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Partaking in the Holy Water:

An analysis of the military balance between Bangladesh and India pertaining to the sharing of the Ganges River
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Table of Contents

I. Introduction................................3 II. Historical Background.3 III. Bracing the Bengal Tiger: Measuring, Estimating and Operating Bangladeshs Forces..................................8 IV. Equipping the Indian Elephant: Measuring, Estimating and Operating Indias Forces15 V. Triumph of the Tusker: An Overview of the Bangladesh-India Military Balance and its Outcomes.....19 A. Land.....................................19 B. Air.....................................22 C. Sea25 D. Ballistic...................................26 VI. Conclusion28 Appendix I.29 Bibliography.................................30

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I. Introduction
Global developments suggest the need for another analogous, broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues asserted Jessica Mathews in her 1989 Foreign Policy article titled Redefining Security1. Less than a decade later, the signing of the Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India in 1996 reaffirmed Mathews notion: contemporary conflict is becoming largely centered on the division of the global commons. This essay aims to analyze the military balance between Bangladesh and India concerning the sharing of Ganges river water. It postulates that any incidence of military conflict will result in Indias victory; however, given the support of numerous South and Southeast Asian Muslim countries, it is also plausible to argue that Indias victory will not be tacit and that a second wave of Bangladeshi retaliation with the resources of the aforementioned allies is equally likely.

II. Historical Background

Before delving into the roots of the water conflict, it is important to note the

foreign relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh prior to the latters independence. In the aftermath of the Partition of India in 1947, Bangladesh (formerly East Bengal or East Pakistan) was made a part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan) owing to her vast Muslim population. This religious commonality, however, proved inadequate in cementing ties between the two newly bonded nations. Among the grievances aired by Bangladesh were linguistic tensions in recognizing Bengali, the spoken language of Bangladeshis, the allocation of assembly seats to minority non-Muslim groups, and growing demands for regional autonomy2. These issues came to a head in 1970 following the
74.

1 Jessica Mathews, "Redefining Security." Foreign Affairs, vol. 68.2 (1989): pp. 162-177. 2 Richard Park, "East Bengal: Pakistans Troubled Province." Far Eastern Survey, vol. 23.5 (1954): 70-

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disastrous impact of the Bhola cyclone that killed up to 500,000 Bangladeshis and displaced even more. The indolent, ineffective response of General Yahya Khans government based in Islamabad angered the opposition Awami League, Bangladeshi citizens as well as numerous foreign leaders. A year later, these echoes of dissent led to a full-scale civil war that culminated in the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Throughout Bangladeshs disagreements with Pakistan, India remained a

passive ally contributing in the form of aid following the Bhola cyclone. This dynamic transformed, however, following Operation Searchlight, a Pakistani military initiative in March 1971 that sought to suppress the Awami League and consequently killed upwards of 300,000 people3. This was followed by a pre- emptive Pakistani strike against India in December 1971 in order to curb Indian participation in the Bangladeshi Liberation War. In retaliation, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi orchestrated to send three Indian army corps, over fourteen air squadrons and naval gunboats, fighter-squadrons and submarines into Bangladesh to aid the opposition Mukti Bahni forces. After thirteen days of battle, joint Indian and Bangladeshi forces claimed a victory that led to the final secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan4. While assistance in the Liberation War certainly aided Bangladesh-India

relations, it did not necessitate camaraderie. Certainly, in the year following Bangladeshs independence, the two nations signed the Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace that reaffirmed their peaceful intentions, specifically in the areas of sharing water resources, flood and cyclone management as well as irrigation methods5. Three years later, in 1975, India completed the construction of the Farakka Barrage that spanned 2,245 meters across the Ganges in
3 Mark Dummett, "Bangladesh war: The article that changed history." BBC News (15 Dec 2011)

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16207201> [accessed 11 Nov 2012] 4 "Indo-Pakistani Wars." Encarta. 2009. 5 Piyali Dutta, "India-Bangladesh Relations: Issues, Problems and Recent Developments." Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, vol. 97. (2010).

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an attempt to serve the need of preservation and maintenance of the Kolkata Port by improving the regime and navigability of the Bhagirathi-Hoogly river system6 On April 16, 1975, the flood control ministers of Bangladesh and India met to decide upon an interim agreement on sharing the water of the Ganges. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of water between the two nations during this period: Figure 1: Distribution of Ganges Water between Bangladesh and India during the interim agreement period from April-May 19757

Following the assassination of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman, his successor Ziaur Rahman increased the internationality of the conflict by demanding its discussion at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1976. While his plea was rejected, Bangladesh and India nonetheless succeeded in signing a five-year treaty in 1977 that guaranteed Bangladesh up to 80% of the water from Farakka during the dry season. This was followed by a three-year treaty signed in 1985 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Lieutenant Colonel H.M Ershad of Bangladesh. The terms of the treaty mirrored those of 1977, although it was
6 Farakka Barrage: Project Farakka [report compiled by the Indian Ministry of Water resources)

<http://mowr.gov.in/index3.asp?sslid=296&subsublinkid=714&langid=1> [accesed 11 Nov 2012] 7 Ishtiaq Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond. Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 25.3 (1998): pp. 131-150.

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understood that a more viable, long-term solution remained to be found. This solution was not to be conceived until a decade later, under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina Wajed and the Awami League. Why was 1996 the ultimate year of success in signing a long-term treaty? According to author Ishtiaq Hossain, there existed several factors on both sides of the border that lent to a favorable outcome. First, on an individual level, Sheikh Hasina Wajed took a personal interest in reaching an acceptable settlement on distributing the water of the Farakka Barrage. Second, Hossain points to the creation of a United Front in New Delhi, a non-Congress government that was more prone to try and improve relations with Indias neighbors. Third, he cites Sheikh Hasinas decision not to speak to the UN about the issue as a precipitator of Indias bonhomie. Finally, Hossain attributes the treatys formation to Sheikh Hasinas diplomatic success, as seen in her resolution to involve the chief minister of bordering West Bengal in the negotiations8. The final 1996 treaty consisted in twelve articles including provisions for a joint commission to ensure the treatys implementation and periodical reviews of the treaty. Figure 2 on the following page shows the distribution of water under the 1996 treaty from January to May of that year.
131-150.
8 Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond. op cit. pp.

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Figure 2: Distribution of Ganges Water between Bangladesh and India following the 1996 treaty from January to May9 mutual understanding between Bangladesh and India concerning wider ranging issues such as the suppression of insurgencies in both countries and cooperation in agriculture and trade. On a regional scale, the treaty precipitated the formation of the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) in 1997, whose members included India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. The SAGQ further promoted collaboration in the areas of investment facilitation, transportation, tourism and trade, which in turn encouraged neighboring East and Southeast Asian nations to look towards the region. Thus, it is feasible to argue that the treaty not only transformed bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India, but that it also drew the attention of other In the immediate years following its signing, the treaty ushered a period of

131-150.

9 Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond. op cit. pp.

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favorable allies across Asia10. Yet, there remain three unresolved issues of contention over the Farakka Barrage that could derail this amity. First, and most pressing, the recent amount of water available in the Farakka

Barrage is as much as 50 percent lower than what was projected by the simulated flows given in the treaty11. Hence, water shortage continues to be a grave issue for Bangladesh, whose media has repeatedly accused India of defaulting on the treatys terms. Second, opposition leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have accused the treaty of being unequal despite Bangladesh claiming an average of 52 percent of water from the Farakka Barrage per annum12. Finally, Bangladesh continues to deny India transit access to certain areas, therefore inhibiting the full flexibility of bilateral trade between the two nations13. Thus, it is apparent that there are a variety of issues, both salient and slight,

that continue to plague relations between Bangladesh and India. While the signing of the 1996 treaty leaves hope that war would be precluded by negotiations, the importance of the resource being contended elicits the potential for combat. Hence, it is pertinent to explore the hypothetical outcome of conflict between the two nations.

III. Bracing the Bengal Tiger: Measuring, Estimating and Operating Bangladeshs Forces
In the tradition of Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, this essay follows the

outline of conflict methodology highlighted in his seminal work, The Art of War. According to Sun, the elements of the art of war are first, measurement of space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and fifth,
10 Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond. op cit. pp.

131-150. 11 S. Tanzeema, and I.M Faisal, "Sharing the Ganges: a critical analysis of the water sharing treaties." Water Policy, vol. 3.1 (2001): pp. 13-28. 12 Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond. op cit. pp. 131-150. 13 "No transit deal with India: Bangladesh." Economic Times (29 Aug 2011).

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chances of victory14 What does this template tell us about Bangladesh and subsequently, India? The first overarching measurement of military capacity is its budget. Bangladesh has a total defense budget of US$1.5 billion, to be divided among the army, navy and air force respectively. Figure 3 below shows the approximate distribution of this budget: Figure 3: Distribution of the Bangladeshi Military Budget (as of 2008)

Data compiled by author from (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bangladesh/army-budget.htm) From the figures presented above, it is noteworthy to observe that Bangladeshi defense purchase for the UN peacekeeping mission is higher than its spending on armament and ammunition for the remainder of the Bangladeshi

14 Sun Tzu and Samuel Griffith. The Art of War. (New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 1971)

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armed forces. Indeed, this reduced allocation of funds for modernizing forces remains a source of discontent for the Ministry of Defense in Bangladesh15. The second measure of defense capability lies in the strength of military

manpower. Figure 4 below shows the allocation of the personnel currently serving active employment in the Bangladeshi military. Additionally, there are 50,000 reserve personnel employed in the military, who are not represented on the graph below16. Their role will be further discussed in the Estimate section. Figure 4: Allocation of Bangladeshi military manpower on active duty between defense services

Data compiled by author from Bangladeshi Army, Navy and Air force websites (http://www.army.mil.bd, http://www.bangladeshnavy.org/glance.html, http://www.baf.mil.bd/index01.php)

15 "Bangladesh Army- Budget." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bangladesh/army-

budget.htm> [accessed 15 Nov 2012] 16 "World's Largest Armies." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm>. [accessed 16 Nov 2012]

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Third, given that conflict over the Ganges would focus on naval and air

capabilities, it is pertinent to discuss Bangladeshs defense assets for those aforementioned military branches. The Bangladeshi Air Force (BAF) is equipped with 70 combat, 40 trainer and seven transport aircraft of mainly Russian, Chinese and American design. Further details of manufacture are provided in Figure 5 below. Figure 5: List of Bangladeshi Air force assets and aircraft manufacture (as of 2011) NB: combat aircraft are highlighted in red, trainer aircraft are highlighted in green and transport aircraft are highlighted in blue. Aircraft Aero L-39 Albatros F-7 and FT-7 Air Guard MiG- 29 Nanchang A-5 Shenyang FT-6 Bell 206 Long Ranger Cessna T-37 Tweet Nanchang PT-6 Antonov An-32 Lockheed C-130 Hercules Country of Origin Czechoslovakia China Russia China China USA USA China Ukraine USA Number in service 7 42 8 7 6 4 12 24 3 4

Data compiled by author from (http://www.baf.mil.bd/index01.php) The Bangladeshi Navy (BN) is currently equipped with a combination of surface crafts, frigates, missile and torpedo boats among others. Figure 6 on the following page shows a comprehensive list of these assets.

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Figure 6: List of Bangladeshi navy assets (as of 2011) Type of Naval Asset Number in Service Ships and crafts 85 Frigates 5 Patrol crafts 24 Minesweepers 5 Missile boats 9 Torpedo boats 8 Survey vessels 3 Auxiliary vessels 22 Landing crafts and vessels 9 Data compiled by author from (http://www.bangladeshnavy.org/glance.html) Finally, it is vital to note the assets of two critical allies of Bangladesh: Brunei and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). First, Brunei and Bangladesh are both a part of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Additionally, the two nations participate in training exchanges for defense personnel and have recently signed an air services agreement that facilitates air links between the two countries17. The Royal Brunei forces currently boast four army battalions, five air force squadrons and four naval corvettes18. The PRC, in its capacity as a neighbor of Bangladesh, is in the process of investing up to US$ 9 billion in the construction of two new terminals in the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong19. Furthermore, it aided Bangladesh in establishing an anti-ship missile launch pad in the same port in 200820. These latter

17 Nasroul Hizam, "Brunei-Bangladesh air services agreement soon." Brunei Times (27 March 2008). 18 Royal Brunei Armed Forces (a subsidiary website of the Brunei Ministry of Defense)

<http://www.mindef.gov.bn/mindefweb/home/e_forcesorg.htm> [accessed 16 Nov 2012] 19 Mukul Devichand, "Is Chittagong one of China's 'string of pearls'?." BBC London [17 May 2010] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8687917.stm>, [accessed on 17 Nov 2012] 20 Kanwal Sibal, "String of Pearls or a Garrote." Vivekananda International Foundation. (6 Aug 2012).

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developments have in turn aroused Indias suspicions towards the PRCs projection of naval power in the region21. Having thus measured the defense assets of Bangladesh, we may now turn to estimating and hypothetically operating these forces. Bangladeshi Army forces are divided among seven regions with their headquarters based in the national capital, Dhaka. Each of these regions has an infantry division associated with it, while Bangladesh has a national total of over twenty-five infantry brigades, seven armored regiments and seventeen artillery regiments. The chief of staff heads the army, while forces are divided into the eastern and western commands, each led by a lieutenant general22. The Bangladeshi Navy is divided into seven operational commands each led by a commodore. In addition, the navy has headquarters based in Dhaka that are divided into four branches: operations, personnel, material and logistics. An assistant chief of naval staff leads each of these branches, while the Chief of Naval Staff, who holds the rank of Vice Admiral, oversees the entire base23. Finally, the Bangladesh Air Force is divided into three branches: Operations and Training, Administrative and Special Duties and Material and Maintenance. An assistant chief of air staff who reports to the Chief of Air Staff leads each branch. Further regional command and control structure of bases is indicated in Figure 7 on the following page.
21 Sam Perlo-Freeman and Julian Cooper. "Military Expenditure." SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments,

Disarmament and International Security. (2011): pp. 157-229. 22 "Army command to be divided." Daily Star [14 June 2012], pp.1. 23 Organogram of Naval Headquarters and Admin Authorities of Bangladesh Navy (2004) <http://www.bangladeshnavy.org/orgm.html>, [accessed 17 Nov 2012]

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Figure 7: Functional Organization Diagram of the Bangladeshi Air force24 In addition to those on active duty, Bangladesh has a national reserve force of about 50,000 personnel who may contribute to the army as need be. While Bangladeshs forces are substantially lower than Indias, they may have an operational impact on conflict in two ways. First, in the event that a military encounter is rendered likely, the Bangladeshi Navy and/or Air Force may launch a pre-emptive strike on neighboring Indian cities of Kolkata, Shillong and Patna. Although a naval attack on Kolkata may prove short-lived due to the forces of its depot ship, the INS Netaji Subhash25, air attacks on the other aforementioned cities could derail transportation and hence the supply of reinforcements to Kolkata. In particular, Patna serves as a significant rail junction between New Delhi and Kolkata; thus, damage to any connections to the Indian national capital could temporarily disrupt Indias response. Furthermore, Bangladeshi air strikes on any of the six air bases located in the Indian state of West Bengal have the potential to obliterate strongholds of Indian air capabilities. Specifically, strikes on the Indian air
24 BAF Command Structure and Organization (2004)

<http://www.baf.mil.bd/organization_chart/organization_chart.html>. [accessed 17 Nov 2012] 25 INS Netaji Subhash Kolkata (2002) <http://www.irfc- nausena.nic.in/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=284>, [accessed 17 Nov 2012]

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bases of Baghdogra, Hasimara and Kalakanda target the mainstay of MiG 21s and MiG 27s in the Eastern command of Indias air force26. Thus, concise air attacks by Bangladeshi forces within the realm of West Bengal have the operational capacity to temporarily deter Indian retaliation. Following this, however, Bangladesh must rely on the crucial support of her allies to withstand the unavoidable wave of Indian reprisal.

IV: Equipping the Indian Elephant: Measuring, Estimating and Operating Indias Forces
As the second largest nation in the world, India has a large population to defend and a vast land expanse over which to do so. It is therefore unsurprising that the military budget accompanying this hefty responsibility amounts to US$ 40.4 billion. Figure 8 below indicates the division of this budget amongst various defense services in India. Figure 8: Distribution of Indian Military Budget (2012-2013)27
26 "Indian Air Force Bases." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/airbase.htm>,

[accessed 17 Nov 2012]. 27 Laxman K Behera, "Indias Defence Budget 2012-2013 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Comment. (2012).

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As in the case of Bangladesh, the second measure of military capability lies in manpower. Currently, it is estimated that the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) has a total of 1,925,000 active personnel on duty while 1,155,000 individuals serve as reserve personnel. Figure 9 below shows the allocation of active personnel among various IAF services. Figure 9: Allocation of Indian military manpower among defense services (as of 2010) Data compiled by author from The Economic Times and IISS Data28 Given the vitality of air and naval capacity for the conflict over the Ganges, further details about Indias air force and navy are provided herewith. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is equipped with 20 attack helicopters, 280 fourth-generation tactical aircraft, 784 fighter/ground attack aircraft and two airborne early warning and control aircraft29. As the worlds largest arms importer, India sources much of her aircraft from Russia, while the remainder of her air capacity is of joint French,
2012), pp. 1. 29 Ibid p. 1.

28 Binoy Prabhakar, "How India compares with China in military prowess." Economic Times (11 Mar

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Anglo and Indian manufacture. Figure 10 below lists prominent aircraft of the IAF and details of their manufacture. Figure 10: List of prominent IAF assets and aircraft manufacture (as of 2011) NB: combat aircraft are highlighted in red, trainer aircraft are highlighted in green and transport aircraft are highlighted in blue. This list is not extensive. Aircraft SU-30 Mirage-2000 MiG-29 MiG-27 MiG-21 BIS Jaguar HPT-32 Deepak HJT-16 IL-76 AN-32 Dornier Country of Origin Russia France Russia Russia Russia UK/France India India Russia Russia Germany Number in service 175 60 11 105 153 151 70 161 17 108 28

Data compiled by author from the Indian Air Force Website at http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=13 The Indian Navy is currently equipped with one aircraft carrier and a multitude of submarines, frigates, corvettes, amphibious warfare vessels and patrol vessels. Figure 11 on the following page shows a comprehensive list of these assets.

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Figure 11: List of Indian navy assets (as of 2011) Type of Naval Asset Number in Service Aircraft carriers 1 Submarines and nuclear submarines 16 + 1 Destroyers 8 Frigates 14 Corvettes and Patrol Corvettes 9 + 15 Amphibious Warfare Vessels 17 Patrol Vessels 29 Auxiliary Fleet 18 Data compiled by author from the IISS Military Balance 2010 It is apparent from the previously given figures that efficient command and control is crucial for the success of forces as numerous as those present in India. The Indian Army is divided into seven regional commands: Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, Northern, South Western and the Army Training Command (ARTRAC)30. Each of these commands (except ARTRAC) in turn contains various combinations of infantry, artillery and armored regiments31. Likewise, the IAF is divided into seven commands: Western, Eastern, Central, South Western, Southern, Training, and Maintenance. An air officer commanding-in-chief leads each command, which is sub- divided into various bases, wings, Forward Base Support Units (FBSUs) and squadrons32. Finally, the Indian Navy is comprised of the Western, Eastern and Southern naval commands, each of which is led by a flag officer commanding-in- chief. Furthermore, each command consists surface fleets and submarines, while the Western naval command possesses Indias aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat33.

30 "Organisational Structure" <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Today/16-Org-

Structure.html>, [accesed 18 Nov 2012] 31 Appendix 1 on p.26 indicates further details of each commands regimental control. Due to the size of the diagram, it could not be included on this page. 32 "Bases (Wings, FBSUs and AFSs)." <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Units/Bases.html>. [accessed 18 Nov 2012] 33 "Operational Commands of Indian Navy." <http://indiannavy.nic.in/about-indian- navy/operational-commands-indian-navy>, [accessed 18 Nov 2012].

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Operationally, India has a plethora of technical and tactical options given her vast assets and their command and control. In all branches of the military, Indias manpower and machinery outstrips those of Bangladesh while her budget remains approximately 27 times that of her neighbor. Crucially, Indias possession of an aircraft carrier places both her navy and air force in a position of superiority over Bangladeshi forces. Some of this capacity, however, may be countered by the Chinese anti-ship missile defenses aboard the BNS Osman and the BNS Bangabandhu of Bangladesh. This in turn provokes the question: who would ultimately triumph in conflict, and in what manner would this victory emerge?

V: Triumph of the Tusker: An Overview of the Bangladesh-India Military Balance and its Outcomes
Having thus outlined the military capabilities of both nations, a comparison of assets on the same platform is in order. While it has been previously noted that a conflict over the Ganges would focus on air and naval power, it is nonetheless pertinent to outline the role of the army in defending the land border between Bangladesh and India. The following section provides a comparative outline of the quality of military branches and their quantity of assets in the two countries. A. Land At present, both Bangladesh and India have numerous force and fencing measures enforced along their border. The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) has 30 battalions spread among 650 border outposts while the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) consists in 45 battalions distributed among 725 border outposts34. In addition, India has constructed fencing along 4,096 kilometers of the border and recently chose to expand the installation of floodlights along 2,840 kilometers of the
34 N.S Jamwal, " Border Management: Dilemma of guarding the India-Bangladesh border " Strategic

Analysis vol. 28.1 (2004): pp. 5-36.

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boundary35. Despite this numerical advantage, however, the density of Indian population around the border heightens the task of security. According to N.S. Jamwal, the effective strength of a 25-30 person battalion at the border is in reality closer to only 15-20 people, as the remainder of troops are required to guard the border outpost, perform administrative duties and ensure the security of various villages scattered along the boundary36. Thus, Bangladeshi border forces may gain leeway in penetrating those preoccupied areas of the border. In considering the remainder of army forces on both sides, any Bangladeshi infiltration at the border would be rapidly quashed by Indian Army reinforcements stationed in district headquarters of the Eastern Command, particularly those within the state of West Bengal. Figure 12 on the following page shows a map of the border and indicates the position of various Indian army strongholds.

35 Reece Jones, " Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border fencing in

India." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 34.3 (2009): pp. 290-304. 36 Jamwal, " Border Management: Dilemma of guarding the India-Bangladesh border " op cit., pp. 5- 36.

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Figure 12: Map of the Indian Army District Headquarters housed in West Bengal37 The remaining component of the strength of both armies lies in their technological capacity. The Bangladeshi Army sources much of its equipment from the PRC and Russia, whose notable manufacture includes 232 battle tanks, 134 armored personnel carriers, 173 towed artillery systems (max. 130 mm range), 166 anti-aircraft artillery and 68 anti-tank guns. The USA also serves as a major supplier of 238 recoilless rifles (105 mm) to Bangladesh38. The Indian Army, on the other hand, manufactures or co-manufactures much of its equipment, though as the
37 West Bengal Map

<http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTemp2PLargeNW1C.aspx?MnId=JhE/GsnwROdY TukS5NCoyw==&ParentID=Xlta2tKWWOv24RWKp3cbGA==>, [accessed 19 Nov 2012] 38 "Bangladesh Army Equipment." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bangladesh/army-equipment.htm>, [accessed 19 Nov 2012]

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worlds largest arms importer, it also sources small arms and battle tanks from Russia, the UK, the USA and Israel. The equipment of the Indian army includes 3,689 battle tanks, 317 armored personnel carriers, 3,700 towed artillery systems, 4,000 anti-aircraft artillery and most significantly, over 89,000 anti-tank missiles. In addition, India has also imported over 3,000 recoilless rifles (106 mm) from the USA39. Apart from the sheer quantity of resources available, Indias advantage lies in the existence of her anti-tank missile system, one of which Bangladesh is still in the process of developing. While the overall modernization of the Indian army has been criticized as driven by the quest for prestige, the desire for technology transfer or by deep-seated institutional preferences40, on a relative scale, the Indian army maintains a position of superiority over the army of Bangladesh. This is compounded by the geographic benefit India has of surrounding Bangladesh on three sides. Although the limitations of ground forces and geographic containment appear to preclude the conclusions of conflict, modern warfare is in equal parts determined by the air and naval capacities of militaries. What, then, of the realm beyond land? B. Air As previously outlined, the BAF consists in 17,000 personnel and 70 combat aircraft while the IAF consists in 127,200 personnel and over 655 combat aircraft. In quantity, then, Indias capacity in terms of personnel is around 7.5 times that of Bangladesh, while her combat aircraft numbers approximately 9 times those of Bangladesh.
39 "Indian Army Equipment." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/army-

equipment.htm>, [accessed 19 Nov 2012]. 40 Iskander Rehman. "India: the next superpower? : the military dimensions of Indias rise." LSE Ideas. (2012).

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In quality, however, there remain three aspects of the air force to be

explored. First, given the delimited scope of the area of conflict, it is important to observe the bases of the IAF Eastern Command and BAF in order to gauge the short- term impact of conflict. Figure 13 shows a map of Bangladesh and eastern India and the air force bases present within this geographic span: Figure 13: Air Force Bases in Bangladesh and Eastern India

Map sourced from http://orbat.com/site/maps/map_files/india-AF-Eastern- command.gif. Bangladeshi air bases added by author. From the map given above, it is apparent that the IAF Eastern command hosts more air bases than does Bangladesh. However, it is important to bear in mind that the entirety of Bangladeshs air force capacity is concentrated within the five

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bases on the map, whereas the IAF Eastern command only controls a fraction of Indias SU-30, MiG 21 and MiG 27 aircraft. Thus, the BAF has the capability to hold its own in the immediate commencement of conflict. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the remainder of Indian aircraft and their average maximum speed range from 1700 km/hr (Mig 27) to 2500 km/hr (SU-30), the IAF is guaranteed a short, decisive victory41. While this may be slightly prolonged in the event that Brunei offers the support of one of its five air squadrons, the vastness of Indias resources and maintenance support ensures her triumph. This is further compounded by the fact that the Royal Brunei Forces do not currently possess any fighter aircraft, thus rendering their air assistance to Bangladesh relatively nugatory42. Finally, there are two technical aspects of the IAFs aircraft that lend it advantage. First, the IAF possesses close to ten combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or as they are popularly known, drones. While UAVs have typically been employed in cases of insurgent and terrorist attacks, India now aims to acquire, and ultimately develop high performance UCAVs that will substitute manned fighter aircraft for conventional attack missions in the future43 This in turn promises to transform the dynamic of Indias air combat to less personnel-heavy in the near future. Second, in looking ahead to discussing naval power, the IAF holds upwards of 15 maritime patrol aircraft with the capacity for anti-submarine warfare. While Bangladesh does not yet possess submarine capabilities, the Indian potential to patrol the seas from an aerial viewpoint adds distinct benefits to the facilitated identification of enemy vessels.
41 Fighters; Indian Air force <http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_unit_page.php?pg_id=23&cat=F>,

[accessed 19 Nov 2012] 42 Royal Brunei Armed Forces (a subsidiary website of the Brunei Ministry of Defense) <http://www.mindef.gov.bn/mindefweb/home/e_forcesorg.htm> [accessed 19 Nov 2012] 43 Kelvin Wong, "Armed Drones in Asia." RSIS Commentaries, vol. 97. (2010).

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C. Sea Any significant expansion of Indian influence can only take place in the maritime domain, argues author David Brewster in his study of Indian maritime strategy44. Indeed, increases in naval power have become a heightened source of tension between India and the PRC, as Indias defense budget allocation to the navy continues to rise while the PRC simultaneously seeks to expand her nodes of maritime communication in the region through her String of Pearls45. Given the PRCs investment in Chittagong, Bangladesh in its capacity as a pearl, the naval balance between Bangladesh and India is arguably a balance between the PRC and India, on a larger scale. As previously detailed, the Bangladeshi Navy employs 15,000 personnel and possesses a host of ships, crafts, frigates and patrol crafts among other equipment (for further details, see Figure 6). Meanwhile, the Indian Navy consists in 58,350 personnel and her assets include various ships, crafts and vessels as well as submarines and an aircraft carrier (for further details, see Figure 11). While Indias submarines serve as effective anti-ship warfare, her aircraft carrier ensures continued support of the IAF. There are, however, two impediments to this advantage. First, Bangladeshi possession of an anti-ship missile launch pad funded by the PRC serves as an effective counter for Indias surface fleet. In particular, the Bangladeshi frigates BNS Osman and BNS Bangabandhu are among the first to be equipped with PRC missiles C-802 and FM-90, which have a range of approximately 120 meters and 500 meters respectively46. Second, given the PRCs active
44 David Brewster, "An Indian Sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean? Security Challenges, vol. 6.3

(2010): pp. 1-20 45 Gurpreet Khurana, "Chinas String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications." Strategic Analysis, vol. 32.1 (2008): pp. 1-39. 46 Shakhawat Hossain, "Dhaka to talk frigate purchasing with Beijing." New Age (20 May 2012), p. 2.

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investment in constructing container-shipping facilities Chittagong, the possibility of seeking reinforcements from other regional pearls remains. However, author Iskander Rahman disputes the potency of this combination, citing that India will still have the immediate advantage of force concentration and hence superiority if it decides to conduct a rapid strike47. Further, Rahman argues that the PRCs contributions to what are ultimately distant nodes of communication only serve to heighten its vulnerability to foreign trade disruption48. Hence, the potency of the PRCs contribution to Bangladeshs modest naval forces remains contested. Nonetheless, the naval fortitude of the PRC and the potential for a large-scale reaction must not be undermined, given the cost of investment in Bangladesh. In summary, then, the naval balance between Bangladesh and India depends significantly on the value the PRC places upon its pearl and the subsequent response this elicits. D. Ballistic An assessment of military capabilities would be incomplete without an overview of nuclear capacity. While the case of Bangladesh and India is certainly too contained in scope to elicit such a drastic response, the existence and threat of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and most potent of all, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) acts as a powerful deterrent to military action. In particular, nuclear capability and the recent development of the Agni-V, Indias ICBM, has fueled the notion that the PRC and India have transformed into mutual nuclear deterrent states in the region. Given Bangladeshs aforementioned ties to the PRC, an insertion of atomic capabilities is therefore rendered relevant.

48 Ibid, p.2.

47 Rehman, "Chinas String of Pearls and Indias Enduring Tactical Advantage." op cit.

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Currently, Bangladesh does not possess any ballistic missiles, though echoes

of desiring such a capacity have grown stronger in recent years given the nuclear developments of Bangladeshs neighbors49. India conducted her first nuclear test in 1974 and has since developed a small range of ballistic missiles, listed in Figure 14 below. Figure 14: List of Indian Nuclear Capabilities (as of 2009)50

vol. 35.2 (2011): pp. 186-193.

49 Abdul Matin. "Surrounded by nuclear weapon states." Daily Star (18 June 2010). 50 Rajesh Basrur and Kartik Bommakanti. "The India-China Nuclear Relationship." Strategic Analysis,

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VI. Conclusion
Having thus outlined the military balance between India and Bangladesh, we observe Indian ground and air success, while the outcome of naval defense remains undetermined. As the hypothesis stated, this analysis hence argues in favor of an overall Indian victory, bearing in mind two caveats. First, from its conception, the issue of the Ganges was never merely bilateral; rather, the regional relevance of the issue precluded the involvement of other nations, in this case Pakistan and the PRC. Thus, while Indias military proves stronger, the desire to avoid incensing her neighbors and hence inciting a disproportionate war is a potent deterrent to conflict with Bangladesh. On the Bangladeshi side, Indias possession of nuclear capabilities and the threat of their usage significantly limit her political sway in the matter. Therefore, in looking at the disincentives to go to war, Bangladeshs location and the political significance of battle balances the threat of Indias nuclear capacity. In addition, the existence of a current treaty concerning the issue renders likely a concerted, prolonged emphasis on negotiations before conflict. Second, then, this examination serves as a reminder that an analysis of the military balance between two nations does not concern armed forces alone. Given the numerous joint agreements that arose after the 1996 water sharing treaty, considerations of multilateral ties that bind Bangladesh and India and the hard and soft power support of allies plays an important role in determining the strategic victor of conflict. Thus, while India may achieve tactical results, Bangladesh may still emerge as a strategic victor and maintain possession over the majority of water from the Farakka Barrage through careful political maneuvers and appeals. The Bangladesh-India balance consequently serves as a reminder of the additional political and religious factors that could come into play in the advent of military conflict.

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Appendix I: Indian Army Command and Regimental Control Details51

51 Image from

< http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Indian_Army_Structure.png>

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