EHESS

Anli-Ollonan FoIilics and Tvansil BigIls TIe SevenleenlI-Cenluv Tvade in SiII Ielveen
SaJavid Ivan and Muscov
AulIov|s) Budi MallIee
Bevieved vovI|s)
Souvce CaIievs du Monde vusse, VoI. 35, No. 4 |Ocl. - Bec., 1994), pp. 739-761
FuIIisIed I EHESS
SlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/20170927 .
Accessed 10/03/2012 1105
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
EHESS is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Cahiers du Monde russe.
http://www.jstor.org
RUDI MATTHEE
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS
THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TRADE IN SILK
BETWEEN SAFAVID IRAN AND MUSCOVY
Introduction
Conceiving
of Safavid Iran as the hub in a wheel of
surrounding
states,
one
quickly
realizes the shallowness of our
understanding
of the wheel's various
spokes.
One, moreover,
is
missing
almost
completely.
Of the Safavids'
dealings
with the
countries that were
closely
connected with Iran
through politics
and
trade,
those with
the Muscovite state remain
virtually
unknown outside of Russian
scholarship.
Long separated
from Iran as it was
by unpacified
nomadic
peoples, Muscovy
was
more distant than either the Ottoman or the
Mughal Empire,
the other two
early
modern states with similarities in
political
structure and economic
policies.
This
situation
began
to
change
in the sixteenth
century,
when its southern
expansion
brought
Moscow within the orbit that Safavid Iran claimed as its own. The
interaction that followed had
nothing
of the mutual
animosity growing
out of rival
interpretations
of a common
religious heritage
that marked the often bellicose
Safavid-Ottoman relations. Nor did the two states
engage
in the kind of cultural
exchange
that characterized the
relationship
between Safavids and
Mughals.
What
brought
Russia and Iran into contact instead were common material
interests,
political
as well as
economic,
that were
intimately
linked to the international
political
configuration
and
patterns
of trade at the turn of the seventeenth
century.
The
following
discussion will take these common
interests as the
starting point
from which to examine the interaction between Iran and the Muscovite state from the
late sixteenth to the late seventeenth
century,
or the
period spanned by
the active
economic involvement of Shah 'Abbas I in Iran and Tsar Peter I in
Russia,
respectively.
In this I will
necessarily pay
close attention to the ultimate rationale
of the Russo-Iranian
axis,
the Ottoman threat to
both,
but I will view their mutual
diplomatic courting through
the
prism
of the
study's
main
object,
the
relationship's
commercial dimension
and,
more
particularly,
the trade in silk.1 Attention to the
Cahiers du Monde russe, XXXV
(4),
octobre-d?cembre
1994, pp.
739-762.
740 RUDI MATTHEE
Safavid silk
trade,
which still awaits a
comprehensive study,
thus far has
mostly
been
focused on the maritime Persian Gulf route which in the
early
seventeenth
century
began
to be used as an alternative outlet for the Iranian silk that was
traditionally
exported
via the land-based route
through
the Ottoman
Empire.
Much less well
known in this shift from a latitudinal to a
longitudinal
axis is the latter's northern
component,
the fluvial route which led from Iran via the
Caspian
Sea to Astrakhan
and thence followed the
Volga up
to
Nizhnii-Novgorod,
from where
goods
were
usually
carried overland to Moscow.2 It is this third outlet for Iranian silk which I
will here
explore
in an
attempt
to establish the
degree
to which it
managed
to become
an alternative to the other itineraries in the course of the seventeenth
century.
Before
doing
so, however,
an overview of its
origins
and
early development
is in
order.
L
Early
relations
Trade relations between Russia and the Middle
East,
including
Iran, go
back to
pre-Islamic
times. Hoards of coins and silver
objects
from the Sasanian
period
in
Iran
testify
to an
early exchange
of
goods,
but in the absence of written sources it is
unfortunately impossible
to elaborate on this trade.3 In
early
Islamic times matters
improve
with the various Muslim
geographers
who
provide
information on
commercial relations between "Rus" and the lands of Islam. In these
early days
a
direct route to
Iran,
or rather two
routes,
existed which crossed the
territory
between
the Black and
Caspian
Seas. The first one was the maritime route that followed the
western shores of the
Caspian
Sea until it reached the
port
towns of Gilan on the
southern coast. The second one followed the same
trajectory
but turned into an
overland route
beginning
in
Darband, traditionally
a
major gateway through
the
Caucasus,
from where it continued in the direction of
Mesopotamia.4
Due to the
unpacified
state of
Daghestan,
the
territory
north of
Darband,
the first
descriptions
of
the overland route
along
the western shores of the
Caspian
Sea
only
date from the
twelfth
century,
while the route itself
began
to be used with some
regularity only
in
the thirteenth.5
Commercial centers and routes witnessed several shifts over time. Protracted
warfare between Arabs and Khazars was followed in the
eighth century by
the rise
of
Itil,
the
capital
of the Khazar
state,
situated at the mouth of the
Volga
near the later
city
of
Astrakhan,
as a trade
emporium. Together
with the
Bulgars,
the Khazars
became the middlemen in a
lively
trade that linked the Baltic North to the Arab East.6
This Transcaucasian link functioned until the tenth
century,
when Rus raids into
Shirvan and Tabaristan
wrought
havoc in the area around the
Caspian
Sea. At the
same time unrest in the Caucasus and renewed hostilities between Arabs and
Khazars made the direct route between Iran
along
the
Caspian
route
impracticable
and forced travelers to make
huge
detours via Khwarazm and the desert between the
Aral Sea and the
Volga
basin.7
The Caucasian link withered after the destruction of Itil and
Bulgar by
the Rus in
the 960's and the fall of the Samanid state in eastern Iran in the same
period. Kiev,
the
capital
of a
newly emerging
state,
replaced
Itil and
Bulgar
as the most
important
trade center in the north-south link. As
long
as
the Kievan state
flourished,
the
point
of
gravity
of Russian-Middle Eastern trade continued to be located in the
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 741
southwest.
However,
the decline of Kiev in the twelfth
century
?
the
city
was
sacked in 1169
?
and the
emergence
of the Vladimir-Suzdal' state caused
a
shift
toward the northeast and made the
Volga
route,
with Suzdal' as its
center,
the main
commercial
artery.8
Economic weakness in much of the Middle East
prevented
the
Volga
connection
from
flourishing
until the
incorporation
of Iran
by
the Khwarazmshahs in the
early
thirteenth
century.
The latter restored commercial relations with
Bulgar,
but the
Mongol
invasion
preempted
a
long-term
commercial revival.9
Subjugating
the
Bulgar
state as well as
Iran,
the
Mongols severely interrupted
commercial
exchange.
However,
under the successor
states,
the Ilkhans in Iran and the Golden Horde in
south
Russia,
trade links revived
remarkably quickly.
In
Iran, Tabriz,
and to a lesser
extent
Sultaniyeh,
became
thriving
commercial
centers,
while in Russia
Sarai,
the
capital
of the Golden
Horde,
and the Black Sea
port city
of Kaffa
(modem Fedosiya)
assumed a
similar role.10 In both territories
Italian,
Genoese and
Venetian,
merchants
managed
to establish
strongholds.
Thus trade flourished until the mid
thirteenth
century,
when the devastation of the Black Death and the Timurid
invasions caused the Golden Horde in Russia to
disintegrate
and llkhanid rule in Iran
to
collapse.
Following
the
Mongol period,
it was the rise of Moscow and its liberation from
the "Tatar
yoke"
which were decisive for the revival of the
diplomatic
and
commercial links with the Islamic world.
Muscovy
established
diplomatic
relations with the Porte before the end of the fifteenth
century.
Its commercial links
with the Ottomans increased as well. At the same time
Muscovy
became involved
in a tenuous
triangular relationship
with the khanates of Kazan to the northeast and
Crimea to the southwest. For a
long
time, Kazan,
the dominant commercial market
on the route to the
Caspian
Sea,
and the Crimean
khanate,
vital in the links with the
Ottoman
Empire,
lived in
peace
with
Muscovy. However,
as soon as the rationale
for mutual
good
will,
the Golden
Horde,
disappeared,
the alliance broke
up,
to be
replaced
with
friendly
relations between Moscow and Astrakhan.11
More than a
good rapport
between Moscow and Astrakhan was
required
to
revitalize the link with Iran
which,
following
llkhanid
rule,
had lived
through
the
turbulent
episode
of the Timurid
occupation
and warfare between various local
dynasties.
Another
catalyst
was the establishment of the Safavid
dynasty
in the
early
1500's,
which ended a
long period
of
dispersed power
in Iran. Mutual interest
between Safavid Iran and Russia can be traced to these
early days
and,
more
specifically,
to the
reigns
of Shah Ismail I
(1502-1524)
and Tsar Vasili III
(1505
1533).
The earliest
diplomatic
contact recorded in the Russian sources dates from
this
period
and concerns a Safavid
envoy
who visited Moscow in 1521.12
Relations,
including
commercial
ones,
long
remained
intermittent,
however. In
the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries few Russian merchants
ventured south into
a
region
that was
unpacified
and lacked the most basic facilities
for commercial traffic.13 On the Russian side Tatars acted as the main
intermediaries in the Russo-Iranian trade. The Italian traveler Contarini in the later
1400's noted that a caravan left Astrakhan for Moscow
every year
"accompanied by
a
great many
Tartar merchants who
[...]
take with them silk manufactured in Gesdi
[YazdJ
and fustian stuffs to
exchange
for
furs, saddles, swords,
bridles and other
things
which
they require."14
On the
part
of Iran the first to
engage
in commercial
traffic with the north were
probably
the Armenians from the town of Julfa on the
742 RUDI MATTHEE
river
Aras,
who
enjoyed
a
preeminent position
in the commerce of northern Iran
?
which
mostly
revolved around silk
?
as of the
early
sixteenth
century. They
seem
to have traded with Moscow
long
before Russia controlled the
Caspian
Sea route.15
They may
also have been instrumental in
attempts
to
transport
silk from Gilan to
Europe
via Russia when the Ottomans struck Iran with
a
commercial blockade in
1514-1515.16 In the
period prior
to the extension of Safavid control over northern
Iran,
they presumably
relied on their
political
clout with local rulers. Thus in 1544
the
beglerbeg
of Shirvan asked Ivan IV to renew
existing privileges
for Armenian
merchants in their trade with Russia.17
The extension of Russian control over the
Volga
route,
which
preceded
Safavid
control over the southern
Caucasus, may
be seen as a land-based variant of the
maritime
expansion
undertaken
by Europe
at the turn of the sixteenth
century.
While the
consequences
for the Ottoman
Empire
and Iran of
Europe's
maritime
exploration
are well
known, however,
the simultaneous advance
by
and
through
Russia remains
relatively
obscure.
Attempts
to break the Iberian
monopoly
over
the sea route to Asia first took the form of efforts to establish an overland
alternative,
as seen in the endeavor
by
the Genoese Paolo Centurione in 1522 to
open up
a route
from the Baltic Sea via the
Volga
and Astrakhan to Central Asia and India.18 These
efforts met with little success as
long
as the lands
lying
astride this fluvial route
remained
unpacified. Pacification,
in
turn,
had to wait until after the Russian
annexation of the khanates of Kazan
(1552)
and Astrakhan
(1556),
as a
result of
which the Caucasus and the
Caspian
Sea were made accessible via the
Volga
route.
Among
the first to take
advantage
of
improved
communications and increased
safety
were the
English
so-called
Muscovy
merchants
who,
faced with a
Portuguese
and
Spanish monopoly
of the
southern,
Atlantic and Indian Ocean routes and a
strong
Venetian
presence
on the Levant
route,
attempted
to use the northern
itinerary
in their
quest
for the riches of the Indies. Under the
auspices
of the
newly incorporated
Russian
Company,
merchants such as Arthur
Edwards,
Anthony
Jenkinson,
and
Thomas
Randolph
led a number of commercial
expeditions through
Russia to Iran in
thel560'sandl570's.19
The Russian annexation of Astrakhan
proved
to be of momentous
importance
for
commercial relations between the Slavic and the Muslim worlds.
Incorporated
into
the Muscovite realm and
rebuilt,
the town
emerged
as the
principal
crossroads where
merchants from
Russia, Iran,
Central Asia and India met and
exchanged
their wares.
From Astrakhan Russian merchants
began
to venture further south.
They
not
only
participated
in the
exchange
of silk and other wares in Shamakhi
(Shamakha),
the
capital
of Shirvan and the southern terminus for most northern
merchants,
but their
presence
was noted in cities such as
Tabriz, Ardabil, Qazvin,
and Kashan as
well.20
The wares
they brought
with them consisted of leather
skins,
metal
objects
such as
knives and
nails,
various
furs,
such as
sable, fox, marten,
and
squirrel,
wax,
and
tallow. Arms were
very
much in demand
too,
especially
chain
armors,
arrows and
spears.
For their
part,
merchants from Iran made their
way up
to the cities of Kazan
and
Nizhnii-Novgorod,
which
developed
into
lively
trade centers. Aside from
Iranians,
Russian cities were visited
by
merchants from Central Asia and
India,
sent
by
their
governments
with official merchandise. Moscow itself was not much
frequented by foreign
merchants in this
early phase.21
In
addition,
Armenian
merchants must have been active in the north-south
link, judging by
the existence of
an Armenian caravanserai in Moscow in the late sixteenth
century.22
Iran
exported
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 743
mostly precious
cloth. The
velvets,
satins and taffetas woven in
Yazd, Kashan,
and
Isfahan that were taken to Russia often made
up seventy
or more
percent
of the total
value of
goods transported
in the late sixteenth
century. Besides,
Iran
supplied
Russia with
carpets,
morocco, saffron,
dyes, precious
stones and steel arms.23
Silk was
among
the items that were
exchanged
in this
period. Anthony
Jenkinson in 1558 observed that Astrakhan was a
meeting place
of Tatar merchants
who
brought
"diners kindes of wares made of cotton
wooll,
with diuers kinds of
wrought silkes,"
and merchants from Shamakhi in Iran who carried
"sowing silke,
which is the coursest that
they
use in Russeland."24
Nonetheless,
the silk
supply
from Iran
appears
to have been
fairly insignificant
in the
early
and mid-sixteenth
century
and
only began
to
expand
when the
emergence
of a demand from western
Europe
in the later
part
of the
century opened up
the
possibility
of
reexport.25
The Muscovite state soon followed
private
merchants in
extending
its ambit to
relations with the lands
beyond
Astrakhan. Contacts that included trade issues
were established with the Central Asian khanates as well as with the Caucasian
territories that were subordinated to Iran. Thus Shirvan and Shamakhi in 1562 and
1563 sent
envoys
to Moscow for trade talks.26 Ivan IV in 1567
dispatched
two
agents
with
royal
wares as far south as the Persian Gulf
port
of Hormuz.27 In this
development,
as well as the construction of a number of fortresses
along
the
Volga
route in the
1580's,
we see a
growing
official interest in trade relations
coupled
with
a concern about commercial
security
on the
part
of Moscow. With the
greater
role
of trade in Russia's
political dealings
with Iran came an increase in state control over
commerce and its
practitioners.
In a
process
that recalls similar
changes
in
relations with the Ottoman
Empire
somewhat
earlier,
an
original
dominance of
private
merchants after 1570
gave way
to a
gradual appropriation by
the Russian
state of the
exchange
of
goods.28
Whereas in the fifteenth and
early
sixteenth
centuries
foreign
merchants
appear
to have had full freedom to trade in cities all over
Russia,
foreign
commercial activities became
severely
restricted in the later
sixteenth
century,
and
especially
after the termination of the Livonian War. In a
mercantilistic effort to limit the activities of
foreign
merchants,
Russia now
only
allowed them to
operate
in so-called
gosti
hostels. The
importation
of
goods
also
was made
subject
to
taxation,
not
just
at the
borders,
but at various
points
en route as
well.29 Nor were merchants from the east
permitted
to
buy
Russian
goods directly
from
producers
and manufacturers. Instead
they
were
obliged
to use Russian
merchants as
intermediaries.30
Foreign
merchants, moreover,
generally paid
two to
three times as much as Russians in tolls.
Lastly,
the
exportation
of a whole
array
of
wares became
subject
to state
monopolization.
The
export
of
precious metals, gold
and
silver,
was
strictly
forbidden.
Other,
so-called
"protected goods"
had
limitations
imposed
on their
export,
the terms of which were to be determined
by
the
Russian state. Arms and
a
number of metal wares fell in this
category.
The same
was true for sable fur and leather skins. Another
example
was
wax,
the
export
of
which
may
have become restricted in 1588 because of
growing foreign
demand.31
Moscow's thrust into the Caucasus
prepared
the
way
for
expanded political
and
commercial
dealings
but did not
immediately
lead to a
steady
increase in traffic with
the southern
neighbor.
For the time
being,
the route
alongside
the
Caspian
littoral
remained far from
secure,
devoid of facilities and infested with bandits as it was.
As robberies were
common,
few Russian merchants headed south. And if
they
did,
it was
invariably
in the form of caravans
protected by
armed
troops.
The latter
744 RUDI MATTHEE
could reach
up
to
1,000
men. Even
then,
there was no
guarantee
that the caravan
might
not be attacked.32 If
anything,
conditions worsened in the last third of the
sixteenth
century.
The 1571
burning
of Moscow
by
the Crimean
Tatars,
the
uprising
of the
Volga
Tatars a
year later,
and the lack of success the Russians had in
their wars with Sweden and Poland threw the north into turmoil. This unsettled
state was matched
by
troubles in the south which
developed
as a
result of the
campaign
the Ottomans
simultaneously waged against
Astrakhan. When
they
took
Azerbaijan
and the
Caspian
Sea littoral between the cities of Baku and
Darband,
travel between Moscow and Iran
along
the western side became
impossible
and
temporarily
shifted to the eastern shore.
In
sum,
the 1570's and 1580's were
hardly propitious
times for commercial
exchange,
as was discovered
by
the voivoda of Astrakhan who
unsuccessfully
attempted
to attract
foreign
merchants to his town in 1586.33
Things
were soon to
change,
however. Defeat in the Livonian War blocked the chances of a Russian
outlet via the Baltic. A succession crisis in the Crimean khanate was a second
development
that forced Moscow to turn its attention to its southern and southeastern
borders
again.
Before
long
the Russians built a new series of fortifications on the
Caucasian frontier.
Having forged
a broad anti-Ottoman
coalition,
which included
a branch of the Crimean
Tatars,
Russia was now
ready
to establish closer relations
with Iran as
well as with the Central Asian khanates.34
II. The
reign
of Shah
'
Abbas I
Renewed Russian interest in the lands to the south
virtually
coincided with the
accession of Shah 'Abbas I to the Safavid throne in 1587. Under Shah 'Abbas I
(r. 1587-1629)
the Safavid state reached its
apogee
of
political power
and
military
strength.
'
Abbas's
expansionist policies
also
brought
him into conflict with the
Ottomans. It was the threat from this common
neighbor
and the
resulting
anti
Ottoman interests shared
by
Moscow and Iran which
provided
the rationale for the
contacts the two states established. There was
nothing
new about these shared
interests. Fear of the Ottomans went back as far as the fall of
Constantinople
in
1453. The
subsequent expansion
of the Ottoman
Empire
into southeastern
Europe
and the area north of the Black Sea had increased concern on the
part
of
European
and West-Asian
powers
alike and was an
early ground
for Moscow to seek Muslim
allies in an anti-Turkish coalition. Russian
envoys
visited Herat in
1464-1465,
while Ivan III in the same
period
sent an
envoy
to Shamakhi.35 Simultaneous
contacts between Uzun
Hasan,
the ruler of the Iranian
Aq-Qoyunlu dynasty,
and
Moscow were
part
of the same
development.
The
subsequent emergence
in
southern Russia of the Crimean Tatars as Ottoman
proxies
lent even more
weight
to
the shared concerns of Moscow and
Qazvin.36
The interest that the Safavids
developed
in their northern
neighbor already
before
Shah 'Abbas was
principally
motivated
by
a lack of success in their wars with the
Ottomans. The Ottoman
attempt
to seize
Azerbaijan
and Shirvan in the
early
1550's
prompted
Shah
Tahmasp
I
(r. 1524-1576)
to send a
mission to Moscow in
1552-1553. But it was
especially
the
hapless peace
of
Amasya
of
1555,
followed
by
Ottoman
aggression against
Astrakhan in the next
decade,
which made both
parties eager
to
intensify
their
diplomatic
relations.37
Amasya
cost Iran
large parts
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 745
of
Azerbaijan
and
Mesopotamia.
The Ottoman
occupation
of
Astrakhan,
in
turn,
eliminated Russian control over a vital commercial center and
interrupted
the most
important
trade route between the south and the north. Matters became even worse
and
a
coalition between Russia and Iran more
plausible
in the
1580's,
when the
Ottomans
occupied parts
of
Georgia
and
Shirvan, including
the
city
of Tiflis.
Through
the first serious Safavid mission to
Moscow,
Shah Khodabandeh
(r.
1578
1587) proposed
a
coalition and
promised
Darband and Baku to the Russians
following
the liberation of these cities. This
mission,
which was led
by
Hadi
Beg
(called
Andi
Beg
in the Russian
sources),
appeared
bold in its
objectives
but
inaugurated
a
pattern
in that it did not lead to
any
concrete results.
Iran,
it would
turn out in
subsequent
encounters,
was keen
enough
to court Russia as a
potential
future
ally, yet apprehensive enough
of the Turks not to
engage
in a formal alliance
with third
parties.
The first Hadi
Beg
mission bore no concrete results but did lead to the
regular
and
frequent exchange
of
envoys,
beginning
with the
embassy
of
Grigorii
Boris
Vasil'chikov to
Qazvin
in 1588. None of these missions led to
any
formal
agreement
due to Shah
'
Abbas's reluctance to
jeopardize
his imminent
peace
accord
with the Ottomans
by concluding
an anti-Turkish coalition with Moscow. On the
other
hand,
these contacts were not
entirely fruitless,
for the second Hadi
Beg
mission,
which was
dispatched
in
1589,
did result in closer economic
ties,
or at least
laid the
groundwork
for such ties in the form of written statements from the Russians
expressing
their desire for economic relations. The commitment to free trade for
Iranian merchants which the tsar articulated on this occasion was an
especially
welcome
signal
for the
separate
Gilan
embassy accompanying
the Iranian
delegation
whose main concern was the unfair treatment of Gilani merchants in Astrakhan as
well as their free access to the Russian market.38
Shah
'
Abbas's
diplomatic
maneuvers toward the north in these
years
aimed above
all at
securing
Iran's
position against
the
Ottomans,
but
increasingly began
to involve
trade relations as well. While the so-called
Kaya
mission sent to Moscow in 1591
had
a
diplomatic mandate,
through
it 'Abbas also
expressed
his desire to establish
commercial links with Russia. The Russian
acceptance
of this
proposal
in fact was
the mission's
only
concrete result.39 In
May 1592,
well before the
Kaya
mission had
returned from
Russia,
'Abbas
dispatched
another mission. Led
by Hajji Khosrow,
its
objectives
included the establishment of toll-free trade for
government goods
carried
by
Iranian merchants. The mission bore no
political results,
but its
commercial success
?
the shah was
given
the
right
to trade toll-free in Russia
?
more
than
compensated
for that. In a
logical
next
step,
'Abbas did not wait for
Hajji
Khosrow to return and in 1593 sent
yet
another
delegation.
Its
leader,
Hajji
Iskandar,
became the first Safavid official merchant sent to Russia in the
guise
of a
diplomatic
envoy.40 Hajji
Iskandar,
who carried a number of
royal
wares,
failed to finalize the
agreement
when the Russians refused to
agree
to his demand of
selling
the
goods
he
had
brought
wholesale while
being
allowed the freedom to choose an assortment of
wares in his
purchases.
He is also said to have overestimated the value of his
merchandise and to have demanded too
many goods
from the Russians in return.41
This first failure to find common
ground
did not forestall further efforts. In
1594 the shah sent a third
embassy
under the direction of Hadi
Beg.
The
royal
merchants who
accompanied
this mission
carried, among
other
things,
ca. 200
kg.
of
silk,
and
bought
a
number of
"protected" goods
for the shah which included
arms,
746 RUDI MATTHEE
metal wares and sable fur. In 1597 Moscow sent a mission to
Iran,
led
by
V V. Tiufiakin. This ill-fated mission
?
all three of its successive leaders
perished
before
they
had reached Iran
?
had
a
commercial dimension inasmuch as one of its
task was the
signing
of a commercial
treaty.
The same
task,
designed
to normalize
trade relations between the two
countries,
seems to have been
assigned
to the full
fledged embassy
which the new Tsar Boris Godunov
dispatched
under the direction
of Zhirov and Zasekin in 1600.42
For the time
being, political objectives
continued to overshadow commercial
concerns,
even as an
asymmetry
in these
objectives began
to mark the relations
between Iran and Moscow in the 1590's. Russia continued to be
eager
to draw Iran
into an anti-Ottoman alliance. Shah
'Abbas, however,
at this
point
had different
priorities. Having signed
an
agreement
with the Ottomans in 1589-1590 that left
his hands free in return for
ceding large parts
of the
north,
he did not
seriously
intend
to resume hostilities and was thus in no
position
to
adopt
an active anti-Turkish
stance. A war
against
the
?zbegs
and internal
reforms, moreover,
absorbed all his
energy,
as was discovered
by
the
Zvenigorodskii
mission which Moscow sent in
1595 in
response
to the various
delegations
Iran had
previously dispatched.
'
Abbas's
political
acumen, however,
told him
that, given
the
volatility
of the
political
climate,
he could not afford to alienate the Russian
by rebuffing
them
altogether.
The solution which the Safavid ruler
adopted
was to leave the Russians in the belief
that Iran was
planning
a war while
simultaneously holding
out an oft
repeated
promise
that he was keen on
concluding
an anti-Ottoman
treaty
with Moscow.
The real issue of
diplomatic
efforts, meanwhile,
began
to be
Transcaucasia,
the
area where
Russian,
Iranian and Ottoman
spheres
of influence
converged
and
clashed. In the late 1500's Russia mounted a
campaign
into
Daghestan against
the
Shamkhal of Tarkov and laid claims to
Daghestan,
Darband and
Baku,
all
tributary
to the Safavid crown. When the Russians built a number of fortresses south of the
river
Terek,
Iranian fears about this
foray
into its northern flank
grew
into
anxiety
about the
possibility
of a
military
union between Moscow and
Georgia.
Unlike the
Russians,
who cautioned their
envoys
to be
circumspect
about the Caucasian
issue,
the Iranians
evidently
had little interest in
keeping up appearances,
as is seen in the
small number of return missions sent
by
'Abbas and the bad treatment suffered
by
the various Russian missions that visited the Safavid court.43
Yet,
in
effect,
Iran
had to move
cautiously
in its resistance to Moscow's claim on
Daghestan, Darband,
and Baku if it wanted to
keep
the
option
of
having
a
potential
anti-Ottoman
ally open.
To
encourage
Moscow to
stop
further
advancing
into the Caucasus
region
thus
became a cornerstone of 'Abbas's northern
policy.44
After 1598 the
geopolitical
balance between Russia and Iran
changed
in the
latter's favor. In Russia the
period
of turmoil known as the Time of Troubles
(
1598
1613)
weakened the state and
thereby
its
ability
to function as a credible
military
partner
in the anti-Ottoman
struggle.
But the Time of Troubles
period
had its most
dramatic
repercussions
on commercial
relations,
as Ottoman and Crimean Tatar
threats and the destruction caused
by peasant
rebellions
temporarily
led to the
closure of the route from Moscow to Astrakhan.45
Iran, meanwhile,
having
concluded the
?zbeg
wars and
a series of internal
military
and administrative
reforms,
entered a
phase
of considerable
political
and
military strength.
The result of these
developments,
a
growing
distance between the two
states,
was
exacerbated
by
the
continuing
Caucasian
aspirations
of both. While Shah 'Abbas
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 747
in 1603-1604 launched a broad
diplomatic
initiative toward various west
European
states which seemed to hold a better
promise
for assistance
against
the Ottoman
foe,
and
simultaneously
resumed hostilities with the
latter,
his
apparent willingness
to
solicit Russian
help
diminished,
and what remained could
hardly
conceal the true
nature of his intentions. Never intent on
concluding
an actual anti-Turkish
treaty
with
Moscow,
the Safavid ruler
merely
wanted to ensure that Russia would not be a
danger
to his northern border.46 The
Russians,
for their
part, grew
ever more
reluctant to assist Iran as
they
were
making preparations
for an offensive in the
Caucasus.
Indeed,
while Shah 'Abbas was
waiting
for the
right
moment to move
against
the
Ottomans,
the Russians advanced their Caucasian claims
by assisting
Alexander,
the ruler of the
principality
of
Kakhet'i,
in his
struggle against
the Turks
and the Iranians. This
prompted
Iran to
subjugate
these
regions
in 1605.
Powerless to intervene
militarily,
the Russians could do little more than
dispatch
a
mission to
protest
Iran's behavior and to
try
and
regain
the lost
territory.
Neither commercial nor
diplomatic
relations flourished in the
following period,
in which
Georgia
and Shirvan suffered
just
as much as the western
parts
of
Azerbaijan
as a result of Shah 'Abbas's Caucasian
campaigns
and his wars
against
the Ottomans. The
trading emporium
of Shamakhi
lay
in ruins in
1607-1608,47
and in the
long
run is said to have decreased in size as a
result of the Ottoman-Safavid
wars.48 Nor were
things quiet
and stable on the Russian side. Faced with
rebellion
by
Cossack marauders
?
who held Astrakhan
occupied
for
a
period
?
the
Muscovite state was unable to continue its former relations with Iran until 1613.
In that
year
the accession to the throne of Tsar Mikhail Romanov
finally
laid
the basis for the
resumption
of
regular diplomatic
contact between the two courts.
A
year
later Russia sent a mission led
by
Tikhanov in an
attempt
to renew
commercial and
diplomatic
ties. The missions of
1615, 1616,
and 1618-1620
which followed all reflected Russia's continued weakness in the tsar's
persistent
request
for
monetary
assistance and in Russia's reluctance to broach the
Georgian
question
with the Safavids. How much Moscow's clout had diminished with Shah
'Abbas,
who was
evidently
aware of the Russian
impotence,
is illustrated in the
rough
and
impolite
treatment the various
envoys
from the north suffered at the
Safavid court.49
If the
poor reception
Russian
diplomats enjoyed
in Isfahan reflected Moscow's
declining importance
in
Iran,
'Abbas had
good
reasons to limit his northern concerns
to
consolidating
the
safety
of his Caucasian border. Iran's
victory
in the war
against
the Turks in 1618 had obviated
any
direct
plea
for Russian assistance.
Commercially things
were
changing
as
well. While he had earlier looked at Russia
as a
possible
alternative outlet for the silk that
traditionally
went
through
the
Ottoman
Empire,
'Abbas now
began
to
explore
a third
option,
that of the maritime
trade route
through
the Persian
Gulf,
which had been
suggested
as
early
as
1608,
as
an alternative to the Anatolian and the
Caspian
trade routes.
By engaging
in
relations with the dominant
powers
of western
Europe,
the Safavid ruler
expanded
his
political bargaining power.50
The
counterpart
of this was a dilution of Russian
influence in Iran. Neither
commercially
nor
militarily
were the Russians of
any
use
in 'Abbas's Persian Gulf
strategy.
It was
newcomers,
beginning
with the
English
and Dutch East India
Companies,
whose assistance the Safavid ruler now
sought
in
his feud with the
Portuguese
and the
implementation
of his commercial
plans
in the
Persian Gulf.
748 RUDI MATTHEE
If all this
spelled
the end to the idea of Russia as an
officially
sanctioned third
outlet for Iranian
silk,
none of it
put
a
halt to the commercial
exchange
between the
two countries. The Mohammad Kazem mission that went to Moscow in
1616,
for
example,
had a commercial dimension. Not
only
did it include
a
supply
of
silk,
but
it resulted in Russian
steps
toward
greater protection
of Iranian merchants in Iran.51
Nor did the
changed
Iranian
priorities
deter the Russians from
continuing
their
activity
in the silk
trade,
either
privately
or in
conjunction
with
diplomatic
traffic.
Numerous
examples
in the 1620's
testify
to this. A
report
from 1626 indicates that
Russian merchants would come down via the
Caspian
Sea to
exchange
their
goods
for silk in Gilan.52 In
1629,
following
the death of 'Abbas I and an
ensuing
rebellion in
Gilan,
ten Muscovite merchants arrived in Isfahan after
being
robbed
by
rebels in Gilan.
Claiming
that their total
cargo
had been 500 bales of
silk, they
were
reimbursed after the defeat of the rebel leader Gharib Shah.53 In
1623, finally,
a
total of over
2,000
kg.
of silk was
shipped
from Astrakhan to various Russian
cities.54
Most
surviving
information from the 1620's concerns the
continuing exchange
of wares at the official level. Griaznom
Selivanov,
one of the merchants who
accompanied
the Korob'in mission of
1621-1623,
carried 500 rubles worth of sable
fur to Iran with the intent to
purchase
arms with the
proceeds.
Ivan
Afanasevich,
the other
high-ranking
merchant
traveling
with the
mission,
carried merchandise
with the aim of
buying
silk in Iran.55
Following
the Korob'in
mission,
the Russians
sent Fedot Kotov in 1623 as an official merchant
(gost')
with tsarist merchandise
and the task of
surveying
the route and of
gathering
information about Iran.56 He
was followed in 1624
by
a Russian ambassador who came to Iran in order to
encourage
the trade of silk via the
Caspian
route. Shah
'Abbas, however,
who at
this
point
was intent on
stimulating
the Persian Gulf
trade,
rejected
his
proposals.
Accompanying
merchants were said to have
bought
ca. 150 bales of silk before their
return to Moscow.57 The Russian ambassador who arrived in Iran two
years
later
ostensibly
was
charged
with the same task.
He, too,
seems to have returned
unsuccessfully.58
The low
priority
which 'Abbas accorded to relations with the Russians in the
latter
part
of his
reign may
have accounted for the fact that the status of trade
relations and in
particular
that of
privileges
and
procedures
remained unresolved.
That northern merchants suffered from this more than their Iranian
counterparts
is
suggested by contemporary
Russian sources which note the existence of an
unequal
situation in the extent to which residents of either state were able to
operate freely
in
the
territory
of the other. Russian merchants are said to have been
routinely
harassed and obstructed in their movements
by
the local rulers of Gilan and
Ardabil,
while their wares were
subjected
to strict
inspections by
the same rulers. Yusuf
Khan,
the ruler of
Shamakhi,
refused to
grant legal protection
of Russian merchants
visiting
his
territory
and even took Russian
captives.
Iranian merchants
accompanying
official
embassies,
on the other
hand,
tended to
operate
in the
guise
of official merchants and
routinely presented
their wares as
royal
ones in order to
enjoy
the freedom from taxation
granted
to official merchandise. The breach of
confidence this
signified
was
acknowledged
in 'Abbas's
promise
to the Russian
envoy
Korob'in that henceforth the merchants sent
by
him would have sealed letters
proving
their official
status,
which would entitle them to be
exempted
from tolls and
taxes.59
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 749
III. The
period
1629-1667
The death of Shah 'Abbas I in 1629 marked the
beginning
of considerable
change
in the
relationship
between the Safavid and the Romanov states. 'Abbas's
successor,
Shah
Safi,
took much less interest in the silk trade than his
grandfather
had
done,
and under him the
royal export monopoly
?
which had never been total
?
quickly lapsed, giving greater
latitude to
private
merchants. The
pacification
of the
north
by
the Safavids and the
regeneration
of Iran's northern
territory
also
contributed to a more
propitious
commercial climate. In the 1630's the German
traveler Adam Olearius testified to the revival of Shamakhi
by describing
the town
as a center of commerce with a
great
bazaar where all kinds of
goods changed
hands,
and several caravanserais for
foreign
merchants.60 A decade
later,
the Turkish
traveler
Evliya
Celebi
praised
Shamakhi and mentioned the existence of
7,000
well
built
houses, seventy mosques, forty
caravanserais "in each of which
many
thousand
tomans of wares are
deposited,"
and
1,200
shops.61
If all of this seemed to
signal opportunities
for a commercial
revival, war,
disease,
and rebellion in Iran's northern
regions
for the time
being prevented
an
upsurge
in the volume of trade
exchanged
between Iran and Russia. The 1630's
saw renewed hostilities between Iran and the Ottomans and a lack of
security
in the
Caspian
sea
region,
which was made unsafe
by
Cossacks.62 Nor did the
following
period
witness much
improvement.
In the
period
from 1633 to 1637 a
prolonged
plague epidemic
in northern Iran affected silk
production
and decimated the ranks
of cultivators and merchants. In 1635-1636 a Russian merchant
doing
business in
Iran
reportedly
took back
only
4,000
tomans of
goods
in return for the
6,500
worth
of
copper, furs,
and cash that he had
brought
with him. His
companions
had almost
all
perished
from the
plague.63
Few Russian merchants were
present
in Iran in this
period,
and the
officially registered
amounts of silk
exported
via the northern route
accordingly
were
insignificant.
Thus in 1634
nothing
was
transported,
and in 1635
out of a
reported
total of
1,073
bales
exported
that
year only eighty
went to Russia.
The next
year
the
plague
made all traffic
impossible.64
The border conflict of
1647-1652 over
Georgia
and
Daghestan, finally,
once
again brought
commercial
traffic to a
standstill. In 1650-1651 138 bales of Iranian silk
lay
in
storage
in
Astrakhan for a lack of
buyers.65
How little silk was
shipped through
Russia in
this
period
is illustrated in the
report
on the Russian trade that was written for the
Swedish
king
in 1653. Its
author,
Johan de
Rodes,
estimated the volume of Iranian
silk that was
transshipped through Arkhangelsk every
three
years
to be 120 to
150 bales.66
Natural
adversity
and warfare
may
have
delayed
a true
expansion
of commercial
traffic
temporarily,
but the real and
long-term
obstacle
lay
in simultaneous
changes
in the
political sphere.
The
profound impact politics
had on trade in Russia is
visible in reactions to the initiatives which various
European powers
took to
open
up
transit trade
through
Russia and all the
way
to Iran. These initiatives all
involved
silk,
a
commodity
which,
used in the
clothing
of the
rich,
enjoyed
a
growing popularity
in
baroque Europe.
Not
only
the
major
mercantile
powers
of
western
Europe, England, Holland, France, Sweden,
but even smaller ones such as
Holstein and
Courland,
in the course of the seventeenth
century equipped
commercial missions with the aim of
opening up
a transit route to the East.67
750 RUDI MATTHEE
The Russian reaction to these overtures was informed
by
a twofold motive.
One was
pressure
on the
part
of its own merchants who felt threatened
by
this
foreign
competition
and as of 1627
petitioned
the state to restrict the
right
of
foreigners
to
trade in Russia.68 In the other
motive,
Russia's
perennial
concern to find allies
against
its Ottoman
foe,
we see the
incongruity
with the
European countries,
which
were interested in trade
relations,
not
political complications.
Moscow made its
granting
of
privileges
to merchants from
foreign
countries conditional
upon
the
willingness
of the latter to lend active
support
in this
struggle.
The
European
countries, however,
were motivated
by
an interest in
getting
Russia to
grant
economic concessions rather than
by
a desire to
engage
in actual
military
treaties.
As a
result,
the numerous
attempts
to establish transit traffic all foundered. This is
as true for the famous Holstein
embassy
of 1636 as it is for the various Dutch
attempts
to
gain
a foothold in the transit market. The two
exceptions
were Poland
and
Austria,
both of which bordered on Ottoman
territory.
Their interest in
approaching
Russia
was in
part commercial,
in that
they
had an
eye
on Iranian silk
and its transit
through Russia,
in
part political,
as
they
were intent on
shifting
the
military pressure
from their own borders to those of Iran.69
While
incongruous objectives prevented
the establishment of a direct link
between Western
Europe
and Iran via
Moscow,
similarly incompatible
interests
began
to mark Russo-lranian relations. No event was more momentous in this
regard
than the
peace
of Zuhab which the Safavids and the Ottomans concluded in
1639. This formal accord removed the Turkish menace and thus
definitively
obviated the
pressing
need for outside alliances. From that moment until the end of
Safavid rule in the
early eighteenth century
Safavid rulers conducted an
extremely
cautious
policy designed
not to
antagonize
the Ottoman
neighbor.
These
changing
circumstances are reflected in
diminishing diplomatic
traffic
between the Romanovs and the Safavids in the 1640's. The continuous interaction
that had marked the
reign
of Shah 'Abbas I
began
to level off under Shah
Safi,
when
the known number of Russian
envoys
is confined to the one who arrived in 1634 with
a
reported (and clearly exaggerated)
dfl.
400,000
worth of cash and fur and
English
cloth,
for which he wished to
buy
silk.70 The trend was
partly
reversed under Sail's
successor,
Shah 'Abbas II
(r. 1642-1666),
when the Russians resumed their anti
Ottoman
foreign policy.
The accession of the new ruler was a natural occasion for
the
sending
of a
congratulatory
mission on the
part
of Moscow.
However,
it took
almost five
years
for such a mission to arrive in Isfahan.71 In
response
the Iranians
in 1648 sent a
mission to Russia
accompanied by
a
large
amount of silk.72 The
Russians
dispatched
further embassies-cum trade missions north in 1651 and
1653,
while in the latter
year
an Iranian
envoy
traveled to Moscow.73 All in
all,
in the
period
from 1647 to 1670 Moscow sent three embassies and a total of six
envoys
to
Isfahan.
Iran,
by
contrast,
is known to have
reciprocated
with
only
three missions
in the same
period,
the ones of 1648 and
1651,
and the mission of Hadi Khan Soltan
in 1657. In the
following period,
from 1670 to
1692,
the imbalance continued.
Russia continued to
try
and
incorporate
Iran in an anti-Turkish
coalition,
expediting
three ambassadors and eleven
envoys
to Isfahan. Isfahan countered with the
dispatch
of one
mission,
in
1671,
and waited twelve
years
before it
responded
to the
Chirkov mission of 1678-1679
by sending
Mohammad
Hosayn
Khan
Beg
to
Moscow.74
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 751
IV. The 1667 and 1673 treaties
Trade between Russia and Iran continued in the mid-seventeenth
century but,
despite
various,
mostly
Russian,
initiatives in that
direction,
was still not
subject
to
a formal "bilateral"
agreement.
It was
only
in the latter
part
of the
century
that
serious consideration was
given
to the
regulation
of commercial links between the
two states.
Mainly responsible
for the serious
attempts
to enframe trade links in a
legal
context in the 1660's were the same
political
stimuli that had so
long
determined relations between the two states. Russia
and,
to a lesser
extent,
Iran
were interested in
diverting
a
portion
of the lucrative silk trade for the
growing
markets in
Europe
from the transit route
through
the Ottoman
Empire
to the northern
route via Astrakhan. For Iran this had the
advantage
of
lessening
its
dependence
on
the
Ottomans,
with whom tensions were
again rising
after a
long period
of
peace.
Dwindling exports through
the Persian Gulf made the Russian alternative seem
attractive as well. Moscow had its
eye
on the revenue that
expanded
trade would
channel into the state
treasury,
but had broader aims as well. New Ottoman
forays
in southeastern
Europe sharpened
Russia's anti-Turkish instincts and motivated the
Romanovs to renew their
attempts
to include Safavid Iran in a
strong
anti-Turkish
coalition. The Russian
attempt
to isolate the Ottoman
Empire politically
as well as
commercially
culminated in 1667 in the
signing
of the
treaty
of Androsovo with
Poland,
which
gave
the Poles transit
rights through
Russia in
exchange
for
cooperation against
the Ottomans. Similar incentives
underlay
Moscow's
overtures toward Iran.75
New Russian efforts to
solidify political
and commercial links with the Safavids
are reflected in the
appearance
in Iran of a number of ambassadors and
envoys
in the
1650's and 1660's. In 1654 the Russian ambassador Lobanov-Rostovskii visited
Isfahan with a
suite of 200 to 300
persons
and as
many
camel loads of furs and other
valuable merchandise and
gifts.
His ostensible
goal
was to conclude a
lasting peace
with the Safavids and to
negotiate
the conditions for silk trade between the two
countries.76 In 1664 F. I. Miloslavskii led a Russian
embassy
to Iran
accompanied
by
a suite of 350
people
and some
prominent merchants,
who
brought
with them
sables, cloth,
gold, silver,
and
copper
to a total value of
76,749
rubles.77 This
mission's
principal
aim was
reportedly
to secure free trade and to obtain
permission
to build a
factory
on the
Caspian
Sea.78 The French travelers De Thevenot and
Chardin asserted that the mission was treated
badly by
Shah 'Abbas II.79 An
initially friendly reception apparently
turned
sour after the Iranians discovered that
the
embassy
was
just
a
trading
mission in
diplomatic disguise.
The Iranians also
seem to have been
appalled by
the Russians' uncouthness. The mission's
request
for the cession of
Georgia following
the
marriage
between the tsar's son and the
daughter
of the ruler of
Georgia
was
rejected by
the Safavid
authorities,
who also
refused the
proposal
for free trade when
they
learned that the Russian intended to
build a
military
fortress instead of a
trading post
on the
Caspian
shores. The
Russian ambassador died
shortly
after he received an audience from the
shah,
and the
second
envoy
had to return in vain.80
Despite
the failure of the 1664 mission as a
diplomatic
overture,
it did serve as a
prelude
to a
reopening
of borders and marked the
beginning
of a more
regulated
and
active silk trade between Iran and Russia. The most forceful
impetus
behind this
was
semi-private
in nature and came from the Armenian merchant
community
in
752 RUDI MATTHEE
Iran. It was not the convenience or the
safety
of the Russia route which caused a
change
in the Armenian attitude toward the northern trade route in the 1660's.
True,
the route was shorter than the maritime
itinerary
but,
as Armenian merchants
noted,
it was
plagued by high
tolls and
poor security
and therefore
hardly preferable
over the Ottoman route.81
Yet,
similarly high
tolls and a
growing
number of
robberies in Ottoman
territory
as well as the threat of renewed war between the
Ottomans and the Safavids made the Julfans inclined to seek an alternative outlet for
their silk trade.82 Trade with Russia also benefited from the
negative
effect of the
Turco-Venetian conflict known as the Candia wars
(1645-1669)
on the commerce
between Iran and the Levant.83
The Armenians in 1659 sent a
delegation representing
the Julfa merchant houses
to Russia and led
by Zakhariya
Shahrimanean with the aim of
convincing
the tsar of
the
advantage
of closer trade links with Iran. While the
precise standing
of this
mission remains
obscure,
it
appears
that its
representatives
behaved in Russia as
quasi-official
merchants,
and were treated as such in Moscow. The richness of the
gifts they presented
to the tsar reflects the interest
among
the Julfans in Russia as a
transit route but
may
also be
interpreted
as an
attempt
on the
part
of the Armenians
to
emphasize
the fact that
they
were not
just royal
merchants but
operated
as
private
entrepreneurs
as
well.84
Strengthened
in their motivation to turn to Russia
by
the outbreak in 1665 of a
new round in the Turco-Venetian
war,
the Julfa
Armenians,
led
by
Stefan
Ramadanskii and
Grigorii
Lusikents,
in 1666
engaged
in talks with Tsar Alexis
Mikhailovich. The 1666 mission resulted a
year
later in an
agreement
between
Russia and the
Julfans,
who
may
have
presented
themselves as a
regular trading
company
in Moscow in order to
gain
status and
legitimacy.85
The
agreement
allowed for toll-free trade
by
Russians in Safavid
territory.
In
return,
Armenian
merchants received
permission
to conduct their trade in all of Russia in addition to
acquiring
a
monopoly
of the
transportation
of silk to Astrakhan and
beyond.
Aside
from
transportation
taxes,
they
were
required
to
pay
a 5
percent
ad-valorem toll in
Astrakhan, Moscow,
and
Arkhangelsk.86
The short-term
consequences
of this
agreement
were
negligible
as trade links
were
severely disrupted by
the turmoil
resulting
from Cossack raids led
by
Sten'ka
Razin in the
period
between 1666 and 1668.
Many
Armenian merchants who had
vested interests in the Ottoman trade also did not
respond
to the
plan
to redirect the
trade. The 1667
treaty
thus remained
a
dead letter for some time.
However,
interest in the northern route did not
disappear
on the
part
of either the
Safavids,
the
Russians,
or the Armenian merchants. In 1670
English agents
sent
by
the Russian
court arrived in Isfahan to
inquire
about the
possibility
of
having
all Iranian silk sent
via Russia. The
Iranians,
who were not disinclined toward the
idea,
sent the one
surviving
member of the mission back to Moscow with the task of
enquiring
about
the
precise
nature of the Russian
requests.87
This contact was followed
up
in 1672 when the Julfans sent
Grigorii
Lusikents
to Moscow as head of an
embassy charged
with the confirmation or renewal of the
1667
treaty.
The outcome of this
mission,
a new
treaty
that was concluded in
1673,
showed the effects of
pressure
exerted
by
Russian merchants who feared
competition
in their lucrative transit trade which
yielded
them
profits
of
up
to 50
percent
on
silk
bought
in Astrakhan and sold in Moscow and
Arkhangelsk.
The Russians used the
frequent
incidence of robberies and
oppression
of Russian merchants in Iran as a
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 753
pretext
to curtail the
right
of Armenians to
carry
transit
goods through
Russia.
They
were no
longer
allowed to
transport
merchandise
beyond
Astrakhan and
Moscow.
They
could
only carry
silk in transit if it could not be sold in
Russia,
and
silk
transshipped through
Russia could
only
be sold to countries with which Russia
was at
peace. They
also needed
special permission
to leave Russian soil. In
return for the
rights they
did
receive,
the Armenian merchants
promised
that
they
would henceforth
transport
Iranian silk
only
via Russia.88
V. The aftermath
Not
surprisingly,
the 1673
treaty
with its new restrictions on Armenian transit
trade led to an immediate
slump
in the transit of silk. Thus
only twenty-four puds
(ca.
390
kg.) appears
to have been
transported
to Russia in
1673,
followed
by
less
than 100
(1,630 kg.)
the next
year.89
Nevertheless,
Moscow had not
given up
on its efforts to maximize silk deliveries
from Iran. Clear
proof
of that is the fact that in 1675 the tsar created the
post
of
official silk
factor,
no doubt "in
response
to what was
expected
to be a
massive
expansion
of the silk trade
[with Iran]
."90 A
year
later the Russians followed
up
on
this
by agreeing
to restore most of the Armenian transit
rights.
Once
again political
considerations contributed to Moscow's decision to revise its commercial
policy.
The context this time was a Dutch
attempt
to
gain
transit
rights,
but the real
motivation was Russia's renewed need for Iranian assistance in the face of Ottoman
threats and the loss of Poland as an
ally.
The Dutch sent an
embassy
led
by
Koenraad van Klenck as ambassador to Moscow. Tsar Alexis
rejected
the Dutch
request
for unrestricted trade in Russia with eastern merchants
but,
faced with
falling
commercial
receipts,
he did heed Van Klenk's solicitations
by allowing
the Dutch to
trade with Armenians in
Arkhangelsk
in return for the
understanding
that Russian
merchants and the state
treasury
would
get
a
share in the turnover and the
proceeds.
Protest
by
Russian merchants did not
prevail
this time: the Armenian merchants
regained
their transit
rights,
even if
they
were no
longer
unrestricted.91
Mutual Russo-Armenian interest in
strengthening
their
cooperation
did not end
there. In 1679 the
Armenians, eager
to inflate their
trading capabilities,
committed
themselves to an immediate annual
export figure
of
48,000
puds (ca. 762,500
kg.
or
more than
8,000 bales)
of Iranian silk.92 The
Russians,
in
turn,
in 1689
expressed
their
continuing support
for the Armenian
enterprise by prohibiting
all Western
merchants from
engaging
in transit trade that excluded Julfa Armenians. In the
east, Indian, Bukharan,
and Iranian
merchants,
were
prohibited
from
traveling
beyond
Astrakhan.
Here, too,
the Armenians were
exempted.93
Russia,
at this
point
ruled
by
Tsar Peter
I,
was not
only
anxious to
prevent
the Turkish cities from
becoming
exclusive
entrep?ts
for Iranian
commerce,
but also became
increasingly
interested in raw
materials,
as
opposed
to
luxury goods,
for its
incipient
manufacturing industry.94
While Moscow's inclusion of the Julfa merchant firms in its commercial efforts
suggests
a clear desire to
support
an
expanding
silk trade with
Iran,
the
corresponding
role of the Iranian authorities is less clear. There are
indications that
Shah
Solayman's grand
vizier
Shaykh
'Ali Khan in the 1670's conducted a
policy
of
privileging
Russian
diplomatic
and commercial
representatives
over those of the
754 RUDI MATTHEE
West
European trading
nations. Aside from a
customary
Safavid
policy
of
balancing
various
foreign competitors,
this
policy may
have been motivated
by
a
desire to find an alternative outlet for Iran's silk to the Persian Gulf
itinerary.
Active
support
of trade links with Russia is further attested for the
period
of Shah
Soltan
Hosayn (r. 1694-1722).
The Russian scholar Kukanova has
argued
that this
Safavid ruler was intent on
opening up
a transit route for Iranian silk in the
early
eighteenth century.95
Her
colleague
Bushev,
on the other
hand,
contests this and
claims that the shah's
only goal
was to secure
transport rights
to
Europe
in case
prices
offered in Russia were too low.96 This is indeed what
happened
to the merchants
who
accompanied
Mohammad
Hosayn
Khan
Beg
in 1691 -1692. One of
them,
Aga
Karim,
who carried
forty-five
bales of raw silk and
a certain volume of manufactured
silk from Tabriz and
Shamakhi,
requested
and obtained the
right
to
transship
his
wares to Western
Europe
after the
prices
offered for them were not to his
satisfaction.97
The restoration of Armenian
rights
heralded the intensification of the
commercial
exchange
between Iran and Russia.
Continuing
Russian merchant
opposition notwithstanding,
Armenians
began
to travel to
Arkhangelsk
on the
White Sea and as of 1686 followed the shorter route to Western
Europe
via
Novgorod.98
A shorter route and safer roads also
helped
make the Russian transit
route to
Europe
an attractive alternative to the route
through Turkey,
the eastern
stretch of which was
increasingly
beset with
security problems
in the late 1600S.
The result of these various factors was a
great expansion
of trade via the
Caspian
and
Volga itinerary
in the last third of the seventeenth and the
early years
of the
eighteenth century.99
The
growing penetration
of Russian and Indian merchants in
Azerbaijan
as well as the
increasing presence
of Armenian merchants in Russian
cities on the trade route to the North bear witness to this.100 Armenian
merchants,
unhappy
with the inconvenient outlet of
Arkhangelsk,
further
explored
alternatives
to this northern route. In 1692 a
delegation
of Juif an merchants went from New
Julfa to the court of Sweden to
open up
the trade route
through
the Baltic
ports.
This contact and the
embassy
led
by Philip
of
Zagly
in 1696 resulted in a
proclamation by
the duke of
Livonia, Courland,
and
Semgalen, establishing
trade
relations with Iran.101
The wares
brought
to Russia
by
Armenian merchants consisted of more than
just
raw
silk;
they
included
large quantities
of Indian
cloth, taffetas,
morocco
leather,
embroidered silk manufactured in Isfahan and
Kashan,
and
precious
stones.102
Silk, however, comprised
the bulk of the Armenian
trade,
as the few available
figures
illustrate.
Grigorii
Lusikents' above-mentioned
proposal
to Tsar Mikhailovich to
transport
each
year 8,000
bales of silk to Western
Europe
via Russia
may
have been
based on
exaggerated
claims
?
given
an annual Iranian silk
yield
of at most
10,000
bales
?
but it nevertheless
suggests
the
potential
of Iranian silk
exports
through
Russia. The actual volume continued to be much
lower, however,
even if
it increased over time. Whereas in
1674,
the
year
after restrictions on Armenian
traders were
issued,
less than
1,600 kg.
of silk were
imported
from
Iran,103
Armenian merchants in 1676 moved
1,170
puds (ca. 19,000
kg.
or 210
bales)
of
Iranian silk
through Arkhangelsk,
while in 1690
they transported
1,305 puds
(ca. 21,000
kg.
or 230
bales),
and in 1691
1,107 (ca. 18,000
kg.,
or 200
bales;
via
Novgorod),
a volume that doubled to
2,232
puds (ca. 36,300 kg.
or 400
bales)
in
1695.104
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 755
Despite
this incontrovertible
expansion,
the volume of silk involved should not
be
overestimated,
at least not when
compared
to the
quantities
that continued to be
transported
elsewhere. The Armenians
naturally
took
advantage
of the
opportunities
offered to
them,
but failed to live
up
to their earlier commitment to
transport
all their silk
through
Russia. The Russian and Iranian
inability
to alter this
situation became clear in 1692 when Moscow
complained
about the Armenian
behavior to the Safavid ambassador Mohammad
Hosayn
Khan
Beg.
With the
complaint
came a firm
request
for
compliance
with the
arrangement. However,
no
change
was ever effected in the direction of the bulk of Armenian silk. In all
likelihood the Safavid authorities never
pressed
the Armenians to follow
up
on the
arrangement.
It
may additionally
be surmised
that,
even if the Safavid authorities
had wished to
persuade
the Armenians to
comply, they
would not have been able to
do so.105
In
purely
commercial
tenus,
it
appears
that the trade between Iran and Russia
was vital neither to Iran or Russia
nor,
for that
matter,
to the Armenians.106 The
latter in
particular
were not
really
interested in
completely redirecting
their trade
from the Levant
route,
where
they enjoyed
the
advantage
of free
trade,
to the Russian
route,
where
they
continued to be faced with restrictions on their movements and
activities.107 The volume of silk
transports
via the
Volga
route continued to be
high
in the
early eighteenth century,
and
may
at times have been
higher
than the
figures
given here,108
but the Russians never succeeded in their
goal
of
diverting
the bulk
of the trade
away
from the Ottoman route. Whereas the annual volume of silk
transported
via the northern
itinerary rarely
exceeded 400
bales,
the
quantities
carried via the Levant continued to
average
at least ten times that number.
Conclusion
Relations between Iran and Russia
go
back to
pre-Islamic
times,
but were
private, informal,
and intermittent well
beyond
the
Mongol
domination of both
realms. It was
only
with the
emergence
of the state of
Muscovy
in Russia and the
establishment of Safavid rule in Iran that the
proper
conditions
emerged
for more
regularized
and continuous
political
and commercial interaction. Both were
expansionist
states which
gradually incorporated
the vast
territory
that
separated
them. The annexation and
pacification
of these hitherto
savage
lands created the
environment of
security
that was
indispensable
for
regular
commercial
exchange.
In
addition,
the
centralizing
tendencies of both these
early
modern states included a
desire to control and
regulate
commerce. Their attitude toward
commerce,
fiscal in
nature inasmuch as it was
inspired by
a need for
revenue,
but not
wholly
devoid of
mercantilist
overtones,
favored the
managed expansion
of commercial links. All
this is manifest in the
gradual
shift in the sixteenth
century
from what
began
as a
purely "private"
commercial
enterprise
toward a
heavy
involvement of the state.
The latter S
appropriation
of the
exchange
of
goods
extended as far as a
monopolization
of certain
politically
sensitive and
strategically important goods.
Although
the
preponderance
of extant sources on state-directed trade is bound to
create a distorted
picture,
it is nevertheless
quite likely
that
long-distance
trade
between Iran and Russia was
often,
if not
mostly,
conducted in
conjunction
with
diplomatic
traffic. This
appears
particularly
true for the
reign
of Shah 'Abbas
I,
756 RUDI MATTHEE
whose
energy
in
harnessing
trade for the benefit of the
royal treasury
earned him the
sobriquet
of
being
the
country's biggest
merchant in the
country by foreign
observers.109
Although
silk seems to have
played
a minor role in the
relations,
which revolved
mostly
around the "restricted" wares coveted
by
both
courts,
raw silk
and manufactured silk
goods
were not
altogether
absent from Iran's
export
list in this
period.
It is clear that 'Abbas's interest in
establishing
trade relations with Russia was
shared
by
the Russian rulers. It is
equally
clear, however,
that what
really brought
the two countries
together
and sustained their
relationship
was a common interest in
keeping
the Ottoman Turks at
bay.
More than economic
imperatives,
it was the
international
political constellation,
taking
its cue above all from the Ottoman threat
and the
resulting
fluctuation of the
pattern
of
political
and
military
alliances between
states,
which determined the various
stages
in the official commercial relations
between Moscow and Isfahan. In
fact, throughout
the seventeenth
century
decisions and
agreements
were never motivated
by purely
commercial
considerations. While Shah 'Abbas valued trade relations with his northern
neighbor, political
motives
involving
the Ottoman
question
and the dominance of the
Caucasian lands continued to inform his
relationship
with Moscow
?
a
relationship
which he
evidently
considered
a means rather than an end in his overall
political
strategy.
Moscow was
similarly
concerned with the Turkish threat and in its
political
actions driven
by
its own Caucasian
ambitions,
but internal
problems
caused it to
operate
from a
weaker
position.
The
inequality
is reflected in the
greater eagerness
of Moscow to continue
diplomatic
and commercial relations with
its southern
neighbor,
which never seems to have been intent on
concluding
an actual
anti-Turkish
treaty
with Moscow and could therefore afford to
display
a
degree
of
indifference
bordering
on
arrogance
toward the Russians.
The
weight
of
politics
continued to bear on Russo-Iranian economic relations
throughout
the seventeenth
century.
This
persisting
element
notwithstanding,
various
phases marking important changes
can be discerned in the
relationship
between Russia and Iran. Thus 'Abbas's death in 1629 loosened Safavid state control
over external trade and ended a
phase
of intense
political maneuvering
and alliance
making
that had followed this ruler's search for the most
advantageous
commercial
outlet. The Ottoman-Safavid
peace
of 1639 further relaxed the
political
hold over
relations
as it removed the Ottoman issue as an
urgent
issue.
Following
these events
Isfahan's interest in
continuing
the momentum of
diplomatic
and commercial relations
began
to fall even further behind that of Moscow. All this is reflected in a
diminishing
frequency
of
diplomatic
traffic between the courts of Moscow and Isfahan.
As
politics
waned,
the economic and the non-official
importance
of the
relationship grew.
The role of the
very
same
private
merchants who had dominated
trade before the intrusion of the
state, appears
to have
increased,
as is evidenced in
the
greater
numbers of Russian merchants
visiting
Iran. Henceforth
attempts
to
redirect trade flows involved
joint
efforts of state and
private enterprise.
A formal
"bilateral" trade
agreement,
a
long-standing
desideratum of above all the
Russians,
was never concluded.
Instead,
the Russians in 1667
granted
concessions to the
Julfan Armenians who
operated ambiguously
as
private
merchants and as semi
official
representatives
of the Safavid court. Russian mercantilism was
clearly
visible in this
move,
which was
temporarily
rescinded under
pressure
from Russian
merchants,
but reinstated in modified and restricted form
shortly
thereafter.
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 757
For the Russians the
agreement signified managed
trade and
guaranteed
income,
and,
increasingly
in the
period
of Tsar
Peter,
a
supply
of raw material for an
emerging
domestic
manufacturing industry.
For their
part
the Iranian Armenians
acquired
an
alternative outlet for the silk
they transported
to
European
markets in
great
quantities. Having
the
option
of an alternative that lessened their
dependence
on
the Anatolian land route
appears
to have been more
important
to them than
actually
using
it to the full.
Despite promises
to that
effect, they
never redirected their entire
silk trade
through Russia,
nor do
they
seem to have been ever intent on
doing
so.
The
quantity
of Iranian silk
transported
via the Russian transit trade
greatly
increased
following
the
agreements
of 1667 and 1673. The new
figures compensated
in
part
for the
falling
volume
shipped
via the Persian
Gulf,
but never even
remotely
reached
the volume that continued to be earned across Anatolia to the
ports
of the Levant.
University of
Delaware, Newark,
1994.
1. For the
diplomatic
dimension of the
relationship,
see Rudi Matt
li?e,
"Anti-Osmaanse allianties en
Kaukasische
belangen: diplomatieke betrekkingen
tussen Safavidisch Iran en Moscovitisch Rusland
(1550-1639)," Sharqiyy?t,
5
(1994):
1-21.
2. The terms latitudinal and
longitudinal
are used
by
W.E.D.
Allen,
Problems
of
Turkish
power
in the
sixteenth
century (London, 1963):
39.
3. Wilhelm
Heyd,
Geschichte des Levantehandels im
Mittelalter,
2 vols
(Stuttgart, 1879),
I:
65ff.;
Elisabeth
Bennigsen,
"Contribution ? l'?tude du commerce des fourrures russes: la route de la
Volga
avant
l'invasion
mongole
et le
royaume
des
Bulghars,"
CMRS, XIX,
4
(1978): 385;
and
Maryta Esp?ronnier,
"Les
?changes
commerciaux entre le monde musulman et les
pays
slaves
d'apr?s
les sources musulmanes
m?di?vales,"
Cahiers de Civilisation
m?di?vale,
89
(1980):
18.
4. Hans Wilhelm
Haussig,
Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstrasse in islamischer Zeit
(Darmstadt, 1988): 25,170.
Two other routes were used to reach the
Byzantine Empire.
One followed
the course of the Kuban river and reached
Byzantine territory
across the Caucasian
passes
into
Georgia.
The other was the coastal route
along
the Black Sea from Tamatarkha to Trabzon.
5. Ibid.
6. W.
Heyd, op.cit.,
I:
53-54,
69
ff.;
H. A.
Manandian,
TJte ancient trade and cities
of
Armenia in
relation to the ancient world trade
(Lisbon, 1965):
135.
7. ?.
Bennigsen,
art. cit.: 388.
8. P.P.
Bushev,
Istoriia
posolstv
i
diplomaticheskikh
otnoshenii
russkogo
i
iranskogo gosudarstv
v
1586-1612
gg. (Moscow, 1976):
32.
9. Janet
Martin,
"The land of darkness and the Golden Horde: The fur trade under the
Mongols
XIII
XlVth
centuries," CMRS, XIX,
4
(1978):
403.
10. For this
trade,
see G.I.
Bratianu,
Recherches sur
le commerce
g?nois
dans la mer Noire au
xuf si?cle
(Paris, 1929)
and Robert-Henri
Bautier,
"Les relations
?conomiques
des Occidentaux avec les
pays
d'Orient au
Moyen ?ge: points
de vue et
documents,"
in Michel
Mollat, ed.,
Soci?t?s et
compagnies
de commerce en Orient et dam l'oc?an Indien
(Paris, 1970)
: 280-286. Commercial
activity
in the
capital
of the Golden Horde is described
by
John de Plano
Carpini,
Hie texts and versions
of
John de Plano
Carpini
and William de
Rubruquis,
ed. C.
Raymond Beazley (London, 1903): 153,
194. This last source
also notes the existence of traffic in silk from China and Iran to Russia.
11. For
details,
see J.
Martin,
"Muscovite relations with the Khanates of Kazan' and the Crimea
(1460
to
1521),"
Canadian-American Slavic
Studies,
17
(1983):
435-453.
12. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 36.
13. See the observations of Ambrosio Contarini about the
Volga
route in the late fifteenth
century,
in
Travels in Tana and Persia
byJosafa
B?rbaro and
Ambrogio Contarini,
trans. W. Thomas and S.A.
Roy;
ed. Lord
Stanley
of
Alderley (London, 1873): 151-154;
and
Anthony
Jenkinson's reference to the utter lack
of victuals between Astrakhan and Kazan' about a
century
later,
in Richard
Hakluyt,
The
principal
navigations voyages traffiques
& discoveries
of
the
English nation,
12 vols
(Glasgow, 1903-1905),
II: 478.
758 RUDI MATTHEE
14.
A.Contarini, op.
dr.: 151.
15. E.S.
Zevakin,
"Persidskii
vopros
v
russko-evropeiskikh
otnosheniiakh XVII
v.,"
Istoricheskie
zapiski,
8
(1940):
157.
16. For this commercial
blockade,
see Halil
Inalcik,
"Osmanli
Imperatorlugunun kurulu?
ve inkisafi
devrinde
T?rkiye'nin
iktisad?
vaziyeti
?zerinde bir tektik
m?nasebetiyle," Belleten,
15
(1951): 661-676;
and Jean-Louis
Bacqu?-Grammont,
"?tudes safavides
I,
Notes sur le blocus du commerce iranien
par
Selim
1er," Turcica,
6
(1975): 66-88;
and
id.,
"Notes sur une saisie de soies d'Iran en
1518," ibid.,
8
(1976):
237-253.
17. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 40.
18. See Hennann
Kellenbenz,
"Der nissische Transithandel mit dem Orient im 17. und zu
Beginn
des
18.
Jahrhunderts,"
Jahrb?cher?r
Geschichte
Osteuropas, N.S.,
12
(1964-1965):
483.
19. See T.S.
Willan,
Wie
Muscovy
merchants
of
1555
(Manchester, 1959): 30-33,
for the overall
endeavor;
and E. Delmar
Morgan
and C.H.
Coote, eds, Early voyages
and travels to Russia and
Persia,
2 vols
(London, 1886).
20. M.V.
Fekliner, Torgovlia russkogo gosudarstva
so stranami vostoka v XVIveke
(Moscow, 1956):
27;
John
Cartwright,
in Samuel
Purchas, Hakluytus posthumus
or Purchas His
pilgrimes,
20 vols
(Glasgow, 1905-1907),VIII:
507.
21. M.V.
Fekhner, op.
cit.:
45-46;
H.
Kellenbenz,
"Marchands en Russie aux xvi^-xvin6
si?cles,"
part 1, CMRS, XI,
4
(1970):
585.
22. See Varatan
Gregorian,
"Minorities in Isfahan: The Armenian
community
of Isfahan
1587-1722,"
Iranian
Studies,
1
(1974):
662.
23. See M.V.
Fekhner, op.
cit.:
52ff.,
and 79-80 for the
exchange
of
goods
in both directions.
24. See E. Delmar
Morgan
and C.H.
Coote, eds, op. cit.,
I:
59;
and R.
Hakluyt, op. cit.,
II: 456.
25. E. Delmar
Morgan
and C.H.
Coote, eds, op.
cit.: 79-80.
26. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 42. See also E.
Delmar-Morgan
and C.H.
Coote, eds, op. cit.,
II: 125-126.
27. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 45.
28. J.
Martin,
"Muscovite
travelling
merchants: The trade with the Muslim East
(15th
and 16th
centuries),"
Central Asian
Survey,
4
(1985): 29, 31,
34-35.
29. M.V
Fekhner, op.
cit.: 102-104.
30. Ibid.: 110.
31. Ibid.: 61-62.
32. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 61-62.
33. Chantal
Lemercier-Quelquejay,
"Les routes commerciales et militaires au Caucase du Nord aux
xvie et xviie
si?cles,"
Central Asian
Survey,
4
(1985):
4.
34. See Alexandre
Bennigsen,
"La
pouss?e
vers les mers chaudes et la barri?re du Caucase. La
rivalit? ottomano-moscovite dans la seconde moiti? du xvie
si?cle,"
Journal
of
Turkish
Studies,
10
(1986):
15-46. For the Russian contacts with the khanate of
Bukhara,
see M. lu.
Iuldasev,
K istorii
torgovykh
i
posol'skikh
sviazei Srednei Azii
s Rossiei v
XVI-XVII w.
(Tashkent, 1964):
47ff.
35. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 35.
36. Ibid.: 40.
Qazvin
was the Safavid
capital
in the second half of the sixteenth
century.
37. Ibid.:
43-44;
A.
Bennigsen, "L'exp?dition turque
contre Astrakhan en
1569," CMRS, VIII,
3
(1967): 427-446;
and H?l?ne Carr?re
d'Encausse,
"Les routes commerciales de l'Asie Centrale et les
tentatives de
reconqu?te d'Astrakhan," CMRS, XI,
3
(1970):
391-422.
38. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.:
136ff.,
149ff.
39. Ibid.: 111.
Kaya probably
does not refer to the name of the
envoy
who led the mission but rather
to his title. See W.E.D.
Allen, ed.,
and
Anthony Manog, trans.,
Russian embassies to the
Georgian kings
(1589-1605),
2 vols
(London, 1970),
II: 534.
40. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 202.
4L Ibid.:
205-208;
and
id.,
"lranskii
kuptsina
kazim-Bek v
Rossii,
1706-1709
gg.,"
in Iran
(sbornik
statei) (Moscow, 1973):
167. The Iranian historian Mo'ezzi attributes
Hajji
Iskandar's
inability
to
agree
to the difference in value to a lack of instructions from Shah
*
Abbas. See
Najaf-qoli Hosayn Mo'ezzi,
TSrikh-e rav?bet-e
slyasl-ye
Iran
b?dony? (Tehran, 1326/1947-1948):
254.
42. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 362ff. Information is
lacking
about the
embassy's dealings
in Iran or the
results
achieved,
but Bushev's
hypothesis
that the
embassy may
never have traveled
beyond
Astrakhan
and was
perhaps
called back as it was
becoming
clear that Shah 'Abbas was not
going
to
sign
a
treaty
after
all,
has
recently
been
proven wrong.
Maria
Szuppe,
"Un marchand du roi de
Pologne
en
Perse,
1601
1602," Moyen
Orient et Oc?an
Indien,
3
(1986): 90-91,
demonstrates that the Zhirov-Zasekin
embassy
did reach Isfahan in 1601.
43. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 294-320.
ANTI-OTTOM AN POLITICS AND TRAN SIT RIGHTS 759
44. Ibid.: 217-229.
45. Ibid.:
432-433;
P.P.
Bushev,
art. cit.: 168.
46. P.P.
Bushev, op.
cit.: 382-383.
47. A chronicle
of
the Carmelites in Persia and the
papal
mission
of
the XVHth and XVIIIth
centuries,
2 vols
(London, 1939)1:
114.
48. Adam
Olearius,
Vermehrte Newe
Beschreibung
der Muscowitischen und Persischen
Reyse
(Schleswig,
1656; repr. T?bingen, 1971):
443.
49. P. P.
Bushev,
Istoriia
posoVstv
i
diplomaticheskikh
otnoshenii
russkogo
i
iranskogo gosudarstv
v
1613-1621
gg. (Moscow, 1987): 44-45,
53.
50. P.P.
Bushev,
Istoriia
posoVstv
...1586-1612, op.
cit.:
339,
349.
51. P.P.
Bushev,
Istoriia
posoVstv ...1613-1621, op.
cit.: 139.
52.
Algemeen Rijksarchief,
The
Hague (hereafter ARA),
VOC
852,
Batavia to
Persia, Aug. 14,1625,
fol.
124;
H.
Dunlop, ed.,
Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische
Compagnie
in Perzi? 1611-1638
(The Hague, 1930):
199.
53. Ibid.: 306.
54. Paul
Bushkovitch,
Tlte merchants
of
Moscow 1580-1650
(Cambridge, 1980):
96. The
quantity
is
given
as
4,440 ansyrs.
The
ansyr
was a
weight
from
Bukhara,
which in the later seventeenth
century
equaled
one
pound.
55. P. P.
Bushev,
"Posol'stvo V. G. Korob'ina i A. Kuvshinova v Iran v 1621-1624
gg.,"
in Iran:
Ekonomika. Istoriia.
Istoriograflia.
Literatura
(sbornik statei) (Moscow, 1976):
126-128.
56. See Fedot
Kotov,
Khozhdenie
kuptsa
Fedota Kotova
v
Persiyu,
ed. and trans. N.A. Kuznetsova
(Moscow, 1958).
57.
H.Dunlop, ed., op.
cit.: 60.
58. 7/vVy.: 191.
59. See
P.P.Bushev,
"Iranskii
kuptsina...,"
art. cit.:
169; id.,
Istoriia
posoVstv ...1613-1621, op.
cit.:
203-204; id., "Posol'stvo
Korob'ina...,"
art. cit.:
146-150;
F.
Kotov, op. cit.,
introduction: 11.
60.
A.Olearius, op.
cit.:. 444.
61.
Evliya Efendi,
Narrative
of
travels in
Europe,
Asia,
and
Africa
in the seventeenth
century,
trans.
Joseph
von
Hammer,
2 vols
(London, 1834; repr.
New
York-London, 1968),
II: 160.
62.
H.Dunlop, ed., op.
cit.: 424.
63. Ibid.: 566.
64. Ibid.:
528, 547, 564, 587, 590, 599,
612.
65. V. A.
Baiburtian,
Armianskaia koloniia novoi
DzhuVfy
v XVII veke: roV novoi
DzhuVfy
v irano
evropeicheskikh politicheskikh
i ekonomicheskikh sviaziakh
(Erevan, 1969):
93-94.
66.
"Beskrivning
av handelsf?rhallandena i
Ryssland,
avfattad av Johan de
Rodes,"
doc. 19 in Artur
Attman et
al, eds,
Ekonomiska
f?rbindelser
mellan
Sverige
och
Ryssland
under 1600-talet. Dokument
ur svenskaarkiv
(Stockholm, 1978):
114.
67. See E.S.
Zevakin,
art. cit. and Heinz
Mattiesen,
"Die Versuche zur
Erschliessung
eines
Handelsweges Danzig-Kurland-Moskau-Asien,
besonders f?r
Seide,"
Jahrb?cher
f?r
Geschichte
Osteuropas
, 3
(1938):
533-569.
68. E.S.
Zevakin, "Persidskii
vopros,"
art. cit.: 132.
69. Ibid.:
153, 155;
H.
Dunlop, ed., op.
cit.: 614.
70. Ibid. : 505. This is
presumably
the same
embassy
that is mentioned for
1045/1635-1636 by
Abu T
Hasan
Qazvini, Fav?'idal-sqfav?yah,
ed.
Maryam
Mir Ahmadi
(Tehran, 1387/1988):
56.
71. AR
A,
VOC
1162,
Isfahan to Heren
XVII,
4
May 1647,
fol. 181. The Fav? 'id
al-sqfavtyah, op.
cit.: 68
(which
is not a
contemporary source) implausibly
claims that this mission was in Isfahan in
1052/1642,
which was the
year
of 'Abbas II's accession.
72. See William
Foster, ed.,
The
English factories
in India 1646-1650
(Oxford, 1914):
223.
73. See Comelis
Speelman,
Journaal der reis van den
gezant
der O.L
Compagnie
Joan Cunaeus naar
Perzi? in
1651-1652,
ed. A. Hotz
(Amsterdam, 1908): 152;
and India Office Records
(London),
E/3/24/228,
10
Apr. 1654,
in W.
Foster, ed.,
The
English factories
in India 1651-1654
(Oxford, 1915):
271.
Speelman
in March 1652 noted the
presence
at the new
year's
celebration in Isfahan of two Russian
envoys,
who had come to Iran "to sell their commodities."
During
his
stay
in Mazandaran in
early 1654,
the EIC
agent
John
Spiller
met a Russian ambassador who was
"accompanied
with 250 or 300
Russians,
and had as
many
camels for
carryage
of his
present
and
luggage." According
to the same
source,
some of
the merchandise the
envoy
had
brought
was sold in
Gilan,
while the rest was
transported
to Isfahan. This
must have concerned the Lobanov-Rostovskii
mission,
mentioned in
ARA,
VOC
1203,
Gamron to
Batavia,
16
May
1654.
Qazvini,
Fav? 'id
al-safavfyah, op.
cit. :
68, only
mentions
1063/1653
as the
year
in which a Russian
envoy
was in Iran.
760 RUDI MATTHEE
74. P.P.
Bushev,
"Piiteshestvie
iranskogo posol'stva
Mokhammeda Khosein Khan-Beka v Moskvu v
1690-1692
gg," Strany
i
narody Vostoka,
18
(1976): 135,
136-146.
75.
E.S.Zevakin,
art. cit.:
.
143-144, 147;
N.G.
Kukanova,
"Rol'
annianskogo kupechestva
v razvitii
russko-iranskoi
torgovli
v
poslednei
treti XVII
v.,"
Kratkie soobshcheniia Institu?a narodov
Azii,
30
(1961):
23.
76.
ARA,
VOC
1203,
Gamron to
Batavia,
16
May 1654; IOR, E/3/24/228,10 Apr. 1654,
in W.
Foster,
ed., English factories... 1651-1654, op.
cit.: 21 i.
11. The
goods
and their value are noted
by
A. la.
Shpakovskii, "Torgovlia
moskovskoi Rusi s Persei
v XVI-XVII
vv.," quoted
in Artur
Atmann,
The Russian and Polish markets in international trade 1500
1650
(G?teborg, 1973):
190-191.
78.
ARA,
VOC
1245,
Gamron to Heren
XVII,
9 Jan.
1665,
fol. 366r.
79. Jean de
Th?venot,
Suite du
Voyage
de Levant
(Paris, 1674): 202-204;
Jean
Chardin, Voyages
du
chevalier Chardin , en
Perse,
et autres lieux de
l'Orient,
ed. L.
Langl?s,
10 vols and atlas
(Paris, 1811),
X: 112ff. Chardin's claim that the bad treatment was the reason
why, upon
the shah's
death,
the tsar
instigated
the Cossacks to invade Iran in
1667, may
have been based on some mmor that circulated in
Isfahan. The
reputation
of boorishness the Russians
enjoyed among
the
Persians,
mentioned
by Chardin,
must have been confirmed
by
the behavior of the
envoys for,
as the Dutch
reported,
the Russians refused
to dismount and had to be
pulled
off their horses when
they
were met
by
the shah. See
ARA,
VOC
1254,
Gamron to Heren
XVII,
9 Jan.
1665,
fol. 366r
quoted.
80.
ARA,
VOC
1245,
Gamron to Heren
XVII,
8 Mar.
1665,
fol. 468v.
Earlier,
the Dutch
reported
that
the
diplomatic
contact had resulted in the
reopening
of the borders between Iran and Russia. See
ARA,
VOC
1242,
Gamron to Heren
XVII,
20 June
1664,
fol. 1090.
81.
Parsamiian,
Armiano-russkie otnosheniia
v
XVII veke
(Erevan, 1953): 73, report
in
Armenian,
quoted
in Edmund M.
Herzig,
"The Armenian merchants of New
Julfa,
Isfahan: A
study
in
pre-modern
Asian
trade,"
Ph.D.
dissertation, University
of
Oxford,
1991: 103.
82.
N.G.Kukanova,
art. cit.:
23; E.S.Zevakin,
art. cit.: 158.
83. Maria Francesca
Tiepolo,
La Persia e la
Repubblica
di
Venezia, (Tehran, 1973):
XV
84.
N.G.Kukanova,
art. cit.: 23-24. See also
V.A.Baiburtian, op.
cit.:
94-96;
R.
Gulbenkian,
"Philippe
de
Zagly,
marchand arm?nien de Julfa et r?tablissement du commerce
persan
en Courlande en
1696,"
Revue des ?tudes arm?niennes,
new ser. 7
(1970): 361-399;
and
A.A.Rakhmani,
Azerbaidzh?n
v
kontse XVI i XVII vekov
(Baku, 1981): 185;
E.M.
Herzig, op.
cit.:
189-190,
notes the
ambiguity
of the
Annenian
position
and
suggests
that their
presentation
of the so-called Diamond Throne
may
be seen as
an effort to
gain standing
as
private
merchants. That
they
saw themselves as more than commercial
representatives
of the Safavid niler is illustrated in their
complaint
in 1672 to the tsar that Iranian
merchants were in the habit of
bribing
the treasurer to have their wares classified as
royal
wares in order
to avoid
having
to
pay
tolls. See P.P.
Bushev,
"Iranskii
kuptsina...,"
art. cit.: 169.
85. E.M.
Herzig, op.
cit.: 192.
86. See VA.
Baiburtian, op.
cit.:
99-100;
K.
K?vonian,
"Marchands arm?niens au XVIIe si?cle. ?
propos
d'un livre arm?nien
publi?
? Amsterdam en
1699," CMRS, XVI,
2
(1975): 213,
237.
87.
ARA,
VOC
1270,
Gamron to Heren
XVII, Apr. 24, 1670,
fol. 693r-v.
88.
V.A.Baiburtian, op.
cit.:
104-105;
E.S.
Zevakin,
art. cit.: 159.
89. VA.
Baiburtian, op.
cit.: 105.
90. Samuel H.
Baron,
"Who were the
gosti?" California
Slavic
Studies,
1
(1973):
14.
91.
V.A.Baiburtian, op.
cit.:
107-108;
E.S.
Zevakin,
art. cit.:
136,
160. The Dutch
embassy
is
described in Balthasar
Coyet,
Historisch Verhael
of Beschryving
van de
Voyagie...van
den Heere
Koenraad van Klenk...aan
Zyne
Zaarsche
Majesteyt
van Moscovien...
(Amsterdam, 1677).
92. M. Kh.
Geidarov,
Remeslennoe
proizvodsdvo
v
gorodakh
Azerbaidzhana
v XVII v.
(Baku, 1967):
49. The bales in which silk was
packed
and
transported weighed approximately
200 lb. or 90
kg.
each.
93. K.A. Antonova et
ai, eds,
Russko-indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v.
(Moscow, 1958):
347
(doc. 242).
94. N. G.
Kukanova,
"Russkoe-iraaskie
torgovye
otnosheniia
v
kontse XVII-nachale XVIII
v.,"
Istoricheskie
zapiski,
57
(1956):
232.
95. Ibid.: 234.
96. P. P.
Bushev,
"Iranskoe
posol'stvo
Fazl Ali-Beka v Rossiiu
(1711-1713 gg.),"
Kratkie
soobshcheniia Instituto narodov
Azii,
39
(1963):
42-43.
97. P.P.
Bushev,
"Putesliestvie
iranskogo posol'stva...,"
art. cit.: 166-169.
98. E.S.
Zevakin,
art. cit.: 161.
99. N.G.
Kukanova,
"Rol'
annianskogo kupechestva...,"
art. cit.: 27-28.
100. See A.A.
Rakhmani, op.
cit.:
179,
and
H.Kellenbenz,
"Russische
Transithandel...,"
art. cit.: 491.
A French
missionary
called late
seventeenth-century
Shamakhi a
great
commercial
entrepot
between Iran
ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 761
and
Moscow,
adding
that the
Indians,
the
greatest
and richest
merchants,
numbered c. 200. See
"M?moire de la
province
du
Sirvan,
en forme de Lettre adress?e au P?re
Fleuriau,"
in Lettres
?difiantes
et
curieuses ?crites des Missions
?trang?res.
M?moires du Levant
(Toulouse,
new
ed., 1810)
4: 27.
101. See R.
Gulbenkian,
art. cit.
102. See Archives du minist?re des Affaires
?trang?res, Paris,
A.E. Perse
5,
"Memorandum on
foreign
trade in
Iran, 1718,"
fol.
188;
and
K.K?vonian,
art. cit.: 205.
103. VA.
Baiburtian, op.
cit.: 105.
104. N.G.
Kukanova,
"Roi'
annianskogo kupechestva...,"
art. cit.:
27;
and
id.,
Ocherki
po
istorii
russko-iranskikh
torgovykh
otnoshenii
v
XVII-pervoi polovine
XIX veka
(Saransk, 1977):
96.
105. P.P.
Bushev,
"Puteshestvie
iranskogo posol'stvo...,"
art. cit.:
162;
VA.
Baiburtian, op.
cit.: 116
119.
106. Ibid.: 93-94.
107.
N.G.Kukanova,
"Russkoe-iranskie
torgovye otnosheniia...,"
art. cit.: 239.
108. In 1712 Armenian merchants
transported 2,660 puds (ca. 43,300 kg.
or 475
bales)
via Astrakhan.
See
N.G.Kukanova,
Ocherki
po istorii..., op
cit.: 110.
109. See R.W.
Ferner,
"An
English
view of Persian trade in
1618,"
Journal
of
the Economic and Social
History of
the
Orient,
19
(1976): 194;
and Pietro delta
Valle, Viaggi
di Pietro della
Valle,
2 vols
(Brighton,
1843),
II: 41.