Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SEPARATION OF POWERS
LIMITS ON JUDICIAL POWER
Jurisdiction Stripping Power of Congress Art. III, 2 (Exceptions Clause): The Supreme Ct shall have appellate jdxwith such exceptions & under such regulations as Congress shall make. Congress can strip SCOTUS of appellate jdx under most circumstances (Ex Parte McCardle) but the limitation must be neutralCongress cannot decide the merits of a case under the guise of limiting jdx (Klein). If the effect of withholding jdx is to prescribe a rule of decision (i.e. directly the court towards a particular outcome) it is violative of SoP. Congress may rewrite background substantive law by passing a new statute in order to prevent court adjudication over a class of pending cases so long as they do not dictate how a court must apply pre-existing law (Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society). Justiciability Limits The requirement of cases & controversies
Tripartite Framework Category 1: When President acts pursuant to Congress authorization his authority is at its max. Pres's acts are presumptively valid.
Category 2: Where Congress is silent, Pres's authority is in the "twilight zone." Constitutionality must be determined on a case-by-case basis based on the imperatives of events & contemporary imponderables. Category 3: When Congress has explicitly or implicitly told the President not to do something, his authority is at its lowest. Only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional will such action disobeying fed law
Inherent Executive Privilege Privilege is not absolute; Court will perform balancing test & weigh executive interests against judicial (SoP analysis). Presidents interest: avoid disclosing information claimed to be confidential; a particular need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets (stronger). Court: the need for fair administration of justice in a criminal trial. A generalized interest in confidentiality will not outweigh demands of due process. (U.S. v. Nixon) Claims of executive are justiciable, PQD not implicated.
Executive Agreements Agreements between the U.S. & foreign nations, effective when signed by the President and the head of the foreign country. In comparison, treaties are effective when ratified by Senate. Executive agreements can be used for any purposeanything that can be done by treaty can be done by executive agreement w/o requiring Senate approval.
The Constitution gives the President substantially greater authority with respect to foreign affairs compared to domestic relations. POLICY: A need to present a clear & unified face to the world with foreign nations requires caution and unity of design; success often depends on secrecy and dispatch which President has comparable advantage of over Congress.
If executive agreement implicates purely foreign affairs, President has plenary authority to engage in that activity without Congressional approval.
The only thing that can limit the President's actions is the Constitution Congress may check the President's actions by passing a statute. BUT remember if Congress acquiesces, even implicitly, to President's exercise of power problem disappears.
Non-Delegation Doctrine
The principle that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to administrative agencies. (Schechter/Panama) Art. I 1: All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Death of the Non-Delegation Doctrine When Congress delegates its legislative power it must provide criteria to guide the agencys exercise of discretion. A court will uphold delegations of lawmaking power so long as Congress by statute sets forth an intelligible principle to which the agency authorized to act is directed to conform. This is an extraordinarily easy standard to meet. All delgations, even without criteria, have been upheld. Whitman: Necessary to protect the public health sufficient. Court has not invalidated an agency act as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in >70 years. An attempt to overturn an executive action without bicameralism (passage by both House & Senate) and presentment (to the President to sign or veto). Congress may legislate only if there is bicameralism & presentment. Anything less is an unconstitutional legislative veto. (Chadha) o Doesnt matter whether single/joint house resolution is more efficient. Must protect SoP & structure of federal government. o Dissent in Chadha invoked efficiency argument; legislative veto is a useful took & has been used in several hundred statutes. There are only four narrow enumerated circumstances where a single house can act: Impeachments Trials following impeachment Approval of Presidential appointments Treaty Ratification Legislative acts are things that have the purpose or effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and obligations of persons outside the legislative branch in some way or are policy determinations.
Legislative Veto
Appointment Power
Art. II 2: President appoints with advice & consent of Senate ambassadors, public ministers, judges, and all other [principal] offices of the U.S. Congress may vest the appointment of inferior Officers in the President, the Courts, or in the Heads of Departments. Congress cannot give itself appointment power.
Determining Whether Principal or Inferior Officer Nature & extent of officials duties, and whether or not they include policymaking functions. Amount of independence & source of supervision. The circumstances under which the official can be removed. Whether they are appointed for a limited tenure. Whether its jurisdiction is limited by instructions from appointing court.
NOTE: In Morrison Special Prosecutors considered inferior officers to whom the President need not be given appointment power. Since SPs have fairly broad investigatory & litigation powers & may be removed only for cause, the judgment that they are nonetheless inferior probably means that almost every federal official below Cabinet level will similarly held to be inferior.
Removal Power
Regulation is acceptable to keep channels free from immoral or injurious use. (Heart of Atlanta)
Economic
NonEconomic
Prevent Congress from exercising plenary police power. States as laboratories of experimentation. Slippery slopeWould this give Congress too much power & destroy vertical separation of powers? Political Safeguards argumentNot worried about limiting federal authority through judicial process because political process is sufficient.
POLICY
No aggregation
Activities that affect supply, demand, or market prices. Production & consumption of commodities.
Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is non-economic if failure to regulate would undercut broad regulatory scheme.
Attenuated link between activity & interstate commerce won't do. Need:
If end is legitimate, means chosen must only be "reasonably adapted" to attainment of that end under Commerce Clause.
Congress must only have a rational basis for concluding activity has an effect on interstate commerce.
BUT Congress's intent in regulating not important; does regulation actually involve interstate commerce?
Jurisdictional hook
Legislative findings
If activity substantially affects commerce, means selected by Congress to regulate need only be "rationally related" to ends sought.
10th Amendment Powers not delegated to the U.S. by the , nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people. Two Views 10th Amendment reserves a zone of activity to the states & 10th Amendment is but a truismmerely a reaffirmation exists as a separate limit on Congresss power. of the fact that Congress can act only within its enumerated powers. Where federal legislation exists, it is supreme. Congress cannot compel states to enact or administer federal regulatory program; there must be a choice, but Congress may offer incentives for compliance. (N.Y. v. U.S.) Government may not command state officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. (Printz) Congress cannot impose affirmative duties on state governments. (Reno v. Comden) Congress cannot single states out for differential treatment, but if a statute applies generally to both state & private actors, it presumably would be constitutional.