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1. city of davao v rtc G.R. No.

127383, August 18, 2005 tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-repealable laws FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City. On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax. RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition. ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs. However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn. Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.

2. gsis v city treasurer GSIS vs The City Treasurer of ManilaFacts Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25 th St., Bonifacio Drive, Manila(Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property). Title to theConcepcionArroceros property was transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 835 [3] dated April 27, 2005. Boththe GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the ConcepcionArroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease to Manila Hotel Corporation. the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter ated September 13, 2002 to GSIS informing of the unpaid real property taxesdue on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken down as follows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes remainu n s e t t l e d b e f o r e t h a t d a t e . O n S e p t e m b e r 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e C i t y T r e a s u r e r o f M a n i l a i s s u e d s e p a r a t e N o t i c e s o f R e a l t y T a x Delinque ncy for the subject properties, with the usual warning of seizure and/or sale. On October 8, 2002, GSIS, through its legalcounsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA)8291.Two days after, GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition [7] with prayer for a restraining and injunctive relief beforethe Manila RTC.RTC ruled that the assessment of Manila was valid. ISSUES

1. Whether or not GSIS isexempt from the payment of real property taxes from
1992 to 2002;2. Whether GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes on the property it leased to a taxable entity; and3. Whether GSISs real properties are exempt from warrants of levy and from tax sale for non-payment of real propertytaxes. Ruling 1. GSIS Exempt from Real Property Tax Full tax exemption granted through PD 1146 Revised Insurance Government Act RA 7160 lifted GSIS Tax Exemptions Local Governement Code or RA 7160 was enacted in 1991. Sec 193 vis-avis Sec234. GSIS tax-exempt status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291 Full tax exemption reenacted through RA 8291 Under it, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39 thereof, a virtual replication of the earlier quoted Sec. 33 of PD 1146. Sec. 39 of RA 8291 reads:SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien . It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarialsolvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to thecontrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds . These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revokedand any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid . Consequently, all laws,ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed,superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. Real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of thisAct . If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39:SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien . x x x xxx Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees,charges or duties of all kinds . These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessmentagainst the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid .

GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government The Manila International Airport Authority Doctrine, which provides that, since MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC, not having beenorganized either as a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into shares, or as a non-stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the purview of local taxation by forceof Sec. 133 of the LGC providing in context that unless otherwise provided , local governments cannot tax national governmentinstrumentalities GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of the LGC, a GOCC following the teaching of Manila International Airport Authority , for, like MIAA, GSIS capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of.And by members, the reference is to those who, under Sec. 87 of the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock corporation, and not tothe compulsory members of the system who are government employees. Its management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whosemembers are appointed by the President. Second , the subject properties under GSISs name are likewise owned by the Republic. Third , GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all government employeesand their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.2. Beneficial Use Doctrine Applicable the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to the beneficial use principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC. SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax . The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax : (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except whenthe beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person .SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units . Unless otherwise providedherein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of thefollowing : (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,and local government units . (Emphasis supplied.) GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost ina sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a taxable person.Thus, the real estate tax assessment of PhP 54,826,599.37 covering 1992 to

2002 over the subject Katigbak property is valid insofar assaid tax delinquency is concerned as assessed over said property. Taxable entity having beneficial use of leased property liable for real property taxes thereon the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against t h e t a x a b l e p e r s o n w h o h a d a c t u a l o r beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner. eing in possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for the realty taxes assessed over theKatigbak property from 1992 to 2002. Moreover, MHC is obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC Contract of Lease to shoulder such assessment. Stipulation l8 of the contract pertinently reads: 18. By law, the Lessor, [GSIS], is exempt from taxes, assessments and levies. Should there be any change in the law or the interpretation thereof or any other circumstances which would subject the Leased Property to any kind of tax, assessmentor levy which would constitute a charge against the Lessor or create a lien against the Leased Property, the Lessee agreesand obligates itself to shoulder and pay such tax, assessment or levy as it becomes due . [28] (Emphasis ours.)3. GSIS Properties Exempt from Levy it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes.SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien . x x x.x x x xThe funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefitsunder this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi- judicial agencies or administrative bodies xxx Summary In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the nationalgovernment, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the beneficial use rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property,leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user. TheKatigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means thatthe City ofManila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property 3. Social Justice Society Enforcement Agency v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug

)In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks toprohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisionsconstitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determinethe manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be usedto harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right againstunreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. G.R. No. 158633 Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency )Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutionalright to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self incrimination, and for beingcontrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees. The Consolidated Issues The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laiddown by the Constitution? and Pimentel Petition(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 andCOMELEC Resolution No. 6486) In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additionalqualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. TheCongress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weakenthe force of a constitutional mandate, 7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is nulland void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if itconflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have nochoice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

9 Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,in Government v. Springer , the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of theocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegatedauthority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of theconstitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied fromthe given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislativeenactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap. 10 Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations whichcircumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive constitutionallimitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribingthe qualifications of candidates for senators.In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules andregulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what theConstitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, theCOMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of electionshould not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13 Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges thequalification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakablyrequires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificateof candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed assenator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public officeshall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under thechallenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of littlevalue if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly statethat non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy.This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section

of the law,without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shallhave to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals withcandidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolvearound the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatorynature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever. While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by itsterms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoralevent. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validityas an implementing issuance.It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its havinginfringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serveas senator

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Perez, J. FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC Jan. 25, 2010 Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Issue: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Held: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

Ruling: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan. First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative. Navarro v ermita RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ETC. ET AL G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010 Pe ralta, J.: Doctrines: No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government Code, so only thecriteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a province. The Court, while respecting thedoctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other branchesof the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution, and determine whether illegality attached to the creation of the province in question. Facts: Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was heldunconstitutional for failure to satisfy the land area and population requirements and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating,"The land area

requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID.OSG now contends that since the power to create a local government unit is vested with the Legislature, the acts of the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting into law R.A. No. 9355should be respected as petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity or constitutionality. Issue: Whether petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity Held: NO. As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed thecriteria for the creation of a province as contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. No law has yet been passed amending Section 461 of the Local Government Code, so only the criteriastated therein are the bases for the creation of a province. The Constitution clear ly mandates that thecriteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province; hence, anyderogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.The Court, while respecting the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot renege on its duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of theConstitution, and determine whether illegality attached to the creation of the province in question. Toabandon this duty only because the Province of Dinagat Islands has began its existence is to consentto the passage of a law that is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the Local GovernmentCode, rendering the law and the province created null and void. The Court cannot tolerate such nullityto be in existence. Where the acts of other branches of the government go beyond the limit imposedby the Constitution, it is the sacred duty of the judiciary to nullify the same.