A. Define the Subject. 1. Who fought the battle?

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was a battle between France and what is now Vietnam. In particular, the French Foreign Legion Parachutists led initially by General Rene Cogny fought the Viet Minh soldiers led by General Vo Nguyen Giap. (The French and Viet Minh units involved in the battle are listed in Annex 1, Annex 2). 2. When did they fight? From the initial parachute assault by the French during Operation Castor to the Viet Minh troops overrunning the French command bunker at Dien Bien Phu, the battle took place between 20 November 1953 and 7 May 1954. I will focus on the first attack of the Viet Minh on strongpoint Beatrice which took place from 1700 13 March 1954 to 0700 14 March 1954. However, the war was in the making long before this battle took place. The quest by European countries to regain control of the colonies of South East Asia was strong following the dropping of the Atomic Bombs on Japan and the end of World War II. The spread of Communism from China was also threatening the solidity of the European presence in this region. France wanted to maintain control of Indo-China and tried doing so with its occupation of Dien Bien Phu. 3. Where did the Battle take place? The battle took place in and around Dien Bien Phu, a small mountain village in the Tai tribal territory of northwest Vietnam. (Map Annex 1) The particular battle I will focus on was fought at the strongpoint Beatrice located in the northeast of the French defensive plan. The surrounding hills and strongpoints played a major role in the reinforcements and action during the battle. (Map Annex 2) B. Review the Strategic Setting. 1. What were the causes of the Battle? Following the end of World War II, several European countries attempted to regain control of their colonies as they existed prior to the war. France wanted to regain control of the Indo-China region of Southeast Asia, but was being hampered by the Communist influence from China as well as the communist movement in Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. The North Vietnamese and Viet Minh were tired of the European and French control over Indo-China and wanted their independence. This could only be accomplished by fighting for what they believed in. 2. Describe each sides objectives. The overall plan of France was to gain back the control of this region and stop the spread of Communism. The French accomplished this by situating themselves deep inside the heart of North Vietnam where they were able to control from the center of the country drawing the enemy into a decisive battle. This was accomplished by an airborne assault on the town of Dien Bien Phu thus controlling the town and the valley in which it lies. Ultimately forcing the Viet Minh to commit its far less advanced forces to the superior French forces. The Viet Minh objective was clear. Eliminate any French occupation of their territory and regain control of the village of Dien Bien Phu. Ultimately, defeating the French would allow them their long sought independence.

3. PERST. a. POLITICAL: As in most modern day battles, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was fought for political reasons. Following the end of World War II, the Vietnamese were under the Communist leadership of Ho Chi Minh, born in central Vietnam with the name Nguyen Tat Thanh (1890-1969). After World War I (1914-1918), Minh was a founder of the French Communist Party. When Japan occupied Vietnam in 1941 during World War II, Minh helped found a new Communist-dominated independence movement, popularly known as the Viet Minh, to fight the Japanese. After Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Viet Minh seized power and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh then became president. To defend their independence, Minh sought the help of Vo Nguyen Giap who had helped Minh form the DRV in 1945. In 1946 Minh made Giap his commander-in-chief of the Peoples Army of Vietnam. The French wanted closure to their presence in Indo-China, but were uncertain in how to achieve it. In May 1953 General Henri Navarre assumed command of French Forces in Vietnam. The French were in a defensive posture at this time and needed to show a strike of force to the Viet Minh. General Navarre created a plan called Operation Castor. This operation would be an airborne assault on the village of Dien Bien Phu. The first reason for carrying out this operation was political. Navarre wanted to prevent Ho Chi Minh and Communism from spreading into Laos and further. This Navarre termed as the On the Strategic Order: The protection of Laos. b. ECONOMIC: The second reason for Operation Castor was economic in nature. General Navarre saw the strategic importance of rice throughout the valley, and said particularly in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. Furthermore the economic situation in Vietnam was very depressed. Following World War II the Vietnamese people had been in and out of occupation. The Viet Minh initially had almost no funding, economy or equipment. The French had many resources and assets available as well as the backing of the United States.
The United States had supported the French effort with massive infusions of arms, equipment, and funds in an attempt to prevent the Communist domination of Southeast Asia.1

c. RELIGIOUS: There were no significant religious impacts on the battle of Dien Bien Phu. d. SOCIAL: The significant social difference between the French and Viet Minh efforts was that like the later involvement of the United States in Vietnam, the French were fighting an unpopular war. The soldiers fighting were not getting the backing of their people back home in France. In contrast, the Viet Minh had the backing of their entire country and were all in support if Ho Chi Minh. Anyone who supported Ho Chi Minh wanted their independence, and supported their cause. This contributed greatly to the success of the Viet Minh. Not only were all able-bodied men fighting, but women and children also contributed by moving supplies and food forward.

Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. xix

e. TECHNOLOGICAL: The technological differences between the two countries are distinct. The French forces were coming from a strong developed European power. France had a well-established military force that included the backing of the United States. The French produced much of their own weaponry, and purchased the remainder from the United States. The typical French paratrooper was dressed in a camouflage uniform, wearing a U.S. made steel helmet, rubber soled jungle boots, load bearing equipment dawning a bayonet, grenades, and a U.S. 30-calibar M-1 carbine rifle. The typical Viet-Minh soldier and infantryman wore a lightweight utility uniform, steel helmet, open-toed sandals, carrying a utility blanket bandoleerstyle, and a 7.62mm submachine gun. Both his helmet and belt buckle adorn the Viet Minh star. French firepower at Dien Bien Phu included heavy 155mm artillery, medium 105mm artillery, and 120mm mortars. In December 1953 a squadron of 10 light tanks augmented the firepower. The American built M24 Chaffees, each mounting a 75mm gun and a heavy machine gun. The squadron was fully assembled and ready for action on 20 January 1954. One of the biggest advantages the French had was the airpower that served not only as their main logistical supply source, but also as a source of firepower. Due to the nature of the airborne operation the French had to rely on being resupplied by either airland or airdrop. This was accomplished by using the C-47 Skytrain as the main means of delivering troops, the C-119 Boxcar for delivering heavy equipment and cargo, the B-26 Bomber, Bearcat, and Hellcat fighters to provide aerial fire support. The Viet Minh guerrilla army had been equipped with small arms and very little else. Following the end of the Korean War in July 1953, China began to supply the Viet Minh with much more sophisticated weapons. These included light and medium field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. The key piece of equipment was the U.S. 105mm gun captured by the Chinese, and given to the Viet Minh. It had a tactical range of 11km. The Viet Minh also had a US 75mm mountain howitzer also recovered following the Korean War. These pieces of equipment were disassembled by the Viet Minh and moved to their location and then reassembled for use. These pieces of equipment were much heavier than anything the Viet Minh had used before, and moving them through the mountainous terrain would prove a challenge. For logistics, the Viet Minh and General Giap were able to procure close to 600 Soviet Molotova two-and-a-half-ton trucks, and a number of American Dodge trucks captured by the Chinese in Korea. But the logistical supply route for the Viet Minh was vastly different from that of the French. The Viet Minh moved their supplies by land, through dense jungle and mountainous terrain. They did so by literally carving roads through the jungle and manually hauling the equipment up and down the mountainous terrain. This was thought by French strategists to be impossible. Once roads and trails were cut the Viet Minh used porters and modified bicycles that could carry 450 lbs. to haul supplies and ammunition to troops. The Viet Minh were very skilled when it came to jungle warfare, as well as very meticulous when it came to concealment on their supply routes. The Viet Minh engineers would construct log bridges just under the surface of the stream to hide them from French reconnaissance aircraft. Treetops would be pulled together with ropes and cables to screen roads and trails. Soldiers would even cover tire tracks with

palm fronds after they passed. The Viet Minh proved to be the masters of camouflage and concealment making it extremely difficult for the French intelligence to gather information. Much of the Viet Minh communication was accomplished using crude hand and arm signals and simple signaling. 1. Compare Military Systems. The French were a well-established military force, but coming off the heals of World War II and battles in Africa. The French units involved in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu were the highly trained paratroopers and Foreign Legion elite French expeditionary force. The French had the military might and technological advantage. The Viet Minh forces were a untrained guerilla force, fighting for independence, and not a paycheck. Their experience was not as great as that of the French, nor was their equipment. Both of these would come with time and prove to be lesser factors in comparison to the leadership and decisions made at the higher levels. 2. What specific events led to this battle? General Giap had amassed quite a significant force from 1950-1953. He had had many successful attacks in northwest Vietnam, and in mid 1953 had settled back to the northeast. When General Navarre took over from General Salan as the Commander in Chief of French Indo-China, both had discussed how the village of Dien Bien Phu would serve the needs of stopping the communist spread into the rest of Indochina.
Among the papers and reports left to his successor had been a strong, detailed recommendation that a new entrenched camp be established at Dien Bien Phu, a move Salan had described as essential to the security of Luang Prabang. General Navarre, a complete neophyte to the Far East, had already been developing the outlines of a tentative military strategy for Indochina. He had decided that he must wrest the initiative form the Vietminh, insist on more reinforcements from France, and develop viable national armies in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to replace French forces in static positions, freeing them for offensive action. Like all his predecessors, he had been concerned with the defense of Laos, the most loyal and anti-Communist of the Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). Laos had also been seen as the likely route for a Vietminh push south along the Mekong River toward South Vietnam and Cambodia. Salans recommendation on Dien Bien Phu had fit easily into what would soon be known as the Navarre Plan.2

Soon would follow Operation Castor and the airborne assault on the village of Dien Bien Phu. Prior to the operation, Major Bigeard commander of the 6th BPC, and Major Brechignac commander of the II/1 RCP were called into Gen Bodets office to be briefed by him personally on the operation.
The way it looks, it ought to come off alright but if the situation is really too tough down there I leave you to judge as to what you have to do in order to save the maximum of personnel and to get out. In any case, if the

Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 8

weather is too unfavorable tomorrow, Dien Bien Phu will never take place.3

Years later Major Bigeard would say Oh, why did it not rain that day! C. Describe the Action 1. OCOKA WEATHER: Weather would play a role in the overall battle but not in the fight for Beatrice.
The valley of Dien Bien Phu had fifty percent more rainfall than any other valley in northern Indochina. An average of five feet of rain fell on the valley of Dien Bien Phu between the months of March and August of those months.4

The rain would cause many problems during the entire operation to include the Nam Yum River flooding creating many movement problems and disrupting supply routes. The storms, rain, and fog would also disrupt the French ability to resupply form the air. Fortunately, the strongpoints were located on hilltops, creating less problems. OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE: The observation and fields of fire in the battle played a significant role in the success of the Viet Minh. With the French occupying the low ground in the valley and the Viet Minh controlling the high ground in the hills and mountain, the Viet Minh had a clear advantage for fields of fire. The forward observers had a clear view of all the French positions, pinpointing every French artillery position, and clearly targeting the airfield. Once the Viet Minh moved their artillery into position they had clear shots down into the valley. The mortars could almost literally be hand thrown down onto French positions. COVER AND CONCEALMENT: The cover that the French had constructed was sub-par for the battle that was to occur. The initial construction of any cover was limited, but as the fear of artillery attack grew, the French forces began to construct overhead cover that was thought to withstand 105mm attacks. This would require an enormous amount of engineer materials. Calculations were done showing that 34,000 tons of engineering supplies would be required to construct a suitable defense. The equated to 12,000 loads of C-47 transport aircraft taking over 5 months.
Gen Cogny and his staff made a decision to allocate about 4,000 tons of engineer materials to the fortress. Roughly this tonnage was broken down as follows: 3,000 tons represented barbed wire and accessories; 510 tons represented PSPs for the airfields; 44 tons were made up of Bailey bridge elements; 70 tons were devoted to five bulldozers (one of which had participated in the Italian campaign of 1943) and 23 tons of mines and explosives. 118.5 tons represented the allocation of
3 4

Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 5 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 6

wooden beams and for the construction of protected foxholes and bunkers for the troops. The engineers were about 30,000 tons short of minimal requirements. That leaves of with exactly enough materials to protect the headquarters command post, the signal center, and the X-ray room of the underground hospital, said Surrat. The rest of Dien Bien Phu will have to get on as best as it can. And that was exactly what happened.5

This grave error in deciding the amount of engineer material (Class IV) that was needed to protect the French positions defense would prove fatal in the final outcome of the battle. Concealment for the French in the valley of Dien Bien Phu was very limited. This was due to several reasons. First, the area had limited vegetation. Many of the trees had been cut down prior to the arrival of the French. Once on the ground, the French started to harvest the remaining trees, and then the shrubs in the area for constructing their survivability positions. This was to compensate for the lack of Class IV that was needed. In clear-cutting the area the French made their positions and activities completely visible to any enemy reconnaissance and forward observers.
Another surprising element in the preparation of Dien Bien Phu for battle was the absence of any attempt at concealment and camouflage. The urgent needs for construction wood led, to be sure, to the almost immediate felling of all the trees in the position area. The trees were followed within a short time by all the bushes, which were used as fuel for the hundreds of cooking fires of the garrison. The constant marching to and fro of 10,000 men, 118 vehicles, ten tanks, and five bulldozers took care of the grass. Within a few weeks, even the slightest slit trench or the smallest bunker entrance outlined itself against the brown earthy background of the valley like a Chinese ink drawing.6

Ultimately the Viet Minh were able to plot exactly where every gun position was, and monitor every movement of the French forces. OBSTACLES: The area of operations had some natural obstacles of significance. One of these was the Nam Yum River that runs strait through the defensive perimeter. The man made obstacles by the French were somewhat limited at first. The initial engineering effort by the 17th Airborne Engineer Company was to work on the airfields, and improve them for the landing of cargo aircraft. Upon the arrival of the 3rd Company 31st Engineer Battalion in early December the engineer support then moved to continuing the infrastructure. Upon the arrival of the M24 tanks, the engineers also had to construct bridges that would support the eighteen-ton tanks. The construction of the bridges was not limited to just the tanks. Bridges were also constructed for the personnel, and even the aircraft to move from their dugout positions to the airstrip. The effort applied towards constructing these bridges was great, and ultimately would play a major role in having the entire defensive plan split down the middle by a river. Only towards the end of December when it was clear that an impending attack would occur, did the engineer effort shift to provide countermobility and survivability. The lack of materials to construct obstacles and survivability positions proved
5 6

Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, Pg 90 Fall, Hell in a Vary Small Place, pg. 93

to be a great challenge. The need for lumber and barbed wire was enormous. The solution was the dismantling of the village buildings of Dien Bien Phu would provide some lumber. The rest was to be cut down locally. The barbed wire was also in critical shortage. The amount of barbed wire that was flown in, was just enough to construct perimeter wire obstacles around the strongpoints. Very limited secondary wire was emplaced within the strongpoints. As important was the fact that the strongpoints were not tied together with any type of obstacles to slow the enemy advance should any strongpoint be taken. These factors would prove to be fatal once the full attack was underway. KEY TERRIAN: The key terrain in this battle is obvious. Whoever controls the high ground controls the battle. The village of Dien Bien Phu was situated in a valley surrounded by hills and mountains on each side. The Viet Minh operated in these hills advancing toward the French defense to within artillery range. The valley in which the French built their strongpoints afforded very limited key terrain, except for the river. This provided the source for water (although to make potable it had to be purified) for sustainment of the defense. The strongpoint of Beatrice was a small hill in the northeast of the sector, nestled up against the jungle and the base of the mountain. AVENUES OF APPROACH: There are several avenues of approach into the village of Dien Bien Phu, but two high speed avenues of approach dominate the area. The first is Road 41 the runs from the northeast to the south. This road is significant in that it was this route, in which the Viet Minh followed, in their first assault onto strongpoint Beatrice. As the route enters the center of the village, it then parallels the Nam Yum River south. The second highspeed avenue of approach is the Pavie Trak Road that runs straight North and South, paralleling the Nam Yum River. This road parallels the Nam Yum River through the entire French defensive plan. This route connects almost all of the French positions, with the exception of Beatrice. 2. Compare the opposing forces. The French forces in Dien Bien Phu were not fully ready to fight. This was due to several reasons. The first of which was the lack of ability to fully prepare for the battle. The defense that was in place was severely lacking for the battle that was to occur. Second was the gross miscalculations of the leadership about the capabilities of the Viet Minh, and the intelligence that did not have any idea of the amount of firepower and troop strength that lie in the hills. Lastly, the French had been slowly losing men and equipment to the Viet Minh by harassing artillery attacks, and probes on their perimeters of almost all outlying strongpoints. The French forces on Beatrice were the 3/13th Half Demi-Brigade of French Foreign Legion (3/13 DBLE). These forces are the most highly trained and equipped forces of the French military. The French had an established officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO), and enlisted structure prior to the beginning of the battle. The big difference (in the eyes of the French) was in the additional support of the tank platoons, the airpower, and their logistical base. With these assets, the French assumed they would have superiority over the Viet Minh. This would later prove to be a huge miscalculation.

On the contrary, the Viet Minh forces were fully ready to fight. Over the last several months they had been moving personnel and equipment into position overlooking the French strongpoints. The leadership of the Viet Minh was headed by Vo Nguyen Giap, with the Chief of Staff on the Dien Bien Phu front, Hoang Van Thai. The Viet Minh had placed two entire divisions the 312th Infantry, and the 351st Heavy Artillery Divisions just outside strongpoint Beatrice. (Map Annex 3) The organization was that of officer and enlisted personnel. The total Viet Minh forces had amassed 49,500 men strong, with a 55,000 personnel logistical support. 2. Describe each sides plan. The overall strategic plan of the French occupation of the village of Dien Bien Phu was to draw the Viet Minh into a decisive battle, in which the French with their superior fire power, and highly trained soldiers would annihilate the Viet Minh forces. This was going to be accomplished by constructing a series of defensive strongpoints in the valley-orientated north south along the Nam Yum River. The center of which would be around the village of Dien Bien Phu, and a airfield. The Viet Minh were situated in the hills and mountain surrounding Dien Bien Phu, with most of their forces to the east of the village. The plan of the Viet Minh was to move its forces into position, close enough to the French forces, so that its artillery and mortars could reach the French strongpoint. Once in position the Viet Minh would move its men forward moving thorough the dense jungle while building a series of trenches close enough to make an attack on one of the French strongpoints. Once enough forces were in place, the Viet Minh would attack the strongpoint, and ultimately overrun the objective with shear mass of forces. 3. Describe the disposition of the forces at the start of the battle. The French were poised in all of their strongpoints, continuing to make improvements on their positions. The French leadership knew of the impending attack based on the past months events and intelligence reports. Leading up to March 13 the Viet Minh had been gradually making progress on harassing, and disrupting the French forces with constant artillery, and probing attacks. The French could barely send out reconnaissance patrols, without coming under direct fire encounters with the Viet Minh. The strongpoint at Beatrice, and Gabriele were covered 180 to 270 degrees around by the Viet Minh forces. (Map Annex 3) 4. Describe the action in chronological order. a. PHASE 1. The preparation of the battlefield *JAN-13MAR54 Movement of the 312th and 351st into position prior to the start of the battle. *11-14MAR54 Pinpoint artillery is dropped on the airfield knocking out not only the ability to land aircraft and resupply, but also taking out any parked aircraft as well. 131530MAR54 Two reporters landed at the airstrip in the last aircraft that landed safely. b. PHASE 2. The Viet Minh 312th and 351st attack Beatrice

*131700MAR54 Viet Minh forces open up with an overwhelming amount of precise artillery fire on the strong point of Beatrice taking out communications and ultimately killing every officer in the 3/13th 131800MAR54 Communications are knocked out and limited to one radio to make contact with the CP. 131830MAR54 Maj Pegot and all of his staff officers are killed by enemy artillery fire. 131900MAR54 Thousands of 312th soldiers advance on the 3/13. 132030MAR54 10th Company holding the northeast of Beatrice ceased responding to radio calls. 132100MAR54 11th Company sends last radio message saying Viets were all over the place 132100MAR54 The barrage of firing from the Viet Minh slackens, as the Viet Minh reorganize, and send more troops forward. 132300MAR54 Suddenly the attack is renewed with the opening up of more barrages of artillery fire. Communications are knocked out to some other sectors, and limited messages are received. 140015MAR54 9th Companys radio went off the air. The last radio message was calling in artillery fire directly on the remaining bunker. 140200MAR54 Sgt Kubiak and the remainder of 3/13 abandoned Beatrice and hid in the jungle until daylight. c. PHASE 3. The French counterattack is foiled for Beatrice. *140730MAR54 The counterattack element is formed and moves out along Road 41 towards Beatrice. This attack does not even make it to Beatrice before the Viet Minh, who offer a temporary cease-fire to collect the wounded, stop it. 140745MAR54 Temporary cease-fire offered by the Viet Minh.
While the French were regrouping for a second attack, a wounded Legionnaire officer suddenly staggered toward them from the other side. It was Lt. Turpin of 11th Company. He was seriously wounded and heavily bandaged and carried a message from the commander of the Viet Minh 312th Division, offering the French a truce from 0800 to 1200 to pick up their wounded from Beatrice.7

140800MAR54 Colonel de Castries calls Gen. Cogny on the telephone in Hanoi, and relays the offering of a truce. Gen Cogny agrees, but when the information is published in the press, the French publicize that they offered the Viet Minh the truce. 5. Describe the outcome of the battle. The outcome of the battle was obvious. The Viet Minh gained control of Beatrice in relatively short time. This was not only significant in that they had defeated a more highly trained and well respected force, but that they now had a foot hold on the overall French defensive plan of the series of strongpoint in Dien
7

Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 142

Bien Phu. This also sent a clear message through Dien Bein Phu to all French Legionnaires that the Viet Minh were to be taken seriously.
The fall of Beatrice had an immediate significance for the men of the Fifth Battalion of the Seventh Algerian Rifle Regiment holding Gabriel. As the occupants of the northernmost strongpoint in the defense complex, they had been direct witnesses to the battle. They had heard the deluge of artillery that had fallen on Beatrice and watched the lethal fireworks display of the shell bursts.Now with Beatrice gone, Gabrielle was even more isolated and vulnerable. Nevertheless, the men of the Fifth Battalion prided themselves on the teak-reinforced blockhouses, dugouts, and shelters that they had built on Gabrielle and considered themselves ready for any attack.8

This would prove not true, and Gabrielle would be the next strongpoint to fall, followed by the rest of the French defensive plan. When the final count was in, it turned out that two lieutenants and 192 men out of a garrison of 750 had survived the eight hour battle.9 The Viet Minh also suffered greatly, the total loss was estimated to be around 590 men in taking this single strongpoint. Both of these numbers, although seem great, are small in comparison to the total that would die in the overall battle of Dien Bien Phu. D. Relate Cause to Effect. 1. Explain the causes of the key event. * Key Event 1. JAN-13MAR54 Movement of the 312th and 351st into position prior to the start of the battle. Causes: The Viet Minh were able to move most of the 312th to almost within hand grenade range prior to the start of the battle through a series of trenches and positions. The 351st Artillery was also in prime position to open its attack on 13 March. This was accomplished by continuous work on trench lines using the natural cover of the jungle to conceal their movement, while working at night. The French knew of their trench work early on, by sending out reconnaissance patrols. The French had limited success in attempting to stop the advancement, many Viet Minh soldiers were killed by Legionnaire snipers, and mortar attacks, but this did not slow down the Viet Minh.
strongpoint Beatrice now was so tightly surrounded that on March 11 and 12 it had required a battalion reinforced by two tank platoons for the Legionnaires to get drinking water from the nearby Nam Yum.10 The Vietminh trenches soon formed a one hundred-kilometer network around the fortifications. Giaps sappers burrowed through the earth while French mortars and artillery hammered the freshly dug trenches. The flat report of telescope-sighted sniper rifles signaled the death or wounding of any bo do careless enough to show his helmet above the trench line. But the work continued, the clods of soft earth flying up onto the parapets. Vietminh wounded and dead were carried form the narrow trenches, and their
8 9

Simpson, Dien Bien Phu The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 74 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 143 10 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 134

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spades passed to replacements. Junctions of two or more trenches were camouflaged, and protective dugouts were cu into trench walls.11

Aside from the trenches that had been made leading up to the strongpoint, the Viet Minh were busy preparing their entry into the defensive perimeter by sapping at the wire obstacles.
We had observed everything and made a minute study of the terrain several nights before the attack, using models too. Every evening, we came up and took the opportunity to cut barbed wire and remove mines. Our jumping-off point was moved up to only two hundred yards from the peaks of Beatrice, and to our surprise your artillery didnt even know where we were.12

Effects: The effect of the proximity of the 312th was directly related to the success of taking Beatrice in such short time. With the support of the 351st Artillery, the 312th infantry was able to quickly move from only 50 to 200 yards away through its preplanned breaches and onto the objective without any delay. As the Viet Minh moved onto Beatrice, they came in waves. The Viet Minh conducted many heroic actions while advancing onto Beatrice, as they approached wire and obstacle they were breached without hesitation by body breachers holding onto bangalore torpedoes. The Viet Minh were willing to pay the ultimate sacrifice to make to through the wire to knock out a pillbox, and stop a French machine gun.
The Vietminh assault waves poured from their trenches, advancing through thick haze, preceded by volunteers of death. These sappers carried bangalore torpedoes, long lengths of bamboo packed with explosives to open breaches in the barbed wire. Others were laden with explosive charges to be placed against the embrasures of the pillboxes and gun positions.13

Lessons Learned: The French quickly learned that abilities of the Viet Minh forces were much greater than anticipated. The ability to mass the forces so close to the defensive perimeter was a recipe for disaster Relate to Current Doctrine: FM 100-5 describes the Foundations of Army Operations and lists the Principles of War. Mass play a significant role in this key event.
Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass.14

The Viet Minh were able to mass two divisions just outside the wire of strongpoint Beatrice. The French had also failed to provide good Security, another Principle of War, around their position. The Viet Minh also used several aspects of Combat Power. The use of Maneuver was decisive in the quick action of the Viet Minh.
Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver-or threaten the delivery of-direct and indirect fires. Maneuver
11 12

Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 64 Roy, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, pg. 167 13 Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 67 14 FM 100-5, Operations, pg. 2-5

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is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance.15

The Viet Minh used Maneuver perfectly to situate themselves poised to strike the French with all their might and gain a foothold in the French defensive plan. * KEY EVENT #2 11-13MAR54 Pinpoint artillery is dropped on the airfield knocking out not only the ability to land aircraft and resupply, but also taking out any parked aircraft as well. Causes: For months the Viet Minh had been laboriously moving their mortars and artillery into position. This was not an easy task.
The artillery pieces had arrived close to Dien Bien Phu over five newly constructed roads, but the trucks could tow them no further without drawing the garrisons attention. Each heavy gun now had to be moved up the steep jungle hills and into position by hand, with the use of block and tackle, thick ropes, and braking chocks to keep them from thundering back down the slopes. Progress was measured in yards during seven days and nights of nonstop hard labor. Gen Tran Do, a division commander, wrote of the arrival of the guns and the silent battle of the keo phao, or canon pulling.To climb a slope, hundreds of men crept before the gun, tugging on long ropes, pulling it up inch by inch. On the crest the winch was creaking, helping to prevent it from slippingIt was much harder descending the slopeThe gun was all the heavier, the track full of twists and turnssteering and jamming [the wheels] were the work of artillerymen. Infantrymen worked wit the ropes and windlass. Entire nights were spent laboring by torch light to gain 500 or 1,000 meters.16

Once in place, the Viet Minh put observers in tree tops, and spent months aiming their indirect fire on every easily identifiable French position. The French would occasionally be fired upon, but only assessed that the Viet Minh had been able to move a fraction of the artillery that was actually in place. The French completely underestimated the abilities of the Viet Minh, and grossly miscalculated the amount of artillery, mortars, and ammunition that the Viet Minh had hiding in the Hills dug-in ready to fire.
Only the cannons mouth protruded from the camouflaged firing port when the cannon was engaged. Artillery officers and their Chinese advisers had spent weeks mapping the exposed French positions. Individual batteries and guns were given coordinates of specific targets. Their fire missions covered the valley: strongpoints; CPs; artillery emplacements; the two small spans over the Nam Yum River, one of them an engineer-constructed Bailey bridge; and the airstrips.17

Effects: The Viet Minh started to test the targeting and aiming of their weapons on the French positions in the valley in late January. The full effect would not be known to the French of the Viet Minh artillery until 11 and 12 March when the Viet Minh started taking out not only the airfields, but individual planes.
Dien Bien Phus airfield was now constantly under Communist fire. In fact, a single enemy 75-mm. Mountain howitzer had been zeroed in on the airfield since
15 16

FM 100-5, Operations, pg. 2-10 Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 52 17 Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 54

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February 1. It had damaged and destroyed almost a dozen aircraft without being located by the French. Now the situation was far more serious, since there were perhaps a dozen enemy pieces firing at the airfield from several directions, and with telling effect. On March 11, one of the large American Flying Boxcars (which had had to remain at Dien Bien Phu overnight for engine repairs) was shot to pieces. It burned late into the night like a warming torch. On the following day Communist 105-mm pieces opened up on the airstrip. The second round destroyed one of the Cricket reconnaissance aircraft. The fourth round destroyed another reconnaissance aircraft. At the same time, enemy artillery began to search for the other combat and reconnaissance aircraft parked in dugouts south of the field.18

The Viet Minh had now taken out the ability of the French to use their airstrips that were of vital logistical necessity. The only means in which logistics and troop replacements could be delivered safely would be by airborne operations. This would have great effects as the battle went on. Lessons Learned: The French had tried to discover where the Viet Minh artillery was placed using reconnaissance aircraft. This did not work due to the excellent camouflage of the Viet Minh. If the French had not become complacent with assuming the Viet Minh could not amass any artillery of strength, they might have been more cautious in concealing their positions, and having their main resupply being an airfield so close to the operation. Current Doctrine: Logistics are key to the success in any operation. General Giap also knew this, and wanted to take out the ability of the French to resupply by the use of the airfields. It provides the physical means with which forces operate.19 By disrupting the French logistical operations, General Giaps forces already had a distinct advantage. * KEY EVENT #3 131700MAR54 Viet Minh forces open up with an overwhelming amount of precise artillery fire on the strong point of Beatrice taking out communications and ultimately killing every officer in the 3/13th . Causes: Just as in the artillery taking out the airfield and aircraft prior to the start of the attack, the same causes for the artillery having such a telling effect were true. The Viet Minh had managed to move the entire 351st Heavy Artillery Division to within easy range of Beatrice. The Viet Minh had targeted every key position on Beatrice to include artillery, mortar, machine gun, command bunkers, and ammunition points. The French survivability positions looked good, but did not offer the proper amount of protection needed during a indirect fire attack. Effects: When the first rounds started to fall around 1700 hours, it seemed as though they were like the smart munitions of today, pinpointing every strategic target.
At 1700 hours on March 13, a distant thunder, like the warning of a monsoon downpour, sounded from the hills. Within seconds the thunder descended on Dien Bien Phu. The ear-splitting clap of high explosives shook the earth. The 105-milimeter and seventy-five millimeter howitzers and 120-milimeter mortars of the Vietminh 351st
18 19

Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 134 FM 100-5, Operations, pg. 2-14

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Heavy Division were sending hundreds of shells whistling onto their pre-selected targets.20 During the first hour of bombardment, a 120mm shell with a delayed fuse penetrated the Command Post, simultaneously killing Major Pegot, Captain Pardi and Lieutenant Pungier and destroying all the radio installations. Lieutenant Carriere, commander of the 9th Company was killed, and Lieutenants Turpin and Lemoine of the 11th and 12th Companies were wounded and forced to abandon command of their units.21

By midnight every officer on Beatrice had been either killed or wounded, leaving the remaining soldiers to the leadership a few non-commissioned officers. Communications had been almost completely knocked out, limiting it to a single radio. Lessons Learned: The French needed to neutralize the Viet Minh fires, but it was obvious that this was not going to happen any time soon. The French now knew the real lethality of the Viet Minh artillery. It was more than a few pieces with little ammunition. Since the beginning of the defensive preparation, the French were very complacent thinking the Viet Minh would not have the audacity to attack their superior forces. The only way in which the 3/13th could have done better was by perhaps building better fortifications. The effort on building fortifications was in neat appearance and not necessarily true survivability.
Major Pegot, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 13th Demibrigade, and his adjutants had just been killed in their shelter. For the benefit of his own officers, a furious Gaucher growled as he stalked off, I always said those shelters were too flimsy.22

Current Doctrine: A fundamental element of Combat Power is the use of Firepower. The Viet Minh used firepower to their advantage throughout the battle. They especially used it in the initial attack at Beatrice, knocking out communications and annihilating everything on the strongpoint.
Firepower provides destructive force; it is essential in defeating the enemys ability and will to fight. It is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system. Firepower may be either direct or indirect.23

Survivability also was integral in failure of Beatrice. If the French had built strong positions, able to withstand the enemies largest weapon system, the chances for success may have been greater. The French, and in particular their engineers clearly violated a key to survivability Harden facilities to resist destruction by the enemy.24 Early on the decision was made not to obtain all the Class IV materials needed to construct a proper defense. This decisions was setting up the entire French force for sure death. * KEY EVENT #4 140730MAR54 The counterattack element is formed and moves out along Road 41 towards Beatrice. This attack does not even make it to Beatrice before it was stopped by the Viet Minh who offer a temporary cease fire to collect the wounded.
20 21

Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 67 Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 68 22 Roy, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, pg. 165 23 FM 100-5, Operations, pg. 2-11 24 FM 5-100, Engineer Operations, pg. 1-9

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Causes: Prior to the start of the attack on Beatrice, many raised questions about the plan and the layout of the strongpoints. Their ability to produce a counterattack force, should one strongpoint start to fall. Even General Cogny on his last visit to Dien Bien Phu was questioning the ability to form a counterattack force.
If Beatrice, which was known to be invested, fell, where would the operation to recapture it start from? What artillery support would it be given? Cogny went up to Beatrice, where a few mortar shells fell at about 1300 hours and asked for all the details of the proposed counterattack..25

Castries reassured him that the reinforcements would be available but probably would not be able to move until daylight, expecting a evening attack. No realistic plan was made to produce the counterattack force, or ability to shift forces into position should one area be overrun. The distance between the strongpoints was also too great to realistically have any force move in place in time. General de Castries plan counted on local counterattacks.
And on full scale of prepared counterattacksThe mission of the centers of resistance which, at certain moments, could be completely encircled, is to hold without any thought of withdrawal even if one of their constituent strongpoints were to be taken by the enemy. It will be their task, under the best circumstances, to reoccupy the lost strongpoint by a local counterattack; or, at the very least, to neutralize it by their proper fires and by calling upon; the means at the disposal of GONO. 26

Effects: As Beatrice started to fall, there was mass confusion. As it became apparent that reinforcements were needed, and a counterattack should be formed, it was becoming too late. The plan to have a local counterattack was clearly not going to work, with so much of the force killed or wounded. The last resort of those left on Beatrice was to call for supporting fires on their positions. The fact that darkness had fallen, and the fog of battle was playing a significant role, replacements that were sent forward struggled to find their way into the supporting positions. A counterattack was not going to happen that night and was instead formed early the next morning. When the counter attack moved out it was already too late. The Viet Minh had full control of Beatrice, and stopped the force on Route 41.
March 14 dawned gray and wet. The bleated attempt at an early morning tanksupported counterattack by the paras of the First BEP and Eighth Shock Battalion had been abandoned. The Viet had been waiting along Route 41, and the paras had been stopped by heavy fire.27

The overall layout of the French defensive plan was now starting to be questioned. If Beatrice had fallen so easily, how long would the other strongpoints last? Lessons Learned: The French needed to plan and rehearse for troop reinforcement during the night. The supporting fires from Gabrielle and Dominique also needed to be rehearsed. More importantly, the French needed to have a designated counterattack force that could immediately
25 26

Roy, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, pg. 159 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pg. 96 27 Simpson, Dien Bien Phu, The Epic Battle America Forgot, pg. 72

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respond to the Viet Minh offensive, and not wait until the morning. The failure to have a solid plan, prepare and rehearse for the obvious was key to the failure of Beatrice. Current Doctrine: Their French defense was destined to fail due to poor planning. With the forces they had on the ground, they needed to develop a strong plan to counterattack should they loose any strongpoint. Many officers knew this, but failed to make solid plans to achieve success.
Counterattacks afford the defender the opportunity to create favorable conditions for the commitment of combat power. Counterattacks can be rehearsed, their timing can be controlled, and the ground to be traversed can be prepared. Counterattacks are most useful when they are anticipated, planned, and executed in coordination with other defending, delaying, or attacking forces and in conjunction with a higher commanders plan.28

If the French had followed this fundamental rule, they may have been successful in maintaining Beatrice. Failure to plan a counterattack force that could be successful at the initiation of the enemy offensive operation ensured the failure of each strongpoint.
Such local counterattacks must be launched during the temporary confusion and disorganization that occur when the attacking forces have entered the position. The attackers have not had time to reorganize and establish themselves and cannot maintain the operational tempo that allowed them to penetrate.29

If the French had sent a counterattack force to strike at the Viet Minh during the lull in the fighting around 2130, they may have been able to prevent the next wave of Viet Minh from making their way onto Beatrice. With a stronger fight at Beatrice and a well-planned counterattack force, the outcome of the entire battle may have been different.

28 29

FM 100-5, Operations, pg. 7-8 FM 71-100, Division Operations, pg. 5-9

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Arnold, James R. The Illustrated History of Artillery, The Vietnam War: Bantam Books, New York. Conboy, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong: Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd., 1991. Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Da Capo Press, New York, 1967. Messenger, Charles. Great Military Disasters: Smithmark Publishers, New York, 1991. Roy, Jules. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1963. Seymour, William. Decisive Factors in Twenty Great Battles of The World: St. Martins Press, New York, 1988. Simpson, Howard R. Dien Bien Phu The Epic Battle America Forgot: Brasseys. Washington, 1994. Windrow, Martin. French Foreign Legion Since 1945: Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd., 1996. Windrow, Martin. French Foreign Legion Paratroops: Osprey Military, Reed International Books Ltd., 1985. FM 100-5 Operations, Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993. FM 5-100 Engineer Combat Operations, Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988. FM 71-100 Division Operations, Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990. FM 7-71-3 Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored), Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1995.

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Annex 1
French Units From 13 March: 10,814 HEADQUARTERS 71st Hq Co. (for all of Dien Bien Phu) ARMOR Composite Squadron, 1st Regiment of Armored Cavalry (1er RCC): 1st and 3rd Platoons (7 tanks) 3rd Platoon (3 tanks) SERVICE UNITS st 31 Engineer Battalion (31 BG) 2nd Company (31/2 BG) 1st Company (31/1 BG) th 5 Foreign Legion Medium Repair Company 29th Mobile Surgical Detachment, French Union Forces 44th Mobile Surgical Detachment, Viet-Nam Natl Army 342nd Parachute Signal Company 2nd Company, 822nd Signal Battalion 2nd Company, 823rd Signal Battalion 403rd Postal Detachment 730th Gasoline Supply Company, Depot No. 81 3rd Ammunition Supply Company (detachment) 1st Quartermaster Operational Exploitation Group 3rd Legion, Garde Republicaine and Gendarmerie (det) INTELLIGENCE (GC 8/GCMA) and detachments of Scurit Militaire, DOP and 6th section (French Central Intelligence) FRENCH AIR FORCE AND ARMY AVIATION Fighter Group 1/22 Saintonge (GC1/22) 21st Aerial Artillery Observation Group 23rd Aerial Artillery Observation Group Airbase Detachment 195 Airforce Siganl Company 21/374 From 13 Mar to 6 May, 1954 Airborne Reinforcements, 4,291 troops

HQ, GAP 2 (for all airborne units) 9th Command & Services Co. (Foreign Legion) 6th Command & Services Co. INFANTRY 1/13 Half-Brigade, Foreign Legion (1/13 DBLE) 3/13 Half-Brigade, Foreign Legion (3/13 DBLE) 3/3 Algerian Rifles (3/3 RTA) 5/7 Algerian Rifles (5/7 RTA) 1/4 Moroccan (1/4 RTM) 1/2Tai Battalion (BT 2) 3rd Tai Battalion (BT 3) 1st Foreign Legion Parachute (1BEP) 8th Parachute Assault (8 BPC) 3/3 Foreign Legion (3/3 REI) 2/1 Algerian Rifles (2/1 RTA) Tai Partisan Mobile Group No. 1 (GMPT 1) ARTILLERY 3 Group, 10 Colonial Artillery (III/10 RAC) 2 batteries of 105mm 1 battery of 105mm 2nd Group, 4th Colonial Artillery (II/10 RAC) 2 batteries of 105mm 1 battery of 105mm 11th Battery, 4th Group, 4th Colonial Artillery (11/IV/4RAC): 4 medium howitzers, 155mm I Battery, North Viet-Nam AAA Group (FT-NVN) 1 section of 2 quad .50 mounts 1 section of 2 quad .50 mounts 1st Foreign Legion Heavy Airborne Mortar Co. (1 CEMLP) 1st Foreign Legion Composite Mortar Co. (1 CMMLE) 2nd Foreign Legion Composite Mortar Co. (2 CMMLE)
rd th

Total Troops 15,105 plus 2,400 PIMs

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Annex 2
Viet Minh Units/Leader 308th Infantry Division Vuong Thau Vu 312th Infantry Division Le Trong Tan 316th Infantry Division Le Quang Ba 304th Infantry Division Hoang Minh Thao 148th Independent Infantry Regiment: (not available) 351st Heavy Division (Reinforce) Vu Hien Sub-Units 36th Infantry Regiment 88th Infantry Regiment 102nd Infantry Regiment 141st Infantry Regiment 165th Infantry Regiment 209th Infantry Regiment 154th Artillery Battalion 98th Infantry Regiment 174th Infantry Regiment 176th Infantry Regiment (incomplete) 812th Heavy Weapons Company 57th Infantry Regiment 345th Artillery Battalion (other military regiments not present) 910th Battalion 920th Battalion 900th Battalion (incomplete) 523rd Signal Company 121st Weapons Company 151st Engineer Regiment 237th Heavy Weapons Regiment (40 82mm. Mortars) 45th Artillery Regiment (24 105mm. Howitzers) 675th Artillery Regiment (15 75mm. Pack howitzers and 20 120mm. Mortars) 367th Antiaircraft regiment (20 37mm. AA guns and 50 .50 caliber AAs) Field Rocket Unit (12 16 Katyusha rocket launchers)

Total Troops 49,500

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