Avoiding full contact: towards limited NATO-India cooperation

Constantino Xavier*

This paper argues for a limited and gradual intensification of relations between the transatlantic security community and India. Recogniz ing that it is neither in NATOs nor in Indias interest to establish a full-fledged partnership or to avoid any type of relation altogether, it suggests that there is substantial scope for an intermediary option characterized by sustained dialogue, technical cooperation and grad ual coordination in the lower levels of security.

A new NATO discovers India

The reformulation of NATOs strategic concept has transformed and enlarged the scope of the alliance in three regards. First, it now defines NATOs 21st century security threats as non-conventional, or non-traditional, including a specific focus on terrorism, pro liferation of weapons of mass destruction to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare.1 The transnational nature of these threats also led to a reformulation of NATOs geographic mandate, which now assumes a universal character, far beyond the tradi tional emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian context (out of area). Third, and in line with the alliances newly globalized area of engagement, the organization is now more open to, and interested in including, new members, asin Eastern Europe, and to developing a wide network of partner and contact countries, mainly in the Asia-Pacific. This last transformation in terms of organizational membership and association is of particular importance to many non-Western
* Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., cherman9@jhu.edu. 1 http://www.cfr.org/nato/future-nato/p21044 p. 4.

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states that were traditionally excluded from the transatlantic securi ty complex, but which now possess increasing economic and military capabilities, new global ambitions, or continued interests in estab lishing their preponderance as middle powers in their respective regions. In 2006, James Goldgeier and Ivo Daalder approached these rising powers very selectively, focusing those which were, at least in form, liberal democracies and thus seemingly conforming to what is now being reconstructed and repeatedly invoked as a core belief of the alliance. Suggesting a global NATO as an alliance of democra cies, they thus noted that other democratic countries share NATOs values and many common interests including Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea and all of them can greatly contribute to NATOs efforts by providing additional military forces or logistical support to respond to global threats and needs.2

Logical and feasible?

There certainly are many reasons to consider India as a legitimate partner or even member of the alliance. Positive factors and areas of compatibility include Indias democratic and pluralistic polity and an overall familiarity with Western and liberal ideas of international order; its concern in balancing Chinas rise in Asia; its ambition to emerge as a security provider in the Indian Ocean; its efforts towards military and strategic diversification; and, perhaps most importantly, its short-term interest in guaranteeing the success of the Internation al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and a stable Afghanistan. However, in Indias specific case, little effort has gone towards assessing how this possibility is assessed in New Delhi itself, the default assumption often being that as a liberal democratic, Englishspeaking and China-fearing country, India will automatically jump on the transatlantic bandwagon together with Japan or Australia. In this perspective, India is a natural partner of NATO and will therefore, sooner or later, join the alliance or, at least, initiate an official dialogue and cooperation. Michael Ruhle, for example, thus notes that the
2 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61922/ivo-daalder-and-james-goldgeier/ global-nato.

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expansion of NATOs partnerships, to eventually even include rela tions with China and India, is both logical and feasible.3 Such hyper-optimistic and simplistic readings ignore, however, significant obstacles. Robert Farley also identifies this wishful think ing as embedded in the assumptions the United States 2010 Qua drennial Defense Review (QDR) makes on India:
While the QDR confidently projects about Indias role in support ing the US-defined international order, it conveniently ignores what might become serious differences in foreign policy outlook () the 2010 QDR Europeanises India. It assumes that India will, minor friction aside, act in the general interests of the political and eco nomic order that the Atlantic powers have established, just as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and NATO.4

Before focusing on shared values and merely assuming that India welcomes the possibility of assuming a new transatlantic avatar, one must first consider the various obstacles in the way. This does not mean that there is not significant potential for cooperation. But it is a potential contingent on recognizing and diffusing important dis agreements, aswell as on a tactful limited engagement.

Obstacles
It is difficult to imagine two more diametrically opposed actors in inter national politics than India and NATO during the Cold War. The oppo sition to any form of alliances and power politics, methods that Jawaha rlal Nehru attributed as intrinsic to Western states and detrimental to world peace, rapidly gained root as one of Indias central foreign policy tenets. This historical baggage weighs on Indian decision-makers even today, including on those that defend a fundamental change in Indias strategic orientation. Varun Sahni describes this burden:
During the Cold War years, India was the only major liberal democ racy that kept apart from the security community led by the United
3 http://www.aicgs.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Ruehle-NATO-and-EmergingSecurity-Challenges.pdf. 4 http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/03/putting-india-on-the-atlantic/.

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States. Indias attitude to the Atlantic Alliance fluctuated between aloofness and hostility, a sentiment that was reciprocated in equal measure by many NATO member states. India tended to view NATO and similar organisations, such as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, CENTO and SEATO as contributing to global insecurity.5

Until very recently, the very word NATO remained ostracized from Indias strategic lexicon. On a 2007 visit to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, athink-tank funded by Indias Ministry of Defense, NATOs Deputy Secretary General, acknowledged euphe mistically that for a casual observer, whether here in this country or elsewhere, the terms India and NATO might not go together easily.6 Arvind Gupta, an Indian diplomat who now heads the same institute, is less ambiguous: India and NATO are poles apart. NATO is a military alliance. India is a non-aligned country with an indepen dent foreign policy. Any engagement between India and NATO is, therefore, problematic.7 There are several instances that entrenched this problematic view of NATO in the Indian perspective over the decades, starting with the rumors during the 1950s about Portugal possibly leasing one of its bases in Goa to NATO8, followed by Indias Soviet rap prochement after 1971, and the crystallization of rival Pakistan on the opposing side of the Cold War. Pakistans status as a major nonNATO ally after 2001 only reinforced New Delhis discomfort with the alliance. But more than two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War and even NATOs contacts with China, developing since 2002, are now stronger than those with India. What explains this immense Indian reluctance? One additional factor may be the mere lack of current information and knowledge on both the past and present of the organization. In a February 2010 cable, the then U.S. ambassador Timothy Roemer noted that many leading strate
5 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07517-20101122.pdf (p.1). 6 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070420a.html. 7 http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ShouldIndiaEngagewithNATO_AKu mar_080708. 8 From Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrus 1957 speech to parliament: Ayear or two ago there was some reference to NATO in connection with Goa and we referred to the NATO countries. () If Goa is made any kind of a base for larger purposes of any alliance, that would be a move of the most serious character. It would be an unfriendly act to India. http://mealib.nic.in/far/1957.pdf.

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gic thinkers confessed a surprising level of ignorance of NATOs founding principles, internal procedures, and diverse associations with non-members.9 Three additional obstacles further strengthen Indias reluctance and explain why its engagement with NATO is far from being sim ply logical and feasible. First, New Delhi is extremely wary of any move that may be perceived as hostile by Beijing. There is too much at stake in this bilateral relationship that has developed very positive ly since the late 1980s. For analyst M. K. Bhadrakumar the percep tion is growing, and is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led security system in Asia10 and there is thus a constant Indian concern to walk a tight rope that pleases both Wash ington and Beijing. Second, there are also concerns that NATO is little more than an instrument for global American hegemony. A2008 statement by then Senator Barack Obama underlined that NATO remains a vital asset in Americas efforts to () defend our interests and values all over the world.11 Washington may seek to construe these American interests and values as being intrinsically universal, but to Indian eyes and ears, this frank assessment only reinforces pre-existing images of NATO as a Cold War analogue to the Moscow-dominated Warsaw Pact. A third obstacle relates to NATOs increasing presence in Asia and Indias ambition to act as South Asias resident middle power. NATOs humanitarian presence and activities on the Pakistani side of Kashmir, following the 2005 earthquake there, was thus seen with some apprehension in India.12 While conceding that the alli ance will increasingly penetrate Indias extended neighborhood, asit already did in Afghanistan, Arvind Gupta questions how New Delhi would react if one of its smaller neighbors, for example Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, joined NATO as a dialogue partner or con tact country. Finally, there may also be a purely strategic calculus behind Indias hesitations. For Nitin Pai, founder and fellow at the Takshash ila Foundation, NATO is an organisation in search of a mission.
9 http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10NEWDELHI263. 10 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ06Df04.html. 11 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-03-03/html/CREC-2008-03-03-pt1PgS1465.htm. 12 http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/oct/27guest.htm.

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Id say it needs India more than India needs it. The onus should be on NATO to court Indian co-operation.13 In this perspective, Indias historical burden may occasionally be exaggerated and deployed as a convenient tactical argument for New Delhi to cut a better deal with the transatlantic community. So, one may ask, what happened to all those common val ues, and threats and challenges supposed to face both countries? A closer look suggests that there is very little in common, or at least much less than normally assumed. In NATOs new 2010 strategic concept, Varun Sahni identifies seven main threats that the organi zations principle of collective defense seeks to address. 14 He notes that while they are all shared by India, they could easily also be adopted by China, namely (i) the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; (ii) the ambitions of international ter rorist groups; (iii) the persistence of corrosive regional, national, ethnic and religious rivalries; (iv) the worlds increased reliance on potentially vulnerable information systems; (v) the competition for petroleum and other strategic resources (thereby highlighting the importance of maritime security); (vi) demographic changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, hunger, ille gal immigration and pandemic disease; and (vii) the accumulating consequences of environmental degradation, including climate change. Democracy thus features as the only factor that may not gath er Chinese support in Rasmussens basket of NATO-India shared values15. Free access to trade routes, sea lanes, and communications networks, or stability and security in Afghanistan could all equally be Chinese values and priorities. The repeated references to shared democratic values, threats and concerns therefore rapidly boils down to democracy16 which, incidentally, is all but a priority in Indias foreign policy agenda. Sahni thus underlines that in contrast to the Atlantic Alliance, it is by no means certain that India regards democracy as a universal value17.
13 http://ajayshahblog.blogspot.com/2006/10/india-and-nato.html. 14 http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. 15 http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/nato-asks-for-dialogueindia/415969/. 16 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/india/30105007_1_india-andnato-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-european-led. 17 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07517-20101122.pdf.

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Opportunities
All these obstacles do not preclude, however, NATO and India from dialoguing and creating new links. But the success of any engagement depends on a careful identification and transposition of the obstacles noted above (instead of just ignoring or wishing them away), aswell as a tactful sequencing of cooperation, begin ning at the lower levels of dialogue and security. This is in line with the argument by David Scott, who argues that the politics of strategic convergence make NATO-India cooperation likely to be ad hoc rather than institutionalized, and implicit rather than explicit18. From a NATO perspective, to successfully court India, there is one set of high security issues that must be avoided, and sev eral different avenues that may be worth exploring. On the taboo list should be issues concerning defense policy and acquisitions, nuclear safety and proliferation, arms control, disarmament, and ballistic missile defense. While some are certainly important issues for international order and security, divergences remain too stark to allow for any meaningful debate, which would also risk being derailed politically. One exception may be terrorism and the shar ing of intelligence on transnational extremist threats, where India has shown surprising levels of interest and availability to coordi nate with Western agencies, especially after the 2008 attacks on Mumbai. Instead, more informal dialogue is required to bridge mutual misperceptions. Track 2 discussions often degenerate into a cycle of useless deliberations, but the NATO-India dialogues, organized since 2005 and whose 5th round was held in 2011, are a notable excep tion. Sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation from Germa ny, and locally hosted by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and the United Services Institute in New Delhi, they have facilitat ed the shift from an area of contestation to an area of convergence. The challenge at the last dialogue in February 2011 was to exam ine the possibilities of moving from convergence to cooperation.19
18 David Scott (2011), NATO and India: The politics of strategic convergence, in International Politics, 49: 98-116. 19 http://www.ipcs.org/india-nato-track-ii-dialogue-50.php.

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Not surprisingly, younger Indian scholars are now more receptive to a closer relationship.20 An official dialogue will thus naturally follow such unofficial dia logues and exchanges. In the words of Arvind Gupta: Adialogue with NATO does not mean agreeing with it on all issues. It only means that India will have a channel of communication open with an organ isation that is fast increasing its presence in various regions. It also means making NATO receptive to Indias own concerns.21 A further basket of issues of immediate security concern and of a more logistical and operational nature may also be pursued. This includes the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which India recognizes under the United Nations mandate, and the future of that country after the withdrawal in 2013-14. Rasmussen recognized that India has an important stake in the security of Afghanistan and the prolonged cohabitation of NATO and Indian interests and forces in that coun try serve as an important step for further cooperation.22 NATOs Deputy Secretary left this option open when he spoke in New Delhi, noting that Afghanistan is the place where India and NATO both seek to provide stability (now); but there may very well be other areas where India and NATO share similar concerns. The same level of informal coordination as seen in Afghanistan has also been achieved in the Western Indian Ocean, where NATOs Ocean Shield mission and the Indian Navy have occasionally col laborated and exchanged information in anti-piracy operations. 23 Long gone are the days in which New Delhi lobbied for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, without armed vessels and nuclear weapons. The unstated objectives now are to transform its navys blue-water and expeditionary capabilities, to maintain the sea lines of communi cation, the access to trade and energy sources open, and the Chinese out of the Indian Ocean. A further area of potential dialogue and cooperation relates to combating drug trafficking, and coordinating disaster relief and
20 One young scholar, for example, mentions that India needs to open a strategic dialogue with NATO and work towards areas of common security concern on a case-bycase basis http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2775. 21 http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ShouldIndiaEngagewithNATO_ AKumar_080708. 22 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-02-07/india/28114001_1_natocyber-attacks-security-concerns. 23 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JJ21Df03.html.

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humanitarian efforts, including airlift. India has been developing its expertise in the evacuation of Indian expatriates from crisis areas since 1991 in Iraq, and has more recently done so again in Lebanon and Libya. These issues, at the lower levels of the technical and secu rity spectrum, are less prone to politicization, mistrust and diver gence, and therefore ideal for initiating a dialogue.

Limited engagement
From a NATO perspective, this paper argued that neither of the extreme strategies (full engagement or no contact at all) is feasible. Nor would they actually serve the interests of the transatlantic com munity as regards to India and Asia in general. Instead, by keeping Indias historical sensibilities and strategic priorities in mind, and by maximizing the incentives and avoiding the obstacles underlying Delhis perception of NATO, the transatlantic security community should delineate a strategy of limited engagement that seeks to guar antee a friendly India in times, or areas, of critical importance in the long-term. This will require a selective (and extremely tactful) focus on technical cooperation, education, exchanges, and joint exercises the lower, softer and less visible dimensions of security coopera tion outlined in this paper.