[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center

Type of event: Interview Date: Tuesday, September Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. MULLIGAN 1720EDT Supervisor TMU ZNY. Employed by the FAA in June 1973 as ATC specialist at ZNY assigned to area a. spent 9 years area a. after that area e for 4.5 5 years as full performance level controller. TMU coordinator 3 years after that. Supervisor area c 3-4 years. Supervisor assigned to ocean areas for 3-4 yrs. Supervisor area d 3-4 years. Then area b supervisor 3-4 years. Then TMU specialist. One of two tm supervisors on 7-3 shift. Weekdays would try and have two on duty, weekends sometimes would only have one. Peer of Rosenberg. Right now report to Michael golden, at time reported to Charlie golden. Golden was in an administration position only, and would report to OMIC. That day was Bruce Barrett. Air traffic manager Michael McCormack was responsible for operational side of building. Assistant facility manager Dave LaCates. Mulligan, Barrett, LaCates, McCormack on administrative side, bottom to top. From watch desk area get a supervisor briefing from the OMIC, or STMC who worked the mid shift. Mid shift is usually 1030pm to 630pm local. , 2003

Situational awareness occurred approximately 10 or 15 minutes past 8. Pete clunky, shift coordinator received a call from Boston center over NORDO, non transponder AA11. Pete informed mulligan. Not a totally unusual situation for an aircraft to loose communications. Phone call came to ZNY because airplane had altered its course 90 degrees to penetrate New York airspace. Com loss, electric display loss of beacon, and deviation of course. At that point hijack was not in Mulligan's mind. First thought in Mulligan's mind was some kind of emergency. Would normally do a 180 and head back to airport, but AA11 did a 90 and headed to New York. So that was unusual. Monitoring scope was set up to see fast moving primary that hadn't as of yet penetrated New York airspace. Used Sparta/Carmel VOR to confirm that the primary spotted was the right one. At this point between 70 and 90 miles from New York area. On the heading it had it would have passed 70 miles to west of metro New York. At this point still thinking emergency. Thought that airplane probably wanted to land at a major airport. - on Tracon hotline and probably got a TMC. First time it was through Tracon to give info to towers. Had Pete McClusky call Newark and JFK to inform them of situation after AA11 went under ZNY airspace. Landline went on speaker, then Newark said they saw fire at trade center. Thought of hijack entered mind when received information from Marty Rosenberg's call with the airlines over a possible hijack. Not sure if that call was through TMU or another unit (see Rosenberg's mfr). Company would normally call the cockpit on a cell phone. But usually if something is going wrong pilot will call company first. Information on stabbing of stewardess did not reach Mulligan until after the trade center was first hit. People were speculating hijacking, but no one had told him there were threatening communications or anything akin to the hijacking. Later on heard of threaten conversations but that was at a recap point. That information would change thinking over possible emergency. Heard from the departure coordinator, James Kurz or Jim stone worthy, of possible radio failure at Cleveland center. So then heard of loss of airplane, then word of another lost communications, off course airplane. UA93 might have been next cue in that something was amiss. It was unusual for an airline to be of course and not communicating. Got a hold of Ben Sliney at the command center informing him of NY ground stop. Believes this occurred before any information on cockpit compromise came through. Can tell from lack of input in logs sheer volume of work done on that morning. Made a pile of paperwork that was handed to Bruce Barrett. When first heard report on AA11 of fire at WTC from Newark tower. Feeling was still emergency. Had received no key work on anything else. Thought it was a very good

possibility that AA11 was the hit since when they lost its signal it was 20 miles within metro New York airspace. When employees came back from cafeteria and informed of hit, he thought it was a 767, AA11 crash but not necessarily a hijack. Convinced that it was AA11. After report of fire at trade center was informed of problem with UAL 175. Only minutes between information. Ua93 left on way to west coast (ZNY to Cleveland center), and heard of problems. Can't guarantee heard of UAL 175 before or after heard of ua93. Fact that had two events, 11 and 93 being similar, had both lost radar and not taking control from ATC. Pretty confidant that 93 came into play in situational awareness of threat from Indianapolis before 175. Initially thought it was 93 that hit WTC. When stopped ZNY traffic, that would be key indicator of time frame. UAL 175. Received the UAL 175 information from area b CIC Ivonna Dowis. Spoke with Ivonna at first over AA11. Trying to get fed ex to verify his altitude. Bittiglia on r42. Fed ex was unable to spot UAL 175. Aal75 had a very high speed because of the space between the train lines. Not much to be told with sequence of events with 175. Believes had already ground stopped. Believe Bob Pilsner, Military Operations Supervisor, came around corner out of MOS area and mulligan told him to call the military. Think NORDO airplane just came into area b airspace. Incident report on AA11 has time markings. When asked Pilsner to scramble planes was thinking to scramble planes on threat of plane coming out of Cleveland center. Actually, definitely asking him to scramble on 175. 93 being out of Cleveland would be too far. Information on AA11 must have come out to have bob filsner make phone call to military. Information from the three sources must have had something to do with wanting to contact military. Got enough from Ivonna and from bob Thumser regarding events with AA11 and UAL 175. Remembers transponder code change with UAL 175 since they were getting a coast track on UAL 175. Three items at same time: Cleveland, AA11 and UAL175. Knew UAL175 was off course at a fairly early time. May have taken a good amount of time to talk to Herndon (Ricky Bell), wanted to find out if fighters had been scrambled. One of the phone calls to bell got information that fighters had been scrambled. Thought scrambling in response to UAL 175.

1249 mulligan requests Fillsner get on line with NEADS. Called to get number. 10 minutes later Barrett asks to do same thing. Collin's asks to scramble because of possible other hijacking. Hard to keep Bruce apprised of events. Aware of another statement filled out by mulligan. UAL 175 - took a look at all of 56 and part of 42 sectors. Wasn't a doubt in mind that there was activity going on. UAL 175 seemed very similar to AA11 except feels that UAL 175 target was lost because sector is high altitude, and changed primary target that isn't selected you could loose it. Lost it on the see all. Never confirmed in own mind that mulligan saw tracer. Not as vivid in mind of communication and information sharing. After UAL 175 went into the second tower Marty Rosenberg had to leave. Thinks Marty was present when hit tower two. Thinks Marty was not there for first hit. Both of them were working together on the phones. Learned of second impact from Tracon or from CNN out of cafeteria. When was told or heard of second hit, no doubt in mind that he was doing the same thing. And everyone assumed it was 175 since it had same circumstances of AA11. After second impact, remember hearing of 11 still being airborne? No. only conflicting information being circulated was when AA11 hit first tower people were saying a light aircraft hit tower, and AA11 still out there. Couldn't believe the light aircraft could do that much damage. And after second hit only 175 could have done that much damage. Squawking beacon code 3321. AA11 completely shut off beacon code. Was it easier to follow and determine crash because of 3321? No transponder very hard to track. If have beacon, as in 175, you have all information you want. If transponder is changed, get the coast target with squawked code. Can do certain things with that. Start new track. Having a transponder with wrong code is better than having none at all. Would be no direct correlation to a change in transponder in flight and what happened to AA11. Can see alt as long as there is an operating transponder. As long as you have the computer set to a certain setting that reads mode c. you would see alt. Mode c intruders are an example. AA11 with code off completely all you have is primary and very difficult to have. That's why asking Ivonna on alt. With UAL 175 can watch the alt descend. Also can see mode c on radar target. Recommendations to be carried forward: Codes have not changed over time.

AFTER REVIEWING TRANSCRIPT: 0841 received information from TMU that American 11 had been hijacked. That information probably came through Marty who was on line with company, the 46 line at approx 830am. Info on flight attendant being stabbed was later to Mulligan's recollection. F1290 on AA11 from Ivonna coordinating an aircraft for a visual. Pete called Tracon and Newark tower. Marty did leave floor after first impact. Marty came back from break after AA11 event had begun. Military assistance from Pilsner around 843. Time of the essence so that is why he asked Pilsner since he figured Pilsner would have a pre programmed scrambled phone to the appropriate place in his office. Figured he could contact the right people. Written procedures to request military assistance is there now - just didn't take as much urgency as now. Numbers to call NEADS. Can get anyone from airman to colonel. Bounced to phone to phone to phone. Tried in past to get info from military since so much going on. Sometimes it takes too long a period of time to get the information. Traffic management coordinator twice - one a hijack to Ivonna, had to be in 70s observed in area a. second was as a TMC late 80s one area in New York got involved. Don't know where departed from. Information through ATC. Mostly informed as procedures just to stay quiet and wait to see what requests are made. Probably very similar procedures to today. Contact command center. On 9/11 would have been about same procedures to get military assistance. Probably in OMIC handbook guide. Call NEADS to get fighters. One recommendation would be that on DEN gets headquarters clerk, NEADS, customs would get a quick response. Unfortunately the way the DEN is being used it is getting like "the little boy who cries wolf, procedures from FAA need to be more thorough and more professional. Have people more air traffic savvy when dealing with these hotlines. Should have a number directly to someone who has the authority to make immediate decisions. Right now bureaucracy might get in its way. If fighters were 6 or 7 minutes earlier still would have taken to long to get permission to engage. More than likely those fighters would have been left waiting for orders. Should streamline communications and have people with real time information directly linked to people with authority to make decisions. Training and awareness of people. ATCs and air traffic controllers need to be aware. Need to be part of basic training to deal with unusual situations. Vast majority of ATCs got training from military in past. Training was a little hard nosed. Many more training failures. But the product was a better product. Do have refresher training. Brings awareness back but can't compare to actual events.

Fictitious situations in which there could be simulations that are as far out of the box as the event of 9/11. Pre 9/11 one scenario Forbes through out was about a plane being run into a building. If you were developmental, it would be what would you do if somebody coming out of Philadelphia wanted to hit the un building.. .type of training that used of happen back then. Different types of emergencies in military dealing with fighters than with commercial carriers. Have to be more flexible with training. Can't get too far out of the box in training - 9/11 taught that. Would be positive if people tried to pick up new 9/11 type scenario. 1853EDT



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