Consciousness and Cognition Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2004) 107116

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The dissociation paradigm and its discontents: How can unconscious perception or memory be inferred?q,qq

Abstract Erdelyi does us all a great service by his customarily incisive discussion of the various ways in which our eld tends to neglect, confuse, and misunderstand numerous critical issues in attempting to dierentiate conscious from unconscious perception and memory. Although no single commentary could hope to comprehensively assess these issues, I will address Erdelyis three main points: (1) How (and if) the dissociation paradigm (Erdelyi, 1986) can be used to validly infer unconscious perception; (2) The implications of below-chance eects; and (3) The role of time. I suggest that (a) signicant progress on construct validity issues is possible; (b) below-chance eects are part of a more general bidirectional phenomenon, very likely unconscious, and do not threaten absolute subliminality; and (c) practice/learning eects pose potential diculties for time-based dissociation paradigms. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Among many illuminating observations, Erdelyi suggests that we must not confuse the special case of the dissociation paradigm (e > a; where a 0) with the general case (e > a, presumably where a > 0), because the special case ostensibly bears the apparently insuperable additional burden of showing that a really does equal 0 (i.e., the null sensitivity problem). Leaving this aside for the moment, Erdelyi further notes that the general and special cases alike suer from formidable construct validity issues: (1) How do we know that a indexes all conscious perception relevant to performance on e (the exhaustiveness problem)? (2) What do we do if e and a are not

q Commentary on M. H. Erdelyi (2004). Subliminal perception and its cognates: Theory, indeterminacy, and time. Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 7391. qq This commentary was undertaken as part of a research program on conscious and unconscious processes in the Ormond and Hazel Hunt Memorial Laboratory, directed by Howard Shevrin and supported in part by gifts from Robert Berry and grants from the Smart Family Foundation. Special thanks to Mark Van Selst, Philip Merikle, and Steven Haase for making their raw data available, and to John Thompson for preparing the artwork.

1053-8100/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2003.11.001

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process-pure, and hence may be inuenced by both conscious and unconscious perceptual inuences (viz. the exclusiveness problem)? Here, Erdelyi seems to tentatively endorse Reingold and Merikles (1988, 1990) relative sensitivity approach. They suggest that if the task is held constant (by which they mean the relevant discrimination and study and test cues), varying only direct (here, a) versus indirect (here, e) instructions, we can then be condent that a is relevantly exhaustive, and that the e > a pattern allows us to infer inuences of unconscious content if we are willing to make the further minimal assumption that conscious inuences are at least as strong under direct as indirect instructions. As an example, both Reingold and Merikle and Erdelyi discuss the subliminal mere exposure paradigm (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) , in which participants at test receive pairs of stimuli, one previously (and very briey) presented, one not. When Ps discriminate these stimuli under direct recognition instructions (a), performance is at chance; under indirect preference instructions (e), performance exceeds chanceapparently allowing us to infer unconscious memorial inuences on e. But. . . perhaps Reingold and Merikles minimal assumption is not so minimal after all. Recently, Whittlesea and Price (2001) conjectured that recognition instructions might lead participants to engage in possibly ineective analytic, detail-oriented response strategies which could block previously presented items from being consciously experienced as familiar, whereas preference instructions might encourage more eective nonanalytic, global impression strategies which would allow such familiarity experiences and their utilization in responding. They then showed that if recognition was performed holistically, performance exceeded chance, and that if preference was performed analytically, performance fell to chance. Thus, Ps strategic approach appears to be crucial, not direct versus indirect task instructions per se. Whittlesea and Price conclude that dierent instructions may simply aid or hinder access to consciously available information, not dierentially access conscious versus unconscious memory. Alternatively, however (and contra Whittlesea & Price), it may be that neither of these eects are conscious, and that the dierent instructions aid or hinder access to unconsciously available information. The problem here is we do not know how the conscious memorial information (if any) accessed by recognition instructions relates, if at all, to the conscious memorial information (if any) accessed by preference instructionsthat is, we do not know if the recognition task is relevantly exhaustive. If we did, we could more condently evaluate the implications of e > a in the mere exposure paradigm. So. . . we are faced with the exhaustiveness and exclusiveness problems once again.

2. Demonstrating unconscious perception by falsifying the conscious-perception-only model Recently, my colleagues and I (Snodgrass, in press; Snodgrass & Shevrin, 2003; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, in press-a, in press-b Snodgrass, Bernat, and Shevrin, and empirical analysis which may allow progress on the crucial construct validity issues and perhaps even demonstration of the special casee > a; where a 0. For starters, in our view demonstrating unconscious perception requires that the null hypothesisthat is, the conscious-perception-only modelbe falsied, which in turn requires its specication. One universally agreed upon core feature of this model is that conscious perception is positively related to stimulus strength. As stimulus duration is reduced and/or masking becomes stronger, conscious perception becomes weaker and less distincteventually reaching subjective and then nally objective thresholds. Relatedly, the

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complexity of stimulus analysis seems positively related to the degree of conscious perception. For example, detection requires very little conscious perception, identication somewhat more, and semantic classication still stronger conscious perception. Further, higher-level analysis is built upon and cannot occur without the constitutive lower levels. For example, semantic analysis requires at least partial identication, which in turn requires nonzero detection. In short, conscious perception functions on a hierarchical strength/complexity continuum, such that greater stimulus intensity is required in order for more complex eects to occur. Marcel (1983) called this the Identity Assumption, which holds that conscious percepts reect the highest level of analysis (as well as the constitutive lower levels) achieved by the stimuli. Assuming only conscious perceptual processes, then, strong and positive correlations should hold among the appropriate higher- and lower-level tasks. Notably, when a > 0, these patterns are indeed found; for example, reanalysis of Haase, Theios, & Jenisons (1999) data yielded r :84 between detection and identication. Similarly, Cheesman & Merikle (1984) found r :71 between identication and semantic priming. These considerations shed light on both the exhaustiveness problem and how unconscious perception can be validly inferred. First, any a that indexes a constitutive lower level of analysis than e indexes is relevantly exhaustive. Thus, if e is semantic priming, identication or detection tasks would be exhaustively sensitive as. However, if e indexed detection, identication would not be exhaustively sensitive because it indexes higherlevel processing. Second, higher-level eects should not be possible when lower-level eects are zero. Along these lines, Cheesman and Merikle found null priming when identication was zero. On the other hand, if e > a when a 0 and is relevantly exhaustive, the conscious perception model is violated. This reasoning reects the core of the dissociation paradigm logic; in contrast, direct versus indirect manipulations are not essential (cf. Erdelyi). In unconscious perception paradigms, e is typically indirect semantic priming, whereas a is often either direct identication or detection. In this situation, and keeping in mind that objective detection thresholds (ODTs) are below objective identication thresholds (OITs), and that OITs are below subjective identication thresholds (SITs), the conscious-perception-only model

Fig. 1. A. The conscious-perception-only models monotonic prediction for the relationship between (direct) a and e, where e is either direct or (more typically) indirect. e eects are zero at the objective detection threshold (ODT) and remain at until the objective identication threshold (OIT) is surpassed; then, the relationship becomes positive. B. The objective threshold/nonmonotonic models prediction for the relationship between a and e, where e is indirect. This relationship is negative as stimulus intensity increases from the objective detection threshold (ODT) to the OIT, there reaching zero. Beyond the OIT, the relationship becomes positive.

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predicts the pattern depicted in Fig. 1Athat is, a monotonic relationship in which e remains at and does not exceed zero until a reaches the OIT, then becoming positive. In our review of the literature (Snodgrass et al., in press-a), however, a strikingly dierent pattern emergesnamely, positive ndings are readily and reliably obtained at the ODT, but null ndings occur at the longer OIT (e.g., Dagenbach, Carr, & Wilhelmsen, 1989). Overall, this produces a nonmonotonic relationship between e and a which is negative-going in the ODTOIT region, but then becomes positive from the OIT on up; see Fig. 1B. In our view, this pattern provides strong evidence for unconscious perceptual inuences on e where a is at the ODT. 2.1. Implications for the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and special case problems The common worry underlying both the exhaustiveness and null sensitivity problems is that weak, residual conscious perception is actually responsible for putatively unconscious eects on eeither because a is nonexhaustive to begin with or because a 0 may be a measurement-error generated illusion. If this is so, e should increase with athat is, only monotonically positive (or at least nonnegative) relationships between e and a should occur. Instead, the negative relationship in the ODTOIT region directly contradicts this central prediction, thus ameliorating the exhaustiveness and null sensitivity problems. Accordingly, this pattern may allow demonstration of the special case. Indeed, even the apparently intractable momentary forgetting account (cf. Erdelyi) also predicts that e should increase with aand is thus also disconrmed by the negative relationship. 2.2. Implications for process-purity issues But why does this negative relationship occur, and why does the relationship reverse direction at the OIT? To explain this pattern, my colleagues and I hypothesize that conscious and unconscious perceptual inuences are typically functionally exclusive (cf. Jones, 1987 typology), such that conscious inuences override unconscious ones when both are present. At the ODT, where conscious perception is completely absent, unconscious perceptual eects on e manifest freely. In the ODTOIT region, however, the relevant stimuli are increasingly detectable, but this conscious perception is not yet sucient to drive higher-level e eects. Accordingly, the overriding conscious perception simply reduces and eventually eliminates unconscious perceptual inuences. Finally, as the OIT is surpassed, conscious perceptual inuences become able to drive higher-level e eects, and the relationship becomes positive. This overall nonmonotonic pattern suggests an answer to the process-purity issuenamely, that although tasks themselves are very likely never process-pure, the mix of conscious and unconscious inuences on task performance depends on whether and to what degree relevant conscious perception is present (cf. Erdelyis hypercomplex indicators). 2.3. Implications for the exclusiveness problem Reingold & Merikle (1988, 1990) suggested that if a is sensitive to both conscious and unconscious perceptual inuences, attaining objective thresholds would inadvertantly eliminate them bothnot only on a, but e as well. However, this reasoning implicitly assumes that

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conscious and unconscious inuences do not interfere with each otherthat is, are either redundant or independent in Jones (1987) typology. Contrariwise, if such inuences are functionally exclusive, removing conscious inuences by attaining ODTs could actually potentiate rather than eliminate unconscious perceptual inuences, thus dissolving the exclusiveness problem. In this way, it becomes clear that the exclusiveness problem is not intrinsic to objective threshold paradigms, but is contingent upon certain assumptions about how conscious and unconscious inuences interact. 2.4. Negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships and inferences for unconscious perception As Erdelyi noted, negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships do not always indicate unconscious perception (cf. his scotopic vision example). In our view, two conditions must be met in order for negative correlations to allow valid inferences for unconscious perception. First, the negative relationship must correspond to independently determined objective or subjective thresholds; otherwise, multiple conscious perceptual processes could be indicated (cf. Erdelyi, 1986, this volume; Holender, 1986). Second, it must be clear that conscious perception would produce a positive relationship; otherwise, negative relationships do not contradict the conscious perception model. Relatedly, the negative relationship must be unambiguous. For example, exclusion-related eects (e.g., Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995) appear to show a negative relationship wherein exclusion failure lessens as stimulus strength increases. If, however, exclusion is a conscious, higher-order criterion-based decision process (Snodgrass, 2002), it should increase with stimulus strength, suggesting that the true underlying relationship may be positive. A similar account might also explain why mere exposure eects decline with increasing stimulus intensity (Bornstein, 1989; Erdelyi, 2004)namely, participants increasingly realize that an old/new dimension is being experimentally manipulated, and spontaneously adopt a discounting (i.e., exclusion) strategy when making preference judgments (see also Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Whittlesea & Price, 2001 for similar accounts of related phenomena).

3. What do below-chance eects mean? Importantly, Erdelyi suggests that nominally a 0 situations may actually be a mixture of osetting below-chance and above-chance performance, thus obscuring the presence of underlying systematic variation in aand that this seriously threatens the very idea of absolutely subliminal eects. In our view, however, this is only true if below-chance eects are caused by conscious perception. Before addressing this issue further, we sketch our interpretation of such eects. Although various other below-chance eects mentioned by Erdelyi may turn out to be genuine, the only reliably established below-chance eects to date are from the pop/look paradigm (see Snodgrass & Shevrin, 2003 for a meta-analysis; see also Snodgrass, Shevrin, & Kopka, 1993; Van Selst & Merikle, 1993). In this paradigm, participants performed forced-choice word identication under both pop (say the rst word that comes to mind) and look (look hard for anything you can see) instructions; additionally, they indicated which of the two strategies they preferred. A very reliable (meta-analytic F 1; 242 36:23, p 6:45 109 ) Preference Strategy interaction

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emerged, wherein Ps (especially look preference Psi.e., lookers) performed above chance in the preferred strategy and below chance in the nonpreferred one. At the same time, overall identication (collapsing across Preference and Strategy) was at chance (X 25:01, chance 25%), as was a separate yes/no detection task (X 49:9, chance 50%). These ndings are very dicult to explain in conscious perceptual terms. As an attempt, one might conjecture that under pop instructions lookers dismiss their (here, weakly conscious) perceptions as implausible, producing inhibitionin eect, spontaneously and successfully adopting an exclusion strategy. Exclusion paradigms themselves, however, suggest that this interpretation is untenable, because their core nding (cf. Merikle et al., 1995) is precisely that participants still facilitate, even using much stronger subjective threshold stimuli and despite explicit exclusion instructions. In contrast, our stimuli are much weaker; moreover, Ps receive facilitation instructions. As another possibility, perhaps lookers somehow systematically mismatched their ostensibly conscious perceptions with incorrect response alternatives. But why would this happen? After all, the correct response is a better match than the incorrect responses. In any event, further analyses revealed that such systematic mismatching did not occurinstead, incorrect responses were spread evenly across the available alternatives. But what about lookers facilitation under look instructions, which seems more compatible with alternative conscious perception accounts? Here, we found that looker facilitation correlated negatively, not positively, with detectionagain contradicting conscious perceptual predictions. Finally, conscious perceptual explanations for the inhibition and faciliation eects become even more implausible given that Ps could not even detect the words presence, and further recalling that ODTs are below OITs. 3.1. Bidirectional vs. unidirectional eects Instead, the most likely explanation is that the stimuli were unconsciously perceived, and then further either unconsciously inhibited or facilitated as a function of Preference/Strategy congruence, perhaps through some kind of unconscious attribution mechanism or simple defensive process (see Snodgrass & Shevrin, 2003 for further details). Further, we propose that this mixture of osetting inhibition and facilitation may reect a fundamental qualitative dierence between conscious and unconscious perceptual inuences on direct tasks (and moreover between unconscious inuences on direct vs. indirect tasks). Namely, unconscious perceptual inuences on direct tasks appear to be intrinsically bidirectional (i.e., aect the variance but not the overall meancf. Katz, 2001), whereas conscious inuences on direct tasks (and indirect unconscious inuences) are unidirectional (i.e., do manifest on overall means). As Katz noted, psychology has focused virtually exclusively on unidirectional eects, which perhaps explains why purely bidirectional eects seem so odd at rst glance. Indeed, such eects will be missed entirely unless their increased variance and/or underlying moderators are examined. Further, as implied above, unconscious bidirectional inuences at the ODT appear to be radically uncontrollable. On the other hand, undirectional conscious inuences are controllable. For example, exclusion failure under subjective threshold conditions, often argued to demonstrate lack of such control, disappears when monetary incentives are given (Visser & Merikle, 1999). This suggests that participants can adopt more lenient exclusion criterions when suciently motivated (Snodgrass, 2002; see also Haase & Fisk, 2001), thus exercising conscious control. In contrast, criterion artifact accounts are much less workable with below-chance ODT eects.

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3.2. Below-chance eects and the negative/nonmonotonic relationship Apparently buying the notion that low-level conscious perception may interfere with unconscious inuences, Erdelyi suggests that below-chance e eects may be part of the nonmonotonic relationshipspecically, that as stimulus intensity declines, e eects may rst overshoot to below-chance levels before rising once more at still weaker stimulus intensities. There seems little evidence, however, that this is the case. For example, e eects in Greenwald, Klinger, and Schuhs (1995; Fig. 4) data (see Erdelyis Fig. 3) decline to chance, but do not go below. Further, although subliminal mere exposure e eects decline with stronger stimulus intensities, they do not dip below chance. In any event, in our view below-chance eects are one part of bidirectional phenomena, not undirectional as Erdelyi suggests. Further, available evidence suggests that such bidirectional inuences (including below-chance eects) and the negative/nonmonotonic relationship are distinct phenomena. For example, Price (1990, 1998) found increased variance on direct semantic classication tasks at the ODT, but not with stronger stimuli; similarly, Snodgrass & Shevrins (2003) Preference Strategy interaction as a whole (i.e., bidirectional identication eects) correlated negatively with detection. It thus appears that, similar to indirect unconscious unidirectional inuences, bidirectional unconscious inuences on direct tasks are overridden by conscious perceptual inuences in the ODTOIT region; beyond the OIT, conscious inuences become able to drive higher-level direct tasks performance; see Fig. 2 (cf. Fig. 1B). At the same time, it is possible that unconscious inuences on dierent tasks at the ODT may correlate negatively in some instances. Indeed, this may be just what Greenwald et al.s data indicate in the direct d 0 < 0 region; analogously, Snodgrass & Shevrins (2003) data may reect a negative relationship between unconscious bidirectional inuences on both identication and detection. Regardless of whether these negative relationships pertain to conscious or unconscious inuences on a, however, these e eects remain dicult to explain in conscious perceptual terms.

Fig. 2. The objective threshold/nonmonotonic models prediction when e and a are both direct tasks, illustrating bidirectional inuences on e. Both above- and below-chance e eects decline as stimulus intensity increases from the ODT to the OIT, there converging to zero. Beyond the OIT, bidirectional e inuences are completely overridden and the relationship becomes positive.

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3.3. Whither absolute subliminality? The above considerations suggest that below-chance eects are part of a more general bidirectional phenomenon, and that these ODT eectsboth inhibition and facilitationlikely reect unconscious rather than conscious perceptual inuences. If so, their underlying presence when overall a 0 does not threaten absolute subliminality, because the real concern is whether conscious inuences on a are completely absent.

4. The importance of time Erdelyi is certainly correct that time-related factors, long ignored, clearly merit close investigation. However, so far I see little reason to believe that such inuences are relevant to absolutely subliminal (including below-chance) eects, and instead considerable reason to believe that they are quite relevant to weakly conscious eects. For example, consider Merikle & Reingolds (1991) mere exposure experiments. For starters, their combined data (p. 230) show no reliable below-chance recognition performance. With this in mind, their clearest nding is that direct recognition performance, initially at chance, later exceeds chance, whereas indirect contrast judgments exceed chance at rst but later decline to chance. This pattern, however, may simply indicate that participants gradually realize that an old/new dimension has been manipulated, and subsequently either increasingly utilize consciously available memorial information when relevant (under recognition instructions) or discount such information when irrelevant (under contrast instructions). These ndings, then, are explainable in weakly conscious memorial terms (cf. Whittlesea & Price, 2001). Further, Merikle & Reingolds (1991) stimuli were presented in full consciousness at study, albeit somewhat unattended. At the very least, these stimuli may have been initially briey conscious. Analogously, subliminal mere exposure paradigms do not typically ascertain whether items are weakly consciously perceived at study (for an important exception, see Bornstein & DAgostino, 1992, who apparently achieved ODT status at study). In contrast, objective threshold unconscious perception paradigms seek to prevent stimuli from being conscious at any time. Accordingly, such paradigms frequently begin with extensive threshold-setting or practice phases, taking into account the fact that direct performance typically improves markedly over time with weakly conscious stimuli, especially when backward masking is used (see, e.g., Wolford, Marchak, & Hughes, 1988). However, once objective thresholds have been adequately established, performance does not seem to improve further. For example, in our pop/look paradigm, each strategy condition had ve blocks, allowing examination of such eects. The Preference Strategy Block meta-analytic F 4; 202 was .94, ns, and the Block meta-analytic F 4; 202 was .81, also ns, indicating that time exerted neither bidirectional nor unidirectional eects on identication. Additionally, in recently collected unpublished data, we found no indication of time eects across two 32-trial detection blocks [Block 1: 50.8%; Block 2: 49.8%, t65 :63, ns.]. Although further empirical tests are certainly in order, these data suggest that time-related shifts between below- and above-chance performance do not underlie a 0. Moreover, some evidence suggests that momentary forgetting concerns are unwarranted in unconscious perception paradigms. For example, Draine & Greenwald (1998) found that direct performance

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worsened when speeded, suggesting that typical, unspeeded direct tasks do not overlook ostensibly eeting conscious perception after all (see also Meier, Morger, & Graf, 2003).

5. Concluding remarks With unconscious perception paradigms, considerable progress is possible with the exhaustiveness, exclusiveness, and null sensitivity (i.e., special case) problems if the conscious-perceptiononly model is suciently specied. Under the right circumstances, negative relationships in the ODTOIT region mitigate all three problems, provided further that the relationship becomes positive beyond the OIT; moreover, this nonmonotonic relationship suggests that conscious and unconscious perceptual inuences are functionally exclusive. Further, below-chance eects on direct measures appear to be part of a more general, unconscious bidirectional phenomenon at the ODT, and their occurrence likely does not undermine absolute subliminality. Regarding unconscious memory paradigms, they may face inherently greater problems ruling out weakly conscious explanations if their stimuli are conscious at study (which is typical but not universal; cf. Bornstein & DAgostino, 1992). Further, time-based claims for unconscious memory must confront alternative explanations in terms of practice eects involving increasing use of potentially available conscious memorial information.

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Michael Snodgrass
University of Michigan Medical Center Riverview Building 900 Wall St., Ann Arbor, MI 48105, USA E-mail address: jmsnodgr@umich.edu