Tabasa vs.

CA
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006 JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN,Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that "it is mans basic right for it is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen. The Case The instant petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States. The Facts The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. 7 Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged: 1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan; 2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State; 3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3). 8

Tabasa vs. CA The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:

The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D). 9 The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following summary deportation order: Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the respondents Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked. By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996. In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired. It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. 10 Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. 12 On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. 13Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. 14 However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. 15 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision, 16 denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The

Tabasa vs. CA affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.
The Issue The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien. The Courts Ruling The Court finds no merit in this petition. RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz: Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.) Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Tabasa vs. CA Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship:18 the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171 Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit: Section 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted. Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied). Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions. Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately. In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

Tabasa vs. CA What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic.22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171 Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified." 23 Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24 Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on. A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit: Ms. Domingo: x x x From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country. The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere. Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.) xxxx x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two typesthe economic and political refugeesare the ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these

Tabasa vs. CA people who left the country because of political persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. 26
From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than political or economic necessity. Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27 This argument has no merit. While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere. Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful. Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation. Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation. This theory is incorrect. As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law. Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation: 2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof. 3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings.

Tabasa vs. CA In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. 28
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held: It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. x x x 29 Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

So vs. Republic
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007

EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate courts Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision. Antecedents On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization 3 under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of mens ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioners Certificate of Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate of Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.7 On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise

So vs. Republic ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002. No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So familys business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable disease.12 Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to petitioners house. He has known petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines. At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the following documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupils17 and High School Students18 Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;19 (6) Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in evidence. The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring that petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00. SO ORDERED.26 The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds: I.

So vs. Republic THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
II. PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. 27 Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct.28 The witnesses did not even reside in the same place as petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific answers to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general statements in answer to his counsels questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.30 On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China; the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from these offices came forward to oppose the petition before the lower court.32 Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly established by his witnesses. In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be dismissed. In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice.34 According to the CA, petitioners two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention specific details of petitioners life or character to show how well they knew him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to petitioners case.35The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement.36 The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.37 Petitioners motion for reconsideration38 was denied in a Resolution39 dated November 24, 2005; hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.40 In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the Brief filed before the CA. In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial naturalization before the court, as in the present case.42 Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before the

So vs. Republic court a quo does not preclude it from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to question an already final decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument that petitioners character witnesses are not qualified to prove the formers qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473. The petition is denied for lack of merit. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.45 Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.50 It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.51 These however, do not justify petitioners contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473. Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here. Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

So vs. Republic Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.53 Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty. Adasas testimony follows: q Do you know the petitioner Edison So? a Yes, Sir. q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him? a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and adviser of their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their place way back in 1991 to 1992. q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous? a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family some social function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend. q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioners birthday? a On several occasions I attend the birthday. q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present? a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila. q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines? a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth. q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression of his conduct? a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working individual and ah (sic) he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report concerning the character of the petitioner. q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a] citizen of the Philippines? a Yes. q Can you tell us why do you say so?

So vs. Republic a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated by law and presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in the Philippines particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I have observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah (sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and meddle (sic) some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and learn the customs and ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced? a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah observed (sic) the usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and some occasions such as fiestas. q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act to become Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)? a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government. His family and himself does not believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah (sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted in any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for. q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage? a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously having ah (sic) the usual contact with his family.54 It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioners family, but not specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasas statements refer to his observations on the familys practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his qualifications. Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus: q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So? a Yes, Sir. q Are you personally acquainted with him? a Yes, Sir. q How long have you known the petitioner? a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir. q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you come to know the petitioner? a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir. q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous? a Yes, Sir.

So vs. Republic q How often did you see the petitioner?

a I see him twice a week, Sir. q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do? a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic). q Do you go to church together? a Yes, Sir. q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go? a Yes, Sir. q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also go during fiestas? a Yes, Sir. q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited? a Yes, Sir. q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner? a Twice a week, sir. q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides? a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir. q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address? a Since birth, Sir. q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us your impression of his conduct? a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the Philippines (sic) Constitution. q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of the Philippines (sic) Constitution? a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the people and the government authority emanate from within; and the other one is the civilian government is not supreme over the military. q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines? a Yes, Sir. q What are these qualifications? a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in the Philippines since birth.

So vs. Republic q What else?

a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir. q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and appraochable (sic) manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines? a Yes, Sir. q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation? a Yes, Sir. q What is the occupation of the petitioner? a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir. q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do? a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir. q Is the petitioner still a student? a Yes, Sir. q Where is he studying? a In UST, Sir. q Is he your classmate? a Yes, Sir. q What was his course? a Pharmacy, Sir. q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary? a Yes, Sir. q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos? a Yes, Sir. q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with? a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir. q Who else? a Elmer Ramos, Sir.

So vs. Republic q Who else?

a Sharmaine Santos, Sir. q You said the petitioner is of good moral character? a Yes, Sir. q Why do you know that? a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah better approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well with friends. q So during school days you see him everyday? a Yes, Sir. q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a week? a Yes, Sir. q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines? a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir. q Why do you say that he is not disqualified? a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir. q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government? a No, Sir. q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas? a No, Sir. q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy? a No, Sir. q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable disease illnesses? a No, Sir. q Why do you know? a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very intelligent person, Sir. q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school? a Yes, Sir.

So vs. Republic q What organization?

a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir. q What does starget means? a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir. q How about the other one which you mentioned? a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate, Sir.55 Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioners qualifications. In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.57 The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.58 We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice. It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.60 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189. The facts: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response: Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. 4 Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, 6therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.
Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition. In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated. We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows: SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx. SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL 8 - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows: Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: (a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws; (b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country; (c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, .; (d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. (e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his claim [where] the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. [The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket added.) As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises: As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." 11 Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx xxx xxx Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ; 3) xxx xxx xxx. (4) xxx xxx xxx; (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12COMELEC argues: 4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES 4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13 The Court disagrees. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus: Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact. Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution . xxx xxx xxx Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the Philippines." They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this? Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of "residence" is synonymous with "domicile." As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law. This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos. If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President. Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad." The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is a qualification. xxx xxx xxx Look at what the Constitution says "In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election." Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote. xxx xxx xxx Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember. The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence "residency" has been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile." But the third more practical reason, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted) Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body: 1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15 Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections; While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of

Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.

Calilung vs. Datumanong

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads: SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003." SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

Calilung vs. Datumanong (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation. In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance? We shall discuss these issues jointly. Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3 In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No.

Calilung vs. Datumanong 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over. Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved. Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained. xxxx Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House. xxxx Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship. Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.) From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of

Calilung vs. Datumanong the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7 For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8 To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

In Re: Benjamin Dacanay

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law. Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar. We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

In Re: Benjamin Dacanay SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law. Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6 Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10 The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14 Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

In Re: Benjamin Dacanay WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

Lopez vs. COMELEC

EN BANC [G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008] EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.: A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution[1] and (2) Omnibus Order [2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman. Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007. On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition[3] before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,[4] petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.[5] He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.[6] On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo. SO ORDERED.[7] In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman. We dismiss the petition. Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,[8] petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Court's ruling in Valles are substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. [9] Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines. In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. More importantly, the Court's 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225[10] in 2003. R.A. No.

Lopez vs. COMELEC

9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: xxxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added) Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation on this point: While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225 . Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.[11] (Emphasis added) While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[12] In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Lopez vs. COMELEC