This essay, like life itself, is a work in progress.

Our perceptions and

observations of the world around us evolve just like everything else in
nature. The observations, opinions, and conclusions of this writer are,
therefore, subject to change without notice. If you wish to comment or
critique this work your correspondence is most welcome. You may find
it incorporated in a later revision of this document. This document has
no copyright since the writer is at a loss as to how one can copyright the
truth as he sees it. It is a gift to all seeking to learn.

Godspeed you on your journeys and may the wind be at your back.

Essay on Citizenship
Part One

There is considerable attention drawn, amongst those outspoken writers in the patriot
community, on the subject of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It has
been called the “Red Amendment” by some, or the communist amendment, the amendment that
changed our citizenship and placed us in servitude, and even alleged to have been unlawfully
ratified by the Supreme Court of Utah [see Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968)]. This addition
to the post civil war Constitution must be carefully read in its entirety and context with its sister
amendments and the rest of the Constitution as a whole. Below are the opening lines of Section
One of this amendment;

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States…”

The amendment has a total of five sections. Sections two and three discuss the apportionment
and eligibility of representatives and senators. Section Four addresses the public debt and
declares “the validity of the public debt, of the United States, authorized by law…shall not be
questioned.” The reader should bookmark this section for it will be discussed in intricate detail in
part three of this essay. Finally, section five states that Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by legislation, the provisions of this article. Again, bear this one in mind for future reference as
well.

The implications of the fourteenth amendment are more fully revealed after one reads it in
context with the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments and then contrasts the word “citizen” as
defined in the fourteenth amendment with the word “Citizen” as referenced elsewhere
throughout the articles of the original Constitution. If one pours through the articles line by line it
will not take long for the reader to notice a slight grammatical difference between the original
articles of the Constitution and the subsequent amendments. Nowhere in the seven articles of the
Constitution will one find the word “Citizen” where the letter “C” is not capitalized as if it were
a proper noun. Nowhere in the Bill of Rights is the term ever found at all. It first appears as a
common noun in the eleventh amendment which states;

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”

In the original articles many key terms are capitalized. This is consistent with old style English.
The Constitution was a formal (some may even say sacred) contract of a newly declared free
people. Throughout the articles the terms “Citizen,” “People,” “Person,” “Persons,” and
“Inhabitant” are all spelled with the first letter capitalized. In English grammar a proper noun is
always capitalized. It is a sign of importance or deference to the character of the thing being
described. One may draw the conclusion that the writers of the Constitution sought to highlight,
to give deference to, the authority from which this document was born.

Anyone who has read the writings of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, or the Federalist Papers
would know that the founding fathers were highly educated and sophisticated men. But when the
framers of the Constitution met to write this document, they boarded up the windows of
Independence Hall so that no one might pass by and hear someone in heated debate speaking a
position in argument that may be taken out of context. Recall these people had just come out of a
rather bloody war for an idea whose time had come, that being the notion that all men were
created equal and each was a sovereign with all rights and privileges of the King of England
himself.

The framers debated fiercely over significant concepts of government and delegation of power,
whether or not to have a President, currency and banking, and whether to have a Bill of Rights.
But these wordsmiths also debated over minutia like whether a phrase need be followed by a
comma, a semi-colon, or a colon. The point is this: If the framers made the point of a word
beginning with a capital letter, there was indeed a point to that capitalization.

To this day, even in the United States Government Style Manual, there is only one way to write a
proper noun. The first letter must be capitalized followed by lower case. So it stands to reason
that the words “Citizen,” “People,” “Person,” and “Inhabitant” were meant to be read with a
sense of deference and respect. So one might also argue with respect to terms like “Powers,”
“Representatives,” “Electors,” “Duty,” and “Revenue.”

What is immediately apparent, as one moves forward into the amendments to the Constitution, is
the decreasing use of this unique grammatical style. With very few exceptions, the only words
that get a capital letter in mid-sentence are words relating to government, military, and the legal
system. The terms “person,” “people,” and “citizen” are relegated to the level of common nouns.

As stated above, the only use of the term citizen between the original articles and the fourteenth
amendment is in the eleventh amendment. The amendment makes a clear distinction between the
term “citizens” and “subjects.” This same distinction is clearly evident in Article III, Section 2,
which reads in the last line of the first paragraph “Citizens or Subjects.”
What is historically evident by the time of the fourteenth amendment is that the very definition of
“citizenship” was about to undergo it’s first metamorphosis in the annals of constitutional law.
Until this time, the concept of a “citizen” of the United States wasn’t considered to be a
designation that carried any legal weight at all. People were citizens of their state, and by virtue
of this citizenship they enjoyed all privileges and immunities throughout the Union of the
compact states. The very concept of state sovereignty, however, met the ultimate test in 1861
when the north quashed the secession of the southern states from the Union. The result of this
war was the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. It was the language of the
fourteenth amendment that became the topic of controversy in the case of United States v.
Anthony.

In 1873, in New York, a woman was indicted for having voted for a representative in congress
when the United States alleged she possessed no such right. This was a suffrage case, ironically,
that most succinctly provides definition of a citizen of the United States. The court stated a
position that had, prior to the fourteenth amendment, been stare decisis.

“It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never
been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United
States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state. No mode existed, it was
said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of
some state.” United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed.Cas. 829 (1873)

The court in this case held that the “…thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were
designed mainly for the protection of newly emancipated negroes…” and further held that the
“…fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States.” For the court, on
the one hand, to state that it long held that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United
States and then to say that now such a citizen has been created and defined and therefore “[t]his
question is now at rest” is no small declaration to be making from the bench. This is a highly
significant statement.

If it was basically stare decisis that there was really no such thing as a “citizen of the United
States,” then why does the Constitution, in several different sections, constantly refer to a
“Citizen” or “Citizens” of the United States? For example, in Art. 1 Sec. 1 it is required that a
person seeking a seat in the House of Representatives be at least twenty five years old and for
seven years a “Citizen of the United States.” A person aspiring to the Senate needs to be thirty
years old and for nine years a “Citizen of the United States.” It is mandated, under Art. 2, Sec. 1,
that no person except a “natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of the President….” Then there is the
reference in Art. 4, Sec. 2, stating “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.”

Refer again to U.S. v. Anthony and examine the operative paragraph from Justice Hunt in its
entirety and context:

“The fourteenth amendment creates and defines citizenship of the United States. It has long
been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been
judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United
States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some state. No mode existed, it was
 said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States, except by first becoming a citizen of
some state. This question is now at rest. The fourteenth amendment defines and declares who
shall be a citizen of the Unite States, to wit, “all persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The latter qualification was intended to
exclude the children of foreign representatives and the like. With this qualification, every
person born in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the United States
and of the state wherein he resides.”

From this paragraph one can presume that Justice Hunt holds the following opinions:

1. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a “citizen” of the United

States did not exist.

2. A person’s recognized status as a “citizen” was inexorably tied to his being a

citizen of a state.

3. The fourteenth amendment created a citizenship that never had existed before.

4. The fourteenth amendment defined a citizenship that never had been defined
before.

5. This newly defined citizen must be:

a) born or naturalized in the United States and

b) subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

6. Those “excluded” by the clause “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” were

children of foreign representatives and the like.

Since this newly defined citizen must meet two criteria to be a citizen of the United States the
question then becomes, what is “born or naturalized” and what is the meaning of “subject to the
jurisdiction thereof.” The term “born” is easy and needs no analysis. The term “naturalized” in
the modern age is generally thought of as meaning the process of immigration procedures
requisite to becoming a U.S. citizen. Black’s Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines the term as meaning
“[t]he process by which a person acquires nationality after birth and becomes entitled to the
privileges of U.S. citizenship. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq.”

The second element to define is the word “subject” as used in the phrase “subject to the
jurisdiction thereof.” According to Black’s, a “subject” is defined as one that owes allegiance to
a sovereign and is governed by his laws. So it naturally follows that a citizen of the United
States will be one who is either born in or naturalized into the United States and will be one that
owes allegiance to the sovereign and is governed by his laws. So who is the sovereign? The
amendment defines the citizen as one who is subject to the jurisdiction “thereof.” This word is
defined in Webster’s as “of the place, thing, event, etc. just mentioned.” So one must return to
the language of Section one which reads, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof…” It is grammatically evident that the place or thing just
mentioned, that being the preceding direct object of the sentence, is “the United States.” So one
presumes, according to this amendment, that a citizen of the United States is one who is either
born in or naturalized in this place or thing called the United States and is also one who owes
allegiance to the sovereign called the United States. The next question to ask it just who or what
is this sovereign named the United States?

In the United States Code there is found a definition of the United States under Title 28, Section
3002 (15)(A). In this section the “United States means – (A) a Federal corporation.” The United
States means a Federal corporation. A corporation, according to Black’s is: “An artificial
person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state.” A more
encompassing definition is provided by the United States Supreme Court in Hale v. Henkel:

“Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises,
and holds them subject to the laws of the State and certain limitations of its charter. Its
powers are limited by its charter. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its
rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its
charter.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 89 (1906); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 584.

If the 14th amendment created and defined a new type of citizen, then the foundation and
authority laid for the definition of a “citizen of the United States” would be grounded in an
absolute anathema to the ideals of the framers of the Constitution, not to mention the dirt farmers
and laborers that got their heads blown off by canons in the name of this ideal. One needs to
really ask the question, “What are the ramifications of being subject to the jurisdiction of a
corporation?” How can a corporation be “sovereign” over an individual? According to the same
Supreme Court justices that handed down the above opinion, such an assertion is an absolute
impossibility;

“The individual may stand upon his Constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry
on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty
to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an
investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he
receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such
as existed by the Law of the Land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can
only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution.
Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and immunity of himself and his
property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the
public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.” id.

If according to Black’s a subject is defined as one that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is
governed by his laws, then there exists a serious conflict with the concept of a citizen individual
defined above and the one defined in the fourteenth amendment. The conflict rests in the fact that
there is a clear and indisputable distinction between the terms “sovereign” and “subject.” The
term “Sovereign” might, for the purpose of argument, be deemed synonymous with “Citizen.”
Taking that as a premise, one is then confronted with the clear language of both Article III,
Section 2, as well as amendment eleven. Both of these passages clearly draw the distinction
between citizens and subjects. If we already know what a “subject” is then what is a citizen. Or
more to the point, what is a sovereign?
 "Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law for it is the author and
source of law;" Yick Wo vs Hopkins and Woo Lee vs Hopkins 118 U.S.
356.

"Here [in America] sovereignty rests with the People." Chisholm. v.

Georgia, (2 Dall) 415, 472.

"To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN is totally
unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used with
propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported
with the delicacy of those who ordained and established that Constitution.
They might have announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the
United States. But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the
ostentatious declaration." Chisholm v. Georgia, (2 Dall) 440, 455.

Thus, the People themselves, either singly or collectively, are sovereign (Chisholm at 456) over
both the State and the federal government and are the true sovereigns within this nation.

"It will be admitted on all hands that with the exception of the powers
granted to the states and the federal government, through the Constitutions,
the people of the several states are unconditionally sovereign within their
respective states." Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 14 L.Ed.
997.

"The people of the state, as the successors of its former sovereign, are
entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the king by his own
prerogative." Lansing v. Smith, (1829) 4 Wendell 9, (NY).

The above concept of a sovereign citizen does not conform with the concept of a citizen of the
United States if indeed that citizen is one who is subject to the jurisdiction of a corporation that
is subject to a charter which was written by sovereign individuals with the unlimited capacity to
contract uninhibited from government interference or scrutiny. How can an individual be
completely free to contract, owing no duty to the State, and yet be subject to a corporation that
can make no contracts not authorized by its charter?

Another way to understand the conflict created by this new concept of a citizen of the United
States is to understand the premise chain of authority. The Declaration of Independence stated
that all men were created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. So if
one visualizes this, then the chain of authority which created the Federal corporation known as
the United States would look like this:

Creator (God)

|
 Man/Woman (Individual-Sovereign-Citizen)

Constitution (Charter)

United States (Federal Corporation)

“citizen” of the United States (subject to the jurisdiction thereof)

The Declaration of Independence declared the equality of all men as “self evident” and further
declared the colonies once subject to the King of England to be “Free and Independent States;
that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown….” The authority to which these
writers appealed was none other than “the Supreme Judge of the world.” As Chief Justice Chase
stated:

’The people of each State compose a State, having its own government,
and endowed with all functions essential to separate and independent
existence’ and that ‘without the States in union, there could be no such
political body as the United States.’” Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 c.f.
Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 125-126.

As stated above, this political body is defined in 28 USC 3002(15)(A) as a “corporation.” This
definition of the United States is supported back through the annals of caselaw as well:

“The United States are not one of the class of corporations intended by law
to be exempt…” United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 631 (1896).

“The United States is to be regarded as a body politic and corporate.” In re

Merriam’s Estate, 36 N.E. 505 (1894).

The “charter” of this corporation is the Constitution, that contract which places the limits, duties,
powers and privileges upon said corporation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has settled this issue as
well;

"The United States is entirely a creature of the Federal Constitution, its

power and authority has no other source and it can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.” Reid Vs. Covert.,
354 U.S. 1 (1957), 1 L. Ed. 2nd. 1148
It then follows, logically, that a citizen subject to the jurisdiction of this corporate body draws all
his rights and privileges at the sufferance of this corporate body. Again, just follow the chain of
authority as drawn above. So can this citizen be a sovereign? The evidence and law before us
would not support this contention at all. This citizen, or individual, does not seem to possess an
unlimited power to contract. Nor would he likely be capable of asserting the claim that he owes
no duty to the United States. It would certainly be impossible to argue he is the author and source
of law when the source to the law governing the body politic he is subject to is the corporate
charter. If given the choice between holding the rank and status on tier two of the above chart
and the status of tier five, what person would choose the latter? The answer, again, is laid out in
the second paragraph of U.S. v. Anthony;

“The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were designed

mainly for the protection of the newly emancipated negroes, but full effect
must, nevertheless, be given to the language employed. The thirteenth
amendment provides, that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.’ If honestly received and fairly applied, this provision would
have been enough to guard the rights of the colored race. In some states it
was attempted to be evaded by enactments cruel and oppressive in their
nature – as, that colored persons were forbidden to appear in the towns,
except in a menial capacity; that they should reside on and cultivate the
soil without being allowed to own it; that they were not permitted to give
testimony in cases where a white man was a party. They were excluded
from performing particular kinds, of business, profitable and reputable, and
they were denied the right of suffrage. To meet the difficulties arising from
this state of things, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were enacted.”
U.S. v. Anthony, 24 Fed.Cas. 829 (1873).

This new citizenship was designed to provide “protection” for a class of persons that had been
previously vulnerable to attack subsequent to their emancipation from indentured servitude. As
such, the federal government created for the emancipated slaves a “citizenship” they could
present in court in lieu of being a Citizen of the state in which they inhabited. This is a direct
consequence of the ignorance of many of our ancestors who held onto foolish notions of
“classes” of people within a free society. The issue was raised prior to the Civil War in the
landmark case Dred Scott v. Sanford. Scott was a slave by birth who found himself in Illinois
and then Wisconsin territory for nearly ten years before the death of his owner, originally from
Missouri. Scott brought his suit in court for freedom under the theory that his residence in free
United States territory as well as the free state of Illinois made him a free man. Chief Justice
Taney held, for the majority, that not only was Scott a slave but that he had no standing to sue as
he was not a citizen of the United States.

What is most fascinating is the argument written by Justice Curtis in the dissenting opinion. He
espoused and broke down a theory grounded in international law, a concept long held as in
itinere and suggested this principle applied in the Scott case by virtue of his master’s choice to
remain domiciled in the Wisconsin territory. Curtis suggested that the masters decision to take up
residence there, and permit Scott to marry in that territory (at Fort Snelling) laid down sufficient
grounds for the argument that Scott was not only a resident of Wisconsin at the time, but that his
being allowed to marry was akin to being vested a property right. Curtis cited previous decisions
that showed a bequest of property from master to slave evidenced intent to grant his freedom
since only a freeman could take and hold such a bequest (Legrand v. Darnell, 2 Pet. R., 664). It
was of course not sufficiently convincing to sway seven of the nine justices on the court. But the
maxim of law laid down in the dissent sheds light to what the fourteenth amendment actually
performed in law a decade later:

It is generally agreed by writers upon international law, and the rule has
been judicially applied in a great number of cases, that wherever any
question may arise concerning the status of a person, it must be determined
according to that law which has next previously rightfully operated on and
fixed that status. And, further, that the laws of a country do not
rightfully operate upon and fix the status of persons who are within its
limits in itinere, or who are abiding there for definite temporary
purposes, as for health, curiosity, or occasional business; that these
laws, known to writers on public and private international law as
personal statutes, operate only on the inhabitants of the country. Not
that it is or can be denied that each independent nation may, if it thinks fit,
apply them to all persons within their limits. But when this is done, not in
conformity with the principles of international law, other States are not
understood to be willing to recognize or allow effect to such applications
of personal statutes. Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,595
(1857)

Even if the in itinere status were recognized “that law which has next previously rightfully
operated on and fixed that status” could likely have been argued as the laws of Missouri, since
this was where Scott and his family resided with no voiced intent to seek his freedom until the
death of his master in 1843.

With the onset of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the newly emancipated
slaves were granted a newly created and defined citizenship of the United States. Under this
protection a form of in itinere status was bestowed upon them even if they never once set foot in
the District of Columbia.

Another thought to ponder for later discussion is the old saying, whenever one gives government
the power to do something for him he gives government the power to do something to him. Some
will argue that this maxim was being shouted loud and clear by the courts on a case by case
basis. But no one listened. It is clear, from the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, that a
the first form of dual citizenship was being crafted in a nation that previously had only one
designation of a “Citizen.”

“[T]he distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship

of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a
citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an
important element is necessary to convert the former to the latter. He must
reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary
that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of
the Union.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69-70 (1872).

“We have in our political system a government of the United States and a
 government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is
distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The
same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a
citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these
governments will be different from those he has under the other. Slaughter-
House Cases, 16 Wall. 74.” United States v. Cruikshank et. al., 92 U.S.
542, 549 (1875).

“Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal

Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the
United States in order to be a citizen of his state. United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, [**434] 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 [***7](1873); and see Short v. State, 80 Md.
392, 401-02, 31 Atl. 322 (1895). See also Spear, State Citizenship, 16
Albany L.J. 24 (1877). Citizenship of the United States is defined by the
Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes, but the requirements for
citizenship [*559] of a state generally depend not upon definition but the
constitutional or statutory context in which the term is used. Risewick v.
Davis, 19 Md. 82, 93 (1862); Halaby v. Board of Directors of University of
Cincinnati, 162 Ohio St. 290, 293, 123 N. E. 2d 3 (1954) and authorities
therein cited.” Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Electors of Baltimore
City, 221 A.2d 431, 433-434 (1966).

Indeed, for the first time there was created in America, arguably, two distinct nation-states.
Citizenship in one did not mean the same as the other. In the Anthony case the defendant was
seeking recognition of 14th amendment citizenship so as to enjoy the protections it offered its
citizens. The court held she could not qualify as a citizen of the United States by virtue of her
sex. Her opportunity was, of course, destined to arrive in the history books and the Constitution
some years later. So if one can indeed be a citizen of both or of either, is there any reason a
person would not want to be, in some cases, deemed a citizen of the United States? After all, the
cases seem to show instances where persons found protection, or sought protection, under the
veil of this newly defined type of citizenship. That was, of course, prior to the bankruptcy of the
United States and the Internal Revenue Code.

“Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Title 26 of the United

States Code, was enacted in accordance with Congress' constitutional
power to lay and collect an income tax. There is a tax imposed, in 26
U.S.C. § 1, on the income of "every individual." No provision exists in the
tax code exempting from taxation persons who, like Slater, characterize
themselves as somehow standing apart from the American polity, and the
defendant cites no authority supporting his position. Slater's protestations
to the effect that he derives no benefit from the United States
government[**6] have no bearing on his legal obligation to pay income
taxes. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 68 L. Ed. 895, 44 S. Ct. 444 (1924);
Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 393
U.S. 833, 21 L. Ed. 2d 103, 89 S. Ct. 103 (1968). Unless the defendant
can establish that he is not a citizen of the United States, the IRS
possesses authority to attempt to determine his federal tax liability.”
United States v. Slater, 545 F.Supp. 179, 182 (1982).
Of course, if one’s only reason for gaining insight into the two forms of citizenship is simply to
escape an audit they are probably missing the bigger picture. The case of In re Merriam’s Estate,
which was affirmed in the Supreme Court in United States v. Perkins, lays down a solid
foundation for something far more ominous that the mere fact that the United States is a
corporation:

“It is suggested that the United States is to be regarded as a domestic

corporation, [*485] so far as the State of New York is concerned. We think
this contention has no support in reason or authority. A domestic
corporation is the creature of this state created by its legislature, or located
here and created by or under the laws of the United States. (Code of Civil
Pro., § 3343, sub. 18.) The United States is a government and body politic
and corporate, ordained and established by the American people acting
through the sovereignty of all the states.” In re Merriam’s Estate, 36 N.E.
505 (1894).

In 19 CJS § 883 one finds the statement that “The United States government is a foreign
corporation with respect to a State.” The above case is cited as the authority. That the United
States is a foreign corporation is exactly what the court held. By affirming the decision, the
United States Supreme Court concurred in U.S. v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 (1896).

Two attorneys made argument for the United States in the New York Court of Appeals. One
attorney, Jesse Johnson, argued that “stock held by decedent in foreign corporations should not
be included in the value on which the tax is to be levied.” However, Charles Baker argued that
the “legacy in question on the death of the testator vested immediately in the United States, and
became at once their property, free from liability to taxation.” Baker then confronted the court
with an either/or position. Either the United States was not a corporation at all, and therefore not
within the meaning of those terms employed in the New York laws, OR the United States was a
domestic corporation entitled to all the privileges and immunities respectively. The court did not
find for either argument. It held the United States was a corporation, it was not domestic, and
was not immune from being taxed on the legacy of the estate. It further held that the tax imposed
was on the right of succession and not on the property itself, rendering the United States
argument with respect to stocks of foreign corporations completely moot. The Supreme Court
affirmed New York’s holding by stating that the legacy became the property of the United States
only after it had suffered a dimunation to the amount of the tax. However the Supreme Court also
made clear that the United States was not one of the class of corporations intended by law to be
exempt from taxation and that the United States was indeed a government corporation.

There is no arguing to the contrary. The United States is a foreign corporation. In fact, if one
reads Title 28 USCS § 297, the “compact states” of subsection (a) are clearly defined as
“countries” in subsection (b). So if the United States is a foreign corporation in relation to a
group of “countries,” then what are the ramifications to those who have dual citizenship,
especially when the foreign corporation formally enters into bankruptcy and becomes pledged to
a third party creditor?
 Essay on Citizenship
Part Two

It is difficult to conceptualize dual citizenship capacity in this country without being able to
conceptualize the jurisdictional foundations of these alleged citizenship capacities. Many critics
of the process of “expatriation” will ask “just what are you expatriating from?” “Where are you
expatriating to?” If government, as we know it today, is nothing more than a corporation, how
can one be certain that an organic republic is even there to move back to if one wanted? Recall in
Part One there was reference to the Constitution as a “corporate charter” for the “federal
corporation.” If that is the case today then the problem of historical analysis grows a bit more
complex when one understands that there is not merely an existence of more than one type of
“citizen” or “Citizen” of the United States. There may well be, in fact, more than one
Constitution.

The legal authority for the American experiment is founded in several writings. The
“theological” foundations can be found in the writings of Locke, Hobbs, and the Magna Carta.
The cornerstone of the national founding is, of course, the Declaration of Independence, penned
by Jefferson in 1776. This document, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World, holds as
self-evident the equality (and arguably inherent sovereignty) of all and further holds the claim
that the States in which these men lived were “Free and Independent.” After the war for
independence the nation operated as a loose Confederacy under the Articles of Confederation.
These articles are where the nation we call America first gets a name…the united States of
America. For ten years the states operated under these articles with considerable difficulty. The
need for a stronger centralized government was recognized by the states so a Constitutional
Convention was called for, whereby the Sovereign States gave authority to representatives to
convene and write up a Constitution. This Constitution is often referred to as a “Trust
document.” The document, finally drafted and signed, had no title but stated in the opening
paragraph that it was a “Constitution for the United States of America.” This is located in what is
known as the Preamble:

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Upon signing this document the People, through those authorized to sign on their behalf, had
created a Trust. This Trust document or Trust instrument called for a Constitutional Republic
form of government in trust. The “Trust” was known as the “United States.” The Trust created a
government controlled by the Trust. This is a concept that must sink in for the reader who has
before now never given much consideration to what was “created” in Philadelphia in 1789.

The “Trust” was known as the “United States.”

Referring to Black’s 6th Edition, one finds the definition of a trust laid out in significant detail
with nearly exhausting explanation. In fact, the term “trust” occupies seven pages of the
dictionary alone, not including ancillary terms like “trustee,” “trustor,” “trust fund,” “trust
indenture” and so on. The word “trust” begins with the following definition:

“A legal entity created by a grantor for the benefit of designated beneficiaries under the laws
of the state and the valid trust instrument. The trustee holds a fiduciary responsibility to
manage the trust’s corpus assets and income for the economic benefit of all of the
beneficiaries. A confidence reposed in one person, who is termed trustee, for the benefit of
another, who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee,
for the benefit of the cestui que trust. State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior Court for Spokane
County, 10 Wash.2d 362, 116 P.2d 752, 755.”

Several paragraphs into this definition is an interesting passage:

“An association or organization of persons or corporations having the

intention and power, or the tendency, to create a monopoly, control
production, interfere with the free course of trade or transportation, or to
fix and regulate the supply and the price of commodities. In the history of
economic development, the “trust” was originally a device by which
several corporations engaged in the same general line of business might
combine for their mutual advantage, in the direction of eliminating
destructive competition, controlling the output of their commodity, and
regulating and maintaining its price, but at the same time preserving their
separate individual existence, and without any consolidation or merger.”
[emphasis added]

Resting on the premises that the “United States” is in fact a Trust means the other parties must be
identified in their respective roles. As stated above, the People (through their representatives of
the sovereign states) are the creator, or settlor. The trustees are those officials to be elected or
appointed as set out in the terms and conditions of the Trust instrument. The Trust Instrument,
the Constitution, called for government officials, set up within the trust as trustees, having
specifically defined responsibilities and functions. The “People,” in addition to being the settlor,
were named as the beneficiaries. They are clearly defined as such by the language of the
preamble which lists the trust instrument as being ordained for the People, as well as all
descendants down the line to the remotest generation (e.g. to ourselves and our Posterity).

Some make the argument that the government had already been created in trust by the signing of
the Constitution. There were, however, no trustees occupying the requisite seats yet due to the
states’ unwillingness to ratify the Constitution without the inclusion of a “Bill of Rights.” It can
be argued, then, that “ratification” of this trust was not yet completed. This may seem like
splitting hairs, but it becomes a crucial issue to ponder considering what transpired in our nation
seventy years later. If the United States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, was a
trust then how is it now under the law a corporation? If the United States was a “trust,” was this
trust revocable or irrevocable? If it was irrevocable, then to say the United States is a
corporation is to clearly evidence the existence of more than one United States. If, on the other
hand, this trust was revocable then there may be posed the question as to whether or not the
“United States” that was a trust even exists at all any more. This is an issue not only maddening
to a person simply seeking enlightenment, it literally pits patriots against patriots.
If the “United States” was set up as a trust, then the creator or settlor was the sovereign People.
One of the qualities necessary to the management of a trust is that the one creating this trust
divests himself of control of the thing once it is created. The trustees are set up to manage the
assets of the trust subject to the limitations and duties of a trust instrument, such as an indenture.
A question one might ask would be whether the “trustees” have the authority to “create” or
“define” the creators of the trust. For example, if a trust indenture clearly states the “Creator” as
being one “Samuel Smith,” can the trustee turn around and attach a rider stating the “Creator
shall hereinafter be known as Samuel Smith as well as James Jones.” If James Jones did not
create the Trust, then he can never be a creator. Could the trustee add him on as a beneficiary?
No, only the Creator can agree to such an amendment since the creator created and defined the
trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries. It may be different if the trust were a constructive trust
without indenture. In such a case the trustee would be empowered to draft an indenture, but he
still must submit the trust document to the creator for approval.

Since the People created the “United States” and established themselves and their posterity as the
beneficiaries, only the People can add or delete beneficiaries. Perhaps the most accurate
definition of a Citizen of the United States is a beneficiary of the United States. So what if
someone doesn’t wish to be a beneficiary anymore? Several “beneficiaries” attempted to do just
that in 1860. Lincoln, acting as a trustee, took matters into his own hands and established a
frightening precedent that has been almost unquestioned for over one hundred years by the
historians and courts alike. Though some may argue the case of State of Texas v. White as
judicial activism, it is nonetheless an opinion of the Supreme Court which warrants analysis;

`When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble
relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guarantees of republican
government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her
admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a
new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other
States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original
States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or
through consent of the States.

`Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession,

adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts
of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were
utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and
of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and
unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to
be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her
citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion,
and must have become a war for conquest of subjugation.

`Our conclusion therefore is that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union,
notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our
judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National
government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations
since the first outbreak of the rebellion.' State of Texas v. White, 7 Wall 700, 726, 19 L.Ed.
227(1868).
If the “United States” was a Trust, then the logic of the Supreme Court is severely flawed. To
start with, Texas could not become one of the “United States” any more that Samuel Smith could
become a trust that he created. The statement with respect to all the “obligations of perpetual
union… attached to the State” seem strange if Texas, or any state, is cast in the role of a “settlor”
or “beneficiary” since the settlor must divest his interest in managing the trust’s assets whereas a
beneficiary has no obligation whatsoever save his simply “being.”

Further, the idea that “the act of which consummated her admission into the Union was
something more than a compact…” is a difficult position to defend if the states are truly “Free
and Independent” as the Declaration of Independence states. It certainly does not comport with
the extensive definition of a trust as cited above in Black’s (i.e. “preserving their separate and
individual existence). Finally, if the United States was a trust then how can anyone make the
argument that the beneficiary is bound to remain a beneficiary against his will? Does not the
thirteenth amendment contradict such a position? The amendment clearly reads “[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude…shall exist within the United States.” The court, in White,
goes on to opine that there was “no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through
revolution, or through consent of the States.” So we then are confronted with the question as to
whether or not this trust was revocable. Black’s defines a revocable trust as a “trust in which the
settlor reserves the right to revoke.” A “settlor” is defined as “one who creates trust –
Restatement, Second, Trusts § 3(1)” and “[o]ne who furnishes the consideration for the creation
of a trust, though in form the trust is created by another. Lehman v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, C.C.A.2, 109 F.2d 99, 100.”

If the sovereign states were settlors, was there anywhere in the trust instrument that evidenced a
revocation clause? Recall the states would not sign off on the Constitution until a Bill of Rights
was added. Upon examination of these articles one may quite justifiably suggest such a caveat of
the right of revocation is stipulated in the ninth and tenth amendments:

“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be

construed to deny or disparage other retained by the people. ”Article IX

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” Article X

Where does one find, anywhere in the Trust instrument, the enumerated right of the United
States to bind a sovereign People to it in perpetuity? Further, where can a clause or passage be
found delegating a power to the United States to bind any one of its sovereign creators or
settlors? Can a man created by God turn around and bind God? Can an entity created by the
sovereign People turn around and bind them if they are “free and independent?” Surely not.
Again, recall the definition of a trust in Black’s, cited above:

…In the history of economic development, the “trust” was originally a

device by which several corporations, engaged in the same general line of
business, might combine for their mutual advantage, in the direction of
eliminating destructive competition, controlling the output of their
 commodity, and regulating and maintaining its price, but at the same time
preserving their separate individual existence, and without any
consolidation or merger.” [emphasis added]

If a trust does indeed encompass a character and quality such that its creators or settlors combine
(or compact) without any consolidation or merger, and if the “United States” was at least at that
time a Trust, why does the court clearly suggest a maxim of law that is incompatible with the
law? Recall the court stated the “act which consummated” admission was something more than a
compact. Just following this sentence is a semi-colon and another phrase further clarifying the
opinion the court was defending;

“The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something
more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the
political body. And it was final.” [emphasis added]

The word “incorporation” is defined in Black’s as the “act or process of forming or creating a
corporation.” This opens a door to a completely different sphere of commercial law. The process
of incorporation implies a granting of privileges and duties by the state as stipulated by a charter.
The state grants incorporation because the corporation is “a creature of the state.” Hale v.
Henkel, supra. The Henkel case clearly draws clear distinction between the sovereign individual
and a corporation. So the suggestion that a sovereign state can be “incorporated,” as was clearly
suggested by the Supreme Court in White, is to suggest that the sovereign state can divest itself
of its sovereignty such that once done the act would be “complete” and “perpetual.”

The Supreme Court addressed this very question almost seventy years after Texas v. White in the
case of Ashton v. Cameron County. In this decision the court addressed a petition for bankruptcy
by a water improvement district which was chartered under a municipal corporation in
California. The decision was a five to four split in favor of prohibiting the petitioner from
declaring bankruptcy under federal law. The logic followed that the corporate municipality came
under the jurisdiction of the sovereign state that created it. Citing previous decisions the majority
held:

“Neither consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of
Congress; none can exist except those which are granted. United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 102 A.L.R. 914, decided January 6, 1936.
The sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning under the
Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any
form of legislation. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 56 S.
Ct. 223.” Ashton v. Cameron County Water Imp. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S.
513, 531 (1936)

Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion for the minority, suggesting that while the states themselves
may not be capable of joining in a bankruptcy, a municipal corporation did not enjoy the same
protection. Some would say such a position is consistent with the Henkel case that makes the
distinction between the sovereign and the corporation. But in any case Cardozo did concede to
the majority view from one vantage point:
 “There is room at least for argument that within the meaning of the
Constitution the bankruptcy concept does not embrace the states
themselves. In the public law of the United States a state is a sovereign or
at least a quasi sovereign.” id. at 543

There is no definition of the word “quasi sovereign” in Black’s, Bouvier’s, or even Webster’s.
Quasi is Latin for “as if; almost as it were; analogous to.” Why would Cardozo suggest a state
as “quasi sovereign?” Go back to the original Trust instrument and all the case law mentioned in
Part One of this essay. The true sovereignty inherently lies and is vested in “We the People.” The
states serve to evidence and execute that inherent and collective sovereignty. Could that be why
Title 28 USCS § 297 refers to the compact states as “countries” in subsection (b)?

One might further confound this trust analysis by suggesting that the United States has always
been nothing more than a mere corporation from the onset. After all, a corporation is a mere
creature of the State. In this case the Free and Independent States, made of the We the People,
“created” a corporate entity to perform certain necessary functions. In that case, the whole trust
argument is moot since the government has always been corporate from its onset. Review of
some of the cases already cited, as well as others, suggest this is an argument not wholly
meritless. Consider this statement by the Supreme Court of California in 1855:

"By metaphysical refinement, in examining our form of government, it

might be correctly said that there is no such thing as a citizen of the United
States. ... A citizen of any one of the States of the Union, is held to be, and
called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly
there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not
a citizen of some one of the states, is totally foreign to the idea, and
inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of
the statement used in the constitution, which must be deduced from its
various other provisions. The object then to be obtained, but the exercise of
the power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective states."
Ex parte Knowles, 5 Ca. 300, 302 (1855).

It was this above concept which “had long been held by many learned authorities, and had never
been judicially decided to the contrary…” [U.S. v. Anthony 24 F.Cas. 829 (1873)], that Justice
Hunt was referring to in his analysis of the newly created and defined “citizen of the United
States.”

It is the opinion of this writer that what the case of State of Texas v. White most clearly
represents is a battered and wounded judiciary trying to justify a police action that was so far
outside the law regardless of what commercial or governmental entity was created and given the
name the “United States” thereafter. When the trustees of the seven southern states that
originally seceded refused to convene in Congress in December of 1860 the remaining body
politic was confronted with a serious dilemma. The Constitution clearly dictated that the
Congress “shall assemble at least once every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.” Article I, Section 4.
When those seceding states didn’t show, and the subsequent states (eleven total) followed suit,
the legislative body could not ever again during the course of the war lawfully assemble for it
lacked a quorum.

Whether trust or corporation, that government ceased to function as per the terms of the trust
instrument. John Locke’s Essays on Civil Government speak to the term sine die (sunset). He
said the best way to end a government is not to meet. What followed was an absolutely
unarguable military dictatorship by President Lincoln. He arrested state legislators for debating
the war, he issued an arrest warrant for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for daring to issue
an opinion that his decision to suspend Habeaus Corpus was unlawful, and he allowed for mass
executions of peaceful dissenters without any trial whatsoever. A sobering history of this war,
suspiciously overlooked by academics for decades, can be found in the book When in the Course
of Human Events; Arguing the Case for Southern Secession, by Charles Adams, Rowman and
Littlefield (2000).

What followed the Civil War was the Reconstruction. This, too, is a topic of study in and of
itself. But what transpires in this time frame is the adoption of three new amendments, the
creation and definition of a new kind of “citizen,” and a conspicuous Congressional Act in 1871
called the District of Columbia Organic Act. This act charters a municipal corporation which, if
one follows the subsequent acts and laws passed, he or she will discover becomes the “United
States.”

Do we exist today in a society of side by side and separate governments (i.e. countries v. the
federal corporation) or rather an overlay of “federal enclaves” (see the Buck Act) that rest atop
the sovereign states? Further, if there are two distinct entities do they each operate under the
same constitution or do they have separate documents, one being a trust document and the other
a corporate charter? It is certainly clear there are two jurisdictions and there are two types of
citizens.

This question of jurisdictional foundation becomes a crucial one to confront even if the answer to
the above historical mystery cannot be agreed upon before the sun sets. This is because the
reality of the present day confronts us with an absolute certainty. That reality is that this “United
States” today is a corporation that is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The certainty is that a “citizen”
who is “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is one who is subject to that bankruptcy. Since such a
condition has tremendous implications and ramifications for creditors, debtors and third parties,
it is crucial to determine just who are the parties respectively.

Essay on Citizenship
Part Three
On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order 6260 declaring:

“All persons are required to deliver ON OR BEFORE MAY 1, 1933 all

GOLD COIN, GOLD BULLION, AND GOLD CERTIFICATES now
owned by them to a Federal Reserve Bank, branch or agency, or to any
member bank of the Federal Reserve System.”

Section 9 of the order reads as follows:

“Whosoever willfully violates any provisions of this Executive Order or of

these regulations or of any rule, regulation or license issued thereunder
may be fined not more than $10,000, or if a natural person, may be
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both; and any officer, director or
agency of any corporation who knowingly participates in any such
violation may be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both.”

The Postmaster General, James Farley, ordered a posting of this order in a conspicuous place
inside each branch of the Post Office. At the bottom of the posting were the declarations that
read as follows:

CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION

OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
Stated within a written document received September 17, 1997, from the U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Richard L.
Shiffin, in response to a FOIA, was the following:

“A fact that is frequently overlooked is that Executive orders and

proclamations of the President normally have no direct effect upon private
persons or their property, and instead, normally constitute only directives
or instructions of officers or employees of the Federal Government.

The exception is those cases in which the President is expressly authorized

or required by laws enacted by the Congress to issue an Executive order or
proclamation dealing with the legal rights or obligations of members of the
public. Such as issuance of Selective Service Regulations, establishment
of boards to investigate certain labor disputes, and establishment of quotas
or fees with respect to certain imports into this country.”

If the President issued an order that literally forced a person to give up his property to the state,
from where did he believe he was vested with a grant of authority? One need only backtrack
through the United States Statutes at Large and one can read quite plainly that the Congress
purported to grant this authority by passage of the Emergency War Powers Act:

“Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the

 United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress
hereby declares that a serious emergency exists and that it is imperatively
necessary speedily to put into effect remedies of uniform national
application.” H.R. 1491, 73rd Congress, March 9, 1933.

What was the emergency? Were we at war? Was there invasion imminent? In fact we were at
war and had been under attack since the United States incorporated in 1871 and began dealing in
bonds. The banks which bought out those loans in 1911 turned around and called them in a year
later. By 1913 the Federal Reserve Act and the purported 16th Amendment were in place in
United States law. By 1917 the Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act (H.R. 4960,
Public, No. 91, 40 Stat. L. 411). This allowed the United States to trade with its enemies in a
time of war. The act carefully stipulated the grant of broad regulatory powers granted the
President as applying to “(c) Such other individuals, or body or class of individuals, as may be
natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United States is at war, other than
citizens of the United States…”

By 1929 the stock market crashed and we were in a depression. Just after Roosevelt’s
inauguration, Congress passed the Amendatory Act (48 Stat. 1, H.R. 1491) commonly referred to
as the Emergency War Powers Act (see Senate Report 93-549, Pgs. 187 & 594). The Congress,
in Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 1(b) and Section 2, amended the Trading with the Enemy Act in
Section 5, Subdivision (b) by extending the President’s broad grant of regulatory powers to
include enforcement against “…any person within the United States or any place subject to
the jurisdiction thereof…”

By operation of law the American people just became an “enemy.” How can the American
people be an enemy of the United States? Recall by this time the United States is a corporation.
That corporation is in serious financial trouble. By June of this same year that corporation
declared bankruptcy by passage of House Joint Resolution 192:

JOINT RESOLUTION TO SUSPEND THE GOLD

STANDARD AND ABROGATE THE GOLD
CLAUSE, JUNE 5, 1933 H.J. Res. 192, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess.

Joint resolution to assure uniform value to the coins and

currencies of the United States. Whereas the holding of
or dealing in gold affect the public interest, and therefore
subject to proper regulation and restriction; and Whereas
the existing emergency has disclosed that provisions of
obligations which purport to give the obligee a right to
require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or
currency of the United States, or in an amount of money
of the United States measured thereby, obstruct the
power of the Congress to regulate the value of money of
the United States, and are inconsistent with the declared
policy of the Congress to maintain at all times the equal
power of every dollar, coined or issued by the United
States, in the markets and in the payment of debts.
 Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That (a) every provision contained
in or made with respect to any obligation which purports
to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a
particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in
money of the United States measured thereby, is declared
to be against public policy; and no such provision shall
be contained in or made with respect to any obligation
hereafter incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or
hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provisions is
contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be
discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any such
coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal
tender for public and private debts. Any such provision
contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued
by or under authority of the United States, is hereby
repealed, but the repeal of any such provision shall not
invalidate any other provision or authority contained in
such law. (b) As used in this resolution, the term
"obligation" means an obligation (including every
obligation of and to the United States, excepting
currency) payable in money of the United States; and the
term "coin or currency" means coin or currency of the
United States, including Federal Reserve notes and
circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and national
banking associations. SEC. 2. The last sentence of
paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of section 43 of the Act
entitled " An Act to relieve the existing national
economic emergency by increasing agricultural
purchasing power, to raise revenue for extraordinary
expenses incurred by reason of such emergency, to
provide emergency relief with respect to agricultural
indebtedness, to provide for the orderly liquidation of
joint-stock land banks, and for other purposes", approved
May 12, 1933, is amended to read as follows: "All coins
and currencies of the United States (including Federal
Reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal Reserve
banks and national banking associations) heretofore or
hereafter coined or issued, shall be legal tender for all
debts, for public and private, public charges, taxes,
duties, and dues, except that gold coins, when below the
standard weight and limit of tolerance provided by law
for the single piece, shall be legal tender only at
valuation in proportion to their actual weight." Approved
June 5, 1933, 4:30 p.m.

If one reads this resolution carefully, it can be broken down to a very simple statement laid out in
subdivision (a):

Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House

of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That (a) every provision contained
in or made with respect to any obligation which
 purports to give the obligee a right to require
payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or
currency, or in an amount in money of the United
States measured thereby, is declared to be against
public policy;

Followed by subdivision (b) which states:

(b) As used in this resolution, the term "obligation"

means an obligation (including every obligation of
and to the United States, excepting currency) payable
in money of the United States; and the term "coin or
currency" means coin or currency of the United
States, including Federal Reserve notes and circulating
notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking
associations.

So if one pulls these operative passages it is clear that the resolution states the following intent:

Any obligation (i.e. an obligation payable in money of

the United States) which purports to give the obligee a
right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of
coin or currency (i.e. currency of the United States,
including Federal Reserve notes) is declared to be
against public policy;

What has Congress just declared here? They have stated for the record that it shall be against
public policy to require payment of a debt. Read Black’s 6th Ed. (page 147) and you can find a
definition that reads, “The state or condition of a person (individual, partnership, corporation,
municipality) who is unable to pay its debts as they are, or become due.” The term defined by
this statement is BANKRUPT. The United States corporation openly declared bankruptcy on
June 5, 1933. It openly declared it to be against public policy to require anyone to have to make
“payment” in “coin or currency” on “any obligation.” So what was Roosevelt doing trying to
collect gold from the people? Congress purported to grant him the authority on March 9, 1933 in
Sec. 2 of H.R. 1491 by stating:

“the President may, through any agency he may

designate…prohibit, under such rules and regulations as
he may prescribe,…hoarding, melting, or earmarking of
gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, by any person
within the United States or any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof;”

Roosevelt was collecting assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. The creditors were the banks. The
debtors were the people, being divested of their lawful right to hold property. The people were
joined into a bankruptcy whether they wished it or not. Now recall a clause you were advised to
bookmark from the first page of this essay:

“The validity of the public debt, of the United States,

authorized by law…shall not be questioned.”
Amendment 14, Section Four.
Then recall that Section Five states that Congress shall have power to enforce, by legislation, the
provisions of this article. Roosevelt is, by grant of authority of Congress, enforcing the public
debt. From here on the United States corporation, bankrupt and held as a possession of a creditor,
is trading with its enemies…the debtor citizenry.

This debtor citizenry is burden by a debt that is impossible, by law, to pay off. The House Joint
Resolution cited above makes very clear two important facts, (1) we are no longer using gold to
back the currency and (2) a federal reserve note is defined as “coin and currency.” Currency is
used to pay debts but this particular currency is evidence of the very debt one seeks to pay. Can
you use your VISA credit card to pay off your VISA account? If the only currency in use, by
law, is the federal reserve note then how is one to ever pay off the debt? An if he cannot pay it
off is he not forever, perpetually, in a debtor state, i.e. servitude? Is this not totally incompatible
with the amendment passed in 1865 with respect to slavery and involuntary servitude?

If a person were to write the national archivist in Washington D.C. for a copy of the
constitutional amendment adopted on January 1st, 1865, he would receive a copy of a parchment
which reads in part:

“ARTICLE XIV Section 1. Neither slavery nor

involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have the
power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation.”

So if a citizen, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, wants to pay off his portion of the debt (or for
the sake of the argument, the ENTIRE NATIONAL DEBT) how can he? He can’t use gold and
silver and the federal reserve knows all too well what its own promissory notes are worth. A
citizen, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, cannot even question the public debt as stated in
Section 4 of the fourteenth amendment. It sounds like a fourteenth amendment citizen is already
in servitude.

What is wrong with Article XIV cited above? Do you see it? The above citation is not a
typographical error. In fact, one may go to copies of the Constitution of the United States printed
in the statute books of several state archives and find this same anomaly. In both The Complied
Laws of Wyoming, 1876, p. xxix, and the Revised Statutes of Colorado, 7th Session, 1868, p. 28,
one can read in black and white the amendment that prohibits slavery is listed as the 14th
amendment. This certainly complicates matters for one who has just digested over twenty pages
of this essay on the 14th amendment that defined and created a “citizen of the United States.” For
anyone learned in the law will tell you the slavery amendment was the 13th amendment,
right? Go to the library and look up the thirteenth amendment and you will find a clause reading
just like the one cited above. But if one checks the archives and reviews the second session of the
Eleventh Congress, the researcher will discover a proposed amendment that reads:

“If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim,

receive or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall,
without consent of Congress, accept and retain any
present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind
 whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign
power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the
United States, and shall be incapable of holding any
office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”

The historical fact that this above amendment was proposed and passed to the states for
ratification is a matter of Congressional Record (see Senate Document No. 103-6, 103’d
Congress, 1St Session, p. 47). The Senate Documents claim this amendment was never ratified by
the states.

Then why do these two documents just referred to from Wyoming and Colorado (pp. xxix and
27-28 respectively) clearly read an ARTICLE XIII that reads verbatim to the one the Senate
Report cites but denies as having been ratified? Further, if one checks The Revised Code of the
Laws of Virginia, p. 80, 1819 and The Constitution of the State of Maine And That Of The
United States, 1825, p. 45, one will see the same Article XIII there as well. In fact, the
examination of the 1876 laws of Wyoming clearly show an omission of the amendment that
creates and defines a citizen of the United States and moves right to the 15th amendment,
concerning the right to vote. Now recall the opening paragraph of this essay in which it was
mentioned that the Supreme Court of Utah asserted the 14th amendment was never lawfully
adopted to begin with [Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266 (1968)]. The Senate wants us to believe the
original 13th amendment was never adopted whereas it seems at least two states, one from the
legislative records, and the other from the judiciary, clearly contest the notion of the 14th
amendment as a lawful amendment. This again raises a question as to whether there is in fact
more than one Constitution in operation. If the states recognized, at least for a time, this
amendment with respect to titles of nobility, why would the federal government be invested in
forgetting about it?

The vexing question is what was it exactly Congress proposed? The answer lies in the definitions
of three terms, foreign power, emolument, and citizen.

Foreign. Belonging to another nation or country;

belonging or attached to another jurisdiction; made,
done, or rendered in another state or jurisdiction; subject
to another jurisdiction; operating of solvable in another
territory; extrinsic; outside; extraordinary. Nonresident
person, corporation, executor, etc. [Black’s 6th Ed.]

Now just suppose that the principle shareholders of the Federal Reserve System were the
following:

Rothschild Banks of England and Berlin

Warburg Banks of Hamburg and Amsterdam
Lazard Brothers Banks of Paris
Israel Moses Seiff Banks of Italy
Chase Manhattan Bank of New York
Lehman Brothers of New York
Kuhn Loeb of New York
Goldman Sacks of New York
Four of these shareholders are offshore, the other four are incorporated in the State of New York.
Now suppose that under the Par value modification provisions of the Bretton Woods Agreement
(July 31, 1945, ch. 339, § 2, 59 Stat. 512) it states that the United States Treasury is now the
individual drawing account of the IMF. Until 1999 a canceled check made out to the IRS could
be turned over to determine where it had been cashed. One saw the stamp “PAY TO THE
ORDER OF FRB” being an abbreviation for Federal Reserve Bank. Now such stamps read
payable to the outfit the IRS asks one to write the check to…the U.S. Treasury.

It is semantics really. There hasn’t been any money in the Treasury since 1911. Who took it? Just
look at the paper in your wallet. The Federal Reserve is a private corporation (Lewis v. U.S.,
608F 2d 1239 [1982]), one that has never been audited once! It is also the holder of the national
debt. The holder of the Treasury is the International Monetary Fund, according to statute. That
doesn’t really make any sense if one knows that under the bankruptcy the FED already took
control of all the assets of the Treasury in 1933. One can dig into this further and discover the
difference between the FED and the IMF are basically the letters. It doesn’t really matter if you
trace the ownership of the bankrupt corporation by following where the taxes go or by who has
all the assets of the Treasury. The results always come up the same.

The bankrupt corporation called the U.S. Government is held and owned by a foreign
power. That power operates outside, extrinsic to, the jurisdiction of the United States. In fact,
under the terms of the Bretton Woods Agreement and Title 22 USC 286 the President of the
United States appoints the Governor of the IMF….who happens to be the Secretary of the
Treasury. The debtor citizenry elects a trustee who appoints another trustee to be Governor of a
foreign power. So a cabinet official is governor of the IMF?

This brings us to our second term, emolument:

Emolument. The profit arising from office,

employment, or labor; that which is received as a
compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office as salary, fees, and perquisites. Any
perquisite, advantage, profit, or gains arising from the
possession of an office.

If Paul O’Neil is in fact the governor of a foreign power, if he is in fact paid a salary by this
entity, then there is certainly a conflict of interest is there not? Such a relationship, whereby a
U.S. government official receives a payment from a foreign power would meet the above
definition of an emolument. But, if one thinks about it, the U.S. Government is a possessory
interest, chattel property if you will, of the creditor Federal Reserve/IMF. It is nothing more that
a satellite. You want evidence? What type of payment do you think the President gets his salary
in? How about a Congressmen, Senator, FBI agent, or midnight janitor at the Smithsonian?

This brings us to our final definition, and the subject of this paper:

Citizen. One who, under the Constitution and laws of

the United States, or of a particular state, is a member of
the political community, owing allegiance and being
entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights…”Citizens”
 are members of a political community who, in their
associated capacity, have established or submitted
themselves to the dominion of a government for the
promotion of their general welfare and the protection of
their individual as well as collective rights.

In Black’s, unfortunately, every term is capitalized so that it is impossible to distinguish the

proper from the common as far as the lexicon is concerned. But just looking at the general
definition offered one sees that citizens are “members of a political community.” The question
one need ask with respect to the original thirteenth amendment is what political community did
the word “citizen” denote in that amendment?

The question is most easily resolved by first establishing what a “citizen” is not. Can a “citizen”
be a term that refers to the sovereign man who is referred to in the articles of the Constitution as
“Citizen?” No, and here’s why. This proposed amendment specifically states that a person who
accepts an emolument of any kind from any foreign power shall “cease to be a citizen of the
United States.” First of all, the Constitution does not grant sovereignty, or Citizenship. This issue
has already been clearly addressed by the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution
certainly cannot revoke that which it has no power to grant in the first place. So “citizen” is
obviously referring to another type of citizen. We could re-raise all the issues of the fourteenth
amendment, but the courts clearly agree that the type of citizen discussed there was not created
and defined until that amendment was enacted. So what is a “citizen” under this proposed
amendment of 1813?

If one were to go back to 1813 one would find that, just like today, Washington D.C. was its own
district, in which many lived and worked. Usually a person’s residence there was temporary due
to his tenure in some governmental office or position of trust. In fact, those who went to take up
residence there, as well as in territories or insular possessions outside the several states, were
commonly referred to as “citizens of the United States.” These were folks, under the suffrage
laws, who were eligible to hold office and were required to have primary allegiance to one of the
several states. So what would be the implications of such an amendment as proposed in 1813? If
an elected or appointed official took a title or payment from a foreign power he would lose his
job.

People generally lose sight of the fact that the battle for financial control of this nation began the
moment the battle for soil ended. The Treaty of Peace of 1782 left the new nation in debt to the
Crown of England to the tune of 18 million lire. The war of 1812 was the creditor coming in to
collect. Why do you think they raided the White House? It is also noteworthy that the hero of
that war, Andrew Jackson, fought to his dying day to prevent another central bank from forming
in this country in the vain hope that the people of the nation would stay true to lawful currency in
which their vested right to own property would be protected. He would roll in his grave if he saw
his face on today’s twenty dollar federal reserve note.

But such an instrument of exchange is in and of itself prima facia evidence of a perquisite, a
privilege, granted by a foreign power. In 1813, the thought was to add some enforcement teeth to
the provisions of the Constitution that prohibited the acceptance of titles of nobility. By 1865 this
amendment conveniently disappears. It is a complicated monkey wrench in the machinery of a
government that just illegally invaded it’s sovereign benefactors’ homes and lands; a government
that forced them to adopt an amendment creating and defining a new kind of citizen; a new kind
of citizen that would one day become pledged to a bankruptcy.

Today anyone who partakes in a federal benefit program is considered federal personnel [see 5
USC 552a(13)]. One’s participation in Social Security makes that person a federal employee,
which was the only type of person ever intended to be subject of the Income Tax under the
Public Salary Tax Act of 1913. So looking back at the original thirteenth amendment, if one
replaced the word “citizen” with “federal employee” one is liable to quickly see the
problem. Everyone loses their “citizenship” under this amendment. Everyone, congressmen,
appointed officials, cops, lawyers, janitors, teachers, even drug dealers. Why? Because everyone
is acting as a “citizen” by taking part in the Social Security system and the bankruptcy. By virtue
of that participation each one is accepting perks from a foreign power, i.e. the privilege of
engaging in commerce by means of a currency system owned by a foreign power.

Robert A. Mundell, a noted Nobel winning economist, last year at the Gustavus Adolphus Nobel
Conference, stated “Money is a component of sovereignty.” That same economist was stupified
when it was suggested that in reality the income tax is merely a tax of the money we use. So
much for higher education.

The reason the proponents of the original thirteenth amendment drafted it was to add an inherent
protection to the United States from outside influence. Those drafters understood completely
what Dr. Mundell would utter nearly two hundred years later at a conference where the topic of
debate was none other than the globalization of government and the economy. Money is a
component of sovereignty, and he who owns it is the true sovereign. Anyone using a federal
reserve note cannot make the claim of ownership of the note. If he could he wouldn’t be liable
for an income tax.his writer just recently was surfing the net (msn.com) and found a link “What
Some Famous People Say About Taxes.” The source of the quotes is from the Encarta World
English Dictionary. In this list of humorous quotations was one that was more ominous. It is
attributed to former President Ronald Reagan, who said “The taxpayer is someone who works
for the federal government but doesn’t have to take a civil service examination.”

So was that supposed to be a joke?

What was created and defined by the adoption of the fourteenth amendment? What new kind of
citizen was born? In reality, nothing was changed. No new citizen was created because the truths
held evident in 1776 are as true today as they were then. Even after the bankruptcy was declared
in 1933, a divided Supreme Court in Ashton v. Cameron County was settled on one issue. A
sovereign state was not capable of even voluntarily joining into a bankruptcy. If the sovereignty
of such a state is only existent because it is empowered by its sovereign Citizens then those
Citizens are incapable of being debtors in the Chapter 11 U.S. Corp. Such a Citizen could swear
an oath and pledge himself to an office of trust in the United States but he would lose such
citizenship if he pledged allegiance to the bankruptcy and accepted privileges arising there
from. Those who masterminded the Federal Reserve and the Social Security Act of 1935 knew
this conundrum all too well. It is for these reasons that births began to be “registered” and names
began appearing in all CAPITAL LETTERS. If one goes to the U.S. Government Style Manual,
Chapter 3, Capitalization, at § 3.2, one can find the prescribed rules for proper names.

“Proper Names are capitalized. [Examples give are]

Rome, Brussels, John Macadam, Macadam family, Italy,
Anglo-Saxon.”

There is no text, manual, or book of any kind this writer has found that prescribes, under the
rules of English grammar, the complete capitalization of every letter of a proper name. If you are
one who has learned that Social Security is a trust and that the all capital letter name is the name
of a trust (a fictitious entity or person under the law) then you know already who the fourteenth
amendment “citizen” is. If you don’t then go pull out the social security card in your wallet.
Printed on that card is the name of the federal employee who is subject to the jurisdiction thereof
and is liable for income tax. Why? Because he is a federal employee that the former president
and movie actor quoted above was blatantly identifying. This federal employee is paid in federal
reserve notes. This is the debtor, that entity the folks in redemption refer to as the
“strawman.” Does it make sense now how you are the creditor under the UCC-1 financing
statement? If not, then you need to go back to page one of this essay and start reading
again. Then go read the Ashton case word for word, both the majority and the minority opinions.
If you still don’t get it then you sure as heck shouldn’t go into court and try to make this case yet.

So many in the patriot movement, so disillusioned on the one hand with the shape government is
in, get filled with a sort of liberty euphoria when they discover the 1041 tax form, or the UCC-1,
or the land patent. They find out that they do not really need a driver’s license at all and want to
run out and take the plates off their car and start operating in the de jure system again. Well, that
is fine except for one thing. The majority out there don’t know that a de jure system even exists.
Your local clerk at the Department of Transportation not only has no idea that there really is
more than one kind of citizenship, he will actually call you names for daring to suggest it (don’t
laugh, this actually happened in Saint Paul last February). Does the Secretary of State even
know? If you want to know for sure, write her and ask her. Does Jesse Ventura know he is likely
nothing more than the elected head of a corporation under the umbrella of the bankrupt federal
corporation called the United States Government? Maybe.

The bottom line is this, if you are waiting for government to reform itself you are going to be
waiting until the sun runs out of gas. The only reformers out there are the ones taking the time to
read this essay and doing something with it. Are you guaranteed to win in court once you have
sufficiently boned up on this stuff? No more than you are guaranteed to reach the summit of
Pike’s Peak no matter how many hours you train on a rock climbing wall. But there is one
certainty you can count on. If you don’t try, and others like you don’t continue to try, there will
be no one out there to execute the reform we all so desperately seek.

My father used to read me a story by Dr. Suess when I was young. It was called The Lorax. The
Lorax was a little furry creature that tried in vain to save a forest from a growing conglomerate
that didn’t care about the environment upon which it depended for survival. At the end of the
story the Lorax flies off into the clouds, leaving behind a pile of stones upon which is carved one
word….UNLESS. That one word laid out the moral of the whole story. It is a moral that
embodies the heart of what a “Citizen” is truly called to consider if he truly cherishes the
sovereignty bestowed upon him by natures’ God. The moral goes like this…

“Unless someone like you cares a whole awful lot,

nothing is going to get better.

It’s not.”