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A p p r o v e d f o r p u b l i c release, d l a t r i b u t l a n



School of A d v a n c e d M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s Monograph Approval


C o l o n e l R i c h a r d Hart S i n n r e i c h . M.A.

D i r e c t o r . S c h o o l of Advanced M i l i t . n r y Studies

Director. G r a d u a t e Degree Programs

A CONCEPT FOR T H E T A C T I C A L EIIPLOYXENT OF L I G H T I N F A N T R Y IN C E N T R A L E U R O P E by HAJ G r e g o r y C. G a r d n e r , USA, 52 pages.

T h e r e h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n m u c h d i s c u s s i o n in w e a t e r n m i l i t a r y .]ournals c o n c e r n i n g t h e u s e of l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e s in C e n t r a l E u r o p e . Many a u t h o r s h a v e i n d i c a t e d t h a t d e f e n s e of r e s t r i c t e d t e r r a i n a n d u r b a n a r e a s a r e t h e m o a t s u i t a b l e missions for L i g h t I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s in t h a t t h e a t e r . T h i -s monograph argues that t h o s e m i s s i o n s a r e n o t appropriate. I n a h i g h intenklty c o n f l i c t . light infantry u n i t s m u s t b e e m p l o y e d o f f e n s i v e l y in a c c o r d a n c e with a tactical style more suited t o their trainina and organizetion. T h Uer initially desy,ribes t h e t a c t i c a l s t v l e of liqht i n f a n t r y f o r c e s in g e n e r a l . I t t h e n f a y , u e s o n t h e Armys Light Infantry Divisions and examines how and why they have adopted that method o fighting. A c r i t i c a l s t u d y t h e n d+,ails t h e use a n d m i s u s e of l i g h t forces s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g of W o r l d W a r 11. Leaaons from t h a t a n a l y s i s a r e u s e d t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t f o r t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f l i g h t i n f a n t r y in C e n t r a l Europe. T h e p r i m a r y conclus.ion;of t h i s m o n o g r a p h is t h a t our L i g h t Infantry D i v i s i o n s m u s t o p e r a t e in E u r o p e in t h e s a m e way t h a t t h e y i n t e n d t o f i g h t in a low i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t . T h a t is. th@y m u s t h e Offensively oriented and fight i n a n unconventional style that focuses o n disrupting rather than destroying the enemy. O u r doctrine must reflect that light infantry forces operate i n this A s e c o n d a r y c o n c l u s i o n c o n c e r n s our l a c k of i n f a n t r y ln manner. E u r o p e . S i n c e d e f e n s i v e missions in high intensity w a r f a r e r e q u i r e c o n v e n t i o n a l d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y , t h e Army s h o u l d b r i n g m o r e regular infantry divisions back into the force structure.

T a b l e of C o n t e n t s




The N a t u r e

. . . . . . . . . . . . of Light Infantry . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


E m p l o y m e n t C o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r L i q h t I n f a n t r y U n i t s 12



. . . . A Concept for Tactrcal Employment . Doctrinal Implications . . . . Concluaion . . . . . . . .

Hietorical Perspective

17 2 1.3



Appendix: Endnotea

C o m p a r a t i v e C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n f a n t r y F o r c e s 37

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39 46


The i n t e r e s t e d s o l d i e r n e e d n o t look f a r t o d a y t o f i n d
c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t of some s o r t of light i n f a n t r y unit. It seems t h a t h a r d l y a n i s s u e of t h e

l e a d i n g m i l i t a r y ~ o u r n a l sis p u b l i s h e d w i t h o u t a t l e a s t o n e a r t i c l e on the subJect. Unfortunately, t h e inconsistent and confiictinq Thus, t w a

n a t u r e of t h e s e s o u r c e s s e e m s t o h a v e c l o u d e d t h e i.ssue.

years after General Wlckham published his White Paper there i s s t i l l much d i s c u s s i o n o n t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e new A m e r i c a n L i g h t Infantry D i v i s i o n s .

If we n a r r o w t h e f o c u s

> Centrq


h o w e v e r . w e f i n d .a

g r o w i n g c o n s e n a u s t h a t l i g h t f o r c e s h a v e s t r a t e g i c u t i i i t y in t h a t theater. ( 1 ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e is t r e m e n d o u s v a r i a t i o n :n

p r o p o s e d m e t h o d s f o r t h e a c t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t of n o n m e c h a n i z e d u n i t s in NATO. T h e o p t i o n s seem t o r a n g e from a s s i g n i n g


i n d i v i d u a l i n f a n t r y m e n a s f i l l e r s f o r heavy u n i t s t o c o m m i t t i n g division t o a non-critical defensive sector. Sadly, t h e


sCocep_t f o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s s h e d s no h g h t

on d e t a i l s of e m p l o y m e n t

mid t o high i n t e n s i t y combat.(2) This


paper will define the tactical missions suitable for infantry d i v i s i o n i n a C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n e n v i r o n m e n t .


I f w o a c c e p t that t h e r e is strategic: and opsratinna:


f o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n in Europe. w e must t h e n d e v e l o p clear concept for its tactical empioyment. Furthermore, this

concept must be adventageous t o the Theater and Corps Commander.

That is, the commander should not have to change his scheme of
maneuver just to accommodate a light unlt which has been thrust upon him. That means preserving the integrity of both heavy and The problem thus becomes, "How can an American C o r p s

light forces.

Commander in Europe use light infantry forces without augmenting them with direct fire support from his heavy units?" The premise

of this paper i s that there i s a limited number of valid tactical

missions for light infantry in Europe because light units must be employed in a manner for which they have been organized and trained. That implies a tactical style that is offensive in nature

and does not include terrain holding or economy of force missions.

The methodology for defending this thesis must. begin with

. I

definition of light infantry and an examination of the nature of the Army's Light Infantry Divisions.

This will be followed by

J .

discussion of several limiting arguments which address not only tne manner in which the unit is organized and supported but also the way in which the forces of the Warsaw Pact wouid attack Western Europe.

Once these paints are established. the combat performance of light forces in selected operations since t h e teginninq of iJor?ci War I 1 can be examined.

This analysis includes not o n l y oifensivr

and defenaive operations, but also operationa i n tho 'tactical rear' of both enemy and friendly front line troops. The results

show that light infantry has little utility at the forward e d g e of the battle area and that i t is far more effective when it employed to disrupt rather than destroy the enemy.
i s

T h e r e s u l t s of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e v i e w will lead t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a c o n c e p t f o r t h e u s e of t h e l i g h t infantry in a mid t o h i g h i n t e n s i t y war.

This c o n c e p t will c o n s i s t o f g e n e r a l

p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h d e l i n e a t e a p p r o p r i a t e m i s s i o n s f o r light f o r c e s . T h e key point is t h a t l i g h t u n i t s m u s t u s e t a c t l c s f o r w h i c h t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t r a i n i n g h a v e p r e p a r e d them.

The a n a l y s i s c o n t i n u e s w i t h a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e d u c t r i n a l
i m p l i c a t i n n s of t h i s c o n c e p t f o r t h e e m p l o y m e n t of Light forces. F i n a l l y , c o n c l u s i o n s a r i s i n g f r o m t h i s d i s c u s s i o n a r e presented.

A n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t m u s t b e m a d e at t h i s ~ u n c t u r e . When
d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t of light i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n s , it is d e c e p t i v e l y e a s y t o b e c o m e e n a m o r e d w i t h a v i s i o n of t h e l i g h t s o l d i e r a s . a n e l i t e f i g h t e r who can o v e r c o m e t h e f i r e p o w e r o f a w e l l - e q u i p p e d enemy with cunning and guile.

m u a t n o t f o r g e t t h a t many of t h e

missions p r o p o s e d i n t h i s p e p e r a r e very d i f f i c u l t a n d r e q u i r e
w e l l - t r a i n e d s o l d i e r s w i t h a high r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e p s y c h o l o q i c a i p r e s s u r e s of w a r a n d a n u n u s u a l t o l e r a n c e f o r p h y s i c a l hardship. L i g h t i n f a n t r y u n i t s may b e e f f e c t i v e , but t h e i r loss r a t e s could b e high. T h e r e f o r e , t h e key q u e s t i o n may n o t b e whet.her or n o t Dut r a t h e r - i %

t h e r e e r e m i s s i o n s f o r t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y in E u r o p e ,

t h e A m e r i c a n Army p r e p e r e d t o pay t h e p r i c e i n t r a i n i n g or in combat casualties t o commit a Light Infantry Division tu hiqh intensity combat? T h e r e a d e r s h o u l d k e e p t h i s in mind a 5 ha

c o n t i n u e s t h r o u q h t h i s paper.


Light infantry operates most effectively at night.


adapts well t o unconventional operations. and has a strong offensive orientation. T h e great British strategist, B. H.

Liddell-Hart, s a w t h e light infantryman as a stalker, athlete, and marksman. H e should b e a soldier not only light o f foot but also
(9) Thus, i n t h e European view, light infantry

quick of thought.

i s first o f all a s t a t e o f mind and secondly a product o f environment.

Some examples o f units which embodied this view of

light infantry in World War I1 were t h e American Ranger Battalions and t h e Canadian-American First Special Service Force.

T h e European view o f light infantry is clearly the model for t h e Light Infantry Divisions. Several proponents, among them t h e

Armys Chief o f Staff. have urged t h e U.S. Army to depart from its traditional view of light infantry and develop a f o r c e light in tactical s t y l e a s well as equipment.

While t h e Light Infantry

Divisions General Wickham created are certainly strategically mobile, they train and operate in t h e classic European sense. The Chief o f Staff has stated that t h e light infantry will be offensively oriented and will train along Ranger-Commando lines so that they become toughened physically, thoroughly grounded in a l l infantry skills. and prepared t o fight aggressively at night. ( 8 ) T h e Command Guidance issued b y t h e 9 t h Infantry Reqiment o f t h e 7 t : m Infantry Division (Light) and comments from several of t h e

Divisions officers confirm that our light lnfantry

trained t o operate in t h i s manner.


indeed beinq

(9) We now must clarify how

forces operating i n t h i s style differ from other types of dismounted infantry.

A useful model which functionally identifies types of

infantry has been proposed by Colonel Huba Waes d e Czege.


H e points o u t - t h a t with t h e arrival o f t h e Bradley Fighting Vehicle and t h e new light infantry organizations, w e can more clearly see certain distinctions on t h e spectrum o f infantry.missions. types o f infantry Three

armored, regular. and light

become evident.

While it is obvious that all infantry units are physically capable of performing a w i d e variety o f tasks. they will only d o well those

missions for which they have been organized and trained.

Armored infantry orients on t h e advance and protection of t h e main battle tank. This t y p e of infantry is mounted in a

fighting vehicle, such a s t h e M 2 Bradley, that has mobility equal t o that of t h e tank. Armored infantry conducts mounted or

dismounted operations t o enhance t h e capabilities o f armored units. Colonel Wass d e C z e g e indicates that armored infantry supports offensive operations by accompanying tanka, suppreesing infantry weapons. and dismounting t o clear obetaclee. In the defenae,

although armored infantry does dig in, it also provides close i n support for tanks in static positions, complements t h e fires of tank g u n s and emplaces obstacles. While armored combat may be more

fluid than Colonel Wass d e Czege seems t o suggest, h i s functional point that armored infantry supports tanks is v a l i d .

A historical example o f armored infantry i n action

World War I 1 can be found in t h e Third Armys


Lorraillr Carnpalqn.

Patton used h i s infantry t o force crossings of t h e Meuse and reduce obstacles thus facilitating t h e advance of h i s armored u n i t s .

Reports from t h e National Training Center show that. our current

armored infantry is capable of a variety of dismounted missions t o include infiltration attacks and counter reconnaissance.


point remains, however, that armored infantry, especially with the Bradleys limited number o f dismountable infantrymen, performs Its focus is obviously

miseions in tactical support o f t h e armor. o n mid to high intensity warfare.

Reqular infantry, in contrast, is supported b y tanks at t h e tactical level. terrain. When defending, regular infantry holds key

In Europe, this might mean defendinq a town w r holding a During offensive operations. iegriiar

critical piece o f ground.

infantry tasks might include reducing bypassed pockets of resistance, keeping open lines o f communication, o r holding the shoulders o f a penetration.

The November 1944 Battle of Schmidt.

in which t h e 112th Infantry Regiment w a s supportad.Sy the tanka of Company A .

707 Tank Battalion, is a n example of t h i s type of

Regular infantry travels mounted, Idea::.y

infantry in action. ( 1 4 )

in M113s. t o increase its tactical mobility and t o carry t h e heavy equipment it needs t o d o its lob. But whatever t h e mission. It is r s p e c ~ a l l y

regular infantry always f i g h t s dismounted.

distinguished by its ability t o quickly occupy a piece of ground and turn it into a fortress.


Although Colonel Wass d e Czeqe describes airborne dnd a i r assault infantry a s light, (16) their tactical style once they get on t h e ground is more similar t o that of t h e regular infantry.


course. these divisions d o have certain strategic and operational capabilities which set them apart from other types of r e g u l a r infantry.

Regular infantry is a l s o optimized for intensity environment.

m i d t o high

It o p e r a t e s in much t h e s a m e way that t h e

9 t h Infantry Division did before it became the High Technology



It is important t o note that with the exception o f

the 2 d Infantry Division. w h i c h h a s a peculiar mission. there a r e

no regular infantry divisions left i n the active force structure. Accordingly. t h e Light Infantry Divisions may be called u p o n to perform missions f o r w h i c h regular infantry would b e better suited.

This may be especially true in high intensity combat.


Mare on t h i s

Light infantry is different. describes it like this:

Colonel Was.5 d e C z n q a

(Light infantry) i.s specialized for rapid a i r transportability. clandestine insertion. n i g h t operations, infiltration. raids, and ambushes: it gives off only small tactical signatures. Light infantry complements other forces at strategic. operational, and tactical levels. (18,

He g o e s o n t o .say that light infantry is difficult to find on the battlefield but once detected it muat complete its tasks quickly and violently or it will be defeated.

The details of t h e

infiltration and ambush s t y l e o f t h e light infantry c.3n b e s e i l n ic the action fought b y the Fifth Ranger Battalion at Z a r ? , ~Grrrnncv ..n February 1945. (19)

While light infantry is more adept than other types of infantry at infiltration and mobile operations at niqht

difficult terrain, it can not dig in, hold ground or a s s a u i t

wall a s regular infantry.



l i g h t l n f d n r r y muat

focus o n low intensity conflict or. at least, the low intensity portion of more lethal battlefields.

The similarity between

this description of light infantry and the classic European view is obvious.

Although the Waes d e Czeqe model gives us


Inirly clear

idea of the nature of light infantry, it is not complete. are other aspects which must also be considered.

Edward Luttwak points out that the salient difference between light and what he calls reqular infantry, lies i n t!ieir respective modes of combat rather than their equipment.. Regular infantry fights in a linear front mode a s pdrC of a w i d c r array of forces. tactical level. It cooperates with artillery and armor Light infantry normally fights in


a non-::nacJr

tactically independent manner.

Its actions a r e coordinated u : i t h

other forces at the operational level. ( 2 2 )

This ~ m p o r t a n t

distinction may be a key to the employment of light infantry u n i t . ~

in high intensity warfare.

Luttwak adds that



these u n i t s


involved in attrition warfare they will

destroyed. ( 2 3 )

Steven Canby describes iight infantry n s an a d ' u n c t to complement and supplement the combined arms team. light infantry a separare arm.


K.:c , - u n s l c ! e ? . :

To i ~ i m ,

1 5 is

an infant?'/

qualitatively different from the 82a Airborne or the new Hiqii Technolo9y 9th D i v i s i o n . dependent force. Light infantry
i s

a sur~ri:~ and e t.err3:r.

These factors protect it from tanks a n d ar*:l:ieiv


and mask its movements.

In summary, light infantry is unlike other

' . . y ! ~ e 4 of


It has it6 own tactical style.

Appended to this paper

i s a table that highlights the distinctive differences between conventional dismounted Lnfantry and light infantry.


table i s tailored. for the purposes of this paper, to m i d and high inte.nsity combat. The heading Operations describes

considerations for the employment of light infantry unito i n conjunction with other combat arms units, while tactics crscrrba:j: the way in which light units fight. Although some of t h e points it

may be open to debate, the comparison serves i t s purpose.

creates a general picture of the unique features of light Infantry.

Let u s now focus specifically on the U.S. Armys Light

Infantry Divisions.

We have seen that these units intend to fight.

CrLtics might offer

in the tactical style of the light infantry. that thia i s wrong.

They would say that the Light Infantry

Divisiona should be optimized for a more conventional style of warfare. This would allow the units to develop proficiency in

traditional regular infantry missions, like defense, and t . h u s increase their utility in a mid to high intensity environment. Such criticism fails to appreciate the Armys concept f o r t h e employment of these divisions. The mission of the Light Infantry Division& cL-?dr::/ requires them to train a s light infantry. primarily for employment in :ow These unit.* arf? ..ntendn~ They hove

intensity conflict.

some utility in mid to high intensity warfare. ( 2 7 )


unambiguous mission statement requires these unite fis t.. x primarily for an unconventional style of warfare.

i n

Low intensity

conflict is characterized by constraints on weapons, tactics, and


the level of violence.


nore specifically, this type of

warfare requires combat forces to fight using the type of decentralized tactics most often associated with Ranger operations

- raids, ambushes, and patrols.



The Chief of Staff has noted

In low intensity conflict, they (light infantry units) will be able to search out and destroy t.he enemy on his terrain using initiative, stealth, and surprise. Attacks by infiltration, air assauit, ambush, and raid will be the norm. ( 3 0 )

This type of fighting fits the traditional tactical style (jf t h e light infantry that we discussed earlier. Since American light infantry units are primarily orient-ed on low intensity conflict, commanders must use that mission to develop and prioritize the tasks for which they must train. mission essential task list drives their traininq priorit-es. Limited resources allow units to train for only a limlted number tasks.


To d o this well, those tasks must fit with a certain s t y i c

Adding other

of fighting, and that is the light infantry style.

tasks which d o not fit the primary mission causes confusion and reduces training quality. (31) We must carefully a v o L d creating a

hybrld unit that is theoretically capable of performrnq all dismounted infantry missions but actually capable of none. (32: The point is, the Light Infancry Divisions are deployed


to Europe, they must fight in the same way in which they w o u l d fight a low intensity conflict. Therefore. we must develop a

concept of employment in that theater th8t will capitalize on their unique capabilities.


There are a number of factors, besides unit capability, which influence the employment of light forces in Central Europe. Arguments have been made by other authors concerning the size, composition, and support of light forces in this theater.


purpose of the following paragraphs is to present t.his author's views on several of these s u b ~ e c t afor the purpose nf furtaer limiting his argument concerning the missions for light 1nfant.r~ units in Europe. The Light Infantry Battalion is the basic Dullding block for light force deployment. While brigades of the Light Infantry

Division may be employed separately if the mission requires, integrity of the battalion must never be violated. There


doubt that we are infantry poor in Europe, ( 3 3 ) but it seems wasteful to split up well trained light infantry u n i ' l s to provldc fillers for heavy units a s some have suggested. (34) On the other.

hand, recall that a s Luttwak pointed out. light infantry dons not work with armor and artillery at the tactical level.

So, ~iniike

the armored or regular infantry, t h e Light Infantry Beittalion i s not trained or equipped to cross attach units.

Its main

role is a s the primary control headquarters for the c l e c e r i t r a l ?Z O C operations that characterize light infantry tacrics. ( 3 s )

The Light Infantry Brigade


the lowost leve; unit which can


properly accept attachments from outside the Division.

battalrons will obviously have some combat oiipport units. such a 3 the FIST and an engineer platoon, the brigade is the f i r s t l e v e l with the command and control facilities to coordinate s u p p o r t i n g


air and artillery a66et6 and sequence their effects with ground maneuver forces. The Light Infantry Brigade can also maneuver

armor, armored infantry, o r regular infantry units although it is only able to provide them with limited logistic support. ( 3 6 )

These capabilities make the Light Infantry Brigaee the most

appropriate unit for employment in the European theater. There

n o doubt that in low intensity operations the division base must present to coordinate intelligence and logistic support. ( 3 7 ) In NATO, however, those supporting systems are already established.


The nature of the theater and the decentralized style of the l i q h t infantry limit the possibilities for the employment of the division

as a whole.

On the other hand, there are a number of uses :for a

Light Infantry Brigade or Brigade Task Force attached to either u Corps or Division. (38) The Light Infantry Division rstabLinhment muat be retained since the primary mission for the un1.t is in low inteneity conflLct. Although much more study is werrantacll. there

are some indications from war gaming that in a Europenii .5<:enario.

the Division Headquarters can be a useful adJunct to t h e C o r p s fur planning and controlling operations. (39) While Light Infantry Divisions are strategically deployabla. the time factor i s very significant when considering their tsc.:icei. employment. It takes a long time properly to prepar;.
; 1


infantry defense, especially if the unit has not regu1arl.y practiced that task. much less lead time. Offensive operations can be conducted with In Europe, therefore, time alone may prevent

the defensive employment of light infantry units.


Light infantry units will not operate in isolat.ion in Europe. They will always complement or supplement the actions of heavy


Much has been written on the subject of heavy/;ight Many of these articles have recommended the cross


attachment of heavy direct f i r e systems to liqht units. ( 4 0 ) There are three problems with that argument. First, it fails

appreciate the tactical style of liqht infantry units.

Second. it

does not consider the nature of the reinforcing mission in Europe. And finally, it ignores the fact that unless units train together and develop a mutual operating concept, their wartime performance i s often poor. (41) Light infantry and heavy force operations a r e

synchronized at the operational not at the tactical level. example, a Light Infantry Brigade miqht infiltrate an enemy division to disrupt and confuse that unit so that a corps counterattack will be more successful. That o : Since light units ore a disrupting, n must work in con]unction


=he correct concap-.

a destroying force, they

with heavy forces to defeat the enemy.

Light infantry units require indirect fire and air support tn accomplish most missions. The experiences of r h e American ?anger

battalions and the German mountain divisions in Worlc Wcir T i clearly show that these units were most successful whr:i =hey ha:! the support of a significant amount of indirect f ; r e .
( 4 : : ;


important point concerning artillery is that in ~ a p ~ r e r ~ . 3 r i : . i cnthc limited logistical capabilities of the L i g h : D i v r s i ~ n . the l i g h t

force should control o n l y t h e effects of the fires. unit. The TACFIRE and AFATADS systems shou'?



facilitate t h i s type

of support.

Logistic support for light infantry units in E u r o p e i s not a major problem. Transport to position light forces can be provided

by the host nation. (43) Based o n equipment and strength figures, the unit will consume far less fuel, ammunltlon and spare parts than an armored or regular infantry unit of the same size. Finally, we must address the way we see the war being fougnt in Central Europe.

A number of sources point out that light

infantry units can defend in close terrain, euch a s the Hohe Rhon, or in built up areas. Others have euggasted that this type of

economy of force defense could free an armored unit. for action. ( 4 4 )

This presumes not only that the liaht unit has t . h r


same capabilities a s the unit it replac@s. which


noc. b u r

also that the Soviets would not make their main effort in this area. We must be careful here. ?he Soviets may well choose

focus the brunt of their attack in what we consider reszricted terrain. General Radzievsky. former Commandant of :he Frunze

Military Academy, has made the 5 o : : o w i n g .Japanese defenses during World War 11:

comments about German d r : e

The weakest spots are...also sectors aefenceu by troops of low fighting capacity. We also regarded a s weak spots in the enemys defences those sectors which he considered to be d-fficxlt of access from a tactical point of view. An a t t - t c k on such a sector was a complete surprise to :he enemy:. . o u r forces gained tremendous acvai;:ages despite t h e fact that they were attacking nvrr difficult terrain. (45)

C o l o n e l Glantz amplifies these comments when hc Aet.3:;~ tl:.?

1945 Soviet attack into Manchuria across ground considered

impassable by the Japanese. (46) The pur?ose of the:3e ~zcmmrntaL Y to emphasize that our concept f o r the uae of light infantry in


Europo must include an accurate appreciation of the wuy in whlch the enemy will fight. This understanding must not be limited to

the echelonment tactics of the Soviet attack but must also embrace operational considerations. Defense and economy of force missions

in terrain that appears tactically restrictive could doom a light infantry force to destruction by a massive Soviet atrack.


N o w that w e have examined the characteristics of the light

infantry and the Light Infantry Divisions in particular, we can

look at the combat performance of this type of unit since the start
of World War 11. The object will be to find consistent lessons in
their performance.

The examples used in this section have been

chosen because they fit the type of high intensity environment we can expect to find in Europe. widely. The specific geographic areas vary

Similarly, none of the subject units were specifically Their tactical style. however. We will anaiyze The secti13n will

designated a s light infantry.

definitely fits the model we have developed.

offensive. defensive. and then rear operations.

conclude with comments on actions in which the ligrit infantry w a s used improperly. This analysis will allow u s to deve?op a valio

concept for the employment of light infantry in Europe. The action fought by the 5 t h Ranger Battalion a b o v e


Germany during 23-27 February 1945 was one of the most succeusfdi Ranger operations of World War 11. It is also an excellent exam2l.e

of light infantry working in c o n ~ u n c t i o nwith a heavy force at t h e operational level. The Rangers were atzached to YaJor Senera? j l a ? t c n Ldd12<crs
X X Corps of Pattons Third Army which was advancinn o n thc Saar


Once a bridgehead had been secured, the battalion w a s q i v e r .

the mission to infiltrate to the Irsch-Zerf roae and cozobiish a blocking position to disrupt the German withdrawal. ( S e a


The battalion beqan its infiltration at 2345 hours on the



( I

( I

K 0


WI LII rnl


KI 0 1


~a m

0 HI C, H I

of F e b r u a r y a n d r e a c h e d i t s o b j e c t i v e by 0600 o n t h e 25th.

At t h n t

time, t h e G e r m a n s w e r e u n a w a r e of t h e R a n g e r s l o c a t i o n or m i s a l o n .
B y t h e a f t e r n o o n , h o w e v e r , they r e a l i z e d t h e i r p r e d i c a m e n t a n d m a d e

several strong attacks against t h e American perimeter. successful.

None were

K e a n w h i l e , X X C o r p s w a s c o n t i n u i n g its a t t a c k t o t h e east forcing t h e German defenders t o withdraw toward t h e Rangers. Through t h e night of t h e 25th the Rangers directed artiliery fire o n the Irsch-Zerf road, denying i t s use t o the enemy.


b a t t a l i o n w a s c o n t a c t e d by A m e r i c a n u n i t s on t h e 2 6 t h a n d w a s f i n a l l y r e l i e v e d o n t h e 2 7 t h a f t e r a m b u s h i n g a p a r t y of 200 G e r m a n 2 in t h e m o r n i n g m i s t s a n d t a k i n g 1 4 5 prisoners.


T h i s a c t i o n i s a n e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e of t h e e m p l o y m e n r o f a l i g h t infantry u n i t in c o n l u n c t i o n w i t h a heavy f o r c e i n ap. o p e r a t i o n a l l y o f f e n s i v e but t a c t i c a l l y d e f e n s i v e manner. The

Rangers effectively infiltrated into position and dlsrupred the c o h e s i o n o f t h e G e r m a n d e f e n s e by f o r c l n g t h e G e r m a n s to a t t a c k them. T h e R a n g e r o m a d e e x c e i l e n t u s e of t h e i r e r t l l l c r v s u p p o r t t.3

int.erdict G e r m a n m o v e m e n t a n d d e f e a t c o u n t e r a t t a c k s .

There are other historical examples of successful i n f i l t r a t i o n s by Liqht i n f a n t r y f o r c e s . R u s e i a n s b e c a m e expert a t it. D u r i n q W e r i d War



T h e y would s l r p t h r o u g h ?.he


G e r m a n l i n e s in s m a l l u n i t s a n d t h e n llnk up i n t h e s w a m p s or d e n s e woods. I n F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 2 , f o r e x a m p l e . t h e 3usaianc. ~ n i i l r r o r e cT Oncf

~ ~ T !

s t r o n g p o i n t s of t h e G e r m a n 2 6 9 t h I n f a n t r y Division. e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e r e a r of t h e Division.

the R u s s i d n r i would L t y i . , . , ~

d u r i n g t h e day a n d c o m e to l i f e at night t o sow m i n e s o n llnos n.f


communications, nsoault resupply columns and attack command posts.

These disruptive activitiaa were coordinated with conventional

attacks a l o n q t h e front which eventually broke the German iine.(431

in September 1981. Iran employed night infiltration rechniques

to disrupt the Iraqi defense of Abadan.
(49) While the details of
iuse of

this battle are unclear, it appears thar Iran made qooa

infiltration and night attacks by light infantry units over a b r o o a area to find weak spots in the Iraqi defense end to pin
d c w n <orze::

in more strongly held sectors. ( S O ) ' I r a n then rapidlv expioited these successes with its armored units. there were no human wave attacks. skillfully employed and well led.
A t



t h i 3 :,nncance.

The Iranian infantry was

In fact, throuqhout the wer c ~ e

Iranians have been repeatedly successful against a Soviet style echeloned defense in depth. Their accomplishmenrs are due iar'cleiy

to their aggressive use of night attacks bv infiltrating l i g h ? .infantry which

i s

supported by artlllery and followed 3 v a r : n o r . ( 5 - '

These examples show that light infantry can be > s e d in

tactically offensive fashion to disrupt enemy dexenses a n d facilitate the attack of an armored force.


Let u s now turn o u r attention to the defensc.

most classic example of light infan:ry found in the Rurso-Finnish War of 1933.



in a defen.%e camg,~:,.::..

In December I939 and January 1940, the Russ:ian 1 6 3 ~ :and


Divisions pushed into FinLand toward the town of Suonusoalai. ( 5 2 : Once the Soviets had penetrated to a depth of 20 miles, the Finns


a t r u c k b a c k u s i n g night a t t a c k s a n d mntti or e n v e l o p m e n t t a c t i c s . (53) T h e defenders blocked t h e road


f r o n t of a n d

between t h e t w o divisions and then beqan t o systematically destroy


(See M a p 2 )

One way t h e y d i d t h i s w a s by s e p a r a t i n g t h e

i n f a n t r y from t h e t a n k s w i t h s u r p r i s e f l a n k a t t a c k s a n d a r t i l l e r y fires.


But m o r e n o t a b l e w a s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e F i n n s

avoided t h e enemys strength and focused their unrelenting attacks

on t h e R u s s i a n k i t c h e n s a n d w a r m i n g fires.


By 9 J a n u a r y . t h e

1 6 3 d D i v i s i o n h a d been b r o k e n a n d t h e 4 4 t h D i v i s i o n had c e a s e d t o e x i s t a s a n o r g a n i z e d unit.

T h i s b a t t l e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e v a l u e of t a c t i c a l i y o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s by l i g h t i n f a n t r y u n i t s w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n operational defense. It a l s o s h o w s h o w l i g h t i n f a n t r y c a n be very

e f f e c t i v e w h e n it i n d i r e c t l y a t t a c k s t h e enemys w e a k n e s s , in t h i s case, his ability t o sustain his soidiers, and allowrnq


f o r c e s , l i k e t h e F i n n i s h w i n t e r , t o c o m p l e t e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of enemys strength.

b r i g a d e of t h e 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ( L i q h t )

recently conducted a similar operation against a n opposing armored column at Fort Hunter-Liggett. T h e u n i t s l i g h r ;nianc_ry

i n f i l t r a t e d t o c o n t r o l a key c h o k e point and e l i m i n a t e s u p p o r t i n g i n f a n t r y w h i l e a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s a n d a r t i l l e r y destroyeci :he v e h i c l e s t h a t c o u l d n o t m a n e u v e r in t h e c l o s e t e r r a i n . < 5 G , 1

success of t h i s m i s s s o n i n d i c a t e s th5t the c o n c e u c rex.iIns



Many a u t h o r s h a v e p o i n t e d out t h a t w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e in u r b a n s p r a w l in W e s t e r n E u r o p e . L i g h t i n f a n t r y w i l l b e a b l e e f f e c t i v e l y d e f e n d u r b a n areas.


A b r i e f h i s t o r i c a i criiaiie

of t h i s a s s e r t i o n


in order.


( T h i s map is taken from Espisito. wgs& _P_oigt Atlas g g c s r Volume JJ, World War 11. map 9.



F i n n i s h 'Motti'

Tactics at Suomussalmi

A qood example of a successful infantry defense of a built. u?

area is the Egyptian action in Suez City at the end of the 1973 war. The Israelis felt that they could take Suez by combining an They did not

armored break-in with a sustained artillery barrage.

know the situation in the town, but felt that the few demoralized Egyptians in Suez would put up only light resistance. would be completed in short order. ( 5 8 ) The mission

The Israelis were wrong.

Strong resistance by Eqyptian infantry forces caught them by surprise, destroyed a significant portion of their armor and forced them to withdraw. General Wickham has cited this engagement a s an

example of the defensive capabilities of liqht infantry forces in built up areas. (59)

In this instance, the Chief of Staff i s probably right. Suez City the Egyptians fought in a light ~ n f o n t r ystyle.



used roadblocks and coordinated tank ambushes to halt the I s r s e J . : . s . Once the defenders had executed their ambushes they w e r e a b l e ';o melt into the depth of the city and avoid d e t e c t r , 3 n .
3 u t - what

would have happened if the Israelis had expected the E g y p L i a r . defense and attacked more prudentiy? In situations where the attacker knows that a t o r n defended, things a r e quite different.


The attacker ?h?r, ha.5


initiative and can bypass the area. invest it, or s i n p l y tack r.55 and allow artillery to reduce the defense. The elriiai!l..% ::,i t h i -

112th Infantry that had taken Schmidt and Kommershridt .%!.iffered that fate at the hands of the Germans. ( 6 0 ) On Zxrrcise 5,;t:Lant Knight. a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division ( L . 1 g h - j critical town. crfended

The unit had an abundance of b a r r i ~ r m a t e r i o l % n d


several days to fortify the area.

Althouqh the battalion

constructed a n excellent defense and fought extremely well, it was eventually wiped out once the attacking armored unit was abie to

fix its position. (61)

The lesson i s that urban defense i s not a m i s s i o n for the light infantry. Light forces are effective in built up arcas oniy

i f they can retain their freedom of maneuver to surprj,.%? . a ~ c l.inbu:s::

the enemy.

But light units are severely handicapped if t.hey a r e

forced to abandon their tactical style and execute a conventional defense.

A light unit that L S known to hold a city o r town can b e

fixed and destroyed by a more mobile and more heav:ly

armed enemy.

Light infantry is simply not trained o r organized fcir iiri;on defense: that is a job for regular infantry. ( 6 2 ) The final area we w i l l examine is rear operations. most detailed analysis of this part of the batt:ef;e:d
i s


by Otto Heilbrunn. considered one of the foremost histurlons of partisan warfare. ( 6 3 ) He divides the depth of the d e , f e n s c . into

the immediate. near, and far rear areas. ( 6 4 ) The actual depth of eech of these areas will vary w ~ t h terrain, enemy, and other factors. rear of front line tacticai units. area ranges from medium to high.
T h e immediate real'

ir.c:Ludes, Ch,?

The int.ensity
T h e near r e a r

.::>m56!: r n


acnu;>irc! l.iy +.P.L?


combat support and combat service support assets which !jack combat units. medium. The battle's intensity there varier; i r G m
i s


Iti2w t r j

Finally, the far rear

the area

i n

w!iich i i i i i i r a r y

operations have operational or strategic implicat.ion%. (135)


Offensively. Heilbrunn

lisht infantry forces

Rangers or Commandos to

- operate in the near rear to

seize key points and

reduce enemy defenses in conlunction with major offensive operations. ( 6 6 ) Heilbrunn envisions thews forces followinq the tenets of Liddell-Harts Indirect Approach to disrupt. and disorganize the enemy by separating h i s forces, endanqerinq supplies, or menacing his routes of retreat. ( 6 7 ) *!>ere 1 : ; new here. The offensive examples offered earlier





fit nicely into this construct. Heilbrunn does break new ground, however, when he discusses the use of light forces to defend rear areas.

He n o t e s that in

Russia the Germans effectively dealt with partisan2 by formrnq Jagdkommandos. These company or platoon sized u n i t s f c u g h t ;

the tactical style of the liqht infantry.

They were armed with

automatic weapons and were expected to Live for an exzendec! per;oc without additional supplies. unconventional tactics mission was to see to rest.

The Jagdkommando:3


defeat the R u s s i a n partisan.%.


that the partisan bands never g a t a n y

h i d e and

Jagdkommandos would march at niqht and

at t?vr.::.y

during the day. opportunity.

They would raid and ambush the p a r i n a n s


The point here

i s

that although liqht infantry



relatively ineffective against Soviet mechanized f o i - c c . 5 operatin., in the rear because of their lack of antiarmor we.spon3 a ~ c !?rq;inic transport. they can be the best defense against t h e Sy~r:znd:< will almost certainly operate in NATOs rear areas Europe. (69)


oar (comes 2 7

The final historical examplee will deal with two cuses in

which light infantry was misused. a t Cisterna, Italy. Ranger Force, composed of three Ranger battalions. was attached to 3d Infantry Division i n the Anzio beachhead. The The first is the Ranger attack

division commander, Malor General Lucian Truscott, chose the Force to spearhead the Division's attack toward Cisterna. was to seize and hold the town until relieved. the line of departure at Ol0Q 30 January 1944. Their nt.isaion

The Hanyers crossed

The unite, howeve!,

had a number of new replacements and the movement became disorganized.

By dawn the Rangers were still not : n

C i s t e r ~ aand Thar w a ' when

the battalions were out of contact with each other.

the 'Hermann Georing' Panzer Division fell on the iao;ated

A l l


relief attempts failed and by niyhtfali two thirds of ?anger Only 6 of the 767 men who h a d

Force had been destroyed.

left for Cisterna made their way back to friendly l ~ n e s .( 7 C j Three lessons emerge irom this disaster. First, Iiqhc

infantry does not have the firepower to conduct conventlorial operations against an armored enemy. Second, light forces c a n n o t

operate independenzly in a high intensity env:ronment be committed in conjunction with heavy units.





decentralized nature of liqht infantry missions raqiiira :nLiv:,<u..j. soidiers and amall unit ieaaers whose fieldcraft
i s


Improperly trained light infantrymen will keep the unit fron accomplishing its mission. second misuse of l i q h t infantry occ:urreci a t Nc!ncnh.r,n, During t h o s e mci111.hs

Kanchuria in July and August of 1939.



well trained unit, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Reqiment, 7th

Infantry Division of the Imperial Japanese Army. fought courageously using a light infantry tactlcal style against the tanks of the Red Army. This action also shows that individual

bravery and leadership cannot overcome doctrinal a n d material deficiencies. The Japanese suffered 86% casualties a n d failed to

stop the Soviets. (71) The lesson from this set of engagements is thac i n high intensity conflict. light infantry cannot fight attrition battles with armored forces. Llght infantry must a v o i d the m o s t intense

parts of the battlefield end focus on disrupting the enemy w h i l e heavy forces destroy h i m .

This section has reviewed a number of actions fought infantry forces since Worid War 11. Let




lcssons f r o m

this review and apply them to our Light Infantry




a n armored counterattack.

The Ranger mission at Zerf



h i s t o r i c a l p r a c e d e n t f o r t h i s t y p e of o p e r a t i o n .

W h a t l i g h t infantry u n i t s

~ s n n g td o is d e f e n d a s t a t i c
They d o

position in either a rural or urban environment.

n o t h a v e t h e e q u i p m e n t , a n t i a r m o r w e a p o n s , t r a n s p o r t , or t r a i n i n g t o a c c o m p l i s h t h a t mission.

If light units can be fixed they will

b e d e s t r o y e d l i k e t h e J a p a n e s e w e r e a t Nomonhan.

Light infantry missions aim at t h e disruption of the enemy, not his destruction.
A s t h e Finns demonstrated, this i s

e f f e c t i v e l y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l focus. o n e i n t e n d e d t o d i s t r a c t t h e enemys a t t e n t i o n from t h e m a i n effort. This principle emphasises

t h e f a c t t h a t l i g h t u n i t s a l w a y s o p e r a t e in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a heavy force. opposition. D i s r u p t i o n i m p l i e s short. v i o l e n t cnnr.nct:j w i t h !.he R a i d s a n d a m b u s h e s f i t t h e b i l i a s d o m i s s i o n s ir:

which light infantry provides tarqeting data for supporting artillery. D i s r u p t i o n alao i m p l i e s t h e t in a h i g h i n t e n s i t y

e n v i r o n m e n t , l i g h t i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n s a r e of s h o r t d u r d t i o n

f o r c e s s i m p l y d o n o t h a v e t h e f i r e p o w e r , p r o t e c t i o n or moo iitv t o r e m a i n in c o n t a c t f o r e x t e n d e d p e r i o d o o f t i m e .

L i g h t i n f a n t r y u n i t s d o n o t e n g a q e t h e e n e m y s strenath.


light f o r c e s m e e t a m e c h a n i z e d e n e m y in d a y l i g h t or a ~ e n terrnin t h e y w i l l a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b e d e s t r o y e d a s w a s t-he R n n g e r Force at Cisterna. A q a i n , light u n i t s ~ u s td o n o t h a v e t h e c o m b a t p o w e r to Light infantry


s l u g it o u t w i t h a heavy force.

c a p i t a l i z e o!?

i t s a b i l i t y t o r e m a i n h i d d e n f r o m t h e e n e m y until i C strike.

ready Lo


Light infantry units fight unconventionally in a high intensity environment. Their training in l o w intensity warfare Their unconvnntional style

applied to the European battlefiela.

revolves around the decentralized execution of Ranger type missions, such as infiltration, patrolling. ambushes and raidn, to disrupt and distract the enemy a s Liddell-Hart advocated. The nature of these operations dictates thar l~qht


infantry missions will be conducted in the hours of darkness. Night protects the force and increases its ability to surprise ana confuse the enemy. The effects of decentralized liqht infantry missions

are synchronized by battalion and brigade headquarters to achlcve

the desired result. An example of a light infanrry unit fighting

unconventionally would be the brigade which infiltratea inte the enemy's rear by platoon. hid during the day, and conducted niqht

raids and ambushes against particular targets in accordance wlth a specific plan to disrupt the coherence of the enemy's defense.

The concept for the employment of iiqht infantry in Europe. then, revolves around the force's capabilities and limitations. There

however, an additional consideration.

The Light

soldier must be psychologically prepared for combat i n Z u r o p e . It i s obvious that light infsnzrymen must be well "rained. But

we have seen, light infantry forces optimized for low Lntenaity

conflict train for combat in which levels of violence arc.) reduceci. Accordingly, light infantry soldiers are mentally prepared for a different kind of war than we expect to find in Europe. concept for the employment of light infantry in NATO must


appreciate this fact and focus the light infantry mission in a low

to mid intensity portion of the combat zone.

If light forces

operate in an unconventional manner and are given mis3ions whlch avoid the enemys strength, they will find themselves on the parts of the battlefield where the intensit-y of combat is lowest. i s where they will be most at home and will operate most effectively. That

T h i s concept for the employment i s light forces i n Europe

involves an offenoiveiy oriented, unconventional style of warfare.

It is focused on disrupting the coherence of the enemy

on its destruction.




Correct employment of the light infantry in Europe must maximize the capabilities of the unit while giving the commander freedom to gain the initiative. We must remember that the primary

s to respond t o continqency missions In role of the light division i

support of vital national interests. Additionally, the divisions

focus is on defeating light enemy forces in low intensity conflict. The European reinforcement mission i s thus secondary and must receive secondary emphasis. Based on these considerations and

other factors such as tactical style, limited trainin? resources. and deployment time, light infantry

best employed in Europe

without direct fire support at the tactical level.

Given that, let u s review how iight infantry w i l l operate. The light division must train for low intensity conf-ict first. doing so it will develop a tactical style with which in any theater.




While a light division may appear capable of


offensive or defensive action at the tactical level. i r effective when used a s an offensive force.


Defensive a c ~ i v i t i e s

tle the unit down, cause it to fight a battle of atrri:;on,

increase the chances that the force will be f i x e a and destroyer.. Offensive actions which incorporate raids, ambushes. p a r r o i l i n q reconnaissance maximize the capabI:itiea of the 1.inht divizicn.

Light infantry operates ad small units to disrupt the enemy. force and o y Light units d o this in two ways. ~y actinq a s a ~ r r i k e adding depth to the battlefield. strike force. liqht unit3 infiltrate or air

As a



objectives in the enemys rear to facilitate the uctions of heavy units.

Light forces add depth to the battlefield by infiltratlng or acting as bypsssed forces and attacking the command an@ supply functions of the enemy. Thus. the enemy

forced to diver:


attention from the close battle. (73) This method of employment leads to a number of specific missions for which the Liqht Infantry Division is suited. listed below in priority: -infiltrate and attack enemy positions to asaist t h e counterattack of a heavy force.
-deep attack to secure vital terrain which assists :ne
of a heavy force.

They are

-provide target acquisition and terminal guidance for artillery, multipie launch rocket systems. air. and ot>er deep attack assets.

-fix and raduc9 bypassed pockets of resistance

and air assets.



-conduct rear operations against light enemy foreas. Conversely, there are many other European missions for wnicb. c n e Light Divisions are .quits c.laarly include: -the convant,ional dafenae of front Line p o s i - . i ? n s i r ! h - . h ??en and restricted terrain. -defense of urban areas. -conventional day or niqht attack against an s r m ~ r e deneny. -rear area defense against. armored forces.





A detailed study of specific light infantry missions in a high

intensity environment is required.

The a i m should be to clearly

articulate both missions and planning considerations in F?I 7-13,


h f g n % g y g3t&g&ig~

and B ~ i g a d eQpnr;tagnn.

Tho key point tn

remember, however. i s that the European commander who receives a light infantry unit can increase his tactical flexibility by using it imaginatively within an offensive, unconventional conco?: employment. There are two other implications that accompany t h e adoption
of this concept f o r light infantry employment i n Europe.



involve both doctrinal literature and force structure. especially, FC 71-101,

O u r doctrinal publications.



Infantry - - -- - _ D r y i s & s n , must omphasize

t h e offensive nature .?nd

unconventional tactics of the light divisions. units are



n o t general purpose forces.

Additionally, these

documents must stress that light and heavy forc3s ~ n t e r n c rn t th;;. operational not the tactical level. Finally, they must make i t

clear that light units cannot defend o r perform economy oz. f o r c e missions in Europe.

On the force structure side, we absolutely musz recrify ozr

.Lack of regular infantry.

W e currentiy have no units :n

cnt? 3c:ivf

force which are designed to hold ground o r conducz convenziona: dismounted infantry operations.
A s this paper has shown. t h e a a e

of light infantry to do these misaions frequently r e a u i r s casualties and often the destruction of t h e unit. It apparent that we need more infantry in Europe.


i s

But we


need r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y , n o t light i n f a n t r y .

T h e Army should accept

a r e l a t i v e r e d u c t i o n in s t r a t e g i c m o b i l i t y a n d m a i n t a i n s e v e r a l
r e g u l a r i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s in t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . These units

should be organized and equipped t o fight i n the tactical styie of t h e r e g u l a r infantry.

T h e L i g h t I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s h o u l d r e m a i n our b a s i c l i g h r infantry unit. While light brigedes are the more appropriate

s t r u c t u r e f o r E u r o p e a n e m p l o y m e n t , t h e p r i m a r y m i s s i o n for l i g a t f o r c e s is in l o w i n t e n s i t y o p e r a t i o n s . T h a t r e q u i r e s a unit w1t.h

significant logistical and intelligence qotherinq copobiiitieo. O n l y a D i v i s i o n h a s t h e a a s e t s t o perform t h o s e f u n c t i o n s .

On a m o r e s p e c i f i c n o t e , a l t h o u g h h i s s t y l e is t o a v o i c attrition battles with heavy forces, the light iniancryman w i L 1 always need an effective light antiarmor weapon that
H I : :

a l i o w him

t o destroy both tanks and armored personnel carriers from ambush. Antiarmor technology must keep pace with armored vehicle d e v e l o p m e n t if t h e l i g h t i n f a n t r y m a n mid to h i g h i n t e n s i t y b a t t l e f i e l d .
is to

h a v e a n y u t i l i t y on t h e


VII. cgtjcLgzg3N
The light infantry is a unique brand of infantry. definitely has its own tactical style.


There are missions for

light divisions in Europe and they are best accomplished by l i q h t units operating without the support of heavy direct fire systems. Light divisions have a number of capabilities. They provide tney

the European theater and corps commanders with a f:exihi?ity have never had before.

only if these light units are employed

i n accordance with an offensive concept will they be effective.

The purpose of this paper has not been to apologize ahead oi time for the inability of light infantry to accomplish certain missions in Europe. On the contrary, the intent has Deen r n

clearly point o u t . what these units can and cannot do. Light infantry missions require a verv hiqh ieve: individual skill and confidence. must be very weli trained.

Accordingly, the .light soldier

But even t h e b e s t lrght ~ n f a n t r v m a n ca!?

only be effective in the right environment. fighter whose tactical acumen



is nor

an e i . i r e

such that he can o e

W e


employed ageinat a well equipped foe.

must bring o u r


in line with the capabilities of the light infantry. in our belief that the Lioht divisions are



qenerii- pur!~09e
'3n . : t o

forces w e may pay with the lives of our s o l d ; # ? r a of the future.


Comparative Characteristics of Infantry Forces

cPnvanflnnsl &nfsntrr
General purpose force


Utility 1s limited t . o specific conditione Strong offensive orientation Best suited f o r ciosr t e r r a in Adapcs w o i l t r > unconvsn:;ona; operations Dominates t h e rr2rrclln and uses i t : o it3 advantaqe Host ofren operates Sattailon i e v r l .snn lower

Equally suited to the offense and defense Operates in any terrain

Limited capability for unconventional operations


difficult terrain a s an obstacle

Operates in large formations (eg. Brigade and above)

Habitually conducts duyiiqht operations, but can operate at night.

Operates m o s T ; f:-eo:ienz..v at niqnt Ach I e v e s n r 0 tec ' Ii on throucrh c o m o u C L n ~ ean(: maneuver: r - l r e l y c d i g : 3 - j n Ill-suited f , 7 r ac:ac;::3 aga i not fort if .Led posit ions Usuallv o p e r n ? e s ~n pure o r .se m i- > ,xr e infanr.rv envircnmer.:

Possesses built-in protection against small arm8 and indirect fires (armored infantry) or diqs-in for protection (reguiar infantry1
Can reduce fortified positions

Operates a s part of a lnrqa combined arms formot.ion

Employs conventional tactics

Mass and firepower are t h e primary

tactical principles


Achieves shock through


Achieves shock through surprise. speed, and violence Chooses the path of 1east ex pec t s t i 13 I ? Engages the enemy at close range Defends from t , h e reverse

Follows the path of least resistance Engages the enemy at maximum ranges Defends from the forward slope ( 2 6 ) Normally emphasises firepower over maneuver Excellent mobility in open and mixed terrain Low mobility in close terrain Frequently conducts frontal assaults

Em? h a s i se s n a neu Y c'r o v elfirepower

Can be outmaneuvered in open terrain Exceiient mobility in close c e r r a i n Infiltrates in order t c attack i h e enemv's fl.31::: and rear Patrols relentless'v all situations Tactics unpredictable form, t i m e , -snci sixice People and c e r r a l r :
0 r L en te d

Patrols to maintain contact Tactics conform to a general pattern Weapons and equipment oriented Ad3usts tactics to available technoloqy



A d u s t s technoloqv to , : t 1 c.3 ava I 1a b : e t3


1. In addition to the Chief of Staff's @hiLe raper L M 2 : Light h f a g t g y . (Office of the C S A . Washington, 1 6 April 1984). the most cogent arqument for the strategic deterrent value of tha Liqht Infantry Division i s made by Major D.H. Petreaus. ("Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence." B i L i k c ~ y Review. December 1984, pp. 35-55.> Edward Luttuak also lays out a strategic rationale for the Army's Light Infantry Divisions on pages 15 and 16 of hi6 study, "gtrafsg&c lllility gf Light Diy&s&gns, 6 sy!st_emat&c E y g l u g L r g n . " ( T R A D O C Contract No. 60-84-C-0099. October 1985). Finelly, Franz Uhle.Wottler argues that for political, military. and economic rea~3ons. scronq l i g h t infantry units would improve NATO's defense posture. (G5f9'ZbtefSid n & f f t n ~ e Y E P F R: GafSr dSE !!beC!iSchFL?L?F'JS3 ?!.I S t s e i . t b c a f f n n . Munich: Bernard und Graeff, l 7 . 9 0 .D p . L ~ j 5 - L O 7 . Translated and republished by CGSC.)


2. The P p s g n f l g n q l SofisgpL ggc the I n f a _ n t r y p&y~h&gc !.=L?L!&>- (?5.-;?, March 1984) only mentions that empioyinq the Liqht Infantry Division in a mid-high intensity environment carries w i t h it o requirement for "augmentation in forces, weapons, and + ! q L 1 i p i n e n t . C . : , perform a f u l l range of missions in mixed or oven t e r r d ~ na q a . ~ n s t heavy forces." p. 2. The best sirigie source which l a y s o u r t,he spectrum of possible light- iniantry missions in Eurcl:.w :R * : ! I F + s%t of "Heavy-Liqht Connection" articlas in h f a n t _ r y ?iqoi;&n~. J u : v August 1984, pp. 10-22.

3. The distinction between the American and European views of l i u t h r . infantry have been specifically noted by at least three a u t . h o r s . Major Scott McHichael. u i g & o r i s a i I'grspen&&yS on LIE^,^ h f q n ' , ~ . 'Introduction'. (Unpublished Manuscript). p . : : Edwarc L u t + w a ; : .

7. Eduard Luttwak concluded h i s TRADOC directed a:u::v ,if Arny .?c,':'a; by urginq the development of a multi-divisional body cmi v e r s a : 1 L t - : , easily deployable and context adaptable liqht infnn-rv force.-,. .. 4 t t & s t o r & c q i ~Ioqiyssg.... n. 82. Steven Canbv a l s o recornsanded t k , , o t t h e U . S . adopt European stvle liqht infantry tacrics a n ; ! organization. I;lesg&s L i s h t _ I y ? f g n t ~ y . . , Forwnrcl. Pea?!? of t hG z: e studies precedod the Chisf of Staff's Whits P a p e r .


J. A . Wickham, W h ~ t ePapar 1@4. pp. 2 . 4 nnd 'L.i.qht _ A _ T _ O 15 s ' Natigis. Special Infantry in the Defense of Europe', N Edition, January 1985, p . 107.
8 . General

9. Commcnd GuldnnGr? E s r r The 2th Rs9ine!!t for 3c! end 3t!! 6tr EURG. (HQ, 9th Infantry Reqiment. 7th Infantry Division (Light). Fort Ord C A : 22 April 1986). pp. 19-23 end briefings to the School of Advanced Military Studies by Major E. Thurman and Colonel H. Wass d e Czege of the 7th Division on 1 0 and 1 4 October 1906.

10. Colonel Huba Was5 d e Czeqc. "Three S ~ n d a o f". LgfsgLky. (July-August 1985), u p . 11-13 and "More on I n f a n t r : r " . Infantry. ._ - -. .- -. (September-October 1986). U D . 13-15. C~:nne?. W a s : i ah? Czege is currently t h e commander of the 1st 3 r i g a , ? e of the 7 t h Infantry Division (Liqht). He is one of the authors ot' the ?.9fi:2 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 and a past director n f t h e School Advanced Military Studies ( S H M S ) .



"Three Kinds of Infantry", p . 11.


12. Hush M. Cole, The L g r r q l n e ga~rn$ign. (Office Military History Washington DC, 1981). p. 605.



~ ; . f

1 3 . Combined A r m s Training Activity, N7-5 h g g n n s Lrqcner.. (l?ambiner; Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. iiunsas. 31 Junuarv 13e.E.J. ? p . 2-3.

14. Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathaws. Three 9c;fl~z; .4~~~4liis~ A l t g ~ z o , ~ c c :Schmi.dt,. (Office of the Chief of M 1 1 i ~ a 1 v History. Washington DC, 1952). p .

15. Wass ae Czegc, "Three Kinds of Infantry", p .


17. Comment made by C o l o n e l Wass d e Czeqs t o SANS o n 1.4 O c C & e r 1986. The 9th Infantry Division. when i c was commanCe.1 b y S e n e r a . Cavasos, concentrated on q u l c k i y preparing srron9poinv.s thaz included well construcced barriers a n d fighting p o u r c i o n u w 1 L . h overhead protection. The Division felt that t h i s r v ? e oi 4 n ? f e n s . ? coula adequately defend against an armored enemy.
19. Wass d e Czege, "Three Kinds o f ' Infantry". p . 12.

1'3. Doctnr Michael J. Kinq. Rqr_lgarsi z g l c c ~ e c jCOTJ~!. Joecn: ;nris ' h r l c k c r 1 2 . Leavenworth P a n e r Numbar 1;. (I:ombnt 3t:icI:es

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. June 1985).

20. Wass d e Czege. "More on Infantry". p. 1 3 .



21. M a J o r Edward Thurman. The L ~ g h f :I n ~ a n r r r E l v i ? ; ~ ! ? : ?!I 9 g ~ ~ ~ & & E~ g rn c op , l (School of Advanced Military 5 t u d i ~ ~ Fx . -7 Leavenworth. Kansas. June 1995). p . 37. Major Thurman ~drveii~ps the: l o w intensity concept i n detail. He concludes : h a t iir~ht ~ . : i f a n t . r Y must be employed in a low intensity portion of the Satt.lefield regardless of the level of overall conflict.


23. 38. 24.
25. This table, with some modification, gigtglicai Fegeegt&ye GI Light hfg!k:yL

is taken from McMichaela, Chapter 5.

26. F H 71-20, The Mechanized ~ g g ~ Task ~ ~ g Force y discusses the reverse slope defense on pages 4-85 thru 4 - 8 8 . It clearly states, however, that mechanized forces d o not usually defend on the reverse slope and that such defenses are appropriate only for small portions of the task force. Lieutenant Colonel Arcnie Galloway has discussed the importance of the reverse slope d r f e n s i : : to light forces in his monoqraph. L&gbt_ h f : s g t ~ ) r & n :.LIg &:f~._ncs.1

The Revarso ZLoee from krolllnston t o the FalklGEds ?r?d EIsynnL!.

(School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. December 1985).

27. Althouqh General Wickhnm states i n h i s h g g r t h t ;he Light Infantry Divisions must be able to fight anytime, enywhere. and against any opponent (p.l), in another article he speciiica;;y states that the Divisions are primarily deeignea f o r - use in iow intensity conflict. (Light Infantry in t h e Defense of Europe, p. 100). The Chief of Staff also made t h i s point in a letter to Light Infantry Division Commanders in April 1985. (Information received from Major Ben Harvey, Army Training Board, 2 4 Oct-ober 1986). Additionally, FC 71-101, I..ght LfiggfiGgy gJy&srgn @ e ~ q f & n n ~ , prescribes n low intensity focus for the Light infan:.ry Divisions. (p.1 and p . 1-2).
28. FC 100-20. h t e p l t y ~ZnZfLlct. ( C G S C . Fort Loavenwor:n, Kansas, 16 July 19%). p. v and p. Glossary-2) 29. Combined Arms Training Integration Directorate. ?!rsgggedgL Ulconventipgg& Eight-ing f s g t b s Lighy, Jnfsntt,y g&v&gaon, (Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, 9 January 1334). This mexu indicates that in a low intensity environment, operations wii: he conducted by small light infantry units using unconvenr.1.onal. Ranger Style tactics. I t was prepared in response 5 0 .an inquiry from Major General David Palmer, then Deputy Commdndilii: o i 5n.e Combined Arms Center, concerning tho employment of L:g>z Ll:vis:.>x:j in low intensity conflict.

30. Wickham.


P q p e ~ . D.


The efforts of the 7 t h Infantry Division ( L i 9 h z . l ti; <?eve.:-,- ; I Misaion Essential Task List (METL) demonstratcv the difiiculty of clarifying the role of a unit that has a global orientation. (G3 Plans, 7th Infantry Division (Lisht), L g f n ~ m e t & o s ?pee: hksey EmgLgyment of _the L i g h t pix&a&o_n,(Fort Ord. CA. 2 Junn 1936) The three most likaly missions identified by the Division are all ~n low intensity environments. With the exception 05 pr01.ect i n g

installations, they a11 have a n offensive orientation, they all recognize the need to defeat a limited armor threat, and they ail anticipate very restrictive rules of engagement. O n a high intensity battlefield. however, the Division anticipates that it must fight defensively agoinst a mobile, armor heavy threat with the help of a number of supporting forces. (pp. 1 - 2 ) The frustration inherent in planning for misaions requiring diverqenr tactical styles i s obvious. The paper states, "This Division was structured to fight in the low end of the conflict spectrum. The very nature of this type of conflict does not lend itself t o the detailed OPLANs characteristic of mid-high intensity scenarios." ( p . 2 ) This author believes that t h e Division can rectify t h i s conflict by planning to fight in a high intensity conflict the same type of decentralized. offensive operations that it plans to pursue in a low intensity environment.

32. Wass d e Czege. comments to SAXS 1 4 October 17t36.


Major General John W. Foss. "Light Infantry llas a Place o n *.he Battlefield", filmy Tim_es, 24 October 1984, p. 21.

34. Major General Howard G. Crowell, Jr. and Lieutenant Coinnei Jared Bates. "Heavy-Light Connection : Division". h c ~ g ; ~ y ( ,J u l v August 1984). p. 18.
35. Colonel Wass de Czege has emphasized that iight infantry arc not hybrids and must preserve their integrity. ( S A M 5 discussion. i.l October 1986). Lieutenant General Saint has indicated =ha= he feels Light Infantry Divisions should be fought at i e o n r d s battalions, and possibly a s brigades or divisions to preserve u n i t integrity and facilitate command and control. <Dlscus~.~o wtth n SAMS, 21 October 1986)
36. The point here is that operations with liqhs inrantrv Knits require heavy forces to modify normal supporting relationships. For instance, cross attachments between armored and mechanize! forces do not normally include Forward Support Battalions (FSB). If a heavy unit works for a light infantry brigade or division. however, it must not only bring its FSB but other fuel. aniaiun;tion and repair parts support a s well. 37. This comment i s based on a conversation with C o l o n u l Dnvid Branlett, Commander, 3rd Brigade, 10lst Air Assault Division. !!e pointed out that his brigade generally worked as a separate t a 9 k force. 3rd Brigade deployed as part of the Divinicn only : n t c undeveloped theaters of operation. Light Infantry ?. visionn wc,tr;c.: probably operate in the same manner.
38. Brigadier General Wayne A. rJown.infl, "L.ight Infnntrv Intoqrn' in Central EurTpe", 1 i i L t : r y Revie!. Septamhar 1 9 R G . p. 1 ' 3 .

37. Durinq a SAPIS ~Jivisinn Level wargame using F i r . 5 t S a t t i c 3C, :he brigades of a Light Infantry Pivision were a t t a c n a c ; t o heavy unitz.. The Division headquarters was then used to plan the defense of a river line and plan for the contingency employment of its brigades. W h i l e obviously frustrating to the Division Commanrier, thi:3 a e e l - c i


to be a n effective role for tho haadquarters to play.

40. See for example Lieutenant General John R. Galvin, "Heavy-Light. Forces and tho NATO Mission". Infsgtry, July-August 1984, p . 1 1 .
41. An excellent example of what happens when heavy and :iqht forces are thrown together u t the tactical level can be s e e n in the

Israeli action at Suez City in 1973. The lack of operational commonality in doctrine and training between General Adan's briqade and his attached paratroopers contributed significantly to tne failure of the mission and the high number of casualties the unic recelved. The subject of light lnfantry in urban combo: is developed in detail by Halor Donald E. Kirkiand in h i s monoqraph. Qffncsiye g p e r g t i g n s UChI3Q E g r g p s i cw3g Z Q E : y s a y y l . !=il!ll I n f g n t r y Eqece.(SAMS. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2 Lncamber i985). Also see Avraham Adan. e~ the Bgnks of Suez, ? r e s i ( i i o ?rass, 13L30). pp. 426-430. The founder and commander of a n u r n D e r of Ranger L I ? : : . ~ . 'Cnicn;.: Darby, was an advocate of indirect firepower in support of Ranger operations. He found a s the war proqressed that. ~ n e 3'anger.s were more successful when they had strong artiliery support. (King. Leavenworth Paper No. 1 1 , p. 41.) The G e r m a n M c u n t a r n 5:v;s;ons had a significant amount of organic ana supporting arrrliery. The firepower of these batteries was extremely importan: f o their s5yls of fighting. The Germans also relied on their air iorces for critical support durinq mountain operations. (?IS P - ? 3 4 . i ? c u n t a i n bJgJfgrrL ~ g ~ g I ~ ggcJ g s J I , 2 4 February L350, pp. 49. 50, 179, a n <

247. )

43. Crowell and Bates, "Yeavy-light f C o n n s c t i o n " .

4 4 . For example, Galvin. p . L 4 , Additionally. S+.Ecaeqic WLJ&+.y 22 u,ll L ~ g h ; @ & y & s i o n n . . . .



LLIZ:W~K. i n
: E

?,escr;he: a light infantry defense of the Hohe Hhon portlor. ~f f h e sector. (pp. 116-122)

I e ~ n :

Patar Vigor, sgyi.5 1983). p. 148.



(St ! a r t i n s



46. Colonel David Glantz. h q g g t Stggm; S o y & % > .?m; Q~nrntigsnL Gssbjt i n zgnchgrig, a?*?. Leavenworth '.a>er VLimhrjr :?. (Combat Studies Institute. CGSC. For= Lunvanworth. X . n n . 3 . 3 ~ : Juns 1983). forward.

Kinq. h,nqswsL




... .


.L. 2


- .

D A Pam 20-236. N&zh& W m b g r . (Depar%nen: of :he A ~ I I V , Washington DC. .June 1.353). pp. 2 2 - 2 4 , 9 . 4 Pan ' O - L t ' 223.;; zzi; Actions, (Department of tna Army. Washinston. UC, I?ar.;.n ~ Y J ~ S F )P , . 248-254. Malor Gaorqe D. Baxtar, "Tacticni Iniiltr3:;on". Infantry, - --- - (March-April 1981). p. 20.

47. Anthony H. Corde.mnan. "Lessons cf + h e :Iran--1rnc ' i ~ i - : 5 7 r r T,dr>''. Armed_ ~g~~~~ J_o~~r_noL. (June 1 9 R 2 ) . p. 70.


51. Ibid.. p. 73.

Peernflnsel ImeLrEsLlnos
52. h s y c & n @ g n d i ag f

and Major Donald Zacherl. S t g g t a g i z 2nd GI IraDlso M1Litarr QEsrntlnns Ln t h E 5 r n n --Iraq kJJg. M M A S Thesis. (CGSC. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1986). p. 61.

W ~ c l df i i s t z z y .

pp. 1054-1055.

53. Edqar O'Balance. x h g E E ~ &ay: 4 zhogt H L g t o c y , ( F ' r n e g e r . New York. 1964). p. 148. The Finnish term for an entrapped enemy iorce is a 'motti', which is their word for a staclc of firewood piled up to be chopped. When the Finns lacked sufficient firepower to reduce strong 'mottin' they relied on cold and hunger to d e s r r o y their enemies. Doctor Allen F. Chew. Q s h t i n s t a g .lgg.sisnr, i ! ? grntsrl Three Cage St_gdjes. Leavenworth Paper Number 5. 1 C:S1 F o r t . Leavenworth. Kansas. December 19811. p . 2 5 .

______ Forces,

54. Malcolm Mackintosh, J u g g n ~ n g g t r a f i i g + - ~ c y o r S g _ v ~ ? t .fizzse (MacMillan, N e w York. 1967). p. 118.


.. 55. Chew, E i g h t l a g thy? Eg6sian.s 15 k i n t a g . Was6 dw Czeqe, briefinq to S A M S ,


14 Uctober i'3eb.

57. This i s also one of the conciusions reached by the Army Scignce Board's Ad H o c Group on urban warfare. Army Science ironre, c & g a & eee2Et BI t h e Ad Hnc 4rnue O E MllltarY Qeerstrnns I n eu1i: 'JP fizeas tng'lbl. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the ,Army ( ! ? C A I . Washington DC, January 1'379). p. 11.

Avraham Adan, g= the_ B_a_nks_ gf pp. 426-430.

the z ~ e i - , . (Presldin



1 .

53. Wickham, "Lrqht Infantry in the D e f e n s e of E1iro;le". GO. MacDonald and Mathews.



Three Bgttler..

pp. 3 7 2 - 3 7 3 a n ? ,352.

61. Wass d e Czega, Discussion with S A M S , 1 4 O c t o b e r


62. Kirkland concludes that urban warz-are calls f o r tne establishrnenz of a hybrid infantry force that would f l l i t n e q n a between t h e heavy and lisht divisions. g f f e ~ g & y n Q e n ~ n & ~ . p !-? ng !~~~~~ &gnpg.. pp. 33-40. His ideas cnrrsspond exact;:? S I L ? ~ Colonel Wass d e C = e q e ' . s model for t h e reTular :nfar.:r:,'.


6 3 . Otto Heilbrunn, rgrt_&ssn


!Praeqer. N e w Y z r k , 1'3E.L:.

Jacket notes.
6 4 . Otto Heilbrunn. w Y o r k , 1963). p. 145.

e r f ~ ~i a n the



( ? r n e . q e ~ - ,N e w

65. Thurman. pp. 22-23.

66. Heilbrunn. W g g f s r e

tbcr, Enecy.:s Rest. pp.




i _ b i d . , p.


68. Heilbrunn,

Partisn_fi W ~ g f a g g . op.


69. David Gates. Yggtegn L i g h t Forces nn_d_ p e z g ~ s sPlanninq; 2 ; _B:rgiers ZII~ Borderrj, Centerpiece Number 9 , Autumn 1983. <Cantre for Defence Siudies, Aberdeen, Scotland), p. 24.
7 0 . King, R"9ger5,
. C

+elgcczd G ~ I J Q~srafices.... B ~ ~



71. Edward J. Drea. Nomgnhgn;

-_-1939, Leavenworth

Japeoesg:zgy&sf r g c t ~ c n _C l O I J ~ ~ , Paper Number 2 , (CSI, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. January 1981). pp. 86-YO.

77. A detailed discussion of various types of i n f r ; t r a : i n n can z = found in Ma7or Raymond Drummond's monograph. i-&gh: l n r > r , t q y : fi lk~ik.&ca~ Deep Bqt_Lia Asset, for central E g r s e ~ , ( 5 A E S : . F o r t L.eavenworth. Kansas, D e c e m b e r 1985) Mn!or D r u m m o n d Lnciude6 5 t . 3 ~ behind operations a s a type of infiltration and indi,=drm c h 3 ~ these operations ore the defensive counterpart to T . B C T L C T I L infiltration. !Stay behind forces qnin access r o :;it? eneay'ij re.3:areas simply by allowing themseivee to be bypassed. ( p . 9 ) Or. Exercise Team Spirit ' 8 5 , elements of a barralion of :ne 7 ~ : ; Infantry Division (Light1 reached the enemy's rear by tni3 metnoc;. val.;? They were very .succrssiul at amnusninq venicleu, raidinu ?,i::> installations. and attackins helicopter iaasers. The 3 n i . r wus never identified n o r decected by t h e enemy. ( p p . i i -2 4 ) 7 n e 3017:. here is that infiitration does not just mean ; l a s 3 i n q throuqn zne enemy's lines on foot. There are other ways. incluaincr : ~ = a y behinds and, perhaps. insertions, r.0 a c c o m p l i o - h t z e s a n ~



73. Hagor W i l l i a m Godwin. The Llnglnt~onaL Eppx!c'zge: 7;. ;-;:+ : : : : ; , L Infantry - - - - Q i y i g i g n , Y M A S Thoais. (L'GSIC. For: L n a v e n w n r t n . .. :..?r.=a.?, 1986). pp. 162-163.



' 4 6

___-_. OA Pamehle_t 201231,. Combat ~n Rugg~.qnEorszLs qnc! S W a m p G . Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, Juiy. 1951.
____ gt! _. PaEehlaL
Z'(_jrzS6: Nlqht !&mbn&. Washlngtnn. 5 . C . : Government Printing Office, J u n e 1953.
Washington, D.C.:

. e!! Pamehlst

/13:2%0, Rear Aree Sscurit?! i n E(us*rn.

Government Printing Office, 1951.



- _.- - - . Fosrjib - - ... - - ( 'Tent ._._ - _. at -- 1 .ve


Baxter. Gaorqe D. "Tactical Infiltration." ?!av-.:~ina 139:. 18-23. Uesch, Edwin W. "Are Our Light 3ivi.sions Too Light?" f i r m v . 1985. 42-48. Boite. Philip L. "LAW - Not I 3 u t of the W c o d s Ya:." Number 6, 1963. 6-11. Burba, Ma!or Genera: Edwin H. "Commandant's September-October :986. 1 - 3 .
k ..f ... . e

-n -r

, ~!I!:!<:;??.

Note." : : +i ..>~:gy.

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Army Science Board. Final hepot pf Ad Hot ,,,, g gn E&.!.&tsr_v Qmr_g&&pgg &g Bg&.& Up A g e g g infWB&L. Washington, D . C . : 0i:ica the Assistant Secretary of t h e Army, January 1979.
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-. - - _. Western - - - - - -- L i g h t Eoo3se snd :lofEnGe FLgnnrnsr krt!,L:?:c?:Ei .?Ilcl. Borders. Centrepiece Number 9. Aberdeen. Scotlann: Centre f o r Defence Studies, Autumn 1905.



Saint, Lieutenant. G e n e r n i C r n s b i e . C o m m e n t s t o SAPl3,



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_. T h u r m a n , Major E d w a r d . 'Comment.3 t o SAXS. 1lJ C c t o b e r . - ' : ' . Y > : ~ .

W a s s d e Czege. Colons;

Huba. C o m m e n t s to SAMS.

14 < t e z n b a r : . ' X 6 .