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PHI 344: Philosophy of Mind Instructor: Elijah Chudnoff Email: e.chudnoff@miami.

edu Office: TBA Office Hours: TBA Course Description: People definitely have minds, and rocks definitely do not. But what about beetles, computers, ghosts, and populations? In this course we will consider the question: what is it for something to have a mind? Different theories of what it is to have a mind tend to privilege one of four key ideas: consciousness, behavior, computation, and representation. We will explore some of these theories and the settings they provide for understanding mental phenomena such as belief, rationality, and experience. And we will examine the key ideas of consciousness, behavior, computation, and representation themselves, particularly with an eye toward understanding their interrelations. Course Books: Jaegwon Kim Introduction to Philosophy of Mind David Chalmers Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings Assignments: 3 papers. They will range from 4 to 6 pages in length. I will provide suggested topics and due dates during the semester. Readings: Introduction Kim - Ch 1: Varieties of Mental Phenomena, Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? Dualism Kim - Ch 2: Up to Arguments for the Thesis That Minds and Bodies Are Distinct Kim Ch 2: Rest of Chapter Behaviorism Kim Ch 3: Up to What Kinds of Behavior Are Entailed by Mental States? Putnam - Brains and Behavior & Kim Ch 3: Rest of Chapter Identity Theory Place - Is Consciousness a Brain Process & Kim - Ch 4 (minus last section) Smart - Sensations and Brain Processes & Kim - Ch 4: Objections to the Psychoneural Identity Theory Kripke - Naming and Necessity (Excerpt)

Computational Functionalism Armstrong - The Causal Theory of Mind & Kim - Ch 5: Stuff before Turing Machines Putnam - The Nature of Mental States & Kim - Ch 5: Stuff on Turing Machines Searle - Can Computers Think? & Kim - Ch 5: The "Chinese Room" Causal Role Functionalism Kim - Ch 6: Stuff before objections and difficulties & Lewis - Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications Block - Troubles with Functionalism & Kim - Ch 6: Objections and Difficulties and after Intentionality Chisholm - Intentional Inexistence Fodor - Propositional Attitudes Dennett - True Believers & Kim - Ch 9: Interpretation Theory Dretske - A Recipe for Thought & Kim Ch 9: The Causal-Correlational Approach & Kim - Ch 9: Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach Internalism and Externalism Putnam - The Meaning of "Meaning" Burge - Individualism and the Mental & Kim - Ch 9: Narrow Content and Wide Content, The Metaphysics of Wide Content States Chalmers - The Components of Content & Kim - Ch 9: The Possibility of Narrow Content McKinsey - Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access & Kim - Ch 9: Rest of Chapter Brueckner - What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori Consciousness Nagel - What Is It Like to Be a Bat? & Kim - Ch 8: Aspects of Consciousness Jackson - Epiphenomenal Qualia Lewis - What Experience Teaches Loar - Phenomenal States Hill - Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem Levine - Materialism and Qualia & Kim - Ch 8: Phenomenal Consciousness Chalmers - Consciousness and Its Place in Nature & Kim - Ch 8: Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? Block and Stalnaker - Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap Consciousness and Intentionality Rosenthal - Explaining Consciousness

Block - Concepts of Consciousness & Kim - Ch 8: Does Consciousness Involve HigherOrder Perceptions and Thoughts? Peacocke - Sensation and the Content of Experience: A Distinction Tye - Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited & Kim - Ch 8: Qualia Representationalism and Externalism Horgan and Tienson - The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality