THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM

GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN AND SAFE OPERATION OF SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS TO WITHSTAND THE IMPACT OF TUBE FAILURE

THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM

GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN AND SAFE OPERATION OF SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS TO WITHSTAND THE IMPACT OF TUBE FAILURE

August 2000

Published by The Institute of Petroleum, London A charitable company limited by guarantee

Copyright 0 2000 is vested jointly in The Institute of Petroleum and the Crown . The Institute of Petroleum is a charitable company limited by guarantee . Registered No . 135273, England All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or transmitted or translated into a machine language without the written permission of the publisher . ISBN 0 85293 286 3 Published by the Institute of Petroleum . Further copies can be obtained from Portland Press Ltd . Commerce Way, Whitehall Industrial Estate, Colchester, C02 8HB, 44(0) 1206 796351 e mail : sales@portlandpress .com

CONTENTS

Page Foreword Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 1 .1 Background 1 .2 Research studies

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1 1 1 5 5 5 6 7 7 8 9 11 11 11 13 17 19 21

2 Heat exchanger selection 2 .1 Compact exchangers 2 .2 Shell and tube exchangers 2 .3 Failure considerations 3 Shell 3 .1 3 .2 3 .3 and tube heat exchanger design Tube failure scenarios New heat exchangers Existing units

Relief system design 4 .1 Physical processes during relief 4 .2 Flow rate of HP gas into the LP side of heat exchanger 4 .3 Dynamic simulation

Annex A - Glossary of terms Annex B - References Annex C - Experimental validation

V1

FOREWORD

These guidelines are intended for all those concerned with the design and operation of shell and tube heat exchangers containing high pressure gas which is either heated or cooled by a low pressure utility fluid . In particular, it provides guidance to take account of any possible catastrophic tube failure . Where the integrity of the low-pressure side of the exchanger is protected by over-pressure protection devices it is important to ensure these are located so that they operate effectively before pressures are generated that could damage the pressure envelope . Such systems may be designed with the assistance of one-dimensional dynamic computer models . To date, these models have had little support for their accuracy . Through a series of projects co-ordinated by the Institute of Petroleum and by gathering industry good working practice for safe design, the engineer now has increased confidence and an understanding of these tools and their strengths and weaknesses . These guidelines have been written primarily for application to shell and tube heat exchangers for service offshore on the UK continental shelf. However, many of the recommendations may also apply to other parts of the world, or to equivalent exchangers onshore in refinery and petrochemical service . For the purposes of these guidelines, certain definitions or interpretations, which are given in Annex A, apply irrespective of any other meaning the words may have in other connections . WARNING : It should be noted that if shell and tube heat exchangers are not designed correctly and a failure occurs then the result could be serious damage to the exchanger and/or its associated piping . Although it is believed that the adoption of these guidelines will help to reduce the risk of accidents, the Institute of Petroleum cannot accept any responsibility of whatsoever kind for loss or damage or alleged loss or damage arising or otherwise occurring in or about premises, areas or facilities to which these guidelines have been applied .

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The contents of this guideline document were developed primarily from the results of a number of research projects funded and managed on behalf of the industry . The studies were carried out in phases, culminating in a 250,000 Joint Industry Project (JIP) involving a number of companies and organisations . This investigation was only possible due to the combined interest of the participants and their contribution is acknowledged . The following representatives on the Steering Group provided the decision making and technical direction for the duration of the project: Amerada Hess Ltd BHP Petroleum Esso Engineering Europe Ltd Fluor Daniel Applied Computer Solutions Foster Wheeler Energy Ltd Health and Safety Executive, Directorate of Science & Technology (DST) Health and Safety Executive, Nuclear Safety Division (NSD) Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Safety Division (OSD) Hydraulic Analysis Ltd IMI Marston Ltd Institute of Petroleum Marathon Oil UK Ltd Dr A (Andrew) Tilbrook Mr K (Keith) Hart Mr W (Bill) McLaren Mr P (Phil) Perkins Mr W A G (Bill) Bridgens Mr C A (Cal) Depew Mr R (Richard) Gowenlock Mr G (Glyn) Hawkins Dr R (Rob) Slominski Mr G J (Graham) Bankes Dr T (Tariq) Al-Hassan Mr A (Andrew) Keech Mr D (David) Nelson Mr M W (Mike) Smith Mr S F (Sjoerd) Schuyleman Mr P J (Peter) Oswald Mr K (Keith) O'Donnell Ms C (Christine) Stobie Mr M (Mike) Taylor Mr R (Roger) Billington Mr R (Bob) Bow Mr T (Tim) Mobbs Mr C J (Kees) van Burg Mr J F (Jan) Hollenberg Dr S T (Sarina) Arnold Dr B (Bart) Broers

Mobil North Sea Ltd Motherwell Bridge Thermal Ltd Phillips Petroleum UK Ltd Shell Global Solutions International B .V.

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Texaco North Sea UK Ltd

The University of Sheffield (& EPSRC) Total Oil Marine Ltd Trident Risk Management (formerly Trident Consultants) W . S . Atkins Consultants Ltd

Mr Dr Mr Ms Dr Mr Mr Mr Mr Dr Dr

J (John) Addison F I (Frank) Knight R (Richard) Head A B (Annette) Cutler B C R (Bruce) Ewan J (John) Love M (Mark) Helingoe D (David) Fitzgerald A (Andrew) Waterson M E (Mary) Gill S (Steve) Murray

The experimental work was carried out on behalf of the JIP under contract by the Health & Safety Laboratory (HSL) at their test site near Buxton in Derbyshire . The following were the key team members without whose invaluable work and dedication the project objectives would not have been achieved : Dr A M (Aubrey) Thyer Ms A J (Jill) Wilday Mr C (Colin) Weil - Steering Group Chairman and Project Co-ordinator Mr K (Keith) Moodie Section 4 Relief System Design' and Annex C'Experimental Validation' are based on the work of Wilday and Thyer (1999) and Thyer and Wilday (1998) respectively . Copyright is vested jointly in the Institute of Petroleum and the Crown . The Institute also acknowledges permission to publish these and other elements of the text as well as Figures 2, 3 and Figures C .1 to C .10 inclusive .

1 INTRODUCTION

1 .1 BACKGROUND The oil and gas industry frequently requires to heat or cool high-pressure (HP) gas . The most common method used has been in shell and tube heat exchangers and there are a large number used offshore on production platforms in the North Sea. The low-pressure (LP) side of the exchanger, which contains a utility fluid such as sea water, is therefore at risk in the event of any leakage from the HP side of the exchanger . Such units may have greatly differing operating pressures between the two fluids and the designer has to consider several variables when choosing the optimum exchanger type, selecting suitable materials, which fluid should be within the tubes and the design pressure and temperature for each side of the exchanger . It has become common practice for the LP side to be designed to withstand a pressure just above the operating or flow lock-in pressure of the utility fluid, but well below the HP side's operating pressure . There is a risk that tube failure could lead to failure of the LP pressure envelope and the release of large quantities of flammable gas . The LP side therefore needs to be protected against tube failure by either fitting bursting discs or safety valves . The adequacy of the methodology used to design the LP side to withstand the sudden release of high pressure gas through tube rupture was not proven. The consequences of such a failure can range from (at the worst) catastrophic rupture of the shell with considerable financial loss and risk to personnel, to satisfactory release through the over-pressure protection system .

The most frequent geometry for these HP/LP heat exchangers is to have the HP fluid within the tubes . Much of the support work undertaken to clarify the recommendations in these Guidelines is therefore based on this geometry . A typical HP/LP shell and tube heat exchanger and its related protection devices is shown in Figure 1 . The recommendations included here are suitable to form a basic approach for the alternate geometry where the high-pressure fluid is contained within the shellside. Typically, in the designs relevant to these Guidelines, the gas in the tubes may be at pressures of 100-300 bar whilst the utility fluid operates at 5-15 bar . There are four main scenarios that could generate pressure above the normal operating pressures within the utility side of the exchanger . These are thermal expansion, external fire, tube failure or flow lock-in . These Guidelines have been written to clarify the oil and gas industry's approach to designing for the tube failure scenario (which for high-pressure services will usually be the most onerous) . It recommends good practice for the engineers faced with decisions on the design and safe operation of heat exchangers .

1 .2 RESEARCH STUDIES The Institute of Petroleum and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have commissioned and funded a number of phased research studies over the last few years aimed at proving the adequacy of the design and