Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
445-452.
III
Dramatism1
Dramatism
is
a
method
of
analysis
and
a
corresponding
critique
of
terminology
designed
to
show
that
the
most
direct
route
to
the
study
of
human
relations
and
human
motives
is
via
a
methodical
inquiry
into
cycles
or
clusters
of
terms
and
their
functions.
The
dramatistic
approach
is
implicit
in
the
key
term
act.
Act
is
thus
a
terministic
center
from
which
many
related
considerations
can
be
shown
to
radiate,
as
though
it
were
a
god-term
from
which
a
whole
universe
of
terms
is
derived.
The
dramatistic
study
of
language
comes
to
a
focus
in
[2]
a
philosophy
of
language
(and
of
symbolicity
in
general);
the
latter
provides
the
basis
for
a
general
conception
of
man
and
of
human
relations.
The
present
article
will
consider
primarily
the
dramatistic
concern
with
the
resources,
limitations,
and
paradoxes
of
terminology,
particularly
in
connection
with
the
imputing
of
motives.
The
dramatistic
approach
to
action
Dramatism
centers
in
observations
of
this
sort:
for
there
to
be
an
act,
there
must
be
an
agent.
Similarly,
there
must
be
a
scene
in
which
the
agent
acts.
To
act
in
a
scene,
the
agent
must
employ
some
means,
or
agency.
And
it
can
be
called
an
act
in
the
full
sense
of
the
term
only
if
it
involves
a
purpose
(that
is,
if
a
support
happens
to
give
way
and
one
falls,
such
motion
on
the
agents
part
is
not
an
act,
but
an
accident).
These
five
terms
(act,
scene,
agent,
agency,
purpose)
have
been
labeled
the
dramatistic
pentad;
the
aim
of
calling
attention
to
them
in
this
way
is
to
show
how
the
functions
which
they
designate
operate
in
the
imputing
of
motives
(Burke
[1945-1950]
1962,
Introduction).
The
pattern
is
incipiently
a
hexad
complementary
analysis
of
attitude
(as
an
ambiguous
term
for
incipient
action)
1
[pg
445]
2
[pg
446]
undertaken by George Herbert Mead (1938) and by I. A. Richards (1959). Later we shall consider the question whether the key terms of dramatism are literal or metaphorical. In the meantime, other important things about the terms themselves should be noted. Obviously, for instance, the concept of scene can be widened or narrowed (conceived of in terms of varying scope or circumference). Thus, an agents behavior (act) might be thought of as grounded in one god; or the circumference of the situation can be narrowed to naturalistic limits, as in Darwinism; or it can be localized in such terms as Western civilization, Elizabethanism, capitalism, D day, 10 Downing Street, on this train ride, and so on, endlessly. Any change of the circumference in terms of which an act is viewed implies a corresponding change in ones view of the quality of the acts motivation. Such a loose yet compelling correspondence between act and scene is called a scene-act ratio (Burke [1945-1950] 1962, pp. 1-7). All the terms are capable of similar relationships. A purpose-agency ratio, for instance, would concern the logic of means selecting, the relation of means to ends (as the Supreme Court might decide that an emergency measure is constitutional because it was taken in an emergency situation). An agent-act ratio would reflect the correspondence between a mans character and the character of his behavior (as, in a drama, the principles of formal consistency require that each member of the dramatis personae act in character, though such correspondences in art can have a perfection not often found in life). In actual practice, such ratios are used sometimes to explain an act and sometimes to justify it (ibid., pp. 15-20). Such correlations are not strict, but analogical. Thus, by scene-act ratio is meant a proposition such as: Though agent and act are necessarily different in many of their attributes, some notable element of one is implicitly or analogously present in the other. David Humes An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (first published in 1748) throws a serviceable light upon the dramatistic ratios. His treatise begins with the observation that moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners. One of these considers man chiefly as born for action. The other would consider man in the light of a reasonable
rather
than
an
active
being,
and
endeavor
to
form
his
understanding
more
than
cultivate
his
manners
([1748]
1952,
p.
451).
Here,
in
essence,
is
the
distinction
between
a
dramatistic
approach
in
terms
of
action
and
an
approach
in
terms
of
knowledge.
For,
as
a
reasonable
being,
Hume
says,
man
receives
from
science
his
proper
food
and
nourishment.
But
man
is
a
sociable,
no
les
than
a
reasonable
being.
Man
is
also
an
active
being;
and
from
that
disposition,
as
well
as
from
the
various
necessities
of
human
life,
must
submit
to
business
and
occupation
(ibid.,
p.
452).
Insofar
as
mens
actions
are
to
be
interpreted
in
terms
of
the
circumstances
in
which
they
are
acting,
their
behavior
would
fall
under
the
heading
of
a
scene-act
ratio.
But
insofar
as
their
acts
reveal
their
different
characters,
their
behavior
would
fall
under
the
heading
of
an
agent-act
ratio.
For
instance,
in
a
time
of
great
crisis,
such
as
shipwreck,
the
conduct
of
all
persons
involved
in
that
crisis
could
be
expected
to
manifest
in
some
way
the
motivating
influence
of
the
crisis.
Yet,
within
such
a
scene-act
ratio
there
would
be
a
range
of
agent-act
ratios,
insofar
as
one
man
was
proved
to
be
cowardly,
another
bold,
another
resourceful,
and
so
on.
Talcott
Parsons,
in
one
of
his
earlier
works,
has
analytically
unfolded,
for
sociological
purposes,
much
the
same
set
of
terministic
functions
that
is
here
being
called
dramatistic
(owing
to
their
nature
as
implied
in
the
idea
of
an
act).
Thus,
in
deal[3]ing
with
the
unit
of
action
systems,
Parsons
Writes:
An
act
involves
logically
the
following:
(1)
It
implies
an
agent,
an
actor.
(2)
For
purposes
of
definition
the
act
must
have
an
end,
a
future
state
of
affairs
toward
which
the
process
of
action
is
oriented.
(3)
It
must
be
initiated
in
a
situation
of
which
the
trends
of
development
differ
in
one
or
more
important
respects
from
the
state
of
affairs
to
which
the
action
is
oriented,
the
end.
This
situation
is
in
turn
analyzable
into
two
elements:
those
over
which
the
actor
has
no
control,
that
is
which
he
cannot
alter,
or
prevent
from
being
altered,
in
conformity
with
his
end,
and
those
over
which
he
has
such
control.
The
former
may
be
termed
the
conditions
of
action,
the
latter
the
means.
Finally
(4)
there
is
inherent
in
the
conception
of
this
unit,
in
its
analytical
uses,
a
certain
mode
of
relationship
between
these
elements.
That
is,
in
the
choice
of
alternative
means
to
the
end,
in
so
far
as
the
situation
allows
alternatives,
there
is
a
normative
orientation
of
actions.
(1937,
p.
44)
3
[pg
447]
Aristotle,
from
whom
Aquinas
got
his
definition
of
God
as
pure
act,
gives
us
much
the
same
lineup
when
enumerating
the
circumstances
about
which
we
may
be
ignorant,
with
corresponding
inability
to
act
voluntarily:
A
man,
may
be
ignorant,
then,
of
who
he
is,
what
he
is
doing,
what
or
whom
he
is
acting
on,
and
sometimes
also
what
(e.g.
what
instrument)
he
is
doing
it
with,
and
to
what
end
(e.g.
he
may
think
his
act
will
conduce
to
some
ones
safety),
and
how
he
is
doing
it
(e.g.
whether
gently
or
violently).
(Nichomachean
Ethics
1111a5)
This pattern became fixed in the medieval questions: quis (agent), quid (act), ubi (scene defined as place), quibus auxiliis (agency), cur (purpose), quo modo (manner, attitude), quando (scene defined temporally). The nature of symbolic action Within the practically limitless range of scenes (or motivating situations) in terms of which human action can be defined and studied, there is one over-all dramatistic distinction as regards the widening or narrowing of circumference. This is the distinction between action and sheer motion. Action, is a term for the kind of behavior possible to a typically symbol-using animal (such as man) in contrast with the extra-symbolic or non-symbolic operations of nature. Whatever terministic paradoxes we may encounter en route (and the dramatistic view of terminology leads one to expect them on the grounds that language is primarily a species of action, or expression of attitudes, rather than an instrument of definition), there is the self- evident distinction between symbol and symbolized (in the sense that the word tree is categorically distinguishable from the thing tree). Whatever may be the ultimate confusions that result from mans instrinsic involvement with symbolicity as a necessary part of his nature, one can at least begin whith this sufficiently clear distinction between a thing and its name. The distinction is generalized in dramatism as one between sheer motion and action. It involves an empirical shift of circumference in the sense that although mans ability to speak depends upon the existence of speechless nature, the existence of speechless nature
does
not
depend
upon
mans
ability
to
speak.
The
relation
between
these
two
distinct
terministic
realms
can
be
summed
up
in
three
propositions:
(1) There
can
be
no
action
without
motion-
that
is,
even
the
symbolic
action
of
pure
thought
requires
corresponding
motions
of
the
brain.
(2) There
can
be
motion
without
action.
(For
instance,
the
motions
of
the
tides,
of
sunlight,
of
growth
and
decay).
(3) Action
is
not
reducible
to
terms
of
motion.
For
instance,
the
essence
or
meaning
of
a
sentence
is
not
reducible
to
its
sheer
physical
existence
as
sounds
in
the
air
or
marks
on
the
page,
although
material
motions
of
some
sort
are
necessary
for
the
production,
transmission,
and
reception
of
the
sentence.
As
has
been
said
by
Talcott
Parsons:
Certainly
the
situation
of
action
includes
parts
of
what
is
called
in
common-sense
terms
the
physical
environment
and
the
biological
organism
these
elements
of
the
situation
of
action
are
capable
of
analysis
in
terms
of
the
physical
and
biological
sciences,
and
the
phenomena
in
question
are
subject
to
analysis
in
terms
of
the
units
in
use
in
those
sciences.
Thus
a
bridge
may,
with
perfect
truth,
be
said
to
consist
of
atoms
of
iron,
a
small
amount
of
carbon,
etc.,
and
their
constituent
electrons,
protons,
neutrons
and
the
like.
Must
the
student
of
action,
then,
become
a
physicist,
chemist,
biologist
in
order
to
understand
his
subject?
In
a
sense
this
is
true,
but
for
purposes
of
the
theory
of
action
it
is
not
necessary
or
desirable
to
carry
such
analyses
as
far
as
science
in
general
is
capable
of
doing.
A
limit
is
set
by
the
frame
of
reference
with
which
the
student
of
action
is
working.
That
is,
he
is
interested
in
phenomena
with
an
aspect
not
reducible
to
action
terms
only
in
so
far
as
they
impinge
on
the
schema
of
action
in
a
relevant
way
in
the
role
of
conditions
or
means.
For
the
purposes
of
the
theory
of
action
the
smallest
conceivable
concrete
unit
is
the
unit
act,
and
while
it
is
in
turn
analyzable
into
the
elements
to
which
reference
has
been
made-
end,
means,
conditions
and
guiding
norms-
further
analysis
of
the
phenomena
of
which
these
are
[4]
in
turn
aspects
is
relevant
to
the
theory
of
action
only
in
so
far
as
the
units
arrived
at
can
be
referred
to
as
constituting
such
elements
of
a
unit
act
or
a
system
of
them.
(1937,
pp.
47-48)
Is
dramatism
merely
metaphorical?
Although
such
prototypically
dramatistic
usages
as
all
the
worlds
a
stage
are
clearly
metaphors,
the
situation
looks
quite
otherwise
when
approached
from
another
point
of
view.
For
instance,
a
physical
scientists
relation
to
the
materials
involved
in
the
study
of
motion
differs
in
quality
from
his
4
[448]
relation to his colleagues. He would never think of petitioning the objects of his experiment or arguing with them, as he would with persons whom he ask to collaborate with him or to judge the results of his experiment. Implicit in these two relations in the distinction between the sheer motion of things and the actions of persons. In this sense, man is defined literally as an animal characterized by his special aptitude for symbolic action, which is itself a literal term. And from there on, drama is employed, not as a metaphor but as a fixed form that helps us discover what the implications of the terms acts and person really are. Once we choose a generalized term for what people do, it is certainly as literal to say that people act as it is to say that they but move like mere things. Dramatism and the social system. Strictly speaking, then, dramatism is a theory of terminology. In this respect a nomenclature could be called dramatistic only if it were specifically designed to talk, at one remove, about the cycle of terms implicit in the idea of an act. But in a wider sense any study of human relations in terms of action could to that extend be called dramatistic. A major difficulty in delimiting the field of reference derives from the fact that common-sense vocabularies of motives are spontaneously personalistic, hence innately given to drama-laden terms. And the turn from the nave to the speculative is marked by such action words as tao, karma, dike, hodos, islam (to designate a submissive attitude), all of which are clearly dramatistic when contrasted with the terminological ideals proper to the natural sciences (Burke [1945-1950] 1962, p. 15) The dramatistic nature of the Bible is proclaimed in the verb (bara) of the opening sentence that designates Gods creative act; and the series of fiats that follow identifies such action with the principle of symbolicity (the Word). Both Platos philosophy of the Good as ultimate motive and Aristotles potentiality-actuality pair would obviously belong here, as would the strategic accountancy of active and passive in Spinozas Ethics (Burke [1945-1950] 1962, pp. 146- 152). The modern sociological concern with values as motives does not differ in principle from Aristotles list of persuasive topics in his Rhetoric. One need not look very closely at Lucretius atomism to discern the personality in those willful particles. Contemporary theories of role-taking would obviously fall within this looser usage,
as
indicated
on
its
face
by
the
term
itself.
Rhetorical
studies
of
political
exhortation
meet
the
same
test,
as
do
typical
news
reports
of
peoples
actions,
predicaments,
and
expressions.
Most
historiography
would
be
similarly
classed,
insofar
as
its
modes
of
systematization
and
generalization
can
be
called
a
scientifically
documented
species
of
storytelling.
And
humanistic
criticism
(of
either
ethical
or
aesthetic
sorts)
usually
embodies,
in
the
broad
sense,
a
dramatistic
attitude
toward
questions
of
personality.
Shifts
in
the
locus
and
scope
of
a
terminologys
circumference
allow
for
countless
subdivisions,
ranging
from
words
like
transaction,
exchange,
competition,
and
cooperation,
or
the
maneuvers
studied
in
the
obviously
dramalike
situations
of
game
theories,
down
to
the
endless
individual
verbs
designed
to
narrate
specifically
what
some
one
person
did,
or
said,
or
thought
at
some
one
time.
Thus
Duncan
(1962)
has
explicitly
applied
a
dramatistic
nomenclature
to
hierarchy
and
the
sociology
of
comedy.
Similarly,
Goffman
(1956)
has
characterized
his
study
of
impression
management
as
dramaturgical.
Does
dramatism
have
a
scientific
use?
If
the
dramatist
nature
of
terms
for
human
motives
in
made
obvious
in
Burkes
pentad
(act,
scene,
agent,
agency,
purpose),
is
this
element
radically
eliminated
if
we
but
introduce
a
synonym
for
each
of
those
terms?
Have
we,
for
instance,
effectively
dodged
the
dramatistic
logic
if
instead
of
act
we
say
response,
instead
of
scene
we
say
situation
or
stimulus,
instead
of
agent
we
say
subject
or
the
specimen
under
observation
in
this
case,
instead
of
agency
we
say
implementation,
and
instead
of
purpose
we
use
some
term
like
target?
Or
to
what
extent
has
reduction
wholly
taken
place
when
the
dramatistic
grammar
of
active,
passive,
and
reflexive
gets
for
its
analogues,
in
the
realm
of
sheer
motion,
effectors,
receptors
(output,
input),
and
feedback,
respectively?
Might
we
have
here
but
a
truncated
terminology
of
action,
rather
than
a
terminology
intrinsically
nondramatistic?
Such
issues
are
not
resolved
by
a
dramatistic
perspective;
but
they
are
systematically
brought
up
for
consideration.
A
dramatistic
analysis
of
nomenclature
can
[ 5 ]
make
clear
the
paradoxical
ways
in
which
even
systematically
generated
theories
of
action
can
culminate
in
kinds
of
observation
best
described
by
5
[pg
449]
analogy with mechanistic models. The resultant of many disparate acts cannot itself be considered an act in the same purposive sense that characterizes each one of such acts (just as the movement of the stock market in its totality is not personal in the sense of the myriad decisions made by each of the variously minded traders). Thus, a systematic analysis of interactions among a society of agents whose individual acts variously reinforce and counter of concepts of equibrium and disequilibrium borrowed from the terminology of mechanics. In this regard it should also be noted that although equilibrium theories are usually interpreted as intrinsically adapted only to an upholding of the status quo, according to the dramatistic perspective this need not be the case. A work such as Albert Mathiezs The French Revolution (1922-1927) could be viewed as the expression of an anima naturaliter dramatistica in that it traces step by step an ironic development whereby a succession of unintentionally wrong moves led to unwanted results. If one viewed this whole disorderly sequence as itself a species of order, then each of the stages in its advance could be interpreted as if designed to stabilize, in constantly changing circumstances, the underlying pattern of conditions favorable to the eventual outcome (namely, the kind of equilibrium that could be maintained only by a series of progressive developments leading into, through, and beyond the Terror). Though a drama is a mode of symbolic action so designed that an audience might be induced to act symbolically in sympathy with it, insofar as the drama serves this function it may be studied as a perfect mechanism composed of parts moving in mutual adjustment to one another like clockwork. The paradox is not unlike that which happened in metaphysics when a mystical view of the world as a manifestation of Gods purposes prepared the way for mechanistic views, since the perfect representation of such a design seemed to be a machine in perfect order. This brings up the further consideration that mechanical models might best be analyzed, not as downright anti-dramatistic, but as fragments of the dramatistic. For whatever humanist critics might say about the dehumanizing effects of the machine, it is a characteristically human invention, conceived by the perfecting of some human aptitudes and the elimination of others (thus in effect
being not inhuman, but mans powerful caricature of himself a kind of mighty homunculus). If, on the other hand, it is held that a dramatistic nomenclature is to be avoided in any form as categorically inappropriate to science of social relations, then a systematic study of symbolic action could at least be of use in helping to reveal any hitherto undetected traces of dramatistic thinking that might still survive. For otherwise the old Adam of human symbolicity, whereby man still persists in thinking of himself as a personal agent capable of acting, may lurk in a symbol system undetected (a tendency revealed in the fact that the distinction between action and sheer motion so readily gets lost, as with a term like kinesis in Aristotle or the shift between the mechanistic connotations of equilibrium and histrionic connotations of equilibrist). Similarly, since pragmatist terminologies lay great stress upon agencies (means) and since all machines have a kind of built-in purpose, any nomenclature conceived along the lines of pragmatist instrumentalism offers a halfway house between teleology and sheer aimless motion. At one point dramatism as a critique of terminology is necessarily at odds with dramatism as applied for specifically scientific purposes. This has been made clear in an article by Wrong (1961), who charges that although modern sociology after all originated as a protest against the partial views of man contained in such doctrines as utilitarianism, classical economics, social Darwinism, and vulgar Marxism, it risks contributing to the creation of yet another reified abstraction in socialized man, the status-seeker of our contemporary sociologist (p. 190). He grants that such an image of man is valuable for limited purposes, but only so long as it is not taken for the whole truth (p.190). He offers various corrections, among them a stress upon role-playing, and upon forces in man that are resistant to socialization, such as certain biological and psychological factors even though some sociologists might promptly see the specter of `biological determinism (p.191) and others might complain that already there is too much `psychologism in contemporary sociology (p. 192). Viewed from the standpoint of dramatism as a critique of terminology, Wrongs article suggest two notable problems. Insofar as any science has a nomenclature specially adapted to its particular field of study, the extension of its special terms to provide a definition
of
man
in
general
would
[ 6 ]
necessarily
oversociologize,
overbiologize,
overpsychologize,
or
overphysicize,
etc.,
its
subject;
or
the
definition
would
have
to
be
corrected
by
the
addition
of
elements
from
other
specialized
nomenclatures
(thereby
producing
a
kind
of
amalgam
that
would
lie
outside
the
strict
methodic
confines
of
any
specialized
scientific
discipline).
A
dramatistic
view
of
this
situation
suggest
that
an
over-all
definition
of
man
would
be
not
strictly
scientific,
but
philosophical.
Similarly,
the
dramatistic
concept
of
a
scene-act
ratio
aims
to
admonish
against
an
overly
positivistic
view
of
descriptive
terms,
or
empirical
data,
as
regards
an
account
of
the
conditions
that
men
are
thought
to
confront
at
a
given
time
in
history.
For
insofar
as
such
a
grammatical
function
does
figure
in
our
thoughts
about
motives
and
purpose,
in
the
choice
and
scope
of
the
terms
that
are
used
for
characterizing
a
given
situation
dramatism
would
discern
implicit
corresponding
attitudes
and
programs
of
action.
If
the
principle
of
the
scene-act
ratio
always
figures
in
some
from,
it
follows
that
one
could
not
possibly
select
descriptive
terms
in
which
policies
of
some
sort
are
not
more
or
less
clearly
inherent.
In
the
selection
of
terms
for
describing
a
scene,
one
automatically
prescribes
the
range
of
acts
that
will
seem
reasonable,
implicit,
or
necessary
in
that
situation.
Dramatistic
analyses
of
order
Following
a
lead
from
Bergson
(1907,
specially
chapter
4),
dramatism
is
devoted
to
a
stress
upon
the
all-importance
of
the
negative
as
a
specifically
linguistic
invention.
But
whereas
Bergsons
fertile
chapter
on
the
idea
of
nothing
centers
in
the
propositional
negative
(It
is
not),
the
dramatistic
emphasis
focuses
attention
upon
the
moralistic
or
hortatory
negative
(Thou
shalt
not).
Burke
(1961,
pp.
183-196)
has
applied
this
principle
of
negativity
to
a
cycle
of
terms
implicit
in
the
idea
of
order,
in
keeping
with
the
fact
that
order
being
a
polar
term,
implies
a
corresponding
idea
of
disorder,
while
these
terms
in
turn
involve
ideas
of
obedience
or
disobedience
to
the
authority
implicit
in
order
(with
further
terministic
radiations,
such
as
the
attitude
of
humility
that
leads
to
the
act
of
obedience
or
the
attitude
of
pride
that
leads
to
the
act
of
6
[450]
disobedience, these in turn involving ideas of guidance or temptation, reward or punishment, and so on). On the side of order, or control, there are the variants of faith and reason (faith to the extent that one accepts a given command, proscription, or statement as authoritative; reason to the extent that ones acceptance is contingent upon such proofs as are established by a methodic weighing of doubts and rebuttals). On the side of disorder there are the temptations of the senses and the imagination. The senses can function as temptations to the extent that the prescribed order does not wholly gratify our impulses (whether they are natural or a by-product of the very order that requires their control). Similarly, the imagination falls on the side of disorder insofar as it encourages interests inimical to the given order, though it is serviceable to order if used as a deterrent by picturing the risks of disorder-or, in other words, if it is kept under the control of reason. Midway between the two slopes of order and disorder (technically the realm where one can say yes or no to a thou-shalt-not) there is an area of indeterminacy often called the will. Ontologically, action is treated as a function of the will. But logologically the situation is reversed: the idea of the will is viewed as derivable from the idea of an act. From ideas of the will there follow in turn ideas of grace, or an intrinsic ability to make proper choices (though such an aptitude can be impaired by various factors), and sacrifice (insofar as any choices involve the mortification of some desires). The dramatistic perspective thus rounds out the pattern in accordance with the notion that insofar as a given order involves sacrifices of some sort, the sacrificial principle is intrinsic to the nature of order. Hence, since substitution is a prime resource available to symbol systems, the sacrificial principle comes to ultimate fulfillment in vicarious sacrifice, which is variously rationalized, and can be viewed accordingly as a way to some kind of ultimate rewards. By tracing and analyzing such terms, a dramatistic analysis shows how the negativistic principle of guilt implicit in the nature of order combines with the principles of thoroughness (or perfection) and substitution that are characteristic of symbol systems in such a way that the sacrificial principle of victimage (the scapegoat) is intrinsic
to
human
congregation.
The
intricate
line
of
exposition
might
be
summed
up
thus:
If
order,
then
guilt;
if
guilt,
then
need
for
redemption;
but
any
such
payment
is
victimage.
Or:
If
action,
then
drama;
if
drama,
then
conflict;
if
conflict,
then
victimage.
Adapting
theology
(words
about
god)
to
secular,
empirical
purposes
(words
about
words),
dramatistic
analysis
stresses
the
perennial
vitality
of
the
scapegoat
principle,
explaining
why
it
fits
so
disastrously
well
into
the
logologic
of
mans
[7]
symbolic
resources.
It
aims
to
show
why,
just
as
the
two
primary
and
sometimes
conflicting
functions
of
religion
(solace
and
control)
worked
together
in
the
doctrines
of
Christianity,
we
should
expect
to
find
their
analogues
in
any
society.
Dramatism
,
as
so
conceived,
asks
not
how
the
sacrificial
motives
revealed
in
the
institutions
of
magic
and
religion
might
be
eliminated
in
a
scientific
culture,
but
what
new
forms
they
take
(Burke
[1945-1950]
1962,
pp.
406-408).
This
view
of
vicarious
victimage
extends
the
range
of
those
manifestations
far
beyond
the
areas
ordinarily
so
labeled.
Besides
extreme
instances
like
Hitlerite
genocide,
or
the
symbolic
cleansings
sought
in
wars,
uprisings,
and
heated
political
campaigns,
victimage
would
include
psychogenic
illness,
social
exclusiveness
(the
malaise
of
the
hierarchal
psychosis),
beatnik
art,
rabid
partisanship
in
sports,
the
excessive
pollution
of
air
and
streams,
the
bulldozer
mentality
that
rips
into
natural
conditions
without
qualms,
the
many
enterprises
that
keep
men
busy
destroying
in
the
name
of
progress
or
profit
the
ecological
balance
on
which,
in
the
last
analysis,
our
eventual
wellbeing
depends,
and
so
on.
The
strongly
terministic,
or
logological,
emphasis
of
dramatism
would
view
the
scapegoat
principle
not
primarily
as
a
survival
from
earlier
eras,
but
as
a
device
natural
to
language
here
and
now.
Aristotle,
in
the
third
book
of
his
Rhetoric
(chapter
10),
particularly
stresses
the
stylistic
importance
of
antithesis
as
a
means
of
persuasion
(as
when
a
policy
is
recommended
in
terms
of
what
is
against).
In
this
spirit
dramatism
would
look
upon
the
scapegoat
(or
the
principle
of
vicarious
victimage)
as
but
a
special
case
of
antithesis,
combined
with
another
major
resource
of
symbol
systems,
namely,
substitution.
7
[451]
In the polemics of politics, the use of the scapegoat to establish identification in terms of an enemy shared in common is also said to have the notable rhetorical advantage that the candidate who presents himself as a spokesman for us can prod his audience to consider local ills primarily in terms of alien figures viewed as the outstanding causes of those ills. In accord with this emphasis, when analyzing the rhetorical tactics of Mein Kampf, Burke (1922-1961) lays particular stress upon Hitlers use of such deflections to provide a noneconomic interpretation of economic ills. While recognizing the amenities of property and holding that mine- ownness or our-ownness in some form or other is an inevitable aspect of human congregation, dramatistic analysis also contends that property in any form sets the conditions for conflict (and hence culminates in some sort of victimage). It is pointed out that the recent great advances in the development of technological power require a corresponding extension in the realm of negativity (the thou-shalt-nots of control). Thus, the strikingly positive nature of such resources (as described in terms of sheer motion) is viewed dramatistically as deceptive; for they may seem too simply like promises, whereas in being powers they are properties, and all properties are problems since powers are bones of contention (Burke 1960). A dramatistic view of human motives thus culminates in the ironic admonition that perversions of the sacrificial principle (purgation by scapegoat, congregation by segregation) are the constant temptation of human societies, whose orders are built by a kind of animal exceptionally adept in the ways of symbolic action (Burke [1941] 1957, pp. 87-113). Kenneth Burke [See also Ethics, article on Ethical Systems and Social Structures; Historiography, article on The Rhetoric of History; Literature; Religion; Role; Semantics and Semiotics; Systems Analysis, article on Social Systems; and the biographies of Aristotle; Hume; Mead.]
Bibliography
Benne,
Kenneth
D.
1964
From
Polarization
to
Paradox.
Pages
216-247
in
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Bradford,
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8
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Burke, Kenneth. 1960 Motion, Action, Words. Teachers College Record 62:244-249 Burke, Kenneth. 1961 The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. Boston: Beacon. Burke, Kenneth. 1966 Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Duncan, Hugh D. 1962 Communication and Social Order. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press. Goffman, Erving (1956) 1959 The presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Hume, David (1748) 1952 An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Pages 451 509 in Great Books of the Western World. Volume 35: Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Chicago: Benton. Mathiez, Albert. (1922-1927) 1962 The French Revolution. New York: Russell. First Published in French in three volumes. A paperback edition was published in 1964 by Grosset and Dunlap. Mead, George Herbert 1938 The Philosophy of the Act. Univ. of Chicago Press. Consist almost entirely of unpublished papers which Mead left at his death in 1931. Parsons, Talcott 1937 The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory With Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. New York: McGraw-Hill. Richards, Ivor A. (1959) 1961 Principles of Literary Criticism. New York: Harcourt. Rueckert, William H. 1963 Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. Wrong, Dennis H. 1961 The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology. American Sociological Review 26: 183- 193.