AMERICA

on theWorld Stage |

||)

Cold Global Hegemony,

War

and 1945-1991

Melvyn P. Leffler

We are and

accustomed heroic

age was memoirs

spearheaded constructed carefully

to viewing ofthe response and orchestrated

the U.S. by

cold war

as a determined aggression im This in their first schol

had was where

no master determined his

to communist the Soviet and their Union.

or conquer to spread He revolution the world. plan a to establish in eastern of influence Europe sphere communist minions would rule. But at the same Sta time, his wartime allies along with and Japanese power, which table. Consequently, tioned communist in order he assumed to control was the inevi

by presidents

advisers ofthe

lin wanted rebirth

arly works a wide of rebutted variety by who blamed officials historians ington origins as well of the as those

was (i). This view also incorporated on the cold war, but was then revisionist inWash for the

in some

to get of German

cau he frequently in France, followers

in Moscow

Soviet-American in the traditional aftermath

conflict ofthe

(2). Nonetheless, cold war the

interpretation

f^^^Kf^_9H03HHI^I^HlB
pI^^^^hbui __#_y j_i_i{ii____i________________r ^^____H ^____p_

_B_______N(Bhm^^HhI^BRP^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H

to avoid and elsewhere Italy, Greece, actions that might provocative frighten or his wartime allies. Within antagonize his own country and his own he sphere, was almost cruel, evil, just genocidal,

reemerged. most eminent in a

the John Gaddis, arguably historian of the cold war,

and other traditional scholars f^^^HIII^^h^k^^^I^^^^^m^h^^HHI^^^^^h'^ W^^^^^^^^^^^^R^^Ias Gaddis ^^B^^^^^^SI^m^HvP^^^^I^^^Q^?f'^v^l^^^^^^^s^Hl suggest (4). Yet U.S. and British officials were initially eager to work with him.

wrote

war was wise and

the mid-1990s that the cold versus of evil, of struggle good in the West democratic leaders and inhumanity of

They rarely dwelled upon his domestic

barbarism.

^_ffi*5w?HMp

reacting

to the crimes

Joseph Stalin, the brutal dictator in the Kremlin (3).

This war way interpretation places in a traditional framework. to understand American the cold It is one foreign

BS* '''^^S^B6^^b__3vB^F
^v -'*^^?i ji ^^^_^__________fi_fl_i_i ^^^%V^^3_______________B ^^^ "V ^^^BJ

'
^^bis ^^ Hj

n___l

Truman ...

President Typically, wrote his wife, Bess,

S Harry after his

first meeting
He he wants can't

with Stalin: "I like Stalin.

is straightforward. Knows what and will when he compromise Averell Harri to Moscow, possible overcome" to

':a'^'*'V;________________________________________ ? ?_K____^___________________________________H

man,

W get it." Typically, the U.S. ambassador that

policy between the end of World War II and the breakup of the Union of Soviet
Socialist But Republics some for quite (U.S.S.R.) time now, in 1991. historians,

remonstrated

"If it were

___
^^H

r*r<cJ^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^^H ^i^_______________________________0______| of our

see him /Stalin/ more frequently, many

difficulties would be

(5)
Yet come. stand the the difficulties fears were grew. nowadays of postwar see They freedom not To over under examine American the and con So American them,

and economists have scientists, political in a much been the cold war studying so because context. They do larger global Soviet the new documents from the Union older lies and its former from empire the U.S. conducted as well and as

scholars context

global and Soviet test between Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman, and Josef Stalin shake hands at the Potsdam Conference, July 23, 1945. (Image courtesy ofthe Truman Presidential Museum & Library, Accession number: 63 1457-29.) to collaborate in stabilizing that Stalin ofthe why, tribution international scholars examine viet fabric litical

documents suggest

its al amore

diplomacy. American

that Stalin inconsistent

totalitarianism

and complex than previously

imagined

policy foreign and that U.S.

as part of an evolving economic of international and po in the twentieth conditions century. War the role leaders II, they say, U.S. or leader, of hegemon,

officials

initially did not regard Stalin,

After World assumed

crimes his and brutal notwithstanding as an with whom partner ity, unacceptable and remaking the postwar world. Most scholars looking at Soviet

documents

now

agree

of power

of Soviet power. To explain and container economy the operation ofthe world and the dis economy in the international look at transna system. They

OAH Magazine of History

March 2005 65

tional ideological conflict, the disruption of colonial empires, and the

rise of revolutionary America states, nationalism in Asia and Africa. They rise explain the

Compared

to the U.S.

in 1945,

the

Soviet

Union

was

weak.

Yet

it

spread ofthe cold war from Europe toAsia, Africa, the Middle East and
Latin pendent ofthe on decolonization, by focusing of peoples and the yearnings the roles the everywhere of newly inde to modernize

loomed very large not only in the imagination of U.S. officials, but also in theminds of political leaders throughout the world. It did not loom
large Soviet capitalize because of fears of Soviet military Yet aggression. they feared ofthe postwar Contemporary that Stalin would

policymakers knew that Stalin did not want war. They did not expect
troops on to march the manifold across Europe. opportunities world: the vacu

their countries and enjoy higher standards of living. Yet the capacity
U.S. to assume on more than depended tions, and its wealth and container of hegemon, balancer, U.S. and strength; the success ofthe its culture "soft power" of mass (6).

ums of power stemming from the defeat of Germany and Japan; the
breakup economic of colonial reform; World vitality, popular empires; yearnings and widespread disillusionment for postwar social and with the function

also depended on the appeal of its ideology, the vitality of its institu
the attractiveness nowadays call of consumption?what scholars

many as the

ing of democratic capitalist economies

During enormous world War II, the American but many could system

(8).

At the end ofWorld War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged
two ing models U.S. was possessed ect power the in the world nations and as exemplars of compet strongest was a But it The of political economy. bipolarity. peculiar on the earth. It nation alone the most incontestably powerful a navy It alone that could proj the atomic bomb. possessed across the The oceans U.S. of was and also an air force the gold richest reserves was that nation and could reach across It of that of in the world. three-fourths times

capitalist

had demonstrated economy the wondered whether contemporaries to function in be made peace effectively

time.
nomic

Its performance during their lifetimes had bred worldwide

depression, social malaise, political instability, and personal

eco
dis

continents.

possessed its invested

two-thirds capital.

the world's national

illusionment. Throughout Europe and Asia, people blamed capitalism for the repetitive cycles of boom and bust and for military conflagra tions that brought ruin and despair. Describing conditions at the end of
the war, had come the historian to believe Igor Lukes has written: ... had that capitalism here was Auschwitz "Many become in Czechoslovakia obsolete. Influen

Its gross

product

three

the Soviet Union and five times that ofthe United Kingdom. Itswealth had grown enormously during the war while the Soviet Union had been devastated by the occupation by Nazi Germany. Around 27 mil lion inhabitants ofthe U.S.S.R. died during World War II compared
to about 400,000 ravished the agricultural Americans. The Germans its mining and transportation of Soviet Russia and devastated economy infrastructure (7).

tial intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes ofthe war in
black and white terms: and there was Stalingrad.

The former was a byproduct of a crisis in capitalist Europe ofthe 1930s; the latter stood for the superiority of socialism" (9). Transnational ideological conflict shaped the cold war. Peoples
everywhere yearned for a more secure and better life; they pondered

alternative ways of organizing their political and

economic ties sought the resistance affairs. communist par Everywhere, as leaders to present themselves of so of fascism, proponents against reform, and advocates of national

cioeconomic

self-interest. Their political clout grew quickly

as their Greece, membership from 17,000 in for example, soared, in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945; in May from 28,000 1945

in Czechoslovakia,

to 750,000 in September 1945; in Italy, from 5,000 in 1943 to 1,700,000 at the end of 1945
(10). these passed "There collapse For Stalin and his comrades in Moscow, unsur advis grassroots developments provided for Truman and his opportunities; is complete on going economic, in Central social

ers in Washington,

they inspired fear and gloom.

and political the extent Europe,

of which is unparalleled sistant Secretary of War

1945

in history," wrote As John McCloy in April

was not nonethe

Soviet Union, of course, (11). The for these conditions. Danger responsible talize on them. "The greatest

less inhered in the capacity ofthe Kremlin to capi

danger to the security

ofthe United States," the CIA concluded in one of

"is the possibility of economic col reports, acces Europe and the consequent lapse inWestern sion to power of Communist elements" (12). its first

Transnational ideological conflict impelled U.S. officials to take action. They knew they had
to restore The cathedral tion; people at Legharn, Italy,was one ofthe casualties yearned for a better future. (Image donated II.The war wrought Corbis-Bettman, BE048024.) by of World War untold devasta tion hope effectively that private markets could func to serve the needs of humankind.

People had suffered terribly, Assistant

Secretary

66 OAH Magazine of History

March 2005

__?_

of

State

Dean

G.

Acheson

told

congressional and

committee social welfare.

in

1945. They

sume

the

land reform, nationalization, They demanded that governments should take action believed business and of state control and state

the means tas and George provide

responsibility to purchase

food

to provide dollars and fuel and,

so

that

other

nations to reduce

had quo State

eventually,

to alleviate

their misery. shall be pushed

They felt it "so deeply," said Acheson,

further further" (13). like Acheson ofthe

"that they will demand that the

interference

curtail restrictions. exchange a new C. Marshall outlined the funds necessary

whole

of 1947, Secretary the U.S. would approach, saying to promote the reconstruction of Europe.

In June

The intent of the Marshall Plan was to provide dollars to likeminded

and McCloy, the officials who became cold war, understood the causes for the world the economy fundamental a cold in the interwar years. and vul Soviet so to grow continue their Europe they could insure undercut the ap employ political stability, into an economic and avoid being sucked peal of communist parties, orbit dominated U.S. officials wanted by the Soviet Union. European resources to and their for the benefit of cooperate governments pool governments economies, in Western workers, their i_. ig__ ?Si___ i _l_________;H"_IBBS i ^^iBBBS6, _ _>__hbsBbKv^BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBsssssMMBi for __H and well-being establishment of a large, market where integrated goods the to do the this, the U.S. would to make ef of collective

Policymakers as the "Wise Men" known ofthe intent Long on

malfunctioning were They nerabilities.

capitalist

correcting before they

weaknesses war with

envisioned

the

Union,
the

they labored diligently during 1943 and 1944 to design

International Monetary reduce Fund

i n I -#?W_L__

_, **__^_M_-fesn^ft^ J____H_1 -_^^1E_____________^K ___________

(IMF) and theWorld Bank. They

to Congress They wanted to buy U.S. the Ameri foreign

-".J* ' nfc

and capital could move freely. In

order incur the responsibility

urged tariffs. can

fi!sbb ^*i"_i ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^h~*Er^> "^EbH^bbbI

people

more

goods. They knew that foreign nations without sufficient dollars

to purchase fuel would easily. They raw materials not be able and to recover govern

^b^^^9^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^h^^^^^^^h^B^B9^^I_^^^^_-a^__k^E^^^I
fectively, Soviet become seer, would its, of

system operate capitalist at least in those parts Union. the the The hegemon, global loans, tariffs, U.S. would or economy: provide and

the globe not dominated by the

over it cred insure

realized

that

ments short of gold and short of dollars would seek to hoard their
resources, regulate establish the free and quotas, flow of capital.

make reduce

currency stability (16).

The Plan tion tries Most ny's not success ofthe on the Marshall resuscita and indus depended ofthe coal mines of western

And they knew that these actions in the years between World War I and World War II had brought
about created zism, the Great the fascism, Depression conditions for and and Na

Europeans revival. Nonetheless, interfere the with three

Germany (17). Germa feared U.S.

totalitarian

officials hoped that Stalin would

efforts zones currency Federal to merge of Germany, reform, SB7 i_______ Republic Plan aid, _H^M_ fered lies western

ism to flourish

(14).

"Now, as in the year 1920," Presi in early March dent Truman declared 1947, "we have in history. is uncertain reached National turning economies ~~ ' ^^^^^^_l >^__________________________________IV __nVT^y ^________________J_____^,r..?_B~~~BB~i a

institute create the

and

point future

have been disrupted by thewar. The

Eco everywhere. are in a state of flux." the president trade, recon

of Germany. Marshall in fact, initially was of Russia Europe. and into he and But its al Stalin

to Soviet in eastern

policies Governments

nomic

abroad,

wanted explained, save dollars, and struction. itwas This was

to regulate promote Freedom warned, the U.S.

a large crowd Palmiro Togliatti, the leader ofthe Italian Communist Party, addresses in Rome to hear him speak. The communists to a offered one alternative gathered better future. In countries like Italy, they enjoyed a huge following. (Image courtesy of Hulton-Deutsch 1-11)008913.) Collection/CORBIS, where the march, freedom power was But regi dispersed. If not stopped everywhere. at home. "In this atmosphere factor will be the type ropean governments on the tion based security be Europe would man power would eastern Europe, would be to be free flow drawn of

would not tolerate the rebuilding

of Germany integration Nor would into an its prospective a western bloc. eastern Eu

understandable; flourished was on

allow

also perilous. Truman mentation, abroad, itwould

evolving

economic

federa

information, Stalin's

force

to curtail

of doubt

and hesitation,"

Truman

declared,

"the decisive

endangered. eroded and be impaired.

his

of leadership that theUnited States gives theworld." If itdid not act decisively,

Soviet and trade. capital, eastern in of influence sphere to control the future of Ger capacity on In late 1947, Stalin cracked down communist coup in Czechoslovakia, as much would that as it alarmed to power to revive occu plans to shape

the world capitalist system would flounder, yet greater opportunities providing to grow and for Soviet to accrue. for Comrnunism If the U.S. did not strength exert leadership, state freedom would be compromised abroad and a garrison markets transnational and free were interrelated. had they To

encouraged economic The French The provoke French

the

and instigated a new round of purges (18).

Germany's the Russians. act autonomously. Germany pation The might of France. revival feared scared the French that Germany also were afraid attack and regain initiatives

might develop athome (15).

U.S. conflict, ideological the world function system effectively. capitalist too new, too the IMF and the World Bank were funded to accomplish the intended Open the peoples inextricably officials By 1947, to make realized and had too

French a Soviet officials

win

culminate against had the

in another American

remonstrated

poorly

inexperienced, results. The U.S.

and demanded military aid and security guarantees

French and other wary Europeans

(19).
capacity

to as

OAH Magazine of History

March 2005 67

their

future.

They

exacted

strategic anxieties troops

commitments

from

the U.S.

The

dence

movements

arose

in French

Indochina

and

the Netherlands

East

North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 as a result of their fears about
as their about were part Soviet Russia. U.S. strate and U.S. of a double containment

Indies. Nationalist
in Indonesia wanted was Decolonization

leaders like Ho Chi Minh

over to gain control an embedded feature ofthe

in Vietnam and Sukarno

countries' postwar the future international (23).

as well Germany commitments gic

their

strategy, containing the uncertain trajectory of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the anticipated hostility of the Soviet Union.
meant (20). needed power balancing, strategic into commit

system, propelled by the defeat of Japan and the weakening

tional European powers. Decolonization fueled cold war

of tradi
as it pro

responsibilities Hegemonic alliances and military ments, Just as western Germany Soviet so did

vided opportunities for the expansion of communist influence. Third World nationalists wanted to develop, industrialize, and modernize
their countries. They often found Marxist-Leninist it blamed wardness tation. Soviet At as attractive ideology their countries' back on the capitalist exploi same the time, economy

to be

integrated

a western

sphere lest it be sucked into a

orbit, worried Japan. U.S. oc that their

officials

cupation of Japan might fail and that the Japanese might

seek to enhance their own in

command

seemed to provide amodel

rapid successors, less modernization. therefore, for

for

Stalin's saw end expand

terests by looking to the Soviets

the communist economic Chinese partners. as In future

or

opportunities

turned 1948, U.S. policymakers from their attention reforming

ing their influence in the Third World; leaders inWashington perceived dangers (24). As hegemon of the free
world economy, U.S. officials

Japanese social
institutions

and political
eco Japan's they

nomic

to promoting reconstruction. growth,

felt a responsibility to contain

nationalism and to revolutionary core and periphery. The integrate Truman administration prod

past

economic

knew, depended
China, hands.

on
and

links to
Korea,

Manchuria,

areas increasingly slipping into

alternative and Japan sources of outlets need raw her

ded the Dutch and the French to

make concessions to revolution but often could ary nationalists, not outcomes of colo shape the nial struggles. When the French, for example, refused to acknowl

communist

ed

materials

for

manufactured goods. Studying the functioning of the global

America's economy, capitalist that concluded cold warriors the industrial Asia, core of north

edge Ho Chi Minn's republic of Vietnam and established a

Bao under puppet government to in 1949, Dai the U.S. chose the French. Otherwise, support Truman and his advisers feared

east

integrated much needed

to be Japan, needed its underdevel with

oped periphery
rope

in southeast
Eu to "'r W' I*; 'W' ;^Nli_Jli_000xX3OCX^ '" ' * -|| ;ft;=ffi.' :'';! ? ? ^ -B i*r' S?-* ^W^CfQy *>l^V?: j .~;! ;_flL l^^^f^ -^-|| i* 5?RflC!Kw_i8Si___' ^ J^'f* access

Asia,

like Western to have

theywould alienate their allies in

a and permit key a communist into gravitate France area to orbit

petroleum in the Middle East (21). Itwas the obligation ofthe hegemon ofthe world capitalist
to make of the compo could system sure

where
Chinese

itwould be amenable to
or Soviet influence. Fall

economy nent units

ing dominos
would the split between the Soviet Bloc in Eastern 1950 map of Europe demonstrates of NATO in the West, Europe and the members (from Doris M. Condit, History ofthe DC: Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, Volume II: The Test of War, 1950-1953 [Washington, Historical Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, 1988].) This sever

in Southeast Asia
the future economic

benefit from the operation of

the whole. But, as hegemon, the U.S.

links between this region and Ja

pan, making rehabilitation in the

also had to be sensitive to the

and of other revival of responsive countries. the to the In Asia,

worries

industrial core of northeast Asia all themore difficult (25). In the late 1950s and 1960s
sparked had by the Korean War

needs the them

as

that U.S.

of power troops would that the U.S.

former remain would

Axis

in Europe, feared many peoples nations. Truman promised as Japan regained even in the Pacific,

Japan's

extraordinary Yet, opposing

economic

recovery,

and fueled by subsequent exports to North America, defied American

assumptions. a position by then, American officials locked the U.S. into like nationalist movements led by communists,

its autonomy,

and

in Japan, even insure peace

if itmeant a new round of security guarantees, as it did with the Philip pines and with Australia and New Zealand (22). Yet, much as American officials hoped to integrate Japan with
Southeast revolutionary uncertain. that prospect Asia, nationalist During World movements War in II, popular the region indepen

Ho Chi Minh. U.S. officials feared that if they allowed a communist triumph in Indochina, America's credibility with other allies and cli
ents would be shattered. Hegemons needed to retain their credibility.

made

Otherwise, key allies, likeWestern Germany and Japan,might America's will and reorient themselves in the cold war (26).

doubt

68 OAH Magazine of History

March 2005

JjL

Hegemony and credibility required superior military capabilities. Leaders inWashington and Moscow alike believed that perceptions of their relative power position supported risk-taking on behalf of allies
and clients in Asia and Africa. In the most important U.S. strategy he doc

disseminating the cold war

their

values

and believe

increasingly institutions

their promoting that America's

culture. success

Yet as a

scholars hegemon,

of

its capacity to evoke support for its leadership, also depended on the
habits its mass and of constitutional values, and (30). the liberal and humane appeal governance, of the resonance of and its free market

ument ofthe cold war, NSC 68, Paul Nitze wrote thatmilitary power
an "policy to have "indispensable of calculated backdrop" and gradual force to containment, coercion." which called a in To pursue containment

was

consumption

economy

the Third World and erode support for the adversary, the U.S. needed
superior military of atomic weapons. of their weapons their arsenal of (27). But after U.S. Prior to 1949, the U.S. had a mo the Soviets tested and developed to officials believed they needed

Endnotes
Vol I: 1945, Year of Decisions, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of reprint 1955); Truman, Memoirs, Trial and Hope, 1946-1952, reprint (New York: Signet, 1965,1956); Dwight D. Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (Garden Eisenhower, Present at the Creation: My City, NJ: Doubleday, 1963); Dean G. Acheson, Years at the State Department F. Kennan, (New York: Norton, 1969); George 2 vol. paperback ed. (New York: Bantam, Memoirs, 1967-1972). 2. See, for example, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); for a discussion ofthe "The Cold War Over see my essay, different historiographical approaches, the Cold War," in Gordon Martel, ed., American Foreign Policy 1993 Reconsidered, (London: 1890 i. For example, see Harry S Truman, (New York: Signet, 1965,

nopoly nuclear

own,

augment deter Soviet

aggression

aim was not only to Their weapons. strategic in the center of Europe, but also to support the

ability ofthe U.S. to intervene in Third World countries without fear of

Soviet countermoves. weapons, therefore, produced paradoxical results. Their enor Nuclear

mous power kept the cold war from turning into a hot war between the
and the Soviet Union. on both sides rec Leaders

U.S.

ognized that such a war would be suicidal. But at

the same time nuclear of encouraged

Routledge,

weapons and Moscow

I994) 3. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War (New York History Oxford University Press, 1997) 4. For some

ficials in bothWashington
to engage in on the "periph Africa,

risk-taking ery," that is, in Asia,

the Middle East, and the

because each

Caribbean

ofthe best new on Stalin, see scholarship Simon Montefiore, Sebag Stalin: The Court of the Tsar,

side thought (and hoped)

that the dare would adversary to escalate the into a nucle

York:

not

(New reprint 2004, Knopf, 2003); M. Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany.

Red

competition

ar exchange
Reagan to

(28). When
revived

Ronald

the determination
regain

of the

the Soviet History of Zone 1945 of Occupation, MA: 1949 (Cambridge, Press of Harvard Belknap Press, The 1995); Cold

U.S.

University military those

superiority in the 1980s,

sought to use

Vojtech Mastny, War and Soviet The Stalin Oxford NATO was as part of a double containment French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman U899652ACME.) International 1996); Mark, Years

he

not military capabilities, for a preemptive attack the Soviet Union, against to sup but as a backdrop U.S. interventions port behalf of anti-com from words,

Insecurity: (New York: Press, University Eduard Maximilian

formed

many. Here, donated by Corbis-Bettman,

the Soviet Union and Ger strategy: containing signs the NATO charter on April 4,1949. (Image

on

"Revolution by Stalin's National Degrees: Front Strategy for Europe, War Cold 1941-1947,"

munist

Angola. as a key

insurgents In other

Nicaragua Reagan

and viewed

El Salvador superior

to

Afghanistan

and

Woodrow

strategic credibility,

to containing

communism,

preserving

capabilities and support

D.C: History Project Working Paper No. 31 (Washington, Center for Scholars, 2001); Geoffrey Roberts, International Wilson "Stalin and the Grand Alliance: Public Discourse, Private Dialogues, and the

ing hegemony
For U.S. the transnational

(29).
officials,

to win the cold war the U.S. required waging to contain and Soviet power. ideological struggle To achieve to be an effective these goals, the U.S. had This hegemon. meant to nurture that the U.S. had the world and lubricate economy, and coopt es and preserve western allied Germany cohesion, and contain Japan, establish military nationalism, allianc and

of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1941-1947," Slovo 13 (2001): 1-15. Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910 to Truman, 1959 (New York: Norton, June 8, 1945, 1983), 522; Harriman of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States: The Conference of Department Berlin: The Potsdam Conference, D.C: Government 1945 (2 vols., Washington, 1: 61. Printing Office, i960), 6. For soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World 5. Robert H. Politics (New York: Public Affairs, Nye, The Paradox 2004); of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford Press, 2002). University 7. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 347-72; R. J.Overy, Russia's War (London: Penguin Books, 1997); Allan M. Winkler,

Direction

build

revolutionary

bind the industrial core of Europe and Asia with the underdeveloped periphery in the Third World. To be effective, Cold Warriors believed
that superior military capabilities were an incalculable asset. They fo

cused much

less attention and allocated infinitely fewer resources to

OAH Magazine of History

March 2005 69

America During World War II, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, IL: Davidson, 2000). 8.Melvyn P. Leffler, A PreponderanceofPower. National Security, theTruman Administration, and theCold War (Stanford, CA Stanford University Press, 1992), 1-141. Harlan in of Communist Regimes Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 Press, 1997), 29; William (Boulder, CO: Westview I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, Books, 2004), 1945 to the Present (New York: Anchor 1-125. 10. Adam Westoby, Communism Since World War II (New York: St. Martiris Gibiansldi, eds., Press, 1981), 14-5. 11.Memo for the President, Secretary's 12. Central Agency, World Relates of the File, Harry by John McCloy, April 26,1945, S Truman Presidential Library. box 178, President's Igor Lukes, A. and L. I "The Czech Road The to Communism," Establishment in Norman M. Naimark

Home

Front U.S.A.:

I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for in Europe, 1944-1954 of North Carolina Leadership (Chapel Hill: University Press, 1998). 20. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins ofthe North 19. William Atlantic 21. Michael in Asia Press, 1981). Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins ofthe Cold War B. Schonberger, Press, 1985); Howard (New York: Oxford University

9.

and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, OH: ofWar: Americans Aftermath Kent State University Press, 1989); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in theWake of World War II (New York: WW. Norton, 1999), 271-3, 525-46. 22. Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 346-7,393-4,428-32,464-5; Roger Dingman, "The Diplomacy The Philippines of Dependency. and Peacemaking with Japan," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27 (September 1986): W. Brands, Henry to SEATO: ANZUS States 307-21; "From United

Intelligence "Review of the As It to the

Situation United 26,

September 203, ibid.

Security States," 1947, box

Strategic Policy toward Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954" International History Review 9 (May 1987): 250-70. 23. For the emerging nationalist in Indochina and struggles Indonesia, seeWilliam J. Duiker, Sacred War. Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam 1995); Kahin, and Revolution in (New York McGraw-Hill, McTuman George Nationalism

G. 13. Testimony by Dean March Acheson, 8, 1945, U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 79th Cong., 1 sess. D.C: Printing 1: 35. (Washington, Government

Office, 1945), of 14. U.S. Department The United Commerce, States in the World Economy D.C: Printing Harley (Washington, Government 1943); Postwar

Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952). "The 24. Odd Arne Westad, New International Three History of the Cold War (Possible)

Office, A. Notter,

Paradigms," Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 551-65; David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, eds., and Michael E. Latham, Staging Growth:

Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 D.C: (Washington, Government

Modernization, Devebpment,and the Global Cold War (Amherst of Massachusetts University Press, 2003). Lawrence, 25. Mark Atwood "Transnational and Building the Cold War Coalition the Making of in Indochina,

Office, 1950), Printing 128; Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American and Political Economic Postwar

Soviet

in the Summer Planning St. of 1944 (New York: Martiris, 1995). 15.Harry S Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States, 194J (Washington, D.C: U.S.G.P.O., Etoctrine speech which 1963), 167-72; see also his Truman to the Congress on the followed a few days later, 176-80, and his special message Marshall 16. Michael ofWestern David W. Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Press, 1987); Europe, 194J-1952 (New York: Cambridge University and Postwar Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America Reconstruction (New York: Longmans, 1992); Thomas W. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World; The Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Plan, 515-29. J.Hogan, The Marshall

Premier Nikita Khrushchev Sukarno (right) iswarmly greeted by Indonesian President Achmed in i960 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria. U.S. officials (second from left) at an Indonesian reception nations would feared nationalist look to Moscow leaders of emerging and Beijing. (Image donated by Corbis-Bettman, BE060377.) History 26

Diplomatic 1947-1949," Jon Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: (Summer 2002): 453-80; Andrew to Southeast Asia Commitment Origins ofthe American (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press, 1987). University see the pathbreaking 26. For the importance of credibility, article by Robert J. McMahon, Power," Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): "Credibility and World 455-71. 27. NSC 68, 14, 1950, Documents "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia

in Thomas

1999). The Origins Plan CA: Stanford 17. John Gimbel, of the Marshall (Stanford, the Line: The Press, 1976); Carolyn Woods University Drawing Eisenberg, to Divide Germany, American Decision 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge Press, 1996). University "Moscow and the Marshall 18. Geoffrey Plan: Politics, Roberts, Ideology and ofthe Cold War, 1947," Europe-Asia Studies 46 Inside Pleshakov, 1371-86; V. M. Zubok and Konstantin War. From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard the Onset 1996), 46-53. 1994): (December the Kremlin's Cold University Press,

Press, 1978), 401-2; NSC 114/2, "Programs for National University Security," October of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 12,1951, Department D.C: 1951: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, Government 1979), 1:187-89. Printing Office, 28. For Soviet policy, see A. A. Fursenko "One Hell of and Timothy J. Naftali, a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, (New York: Norton, 1958-1964 Fursenko Khrushchev's and Timothy Cold War Naftali, 1997); Aleksandr (New York: Norton, 2005). 29. Peter Schweizer, Reagan's War. The Epic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism (New York: Doubleday, 2002). and the 30. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,

70 OAH Magazine of History

March 2005

JL

NJ: Princeton University (Princeton, Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars and O. Robert Press, 2001), Keohane, Cooperation Hegemony: After 163-214; in the World Political Economy Discord University (Princeton, NJ: Princeton The Ideas that Mandelbaum, Press, 135-81; Michael 1984), especially in the Twenty-First and Free Markets the World: Peace, Democracy Conquered (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2002); Geir Lundestad, 1945-1997 Integration: The United States and European Integration, Oxford University Press, 1998); Gaddis, We Now Know. Century "Empire" by (New York:

the Department of State, of Defense, Department Central Agency, Intelligence sites containing have libraries the tories, and other information.

For

see

<http://www.state.gov/history/>; for The speeches, them

for the

<http://www.defenselink.mil/>; <http://www.cia.gov/>. selected documents, You can access

presidential oral his <http:// see Rob

through context,

www.archives.gov/presidential_libraries/index.html>. For short books the cold war locating

in a global S. Painter,

ert J.McMahon,
Oxford regarding

The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (New York:

David Routledge, Coexistence, The Cold War: An 2002); Geoffrey Revolution and Cold War, East, West, since 1945, now Roberts,

Bibliographical Note
Most governments after publish the fact, primary now source documents

the history of their foreign policy. These documents

decades but we have For the evolution and 1960s. 1940s, 1950s, cold war, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of

are published

Press, University 2003); International History (New York: in World Politics: The Soviet Union 1945-1991; (New York: Routledge, South: Major Developments

many

documents for the many U.S. in the ofthe role ofthe

North,

Geir Lundestad, 1999); in International Relations

4th ed. (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1999).

Many using from and tries scholars are primary the former other to documents Soviet Union coun cold war.

the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office);

for see Britain Foreign and the cold war, and Commonwealth

communist study listed the

Office, Documents
Policy Overseas. Since

on British
the end

In addition to the books and

articles David in note way, Stalin Hollo 3, see and

of the cold war, the Cold War

International History Project

^^^^^Bm
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source Soviet documents Union communist and from other the

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Bomb: the Soviet Union

Haven, Energy, CT: 1939-1956 Yale Uni

and Atomic

mary

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versity Press, 1994); William

Taubman, Man Norton, rison, and His

Khrushchev: Era

The

formerly

nations,

the People's Repub including are indis lic of China. They for understanding pensable

2003); the Soviets Up Driving Soviet-East German the Wall: 1953-1961 Princeton 2003). Some (Princ Univer ofthe

(New York: Hope M. Har

the global context of the cold

See the Cold War Interna

Relations, eton, NJ:

war.

tional History Project, Bulletin

D.C: Woodrow Center, Central In China's reception Chairman given leader Ho Chi Minn Mao Ze Dong (left) chats with Vietnamese in Beijing in 1955. (Image donated ,BEo46963.) by Corbis-Bettman (right) at a

sity Press,

(Washington, International Wilson 1992-2004). The

most fascinating books deal with Chinese foreign policy

and Mao the Tse-tung relations and S.N. between Stalin. See,

telligence Agency
several See,

(CIA) has
volumes of

published documents.

for Ho

for example,

Goncharov, Partners: Sta Press,

Woodrow

for example, ed., Assess J. Kuhns, lin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford,

JohnWilson
Xue, CA: Uncertain Stanford

Lewis, and Litai

University

ing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Springfield, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997); Scott
ed., Selected Estimates Staff, Center Ben on the Soviet for the Union, of 1950-1959 ton, D.C: History Study Intelligence, At Cold War's B. Fischer, End: Europe, 1989-1991 (Washing Central U.S. In VA:

1993); Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Univer
sity of North For key ter World Current Economic Carolina books on Press, the 2001). to reconstruct effort N. Gardner, and the world economy Diplomacy International Herman 1945-1980 (New York: see af in

A. Koch,

Intelligence telligence There als on

Agency, on the Soviet

1993); Union

War

II, see Richard The

and Eastern

(Reston, source

Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).

are several the cold war. Project, key Web The most sites for important primary locating are the Cold War materi International

Perspective: Origins Order (New York: Columbia Prosperity Zeiler, and

Sterling-Dollar the Prospects of Our

Van

der Wee,

Upheaval: and 2003).

Press, University 1980); The World Economy, the American

(Berkeley: University
Thomas W. University Cambridge For transnational

of California Press, 1986); Alfred E. Eckes and

Century cold war, Press,

History

ction=library.

collection^

<http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=i409&fusea the National Archive, Security the Parallel History Project for Pact,

Globalization

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>; NATO and the Warsaw Documents The

<http://www. information and

on the

ideological

conflict

and

the

Joyce

Declassified

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/>; Reference Service, <http://www.galegroup. of American on many issues, U.S. on Scientists like also has the nuclear agencies past foreign

and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States
& Row, 1945-1954 1972); Walt W. Ros (New York: Harper Foreign Policy, A Non-Communist Growth: tow, The Stages of Economic Manifesto, 3rd. ed. (New York: Cambridge Press, Furet, The Francois University 1990);

com/psm>. with valuable

Federation

aWeb arms also

site race. have

documents

See <http://www.fas.org/>. Web sites containing

Many documents

government current and

policy.

Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Odd Arne Westad, Cold OAH Magazine of History March 2005 71

JjL
and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry as and the Origins ofthe Chi

War

nese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);
E. Latham, Carolina Modernization Ideology: American Social Science

Michael

and "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University

the Other David 2000); Shore: American Intellectuals Press, C. Engerman, Modernization and the Romance of Russian

of

North

from Devel

opment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford
Press, are 1997). some wonderful the cold war. studies See, on decolonization, for example, Robert revolutionary J. McMahon,

Gary W. Reichard Chair and Project Editor, State University, Long Beach Joyce E. Chaplin Harvard University Ted M. Dickson Providence Day School, Charlotte NC Michelle Forman

University There

California

nationalism,

and

Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Strugglefor Indone sian Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981);
Frances Gouda Brocades Thijs Zaalberg, Indies /Indonesia: US Foreign Amsterdam 1920-1949 (Amsterdam: East and American Policy and Visions Indonesian Press, ofthe Na 2002);

Netherlands tionalism,

University

Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fightfor In dependence and the Origins ofthe Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford
Press, 2002); Piero Gleijeses, War J. Duiker, Conflicting is often U.S. Missions: Havana,

University

Washington,
context; see,

and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University

2002). example, The Vietnam examined Containment for William

of North
in this Policy

Middlebury (VT) Union High School

Michael Grossberg Indiana University Robert Huehner

Carolina

Press,

and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); George C. Herring, America's LongestWar: The United States and
Vietnam, Peace: 1950-1975, For power and The Making Balance: 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). see Mark A Constructed the cold war, Trachtenberg, ofthe European Settlement, 1945-196} the Cold War (Princeton,

David

University ofWisconsin, Washington County Lee W. Formwalt Organization of American Historians Michael Johanek The College Board Kevin Organization B. Byrne American Historians of

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); William

Elusive Power and Perceptions the Truman During

Curti Wohlforth,
(Ithaca,

The
NY:

Cornell University Press, 1993); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of

Power: National Security, Administration, and the Cold War

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). Raymond L. Garthoff has written two lengthy and illuminating books that link power and
ideology. tions From See Garthoff, Nixon Detente to Reagan and Confrontation: D.C: (Washington, American-Soviet Brookings Rela Institution,

1985) and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of
the Cold War (Washington, of the For discussions movements, Movement 1999); D.C: end of Institution, 1994). Brookings on ideas that focus the cold war and Uma

transnational The

see Matthew to End Robert D.

Transnational

Press, University West: Gorbachev, Columbia

Forces: Unarmed Evangelista, the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell and the Idea ofthe Russia English,

Venkateswaran

Educational

Testing Service

Cold War and the End ofthe (New York: Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nucle 2000); Disarmament Movement, 1971 ofthe World Nuclear to the Present CA: Stanford Press, University 2003). (Stanford, see the citations in of hegemony and soft power, For discussions notes and 29. 5 Intellectuals, Press, University ar Abolition: A History

(jkMegeBoaxd Advanced Placement

Program

Melvyn P. Leffler is the Edward Stettinius Professor ofAmerican History at The University of Virginia. Currently, he is a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and holds theHenry Kissinger Chair at
His the Library of Congress. book, A Truman the Administration, ecurity, versity Press, 1993), won the Bancroft, of Power: National Preponderance Uni and the Cold War (Stanford now Ferrell, and Hoover prizes. He is

writing a book about why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it endedwhen it did.

b3_9
72 OAH Magazine of History March 2005