What New World Order? Author(s): Joseph S. Nye Jr. Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No.

2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 83-96 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045126 Accessed: 29/09/2009 16:32
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfr. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

Joseph S. Nye,

Jr.

WHAT NEWWORLD ORDER?

to President ^M. he 1991 Persian Gulf War was, according it is a big idea; a Bush, about "more than one small country; new world order," with "new ways of working with other
nations . . . peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against

arsenals and just treat and controlled aggression, ment of all peoples." Not long after the war, however, the flow of White House words about a new world order slowed to a reduced
trickle.

or Franklin Wilson's fourteen Like Woodrow points Bush's Roosevelt's four freedoms, rhetoric George grand for the larger goals important public support when expressed
a liberal democratic state goes to war. But after the war, when

reality intruded, grand schemes turned into a liability. People were outcome the war's imperfect with an led to compare standard for judgment ideal. The proper should impossible have been what the world would look like if Saddam Hussein of Kuwait. The victory lost its lustre had been left in possession
because of an unfair comparison that the president inadvert

and recession shifted the political agenda ently encouraged, House thus decided the domestic economy. The White
lower the rhetorical volume. II

to to

faces a deeper administration than mere problem more political tactics. The world has changed rapidly in the two at to keep It than time is since 1945. difficult past years any one's conceptual within such in fundamental shifts footing a new to fit politics. Familiar concepts fail reality. It is worth it that Americans took several years to adjust to the recalling last great shift in the late 1940s. But the Bush administration, famous for eschewing "the vision thing," added to the confu sion because it had never really thought through what itmeant nor its the administration by the concept it launched. Neither The
of the Harvard Center for International Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is Director Affairs and author of Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American
Power.

84
critics

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
were clear about the fact that the term "world order" is

used in two very different ways in discussions of world politics. in tradition of the Nixon Richard and Henry Realists,
Kissinger, see international

each others' power. World order is the eign states balancing a of of stable distribution the major power among product states. Liberals, in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and at as as look states. relations well Carter, among peoples Jimmy see order arising from broad values like and They democracy human rights, as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations. was that it The for the Bush administration problem and acted like but borrowed the rhetoric of Nixon, thought
Wilson out the and Carter. Both aspects them. of order are relevant to the

politics

occurring

among

sover

current world
relation

situation,
between

but the administration

has not sorted

a new world there is definitely the realist perspective not order, but it did begin with the Gulf War. Since order has little to do with justice, but a lot to do with the distribution of From
power among states, realists date the new world order from

in eastern Europe in the the collapse of the Soviet empire autumn of 1989. The rapid decline of the Soviet Union caused the end of the old bipolar order that had persisted for nearly
half a

a stability of sorts. The Cold The old world order provided a War number of Third World exacerbated conflicts, but conflicts the economic United and States, among Europe threat. Bitter ethnic divisions were kept under a tight military in eastern Europe. A number of lid by the Soviet presence or Third World conflicts were averted shortened when the too their clients them feared that superpowers might drag
close to the nuclear Japan were dampened by common concerns about the Soviet

century.

were brief. In fact some experts that a believe example, stronger Soviet Union would never have allowed its Iraqi client to invade Kuwait. If so Kuwait can be counted as the victim
rather than the cause of the new world order.

abyss.

The

various

Arab-Israeli

wars,

for

Some analysts see the collapse of the Cold War as the victory and the end of the large ideological liberal capitalism conflicts of this drove the that great international cleavages no to is liberal capitalism as century. There single competitor an overarching than the end of history, the ideology. Rather a return of history in the War world is witnessing post-Cold of

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

diversity
has many

85

of sources of international
competitors, albeit

conflict.

Liberal
ones.

capitalism
Examples

fragmented of

include

the

indigenous
of

neo-Maoism

of Peru's
Islamic

Shining
fundamen

Path

movement, guerrilla the rise and talism

variants the many ethnic nationalism.

This
to the isms

does not mean

future."1 There

that the new world

is an enormous

politics will be "back

between the of

difference in eastern animosities

democratically
of western untamed

tamed

and
and whose

institutionally
the revival ancient

harnessed

national
Europe were never

Europe nationalisms

structure of state communism resolved in the institutional the Soviet empire. will be riiore permeable Moreover national boundaries
in the past. Nationalism and transnationalism will be

and than

contend

in the new world transnational Large politics. ing forces to distribute economic according production corporations technological changes in com global strategies. Transnational
munications and

occurs in real time; both George Bush and Saddam Diplomacy for the latest reports. Hussein watched Cable News Network mass Human and violations suffering in distant parts of rights the globe are brought home by television. Although Marshall
McLuhan

transportation

are

making

the world

smaller.

was misleading duce a "global village," his metaphor because In remains feeble. fact nationalism global political identity
becoming aware for Not stronger in most of the world, increases not weaker. the Instead

argued

that

modern

communications

would

pro

a is

of one global
of conflict. all each

village
other.

there are villages

That, in turn, forces are

around

the globe more

opportunities than terrorism, all

transnational are malign.

benign

nationalisms

Transnational

the spread of aids

and global warming

are cases in point. With

technologies a half than

any more trade, drug

across time, technology spreads of weapons of mass destruction

and the borders, are now more

century old. The collapse of the Soviet Union removes two of the factors that slowed the spread of nuclear weapons in the old world order: tight Soviet technological controls and influ
ence over its client states. The United States cannot escape

from

these

susceptible

transnational and few of them are problems, to unilateral solutions. Like other countries in the
Instability in Europe After the Cold War,"

1 See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: International 1990. Security, Summer

86

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
order, the United
the national

new world
dialogue

States
and in the

will

be

caught

in the

between

transnational.

to influence others in United States will need power concerns. to If transnational traditional and the both regard old world order has collapsed, what will be the new distribu tion of power? Over the past few years of dramatic change, different observers have claimed to discern five alternatives. the failure of the August Return to bipolarity. Before coup some argued that a and the final collapse of the Soviet Union, The climate and a return to the Cold War. But harsh international even if the coup had succeeded, it would not have restored in large The of the Union stemmed decline Soviet bipolarity.
part from overcentralization. Stalin's system was unable to newly repressive Soviet or Russian regime would create a

Industrial Revolution, cope with the Third use of information is the key to successful
The return of the centralizers might have

in which economic
created

flexible growth.
a nasty

international
strength,

climate,

but
would

rather
have

than
continued

restoring
the

Soviet
long-term

recentralization

decline

same would be true for a of the Soviet economy. The centralizing Russian dictatorship. clich? that drips easily from is a popular Multipolarity. This but if used to imply an historical the pens of editorialists, for century it is highly misleading, analogy with the nineteenth the old order rested on a balance o,f five roughly equal great
while Russia its reform great today's will continue is a question powers to suffer of are from far bal equally economic weakness, not years. is a China from

powers anced. and

decades,

country and, despite favorable growth, will remain developing so well into the next century. Europe is the equal of the United
States in population, economy and human resources. Even

1991 summit at Maastricht, the December however, as a single to act the lacks political unity necessary Europe global power. and technological with economic is well endowed Japan resources is limited in the of but its power portfolio strength, area as well as in the cultural and ideological hard military soft power. Japan would have to make that provides appeal as well as major changes in its attitudes toward military power after

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

in its ethnocentricity scale of the United
Three economic

87
the

before States.
blocs. Those

it would
who

be a challenger
devalue military

on

power

in a world of argue that Europe and Japan will be superpowers restrictive economic blocs. An Asian bloc will form around the bloc around the dollar and a yen, a western hemisphere remnants bloc (including of the former Soviet European will the cluster around Unit Union) (ac Currency European or the deutsche mark to optimists) (in the view of cording versus a Pacific bloc.2 pessimists). Others foresee a European are three problems There with this vision. First, it runs to the thrust of global technological counter trends. While regional trade will certainly grow, many firms would not want to be limited to one-third of the global market and would resist
restrictive regionalism. Second, restrictive regional blocs run

concerna of some of the lesser states that against nationalistic need a global system to protect themselves against domination do not want by their large neighbors. Japan's Asian neighbors to be locked up in a yen bloc with Japan. There will continue to be a constituency for a broader trade system. international too vision Most is this of dismissive however, important, in turmoil, large nuclear neighbors security concerns. With both Europe and Japan want to keep their American insur
ance policies against uncertainty. The second Russian revolu

tion is still in its early years, and China faces a generational transition. It is difficult to imagine the United States continu wars. The context in its the of trade ing security guarantees was not end of the Cold War marked and by European for calls withdrawal of American Japanese troops. European and Japanese security concerns are likely to set limits on how
restrictive the economic blocs become.

to Charles Krauthammer, the Unipolar hegemony. According Gulf War marked the beginning of a Pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony.3 The premise is correct that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the world with only one superpower, but the hegemonic conclusion does not follow. For one thing the world economy is tripolar and has been since the 1970s. Europe, Japan and the
Paris: Foyard, 1990. Lignes d'Horizon, 2Jacques Attali, 3Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar in Rethinking American Moment," Cold War toNew World Order, Graham T. Allison F. Treverton, and Gregory 1992. Norton,

Security: Beyond eds., New York:

88
United

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
States at account least, for the two-thirds United of States the world's cannot product. exercise hege In

economics, mony.

Hegemony
through interest tive

is also unlikely actors

can be

because

of the diffusion
To cite

of power
exam

transnational rates

interdependence.

a few

ples: private

in global
used

capital markets

constrain

the way
economy;

to manage

the American

the transnational
of capacities number of issues aids, more of migration, than one governmental

spread
otherwise on the

of technology
and poor international

increases
weak

the destruc
states; and a trade, roots in

no great power, in coping with such problems, effective the United States included, will be able to solve them alone. Multilevel ad describes interdependence. No single hierarchy a structures. The distri world politics with multiple equately bution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. is for The top military there is no other layer largely unipolar, to the The United States. economic military power comparable two for and has been The middle is decades. tripolar layer a shows diffu bottom layer of transnational interdependence
sion as of power.

global warming?have and flow across country Since control. military

agenda?drug societal deep borders means

outside largely are not very

None areas.
A.J.P. fungible

of this complexity
as money wrote the and

would matter
could the determine test of

ifmilitary
the a great and

power were
in all

outcomes was

In describing
Taylor

Europe
that

before

1914, the British

power

historian
the

ability
predictor

to prevail
of

in war.
outcomes

But military
in the economic

prowess

is a poor
transnational

States is better layers of current world politics. The United more a of diversified with power resources portfolio placed than any other country, but the new world order will not be an era of American hegemony. We must be wary of the prison of
old

world order after the Cold War is sui generis, and we by trying to force it into overly constrain our understanding with their me bed of traditional metaphors the procrustean chanical polarities. Power is becoming more multidimensional, The
structures more complex and states themselves more of perme

concepts.

able. This
on more

added
than the

complexity
traditional

means
military

that world
balance

order must
power

rest

alone.

The problems encountered by the Bush are The War illustrative. of the Gulf end

at the administration traditional approach

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

of balancing went realist Iran and Iraq into of was clearly of order, not enough, and U.N.

89
and
of

resolutions
refugees) The

687 and 688

deep view

(which dealt with

areas national resting

Iraq's weapons
sovereignty. on a balance

world

it does military power, is necessary but not sufficient, because not take into account the long-term societal changes that have the world away from the Westphalian been slowly moving In after 1648, system. thirty years of tearing each other apart over religion, states agreed in the Treaty the European of in the determine that the ruler, effect* would Westphalia a was state of Order of regardless popular preference. religion
based on the sovereignty balance of of states, states was of not the sovereignty eroded over of the peoples. The mechanical

slowly state

ensuing
cratic Now

centuries

by

the growth
the norms in

of nationalism

and demo
persist. mi

but participation, the growth rapid

transnational

sovereignty communications,

gration erosion
between

and economic interdependence and of that classical conception

norm and reality. IV

is accelerating the the gap increasing

This

evolution on values

makes and

more institutions

relevant

the

liberal as

of a world
resting

society

of peoples

as well

as states, and of order

military power.

conception

as well

Liberal views that were once regarded as hopelessly Utopian, such as Immanuel Kant's plea for a peaceful league of democ now that political scientists report racies, seem less far-fetched
virtually Current example, no cases of democracies over against debates pit to war with each other. going the effects of German for reunification, see western other each realists who

Europe going back to the troubled balance of power, and liberals who fault such analysis for neglecting the fact that unlike is democratic 1870, 1914 or 1939, the new Germany and deeply enmeshed with its western neighbors through the institutions of the European Community. Moreover the inter actions between democratic institu politics and international
tions reinforce each other.

Of course the game is still open in post-Cold War Europe, is very different and Europe from other parts of the world such as the Middle East, where traditional views of the balance are still the core of wisdom. of military But the power of the democratic market economies (and experience Europe

90
more

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

suggests that in at least parts of this hybrid generally) of divisible and transferable world, conceptions sovereignty an order. The may play part in a new world increasing are a case in complex practices of the European Community
point.

These liberal conceptions of order are not entirely new. The norms Cold War order had and institutions, but they played a II Roosevelt, limited role. During World War Stalin and a to a multipo Churchill United Nations that assumed agreed lar distribution of power. The U.N. Security Council would the doctrine of collective enforce security and nonaggression
against smaller states while the five great powers were pro

tected by their vetos. Even this abbreviated version of Woodrow Wilson's institu was to order tional approach hobbled, however, by the rise of The vetoed each other's initiatives, superpowers bipolarity.
and the organization peacekeepers aggressors. The was reduced to observe one exception, to the more ceasefires the modest rather U.N. role role than in of re the stationing pelling

Korean War, proved the rule; it was made possible only by a in June 1950. temporary Soviet boycott of the Security Council new policy the decline of Soviet power led to Moscow's When in applying the U.N. doctrine of cooperation with Washington of collective security against Baghdad, itwas less the arrival of
a new world order than the reappearance of an aspect of the

to have come into liberal institutional order that was supposed effect in 1945. one aspect of the liberal But just as the Gulf War resurrected ness
approach security against to world order, it also exposed an important weak

in the

liberal borders
within

conception.
in the U.N.

The
Charter

doctrine

of force

collective
appli

enshrined

is state-centric,

cable when
peoples

are crossed
a state.

but not when

is used

to the this problem try to escape by appealing and self-determination. Let of democracy peoples principles within states vote on whether they want to be protected behind Liberals
borders of their own. But self-determination is not as simple as

it sounds. Who decides what self will determine? Take Ireland, If Irish people voted within the existing political for example. Ulster would have a Protestant majority, but if the boundaries, Irish voted within the geographical boundaries of the island, a Catholic majority. be encompassed within Ulster would

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

Whoever
vote has

91

has
the

the power
power

to determine
the

the boundaries
outcome.

of the

to determine

It seemed clear that similar problem plagues Yugoslavia. allowed to vote on should be Slovenia relatively homogeneous a vote in similar Croatia turns Serbs in but self-determination, a vote on some districts who then demand into a minority It is not surprising Croatia. secession from an independent that issues of secession are more often determined by bullets than ballots. A
Nor are these rare

170 states in today's world are ethnically homogeneous. Only half have one ethnic group that accounts for as much as 75 Most of the republics of the of their population. percent have significant minorities and many former Soviet Union of a thousand is a continent have disputed borders. Africa across some within and ethnic and linguistic peoples squeezed states. Once such states are called into question, it is forty-odd to see where In such a world, ends. the process difficult of and international surveillance local autonomy federalism, some a promise, but policy of unqualified minority rights hold turn into a would for national self-determination support enormous world of disorder. principle v How
terms of

examples.

Less

than

ten

percent

of

the

then is it possible
the balance of

to preserve
power among

some order
sovereign

in traditional
states, while

also moving toward international institutions that promote ' justice among peoples?" International institutions are gradually evolving in just such a post-Westphalian in 1945, articles 55 and direction. Already states to collective responsi 56 of the U.N. Charter pledged of human rights and fundamental free bility for observance doms. Even before the recent Security Council resolutions
authorizing postwar interventions in

set a sanctions in South Africa against apartheid not for precedent being strictly limited by the charter's state ments In Europe about sovereignty. the 1975 Helsinki Ac can be referred to the cords codified human rights. Violations on or the Conference European Security and Cooperation law is gradually evolving. Council of Europe. International In 1965 the American Law Institute defined law as international . . . "rules and principles dealing with the conduct of states and tions of
international organizations." More recently the institute's law

Iraq,

U.N.

recommenda

92
yers

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
added the revealing words, "as well national as some concerns. of their

relations
increasingly

with

persons."
treated as more

Individual
than just

and minority

rights

are

in many, perhaps most, parts of the world such are and violations flouted To go unpunished. principles an armed multilateral mount to right all such intervention Of
wrongs would be another of source of enormous disorder. But

course

we

should

not
and

think of
is a matter limited

intervention
degree, economic

solely
with

in military
at ranging the low

terms.
from end of

Intervention statements

actions

measures

to full-fledged the spectrum invasions at the high end. The U.N. Security Council and regional organizations may decide on limited nonmilitary interventions. Multilateral infringe ments of sovereignty will gradually increase without suddenly of power among states. the distribution disrupting On a larger scale the Security Council can act under chapter seven of the U.N. if it determines that internal Charter
violence or Such

likely to spill over

region.

development

of weapons

of mass

destruction

are

into a more
are

general
somewhat

threat

to the peace

in a
the

definitions

elastic?witness

in the 1960s. The of sanctions against Rhodesia imposition reasons for multilateral will gradually intervention expand a was over time. Although of its Iraq special case because and 688 Council resolutions 687 blatant aggression, Security
may ment create for precedent of minorities threatens is developing instances a other relations situations with of mass of states where neighbors destruction act on a mistreat or where in viola

a country In other

weapons

tion of its obligations

under
groups

the Nonproliferation
may

Treaty.
regional

as Nigeria and others did basis to deal with internal fighting, to Liberia under the framework of the troops by sending In West African States. of Economic Yugoslavia Community the threat of economic the European employed Community in an effort to limit the sanctions as well as observer missions of American In Haiti members of the Organization violence.
States

throw of a democratically efforts was fully successful,

what are usually considered in cases

imposed

economic

sanctions

in

response

to

the

over

elected government. but each involved

domestic affairs.

None of intervention capabilities

members

the in for

It may
independent

also be possible
actions

to enhance
where the

U.N.

permanent

do not have a direct interest. The gains for collective for example, from the Gulf War would be squandered,

security if there

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

were no international response to a Rwandan invasion

93
of

Uganda deployment
brigades

or
from

a Libyan incursion into Chad. A U.N. rapid force of 60,000 troops formed from earmarked
a dozen countries could cope with a number of

as determined such contingencies by the Security Council. to traditional peacekeep Such a fighting force, as contrasted core of around a professional ing forces, could be formed 5,000 U.N. soldiers. They would need frequent joint exercises
to develop common command and operational procedures.

involvement could be limited to logistical and air support and, of course, the right to help control its activities staff committee. through the Security Council and the military an to need be worked but idea that would details out, Many or the Cold War have been silly Utopian during suddenly in the aftermath becomes worth detailed practical examination of the Cold War and Gulf War. and institutions will leave much Such imperfect principles room for domestic violence and injustice among peoples. an is immediate Yugoslavia example, and it will not be alone. were to But the moral horrors will be less than if policymakers to to try either right all wrongs by force or, alternatively, return to the unmodified the system. Among Westphalian of the old system are the poorly staunchest defenders inte states whose elites fear that new doctrines grated postcolonial of multilateral intervention by the United Nations will infringe to a liberal vision of a new their sovereignty. The transition is occurring, world order but not smoothly. Liberals must realize that the evolution is a matter of beyond Westphalia The U.S.
decades terms and miss centuries, while that realists are and VI must recognize that the of

traditional
transnational

definitions
the

of power

and order

in purely military

changes communications

in a world occurring instant information.

What
world

is the American
order? As

national

interest
rhetoric

in promoting
asks, why not

a new
put

America

first? The country faces a number of serious domestic from about 7.5 problems. The net savings rate has dropped to about 4.5 in of national the 1970s gross percent product eats The federal budget deficit percent today. up about half of net private savings. The educational not a is system producing an of level for skills in progress high enough continuing In terms of high school dropouts economy. information-age

election-year

94

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
States is wasting a quarter of its human resources to five percent for Japan. There is a need for to do in public infrastructure. Clearly we need

the United compared investment

more

at home.

But Americans should beware of a false debate between In a world of transnational domestic and foreign needs. the distinction between domestic and foreign interdependence becomes blurred. The real choice that Americans face is policy con not between but domestic and foreign policy, between and investment. President Bush has said that the sumption States has the will but not the wallet. The opposite United is closer to the mark. The United .States spends about 31 percent on government at all levels, while of gross national product most European to 40 percent. The countries closer spend
United dues are States is a rich a relative that acts poor. country countries and many pittance, America's see our U.N. failure

to pay them as proof of our hypocrisy about a new world our cite low levels of aid and order. Similarly Europeans
question munist our eastern seriousness Europe. and The relevance American to stability economy in postcom could sup

port a few more percentage points of gross national product to to maintain international invest at home while helping order. But why spend anything on international order? The simple answer is that in a world of transnational interdependence, can hurt, influence or disturb the ma disorder international States. A nuclear weapon living in the United jority of people or a from Soviet sold stolen former republic could be brought or the cargo into the United States in the hold of a freighter a a in Eastern Middle of commercial airliner. Chaos bay
country can sustain terrorists who threaten American travel

lers abroad. A Caribbean country's inability to control drugs or across our borders. disease could mean larger flows of both chemicals overseas can contribute Release of ozone-depleting to a rise in skin cancer in the United than States. With more ten percent of U.S. gross national product exported, American conditions. And economic international upon jobs depend even though not a direct threat to U.S. security, the human by transnational rights violations brought home to Americans are discomforting. If the rest of the world is communications are too weak to deal with in chaos, and governments mired the U.S. government their parts of a transnational problem,

WHAT NEW WORLD ORDER?

will not be able to solve such problems
to reduce the damage done to Americans.

95
them

alone or influence

even after the Cold War the United States has in international interests stability. The United geopolitical interest that no hostile power control States has a continuing turmoil draw us in the continent of Europe or that European as twice before in this under adverse circumstances, happened such events now have a much lower probability century. While a wise and thus can be met with a much reduced investment, out low still takes insurance against probability foreign policy events. Given the uncertainties in the aftermath of the Soviet In addition,
collapse, duced an American troop levels, has presence, security a effect reassuring even as at greatly re inte European

gration proceeds. and prosperous

eastern part of the

The United States has an interest in a stable western that gradually draws the Europe
continent toward pluralism and democracy.

role will rest with the Europeans, but if the The primary were to divorce itself from the process, we might United States situation far less stable. find the future geopolitical and economic States also has geopolitical The United inter ests in the Pacific. The United States is the only country with both economic and military power resources in the region, and is desired by Asian powers who do not its continued presence
want

to such a military role, and Japanese is opposed leaders realize a in the region. With it would be destabilizing relatively small but symbolically the United States important military presence
can

Japan

to remilitarize.

Japan's

current

political

consensus

aging Japan to invest its economic power not in military force but in international institutions and to help share the lead in with transnational issues. dealing In realist terms the United States will remain the world's next well into the have long century. Economists largest power consumer a of noted that if the largest collective good, such as its production, order, does not take the lead in organizing there is little likelihood that the good will be produced by others. That was the situation in the 1920s when the United or cooperate to join the League of Nations States refused in the the of international Isola economy. preserving stability tionism in the 1920s came back to haunt and hurt Americans a decade later. There is even less room for neo-isolationism
today.

help

to

provide

reassurance

in the

region,

while

encour

Why

not simply

leave the task of world

order

to the United

96

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

the United Nations is the sum of itsmember Nations? Because States is by far the largest member. nations and the United U.N. scale efforts like the repulse of Iraq will continue Large to require the participation of the world's largest power. The United States correctly wants to avoid the role of world The way to steer a middle policeman. path between bearing too much and too little of the international is to renew burden to multilateral commitment the American institutions that fell use of multilateral into abeyance in the 1980s. The institutions, also helps share the burden that while sometimes constraining,
the American

ism also
other make

limits the resentments

that can lead them for Americans

people

do

not

want

to bear to resist

alone.

Multilateral

and balances
American to achieve

the behavior
wishes interests.

of
and

nations it harder

national

toward failed in its policies While the Bush administration at end of its in the actions and the Gulf War, Iraq before the multilateral that expelled coalition Iraq from organizing interest in a new world order. The Kuwait fit the national combined both the hard power of military administration to co-opt others might and the soft power of using institutions to share the burden. Without resolutions the U.N. it might have been impossible for the Saudis to accept troops and for States others to send troops. Nor is it likely that the United to foot nearly the entire bill for others could have persuaded
the war. Had there War been order no response be to Iraq's aggression dangerous. and

violation
the

of its obligations

under
would

the Nonproliferation
far more

Treaty,

short the new world evolving and not susceptible In

ulation. Russia and China

post-Cold

It is messy, order has begun. or manip to simple formulation

face uncertain futures. Regional

bullies

seek weapons pressure may increase. The both traditional power and is to pursue effectively liberal democracy promote
so without ocratic causing chaos. are governments

will

Protectionist of mass destruction. United States will have to combine if it liberal institutional approaches to its national interest. We want and human rights where we can do
reason likely is obvious: liberal dem to threaten us over time. We

The less

our alliances will need to maintain the short run, while simultaneously
ocratic values, human

and a balance of power in to promote dem working

institutions for the

To

do

less is to have only a fraction

rights

and

of a foreign

long

run.

policy.