Running head: CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS

Conflicting Reward Systems and Their Impact on Criminal Justice Administration Kevin Gillilan Faulkner University

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS Abstract A common issue in the field of criminal justice today is conflicts present in the established reward systems. This issue applies to all levels of criminal justice to include police,

corrections, and the court system. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of conflicting reward systems, provide examples, and to raise the issue of performance evaluation in all levels of the criminal justice system. It is questionable whether performance expectations are properly measured by current evaluation procedures, and whether the effectiveness of the criminal justice system should be judged by criminal statistics alone or the quality of the work performed. In conclusion, this report discusses suggestions for reform and experimentation among law enforcement professionals.

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS Conflicting Reward Systems and Their Impact on Criminal Justice Administration According to Kerr (1995), most people try to model behaviors that are rewarded, and exclude behaviors that are not. There are several examples in the field of criminal justice where desired behavior goes unrewarded, while rewards are given to officers who accomplished goals by exhibiting undesirable behaviors (Kerr, 1995). Kerr (1995) suggests that this may be due to parts of a given task being highly visible, and other parts going unnoticed. These faulty reward systems may lead to low morale among officers because they are set up to reward behavior that conflicts with what is desired by management (Kerr, 1995). Dilulio, Alpert, Moore, Cole, Petersilia, Logan, & Wilson (1993) points out that most people believe that the criminal justice system should be fair and effective. However, understanding how to accomplish this is difficult because of the need to clarify the differences that exist between expectation and performance (Dilulio et al., 1993). Dilulio et al. (1993) suggests that outcomes are often narrowly defined causing confusion among criminal justice professionals on which goals to concentrate on. Saloom (2010) advises that criminal justice professionals work hard enough just to keep their respective end of the system functional. Fitch (2011) states that criminal justice professionals learn what is desired or undesired by utilizing a thorough and meaningful reward and punishment system. Conflicting Rewards and Assessment in Police Agencies

Most police agencies in the United States have incentives in place to reward the efforts of their officers. These can be in the form of merit awards, raises, and even advancement within the

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS agency. Most of these rewards are earned by an act of heroism or based on statistics of some kind. While these actions are important, this may cause other policing duties to fall by the wayside (Dilulio et al., 1993). The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights (2000) reports that many reward systems in the U. S. are flawed, encouraging racial profiling by placing an emphasis on high crime areas which are highly populated by minorities. According to Osburn (1994), police may also be tempted to target criminals with sought after assets because of existing forfeiture laws, while disregarding other crimes.

Assessments on the effectiveness of law enforcement are primarily based on crime rates, arrests, response time, and clearance rates. These statistics fail to recognize the full impact that police have in the community. These statistics also misguide administrators and officers to focus on production rather than service. Performance assessments should reflect the impact made in the community by incorporating new ways of measuring success (Dilulio et al., 1993). Current assessments focus too much on quantity rather than how well the job is performed, and centered on success within the department rather than the community. Marx (1974) advises that rather than looking at the statistics alone, efforts should be made to study the processes by which the rates were accumulated. Marx (1974) points out that statistics are often unreliable and lead to other important police duties to go unrewarded. Focusing only on crime may obstruct other police goals and objectives (Marx, 1974). It may also lead to placing more importance on disciplinary action for failure to reach objectives than rewarding offices for success (Marx, 1974). In order to fully understand the operations of a police agency, performance measures are needed (Marx, 1974). Improper reward systems can cause inter-departmental relationship issues, lack of proper recognition, and low morale among officers (Pagon, Spector, Cooper, and

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS

Lobnikar, 2011). Public trust may be increased by formal recognition of officers successes. The job should be structured to reward desired behaviors (Marx, 1974). The Impact on Corrections and the Court System According to Dilulio et al. (1993), the criminal justice system is often judged by the rates of crime and recidivism. Rehabilitative and reintegration programs can be important for battling recidivism because research shows that recidivism rates are lower for those who have participated (Dilulio et al., 1993). The problem is that these programs are costly. In addition, the difficulty for convicted felons to receive assistance once released may increase recidivism rates (Snyder & Stinchcomb, 1996). The public is not very supportive of these types of programs because they give the perception of being too lenient on crime. This causes the programs to receive limited public funding (Dilulio et al., 1993). Kerr (1995) stated that the courts are impacted by faulty reward systems. Judges and prosecutors are elected on promises to be tough on crime. However, when they are elected they often focus on clearance or success rates. This often leads to excessive plea bargaining and fast adjudication of cases (Snyder & Stinchcomb, 1996). Trial court performance is often judged by the speed or number of cases handled rather than justice vs. injustice (Dilulio et al., 1993). In 1986, it was argued that courts should be rated successful or unsuccessful based on overall performance rather than disposition times (Dilulio et al., 1993). Saloom (2010) stated that politicians were reluctant to reform criminal justice policies because there was little financial incentive to do so, and because the resistance of prosecutors who wish to retain discretion and power.

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS Conclusion To correct the problem, criminal justice executives need to understand which types of

behavior are desired, and observe which behaviors are being rewarded. The reward system that is in place may explain some of the undesired behaviors among officers. Desired behaviors should be positively reinforced by the reward system in effect (Kerr, 1995). The reward system should encourage a culture of ethical behavior. Police and correctional officers should witness advancement among ethical officers, and discipline for the unethical. Ethical behavior must be built within the department (Fitch, 2011). Crime and recidivism rates should be grounded on the needs of the community and performance standards should be realistic (Dilulio et al., 1993). The criminal justice systems ability to achieve goals should be set apart from its ability to reach justice. Experimentation among criminal justice executives to build strong community relationships have already begun. These methods differ from the professional models of police strategy. This new strategy is based on targeting community problems, changing the officers perception of their job, and changing relationships within the agency (Dilulio et al., 1993).

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS References Dilulio, John, J., Alpert, Geoffrey, P., Moore, Mark, H., Cole, George, F., Petersilia, Joan, Logan, Charles, H., & Wilson, James, Q. (1993). U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System. Retrieved from website: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/evaluation/guide/documents/documentI.html Fitch, Brian, D. (2011). Focus on Ethics: Rethinking Ethics in Law Enforcement. FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin, Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/october-2011/focus-on-ethics Kerr, Steven. (1995). On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B. Academy of Management Executive, 9(1), 7-14. Retrieved from http://www.ou.edu/russell/UGcomp/Kerr.pdf Marx, Gary, T. (1974). Alternative Measures of Police Performance. Criminal Justice Research, Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/alt.html Milon, Spector, Paul, E., Cooper, Cary, L., & Lobnikar, Branko. (2011). Managers in Suits and Managers in Uniforms: Sources and Outcomes of Occupational Stress. International Journal of Police Science and Management, 13(3), 211-219. doi: 10.1350/ijps.2011.13.3.245

CONFLICTING REWARD SYSTEMS Osburn, Judy. (1994). Asset Forfeiture is "Dysfunctional Policy": Empirical Study Finds

Forfeiture Negatively Impacts Police Procedure, Forcing Agencies to Subordinate Justice to Profit. F.E.A.R. Chronicles, 2(2), Retrieved from http://www.fear.org/chron/study.txt Saloom, Stephen . (2010). Adversaries as Allies: Joining Together to Prevent Criminal Injustice . Albany Law Review, 73(4), 1235-1244. Retrieved from http://www.albanylawreview.org/articles/06 Saloom.pdf Snyder, Howard, N., & Stinchcomb, Jeanne, B. (1996). Do Higher Incarceration Rates Mean Lower Crime Rates?. Corrections Today, Retrieved from http://www.aca.org/research/pdf/researchnotes_oct06.pdf The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, (2000). Revisiting Who is Guarding the Guardians: A Report on Police Practices and Civil Rights in America. Retrieved from website: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=473617