WEST YORKSHIRE FIRE SERVICE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE No.

44 HIGH RISE BUILDINGS

1. INTRODUCTION 2. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 3. ACCESS AND MEANS OF ESCAPE 4. STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS 5. PRE-PLANNING 6. SECTORISATION OF HIGH RISE INCIDENTS 7. FIREFIGHTING PROCEDURES 8. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR HIGH RISE INCIDENTS 9. LIFT RESCUES

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1.

INTRODUCTION

Although there is no official classification of what constitutes a high rise building, the following is generally accepted when defining buildings by their height. Low Rise - Buildings up to 4 floors Medium Rise - Buildings from 5 to 7 floors High Rise - Buildings of 8 floors and above

For Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) purposes a high rise building may be considered as one that contains floors at such a height that external rescue and firefighting are not feasible. This height would normally depend on the limits of standard fire brigade equipment available to execute these actions. In the United Kingdom this would usually mean a building whose uppermost storey is above 24 metres in height. However, due to limited access for high reach appliances, many buildings of five storeys high will also meet these criteria. High rise buildings are designed and constructed for many different uses including residential towers, hotels and various types of commercial and industrial complexes. 2. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

The design and construction of residential high rise buildings is based on the structure being subdivided into floor sections, then into compartments; i.e. Flats. The design is such that, if a fire breaks out within a flat, it will be contained to that compartment, allowing person(s) to escape via a protected area to a place of safety. This is ultimately in the open air, at ground level. Occupants of compartments reasonably remote from the fire may not need to move at all (see section 8.4 Safety & Welfare of Occupants). 2.1 Definitions of a Firefighting Shaft (Diagram 1)

2.1.1 Firefighting Shaft A protected enclosure containing firefighting stairs, firefighting lobbies and, if provided, a firefighting lift together with its machine room. 2.1.2 Firefighting Lobby The protected lobby provides access from a firefighting stair to the accommodation area. 2.1.3 Firefighting Stair The protected stairway communicates with the accommodation only through a firefighting lobby. Diagram 1- Fire fighting Shaft
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2.1.4 Firefighting Lift A protected lift and shaft, that communicates with the accommodation only through a firefighting lobby. 2.1.5 Design and construction of firefighting shafts With the exception of blocks of flats and maisonettes, every firefighting stair and firefighting lift is approached from the accommodation via a firefighting lobby. All firefighting shafts should be equipped with fire mains having outlet connections and valves in every firefighting lobby. 3. ACCESS AND MEANS OF ESCAPE

Staircases within blocks of flats are normally enclosed in fire-resisting material and access to them will be through self-closing fire-resisting doors. The number of escape staircases provided within residential flats will be dependent upon the design and the height of the building. As well as providing a means of escape they also provide access for fire crews to reach affected floors at an incident. 3.1 Provision of firefighting shafts

Buildings with a floor at more than 18m above FRS vehicle access level, or with a basement at more than 10m below FRS vehicle access level, should be provided with firefighting shafts containing firefighting lifts (see Diagrams 2 + 3). A firefighting stair and any firefighting lift should serve all intermediate floors between the highest and lowest storeys that they serve.

Diagram 2 - Provision of firefighting shafts

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Diagram 3 - Components of a Firefighting shaft 4. STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS

All high rise buildings are provided with structural fire protection and fixed installations. The facilities installed within the building have a direct bearing on the operational tactics to be employed. The principal equipment found in a multi-storey building may include: Dry and Wet Risers Lifts with Firefighter control switch Provision of Firefighting shafts Smoke vents (manual or automatic) Hose reels / Fire extinguishers Smoke stop doors

Integral hose reel systems in high rise properties are only intended for first-aid fire suppression. These systems vary in performance and regularly suffer from vandalism. The maintenance and performance standards of an integral hose reel system cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, integral hose reel systems are not to be used by FRS personnel. 4.1 Dry and Wet Risers Currently, dry risers must be provided in all residential buildings exceeding 11 metres in height but not exceeding 60 metres. In commercial buildings the minimum height necessitating a riser is 18 metres. As the pressures required to overcome the height to which water must be pumped may be greater than can be achieved by a single pumping appliance, wet risers must be installed in buildings over 60 metres in height. The inlet to any dry or wet rising main is required to be sited so that there is access for pumping appliances to within 18 metres of the inlet. Due to a wide variation in the design and layout of high rise buildings, it is vital that all personnel likely to attend such buildings are familiar with the location of the riser inlet box and the location of the nearest hydrant.
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It should be borne in mind that premises may still exist which were constructed before the regulations were introduced, requiring the installation of rising mains. Station personnel should be aware of the location of these premises. The regulations state that riser outlets should be located either within a protected lobby or an approach stairway. There should be no point on any floor or staircase, more than 60 metres from a riser outlet. Personnel should be familiar with the location, method of access to, and operation of all inlet / outlet valves for risks within their station area. An Operational Information Sheet should be completed to assist crews attending from other station areas and a Tactical Information Plan should be considered for risks of a complex or unusual nature. 5. PRE-PLANNING As part of routine operational information gathering, it is essential that crews carry out pre-planning visits to high rise risks. An Operational Information Sheet or Tactical Information Plan (see Fire Engineered buildings below) should be completed for each identified risk. High rise premises should also be considered for local and Brigade exercises. The following areas should be examined during pre-planning visits: Approach and access roads - including sites for aerial appliances and marshalling areas. Access into the building. Location of hydrants. Location of Dry / Wet riser inlet. Location of lifts, access to lift motor rooms and the operation of the Fire Service switch (where fitted). Stairways and designated Firefighting Shafts. Fire alarm annunciator panels or repeater panels, where applicable. Premises information boxes where applicable. Fixed firefighting equipment and method of operation. Any fixed communication equipment. Premises with Fire Engineered solutions must have a Tactical Information Plan prepared in conjunction with the Fire Engineering Team). Any unusual features within the building e.g. external security doors on individual flats. Liaison with on-site management/security.

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6.

SECTORISATION OF HIGH RISE INCIDENTS

Search Sector Fire Sector

Lobby Sector

Diagram 4 - ICS Model for Vertical Sectorisation 6.1 Introduction

The rationale for the above model is based on maintaining effective spans of control when Sector Commanders cannot follow the normal practice of being physically present in the sector, due to smoke etc., as well as cases where internal and external sectorisation is required at the same time. If necessary (e.g., aerial appliances being used for access or rescue) external sectorisation would follow the conventional model, identifying the sectors by number. It may, on some occasions, only be necessary to operate a single Fire Sector internally, with external and support sectors operating outside in the conventional way. However, there will occasionally be incidents with large numbers of personnel directly firefighting, involved in search, ventilation and salvage operations etc where more than one internal sector is necessary. The zones of activity within the structure (e.g., internal firefighting operations) could then be identified as in the following examples:

6.2

Fire Sector

This would be the main area of firefighting operations, consisting of the floor(s) directly involved in fire, plus one level above and one level below. If crews involved in this exceeded acceptable spans of control, consideration should be given to activating a Search Sector.

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6.3

Search Sector

This would be the area of operations, in a high rise, above the Fire Sector where search and rescue, venting and other operations are taking place. If the distance from the ground floor lobby to the Bridgehead is more than two or three floors and spans of control require it, consideration should be given to activating a Lobby Sector. 6.4 Lobby Sector

This would cover the area of operations from the ground floor lobby to the Fire Sector. The Lobby Sector Commander will act as the co-ordinator of all logistics needs of the Fire and Search Sector Commanders. The Lobby Sector Commander would also co-ordinate all operations beneath the Bridgehead level, including salvage and ventilation, liasing with fellow Sector Commanders in the usual way. 6.5 Bridgehead

At serious or protracted high rise incidents, a formal Bridgehead is established to assist the Incident Commander in commanding fire and rescue operations. In such instances the location of a Bridgehead must be at least 1 floor below the Fire sector. However, following Dynamic Risk Assessment, for incidents of a minor or less serious nature, the Incident Commander may vary the location of a Bridgehead, but must take into account the following:

Safety of crews Extent of fire/smoke Access to riser outlets Access/egress to the Bridgehead Space required for personnel and equipment Building construction i.e. fire fighting shafts Standard of Fire Safety measures in place Possible escalation of the incident

If the incident is formally sectorised the Fire and Search Sector Commanders should position themselves at the Bridgehead with access to the Entry Control Board (ECB) and communications. 7. FIREFIGHTING PROCEDURES

Whilst it is not possible to format a procedure that will fit every eventuality, there are several factors that an Incident Commander needs to consider when determining his/her tactical plan. Type of premises Domestic/Residential, Commercial/Industrial Design of, and access into buildings (inc Firefighting Shafts) Availability of resources Severity of any fire Spread of smoke and locations of manual or automatic vents
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Additional hazards, e.g. provision of security gates, etc.

The following procedure should be used for guidance by Incident Commanders attending high rise incidents, but should not be taken as being prescriptive. 7.1 Use of lifts by fire service personnel The majority of multi-storey premises provide a lift, which is available for use by the FRS in an emergency. Such lifts are fitted with a switch at ground floor level to enable FRS personnel to take control of the lift. Some modern lifts have electronic safety devices, which prevent the lift car doors from closing unless contact is maintained on an operating button inside the lift car. This requires a member of a crew to remain with the lift car at all times. Initially, this may not take place until supporting appliances arrive. It is essential that the procedure for operating the fire switch be known by all personnel for premises within their respective station area. 7.2 Safety devices fitted to lifts The majority of lifts in multi-storey premises, offices etc. are now fitted with a safety device which, on actuation of a fire alarm, automatically returns the lift car to the ground floor, opens the doors and prevents the lift from being used again until it has been reset. Following a major accident in which a lift car that was on fire on the first floor returned to the ground floor opened the doors and spread the fire, resulting in Fire Service personnel being trapped between floors, the following should be considered. Actuation of alarm after arrival of brigade will cause lift car to return to ground floor and open lift car doors. Fire can be transferred from one floor to another. Floors below the scene of operations could suddenly become smoke logged. Personnel can become trapped between floors. Any persons using the lift at the time of the actuation could suddenly arrive at the ground floor and this may be involved with fire and be smoke logged.

The need to have an exit route readily available should be included in the Incident Commanders risk assessment. If using a lift, crews should proceed to the floor below the fire sector. This would mean by definition that the Incident /Crew Commander and crew members when using a lift would proceed to two floors below the actual floor(s) involved in fire. From this point access to the Fire Floor must be made via the staircase(see section 7.3).
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7.3

Action to be taken by the first appliance

The Incident Commander should make an immediate risk assessment in accordance with Operational Procedure No. 37 - Incident Ground Risk Assessment. The Incident /Crew Commander should gather all available information and proceed to the floor below the fire sector with a team of two crew members equipped with Breathing Apparatus, the equipment listed in section 7.4 below and an additional crew member to operate the ECB. Following the Dynamic Risk Assessment the Incident Commander will determine the most appropriate location to set up a Bridgehead (see section 6.5) and commence any necessary firefighting operations. N.B. When the crew of the initial appliance is staffed by four riders the Incident/Crew Commander should proceed to the floor below the fire sector with a team of two crewmembers equipped with Breathing Apparatus, the Rapid Deployment Board and equipment listed in section 7.4 below. If required two BA wearers may be committed under Rapid Deployment procedures (Operational Procedure No 30 Breathing Apparatus Procedures) when the following has been established: It is immediately clear that persons are at risk and in need of rescue, and are either within view or known to be within a short distance of the entry point. Dangerous escalation of the incident can be prevented by immediate or limited action.

OR

If the Incident/Crew Commander of the first appliance has committed BA teams under Rapid Deployment and/or there is a likelihood of deploying further BA teams, the Incident/Crew Commander must ensure that the second attending appliance provide an Entry Control Officer (ECO) and ECB to the scene of operations. Once staffing allows, a crew member with a radio should be detailed to take control of the lift by utilising the 'Firefighters' switch. The crewmember, in conjunction with the IC, will ensure the required personnel and equipment are deployed to the correct scene of operations. The driver/pump operator will run out lengths of hose from the pump to the dry riser inlet. The lines to the dry riser will only be charged on the instructions of the Incident Commander. It is essential that good communications be established between the Incident Commander and Command Support. For a building containing a fire-fighting shaft (diagram 3 below) where the firefighting lobby on the fire floor has not been affected, BA crews should connect hose lines directly into the rising main on the fire floor. When the hose is charged, BA crews should proceed through the doors into the compartment/corridor to fight the fire.
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Hose should not normally be run through the doors between the firefighting lobby and the firefighting stairs, as this will allow products of combustion to enter the stairway and compromise the escape route of anyone above the fire floor.

Diagram 5 A Firefighting shaft 7.4 Equipment list:

This list is not exhaustive and may be increased or decreased depending on the circumstances. High rise packs. BA Entry Control Board (see 7.3). Rapid Deployment Board (see 7.3). Door forcing equipment, e.g. crowbar, large hammer, etc. Long line. Hand lamps. Firefighters switch key and Security door keys Reciprocating saw (if carried). Resuscitator. Hand held radios. Dry riser landing valve cupboard keys.

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7.5

Action to be taken by the second appliance crew

The Crew Commander of the second appliance is responsible for ensuring the Incident/Crew Commander of the first appliance has sufficient resources to deal with the incident (see equipment list section 7.4 above). For emergency protection of firefighters, and as soon as resources allow, an additional covering jet should be run out from the Bridgehead (see section 6.5) to the entrance of the firefighting lobby/scene of operations. If the first appliance has deployed a BA team under Rapid Deployment (section 7.3), an ECB must also be taken to the scene of operations and Stage I or Stage II control procedures must be implemented as soon as possible. If no contact can be made the Incident/Crew Commander of the first appliance, a further team of two breathing apparatus wearers with an ECB should proceed to the scene of operations to render any assistance necessary. Any additional crewmembers will assist with the water supply and check the landing valves on the additional floors of the building to ensure these are in the closed position. 7.6 Action by any additional crews of appliances attending

Upon arrival, contact should be made with the Incident Commander through Command Support. The Incident Commander will determine where the additional crews/resources will be deployed. The Incident Commander should consider the need for crews to be deployed to the floors above the fire floor to verify the safety of occupants in this part of the building. 8. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR HIGH RISE INCIDENTS

As good practice the following considerations should be borne in mind when attending High rise incidents and/or developing training scenarios. 8.1 Safety and Welfare of Crews

High rise fires may be physically demanding and resource intensive incidents. Incident Commanders must ensure that the physical capabilities of crews committed into an incident are monitored, particularly for heat related injuries, whenever crews are exposed to prolonged high temperatures. As far as practical any strenuous activity carried out prior to attending an incident should also be taken into account. Early consideration should be given to rotation of crews and reliefs at protracted incidents. Due to the design and construction of high rise buildings particularly in relation to compartmentation, Incident Commanders should consider the increased risk of Flashover or Backdraught occurring. All personnel should make themselves aware of the guidance contained in Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Compartment Fires and Tactical Ventilation.

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8.2

Equipment and Appliances

To assist firefighting operations at high rise incidents, all appliances carry high rise packs containing smaller diameter hose and a branch. This type of equipment is particularly suitable for incidents of a residential/domestic nature. As a guide, when using the small diameter hose and branches, 1 dry rising main charged to 10 bars at the inlet is capable of providing 2 effective firefighting spray/jets. However, the Incident Commander should always take into account the likely fire loading at a premise. An indication of likely fire loading will be given by the type of premise being attended i.e. residential/domestic or Industrial/Commercial and any additional information gathered at the scene. If the fire loading is considered to be higher than a typical single unit residential /domestic incident, the Incident Commander must consider if the smaller diameter hose carried in the high rise packs will deliver the required flow of water for the incident. If a greater flow of water is required the Incident Commander must deploy larger diameter delivery hose, which produces far less frictional loss than smaller diameter hose and subsequently a greater flow of water. 8.3 Firefighting Installations

A defective, vandalised or otherwise inoperative installation will severely restrict firefighting and rescue efforts. An open landing valve is the most common cause for a riser not delivering the required amount of water when correctly charged. In this instance, if safe to do so, the pump feeding the riser should be closed down and the riser outlets checked in an attempt to rectify the problem. All personnel must be familiar with the alternative methods of providing a water supply to the scene of operations. The practicality of running hose up internally or hauling aloft externally should be considered during familiarisation inspections. When deciding to use an alternative method of providing water to a fire floor, an Incident Commander should always take into account that it may result in hose lines compromising fire safety measures put in place to protect means of escape and/or restrict products of combustion spreading to the floors above the fire floor (see 8.4 and 8.5 below). When a dry riser has been used, it should be drained on conclusion of the incident. 8.4 Safety and welfare of occupants

Although modern multi-storey flats are constructed using fire-resisting materials, the possibility of the spread of fire, smoke and gases to other parts of the building by both internal and external means must be taken into account. Stairways and enclosures may have been affected due to damaged smoke-stop doors, door closers and fire-resisting glazing. The Incident Commander must also consider the risk to occupants who may inadvertently enter a smoke filled stairway.
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If the building is of a simple stairway design the chance of this occurring will be increased. If required a crew member should be detailed, to ensure that occupants are reassured and do not unnecessarily evacuate the building. A typical cause of this problem includes fires in refuse chutes. Although these fires are normally easily dealt with, smoke penetration of many floors can happen causing anxiety to occupants. Should the Incident Commander decide that a full or partial evacuation of a high rise building is necessary they must inform MACC immediately. This is to ensure that consistent information is given to any residents who may telephone MACC for advice during the incident. In the absence of an evacuation message from the Incident Commander, MACC will default to issuing stay put guidance to any affected occupier. 8.5 Ventilation

Effective means are needed to minimize the possibility of serious contamination of the firefighting shaft by smoke. This is achieved having due regard to the configuration of each particular building via a number of means including: 8.5.1. Natural Ventilation An opening vent with an area of not less than 5% of the horizontal cross sectional area of the firefighting stair enclosure should be provided at the top of the stair enclosure, sited where it will not be unduly affected by wind. The vent should be provided with a remote control mechanism located adjacent to the Fire Service access doorway and clearly marked as to its function and means of operation. For firefighting stairs adjacent to external walls, opening vents with an area of not less than 15% of the horizontal cross sectional area of the stair enclosure should be provided at each storey level above ground level. 8.5.2. Pressurisation System Pressurised staircases are commonplace in fire-engineered buildings, where escape routes are kept clear by means of supplying clean air into the staircase, thereby developing positive pressure in the spaces requiring protection. In a pressurised system the airflow is always away from the escape routes to ensure that there is a higher pressure than the surrounding area. Additional information regarding pressurisation systems can be found in the New Fire Safety Library Smoke control by pressurisation.

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8.5.3 PPV Consideration should be given to the use of using Positive Pressure Ventilation as a device to pressurise stairs to maintain egress (OPS Procedure No 5 - Positive Pressure Ventilation, Section 6.1). Diagram 5 shows a PPV fan creating positive pressure in the stairwell to maintain the safe smoke-free means of egress with the smoke forced to atmosphere. In view of the differing methods of achieving ventilation within high rise buildings, crews should carry out site-specific visits as part of the training programme to high rise buildings within the station area. Should any further information be required regarding technical issues this can be obtained by contacting the relevant department at Fire Service Headquarters. 8.6 Wind pressures

+ve

+ve

+ve +ve
+ve +ve

+ve +ve
PPV FAN

+ve

Diagram 5 PPV Pressurised Staircase

Incident Commanders must give due regard to the effect of wind patterns, which can be extremely complex around high rise buildings. A wind creates high pressure on the upwind side of a building and low pressure on the downwind side. Strong winds outside a building at high level can have a dominant effect in ventilation. Opening vents to provide horizontal ventilation may result in a near gale blowing through the building. Ventilation must always be strictly controlled within the fire area to prevent serious fire growth and spread. (All personnel should be made aware of guidance to be found in the Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Compartment Fires and Tactical Ventilation). 8.7 Lift failure or unavailability

Should the lift be unavailable for use, the Incident Commander must consider the increased difficulties in transporting the logistics required for the incident. It may be a considerable distance up to the Bridgehead location therefore assistance should be requested immediately. Relief crews and equipment may be sent to a staging area midway between ground floor and the Bridgehead prior to being required. This will ensure they reach the Bridgehead with the minimum delay and in a physical state ready for fire fighting or rescue operations as required.

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Where practical all resources should not travel in the same lift at the same time, as a lift failure could substantially deplete the availability of personnel and equipment. Should the lift fail when being used by crews to reach the Bridgehead, the Incident Commander/command support operator must be informed immediately. The safety of the lift crew must be considered, taking into account their position in relation to the fire and the potential for contact with smoke. Assistance may be required to release the lift crew to allow fire fighting operations to continue. 8.8 Communications

The Incident Commander relies on disciplined use of radio equipment when commanding operational activities on the incident ground. However on occasions this may be interrupted by communication blackspots. Should established communications fail, a runner equipped with a fireground radio should make their way to the Bridgehead utilising the lift/stairs in an attempt to reestablish communications. The loss of communications may be due to the Bridgehead being compromised, therefore when using the lift, runners should exit the lift two floors below the Bridgehead, the exact location of which can be obtained from Command Support. Communications should then be re-established by radio, or a series of runners utilised to relay messages between the Bridgehead and the ground crew.

8.9

Glass management

Falling broken glass from a fire or rescue situation may provide a significant risk to persons at ground level. Glass can be carried considerable distances by wind currents and therefore Incident Commanders should nominate a Safety Officer to consider the safe positioning of personnel and appliances, and removal of members of the public from areas of possible danger. 8.10 Security gates/doors

Occupants in many high rise residential premises are making increasing use of both security gates and vandal proof door surrounds. These will severely hamper attempts to gain access into such premises. Incident Commanders should consider the need for the extra equipment necessary to force entry. 9 LIFT RESCUES

In the vast majority of lift rescues, persons are confined within the lift cars, either because the lift door will not operate or a related defect. Occasions have arisen where Owner/Occupiers are refusing to allow crews attending their premises to carry out Lift Rescues, in order to avoid charges being raised against them.
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If this occurs the Incident Commander must consider what is an appropriate course of action. Where crews identify that the car occupants are in distress and\or the estimated attendance time of the lift engineer is excessive, Powers of Firefighters in an Emergency exist within the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, to enable suitable action to be taken. However, if crews identify that the lift car occupants are not suffering from any distress and/or the lift engineers arrival is within a reasonable timescale, which would not unduly effect the well being of the lift car occupants, no FRS action may be appropriate. Where appropriate MACC will annotate mobilising instructions with the phrase caller in distress as this will assist Incident Commanders in their assessment and course of action. Section 11 of the FRS Act 2004 gives the authority to FRS to respond to other eventualities, in particular power is granted when the event or situation is one that causes or is likely to cause one or more individuals to die, become injured or become ill. Lift rescues clearly fall within this category. Section 44 details the Powers of Firefighters etc in an emergency. Authorised employees may take any reasonable action necessary, if they reasonably believe an emergency has occurred. However it does not give authority to employees to act in an inappropriate manner. Actions must be, reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances of the emergency. Any actions taken may need to be justified at a later date. A common sense approach is required. An explanation given to the person refusing entry to the FRS of the above powers and the consequences of obstructing the FRS in taking authorised action should normally suffice in resolving the situation. As a very last resort for a justifiable emergency the police may be requested to attend to enforce the above FRS powers. An incident of this type will still attract charges and a form FS 701 will be completed.

9.1

Incidents involving all types of lifts.

Incident Commanders should consider the following guidance that is applicable to the various types of lift likely to be encountered in West Yorkshire. Undertake a risk assessment. Location of the lift car should be ascertained and the persons inside the lift reassured. Find out any action taken by persons on site before the arrival of the fire service. Determine type of lift involved, ie. Electric, hydraulic, pneumatic etc. Once this has been done, the power to the lift should then be isolated. Two crew members should gain access to the lift motor room. It is essential that good communications be established between the lift motor room and the Incident Commander. Ensure all personnel are aware of any potential hazards, eg. falling into the lift shaft, access in or out of the lift car etc.
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Before attempting to lower any lift, it should be raised slightly to ensure that the weight of the car is being securely held by the suspension mechanism. The lift should then be raised or lowered to the next appropriate floor, using the equipment available, i.e. winding handles, bleed off valves etc. Communications must be maintained at all times during this process. Some local authority councils have installed lift top car alarms to the lift cars to prevent vandal access and lift surfing. These devices usually consist of a passive infrared detector (P.I.R.) to detect movement on the lift top, which automatically stops the lift car, and operates an alarm and flashing beacon. The alarm should only be isolated if, a. The alarm is sounding and is causing distress to lift car occupants and/or Fire Service personnel. b. Fire Service personnel need to cross the shear trap for any reason i.e. to open internal lift doors. To isolate the car top alarm the key provided by the local authority lift engineers should be used. Note: The lift car must be isolated using the main isolation control in the lift motor room prior to isolation of the car top alarm. Visits must be carried out in each station ground to familiarise crews with different types of lifts installed in buildings in their areas. This should be in conjunction with local authority lift engineers to ascertain which lifts are fitted with this type of device. Upon completion of Fire Service operations the car top alarm should be reset by turning the key and removing it. However, the main isolation control must remain isolated. A "Shear Trap" (see diagram 6) exists between the lift car and landing opening. No one should cross the shear trap until the lift is stationary and it is confirmed that the lift is at it lowest level. Any movement of the lift car poses a risk of life threatening injuries to a person crossing the "Shear Trap". It should be noted that the shear trap risk also exists between a lift car balance weight and any structure within the lift shaft. Personnel observing the movement of a lift car, or working on the landing opening area must be aware of the risk of falling into the opening. They must also ensure that they never enter the "Shear Trap".

Diagram 6 - Showing "Shear Trap".

If the lift car fails to move, it may be because the safety gear has operated. Operational personnel should not attempt to reset this safety gear but should request the attendance of a lift engineer.
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Once the lift reaches a floor level the lift car doors may be opened using the appropriate lift key. Should the door not open easily, the lift car should be moved to another floor until the lift door operates or until it can be established if there is another defect. Only in exceptional circumstances should any attempt be made to force the lift car door open. When the power to the lift has been isolated, a firefighter should be stationed at the power isolation point while operations are in progress. On leaving the incident, a notice should be placed on the switch stating that an emergency isolation has taken place and the power should not be reinstated until the lift has been checked out by a competent person.

Occasions have arisen, when due to the impending failure of the lift car securing / breaking mechanism, there has been a need to secure or immobilise a lift car or counter balance within its shaft. This is an extremely dangerous procedure for both firefighters and lift car occupants. Incident Commanders must ensure that personnel are not deployed into areas in and around the lift car / shaft, which would cause injury to personnel, if a sudden failure of the lift car securing / breaking mechanism should occur. Incident commanders must quickly assess and deploy within a safe system of work, any additional or specialist equipment required to secure the lift in its position. 9.2 Incidents involving Hydraulic lifts. Isolate the power to the lift and check the pressure gauge attached to the lift pump. If the pressure gauge reads zero and the lift car is not at the lowest floor, it may be held by the emergency braking mechanism or lodged against an obstruction in the shaft. In both cases, it is an extremely dangerous situation and no attempt should be made to move the lift car or remove any casualties without the advice of a qualified lift engineer. Under no circumstance has the lift car to be touched or the Shear Trap crossed until a qualified lift engineer has confirmed that the car is secure and properly supported by its suspension mechanism. After isolating the power to the lift and finding a reading on the pressure gauge, the car should first be raised by means of the hand pump. When an upward movement is seen it may be presumed that the weight of the lift car is being held by the suspension mechanism and it is safe to lower the car using the emergencylowering valve. If the lift car does not rise when the hand pump is being operated, it must be presumed that the car is not being held by its suspension mechanism. This is irrespective of the pressure gauge reading. This must be treated as a lift car with a pressure gauge reading of zero.

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When operating the emergency lowering valve, initially operate the valve for approximately two seconds and observe the movement of the car. If there is movement, then continue until the car reaches the floor level. However if the movement stops or there is no movement in the initial operation of the valve, it should be presumed that the lift is either held by the emergency braking mechanism or lodged against an obstruction in the shaft. This must be treated as a lift car with a pressure gauge reading of zero. It is extremely dangerous, due to the need to cross the Shear Trap, to put improvised securing devices in place when it cannot be confirmed that the lift is being securely held by its own suspension mechanism. This must only be considered when urgent action needs to be initiated to save life. It should be noted that if the lift car becomes lodged on an obstruction in the lift shaft after the descend button in the car has been pressed, the lowering valve in the normal lift mechanism may remain open draining the hydraulic oil from the system. If this is the case, this must be treated as a lift car with a pressure gauge reading of zero. Machine Room Less Lifts (MRLLs)

9.3

In the last few years the lift industry have been developing a number of lift design options principally to address the requirements for people with disabilities. Part of this development has been the evolution of machine room less lifts (MRLLs). These incorporate the hydraulic machine within the shaft itself and it is not unusual to find lifts with up to 1000 gallons of hydraulic oil within the shaft. The prospect of a fire in a lift shaft having this additional fuel load is a principle concern. The electrical type of MRLL also brings with it a need for firefighters to change their approach to the rescue of individuals trapped within the lift car as it is no longer possible to hand wind the electric motor of these. When crews undertaking familiarisation visits find lifts installed in a premise, they must ensure that they are aware of the correct operation in case they are of the newer type of lift. This may involve contacting the lift engineers to arrange a demonstration for training purposes.

Deputy Chief Officer (Operations) September 2006

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REFERENCES

Fire and Rescue Service Circular 32/06 Fire Fighting in High rise Buildings. Fire Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Compartment Fires and Tactical Ventilation. Breathing Apparatus see Operational Procedure 30. Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.

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