Criminalizing Spousal Rape

Address correspondence to: Jennifer McMahon-Howard, 1000 Chastain Road MD 2204, Kennesaw, GA 3014; e-mail:
jmcmaho7@kennesaw.edu.
Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 52, Issue 4, pp. 505531, ISSN 0731-1214, electronic ISSN 1533-8673.
2009 by Pacic Sociological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photo-
copy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, at
http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/sop.2009.52.4.505.
CRIMINALIZING SPOUSAL RAPE:
THE DIFFUSION OF LEGAL REFORMS
JENNIFER MCMAHON-HOWARD
Kennesaw State University
JODY CLAY-WARNER
LINDA RENZULLI
University of Georgia
ABSTRACT: While efforts to criminalize spousal rape began in the
1970s, by 2002 only twenty-three states had adopted laws that allow for the
full prosecution of sexual assault by a spouse. The authors present the rst
analysis of martial rape law reform to incorporate insights from research on
diffusion. The authors nd that states are more likely to criminalize spousal
rape when women in the state have more economic power. Conversely,
states are less likely to criminalize spousal rape when the legislature
passed previous incremental reforms or when a neighboring state already
criminalized spousal rape. The authors also nd that states that criminalize
spousal rape under a split-party government are particularly inuential in
the spread of such reforms and that the processes driving early diffusion are
different than the processes driving later diffusion. Overall, results suggest
that understanding law reforms requires greater attention to incremental
change, negative effects of spatial diffusion, and the importance of time.
Keywords: spousal rape; legal reforms; diffusion
Researchers estimate that 14 percent of married women in the United States will
at some point experience spousal rape (Resnick, Kilpatrick, and Vernonen 1991).
Prior to the enactment of state rape law reforms, none of these rapes could have
been prosecuted under the law. In fact, thirty years ago the rape laws in every
state included a spousal exemption that gave husbands the legal right to have
sex with their wives without consent. Since rape was codied originally in English
Common Law as a property offense and wives were the property of their husbands,
the spousal exemption served to protect a man from being charged or prosecuted
with the rape of his own wife (Russell 1990). The spousal exemption found its way
into modern U.S. laws governing rape and was a taken-for-granted part of our legal
code well into the twentieth century. It was not until the 1970s that challenges to
SOP5204_05.indd 505 11/20/09 12:18:41 PM
506 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 52, Number 4, 2009
the marital rape exemption began, and since that time every state has addressed
the spousal exemption in some fashion. Laws in over half of the states, however,
still do not protect women fully from rape by a spouse.
In examining spousal rape laws, previous scholars focused on the intrastate
context of successful rape law reforms and have relied on either case studies of
individual states (Marsh, Geist, and Caplan 1982) or cross-sectional analyses ex-
amining the correlates of the adoption of marital rape laws in all states (Berger,
Neuman, and Searles 1991). These types of research designs, however, can provide
only limited information regarding the causal factors and systematic processes
inuencing the criminalization of marital rape because they do not take into ac-
count the ways in which states inuence one another. Also, these studies were con-
ducted early in the reform period when not enough time had elapsed for patterns
to emerge, making it difcult to assess temporal effects. As a result, researchers
have been unable to determine what distinguishes the states that fully criminal-
ized wife rape from those that have not, thus stymieing married womens efforts
to achieve equal protection under the law (Finkelhor and Yllo 1985).
Therefore, the question remains: Why do some states continue to allow marital
exemptions for rape, while others fully criminalize it? Here we utilize a conict
model embedded within a diffusion framework to address this question. Our ap-
proach recognizes that conict and diffusion are not competing processes but, in-
stead, work in concert to inuence legal change. In this way, we use a conict per-
spective to guide our modeling of the diffusion process. We construct hypotheses
in line with the relevant literature but focus on three central arguments. First, we
argue that womens power is positively related to the elimination of the spousal
exemptions. Second, we predict a negative effect for spatial diffusion, such that
when states fully criminalize marital rape, it decreases the likelihood that neigh-
boring states will also pass such legislation. Third, we suggest that incremental
changes in rape laws negatively affect the passage of stronger reform legislation.
To examine these issues the rst author collected data on the social and political
characteristics of states as well as data on all changes to the marital rape laws of
all states from 1976 to 2002. While overcoming the methodological weaknesses of
previous research on marital rape laws, this original, longitudinal dataset enabled
us to utilize a heterogeneous diffusion model to examine the adoption of marital
rape laws over time. Thus, we provide the rst longitudinal investigation of the
causal determinants of the adoption of rape law reform.
Utilizing this dataset, we offer several important contributions to the general litera-
tures on legal change and diffusion. We conduct the rst quantitative, longitudinal
analysis to examine whether legal reforms are more likely to be achieved through
small incremental changes in criminal law or through the passage of single, more
sweeping legislation. This is an issue of growing importance for social movement
researchers, as well as those studying legal reform (Cornwall, Brayden, Legerski,
Dahlin, and Schiffman 2007). As a result, our examination of the effects of incremen-
tal changes provides a broader contribution beyond its application to marital rape
law reform. We also join in the ongoing debate regarding variation in the direc-
tion of spatial diffusion (Soule and Earl 2001). While early literature consistently
found positive effects for spatial proximity, more recent literature has called this
SOP5204_05.indd 506 11/20/09 12:18:41 PM
Criminalizing Spousal Rape 507
assumption into question. Here, we contextualize arguments regarding the direc-
tion of diffusion effects and provide empirical analyses. Finally, a serendipitous nd-
ing prompts us to explore possible time period effects for heterogeneous diffusion
processes, thus allowing us to contribute to research on the temporal effects of
diffusion. While advancing our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the law
formation process, these contributions also move us closer to understanding why
so many of the 63 million married women in the United States still lack full legal
protection against spousal rape (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006).
HISTORY OF RAPE LAW REFORMS
In response to the creation of the Model Penal Code in 1962 and as part of the
adoption of broader criminal law reforms, a few states made minor changes to
their rape laws in the early 1960s (Gornick and Meyer 1998). Beginning in the
1970s, however, feminist activists sought more drastic changes to states rape
laws, including the elimination of the spousal rape exemption. Couched within
the larger second womens rights movement, feminist activists initiated the anti-
rape and rape law reform movement in the 1970s in order to achieve a number of
goals, such as improving the legal response to rape, providing services for rape
victims, and reforming states rape laws (see also Gornick and Meyer 1998; Spohn
and Horney 1992).
In regards to rape law reforms, activists lobbied state legislators to broaden the
crime of rape (i.e., pass gender neutral rape laws, redene rape to include multiple
forms of sexual assault, and eliminate the spousal rape exemption) and change ev-
identiary rules and requirements (i.e., eliminate the resistance requirement, elimi-
nate the corroboration requirement, and pass rape shield laws). Although feminist
groups had somewhat different goals and motivations than conservative law-and-
order groups, these two sets of groups created a unique alliance with each other
to advocate for rape law reforms. Together, these activists achieved early success,
with forty-nine states passing at least some version of rape law reform between
1970 and 1979 (Gornick and Meyer 1998). Of all of the goals of the rape law reform
movement, however, efforts to eliminate the spousal rape exemptions were the
most strongly resisted (Russell 1990).
Despite this resistance, in 1976 Nebraska became the rst state to abolish com-
pletely its marital rape exemption (Finkelhor and Yllo 1985; Russell 1990), and
other states followed by either partially or completely eliminating their spousal
rape exemptions. While some states completely eliminated the spousal rape ex-
emptions by striking out not a spouse from the rape statute, other states adopted
partial marital rape law reforms, which only limited the exemptions. It was not
until 1993, when North Carolina eliminated the marital rape exemption from its
rape statutes, that spousal rape became a crime under at least some condition in all
fty states (Bergen 1996; Finkelhor and Yllo 1985; Russell 1990). Although states
have continued to reform their marital rape laws, partial spousal exemptions still
exist in over half of the states. For example, laws in some states permit husbands to
force sex upon their wives under certain circumstances (i.e., the victim is mentally
incapacitated) and/or include special evidentiary and reporting requirements
SOP5204_05.indd 507 11/20/09 12:18:41 PM
(i.e., bodily injury) that make the prosecution of spousal rape different from that
of non-spousal rape. Thus, married women continue to lack full legal protection
from spousal rape in many states.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGES
IN MARITAL RAPE LAWS
Catherine MacKinnon (1989) argues that laws, especially laws regarding rape and
sexual harassment, are a reection of male dominance. In a social system where
women are structurally inferior to men and deprived of power, men create laws
that reect this social system and, in turn, perpetuate womens subordination
(MacKinnon 1989). As groups gain economic and political power, however, laws
are modied to reect their interests (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes 2002). For exam-
ple, in response to conicts and contradictions brought about by the expansion
of womens rights following suffrage, lawmakers began to alter some laws gov-
erning women. Thus, since an increase in womens power is associated with the
passage of laws favorable to women, spousal rape exemptions should become less
common as the power differential between men and women decreases.
While most research on law formation focuses on the effects of the social and
political environment on the criminalization process, and especially the power
differentials between competing groups, other research suggests that the process
of interstate diffusion can help explain the probability and timing of legislation
(Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998; Rogers 1962; Soule and Earl 2001; Strang and
Tuma 1993). Diffusion researchers model a heterogeneous diffusion process, which
suggests that policymakers, not knowing the optimal policy to adopt, often look to
the policies adopted by nearby states to help them draft and make decisions about
certain policies (Soule and Earl 2001). The probability and timing of legislation,
therefore, can be best understood when researchers focus on social and political
factors while simultaneously considering the propensity, susceptibility, infectious-
ness, and proximity to prior adopters as commonly done in diffusion research
(e.g., Myers 2000; Soule and Earl 2001).
Propensity
Propensity refers to intrinsic characteristics of actors that directly affect the
likelihood of an event, regardless of the actions of others (Myers 2000; Soule and
Earl 2001). While diffusion researchers focus on how actors inuence each other,
they do not ignore the actors intrinsic characteristics. Acknowledging that con-
icts within a group or state may inuence the occurrence of an event, diffusion
researchers include measures of group conict in their empirical models in order
to examine the effects of diffusion above and beyond the effects of conict (i.e.,
Myers 2000; Soule and Earl 2001). Drawing from the research on womens rights
legislation, we conceptualize and derive hypotheses about states propensity for
adopting marital rape laws.
Researchers nd that when womens power and equality increase, laws that
favor the rights of women are more likely to be passed. Increases in the proportion
SOP5204_05.indd 508 11/20/09 12:18:41 PM
of women working in the paid labor force increase the likelihood of the adoption
of womens suffrage, liberalized abortion laws, and the consent dimension of rape
law reforms (Berger et al. 1991; McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery
2001; Ramirez and McEnaney 1997). Similarly, an increase in womens political
participation, as evidenced by higher proportions of women in the state legislature
and/or higher proportions of female lawyers, is associated with a higher likeli-
hood that a state will adopt womens suffrage, police reform legislation regarding
domestic violence, rape law reforms, and women-friendly policies in general
(Berger et al. 1991; Caiazza 2002; McCammon et al. 2001; Murphy 1997). Thus, we
expect to nd that states with higher levels of gender equality and power will be
more likely to adopt a strong marital rape law.
Also, the political environment affects the success of legislation advancing the
rights and protections of women. Since states with more liberal ideologies are
more open to policy changes, they are more likely to pass new laws that favor the
rights of women (Soule and Olzak 2004). Research bears out this claim, as states
with more liberal ideologies are more likely to pass domestic violence legislation,
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and certain dimensions of rape law reform
(Berger et al. 1991; Call, Nice, and Talarico 1991; Murphy 1997; Soule and Olzak
2004). Therefore, we expect liberal government ideology to be positively associ-
ated with the passage of strong marital rape laws.
Additionally, to address a gap in the literature on legal reforms, we consider
previous changes in a law as a propensity factor. Soule and Earl (2001) found that
states that passed weaker, civil legislation requiring police to collect data on hate
crimes or allowing civil redress for hate crime victims were less likely to pass a
strong criminal hate crime law. On the other hand, McCammon et al. (2001) found
that the adoption of partial woman suffrage (i.e., school suffrage) had no effect
on a states likelihood of adopting full woman suffrage. Neither of these studies,
however, examined the effect of passing weaker, criminal laws on the likelihood of
eventually passing a stronger criminal law.
We suggest that small changes in a given criminal law may affect a states likeli-
hood of overhauling the legislation. As activists seek multiple goals in a particular
social movement, they must choose strategies and tactics they believe will be most
successful in obtaining their goals. Importantly, reformers must decide if they are
going to make radical demands or modest demands (Gamson 1975). While differ-
ent strategies and tactics may be more or less successful in gaining support for and
enacting a legal reform, there is very little research that examines this issue. This is
especially important to consider in regards to efforts to pass controversial legisla-
tion. Here, in an effort to appease reform advocates without upsetting opponents,
legislators may pass a weaker version of the proposed law reform. As reformers
continue to press for legal reform, however, legislators may resist adoption of the
stronger law. Indeed, this logic is consistent with the recent claim that although
activists are more likely to see intermediate policy reform as a stepping stone to
further change, these reforms may be interpreted as the end goal by legislators
(as a means to pacify activists) (Cornwall et al. 2007:249). Therefore we predict that
passing a number of weaker spousal rape laws, which only limit the exemptions,
will decrease the likelihood of completely abolishing the spousal exemption.
SOP5204_05.indd 509 11/20/09 12:18:41 PM
Susceptibility
Susceptibility is the likelihood that an actor will mimic the particular actions of
other actors, taking into account the likelihood of exposure (Myers 2000). In this
regard, states may vary in the degree to which they will respond to the spread of
a legal reform by adopting a similar reform. While the adoption of a law reform
in other states puts pressure on at-risk states to adopt a similar policy, differences
in the susceptibility of the at-risk states will determine which states will adopt the
legal reform in response to this pressure. States may, in a sense, be primed for a
particular policy change as a result of state-level characteristics or events and, in
fact, the priming may increase the effects of the exposure. In their research on hate
crime laws, Soule and Earl (2001:292) use the repeal of the sodomy law to measure
susceptibility. They argue that states that repealed their sodomy law may be more
attuned to legal issues concerning gays and lesbians . . . [and] more sensitive or
conditioned to policies extending rights and benets to gays and lesbians. As a
result, states that repealed the sodomy law are more likely to pay attention to other
states as they begin to pass hate crime laws and are more likely to respond by pass-
ing similar hate crime laws.
In examining the adoption of strong marital rape laws, we argue that states that
ratied the ERA may be more primed for the adoption of other womens rights
legislation. As a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution, the main
purpose of the ERA was to guarantee equal rights for women (Crowley 2006). Since
states that ratied the ERA may be more likely to pay close attention to the adoption
of womens rights legislation in other states, these states may be inclined to pass
a strong marital rape law when they are exposed to other states that have passed
marital rape law reforms. Thus, using ERA ratication, we predict that susceptibility
will increase a states likelihood of adopting a strong marital rape law.
Infectiousness
Infectiousness is the amount of inuence a particular actor or event will have
on at-risk actors or events. While an actors propensity refers to its internal char-
acteristics that determine the probability of an event, regardless of the actions of
other actors, an actors infectiousness refers to its internal characteristics that de-
termine the likelihood that other actors will mimic its actions. Previous research-
ers link infectiousness with visibility. Specically, Soule and Earls (2001) measure
of infectiousness highlights the visibility of laws passed by split-party legisla-
tures. They contend that there is a great deal of attention from both the media
and political actors in other states when split-party legislatures pass controversial
laws, because consensus in these situations is unexpected and because news of
the adoption of such legislation will travel to members of both parties in other
states as information ows along party lines (Soule and Earl 2001:293). Indeed,
their research shows that states that passed hate crime laws under split legislative
houses are more infectious on at-risk adopters. Similarly, to capture visibility, My-
ers (2000:183) conceptualizes infectiousness as the sum of the severity of all riots
that have previously occurred. He argues that large riots receive more media
SOP5204_05.indd 510 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
attention than do small riots, making them known to a larger group of people.
Myers (2000) research shows that more severe riots are more infectious than less
severe riots.
Following these arguments, we conceptualize infectiousness as the visibility of
previous marital rape legislation, and we use both the activities of split-party leg-
islatures as well as the degree of change in a states marital rape law as proxies for
visibility. We argue that states that pass strong marital rape laws when the gover-
nor and legislative majority are of different political parties will be highly infec-
tious. Also, we expect that when other states make stronger, more severe changes
in their marital rape laws, which increases the overall strength of the marital rape
laws across the United States, the likelihood of a given state passing a strong mari-
tal rape law will increase.
Proximity
Research on spatial diffusion indicates that states are inuenced by other states
in their geographic proximity (Grattet et al. 1998; McCammon et al. 2001; Renzulli
and Roscigno 2005; Soule and Earl 2001; Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Tuma
1993). Since states that are in close proximity to each other often communicate and
share knowledge with each other, these states inuence each other in regards to
social policies (Strang and Tuma 1993). For example, since information may easily
transcend state borders via commuting and relocating workers, shared newspa-
pers, radio, and television, these avenues of communication increase a states ex-
posure to and knowledge of legal changes in bordering states. As a result, policies
adopted in one state may affect the likelihood of the adoption of a similar policy
in neighboring states. The effects of a states spatial proximity to other states that
previously adopted a particular law, however, can either increase or decrease that
states likelihood of adopting that particular law.
While most research suggests that being in close proximity to the source of an
innovation increases an actors likelihood of adopting a similar policy (Grattet et al.
1998; McCammon et al. 2001; Renzulli and Roscigno 2005; Soule and Zylan 1997),
a few researchers have found signicant negative effects for spatial proximity
that being in close proximity to the source of an innovation decreases an actors
likelihood of adoption (Myers 2000; Soule and Earl 2001; Tolnay, Deane, and Beck
1996). In their analysis of the diffusion of the lynching of blacks by white mobs
in the southern United States, Tolnay et al. (1996) found that lynching activity in
one county decreased the likelihood of lynching in nearby counties. Similarly, in
examining the spread of race riots in the United States, Myers (2000) found that
although riots in nearby cities initially increased the likelihood of rioting in neigh-
boring cities, riot proximity had a negative effect over time. Also, Soule and Earl
(2001) found that states were less likely to adopt a hate crime law when they were
in close proximity to other states that adopted such legislation.
Instead of increasing the likelihood of the spread of the new law, the effects of
spatial proximity may be negative for more controversial laws (Soule and Earle
2001). If passing a certain law reform is followed by a negative social reaction (i.e.,
SOP5204_05.indd 511 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
strong criticisms of the change), then nearby states may be less likely to adopt a
similar law. Given that the elimination of the marital rape exemption was con-
troversial and strongly resisted (Berger, Searles, and Neuman 1988; Largen 1988),
we predict that spatial proximity will have a negative effect on the likelihood of
completely abolishing the spousal exemption.
DATA AND METHODS
Previous data limitations presented difculties for studying marital rape law re-
form and rape law reform in general. Specically, there was no one source of data
that combined the measures needed to conduct a compressive quantitative study
of the diffusion of marital rape law reform. To overcome this limitation, the rst
author gathered data from multiple sources, coded, and entered data for each state
from 1976 (the year the rst state adopted a marital rape law) to 2002 (the year of
data collection) to form a comprehensive dataset. Using the current state statutes,
which provide the legislative history for the statute, we identied the years each
state made any change to their sexual assault laws. We used the yearly session
laws, which contain the specic details on all of the laws passed by the state leg-
islature in a given year, to gather information detailing all changes made to each
states marital rape law.
1
We utilized various other secondary sources in order to
gather the most appropriate information regarding the intrinsic characteristics of
states. Since this involved a variety of data sources, we list each source when dis-
cussing the relevant variables.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, marital rape law, measures whether the state fully
recognizes marital rape as a crime with no exemptions or special requirements.
Exemptions and special requirements include time limitations for reporting the
crime; evidence of bodily injury; parties must be living apart; rape is permitted
if wife is physically or mentally impaired, unconscious, or asleep; lesser penal-
ties or reduced sentences; and exemptions for lesser sexual offenses, such as
sexual abuse or sexual assault. No marital rape exemptions or special require-
ments exist if the states statutes do not distinguish marital rape from other rape
cases, meaning that the law treats marital rape cases exactly the same as other
rape cases. Marital rape law was coded 0 if the state still has any of the marital
rape exemptions listed above and 1 if no exemptions exist, which indicates adop-
tion of a strong marital rape law. Following previous research on the adoption of
reforms (Berger et al. 1991; Call et al. 1991; Murphy 1997; Soule and Earl 2001),
we use statutory changes, instead of case law decisions, to determine the status
of the marital rape law for our dependent variable.
2
Since rape law reformers
specically sought legislative changes instead of changes through case law (Lar-
gen 1988), using legislative outcomes to measure our dependent variable is most
appropriate for our study. At the time of data collection, twenty-three states had
abolished completely their marital rape exemptions, whereas twenty-seven states
still had partial exemptions (see Table 1).
SOP5204_05.indd 512 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this study measure the four properties of dif-
fusion and reect our hypotheses: propensity, susceptibility, infectiousness, and
proximity (see Table 2 for descriptions of the independent variables).
TABLE 1
Years of State Abolition of Marital Rape Exemptions
Year Marital Rape
Exemptions Completely
Abolished States (N 50)
State-Years
per State
1976 Nebraska Omitted
1977 Oregon
a
1
1978 New Jersey 3
1981 Massachusetts
b
6
New Hampshire 6
Wisconsin 6
1985 Vermont 10
1987 North Dakota
a
6
1988 Colorado 13
1989 Indiana 14
Maine 14
1991 Missouri 16
Montana
a
8
New Mexico 16
Utah 16
1993 North Carolina 18
Texas
a
9
1995 Pennsylvania 20
1996 Georgia 21
1998 Delaware 23
2000 Kentucky 25
West Virginia 25
2001 Arkansas
b
13
Censored Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada (14),
a
New York,
Ohio (14),
a
Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming
27
Source: Legislative Session Laws (U.S. Bureau of the Census 19762002) and Anderson (2003).
Note: Twenty-three states plus Washington, D.C. have completely abolished MRE. Twenty-seven states have partial
exemptions.
a
States in which the legislature only meets every other year. State-years in which the legislature did not meet were
omitted from the analyses.
b
Although Massachusetts eliminated its marital rape exemption when it passed a major criminal law reform in 1974,
this change was not recognized until it was claried in a 1981 case law decision.
SOP5204_05.indd 513 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
T
A
B
L
E

2
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n

a
n
d

S
o
u
r
c
e

M

S
D
P
r
o
p
e
n
s
i
t
y

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s

%

o
f

l
a
b
o
r

f
o
r
c
e

w
h
o

a
r
e

w
o
m
e
n
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

t
h
o
s
e

e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d

i
n

t
h
e

c
i
v
i
l
i
a
n

l
a
b
o
r

f
o
r
c
e

w
h
o

a
r
e

w
o
m
e
n

(
U
.

S
.

C
e
n
s
u
s

B
u
r
e
a
u
)
4
4
.
5
0
2
.
4
7

%

l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
o
r
s

w
h
o

a
r
e

w
o
m
e
n
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

s
t
a
t
e

l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
u
r
e
s

w
h
o

a
r
e

w
o
m
e
n

(
U
.
S
.

C
e
n
s
u
s

B
u
r
e
a
u
)
1
4
.
8
1
8
.
1
3

N
O
W

m
e
m
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

N
O
W

m
e
m
b
e
r
s

p
e
r

c
a
p
i
t
a

i
n

e
a
c
h

s
t
a
t
e

(
N
O
W

H
e
a
d
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
s
)
;

v
a
l
u
e
s

m
u
l
t
i
p
l
i
e
d

b
y

1
0
,
0
0
0

f
o
r

e
a
s
e

o
f

p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
5
.
3
3
3
.
7
7

L
i
b
e
r
a
l

g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t

i
d
e
o
l
o
g
y
M
e
a
n

p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n

o
f

t
h
e

s
t
a
t
e

g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t

o
n

a

c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
-
l
i
b
e
r
a
l

s
c
a
l
e

(
B
e
r
r
y

e
t

a
l
.

1
9
9
8
)
4
9
.
3
1
2
2
.
5
0

N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s

c
h
a
n
g
e
s
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s

c
h
a
n
g
e
s

t
o

a

s
t
a
t
e
s

m
a
r
i
t
a
l

r
a
p
e

l
a
w

(
S
t
a
t
e

S
e
s
s
i
o
n

L
a
w
s
)
1
.
0
0
0
.
9
9
S
u
s
c
e
p
t
i
b
i
l
i
t
y

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e

R
a
t
i
e
d

E
R
A
W
h
e
t
h
e
r

t
h
e

s
t
a
t
e

r
a
t
i
e
d

t
h
e

E
R
A

(
0

n
o
,

1

y
e
s
)

(
C
r
o
w
l
e
y

2
0
0
6
)

m
u
l
t
i
p
l
i
e
d

b
y

t
h
e

n
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

s
t
a
t
e
s

t
h
a
t

c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
l
y

e
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d

t
h
e
i
r

s
p
o
u
s
a
l

r
a
p
e

e
x
e
m
p
t
i
o
n
s

(
S
t
a
t
e

S
e
s
s
i
o
n

L
a
w
s
)
6
.
3
4
8
.
0
4
I
n
f
e
c
t
i
o
u
s
n
e
s
s

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s

S
t
r
o
n
g

l
a
w

p
a
s
s
e
d

u
n
d
e
r

a

s
p
l
i
t
-
p
a
r
t
y

g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
S
u
m

o
f

t
h
e

n
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

s
t
a
t
e
s

t
h
a
t

p
a
s
s
e
d

a

s
t
r
o
n
g

m
a
r
i
t
a
l

r
a
p
e

l
a
w

w
h
e
n

t
h
e
r
e

w
a
s

a

s
p
l
i
t

-
p
a
r
t
y

g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t

(
S
t
a
t
e

S
e
s
s
i
o
n

L
a
w
s
)
4
.
8
9
4
.
0
3

C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h

o
f

c
h
a
n
g
e
s
S
u
m

o
f

t
h
e

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h

o
f

a
l
l

c
h
a
n
g
e
s

m
a
d
e

t
o

t
h
e

m
a
r
i
t
a
l

r
a
p
e

l
a
w
s

i
n

a
l
l

s
t
a
t
e
s

b
y

e
a
c
h

y
e
a
r

(
S
t
a
t
e

S
e
s
s
i
o
n

L
a
w
s
)
9
0
.
8
8
6
4
.
0
4
P
r
o
x
i
m
i
t
y

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e

I
n
t
e
r
s
t
a
t
e

p
r
o
x
i
m
i
t
y
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

b
o
r
d
e
r

s
t
a
t
e
s

t
h
a
t

a
d
o
p
t
e
d

a

m
a
r
i
t
a
l

r
a
p
e

l
a
w

(
S
t
a
t
e

S
e
s
s
i
o
n

L
a
w
s
)
1
.
0
0
1
.
1
3
C
o
n
t
r
o
l

V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s

W
h
i
t
e

p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

s
t
a
t
e

p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n

t
h
a
t

i
s

w
h
i
t
e

(
U
.
S
.

C
e
n
s
u
s

B
u
r
e
a
u
)
8
2
.
1
6
1
2
.
8
4

U
r
b
a
n
i
c
i
t
y
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

o
f

s
t
a
t
e

p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n

l
i
v
i
n
g

i
n

u
r
b
a
n

a
r
e
a
s

(
U
.
S
.

C
e
n
s
u
s

B
u
r
e
a
u
)
6
8
.
1
4
1
4
.
2
5

V
i
o
l
e
n
t

c
r
i
m
e

r
a
t
e
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

v
i
o
l
e
n
t

c
r
i
m
e
s

r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d

t
o

t
h
e

p
o
l
i
c
e

p
e
r

1
0
0
,

0
0
0

p
e
r
s
o
n
s

(
F
B
I
s

U
n
i
f
o
r
m

C
r
i
m
e

R
e
p
o
r
t
s
)
4
8
3
.
0
4
2
4
3
.
0
1

P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

p
e
r
s
o
n
s

l
i
v
i
n
g

i
n

t
h
e

s
t
a
t
e

(
i
n

t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
)

(
U
.
S
.

C
e
n
s
u
s

B
u
r
e
a
u
)
5
,
1
6
7
.
4
0
5
,
6
6
8
.
5
3

R
e
g
i
o
n
C
e
n
s
u
s

R
e
g
i
o
n

d
u
m
m
i
e
s

(
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
:

S
o
u
t
h
)
N
o
r
t
h
e
a
s
t
0
.
1
4
0
.
3
5
M
i
d
w
e
s
t
0
.
2
2
0
.
4
2
W
e
s
t
0
.
2
6
0
.
4
4
N
o
t
e
:

N

1
,
0
1
1
.
SOP5204_05.indd 514 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
Propensity. Since the propensity factors in this case will refer to the intrinsic
characteristics of states that affect the likelihood of a state adopting marital rape
reforms, we must conceptually examine each states gender climate, political cli-
mate, and previous legal changes.
3
In order to do so, we use measures of womens
representation in the economic and political systems as well as a measure of femi-
nist activism to tap into the gender climate of each state (Berger et al. 1991). The
percentage of paid labor force participants who are women is our indicator of womens
economic equality,
4
and the percentage of state legislators who are women is our indi-
cator of womens political equality. We use data from the Statistical Abstracts (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 19762002) to create both of these variables.
We use state-level National Organization for Women (NOW) membership as an in-
dicator of the strength of feminist activism in each state. Though there are other
local feminist activist groups and not all feminists are members of NOW, NOW is
by far the most prominent feminist group in the country, and one that is found in
every state.
5
By contacting NOW headquarters, we were able to obtain information
regarding yearly NOW membership for each state. The measure of the number of
NOW members in each state was divided by the state population for each year. For
ease of presentation and interpretation, these values were multiplied by 10,000.
To capture the overall political climate of each state, we include measures of the
dominant government ideology in each state. Consistent with previous research, we
use Berry et al.s (1998) government ideology scores, which have been updated
through 2006,
6
to measure the openness or receptivity of the political culture (Bar-
clay and Fisher 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004). In constructing these government ide-
ology scores, Berry et al. rst use interest group ratings of the ideological positions
of members of Congress, which researchers have found to be reliable and valid,
to estimate the ideological positions of the governor and the two major political
parties in both chambers of the legislative branch. Then, for these ve actors in the
state government, they weigh these ideology ratings based on the distribution of
power between these entities and they combine these scores to create the overall
government ideology score for the state. Because government ideology may shift
with each new election, the scores are time variant. Higher scores indicate a more
liberal government ideology.
The last propensity variable measures the number of previous changes made to a
states marital rape law.
7
For example, if a state rst reformed its marital rape law
in 1979 by creating a partial spousal exemption and reformed its law again in 1983
by limiting the number of conditions that qualify for a spousal exemption, the
value for the number of previous changes is 0 for this state for 1976 through 1979,
1 for 1980 through 1983, and 2 for 1984. If a state completely abolished its exemp-
tion with the rst change, then this state would always have a value of 0 for the
number of previous changes (the state drops out of the analysis once it completely
abolishes its exemption).
Susceptibility. Since a measure of susceptibility should incorporate a state-
level characteristic that increases the intensity of a states exposure to the adoption
of marital rape laws in other states and makes the state more responsive to the
actions of these states, we measure susceptibility by combining a measure of the
ratication of the ERA with a measure of the actions of other states (the number
SOP5204_05.indd 515 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
of states that have abolished the marital rape exemption). The ERA ratication
component of this variable is coded 1 if the state ratied the ERA prior to the year
of data and 0 if the state did not ratify the ERA or if the state ratied the ERA but
rescinded its ratication prior to the year of data (see Crowley 2006). To create
our measure of susceptibility, we then multiply ERA ratication by the number of
states that previously abolished their marital rape exemptions before that particu-
lar year.
Infectiousness. We employ two measures of infectiousness, both of which are
cumulative. First, we use strong law passed under a split-party government as a mea-
sure of infectiousness. For this measure, we calculated the total number of states
that abolished their marital rape exemptions during a legislative session in which
the political party of the governor was different from the majority party of the state
legislature. Because the unit of analysis is the state-year, values on this variable
increase over time. The United States Census Statistical Abstracts (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 19762002) provide yearly data on the dominant political party of the
state legislature and the political party of the governor.
Second, we use the cumulative strength of change in a states marital rape law as
a measure of infectiousness. To calculate this variable, we went through a multi-
step process. First, using Andersons (2003) overview of the marital rape laws in
each state, we created categories of the strength of different types of marital rape
laws. Next, using our data collected from the session laws, we gave a score to each
state based on the strength of the marital rape law in each yearweak, moderate,
strong, or strongest marital rape law.
8
Finally, we gave each state a score on the
extent of change the marital rape law had undergone in a given year. Extent of change
was given a score of 0 if there was no change in a states marital rape law in a given
year, 1 if there was a weak/small change (a state changed its marital rape law, but
the marital rape law still falls within the same strength category), 2 if there was a me-
dium/moderate change (the change moves the classication of the strength of the
law up to the next category), and 3 if there was a large/strong change (the change
moves the classication of the strength of the law up two or more categories).
Finally, since a concept of infectiousness is best measured by taking the cumula-
tive effect of the innovation from all adopters, we rst summed scores of extent of
change for all states in a given year. Then, as infectiousness accumulates over time,
the extent of all states changes in the previous year is summed with the extent of
all changes in the current year to produce the cumulative extent of change in states
marital rape laws.
Proximity. A measure of interstate proximity is included to assess the effects
that nearby states may have on a states likelihood of adopting a marital rape law.
Interstate proximity measures the number of bordering states that previously ad-
opted a strong marital rape law.
9
Control Variables. We include several other measures that researchers have
found to affect passage of criminal laws or laws governing the rights of women,
such as the racial composition, urbanicity, crime rate, population size, and the re-
gional location of the state (i.e., Berger et al. 1991; Call et al. 1991). The United
States Census (19702000) provides information on the racial composition of each
SOP5204_05.indd 516 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
state, which is measured in the present study by the percent of the state population
that is white (this variable is ten-year time varying). The Statistical Abstracts (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 19762002) also provide information on the percent of the
state population that lives in urban areas, and these data are used to measure the
urbanicity of each state. We use data from the FBIs Uniform Crime Reports (FBI
19762002), which provide information on all crimes reported to the police in a
given year, to measure the violent crime rate in each state.
10
The number of violent
crimes per 100,000 inhabitants is used to measure the violent crime rate. To measure
the size of the state population (in thousands), we use data from the Statistical
Abstracts (U.S. Bureau of the Census 19762002). Using the four main U.S. census
regions, dummy-coded regional variables for the Northeast, Midwest, and West
(South is the reference category) measure each states regional location.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
We analyze legislative adoption generally through an event-history analysis. In
Model 1, we examine only the effects of the propensity and control variables. In
Model 2, we add the heterogeneous diffusion variables measuring susceptibility,
infectiousness, and proximity. Since our two measures of infectiousness are highly
correlated with one another, they could not be included in the same model. Thus,
Model 3 includes all of the same variables as Model 2 except we replace our rst
infectiousness variable (passed law under a split-party government) with our sec-
ond infectiousness variable (cumulative extent of change). All independent vari-
ables are lagged one year to ensure that the intrastate and interstate variables are
measured prior to the adoption of a marital rape law. Unless otherwise noted, all
variables are measured yearly and we use linear interpolation to estimate values
for any data that were not available for a particular year (see Chow and Lin 1976
and Lanning 1986 for a discussion of the benets of using interpolation for missing
data in time series analyses).
We begin our analyses with the conditional appearance of the rst event, which
is a common approach for studying the emergence or adoption of a new event.
Since Nebraska was the rst state to abolish completely its marital rape exemp-
tion in 1976, we begin our analysis in 1976, and we omit Nebraska.
11
The unit of
analysis is the state-year. For each state, there is one record for each year until
the year that the state abolishes its spousal exemption. Once a state abolishes its
marital exemption, it is no longer at risk. Thus, if a state prohibits all of its marital
exemptions in 1979, four separate records are included in the data, one for 1976,
1977, 1978, and 1979, for that state. The twenty-seven states that did not eliminate
the marital exemption by the end of the time period (2002) are treated as censored
and each therefore has twenty-seven records (one record for each year from 1976 to
2002). We omit state-years when the legislature did not meet, which include even
years for Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas
(Council of State Governments 2003).
We use discrete time modeling with a dichotomous dependent variable (Alli-
son 1984) because law reform is binary and an outcome can occur only once a
year during the annual meeting of the legislature. Probability is measured by the
SOP5204_05.indd 517 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
hazard that a state will abolish its marital exemptions in a given year. Specically,
we use a heterogeneous diffusion model to estimate the hazard rate of adopting
this rape reform (Strang and Tuma 1993). In traditional diffusion models, research-
ers were constrained to assume all actors were equally inuential in the spread
of adoption and equally affected by the adoption of an event by other actors. In
reality, however, actors and events vary in both the degree to which they can inu-
ence or be inuenced. By using heterogeneous diffusion techniques developed by
Strang and Tuma (1993), we can relax that assumption. We use the following event
history equation:
N C D I F
n
s S t
t ( ) ( )
( )
+ + +
,
,
]
]
]
e
exp X
n s n ns
V W Z
Where: i
n
(t) is equal to the hazard of adoption for an individual n at time t, C is a
parameter estimate for the effects of X
n
(i.e., propensity variables), D is a parameter
estimate for the effects of V
s
(i.e., infectiousness), I

is a parameter estimate for the
effects of W
n
(i.e., susceptibility), F

is a parameter estimate for the effects of Z
ns
(i.e.,
proximity), and n is an actor at risk for adopting, s is a prior adopter, and t is time.
This equation will allow us to model the four diffusion predictors discussed
above: propensity, infectiousness, susceptibility, and proximity.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Propensity
The rst equation in Table 3 models the effects of propensity factors, or intrinsic
characteristics of a state, on the adoption of a strong marital rape law (complete
abolition of the spousal exemption). We predicted that states with a climate favor-
able to women and those with a liberal government ideology would be more likely
to pass a strong martial rape law. We also expected that an increase in the number
of previous changes to a states martial rape law would decrease its passage of
strong martial rape laws. Our results indicate support for the gender climate and
prior law hypotheses.
Gender Climate. We nd that the percentage of the labor force comprised
of women is positively related to the elimination of the marital rape exemption.
This nding is consistent with previous research on the effects of womens labor
force participation on the adoption of womens rights legislation and suggests that
the gender climate plays an important role in the adoption of marital rape laws
(Berger et al. 1991; McCammon et al. 2001; Ramirez and McEnaney 1997). Contrary
to expectations, however, the percent of legislators who are women and NOW
membership are not signicant predictors. We explore the effects of NOW mem-
bership in more detail below. The lack of signicance of female legislators may
be related to the fact that men still far outnumber women in the state legislatures.
Thus, although women are gaining access to the state legislatures, and researchers
nd that female legislators are more committed than male legislators to advancing
womens interests (Thomas and Welch 1991), female legislators may still lack the
SOP5204_05.indd 518 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
TABLE 3
Coefcients from Discrete-Time Event History Analysis Using Logit Estimates of
State Adoption of Strong Marital Rape Laws on Selected Independent Variables:
United States, 19762002
Model I Model II Model III
Independent Variables OR b OR b OR b
Propensity
% female labor force 1.66 0.51** 1.47 0.39** 1.39 0.33*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
% female legislators 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.03 0.96 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
NOW membership 1.02 0.02 1.06 0.06 1.10 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Government ideology 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of prior changes 0.39 0.95** 0.21 1.55** 0.19 1.65**
(0.36) (0.44) (0.44)
Susceptibility
ERA prior law 0.97 0.03 0.95 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Infectiousness
Passed law under split-party 1.57 0.45**
(0.14)
Cumulative extent change 1.04 0.04**
(0.01)
Proximity
Number of bordering states with law 0.34 1.07** 0.29 1.25**
(0.40) (0.42)
Controls
% white 1.11 0.11* 1.11 0.11* 1.13 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Urbanicity 0.98 0.02 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Violent crime rate 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Northeast 0.85 0.17 3.55 1.27 5.16 1.63
(0.87) (1.01) (1.05)
Midwest 0.49 0.72 2.13 0.76 3.17 1.15
(0.87) (1.01) (1.02)
West 2.39 0.86 8.18 2.10* 10.87 2.39*
(0.91) (1.06) (1.11)
Constant 34.87 30.79 30.76
Model log likelihood 88.86 81.15 78.89
Pseudo R
2
0.16 0.23 0.26
Note: N 1,011. Odds ratios (OR) and logit coefcients (b) with standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
SOP5204_05.indd 519 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
ability to gain the support necessary to pass womens rights legislation. It may also
be that larger numbers of women are elected to legislative positions in states in
which the legislatures are weak, resulting in lower levels of legislative activities in
those states.
12
Regardless of the percentage of women in the state legislature, how-
ever, both male and female legislators may be more likely to support legislation
that extends the rights and protections of women in states that have experienced
an increase in womens participation in the labor force. Thus, while female legisla-
tors may lack the power to inuence the adoption of marital rape laws directly, an
increase in womens participation in the labor force indirectly affects the adoption
of marital rape laws.
Political Climate. In addition to the effect of womens economic and political
power, researchers suggest that a states political climate plays an important role
in the adoption of womens rights legislation (Berger et al. 1991; Call et al. 1991;
Murphy 1997; Soule and Olzak 2004). While we predicted that states with more
liberal government ideologies would be more likely to adopt a marital rape law,
our results indicate that a states government ideology does not affect the likeli-
hood of adopting a marital rape law. Since the ndings from previous research on
the relationship between a states political environment and adopting rape law
reforms are mixed (Berger et al. 1991; Call et al. 1991), our nonsignicant nding
is not completely surprising.
In fact, since we nd that a states government ideology is not signicant, the
present study provides support for Berger et al.s (1991) claim that the political
environment of a state may not be important for the passage of all aspects of rape
law reform. Berger et al. suggest that the differential effects of the political environ-
ment on the adoption of rape law reforms may be due to the diverse backgrounds
and interests of rape law reform activists. That is, feminists and law-and-order
groups, who are traditionally members of different political parties and on oppo-
site sides of the government ideology spectrum, were the main forces behind the
rape law reform movement. Therefore, the different political backgrounds of the
rape law reform activists may have generated support from politicians from di-
verse backgrounds, making state government ideology unimportant for the adop-
tion of certain rape law reforms.
Previous Changes in Martial Rape Law. We also examined the effects of pre-
vious changes in a states marital rape law. We nd that an increase in the num-
ber of prior, weaker changes to a states marital rape law signicantly decreases
a states likelihood of completely eliminating the spousal exemption. Each addi-
tional change in the states marital rape law decreased the hazard of completely
exempting the marital rape exemption by about 60 percent.
Why did prior changes in the marital rape law have such a dramatic negative
effect on removal of the spousal exemption? Our results suggest that when com-
promise legislation is passed, legislators become less willing to take on the more
complete legislation at a later time. Although we do not measure activist mobiliza-
tion following the adoption of partial reforms, previous research suggests that the
adoption of intermediate reforms signals opportunity for additional reform and
encourages mobilization for activists (Cornwall et al. 2007). Therefore, while the
SOP5204_05.indd 520 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
adoption of partial marital rape law reforms may have encouraged activists to push
for stronger reforms, our results indicate that the adoption of these reforms actually
decreased legislators willingness to pass stronger reforms. In a sense, legislative in-
ertia occurs whereby laws become increasingly difcult to change. As a result, once
a legal change is made, it is unlikely that it will be revisited again soon.
This process may become even more pronounced in the case of controversial
legislation, such as the abolition of the marital rape exemption. It is likely difcult
for legislators to take on controversial issues, as by denition such issues have the
potential to produce conict with constituents and divisive arguments on the oor
of the legislature. Thus, rational political leaders would nd it unwise to revisit
controversy that has already been decided. Additionally, our results regarding the
effect of the adoption of weaker versions of a proposed law on the likelihood of
adopting the stronger law are consistent with and advance Soule and Earls (2001)
argument that states shield themselves from passing a strong, controversial law
by enacting weaker laws.
The negative effect for prior laws has important implications for activists and
social movement scholars. Since abolishing the marital rape exemption was so
strongly resisted, activists may have thought that their chances of success would
be much greater if they lobbied for a partial exemption (a conservative goal) in-
stead of lobbying for complete abolition (a radical goal). Accepting a partial re-
form, activists may have counted on continued lobbying efforts to further reform
the law, thus viewing the change in law as incremental progress instead of as a
nal compromise. Our results suggest, however, that social movement activists
may in fact be more successful in reaching their ultimate goal when they advocate
for sweeping change.
Susceptibility. Researchers nd that some at-risk actors may be more vulnerable,
or susceptible, to the inuence of prior adopters. Contrary to our hypothesis, however,
we do not nd signicant effects for susceptibility (Table 3, Models 2 and 3). We
explore this surprising nding in detail after discussing the results of the remaining
hypotheses.
Infectiousness. We measure infectiousness in two ways: the number of states
that have passed a strong marital rape law under a split-party government and
the cumulative extent of change in marital rape laws. Since these measures are
highly correlated (r .98), we examine them in separate models in Table 3. As seen
in Model 2, our results indicate that a unit increase in the number of states that
completely eliminated their spousal rape exemptions under a split-party govern-
ment increases the likelihood of completely abolishing the exemptions in at-risk
states by 57 percent. Additionally, infectiousness measured as cumulative extent
of change is also a signicant predictor (Model 3). The odds ratio indicates that
for each unit increase in the score of cumulative change, the likelihood of passing
a strong marital rape law increases by 4 percent. Given the cumulative nature of
this variable and, as a result, its large upper range (0 to 189), this is a substan-
tively important nding. Thus, we nd that completely eliminating the marital
rape exemptions under a split-party government and making more severe or
stronger changes in a marital rape law are two factors that increase the amount of
SOP5204_05.indd 521 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
inuence a state has on the likelihood of other at-risk states adopting a strong
marital rape law.
Proximity. As predicted, we nd that a states geographic proximity to other
states that adopted a marital rape law is a signicant negative predictor of adop-
tion. As shown in Table 3 (Models 2 and 3), the coefcient for the proximity vari-
able is negative and signicant, which indicates that an increase in the number
of bordering states that have passed a marital rape law decreases the likelihood of
abolishing the spousal exemption. In fact, a unit increase in proximity decreases
the likelihood of adopting a marital rape law by about 70 percent. This negative ef-
fect of spatial proximity is consistent with ndings from previous research on the
adoption of hate crime legislation (Soule and Earl 2001). Thus, just as states look
to nearby states to determine what laws to pass, they also take cues from nearby
states in regards to what laws not to pass. This is particularly true in the case of
controversial laws (Soule and Earl 2001).
Given that the elimination of the marital rape exemptions received some of the
strongest resistance among all of the dimensions of rape law reform (Berger et al.
1988; Largen 1988), Soule and Earls explanation of negative diffusion is appli-
cable to the diffusion of the elimination of marital rape exemptions. Specically, if
a state passes a law that completely abolishes the marital rape exemption and this
act receives a negative reaction by certain groups or individuals in that state, this
negative attention may decrease the likelihood of completely abolishing the mari-
tal rape exemption in neighboring states. As a result of negative reactions from
constituents following the adoption of a strong marital rape law, legislators may
discourage lawmakers in neighboring states from passing a similar law. Similarly,
media attention of such negative responses may deter legislators in nearby states
from passing this law (see Myers 2000).
Control Variables. Among our control variables, we only nd signicant ef-
fects for the racial composition of a state. Contrary to previous research on the
adoption of rape shield laws (Call et al. 1991), our results indicate that an increase
in the percent of whites in a states population increases a states likelihood of abol-
ishing the marital rape exemption. Further consideration of this nding suggests
that it may not actually be inconsistent with previous research. The racial issues
pertinent to rape shield laws (i.e., the special attention given to the victims sexual
history in interracial rape cases) are irrelevant to marital rape laws because they
seldom involve interracial spouses. Thus, the ndings regarding racial composi-
tion and rape shield laws may not be applicable to marital rape laws. Instead, it
may be that states with a higher percentage of whites are more likely to pass mari-
tal rape laws due to racial differences in support of the criminalization of marital
rape (Jeffords and Dull 1982).
Time Period Effects
Although existing empirical (Murphy 1997; Soule and Earl 2001; Soule and
Olzak 2004) and theoretical (McGarrell and Castellano 1993; Strang and Tuma
1993) work led us to expect to nd signicant effects for feminist activism and
SOP5204_05.indd 522 11/20/09 12:18:42 PM
susceptibility on the adoption of marital rape laws, we did not nd these effects in
our main models. In order to understand these ndings (or lack thereof), we con-
sidered the possibility that both feminist activism and susceptibility may be more
or less inuential during different periods of the rape law reform movement much
as institutional theory would predict. In fact, institutional theory has shown that
time affects the diffusion of organizational practices in civil services organizations,
for example (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Using this logic, Kane (2007) suggests
that the factors that affect the adoption of law reforms may depend, in part, on the
historical time period in which the adoption occurs. Specically, Kane showed that
the causal determinants of sodomy law reform varied as different groups led the
efforts to decriminalize sodomy during two distinct time periods. Therefore, we
apply Kanes logic to the case of marital rape law reform to explore possible time
period effects.
In the case of marital rape laws, it is possible that due to the unique characteris-
tics of the rape law reform movement, in particular, and the womens rights move-
ment, more generally, the factors predicting marital rape law reform vary over dif-
ferent time periods of the rape law reform movement. Here, we suggest that due
to NOWs declining role in the rape law reform movement (Largen 1988), NOW
membership will signicantly affect the adoption of strong marital rape laws in
the early period of the rape law reform movement but not in the later period. Simi-
larly, due to the changing nature of the womens movement from the 1970s to the
1990s, we predict that a states susceptibility will signicantly affect the adoption
of marital rape law reforms during the early period, but not in the later period.
In order to examine the effects of NOW membership and susceptibility in differ-
ent time periods, we ran separate event history analyses
13
for the early rape reform
period (19761989) and the late/modern reform period (19902002) (see Table 4).
14

These time period designations were used by Clay-Warner and Burt (2005) in their
analysis of the effectiveness of rape law reform. They explain that there were ongo-
ing changes to rape laws during the 1970s and 1980s and that all states had made
at least one change to their rape law before 1990.
15
As a result, they conduct sepa-
rate analyses for the early period and for the late/modern periods.
First, we explore possible time period effects for NOW membership. As seen in
Table 4, our results indicate that the effect of NOW membership is positive and
signicant in the early reform period (Model 1), but not in the late reform period
(Model 3). Thus, during the early period of the rape law reform movement, hav-
ing a higher rate of NOW membership increased a states likelihood of adopting a
strong marital rape law. These differential effects may be due to NOWs declining
involvement in the rape law reform movement over time. At the forefront of the
rape law reform movement, NOW formed a Task Force on Rape in 1973, organized
one of the rst Take Back the Night marches in 1975, and helped to pass a rape
shield law in 1978. Throughout the 1980s, however, NOWs attention shifted to
other social issues, and smaller, more specialized feminist organizations, such as
the National Clearinghouse for Marital and Date Rape, became more active in lob-
bying for rape law reforms.
Also, these time period effects may be due to the overall decline of the rape
law reform movement, more generally. Due to the early successes of the anti-rape
SOP5204_05.indd 523 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
TABLE 4
Event History Analysis Using Logit Regression of State Adoption of Strong
Marital Rape Laws on Selected Independent Variables: Early Reform Period
(19761989) and Late Reform Period (19902002)
Early Reform Period
(19761989)
Late Reform Period
(19902002)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent Variables OR b OR b OR b OR b
Propensity
% female labor force 1.40 0.34* 1.26 0.23 1.34 0.29 1.55 0.44
(0.17) (0.22) (0.27) (0.30)
% female legislators 1.00 0.00 0.92 0.08 0.98 0.02 0.99 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
NOW membership 1.26 0.23
1.29 0.25 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08

(0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11)
Government ideology 1.02 0.02 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of prior changes 0.10 2.26
0.04 3.32* 0.29 1.23** 0.26 1.34*

(1.18) (1.40) (0.47) (0.54)
Susceptibility
ERA prior law 1.78 0.58
0.99 0.01
(0.35) (0.04)
Infectiousness
Passed lawsplit party 1.03 0.03 1.04 0.04
(0.73) (0.25)
Proximity
Number bordering states
with law
0.12 2.09* 0.42 0.86*
(0.98) (0.42)
Controls
% white 1.11 0.11 1.16 0.15 1.08 0.08 1.09 0.08*
(0.10) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
Urbanicity 1.03 0.03 1.05 0.05 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Violent crime rate 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 31.36 32.06 21.90 27.72
Model log likelihood 30.52 24.83 51.92 49.21
Pseudo R
2
0.28 0.42 0.15 0.20
N 598 N 413
Note: Odds ratios (OR) and logit coefcients (b) with standard errors in parentheses.
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

SOP5204_05.indd 524 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
movement, such as the increased awareness of rape, the improved institutional
response to rape, the development and maturation of rape crisis centers, and the
increase in rape services provided by other, more mainstream, local agencies,
mobilization began to decline in the late 1970s (Gornick and Meyer 1998) and
continued to decline throughout the 1980s. Thus, it is possible that these institu-
tional shifts affected the signicance of our measure of feminist activism (NOW
membership) during different time periods of the movement. Since NOW played
a crucial role in initiating and generating early support for the rape law reform
movement, the strength of a states NOW membership increased a states likeli-
hood of passing a strong marital rape law during the early reform period but not
during the later period.
In exploring possible time period effects, we also nd that a states susceptibility
is signicant in the early reform period (Model 2), but not in the late reform period
(Model 4). Thus, states that ratied the ERA were more susceptible to the diffusion
of strong marital rape laws during the early rape law reform period; however, sus-
ceptibility had no effect during the late reform period. Changes in the nature of the
womens rights movement may help explain the differential effects of susceptibil-
ity. Specically, the rape law reform movement emerged in the early 1970s, during
the height of the second wave of the womens movement when feminist activity
was especially strong (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005). During this period of rapid
change in womens rights legislation, states that ratied the ERA may have been
viewed as more progressive and have felt more pressure to follow the lead of other
states that were enacting new laws to extend the rights and protections of women.
By the late 1980s and 1990s, however, most states had passed at least some form of
womens rights legislation, the womens movement had become fragmented, and
the rate of enactment of womens rights legislation declined (Sawyers and Meyer
1999). As a result, states that ratied the ERA may have felt less pressure to uphold
their image as progressive states, making them less likely to follow reforms in
other states. Thus, our time period ndings support Kanes (2007) general claim
that historical context may alter the causal determinants of legal change.
CONCLUSION
In this article we examine how various intra- and interstate factors contribute to
the passage of strong marital rape laws. As this is the rst analysis of martial rape
law adoption that takes interstate processes into account, we offer a signicant con-
tribution to our understanding of the process by which strong martial rape laws
are passed. Specically, we demonstrate that states are more likely to pass a strong
martial rape law when they have a high female labor force participation rate and
a small number of previous changes to their martial rape laws. We also nd that
the infectiousness of a martial rape law increases the likelihood that other states
will adopt a strong law and that sharing borders with states who have adopted a
strong law decreases the likelihood of adoption. Interestingly, NOW membership
and susceptibility only increase the likelihood of passing a strong marital rape
law during early years of the reform movement. These ndings are instructive for
activists in the twenty-seven states that still lack a strong marital rape law.
SOP5204_05.indd 525 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
Our work also offers several insights that are relevant to the literatures on legal
change and diffusion. Our research suggests that (1) incremental changes may be
detrimental to the passage of full reform, (2) spatial proximity is likely to have a
negative effect for controversial legislation, and (3) the diffusion process may be
subject to time effects. We detail each of these contributions below.
First, because few authors have provided theoretical or empirical examinations
of how weak reforms may inuence the likelihood of subsequent strong reforms,
studying the elimination of marital rape exemptions provided an excellent op-
portunity to examine the effects of incremental legal reform. In this case, states
did one of the following: (1) completely eliminated their marital exemptions with
only one reform, (2) made a number of smaller changes to completely abolish
their exemptions, or (3) made one or more smaller changes to their marital rape
law and continued to retain partial exemptions. Our results indicate that mak-
ing moderate, incremental changes is a resistance strategy that may ultimately
reduce the chances of more far-reaching changes. Our ndings suggest that the
adoption of weaker laws does not indicate that the legislative environment is
becoming more favorable to the adoption of the stronger law. Instead, the adop-
tion of weaker versions of a proposed law indicates that the legislators are pass-
ing weaker laws in lieu of stronger legislation. Our strong, signicant results
regarding prior changes suggests that social movement researchers may want
to examine whether incremental legislative changes are used by legislators as a
resistance strategy in other law reform movements. More generally, since there is
disagreement over which movement tactics lead to success (Cress and Snow 2000;
Gamson 1975; Kane 2007; Piven and Cloward 1977), our ndings both contribute
to this ongoing debate and encourage researchers to investigate further the effects
of modest versus radical tactics.
Second, our results regarding the negative effect of spatial proximity provide
an important contribution to the literature on the diffusion of laws. Researchers
most often nd that a states spatial proximity to other states that previously ad-
opted a particular law increases the states likelihood of adopting a similar policy.
In the case of marital rape laws, however, our results indicate that being in close
proximity to a state that eliminated its marital rape exemption decreases a states
likelihood of passing a similar law. This nding is consistent with Soule and Earls
(2001) research and suggests that the direction of the proximity effects may de-
pend, in part, on the social response following the adoption of the policy in nearby
states. Specically, when policies in nearby states are passed with general social
approval, a states close proximity to an adopting state may increase its likelihood
of adopting that policy. Conversely, when policies passed in nearby states are con-
troversial and elicit negative social responses, being in close proximity to these
states may decrease a states likelihood of adopting that policy.
Our study is limited, however, in that we do not compare the adoption of a con-
troversial law to the adoption of a less controversial law and we do not directly
examine how the social responses to the adoption of laws in neighboring states can
inuence a states likelihood of adopting new laws. Therefore, additional research
is needed to examine the differences in the causal determinants of the adoption
SOP5204_05.indd 526 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
of controversial laws compared to less controversial laws and to test directly the
effects of social responses to the adoption of controversial laws in nearby states.
Nonetheless, the relative uniqueness of our nding in the diffusion literature sug-
gests the importance of controversy in shaping the direction of proximity effects.
In addition, qualitative research could complement the ndings reported here.
While our research contributes by providing a comprehensive longitudinal national
analysis that produces generalizable ndings about legislative diffusion, qualitative
research may be able to provide contextualized accounts of legislative activities
within specic states. For example, a qualitative case study may be able to explore
the ways in which female economic and political power inuences the passage of
martial rape laws. A qualitative research study might also esh-out the mechanisms
by which legal reforms diffuse across states. Our work provides a starting point for
such research.
Third, we make a signicant contribution to the literature on the diffusion of
laws through our time period ndings. Using separate analyses to examine differ-
ences in the causal determinants of the adoption of strong marital rape laws dur-
ing different periods of the rape law reform movement, we nd that both NOW
membership and susceptibility are signicant in the early reform period but not
in the late reform period. Along with Kanes (2007) research, these ndings point
to the importance of considering the historical context of the diffusion of law re-
forms. In the present case, it was important to consider the changing context of
both the rape law reform movement and the larger womens rights movement.
Also, since previous researchers considered time period effects for propensity and
proximity factors (Kane 2007; Tolbert and Zucker 1983) while ignoring possible
time effects for susceptibility, our nding regarding the differential effects of sus-
ceptibility should encourage others to consider time period effects in all aspects of
the diffusion process.
Thus, our research raises important questions about the spread of reforms in
general and the spread of legal reforms concerning women in particular. How, for
instance, might compromise legislation inuence activists efforts to maintain or
overturn laws that govern womens reproductive rights? Although much of the
literature on the diffusion of law reforms has examined the implementation of new
laws (e.g., Renzulli and Roscigno 2005; Soule and Earl 2001), our work highlights
processes important in reforming and amending laws. As a result, our work is
instructive not only for understanding the circumstances most likely to advance
womens rights, but it also speaks to the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to main-
tain legal rights that women have already won.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Daniel J. Myers for statistical guid-
ance and Jeremy Reynolds for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this
paper. Also, we thank the NOW for providing state-level membership data. The
rst author held an American Association of University Women Dissertation Fel-
lowship and a Verizon/Hopeline Fellowship during the period of this research.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Sociological Association in New York in August 2007.
SOP5204_05.indd 527 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
NOTES
Each state keeps a record of all laws passed during each legislative session. While the 1.
more recent session laws (i.e., 1990s to the present) are available on the website for the
state legislature of most states, the older session laws are more difcult to access. For
the present study, the rst author collected data from a law library that has a rare, special
collection of the session laws of all states from the early 1800s to the present.
As an exception, we recognize a case law decision in Massachusetts ( 2. Commonwealth v.
Chretien 1981) as abolishing the exemptions in this state. Technically, a 1974 statutory
revision removed the common law spousal exemption in Massachusetts; however, the
abolition of the spousal exemption was not recognized in Massachusetts until the courts
claried this issue in 1981. To be consistent with prior research, which cites Nebraska as
the rst state to abolish the spousal rape exemption in 1976 (Finkelhor and Yllo 1985;
Russell 1990), we use the 1981 case law decision instead of the 1974 statutory revision in
Massachusetts. Since we found similar results in analyses omitting Massachusetts, using
the 1981 case law decision for Massachusetts does not bias our analyses.
Due to missing data for Washington, D.C. for the percentage of female legislators and 3.
the government ideology of the state, Washington, D.C. is removed from the analysis.
Analyses that include Washington, D.C., but exclude these two variables, produce simi-
lar results to those reported in our tables. Therefore, in order to account for the effects of
womens representation in the legislature and government ideology for all fty states,
we opted to exclude Washington, D.C. from the analyses.
The measure of percent of women in the labor force is available, reliable, and consistent 4.
across each year, which makes it unique and appropriate for our analysis. As with any
measure, of course, there are limitations. The variable does not tap womens working
conditions, wages relative to mens, and benets, each of which could be a strong mea-
sure of economic independence and power. Such measures are not available annually
from reliable sources, however. Therefore, we sacrice some degree of nuance in favor of
accurate and reliable estimates that still tap our conceptualization.
While other measures of feminist activism were more readily available, we recognized 5.
the NOW membership data to be more consistently accurate across states and time and,
thus, a more appropriate measure. As a result, we contacted NOW and received special
permission from the NOW executive board to obtain and utilize its membership data.
We would like to thank NOW for allowing us to obtain these valuable, unique data.
An unpublished supplement to their original 1998 article, which provides technical in- 6.
formation on the creation of the ideology scores, and the updated data are available at
www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_les/page0005.htm.
All changes were made in the direction of increasing the strength of the marital rape 7.
law.
We classied statutes that do not allow for married spouses, separated (or living apart) 8.
spouses, or divorces to be prosecuted for rape under any condition as weak laws. Stat-
utes were classied as moderate if they contain spousal exemptions under certain condi-
tions (i.e., the victim is mentally incapacitated), special requirements (i.e., bodily injury,
report within thirty days, etc.) for marital rape not found in the general rape statute, and/
or if there are lesser penalties for marital rape. Laws were classied as strong if the stat-
utes allow for the prosecution of a spouse for rst degree rape under all conditions but still
maintain limitations or exemptions for lesser offenses. Finally, statutes were classied as
the strongest law if the spousal rape exemptions were completely abolished for all rape/
sexual assault offenses with no special requirements, exemptions, or reduced penalties.
SOP5204_05.indd 528 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
9. In analyses not shown here, we also ran analyses with regional proximity variables
the number and proportion of states in the states region that abolished the martial rape
exemption. All proximity variables had similar effects in the analysis. Since we are in-
terested in the effects of the adoption of laws in nearby states, the regional proximity
variables would not provide us with an appropriate measure. Since some region-mates
are geographically distant from each other (i.e., North Dakota and Arkansas) and some
bordering states are not region-mates (i.e., Louisiana and Arkansas), the regional prox-
imity variables include the effects of some states that are geographically distant, but
exclude the effects of some border states. Thus, for our purposes, the number of border-
ing states that abolished the exemption provides a better measure of a states proximity
to the source of diffusion.
10. The violent crimes reported in the UCR include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and ag-
gravated assault.
11. We omitted Nebraska from the analysis because the starting year of the process of legis-
lation (1976) is conditional on the adoption of legislation in this state.
12. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
13. We also ran a simple interaction between these two variables and time and found that
these interactions were signicant; however, we include separate models to show how
time periods affect the diffusion process in general.
14. In these analyses, we use the passed law under a split-party government variable to mea-
sure infectiousness. We also ran analyses with the variable using the cumulative extent
of change in a states marital rape law to measure infectiousness. Both analyses produced
similar results. Therefore, to be consistent with research on the diffusion of laws (i.e.,
Soule and Earl 2001), we use our passed law under a split-party government variable.
15. This is also true for laws specically related to marital rape. Almost all states made at
least one change to their marital rape law by 1990, which indicates that there were ongo-
ing changes in states marital rape laws during the early reform period. While eleven
states completely abolished their spousal exemption during the early reform period,
twelve states did so during the late reform period. Since there were no Southern states
that completely abolished their exemptions during the early reform period, we exclude
our regional control variables from our time period analyses.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Michelle J. 2003. Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Infer-
ences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates. Hastings Law Journal 54:1465574.
Barclay, Scott and Shauna Fisher. 2003. The States and the Differing Impetus for Divergent
Paths on Same-Sex Marriage, 1990-2001. Policy Studies Journal 31(3):33153.
Bergen, Raquel K. 1996. Wife Rape: Understanding the Response of Survivors and Service Provid-
ers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Berger, Ronald J., W. Lawrence Neuman, and Patricia Searles. 1991. The Social and Po-
litical Context of Rape Law reform: An Aggregate Analysis. Social Science Quarterly
72(2):22138.
Berger, Ronald J., Patricia Searles, and W. Lawrence Neuman. 1988. The Dimensions of
Rape Reform Legislation. Law and Society Review 22:32957.
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 1998.
Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 19601993.
American Journal of Political Science 42(1):32748.
SOP5204_05.indd 529 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
Caiazza, Amy. 2002. Does Womens Representation in Elected Ofce Lead to Women-
Friendly Policy? Washington, DC: Institute for Womens Policy Research.
Call, Jack E., David Nice, and Susette M. Talarico. 1991. An Analysis of State Rape Shield
Laws. Social Science Quarterly 72(4):77488.
Chow, Gregory C. and An-loh Lin. 1976. Best Linear Unbiased Estimation of Missing Ob-
servations in an Economic Time Series. Journal of the American Statistical Association
71(355):71921.
Clay-Warner, Jody and Callie H. Burt. 2005. Reporting Rape: Have Things Really Changed?
Violence Against Women 11:15076.
Cornwall, Marie, Brayden G. King, Elizabeth M. Legerski, Eric C. Dahlin, and Kendra S.
Schiffman. 2007. Signals or Mixed Signals: Why Opportunities for Mobilization Are
Not Opportunities for Policy Reform. Mobilization 12(3):23954.
Council of State Governments. 2003. Book of the States. Lexington, KY: Author.
Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. 2000. The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The
Inuence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing. The Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 105:1063104.
Crowley, Jocelyn. 2006. Moving Beyond Tokenism: Ratication of the Equal Rights
Amendment and the Election of Women to State Legislatures. Social Science Quar-
terly 87(3):51939.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 19762002. Manual of Law Enforcement Records: Uniform
Crime Reports. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
Finkelhor, David and Kersti Yllo. 1985. License to Rape: Sexual Abuse of Wives. New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Gamson, William A. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.
Gornick, Janet C. and David S. Meyer. 1998. Changing Political Opportunity: The Anti-
Rape Movement and Public Policy. Journal of Policy History 10:36798.
Grattet, Ryken, Valerie Jenness, and Theodore R. Curry. 1998. Innovation and Diffusion in
U.S. Hate Crime Law. American Sociological Review 63:286307.
Jeffords, Charles and Thomas Dull. 1982. Demographic Variations in Attitudes towards
Marital Rape Immunity. Journal of Marriage and the Family 44(3):75563.
Kane, Melinda D. 2007. Timing Matters: Shifts in the Causal Determinants of Sodomy Law
Decriminalization, 19611998. Social Problems 54(2):21139.
Lanning, Steven G. 1986. Missing Observations: A Simultaneous Approach versus Interpo-
lation By Related Series. Journal of Economic and Social Measurement 14:15563.
Largen, Mary A. 1988. Rape Law Reform: An Analysis. Pp. 27192 in Rape and Sexual As-
sault II, edited by A. W. Burgess. New York: Garland.
MacKinnon, Catherine. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Marsh, Jeanne C., Alison Geist, and Nathan Caplan. 1982. Rape and the Limits of Law Reform.
Boston: Auburn House Publishing Company.
McCammon, Holly J., Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery. 2001.
How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Womens Suf-
frage Movements, 18661919. American Sociological Review 66:4970.
McGarrell, Edmund F. and Thomas C. Castellano. 1993. Social Structure, Crime, and Politics:
A Conict Model of the Criminal Law Formation Process. Pp. 34778 in Making Law:
The State, the Law, and Structural Contradictions, edited by W. J. Chambliss and M. S. Zatz.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Murphy, Patricia. 1997. Domestic Violence Legislation and the Police: The Role of Socio-
Economic Indicators, Political Factors and Womens Political Activism on State Policy
Adoption. Women and Politics 18(2):2753.
SOP5204_05.indd 530 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
Myers, Daniel J. 2000. The Diffusion of Collective Violence: Infectiousness, Susceptibility,
and Mass Media Networks. American Journal of Sociology 106(1):173208.
Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1977. Poor Peoples Movements: Why They Suc-
ceed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books.
Ramirez, Francisco O. and Elizabeth H. McEnaney. 1997. From Womens Suffrage to Re-
production Rights? Cross-National Considerations. International Journal of Compara-
tive Sociology 38(1/2):624.
Renzulli, Linda and Vincent J. Roscigno. 2005. Charter School Policy, Implementation, and
Diffusion in the U.S. Sociology of Education 78:34465.
Resnick, Heidi, Dean Kilpatrick, C. Walsh, and L. Vernonen. 1991. Marital Rape. Pp.
32953 in Case Studies in Family Violence, edited by R. Ammerman and M. Herson.
New York: Plenum.
Rogers, Everett M. 1962. Diffusion of Innovation. New York: Free Press.
Russell, Diana E. H. 1990. Rape in Marriage. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Sawyers, Traci and David Meyer. 1999. Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance
and Public Policy. Social Problems 46(2):187206.
Soule, Sarah A. and Jennifer Earl. 2001. The Enactment of State-Level Hate Crime Law in
the United States: Intrastate and Interstate Characteristics. Sociological Perspectives
44(3):281305.
Soule, Sarah. A and Susan Olzak. 2004. When Do Movements Matter? The Politics of Con-
tingency and the Equal Rights Amendment. American Sociological Review 69:47397.
Spohn, Cassia and Julie Horney. 1992. Rape Law Reform: A Grassroots Revolution and Its Im-
pact. New York: Plenum Press.
Staggenborg, Suzanne and Verta Taylor. 2005. Whatever Happened to the Womens Move-
ment? Mobilization: An International Journal 10(1):3752.
Strang, David and John W. Meyer. 1993. Institutional Conditions for Diffusion. Theory and
Society 22:487511.
Strang, David and Nancy B. Tuma. 1993. Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity in Diffu-
sion. American Journal of Sociology 99(3):61439.
Thomas, Sue and Susan Welch. 1991. The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of
State Legislators. The Western Political Quarterly 44(2):44556.
Tolbert, Pamela S. and Lynn G. Zucker. 1983. Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal
Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform 18801935. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly 28:2239.
Tolnay, Stewart E., Glenn Deane, and E. M. Beck. 1996. Vicarious Violence: Spatial Effects
on Southern Lynchings, 1890-1919. American Journal of Sociology 102(3):788815.
United States Bureau of the Census. 19762002. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofce.
United States Bureau of the Census. February 22, 2006. Womens History Month. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofce.
Vold, George B., Thomas J. Bernard, and Jeffrey B. Snipes. 2002. Theoretical Criminology, 3rd
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
SOP5204_05.indd 531 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM
SOP5204_05.indd 532 11/20/09 12:18:43 PM

Criminalizing Spousal Rape

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Criminalizing Spousal Rape

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Address correspondence to: Jennifer McMahon-Howard, 1000 Chastain Road MD 2204, Kennesaw, GA 3014; e-mail:

1.29 0.25 0.92 0.08 0.92 0.08

0.04 3.32* 0.29 1.23** 0.26 1.34*

p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen