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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1 of 5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:
 Staff
 visit
 to the
 Boston Center,
 New
 England Region,
 FAA
Type
 of
 Event: Briefing
 and
 Scheduled Interviews
Date:
 September 22-24, 2003
Special
 Access Issues: NATCA (National Air
 Traffic
 Control Association) representatives sat in on
some
 interviews. A FAA legal representative
 from
 the New England Region attended all staff contacts
with
 FAA personnel
Prepared
 by: Miles Kara
Team
 Number: 8Location: Nashua,
 NH
 (Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)Participants - Non-Commission: See individual interview reports
Participants
 - Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown
Background
 Summary
Commission
 staff
 were able
 to
 efficiently
 and
 effectively
 formally interview
 18
 people, tour
 facilities
 at
both the Boston Center and the New England Region, and accomplish discovery of
 four
 additional
relevant
 document sources, thanks
 to a
 forthcoming,
 responsive
 reception
 by the
 Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio. Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to thepeople that would do
 Staff
 the most good in the time allotted. That required dropping some potentialinterviewees and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the FAA work
 force.
The
 work
 force
 accommodated those changes and the representatives of FAA Counsel appointed to
attend
 Staffs
 presence pitched in and helped out. NATCA representatives, when requested by
interviewees
 to be present were also
 helpful
 in the overall process. The Staff
 left
 with the impressionthat Boston Center, Mr. Biggio in particular, wanted us to gain a complete and accurate view of their
collective
 work under near-unprecedented pressure on September
 11
2001. The Regional Administrator
took
 a brief exit brief
 from
 the team at which time she was advised of the support provided by Mr
Biggio and
 staff
 and of the
 document discoveries made
 by the
 Commission
 staff.
Major
 Points
Discovery
Staff
 learned of additional responsive information that had not been provided through the
document
 request process.
Accident
 File
Staff
 learned
 from
 Mr. Bob
 Jones, Quality Assurance
 Office
of the
existence of an accident file,
 different
 from
 the accident
 package
provided by FAA to both the
FBI
 and NTSB, and subsequently provided to the Commission in response to a document request
to
 DoT. Among other items in the package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephonecompany records.
 Mr
 Jones, locally considered
 a
 hero because
 of his
 quick work
 in
 replaying
 the
tapes of cockpit conversations that day was insistently steered our way by Mr. Biggio.
 fter
 Action Review
Staff
 learned that the New England Region convened a round table two
weeks after
 Ssentemrier
 
 tn
 r nnHnr t
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 review
 of
 events
 of
 the Hav
 Staff
 is
 not aware
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1ORANDUM FOR THE
 RECORD Page
 2 of 5
of
 any
 formal
 product that ensured, but asked that associated
 files
 and records of that event bemade available to the Commission. A member of the Region's 24-hour operations center, duringinterview, produced a region log, a document previously not provided
 staff,
 but one that
 staff
 wascertain must exist since a similar document was produced by the Eastern Region in New York.
Staff
 has a
 copy
 of
 that log.
Additional
 Transcripts
During one interview
 Staff
 became aware of a radar controller positionthat
 controlled
 the
 scrambled
 Otis
 fighters. Staff
 asked
 for information
 from
 that position.
 It is
Staffs
 understanding that the only information that went into the
 accident package
was datapertaining
 to
 FAA's actually contact with
 or
 handling
 of the
 four
 hijacked
 aircraft,
 possiblybecause that
 was the
 FBI/NTSB
 focus.
 That excluded
 any
 accident
 file
 information that pertained
strictly
 to the Otis
 fighters
 themselves. The FAA legal representative said he would make sure
we
 got the information we needed. Separately, and previously, Staff had brought to Headquarters
FAA
 attention
 the
 lack
 of
 transcripts pertaining
 to the
 Otis fighters,
 aircraft
 that
 we
 know
 from
other
 sources
 had
 been controlled
 by
 FAA,
 at
 least
 in
 part.
 FAA
 provided
 the
 tapes
 of
 BostonCenter radar
 control
 positions
 17R
 and
 18R
 to
 Staff
 on September 25,
 2003.
Personal Notes
Two persons interviewed brought with them personal notes at least one set ofwhich
 had
 been constructed
 a few
 days
 after
 9/11.
 Staff asked
 for and
 voluntarily
 got
 both sets
 ofnotes.
 Those notes are important because both individuals worked in the
 Traffic
 Management
Unit
 that day,
 the
 focal point
 for
 decisions made
 by and
 information flowing
 to the OMIC, Mr.Biggio.
Boston Center Performance
To a person, Boston Center is proud of its performance that day
and
 the Center has internalized that it did all that it could do, given the events of the day. The Senior
Traffic
 Management Controller, Mr. Bueno,
 carefully
 and repetitively described to Staff the box, hisdescription of how the Center perceived that hijackings would proceed. No one seriously considered any
outcome
 other than an airplane proceeding to an airport somewhere and landing, perhaps Cuba. The
view
 prevailed even
 after
 the content of the cockpit communications was learned. Therefore, Boston
Center
 controllers proceeded to do what they were trained to do; they notified supervisors as events
proceeded,
 and then continued to try and ensure safety in the sky by keeping planes separated,
 from
 each
other
 and
 from
 AA11, and notifying adjoining sectors within the
 Center
 and other Centers, as necessary.
Determining
 a hijack
No one
 factor
 or combination of
 factors
 that day, other than the cockpitcommunications, definitely led Center personnel to a hijacking awareness. There are three such factors.
Loss of Radio Contact
This phenomenon was common, to the point of being notorious.
Pilots
 and crews were simply lax in maintaining contact. One interviewee made sure weunderstood
 the
 commonly
 misunderstood
 acronym
 NORDO.
That
 means no
 radio
in the
literal
 sense that the
 aircraft's
 radio(s) are not working. It is in that
 sense
 that controller
 38R
 is
captured
 on tape early in the AA11 story designating
 AA11
 nordo,
implying that the pilot is incontrol
 and
 unable
 to
 communicate. That
 is
 different from
 an
 aircraft
 with
 a
 working radio,
 but
deliberately not communicating. The term for that,
 Staff
 was told, is
 NORAK,
(ph)
Loss of Transponder
This phenomenon is much rarer, but not
 in-and-of-itself,
 alarming.Controllers routinely ask the
 affected
 plane to
 recycle
 your
 transponder.
[That is the protocolused with
 UA175
 by New York
 Center
 controllers.]
 Controllers generally agreed
 that
transponder
 loss would be reported to the supervisor. The combination of
 nordo
and
transponder
 loss is highly unusual and many controllers had never experienced that combination.
According to Mr.
 Biggio that combination
 is a
 sign
 of
 major
 equipment malfunction
 and at
 that
point in the
 flight
 of AA11
 would
 not
 have triggered
 any
 notion
 of a
 hijack.
Course Deviation
One controller, a supervisor on duty that day as a radar associate tocomplete monthly qualification requirements, citied minor course deviation—AA11
 failure
 toclimb
 to
 35000 feet—as
 an additional
 warning
 sign.
 There
 was no
 consensus
 on
 that point,
 but all
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,£MORANDUM
 FOR THE RECORD Page 3 of 5controllers agreed that the combination of
 nordo,
transponder loss, and significantcourse deviation—the AA11 turn to the south—was serious. However, Mr. Biggio on that point
said
 that given a
 major
 equipment malfunction what might be happening was a pilot turning to
land
 at a
 heavy
capable airport. One controller supported that thesis, describing a
 heavy
pilotas one who would try to land at Kennedy, vice elsewhere. A
 heavy
aircraft is a term used byFAA
 controllers to
 describe
 a
 large aircraft
 such as a 747/757/767.
 Center
 personnel
 who
observed the turn south also observed a unusually rapid rate of progress, indicatively of a pilot
who
 wanted to get somewhere in a hurry.
The Intervening Variable Unusual Cockpit Communications.
 After
 AA11 lost its
transponder
 and just before it made a significant course deviation to the south, unusual communications
of
 unknown source were heard on the AA11 assigned frequency of controller 46R. It was quite clear to
the
 controller that he had a problem and he immediately and loudly made that
 fact
 known. In a rapid
sequence
 of events a quality assurance
 staff
 member, Bob
 Jones,
 personally went to the basement and
reran
 the tapes and made the call that the voice said we have some
 planes.
Mr. Jones' accident file
timeline will
 provide the exact time he communicated that
 fact
 to the watch desk and to Mr. Biggio. The
OMIC
 log shows that Biggio declared a hijack, based on cockpit communications at 0825 EDT. That
time
 appears to
 staff
 to be the time of the original communication itself and not the time that Biggio was
notified
 by
 Jones.
 The
 accident
 file log
 will
 be
 determining
 factor.
First
 Aircraft
 Impact into WTC and
 AA11.
 The Boston Center learned of developing
problems
 in New York one of two ways. First, a CNN
 feed
 is maintained in a
 office
 contiguous to thewatch desk in the center proper. Second, controllers on break typically went to the cafeteria where a
CNN
 feed
 was
 also available. Intuitively
 and
 instinctively, Center personnel
 who
 were aware
 of and
followed
 AA11
 on its
 flight
 south knew that
 it was
 AA11 that impacted
 the
 north tower, irrespectively
of
 differing
 information
 available
 from
 CNN.
 At least at the supervisory
 level,
 if not at the individual
controller
 level, Boston Center personnel also understood AA11 to be slowing and descending.
 Staff
tentatively
 concludes that Boston Center itself was not the initial source of
 confusion
 about AA11
 after
the
 impact of the first plane into the WTC. Nevertheless, Center personnel aware of the altitude search
for
 AA11, southbound, were also aware
 of two
 other factors. First
 the
 last know accurate altitude
 for
AA11 was 29,000
 feet.
 Second, UA175, under direct query by a Boston Center controller sited AA11 at
about
 0837 EDT and established its altitude to be 27-29,000
 feet.
The Altitude Problem.
 FAA controllers cannot determine altitude on a
 non-transponding,
primary-only,
 aircraft.
 Center personnel
 confirmed
 that to
 Staff
 several times over. On the other hand,
air
 defense scope operators at the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) can determine altitude in that
circumstance.
 According
 to the Deputy Commander at the 84 Radar Evaluation
 Squadron,
 FAA did
not
 purchase that altitude-determining capability and,
 further,
 was
 considering
 the
 elimination
 of all
primary radar returns
 from
 its
 en-route radar system. Most Center personnel were
 not
 aware that
 theSector
 Area Operations Center (SAOC) at NEADS could read altitude and that might have been a reason
to
 contact NEADS. One key person did, Colin Scoggins, a member of the TMU and the person most
often
 in contact with NEADS. He arrived at the Sector about 0825 EDT and immediately became aware
of
 a developing situation. His initial instinct was to stay out of the
 road—too
 many onlookers impeded
the
 task
 at
 hand.
 As he
 became aware
 of a
 primary-only possible hijacked
 aircraft
 his
 immediate
response was
 that NEADS needed
 to be
 notified
 so
 they could
 get
 altitude
 on the
 airplane.
 He
 headed
 for
the
 TMU and by the time he arrived Joe Cooper was in contact with
 NEADS.
 Mr. Scoggins spend the
majority
 of his
 time thereafter
 in
 intermittent direct phone contact with NEADS, primarily
 Major
Deskins,
 trying to assist NEADS in gaining scope contact with AA11. His calls, however, were not on a
taped
 line. He believes those calls were taped at NEADS. The
 difficulty
 was that NEADS wanted
 lats
and
 longs and he was trying to give them position
 from
 a known VOR, e. g.
 x
miles south of Albany.
He
 recalled that he passed two distinct sets of lat-long coordinates to NEADS.
Military
 Notification.
 No
 person
 Staff
 interviewed seriously considered contacting NEADS
through
 the process on paperFAA-NMCC-NORAD, if they were even aware of it. Dan Bueno gets
high
 marks
 from
 Center personnel
 for
 instinctively calling
 FAA
 traffic
 approach personnel
 at thelocation
 where he knew the fighters to be—Otis AFB. Bueno called Otis
 because
 he knew from thehttp://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/view.php?Horde=a5c6a09aa8293d831d4502cd... 9/29/2003

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