talk is about expressiveness rather than for prese ing a theory.

Concepts and propositions2 We write

denotes(M ike, mike) or when functional, mike = denot T elephone(M ike) is the concept of Mikes telephone denot(T elephone(M ike)) = telephone(mike)

Knowing what and knowing that knows(pat, T elephone(M ike)) Suppose telephone(mike) = telephone(mary ) T elephone(M ike) = T elephone(M ary ) Possibly, knows(pat, T elephone(M ary ))

Truth values and propositions: man(mike) true(M an(M ike) knows(pat, M an(M ike)) means Pat knows whether M Possibly knows(pat, M an(M ike)) man(mike)

k(pat, M an(M ike)) true(M an(M ike)) knows(pat, M

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Equality and Existence

true(T elephone(M ike) EqualsC T elephone(M ary ), alth T elephone(M ike) = T elephone(M ary ) telephone(denot(M ike)) = telephone(denot(M ary )) telephone(mike) = telephone(mary ) denot(T elephone(M ike)) = denot(T elephone(M ary ))

(X )(exists(X ) (x)denotes(X, x))

ishorseCP egasus W inged(P egasus) ?true(Winged-Horse(P egasus)) true(Greek mythology, Winged-Horse(P egasus)) exists(P egasus)
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We can have

(X )(exists(Greek Mythology, X ) Winged-Horse(X

but most likely, there doesnt have to be a domain Greek mythological objects. This suggests that some the rules of inference of predicate logic be weakened such theories.

About propositions true(N ot(P )) true(P ) true(P And Q) true(P ) true(Q) ? P And Q = Q And P ? P And (Q Or R) = (P And Q) Or (P And R)

This way lies NP-completeness and even undecidablity whether two formulas name the same proposition.

Functions from things to concepts

Numbers can have standard concepts Concept1(n) i certain standard concept of the number n. Writing Con suggests that there might be another mapping Conce from numbers to concepts of them. We can have

knew(kepler, CompositeC (N umber(P lanets))), and also knew(kepler, (CompositeC (Concept1(denot(N umber(P la

Functions from things to concepts2

Russells example: I thought your yacht was longer tha it is. can be treated similarly, although it requires a fu tion going from the concept Length(Y ouryacht) to w I thought its value was.

denot(I, Length(Y ouryacht)) > length(youryacht)

Functions from things to concepts3

We may also want a map from things to concepts of th in order to formalize a sentence like, Lassie knows location of all her puppies. We write this

(x)(ispuppy (x, lassie) knowsd(lassie, LocationdC (Con

Conceptd takes a puppy into a dogs concept of it, a Locationd takes a dogs concept of a puppy into a do concept of its location. The axioms satised by know Locationd and Conceptd can be tailored to our ideas what dogs know.

(n2)(k(pat, Concept2(n2) EqualsC T elephone(M ike) knows(pat, T elephone(M ike)) or knows(pat, T elephone(M ike)) denot(pat, T elephone(M ike)) = telephone(mike
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Concepts as approximate entities

Approximate entities occur in human common se reasoning. They dont have if-and-only-if denitions, e the rock and ice constituting Mount Everest.

The set of individual concepts of Greek mytholog another approximate entity. Few of them have deno tions.

The logical way of handling approximate entities is axiomatize them weakly. Did Pegasus have a mother? exists(Greek Mythology, P egasus), exists(Greek Mythology, T hor), exists(Greek Mythology, George Bush), exists(Greek Mythology, M other(P egasus))?

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Mr. S and Mr. P

Two numbers m and n are chosen such that 2 m n 99. Mr. S is told their sum and Mr. P is told th product. The following dialogue ensues: Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr P: S: P: S: I dont know the numbers. I knew you didnt know. I dont know either. Now I know the numbers. Now I know them too.

In view of the dialogue, what are the numbers? Two puzzles involving knowledge www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/puzzles.html

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Formalizing Mr. S and Mr. P

knows(person, pair, time), k(person, P roposition, time) persons: s, p, sp knows(p, P air0, 0) knows(s, Sum(P air0), 0) knows(p, P roduct(P air0), 0) (pair)(sum(pair) = sum(pair0) k(s, N ot(P air0 Equal Concept1(pair)), 0)) k(sp, . . . , 0)

In the paper A(w1, w2, person, time) means that in wo w1, world w2 is possible for person at time. Two puzzles involving knowledge www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/puzzles.html

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