Birth, death and truth: an essay in memory of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze

MB Ramose
University of South Africa Department of Philosophy P. O. Box 392 UNISA 0003 Email: ramosmb@unisa.ac.za Abstract The birth of a particular individual is contingent even though the doctrine of creation out of nothing teaches otherwise. Birth is an ontological invitation alerting the individual to inevitable death. In the intervening period along the path to death the individual is locked in the existential quest for truth. During his lifetime Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, was engaged in the complex quest for truth. His engagement in the search of the truth of and about Africa elevated him to the status of one of the distinguished philosophers Africa has ever produced. This essay is in memory of Eze as an African philosopher, a philosopher engaged in the truth of and about post-colonial Africa.

Introduction The birth of Eze is recorded in many biographies (http://en.wikipedia.org./wiki/Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze). Though contingent, birth in Africa and some other cultures is celebrated as a welcome moment. It is welcome to the world. No doubt there are conceivably other cultures in which birth is regarded as a point of entry into suffering with transitory pleasure. On this view, birth is a moment of mourning. It is outside the scope of this essay to consider this latter view. For us the crucial point is that Eze was born. The trajectory of his birth included his formal training in the discipline of philosophy. As a philosopher, Eze lectured in the field, participated in numerous philosophy conferences and produced many writings in the subject. Indeed, he edited the book, Postcolonial African Philosophy and wrote the introduction thereof. One of his primary concerns in the introduction is to understand and define the meaning of post in the expression, postcolonial. He submits that the post of the postcolonial serves as a signal and pointer to the (in many parts of Africa) unfulfilled dreams of the independence achievements of the 1960s. (Eze 1997: p. 6) In this way Eze poses a double-edged question, namely; (i) what were the aims of the independence of Africa? and, (ii) why were some of the aims not achieved? For the purposes of this essay, this double-edged question constitutes the substance of Ezes search for the truth of and about Africa. It is to Eze as the seeker of this two-fold but complex truth that I wish to turn. In pursuing this I wish to re-member Eze. To return him from the silence of death and thus reinstate him as a member of the ongoing conversation or dialogue on the truth about postcolonial Africa.

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Memory: a lost struggle against death? In his celebrated novel, Lemonas Tale, Ken Sarowiwa contemplates birth and submits that children do not choose their parents. But this reflection must be complemented by the correlative insight that parents do not choose their children apart from formal adoption. In this we discern that there is no market place of children or parents that either can visit to make their choice of parent or child before birth. The ontological impossibility of choosing beforehand ones parent or child speaks to the metaphysical idea that birth and, indeed, life is contingent. The reluctance to accept contingency and admit that humans, like so many other living entities, are no more than vital dust1 is manifested by many teleological theories imputing pre-ordained purpose and meaning to life. This reluctance is displayed particularly when death strikes. At this moment remembering or memory takes many forms, for example, speeches or funeral orations, weeping, erection of tombstones including the construction of pyramids enduring the passage of time. Remembering in this way is an attempt to overcome the transitoriness of birth. It is an attempt to deny death both its sting and its victory. No doubt in some cultures death has no sting since it is conceived as the happy return to life without suffering. Again, it is outside the scope of the present essay to deal with this conception of death. We shall concentrate on the former which understands death as the unhappy end of the path of birth. Does memory, as an act of remembering conquer death? When we stop to re-member and simply forget the deceased individual in what way does the individual continue to live? It would seem that oblivion is the final judge consigning all dead individuals to the inaccessible black hole of infinity. Despite this, I write this essay in the hope that Ezes death is an invitation to us to continue to re-member him into the longest and widest future of Africa and humankind. In this way his engagement in the search of the truth of and about Africa will remain an enduring reality for those of us who have survived him. Truth as experience and Idea Long before Pontius Pilate asked Jesus the question: what is truth, humankind was already in search for truth. It is indeed tempting to suggest that humankind was in search for the truth. Yet, there is a difference between truth and the truth. The latter inclines to the view that the truth about anything is already in waiting to be grasped and grabbed by those who have the light to see it. This line of reasoning rests more on the understanding that the truth is immutable and eternal. As such it speaks more to Platos famous world of Forms or Ideas. Understanding the truth in this manner is problematical in many ways. One of the problems is the high susceptibility to dogmatism. In its turn dogmatism encourages dictation and imposition thereby blocking discussion and conversation. There is no indication in his introduction to Postcolonial African Philosophy that Eze is in any way sympathetic to this understanding of the truth. On the contrary, in his search of the truth of and about Africa Eze argues for dialogue between Europe and Africa in these terms: And since the imperial and the colonial domination of Africa were, at root, constitutive elements in the historical formation of the economic, political, and cultural expressions of the Age of Europe, including the Enlightenment, it is imperative that, when we study the nature and the dynamic of European modernity, we examine the intellectual and the philosophical productions of the time
1 The expression is a direct borrowing from Christian de Duves book under the title, Vital Dust.

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in order to understand how, in too many cases, they justified imperialism and colonialism. (Eze 1997: p. 6) The intellectual and philosophical productions of the time, including the Enlightenment must be examined because some of them are living examples of the invention of Africa and the construction of the idea of Africa (Mudimbe 1988, 1994). Such inventions and constructions often served as justification for the colonization and enslavement of the peoples of Africa. It is precisely through a critical interrogation of this justification that African thinkers today are called upon to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest identities imposed upon them by Europeans. (Eze 1997: p.12). The imposition of identities is by no means a trivial matter. It is the concretization of power through naming. By giving a name to an aspect of reality those who do so arrogate unto themselves the power to define and describe that reality. Acceptance of such definition and description often entails practical consequences and these may not always be to the benefit of the named. To challenge imposed identities is in effect to question the power of the name giver and, ultimately to reverse the adverse negative consequences that flow from the imposed identity. This may be exemplified by the practice of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa especially from the late 1960s. One of the activities of the Movement was to question the acceptability and validity of christian (Soyinka 1999: p. 32) names given to Black people at baptism. The point of argument was that once a Black person is named Mologadi by the parents then this name is valid and need not be replaced by the so called christian name of Mary. As a result of this questioning, many children born under the influence of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa were given names such Nkululeko, Sefenyiwe, Nqobile or Koketso. There is no doubt that the naming ceremony is very important in many cultures of Africa. Naming in these cultures is also significant in view of the triadic relationship between the living, the living-dead and the yet-to-be-born. Against this background, complemented by the deliberate intention to challenge the power of the colonial name giver, it is suggested that in writing about the Igbo culture on name giving Okere is implicitly writing about many other cultures in Africa. He writes that: Igbo names always bear a message, a meaning, a history, a record or a prayer. This is also to say that they embody a rich mine of information on the peoples reflection and considered comment on life and reality. They provide a window into the Igbo world of values as well as their peculiar conceptual apparatus for dealing with life. Obviously their range of application spans the whole of life itself the names themselves demonstrate the power of the special technique devised by an illiterate culture to put into record some of the best thoughts and ideas of its heritage. (Okere 1996: p. 133 & 147) And so do the above names given as examples in South Africa; they all have a bearing on the meaning and history of the struggle for liberation. They mean respectively Freedom, Thou shalt not be conquered, Victory and Addition, that is, an addition to the forces engaged in the struggle for freedom.

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The necessity of dialogue For Eze, a critical dialogue between Africa and Europe is necessary in discovering the truth of and about Africa. Because of its dialogical character the search for the truth is in reality the search for truth. For this truth shall emerge out of the experience of the interactive encounter between Africans and Europeans. In this sense truth is a construction arising out of the contemporaneous convergence of perception and action (Bohm 1994: p. 181). It is dialogue proper. For In dialogue the value systems, experiences, analysis, synthesis and paradigms of understanding of the other are welcome to inspire the process of a genuine dialogue, and are breathed, grasped and absorbed by it. It carries an openness to re-contemplating ones own stance and understanding. A genuine dialogue is eager for any external impetus, which suggests new explorations of order to transcend another orbit of perception. In a dialogue, we are thus finally speaking to ourselves as well as through the medium of the other, since it invariably culminates in a new self-understanding. This radical change becomes possible only if we are able to understand the others perspective(Jalali 2003: p. 19). In it is in this sense of dialogue that we should understand Ezes term to combat. Africas independence: reality and illusion It is common cause that the term Africa as a referent to the geographic expanse known as such today is problematical in many ways. For African scholars like Ali Mazrui, this term is used only under protest and so does the present author. It is interesting that in the introduction to postcolonial African philosophy Eze does not problematize the term at all. The problematization is crucial since the name Africa is an imposition even in Ezes own terms. Colonisation is the experience and context out of which the struggle for the independence of Africa was born. Colonisation itself was an unprovoked act of violence. It cannot be justified on the terms of the just war doctrine. One of the consequences of the unjustifiability of colonization in terms of the just war doctrine is the demand for the reversal of its adverse consequences on Africa. Concretely, this means the restoration of full and unencumbered sovereignty, reparations and compensation to decolonized Africa (Ramose 2003: p 463 500). The April 1994 Kampala conference on reparations to Africa was in part the reiteration of these concrete demands of natural and historical justice. It is significant that this conference took place more than thirty seven years after the independence of most of Africa and on the eve of the extension of democracy to every population group in South Africa. Concerning the former, it is an implicit admission of Ezes insightful observation that the dreams of the independence of Africa are yet to come true. With regard to the latter, it underlines the vital point that by accepting government instead of state succession at the transition to trans-ethnic and colour-blind democracy, Black South Africa failed to learn from the independence experience of other African countries. Accordingly, the dream of a liberated South Africa, currently imprisoned in an ill-timed constitutional supremacy, is yet to come true. The apparently voluntary option by African countries for government succession denied Africa economic freedom at independence. Economic power at independence remained and continues to be vested in the hands of the successors in title to the unde-

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served economic privileges and benefits acquired initially at conquest in the unjust wars of colonization. In this way Africa was elevated to the status of political master of her own affairs but reduced to an economic slave of the former colonial power. This legacy of Kwame Nkrumahs famous seek ye the political kingdom first and the rest shall be added unto you, must continue to be examined and challenged if the political and economic exploitations that Eze stood against must be combatted. Ironically, Nkrumah argued in some of his writings that political independence without economic independence was empty. Yet, he allowed Ghana to opt only for political independence. Ali Mazrui, one of the earliest analysts of this African condition described it appositely as Africas transition from slavery by coercion to slavery by consent. It is this paradoxical consent which has plunged independent Africa into the abyss of material and intellectual poverty to date. In this situation, the African philosopher is called upon to explode the myth that the widespread deadly but preventable poverty in Africa is a natural condition established by divine ordination. In this way the African philosopher engaged in the struggle to explode this myth shall make a solid contribution to the second liberation struggle inaugurated by the concession to the political independence of Africa. Keeping alive the memory of Eze is continuing this second liberation until we meet him at the rendezvous of victory. Another aspect of Africas second liberation struggle is philosophic and practical racism. This was one of Ezes greatest concerns as his well considered article, The color of reason: the idea of race in Kants anthropology shows. Indeed reason was used in Western philosophy as the distinctive quality justifying the erection of the boundary between humans and non-humans. Even before the Enlightenment, Aristotles definition of man as a rational animal was used in the service of this boundary in order to justify colonization and the enslavement of the African, the Amerindian and the Australasians. The bull of Pope Paul III, Sublimis Deus, declared boldly and unambiguously that all men are rational animals (Hanke 1937: p. 71-72). By this the bull demolished theoretically the arbitrary boundary separating the European humans from the putative non-human colonized peoples. But in practice, Sublimis Deus neither obliterated nor overcame the apparent instinctive racism of the West. In the past this racism was pursued under the standard bearer of the mission to civilize. Today it is muted under the seemingly benign hierarchy separating the first and third worlds in the name of development. But the promise of development is a subtle device to sustain the development of the underdevelopment of Africa for the greater benefit of her former colonizers as well as the new comers eager to exploit Africa. This modern racism under the guise of development is supported by the far from just terms of international trade contained in the various instruments of the World Trade Organization. On this reasoning, Ezes struggle against racism is simultaneously a struggle for justice in the domain of international economic relations. One other aspect of Africas second liberation struggle is democracy. Ezes concern over this is reflected in his debate with Kwasi Wiredu contained in the same book, Postcolonial African Philosophy. The debate is relevant for our time for many reasons. One is that it occurs at a time when the West and other countries impose democratization as a condition for providing development aid to Africa. But the imposition is at times waived if African tyrants are able and effective defenders of Western economic interests. Thus double standards is one of the problems pertaining to democratization. Another problem is that the imposition of democratization is the implanting of a model of governance that is not by necessity consistent with indigenous African cul-

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ture on governance. Kwasi Wiredu argues plausibly and persuasively in his plea for a homegrown African consensual democracy that there is no necessary connection between democracy and the multiparty system (Wiredu 1997: p. 308). His argument is crucial at the epistemic and political levels. At the former level, it is the reaffirmation of the indigenous African modes of knowing and doing even if they may require adaptation and adjustment to modern conditions. At the latter level, it questions the assumption that the West has the power to impose its understanding of democracy on Africa. It is in the light of these considerations that the imposition of democratization must be challenged. In 1994 South Africa experienced complete and comprehensive democratization. But this did not necessarily lead to governance vested with economic power to overcome the widespread deadly but preventable poverty under which the vast majority of the population continues to live. In challenging the imposition of democratization and, in the critique of democracy it is crucial for African philosophers to bear in mind that democracy is a means par excellence. I am aware that this submission is contrary to Ezes predilection for democracy as a formal framework (Eze 1997: p. 320 321). It is this contradiction to Eze which contributes to keeping his memory alive. Requiescat in pace Perhaps it is now time to pronounce a requiescat in pace for Eze, to wish that he rests in peace since he is no longer physically with us. In this way we are acknowledging his absence. But he is present to us and with us because we keep and preserve him in our memory. In this domain of remembrance, Eze is not resting in peace. He is stimulating, challenging and encouraging us to take the African condition seriously in order to change it for the better. The more the condition becomes better the greater and deeper the challenge to preserve and sustain the gains already made and to improve upon such gains in order to make them best. And so the struggle for the liberation of Africa shall never come to an end because the new conditions brought about by change shall demand new solutions. Accordingly, our conversations with Eze shall never cease and our incessant engagement with his thoughts will be a tribute allowing us to say to him, well done son of the soil, requiescat in pace. References Bohm, D. 1994. Thought as a System. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Eze, EC. 1997. (ed.) Postcolonial African Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Eze, E.C. 1997. Democracy or Consensus? a response to Wiredu, in Eze, EC. (ed). op. cit., 320-21. Hanke, L. 1937. Pope Paul III and the American Indians, Harvard Theological Review, XXX, 71-72. Jalali, Ahmad. 2003. Dialogue and UNESCOs Mission: an epistemic approach, Dialogue and Universalism, XIII(6), 19. Mudimbe, VY. 1988. The Invention of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mudimbe, VY. 1994. The Idea of Africa. Oxford: James Currey Ltd.

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Okere, T. 1996. Names as building blocks of an African Philosophy, in Okere, T. (ed.) Identity and Change, Nigerian Philosophical Studies, 1. Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Ramose, MB. 2003. I conquer, therefore, I am the sovereign, in Coetzee PH and Roux, APJ (ed.) The African Philosophy Reader. London: Routledge. Soyinka, W. 1999. The Burden of Memory the Muse of Forgiveness. New York: Oxford University Press. Wiredu, K. 1997. Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: a plea for a non-party polity, in Eze, EC. (ed.) Post Colonial African Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.