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Operation DESERT SHIELD is the name, assigned by a United States-led coalition of nations, which joined to defend Saudi Arabia after Iraq, under the orders ofSaddam Hussein, invaded and occupied Kuwait. In Kuwait, the Iraqi military was a clear and present threat to Saudi Arabia. While it was unlikely that the Saudi military could stop an Iraqi invasion, the idea of having foreigners, especially non-Arab, non-Muslim forces enter the Kingdom was alarming to the conservative monarchy, heading an Islamic state under Islamic law. Eventually, however, the King decided to be joined by a coalition of nations in defending his country. The largest force in the Coalition was from the United States, and there were delicate issues of respecting the leadership of the Saudi military, while having the most experienced command and staff. A high-level U.S. delegation, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, United States Central Command commander GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., and others met with the King, and obtained agreement to defend Saudi Arabia. While it had been hoped that the strong defensive coalition, combined with diplomacy, might convince Saddam to withdraw, those measures failed to liberate Kuwait. After a United Nations deadline passed, an intense air campaign, Operation DESERT STORM disrupted Iraqi command and control and caused serious damage to the Iraqi military. Eventually, however, a 100-hour land operation, Operation DESERT SABRE, ejected the Iraqis from Kuwait.
majority votes, adopted 15 resolutions related to the crisis, among other things: condemning the initial invasion; calling for Iraqi troop withdrawal and protection of prisoners of war, diplomas and civilians; imposing strong, mandatory, comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq until it complied with its demands; arranging for aid to innocent victims of the conflict and countries economically affected by the embargo; and setting a deadline before authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore international peace and security in the area. UNSC Resolution 665, of August 25, authorized a maritime blockade. Resolution 678, passed November 29, invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can include military action. The deadline passed. And a seven-week war took place--waged by a coalition of troops representing 34 nationalities--to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Resolution 686, of 2 March 1991 after the cease-fire, demanded provocative overflights stop and provided the basis of no-fly operations.
Air Planning
GEN Schwarzkopf asked for assistance in planning an air counterattack, and COL John Warden III presented the original draft concept, called INSTANT THUNDER, for the 1991 Gulf War air campaign to GEN (ret.) Chuck Horner, then a lieutenant general commanding Schwarzkopf's air component (AFCENT) for United States Central Command. According to a book by Horner (coauthored by Tom Clancy), Horner found his personality immediately clashed with Warden's, although there wee good ideas in the presentation. [6] Sound thinking was involved, one member of the Checkmate. David Deptula, teamed stayed in Saudi Arabia, and now is himself a lieutenant general, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, United States Air Force. Horner looked further for a compatible air operations planners, and selected Buster Glosson. The problems first seemed a matter of personalities. GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commanding United States Central Command during the Gulf War, spoke well of Warden's original air war concepts. [7] Schwarzkopf did express concern that Warden saw the air component winning the war, and did not provide enough support to land forces. In his August 10 presentation, Warden modeled the Iraqi system as a set of five concentric circles, with Saddam and his command and control at the center. Next came the industrial and other infrastructure needed to sustain a war, such as the electrical grid. In the third ring was transprtation, with the fourth ring as the civilian population and its food supply. The outermost, and to Warden the least important, ring was the enemy's conventional military forces. Warden was not insistent that the centers of gravity would always be the same: The enemy's air [in the sense of air targeting] center of gravity may lie in equipment...in logistics...geography...in personnel...or in command and control.[8] Putting the Iraqi army as the lowest priority clashed with Schwarzkopf, who, while an advisor to South Vietnamese forces, objected that his unit did not have enough air support. A U.S. colonel, not in Schwarzkopf's chain of command, asked Schwarzkopf, sarcastically, what would be enough. Schwarzkopf, then a captain, replied:
Sir, when it's my a** out there on the ground, about a hundred B-52s circling around would be just barely adequate. Now, I'm willing to settle for something less, but I'm not willing to settle for nothing. [9] Throughout the Gulf War, Schwarzkopf wanted most support plans to include area bombing by B-52s against troops in the field, even when more modern precision-guided munitions might be more effective for a specific objective, and an objective, such as Saddam's communications, might be more critical than the Republican Guard. This is not meant as serious criticism of Schwarzkopf, but to illustrate the kinds of cultural conflicts that take place between different services, or even between different branches of different services Schwarzkopf, who came up from a regular Infantry background, disliked Army Special Forces, although he commended them for their performance at the end of the Gulf War. Warden had written if our tools in the Iraq case had been similar to those available in World War II, we would have been compelled to attack Iraq serially, and we would have started with some part of its air defense system. If we were very lucky, after a long period of time, we might have been able to start the reduction of the key inner rings but that would have been far into the future.[10] The actual campaign attacked both inner and outer rings simultaneously, but Glosson was able to present these ideas in a way acceptable to Horner and Schwarzkopf. Increasing the tension, Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan gave an interview, published on September 16, not only suggesting that the Air Force could be decisive, but giving clues to the evolving INSTANT THUNDER plan. Cheney immediately fired him. [11]
A fundamental challenge was the CENTCOM position that a second, armor-heavy corps would be necessary to take offensive action against the Iraqis in Kuwait. This was briefed to the White House on October 11, and, according to Powell, advisors thought CENTCOM had enough force, and called Schwarzkopf another " [George]" McClellan, a Union commander in the American Civil War who was hesitant to go on the offensive. Gordon and Trainor reported that the Civil War critic was National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, a Air Force lieutenant general assigned to the White House. [16] On October 29, Schwarzkopf recounted that Powell told him that a frustrated Cheney had come up with his own plan, judged of extreme risk. Criticism flowed back and forth for a week. On 2 November, Schwarzkopf met with the Saudi leadership over the delicate question of ultimate command authority in a coalition. The compromise was that Schwarzkopf and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Sultan al-Saud, were to be co-equals, but the CENTCOM commander would have final authority for operational decisionms. After significant discussion, on November 8, CENTCOM it was made public that it had been given even a larger force than originally requested, VII Corps (LTG Fred Franks), which was being demobilized as part of draw-downs in Europe, was designated as the second Army corps. Commitments also were made to upgrade all M1 Abrams tank guns to the newer 120mm version; civil servant volunteers from the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command set up an overhaul facility, at the port of entry into Saudi Arabia, to upgrade guns, armor, and other systems. According to Cole's review of Rich Atkinson's book, Crusade, From the moment Franks arrived in Saudi Arabia, if not before, Schwarzkopf took an immediate dislike to the man. Atkinson says that Schwarzkopf privately dismissed Franks as a pedant with an ability to mask battlefield timidity with verbose and theoretical lectures on tactics and operational maneuvering. [12] Without judging pedantic styles, it should be noted that Schwarzkopf's staff experience was in operations, finance, or personnel; he taught engineering at West Point. After Desert Storm, Franks was promoted to the four-star commander of Training and Doctrine Command, the pinnacle of Army concept development. Simply comparing their assignments shows them to have very different personalities. The President used his authority to call up reserves, but, in practice, only combat support and combat service support units actually deployed to the theater of operations. Three Army National Guard combat brigades intended to "round out" U.S. Army divisions proved not to be combat ready. [17]